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ABSTRACT

A study was conducted to test the following hypotheses concerning division of household labor (DOHL) between husbands and wives: (1) the division of household labor is somewhat affected by the availability of time, especially the wife's time; (2) there are strong effects of relative power, as measured by market-related resources, marital commitment, and decision making; and (3) weak effects are expected for sex-role attitudes, and taste for housework, particularly for the husband's taste. Data from the study comes from a subsample of 1,364 husband-wife units, part of a national probability sample of United States households interviewed in 1978. The available-time hypothesis was tested using spouses' employment status; relative interpersonal power was measured by earnings and education ratios of husbands and wives, by spouses' perceptions of decision making, and by frequency of thoughts of divorce for each person; and sex-role ideologies were measured by husbands' and wives' summated responses to questions about women's and men's work, family roles, and taste for housework. Results showed the following: (1) the wife's time (as measured by employment status) affects the DOHL more than does the husband's; (2) the DOHL relates to relative power only as reflected by the husband's thought of divorce; (3) it relates to sex-role attitudes of the spouse whose perceptions of the DOHL are being measured, and most strongly to the husband's; and (4) it relates to the wife's taste for housework, unless controlled for the wife's employment status. (KC)

THE DIVISION OF HOUSEHOLD LABOR

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In agricultural societies, men's and women's work was organized around the household. After industrialization, household production became women's work (Reid, 1934:71). Since taking care of a family, like having a baby, apparently came naturally to women, it received little analytical attention (Moffat, 1976:90). Sociologists preferred to study the attitudes, values, and daily activities of really significant actors like autoworkers, Skid-Row bums, medical students, and soldiers. Not a single entry in the 1968 International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences refers to housework. Even in the 1970s neither the Marxists nor the 'New Home Economists' ever bothered to take a good, close look inside households to find out how production is organized on a daily basis (Berk, 1980:137).

Technological development dramatically changed the methods of doing housework but the basic tasks remain much the same. Care of young children, preparing and cleaning up after meals, doing laundry, shopping, and cleaning still require the most time, as they did a century ago. Laundry no longer involves carrying water, boiling, rubbing, bluing, rinsing, wringing, and hanging (Strasser, 1980) but housewives spend as much time at it because the standards rose. People change their clothes more often lest they smell like people. Today a U.S. housewife spends as much time on housework as did her counterpart 50 years ago (Vanek, 1974), an average of 52 hours a week for full-time housewives (Walker and Woods, 1976).

In contrast, employed wives average only 26 hours a week on housework. Yet their total time spent on household maintenance and financial support greatly outweighs that of their husbands, who typically spend little more time on housework than do husbands of nonemployed women, about 11 hours for each (Walker and Woods, 1976:45, 50; Robinson, 1977; Gauger and Walker,

Theoretical Perspectives

In this section we shall discuss what we expect to find and why we expect to find it in the context of earlier work on the determinants of the division of household labor (DOHL). We shall present and evaluate four hypotheses to be tested with our data. The four hypotheses are derived from several theoretical perspectives.

Time Availability

The hypothesis that available time determines the DOHL stems from a theory developed by the 'New Home Economists.' The theory suggests that decisions about the allocation of husband's and wife's time to market and home work result from men's and women's relative productivity in each sphere (Becker, 1976). The advantage of the theory is that it explains the DOHL on rational grounds, thus demystifying it. But the theory has some problems. The New Home Economists have never clarified whether decisions about home work and market work are made sequentially or concurrently, hence it would be difficult to confirm the theory in the absence of information on the actual decision-making process. It is just as plausible to suppose that women's prior assignment to housework makes them less able to compete with men in wage work as it is to conclude that women do housework because their wages are lower than men's are. A worse problem is that, while wage rates straightforwardly measure market productivity, there is no way to measure household productivity. The New Home Economists simply assume that women's socialization makes them more productive than men in the home, as Ferber and Birnbaum (1977) point out. Hence, whatever its merits, the theory that differential economic productivity causes the household division of labor is not testable.

However, one can apply the reasoning of the New Home Economists and test whether the number of hours of wage work performed by husbands and wives

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However, one can apply the reasoning of the New Home Economists and test whether the number of hours of wage work performed by husbands and wives

affects the DOHL. If the decisions about the DOHL are made rationally, as the New Home Economists suggest, then the more hours of wage work that husbands perform relative to wives, the smaller will be the husbands' share of home work.

However, data from time budget studies and from surveys about the DOHL do not clearly support the expectation that the DOHL is a rational function of each spouse's available time. Time budget studies, the most precise way to measure household labor (Stafford and Duncan, 1979), have shown that employed women do fewer weekly hours of housework than do nonemployed women. But the husbands of both employed and nonemployed women do equally small amounts of housework (Meissner et al., 1975; Walker and Woods, 1976; Gauger and Walker, 1980). Analyses of survey data on relative spouse contributions reveal that the wife's employment increases the husband's share (Blood, 1963; Hoffman, 1963; Powell, 1963; Silverman and Hill, 1967; Bahr, 1974) unless other kin are able to do the work (Szinovacz, 1977). Apparently the husband's contribution 'increases' simply because the wife's necessarily decreases in order to allow her enough time to sleep (Pleck, 1977), that is, only the husband's relative time, not his absolute time spent in housework increases.

While a few recent studies have suggested small increases in husbands' hours of housework associated with wives' employment (Presser, 1977; Pleck, 1979), these differences are not striking. Other studies have indicated little or no change (Moore and Sawhill, 1976; Walker, 1979; Walter and Gauger, 1980).

We therefore expect a small increment in husbands' relative contribution to the DOHL with wives' increased hours of market work but little or no change with decreases in husbands' market work. This expectation implies that, unlike the New Home Economists, we doubt that the DOHL results mainly from a rational decision-making process.

Relative Power

The reason we doubt that the DOHL can be explained on the basis of rational decision-making is that women seem to be in a disadvantaged power position in the family (Gillespie, 1971). Their relative lack of power stems from their disadvantaged labor market status, from their disadvantaged status in the remarriage market as they age, and from their role in rearing children. Even if a woman is working for pay, she is likely to earn less than her husband does, and to be less able to support herself and her children (or to find a spouse substitute) were the marriage to dissolve. If this is true in the aggregate, leading to the generally uneven DOHL in two-earner families, perhaps intercouple variation in relative resources (such as wages and alternatives to the marriage) would relate to the DOHL. Housework, generally not highly valued or rewarded (Oakley, 1974; Berheide et al., 1976; Ferree, 1980), may perhaps best be described as routine domestic service work performed by a less powerful for a more powerful person.

The relative power or resources hypothesis has been tested in a number of ways. First, relative power may be a product of relative resources derived from or related to market position: education, earnings, or occupational status. Some studies have compared the effect of the relative availability of resources between spouses as required by the hypothesis. Others have tested the effects of absolute levels of such resources. Results for these tests have been mixed. More sharing of housework occurs at higher levels of the wife/husband earnings ratio (Scanzoni, 1978) but not at higher levels of the wife/husband education ratio (Farkas, 1976). When testing the effect of absolute levels of earnings and education, high earnings, educational level, and occupational status have been reported to lead to both lower (Clark et al., 1978) and higher male contribution to the DOHL (Farkas, 1976; Berk and Berk,

1978). For wives, having managerial jobs is related to lower levels of responsibility for housework (Berk and Berk, 1978) but high earnings decrease only the time spent in cooking (Stafford and Duncan, 1979). Finally, more sharing of housework occurs among blacks (Farkas, 1976; Stafford and Duncan, 1979), which may reflect more equal levels of spouse resources.

A second way to conceptualize power is in terms of commitment to the marriage. According to the principle of least interest (Thibaut and Kelly, 1959), the person with the least interest in maintaining a relationship has the most power in it. Testing this effect empirically, Stafford et al. (1977) found that both men's and women's contribution to housework related directly to their commitment to the marital or cohabiting relationship.

A third way to measure relative power would be simply to ask couples to report who makes major household decisions (Ericksen et al., 1979). While suffering from a number of conceptual or measurement problems (Safilios-Rothschild, 1969), such a measure would avoid the assumptions implicit in measuring power through relative resources.

Thus we expect to find a moderate to strong relationship between spouses' relative resources or power and their contribution to the DOHL. Given the external environment in which they operate, equal resources may not yield equal time inputs but the differences among couples should become apparent.

Sex-Role Attitudes

Popular conceptions of changing family organization often appear to stem from vague notions of changing values. While it seems reasonable that less traditional attitudes might lead to a less traditional DOHL, the reverse is also possible: changed behaviors may induce changed attitudes. Problems of causal ordering plague attempts to test attitude-behavior relations such as this.

A second problem involves the identity of the reporting respondent. Often wives tend to report for the household, so that only their attitudes are measured. The issue of which spouse's attitudes should be most influential has not been addressed in past research. We suggest that the husband's attitudes may be more influential than the wife's. Since the weight of tradition favors assigning the wife a disproportionate share of housework, she would probably welcome 'help' no matter what her attitudes were. But he would probably offer to 'help' only if he favored more egalitarian roles.

Given problems of interpretation due to concurrent measurement of behavior and attitudes, evidence tends to favor a relation between sex-role attitudes and the DOHL (Stafford et al., 1977); Clark et al., 1978; Scanzoni, 1978). However, Miller (1980) reports that wives' attitudes but not husbands' affect help with child care and neither wives' nor husbands' attitudes affect the DOHL.

While we expect a moderate relation between attitudes and the DOHL, we would also expect, as stated above, that husbands' attitudes will be more influential than wives' attitudes. We would also exercise due caution in interpreting the causal ordering.

A further possibility here is that neither relatively high wife resources nor nontraditional attitudes suffice alone to break the cake of custom. We shall also investigate the possibility of an interaction between the two, on the assumption that non-traditional sex-role attitudes would affect the DOHL only if the wife had a relatively high share of resources to back her up.

Taste for Housework

Economists have suggested that women perform market work inversely to their "taste for housework" (Cain, 1966). Such a taste explained the labor force participation rates of young, childless college graduates during the

mid-1960s (Spitze and Spaeth, 1979). Such a taste might also affect the DOHL, either directly or through its effects on hours of market work. At first glance the theory that might generate such a hypothesis seems preposterous. To hold that menial labor is performed by certain castes or classes because they have a taste for such labor, say, chopping cotton in the Alabama sun, is akin to blaming the victim. Furthermore, married women actually confront the choice of whether to have one job or two jobs (Ferber and Birnbaum, 1980). Wives with a taste for housework are in fact expressing a taste for doing only housework rather than housework plus market work.

This study tests the effect of husbands' and wives' taste for housework on the DOHL. If, following the reasoning of the economists, a taste for housework is related to doing more or less of it, then we would expect men with such a taste to assume more responsibility for it than would men with no taste for it. However, we are not convinced that the economists are on the right track. Furthermore, we know of no earlier study that tested the ef of either spouse's preferences for housework on DOHL. If wives are capable of preferring housework or market work, husbands should also be capable of making such a preference. We are inclined, however, to expect that husbands' preferences for housework will have little, if any, effect on the DOHL. We would expect wives' preferences to have some effect.

Summarizing our hypotheses, we expect the division of household labor to be affected somewhat by the availability of time, especially the wife's time. We expect strong effects of relative power, as measured by market-related resources, marital commitment, and decision-making. We expect weak effects for sex-role attitudes and taste for housework, particularly for the husband's taste.

Data and Methods

Data for this chapter come from a subsample (N=1364) of husbands and wives married to one another, part of a national probability sample of United States households (N=2002), interviewed in late 1978. The unit of analysis is the married couple.

Coding of variables is described in Table 1. We measure the constructs for each hypothesis as follows.

The available-time hypothesis is tested using spouses' employment status (we have no data no number of hours worked) measured as a 0 - 1 dichotomy with part-time employment coded as .5. Means are .91 for husbands and .49 for wives.

Relative interpersonal power is measured three ways, First, by using earnings and education ratios of husbands and wives. Another market variable, occupational status, is not included since it would be missing for wives not currently employed.

Second, we use spouses' perceptions of decision-making. The summated scale includes five major and infrequent decisions.

Third, we tap frequency of thoughts of divorce for each spouse. According to the principle of least interest, the person who gains least by maintaining a relationship or gains most by dissolving it thereby controls it more effectively (Thibaut and Kelly, 1959). Our operationalization assumes that a person considering divorce feels that she/he has potentially more to gain by marital dissolution.

We measure sex-role ideologies by husbands' and wives' summated responses to a series of questions about women's and men's work and family roles

Taste for housework is measured by asking each spouse whether he/she generally prefers work or home activities or both or neither. Controls are included for wife's race and husband's age. Either spouse's age or race could have been included; they correlate very highly. We also control for mean levels of education and earnings since this may relate to their relative levels.

Finally, measuring housework presents problems. We ask who does each of five daily household tasks, adjusted for tasks not performed in a given household, on a scale of one to five. The high score indicates more work performed by the husband: meal preparation, food shopping, care of children and old people, daily housework, and after-meal cleanup. While the most precise household labor data derive, as noted before, from time budget studies, most research is based on surveys reporting spouses' relative contributions to household tasks because time budget data are so costly to collect. Also, when research focuses on the relative rather than on the absolute contribution, precise hourly estimates are not needed.

Survey questions on household labor vary widely on three dimensions: number of tasks, number of response categories, and question wordings. The number of tasks included varies from one, "household role sharing" (Clark et al., 1978) through eight (Blood and Wolfe, 1960; Presser, 1977); 20 (Stafford et al., 1977), 33 (Hoffman, 1963), and 60 (Berk and Berk, 1978). Scaling such items is a problem because the data are not interval-level. Tasks which vary widely in the time needed to do them should not be weighted equally. For example, Blood and Wolfe (1960) weight sidewalk shovelling and evening meal cleanup equally; they include no item for preparing meals. Stafford et al. (1977) try to decrease the problem by weighting tasks by frequency of occurrence.

Response categories and question wordings also vary. Least amenable to interpretation is Presser's (1977): "Does your husband ever help you with . . . .?" Berk and Berk (1978) ask: "Who generally does . . . ." each task, allowing multiple actors. Hoffman (1963) used children's reports on "major" and "minor" actors for each task, coded two and one in her scale. Blood and Wolfe (1960) and Stafford et al. (1977) used response categories ranging from one partner doing the task always, one partner doing it more often, to both equally, yielding five categories. While clearly imprecise, such measures have been justified (Berk and Berk, 1978) on the grounds that they produce results similar to precise hour and dollar measures.

Our measure shares some of the problems noted above but it can be justified on theoretical and empirical grounds. Doing the five tasks in our measures requires 72 percent of total housework time spent by all household members: meal preparation, 15 percent; shopping, 12 percent; physical and nonphysical care of family members, 12 percent each; regular housecare, 12 percent; and after-meal cleanup, nine percent (Walker and Woods, 1976:57). Except for washing clothes, five percent, these tasks comprise all the "frequently" done tasks reported in that time budget survey. Using survey rather than time budget data makes our hypothesis tests more conservative since differences between levels of sharing a given task may not be reflected. However, our data have the advantage of including attitudinal and demographic measures not included in time budget data sets.

Husbands' and wives' reports on the DOHL are not totally consistent (Booth and Welch, 1978; Douglas and Wind, 1978; Berk and Shih, 1980). But we have found that reports of total contribution correlate highly and that inconsistent reporting is unrelated to demographic or attitudinal variables across individual items. Hence we conclude that analyzing mean husband-wife

responses reasonably solves the inconsistency problem. We also report results for each spouse's responses for comparison.

Table 2 shows regressions for housework on all relevant independent variables. Equations are estimated with and without attitudinal variables, reflecting our necessarily cautious stance toward their causal ordering. Table 3 shows similar results using each spouse's perception as a dependent variable. These results are similar for most independent variables. Differences will be noted.

Findings

Our first hypothesis concerned the effect of available time on the DOHL. We expected a slight increase in husband's housework with his wife's increased hours of market work but we expected little or no change with decreases in husbands' market work. We found that both wives' and husbands' employment status affect the DOHL (see Table 2). Betas for the wife's employment status are substantially larger, the largest in the equation. However, the metric coefficients imply only small substantive differences. Full-time employment of a wife (or nonemployment of a husband) would yield a change of .4 - .5 on a scale of one to five. As stated earlier, this effect probably reflects decreased input of wives rather than increases in husbands' housework, except perhaps in the case of nonemployed husbands. We have no way of distinguishing between these alternative interpretations.

Our second hypothesis concerned the effect of relative power or resources on the DOHL. It was tested by using as variables the wife/husband education and earnings ratios, husband's and wife's perception of family decision-making, and frequency of thinking about divorce. The hypothesis received less support than we expected (see Table 2). The wife/husband earnings ratio, education ratio, and perceptions of decision-making failed

to have significant effects. Mean education level, included as a control, had a large positive effect on the husband's contribution to the DOHL, perhaps reflecting subcultural differences among couples.

The only power variable to significantly affect the DOHL was the husband's thought of divorce, which decreased his contribution to the DOHL. The wife's thought of divorce had no such impact. This outcome has common sense plausibility. A badly-kept house reflects on the wife, not the husband. Hence a husband who dislikes his wife can withdraw from housework without loss of self-esteem.

The problems of causal ordering between attitudes and the DOHL, noted earlier, also might be raised with regard to thinking about divorce. Conceivably an inequitable division of labor might cause the wife to think of divorce. However, the lack of an observed relationship between the two variables make such an interpretation improbable. Similarly, a rare husband, overburdened with housework, might contemplate divorce. Again, the observed relationship makes this interpretation unlikely.

Our third hypothesis predicted a moderate relationship between sex-role attitudes and the DOHL. Husbands' attitudes were expected to be more influential than wives' attitudes. We found that husbands' but not wives' sex-role attitudes affected the DOHL. As we suggested earlier, this may reflect a greater willingness of nontraditional husbands to pick up a more equal share of work or it may reflect an attitudinal change in response to changes in household organization that resulted from the wife's employment. These effects will be discussed shortly when we compare husbands' and wives' perceptions of the DOHL.

We also hypothesized that an interaction might occur between the wife's resources and nontraditional sex-role attitudes. In order to obtain a more

equitable DOHL, wives would need higher relative levels of resources and one or both spouses would need to hold nontraditional attitudes. In other words, wives would need to believe that their demands for 'help' were justified and have the resources to back them up. While a high level of multicollinearity between and among interaction terms and their components made such tests difficult, we found no significant increase in explained variance when either interaction term was added (not shown).

Finally, we determined whether taste for housework might influence the DOHL either directly or indirectly through time spent in market work. Again, causal ordering might be questioned since a relationship could arise due to rationalization. Anyone, particularly a wife, might choose to define herself as enjoying housework in order to feel more satisfied with her life. In fact, we do find an effect of wives' taste for housework and not of husbands' taste. Pragmatically, this variable reflects different choices for each spouse. Only eight percent of the husbands expressed a preference for housework over job, while 43 percent of the wives did so. For husbands, this is clearly a socially undersirable response. Again, it is difficult to arrive at a clearcut interpretation of the wives' response.

In addition to mean income and education, we included two demographic variables as controls: husband's age and wife's race. Both characteristics are so highly correlated between spouses that the inclusion of only one seemed adequate. Neither had a strong effect, but black couples tended slightly to have a more equitable DOHL, consistent with past research.

In Table 3 we present the same analysis with husbands' and wives' perceptions, rather than their mean, as dependent variables. To the extent that they relate in a similar manner to the variables discussed earlier, we will have a greater degree of confidence that these effects do not result from biased perceptions.

While two of the effects reported in Table 2, husband's thought of divorce and race, appear to arise more as a product of one spouse's perception than the other's, the differences in size of coefficients for husband's and wife's perceptions are not large. The only major difference between the two sets of equations is in the effects of sex-role attitudes. Only the husband's sex-role attitudes affect his perception of the DOHL, while the wife's attitudes affect her perceptions. This may reflect two processes of rationalization: each spouse may distort perceptions of the DOHL slightly in order to make them conform to sex-role ideologies, but may also do the reverse. Since other effects are similar and spouses' perceptions correlate .65, we would expect more of the latter to be taking place.[1]

Analysis by Wife's Employment Status

Since an equitable division of household labor presumably would be based in large part on available time and since many of the variables examined here (such as wife/husband earnings ratio and sex-role attitudes) are related to the wife's employment status, we further specify these effects by separating our sample by wife's employment status (see Table 4). Only full-time and nonemployed wives are included. The eight percent of husbands who are not employed full-time are also excluded to charify other effects.

We find that, for both groups, the explained variance is quite low, indicating that much of the previous explained variance related to the wife's employment status. Mean education level of spouses continues to exert an effect for both groups, perhaps indicating subgroup cultural differences in norms. For employed wives, however, the education ratio also affects the DOHL but in a counter-intuitive direction. Wives with less education relative to their husbands receive more 'help' from them. Apparently education does not function as a resource. On the contrary, the higher the husbands' education,

the more 'productive' they may be in the home, regardless of their wives' educational attainment.

The effect of husband's thought of divorce is no longer significant but it is of similar size as that reported in Table 2, probably reflecting the smaller N. This effect is much larger for employed-wife couples than others, however, perhaps because housework is more likely to be negotiated in such families. Similarly, the effect of the husband's sex-role attitudes applies only to those families. The husband's attitudes may be irrelevant if the wife is not employed.

Finally, the husband's age comes into play for families with nonemployed wives. Such families are likely either to be quite young with small children or to be much older, with the adults close to retirement age. In the former instance, the wife may be unable to do everything that needs to be done even if she is home full-time. Any recent change in norms regarding housework would also be highlighted in the contrast between these groups.

Discussion

In this test of four hypotheses regarding the DOHL, we have found that (1) the wife's time (as measured by employment status) affects the DOHL more than does the husband's; (2) the DOHL relates to relative power only as reflected by the husband's thought of divorce; (3) it relates to sex-role attitudes of the spouse whose perceptions of the DOHL are being measured, and most strongly to the husband's; (4) it relates to the wife's taste for housework. This last effect disappears with controls for the wife's employment status; it therefore presumably results from its relation to her employment. Both attitudinal effects have unclear interpretations of causal ordering. There is no interaction effect between sex-role attitudes and relative resources. There are very slight race and age effects, and a relatively strong impact of mean educational level of both spouses.

Thus our expectations of a relatively strong impact of relative resource variables, based on the notion that housework represents menial labor performed by a less powerful person for a more powerful one was not borne out. This finding may imply that this view of housework is distorted or that our measures of relative resources are inadequate. It may also reflect the fact that, despite variation in relative resources of spouses, women rarely attain an equal footing with their husbands. Husbands can more easily survive a divorce financially than can wives, and husbands face a more favorable remarriage market because men's average age at death is lower than women's and men typically marry younger wives. As long as this combination of factors persists, it may be unrealistic to expect much variation in the DOHL due to variation in women's lack of power.

Perhaps the fact that the DOHL is more congruent with attitude-taste variables than with relative power should not be surprising, given the relatively static nature of our data. Most marriages are not, after all, permanent battlegrounds. People come into marriages with expectations as to how housework should be divided. They probably tend to marry persons who share those beliefs. If one spouse changes those beliefs, the ensuing negotiation may result in either a new consensus or in some instances, a divorce. What we see here is, in the majority of cases, an equilibrium between attitudes and behaviors, with little evidence of any negotiation which may take place before or early in marriage.

We feel little cause for optimism here about future rapid change toward a more egalitarian division of household labor. Any change is likely to occur slowly as a result of a multitide of individual adjustments. Government policy can have little impact on the DOHL. Even in those countries which officially endorse sharing of housework, such policies are viewed as

unenforceable (Newland, 1980). Our government shows no interest in this type of 'interference' in private affairs.

The most likely source of change over the long run appears to be women's increased labor force participation, which leads to necessary cuts in the hours of housework. The slack will be picked up either by husbands or by increased purchase of services. Probably the single most efficient way to reduce the time needed for housework is to have fewer children. The dirt in the corners can wait indefinitely for someone to pick it up but a howling baby requires a more immediate response.

While we found no evidence here of any effect of relative income, perhaps women's attainment of actual parity with men's salaries may affect the DOHL. We did not examine actual oocupations here but it is possible that decreases on sex segregation of jobs would lead to eventual changes in the DOHL, since 'women's jobs' have traditionally been more flexible than men's in relation to family needs. However, this long term change is likely to occur at the expense of much 'lost' sleep and leisure for employed women in interim.

Footnotes

[1] This analysis also sheds some light on the interpretation of survey data intended to test hypotheses about housework. Tests of hypotheses involving demographic variables appear to have the same results whether the husband or the wife is the respondent. Tests of attitudinal effects do not. Whatever discrepancy exists between husband and wife reports may relate to rationalizations on the part of one or both spouses, causing either attitude change or biased reporting of the DOHL. Thus attitudinal hypotheses would be best tested using time budget data for housework, with separate interviews of the husband and the wife for attitudinal data. Such data do not now exist. Future time budget studies would do well to incorporate two additional features: (1) extensive interview data from both spouses for analyses in conjunction with data on hours and (2) a longitudinal design for a panel of couples to determine under what conditions these behaviors shift over time.

Table 4.1. CODING OF VARIABLES USED IN CHAPTER 4 ANALYSES

Variable	Coding
Employment status of wife, husband (EMSTAT)	1=employed full-time, .5=part-time, 0-not employed
Earnings ratio of wife and husband (EARNRATIO)	Ratio of wife's to husband's 1977 earnings, coded in categories from 1=under $5,000 to 7=over $30,000 and recoded to midpoint
Mean earnings (EARNMEAN)	Husband and wife's combined mean earnings, coded as above
Education ratio (EDRATIO)	Ratio of wife's to husband's education, in years
Education mean (EDMEAN)	Husband and wife's combined mean education, in years
Husband's and wife's thought of divorce (DIVTHOUGHT)	"During the past year, would you say that you have thought about getting a divorce . . . .," coded 0=never (in response to filter question), 1=hardly ever, 2=once in awhile, 3=sometimes, 4=often
Decision-making (DECISIONS)	Husband and wife's combined mean-sum of 5 items: who decides about vacations, husband's job, dwelling, wife's jobs, moving, coded 1=wife always, 2=wife usually, 3=both equally, 4=husband usually, 5=husband always (range 5-25)
Sex-role attitudes of husband, wife (SRATT)	Sum of responses to items (26f, g, h, i, j, l, n, o in Appendix I) regarding women's work and family roles, recoded so that 1=traditional, 5=nontraditional
Taste for housework of husband, wife (HWTASTE)	"In general, would you rather do the kind of work that people do on jobs or the kind of work that is done around the house," coded 0=job, .5=both or neither, 1=house
Wife's race	1=black, 0=other
Husband's age	Age coded in years
Division of household labor (DOHL)	Husband's mean contribution to 5 tasks: preparing meals, shopping, caring for children or old people, doing daily housework, cleaning up after meals, coded 1=wife always, 2=wife usually, 3=both equally, 4=husband usually, 5=husband always with a range of 1-5, adjusted to exclude jobs performed by someone other than husband or wife

Table 4.2 UNSTANDARIZED COEFFICIENTS PREDICTING MEAN OF HUSBAND AND WIFE DOHL REPORTS (STANDARIZED COEFFICIENTS IN PARENTHESES)

Independent Variables	1[a]	2[b]
Wife EMPSTAT	.478 (.368)*	.425 (.327)*
Husband EMPSTAT	-.359 (-.170)*	-.352 (-.166)*
EARNRATIO	-.020 (-.028)	-.025 (-.036)
EARNMEAN	-.000 (-.021)	-.000 (-.051)
EDRATIO	-.110 (-.050)	-.125 (-.057)
EDMEAN	.042 (.162)*	.031 (.118)*
Wife DIVTHOUGHT	-.004 (-.007)	-.019 (-.029)
Husband DIVTHOUGHT	-.065 (-.080)*	-.064 (-.070)*
DECISION	.004 (.014)	.010 (.038)
Wife SRATT	-	.010 (.069)
Husband SRATT	-	.017 (.100)*
Wife HWTASTE	-	-.140 (-.103)*
Husband HWTASTE	-	.089 (.043)
RACE	.182 (.070)**	.156 (.060)
Husband AGE	-.003 (-.064)	-.001 (-.017)
a	1.551	1.10
R^2	.19	.23
$\bar{X}$	1.78	

* $p < .05$

** $p < .10$

N = 661

[a] Employment status, power, and control variables.

[b] Attitude and taste variables added to column 1.

Table 4.3. UNSTANDARDIZED COEFFICIENTS PREDICTING HUSBANDS' AND WIVES' PERCEPTIONS OF DOHL (STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENTS IN PARENTHESES)

Independent variables	Husband perception 1[a]	Husband perception 2[b]	Wife perception 1[a]	Wife perception 2[b]
Wife EMPSTAT	.540 (.373)*	.481 (.332)*	.417 (.293)*	.369 (.259)*
Husband EMPSTAT	-.344 (-.146)*	-.343 (-.146)*	-.374 (-.161)*	-.361 (-.156)*
EARNRATIO	-.020 (-.025)	-.022 (-.028)	-.020 (-.025)	-.029 (-.038)
EARNMEAN	-.000 (-.039)	-.000 (-.060)	.000 (.000)	-.000 (0.032)
EDRATIO	-.103 (-.042)	-.117 (-.047)	-.117 (-.048)	-.134 (-.055)
EDMEAN	.041 (.143)*	.030 (.104)*	.042 (.151)*	.031 (.111)*
Wife DIVTHOUGHT	.021 (.030)	.006 (.008)	-.030 (-.042)	-.043 (-.061)
Husband DIVTHOUGHT	-.051 (-.057)	-.051 (-.057)	-.079 (-.089)*	-.078 (-.088)*
DECISION	.013 (.047)	.019 (.069)**	-.006 (-.022)	-.000 (-.000)
Wife SRATT	-	.004 (.023)	-	.017 (.104)*
Husband SRATT	-	.025 (.133)*	-	.009 (.048)
Wife HWTASTE	-	-.138 (-.091)*	-	-.143 (-.097)*
Husband HWTASTE	-	.121 (.053)	-	.057 (.025)
RACE	.160 (.056)	.137 (.047)	.203 (.072)**	.174 (.061)
Husband AGE	-.004 (-.072)**	-.002 (-.032)	-.002 (-.043)	-.000 (-.000)
a	1.50	1.02	1.60	1.19
R^2	.18	.21	.15	.17
$\bar{X}$	1.89		1.67	

* $p < .05$

** $p < .10$

N = 661

[a] Employment status, power, and control variables.

[b] Attitude and taste variables added to column 1.

Table 4.4.· UNSTANDARDIZED COEFFICIENTS PREDICTING MEAN HUSBAND AND WIFE DOHL REPORTS, BY WIFE's EMPLOYMENT STATUS (STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENTS IN PARENTHESES)

Independent variables	Full-time employed wives[a]		Non-employed wives[a]	
	1[a]	2[b]	1[a]	2[b]
EARNRATIO	.015 (-.026)	.024 (-.040)	-	-
EARNMEAN	.000 (.068)	.000 (.032)	-.000 (-.099)	-.000 (-.099)
EDRATIO	-.375 (-.131)*	-.375 (-.131)*	.058 (.035)	.058 (.035)
EDMEAN	.048 (.182)*	.035 (.132)	.045 (.208)*	.042 (.194)*
Wife DIVTHOUGHT	-.026 (-.044)	-.038 (-.064)	.027 (.044)	.022 (.035)
Husband DIVTHOUGHT	-.070 (-.102)	-.067 (-.097)	-.032 (-.040)	-.038 (-.046)
DECISION	.007 (.027)	.015 (.053)	-.002 (-.009)	.000 (.004)
Wife SRATT	-	.010 (.070)	-	-.000 (-.001)
Husband SRATT	-	.026 (.155)*	-	.005 (.032)
Wife HWTASTE	-	-.061 (-.044)	-	-.123 (-.104)
Husband HWTASTE	-	.105 (.047)	-	.100 (.063)
RACE	.109 (.051)	.120 (.056)	.090 (.029)	.054 (.017)
Husband AGE	.002 (.044)	.005 (.088)	-.007 (-.149)*	-.005 (-.122)**
a	1.50	.79	1.28	1.21
R^2	.08	.12	.08	.09
$\bar{X}$	2.02		1.53	
N	257		270	

* $p < .05$

** $p < .10$

[a] Husbands employed full-time

[a] Employment status, power, and control variables.

[b] Attitude and taste variables added to column 1.