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ABSTRACT

Educational policy analysis consists of a "troika" of major components--politics (or power), technology (ideas), and service delivery (workers). Three case studies of New York City programs illustrate how the components interact in different situations. The city's School Improvement Project aims to make schools more effective in teaching poor children. It has not been successfully implemented, however, because politicians have not committed additional resources and because neither they nor the workers (teachers) believe the project can succeed. In the case of early childhood projects, the federally-funded Head Start and day care programs are successful but do not coordinate with similarly successful nursery and kindergarten programs in the city's public schools, chiefly because of differing political origins and because of cleavages between the workers' two unions. Finally, the city's youth employment training projects are split between public secondary school programs and the city employment department's training programs. Because data are lacking on either program's content and performance, program decisions depend mostly on political and union factors. Hence, as with early childhood projects, parallel programs remain uncoordinated. (Author/RW)

EDUCATION POLICY ANALYSIS AND THE RENT-A-TROIKA BUSINESS

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Policy Analysis

Policy analysis is about doing good things. The enterprise of doing good has three parts: first, to know what is good; second, to know what causes that good outcome; and third, to get people to do the things that lead to good results. The first part, knowing what is good (selecting values, stating goals), is done by politics and politicians. The middle and causal part is the province of subject matter experts, people who know about pedagogy, educational psychology, curriculum, etc. The last part, getting people to do things (e.g., implement programs, determine and deploy resources), is done by managers and administrators. Policy analysis is none of the above and makes use of all of the above. It requires policy analysts to broker among politicians, scholars, teachers, and managers; between profoundly normative questions (What is "equity" for multiply handicapped children and who is to decide?) and mundanely applied questions (How can teachers at the Elmowood School be encouraged to stop xeroxing identical IEP prescriptions for different children?).

While policy analysts are not ordinarily either politicians, subject matter experts, or administrators, they get their credibility not only from their ability to understand what works but from their ability to communicate that to the other audiences with appropriate sensitivity to their worlds. Clinical psychologists call this schizophrenia but the reality is worse than that. Successful policy analysts need to understand values, technology, and service delivery. Walter Lippman once called the expectation of certainty as a precondition to political action a "monstrous demand." The same thing may be said, for the same reasons, about policy analysts.

Let us take two preliminary examples. Table 1 shows what New York City spends to teach children of different ages. Budget analysts can

Insert Table 1 about here

explain the cost variations (and their probable intractability) but not to the satisfaction of a curriculum analyst who would want to know why the area with the greatest potential for positive outcomes--elementary education--bears the heaviest disparity in the pupil/resource ratio. It is even more difficult to justify the special education resource disparity (is it a dis-parity?) to a parent whose high school daughter is enrolled in a regular program but also has a desperate need for expensive remediation.

From one perspective, the table displays the enacted values of the City of New York. The rhetorical values may focus on early intervention, but the dollars do not support that. Pursuing an analysis built solely on that single table would quickly involve questions of responsibility

and accountability (Did any individual or group ever make a "decision" about any of those allocations?) and of implementation (The City's demography and the Union's contract probably contribute heavily to the junior high figure but how malleable are those factors?).

Or take the common phenomenon in urban school administration that the administrator closest to the child has the least power over the budget. Many people believe that the school building (not the individual classroom and not the school district) is the most important institutional determinant of learning. To the extent that that is true, then the building is also the appropriate locus of accountability; yet no administrator will accept that accountability unless it is matched with appropriate discretion, authority, or control. Devolving resource allocation authority to the building level through school-site budgeting is a step in that direction. Table 2 outlines the major expenditure categories for five public schools in New York City.

Insert Table 2 about here

An hour on the telephone will convince anyone that New York, like most other big cities, allots resources to decentralized districts, and the districts pass those resources to schools according to marvelously complicated formulas and equations, applied in series, which themselves reflect the values of other superordinate authorities. If school-site budgeting is to redeem the legal promise that makes the building administrator "the responsible head of the school" and if that means that the principal should be able to program or configure the school according to precise local needs and beliefs, then it needs also to be recognized that

the current system sends teachers to school buildings according to the number of children enrolled and, once there, deploys them in patterns fixed by contract and regulations. A principal "organizes" classes and schedules the school's activities but largely as a matter of clerical routine. If class size may only vary within narrow limits, how can special needs be accommodated? If teachers may only teach "within license," how can new classroom teaching patterns or new curricular emphases be established? The current procedures for resource allocation at the building level have more to do with the equitability of adult working conditions than with the production of responsive learning environments for children. Administration is comfortably clerical. In New York, the principal of a high school with a $3 million operating budget ends up with a discretionary amount of $8,000, the unused balance saved from the "supplies and postage" account.

Politically, the implementation of school-site budgeting would require formidable changes in union relations, in the centralized and decentralized structure of governance, and in management support routines. Our ability to take those political and managerial steps is determined by a complicated argument in the technology of schooling. The strongest test of any reform is its ability to impact the lives of children.[1] If school-site budgeting freed leaders to re-structure schooling services for greater benefit to children, that would be a powerful argument in its favor. But schools are not the only source of what children learn. One conceptualization of the inputs to schooling is that of R. Gary Bridge, Charles M. Judd, and Peter R. Moock:

(a) Student Characteristics (e.g., IQ, sex, age, personality aspirations),

(b) Family Background Characteristics (e.g., ethnicity, socioeconomic status, wealth, family size),

(c) Student Body Characteristics (e.g., racial composition, study habits),

(d) Teacher Characteristics (e.g., training, experience, age, sex), and

(e) School Characteristics (e.g., physical plant, per pupil expenditure, curriculum).[2]

It is significant that only the last two of those five factors are directly under the control of the school and that even within those two, the principal faces varying degrees of intransigency.

New York City school principals are paid between $37,000 and $43,000 per year to preside over teaching and learning institutions whose operating budgets are seldom less than a million dollars. Schooling is a process where the inputs are variable and the technology is weak and uncertain. Most production engineers would recommend against routinization and centralization, especially where the production process goes on in a thousand different locations.[3] School-site budgeting, a fundamental and clearly indicated reform, thus requires nearly simultaneous attention to the political, technological, and managerial dimensions of the problem. Those properties are even more clearly on display in the school improvement area.

Case 1: Making Schools Better? The School Improvement Project

In the School Improvement Project, begun in 1978, New York has chosen to challenge two of the central tenets of the neo-conservative dogma—that poor children cannot be helped in public schools and that these schools themselves cannot be improved. The operational question is: How much learning can a principal expect of a child who comes up the steps—alone because his mother has a full-time job; angry because he was a captive spectator at a screaming match among adults; confused because only one parent is in the home; and unmotivated because of the absence of models to emulate (i.e., parents who read)? If a child is otherwise reasonably intact, but nonetheless poor, is there something that will help that child learn in that school and despite that poverty? Does there exist an instructionally effective school that will override the learning related difficulties ordinarily associated with low social class standing? Ronald Edmonds is not only one of the leading analysts of this question but as the Senior Assistant to the Chancellor for Instruction, he spent three years trying, through the School Improvement Project, to bring the instructionally effective school to New York City. Edmonds argued that an instructionally effective school will (at its maximum) teach "poor children at least as well as it teaches middle-class children" or "an effective school will bring the children of the poor to those minimal masteries of basic school skills that now describe minimally successful pupil performance for the children of the middle class."[4]

The School Improvement Project (SIP) was begun to convince the City's educators—especially those working with children in the bottom

one-third achievement ranks—that the schools they already controlled could make a difference with the children who were already there. One critical part of that was illuminating the contribution that "within-school factors" (things accessible to school people right now) make to the achievement of poor children. Teachers cannot, for example, go into the students' homes each weekday evening and turn the TV off but they do already control the "within-school factor" of how much of their day they devote how intensely to instructing.

Edmond's analysis has tried to isolate those factors thought to characterize schools that successfully teach poor children: (1) administrative style (especially strong leadership with instructional as well as business management components); (2) teacher expectations that their students can do well and that they can teach all their students); (3) an instructional emphasis on basic skills acquisition; (4) a safe school climate conducive to learning; and (5) an ongoing system to assess pupil progress and drive subsequent teaching and learning.

Table 3 summarizes Edmonds and six other sources on the characteristics of the instructionally effective school. There is some remarkable

Insert Table 3 about here

unanimity among the studies, at least about the names of the variables. With one exception (the "F" row), the factors on the list are already within the control of schools as they now exist. In fact, one common response to these factors is that "there is nothing new here." But these generally understood factors do not now characterize urban schooling (How many teachers believe that they can teach poor children?),

Although some may think they know that these factors are related to successful schools, they have yet to act on that belief.

It is true that some of the "school improvement" factors are more easily operationalized than others. Creating an instructional emphasis, or as Michael Rutter describes it, an "academic press" is do-able. Schools generally have, by law, 180 days per year to work with children. But studies have shown that the number of hours in that 180-day-year devoted to mathematics instruction in the second grade in which teachers were using materials that allowed students to experience success (a factor importantly related to achievement) vary from a high of 60 hours per year to a low of 30 hours. The comparable figure for reading instruction in the fifth grade ranges from a high of 150 hours to a low of 60 hours--or, an hour of reading instruction every third day![5] Thus, convincing teachers to spend more time teaching can improve student achievement and the flexibility for that increased emphasis exists. Actually getting teachers to spend their time this way is difficult but feasible.[6]

Two others of the five factors are relatively easy to realize. Establishing security is a logistical problem that has solutions as many schools have demonstrated, and establishing a pupil performance monitoring system may mean more paper work but the technology exists. The more difficult facet of assessment is getting teachers to accept that the pupil's performance should have consequences for what they as adults do--that is uncomfortably close to an accountability model with teeth.

But what should be done for schools without "strong leadership" or high expectations on the part of the faculty for their own and their students' performance. Such attitudinal factors are notoriously wobbly

and resistant to change but they are central to the school improvement question since New York's public schools are, after all, staffed by ordinary human beings. Thus, changing the pupils' performance begins with changing the teachers' attitudes.

The School Improvement Project was fielded in 1979-80 with four headquarters administrators, twelve liaisons between the participating schools and the central headquarters, and two office staff persons. Forty-three schools volunteered to take part, and ten public elementary and four non-public schools were chosen. Participating schools were selected to represent a size range; poor and not-poor neighborhoods; Black, White, and Hispanic populations; and various degrees of success on the Citywide reading achievement tests.

Each school formed a planning committee that had to include the principal, the UFT chapter chairperson, and the central headquarters liaison. Committees averaged fifteen members and over the course of the school year took about 30 hours to complete a plan for making their school better. The committees' work was based on a needs assessment which combined student test data, questionnaire responses from staff, and systematic observation by the school liaison.

At the end of the year, some schools had produced a plan for what was to be implemented in 1980-81. No school had begun that implementation. Two of the ten public schools had pulled out. The non-public schools had not even begun their planning meetings, and the community superintendents had become uneasy about their peripheral involvement. While most of the schools succeeded in "planning" to do something and while most participants seem to have enjoyed "planning," the Board's

evaluation of the project omits any mention of the substance of the plans —more classroom contact hours, the adoption of a specific reading curriculum, the introduction of team teaching coupled perhaps to a diagnostic-prescriptive sequence for monitoring pupil progress? The evaluation is silent on this critical question. Change efforts generally come in two parts, "process" and "product." The factors associated with successful schools for the urban poor are substantive, not processual; yet the School Improvement Project designed to introduce them has not yet reached that point. And, when asked about the prospects for actually implementing the plans, school people said that that would depend on the availability of extra help from outside their schools!

The School Improvement Project was begun as a demonstration of the ability, within existing resources, of some specific factors to turn around educational achievement for poor children. At the end of the first year, the focus on the most needy schools has been diluted, only a handful of schools have taken part, the outcome for the year's work is a set of plans yet to be implemented and of uncertain substance. The project, once a centerpiece of the reform efforts of the Macchiarola administration, is a long way from being a convincing demonstration of its two-part premise—that (1) poor children can be taught by re-configuring the existing resources of public schools and (2) that urban schools can be improved.

The project has dealt only with schools that volunteered to take part. The experience of the eight volunteers is unlikely to be very compelling to the hundreds of schools in the City with demonstrably greater and probably quite different processual and substance needs for reform. Both the Ford Foundation and the Federal government have long

since concluded that light-house "demonstrations" do not, by themselves, lead to replication, especially not among the lowest achieving group of schools. Thus, there seems little hope for moving all the way to "institutionalization"; i.e., the reliable and stable adoption of a proven set of factors in a large number of schools.

From the beginning, the project was hard pressed because it directly challenged defeatist conclusions and minimalist standards, because it rejected the prevailing social science wisdom, and because its own "bootstrap" logic ran counter to a tradition of "extra-pay-for-extra-effort." No one expects New York's public schools to have dramatically more money, regardless of the nobility of the cause. To be credible, SIP had to demonstrate that New York schools could be improved on their own resources, without large outside grants. And "improvement" had to carry all the way through to changes in pupil outcomes, especially test scores. Demonstrating that that could happen without extra resources may attract those inclined to replicate the effort, but it would call into question the performance of other similar schools achieving less but with the same resources.

Despite its shortcomings, SIP is too important a test of propositions too central to the survival of the schools to be abandoned. The approach is not wrong (but neither is it our only option). In any effort to make schools better, there is no substitute for thinking ahead (planning) and there is no way around, over, or through the people who do the work of schooling (the process of involving teachers). Neither are there short cuts. But the puny outcomes for the investment to date do raise some difficult issues, especially about the stability of political support

for what has to be a protracted process. As the first year assessment report put it:

> The general lack of visible support from the central school administration for the project appeared to reduce the strength and public credibility of the program, as well as hurt staff morale. The priority placed on the delivery of central resources and services to project schools in the coming year will indicate whether the central administration has developed a renewed interest in the School Improvement Project.[7]

Equality of educational opportunity--building toward a situation in which all children have the same opportunity to learn the same things--is the central premise of a public school system. In that regard, SIP has been a properly outrageous attempt that deserves to be both modified and continued. It also deserves to be extended in a revised version to the high schools where nothing of its sort yet exists.

The issues that SIP raised in New York were formidable. Focusing on the children most in need meant calling attention to schools that would be most widely (if unfairly) perceived as failures and that would damage the ability of school leaders to get additional resources in a shrinking economy. Expanding the population of test schools so that it included more than simply the "undeserving poor" may have yielded a more stable political coalition but at great cost in diluted resources.

The intellectual obstacles are just as formidable and clearly related to the political questions. Are the factors causes or effects? Do already good schools for the urban poor shape their staffs in the directions

observed or is it (was it?) the other way around? There is general agreement that no single factor is sufficient, but no real idea about what constitutes a critical mass among the various factors. What is the relative contribution of each? Are some more important than others? Can large amounts of one be substituted for small amount of another? What interaction effects exist? Are some prior to others in an improvement sequence? In fact, skepticism far outweighs optimism about these factors. Many school people are waiting to see if the technology has in fact changed, a technical judgment with political consequences. Admiral Rickover bet his career on the prospect that nuclear power could run submarines. There is undoubtedly a now-retired Air Force general who gambled and lost his career trying to stuff nuclear power plants into airplanes.

And finally, SIP came up against the state of the art in our ability to manage the process of implementing change. In large part, SIP assumed that improvement is best packaged as a project and imposed by an outsider. Teachers, really adults in mid-career, are then supposed to be so dazzled by the better mousetrap that they will abandon those practices which, until that moment, were their own best professional solution to a difficult problem (how to teach) and instead substitute that better idea. In the three years, 1979-81, New York's Board of Education piloted 781 innovative programs.[8] Those efforts are useful but they are not sufficient and they need definitely to take into account what has been painfully learned by the Federal government about the problem of "implementation." The Great Society tried to drive school reform from the Federal level but got outgunned by the service delivery or "street-level" bureaucracy.

In the fifteen years, 1965-1980, the Federal government put $15 billion into school reform nationwide, with outcomes far more modest than anyone wants to admit. The first obstacle was that recurrent reality, the state of the art in teaching and learning; the second was a disastrous tactical underestimate of the virility of the political culture of the local school building. Principals in their schools and teachers in their classrooms are the final arbiters of school policy--Federal legislation, court mandates, Chancellor's regulations, community board policies to the contrary not yet withstanding.

Case 2: Orchestrating Some of the "Other Educators"

Public schools are uniquely a demand institution obligated to try to help any child through comprehensive teaching and learning. But they are not alone. Consider the 15,000 hours that a high school graduate will have spent in school from kindergarten through the twelfth grade. Most children spend more time watching TV than attending classes and that medium sends a powerful set of messages. Similarly, the former director of the National Institute of Education, Harold Hodgkinson, has noted that "probably the best way to eliminate major student learning problems would be to make sure that every pregnant woman in the U.S. had one prenatal exam and an adequate diet during pregnancy. Researchers estimate that this would eliminate 40% of later learning problems."[9] But Boards of Education are not responsible for providing every service a child may need. A recent analysis indicates, for example, that 22 New York City agencies spend a million dollars or more on various direct services for children; e.g., the Department of Mental Health ($46,000.000)

and libraries ($36,000,000). In fact, the Board's share of the expenditure for services to children is less than half (48.5 percent) of the City's 1979 total.

Insert Table 4 about here

The injunction about the "other educators" is now commonplace, although few purport to know exactly what to do about it. One thing that ought not to be done is to attempt a school-driven human services integration strategy. Schools do not have that authority, they lack the resources, they should not be distracted from their unique mission, and no one would let them succeed anyway.[10] But some greater articulation or "orchestration" may be useful and feasible. In New York City, two candidates for that are the Agency for Child Development (ACD), which deals with very young children, and the Youth Employment Training Programs of the Department of Employment. ACD's mission overlaps with the Board because it works at the early childhood age level where public investment yields a high and useful return. Employment training programs parallel much of the Board's vocational education mission; moreover, given the gravity of youth unemployment and its social and personal consequences, the area deserves priority attention. In order to examine what sort of orchestration may be feasible, we should understand some of the dimensions of the two programs.

A. Early Childhood Programs

The City's youngest children, those not yet eligible for the first grade, are clients of two City agencies: the Agency for Child Development operates a Head Start program enrolling 8,200 children and a Day Care

program enrolling 42,000. The Board of Education serves a total group whose size is curiously similar to ACD's total (about 50,000) through "nursery" or pre-kindergarten classes (enrollment 2,700) and kindergarten classes (enrollment 49,000). The result is a little like having two electric power companies serving the same area, something only one municipality in the U.S. does. The analogy suggests both the benefits of competition and the costs of redundancy.

The dual system is a consequence of the anti-public school animus of the 1960's Federal government when schools were defined as part of the problem poor people faced. Head Start was to be the foundation of an alternate, if not competing, system, although the largest share of Federal support has since come through Title XX of the Social Security Act of 1974. In a four-year period, beginning in 1971, the number of public day care centers in the City expanded from 91 to 420. The program has fallen back to 381 centers but their creation remains a major event in social welfare architecture. Head Start, despite its well documented success, is the junior partner with programs in 122 of the 381 centers serving 8,200 children. Unfortunately, the introduction of these early childhood programs occurred at precisely that fleeting historical moment (1971) when the crest of the baby boom wave was swamping the public schools. Believing it had no other choice, ACD built its own facilities through a "turn key" procedure in which private contractors put up buildings which the City then leased back on contracts which will not expire until the 1990's. We now have a set of very costly day care facilities figuratively across the street from more substantial but abandoned public elementary schools.

Centers are open from 8:00 A.M. to 6:00 P.M. Each has a family counsellor, breakfast and hot lunch programs, medical testing, and some additional services such as immunization. Day care centers try to work with the whole family and often accept referrals from agencies dealing with child abuse, adult employment services, etc.

Five years ago, about 25 percent of the day care population was White; the current estimate is 5 percent. Day care became a program for minority families because of changes in income eligibility. One major justification of the program has always been that it frees mothers for paid employment. But if the income for a family of four exceeds $11,000, then the family is charged from $3 per week to $40 per week for each enrolled child. If the four-person family makes more than $19,660, their children are ineligible for day care. One effect has been to encourage those who can to go elsewhere. Full-day kindergarten programs in Manhattan private schools cost less than $3,000,[11] while ACD would have to charge $2080 at the upper limit of income eligibility. Another effect has been to pull mothers out of paid employment and back into child care (and welfare) just as they are becoming economically self-sufficient. The third effect is a racially segregated program for children.

ACD employs 5,300 teachers (2.5 per class), 470 center administrators, 300 other support personnel in the field, and a central staff of 530. The very high overhead ratio (one staffer for every fourth teacher) is due to the comprehensive services, the cumbersome process of determining income eligibility, and the crush of Federal paper work. ACD's programs are a bargain for the City. Head Start is totally funded by the Federal government; and between 75 percent and 95 percent of the costs

of programs supported under the other titles are paid for by the Federal and State governments.

In contrast with ACD's ability to control access to its programs by varying income eligibility, the Board of Education must admit any 5-year-old whose parents request kindergarten. To meet the demand, 41,000 of the total public kindergarten enrollment of 45,000 can be provided only half-day sessions (2 1/2 to 3 hours). While ACD has one instructor for every ten children, Board teachers see 44 children per double session day, and many classrooms lack paraprofessional assistance. Board programs are limited to education plus some food service. Kindergarten programs exist in all community school districts; each district has one early childhood technical assistance liaison, and the central Board's total pre-school support staff is two (2!) persons. The Board of Education supports no nursery or pre-kindergarten programs with City funds.

New York's bifurcated systems are part of what the Federal government wished for. The Board of Education's kindergarten programs are for the most part custodial with a few cognitive aims. ACD tries to deal with the "whole child" in a developmental context that downplays cognitive purposes. ACD, far more heavily supported, works over an extended day with the neediest children. Although starved for resources, the Board's kindergarten programs deal with some of the poorest children, plus others, but none on a day-long basis.

The more radical of the Great Society planners thought that a competing system would either galvanize the public schools to dramatic improvement or so clarify their inadequacies that they would be driven out of business. Neither has happened, nor has there been a confirmation

of the "anti-child" allegations made against public school people. Teachers who care more about the time clock than the kids can be found in Head Start centers, too. Day care programs are just as vulnerable as kindergartens to parent demands that the smallest children be taught to read, "ready or not." The separation between the two systems is increasingly difficult to justify. Head Start and other early childhood programs, if operated under Board auspices, would continue to provide the most extensive service to children with the most need. Yet under Board auspices, these children would be less segregated by social class than currently; an alliance with parents from other circumstances in pursuit of expanding program services would be more feasible; and some of the Board's facilities might be more efficiently used (although the duration of the ACD leases precludes immediate savings). Finally, under Board auspices, the potential for more closely articulating the children's experiences across programs would be enhanced. The long-term benefits of that are clear. A longitudinal study of more than a hundred Black children from low income families who, in 1962, were among the first to receive pre-school assistance showed significant enduring gains. Two years of pre-school education for one child cost $5,984 and returned $14,819 in savings from a reduced need for later special education ($3,353), increases in projected lifetime earnings ($10,798), and the mother's income from paid employment during the hours the child was in program ($668).[12]

Thus, in early childhood education, "orchestration" should mean coordination under a single agency. At the other end of the youth age spectrum, Board programs share the vocational training mission with programs supported through the Department of Employment.

B. Youth Employment Training

Simply saying that there is "shared responsibility" between the New York Board of Education and the City's Department of Employment (DoE) conjures up a complicated picture. The actual configuration is surreal. If youth employment training programs are charged with moving young people from school to paid employment, then policies and services ought to be fashioned with some attention to the relevant actors. Public sector agencies include (a) the U.S. Department of Labor, (b) the State Department of Labor and (c) of Education, (d) municipal social service agencies including the Department of Employment, (e) the Board of Education with its multiple approaches (occupational education, vocational training, career education, etc.), and 90-plus secondary schools, and (f) the City's Board of Higher Education. The private sector has vocationally relevant educational organizations such as (g) private and (h) parochial schools; (i) private, for-profit vocational schools; (j) colleges and universities, and (k) community-based organizations. The most important part of the private sector includes (l) unions and (m) prospective employers. If it were possible to get each of those sector views represented by one individual (it is not), we would already need 13 chairs at a conference table.

Anyone interested in helping young people into the world of work has to appreciate the range and complexity of interests that are represented by all those different players. Labor unions, for example, are alleged to be uninterested in making job training programs more successful if the result is competition that will depress the value of existing union members' labor or displace members' relatives who would otherwise qualify

for vacant positions. The personal world of an unemployed young person is just as complicated as the policy world, since they, too, need to estimate what experiences will lead to which skills that will quality for what future jobs. Both the Board of Education and the Department of Employment (in the Human Resources Adminiatration) offer programs to help with that.

The following table diaplays the major vocationally oriented activities of the two agencies.

Insert Table 5 about here

Employment training through DoE is provided by contracts to local groups, usually community-based organizations (CBOs). About 350 of the Department's 800 contractors deal with youth exclusively or include youth in their programs. There are four major activities: (1) classroom training (enrollees get cash allowances); (2) work experience (supervised employment with wages paid by CETA); (3) on-the-job training (no classroom instruction, employers and CETA split enrollee's wages); and (4) career experience (classroom training plus work experience, with more than one type of employment experience to enhance job readiness). In addition, enrollees go through a number of diagnostic activities; and some programs are funded for supporting services such as child care, transportation, and counseling. All have a placement component.

What are the training practices in the various sites? How are trainers with differing strengths deployed across what curriculum sequences? How are enrollee needs matched to the akills to be enhanced and to the prospect of available jobs? Does the kind of training vary by the characteristics of ethnic, racial, or other groups; and if so, to

what effect? There is simply no data available on the actual content of programs. Program operators account for their enrollees at the moment they leave the program ("positive terminations" are successfully placed graduates) and some keep follow-up data 60 days after termination but that file is a very pale and partial shadow of the program effects. In fact, it can't be linked to programs at all in the absence of information on what is actually done in the field. Because the money is provided to the City and the City accounts to the Federal government according to the various titles of the CETA legislation and because several titles include services to youth, it is difficult to get accurate figures even, for example, on the gross number of contractors in the City serving young people. (The 350 figure is a guesstimate.)

There are more important explanations for this lack of data about program content and performance. The youth employment focus of the CETA legislation dates from the 1977 Youth Employment Demonstrations and Program Act. CETA had its roots in the old Manpower Demonstration and Training Act. Employment training programs outside the schools are a recent invention, and the decision to provide training services through community-based organizations has created what amounts to a cottage industry. With refreshing candor, no one pretends to know how to cure youth unemployment. The hope is that new solutions will occur spontaneously from people unburdened by previous theories of what is causing what in their clients' lives. The price of those trials is a great deal of error. If we were learning from our mistakes that might be acceptable, even useful. But in the absence of more detailed information about the curricular dimensions of the programs and the differential outcomes for trainees, we

simply do not know what is going on, let alone what works.

A recent comparison of the program emphases of community-based organizations and local education agencies demonstrates one consequence of our inattention. Training can have three different objectives: (1) new skills (how to cut carpets, operate a lathe); (2) new knowledge (especially the basics of reading, writing, and mathematics); and (3) new attitudes (punctuality, cooperativeness, etc.). The relative emphasis among the three is important when, for example, skill training assumes a level of knowledge not yet in place; walking does come before jogging. CBOs were found to emphasize skills training while local schools' emphasized attitudinal changes; half of what CBOs do prepares for specific jobs and 55 percent of what schools try to do shapes attitudes about work. More remarkable is everyone's relative inattention to building "knowledge" --really basic literacy--when most of the programs serve young people who have documented reading problems and who will not make any headway in the world of work until those prior problems are overcome.

Insert Table 6 about here

Until recently, CETA regulations have not allowed trainers to work on basic skills without which vocational success is impossible. In the last decade, school people have learned a lot about how to cause basic skills acquisition, yet there is no evidence of the transfer of that expertise from the schools to the trainers. In fact, the training community has been so pre-occupied with fraud and fiscal mismanagement that it has not been able to attend to its training mission even had it been inclined to do so. Virtually the only time the question of effectiveness

gets raised is in connection with ethnic politics—"You're not helping Antartions enough"—and the response is then the quick fix of a contract let to an Antartican-oriented CBO. Training programs are now operated as income transfer and community development activities, but not yet as training activities.

In that regard, the educational expertise of the Board of Education might usefully complement DoE's strengths. The Board, for example, maintains a computer-based file that flags potential drop-outs, produces a vocational profile on each youngster, and adds other information related to academic progress. At the same time, the CETA-sponsored Private Industry Council has a computer system that can match clientele characteristics with job availability. Those two systems have different pieces of the same puzzle but not on the same youngsters, and neither file overlaps with or is available to the Department of Employment's youth programs whose intake and diagnosis system is run separately and differently. Some youths undoubtedly get ping-ponged among the various components; all youths have their career fates bound to which system they happen to enter.

What should be done? People from the manpower training community argue that more money or authority to the schools would merely reward a group whose failure is the source of the unemployment problems faced by young people. Compared to trainers, school people may be far more knowledgeable about basic skills acquisition but they are not well connected to the private sector. Eventually, we should find a way to exchange strengths and not suspicions. The larger question is: "What works?" It is clear that the purposes and the clientele of the two agencies overlap and, to some extent, so do the methods. It seems unlikely that the City

would benefit from a single giant system driven by orthodox and singular solutions to problems as complex as youth unemployment. Redundancy can be justified if it results in competition and if the competition leads to greater efficiency and effectiveness. But if we are to countenance parallel operations, we ought at least to be able to compare them. Thus, especially the Board's occupational and DoE's youth employment programs need to use comparable documentation systems that track differing clientele through differing programs to (probably) differing outcomes.

The barriers to such systems are the additional paper-work burden and the specter of evaluation, especially for the Department of Employment. While there are ways to minimize the paperwork complications, the fact of the matter is that the City cannot help young people become job-ready by the current non-system of flying blind. As a society, we find ways to count the things we care about--calories, horsepower, the GNP--but the training community has not yet begun to keep track of the core of its responsibilities. A comprehensive and detailed data system will undoubtedly spotlight some uncomfortable situations and increase political heat. But it is hard to believe that training programs will be in jeopardy solely because of a better understanding of how to make kids employable. It is not unimportant to political support that some income transfer and some community development purposes get served, en passant, to the training purpose. But it is also important that we never quite get to training. Thus, we need a documentation system that should contribute to sharing strengths and to complementarity without jeopardizing the continued existence of parallel efforts.

Conclusion

The pivotal components of policy analysis, in this view, are politics, technology, and service delivery or power, ideas, and workers. The cases presented in this paper put those ideas together in different ways and demonstrate something of the interaction among the factors; each of which is ordinarily at a different developmental stage than the others.

In the instance of the "instructionally effective school," neither the politicians nor the workers are inclined to support the idea or incorporate it in their practice until researchers have more clearly demonstrated that there exists a set of within-school factors which can override the learning-related difficulties ordinarily associated with low income status. But, since beliefs govern action and since most practitioners no longer believe that they can teach poor children, researchers cannot find the evidence necessary to build the case for strengthening practice or for more generous support for public schooling.

In early childhood education, the benefits are so clearly evident that (as of this writing) not even the Federal government is inclined to reduce the program. Whether or not New York City takes the next and logical steps in articulating the under-utilized schooling sector with the separate Head Start/day care programs is a political question that has more to do with the fact that the workers of the two establishments are organized by two different unions: the public school teachers by the United Federation of Teachers and day care by the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees.

With respect to youth employment training, so little is known about how training services are delivered and to what effect that there is no

way to avoid a situation of unallayed politics in the most venal and cynical sense. The same has been true in public schooling (although to a lessening extent). Absent a reliable technology, the politics of education is only about adults, not children; working conditions, not learning outcomes.

Thus, the troika of policy analysis--politics, technology, and service delivery. Colloquially, "troika" refers to a sled pulled by three horses. In this case, we need to note that troikas are not particularly efficient machines; they are difficult to maneuver and hard to drive. Fortunately, the role of policy analysis is not to direct the troika but rather to map its progress and comment on its direction.

Footnotes

[1]Whether or not children benefit is an optimum criteria but not always an appropriate one. There are many things which deserve doing even though children may never benefit.

[2]R. Gary Bridge, Charles M. Judd, & Peter R. Moock. The determinants of educational outcomes: The impact of families, peers, teachers, and schools. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1979, p. 10.

[3]New York's Board of Education has more instructional employees (58,000) than the Chrysler Corporation has hourly employees (54,000); yet Chrysler's operations are concentrated in only 40 plants while the Board oversees more than a thousand schools.

[4]Ronald Edmonds. Effective schools for the urban poor. Educational Leadership, 1979, 37, pp. 15-16.

[5]David C. Berliner. "Tempus Educare" in Penelope L. Peterson and Herbert J. Walberg, Research in teaching: Concepts findings, and implications. Berkeley: McCutchan, 1979.

[6]There are several things that can increase "instructional emphasis" beginning with getting the kids to come to school. On any day, about 150,000 students will be absent from New York City's schools.

[7]Office of Educational Evaluation. School Improvement Project: A summary of the First Annual Assessment Report. New York City Public Schools, September 1980, p. 18.

[8]Mayor's Management Report, Supplement. September 17, 1980, p. 230.

[9]Harold Hodgkinson. What's right with education. Kappan, 61(3), November 1979, p. 160.

[10]There are about 18,000 local education authorities in the U.S. but 41,000 local criminal justice agencies. There are some 250,000 school administrators but 330,000 social workers. There are 2 million teachers but 4.3 million health care workers. Public elementary and secondary education costs $70 billion but the Federal government spends $180 billion on income security. There are 30 million little kids currently enrolled in public elementary schools but there are 36 million retired and/or disabled voters in the Social Security system. Who is to integrate whom?

[11]The Board of Education's 1980 "budgeted cost" per elementary school pupil is $2,774. (Mayor's Management Report, Supplement. September 17, 1980, p. 220.)

[12]Lawrence J. Schweinhart & David P. Weikart. Young children grow up: The effects of the Perry Preschool Program on youth through age 15. Ypsilanti: Center for the Study of Public Policies for Young Children, High/Scope Educational Research Foundation, 1980. (All figures are 1979 dollars.)

Table 1: Enrollment, Budget, and Direct Instruction Distribution for New York City Public Schools: 1979-1980

	Elementary	Junior High	High School	Special Ed.
Percent of October enrollment*	44	20	30	6
Percent of total budget*	39	21	26	14
Average per pupil cost for direct instruction only**	$1,815	$2,258	$1,707	$4,929

Sources: *Board of Education City of New York, "A Functional Analysis of the 1979-1980 New York City Board of Education Budget", (June 1980) Instructional/Organizational Budget for Public School Pupils: 1979-1980", p. 17.

**ibid., Exhibit 7, "Per pupil Cost by Organizational Level, 1979-1980" p. 13.

Table 2: Budget Dimensions of Five Sample New York City Public Schools by Size and Level

Categories	Small Elementary (K-6)	Large Elementary (K-6)	Small Junior High (6-8)	Large Junior High (7-9)	Large High School (9-12)
Students	767	2,058	695	1,257	2,995
Teachers	$570,500* (28)	$1,762,694 (78)	$907,310 (40)	$1,304,000 (64)	$2,308,000 (115)
Supervision	$32,668 (1)	121,741 (4)	$95,022 (3)	$140,290 (5)	$295,000 (11)
Clerical	$14,184 (1)	$56,364 (4)	$29,600 (2)	$43,131 (3)	$130,000 (10)
Para-Professionals	$42,730 (5)	$5,761**	---	$51,276 (6)	---
Counselors	---	---	$25,800 (1)	$49,226 (2)	$46,400 (2)
Aides	$31,696 (7)	$61,746**	$52,486**	$36,224 (8)	$31,600**
Guards	---	---	$9,869	---	$40,000 (4)
Other than Personnel	---	---	$2,587	---	$31,000
Totals	$691,778 (42)	$1,958,306 (86)	$1,122,674 (46)	$1,624,147 (88)	$2,882,000 (142)

*Dollar amounts are Fiscal 1980. Figures in parentheses are numbers of staff.
**Total for hourly rates: numbers of staff unavailable.

Source: Interviews by J. Michael Brown, Department of Educational Administration, Teachers College, Columbia University

Table 3: Summary of Within School Factors Thought to Characterize the Instructionally Effective School

	EDMONDS (20 Detroit and 5 Lansing Schools: achievement data plus case analysis)	CLARK LOTTO McCARTHY (Secondary analysis of 117 urban education studies plus elite interviews)	VENEZKY WINFIELD (Reading programs of two urban, minority schools, one high, one low achieving)	HAGGEN LAWSON SWEET (Controlled for class. 21 high achieving/low achieving schools)	BROOKOVER LEZOTTE (6 improving, 2 declining Michigan schools)	AUSTIN (Secondary analysis of 4 SDE studies of "exceptional" schools)	MAGNUS ET AL (Re-examination of school effectiveness studies)
(A) Principals' characteristics and behavior	Strong leadership	High expectations	High expectations of reading achievement; high task orientation; works closely with specialists; high risk reading goals.	Directive about decisions, but "supportive" of teachers.	Assertive leader, responsible for evaluation of accomplishment of objectives. High expectations of kids.	Strong leadership, observes & teaches high program control, more experience & "pertinent" eduction. High expectations of all.	High expectations; high structure; clear goals.
(B) Teachers' characteristics and behavior	High expectations of childrens' minimum performance.	Staff development programs with specific goals.	Confident, inventive, flexible; encourage students, maintain discipline; high staff development; low time on administrative work.	"Task oriented"	High expectations for all kids of beginning and of further academic achievement. Feel responsible for teaching. "Accountable." Less satisfied.	More experience, more "pertinent" education. "Warmer" high expectations of kids.	High expectations of students; provide structured classrooms, emphasize homework.
(C) School climate or atmosphere	Orderly, conducive to learning, quiet.	Structured learning environment	High morale; effective use of praise; focus on student achievement.		"Disciplined"		Student discipline and structured learning stressed. "Traditional values" of teaching and learning.
(D) Instructional emphasis	Highest priority to pupil acquisition of basic skills.	Concentration on teaching clear goals.	Highest priority to reading with clear goals; homogeneous groupings for reading; client centered services, adaptable instruction.	More time to social studies. More whole group instruction.	Emphasis on reading and math. More time invested	Emphasis on cognitive development. Longer instructional day.	"Strong press for academic excellence," emphasis on homework and study.
(E) Pupil evaluation	Frequent	"Individualized instruction"	Closely monitored student progress	Yes	Teachers accept pupil test results as measure of their adult performance.	Teacher-made tests.	Tests closely related to syllabus. Test taking skills stressed.
(F) Resources	Flexible allocation to follow priorities.	Small classes, more adults. Outside, extra money.	Availability and coordination of extra personnel, time and materials; supplementary materials.	Many adult volunteers, fewer paid aides, high access to additional materials.	Not high use of paraprofessionals.	"Close involvement" of teachers and paraprofessionals with pupils.	"Shared purposefulness" among school persons and home.

Source: Dale Mann, "The Instructionally Effective School: A Planning and Feasability Study" prepared for the Carnegie Corporation of New York, May 1979 (Teachers College, Columbia University).

Table 4:

New York City Agencies Providing Direct Services to Youth, Fiscal Year 1978

Agency	Total Agency Expenditures	Youth Expenditures	Agency Share Total Direct Yo Expenditures
Board of Education	$2,603.4	$2,597.8	48.5%
Human Resources Administration/ Dept. of Social Services: HRA/DSS	3,113.7	1,517.4	28.3
Miscellaneous	971.3	391.6	7.3
Charitable Institutions Budget	605.4	299.3	5.6
Health and Hospitals Corporation	805.3	125.0	2.3
Department of Employment	219.7	78.5	1.5
Department of Health	159.3	76.4	1.4
Police Department	897.3	70.5	1.3
Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Alcoholism Services	97.8	46.7	.9
Department of Parks and Recreation	112.9	41.7	.8
Libraries	62.9	36.9	.7
Department of Correction	108.4	19.7	.4
Department of Probation	22.9	11.6	.2
Community Development Agency	39.9	10.5	.2
Mayoralty (Youth Board only)	8.0	8.0	.2
Department of Cultural Affairs	24.8	6.8	.1
Criminal Justice Coordinating Council	18.3	4.9	
Office of Model Cities	35.1	4.8	.1
Board of Higher Education	478.9	3.7	.1
District Attorney-Kings County	12.0	1.9	.1
Law Department (Family Court only)	1.7	1.7	.0
District Attorney - Bronx County	7.4	1.1	.0
District Attorney - New York County	13.5	.9	.0
District Attorney - Queens County	5.3	.7	.0
Department for the Aging	29.3	.3	.0
District Attorney - Richmond County	.8	.1	.0
Commission on Human Rights	1.3	.1	.0
Board of Correction	.1	.1	.0
TOTAL	$10,457.1	$5,358.9	100.0%

Source: Charles Brecher and Raymond D. Horton, "An Exploratory Study of Public Expenditures for Children in New York City" Conservation of Human Resources, Columbia University, August, 1971, Table II.

Table 5: Employment Related Programs in NYC: Board of Education and Department of Employment Compared

Board of Education Programs

	(Program Title)	(No. of Youth Served)[1]	(Cost)[2]	(Program Description)
(1)	SECONDARY OCCUPATIONAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS	112,559	$206,200,000	Vocational preparation through 100 sites some of which are in academic schools, others in what were formerly known as "trade schools," "vocational" schools, etc. To qualify as a program (as distinct from a particular course in the elective part of a student's day), training must go on a minimum of ten periods per week over a two-year sequence. Of the total enrolled, 10,500 attend after school but receive no academic credit.
(2)	COOPERATIVE EDUCATION (WORK EXPERIENCE PROGRAM)	11,480		600 companies provide paid work experience to individual students. For the larger companies, students alternate one full-time week at work with a full-time school week. Youth served are enrolled in secondary schools and get academic credit.
(3)	ADULT OCCUPATIONAL TRAINING	23,500		90 sites where unemployed or underemployed adults (no age limit) may receive job skills training.

[1]Source: "Mayor's Management Report: Supplement," September 17, 1980, p. 226.

[2]Source; Interviews. Figures are fiscal 1980 estimates.

(continued) Table 5: Employment Related Programs: Board of Education and Department of Employment Compared

Department of Employment Programs

(Program Title)	(No. of Youth Served)[3]	(Cost)[3]	(Program Description)[4]
(4) SUMMER YOUTH EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS	46,250	$26,400,000	The progam is designed to give as many youth as possible something useful to do during the summer, out-of-school months. Enrollees, more than 90 percent of whom are minority, work for nine weeks, a maximum of 25 hours per week. The most frequent placements are with the Parks Department, in day care centers, and other City activities. Some "vocational exploration" activities allow some enrollees to work in the private sector.
(5) YOUTH EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING PROGRAMS (YETP): OUT-OF-SCHOOL	11,800	24,100,000	Various contracts provide technical training, English-as-a-Second-Language training, preparation for the General Equivalency diploma.
(6) YETP: WORK EXPERIENCE AND ON-THE-JOB TRAINING	1,500	17,000,000	Public and non-profit contracting organizations provide part-time employment for in-school and out-of-school youth. The On-the-Job-Training component helps youth qualify for specific occupations through demonstration and practice. One method is "hire first, train later."
(7) YETP: IN-SCHOOL	4,580	9,450,000	CETA legislation sets aside 22 percent of New York's total allotment for programs sponsored by the Board of Education. The Board's is a career experience program for high school students that allows them to get limited work experience plus the help of some guidance and support services. The totals include demonstration or "exemplary" programs.
(8) YOUTH COMMUNITY CONSERVATION AND IMPROVEMENT PROJECTS (YCCIP)	2,400	4,191,000	About 30 contractors provide experience in housing rehabilitation, weatherization, or seal-up, park maintenance and construction.

[3]Fiscal 1980, interviews, Department of Employment.

[4]Department of Employment, "1979 Annual Report," City of New York.

Table 6:

Type of Youth Employment Training Contractors and Behavioral Objectives of Training As Percent of Total Program Effort

	Behavioral Objectives			
Type of Contractor	Skills	Knowledge	Attitudes	Total
Community-based organizations	51	23	26	100
Local Education Agencies	35	10	55	100
Total	86	33	81	
(average)	43	17	41	

Source: Dale Mann, CHASING THE AMERICAN DREAM: JOBS, SCHOOLS AND EMPLOYMENT TRAINING PROGRAMS IN NEW YORK STATE, New York, The Community Service Society, 1980. About half the programs analyzed were from New York City.