ABSTRACT
        This special edition of "Communication" brings
together the work of nine leading scholars of small group
communication. The following topics are discussed: (1) small group
communication research in the 1980s; (2) unanswered questions in
research on communication in the small group; (3) emerging trends in
small group research; (4) structure in group decision making, with
implications for future research; (5) issues for teaching and
research associated with problem-solving discussions in small groups;
(6) consensus in small groups; (7) a formulative investigation of
power and communication behavior; (8) the therapy group as rhetorical
experience; and (9) Japanese student protest as a rhetorical
movement. (RL)

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SMALL GROUP COMMUNICATION IN THE 1980'S

"Small Group Communication Research in the 1980's:
Conceptualization and Methodology".   3
      DALE G. LEATHERS

This article identifies the defining features of three major types of
small-group communication research: rhetorical, quantitative, and
qualitative studies. The conceptual and methodological strengths and
weaknesses of these kinds of small-group communication are compared
and contrasted in an attempt to provide useful guidelines for research
conducted in the 1980's. This evaluative focus is combined with an
effort to specify new conceptual and methodological perspectives which
can be used to address a greater variety of research questions. Parti-
cular emphasis is placed on research which examines the systemic impact
of group process variables on the quality of small-group communication.

"Unanswered Questions in Research on Communication in the Small Group.
A Challenge for the 1980's" 17
      DENNIS S. GOURAN

Past research on small groups has done much to reveal the facilitative
and inhibitory influences that affect the performance of groups.
Dealing with problems that arise during the course of a group's inter-
action, however, has been the subject of little scholarly attention.
Research in the current decade should focus on the study of counter-
active influence. Five areas in which such research seems to be
especially appropriate include: authority relations, pressure for
uniformity, status effects, disruptive behavior, and member goal
orientation. In addition to providing needed answers to questions of
interest, a focus on counteractive influence will contribute to the
development of theoretical coherence in research, provide continuity
between past research and future inquiry, and place the accent in
scholarship on the role in communication.

    Small group research may become one of the dominant trends in
    speech communication in the 1980's. The growth of small group
    communication is a logical outgrowth of the vital importance of
    the small group in everyday life and the growing reservoir of
    accumulated research in persuasion and interpersonal communication
    over the past two decades. This article provides a summary of
    related research that should prove relevant to the study of small
    group communication during the 1980's. Three broad areas of
    social psychological research are reviewed. This research points
    to an increasingly important role in small group research for the
    study of more traditional variables and the integration of small
    group research within the mainstream of communication research.

    The Purpose of this paper is threefold: (1) to describe decision
    making structures drawn from descriptive studies; (2) to identify
    the type of communication occurring during these structures; and
    (3) to suggest directions for future research in the development
    and testing of phase theorems. The paper begins with a concise
    presentation of current decision making models, noting similarities
    and differences. In the second section, methodological problems
    and issues are raised to point out possible limitations of previous
    research. The paper concludes with suggestions for future research,
    including research dealing with basic structural questions as well
    as those questions concerned with providing a greater understanding
    of communication in group decision making.

    This article traces the historical development of research on
    decision-making processes in the small group. The article begins
    with a discussion of Dewey's reflective thinking format and
    reports research in decision-making models through the 1970's.
    The review of the literature warrants the conclusion that
    individuals prefer some type of procedural method for organizing
    group discussion. Therefore, contemporary research should
    continue to locate and test additional variables that may help
    to determine when decision-making should be "descriptively" vs.
    "prescriptively" organized. Research investigations attempting
    to isolate these variables may aid speech communication scholars

to derive more practical guidelines for teaching students how
to lead discussions as well as resolve academic controversies
surrounding decision-making models.

This paper has three purposes: first, it presents ten suggestions
for reaching consensus based on findings from small group research
which are (1) Orient the group, (2) Insist on true consensus, (3)
Maintain a position as long as it is valid, (4) Seek out differences
in opinion, (5) Remain open to other opinions, (6) Be willing to
compromise, (7) Contribute frequently to the discussion, (8) Use
group pronouns rather than personal pronouns, (9) Give adequate
information, (10) Clarify the discussion; second, it reports results
of tests showing the validity of the ten suggestions; third, it
challenges scholars to translate group communication theory and
research into understandable and useable suggestions for everyday
use.

Following a formulative research strategy, 37 personal orientations
toward power are identified. A preliminary instrument based on
these 37 orientations was administered to samples of corporate
executives, government employees, law enforcement personnel, and
sales associates. A final instrument, based on the 7 factors
common to all 4 samples, was checked for reliability and validity.
Validity checks included correlating the 7 power orientation scores
with the sentencing decisions of the District Court judges, the
leadership styles of managers, and the dogmatism scores of business
and community leaders.

The purpose of therapy groups is to train participants in behavior
which will improve their sitatuion in the world. Thus, the group
must stimulate conditions in which the participants will live. For
that reason, orderly procedures must be imposed and behaviors that
would be unproductive outside the therapy group discouraged. There
is no necessary advantage in the catharsis and prurient inquiry
that characterizes much group therapy. In fact, the only justifi-
cation for group therapy is to teach participants orderly and

rhetorical procedure in social communication. Systematic opera-
tions in the group governed by the use of the Standard Agenda
will facilitate the learning experience of behaviors useful out-
side the therapy group. These will carry over into in vivo
experience. There are standard patterns and techniques available
to accomplish these ends.

        DOLORES and ROBERT CATHCART

Japanese student protest may be studied as a rhetorical movement.
However, Japanese student groups cannot be measured with a
"Western yardstick" replete with the terminology of Western
rhetoric. In order to analyze the rhetorical nature of Japanese
group life, the rhetorical critic must understand the unique
socializing function of groups within the Japanese culture. The
interwoven network of groups operate as communication centers
among individuals. Japanese society rests upon groups for promot-
ing social harmony. Thus, the rhetorical critic must recognize
that group behavior is embedded in Japanese traditions and these
factors must be taken into account before the critic may render
a judgment about the effectiveness of Japanese student protest.

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PREFACE

This special edition of <u>Communication</u> brings together several of the leading small group scholars for the purpose of assessing the study of small groups from the speech communication perspective.

One of our primary objectives in convening this group of scholars was to determine whether the perceptions of speech communication theorists regarding the study of small groups had altered during the previous decade.

Our invitation to these scholars, therefore, carried the most general charge that they address the current status of small group research and future issues and directions eminent in the study of small groups in the 1980's.

The appearance of this special issue of <u>Communication</u> is appropriately timed. Few systematic attempts to update the "state of the art" in small group communication have appeared since the "ground-breaking" criticism of the early 1970's in the national journals of speech communication, and more recently, the <u>Central States Speech Journal</u>.

The timing of this issue also seems especially important as we enter the 1980's--a time in which the speech communication profession has given renewed attention to assessing its academic and social impact. We hope this special edition of <u>Communication</u> will provide speech communications scholars with a valuable reference and resource of information in small group communication.

I extend my appreciation to those scholars who contributed so graciously of their time and effort. Their contributions are evident in the pages of this journal. The Communication Association of the Pacific, and its international president, Dr. Donald W. Klopf, are graciously acknowledged for their support in making this special edition possible.

<div align="right">

Michael R. Neer
Special Editor
<u>Communication</u>

Department of Speech
University of Hawaii
Honolulu, Hawaii

</div>

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A WORD FROM THE EDITOR

This edition of Communication, capably compiled and edited by
Dr. Michael Neer, marks another in a continuing series of special issues
that the Communication Association of the Pacific has devoted to the
discussion of a topic of major importance in speech communication.

Recent special editions have been devoted to communication apprehen-
sion and organizational communication, and an upcoming edition is scheduled
on functional communication.

As editor of Communication, I would like to acknowledge individually
each of the contributors to this special edition on "Small Group Communi-
cation in the 1980's," who, through their previous scholarly contributions,
have earned a reputation as leading scholars in small group communication.
The contributors are:

Dale G. Leathers, University of Georgia

Dennis S. Gouran, University of Indiana

Robert N. Bostrom, University of Kentucky

Ronald L. Applbaum, California State University at Long Beach

John K. Brilhart, University of Nebraska at Omaha.

John A. Kline, United States Air Force

Mary Cavanaugh, Regis College

Carl Larson, University of Denver

Al Goldberg, University of Denver

Jeffrey Bellows, University of Denver

Gerald M. Phillips, The Pennsylvania State University

Dolores Cathcart, Free Lance Writer; Robert Cathcart, Queens College
of the City University of New York

We look forward to continuing our professional association with each
of these scholars and hope that the series of special editions will provide
an update of research and theory relevant to their respective areas of
investigation.

Wayne H. Oxford
Editor
Communication

FROM THE PRESIDENT

This special edition of Communication is one of a series the
Communication Association of the Pacific has published in its thirteen
years and I am pleased to announce that another is being prepared. Dr.
David D. Hudson, Department of Speech, University of Hawaii, is editing
the next one. The journal, he states, will provide educators with a
rationale for the use of communication methods in the teaching of English
with special emphasis placed on helping educators develop "communication
competence." The issue, as a consequence, should have value to CAP members
in Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and Micronesia who teach English as a
second language.

There is a growing interest in speech instruction among those educa-
tors because the old techniques of teaching reading, writing and literature
have not set well with the customers, the students who pay for the courses.
They recognize there is little utilitarian reward in mastering a language,
if they cannot use it for oral interaction purposes. Their quiet rebellion
has caused changes in the educational process with attention being directed
to oral communication practices. Dr. Hudson's edition, therefore, should
prove to be a help to those who are shifting to speech instruction.

The following will author articles on how to teach the five oral
communication functions to speakers of other languages:

FUNCTION	AUTHORS
1. Controlling	a. Drs. Linda Heun and Jane Byrd (Northeast Missouri State University)
	b. Barbara Warnick (University of Washington)
2. Feeling	a. Dr. John Stewart (University of Washington) and Dr. Vincenne Waxwood (University of Guam)
	b. Dr. Alton Barbour (University of Denver)
3. Informing	a. Drs. Robert Hopper and Kristine Fitch (University of Texas at Austin)
	b. Dr. Charles Stewart (Purdue University)
4. Ritualizing	a. Dr. Robert Ross (University of Northern Colorado)
	b. Ms. Judy Goldberg (Arapahoe Community College, Littleton, Colorado)
5. Imagining	a. Dr. Paul Hunsinger (Christian Broadcasting Univer-sity, Virginia Beach, Virginia)
	b. Dr. Donald Ecryod (Temple University)

Dr. R. R. Allen (University of Wisconsin, Madison) is preparing the
lead article for the journal. His contribution will provide a theoretical
justification for the use of speech communication methods to teach English
to speakers of other languages. Dr. Barbara Wood (University of Illinois,
Chicago Circle) will provide a summary and synthesis of all the articles
contributed.

Editor Hudson has assembled a powerful group and the edition should,
represent a significant contribution to speech education when it appears
later this year.

By the way, articles appearing in Communication will be abstracted for international dissemination in Sociological Abstracts, Language and Language Behavior Abstracts, and Social Welfare, Social Planning and Social Development.

Donald W. Klopf
President

The Communication Association of the Pacific

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   (City)   (State)   (Zip)

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CONFERENCE TIME

It's conference time in CAP and the various CAP groups are holding the
following conferences:

1. <u>CAP-Japan Conference--June 20-21</u>, Nihon University High School, Nagasaki, Japan.
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   For details, write to:
   > Dr. Roichi Okabe, Program Coordinator
   > Department of English,
   > Nanzan University
   > 18 Yamasato-cho, Showa-ku,
   > Nagoya-shi, Aichi-ken 466,
   > Japan

2. <u>CAP-Korea Conference--June 26-28</u>, Seoul, Korea.
   For details, write to:
   > Professor Myung-seok Park
   > Department of English
   > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
   > Seoul, Korea

3. <u>CAP-Philippines Conference--July 1</u>, Manila, Philippines.
   For details, write to:
   > Mr, Jose Mordeno
   > SPEECHPOWER
   > Dona Amporo Bldg Suite 414
   > Espana'Corner Cataluna Sts.
   > Sampaloc, Metro Manila
   > Philippines

4. <u>CAP-Australia Conference--July 8-10</u>, Sydney, Australia.
   For details, write to:
   > Mr, Harry-Irwin
   > Department of Communication Studies
   > Kuring-gai College of Advanced Education
   > Box 222, PO Lindfield 2070
   > Lindffeld, NSW 2070
   > Australia

5. <u>CAP-America Conference--July 25</u>, University of Hawaii, Honolulu.
   Absentia papers accepted. For details write to:
   > Dr. Ronald Cambra
   > Department of Speech 13
   > University of Hawaii
   > Honolulu, Hawaii 96822

A MESSAGE FROM THE SPECIAL EDITOR

A SPEECH COMMUNICATION PERSPECTIVE OF THE SMALL GROUP

Historical Development

In its relatively brief history, the study of small groups has passed through a number of research phases. Lewin's group dynamics research of the 1920's provided the first translation of earlier philosophical debates and paved the way for applied research in real-world problems.[1] During the 1940's research was completed which expanded Lewin's attempts at studying the environmental conditions under which groups functioned.[2]

It was not until Bales' research on interaction process analysis in the 1950's however; that there was an impetus for communication research in the small group.[3] His research also shifted the locus of inquiry from the group's effect upon the individual to how the individual may affect the decision-making processes of the group. The 1960's and 1970's may be characterized as a period of rapid growth in studying the communication within the small group. The focus of the 70's also shifted from the "input-output" paradigm which considered the individual "apart from the group" to the view of the individual as "in" the group or integrated within the communication system of the group. The decade began with a call for studying "spoken symbolic interaction," by the end of the decade, research of Merabian's concept of "speech immediacy" was well-represented with small group research. Cragan's and Wright's summary of research during the decade, for instance, reveals that over two-thirds of the research focused on communication-based explanations of group behavior or communication variables affects group o   .[4]

Criticisms of Small Group Research

However, small group research has experienced its share of "growing pains" during its development. Despite the apparent shifts in its focus, small group research has been the target of much justifiable criticism. McGrath and Altman, in their survey of the status of small group research, provided the criticism that is still echoed today:

Though we have a very high volume of research activity, we have not had a rapid growth of a body of knowledge, because we are not gaining empirical knowledge in a form which permits us to integrate it cumulatively with prior evidence. We cannot readily tie one set of findings to another, simply because there is no broad, shared frame of reference in terms which they can be related.[5]

Fisher and Hawes more succinctly and poignantly state the case when they observe that "deplorably little has been added to knowledge of small group processes since the landmark research of Bales'."[6] The source of each of these criticisms is well-illustrated in Homans' analogy that "we have pursued the higher branches of our science before the trunk was strong. . .thus, we have not grown because we have nothing to grow from."[7]

Yet, amidst criticism of the study of the small group, research continues. Although research findings may be accumulating faster than the knowledge they produce, the study of groups is not as fruitless as is often claimed. As Gouran contends, "In spite of small group research, we have developed reasonably good insights into the factors that determine the manner in which the members of groups behave.[8]

Thus, despite the accelerated rate of research, the study of small group communication has not proceeded without a sense of purpose or direction. Research has now begun to redefine the starting points for reconceptualizing what is studied as well as how it should be studied, although the process may appear circuitious. (For instance, some would argue that research contributes to theory development, while others would argue that grounded research must preceed the assumptive nature of logical-positivist experimentation.) Nonetheless, the starting points for theory construction in small group communication were articulated in a series of original speech communication criticisms during the early 1970's.

Ernest Bormann and Dennis Gouran were among the first to challenge the status of small group communication research. Bormann labelled small group research as a paradox by suggesting that laboratory methods yielding statistically significant findings were not consistent with field observations of real-life groups.[9] According to Bormann, laboratory subjects were more likely to acquiesce or adopt the attitudes they believed fulfilled the expectations of the researcher.[10] Paper and pencil tests and the lack of well-defined neutral operational labels served to accentuate the paradox because they "promised" the results that researchers expected. However, Bormann's criticism of small group research cuts much deeper. As Bormann now contends:·

> Prior to 1968 the field of small group research was dominated by a quasi-paradigm which was inappropriate and barren, and that in the decade since that time too many sholars have continued to use that very same unfortunate research perspective. Like natural scientists practicing normal science wtihin the assumptive system of a research paradigm, investigators studying communication tended to solve puzzles within the premises of the quasi-paradigm. I call the research a quasi-paradigm because it has the form of a scientific paradigm, but not the content. Without a theory the quasi-paradigm cannot provide a common set of variables as keys to investigations and cannot provide theoretically derived hypotheses for experiments.[11]

Similarly, as Larsen contends, "small group research appears to be characterized by an almost random selection of independent variables and an almost random matching up of these with dependent variables."[12] Larsen suggests that random selection persists because there exists no apparent relationshiop between the analytical and statistical decisions of the investigator and his conceptual and theoretical concerns.[13]

Dennis Gouran also was critical of the lack of theoretical focus in the study of small group processes. Gouran concurred with Bormann that statistical tests are often given precedence over research design because researchers have not agreed upon the outcomes of small group interaction.[14]

For Gouran, a hierarchy or taxonomy of group outcomes would help reduce the number of dependent variables as well as assign priority to those variables tested. Within such a framework, researchers may initiate meaningful research questions and then determine the type of statistical design which best fits the purposes of a study. Gouran suggested that a meaningful taxonomy be consturcted by focusing on the sequential relationships among units of communication and utilizing multivariate methods for deriving those variables most relevant to developing theoretical frameworks.[15]

Mortensen also argued that the quantity of unrelated concepts studied within the small group may be reduced (or at least prioritized) if their effect on the communication process is isolated.[16]

Larsen and Mortensen further suggested that a radical departure from experimental laboratory groups was necessary before theory-building could be pursued.[17] Mortensen suggested that descriptive normative methodologies may provide a theoretical framework for integrating small group research while Larsen suggested that experientially-based insights derived from the field of groups may also provide the understanding needed in developing theoretical frameworks.

More recently, Becker has suggested that we determine the applicable range of our generalizations, and for activities that fall beyond that range, additional generalizations be developed.[18] Becker believes one fruitful line of research for determining the range of theoretical generalizations could come from the "rules perspective" of interpersonal communication. If small group communication is viewed as regulated and sequential relationships among variables, as Gouran suggests,[19] then small group research should attempt to specify the underlying rules which govern group discussion. Although making no reference to Gouran, Becker also implies that a taxonomy of group outcomes may not be forthcoming until a wider range of groups are studied with a wider range of dependent measures that relate closely to the various important goals of such groups.[20]

These "constructivists" comments are consistent with Bormann's call for the development of a non-assumptive research tradition which permits researchers to infer meaning, intention, and purpose from the social milieu which communication is initiated. These criticisms, taken together, reflect Fisher's concern that researchers study group behavior as a interaction system rather than collections of individuals whose communication is viewed as a product instead of as a process contributing to their "groupness."[21]

Critical Perspective for Studying the Small Group

Thus, after a decade of assessing the status of small group research, a consensus appears in view about future directions the study of small group research should pursue. However, the emerging consensus reflects what small group researchers should do rather than how research should be done. Perhaps a point of departure among the criticisms lies with selecting the starting points for future research. Gouran, among others, is optimistic that a modification of current approaches to studying the small group are capable of generating theory.[22] Bormann and others, how-

ever, insist that theory building cannot proceed through existent methods.[23] However, we should avoid the temptation to fault either the lack of theoretical focus or research methodologies unless we. fault each. Although it may be argued that a theoretical focus preceeds and determines the selection of methodology, theory cannot be advanced without an appropriate method to test its assumptions. Theory and methodology are best viewed as intrinsically bound and dependent upon each other.

In light of the criticisms levied against current research practices, it would appear that methodological weaknesses first be resolved before theoretical frameworks can be developed and adequately tested. Theoretical frameworks appear more difficult to assess since few have been developed apart from methodological considerations. Perhaps theory-building will be best served by reexamining the philosophical bases of communication. Bormann and Becker, for instance, offer a human action perspective for studying the content of small group communication, including intentional and rule-governed behavior while Fisher and Hawes offer a human interaction perspective within a general systems framework.[24] These and other perspectives have received increased attention during the 1970's as evidenced through the incorporation of interpersonal and persuasive theory relevant to small group interaction.

Perhaps one of the most important questions which needs to be debated upon entering another decade of research is whether our methods determine our theoretical/philosophical assumptions.

Although Bormann and others have persuasively argued for alternative methods, we should also question whether changing our methods will change our assumptions. There are at least three assumptions that may be central to debating this question. They concern the nature of the experimental method, the process of operationalism, and the focus of communication theory.

Few would dispute the inability of the hypothetical-deductive method to generate new knowledge, its purpose is to confirm rather than generate. However, the limitation of hypothetical-deductive research lies not with its statistical or behavioristic assumptions, but its lack of explanatory power to infer causation. Consequently, its results are qualified by degrees of relatedness (i.e., probability) among variables. Though these statements are by no means novel, it should also be remembered that the limitations of hypothetical-deductive research (i.e. its inability to generate information beyond which it is given) becomes its strength when used within the confirmation stage of the research process. When used to test inadequately conceptualized or defined operational terms, the investigator rather than the method is at fault.

On the other hand, a case may be made for the creative utilization of the hypothetical-deductive method as a starting point for generating inductively-based hypotheses not grounded in previous observation. Realistically, every possible behavior or combination of behaviors need not be directly observed before hypothesized. Behavior may be hypothesized from generalizations and inferences of past experience or speculating what may occur. Perhaps all knowledge begins as a twinkle of

imaginative speculation of what is or is not possible in spite of what is probable. Although the source of origin for some hypotheses may lie within the researcher's imaginative vision, if confirmed, these hypotheses may help to reduce the trial and error guesswork of groups who lack such vision.

Assumptions underlying operationalism have been debated in speech communication. O'Keefe, for instance, argues that research should break from its logical-positivistic assumptions because operational definitions are neither static nor all-emcompassing of situations they are designed to cover.[25] Even assuming that operational definitions may be reduced to logical-positivistic statements, questions may emerge as to how far communication behavior may be reduced to ensure its operational consistency from one study to another. The longer that behavior is observed in any communication setting, the larger the number of behaviors that may be processed. Unfortunately, an infinite number of behaviors cannot be processed unless they are categorized and labelled where they best seem to fit. Therefore, communication is subject to interpretation regardless of the amount of grounded observation upon which it is based. Furthermore, the more that communication is reduced to its subcomponents, the larger the range of behaviors that must be specified in an operational definition. For instance, an orientation statement may be reduced to all the observable verbal and non-verbal behaviors that encompass its expression (including a group member's previous communication behavior). However, increasing the number of verbal and non-verbal markers not only makes exact replication difficult, but also assumes that the behaviors encompassing such statements are performed in the same order each time they are processed. Yet the same statement may be processed differently each time it is communicated (although it may look the same on the surface). In other words, human variability may make it difficult to concretize an operational definition beyond its general qualities. Consequently, the validity of an operational definition may be limited to its power of abstraction. The paradox of operationalism is deciding how much invariability to ensure an operational definition without destroying the inherent variability within human communication.

Thus, rather than fault a particular method for its shortcomings, it may be as meaningful to challenge the assumptions upon which our methods rest. It is no revelation to state that we can only study humans to the extent that they are creatures of habit; nor is it a discovery to claim our methods serve primarily to quantify those habits that are observable. Yet, as we know, humans also may behave in ways that are inconsistent with their habits, thus breaking the communication patterns we observe. The amount of human variability we can tolerate and the subsequent uncertainty we are willing to accept are questions that we perhaps cannot expect our methods to qualify (or quantify).

As communication theorists we often attempt to bring the communication process within microscopic focus. Though we do not hold an ethnocentric view of our discipline, we do tend to view communication as causation. Our assumption that communication encompasses all behavior to which meaning can be assigned implies that communication is the focal point of interaction. Although this view of communication may be a realistic

assumption (since behavior must be communicated to be assigned meaning),
it becomes difficult to either prove or disprove the impact of communi-
cation with such a world-view.

Within the small group, the communication process may appear as a
"system" of relationships among units of communication. However, analyzing
the relationships among these units of communication may not only prove
impossible but also assumes that communication develops as a sequential
process. However, as the system evolves, so does the communication within
that system. Thus, an enormous amount of communication may be processed
within the system, some as antecedent conditions defining the system and
others as consequent conditions defined by the system. In other words,
previous communication may not always explain ongoing or future communi-
cation, as evidenced by Scheidel and Cromwell's finding that interac-
tion process analysis yields up to 80% unpredictability in the sequence
of statements analyzed.26

Studying communication at critical points within the process (e.g.
leadership emergence, role differentiation, criteria development, norm-
ative development, etc.) may, therefore, provide the best explanation of
the impact of communication within the small group. Rather than cate-
gorizing either isolated communicated behaviors or analyzing the entire
communication process itself, it may prove as beneficial to focus on the
critical points at which communication functions to alter the group
process.

By analogy, every drop of water defines a river; no drop may be
viewed more important than another as the river is in process. Not until
the river overflows or cuts new banks may the changes in its physical
structure be observed. And even then it is not the water that is the
focus but changes in the river's flow and structure. Thus, the communi-
cation process itself does not become focused until changes occur in the
group's structure (including the subsequent flow of communication).

This view of communication does not alter our assumptions about the
communication process, however, it emphasizes a "process intervention
analysis" in which the communicative behaviors of the small group may be
distinguished throughout the group process. For instance, an orienting
statement may appear within the conflict or acceptance phases as well as
during the orientation phase of discussion. Rather than reducing the
communication process to operational labels which may obscure the quali-
tative differences among communication behaviors (and thus assume that
all verbal statements within one phase are similar or that verbal state-
ments between phases are dissimilar), process intervention analysis
assumes that communication processes and developmental phases are inter-
dependent and that each should be anchored by observing the physical
structures they define (such as leadership emergence).

Thus, intervention analysis attempts a middle ground between analy-
zing the entire communication process, on one hand, and isolating verbal
statements, on the other hand. Instead, it suggest that the communication
process be brought into focus by viewing the critical points to which
communication flows and differentiating among those units of communication

that appears most essential to altering the structure of the group process.

Overview of the Special Edition

The contributing authors to this special edition of Communication
have articulated and expanded the prevailing themes of the 1970's. Four
of the major issues addressed in this edition are: (1) theoretical
approaches to the study of the small group; (2) methodological consider-
ations in studying the small group; (3) the applicability of small group
research to actual group practices; and (4) the role of communication
within the small group.

Theoretical perspectives are introduced for studying decision-making
processes, interpersonal processes, group development, and the cultural
context of group communication. One feature shared in common in many of
these perspectives is the development of conceptual frameworks utilizing
existing research as a starting point for theory-building. Dennis Gouran
offers a counteractive influence for integrating a variety of findings on
group relations whose development is communication dependent. John
Brilhart, in his synthesis of decision-making research, suggests that a
reconceptualization and subsequent operational definition of Dewey's
reflective thinking format may be in order in view of the contradictory
research findings that have accumulated regarding its effectiveness.
Robert Bostrom discusses three emerging models that have been developed to
integrate social psychological research on conflict and negotiation.

A second common theme shared by a number of the contributors is the
reiteration of methodological alternatives for studying small group commu-
nication. Dale Leathers suggests a synthesis of major modes of inquiry
with each mode utilized at its most critical or useful point within the
research process. Ronald Applbaum's critique of phase development models
offers possible research strategies for minimizing methodological short-
comings and also raises serious questions for further research. Alvin
Goldberg and his associates demonstrate the sophistication of factor
analysis for testing both theoretical and operational definitions of
leadership and power developed in previous research. The factor solution
in their study not only helps to derive the most discriminating operational
definitions of power, but also bases their validity upon behavioral pre-
dictors how individuals in positions of leadershiop exercise their power.

Articles by John Kline, Dolores and Robert Cathcart, and Gerald
Phillips also demonstrate the utility of studying the small group beyond
the university laboratory. Although Phillips and the Cathcarts do not
directly address methodological issues, their articles represent the
grounding of operational definitions of group processes through observing
contexts of "real-life" groups.

A third common concern shared among the contributors of this special
edition is that of demonstrating the relevance and utility of small group
research to the actual practice of small group communication. Gouran
claims that research has focused on how groups function rather than
enlarging our understanding of how to improve their performance. As a
consequence, Gouran contends "we know what functions may best serve a

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group's efforts but we do not know how best to respond to circumstances that vitiate their performance. In other words, group participants may know what to do, though they may not always be as knowledgeable about how to do it. Brilhart emphasizes that professionals who enroll in our courses are more concerned with what "works" than with our scholarly controversies, yet much of what we teach is a little dubious, only partly grounded, and in some cases downright misleading. Brilhart's primary concern, as he suggests, is that we conduct research which enables us to give advice to people that is less subject to "variability."

A final shared concern among a number of contributors to this special edition is that of the role of speech communication in the study of the small group. Leathers begins by reminding speech communication theorists that they are not social psychologists but scholars whose concern lies with studying the communication behavior of the small group. Gouran also places communication at the focus of small group behavior. As he suggests, once the group process begins, participants have few resources on which they can rely other than their communication repertoires, to alter group behavior and combat problems that may arise.

Robert Bostrom suggests that other disciplines also are developing a theoretical push toward communication as the central group process. If his prediction holds true, speech communication theorists should also be concerned about keeping pace with the integration of communication within the mainstream of small group research so that they may occupy an integral role during this period of integration. Perhaps the catalyst motivating speech communication scholars will lie not only with bringing theoretical order and coherency to their research, but also with ensuring their contributions do not lose their focus should other disciplines develop a "speech centrality" emphasis.

In a recent special issue of Communication Education devoted to "the status of the discipline," Marlier observed:

> Cross-disciplinary research (between speech communication and other disciplines) therefore, has frequently served to reinforce the image of speech communication as a disunified field rather than to stimulate an awareness on the part of colleagues from other disciplines that a specialized understanding of the process of communication . . . is a valuable addition to any contextually specific research effort in which the subject being examined exhibits changes over time stimulated by, and accomplished through, communication.[27]

Fisher has also claimed that the speech communication discipline oftens suffers an identity problem, if not crisis, in not knowing the parameters of its self-identity.[28] Hostettler, writing in the 1960's, stated what may still be considered a consequence of a lack of disciplinary identification:

> Virtually everyone involved in the discipline of speech communication is, at some time, approached by either a stranger or a colleague from another discipline and asked to explain, in twenty-five words or less, just what speech communication is, anyway.[29]

Speech communication theorists may., therefore, be standing at the crossroads of no longer having to defend their discipline, but instead demonstrate its distinctiveness by infusing leadership in the cross-discipline study of the small group.

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Special Editor
<u>Communication</u>

FOOTNOTES :

See for example, Kurt Lewin, <u>Field Theory in Social Science.</u> (New York: Harper, 1951).

See for example, Morton Deutsch, "An Experimental Study of the Effects of Cooperation and Conflict upon Group Pressure," <u>Human Relations</u>, 2 (1949), 129-152 and 199-231; and Alex Bavelas, "Communication Patterns in Task-Oriented Groups," <u>Journal of Acoustic Soc. Am.</u>, 20 (1950), 725-730.

Robert F. Bales, <u>Interaction Process Analysis</u> (Cambridge, M.A.: 1951).

John F. Cragen and David D. Wright, "Small Group Communication Research in the 1970's:" A Synthesis and Critique," <u>Central States Speech Journal</u>, 31 (1980), 197-213.

Joseph E. McGrath and Irwin Altman, <u>Small Group Research: A Synthesis and Critique of the Field</u> (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1966, 76-77.

B. Aubrey Fisher and Leonard C. Hawes, "An Interact System Model: Generating a Grounded Theory of Small Groups," <u>Quarterly Journal of Speech</u>, 57 (1971), 444-53.

George C. Homans, <u>The Human Group</u> (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950).

See Dennis S. Gouran, "Unanswered Questions in Research on Communication in the Small Group: A Challenge for the 1980's," (appears in this special edition of <u>Communication</u>),

See for example: Ernest G. Bormann, "The Paradox and Promise of Small Group Research," <u>Speech Monographs</u>, 37 (1970), 211-217; and Dennis S. Gouran, "Response to the Paradox and Promise of Small Group Research," <u>Speech Monographs</u>, 37 (1970), 218-219.

Bormann.

Ernest G. Bormann, "The Paradox and Promise of Small Group Communication Revisted," <u>Central States Speech Journal</u>, 31 (1980), 214-220.

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14 Gouran.

15 Dennis S. Gouran, "Group Communication: Perspectives and Priorities for Future Research," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 59 (1973), 22-29.

16 C. David Mortensen, "The Status of Small Group Research," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 56 (1970), 304-309.

17 See Mortensen and Larsen.

18 Samuel L. Becker, "Directions of Small Group Research for the 1980's," Central States Speech Journal, 31 (1980), 221-224.

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22 Gouran.

23 Bormann, "The Paradox and Promise of Small Group Communication Revisited."

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25 Daniel O'Keefe, "Logical Empiricism and the Study of Human Communication," Speech Monographs, 42 (1975), 169-183.

26 Thomas Scheidel and Laura Cromwell, "Idea Development in Small Decision Groups," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 50 (1964), 140-145.

27 John T. Marlier, "What is Speech Communication, Anyway?," Communication Education, 29 (1980), 324-328.

28 B. Aubrey Fisher, Perspectives on Human Communication (New York: MacMillan, 1978), 96.

29 Gordon F. Hostettler, "Speech Communication as a Liberal Discipline," Communication Education, 29 (1980), 328-332.

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SECTION I INTRODUCTION

Theoretical and Methodological Critique of the Study of Small Group Communication

The articles in the first section of this special edition are reminiscent of criticisms of small group communication at the turn of the previous decade. A decade later, the same criticisms reappear. However, once previous criticisms are laid to the rest the authors direct their comments to specific alternatives for studying small group communication in the 1980's.

Dale Leathers assesses modes of inquiry in studying the small group. For Leathers, rhetorical studies should be developed to generate rhetorical strategies as they are practiced within the small group. However, rhetorical studies are primarily designed to formulate rather than to test research questions. According to Leathers, qualitative and quantitative studies should translate rhetorical questions into testable research hypotheses. Leathers also points out the limitations of both qualitative and quantitative studies. The foremost methodological shortcoming of qualitative studies is they often lack a well-defined theoretical rationale for both the selection of message variables which are qualitatively superior for study and the selection of time intervals for analyzing verbal interaction. Quantitative studies, on the other hand, often develop conceptually weak rationales justifying their selection of research methods. Leathers concludes by suggesting the three modes of inquiry be combined as well as supplemented with field studies of real life groups. For Leathers, the question is not which method to employ, but rather an understanding when to employ each within the research process.

Dennis Gouran offers a theoretical framework for establishing a hierarchy of group objectives. According to Gouran, one objective encompasses the knowledge requirements for being a constructive group participant in responding to group members whose behavior deviates from established group goals. Gouran has labelled such deviances as counterproductive to the group and the communication designed to alter the deviance is accordingly labelled a counteractive influence. Gouran lists five promising lines of research for testing the role of counteractive influences, including the formulation of verbal strategies to counteract the negative influences of authority figures within the group, the disruptive influence of interpersonal conflict, and the influence of high status members who, by their presence, may divert the group from its goals.

Perhaps the central question in formulating verbal strategies designed to counteract potentially counterproductive influences is how to best respond to deviations without further intensifying the deviance. Although there is a gap in the research between knowing what one should communicate and how communication should actually be attempted, Gouran suggests that some strategies may be derived from available research while other strategies need to be derived for counteractive influences for which research does not now exist. Gouran's framework offers a theoretical-utilitarian approach to the study of the small group; it

integrates a diversity of research under one conceptual framework while also providing practical guidelines for effective member participation. As Gouran states, "a focus on counteractive influences will contribute to the development of theoretical coherence in research, provide continuity between past research and future inquiry, and place the accent in scholarship on the role of communication."

This section concludes with Robert Bostrom's synthesis of accumulated research in conflict and negotiation and suggests how these findings may be incorporated within the mainstream of communication research. Bostrom's review of social psychological research in conflict and negotiation demonstrates that conflict resolution is communication-centered behavior thus suggesting a convergence of interest in the communicative interactions within the small group. Bostrom's review of pertinent research perspectives (such as interpersonal attraction, choice-shift phenomenon, impression management, social comparison processes and group composition) also suggests that communication strategies may be derived to explain how group interaction is processed. Specifically, Bostrom suggests that the simultaneous testing of two or more research perspectives may stimulate the development of theoretical models to explain and predict communication effects. Various combinations of variables may be designed to test interactive effects and their impact on small group outcomes.. Each variable also may affect different outcomes. For example, a member making concessions and willing to compromise may be perceived more attractive or compare more favorably with other group members--thus building cohesiveness--but also may be perceived less credible when introducing subsequent persuasive arguments.

In summary, the articles discussing the current status of theoretical and methodological perspectives reiterate criticisms of the previous decade. However, it appears that small group theorists, guided by the research of the previous decade, are generally optimistic about the study of the small group in the 1980's. A consistent theme emerges among these articles. Each suggests a synthesis of existing research and methodologies for integrating accumulated research findings and the utilization of these findings to generate conceptual frameworks suitable for hypothesis testing and theory-building.

"SMALL-GROUP COMMUNICATION RESEARCH IN THE 1980's: CONCEPTUALIZATION
AND METHODOLOGY

Dale G. Leathers*

Small-group communication research of the next decade might be
approached most profitably with balanced, temporal perspective. Thus,
we should look to our relatively recent history in an effort to appreciate
what is unique about our intellectual heritage and to develop conceptual
continuity in our research.

Arrogant and inflexible attachment to either the past or the future
represent equally unproductive positions. Thus, we can recognize rhetori-
cal theory and rhetorical criticism as the source of some of the most
original thinking about the nature of small-group communication without
canonizing the efforts of the pioneers who were trained in these subjects.
At the same time, we can recognize the demonstrable need to combine the
conceptualization skills of the rhetorician with the quantitative compe-
tencies of the social scientist.

Just as we must guard against the temptation of denigrating the
research of our most senior colleagues, we must guard against the assump-
tion that the "new breed" of small-group communication researcher has
become our sole source of enlightment. Thus, I was both amused and alarmed
when a nationally known colleague suggested to me a few years ago that
researchers of our generation would soon be replaced by the new breed of
Ph.D. He went on to observe solemnly that their sophisticated understand-
ing of the small group so far exceeded ours that we would probably need
an interpreter to understand their journal articles.

When I encountered my colleague recently, my first inclincation was
to assert that he had been prescient in at least one sense. Interpreters
have proven to be a necessary but not a sufficient aid to the journal
reader who seeks to understand some of the publications of the new breed.
For that distinct minority of young scholars who cultivate the fatuous
practice of using needlessly abstract terms such as stochastic, androgy-
nous, and concatenous to express or qualify simple ideas, interpreters,
should be required. In fact, I was tempted to suggest that editors of
our communication journals require that an unemployed English professor
be submitted with each manuscript which obfuscates, pontificates, or
equivocates.

At this point, I recognized the need to view all small-group com-
munication researchers with balanced, temporal perspective. I recognized
that few research areas were bless with a more promising group of young
scholars even as I recoiled as the thought of the excessive preoccupation
with self that some of them have demonstrated at our communication conven-
tions.

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The overriding purpose of this paper; therefore, is not to exhibit an unseemly infatuation with research conducted at any given point in time or to ascribe superhuman qualities to any group of researchers. On the contrary, I will attempt to make an objective assessment of three of the major kinds of small-group communication research which are presently being undertaken.

To place that assessment in proper perspective, I believe it is useful to begin by identifying some of the most fundamental assumptions which I make about small-group communication. I assume that: (1) members of a small-group typically experience a set of intragroup forces which help make small-group communication a distinctive phenomenon; (2) small-group communication researchers should be primarily concerned with identifying the nature of and with measuring the impact of those factors which affect communicative interaction in the small group; and (3) small-group communication researchers should in most instances seek to determine what variables affect small-group communication rather to determine what variables small-group communication affects.

Steiner provides graphic support for the first assumption when he writes that "when a person functions as a member of a group, his behavioral predispositions are likely to be less critical than the demands of the social system,"[1] It is precisely because group process variables such as cohesiveness and conformity exert systemic demands on group members that group members frequently behave differently by virtue of the fact that they are in the small group.

Too frequently, I believe, researchers treat the systemic pressures generated in the small group, as well as the small-group context, as incidental factors which have few behavioral implications in their own right. This unfortunate tendency was manifested recently in a manuscript prepared by two highly-respected colleagues. As a manuscript reviewer, I was shocked to note their contention that there is nothing distinctive about small-group communication. They went on to compound their basic conceptual error by asserting that the small group may be viewed as "merely" a "setting" where communication takes place.

Indeed, their conceptual error seemed so egregious that I was moved to write that "if the authors persist in their errant claim that small-group communication is indistinguishable from other types of communication, they are apt to impair seriously the credibility of their own work in the eyes of many small-group researchers both inside and outside of our discipline."

The second assumption seems almost equally important to me if we are to escape the charge that we are in fact social psychologists whose Ph.D. in speech communication was either an act of expediency or madness, or both. Our primary responsibility clearly is not focus on all kinds of behavior in the small group but on communicative behavior. To undertake small-group research which does not focus on communicative interaction simply perpetuates the claim that we have no worthwhile intellectual heritage of our own, and that we have in some cases been doomed to the ignominious and parasitical role of using the social psychologists' tools to undertake what they have accomplished a generation ago.

The third assumption is integrally related to the second. I am

certainly not uninterested in the attempts of other disciplines to use
the small group as a microcosm of interaction in larger societal units,
or as a tool to diagnose and treat various mental disorders. Moreover,
I believe small-group communication researchers may properly examine the
impact of small-group communication on group outcomes. Nonetheless,
these should remain secondary concerns in the study of small-group
communication.

In this paper I will not attempt a comprehensive review and evalu-
ation of all of the studies which might be classified as small-group
communication research. This need has already been satisfied with two
reviews which trace the development of research from 1930 to the late
1970's. In this splendid review of small-group communication research
done between 1930-1970, Larson contends that any given study might be
classified into one of six broadly defined categories: problem-solving
and judgment processes, communication processes and member attitudes,
description of process, leadership and moderation, teaching small group
processes, and format comparisons. Moreover, Cragan and Wright have
covered most of the decade of the 1970's with their convention paper
entitled "Small Group Communication Research of the 1970's: A Synthesis
and Critique."

My own essay focuses on three types of small-group communication
studies which seemingly have had the most sustained impact on contempora-
ry researchers, and are apt to exert a major influence on small group
communication research conducted in the 1980's. For ease of identifi-
cation I will refer to these types of studies, respectively, as rhetori-
cal, quantitative, and qualitative studies.

More specifically the objectives of this essay are (1) to provide a
comparative description and evaluation of the major conceptual and methodo-
logical features of these three types of small-group communication stu-
dies; and (2) to specify the conceptual and methodological features of
small-group communication research which should be emphasized in the 1980's.

RHETORICAL STUDIES

The genesis of rhetorical studies of small-group communication
might be traced to Edwin Black's SM article entitled "A Consideration
of the Rhetorical Causes of Breakdown in Discussion." Not surprisingly,
some of Black's language seems a bit archaic when considered twenty-
five years later. For example, small-group communication has replaced
discussion as the operative term and few scholars are willing to talk
in public about communication "breakdown" in an age that gives lipservice
to the transactive perspective.

Closer inspection reveals the conceptually innovative nature of
Black's rhetorical study, however. Black was innovative in his assertion
that "the language of rhetorical theory" provides a useful vehicle for
describing communicative interaction among small-group members, in his
claim that some of the most disruptive forces in the small group are
essentially rhetorical in nature, and in his use of rhetorical concepts
to generate testable hypotheses.

The salient conceptual features of Black's rhetorical study are

strikingly similar to the most important conceptual features of many
rhetorical studies which are currently being published. Indeed, recent
rhetorical studies of small-group communication continue to exhibit
commendable conceptual strengths and troublesome methodological weakness-
es.

To his credit, Black emphasized that the methodological limitations
of his rhetorical study were such that it could be used for generating
but not for testing hypotheses. Thus Black wrote that "the conclusions
from this investigation cannot be taken as final; they are untested and,
hence, but tentative. However, should experimentation validate these
hypotheses, we have advanced another step toward a rhetorical theory for
group discussion."[5]

Black's study was unlike many contemporary rhetorical studies of the
small group in that the number of groups he used, thirty-five, was highly
respectable. On the other hand, many methodological features of Black's
study remain prominent features of rhetorical studies published twenty-
five years later. Thus, key variables are rarely operationalized in
rhetorical studies, a comprehensive and representative sample of relevant
communicative behaviors is typically not provided, the precise procedures
used to record, process, and analyze data are frequently not spelled out,
and rhetorical studies are not apt to focus explicitly on the safeguards
employed to help assure both internal and external validity.

Many contemporary rhetorical studies of small-group communication
reflect the creative influence of Ernest Bormann's research at the
University of Minnesota. Since Bormann was my own Ph.D. advisor I have
also been influenced in many ways by a man for whom I feel great profes-
sional respect and personal regard. Nonetheless, I disagree strongly
with Bormann's implied position that case studies of small-group communi-
cation should be a substitute for rather than a supplement to experimental
studies of small-group communication.[6]

Bormann's own creative translation of Robert Bales' fantasy theme
analysis into rhetorical terms has affected rhetorical studies in at
least two ways. First, a number of Bormann's students and other researchers
have used Bormann's fantasy theme model, or a close derivative, in their own
research. Second, Bormann's fantasy theme model has stimulated researchers
to attempt to recreate "symbolic reality" in the small group as perceived
from the perspective of group members.[7] In those instances where fantasy
themes are not the basic unit of analysis the group members' perception
of reality still receives major emphasis.

Barbara Sharf's recent CM article is a good example of a rhetorical
study which formulates a provocative research question if not an actual
hypothesis. What, asks Sharf, are the rhetorical aspects of communicative
behavior when group members successfully resolve a struggle for leadership
and when they do not?[8] If my assumptions about small-group communication
are correct, this is precisely the type of question which a researcher
should be asking.

While Sharf's conceptualization is creative and suggests hypotheses
which might subsequently be subjected to empirical test, it is her method-
ology which reveals the pre-scientific or non-scientific nature of this

type of rhetorical study. To begin, many of her most central terms
are not nominally defined and none of them appear to be operationally
defined. Thus, group members create "holistic rhetorical visions,"
use "rhetorical resources," experience the "non-stabilization of
leadership," and endure "rhetorical struggles" but Sharf never pauses
to provide precise, referential definitions for these terms.[9]

In addition the study reflects an inattention to procedural detail—
and specificity which seems rather characteristic of recent rhetorical
studies of small-group communication. Thus, no attempt is made to select—
a random or representative sample of relevant behaviors of group members,
no attempt is made to develop and validate a category system which could
be used to classify such behaviors, and no attempt is made to use inde-
pendent observers to verify the accuracy of the author's own subjective
description of the "rhetorical aspects" of group interaction which she
alone deems to be relevant to her research question. Indeed Sharf simply
observes that she selected "particularly salient interactions" for study.[10]

If such incomplete and subjective research procedures serve to
threaten the internal validity of this study, the lack of external vali-
dity is equally problematic. Since Sharf uses only two groups for her
analysis, generalization of results must await further research. To
her credit, Sharf injects a disclaimer that sounds strikingly similar
to Black's when she writes that "While the two case studies do not
establish generalizable conclusions, the results do suggest a theoreti-
cal line of thought worthy of further consideration."[11]

Another contemporary rhetorical study, which describes the
rhetorical characteristics of conscious-raising groups composed of
members of Gay Liberation, exhibits similar conceptual strengths and
methodological weaknesses. Thus, Chesbro, Cragan, and McCullough do an
illuminating job of identifying interesting and relevant features of
communicative interaction in such groups while illustrating these fea-
tures via selected excerpts.[12]

The subjective and flawed nature of their research procedures sug-
gest once again, however, that such rhetorical studies may properly be
used to formulate but not to test research hypotheses. Thus, the re-
searchers do not clearly define their unit of analysis, do not develop
or validate any classificatory scheme or category system, and report no
reliability figures for the impressionistic "classifications" which they
undertake. With regard to the reliability of their classification they
confine themselves to the ambiguous comment that there was "substantial
agreement" regarding the "rhetorical characteristics of each stage."[13]

External validity is a problem once again in this rhetorical study.
On the basis of studying only three consciousness raising sessions the
authors come to the alarming conclusion that the "consciousness raising
stages identified here appear generally reliable and generalizable to
other revolutionary groups employing the process."[14] Rare indeed is the
social scientist who would use three groups to support a similar claim.

Quantitative Studies

From the outset quantitative studies have been primarily concerned with classification and tabulation. The major tool of the trade for the quantitative researcher is the category system. Since category-systems lend themselves to the examination of the temporal aspects of communicative interaction in groups, it is hardly surprising that quantitative researchers have become preoccupied with such terms as phases, patterns, and sequences.

Initially, quantitative researchers were concerned with classifying every communicative act and tabulating the number of times specific contributions were classified into the categories developed by the researcher. More recently researchers expanded their focus by using Markov analyses to determine the probability that one kind of communicative act will follow another; and ultimately, with predicting patterns or sequences in the communication that is apt to occur in groups.

Aubrey Fisher has probably been the most productive and prominent exponent of the quantitative study of small-group communication. In 1970 Fisher initiated his own series of quantitative studies by emphasizing that the purpose of his initial study "was to discover the nature of the interaction process across time leading to group consensus in decision-making groups."[15] Classifying all actions which group members took on decision proposals, Fisher concluded that decision-making groups pass through four identifiable phases: orientation, conflict, emergence, and reinforcement.[16]

The most obvious strength of this and subsequent quantitative studies is the attempt to determine what changes take place in the communication interaction in groups over time and in attempting to determine the probability that the communicative acts in groups will exhibit certain distributional and sequestial patterns. Fisher Ellis, Mabry, Stech and others deserve much credit for their sophisticated efforts to identify and illustrate such patterns.

While rhetorical studies tend to be distinguished by their conceptual strengths and methodological weaknesses, quantitative studies tend to exhibit methodological strengths and conceptual weaknesses. In particular there are three conceptual problems that seem to me to persist in quantitative studies: (1) quantitative researchers rarely develop a complete and persuasive rationale which spells out the theoretical or practical justification for undertaking such studies: (2) the implications of the results are rarely discussed for the express purpose of specifying how the results could be used to facilitate communication in groups that were not part of a given quantitative study; and (3) most quantitative studies have been narrowly focused on the task dimension of interaction in groups.

As early as 1971 Aubrey Fisher was writing that "separating a group's task and socio-emotional dimensions seems to reflect, as well, the hackneyed conflict between reason and faith, classicism and romanticism, logic and emotions, pathos and logos.[17] In view of Fisher's early commitment to use quantitative studies to examine both the task and socio-emotional dimensions of small-group interaction, I find the continuing

preoccupation with the task dimension to be both puzzling and inconsistent.

As I have already suggested, many quantitative studies exhibit a degree of methodological sophistication and a set of methodological strengths which is not characteristic of rhetorical studies. Specifically, quantitative researchers have shown a laudable inclination to develop their own category systems rather than borrowing them from the social psychologists and they have employed a number of advanced statistical procedures for the purpose of data processing and data display. Moreover, the research procedures of quantitative studies are typically free from the subjectivity, ambiguity, and imprecision which are frequently evident in rhetorical studies. . . .

A number of quantitative studies do exhibit at least two methodological features which limit their long-range potential, however. First, Fisher and his associates, as well as many other quantitative researchers, remain committed to the tedious and time-consuming practice of classifying all contributions that occur in a small group. The reasons why quantitative researchers do not employ the more parsimonious practice of sampling relevant or representative communicative acts in groups is unclear. Second, the persistent attempt to study all contributions made in groups has resulted in a disturbing trend. As they are forced to classify and analyze more and more data, quantitative researchers have been drawn to the questionable practice of using increasingly limited numbers of groups in their studies.

Mabry contributed to a reversal of this trend by studying twenty-seven, five-person groups. He was able to study this substantial number of groups by making two methodological modifications. He broadened his classificatory focus to content themes and he expanded his context unit of analysis to a one-minute period of time. By greatly expanding the number of groups he studied and by reducing the amount of data he would classify as a result of the specified methodological modifications, Mabry was able to achieve highly utilitarian objectives. At the same time, he was forced to use the one-minute context unit, which seems arbitrary at best, and he was forced to specify that each group reach consensus in the unrealistically short time of thirty minutes.[18]

In retrospect Mabry's attempt to use a respectable number of groups seems to be the exception rather than the rule for quantitative studies. The prevailing practice seems to be to study fewer and fewer groups as the burden of data analysis increases. Thus, Fisher used ten groups in his 1970 SM study, Ellis and Fisher used four classroom groups in their 1975 HCR study, Ellis used two decision-making groups and two consciousness-raising groups in his 1979 CM study, and Fisher and Beach used only one meeting of one T-group in their 1979 WJSC article.[19]

The most obvious effect of this practice is to vitiate the external validity of such quantitative studies and make generalization of results to other groups impermissible. Not surprisingly, then, some quantitative researchers find themselves in the uncomfortable position of formulating but not testing hypotheses. Thus, Fisher and Beach admit that ". . .the conclusions of the study are in the form of plausible hypotheses. Future studies shall test these hypotheses and provide an empirical basis for

their confirmation or disconfirmation."20

Quantitative Studies

The focus of quantitative and qualitative studies is quite different.
Quantitative studies are purely descriptive in the sense that a category
system is used to classify the contributions of group members. In most
cases the categoric labels are used to describe the kind of contribution
but imply no judgment as to. its desirability. By contrast qualitative
researchers use scales to rate the desirability of communicative beha-
viors in groups in terms of their qualitative impact on the communicative
interaction which is occurring. Although both quantitative and qualita-
tive studies employ the statistical tools of the social scientist, quali-
tative studies go beyond description in the attempt to differentiate
communicative acts in groups on the basis of their measurable quality.

While a number of researchers are doing qualitative studies of small-
group communication, the work of two individuals reflects a long-term
commitment to this type of research. Dennis Gouran's research at Indiana
University has been highly instrumental in demonstrating the inherent
potential of qualitative studies and in refining the measuring instru-
ments which are necessary to undertake a qualitative study. In addition,
my own research reflects a continuing attempt to develop the conceptual
framework and methodological procedures which make the qualitative study
distinctive. My 1969 article in QJS, "Process Disruption and Measure-
ment in Small-Group Communication," describes what is probably the first
qualitative study undertaken by someone in speech communication.

From a conceptual perspective qualitative studies of small-group
communication exhibit a number of defining features. Qualitative re-
searchers typically: (1) develop an explicit rationale which spells out
the theoretical and practical value of evaluating the quality of com-
munication in groups; (2) use content analysis and factor analysis to
develop scaling instruments which identify both the desirable and un-
desirable communicative qualities of individual contributions by groups
members; (3) seek to identify and measure the impact of variables which
have a particularly pronounced impact on the quality of communicative
interaction in the small group.

My own studies, for example, have been designed to measure the im-
pact of variables such as high level abstractions, implicit inferences,
facetious interpolations, and multichannel message inconsistencies on
subsequent verbal and nonverbal feedback which they elicited.22

These studies seem to support at least two conclusions of consi-
derable import for members of our profession. First, certain types of
message variables have a highly consistent and predictable impact on
the quality of communication in small groups. Second, there does indeed
seem to be an identifiable relationship between the quality of group
communication and group outcomes. Thus, the results of one of my quali-
tative studies led me to suggest that there is "a direct relationship be-
tween the quality of communication and the quality of product in the
problem solving group."23

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While the research of Gouran and his associates does not use trained confederates to manipulate message variables in laboratory groups, it reflects a very similar conceptual perspective. This conceptual perspective is clearly delineated in the statement of objectives for the recent CM study by Gouran, Brown, and Henry. The objectives of that study were (1) to determine which type of contribution will have the greatest impact on the perceived quality of decision-making discussions, (2) to develop a behavioral inventory (types of contributions) that could be used to assess the quality of communication in similar types of discussions, and (3) to assess the theoretical impact of a discovery showing differences in the relative impact of different variables on perceptions of quality of decision-making discussions.[24]

This study makes a particularly important contribution to qualitative research. For the first time, Gouran et al. measure the relative impact of different kinds of contributions on the perceived quality of outcomes in small groups. Thus, Beta weights suggest that the relevance of issues discussed was the most important feature of individual contributions (1.74) while evenness of participation (.05) was the least important feature of individual contributions.[25]

While the conceptual strengths of qualitative studies have already been identified, the conceptual problems may not be so obvious. In my view these conceptual problems are integrally related. Researchers have not achieved consensus as to the exact nature of communicative behaviors which are qualitatively superior, and, as a result, measuring instruments may be unduly influenced by the value system of the researcher.

From a methodological perspective qualitative and quantitative studies seem to reflect some of the same strengths in data processing and data display. Unlike quantitative researchers, however, qualitative researchers must confront the difficult problem of selecting a defensible sample of communicative behaviors in groups. Unless such samples can be defended as representative of other pertinent communicative behaviors in the designated groups, the reported relationship(s) between message variables and communicative effects may be attributed, at least in part, to experimental artifact.

Conceptualization and Methodology in Future Research

As my evaluation suggests, each major type of small-group study considered has both inherent strengths and weaknesses. Ideally small-group communication studies of the 1980's will be able to combine the conceptual creativity of the rhetorical study with the methodological rigor of the quantitative study. In addition, such studies are apt to yield more useful knowledge if they follow the lead of qualitative research by seeking to identify which variables affect communicative interaction in small groups and by specifying what steps can be taken to reduce or eliminate the sources of disruption.

In attempting to synthesize the most desirable conceptual and methodological features of rhetorical, quantitative, and qualitative studies I am not suggesting that we be satisfied with producing a hybrid type of research. Indeed I believe we should combine the effort to

incorporate the best features of current research with attempts to develop new kinds of conceptualizations and methodologies.

To begin, it is important to recognize that the nature of the questions asked about small-group communication is perhaps the single most important feature of the conceptualization process. In too many cases the researcher's personal identification with certain types of statistical tests seems to dictate the research questions which is formulated. In fact the nature of the research question addressed should determine the types of statistical tests which are used. Furthermore, researchers should consider formulating research questions which build upon one another and lend themselves to a series of conceptually-related studies which produce cumulative knowledge.

To increase the utility of attempts to conceptualize small-group communication I believe that it is important to expand the scope of subjects which is considered. For example, we need to know much more about the effects of a variety of small-group contexts on communicative interaction in groups and group outcomes. Such defining features of the physical environment as territorality, the use of space, and seating arrangements have received insufficient attention.

In addition we need to examine the impact of such interpersonal variables as empathy, assertiveness, and trust on the development of relationships in groups. As we move beyond our preoccupation with decision-making groups, we need to study groups that serve a wide array of socially useful functions at the same time that we more thoroughly examine the effects of communicative interaction in small groups on the self-concept and self-confidence of the members.

As we consider guidelines for conceptualizing small-group communication studies, I believe we should consider the audience we are trying to reach. For purposes of promotion and ego-satisfaction, conceptualization which impresses our colleagues is indeed useful.. If we consider the broader objective of seeking knowledge of demonstrable value for members of given kinds of groups, however, the nature of our conceptualization may be quite different.

More specifically, the following guidelines may be helpful in conceptualizing the nature of small-group communication research which should be undertaken in the next decade. First, small group communication studies should feature fully developed rationales which specify why there is a need for the types of knowledge a given study can yield, and enumerate the theoretical and/or applied uses for such knowledge.

Second, small-group communication researchers should attempt to identify, operationalize, manipulate, and determine the relative importance of those systemic variables, or intragroup forces, which affect group members' behaviors in identifiable ways. Until we begin manipulating group process variables such as level of cohesiveness and degree of conformity pressure, we are disregarding those systemic properties which help make small-group communication distinctive.

Third, small-group communication researchers should treat the communication that occurs in small groups as a multi-channel phenomenon.

Ours is a field which has been and remains preoccupied with verbal discourse. This conceptual myopia is particularly alarming since we now know that the nonverbal communication channels fill many important functions in the small group more effectively and more efficiently than verbal discourse. In addition we now have evidence to suggest that the kinds of information provided by the verbal and nonverbal channels are often substantively different.[26]

Fourth, we should attempt to identify, measure, and develop those communicative competencies which are indispensable for effective communication in the small group. We know, for example, that individual predispositions to be reticent, apprehensive, and withdrawn seem to be exaccerbated in the small-group. The clear implication seems to be that both those who experience such problems and those who interact with them must develop a specialized set of communicative competencies if communication in the small group is not to be seriously impaired.

From a methodological perspective, I believe that it is important that we undertake more field studies which seek to identify the nature of those forces which facilitate and disrupt communication in socially significant groups over time. To accomplish this objective the use of such field techniques as unstructured interviews and participant observations should be encouraged. At the same time field studies should be used as a supplement to, rather than a substitute for, experimental studies.

The Minnesota Studies deserve praise for their avowed objective of studying real groups in their native environment. Much less praiseworthy is the tendency to use a single group or a handful of groups for generalizing results to other groups with essential characteristics which are presumably similar in nature. In fact the Minnesota Studies might more properly be identified as the Minnesota Case Studies.

Secondly, the methodology of small-group communication studies of the 1980's should include both description and evaluation of relevant communicative behaviors, events, and contexts. Thus, it is useful to know what stages given kinds of groups pass through over time. It is much more useful to know which specific features of the communication in these various stages contributed to or detracted from the attainment of the goals of these groups.

Finally, the methodology of future research should exhibit a balanced concern for both the internal and external validity of a given study. No matter how creative a given rhetorical study may be, the results are empirically untenable if they are a product of incomplete and imprecise research procedures which make replication impossible. Similarily, no matter how rigorous the safeguards used in quantitative studies to help assure the internal validity of a given study, the results have little value if they cannot be generalized to other groups with similar characteristics.

In summary, we have reason to be optimistic as we contemplate research in the next decade. If we approach that decade with balanced, temporal perspective we can be confident that we can do much to help facilitate communication in the ever increasing numbers and kinds of small groups that are such an important force in our society.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Ivan D. Steiner, Group Process and Productivity (New York: Academic Press, 1971), 170.

[2] Carl E, Larson, "Speech Communication Research on Small Groups," The Speech Teacher, 20 (1971), 91.

[3] John E. Cragan and David W. Wright, "Small Group Communication Research of the 1970's: A Synthesis and Critique," paper presented at the annual convention of the Speech Communication Association, Minneapolis, Minnesota, November 3, 1978. See also David Mortensen, "The Status of Small Group Research," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 56 (1970), 304-309, and Ernest G. Bormann, "The Paradox and Promise of Small Group Research," Speech Monographs, 37 (1970), 211-217.

[4] Edwin B. Black, "A Consideration of the Rhetorical Causes of Breakdown in Discussion," Speech Monographs, 22 (1955), 15-18.

[5] Ibid., 18-19.

[6] Bormann, "The Paradox and Promise of Small Group Research," 214. Rhetorical studies are undeniably useful in formulating hypotheses that can be subjected to subsequent testing in the experimental laboratory but most rhetorical studies cannot in their present form be used to test hypotheses. Thus, I am puzzled by Bormann's assertion that laboratory studies "are not very useful in providing knowledge about group process."

[7] Ernest G. Bormann, "Fantasy and Rhetorical Vision: The Rhetorical Criticism of Social Reality," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 58 (1972), 399.

[8] Barbara F. Sharf, "A Rhetorical Analysis of Leadership Emergence in Small Groups," Communication Monographs, 45 (1978), 158.

[9] Ibid., 168-171.

[10] Ibid., 162.

[11] Ibid., 171.

[12] James Chesbro, John F. Cragan, and Patricia McCullough, "The Small Group Technique of the Radical Revolutionary: A Synthetic Study of Consciousness Raising," Speech Monographs, 40 (1973), 139-143.

[13] Ibid., 139.

[14] Ibid., 145.

[15] B. Aubrey Fisher, "Decision Emergence: Phases in Group Decision-Making," Speech Monographs, 37 (1970), 54.

[16] Ibid., 61-65.

[17] B. Aubrey Fisher, "Communication Research and the Task-Oriented

Group," Journal of Communication, 21 (1971), 139.

[18] Edward A. Mabry, "An Instrument for Assessing Content Themes in Group Interaction," Speech Monographs, 42 (1975), 292-294. See also Edward A. Mabry, "Exploratory Analysis of a Developmental Model for Task-Oriented Small Groups," Human Communication Research, 2 (1975), 71, for an elaboration of Mabry's quantitative procedures, and Ernest L. Stech, "Sequential Structure in Human Social Communication," Human Communication Research, 1 (1975), 168-179, for an additional exemplar of a quantitative study.

[19] Fisher, "Decision Emergence: Phases in Group Decision-Making," 53-66; Donald G. Ellis and B. Aubrey Fisher, "Phases of Conflict in Small Group Development: A Markov Analysis," Human Communication Research, 1 (1975), 195-212; Donald G. Ellis, "Relational Control in Two Group Systems," Communication Monographs, 46 (1979), 153-166; Aubrey Fisher and Wayne A. Beach, "Content and Relationship Dimensions of Communicative Behavior: An Exploratory Study," Western Journal of Speech Communication, 43 (Summer, 1979), 201-211.

[20] Fisher and Beach, "Content and Relationship Dimensions of Communicative Behavior: An Exploratory Study," 211.

[21] Dale G. Leathers, "Process Disruption and Measurement in Small Group Communication," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 55 (1969), 287-300; Dale G. Leathers, "Testing for Determinant Interactions in the Small Group Communication Process," Speech Monographs, 28 (August, 1971), 182-188; Dale G. Leathers, "The Impact of Multichannel Message Inconsistency on Verbal and Nonverbal Decoding Behaviors," Communication Monographs, 46 (1979), 88-100.

[22] Dale G. Leathers, "The Informational Potential of the Nonverbal and Verbal Components of Feedback Responses," Southern Speech Communication Journal, 44 (1979), 331-354.

[23] Dale G. Leathers, "Quality of Group Communication as a Determinant of Group Product," Speech Monographs, 39 (1972), 173. Two other studies which exhibit many of the defining features of the qualitative research I have undertaken at U.C.L.A. and the University of Georgia are Daniel S. Prentice, "The Effect of Trust-estroying Communication on Verbal Fluency in the Small Group," Speech Monographs, 42 (1975), 262-270, and John A. Courtright, "A Laboratory Investigation of Groupthink," Communication Monographs, 45 (1978), 229-246.

[24] Dennis S. Gouran, Candace Brown, and David R. Henry, "Behavioral Correlates of Perceptions of Quality in Decision-Making Discussions," Communication Monographs, 45 (1979), 52. See also William E. Jurma, "Effects of Leader Sturcturing Style and Task-Orientation Characteristics of Group Members," Communication Monographs, 46 (1979), 282-295.

[25] Ibid., 57. I do not mean to imply that Gouran has never undertaken a study which might be identified as quantitative research. For example, see Dennis G. Gouran, "Variables Related to Consensus in Group Discussion of Questions of Policy," Speech Monographs, 36 (1969), 387-391.

[26] Leathers, "The Informational Potential of the Nonverbal and Verbal Components of Feedback Responses," 348-354.

UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN RESEARCH ON COMMUNICATION
IN THE SMALL GROUP: A CHALLENGE FOR THE 1980's.

by Dennis S. Gouran*

In a recent issue of Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin appears
an aritcle entitled, "Humans Would Do Better Without Groups." The author,
Christian J. Buys, reached this conclusion on the basis of findings in ten
different areas of social psychological research. Although it is doubtful
that the scholarship cited actually warrants such a damning allegation,
anyone having much sustained involvement in formal groups must occasionally
harbor similar sentiments. The experience of participating in such groups
is often frustrating, fruitless, or otherwise unrewarding. And even in
those instances in which members take pleasure at their accomplishments,
evidence exists to suggest that by other standards of performance participa-
tion may be less than worthwhile.[2]

The history of research on small groups has been largely the study of
inhibitory and facilitative influences. Indeed, if Professory Buys'
assessment is correct, it has been primarily a study of the former. In
spite of the many criticisms of small group research, we have developed
reasonably good insights into the factors that determine the manner in which
the members of groups behave.[3] Inquiries about group process, however, have
concentrated on enlarging our understanding of how groups function, and not
on improving their performance. For the person who regularly confronts the
realities of group life, this body of scholarship has provided little
direct knowledge for dealing with the large array of problems that arise.
In this sense, research on groups has left a multitude of unanswered
questions, and therein lies a challenge for the future. The answers to
these questions, I contend, can be found in the study of counteractive
influence.

Why Counteractive Influence?

If research has provided significant insights into both the facilitative
and inhibitory influences on group members' behavior, does it not seem to
follow, then, that we have the necessary information for improving their
performance? My answer to this question in, "No." It is one thing to under-
stand the determinants of effective and ineffective interaction and quite
another to be able to alter the process. The knowledge requirements for
being a constructive contributor are different from those involved in altering
the course of a discussion when it appears to be headed toward an undesirable
end. A participant in a discussion may recognize, for example, that
incompatibility of individual goals is a source of negative influence in
the execution of a group's task and that commitment to a supraordinate
goal can facilitate performance.[4] These understandings, however, do not

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suggest the means by which group members having incompatible goals can become committed to a supraordinate goal. So it is with many other aspects of group process in which one correctly perceives the inhibitory influences that are operative and the sorts of conditions that need to exist for a group to function effectively, but for which the means of converting an undesirable state into a desired state are not apparent.

Symptomatic of the lack of knowledge for dealing with problems in groups has been the steady decline over the last 20 years in the emphasis on rational models of problem-solving and decision-making in pedagogical literature and instruction. The reduced reliance on such models is probably the result of an implicit awareness of the deficiencies in our understanding of how to induce the behavioral sequences for which the models call. In short, although we can specify what functions may best serve a group's efforts to achieve its goals, we are seriously deficient in information concerning how best to respond to circumstances that vitiate their execution. Even those who remain strong advocates of rational models are hard pressed to offer well substantiated advice on how to deal with deviations from rationalistic require- ments. In spite of the impressive evidence that can be marshalled to show the adverse consequences to which such deviations often lead, the matters of prevention and remedy are the subject of comparatively little attention. Irving Janis, who perhaps currently is the foremost proponent of rational models of decision making, for example, devotes only 17 pages to preventing problems that commonly arise in decision-making groups.[5] Compared to the more than 200 pages he allocates to evidence of breakdown, this seems a rather paltry sum. More important, however, a careful examination of his suggestions reveals that his conception of prevention consists largely of the willing avoidance of the behaviors that promote the syndrome he has labeled "groupthink." What measures an individual recognizing the symptoms can take to combat the effects of groupthink is an issue that Janis does not address. Yet, it seems that in the context of a group experiencing this phenomenon, a knowledge of how to counteract it would be as important as the knowledge of how ideally the group should be functioning.

The discrepancy between the confidence scholars exhibit in making generalizations about how groups function and that which they display in offering advice on how to deal with problems is further, and perhaps best, illustrated in the following statement by Shaw: "In the first part of this chapter [the subject of which is issues, applications, and prospects for research on small groups], an attempt was made to show some of the possible applications of research-established principles. This attempt was a tentative, first step taken with a great deal of trepidation."[6] Shaw's diffidence, although somewhat less extreme five years later in the second edition of his book, nonetheless resurfaces in the total of five pages he devotes to improving the performance of groups.[7] The relatively few strategies that even begin to resemble coping strategies, moreover, are not supported by evidence showing that they do work. At this stage in the development of knowledge, we appear to be limited to indicating possible strategies that are implied by the characteristics of effective and ineffec- tive groups. The specific behaviors capable of transforming liabilities into assets, of overcoming obstacles, or of mitigating the effects of other kinds of difficulties that arise in the course of a group's interaction

remain largely undetermined. Research has simply not dealt with these kinds
of concerns. A focus on counteractive influence in future research could
do much to alleviate such ignorance and to invest scholarship with the
kind of social utility that is currently in demand.

A Preliminary Conception of Counteractive Influence

Before I can begin to discuss possible target areas for research and the
values of scholarship directed toward increasing our understanding of
counter-active influence, it is necessary to develop a working conception
of the phenomenon. Counteractive influence as I am using the term is a sub-
classification of interpersonal influence. A such, it is difficult to
define because the genus itself is non-specific. The generic construct
of interpersonal influence is generally understood but not precisely
delimited. As Wheeler has observed is discussing the construct, "'inter-
personal influence' is not a logical area that can be adequately defined."[8]
It has rather developed as a product of implied agreements among scholars
that certain processes of interest are its constituents.[9] In spite of the
definitional difficulty posed by the elusiveness of the general construct
under which counteractive influence may be subsumed, it is still possible
to be reasonably specific in describing its essential characteristics.

To distinguish counteractive influence as a species, it is useful to
think in terms of the path-goal paradigm, as viewed from the field theory
perspective. Cartwright and Zander characterize a goal as the "preferred
location" in a group's "environment."[10] For those who find the Lewinian
terminology too antiquated, one might substitue the expression "desired
state of the system." Whatever terminology is more appropriate, the
path-goal paradigm entails the notion that groups progress from some state
to another by means of a sequence of behavioral activities. These
activities, in turn, constitute the path along which the group travels
toward a destination. The final destination, however, is not always the
one intended, that is, the desired state. In addition, even the successful
arrival at an intended destination can be fraught with obstructions that
inhibit or otherwise divert movement along the goal-path. Although it is
possible to conceive of the sequence of activities that would enable a
group to move toward its goal with minimal interference (as most rational
models do), one cannot always anticipate or know how to contend with the
obstacles he or she is likely to encounter. For this reason, the path
that a group follows can lead to an undesired destination or deviate so
substantially from the charted course as to prove a prohibitively costly
venture.

In an idealized conception of group process, the path-goal paradigm
posits a linear sequence of activities leading directly from an existing
state to a preferred state. Research and theory, beginning with Scheidel
and Crowell's spiral model of idea development and moving through more
recent inquiries into group development and conflict management, however,
suggest that pathways to goals are not linear.[11] Although it remains
to be demonstrated what model best corresponds to reality, it seems safe
to conclude that goal-paths are somewhat circuitous even under the best
of circumstances.[12] An obvious reason, of course, is that the conditions

necessary for a group to move in linear fashion are too numerous ever to be
fully satisfied. This notion appears to be implicit in the familiar formu-
lations of group performance and productivity advanced by Cattell and
Steiner.[13] Although Cattell focuses on "effective synergy" and Steiner
on "actual productivity," both suggest that a group's ability to function
effectively is typically less than its potential. Nonlinear motion is
consistent with these theorists' conception of performance. In other words,
departures from linearity are indicative of the sources of interference that
prevent a group from utilizing its collective resources in the most effective
manner possible. The more frequent the departures and the greater their
magnitude, the lower is the likelihood of a group's achieving its goal.
Even if the goal is achieved under circumstances in which departures are
frequent and large, efficiency in the utilization of resources will be
correspondingly low.

With this frame of reference, one can conceive of three sets of forces
acting on the members of a group as they move from an existing state to a
preferred state: 1) forces that act to move a group toward its goal, 2)
forces that act to move a group away from its goal, and 3) forces that act to
alter the direction in which a group is moving. When these forces are
sufficiently strong to have impact, they function as influence. Influence,
then, is the effect of a force on the direction of a group's movement. Given
the nature of the forces described, one can identify three classifications of
influence: facilitative, inhibitory, and counteractive. Facilitative
influence is the result of those forces acting on a group to move from an
existing state to a preferred state. Inhibitory influences, on the other
hand, are the product of forces directing a group's movement away from its
goals. Counteractive influence, then, is a consequence of the forces acting
on a group to alter its direction. In this sense, it can be either positive
or negative. Although my concern is primarily with the positive dimensions
of counteractive influence, nothing in its conception requires that it be only
positive or only negative.

In a situation in which facilitative influences are the exclusive or pre-
dominant type operative, movement toward a group's goal theoretically would be
steady and deviations from the goal-path inconsequential. Under conditions
in which only inhibitory influences are operative, movement would be
progressively away from the goal path. In most groups, of course, both types
of influence are present. As a result, neither of the extreme cases described
is likely to materialize. The behavior of groups in general reflects an inter-
mittent pattern of departure from and return to the goal-path. Without the
concept of counteractive influence, however, it is difficult to explain how
either of the other types of influence can take hold and determine the direction
in which a group is moving at any given point. Would it not otherwise appear·
that once the stronger of the two types of forces in initially applied, the
direction of movement would be irreversibly determined?

If counteractive influence can be both positive and negative, its essential
functions must be specified in relationship to the type of influence against
which it is directed. Positive counteractive influence, then, redirects move-
ment toward a goal-path when inhibitory influences are functioning to sustain
movement away from the goal-path. Negative counteractive influence, in contrast,

serves to alter movement-away from a goal-path. Once direction has been successfully altered by either type of counteractive influence, then the corresponding facilitative or inhibitory influences that maintain direction will take control until such time as another counteractive force develops sufficient intensity to alter direction. In a practical sense, positive counteractive influence serves to limit the magnitude of the departures from a goal path created by inhibitory influences. Negative counteractive influence, on the other hand, by diverting movement, along a goal path for which facilitative influences have been responsible, tends to maximize the discrepancy between a group's actual performance and the quality of performance of which it is capable.

It should be apparent from the preceding discussion that counteractive influence need not be intentional. If one conceives of it as behavior having the effect of altering direction, then it follows that not all instances of counteractive influence involve deliberate purpose. If future research is to focus on counteractive influence, it may progress more rapidly by examining intentional behavior, but that emphasis should not preclude consideration of behavior that incidentally functions counteractively. In fact, systematic observation of behavior that incidentally appears to have the effect of altering direction might well prove to have substantial instrumental value in the design of communication strategies for improving the performance of groups.

Thus far, the conception of counteractive influence I have been advancing portrays the phenomenon in more or less dichotomous terms; that is, as behavior having or not having the effect of altering direction. Any realistic representation of the concept, however, must admit of degree. Hence, although counteractive influence has the tendency of altering direction of movement toward or away from a goal-path, the tendency may be manifest in several different ways. Counteractive influence presumably could function to retard, neutralize, or reverse movement in a given direction. The range of consequences encompassed by the concept is indicative of the relative strength of the various behaviors exhibited in response to conditions within a group's interaction that are facilitating or inhibiting its performance.

Although this preliminary conception of counteractive influences is in need of further refinement before it can be made operational, I hope that it is sufficiently distinctive to warrant consideration of its utility as a focus for future research. My purpose has not been to develop a rigorous definition but simply to set counteractive influence apart from those related species of interpersonal influence with which it might otherwise be confused. Conceptual inadequacies notwithstanding, it should now be possible to identify some problem areas in which the study of counteractive influence may prove useful.

Selected Areas for the Study of Counteractive Influence

Any number of areas of research on communication in the small group are appropriate for the study of counteractive influence. I have chosen five, however, on the grounds that they involve situations in which

negative influences to which participants respond inappropriately or feel ill-equipped to combat are frequently at work. In each case, moreover, existing scholarship provides leads for the development of communication strategies whose counteractive potential could be assessed under controlled conditions. The five areas include authority relations, pressure for uniformity, status effects, disruptive behavior, and member goal orientation. In making the selection, I do not wish to convey the impression that these are the only areas worthy of attention. On the contrary, within the framework developed, the research possibilities are almost limitless. But we have to start somehwere, and the five areas mentioned deal with common realities of group life. In addition, the kinds of problems to which counteractive influence might be directed are well within the realm of group experiences of most people.

Authority Relations

Among other things, the study of authority relations has revealed how easily people in positions of power can ordinarily elicit compliant responses to their influence attempts. Milgram's controversial research on obedience to authority, for example, rather dramatically underscores this conclusion.[14] Other research, moreover, has established that because of the relative ease with which authority figures induce compliance, groups may be led to foolish, inappropriate, or costly decisions.[15] Apparently, under some circumstances in which authority figures effectively exercise influence, a kind of "pluralistic ignorance" sets in, and although individual members privately oppose the direction in which the authority figure wishes to move, they remain silent because of the perception that others are favorably disposed.[16] In most instances, however, the success of an influence attempt by an authority figure stems from the perception that he/she either has the right to determine or possesses the resources with which to make noncompliance punishing.[17]

Not all influence attempts by authority figures have negative consequences, of course. When they do, however, the question that arises from the point of view of the influence target, who recognizes that the authority figure is talking the group in an undesirable direction, is how best to respond. In other words, when an authority figure is leading a group away from its goal, what sorts of communicative strategies can be employed to redirect the members toward the goal-path? Does one apply some tactic of ingratiation? Will reasoning with the authority figure create receptivity to redirection? Is a head-on confrontation likely to work? Is the appropriateness of any given strategy determined by other sets of circumstances? The danger in following intuitive hunches in this type of situation is that one's efforts to counteract the negative influence being exerted by the authority figure might do more harm than good. The wrong choice could prove to be unfortunate. Yet for the individual who recognizes the need to be able to counteract the influence of an authority figure, intuitive hunches are all that one has to go on. Research to date has not revealed what communicative strategies to pursue.

In spite of the absence of research on specific communicative mechanisms for contending with the influence of authority figures, the knowledge that one's power is determined by the target of influence suggests that such influence can be successfully counteracted.[18] In addition, we know that resistance to an authority figure's influence attempts increases the probability that resistance

will be displayed by others.[19]   Guided by such clues, we should be able
to begin developing communicative strategies that have the greatest potential
utility for counteracting this type of inhibitory constraint.

Pressure for Uniformity

Pressure for uniformity is a second area in which a need for research
on counteractive influence exists. Opposition to a majority position
frequently induces pressure for uniformity, particularly in highly cohesive
groups.[20]   Schacter has further demonstrated that persistent opposition can
lead to rejection of the deviant member.[21]   Although pressure for uniformity
and the conformity to which it gives rise are not intrinsically undesirable,
they can contribute to the development of a climate that promotes the
ineffective execution of a group's tasks. Faced with the alternatives of
either acquiescing or being rejected, many people feel helpless in situations
in which they are subjected to pressure for uniformity. The identification
of specific communicative strategies that enable one to respond effectively
to pressure for uniformity, therefore, would be a most welcome addition
to the literature on conformity.

As in the case of authority relations, previous scholarship has provided
some leads for developing strategies for counteracting the inhibitory
influence of pressure for uniformity. In a situation very much like the
one studied by Schacter, Harnack found that by remaining reasonable and by
not responding in kind of abusive remarks, not only did opinion deviates
continue to be accepted by the majority they opposed, but they actually
induced movement toward their own position.[22]   Valentine and Fisher further
discovered that different types of deviance have different consequences
for a group's performance.[23]   The variety of deviance they refer to as
"innovative" appears to have constructive effects as opposed to "noninnova-
tive" or ordinary deviance, which tends to be personally oriented and
conflict producing. Finally, Bradley, Hamon, and Harris uncovered evidence
showing that by being well informed, individuals playing a deviant role
in decision-making groups could function effectively in the face of majority
pressure. Deviant members who drew upon external sources of information
to support their arguments tended to influence the thinking of majority
members, many of whom adopted the deviates' arguments as their own in sub-
sequent discussions.[24]

None of these studies is conclusive, but collectively they suggest
that majority pressure can be successfully resisted and, perhaps more
importantly, that communicative strategies capable of altering the direction
in which a majority may be moving can be devised. Much more needs to be
done in examining the comparative utility of different strategies under
varying conditions of pressure. For instance, it is not clear from the
studies cited to what extent deviates were under pressure to conform.
Degree of pressure would appear to be a critical determinant of what
strategies can most effectively be employed to counteract majority
influence. Still, a beginning has been made, it remains for others to make
the inquiries that will reveal more precisely those strategies that function
counteractively with the greatest probable success.

Status Effects

The differences in status that separate the members of a group into roles
ov varying importance can lead to a high ranking participant's having undue in-
fluence on the direction which the group moves.[25] For this reason, it is an
especially important area in which to study the operation of counteractive
influence. The greater influence potential of high status members is attribu-
table to others' perceptions that such individuals are more valuable to the
group. As a result, those of comparatively lower tank tend to be deferential
in their interaction with persons of high status, to provide inaccurate informa-
tion, to devalue their own opinions and judgments, and to be uncritical of the
ideas expressed by the more valued members.[26] That these aspects of status
differentiation can adversely affect performance has been demonstrated, among
others, by Torrance. He found in a study of problem-solving groups that lower
status members having a correct solution were prone to endorse the solutions
proposed by the highest ranking member even though they were incorrect.[27]

The privilege that high status affords its possessors to influence the
judgment and performance of others is difficult to overcome. As Homans has
pointed out, individuals having high status are viewed as capable of providing
scarce resources for compliant behavior whether in fact they are or are not.[28]
In this case, it is the perception that counts. Questioning or challenging the
judgment of such an individual, then, is not likely to be taken graciously by,
either the high status participant or other group members who see him/her as
controlling valued psychological and material resources. Under these circum-
stances, how does one react when it is perceived that the influence of a high
status member is leading a group in the wrong direction or otherwise limiting
its effectiveness? Although this question has yet to be answered, two facts
about the maintenance of status provide some potentially valuable insights.
First, the status that initial impressions and external factors give one are
insufficient for maintaining a high ranking. In addition, the individual
having high status, although allowed a certain degree of freedom to violate
group norms, ultimately must live up to the group's expectations and to conform
to its most highly valued norms.[29] The fluidity of status rankings may hold
the key to discovery of the most effective means of counteracting the influence
of high status group members whose behavior is inhibiting the performance of
a group. It appears that the essential consideration is whether or not one
can demonstrate that such behavior constitutes a serious enough violation
of accepted standards of performance. If so, then strategies centered on the
inconsistency between a high status member's behavior and the group's norms
and expectations have the greatest likelihood of success for altering direction.

Disruptive Behavior

Disruptive behavior is another area in which there is need for research
on counteractive communicative strategies. From the point of view of the
participant, in fact, this may be the area of greatest need of study. Many
people feel ill at ease when instances of interpersonal hostility arise,
when a group member becomes deliberately antagonistic toward the other partici-
pants, or when someone is extremely belligerent in stating their opinions.
Such disruptions can be generally subsumed under the heading of affective
conflict. This type of conflict, we know from both experience and research,

frequently interferes with the ability of a group to achieve its goals and with the quality of its performance.[30]

A rather substantial literature on interpersonal relations has accumulated within the last several years that deals with problems of breakdown in communication. One might easily think, therefore, that we have many of the necessary insights for responding effectively to disruptions when they occur. The thrust of this literature, however, is aimed at self-improvement through expanded awareness, the cultivation of sensitivity toward others, and the management of one's own personal problems. To the extent that a knowledge of what contributes to effective interpersonal relations enables one to be a more constructive group member, this body of scholarship is valuable. Unfortunately, it is not adequate for addressing the kinds of problems to which disruptive behavior in others often leads. Certainly, it provides few insights on which one can reliably draw in responding effectively to the exigences created by disruptive acts. To be able to counteract the inhibitory influence of such behavior requires levels of understanding about how communication functions that we do not presently possess.

One potentially promising avenue of investigation is suggested by the differences between affective and substantive conflict in their impact on group performance. Guetzkow and Gyr, for example, discovered that substan- tive conflict, that is, issue oriented conflict deriving from a group's agenda, promotes effective interaction and contributes to consensus. Affective conflict, on the other hand, inhibits consensus and leads to general dissat- isfaction among group members.[31] Studies focused on efforts to convert affective conflict into substantive conflict, therefore, might hold some answers to the question of how best to counteract disruptive influences. Several experiments on the effects of orienting behavior indicate that such a conversion is possible.[32] But to determine if the suspected relation- ship to improved performance is valid, more carefully designed studies of specific communicative strategies will have to be conducted.

Member Goal Orientation

The final area I have designated as important for the study of counter- active influence involves the goal orientation of group members. When the individuals comprising a group adopt a competitive orientation, they tend to perform less well than when they are cooperatively oriented. This effect of members' goal orientation was detected early in the history of research on small groups by Deutsch and has since been rather consistently demonstrated in other investigations involving both laboratory and natural groups.[33] The adverse effects of a competitive orientation surface in both the task and social dimensions of a group's performance, for example, productivity is reduced, morale tends to be low, and the participants are more likely to attribute responsibility for failure to the other members. Not only are the prospects for achievement of a group goal limited when the members interact competitively, individual goals are frequently not achieved.[34]

Most situations requiring groups call for a cooperative orientation and coordination of effort; hence, in these sorts of situations, competition is the unnatural state of affairs. When individuals perceive their individual

goals to be at odds with the objectives of the group, however, it is difficult to prevent the emergence of a competitive climate. Trying to establish congruency between individual and group goals appears to be the best remedy to this problem.[35] How such congruency can be made apparent is a function of communication, but at present particular strategies have not been identified. By investigating the relative efficacy of different types of appeals designed to bring individual and group goals into proper alignment, communication researchers could make a substantial contribution to overcoming one of the most significant sources of ineffectiveness in group interaction. For anyone who has experienced the debilitating effects of competition on group performance, having means with which to counteract its effects would undoubtedly be of substantial value.

Additional Advantages and Values of Focusing on Counteractive Influence

Thus far, I have been trying to justify a focus on counteractive influence in future research on the grounds of need and social utility. In certain respects, that may be justification enough. If research in the present decade is to develop such a focus, however, those doing it may require further justification. Among the many possible advantages and values, three seem to stand out. First, counteractive influence has the potential of becoming an integrative concept; that is, it may permit us to deal with a wide variety of problems from a common perspective. Second, it allows for continuity in the transition from present concerns to future achievements. Finally, and perhaps most important, it will place the accent in research on groups clearly on the role of communication. Having stated the advantages, let me now elaborate.

The kinds of problems about which I have been commenting throught this essay stem from different sources, but they have similar consequences. That is, they interfere with the manner in which a group performs its tasks by taking it from its goal-path. Different problems, of course, require different specific remedies. The communicative strategies that we might investigate, however, would have the common purpose of redirecting movement toward group toals. By conceiving of such strategies as forms of counteractive influence, we may be able to invest our scholarship with the kind of theoretical unity and coherence that it for so long now has been criticized as lacking. In addition, the restricted focus should facilitate classification of communicative strategies in relation to both probable success and the sorts of problems for which they are most appropriate. I do not envision a perfect referencing-system as the end product, however, a matrix of problem/strategy/outcome relationship could be developed. The utility of such a matrix would lie in revealing the state of knowledge at any given time and in making apparent where the gaps in our understanding are located. The concept of counteractive influence and the knowledge that research on it generates may not by sufficient to move us from Kuhn's "preparadigmatic" to "paradigmatic" stage, which he suggest occurs in the normal development of science.[36] The concept nevertheless could prove to be important in the transition.

The second advantage of concentrating on counteractive influence is that it will provide continuity between existing and future scholarship. Criticisms of research on groups often create the impression that radical departures from past efforts hold the only promise for making significant progress in future inquiry, but to act on such an impression, I believe, would be a mistake.[37]

As astronaut Frank Bormann remarked on the occasion of the successful completion
of the first manned flight to the moon and back, "We stood on the shoulders
of giants." Although the giants in group dynamics may not be as large or
have shoulders quite so broad as those in the physical sciences whose
contributions made space travel a reality, a groundwork for significant
advances has been laid by people of substantial accomplishments. The
sources of ineffectiveness and the requisites of effective performance have
been reasonably well thought out and demonstrated over the last half century
by a large number of active scholars. It remains for their successors to
discover the means by which the discrepancies between what groups accomplish
and what they are capable of accomplishing can be reduced. The study of
counteractive influence holds such promise.

The last of the values I see deriving from the study of counteractive
influence is that it will more sharply accent the role of communication in
group process. Developing knowledge useful for counteracting unwanted sources
of influence on a group's performance will require that we look to the
resources that individuals possess within their communicative repertoires,
for once the process of group interaction has begun, there are few other
resources on which one can draw to combat the problems that arise. The rather
substantial body of research on the contingencies of interaction that was
undertaken in the 1970's by members of our profession has shown quite clearly
that the characteristics of given utterances have significance for the types
that follow and that the relationships are amenable to description.[38] Although
the interests reflected in that research are diffuse, the orientation can be
carried forward in efforts to test more systematically what types of utterances
have the greatest impact in altering the direction in which inhibitory
influences may be leading a group. If communication has the dynamic properties
that past research and theory has led us to believe, then it is reasonable
to expect that the process can be made to work more effectively through the
discovery of strategies that serve to counteract inhibitory influences.

In promoting the concept of counteractive influence as a focus for future
research, I am not so naive as to believe that research findings will produce
the level of understanding that would enable group members to overcome all of
their problems. The performance of groups is analogous to the efficiency of
machines, that is, the energy developed is never equal to the energy supplied.
However, just as it is possible to increase the relative efficiency of a
machine, it should be possible to improve the performance of groups. The
study of counteractive influence possesses such potential. It has a
foundation in existing scholarship and provides a basis for channeling our
efforts toward a reasonably clear goal. Too often, criticisms of research
on small groups have resulted only in calls for doing things differently or
better without the target or means in view. That approach to stimulating new
inquiry, I fear, serves only to produce further wandering. My hope is that
the present effort will have more constructive and socially significant
consequences. Perhaps then someone someday will be able to write that
"Humans Are Better Off Because of Groups."

FOOTNOTES

[1] Christian J. Buys, 4 (1978), 123-125.

[2] See, for example, Hoffman's discussion of research on member satisfaction and problem-solving accuracy in L. Richard Hoffman, "Group Problem Solving," in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, ed. Leonard Berkowitz II (New York: Academic Press, 1965), pp. 99-132.

[3] Shaw, for example, has advanced 136 generalizations about factors affecting how groups function that are generally well supported by research. See Marvin E. Shaw, Group Dynamics: The Psychology of Small Group Behavior, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976).

[4] See Muzafer and Carolyn W. Sherif, Groups in Harmony and Tension (New York: Harper and Row, 1953).

[5] See Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), pp. 207-224.

[6] Marvin E. Shaw, Group Dynamics: The Psychology of Small Group Behavior (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), p. 361.

[7] Ibid., pp. 393-398.

[8] Ladd Wheeler, Interpersonal Influence (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1970), p. vii.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, "Individual Motive and Group Goals: Introduction," in Group Dynamics: Research and Theory, eds. Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), p. 350.

[11] See Thomas M. Scheidel and Laura Crowell, "Idea Development in Discussion Groups," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 50 (1964), 140-145. See also B. Aubrey Fisher, "Decision Emergence: Phases in Group Decision-Making," Speech Monographs, 37 (1970), 53-66; B. Aubrey Fisher and Leonard Hawes, "An Interact System Model: Generating a Grounded Theory of Small Groups," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 57 (1971), 444-453; Donald G. Ellis and B. Aubrey Fisher, "Phases of Conflict in Small Group Development: A Markov Analysis," Human Communication Research, 1 (1975), 195-212.

[12] Research in this area has been conducted under such different circumstances that no model suggested by any single investigation is likely to be adequate for characterizing patterns for all of the types of situations in which group interaction occurs.

[13] Raymond B. Cattell, "Concepts and Methods in the Measurement of Group Syntality," Psychological Review, 55 (1948), 48-63, Ivan D. Steiner, Group Process and Productivity (New York: Academic Press, 1972).

14 See Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority (New York; Harper
Colophon Books, 1969).

15 See, for example, Janis' discussion of the Bay of Pigs Invasion in
Victims of Groupthink, pp. 14-49. See also Dennis S. Gouran, "The Watergate
Coverup: Its Dynamics and Its Implications," Communication Monographs, 43
(1976), 176-186.

16 Robert L'. Schanck, "A Study of a Community and Its Groups and.Institu-
tions Conceived of as Behavior of Individuals," Psychological Monographs,
43 (1932), No. 195. See also Jerry B. Harvey, "The Abilene Paradox: The
Management of Agreement," Organizational Dynamics, 3 (1974), 63-80.

17 See, for example, Homans' discussion of the reasons for compliance
to authority in George C. Homans, Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms,
2nd. ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974), pp. 193-224. See
also the discussion of behavior control in John W. Thibaut and Harold H.
Kelley, The Social Psychology of Groups (New York: Wiley, 1959), pp.
100-125.

18 See John R. P. French, Jr., "A Formal Theory of Social Power,"
Psychological Review, 63 (1956), 181-194.

19 Milgram, pp. 113-122.

20 See Stanley Schacter, "Deviation, Rejection, and Communication,"
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 46 (1951), 190-207. See
also Janis, pp. 2-9.

21 Ibid.

22 R. Victor Harnack, "A Study of the Effect of an Organized Minority
Upon a Discussion Group," Journal of Communication, 13 (1963), 12-24.

23 Kristin B. Valentine and B. Aubrey Fisher, "An Interaction Analysis
of Verbal Innovative Deviance in Small Groups," Speech Monographs, 41
(1974), 413-420.

24 Patricia H. Bradley, C. Mac Hamon, and Alan M. Harris, "Dissent in
Small Groups," Journal of Communication, 26 (Autumn, 1976), 155-159.

25 See Paul V. Crosbie, "Status Structure," in Interaction in Small
Groups, ed. Paul V. Crosbie (New York: Macmillan, 1975), pp. 177-185.

26 Evidence of such characteristics may be found in the following
collection of studies: Harold H. Kelley, "Communication in Experimentally
Created Hierarchies," Human Relations, 4 (1951), 39-56; William H. Read,
"Upward Communication in Industrial Hierarchies," Human Relations, 15 (1962),
3-15, Fred L. Strodtbeck, Rita M. James, and Charles Hawkins, "Social Status
in Jury Deliberations," American Sociological Review, 22 (1957), 713-319, E.
Paul Torrance, "Some Consequences of Power Differences on Decision Making in
Permanent and Temporary Three-Man Groups," Research Studies, Washington State
College, 22 (1954), 130-140; J. C. Moore, Jr., "Status and Influence in Small
Group Interactions," Sociometry, 31 (1968), 47-63.

27 Torrance. See also a study of overestimation of high status group members' performance by Muzafer Sherif, B. Jack White, and O. J. Harvey, "Status in Experimentally Produced Groups," American Journal of Sociology, 60 (1955), 370-379.

28 Homans, p. 223.

29 See Crosbie, pp. 182-183. See also Eugene Burnstein and Robert B. Zajonc, "Individual Task Performance in a Changing Social Structure," Sociometry, 28 (1965), 349-362. Hollander's notions on "idiosyncratic credit" are also supportive of this conclusion. See Edwin P. Hollander, "Conformity, Status, and Idiosyncratic Credit," Psychological Review, 65 (1958), 117-127.

30 See Harold Guetzkow and John R. Gyr, "An Analysis of Conflict in Decision-Making Groups," Human Relations, 7 (1954), 367-382; Dale G. Leathers, "The Process Effects of Trust Destroying Behavior in the Small Group," Speech Monographs, 37 (1970), 180-187, Thomas J. Knutson, "An Experimental Study of the Effects of Orientation Behavior on Small Group Consensus," Speech Monographs, 39 (1972), 159-165, Timothy A. Hill, 'An Experimental Study of the Relationship Between Opinionated Leadership and Small Group Consensus," Communication Monographs, 42 (1976), 246-257.

31 Ibid.

32 See Dennis S. Gouran, "Variables Related to Consensus in Group Discussions of Questions of Policy," Speech Mohographs, 36 (1969), 387-391, Knutson; John A. Kline, "Orientation and Group Consensus," Central States Speech Journal, 23 (1972), 44-47; Thomas J. Kowitz and Albert C. Kowitz, "Effects of Information Type and Levels of Orientation on Consensus Achievement in Substantive and Affective Small Group Conflict," Central States Speech Journal, 28 (1977), 54-63.

33 See Morton Deutsch, "An Experimental Study of the Effects of Cooperation and Competition upon Group Process," Human Relations, 2 (1949), 199-231. For a review of other research, both on laboratory and natural groups, see Shaw, 1976, pp. 324-328.

34 For a convincing demonstration, see Morton Deutsch and Robert M. Krauss, "The Effect of Threat Upon Interpersonal Bargaining," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 61 (1960), 181-189.

35 See Muzafer and Sherif.

36 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 10-23.

37 Ernest Bormann has been one of the severest critics of small group research. He is frequently cited as one who has called for a radical departure from the past direction of research on small groups. Although his arguments have been subject to misinterpretation, he perhaps more than others sees little value in much of the existing scholarship on groups. See Ernest G. Bormann, "The Paradox and Promise of Small Group Research," Speech Monographs, 37 (1970), 211-216, Ernest G. Bormann, "The Promise and

and Paradox of Small Group Communication Revisited," unpublished manuscript, Speech Communication Association Convention, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1978.

[38] For an excellent summary and critique of this rather substantial volume of research, see Dean E. Hewes, "The Sequential Analysis of Social Interaction," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 65 (1979), 56-73.

EMERGENT TRENDS IN SMALL GROUP RESEARCH

Robert N. Bostrom*

In the last decade, we have seen dramatic changes in the study of human communication. In the 1960's, we were preoccupied with attitudes and attitude change--"persuasion" was the primary interest of the majority of communication researchers. In the 1970's, "relationships" and "relational communication" began to dominate. In the four ICA Communication Yearbooks that have been published (1977-1980), all "interpersonal" research reported directly concerned relational communication.

Although the study of communication in small groups has not exactly been in a dominant position in our discipline, several factors point to an increasing interest in small groups in the 1980's. The extension of relational concerns from the dyad to the small group is a logical outgrowth of present research interests. The obvious importance of small groups in our daily life, together with our maturing research methods, seem to point to the small group as the center of communication research in the 1980's. This prediction is based on several different trends. In social psychology, several lines of research point to an increasing interest in communicative variables as the principal determinants of group outcomes. These include recent developments in choice shifts, in bargaining, and in group composition. In addition, some exciting new conceptual schemes have been developed which may offer valuable new insights to the nature of the group-process.

Hackman and Morris[1] characterized group inputs as belonging to three main types: individual factors (skills, attitudes, personal characteristics), group-based factors (structure, size, cohesiveness), and environmental factors (task characteristics, reward structure, level of stress). One environmental factor that has fundamental implications for the nature of group interaction is the division of groups into "common motive" (antagonistic, or bargaining groups).[2] Until now, the bulk of small group research in social psychology has used common-motive groups, and has concentrated on group-based and environmental factors. But we can see strong indications of an increased interest in the individual level input factors and in mixed-motive groups. These trends stem from two main sources; the recent discoveries concerning the risky shift phenomenon, and the outcomes of recent research negotiation and bargaining. Both of these point to an increasingly important role in small group research for more traditional "communication" variables--credibility, message structure, and the like--and all point to the increasing integration of small group research within the "mainstream" of communication research.

The first of these trends is exhibited in the choice shift phenomenon ("risky-conservative"). The two main explanations for this effect are the social comparison theory, and the persuasive arguments theory. The

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persuasive arguments. theory is achieving preeminence in the minds of most researchers, and this points towards an increased interest in communication. In addition, some of the recent trends in bargaining and negotiation seem to be developing in the same direction. Lastly, research on the influence of minorites in group deliberations (especially concerning juries) point to an increasing interest in communicative phenomena. All of these trends point to a convergence of interest in the communicative interactions in small groups.

The "Choice-Shift" Phenomenon

Groups typically choose different kinds of solutions than do individuals by themselves. There are a number of comprehensive reviews of this phenomenon in the literature.[3] Although there is an overwhelming tendency to term this change the "risky" shift, Cartwright has pointed out that groups are not invariably more risky than individuals on "Choice Dilemma Questionnaire"[4] tasks. Cartwright states that the effects of group discussion depend on the content of the items and the nature of initial choices within the group. An analysis of the effect of group discussion on individual items in the CDQ reveals considerable variation. For some items, group discussion leads to a tolerance for a 10% to 15% reduction in the likelihood that the risky alternative will be successful. This indicates increased tolerance for risk. For other items the tolerance for risk is only increased by about 6% or 7%, and, for still others, discussion decreases the tolerance for the risky choice. Stoner[5] was able to successfully construct items that consistently yield conservative shifts after group discussion.

Cartwright also notes that the typical size of shift per item across the 12 contained in the CDQ is approximately from 6 in 10 to one of 5 in 10 chances for success. This chance, though statistically significant, is not large. He also points out that existing research provides little information about the way persons perceive the riskiness of choices, their initial levels of risk, or their assessment of the values of outcomes.[6] In other words, group discussion produces shifts by changing the perceived riskiness of the choices, by altering the ideal level of risk, or by modifying the value of the outcome implied by each of the decision alternatives. Which of these processes occurs, or whether they all occur, is a truly important research question.

We also need to decide how best to conceptualize the process by which group discussion alters prior individual decisions. Many writers call attention to two major processes whereby group discussion might alter prior individual decisions: (a) the presentation or knowledge of others' positions and the social comparison of one's own opinion with that of others; and (b) the presentation of new information or arguments concerning the decision alternatives.[7] The first emphasizes normative influence processes, and the second emphasizes persuasion processes. Much research has also tended to focus on the role of one or the other of these two mechanisms in producing group influence.

The Social Comparison Explanation -- The source of this explanation comes from Festinger's social comparison theory.[8] In order to predict the extremity shifts that seem to follow from group discussion, however, the theory must be modified to include the notion that the poles of atti-

tudinal and belief dimensions, like those of ability dimensions, can
often be clearly labeled as positive and negative. If attitude dimen-
sions, like abilities, are evaluatively clear, social comparison might
operate in a number of ways to produce group polarization effects
(extremity shifts)..

For example, a person may value a particular opinion but, for
fear of being labeled extreme or unreasonable may express a more moderate
position than that which he or she prefers. Then the discussion reveals
that other group members espouse positions closer to his or her personal
ideal or more extreme than was expressed on the premeasure. The release
from fear or negative evaluation allows such a person to agree with more
extreme positions. Since this process presumably operates in varying
degrees for several of the group members, it could account for the
polarization effect.

A slightly different interpretation points up a more positive aspect
of the individual's behavior: impression management or self-presentation,
rather than the "release" from fears. Here group members could compete
to express more extreme views, trying to express the more admired (extreme)
position.

Alternatively, the attitude dimension itself may directly possess
an evaluative component. From this standpoint, since ability is a dimen-
sion with clear evaluative poles, the attribution of ability to those
who express an extreme attitude may be a generalization of an evaluative
judgment made directly on the basis of the person's attitudinal stand.
Jellison and Riskind[9] prefer the first interpretation, but these inter-
pretations have not been clearly resolved. Regardless of which of these
views will ultimately be shown to be more accurate, either one fits the
view that the fulfillment of self-presentational concerns underlies group
polarization effects. Hence the research indicates clearly that the an-
swer to most of these problems lies in further explication of the com-
municative behavior of the group members.

The Persuasion Explanation -- The persuasion explanation states that
mere knowledge of other's positions per se is not the critical ingredient
for group polarization effects. Instead, it is the information that is
exchanged during the course of the discussion that plays the major role.
According to this interpretation, the group produces arguments that favor
a more extreme position. Though individual group members may have been
aware of some of these supporting elements, most were not aware of all
of them. Thus, the net effect is a shift as a result of the new persua-
sive information to which group members are exposed. In fact, most groups
move toward decisions involving greater risk. The persuasion explanation,
then, must include some cultural value to account for the preponderance of
persuasive arguments in favor of risk. Burnstein and Vinokur, for example,
favor cultural values as a complete explanation.[10]

What could be the nature of these persuasive arguments? People in-
volved in a discussion try to influence each other mainly in three ways:
(a) they communicate their preferences and learn the other's stand, (b) they
communicate promises and threats, rewards and punishments for yielding or
resisting the attempted influence (i.e. they learn the other's demands);
(c) they communicate the reasons for these preferences and learn the

other's arguments. The first facet has been studied mainly within the tradition of conformity[11] and social comparison theory[12]. In the second two activities we might discover clues to the kind of persuasive arguments offered. The second is related to effect dependence, and as Jones and Gerard[13] have remarked, has attracted little interest. Except for a series of experiments stimulated by Festinger's theory of informal communication in the early fifties, only a few studies have been performed on that topic during the last twenty years.

The third area is often described as integration theory.[14] Ebbesen and Bowers[15], although not explicitly referring to integration theory, also stress the importance of the relative number of pro and con arguments in explaining the choice shift following group discussion. Jones and Gerard[16] describe this kind of influence as "information dependence."

Whether or not the other person is liked is another important variable that has received a good bit of attention. Liking of the other person can be based on experience, or on a present behavior. A person in need of reinforcement of his beliefs and values, and perceiving a discrepancy between his and the group's position, is prone to conform in order to feel secure. To agree with a liked person provides more security than to agree with a disliked one, especially, on issues of value.

Most experiments do not differentiate the perception of another's position (stand) from the perception of another's desire to influence (demand). One exception is a study by Mills and Aronson[17] which suggests that to know someone's position does not itself cause conformity, if the subject assumes that the other does not want to exert influence. The perception of demand is also less effective if there is no way by which the other could check whether his influence attempt results in yielding or not.

The demand of a liked person is less objectionable than the demand of a disliked one for two reasons. If liking is based on rewards received in the past, yielding is an act of restoring equity.[18] It is also a means of preserving friendship and obtaining rewards or avoiding punishment in the future. Although many experiments reveal only weak, if any, effect dependence,[19] the desire to influence, i.e., to demand, is communicated quite frankly. It is therefore likely that in some of these studies both the perception of a stand and the perception of a demand affected by social-emotional responses. Whether liking affects not only the influence of stand and demand perception, but also the influence of persuasive argumentation, possibly by enhancing attention and remembering, is difficult to state. There seems to be no difference in remembering the arguments of a liked and a disliked person. Even if the arguments of a liked person were perceived as more convincing than the arguments of a disliked one, this may be due to some kind of post hoc explanation of the subject, e.g., "I have been influenced; therefore, the arguments must have been convincing, since I am a reasonable person who would not be seduced by personal attraction in finding the right answer to a problem."

Researchers in communication should be quick to point out the general poverty of the "liking" interpretation. Even a cursory examination of the concepts of attractivensss and credibility should produce more interesting findings--especially for a theory labelled "persuasive arguments." For

example, Fontes and Budens[20] demonstrate that the foreperson in jury studies usually has much more influence than other jury members. Or the significant phenomenon might be, as mentioned earlier, more closely related to communicative activity. Cline and Cline,[21] for example, showed that choice shifts were directly influenced by the patterning of communicative activity in small groups.

Most of this research is moving in one principal direction: greater attention to the process of communication as an explanatory variable for the outcomes of small group transactions. A similar trend can be seen in the research in bargaining and negotiation.

Communication In Mixed-Motive Groups

Bargaining and negotiation was once thought of as primarily antagonistic and noncommunicative. However, more recent developments have stressed the mutual influence process and the ways in which mutually acceptable solutions can be reached. Many researchers have discovered how bargainers influence each other by varying the cooperativeness implicit in their moves. Another way in which bargainers exert influence is by varying the sequence in which these moves are arranged. By starting tough and then systematically softening demands, by making concessions, a bargainer can communicate willingness to settle for a particular division of resources. Even in the relatively simple "prisoner's dilemma" interaction,[22] an individual can make positive concessions by following competitive choices with cooperative ones. On the other hand, by increasingly toughening his position (or in the PD game, by shifting from cooperative to competitive, or contingently cooperative, behavior) a bargainer can make negative concessions and can convey his willingness to settle for a particular offer made by the other.

A number of experimental studies employing one or more variants of the PD game have examined the effects of shifts in the cooperativeness of a simulated other upon subjects' cooperation. Schellenburg, for example, found no systematic difference between shifts in cooperativeness and subject behavior.[23] Other studies, however, demonstrate that a change in the other's behavior from low to high cooperativeness induces greater cooperation than either a shift from high to low or a pattern of high unchanging cooperativeness.[24] This research seems to indicate that an individual who makes concessions is more likely to elicit cooperation from the other than one who makes demands or no concessions.

This conclusion is supported by several experiments on contingent experimental strategies upon behavior. Pilisuk and Skolnick[25] had students play an arms race-disarmament game against a simulated opponent who employed one of two experimental strategies: "matching" (the number of missiles produced by the opponent was equal to the number produced by the student on the previous trial); or "conciliatory" (the number of missiles produced by the opponent was equal to one less than the student's number on the previous trial). The conciliatory strategy was more likely to induce cooperation than the matching one.

Some other researchers have found conciliatory strategies are

least effective in inducing cooperation. They often result in exploita-
tion by subjects. Although Marwell, Schmitt, and Boyesen[26] have obtained
evidence to the contrary, indicating that a pacifist strategy may elicit
cooperation (at least among Norwegian subjects), other studies support
more cooperative behavior in the outcomes.[27] Why should a pacifist stra-
tegy be ineffective? Bixenstine and Gaebelein[28] suggest one possible
answer. Subjects in this PD study played against a contingent strategy
that was programmed to match their prior cooperative or competitive
behavior in reciprocal fashion, either immediately or gradually. The
investigators expected the greatest cooperation to be elicited when sub-
jects played against a strategy that was quick to reciprocate coopera-
tion and slow to reciprocate competitive behavior (retaliate). Instead
they found that subjects exploited the other in this condition, taking
advantage of his "eagerness to cooperate" by choosing competitively on
these occasions. The condition that elicited the greatest cooperation
was one in which the strategy was again slow to compete but was now also
slow to respond to cooperation by subjects with like behavior. Because
the other was slow to reciprocate cooperation, his cooperative behavior
may have appeared all the more valuable, and subjects' temptation to
defect was therfore reduced. As Bixenstine and Gaebelein conclude:
"Turning the other cheek (or being slow-to-compete) is fine, but for
maximum influence in producing mutually beneficial behavior, it is best
wed to a cautious exposure of one's cheek to begin with!"[29]

The role of concession making can also be seen in the Acme-Bolt
Trucking game. Bargainers typically begin by deadlocking in the middle
of the one-lane section of road, taking a relatively tough stance. After
some jockeying back and forth and some loss fa time and money for both
parties, we might expect to see one player (perhaps Acme) reverse his
truck, allowing the other (Bolt) to go through the one-lane section
first, before completing the trip himself. On a subsequent turn we might
expect the bargainers to once again meet in the middle, with Bolt backing
up this time in order to permit Acme through first. This pattern of al-
teration, one which represents the optimal solution to the mutual coor-
dination problem posed by the game, is a clear example of reciprocated
concession making. Beginning with a relatively intransigent stance,
one bargainer eventually decides to run the risk of trusting the other
and makes a unilateral concession. This concession, if reciprocated, can
lead to a mutually beneficial solution to the bargaining problem. How-
ever, if not reciprocated-if the concession maker is "betrayed" by his
adversary-the result may well be a mutually destructive conflict that is
difficult to resolve.

A number of experiments have examined the concession-making process
in variants of the Bilateral Monopoly game. The general conclusions
reached by these studies are first, that the rate and magnitude of con-
cessions by a simulated other tend to be reciprocated in kind.[30] In
addition, a strategy of starting tough and then gradually making conces-
sions is a more effective means of reaching an optimal division of re-
sources than one in which a softer stance is maintained throughout.

The tendency of bargaining pairs to settle on a mutually favorable
contract is described by Kelley and Schenitzki[31] as the "systematic con-
cessions model." According to this formulation, each party begins by
proposing contracts for which his own profits are high. As these offers

and counteroffers are rejected by the other, he then proposes contracts
that are somewhat less profitable. Each time a bargainer makes a con-
cession, he thereby increases the set of contracts he considers accept-
able. Concessions continue in a stepwise, systematic fashion until bar-
gainers reach the point where their two sets of acceptable contracts first
overlap. This is the point of maximum joint profit and represents the
optimal settlement.

One implication of the systematic concessions model is the fact
that a favorable agreement is more likely to be reached if all issues are
juggled simultaneously, thereby presenting to the other an integrated
rather than segmented picture of one's shifting preferences. Considered
as a whole, the research suggests that the concession making process has
two important consequences for the bargaining relationship. First, con-
cessions convey vital information about a bargainer's subjective utili-
ties. They allow each party to gauge the other's preferences and inten-
tions and, in turn, permit each party to present or misrepresent infor-
mation about his own. For example, a bargainer who makes frequent con-
cessions will probably be viewed as willing to settle for less than one
who makes concessions only occasionally. Similarly, a bargainer who
makes concessions up to a certain point and then refuses to move beyond
this point will probably be seen as being close to some "cutoff point"
on his utility scale below which he will leave the relationship rather
than settle. On the other hand, a bargainer who makes negative conces-
sions may be seen as threatening to toughen his position unless a parti-
cular offer is accepted. Thus, concessions may be shaped in a variety of
ways each of which has important consequences for the way in which one's
preferences and intentions are viewed by the other. And, as many studies
illustrate, when concessions are made systematically--especially when they
are coupled with extreme opening demands--they are instrumental in the
attainment of an optimal division of resources.

Second, concessions convey important information about bargainers'
perceptions of adversaries. They allow each party to find out how he
looks in the other's eyes. And to the extent that a bargainer believes
he is seen as capable and effective, he will probably behave in increas-
ingly cooperative fashion. It seems strange that so little of the bar-
gaining studies have not focused on the central issue--the content of the
communicative interaction.

All in all, the literature in bargaining suggests that the prin-
cipal method in arriving at a cooperative best solution is inextricably
tied to the processes of information exchange and persuasion. When "game"
situations were first studied, it was thought that they formed a model of
competitive interactions only. In 1968, however, game theory was offered
as a model of the cooperative process, and was demonstrated to serve as
well in this capacity.[32] This view was not readily accepted at this time,[33]
but has since has come to be the dominant pardigm of bargaining and nego-
tiation research.

Group Composition in Small Group Behavior

Closely tied into the choice shift research and the bargaining
research is a line of inquiry usually labelled "group composition." In
these studies, the initial predispositions of group members are systema-

tically varied to see how these compositions affect the groups' solutions.
Here we have clear instances of the study of various size and types of
minorities in dliberative outcomes.

How do minorities influence a group in reaching decisions? Many
persons feel that prior bias is the main way that this is done. Much of
this research has been conducted in studying mock juries. Unfortunately,
a good deal of this research suffers from serious methodological difficul-
ties.

One good example occurs in a study conducted by Davis and his
associates.[34] They studied the general effects of bias on the nature of
decisions rendered in 6-person juries. They believed that initial bias
would affect the outcome of a jury's deliberation as well as the kind of
verdicts rendered. 708 Ss were asked a series of questions to measüre
possible bias toward the prosecution or the defense in a rape trial. On
the basis of these questions, the experimenters divided the Ss into three
groups: "Pro-Prosecution," (34%); "Moderate," (33%); and "Pro-Defense,"
(33%). All Ss watched a videotaped trial, and then indicated their pre-
ference for the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Of the total of
708 Ss, 447 (63%) indicated that they thought him guilty, while 261 (37%)
thought him innocent. The initial predisposition had only a slight effect
on the judgements of innocent or guilty. Then these Ss were divided into
128 6-person juries, and were allowed to deliberate. In spite of the
overwhelming number of guilty predispositions, only 49 of these groups
(41.1%) were able to reach a verdict of guilty in the alloted time. 41
of the juries (35.9%) voted not guilty, and 28 of the groups were unable
to reach a decision. Davis and his coauthors claim that initial bias had
significantly affected the number of guilty verdicts. This bias is de-
monstrated by the following table:

TABLE I

	Guilty Verdict	Hung Jury	Not Guilty Verdict
Pro-Prosecution	20	9	11
Moderate	18	9	12
Pro-Defense	11	10	18

The frequencies reported do not produce a significant chi-square (4.32,
df=4). Then the authors present an analysis of the results of the deli-
berations broken down in terms of the composition of the juries. Juries
were constructed according to the post-trial, predeliberation judgements
of the jurors. These groups were 6-0, 5-1, 4-2, 3-3, 2-4, 1-5, and 0-6
in favor of a guilty verdict (see Table II). Of this analysis, they re-
ported "Moderate and Pro-prosecution matrices are rather similar, but
the pro-defense matrix is somewhat different from the first two. We lack
a standard, straightforward means of assessing the intercondition agree-
ment among the matrices, but inspection (of the table) offers no clear evi-
dence that group decision processes vary with condition."[35] These authors
overlooked a very efficient means of assessing the "intercondition agree-

ment among the matrices, but inspection (of the table) offers no clear
evidence that group decision processes vary with condition."[35] These
authors overlooked a very efficient means of assessing the "intercondition agreement among the matrices," the partitioning of chi-square for
multiple interactions.[36] f three-factor partition can be constructed by
eliminating the 6-0 juries (they routinely returned a verdict of guilty,
as we might suspect), the 1-5, and the 0-6 juries (they also produced no
surprises--producing routine verdicts of not guilty).

TABLE II

	Pro-Prosecution			Moderate			Pro-Defense		
	G	H	NH	G	H	NG	G	H	NG
Majority									
5-1	7	0	2	7	2	1	6	0	0
4-2	6	5	1	5	3	3	4	5	5
3-3	0	2	6	1	4	4	1	5	1
2-4	0	2	2	0	0	13	0	0	5

This three-element matrix can be analyzed into several components, the
"main effects," the interactions among majority, bias, and verdict, and
the triple interaction between all three. Since the verdict rendered is,
of course, the dependent variable in this interaction, the triple partition
of chi-square is analagous to a two-way interaction in an analysis of variance. When this chi-square is calculated, it yields a value of 15.26,
which, with df-12, is not significant. Therefore we cannot conclude,
with these authors, that the "pro-defense matrix was somewaht different
from the first two." Since the triple interaction was not significant,
we may collapse the frequencies into more simple comparisons. The bias
by majority size interaction is of little theoretical interest, since
these two factors were varied by the experimenters. Bias by verdict,
the one of greatest theoretical interest to these researchers, only
produced a chi-square of .268, far from significance. The majority size
of verdict interaction, on the other hand, produced a chi-square value of
43.231, significant at the .001 level (df=6). It is worth examining this
matrix separately:

TABLE III

	Verdicts		
	G	H	NG
Distribution			
5-1	20	2	3
4-2	15	13	9
3-3	2	11	11
2-4	0	2	-10

Table III shows clear evidence for the strength of the jury composition
effect as opposed to the initial bias of the jurors. On the other hand,
"bias," as such had little effect, as Table IV demonstrates:

TABLE IV

Initial Bias	Verdicts Reached		
	G	H	NG
Pro-Prosecution	13	9	11
Moderate	13	9	11
Pro-Defense	11	10	11

The interesting fact of the outcome of this experiment (and one that apparently escaped the authors of it) was that the trial (and by extension, the messages in the trial) did produce some slight differences in the initial judgments, but the manner in which these judgments were arranged in the juries was of much greater importance in predicting the outcome of the deliberations.

These judgments, and the nature of the group composition have not been studied as much as we would like. The effect of the "not-guilty" minority seems out of proportion to its size. These and other questions are beginning to be studied by communication researchers. Some of the newer methodologies many hold promise for all of the problems discussed above.

New Approaches to Small Group Research

One interesting development is the possibility of reducing the persuasive arguments explanation to a mathematical model. Boster, Mayer, Hunter and Hale[37] have made a strong beginning in this kind of study, one which show great promise for the future. This model is particularly strong since it incorporates features of the persuasive arguments theory with group composition. Boster and his associates have shown that actual groups correspond closely in their behavior to their model.

Another theory that offers much promise in small group interaction is that proposed by Siebold, Poole, and McPhee.[38] Drawing on Giddens' theory of structuralization, they propose an interaction system based on message analysis. They ask that we study the valence of a message, its quality as argument, and the influence strategy it demonstrates. They hypothesize that groups organize "decision schemes" which stem from the character of the interaction system. This theoretical approach should be especially valuable in interpreting some of the theoretical issues discussed above. It should be especially valuable in clearing up some of the problems inherent in choice shift theory and group composition problems.

In another seminal approach to group interaction, Hewes, Planalp and Streibel[39] have proposed a comprehensive mathematical treatment characterizing the nature of dyadic interactions in a small group. This model, though complex, demonstrated a usable method of studying mutual influence in the small group context. Their technique could be used to provide a more precise, flexible and complete representation of group interaction.

With this representational scheme, development of hypotheses concerning the principal issues in small group processes should be facilitated.

All in all, the prospects for small group research are indeed bright. The theoretical "push" in other disciplines is definitely toward communication as the central process, and the development of powerful methodological tools seem to presage a new generation research interests. The 1980's may well be the decade where small group communication is the dominant research interest.

FOOTNOTES

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[20] N. Fontes and R. Bundens, "Persuasion During the Trial Process," in M. Roloff and G. Miller (editors) Persuasion: New Directions in Theory and Research (Beverly Hills: SAGE, 1980), 249-266.

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[34] J. Davis, C. Spitzer, D. Nagao, and G. Stasser, "Bias in Social Decisions by Individuals and Groups," in H. Brandstatter, J. Davis, and H. Schuler (editors), Dynamics of Group Decisions (Beverly Hills: SAGE, 1978), 33-52.

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[38] D. Siebold, M. Poole, and R. McPhee, "New Prospects for Research in Small Group Communication," paper presented to the Central States Speech Association," Chicago, 1980.

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SECTION II INTRODUCTION

Developmental and Decision-Making Processes
Within the Small Group

When groups convene to make decisions some form of patterned interaction typically develops. The exact nature and shape of the developmental process may not be clearly defined. However, as scholars from Dewey to those in speech communication have observed, groups proceed through a series of phases and steps, though the process may not always be predictable or appear in a chronological or orderly sequence. The three articles in this section address the nature of developmental phases and decision-making processes within the small group.

Ronald Applbaum outlines five models of group development and extrapolates both the common features among each and the inherent limitations shared by each. Applbaum concludes that models characterizing group development each recognize orientation and acceptance phases, although the operational labels and the exact nature of each phase may differ. All models also recognize the presence of rising conflict intervening between the orientation and acceptance phases. Finally, all models distinguish between socio-emotional and task dimensions, although as Applbaum notes, researchers often equate group development with the task dimension. Applbaum also points out the inherent limitations of the models. His criticism is reminiscent of Leathers assessment of research methods employed in studying the small group. Specifically, Applbaum is critical of the varying time frames used in analyzing and defining group phases, the utilization of subjects and groups from widely divergent contexts, and the use of linear-based models to explain the non-linear process of group development. Applbaum concludes by offering areas in which research is needed. He first suggests that research conduct a general reexamination of environmental and situational factors affecting group development. A second area of research suggested by Applbaum is the interaction of communication processes and developmental phases. Two questions which emerge from Applbaum's assessment include: (1) may a group be structured so as to maximize the communication effectiveness of its combined membership, and (2) may differing "communication maps or profiles" be derived from corresponding changes within a group's structure and development.

A second article by John Brilhart attempts to develop a bridge between theory-development and the application of theory. Thus, in its theme, Brilhart's approach is similar to Groaan's call for translating theory into practice. Brilhart's focus is centered on organizing the content or subject matter that groups meet to discuss. His review of research in "prescriptive" verses "descriptive" patterns of decision-making leads to the conclusion that following some form of reflective thinking is superior than following no pattern in organizing the decision-making process. Brilhart also provides research evidence that decision-making is contingent upon member-dependent variables (such as orienting statements, individual skills of discussion leaders, and member understanding and experience in using hypothetical-deductive methods). Brilhart, therefore, cautious against the acceptance of any particular method or the ruling out of other methods (as some textbooks at least make implicit when focusing on a specific method).

In the research reviewed by Brilhart perceptual measures of member satisfaction are often reported rather than observable differences in decision-making outcomes, such as decisional quality. However, these findings are instructive in that they indicate members often are more "comfortable" or "secure" in following an established set of operational procedures. Hence, decision-making ability may be based, in part, on perceived behaviors or methods considered important to follow. In other, words, if a method is perceived important, then perception may be an influential determinant of success. As Brilhart suggests, group practitioners who enroll in our courses are more immediately concerned with what works than why something works. Renewed emphasis on perceptual processes may help satisfy the immediate need to "know how to" as well as help ground some of the dubious advice we often provide for how decisions should be made.

The third article under decision-making and developmental processes is authored by John Kline. Kline's article represents an attempt to utilize previous research as a starting point for future research. Kline selected ten suggestions for achieving consensus based on findings from previous research and supplied half the group he tested with the list of suggestions. His results indicated that groups given the list of suggestions more often achieved consensus than groups not provided the suggestions. Kline's research also lends itself to further hypothesis testing. For instance, the ten suggestions represent both the task and socio-emotional dimension of group interaction. The effects of each also may be tested by administering the task suggestions to half the groups and the socio-emotional suggestions to the remaining half.

Kline's findings also may be important for their pedagogical implications. Although the suggestions may sound common-sensical to students when presented in class, they may serve as a reminder that common sense must be practiced rather than taken for granted. It would seem, as Kline's findings suggest, that common sense may often be a misleading or inappropriate label for behavior that is assumed easy to perform. However, what students may learn from discussing the suggestions is that the motives and intentions underlying communication must be made clear among communicators. Within the small group, an atmosphere of "mutuality" must be communicated rather than remain a silent assumption among group members. Behaviors occuring under conditions of conflict may be attributed various interpretations until their intended meaning is verbalized (or metacommunicated). Thus, conflict intended as constructive may be dependent upon the verbal context in which behavior is communicated. Thus, communicators must establish the motives underlying their speech.

STRUCTURE IN GROUP DECISION MAKING:
A DIRECTION FOR FUTURE COMMUNICATION RESEARCH

by Ronald L. Applbaum*

Most empirical research on the decision process is classified into one of three categories: individual, group, or organizational. Researchers working independently, in all three areas, have described the existence of structural patterns in the decision making process. These structures have usually been conceptualized as either phases or stages of decision making

Despite our previous research, as Theodore Mills observed, we tend to underestimate the extent to which group participants follow or create an ordered, often ritualized way of interacting. We fail to perceive these patterns because "we are properly trained to look beyond the surface of overt behavior in order to infer what a man means by what he wants by what he does, we tend to overlook the design that exists on the surface of inter-personal behavior."[1]

The purpose of this paper is threefold: (1) to describe the basic structures postulated by researchers, (2) to identify the interactive decision making structures and the role of communication in those phase structures; and, (3) most importantly, to explore directions for future communication research in developing and/or testing phase theorems.

Before we proceed, it should be noted that researches and scholars dealing with group structures tend to merge or equate the concepts of group development and decision making. It is, however, not at all clear that every group development model involves decision making processes and vice versa. In addition, models of individual decision making are often discussed alongside group decision making. Research has not indicated that the structural properties of group and individual decision making are identical. This paper will deal only with those phase theorems that describe group decision making processes.

Phase Theorems and Decision Making

In this section, we will explore a number of descriptive studies which identify distinct structural phases during the decision making process. We also will describe some of the similarities and dissimilarities between the proposed group structures.

Before proceeding, however, it should be recognized that group phase theorems begin with three assumptions. First, a "natural" process of group decision making exists, that is, groups proceed in the decision making process in a fairly consistent pattern. Second, decision phases are comprised of distinct activities or interactive behaviors. And, third, structural phases occur within a specific time frame. And, if we assume that all three

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assumptions are correct, a basic group phase theorem should be generalizable across a variety of group and organizational contexts. It is also assumed by many small group researchers and scholars that identification of basic phases of the process has practical application, providing group participants with significant information with which to control or correct on-going decision processes.

Bales and Strodtbeck

Bales believed that the order of problems confronting a decision making group, would be. (1) communication about the nature of the problem to be solved; (2) evaluation; (3) control of overt action; (4) decision; and (5) tension reduction.[2] Bales and Strodtbeck provided one of the first descriptive studies to support the assumption that decision making groups go through a number of phases as they move toward their goal.[3]

Their results were based on the observation of laboratory groups dealing with problem solving tasks. They divided each group session into three equal periods and then categorized each group member interaction using the twelve category, Interaction Profile Analysis. Based on the IPA categorizations, they found three distinct phases:

1. Emphasis on problems of orientation

2. Emphasis on problems of evaluation

3. Emphasis on problems of control

Each phase was characterized by a different dominant pattern of group interaction. In phase one, members predominately gave and asked for orientation. Members were frequently asking and giving direction, information, repetition and confirmation. In phase two, members communicative acts primarily concerned problems of evaluation. Members asked and gave opinion, evaluation, feeling and wishes. In the final phase, problems of control were primary. Members asked and gave suggestion, direction, possible ways of action and suggestions.

A balance between task and social emotional activity occurred over the entire problem solving session. Both positive and negative reactions increased as the group progressed from phase one to phase three. However, the later stages of the control phase indicated primarily positive reactions. A. Paul Hare suggested that the positive and negative reactions were related to socio-emotional problems of the group process.

Since the ratio of negative to positive reactions tends to be higher in response to suggestions than to statements, the decision point is the critical bottleneck in the process. Once the decision point has been passed, the rates of negative reaction usually fall off and the rates of positive reaction rise sharply.[4]

Although their model is linear, Bales and Strodtbech's research emphasized the cyclical nature of the group process during decision making. A group proceeds through all three phases on each task and recycles back to deal with

a new task. While the three phases occur in "normal" group situations, a number of variables may modify the characteristics of the group phases, e.g., status, change, leadership, external authority, type of task, amount of information possessed by members. Bales also found that communicative behaviors by group members changed from meeting to meeting.[5] Generally, positive reactions increased over time, while negative reactions increased initially and then decreased. It should be noted that the groups had a tendency to swing back and forth between the needs of the task and those of the group members which Bales conceptualized as an equilibrium problem.[6]

Bennis and Shepard

Based on experience with training groups and in educational settings, Bennis and Shepard developed a model of group development consisting of two phases, each with three subphases.[7]

Phase I. Dependence-Power Relations
  Subphase 1. Dependence Submission
         2. Counterdependence
         3. Resolution

Phase II. Interdependence
  Subphase 4. Enchantment
         5. Disenchantment
         6. Consensual Validation

Participants are primarily concerned with their dependence and power relationships in phase one. In the first subphase, the emotional reaction is one of dependence-fight. Participants respond as in an ordinary discussion group and avoid talking about the group task. Aggressive members with experience tend to dominate. In the second subphase, assertive counter-dependent participants are involved in attempts to restructure the group. And, in the final subphase, the group members take over leadership roles and proceed to work intensely on the task. A group emerges from the collectivity of individuals. The second phase is characterized by members dealing with problems of interdependence and personal relationships. The individual emerges from the group. In the fourth subphase, we have a general distribution of participation. The group members joke and laugh. There is a high rate of interaction and participation. The participants are satisfied with the group. In subphase five, the participants become disenchanted with the group and other participants. Finally, subphase six, group members begin to understand and accept each other. The members become more open in their communication relationship.

Bennis and Shepard proposed that valid communication in the decision process is affected by the members' orientations toward authority and intimacy that members bring to the group.[8] Participants are concerned with dependence (how they relate to authority) and interdependence (how they work out the personal relations with their peers). The Bennis and Shepard model like the Bales and Strodtbeck model separates the task and socio-emotional dimensions of the group.

Tuckman

Tuckman developed this phase theory from the published results of studies dealing with group development.[9] The theory was drawn from studies on therapy groups and then applied to training groups, laboratory groups and groups in natural settings. He proposed the existence of four major stages in decision making.

    Stage 1. Forming
    Stage 2. Storming
    Stage 3. Norming
    Stage 4. Performing

This model is linear. Like the two previous models, it also makes a distinction between task and socioemotional behavior.

Each stage is divided into dimensions: (1) group structure dealing with patterns of interpersonal relations and (2) task behavior concerning the work being done by the group. The characteristics of each dimension change as the group progresses through its developmental phases.

On the task behavior level, the group begins by identifying the task. During the storming stage, members respond emotionally to the task creating intergroup conflict. The participant may resist attempts toward behavior modification. As task conflicts are resolved the group moves to the norming stage. The group members discuss their opinions and/or establish criteria for evaluating decision alternatives. The participants are characterized by their openness. And, finally, in the performing stage, we see the emergence of the solution and/or modification of behavior in desired direction.

On the group structure level, the group members first attempt to discover the acceptable interactive behavior. In the storming stage, participants attempt to establish their independence and resist the formation of group structure. As the participants quest for individuality is repressed, the group begins to develop cohesion. Group feeling increases and task conflicts are avoided to assure harmony among members. Finally, in the performing stage, we see the emergence of the solution and/or modification of behavior in desired direction.

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Like Bales, Tuckman recognized that a difference could exist between phases over a single meeting and those of longer duration. And, like Bennis and Shepard, he assumed that the primary task was accomplished in the latter stages of the decision making process.

Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Theoret

Based on a field study of 25 decision processes, together with a review of the literature, Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Theoret developed a three phase model for "unstructured" decision processes.[10]

Phase 1. Identification
     Routine 1. Decision Recognition
     Routine 2. Diagnosis

Phase 2. Development
     Routine 1. Search
     Routine 2. Design

Phase 3. Selection
     Routine 1. Screen
     Routine 2. Evaluation-Choice
     Routine 3. Authorization

The three phases are distinct, but not necessarily sequential phases in the decision process. The identification phase consists of two routines. decision recognition in which opportunities, problems and crises are recognized and evoke activity and diagnosis in which the groups attempts to understand the evoking stimuli and determine any cause-effect relationships. The development phase is concerned with activities leading to the development of one or more solutions to a problem. Development is described in two basic routines, search and design. Search is evoked to find ready-made solutions, design is used to develop custom-made solutions or to modify ready-made ones.

Search is a hierarchical, stepwise procedure. The search begins with the familiar and extends to more remote and less familiar areas as earlier searches fail. In the search does not produce a solution, the group may turn to designing one specifically for that situation. Design is an iterative process.

They factor their decision into a sequence of nested design and search cycles, essentially working their way through a decision tree, with the decisions at each mode more narrow and focused than the last. Failure at any mode can lead to cycling back to an earlier mode. Thus a solution crystallizes, as designers grope along, building their solution brick by brick without really knowing what it will look like until its completed.[11]

The Selection phase is divided into screen, evaluation-choice and authorization subphases. It also is a "multistage, interactive process involving a progressively deepening investigation of alternatives. Screening reduces the number of alternative solutions, evaluation-choice is used to investigate the remaining solutions and select a course of action; finally, authorization deals with the ratification of the chosen solution.

It is acknowledged by the researchers that one decision process could involve a great number of selection steps, many of these related to the development phase.

Communication occurs throughout the decision process. And, three specific communication routines are delineated. First, the exploration routine involves scanning for information and passive review of unsolicited information. It may be used to identify the decision situation of problem, build conceptual models and develop a general data base. Second, the investigation routine is for the search and research of specific information. This routine appears during the diagnosis, search and evaluation-choice routines. The third routine is dissemination. The greater the number of people involved in the outcome of the decision, the more time decision makers spend disseminating information about its process.

Fisher

The purpose of Fisher's investigation was to discover the structure of the interaction process across time leading to group consensus on decision-making tasks.[12] Ten groups varying in size from four to twelve members were selected for examination. The study did not control or separate the task and social dimensions. Fisher assumed that the observed patterns of interaction would reveal how groups use interaction to achieve consensus on decision proposals. The analysis revealed four separate phases. However, "the phasic progression reflects a continuous and gradual change of interaction patterns."[13]

Phase 1. orientation
Phase 2. conflict
Phase 3. emergence
Phase 4. reinforcement

The first phase of decision-making was called orientation. The members get acquainted, clarify and tentatively express attitudes. Problems of socializing and a socio-emotional climate affect the task interaction patterns in the early phase. Participants seek ideas and directions for proceeding on with the task. A degree of ambiguity exists as the initial expression of tentatively favorable attitudes.

The second phase is called the conflict phase. With the emergence of decision proposals, members begin expressing their attitudes, positive and negative, toward specific proposals. With the expression of attitudes comes disagreement among group members and attempts to persuade dissenting members. Coalitions develop from ideational polarization.

The next phase is called emergence. Conflict and argument are reduced during the third phase. It is in the third phase that we have a recurrence of ambiguity. Ambiguity serves as a form of dissent. Fisher suggests the group members proceed to change their attitudes from disfavor to favor on the decision proposals through the mediation of ambiguity. The ideational coalitions dissolve during this phase. The group participants begin to support specific decision proposals, if only in an ambigious manner.

The final phase has been labeled reinforcement. Decision proposals
are reinforced by comments of the participants. Ambiguous dissent
dissipates in this phase. This phase is characterized by a spirit of unity.
Emerging decisions are reinforced and members show their agreement. Fisher
notes that the four phases will not be present in all decision groups.

Phase Theoreoms: An Analysis and Directions
For Future Research

In attempting an analysis of phase theorems, we should begin by noting
certain methodological differences and assumptions. First, the source
of data varies widely among researchers. Bales and Strodtbeck used
twenty-two problem-solving laboratory groups.[14] Tuckman's theorem is
based on published research observations.[15] Bennis and Shepard's
theorem is derived from non-participant reactions and five years of group
dynamic classroom observation.[16] Mintzberg, et. al., relied on field
study observations of organizations.[17] And, Fisher utilized non-classroom
college.groups. Drawing the groups from widely different sources or contexts
is not unusual in small group research. In the basic group development
research, for example. phase theorems have been developed from as widely
divergent sources as neurotic patients in one case to social workers,
psychologists and psychiatrists in another.[18] Researchers will rarely
attempt to relate conclusions from such widely divergent sources and, yet,
our literature indicates no such reservation by scholars. In addition,
no valid basis for comparison is provided by the researches.

The researchers also use different time frames for either analysis or
development of their theorems. Bales and Strodtbeck observed one meeting
session.[19] Bennis and Shepard based their findings upon the duration of
the training group.[20] Mintzberg, et. al., observed the decision making
groups over a three to six month period.[21] And, Fisher used groups that
met over a range of twenty-five minutes to thirty hours.[22] Thus, some
researchers describe phases during the course of a single meeting, others
over a series of meetings, while some describe the entire history of the
group. Time is a crucial dimension in the small group process and, yet,
researchers do not adequately account for its impact on their studies.[23]

Krueger has questioned four other methodological practices regarding
previous phase theorem research.[24] First, researchers assume that groups
complete full life cycles which is defined as completion of the group task.[25]
Second, phase models utilize rigid prescriptions of group behavior, assuming
that all groups .follow a similar sequence of development.[26] Third, most
models predict linear and progressive changes in group behavior.[27] And,
fourth, there is no clear operationalization of the term "phase."

Although a number of descriptive phase theorems have been developed
over the last three decades, there is a significant lack of empirical
research to verify the validity of the proposed theoretical structures
or underlying assumptions. Witte attempted to test whether distinct
phases do exist and whether they follow a simple sequence as suggested in
the literature. He found that decision processes do consist of a number
of different phases. However, the sequence of five phases, problem recog-
nition to gathering of information to development of alternatives to evaluation

of alternatives to choice, was not supported in his research. He found that the decision process consisted of a plurality of sub-decisions, and when he tested the phase thereom in terms of sub-decisions, he again found no support for a five sequence model.

Witte also found that communicative activity dominated every time interval and that the total level of activity peaked at the beginning and end of the group process, but was lower in the middle periods. He also found that the number of choices peaked at the end of the process. Witte concluded:

> We believe that human beings cannot gather information without in some way simultaneously developing alternatives. They cannot avoid evaluating these alternatives immediately, and in doing this they are forced to a decision. This is a package of operations and the succession of these packages over time constitutes the total decision-making process.[28]

Although most researchers have observed that the decision making process can be very cyclical, their models are basically linear. Scheidel and Crowell proposed a spiral or circular model of problem solving emphasizing the communication process in discussion groups.[29] Their model, unlike the previously reported ones, has no specific phases. They describe the "discussion process as one with considerable freedom and flexibility in the movement from contribution to contribution."[30] While order exists in the decision process, the group does not follow a predictable sequence of operations.

Based on a task analysis of group member interactions, they proposed that discussions follow a spiral format, that is, as the group moves toward a solution, it follows a circular course which serves to anchor each new group position.

> Group thought seems to move forward with a "reach-test" type of motion, that is, one participant reaches forth with an inference which seems to be elaborated at length with movements of clarification, substantiation and verbalized acceptance.[31]

They also reported that actual member statements were highly unpredictable, that is, there was a great deal of freedom of choice in group discussion. The generalizability of this last finding maybe limited. The discussion groups were composed of skilled group participants. Furthermore, the problem given the groups had no correct solution, required a minimum of prior knowledge, if any, and was not subject to external authority or limitations.

Fisher also pointed out some "serious" limitations in the research of Bales and Strodtbeck, Bennis and Shepard and Scheidel and Cromwell.[32] he notes that only Scheidel and Cromwell examined the verbal behavior related specifically to the task decision making. And, none of the three researchers studied the time dimension as a factor in group decision making.

Krueger who had questioned some of the assumptions of earlier phase research investigated the communication development of self-analytic groups. She found that different groups with similar initial conditions can evolve into different

end states. She suggested that earlier phase studies may have investigated structures which were too general and therefore, not sensitive to actual group differences (Scheidel and Crowell has made the same criticism of the IPA system in their research). The analysis of group communication yielded nonlinear patterns of change in three dimensions of information processing. source of information, time orientation and evaluation of information. Her results provide further support for a nonlinear model. Krueger also rated two factors which question the previous research on phase theorems. First, the groups did not exhibit more "work" in the final stages of the group's life cycle as had been proposed by others. She suggests that "Previous models which impose a structure on the group, rather than allowing it to emerge from the data may obscure what actually happens at termination by collapsing the last third or quarter of group life into a single final stage."[33] And, second, she noted that the development of dimensions occurs at varying rates and patterns. She suggested that including several distinct dimensions or variables in one model may obscure important development differences.

Descriptive studies of group development have all noted the early presence of conflict in the decision process. In Fisher's research, for example, conflict is the second phase and manifests itself in other forms in later process phases. Ellis and Fisher have proposed a three phases of conflict in small group development.[34] Phase one, interpersonal conflict, characterized by positive reinforcement. Conflict was the result of individual differences since the group issues had not developed. Phase two, confrontation, characterized by an increase in member conflict and disfavor. Statement ambiguity is highest in phase two. And phase three, substantive, the conflict is group as opposed to member generated. In the final stages, the reinforcement interaction closely resembles phase one. The authors note that "focusing on the process of interaction demonstrates the tentative nature of conclusions about the effects of input variables."[35] No attempt was made to fit this phase theorem into Fisher's earlier four stage general decision structure.

Despite a wide disparity in sources of data, time dimensions and measuring devices, the descriptive studies indicate a remarkable number of common elements. All models note the distinctions between socio-emotional and task behaviors. Although the models do not agree on the nature of each phase, several phases include characteristics common to all models. The first stage of decision making in all models is a type of orientation-- participants become familiar with other group members and the group task. All the models recognize the presence of conflict rising shortly after the orientation phase, and diminishing in the final decision stages. All models have as the last stage the acceptance of the decision. The exact nature of the phases across models are not consistent and, therefore, difficult to compare or contrast. In Table 1. an illustration in provided that shows the five previously discussed models and the relative structure similiarities during the life cycle of the decision making group.

Attempts to apply our limited knowledge of structure to practical use is common in group discussion textbooks. Unfortunately, empirical research regarding the utility of prescribed group structures is limited. Larson

Table 1. Phase Structure in Decision Making Groups

Bales/Strodtbeck	Orientation		Evaluation		Control		
Mintzberg, et. al.	Identification		Development		Selection		
Bennis/Shepard	Dependence		Power Relations		Interdependence-Personal Relations		
	Dependence-Submission		Counter-dependence Resolution	Enchantment	Disenchantment		Consensual Validation
Tuckman	Forming		Storming		Norming		Performing
Fisher	Orientation		Conflict		Emergence		Reinforcement

comparing three discussion patterns, single question, ideal solution and reflective thinking, found the latter less effective than the others.[36] Brilhart and Jochem comparing the reflective thinking format with two other structures, brainstorming and a pattern based on Bales phase theorem found the reflective thinking format the least effective and brainstorming producing more and better solutions.[37] Bayless, on the other hand, who examines three patterns, including the reflective thinking format found no evidence that any specific pattern had a significant effect upon the quality of the group's decision.[38]

Despite three decades of descriptive studies in which a number of phase theorems have been proposed in a variety of disciplines, we have barely scratched the surface of group decision making. A major gap in our literature exists in attempting to explain the relationship between decision making and phase structures. We lack a single generalizable theory to describe the phasic structures during decision processes. All existing models have serious methodological or conceptual flaws. Recent research has pointed to the fallacy of a number of the assumptions underlying the basic phase theorems. And, further research is sorely needed to determine the significance of these findings.

In the more general area of group process the following questions need to be addressed by researchers:

1. What is the relationship between phase structures and decision processes?
   1a. Is the efficiency of the decision making related to the phase structure?
   1b. Is the effectiveness of the decision making related to the phase structure?

2. Do phase structures vary as a function of the type of decision required?
   2a. Do person-directed decision structures differ from non-person directed structures?
   2b. Does the group's final action, for example, recommend vs. implement, relate to the phase structure?

3. Do phase structures vary as a function of group composition?
   3a. Does the gender of the participants relate to phase structures?
   3b. Do personality variables, e.g., authoritarianism, relate to phase structures?
   3c. Does the leadership of the group relate to phase structures?
   3d. Is group cohesion related to phase structures?
   3e. Is group member commitment related to phase structures?

4. Do phase structures differ across organizational contexts?

5. How does time relate to phase structures during decision making?

6. Do phase structures vary between structured and unstructured decision making groups?

7. If the decision process is cyclical, rather than linear, what is the constant relationship between such activities as information gathering, development of alternatives, evaluation of alternatives and choices over the total time period?

8. Are individual and group decision making structures significantly different?

As researchers primarily concerned with the process of communication, we have an additional set of research questions needing answers:

1. What is the relationship between the group communication process and group decision process?

2. Are the interaction patterns of the socio-emotional and task dimensions related?
   2a. What are the interaction patterns in the socio-emotional dimension?

3. Do the personality characteristics of the group members effect the group interaction and, therefore, the phase structures?

4. Does the information level of group members effect group interaction and, therefore, the phase structure?

5. Do a variety of interaction patterns exist within the more general phase structures?

6. Does the time-dimension relate to interaction and phase structure during decision making?
   6a. Do time constraints modify the interaction patterns to conform to specific phase structures?
   6b. Is member interaction an iterative process in decision making?

The questions listed previously are merely guides to begin our research endeavors and not meant to be exhaustive. As communication researchers and scholars, we need to examine the existing information on decision making structures and develop a new picture of the communication process during decision making. Our discipline has with few exceptions not investigated this area and clearly has not to date been able to articulate any clear relationship between interaction patterns and group decision making. If our research is to have any practical value in decision making, it is imperative that we begin our explorations as soon as possible.

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PROBLEM-SOLVING DISCUSSION: SOME ISSUES
FOR TEACHING AND RESEARCH

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In this paper I have summarized some of the research and theory
bearing on the question, "To what degree and in what ways should a prob-
lem-solving discussion be prescriptively organized?" and point to some
lines of investigation begging our attention in speech communication.

We have argued over "descriptive" and "prescriptive" approaches to
the study and teaching of problem-solving discussion. Many have written
and spoken as if a "small group communication" approach is intrinsically
different from a "discussion" approach. The advice we give to people in-
terested in problem solving by groups is highly variable, to say the least.
If by "discussion" we refer to a form of group performance (such as the
collective public speaking of a panel group), then the study of small group
communication is something different. But at least to me the distinction
is a highly artificial, useless and foolish one. It is encouraging to note
that writers of many recent textbooks in the small group area have stated
explicitly that they are attempting to combine or synthesize these "two"
approaches. Students, executive trainees and other adults who come to
both credit and non-credit classes are seeking both to understand some of
the forces at work in the small groups to which they belong and how to
communicate influentially in these groups. They care about what "works,"
not our scholarly (or pedantic) controversies. Most of all they ask "how
to. . ." when in designated roles of leadership, such as chairing a com-
mittee or as manager consulting with work groups. Learning about commu-
nication in small groups may be fascinating to us as graduate students and
professors of the social psychology of small groups, but most of our clients
have little time for that. They seek the down-to-earth advice in such
books as Bormann and Bormann wrote,[2] or the workshops of an Andre DelBecq
(Nominal Group Technique) or the late Norman Maier with his practical
training in leading problem solving conferences and discussions.

To date there has been a limited amount of research bearing on the
advice we should give about how to organize/lead problem solving discus-
sions, or, if you prefer, how to provide some organizing pattern in group
discussions. Little of the grounded knowledge we have is of recent vin-
tage. And from all of it only one very certain conclusion emerges: .
"...research does not produce unequivocal thinking models in groups..
But it does unequivocally support the advantage of some sort of rational
decision making agenda."[3] However, we do have some evidence indicating,
what sort of outline ("agenda") to follow, and questions that we need to
address in our future research. The rest of this paper speaks to those
questions.

Almost every textbook in discussion/small group communication gives
credit to the model of problem solving presented by John Dewey in his

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classic <u>How We Think</u>.[4] Dewey was <u>not</u> concerned with how to organize dis-
cussions, or even if they should be organized by anyone. He was motivated
by the question, "How do productive individuals solve problems? What pro-
cess of thinking do they engage in?" The answer, he believed, should be
taught as the central objective in all of education. His answer was based
on science as method, specifically as it was manifested in the reports of
people he considered to be effective problem solvers (mostly his students),
about how they had actually proceeded while thinking toward the solution
to some problem. From analyses of their reports he determined that there
were five steps in what he called the process of "reflective thinking".
(1) awareness of a felt difficulty; (2) location and definition of this
difficulty; (3) location of possible solution(s); (4) development by
reasoning of the implications of the solution, (5) further observation and
experiment leading to its acceptance or rejection. I repeat for emphasis
that this was a model of "rational" thought by individuals, not designed
by Dewey as any sort of guide or outline for groups to follow. He reported
no evaluation research of teaching this model, no empirical comparisons of
the outcomes achieved by this procedure compared with those achieved by in-
tuitive thinkers. Such research would have to be done by others, not a
philosopher.

Although Dewey was not concerned with small group communication per
se, and he has been cited more than any other source for advice on how to
organize discussions, his work has been paid more lip service than close
consideration. Sometimes I wonder if some of those who quote him actually
read his book. He described and advocated much more in the procedures of
"reflective thinking" than has been provided in any current text on group
communication, some of which has been tested empirically by small group
researchers and some of which has not. A "revisit" of Dewey can be most
enlightening to help us discover more of what he meant by the concept of
"reflective thinking."

Although he stressed the importance of a definite ordered and orderly
sequence, Dewey did <u>not</u> present the exact sequence provided as the guide
for reflective thinking was

> . . . a consecutive ordering in such a way that each [step],
> determines the next as its proper outcome. . . . The successive
> portions of the reflective thought grow out of one another and
> support one another; they do not come and go in a medley.[5]

Stage 1 of this sequence, "a felt difficulty," was variously described as
"whatever perplexes or challenges the mind" and "an ambiguity to be re-
solved," such as which fork to take when one has no road map. To resolve
this felt difficulty was the whole purpose of problem solving: "The
problem fixes the end of thought, and the end controls the process of
thinking."

Stage 2, "definition of the difficulty," involve a <u>detailed</u> explo-
ration of the problem:

> The essence of critical thinking is suspended judgment;
> and the essence of this suspense is inquiry to determine
> the nature of the problem before proceeding to attempts
> at its solution. This, more than any other thing, trans-

forms mere inference into tested inference, suggested conclusions into proof.[6]

Certainly, Dewey indicated, a mere enumeration of facts is not reflective thinking; thinking produces the organization of pertinent facts into some image of the problem. The organizing was conguent with his insistence that education, at the core, was for training the mind to function in a "disciplined"--as opposed to intuitive or haphazard--way. This discipline he described as "the habitual power of effective mental attack," "ability to 'turn things over,' to look at matters deliberately, to judge whether the amount and kind of evidence requisite for decision is at hand, and if not, to tell where and how to seek such evidence."

At stage 3 of reflective thinking, "occurence of a suggested explanation or possible solution," he called for suspension of decision making, for enumeration and clarification of varied (even many) solutions:

> Since suspended belief, or the postponement of a final conclusion pending further evidence, depends partly upon the presence of rival conjectures as to the best course to pursue or the probable explanation to favor, cultivation of a variety of alternative suggestions is an important factor in good thinking."[7]

Only by comparing these varied ideas could one adequately judge them. Dewey could well have accepted the concept and technique of "brainstorming" into his model of "reflective thinking," but there was nothing in his model bearing on criteria-ideas vs. ideas-criteria controversy, or indeed whether or not to specifically devote a phase of the process to criteria as such.

At stage 4, "The rational elaboration of an idea," the implications of possible solutions were explored by Dewey's problem solver. Some ideas would be rejected, some modifed, some accepted. Further indication that Dewey would have encouraged his students to engage in "brainstorming" is shown in how he described what might happen to some ideas at stage 4: "Suggestions at first seemingly remote and wild are frequently so transformed by being elaborated into what follows them as to become apt and fruitfull."

Stage 4 and Stage 5, "Corroboration of an idea and formation of a concluding belief," comprise what is typically called "evaluation of possible solutions" in recent presentations of reflective thinking by authors of small group textbooks. Dewey was adapting the hypothesis testing procedures of experimental science, and so advised the problem solver to do as much empirical corroboration of an idea as possible, including an "experimental" test (what we might call a trial run).

In Dewey's model there was no criteria step as such, but certainly the judgment of ideas involved in stage 5 called implicitly for criteria and he explicitly referred to "the conditions demanded by the theory" to be used in evaluating an idea. Also, Dewey did not suggest the final step we usually find in current models for problem solving group discussions-- how to put the decision into effect. Perhaps this was due to his concern with how to develop "disciplined" minds. We find, however, that groups often reach consensus on a policy statement without making plans

to get it put into effect unless they are reminded by someone with a question such as "How shall we put this into effect?"

That the procedure for reflective thinking would be varied somewhat from problem to problem was stated forcefully by Dewey:

> The disciplined. . .mind. . .is the mind able to judge
> how far each of these steps needs to be carried in any
> particular situation. No cast-iron rules can be laid
> down. Each case has to be dealt with as it arises, on
> the basis of its importance and the context in which it
> occurs. To take too much pains in one case is as foolish
> --as illogical--as to take too little in another.[8]

The five stage model of individual problem-solving which Dewey advocated was taken and modified somewhat, but without any sort of empirical testing, as a guide for problem solving discussions. The first major book devoted to this was Elliott's The Process of Group Thinking.[9] Based on his fifteen years of chairing discussions, training discussion leaders, and directing conferences and conventions in which small group discussions were central, Elliott tried to formulate a guide book for leading discussions in voluntary organizations such as the YMCA and YWCA. To him, group decisions were the methodology of democracy in volunteer organizations. Elliott stressed that ability to think well is not inherited by the individual, but must be learned, and even more so by the group if impulse, dictators, or tradition are not to rule in such groups. Such group thinking was the antithesis of a ". . .haphazard talkfest, where persons meet to consider a question with neither plan nor procedure and with but little basis of fact or evidence." Elliott credited Dewey as the basis for his "Outline of Group Thinking Procedure" which involved three major phases: I. The Situation and Its Problem; II. What to Do?' III. How To Do It (ways and means). Phase I was devoted to analysis of the problem, II. entailed a search for possible solutions, then an exploration and evaluation of these against facts, opinions and goals of the group members until a decision was reached. Phase III, "How To Do It?" was Elliott's addition, the planning of a course of action to put the solution decided upon into effect. Other writers on the subject in the same period urged that problem solving groups follow some similar outline.[10]

The next major text using an extension of the model of problem solving developed by Dewey was written by McBurney and Hance.[11] This book, and its sequel in 1945, advocated a problem solving model closely patterned after Dewey. Subsequent was the writing of Barnlund and Haiman[12] which credited Dewey as the source of a pattern for organizing "complete problem" discussions into six states. (1) ventilation; (2) clarification; (3) fact-finding; (4) discovery, (5) evaluation, and (6) decision-making. Barnlund and Haiman did not agree on whether or not to insert a definite "criteria" step, or when to do so. They did agree that "specific circumstances might make one or the other approach most fruitful, and that one ought to experiment with each method." This book also included the three phases of problem solving described by Bales and Strodtbeck.

Subsequent small group communication textbooks have presented variations of the reflective thinking sequence, some with a definite criteria stage and others without, some with criteria to be discussed prior to

the search for solutions and some with the reverse. In all too many such books one model is presented as the way to solve problems, or to organize problem solving discussions.

Empirical research into how groups solve problems, and the effectiveness of trying to follow some model or outline of the problem solving process for controlling the content of remarks during group interaction, seems to have begun with Bales and Strodtbeck[13], using the newly developed Interaction Process Analysis (IPA) system for categorizing discussant behaviors. They reported discovering three rather general phases in the problem solving deliberations of groups (especially of Harvard students paid to discuss human relations case problems with no training or designated leader). These phases were labelled "orientation," "evaluation" and "control." There was no sharp distinction among these phases, they were obtained by dividing a discussion into three equal time periods. During the first third--"orientation"--there tended to be more asking for and giving of information, repeating and confirming than in the later periods. In the "evaluation" phases the proportion of evaluative type comments increased somewhat over the first phase, with a concomitant decline in the proportion of information exchange. In the final third, the discussions included more suggestion seeking and giving than earlier, and more expressions of agreement and disagreement, with a further decline in the relative amount of informational statements. However, even in this final third of the discussions the percentage of control-type remarks was far less than the percentage of orienting and evaluating ones. For the most part the groups observed had no designated leaders, had no history or future, lacked any plan for conducting their discussion, and had no training at all in group communication for the purpose of problem solving. That these phases occurred gives us nothing on which to model effective problem solving group interaction. A description of how the untrained function is not likely to give us a modern science of medicine, or highway construction, or of human affairs. IPA is much too general a system for analyzing the logical sequence of statements offered in an effort to solve a problem. Yet some speech communication writers have taken this three-stage model as a guide for organizing problem solving discussions, or have used it to suggest that we ought not to train people in rigorous problem solving sequences to follow during problem solving discussions.

In 1952, Maier and Solem reported that training a discussion leader to have the group not accept the first idea they could all agree upon but seek an additional solution led to better quality solutions.[14] This seemed to support the importance of some procedure in problem-solving discussions that would guarantee Dewey's dictum that solutions needed to be listed, then compared rather than being discussed when presented until a consensus emerged.

In a subsequent study Maier and Maier reported on the effectiveness of having leaders trained to guide groups in a detailed analysis of the problem facing them before permitting any discussion of what to do-- thorough problem analysis before solution discussion.[15] Only the designated leaders had been trained to use the developmental model, largely a series of questions about the nature and "causes" of the problem. After that was done, the group could follow any course in reaching a solution. The findings are most important to a science of group problem solving. Blind judgments by subject-matter experts showed that the "developmental"

or the problem-ideation-criteria-evaluation-decision sequence under a
supplied trained leader. Somewhat surprisingly, significantly more said
they preferred the complex "creative problem solving" sequence of five
steps than the simpler problem-solution model in which an idea could be
evaluated and modified as soon as it was introduced. This finding held
regardless of the problem discussed. Bayless also reported that subjects
in his study of sequences for group problem solving felt that following
a several-step problem solving outline had helped them in reaching a deci-
sion.[20]

Larson used student groups to discuss industrial relations problems.
This solution was one of five possible alternatives supplied to each group,
from which they had to choose the "best" solution.[21] Four different ana-
lysis formats were compared: "no pattern" in which the group was given
the problem to solve but no analytic outline to follow; "single question"
which is akin to Maier's developmental pattern; "ideal solution" form
which focuses attention on the wants and values of people affected by the
decision; and the "reflective thinking form." Any of the three prescrip-
tive patterns for guiding group discussion produced significantly more
correct solutions than did the "no pattern" discussions. The merit of
some prescriptive model of problem solving for guiding discussions was
thus clearly demonstrated.

From historical accounts of numerous high-level policy groups, Janis
developed the general hypothesis that a lack of conflict in problem solv-
ing discussions by high-status groups often leads to disastrous solutions.[22]
These poor outcomes, he concluded, often result when low-status members
conform to high-status member's ideas or to large initial majorities. Sup-
porting Janis' hypothesis, Flowers found that problem solving discussions
with designated (and high-status) leaders who were "open" produced more
different possible solutions and used more evidence than did groups
supplied with "closed" leaders who had already decided on what the solution
should be.[23] Further evidence of the importance of information in problem
discussions was supplied by Gouran.[24] He found that the proportion of
"orienting" behavior in a discussion is closely related to the achievement
of consensus on policy questions. By "orientation" Gouran refers to the
type of statements which includes goal-oriented factual information,
suggestions and conflict resolutions. This line of research indicates
the importance of a step to gather and interpret information about the
problem and of one to focus on possible solutions. While these findings
do not specifically refer to organization of problem solving, a pattern
encouraging "orienting" behaviors (as does Maier's "developmental" pattern)
would likely help to produce the conditions leading to consensus on a
solution that had been the subject of critical scrutiny and conflict
during the discussion. In short, issues of what model of problem solving,
if any, to follow and the kinds of statements made during problem-solving
discussions are somewhat interdependent.

Except for studies of "brainstorming" as such, during the last decade,
almost no research has been reported in scholarly journals about sequences
for organizing problem solving. Yet from the preceeding summary of Dewey's
ideas and what has been done to test them, it is apparent that there are
still many questions to be investigated. It is still true that much of
what we teach students and clients who want to lead and participate in pro-
ductive problem solving discussions is a little dubious, only partly

pattern produced significantly more high quality solutions than did a "free"
pattern of discussion, in which the designated leader imposed no outline on
the group. However, the "developmental" pattern called for more skill and
patience on the part of the leader, or the result could be resentment by
members at having their remarks restricted to one issue at a time. The
members of these groups were all managerial personnel involved in organi-
zational development training programs conducted by Maier, but not spe-
cifically trained in the logic and patience required for reflective think-
ing.

A few scientific studies of individual problem solving and individuals
in problem solving discussions give us suggestions for developing se-
quences for group problem solving. Parnes and Meadow demonstrated that
following the "rules" of brainstorming led individuals to find more and
more "good" possible solutions than not following these rules.[16] Espe-
cially important in these rules was the play-like enumeration of every pos-
sible solution the person could think of before thinking of criteria and
the relative merits of the ideas. Pryon and Sharp created a test of re-
flective thinking ability, based on Dewey's model.[17] They found that dis-
cussants were rated high in their contributions to problem solving by
fellow participants and that observers scored higher on this test than
did discussants rated low in contributing to the group's problem solving
efforts. From these studies it seems likely that training in a prescrip-
tive model of problem solving could produce superior results. But the
questions still remained as to whether or not problem solving by a group
would be more effective if the group followed such a prescriptive model,
and as to whether certain sequences of problem solving thought were su-
perior to others for this purpose, at least with certain types of prob-
lems.

In 1964, Brilhart and Jochem confronted the issues of complex vs. simple
models for organizing problem solving discussions, and within a complex
model the "ideas-criteria" sequence vs. the "criteria-ideas" sequence.[18]
This experiment showed that separating ideation from evaluation during
discussions ("brainstorming") produced more plausible solutions and more
ideas as judged "good" by independent evaluators than evaluating ideas
as they are introduced. Significantly more participants in the groups
preferred a complex five-stage model for organizing their problem solving
discussions than a simple problem-solution sequence modeled after the
phases described by Bales and Strodtbeck.[19] Also, significantly more
subjects said they would prefer the "ideas-criteria" sequence over the
"criteria-ideas" sequence in future discussions. However, these discus-
sants dealt with typical case problems to which their relationship was
at best advisory. It was not clear that these preferences would be
obtained if the participants were discussing problems for which relatively
few options were possible and when the decision would have a direct effect
on the life of the discussants. To get at these questions, Brilhart in a
later study (unpublished) had student groups make decisions about how to
distribute final course grade points among themselves and on which of
nine possible dates to have their final written examination in a basic
public speaking course. The decisions were binding on them and their in-
structors. All experimental groups in this study were composed of students
from the same class who knew each other prior to the experiment. Each
group discussed each problem, using either the problem-solution sequence

grounded, and in some cases downright misleading in light of the empirical knowledge available.

Some Conclusions and Recommendations for Research

A few grounded propositions for organizing/guiding/leading problem solving discussions emerge from the literature reviewed in this paper, plus some implications for future research.

1. Some version of reflective thinking as a model, guiding outline, or organizationing format produces better solutions from problem solving discussion groups than does non-prescriptively organized discussion. Some pattern--almost any pattern--is better than none.

2. Use of any detailed outline or model of problem solving requires special skills on the part of a designated coordinator/leader of the discussion.

3. Discussants trained and practiced in problem solving procedures akin to what is generally accepted as the sequence or procedure of hypothesis testing in empirical science tend to be perceived as more valuable than persons not so skilled.

4. Early on during a discussion, as well as later, the group needs a high frequency of "orienting" statements providing information about the problem.

5. The search for ideas apart from any evaluation of them, and the special patience this requires, are well worth the time and effort, but are unlikely to occur without a plan or outline to follow.

6. There is no consensus among writers and no empirical evidence to establish conclusively whether criteria as such should be discussed separately or only when and if they emerge in the discussion of ideas, and if separately, whether before or after the search for ideas.

Implications for future research include at least the following:

1. More study of actual group embedded in large, social structures needs to be undertaken to determine if there are any clear patterns in the problem solving sequences followed through time when problem solving extends over two or more meetings.

2. Actual groups need to be observed with analytic techniques to determine if there are any consistent differences in the problem solving procedures of those whose outcomes are judged to be highly successful from the procedures followed by those judged to be highly successful from the procedures followed by those judged to be relatively unsuccessful, and/or in the procedures followed by the same group when its outcomes are of differential quality.

3. Some study of the relationship between prescriptive patterns and the achievement of consensus need to be made.

4. No one has reported studies of the actual effectiveness of training in prescriptive organization of problem solving discussions when applied to non-classroom situations. Such studies are needed to appraise our writing and instructing.

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CONCENSUS IN SMALL GROUPS: DERIVING SUGGESTIONS FROM RESEARCH

by John A. Kline*

In the Spring of 1975 I left the University of Missouri to become
Communication Skills Advisor for Air University. Air University, a part
of Air Training Command, provides a continuing program of professional
military education of Air Force officers and senior noncommissioned officers.
In addition, the Air Force Institute of Technology, ROTC, Civial Air Patrol,
Leadership and Management Development Center, and many short-courses and
nonresident schools are conducted by Air University.

One of the things that has impressed me most during my time with Air
University is the desire of Air Force personnel to put sound communication
theory and research into practice. At the same time I have been distressed
by an unwillingness of many communication scholars to translate theory and
research into understandable and useable suggestions for everyday use.

Findings from the study of group communication offer much potentially
valuable information for managers, educators, and others interested in
communicating more effectively in groups. But this information must be
collected and analyzed carefully to provide useful lists and guidelines
for group behavior.

Ten Suggestions for Reaching Consensus

One area of group communication that has received a good deal of attention
in the past decade is how persons in groups reach agreement or consensus.
Consensus has long been considered a desirable outcome of group decision-
making. With recent studies we are now in the position of presenting some
suggestions which can help a group reach consensus more effectively. here
are ten suggestions for reaching consensus which are based on findings
from small group research.

Orient the group. Help the group reach its goal by emphasizing facts,
making helpful suggestions, and trying to resolve conflict. Studies show
that even one group member skilled in providing orientation can influence
whether or not a group reaches consensus. Groups composed entirely of
persons with orienting ability are even more successful in reaching
consensus. Orienting statements can relate to the actual process of the
discussion as well as content. "What you've said makes sense to me,"
"How do the rest of you feel?" or "So far we seem to agree on the first two
points, let's move on to the third," or "I don't believe we've heard from
Herb yet," or "Perhaps we are closer to agreement than we thought." Questions
that ask for clarification or statements that get the discussion back on
track also serve to orient the group.[2]

Insist on true consensus. Avoid majority vote, coin-flipping, and
bargaining. These techniques only seem to reduce conflict; in fact, all
they do is postpone it. Of course, group leaders must attempt to resolve

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disruptive conflict, but this resolution must come through reasoned discourse and sensitivity to the needs of others. A healthy clash of ideas may actually be productive. But if a problem is solved through voting, chance, or negotiation, some members will be dissatisfied, and the outcome will not be agreement or true consensus.[3]

Maintain a position as long as it is valid. Don't change your mind simply to avoid conflict. If the reasons for thinking the way you did still hold, then don't switch sides capriciously. Generally, consensus is built over a period of time, little by little, with agreement on minor points. Sometimes, of course, consensus can come as a major insight, and if so, participants will want to modify their stance to go along with the group. But groups should be suspicious if agreement comes too easily to too soon. The group should investigate the reasons and be sure that everyone accepts the solution for similar or complementary reasons. When members change their minds, they should change them based on facts and logical reasoning.[4]

Seek out differences in opinion. Differing opinions are both natural and to be expected. Disagreement can aid the problem-solving process because ideas will not go untested. It is poor economy to agree too quickly in a discussion and then have the idea fail when it is implemented. A solution that stands testing within the group will more likely stand on its own merits once it leaves the group. Similarly, expression and discussion of a wide range of opinions and a chance for all to have their voices heard will increase the satisfaction of participants once consensus of secured. Writers about small-group communication have long advocated encouraging other opinions, and recent research supports this advice.[5]

Remain open to other opinions. Don't be overly opinionated. This suggestion is clearly the corollary to the preceding guideline. We have all known people who seek the views of others with the intent to be influenced by them: "Don't confuse me with the facts; my mind is made up." Of course, it is important to take a stance, to present it as lucidly and logically as possible, and to maintain the position as long as it is tenable. But it is also important to be alert for the possibility of consensus by listening and carefully considering alternate views and analysis of others. This problem of being opinionated is even more significant with leaders than with other group members. Studies have shown that a low or moderately opinionated leader is held in higher esteem by other group members than a highly opinionated one. And the low opinionated leader's group, it has been found, is much more likely to reach consensus. One way to avoid being opinionated is to put the emphasis on facts rather than unsupported assertions.[6]

Be willing to compromise. Don't assume a win/lose stance. When discussion reaches an absolute stalemate, search for an alternative that might be acceptable to both sides. Many times there is no one correct solution, but rather the problem is to find a solution that everyone can "live with." It is much better to have all group members reasonably satisfied than to have some very satisfied and others extremely dissatisfied. On the other hand, groups should always return to the original objectve to test whether the compromise is really responsive. Nothing is worse than a group decision which so waters down a good idea that its thrust is blunted.[7]

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Contribute frequently to the discussion. Studies suggest that it is not the duration but the frequency of participation that orients the group and aids in reaching a consensus. This suggestion may appear to violate the usual rule that a participant should be a good listener and react to the comments of others. Good listening is vital. Yet studies tell us that group members view persons who enter the discussion most often as being better participants than those who speak less often. Active participants also tend to be more satisfied with the discussion and thus are better motivated to accept the consensus.

Use group pronouns rather than personal pronouns. Studies show that in groups which do not reach consensus the group tends to use more self-referent words, such as I, me, my, and mine. Groups which reach consensus, on the other hand, are more apt to use group-referent words, such as we, our, and us. Obviously the use of "group" words conveys a sense of unselfishness and togetherness to other group members, whereas "self" words convey an opposite meaning.[9]

Give adequate information. An opinionated person may give primarily opinions rather than support for the opinions. But persons who are not highly opinionated may also simply fail to make their points clear. All partici-pants should be sure to provide enough information or evidence to support their views. Some experts suggest that groups will increase chances of reaching consensus if they emphasize facts, statistics, and opinions of qualified sources which bear directly on some aspect of the question at hand. Studies have shown that groups which use sterotyped or redundant language and rote thinking, instead of seeking new approaches, are less likely to reach consensus.[10]

Clarify the discussion. Make sure that the group's problem-solving activity is understandable, orderly, and focused on one issue at a time. Consensus often comes more easily if each of the factors is weighed individually and systematically. Sometimes a single group member can do little about planning for the most efficient problem-solving unless that member is also the leader. But each participant has an obligation to stick to the subject, to avoid side discussions, and to clarify the issues with questions, so that everyone can have an equal understanding. Each partici-pant can use proper orienting techniques to help keep the discussion focused and self-discipline to prevent the introduction of extraneous or unrelated matters.[11]

Tests of the Ten Suggestions

These ten suggestions derived from experimental research have proven effective for groups attempting to reach consensus.

Test 1. In an unpublished study of group decision-making, I supplied ten, 5-person groups with a list of suggestions similar to those (some of the suggestions were worded a little differently), ten other groups received no suggestions. I found that groups with the suggestions were significantly more successful in reaching consensus on a topic dealing with the sale of beer in the student union, as measured on a five-point "strongly agree-

strongly disagree" single self-rating attitude scale. Furthermore, members of the successful groups were significantly more satisfied with their own performance and the performance of the group.

Test 2. In a continuing study completed so far on twelve beginning speech classes (one class each quarter for successive quarters), odd numbered classes each received approximately fifty minutes on instruction on the ten suggestions for consensus. Then they were asked to learn the suggestions before the next class meeting so they could follow them while discussing a problem in their small group. The even numbered classes did not receive the instruction. Each class was divided into four small groups with four to six persons in each group. The task of each group was to select two persons from a list of five to receive needed treatment on a kidney machine. Of the 24 groups that received the suggestions, 14 had unanimous agreement or consensus on both persons selected. Of the 24 groups not receiving the suggestions, 6 reached consensus on both persons. The difference between groups was significant at .05 level ($\chi^2 = 5.48$; d.f. = 1).

Other Tests. If is possible that simply presenting the ten suggestions to the experimental groups in the tests enforced the idea that reaching consensus was important. In other words, the increased emphasis on consensus may have been as important as the suggestions themselves. But in addition to these tests, field observation of actual functioning groups discussing Air Force, religious, educational, and business related topics suggests that most decision-making, problem-solving groups employing these ten suggestions can enhance their ability to reach consensus.

Analysis

Both group membership and the nature of the problem can, of course, make a difference. The suggestions seem most effective with those who have had limited experience on solving problems in small groups, but they also proved effective with experienced members as well. Some findings also suggest that the process of reaching consensus on "affective" problems (those which generate an emotional response) may differ from that of "substantive" ones (those where the solution comes primarily from analysis of facts). For example, problems of bussing school children or of building a major airport near a housing area are affective problems, whereas the question of whether to surface a driveway with asphalt or concrete is more substantive. Being opinionated, overusing personal pronouns, and viewing the issue as a win/lose transaction all seem to be a greater hinderance to consensus with affective problems. Lack of information presents a greater problem with substantive ones. But whatever the nature of the problem, consensus should be the goal of the discussion.

It may take time to reach a true consensus, but the time will be well spent in terms of morale and group satisfaction. And the time spent will also be cost effective when compared to the time and effort to undo a wrong decision. Groups which achieve true consensus have a better chance of making the right decision the first time.

Suggestions and Football

In Alabama where I live, folks are proud of Southeastern Conference football. A few years ago, a coach of one of the Southeastern Conference teams became dissatisfied with the performance of his quarterback during a game. It was near the end of the first half and his team was trailing. The coach called the quarterback to the sidelines and said, "It's now second down and we are on our own 20 yard line. I want you to do exactly as I say. Run the ball on the next play, throw a pass on the third down, then punt on the fourth down." The quarterback followed the coach's instructions to the letter. On the second down he ran the ball for thirty yards. On the third down he passed to his split end who was tacked on the one yard line. Then the quarterback punted the ball. The coach ran on to the field screaming, "What were you thinking about?" The quarterback replied, "I was thinking that I had a pretty stupid coach."

By the same line of reasoning it would be pretty stupid to believe that a list such as the ten suggestions for reaching consensus would work in every situation. There are just too many variables involved. Still, carefully constructed guidelines based on existing research and theory can be tested and amended as more information becomes available.

I hope that in the 1980s we see more efforts to translate theory and research into understandable and useable suggestions for everyday use.

FOOTNOTES

[1] These suggestions have been previously reported as "Practical Techniques for Achieving Consensus," _Journal of Applied Communication Research_, 7 (April 1979), 30-34.

[2] Dennis S. Gouran, "Variables Related to Consensus in Group Discussions of Questions of Policy," _Speech Monographs_, 36 (August 1969), 385-391; Thomas J. Knutson, "An Experimental Study of the Effects of Orientation Behavior on Small Group Consensus," _Speech Monographs_, 39 (August 1972), 159-165; John A. Kline, "Orientation and Group Consensus," _Central States Speech Journal_, 23 (Spring 1972), 44-47.

[3] Jay Hall, "Decisions, Decisions, Decisions," _Psychology Today_, 5 (November 1971), 86.

[4] Hall, 86; Gerald M. Phillips, _Communication and the Small Group_, 2nd edition (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973), 15-16.

[5] Hall, 86; James L. Hullinger, "Consensus Achievement in Small Group Discussion," unpublished paper, Department of Speech Communication, University of Missouri, Columbia, (1973), 9.

[6] Gouran, 91; John A. Kline, "Indices of Opinionated and Orienting Statements in Problem-Solving Discussions," Speech Monographs, 37 (November 1970), 282-286; Hugh C. Russell, "An Investigation of Leadership Maintenance Behavior," doctoral dissertation, Indiana University (1970), 99, 105; Timothy A. Hill, "An Experimental Study of the Relationship between Opinionated Leadership and Small Group Cosensus," Communication Monographs, 43 (August 1976), 246-247.

[7] Hall, 86; Hullinger, 10.

[8] Thomas J. Knutson and William E. Holdridge, "Orientation Behavior, Leadership and Consensus: A Possible Functional Relationship," Speech Monographs, 42 (June 1975), 105-114; Henry W. Riecken, "The Effect of Talkativeness on Ability to Influence Group Solutions of Problems," Sociometry, 21 (1958), 309-321; Robert N. Bostrom, "Patterns of Communicative Interaction in Small Groups, Speech Monographs, 37 (November 1970), 257-263.

[9] Kline, "Indices"; John A. Kline and James L. Hullinger, "Redundancy, Self-Orientation, and Group Consensus," Speech Monographs, 40 (March 1973), 72-74.

[10] Thomas J. Knutson and Albert C. Kowitz, "The Effects of Information and Orientation in Affective and Substantive Conflict on Small Group Consensus," unpublished paper, Department of Information Sciences, Illinois State University, (1974).

[11] Harold Guetzkow and John Gyr, "An Analysis of Conflict in Decision-Making Groups," Human Relations, 7 (1964), 367-382.

SECTION III INTRODUCTION

Applied Field Study of the Small Group

Articles in this section each demonstrate the relevance of small
group concepts and principles within a variety of communication contexts.
Although we may not have developed a comprehensive theory of group behavior,
the refinement of theoretical perspectives may be facilitated by applying
those aspects of social groups most relevant to theory-building in small
group research.

In their article, Cavanaugh, Larson, Goldberg and Bellows provide a
field-theoretical study for testing current conceptions of power. Their
study attempts to confirm definitions of leadership through factor analysis
of the self-perceptions of individuals who possess power by virtue of their
occupational role. The Power Orientation Scale (P.O.S.), an instrument
devised by the authors for testing the power concept, was composed of
numerous theoretical and operational definitions found in their review
of the power and leadership research. The study provides empirical
validation of existing definitions of power by those who perform leader-
ship roles and offer a potentially useful instrument for measuring power
across different social contexts. The study supports the conclusion that
an individual's orientation toward power influences how that power is
exercised within the context of leadership.

Articles by Gerald Phillips and Dolores and Robert Cathcart examine
how the small group process operates within a particular human interaction
system. Implicit in each article is the utility of small group concepts
in explaining the structure of interaction within these systems. Phillips
suggests that Standard Agenda, a systematic operation combining PERT/CPM
and Dewey's reflective thinking format, facilitates the learning of
behaviors useful within the therapy group. Phillips perspective of the
therapy group raises the question whether the therapy group is analagous
to the problem-solving group. For instance, does the therapy group,
with its apparent high normative interaction and common goal orientation
among members, utilize decision-making procedures more effectively than
the problem-solving group? Also, may the therapy group more easily
resolve interpersonal conflict because of the normative nature of its
interaction? In other words, are methods of achieving consensus
operative within the therapy group as they are in other groups or, on
the other hand, do therapy groups need not be reminded how to achieve
consensus because of their commonality of purpose? Finally, are counter-
active influences operative within the therapy group? If so, are these
influences communicated more effectively due to the group's normative
interaction? Answers to these and other questions may contribute to
our knowledge of the group process in other contexts and lend additional
strategies for testing whether problem-solving groups may enhance their
effectiveness by developing the uniqueness of purpose and procedure that
is characteristic of the therapy group.

In their article, the Cathcarts' analyze the traditions embedded
within Japanese society that permeate the Japanese use of groups. It
is these traditions, the Cathcarts' state, (e.g. non-competitiveness,
group harmony, mutual consensus, reciprocal power, and absence of group

pressure on the individual) that the rhetorical critic must appreciate
before understanding the behavioral processes of Japanese groups.
Conferees attending the 12th International Convention of the Communication
Association of the Pacific special session on "Small Group Communication
in the 1980's" generally remarked that the analogy between Japanese and
American groups ends with the definition of "group." Japanese groups are
seldom transient nor do they convene simply to resolve problems. Japanese
groups, according to the conferees, are tightly knit cohesive bodies in
which individuals may seek and establish their identity. These arguments
are similar to the Cathcarts' insistence that non-western groups cannot
be measured with a "western yardstick.". Should small group theorists
examine the group process within highly structured settings such as the
corporate context, a local chapter of N.O.W., or a local fraternity or
sorority, for instance, would the analogy between Japanese and American
groups prove more relevant. Thus, the study of group process within
highly specialized contexts may offer creative insights for dealing with
group behavior in new and different ways.

These articles may provide research with potentially testible
hypotheses for theory-building while also grounding operational definitions
of variables tested within the small group. Each of the contexts described
by the authors share a number of common characteristics. First, they are
characterized by highly defined and unified goals. Second, they each
demonstrate a high degree of normative or situation-specific behavior.
Third, each situation exhibits fuller member commitment unlike that
reflective of the "law of partial inclusion" of most laboratory groups.
Finally, members appear to have better defined role identities within
their respective groups.

In spite of these commonalities, generalizations across cultural and
situational contexts may not be forthcoming given the differing environ-
mental conditions operative within each context. Specifically, environ-
mental conditions affecting group behavior may be unique to the context
they are studied, especially in view of the dissimilar goals of the
groups described in these studies. For instance, judicial decision-
making may be influenced by factors external to individual judges'
conception of power, such as public pressure to sentence particular
offenders or reelection pressure to impose harsher sentences for particular
crimes. Pressures toward conformity also may operate within Japanese
groups and therapy groups. Although the motivation to conform may reflect
internalization of group goals, the nature of the conformity process may
differ (e.g. Japanese group members may conform to preserve group harmony
while therapy group members may conform in order to enhance their learning
of new behaviors practiced within the group) thus making generalizations
across contexts difficult to derive. However, as Bormann has recently
commented, small group research should examine member-shared values that
serve to identify the group.. Unfortunately, the shared values of members
may be tied to their immediate group membership thus compounding the
difficulty of developing theories whose range may extend beyond the
immediate field of study. In other words, similar group behaviors and
outcomes may be the consequence of dissimilar environmental conditions.
Thus, communication strategies appropriate within one context may be
inappropriate in another if they violate the expected behaviors in that
setting.

POWER AND COMMUNICATION BEHAVIOR:
A FORMULATIVE INVESTIGATION

Mary Cavanaugh, Carl Larson,
Al Goldberg, and Jeffrey Bellows*

Introduction

Several communication theorists have argued strongly that in our
attempt to understand human communication phenomena greater attention
should be paid to the construct "power." Miller has contended, "Every
lay person and communication scholar alike realize that in many com-
municative situations the variable of power explains a great deal of
the variance."[1] Brown and Keller have asserted, "It may not be too
much to hypothesize that power is the most important factor in any
communication."[2] Over the past 40 years theory and research by social
scientists has produced no single, uniform conceptualization of power.
Nagel has concluded that, "Despite, or perhaps because of its ubiquity,
the term power often fosters more disagreement than understanding. In
popular speech and writing, it is applied on the basis of intuition,
preconception or dogma."[3]

Two explanations have been offered as to why the phenomenon of
power has remained so elusive. Martin attributed part of the problem
to a lack of agreement about basic definitions and to theorists' use
of idiosyncratic terminology.[4] Clark claimed, "It has been generally
true that any single author deals only with those aspects of power
which are of particular importance in clarifying a specific theoretical
or empirical problem.[5] Idiosyncratic theoretical views of power com-
bined with relatively narrow explications of the construct have pro-
duced a body of knowledge about power typically characterized as
"scattered, heterogenous, even chaotic."[6] Tedeschi and Bonoma attempt-
ed to account for such chaos by proposing, "One possible explanation
why the concept of power encompasses so much aggregate data and so
many dissimilar disciplines is that it has developed from a series of
intuitive analyses spanning several centuries."[7]
    Whatever the present state-of-the-art, and explanations thereof,
it is clear that the construct "power" lacks explication sufficient for
its productive use by communication theorists and researchers attempt-
ing to understand Human Communication phenomena. For these reasons, we
embarked on a research program designed to explicate the construct
"power."

The clarification or explication of constructs is generally re-
garded as formulative or exploratory research. Selltiz, Wrightsman and

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Cook state:

> Few well-trodden paths exist for investigators of social relations
> to follow; theory is often either too general or too specific to
> provide clear guidance for empirical research. In these circum-
> stances, exploratory research is necessary to obtain the experience
> that will be helpful in formulating relevant hypotheses for more.
> definitive investigation.[8]

Research Objectives

Our efforts in this formulative investigation were directed to-
wards explicating the construct "power" as it might be represented in
the general population. That is, we were interested in how people view
power, what the concept means to people, what they perceive to be its
legitimate and illegitimate uses, and what implications or consequences
are associated with its possession. We were interested in identifying
people's orientations toward power ultimately so as to test our belief
that these orientations toward power would be manifested in an indi-
vidual's communicative behaviors toward others.

In pursuing these objectives we followed the basic format outlined
by Selltiz, Wrightsman and Cook for the conduct of formulative or ex-
ploratory research.[9] Our basic strategy consisted of: (1) A review of
the power literature in order to identify, on an a priori basis, the
various dimensions of power, thus far identified, along which indivi-
duals might orient themselves; (2) A survey of individuals who have
had practical experience with the phenomenon power, in order to add to
the dimensions thus far identified, any additional dimensions which
might have been overlooked by the theorists or researchers; (3) The
derivation from Steps 1 and 2 of a set of dimensions, reasonably ex-
haustive, which might in some combination, describe a given individual's
orientations toward power, (4) Securing responses to these dimensions
from homogeneous samples of individuals, in order to discern the speci-
fic orientations characterizing each sample; (5) The identification
of those orientations which recur across, samples, and therefore, might
be assumed to represent common orientations toward power, present in
the population at large; (6) The development of a self-report scale
for assessing individual orientations toward power; and (7) The pre-
liminary testing of this scale for its adequacy (reliability and va-
lidity) in providing an empirical index of a given individual's
orientations toward power. The results of executing these steps are
reported in the remainder of this manuscript.

Review of Literature

Power as a Characteristic of the Individual

The first conceptual framework emerging from the literature is
the notion of power as it is situated in a single actor. Three perspec-
tives are presented whithin this first framework..

The Personal Nature of Power. Hillenbrand suggests that the locus

of power is the individual himself. He argues against the notion that power is a function of ascribed values or organizational/social roles. His position is clear: "It cannot be emphasized enough that institutions as such never exercise power; it is always the men in charge of institutions, whether national or international, who have power."[10] Several other writers support this view by ascribing power to individual or organismic roots, such as Guardini.[11] As Berle puts it, "power is an attribute of man.. It does not exist without a holder."[12]

Adler saw the expression of power as a "compensatory mechanism" and said, "Whatever men are striving for originates from their urgent attempts to overcome the impression of deficiency, insecurity, weakness."[13] May further explored the domain of power from the context of the personality.[14] He saw five separate levels of expressed power moving from exploitive to manipulative to competitive to nutrient to integrative.

Power, according to May, undergoes a maturational or developmental process. The infant begins life with an innate "power to be" and identity progresses through the stages as he matures until he reaches the integrative level (power with another).[15]

Power as a Person-Environment Interaction. The notion of power as an individual characteristic is expanded. Power is viewed as a potential which affects, and, in turn, is affected by its specific environment. DeCharms expresses the person-environment relationship when he defines "personal causation" as "the personal knowledge of being an agent of change in the environment."[16] Sites highlites the interactional nature of the person-environment relationship by suggesting that "the individual can manipulate both environment and self, and thus, within limits, construct his own reality and his behavior toward it. Since he can construct it, he can control it."[17]

The Power Motive. The power motive is framed within the context of individual behaviors oriented toward the attainment of goals that deal with controlling others. Kipnis describes power motivations as advising "when an individual experiences an aroused need state that can only be satisfied by inducing appropriate behavior in others."[18] Minton's analysis of the power motive as "a power dimension that refers to variations across individuals regarding the extent to which one is motivated to attain specific goals of power"[19] seems representative of the general view of the power motive. Minton goes on to describe two basic orientations toward power within the context of the power motive. Intrinsic motivation is seen to be that set of behaviors which are self-initiated, and ultimately generate feelings of self-determination. Extrinsic motivation is related to behaviors wherein power goals are externally determined.[20]

Winter also takes the position that the power motive can be defined as "a disposition to strive for certain kinds of goals, or to be affected by certain kinds of incentives."[21] For Winter, the power motive is found by examining the "thoughts, images, and theme in the minds of people when power is aroused or made salient to them."[22]

McClelland, working from the power motive set, defines power as "thoughts about someone having impact."[23] The motivation for having

impact could be stemmed from three separate roots:

(1) Through strong, direct action involving control or influence.

(2) Through the production of actions which would produce an emotional response in another individual.

(3) Through a concern for reputation.[24]

McClelland's strategies are not necessarily discrete categories. Any or all of the motivations might be in force at any time. The drive for power goals may be situational, as well as dependent on individual pre-dispositions to rank one drive factor ahead of the others. That is, certain individuals may be oriented toward a "concern for reputation," and may ascribe power behaviors to this drive regardless of their ap-propriateness within a given context.

Summary. The dimensions of power emerging from this conceptual framework were:

(1) The importance of the individual powerholder as a catalyst in manifestations of power.

(2) The conceptualization of power as a person-environment inter-action.

(3) The conceptualization of power as an impact that goes beyond control of behavior of others.

(4) The manifestation of power as either an approach ("Hope of Power") or an avoidance ("Fear of Power") motive, and

(5) The distinction between a "personalized" and a "socialized" face of power.

Power as an Interpersonal Construct

This conceptual framework enlarges the previous concept of power as a personality construct to include social relationships. Emerson states, "Power is a property of the social relation; it is not an attribute of an actor."[25] Developing a conceptual framework around an interpersonal theme requires that the role of the target in the power relation be examined. Two major aspects of the target's role are identified.

Field-Theoretic Approach. Cartwright represents this approach by presenting power as "those psychological forces acting in P's life space which are activated by agents other than P."[26] Power is seen to exist within a social matrix and consideration would be given to the extent of change A could induce in B over and above B's resistance. Levinger characterizes the ability to move another individual in a given direction as "the ability to exert interpersonal influence." Implicit in that term is "the manipulation of valences in another person's psychological en-vironment." Levinger sees "valences" as including both positive and negative forces that are significant to the target's psychological space.

Kelman contributes to this view by adding the idea "that if the target perceived the powerholder as able to mediate goal achievement, the responsiveness of the target to the influence attempt would increase.[28] French and Raven conclude that there are five bases of social power: (1) reward, (2) coercive, (3) legitimate, (4) referent, and (5) expert.[29] Later Raven adds information power as a sixth base.[30] Three of these bases are focused on the powerholder and his ability to change the behavior of the target (reward, coercive and informational) while the other three (legitimate, referent and expert) relate part of the success of the powerholder to the perceptions that the target holds about him. Lehman identifies the types of resources which would be important to the concrete application of power:

(1) <u>Utilitarian resources</u> - composed of material goods and services.

(2) <u>Coercive resources</u> - composed of physical force and violence.

(3) <u>Normative resources</u> - composed of shared beliefs, values and sentiments.[31]

The field-theoretic model is concerned with perceived resources and target resistance, and makes an implicit statement regarding the reciprocal nature of power. The following perspective makes this relationship explicit.

Outcome Approach. Martin expresses the reciprocal nature of the power relationship by suggesting "that power relations may be relations of mutual convenience, power may be a resource facilitating the achievement of the goals of both A and B. . ."[32] The net effect of the power relationship is measured by the discrepancy between the power goals achieved by A and those achieved by B. Thibaut and Kelley describe those goals as "matters of interest" and develop an outcome matrix:

If two persons interact, the pattern of outcomes given in their interaction matrix indicates that each person has the possibility of affecting the other's reward-cost position and, thereby, of influencing or controlling him.[33]

Emerson defines social relationship in general as "ties of mutual dependence" and suggests "Power resides implicitly in the other's dependency."[34] This dependency is directly proportional to the amount of motivational investment a target has in the outcome or goals that are mediated by the powerholder, and is inversely proportional to how available these goals or outcomes are outside of the present relationship between the powerholder and the target. If the goals are not important to the target or are readily available from someone other than the powerholder, the power of that source would considerably diminish.

Summary. These two aspects (Field-Theoretic Approach and Outcome Approach) of the interpersonal construct framework contribute new dimensions of power to the item pool for the power Orientation Scale. From the Field-Theoretic Approach come two characteristics of the manifestation of power:

(1) The agent must see himself as having the ability to move forces within another individual. This required the ability of the

source to correctly sort out which resources that he pos-
sessed were important to which targets in what types of si-
tuations.

(2) The "perceptions" of the target about the resources available
to an agent must be considered.

From the Outcome Approach comes an emphasis on the reciprocal nature of
the power relationship. This reciprocity would come from either the de-
sire of both parties to achieve valued outcomes or from the existence of
a mutual dependency between the two parties.

Power as a Commodity

The third conceptual framework, power as a commodity, is developed
from the interpersonal construct framework. While both are social matrix
frameworks, the nature of the power relationship is considered transac-
tional in the commodity framework, rather than interactional as in the
interpersonal construct framework. Generally, power is discussed in the
commodity framework in "economic" terms. Central to the commodity notion
is the cost involved in maintaining power and how that affects the behavior
of the powerholder.

Three basic models of the commodity framework are presented: (1) the
cost of power; (2) power and control of resources; and (3) power as ex-
change.

The Cost of Power. Harsanyi introduces this position with the sug-
gestion that "a realistic quantitative description of A's power over B
must include, as an essential dimension of this power relation, the costs
to A of attempting to influence B's behavior.[32] This cost approach is
useful in making comparisons of degrees of power. If one individual can
accomplish something at far less cost than another individual, the former
can be said to possess greater power than the latter.

Breed sums up the cost of power model. He states that the applica-
tion of power involves three separate costs:

(1) of the assets "consumed" as power is generated;
(2) of the power itself as it is spent;
(3) and of symbolic gestures which, the more often they are used,
tend to hasten the point of actual expenditure.[36]

Power and Control of Resources. Burt assumes "that actors are pur-
posive in that they use their control of resources in order to improve
their individual well-being. . ."[37] The focus here is on one's ability
to constrain the allocation of resources such that accurate predictions
result about the ability of an actor to realize his own interests despite
resistance from other actors.

Power as Exchange. This model, as advanced by Homans, posits that
"for a person engaged in exchange what he gives may be a cost to him, just
as what he gets may be a reward, and his behavior changes less as profit,
that is, reward less cost, tends to a maximum.[38] Cost is here viewed in
the negative sense. That is, the higher the cost of an activity to an

individual, the less likely he is to perform it.

Champlin describes the basic nature of the exchange model when he states, "Having power is thus being in a position to get others to do what one wants them to do without having to make unacceptable sacrifices. The more the behavior of others can be shaped to one's wants, and the less one gives to achieve this, the more power one has."[37]

Summary. The major contribution emerging from the commodity framework is the notion of the cost to the powerholder in the power relationship.

Power as a Causal Construct

The framework is primarily concerned with developing specificity in the operational aspects of the study of power. The thinking of researchers working in this area is that by placing power in a causal framework it would become less of an abstract notion and more subject to study by traditional empirical technique.

Two basic characteristics are involved in the causal construct framework: (1) power as asymmetric; and (2) power within the probability or mathematical context.

Power as Asymmetric. March expresses the operational flavor of this framework in his description, "Specifically, the set of all influence relations is here defined to be the subset of all causal relations such that the behavior of an individual appears as the terminal point in the causal linkage."[40] Nagel, in the same vein, defines an actual or potential power relation as "an actual or potential causal relation between the preferences of an actor regarding an outcome and the outcome itself."[41]

Riker sees two basic types of causal relation: (1) recipe causality and (2) necessary and sufficient condition. Recipe causality involves statements of manipulation. The manipulated variable is presumed to cause the intended outcome and if no manipulation occurs, then no causal relationship exists between the two events. Recipe causality emphasizes how to make two specific events occur. Riker relates this to a concern with "other-oriented" power outcomes. A power outcome that is "other-oriented" emphasizes behaviors that lead to the disutility of some other person.[42]

Necessary and sufficient condition causality is concerned with the constellation of antecedent events in force in relation to a specific consequence. When necessary and sufficient condition causality operates, the attention is on a full explanation of the outcome. The effect itself becomes the focal point, not the manipulation of a variable to produce the event. Riker compares this type of causality with an "ego-oriented" form of power. The emphasis of ego-oriented power is on constraining the interaction itself. The agent of the power situation (ego) increases his own utility by maintaining the ability to control the interaction. His interest is focused on increasing his own utility rather than decreasing the utility of others.

The Probability or Mathematical Context. Kahn and Boulding define power as "the ability of one person or group of persons to. . .change

the probabilities that others will respond in certain ways to specified stimuli."[43] Gamson carries on with the basic definition of power in pro-bability terms and argues for models that place the examination and measure-ment of power in a mathematical context:

> Instead of attempting to make statements about how much or what kind of power A has over B, we should speak instead of how much and what kind of power A has over a specific domain of B's decisions. The dividend we receive for this change is the employment of the highly useful conceptualization of power as a change in probability.[44]

Power is then determined by the difference between the probabilities that an individual would choose a given alternative prior to, and after, an alleged exercise of power. Gamson concludes, "Power has been successfully exercised if and only if there is a difference."[45] Schopler and Layton capture the essential nature of the mathematical model in suggesting, "Minimum attributed power exists when B does something unpredictable, which is perfectly predictable from A's intervention."[46]

Summary. Power as a causal construct provides additional dimensions to the pool for the development of the Power Orientation Scale. This perspective interprets power as specific to behaviors of the source which elicited certain responses from the target within the power relation. Further, when placed in the context of the probability model, the situa-tions in which power can be examined are greatly expanded. Both the dis-cussion of the asymmetric nature of power relationships and Riker's "ego/other" orientations were useful in building the pool of power di-mensions.

Power as a Philosophical Construct

The philosophical component provides the fifth and final framework. Four basic lines of thinking emerge in this construct: (1) morality or amorality of power; (2) power and values; (3) power and responsiblity; and (4) power and social norms.

Morality or Amorality of Power. This first line of thought centers on the nature of power itself. Hobbes suggests that power is "a present means to achieve some future apparent good. . ."[47] However, most theorists and philosophers view power as neither intrinsically good nor evil. Rosinski says, "Were it not equally potent for good or evil, it would not be power at all."[48] Guardini supports the view of power as esentially a neutral force. He argues, "Power awaits direction. Unlike forces of nature, it becomes part of a cause-and-effect relationship, not through necessity, but only through the intervention of an agent."[49] Actors, then determine the morality of power. Votaw describes the two different orien-tations in this way, "A man who believes power to be essentially evil will approach the issues of power in a very different way from the man who sees power as a resource of human society, albeit subject to abuse."[50]

Power and Values. Kahn and Boulding approach power and values from three vantage points:

(1) Subjective feelings: The "What's in it for me" position. The

powerholder with this orientation would want to arrange a power relation to be sure there would be "something in it" for the target as well in order to make compliance enticing.

(2) Depersonalized values/choices made by force: This individual would choose a coercive mode and would try to legitimize this power on the basis of an ideology rather than on personal traits.

(3) Relativist approach: Values are objective and grounded in the situation. An individual ascribing to this approach would choose to ground his power in terms of his expertise and would try to have others understand the situation as he does.[51]

Different approaches to value systems would be reflected in different power patterns or the way an individual would choose to exercise power.

Power and Responsibility. This dimension ties a notion of responsibility to the exercise of power. By accepting great amounts of responsibility an individual also accepts the power that would be necessary to take the actions that go along with responsibility. Berle says, "Power is invariably confronted with, and acts on the presence of a field of responsibility."[52]

Power and Social Norms. This fourth approach argues that the value-loading on the term power itself has given it a negative connotation in the society at large. Martin and Sims suggest that although ambition is glorified in the abstract, it is often frowned upon in practice.[53] McClelland contends that an individual quickly learns that to act on behalf of others is legitimate, but to act on behalf of oneself is not.[54] Finally, Gross presents a strong criticism of the social attitude toward power. "Power, like sex under Victorians, has often been regarded as a subject not to be openly discussed but rather to be sought, thought about and used under the cover of darkness."[56]

Summary. All of these issues provide very different bases from which items about orientations to power were drawn. The application of thoughts about good and evil, values, responsibility and social norms provide diverse input for the item pool.

Expanding the Dimensions of Power

The dimensions of power extracted from the literature may or may not exhaust orientations individuals hold toward power. In order to expand upon the dimensions of power extracted from the literature an additional step was necessary. An open-ended survey was conducted following a purposive sampling plan which selected twelve respondents from civil service positions (6 adminstrators and 6 staff), thirty-three middle-level managers, and nine corporate-level executives. These fifty-four respondents were probed with questions designed to elicit their positive and negative reactions to being in a position of power and their attitudes about acceptable and unacceptable uses of power. Each response of each of the fifty-four respondents was compared with the dimensions extracted from the literature. Any dimension from the survey not already adequately represented by a dimension extracted from the literature resulted in an additional dimension

being added to the list. A consensus decision on the part of three members of the research team was the criterion for adding a dimension. This process resulted in the identification of seventeen additional dimensions representing orientations toward power. The final set of thirty-seven dimensions of power, isolated from both the literature review and the survey, follows:

1. The ability to control outcomes.

2. The ability to control persons.

3. The ability to control specific behaviors.

4. Enhancing one's own position.

5. Minimizing one's cost or effort.

6. The ability to resist control.

7. Having impact.

8. Group goal attainment.

9. An approach toward power.

10. An avoidance of power.

11. The ability to control tangible resources.

12. The ability to control intangible resources.

13. The ability to restrict the alternatives of others.

14. Power as expertise.

15. Referent power.

16. Legitimate power.

17. Power as situational.

18. The intentionality of power.

19. Power as natural instinct.

20. Power as reciprocal.

21. The avoidance of powerlessness.

22. Power as potential.

23. Control of sanctions.

24. Power as amoral.

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25. Power as secrecy.

26. Shared power.

27. Power as positive.

28. Power as negative.

29. The psychological benefits of power.

30. Power through the display of weakness.

31. Power in conflict.

32. Power as responsibility.

33. Power as a privilege.

34. Power as loneliness.

35. Psychological losses.

36. The abuse of power.

37. Power as political.

Four Initial Samples

Our preliminary power orientation scale consisted of seventy-four items (two each for thirty-seven dimensions). At this point we were guided by Kadushin's injunction that investigations of power "should be confined to those likely to have some in the first place."[56] Kadushin's point was well taken, even though determining who has power requires subjective a priori determinations about what power is. Although such determinations were inconsistent with our decision not to define power on an a priori basis, it was felt that it would be reasonable to select subjects who were either in supervisory positions or higher, who were perceived as being in a position of power. Four samples meeting these criteria were selected.

The Corporate Sample

One sample of 166 subjects was drawn from the corporate sector of private business. Thirty different corporations were contacted to obtain the 166 respondents. Homogeneity within this sample was assumed because the organizations contacted were medium-sized corporations and were in service, as opposed to manufacturing, industries.

Qualifying respondents had to be a member of one of the following categories: (1) Individuals who carried a corporate title; (2) Individuals who were involved directly in the supervision or management of others within the corporation; and (3) Individuals considered as "staff" but who were responsible for participating in policy decisions which had an effect on the corporation as a whole.

The Law Enforcement Sample

This sample consisted of 134 uniformed state highway patrolmen on active duty at the time of the study. Homogeneity was assumed because all respondents were field officers from the same highway patrol system.

The Sales Sample

The third sample consisted of 126 sales associates from a medium-sized real estate firm. Homogeneity was assumed because all sales associates worked for the same firm and in the same geographic area. The considerable autonomy and influence possessed by the sales associate in mediating between a buyer and a seller on a financial matter of considerable importance to both made this sample an appropriate one for inclusion in our investigation.

The Government Sample

The fourth sample consisted of 119 management and staff personnel from government agencies. The agencies were federal, and the respondents were predominantly individuals who held regional, rather than state or local reponsibilities.

Responses to the preliminary (74-item version) Power Orientation Scale were obtained from the four samples. Following Harman's suggestions, separate factor-analyses followed by varimax rotations were performed on the responses of each of the four samples. At this point each sample was characterized by a set of factor structures. We regarded these factor structures as representing orientations toward power (or dimensions of the construct "power") existing within each of the four samples. We then turned our attention to identifying those orientations or dimensions, if any, which might recur across samples. At this stage in our investigation we were attempting to discover those orientations toward power which might be capable of describing a person's view of power, regardless of a specific population from which that given individual might be sampled.

Comparing Factor Structures Across Samples

The factor analyses of the corporate, government, law-enforcement and sales samples generated 17, 17, 17 and 18 factors respectively. Variances accounted for were 68%, 69%, 79% and 72%, respectively. Harman, Kaiser, and Horst have suggested strategies for comparing similarity of factor structures across samples.[58] We selected the more conservative approach of correlating factor loadings across samples. Each set of factor loadings from every other sample. With four samples, there are six possible sets of pair-wise correlations. In order for a factor to be considered comparable across samples, we set as a decision rule that all six-pair-wise correlations had to be significant at $p = .05$. Appendix I presents the results of these comparisons.

As may be seen from Appendix I, seven factors satisfied our decision rule for comparability. These seven factors were present to some degree in all four samples. We have concluded, for the time being, at least, that seven orientations toward power are discernible and common to a reasonably wide variety of settings in which power is likely to be exercised. Having

now reduced our Power Orientation Scale to a final set of 40 items, the
following orientations toward power are represented within the scale.

Factor Cluster 1: Power as Good

Item 5: In the long run, it is better to avoid having power. (nega-
tive loading)

Item 16: The responsibility and challenge of power is exciting.

Item 18: Power is something to be avoided. (negative loading)

Item 32: I would like to be a powerful person.

Item 37: In general, powerful people do more harm than good. (nega-
tive loading)

This factor cluster represented the notion of power as a positive force.
Individuals scoring high on this Power Orientation Factor might perceive
power as exciting and desirable. With such an orientation, these indivi-
duals may be more agressive in their search for and maintenance of a power
position.

Factor Cluster 2: Power as Resource Dependency

Item 6: Knowing things others don't know gives you power over them.

Item 7: You know you have power when other people must come to you
for things they need.

Item 19: Having information that others want and need gives a person
a great deal of power.

Item 20: People know they are powerful when others are dependent on
them.

It is apparent from the analysis of this cluster that of all the resources
an individual would control, that of knowledge or information appears to
be central to this orientation. An individual scoring high on this Power
Orientation Factor would appear to recognize the value of the possession
and control of resources, especially information, and might be more at-
tuned to the use of such resources.

Factor Cluster 3: Power as Instinctive Drive

Item 11: The drive for power exists in all of us.
Item 23: People naturally try to avoid feeling powerless.
Item 24: People instinctively seek power.

An individual who scores high on this Power Orientation Factor would ap-
pear to perceive the desire for power as a natural instinct rather than
a desire nurtured within a particular environment. In other words, the
desire for power is seen as a natural element of the human condition. The
significant aspect of a high score on this factor is the perception of a
drive for power as an attribute of all persons. As a result, to seek and
to maintain power would be considered acceptable since all persons possess
such a drive.

Factor Cluster 4: Power as Political

Item 28: It takes political skill to become powerful.

Item 40: Remaining in power requires political skill.

The factor loadings from items 28 and 40 were consistently high across all four of the samples. However, this might be the weakest of the factor clusters because only one dimension of power ("power as political") is represented. This dimension reflects the belief that an individual must approach the acquisition of power through the use of political tactics. An individual with a high score on this Power Orientation Factor might be one who is cognizant of the implications of "playing politics" to achieve and maintain power.

Factor Cluster 5: Power as Charisma

Item 24: Powerful people are easy to recognize, even in situations where they do nothing to demonstrate their power.

Item 31: You can usually tell a powerful person as soon as he or she enters the room.

Unlike Factor Cluster 4, this cluster is representative of two different dimensions of power. The first dimension (Item 24) is that of "power as potential." This dimension considered power as something that could be held in reserve and used when needed by the source. The second dimension (Item 31) is that of "having impact." In this instance power is viewed as an ability to take strong action or to evoke emotional responses from others. It also included the idea that people behave differently toward individuals perceived as having power.

Factor Cluster 6: Power as Control

Item 1: An advantage of having power is being able to get people to follow your orders.

Item 3: Having power gives you independence.

Item 12: An advantage of being in a position of power is being able to control the rewards and punishments of others.

Item 30: An advantage to having power is the freedom it gives you.

Factor Cluster 6 contained items that were closely related to the items which constituted Factor Cluster 7. The correlations between Factor Cluster 6 and Factor Cluster 7 obtained from three of the samples used in the reliability and validity tests were .91, .94 and .95. Since these correlations were substantial, we felt the degree of similarity between the final two factor clusters was sufficient enough to justify collapsing the two for scoring and interpretation purposes. The factors and items for Factor Cluster 7 will be presented prior to further interpretation of this final factor cluster.

Factor Cluster 7: Power as Autonomy

Item 1: An advantage of having power is being able to get people to

follow your orders.

Item 3: Having power gives you independence.

Item 30: An advantage to having power is the freedom it gives you.

Items 3 and 30 come from the "ability to resist control" dimension of power, and between Factor Cluster Six and Factor Cluster Seven these items loaded consistently and highly across all four of the samples. Item 1 from the "ability to control the person" dimension of power (Factor Cluster 6 and Factor Cluster 7) and Item 12 from the "ability to control sanctions" dimension (Factor Cluster 6) added strength to the combined clusters as the content of each were highly related.

It is not surprising that these two clusters were similar. Very often individuals in control are also those individuals perceived as highly autonomous. Conversely, a high level of autonomy would appear to facilitate an individual's ability to maintain control. These final two clusters are interpreted jointly as "Power as Control and Autonomy." Individuals scoring high on this last Power Orientation Factor would appear to value power as a means of establishing control and maintaining their individual autonomy.

A total of six Power Orientation Factors were identified. They were: (1) Power as Good, (2) Power as Resource Dependency, (3) Power as Instinctive Drive, (4) Power as Political, (5) Power as Charisma, and (6) Power as Control and Autonomy. The 40-item Power Orientation Scale, included at the end of this paper, contains the items which constitute these factors, as well as additional items which loaded highly on a given factor in some, but not all, samples. The items were retained in the scale for masking and because of potential information in future investigations.

Preliminary Reliability and Validity Checks on the Power Orientation Scale

Reliability

Since factor-analytic techniques were employed in the construction of the Power Orientation Scale (these techniques guarantee high-intercorrelations among items comprising a given factor) we felt that internal consistency measures of reliability were already unfairly biased in favor of the instrument. Therefore, test-retest reliability was explored. Forty undergraduate college students were administered the scale initially and after a 3-week time lapse. Reliabilities for the 7 factor scores (prior to collapsing factors 6 and 7) are presented in Appendix II. As may be seen from examining Appendix II, moderate to strong reliabilities were found for the 7 factor scores. The lower reliabilities are, as might be expected, associated with factors comprised of relatively few items. In general, we considered the reliabilities sufficient for pursuing issues associated with validity.

Validity

Although strong cases for content and construct validity can be made on the basis of the manner in which the Power Orientation Scale was con-

structed, we considered it more important at this point to pursue issues associated with concurrent validity. We selected as preliminary concurrent validity criteria the following: (1) decision-making behavior; (2) leadership behavior; and (3) dogmatism.

Validity Check One

The validity test reported here involves a comparison of sentencing decisions made by Denver District Court judges, with the judges' scores on the Power Orientation Scale.

Sentencing Guidelines. As of October, 1977, the Denver District Court (a Colorado State Court) has employed a statistically based sentencing guideline model to help in structuring judicial discretion. Historically, wide latitude has been granted to sentencing judges in the range of sanctions that they might impose on convicted offenders. It has been felt that while the wide range of available sanctions did contribute to an effort to "hand-tailor" the penalty to fit the crime, the by-product of the wide latitude could be "sentence disparity" from offender to offender, and from courtroom to courtroom. In an effort to insure equity in sentencing, the Denver District Court, with the assistance of the Law-Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), instituted a a research program to develop and implement a sentencing guideline model to work within the parameters of the existing Colorado Penal Code. The aim of the guidelines project was to implement the sentiment that similarly situated offenders (prior criminal record and background) convicted of similar offenses should receive similar sentences.

The guideline model, as developed and implemented in the Denver District Court, is basically a descriptive model. That is, there is no presumption regarding what is the "right" sentence. The guideline sentence is based on the sentencing history of the particular panel of judges serving on the criminal bench. In this sense, the guideline sentence is the average sentence handed down (in the preceding six months to one year interval) by all judges, for similarly situated offenders convicted of similar offenses.

The guideline that the judge receives at the sentencing hearing will either suggest an "out" decision (probation, deferred judgment, deferred prosecution, etc.) or an "in" decision with a range suggested for the duration of incarceration (i.e., two to four years). The judge's actual sentence will then either "hit" the guideline (i.e., he gives probation for an "out," or he incarcerates the offender to a term consistent with the guideline range) or he will "miss" the guideline (i.e., he incarcerates when the guideline suggests "out," or he probates when the guideline suggests incarceration). The sentencing decision then, with regard to the guideline may (1) hit the guideline, (2) miss the guideline in the direction of no incarceration, or (3) miss the guideline in the direction of incarceration. Percentage tables may then be drawn with respect to each individual judge's performance as measured against the guideline.

The sentencing decisions of nine district court judges for one year were transformed into percentages in each of three categories (hit, miss/incarceration, miss/no incarceration). These percentages, as

well as the Power Orientation scores of the district court judges, were transformed to ranks and rank order correlations computed. A significant positive correlation was found between the "Power As Resource Dependency" factor and the sentencing criterion "hit" (Spearman rank order correlation = .61). District court judges who tended to view power more in terms of access to and possession of knowledge and information also tended to make more sentencing decisions which fell within established sentencing guidelines. Since these sentencing guidelines were, in fact, based upon feedback the judges had received concerning the sentencing behavior of other district court judges, this specific relationship is quite sensible. No significant rank order correlations were found between power orientation scores and the sentencing criterion "miss/no incarceration." A significant negative correlation was found between "Power As Instinctive Drive" and the sentencing criterion "miss/incarceration" (Spearman rank order correlation = -.63). The higher a judge's score on this "Power As Instinctive Drive" factor, the less likely was he to impose incarceration when the guidelines didn't call for it. Apparently, the perception of power as a positive and natural element of human condition is accompanied by a greater willingness to exercise power in favor of the offender.

These two relationships provided preliminary support for the assumption that an individual's power orientation may be related to decision-making behavior.

Validity Check Two

To examine leadership, Fiedler's Least Preferred Co-worker was selected.[59] The scale provides an index of the likelihood that a leader will adopt an "interpersonal" or a "task-oriented" approach in relating with subordinates. Forty-eight "business leaders," identified by representatives of the Denver Chamber of Commerce, responded to both the Power Orientation Scale and the LPC. A weak, but significant (-.278) correlation was found between "Power As Resource Dependency" and the LPC score. This inverse relationship implies that managers who score high on "Power As Resource Dependency" are more likely to maintain psychological distance from their subordinates and adopt a task-oriented approach. Apparently, the tendency to view power as emanating from access to and possession of information not readily available to others is associated with beliefs such as "I know more than they do about the job," or "I'm the one who knows what has to be done." Such beliefs would be consistent with psychological distancing and greater emphasis on task dimensions of the supervisory-subordinate relationship.

Validity Check Three

To explore relationships among power orientations and dogmatism, Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale, Form E was selected. Thirty-three Denver area leaders, again selected by representatives of the Denver Chamber of Commerce, responded both to the Power Orientation Scale and the Dogmatism Scale. Two significant correlations were found. The "Power As Good" factor correlated negatively with dogmatism (-.40). Respondents who saw power in positive terms as exciting, or as something to be sought, scored lower on the dogmatism scale. The second significant correlation was between "Power as Control and Autonomy" and dogmatism (+.38). Respondents who saw power in terms of the ability it gives one to control others scored

higher on the dogmatism scale. These two relationships, interpreted together, provide a rather intriguing view of personal orientations toward power. Viewing power as a mechanism for exercising control over others is associated with dogmatism, however, viewing power as good, challenging, and exciting is associated with less dogmatism. It seems reasonable, though some may be surprised by it, that viewing power in positive terms is not necessarily associated with intolerance toward other points of view. Perhaps more important, viewing power as a means for exercising control over others was associated with general intolerance towards beliefs inconsistent with those of the respondents.

We are guardedly optimistic about the results of these preliminary reliability and validity checks. There do seem to be some relationships between an individual's personal orientation toward power and his or her decision-making behavior, leadership, predisposition, and dogmatism. Our fourth validity check, now in progress, is an exploration of the relationships between the power orientation factors and the probability that a given individual will engage in confirming or disconfirming communicative behavior toward others. We believe that orientations toward power will ultimately predict these and a great many other classes of communicative behavior. To this end we submit our preliminary findings, and hope that others may be sufficiently interested in and concerned about the power construct to add additional empirical findings to these.

Appendix 1

Significant Factor Clusters
Emerging From Comparisons of
Factors Across Samples

C = Corporate Sample
G = Government Sample
S = Sales Sample
1 = Law-Enforcement Sample

FACTOR CLUSTER 1

Factors	C	G	S	L
C	1.00	.84	.76	.66
G	.84	1.00	.65	.65
S	.76	.65	1.00	.60
L	.66	.65	.60	1.00

FACTOR CLUSTER 2

Factors	C	G	S	L
C	1.00	.81	.80	.47
G	.81	1.00	.73	.54
S	.80	.73	1.00	.49
L	.47	.54	.49	1.00

FACTOR CLUSTER 3

Factors	C	G	S	L
C	1.00	.58	.82	.50
G	.58	1.00	.58	.36
S	.82	.58	1.00	.44
L	.50	.36	.44	1.00

Appendix 1 (continued)

FACTOR CLUSTER 4

Factors	C	G	S	L
C	1.00	.73	.75	.35
G	.73	1.00	.60	.33
S	.75	.60	1.00	.46
L	.35	.33	.46	1.00

FACTOR CLUSTER 5

Factors	C	G	S	L
C	1.00	.61	.76	.63
G	.61	1.00	.64	.54
S	.76	.64	1.00	.52
L	.63	.54	.52	1.00

FACTOR CLUSTER 6

Factors	C	G	S	L
C	1.00	.58	.68	.51
G	.58	1.00	.42	.27
S	.68	.42	1.00	.38
L	.51	.27	.38	1.00

FACTOR CLUSTER 7

Factors	C	G	S	L
C	1.00	.46	.58	.56
G	.46	1.00	.53	.51
S	.58	.53	1.00	.46
L	.56	.51	.46	1.00

Appendix II

Test-Retest Correlations of
Power Orientation Factor Scores
Over Three Weeks

N = 40

FACTOR		r
1	(Power as Good)	.83
2	(Power as Resource Dependency)	.77
3	(Power as Instinctive Drive)	.49
4	(Power as Political)	.62
5	(Power as Charisma)	.54
6	(Power as Control)	.63
7	(Power as Autonomy)	.55

Power Orientation Scale

Instructions

Power means different things to different people. We are interested in how you personally view power. What does power mean to you? We are not interested in what you think power means to others. Instead, we want to know how you view power and how you feel about power.

Your responses will be kept entirely confidential. Your name will not be attached to your responses. The only individuals who will see your responses will be members of the research team. No one in the organization for which you work will be allowed to see your answers. Please be honest and candid in your responses. This research project will benefit greatly from your direct and honest responses to these statements.

The following are all statements about power. You may find that you agree strongly with some of these and disagree strongly with others. You may also find there are some statements you are uncertain about. Whether you agree or disagree with any of the statements, you can be sure that many other people feel the same as you do.

Mark each statement in the left margin accoridng to how much you agree or disagree with it. Please mark every one.

Write +1: I AGREE A LITTLE   -1: I DISAGREE A LITTLE
      +2: I AGREE ON THE WHOLE   -2: I DISAGREE ON THE WHOLE
      +3: I AGREE VERY MUCH   -3: I DISAGREE VERY MUCH

( ) 1. An advantage of having power is being able to get people to follow your orders.

( ) 2. People in powerful positions are often rewarded for doing very little.

( ) 3. Having power gives you independence.

( ) 4. An advantage of being in a position of power is that people seem to treat you as somebody special.

( ) 5. In the long run, it is better to avoid having power.

( ) 6. Knowing things others don't know gives you power over them.

( ) 7. You know you have power when other people must come to you for things they need.

( ) 8. An advantage to being considered powerful is that other people want to be like you.

( ) 9. A person can be powerful within one group and not within another.

( ) 10. There is no such thing as power without purpose.

( ) 11. The drive for power exists in all of us.

( ) 12. An advantage of being in a position of power is being able to control the rewards and punishments of others.

( ) 13. Powerful people are cautious about whom they confide in.

( ) 14. Success and power go hand in hand.

( ) 15. If you have power, you have a sense of security.

( ) 16. The responsibility and challenge of power is exciting.

( ) 17. People seek power for its own sake.

( ) 18. Power is something to be avoided.

( ) 19. Having information that others want and need gives a person a great deal of power.

( ) 20. People know they are powerful when others are dependent on them.

( ) 21. People usually deserve the power they get.

( ) 22. How much power a person has varies considerably from one situation to another.

( ) 23. People naturally try to avoid feeling powerless.

( ) 24. Powerful people are easy to recognize, even in situations where they do nothing to demonstrate their power.

( ) 25. Sometimes powerful people cannot avoid hurting others.

( ) 26. The meek shall inherit the earth.

( ) 27. Power means the ability to beat the competition.

( ) 28. It takes political skill to become powerful.

( ) 29. Sometimes it's necessary for a powerful person to tell people what they should think.

( ) 30. An advantage to having power is the freedom it gives you.

( ) 31. You can usually tell a powerful person as soon as he or she enters a room.

( ) 32. I would like to be a powerful person.

( ) 33. Power comes from being an expert in something.

( ) 34. People instinctively seek power.

( ) 35. Whether power is good or bad depends on the type of person who

has it.

( ) 36. Power should be used to do the greatest good for the greatest number of people.

( ) 37. In general, powerful people do more harm than good.

( ) 38. Having power means that people may not like you.

( ) 39. Powerful people are likely to feel anxious.

( ) 40. Remaining in power requires political skill.

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RHETORITHERAPY: THE GROUP AS RHETORICAL EXPERIENCE

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(The purpose of therapy groups is to train participants in behavior which will improve their situation in the world. Thus, the group must stimulate conditions in which the participants will live. For that reason, orderly procedure must be imposed and behaviors that would be unproductive outside the therapy group discouraged. There is no necessary advantage in the catharsis and prurient inquiry that characterizes much group therapy. In fact, the only justification for group therapy is to teach participants orderly and rhetorical procedure in social communication. Systematic operations in the group governed by the use of Standard Agenda will facilitate the learning experience of behaviors useful outside the therapy group, that will carry over into _in vivo_ experience. There are standard patterns and techniques available to accomplish these ends.)

Some Basic Assumptions

Therapy groups and therapy-like groups have consistently operated around the twin themes of nurturance of participants and encouragement of a kind of communication characterized by expletive and catharsis. The design is to encourage that participants meet their emotional needs. The problem with this kind of approach is that people rarely have the luxury for this kind of expression in their natural social life with others. In fact, most people in therapy are there because they cannot distinguish their obligations from their desires. They have tried to do whay they wanted at the expense of others, or were so locked into their obligations that they could not derive satisfaction from their personal lives. The obvious purpose of a therapy group is to serve as a laboratory in which participants first learn to distinguish what is doable from what is merely desirable. They must learn to meet needs in the world in such a way that their personal pleasure principle is served.

A second major urgency in group therapy is to train participants in paying attention to the needs and wants of others with whom they associate. It is a main premise of a great many therapy-like group programs (assertiveness training for example) that people should learn to demand what they want from the people around them. However, it is a basic principle of social organization that the utilitarian principle of the greatest good for the greatest number ought to be served. Thus, a fundamental learning the therapy group is to serve one's own needs while similarly facilitating similar need-serving by others. Through mutual self-serving, no party will

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be fully satisfied but each will find some satisfaction.

A final basic assumption is the necessity to avoid passivity. A great many therapy clients enter treatment with the belief that something will be done to them or for them. It is a major goal of therapy to train participants in management of their own behavior. This means that clients must <u>learn to decide how they will behave and how to execute their own decisions skillfully.</u>

The Role of Communication in Group Therapy

One characteristic of emotional dis▮▮▮ is disturbed communication. While it is not clear whether inability ▮ ▮mmunicate well makes one emotionally ill, or whether emotional illness comes and affects communication, it is clear that emotional distre▮ is signified by attendance to communica-tion symptoms. Standard textbooks ▮n psychotherapy[1] list a variety of communication disturbances for each of the clinically diagnosable emotional illnesses. In lay terms, communication problems are too much or too little talk, egocentric talk, talk that is out of phase with the social situation, and talk that is unproductive when used to accomplish social goals. In full or in part, psychotherapy requires modification of communication behavior, either by overt attempts to alter communication behavior or by the assumption that attention to personality dynamics will bring about salubrious changes in communication.

Ernest Becker identifies speech as the "specifically human" component of behavior.[2] In order to use speech to avoid extinction, an extraordinary physiological process must take place in which organs not designed primarily for speech are used for speech.[3] In fact, speech is one of the few human processes in which conscious control is exerted over normally autonomic functions. For example, the lungs which provide the power for speech must be consciously managed to control the air flow necessary for audibility. The larynx, a valve which keeps the windpipe secure from foreign objects must be controlled to bring vocal folds into proper juxtaposition not only for phonation but for production of delicate nuances in phonation. Tongues, lips and teeth, designed for mastication and swallowing must be coordinated to produce complicated combinations of sounds and the whole must be resonated for appealing effect through the use of drainage cavities in face and chest. None of this activity is spontaneous. It must be pre-mediated according to some template of performance in order to be produced effectively.[4]

Once the basic management of vocal production is used, the whole process must be socialized. As a result, problems in communication occur among people some of whom are diagnosed as emotionally ill and others of whom are diagnosed as boring, ineffective, or unpleasant. In fact, it appears that the greater number of people in psychotherapy are there simply because they went, not necessarily because they had a disorder, a situation which requires that the entire medical model must be questioned when applied to social problems experienced by humans.[5] There are seven basic types (among others) of communication problems experienced by humans:

1. Some people do not understand how speech can be used to accomplish social goals. They reject the notion that conscious control of

speech would be productive, hence they are unable to generate
sensible goals with others in social intercourse, and obviously
cannot engage in careful efforts to accomplish social goals.
Their speech is largely emotional, cathartic, impulsive, and
reactive.

2. Some people understand that social goals can be accomplished
   through control of discourse, but they are unable to executive
   behaviors designed to accomplish their own social goals because
   they do not know how to adapt to the needs and competencies of
   the person(s) they address. These people lack a dual perspective[6]
   which permits them to understand that what motivates them also
   motivates others.

3. Some people are egocentric or narcissistic to the point where they
   believe others owe them response to whatever they say or demand.
   They do not understand principles of social exchange or equity
   in human interaction.

4. Some people simply have an idea deficit. They have had little
   actual or vicarious experience and consequently have little or
   nothing to say.

5. Some people are incapable of putting their ideas into intelligible
   order because they are deficient in logic and grammar systems.
   Where the cause of this problem is physiological, there is little
   that can be done either by speech training or psychotherapy. Where
   the problem is the result of social training or a learning deficit,
   therapy can inculcate orderly linear processing in social inter-
   action.

6. Some people have a vocabulary deficiency which keeps them from
   speaking with adequate precision or subtlety.

7. Some people may lack the ability to form sounds properly, articu-
   late clearly, speak loudly enough, or with proper rhythm. Most
   problems in this area lie in the province of the speech pathologist.

In general, however, communication problems seem most amenable to instruction,
not therapy. While "treatment" of internal states of anxiety and distress
are useful in alleviating anxiety and distress, they commonly have little
affect on verbal output.

The history of the treatment of "reticence" has demonstrated that a
great many kinds of communication problems, many of which appear to warrant
referral to psychotherapy, can, through application of group process be
alleviated. This does not mean automatic relief of intra-psychic distress,
although many students report that learning communication skills was
effective in reducing their internal tensions. At any event, whether
communication training is applied directly qua communication training,
or in the guise of group psychotherapy, it must be applied in an orderly,
goal-directed way.

The application is obvious. Sadock stipulates three goals for group psychotherapy: 1) to understand effective social process, 2) to be able to accept others and show affection, 3) to be able to test reality, interact and release tension. In communication language, the goals are to teach people how to exert an effective and appropriate influence on the people with whom they interact in the social settings with which they are familiar. These can be subsumed in the goals specified in Bloom's Taxonomy (cognitive, affective, behavioral/psycho-motor) and specified for pedagogy by Mager. With these goals in mind, group therapy can be viewed as an instructional setting in which the therapist/instructor seeks to accomplish traditional educational goals, even though each individual may have a different set of educational goals.

Group Therapy is a way to take people for a brief time out of the high-stake competitive society and teach them how to become more successful on the job or with family and friends. The requirement is learning effective performance. Group therapy is not designed to heal souls, nor are group therapists designated as priests. When there is a moralistic component to group therapy it tends to subvert the accomplishment of legitimate behavior goals. There is no real evidence that strong belief in some psycho-dynamic system does very much to improve behavior. In fact, quite the contrary appears to be the case, the more authoritarian and moralistic the therapist, the more subserviant and ineffective the participant. Fanatic and phrenetic therapy-type operations like EST, sensitivity training and scientology make vast and undocumented claims for life reformation, while they avoid hard scrutiny of what they teach and how their clients learn to serve their own needs. It should be a given that a report that a client feels better is not sufficient accomplishment to justify group operations. The client must operate demonstrably more effectively in groups outside the therapy setting in order for treatment to be justified as healthful.

An industrial model is an appropriate metaphor for group therapy. A group member (employee) functions with his peers (fellow employees). His performance is reviewed by his colleagues (as in a peer review on the job) and evaluated by his therapist (supervisor) who then makes suggestions for improvement, ratifies ideas offered by the client, corrects plans and goals, and facilitates a programme for future change. As a result of this process, the group member (employee) in this therapy group (on this job) and in any other group setting which requires conscious and controlled human communication performance. The documentation of improvement comes with reports of successful accomplishment outside the groups, not with subjective reports of intra-psychic changes. In fact, sesquipedelian reports of intrapersonal dynamics are boring, not generalizable, and often the result of the client's urgency to please the therapist with some kind if unverifiable report. It is much the same as the employee trying to please the boss with reports of how he feels he is doing his job better and how satisfying it is to him. The payoff is for production!

This view of group therapy avoids the diagnosis/treatment aspects of the medical model which has pervaded psychotherapy since its beginning. When we reject a medical model we do not reject the notion that people have problems. What we reject is naming problems and assuming that once a name has been generated it subsumes the same etiologies and symptoms with everyone who has a problem to which the name can be given. The varieties of human experience

and misery are so vast that they defy taxonomy. People who are miserable
think of themselves as unique in their misery, though people who are happy
all seem to be happy in the same way. This paraphrase of Tolstoy's maxim
guides us to the conclusion that anyone who would work with human misery
must adapt himself to the particular case under the assumption that every
human would be better off if things came out his way a little more often,
without, of course, messing up others. To bring this about, the most obvious
behavior change is communication, first because it is intrinsic in all
social interaction and, second, because it is eminently amenable to change.

Therapy clients often expect too much too soon. They seem willing to
endow the therapist with awesome power and then sit back to wait for change
to come about through the ministrations or priestly blandishments of the
omnipotent therapist. They deal with therapists as they deal with their
doctors. The unfortunate thing is that while a person cannot perform a
cholecystectomy on himself, he can perform a communication transformation,
often without the interference if either a therapist or a teacher. In fact,
"adjusted" people do precisely that. They adapt their communication content
and style to the requirements of the situation at hand. In therapy, the
act of attending sessions has a placebo effect of feelings, but no affect
whatsoever on communication behavior. Reliance on the therapist hence is
abdication of the ability to change. When the therapist uses the placebo
effect of good feeling to motivate change, he serves this highest calling.

Therapists cannot make people feel better. No one can change how some-
one else feels. What therapists (and teachers) can do is exert some control
over environments in which people learn and offer some techniques of
learning. Therapists can say what is permissable for clients to say and
teach people how not to hurt each other while they learn. They can help
people learn to help each other and then help themselves. They can demon-
strate how to be effective and then offer methods and procedures for the
individual to accomplish what he sees his model do. Therapists can help
people become more accurate and sensible in interpreting what others say and
do. The therapy group is the appropriate place for people to learn skills
of dealing effectively with each other. By "effectively" we mean considerate
and productive development of mutual social exchanges.[12]

The principle of consideration and exchange is highly uitlitarian. It
does not presume cure. It does presume that everyone can get a little more
of what they want by seeing to it that other people get their share. No
one "actualizes" under a utilitarian system, but everyone gains. This is
in contrast with a utopian type of system in which people are promised
that perfection is available to them. Commonly[13] therapeutic systems have
been highly utopian in the promise they offer. In operation, the freedom
consistently associated with therapy has resulted in encouragement[14] of
emotional expression, a process highly over-rated as therapeutic. As
therapy groups emphasize disclosure, spontaneity and authentic expression,
the content of potential extortion and blackmail are made available to
whomever wishes to use them. Furthermore, encouragement of actualization
is an arrogant process in which some people get the idea that others exist
in order for them to fatten their batting average.

Poorly run therapy groups can encourage narcissistic and egocentric

values. Utopian leaders offer a form of Nirvana through commitment to a true-belief system. Anarchic, member-oriented groups can permit arrogant and power-ful individuals to use the weakness of their colleagues to their personal ends. Therapists who avoid intervention with the strong on behalf of the weak on the grounds that it is free expression, encourage an anti-Copernican view of the world that is not effective in life outside the group. The important recognition for the therapist is that every group member must live a life elsewhere in which his personal interests are not paramount and in which disputes are decided by some authority structure or legal institution. Whatevery joys come to the individual in the garden of the group, unless there is a set of heuristics to carry effectiveness outside the group, the time is wasted. This means that therapy groups must be at least as respectful of individual rights as the society at large and provide means for resolving conflicts according to laws of society, equity, and social norms. Furthermore, however long a therapy group lasts, it must be regarded as temporary and unreal. Their sole purpose is to provide members with tools and skills to make them effective humans outside the group. Any other success measure violates basic principles of human dignity. What group members must learn is to win collect-ively, by pleasing each other and encouraging collaboration in mutual goal seeking through understanding, consideration and adaptation.

The above premises are bases for the assertion that group therapy ought to be based on a systematic rhetoric operating in a simulation of life situations. What is learned in the group must be tested outside the group, then integrated into each individual life. The therapy group itself can have no independent existence. It is not an end unto itself, it is a rhetorical means by which individuals can be helped to acquire necessary rhetorical skills for effective accomplishments in their life outside the group.

The Rhetorical Nature of the Group

Grace DeLaguna believed that humans organized groups in order to accomplish specific (as in "species") tasks.[15] Ernest Becker argued that the human neonate is so fragile that without formal organization there would be no way to ensure survival of the species.[16] Families, clans, tribes, communities, and governments, and Gemeinschaften and Gesellschaften of classical sociology, are formed through communication. People learn topics for discourse and formats of presentation appropriate to particular social units. They learn to adapt themselves to the behaviors of others, to earn their place in their social unit, and to work for the good of the order in order to serve them-selves. They direct themselves to the "other."[17] Every human carries on a dialectic between what must be done for the general welfare and what he must do for his own physical and psychological survival. Because everyone must act for the good of all, no one can win entirely. What an individual can win is a function of what society permits him to win and what he is skillful enough to earn according to the rules of society. While some psychiatric specialists[18] believe it is their obligation to change society, the prevailing view is that psychotherapy seeks to make humans fit to live effectively in society as it is, or to acquire the skill to improve their lot in life by moving to a more comfortable location in society.

The word "society" is a hypostatization. The reality of society is created

architectonically by the symbols that people exchange about it. The most
contemporary view of human communication is that it is used to form realities
through the use of symbols. People agree on what society is, and then live
by their agreements. They act "as if" what they agree on is real.[19]
Every person acts to impose his own stamp on reality, to make it come out
his own way. This is not necessarily self-centered, merely self-interested.
It is presumed that most people learn that only if they serve the interests
of others in some way will those others be interested in cooperating with
individual goal seeking.

The urgency of the individual quest have something to do with the
natural ethological goals of homeostasis, territory, stimulation and
survival.[20] The personal use made of symbols to attain individualized
goals can happen only when members of society generally seek the same
ends through the same instruments. Biologically, it appears, we are
impelled toward a common symbology, our languages derive from the same
psychobiological roots, and thus, our institutions are rooted in our
nature as humans.[21] But, there is nothing that comes to use automatically.
Even when society is organized to its best advantages, each individual human
must seek his own advantage within social rules. Thus, he must manage
symbols so that he can act sufficiently to the satisfaction of others to
impel those others to participate in providing what he seeks. This process
of conscious symbolic deployment to impel others to collaborate with personal
goal-seeking is called rhetoric.

It is not the case that one person performs rhetorically and others do
not. Rhetoric can only be carried in the context of other rhetorical beings.
As aggregates of people become large, the capability of one person to exert
influence on social outcomes diminishes. Electoral units can only deal with
general physical well being, safety and comfort, that is, to provide the
conditions in which pursuit of happiness can take place. Governments cannot
provide happiness for citizens. The quest for happiness consists of
individuals seeking cooperation from other individuals for the attainment
of legitimate social goals from which one or more persons benefit and as
few people as possible suffer. In order to maximize personal attainment,
people form their communities, families, social groups in which they
can seek enhanced self esteem and personal gratification. The general
programmes of society cannot address the curses of human existence;
loneliness, boredom and ineffectuality.[22] Indeed, the entire Anglo Saxon
Common Law militates against special privilege notions and the service of
individualized pleasure principles. Government is provided for the purposes
of guaranteeing the general welfare and redress at equity. Individuals
can seek personal goals only by employing rhetoric in small groups.

Those who do rhetoric in large groups (governmental and corporate
units) function through lobbying, concerted action, debate, and deploy-
ment of force and threats of force (social, political and economic.)
Issues are often resolved through "log-rolling," cynical but necessary
exchanges of factors required in order to satisfy the urgencies of
pressures groups with equivalent power. In a democratic socity, ways
and means to equity between contending groups evolve and become common
practice, through the utilitarian device of writing laws and statutes,
complaining when they do not work and providing the complex mechanism

of a judicial system to right wrongs or to permit wrongs to be righted through
common decision-making. Each person pays a utilitiarian price of taxes and
effort in order to make the process run. However idealistic governments try
to be, they can never fulfill more than the rudimentary conditions of Bentham's
"felicific calculus." Attempts at utopianism expressed in Hitler's Germany,
the Soviet Union, or the petty contemporary dictatorships of Africa and South
America end up with some groups paying the price for the welfare of other
groups with the inequities solidified through the totalitarian means of decision
making and enforcement. Utilitarian governments operating through constitutional
means guarantee minimal levels of economic welfare and personal safety allowing
for the possibility of one person having more money and satisfaction than another
and furthermore, permitting that person to be protected by laws designed
to preserve individual rights and dignity. Thus, in such societies, individuals
must learn more than how to please the state. They must learn to please each
other in order to share the available bounties. In a theocracy like Iran 1980,
a sane person needs to look like a good Muslim, and offenders can be rehabil-
itated by teaching them Muslim observance. In contemporary American society,
people who cannot deal effectively with others tend to lose. They can be made
effective by teaching them bargaining, persuasiveness, and utilitarian behavior.
When people learn to negotiate with each other so that everyone has a chance
at a fair share, the group serves its most useful function. Even though
"group" is an "abstraction with no hands," as Kierkegaard puts it, the group
is composed of individuals acting on their own behalf in such a way that their
aggregation acquires identity subsumed in their own personal attainment. The
small group is the basic social locus of personal accomplishment in a democratic
society. People who cannot deploy themselves well in small groups are unhappy
or sufficiently inapposite in behavior to require help. The help consists of
resocialization. Resocialization can involve restructuring of social ideas,
but it mostly requires training or retraining in effective social behavior.
It is within this kind of rhetorical milieu that the process called "rhetori-
therapy" best operates.

A Rhetoritherapeutic View of the Small Group

When people meet face to face in social and vocational groups and know a
bit more about each other than their names, each person is, at the first, a
self contained political unit, trying to do decently for himself. Face to
face groups are the smallest units in which conflicting goals can be recon-
ciled without imposing representative democracy or other forms of
intermediation. The small group is the largest consensual unit where bipolar
resolution (parliamentary procedure) can be avoided, and in which formal
exchange of sentiments, goods and services replace controlled combat. In
the small group, humans can seek personal goals of identity, potency,
affection and fun. To do this, each person must put up some behavior at risk
in a marketplace in order to get rewarding responses from others. In a proper
marketplace the person who does not need his dollar can trade it for goods
from a person who needs the dollar more than the goods. A person who needs
a smile and a kind word can trade a service for it, while one who needs
services can learn to deploy smiles and kind words.

George Homans offers goods, services and sentiments as the basic units
of social exchange.[23] The human who cannot explain to others what he has to

offer and what he seeks gets what he gets by accidents, and most commonly
loses. Each social unit imposes its own norms of what effective persuasions
is to be, and the social success of individuals is directly contingent on
the ability to conform to the regulations of social play that prevail in
the social group. Sometimes people are excluded from the benefits of the
rules because of ethnicity or because they have egregiously violated some
taboo. Most of the time, however, people do not get what they want from
groups because they do not know how to play effectively by the rules.
When this happens, the individual either seeks another group, withdraws
into personal anomie, or seeks some kind of help, usually psychotherapeutic.
It is the basic premise that whatever kind of help is sought, the kind that
is most effective trains the individual in playing by the rules, that is,
learning how to make and receive requests according to the rules by which
the people around them make and receive requests.

Within a therapy group the individual can learn to function as a proper
social being. By learning to do for others and to make legitimate requests
for exchanges, the therapy client can acquire some hypotheses about what
might constitute effective behavior outside the group. With the protection
of the therapy group, including the nurturance of fellow members and the
advice of the therapist, the individual can test his social hypotheses and
report on the results. In theory, within the therapy group, the individual
can learn techniques of making friends, having fun, getting attention,
influencing outcomes and whatever else a successful social being needs to
know. He can also learn to avoid hurting others, how to withstand hurt and
how to seek redress of grievance.

The goal for learning within the therapy group is effective rhetoric,
that is, being able to discover and deploy means of persuasion appropriate
to individual and situation through the use of logic and emotion in the
framework of personal credibility. When therapy clients learn rhetoric,
they learn that they cannot gain by taking away from others, but must
rely on mutuality to support their own efforts. Rhetoric eschews brutality
and intimidation. It is the creation of joint reality which is rewarding
to those that create it and which, furthermore, does not bring along
undesirable concomitants from hurting others in the process of creation.
Rhetoric is, in this sense, the art of learning to care for or about others
sufficiently to justify those others acting on your own behalf. This is
done through the acquisition within the therapy group of heuristics which
can be applied outside the group. To inculcate the heuristics well the
therapy group can afford no greater risk than lies outside the group, nor
can it permit the members to acquire protective devices that would not
be permitted outside the group. A therapy group is best when members are
not mislead about what is effective behavior.

That the group supports the individual's efforts to find identity is
derived from G. H. Mead.[24] The notion that people seek security and satis-
faction within a group is Sullivanian.[25] The idea of accomplishing this
process through planned discourse is Aristotelian. If identity and personal
satisfaction are not sought through the conscious deployment of words, they
are sought through oaths and rituals, mysticism and magic, threats, intimidation,
blackmail and brute force. It is the premise to democratic society to reject

all of these, and thus, those who seek at all are required to do so through
the use of words. Those that violate the social code of seeking are sanctioned,
imprisoned, consigned to treatment, or ignored. Those who do not seek at all
are alienated and receive only minimal bounties from society, those that come
to all automatically. Those who do not know how to seek are offered both
instruction and treatment. In the case of group therapy, they are one and the
same.

In a sense, we are all like Lili, who yearned for her home in Mira, where
everybody knew her name. We seek the place that when we go there, they have to
take us in. Both literally and figuratively our group is our home, for
within our group we find our allies, our family, our friends, our workmates, our
communards, our neighbors. Our therapy group must provide us with simulations
of all of these sufficiently to improve the way we deal with the particular group
within which our function is ineffective. It is within our particular life groups
that our declarations of identity are confirmed or rejected. In the therapy
group, each participant can declare, "I am a . . . ." and learn to do so in a
manner sufficiently convincing and rewarding to others to earn ratification.
Once he learns to make it convincing enough to carry it into life situations,
he has learned rhetoric. However much a person means what he says, if it is
not said well enough to convince others, they will not respond in rewarding ways.
No amount of anger or tears will convince others to ratify an inept declaration
of self. In fact, like the Parable of the Sun and the Wing, the angry or tearful
declaration will only confirm the decision that the person making it is unworthy
and incompetent. Skill must be learned according to the rules everyone observes,
and no amount of self-seeking or idiosyncratic demand, however well stated and
well intentioned will earn the rewards the group has to give. The person who
is unhappy and inept was made so by the group and can be restored to competence
only by the group. This is the power conferred on the therapy group to educate
and train its members. In this case, the groups seeks to train its members in
artistry in the rhetorical use of symbols.

The Rhetorical Use of Symbols

Artistic rhetoric is the conscious use of symbols to attain human goals.
There are two main modes of symbol deployment, expression and rhetoric.
Expression is emotional projection through expletive, laughter, crying, cursing
and the like. Rhetoric is the designed use of symbols for the purpose of
involving others. Expression gains attention but rarely compliance. Rhetoric
must gain attention in order to gain compliance. Expression is effective when
it relieves personal tragedy momentarily. Rhetoric is effective when it enables
a person to attain a goal by motivating others. Expressive acts are impulsive.
They commonly alienate those who witness them. Rhetorical acts are carefully
designed to persuade those who witness them. Expression is often a goal of
group therapy, although there are few situations in life where expression can
gain social cooperation. The good personal feelings that come from catharsis
are aften cancelled by the social alienation that comes from catharsis. One
of the main hazards of being human is that space must be shared with other humans
who react to what others do. In the presence of others, something is always
communicated.[27] When a person expresses it communicates an expressive person.
Expressive people are desirable when the home team scores the winning touchdown
with six seconds left to play and at few other times.

Rhetorical communication is designed to change information, attitude or behavior of others. The communicator has some goal in mind, however obscure, that can be attained if the behavior of other people is properly transmitted. If the goal is too obscure, the behaver doesn't know when he has achieved it. Thus rhetoric is a combination of capable goal-setting and careful execution of strategy. Every football coach would understand the process. The human develops a "game plan" which consists of long term and immediate goals which must be sought persuasively. Sometimes persuasion is in the form of action: threats, oaths, intimidations, and brute force. Most of the time persuasion is symbolic, communication acts, some expressive and egocenteric hence ineffective, some carefully planned and amenable to evaluation based on their utility in accomplishing long term and immediate goals.

Because every act of communication is potentially persuasive, humans must monitor their own actions carefully. The listener/receiver of communication regards communication acts as specifically intended, regardless of how the communicator regards them. Thus, expressive acts persuade, though commonly the persuasion is not what the speaker desires. However, the advice that people attend to their communication acts and select and execute them, whenever possible, with some goal in mind, is often rejected on the grounds that it is "manipulative." Those who take an utopian view of communication tend to feel that if the inner state of the human was sufficiently "improved," communication would be salubrious in every case. Utilitarians, who believe that inner states are shaped by the effectiveness of communication, advise people to do the best they can, under the assumption that if everyone does the best they can, some mutually beneficial common reality can be negotiated.

People come to therapy groups sometimes because their intentions for others are muddled or conflictful. Such people need to restructure the way they think about humans. Often, this becomes a moral issue and the therapist functions as moral guide and preceptor. Sometimes humans come to therapy groups because their actions are ineffective. Advice about internal conflicts is generally not helpful in altering human behavior. Given the proposition offered by Becker,[28] that humans are sometimes controlled by dark voices, it is possible in any case that the intent of communication is to hurt others. This means that a principle of caveat emptor applies in the communication marketplace, and that, it must be the mission of the therapy group to teach people not only how to intend, but how to accomplish and defend.

Rhetoric is the systematic procedure by which all of this process is carried on. It does not matter what the internal state of the individual is, when the individual attempts to communicate with others, persuasion is involved, and persuasion may be both criticized and taught on criteria of orderly procedure. Rhetoric begins with a goal which one human seeks from another. Each goal is based on some personal pleasure principle which may or may not be appropriately served by the response others make to communication. The process of relationship is essentially a process in which parties attempt to beam persuasions at each other, test the results and adjust communication so that rewarding actions are continued and

punished actions terminated.[29]

Since every person in a relationship has some goals, mutual accomplishment is dependent on negotiation, giving up and getting as a result. Candidates for therapy do not handle this well. They are not, generally, oriented to the general welfare of the relationship, but rather paraphrase General Motors old dictum into 'what is good for me is good for us.' The other party, with no reason to accept the premise, usually responds in ways that seek his/her goals, or terminates the relation. The result is failure, a blow to esteem, anxiety, moral guilt, existential Angst, anomie and isolation, or whatever noun is most appropriate to the internal feeling of pain. Note, however, that whatever we call the internal state it is, according to a rhetorical view, a result of some failure to accomplish desired ends through the use of communication. We might then assume that adjustment of process might result in improvement of state.

Wendell Johnson created the concept of IFD Disease.[30] People idealize and attempt to achieve, when they fail they are frustrated, when they generalize their frustration they are demoralized. To the therapist/teacher, the pragmatic question of where the most economical and effective intervention may be made, must be paramount. It is extraordinarily difficult to talk people into changing their internal state and since so many of them are really not sure of their goals, it is virtually impossible to get them to associate specific goal accomplishment with their own acts, the most obvious intervention point lies in the nature of action itself. The therapist, by calling attention to the quality of acts evaluated by their positive impact on others can improve the way a person is viewed by helping him attain a general goal which everyone has, that is, doing well according to the consensus norms of society. By understanding what everyone has at stake, and individual might well learn to understand what s/he has at stake. Socrates dictum, "the unexamined life is, not worth living" is activated in the rhetorical principle of dual perspective. Thought devoted to what might motivate others provides insight into what you, yourself, seek. People are not so different from one another in what they seek. The pleasures and pains available to one are available to others. In the therapy group, it is possible to learn these ideas actively by trying out talk and talking about its impact. By hearing from one person why a particular unit of talk was ineffective, it is possible to reconstruct effective action, sometimes by revising or specifying internal goals, both long and short term. The internal effect, however, is often fortuitous usufruct. It cannot be attained directly but only through revision of action into planned and considerate form.

The foregoing, of course, does not apply to psychotics. However, psychotics are normally not treated en group. There must be some similarity in value systems between members in order for them to have sufficient common meaning to make communication possible. Therapy groups need not be homogeneous in terms of diagnosed difficulty, but they must be homogeneous in shared social values. All parties must have a common language, logic and set of social motivations to satisfy the requirements of the trivium. Vocabulary and grammar must result in common meaning, people should share common ideas about modes of reasoning and supporting ideas, and they must concur on proper ways and means of making requests and asking for action.

Behavior cannot be compelled by anything other than force, nor is behavior automatic. The latest of Skinnerian conceptions is that even if conditioning can account for all human behavior, what it takes to condition a human is so difficult to discover that in essence, the person seeking to motivate another must operate rhetorically and select the most effective reinforcer in the given case.[31] This is the point on which much group therapy goes awry. It is that therapists often conceive of a formula of healing rather than see themselves as trainers of social convention and effectiveness. The narcissistic appeal of cathartic expression is anethema to effective healing within the group, as is the idea that internal improvement reflects itself in effective action. What is most needed is orderly procedure in helping therapy clients achieve maximum effectiveness in their <u>performance behavior with others outside the group.</u> Any theological assumptions about the proper frame of mind or particular techniques must be sacrificed to the orderly understanding of the given case. Attention to normal process, as in the case of John Dewey's description of thinking process is a good starting point.

The John Dewey Formulation

Some life groups are controlled by autocrats, few are totally autonomous. Most life groups are directed by consensus of members with some members being more prominent than others in proposing and executing solutions. Groups within work and other formalized settings have a hierarchic leadership operating according to some established formula of legislation, execution and adjudication. Every life group develops a set of norms and provides ways and means for people to become good group members. Groups do not come together, normally, to discuss what they are to discuss or do, nor do they normally deal publicly with private business like feelings and emotions. The therapy group is, thus, on the face of it, abnormal, since it is customary for group members in therapy to figure out what the group is to do, and much of what is done has to do with feelings and emotions. Often the agenda of the therapy group is a "taking turns" kind of Show and Tell or Can You Top This? in which members vie for the attention of the therapist/leader by disclosing, insulting, emoting, or doing whatever it is seems to bring the most attention. In reality, however, the therapy group is a problem-solving dealing with the question, <u>What Can We Each Do to Provide Maximum Training in Life Skills for Each Other?</u> Problem solving is a generally orderly process with a few inspirations and almost no noetic breakthroughs. For a therapy group to operate as though marvelous moments will come violates the old Aramic adage, "never stand in a place of danger believing a miracle will be worked on your behalf lest it not be." Since the therapy group is a problem solving group, its agenda ought to consist of problem solving procedures.

John Dewey[32] offered five steps apparently characteristic of all problem solving. These steps were later adapted[33] into principles of thought applicable to group problem solving. The five steps are paraphrased as follows:

1. There is a feeling or notification that a problem exists.

2. The problem is defined or specified.

3. Suggestions are made to solve the problems and the implications and possibilities of each explored.

4. A solution is selected or constructed from among the possibilities.

5. The solution is put into operation and the results tested.

The introduction of PERT/CPM systems to problem solving made application of problem-solving methodology to group needs even more precise.[34] The result is a methodology known as "Standard Agenda."[35] Briefly, it consists of the following steps:

1. A group is charged. Some authority tells them what they are to do or they decide on a common task that unites them in purpose. For example, prepare a sales plan for the 1981 season or devise a way to stop the change in the zoning proposal in our town.

2. The group phrases an heuristic question, the answer to which will be the substantive content of the end product. The question is open-ended, specifies an agent to act, and avoids polarization around a "do! no do!" dichotomy. For example, what should be the sales department program for increase of sales in 1981? or how can this citizen's group influence the zoning commission to withdraw its proposal?

3. The group examines information in the form of eyewitness testimony, observations by laypersons and experts, conducts experiments, finds statements from authorities, statistics, etc. and prepares a statement on the nature of the problem. They identify symptoms and causes (where possible) and re-define their question in the light of the data.

4. The group sets goals, devises a set of criteria against which proposals can be tested and specifies the limitations placed on their work by law, morals, money, institutional practice, etc.

5. The group devises a solution by stimulating various proposals and either selecting one or devising one based on their criteria and subject to their limitations to meet their goal.

6. The group devises a plan to meet the solution by specifying who is to do what, when and where, with what for what purpose under whose supervision and with what desired effect. Where necessary budgets are prepared.

7. The group devises a plan to persuade the adopting authority to accept the proposal.

8. The proposal is then put into operation and evaluated according to the criteria specified.

By adhering to this relatively agenda, the group moves consistently in

constructive directions. There is an "order of the day" which permits the leader to rule-out digressive material while talk which advances the agenda can be rewarded. While the agenda is being worked out, members can play various roles. They can provide information or opinion, they can be critics, they can raise questions, they can offer mundane or inventive ideas, they must deal with one another in a courteous and respectful format. In short, by adhering to Standard Agenda group members are required to act in the same orderly and civil way they must in outside groups.

A Standard Agenda for Group Therapy

Applied to the group therapy process, the Standard Agenda might look like this.

1. <u>The Charge</u>. The therapist explains the rules for group operation and defines what is permissible and what is not. Possibilities of individual goals are outlined. An explanation is offered about how each member might contribute. A statement is made about how members will know when they are ready to leave the group.

2. <u>Definition</u>. Each individual can explain what they think their problem to be, and the group can participate in building a wording to suit the specifications for wording. Members can sub-group themselves with people who have similar problems. Possible outcomes can be specifiec in behavior rather than feeling terms.

-3. <u>Fact-finding</u>. The reports offered by individuals about their problems can be compared with what goes on in the group and assessments made about the nature of individual problems, symptoms and causes can be identified and decisions made about where efforts at solution should be directed.

4. <u>Goalsetting</u>. Members devise realistic statements about what they hope to accomplish phrased in such a way that both they and others can test their level of accomplishment. Limitations on improvement should be specified in order to curb excessive and unrealistic expectations.

5. <u>Solutions Proposed</u>. Members share ideas about actions to be taken inside and outside the group. Ways and means to prepare and practice are devised and members participate with each other in implementing attempts at solutions and evaluating those attempts according to criteria proposed.

6. <u>Operation Plans</u>. Members help each other to devise formats for integrating effective solutions into normal behavior and for confronting other problems which arise outside the therapy group.

7. Members participate in persuading each other of the efficacy of the plans and the prognosis for success.

8. <u>Evaluation</u>. Periodic self-evaluations and evaluations by fellow members are made and are integrated into the decision about the next

problem to tackle.

The next effect of this procedure is to reduce jeopardy of group members.
For example, if the therapist reserves the right to criticize to himself
or introduces rules for criticism for all group members to follow, or even
makes it an agenda item for members to agree on how criticism is to be
given, each member is protected from vituperation, persecution and unjustified
attack and furthermore, has some opportunity to present grievances or seek
equity if something unfortunate occurs within the group. The power to decide
on how the group is to operate can be granted to the group by the therapist,
who reserves the authority to adjudicate disputes. This type of operation
appropriately simulates a corporate model.

It may be an objection that such an orderly model is not appropriate for
those people whose desire is to improve standing and behavior within a
family or loving unit. However, even sanguinary units have business to do,
and the act of loving and living together necessarily follows some kind of
order. Thus, discovery of an appropriate order of procedure for intimate
units is proper business within the therapy group and amenable to remediation
through the use of Standard Agenda.

The net effect of imposing order on the therapy group is first, to
protect members from irregularities and to provide the maximum chance to
carry-over learnings into life experiences. Orderly procedure reduces the
amount of attention any one member can get, particularly be egocentric
methods. When attention is paid, it is commonly as a reward for some
contribution to the group, a process which reinforces behavior potentially
productive outside the group.

Cultivation of individual skills reduces unnecessary competition, but
members can learn ways to compete through imposition of group exercises.
By making members collectively responsible for outcomes, narcissistic
goalsetting is discouraged. Emphasis on factual data tends to reduce
attention to feelings and emotions, and furthermore, helps members to learn
to make their talk specific. Emphasis on clear and precise statements of
group goals helps members learn to explicate their own goals. Finally, the
process of talk in a structured format is sufficiently orderly that members
can learn to understand that the only way to control the responses they
get from others is to control their own behavior. Random and responsive
unproductive behavior is thus discouraged.

Principles and Procedures of Rhetoritherapy

Rhetoritherapy is a Standard Agenda based procedure for training
individuals in basic skills at social communication. Membership in groups
employing rhetoritherapy is negotiable, that is, potential members specify
a problem to which rhetoritherapy can be appropriately applied and the group
leader/instructor confirms the existence of the problem through observation
of communication behavior. The basic assumptions of rhetoritherapy appear to
be appropriate to group therapy as well.

The first assumption is that people need to be protected while they learn.

The therapy group is an appropriate place for people to learn how to relate to others under circumstances where the penalties for failure are not so great as to be demoralizing. By controlling possibilities through formal agenda and maintenance of bureaucratic controls and hierarchies, vocational and social experience can be simulated with criticism managed to the preference and tolerance of the individual.

A second assumption is that people must be accountable for their symbolic output. Spontaneous behavior must be understood as thoughtless and potentially counter-productive behavior. Negative spontaneity must be encouraged to teach people to manage rather than release their emotions and to discipline themselves so that they control their verbal output to their own advantage by being considerate of the concerns of others.

Third, people cannot manipulate others, but they can control their own behavior. While response behavior cannot be predicted precisely, the probability of successful social interaction can be raised by considering the goal seeking behavior of others and by bargaining with them so that all gains are mutual. People can proceed socially only through negotiated exchanges. Concentration on exchanging tends to suppress egocentric urgencies.

Fourth, people ought to have the opportunity to learn social behavior without being treated as if they are sick. Sickness is a valid concept only when there are pathological states that can be cured. Social ineptness is not a disease but a personal condition remediable through learning social skill. The therapy group is the proper place for such skill to be learned. In fact, the therapy group is a learning laboratory in which participants can be encouraged to make hypotheses about their own potentially effective social behavior, and test those hypotheses under the guidance of a skilled and sensitive teacher/critic..

Fifth, nothing that happens in the therapy group is important in itself. Whatever the participant learns must be carried into life experience. If the participant learns that the therapy group is a comfortable place to be and that the therapist can nurture and protect, or that the participant has license to the thoughless, then the therapy group actually is harmful. When the participants transfer onto the leader/therapist or uses the group as an excuse to perseverate socially gauche behavior, then group can become an addiction. To prevent this, the therapist must remain relatively aloof, protected by orderly procedure and Standard Agenda and to accept the role of teacher/critic of social behavior rather than that of "healer."

The advantage of the rhetoritherapy procedure is that formal learning of technique can be administered to participants. Through the use of tailored exercises, group members can learn to manage agenda, gain experience in productive membership contributions, achieve reasonable supportive cohesion and acquire experience in health nurturing norms of social behavior. Simple group exercises like those found in various hand-books for group leaders or in basic group discussion texts are sufficient for learning experiences, provided they are followed by careful and sympathetic critique by the therapist and by participants bound by rules of decency and discretion.

The techniques of rhetoritherapy are demonstrably effective applied to overcoming basic communication problems like reticence, shyness, or social apprehension. They are also useful in building skills as casual social interaction, social conversation, interviewing, dealing with status figures, participating in formal group decision-making, public speaking, and maintaining productive conversation and question asking and answering on the job and in the classroom.36 The formalities of rhetoritherapy tend to overcome the resistance offered by the claim made by therapy clients that they are sick and ought to be treated. By treating them as well but undereducated, they are obligated to action.

Most important of all, the formal procedures of rhetoritherapy demand that participants and therapists alike maintain rules of mutual respect and courtesy. The mawkishness and emotion sometimes characteristic of therapy groups is simply not present, and since there is no evidence at all that catharsis in therapy groups is useful, ruling it out avoids a great deal of time-wasting. Furthermore, group therapy conducted under formal rules is often dull and not at all encouraging to prurience. Acquiring skill requires learning technique often through repetitious drill. Such procedures are only useful for participants who wish to improve, and thus, rhetoritherapy tends to self select clients so that some success can be achieved with virtually all of them.

Young therapists in training often complain that they do not know exactly what to do when they lead groups. Often they are encouraged to be spontaneous and let "it" happen although the "it" is rarely defined or explained. Once the notion that the therapist is responsible for changing social communication behavior of group members, s/he can get about the business of applying orderly technique in the interest of the legitimate persuasion inherent in the group process.

The orderly technique is actually quite simple. The steps of Standard Agenda are followed. The group sets itself a task. The task can be an exercise selected by the group because they are interested or by the leader/therapist because he thinks it is useful. The group can define this task as some form of activity to support learning efforts by one or more of the members. In either case, the group must define its question, seek information, set goals, specify limitations, explore alternative solutions, prepare a plan of action, defend the decision to the therapist, put the solution into operation and evaluate the result. The therapist can expedite group action by setting deadlines. After each exercise, member activity, planning session or evaluation outcomes session, the therapist can examine each members behavior. He may raise legitimate questions about intentions the actions sought, quality of execution and effect. Whatever criticism is offered must be confined to areas where remedies are available. It should be made clear that the group does not provide complete healing, that it can only do what it can do. Thus, when the group is trained to participate in criticism they must learn not to swing wildly. It is not the point to criticize in order to release interpersonal tension, rather to improve the person undergoing the criticism. Improvement can only come from the recommendation for action. Furthermore, recommendations must be phrased behaviorally, that is, in the form of directions. The comment, "you were too sharp when you answered

him" is not useful. The comment, "try to repeat what you thought you heard him say before you answer," is useful. Each criticism should result in a set of notes for behavior alteration which the member can make part of his own goal-seeking agenda.

The operation of rhetoritherapy is not complicated in conception. For the teacher of performance skills it is easy to operate. Paramount is the notion that theory is not important, at least not to the learner. Any group member who wants to learn theory can be given a bibliography. Time in the group must be spent on activities that have a good chance of improving the way members behave toward one another, put in a form that permits members to remove them from the group and use them in life experiences. The final phase of any group employing rhetoritherapy should be planning and execution of activities outside the group, first with someone from the group monitoring, then with oral reports about plan and operation given to the group before and after the fact. When the member learns to use what he has learned on his own, his time in the group is over. Whatever other problems he may carry with him, there is good reason to believe that he has the ways and means of dealing with his communication problem, even if they are nothing more than talking coherently and effectively with his new psychiatrist.

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JAPANESE STUDENT PROTEST

by Dolores Cathart and Robert Cathcart*

The rhetoric of social movements has become an increasingly important area of study. There is a growing body of knowledge of what constitutes a movement and we are now beginning to understand the function of rhetoric in the formation and development of movements such as Feminism, Pacifism, Abolitionism, and Charterism. But, as yet we have not explored the possibility of testing movement theories and rhetorical analysis against social movements in non-Western cultures.

Stephen Lucas, in his overview of the first generation of movement studies, observes:

. . .We could profit greatly by developing a body of substantive studies dealing with the rhetoric of social movements in Europe, Asia and Africa. Rhetorical scholars have heretofore confined themselves almost exclusively to investigating move- ments indigenous to America and Great Britain. . . . Until such study is undertaken in earnest, our understanding of the rhetoric of social movements must remain partial and parochial.

Communicative processes and patterns differ widely across cultures, therefore, to make a cross cultural study of a subject as complex as a movement requires a vigilance that keeps interpretation within a framework of the values and customs of the particular culture being studied.

In a speech at a Harvard commencement, Alexander Solzhenitsyn said:

Every ancient and deeply rooted self-contained culture. . . constitutes a self-contained world, full of riddles and surprises to Western thinking. . . . Western imcomprehension of the essence of (these) other worlds (is) a result of mistakenly measuring all with the Western yardstick.

This has been especially true in reporting the events surrounding social protest movements in other countries. The propensity to measure with a "Western yardstick" has contributed to the idea that social movements are the same anywhere in the world. The activities and the rhetoric associated with social and political protest tends to look and sound the same across cultures until they are studied from a cultural perspective.

I

In this paper, it is our purpose to examine the Japanese student movement. It is especially important to consider the cultural context of Japanese student protest because Japanese social and linguistic codes differ so radically from our own. Of course, it is not possible here to give an in depth description of the intricate and fascinating Japanese culture but we will describe those cultural factors that most directly apply to the student movement.

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The general isolation Japan decreed for herself prior to the 20th
Century produced an insular society that is very homogeneous and to this day,
is structured in accordance with ancient traditions.[2]

The rigidly structured hierarchy that still govern Japanese society had
its origin in the tightly knit family characteristics of a rice culture.
Eventually, the family came to mean the household or ie and included persons
not related by blood. During the feudal period, a daimyo or lord had complete
control over his lands, and all the persons under his rule were considered a
part of his ie or household. The smaller family units were linked in one
large social and political ie. Each daimyo was absolute master of his house-
hold but at the same time assumed responsibility for all its members. To
maintain loyalty, to preserve the hierarchy and insure responsibility for
such a vast household, elaborate social customs were instituted. Definitive
roles evolved, each demanding specific behaviors and speech. Within the
household each person had specific responsibilities to those persons immediately
superior and to those immediately inferior in the hierarchy. They were all
bound together by a total dedication and unquestioning loyalty to the house-
hold. Persons had no choice. No individual could leave his family or give
up his role for each was a link in a chain and those above one and those
below were dependent on the one between. This system kept individuals tied
to one place and one ie. Individual welfare depended on the fortunes of the
entire household.

Language developed forms to fit role and, now as then, persons must
be addressed according to their status.[3] In ancient Japan it could have cost
one dearly to forget one's place or make a mistake and speak in an unacceptable
fashion. In modern Japan the fear of making a mistake in social communication
persists. Custom and the language itself make it imperative to know a person's
status attempting to communicate. In modern business the practice of exchanging
business cards when one is introduced reveals this information. It isn't easy
for a Japanese to freely mingle in society. Communication of any substance
usually takes place between persons who know each other well.

In Japan, the nakama or small group is the most distinctive and important
part of the social structure. The individual exists as a part of group. Self
is conceived of in relationship to others, not independently. The feeling of
dependency on others is to a Japanese, a warm, good, fulfilling feeling. Each
member of a nakama knows he is important to the others. He has purpose in the
common good of the group. The Japanese sometimes talk of "no self" but this
is not a denial of self so much as a belief that self is submerged in group.

This self concept is quite different from the Western version where
self is realized through independent thought and action. Japanese value
group decisions and responsibility, while Westerners value individuality
and responsibility to and for self apart from group.

The entire Japanese hierarchy rests on a foundation formed of many small
groups. The whole system depends on the intimate relationships that develop
within these groups and the links that keep groups connected to the larger
group. Edwin Reischauer in his book, The Japanese, observes:

> The group emphasis has affected the whole style of interpersonal
> relationships in Japan. . . . The key Japanese value is harmony,
> which they seek to achieve by a subtle process of mutual under-
> standing, almost by intuition, rather than by sharp analysis of
> conflicting views or by clear-cut decisions. . . . Consensus
> is the goal--a general agreement as to the sense of the meeting,
> to which no one continues to hold strong objections. . . .
> Varying positions are not sharply outlined and their differences
> analyzed and clarified. . . . Much is suggested by indirection or
> vague implication. Thus any sharp conflict of views is avoided
> before it comes into the open.[4]

As Reischauer points out, group emphasis influences all interpersonal
relationships in Japan. Business and government like all other institutions
must operate on the basis of consensus. Messages must travel from the
bottom upward as well as from the top down before enough information
accumulates and enough time has passed to assure a consensus. Responsible
leadership must always reflect group will. Usually individuals who have
reservations about a decision will overcome them if they become convinced
the decision will be in the best interests of the group. But, occasionally
decisions are postponed or put aside rather than made with any objection
still standing. This places power in all levels of the hierarchy. It
is not possible to ignore or discredit a minority position. This reciprocal
power underlies all Japanese social transactions, large and small.

II

The university plays an interesting part in the Japanese system. In
the years since the occupation of Japan, the economy has developed at a
phenomenal rate. After total defeat in the war, with most of the population
near starvation and the society in a state of shock, Japan, with encouragement
and help from the United States, made a startling leap ahead. Everyone
welcomed the promise of what the Japanese called "the bright new life" offered
in the employment as a "salaryman" for one of the fast growing companies.

Once employed, a salaryman has a security unparalleled in modern
industrial societies. Jobs are lifetime commitments on the part of both
employer and employee. Companies take care of their employees in the
tradition of the household or ie. An employee when hired is literally
adopted by the company. He is expected to leave his old life behind and
devote himself to the company. His primary loyalties will now be to
his new work group. These will be the people with whom he will spend most
of his time for the duration of his lifetime work career. Japanese companies
take a close interest in their employees' lives. It extends to health
care, vacations, social life, and even family affairs.

The stability of employment has its price. It requires making the
right career choice because once in a job it is nearly impossible to
leave. Companies all hire their employees from the senior classes at
the university. The more prestigious the university, the better the job.

The desire to attend a prestigious University creates a murderous

competition for admission. The whole educational system has become a series
of trials for Japanese children. Examinations on every level are very
difficult, requiring children to spend long hours preparing. Mothers have
become so involved in the struggle to have their children succeed that there
is a Japanese name for such a mother, kyoiku mama, or education-bent mother.
When "Hell Week" arrives, the week in which University admission exams are
given, many of these mothers accompany their children to Tokyo to prepare
special foods and help them get ready for the ordeal.

Once admitted to the University the trial is over. As Jack Seward says:

> Getting into schools, especially colleges, is so difficult that the
> Japanese seem to compensate for this by slanting the remainder of
> the process downhill. Most students who enter college are permitted
> to graduate, the exceptions being mostly those whose health or
> finances fail them enroute.[5]

Western students must compete for grades in college and once they graduate
they must face fierce competition for good jobs. In Japan the competition
all occurs at those entrance examinations;

> After graduation, the government employs a significant percentage
> of the students from the University of Tokyo, while large
> private companies take the rest from that school and many from
> the three or four other most respected institutions.[6]

The period of time in the University is recognized as an interim in a
Japanese person's life, a reprieve actually, before assuming the rigorous
duties of an adult.

As adults, the Japanese must repress any inclination to openly express
individuality, but the university student is exempt from many of the
strict taboos that apply to the rest of society. They try out new approaches
to thought, action and dress. Some students even say college is the place
where one learns to drink, smoke, play cards and engage in sex. It is a
time to "go Western" and try out such wild things as holding hands and
kissing, wearing long hair and jeans. Non-Japanese ideas and foreign
philosophies seem especially attractive.

Once a Japanese takes his place as an adult it is expected that he will
always be most concerned with the welfare of his group. This means, if he
is a company man he must always view events and ideas in light of how they
affect his company, if he is a government employee he will be most concerned
with maintaining his agency's interests. Naturally, he will be most
interested in events and policies that directly affect his particular group's
status and welfare. University students, on the other hand, are unusually
free from the restraints of conformity demanded in this system. At the college
a student is not only exposed to Western philosophy but also freed to question
his own society and to take an interest in wide ranging events and issues.

To understand the unique position of the college student in Japanese
society it is important to understand how the university developed as an

institution in Japan. The university did not evolve out of the traditional educational system. The first university in Japan was not created until 1868 during the Meiji period. Japan in a rush to industrialize and modernize, needed teachers from the Western countries to train youth for new careers and to teach Western sciences and methodologies. The University was created for this purpose. Later, Japanese traditional scholars tried to influence the University to concern itself with moral teaching rather than Western subjects but the government came down on the side of keeping it a Western-type institution. Tokyo University has ever since produced all the civil servants for the government.

Parents of students at the University and most of the general public seem to feel it is natural for college students to "go Western." Their behavior doesn't draw sharp criticism, perhaps because the university is still considered a Western institution where "foreign" customs are to be expected.

It is easy to overemphasize the outward behaviors and think that Japanese college students are very much like college students everywhere. They seem to be in rebellion about the same kind of things. The Japanese student movement has concerned itself with international issues such as the American treaty and America's involvement in the Vietman war. It has called attention to the obvious connection between big business and government in Japan. It has protested against the University itself, charging the administration and faculty with indifference. Much of this protest seems similar to protest by students in other countries.

However, underneath the Western clothing and the Western ways a Japanese student remains dependent on group for security and acceptance. Away from family and childhood friendship groups for the first time a student feels isolation and loneliness, and longs for the warmth of a group. Many clubs exist on college campuses to fill this need and political clubs have a strong appeal. Not only do such clubs concern themselves with new exciting ideas but they usually have the most charismatic leaders. Radical ideas presented in a passionate way tend to arouse and fuse feelings among the student group, but most students involved in protest are more concerned with their role in such a group than motivated by its radical politics.

To quote an authority on Japanese affairs writing about protest:

> . . . It is hard to believe than ideology provides the
> nexus. . . . Boys and girls in from the country, lonely in
> the great city. . . join this or that faction less from
> intellectual persuasion than from boredom and self-pity and
> a longing for company. Once in, they submit absolutely to
> the dictates of their leaders, fighting as noisily against
> other factions as against the police. Partly, no doubt, it
> is a matter of affection for those leaders and a wish to return
> to childhood; but partly, too, it is a matter of fear. The
> consequences of defection can be very painful. The English
> word, "lynch" occupies a prominent place in student jargon,

and its principal reference is to the pulverisation of an
erstwhile comrade convicted of disloyalty. One is reminded
less of the Students for a Democratic Society than of the
bands of gamblers and masterless samurai who made life
exciting in Tokugawa Japan.[7]

This reference to masterless samurai is apt. Student confrontations with
the Kodotani, the riot police, often seem to be ritual reenactments of battles
between samurai warriors. Students wear helmets emblazoned with their group
insignia and carry bamboo staves creating a warrior like appearance. The
sense of ritual is enhanced as the thousands of students form close lines and
wind rhythmically through the streets shouting a chant of funsai! (pulverize).
The strong quality of a ritual pageant seems to override the impact of the
issue involved in the protest.

Edward Seidensticker has referred to this ritual quality.
Student demonstrations, with their chanting and their zig-
zagging, have an orgiastic quality about them that calls
to mind nothing so much as a Shinto festival. . . . . They
call to mind. . .something primevally Japanese, the chanting
to which the portable shrine makes its way through the paddies
during a summer festival. 'Half the shrine-bearers keep time
to call of two or three syllables, and the other half answer
with a matching call, and the effect is bacchanalian. So
it is with the students, "Ampo!" shouts one half, and
"Hantai" replies with the other, and the process is
repeated endlessly. "Down with the Security Treaty" in
this case. Or "Pulverize President Furuta!" or "Pulverize
the Enterprise!" or whatever best suits the mood or the
occasion.[8]

III

During the American occupation of Japan, many changes were made to
create a democracy in Japan. A democratic constitution was adopted and
democratic idealism was taught in the schools. Students were actively
encouraged to organize into political clubs and to be concerned. They did
so with such enthusiasm that the results led to troubles that put the
Occupation forces and government on one side and the students on the other.
The largest student organization was Zengakuren, organized in 1948. Its
first central committee was communist oriented. Zengakuren was able to
claim as many as 440,000 members by organizing all the smaller groups on
campuses around political issues.

The occupational government became disturbed by what they perceived
as a communist menace. They reacted by putting a bulletin to the universities
saying, in essence, educational institutions should be politically neutral.
Matters became worse and in 1950 an order was issued prohibiting students
from conducting a strike. The students became more militant and now anti-
American. Students continued to demonstrate frequently both on campus over
issues that involved students and professors or the administration, and in
the streets over larger issues.

Like other Japanese small groups students can be most aroused by issues
that directly concern their own group. By creating disorder on campus
political clubs were able to attract those students who were usually
politically unconcerned or apathetic. When large issues like Ampo brought
out over 10,000 students a day, it was because Zengakuren had organized the
leadership of these smaller campus groups. Earlier campus struggles had
mobilized most of the students and they all could be counted on when their
group was called.

The huge Ampo demonstration was a peak for the student movement. There
was a tremendous furor and daily demonstrations around the Diet. President
Eisenhower was forced to cancel his planned trip to Japan and Prime Minister
Sato was forced to resign. Despite all this the Security Treaty was signed.

Within the Zengakuren there was a general issue of defeat and much
criticism of the leadership. The Zengakuren factionalized. Speaking of the
discords that developed Chie Nakane says:

> It is like a domestic discord, so that it tends to be very
> emotional or radical. In the extreme case it may drive some
> of the directors or section heads to commit suicide. Within
> the last six months in the height of the student revolts,
> three director's committed suicide; and very similar phenomena
> occurred during the earlier union movements in industrial
> fields soon after the war. These movements are felt most
> intensely by all those concerned, but they are always in
> contrast to the peaceful order of the life of the general
> public which surrounds them. Thus trade and student unions
> and other popular movements, in spite of. . .radicalism and
> violence, have little social significance, in that they are
> unable to stir the majority, even of those in the same category.[9]

The reaction of the general public is important to consider if we are
to understand what cultural significance there is in such protest activity.
We have already mentioned the Japanese tolerance for "deviant" behavior
on the part of students. They see student radicalism as a phase of youth
that tenko will take care of. The term shushoku tenko refers to employment
conversion; a turning around of belief and behavior after graduation and
employment. In Japanese Patterns of Behavior Takie Sugiyama Lebra says:

> Role orientation for the Japanese takes two forms: extreme
> role commitment and versatile adjustment. Role is internalized
> in the one, while it remains external in the other. In the
> former, the self is absorbed in the role, whereas in the latter,
> the self is not affected by the role. . . . That role can
> become identical with self or can come to represent all meaning
> in life. . .is only one side of the picture, however, since
> roles are played in a social setting, one can perform a role
> perfectly without internal commitment. Role orientation
> involves versatile adjustment to whatever role is one expected
> to play. . . . Carrying over one's previous role behavior
> into a new role is met with negative sanction. A young man
> is expected to play a young man's role, to be like a young man,

but on reaching adulthood he should behave like a mature
adult: he had better abandon his dream or idea cherished in
adolescence. It is common knowledge that most of the former
Zengakuren leaders, . . . have converted and become members
of the Establishment since graduation.[10]

It would seem the public is correct in viewing student protest as a
youthful phase. In Japanese Radicals Revisited,[11] a study of what became of
the 1960 political activists who so violently protested the American Japanese
Treaty, Kraus found that a few of the most radical activists and some of the
leaders had sought professional jobs in teaching, publishing or journalism
that offer more autonomy than most Japanese occupations. In such careers they
are able to continue their concern for political and social problems. But most
business and government jobs require such conformity that salarymen are almost
apolitical. Most of those who engaged in protest while attending the univer-
sity later become much more conservative. Though they may retain a loyalty
to their former student group, their primary loyalty is to their work group.
This group solidarity isolates one group from another in Japanese society and
produces a stable system. As Chie Nakane says in her book Japanese Society:

> Such a society is fairly stable; it is difficult to create
> revolution or disorder on a national scale, since there is
> segmentation of the lower sectors into various group
> clusters fenced off from each other. Structural difficulties
> stand in the way of a broad scope of joint activity--members
> of a trade union, for example, are too loyal to their own
> company to join forces with their brothers in other company
> unions; student unions. . .develop groups where the solidarity
> of one group differentiates it from another.[12]

The general public is well aware of the limitations placed on protest
by the rigid cultural demands for conformity. There is not the worry that
anything is at stake that will greatly disturb the harmony of the system. The
balance is maintained because the public and the government alike do not view
protest as a threat to the system. As long as the protests were confined to
the campuses and dealt with intra-institutional matters the general public was
mostly unconcerned about them. It is true that in an Asahi Shimbun newspaper
poll the public deplored the use of violence and there was disagreement about
the propriety of students taking over buildings and holding professors hostage,
but there was also a show of sympathy for the students. When students tested
themselves against authority they were often praised for their "sincerity,"
even by the professors they had tormented.

When student protest breaks out of the university and concerns itself with
larger issues the general public often reacts to the Japaneseness of the
demonstrations. The acts of the protestors are put to the test of the old
samurai code. Students are frequently praised as if they were ronin (masterless
samurai) doing battle. Frequently, it appears that the student's central concern
is the battle with the riot police rather than the issue they are protesting.
What seems to be important to the students and the onlookers, is not the call
for the rejection of an American treaty or the closing of an airport, but the
display of discipline and self sacrifice on the part of the students when they

are faced with overwhelming odds. The tolerance for student protests, even when they become unruly, may be partly due to the cultural need to maintain harmony and balance. In 1970, Edwin Seidensticker complained:

> The universities, with a very few exceptions have been
> powerless, the police have been so reticent as to approach
> the negligent, refusing to act when it has not been likely
> that action would improve their image; and the Government
> seems to be of the view that something nearer a complete
> anti-student consensus must precede really firm anti-
> student measures. Japan is a land of palaver, and this
> particular palaver has not yet gone on long enough. . . .
> Japanese Politics are so ordered that the Government
> cannot cut the palaver short without risking its own life.[13]

The answer for why the general public did not become alarmed and indicate to government their desire for anti-student action may lie in the fact that the Japanese feel the students represent them. In the Asahi Shimbun newspaper public opinion survey the majority of the people indicated they felt government and society were the cause of student protest. Students, being free to question things, can act against the government or against corporations without disgrace. Their protest can question those in power without disrupting a system which requires acquiescence and loyalty. Protest might even be seen as a form of ritual behavior society projects onto the student.

In modern Japanese society the old traditions have actually been strengthened by changing them to fit the new demands of a technological society but it has become increasingly difficult for the huge modern institutions of business and government to remain responsive to the small groups within the hierarchy. The whole system depends on this responsiveness. Every Japanese has a stake in maintaining the inter-dependency. Protest is a way to alert those above that this relationship must not be ignored. In this way student protest serves to strengthen the system rather than work against it.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Stephen Lucas, "Coming to Terms with the Rhetoric of Social Movements," Seminar on Social Movements, SCA, 1979.

[2] In contrast to America, which has often been called a "melting pot," Japan has had practically no ethnic groups to assimilate.

[3] Takao Suzuki, Japanese and the Japanese (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1978), pp. 128-147.

[4] Edwin O. Reischauer, The Japanese (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1977). p. 135.

[5] Jack Seward, _The Japanese_ (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1972).

[6] _Ibid._, 71.

[7] Edward Seidensticker, "The Pulverisers," _East and West_ (1970), 84.

[8] _Ibid._, 83.

[9] Chie Nakane, _Japanese Society_ (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), pp. 149-150.

[10] Takie Sugiyama Lebra, _Japanese Patterns of Behavior_ (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1976), pp. 85-86.

[11] Ellis S. Krauss, _Japanese Radicals Revisited_ (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).

[12] Nakane, p. 149

[13] Seidensticker, 87.