DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 199 151 SO 013 209

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TITLE A Balance Sheet for East-West Exchanges. IREX Occasional Papers, Volume 1, Number 1.
INSTITUTION International Research and Exchange Board, New York, N.Y.
SPONS AGENCY Ford Foundation, New York, N.Y.: International Communication Agency, Washington, D.C.: National Endowment for the Humanities (NFAH), Washington, D.C.
PUB DATE 80
NOTE 77p.: Papers presented at the Conference on Scholarly Exchanges with the USSR and Eastern Europe: Two Decades of American Experience (Washington, DC, May 10-13, 1979). For related documents, see SO 013 210-212.

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC04 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Economics: History: *International Educational Exchange: Political Science: *Program Evaluation: *Research Needs: *Research Problems: Sciences: *Social Sciences: Sociology
IDENTIFIERS Europe (East): United States: USSR

ABSTRACT

Four papers discuss research exchanges between the United States and the USSR and East Europe. The first paper considers the evolution of perceptions of social scientists in these countries during the Cold War and Detente. The dominant view of American researchers during the Cold War was that the United States, as the most modern society, was the yardstick for measuring other societies. The United States experienced rapid growth of training and research related to the Soviet orbit. However, soviet scholars were constrained by Marxist-Leninist doctrine and by educational and research policies. In the 1960s, American social scientists gained a greater appreciation for the complexities of modern societies and East European social scientists began innovative studies. The second paper discusses evaluations of research exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union. The conclusion is that these exchanges are scientifically valuable to both countries. The most serious problem is Soviet political repression of its scientific community. The third paper discusses problems and accomplishments of East European studies in the United States. Although progress seems to be steady, American social scientists have come to pursue topics that are politically safe, and thus often of secondary importance. The final paper suggests that in exchanges between the Soviet Union and the United States, both academic and government communities profit. The point that Soviet exchanges are generally in sciences and engineering and American exchanges are in history and literature illustrates that each side sends whom it wishes. Thus, the author concludes that this type of exchange is neither unbalanced nor unfair. (Author/KC)

Working Papers

A Balance Sheet for East-West Exchanges

Conference on Scholarly Exchanges with the USSR and Eastern Europe:

Two Decades of American Experience

May 10-13, 1979

IREX Occasional Papers
International Research & Exchanges Board

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IREX programs are supported by grants from the US International Communication Agency, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Ford Foundation, other private foundations, and corporate donors.

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Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 80-80897

IREX Occasional Papers, Volume 1, Number 1

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PREFACE

This IREX Occasional Paper is one of a series summarizing a conference which was organized to evaluate the results of twenty years of scholarly exchanges with the USSR and Eastern Europe.

The "Conference on Scholarly Exchanges with the USSR and Eastern Europe: Two Decades of American Experience" was held from May 10-13, 1979, in Washington, D.C., at the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University. More than 300 participants assessed what U.S. scholars and specialists have learned from the exchange experience in order to communicate their conclusions to the nation's public affairs community--to colleagues in government, business, journalism, and to other professionals concerned with the analysis of Soviet and East European behavior and the formation and consequences of American policy towards that part of the world.

The present collection includes papers presented (and subsequently revised to reflect the discussion and debate at the conference) under the heading of A Balance Sheet for East-West Exchanges.

The introduction to this IREX Occasional Paper was prepared by Dr. William B. Bader, chief of staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who chaired the panel at which the original papers were presented. The papers were edited and prepared for publication by Dorothy Knapp and Cynthia Merritt, IREX Information Services.

Allen H. Kassof
Executive Director
April 1980

INTRODUCTION

The proper implement for dining with the Devil has always been thought to be a long spoon. Translating that bit of folk wisdom into foreign policy, Americans have also generally accepted the idea that dealing with their enemies was best done at a distance. In particular, towards the Soviets, the prevailing attitude has long been founded in George Kennan's 1946 advice to Charles Bohlen not to get "chummy" with them. Translated into the terms of the SALT II debate of 1979, that point of view inevitably put treaty supporters on the defensive against charges that their position was rooted in some sort of "trust" of Moscow. And he who trusts, it is presumed, is a dupe in the making.

Those perceptions or prejudices define the abiding political context in which U.S.-Soviet scholarly exchanges came into being and, passing now through very hard times, manage to continue. Inevitably, that bias has been a hard one to shake. But in the real world, as the essays which follow demonstrate, it can often be helpful to dine with devils. Experience shows, as the Soviets would say, that the bilateral menu, while heavier on lard than on caviar, generally proves nutritious. Moreover and more obviously, while the Devil is dining with you, he is not dining on you, and you and he may even develop a certain understanding of each other's tastes.

Understanding is, in fact, the goal of the exchanges. Most important from the American point of view is to develop a firsthand knowledge of Soviet ways, means and attitudes in as many spheres as possible. The expertise the U.S. acquires on the Soviet Union, even from a student of Slavonic liturgy, exists at least in potential to help us calculate East-West policies. It is up to us to use that potential. Though we often waste it, we would be truly wasteful to deny ourselves the chance even to acquire it.

Similarly, while we cannot quantify the impact on Soviet thinking of exposure to our peculiarities, we must be confident enough of our strengths to invite inspection of them even if, as some assert, it may be true that many Soviet scholars visiting under the exchanges are primarily scientific vacuum cleaners. We should not expect to convert them. But we should assume that in the gathering of the data they could probably obtain in other ways, they are taking in something more than just our know-how. Conceivably, some of them are also acquiring an education in creative freedom.

No rule prescribes that free inquiry is contagious. The United States, however, does assume that such inquiry is valuable. And when it is less than free, as U.S.-Soviet exchanges naturally are, it still possesses value. Our goal, as these papers make clear, is to enhance that value by pressing constantly for greater freedom. That has been our goal since the exchanges began in 1958. It remains one to pursue, not to abandon.

William B. Bader
Staff Director
Committee on Foreign Relations
U.S. Senate

CHANGING MUTUAL SOCIAL SCIENCE PERCEPTIONS:

The U.S., and the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe

Cyril E. Black

The policies that countries adopt toward each other are a reflection of their mutual perceptions. These perceptions are based both on historical experience and ideology, which inevitably tend to be ethnocentric, and on scholarly study, which tends to counterbalance this ethnocentricity. We are concerned here with the evolution of the mutual perceptions of American and of Soviet and East European social scientists since the Second World War, and its long-term influence on mutual understanding. The principal disciplines within the social sciences that are relevant to this theme are economics, history, political science (including law and international relations), and sociology. Marxism-Leninism, depending on the context, may refer to social science generally or more particularly to social theory. Other social science disciplines, such as anthropology, geography, psychology, and social psychology, for a variety of reasons, did not play a central role in East-West cultural relations.

I. The Era of Confrontation

It now seems clear that the Cold War originated in a failure of the political and intellectual leaders of the US and USSR to overcome the deeply rooted antagonisms which had come to a head during the period of the Soviet-German Pact (1939-1941) and which had been only superficially surmounted during the years of wartime cooperation. This failure was due as much as anything to attitudes and assumptions which were informed by very limited scholarly study.

American Perceptions. The approach of American social scientists to the study of the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe in the first postwar decade was influenced as much by their liberal tradition—liberal in the sense of being rooted in the values of Western Europe and North America—as by the immediate Soviet-American confrontation. This tradition had long been characterized by a form of cultural provincialism: the view that Western institutions and values have universal validity, that all countries should develop along the lines pioneered by the West, and that the main questions to ask about them is how far behind they are and when they will catch up.

Americans have been particularly prone to seeing developments abroad as an extension of the American experience. After the Second World War it was the dominant view of American social scientists that the United States was the most modern society, in many ways exceptional and unique, but still the yardstick for measuring the other societies. An important heritage of the war was the Manichean outlook that pitted democracy

first against fascism and then against communism. Certain similarities between the Soviet and Nazi systems had been of course noted in the 1930's, and now it was not difficult to redirect toward the Soviet Union the attitudes that had arisen in regard to Germany. This ideological bias tended to strengthen the view of the U.S. as a unique society, relatively free from internal dissensions, that had the right and duty to lead and instruct others.[1]

While noting this characteristic American outlook, one is impressed both with the great advances made in the 1940's and the 1950's in the understanding of the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe by comparison with the meager results of the prewar period, and also with the limits placed on this important body of work by its conceptual framework. The scope of the American research effort is reflected in the appraisal undertaken by the Review of Russian Studies sponsored by the Joint Committee on Slavic Studies of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council in 1957-1958,[2] and by a subsequent review of East European studies under the same auspices.[3]

The expansion of training and research on the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe had by the 1960's produced a much larger volume of scholarly work in the United States than in Western Europe or indeed all the rest of the world. In the first postwar decade (1946-1957) over 400 students received M.A. degrees and some 80 completed the requirements for the Ph.D. in Russian studies. Over nine-tenths of this work was in four disciplines: economics, history, language and literature, and political science (including law and international relations). In East European studies, some 130 Ph.D. degrees were granted in the social science disciplines between 1945 and 1965. Three journals established in 1941--the American Slavic and East European Review, the Russian Review, and the Journal of Central European Affairs--provided outlets for scholarly articles and book reviews. In 1950 the Current Digest of the Soviet Press was established by the Joint Committee on Slavic Studies to provide weekly translations of selected materials from Soviet newspapers and journals and an index of Pravda and Izvestia. Accompanying this scholarly activity was a very extensive expansion of library holdings in public and university libraries.

The principal conceptual limitation of this work lay in the predominant influence of the totalitarian model as the frame of reference. Whereas the relatively few treatments of the Soviet Union in the 1930's had to a greater or lesser degree--even by many opponents of the Bolshevik system--explained the excesses of its leaders in terms of their dynamic effort at economic and social transformation, postwar interpretations drew very largely on the more static totalitarian model that had been developed to explain Italian Fascism and German National Socialism. While this model had a number of variants, its main features were set forth in two authoritative statements.

The political system was seen as having six main characteristics: an official ideology concerned with all aspects of human activity; a single party headed by an autocratic leader; an all-encompassing system of police control employing terror; centralized control and manipulation of all means of communication; a monopoly of instruments of force; and a centrally planned and directed economy.[4] As a social system, totalitarianism was described in terms of eight main characteristics: ideology, centralization, planning and control, and police terror were similar to the political model. To these were added: the ability to commit major resources for solving key problems at great human cost; informal adjustment mechanisms that in some degree alleviate the pressures of overcentralization and overcommitment; a long-term rigidity of goals and methods which is corrected by tactical flexibility; and caution regarding major risks in foreign affairs.[5] The overarching model was based on earlier theory, but the political characteristics were based on observing the system as a whole essentially from the outside; whereas the social characteristics were based on information collected from questionnaires and interviews with several thousand Soviet citizens who had left the country as a result of the war.

Generally speaking, most specialized research in political science and sociology elaborated on the themes generated by the totalitarian model. A major study of the political system that sought to fill in the details of the totalitarian model was Merle Fainsod's How Russia Is Ruled (1953). This study was notable not only for its masterful factual detail, but also for its evaluation of Soviet institutions and policies in terms of controls and tensions and its effort to appraise the political cohesiveness of the system. Its emphasis on the types of conflict that could be perceived within Soviet society marked an important advance over preceding interpretations, which had conveyed a sense of monolithic uniformity.

In a field such as history the problems of studying a society at a distance were somewhat less limiting than in political science and sociology, since many primary sources were in print and available in American libraries, which were also well stocked with secondary works in many languages. At the same time, the lack of access to archives precluded the type of research in original sources that is the foundation of historical scholarship. This limitation, combined with an interest in the origins of the Russian Revolution, led to a particular focus on political thought and intellectual history. It would seem that the model of the French Revolution played an important role in this development. Just as the French Enlightenment was seen as the source of the ideas that came to fruition in the years after 1789, so the diverse strands of Russian thought in the nineteenth century were studied as a means of understanding the actions and policies of Lenin and his colleagues.

The positive side of this emphasis, which had a parallel in the study of literature, was the publication of a series of thoughtful studies of individuals and movements ranging from the Slavophiles through the Populists to the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks. The limitation of this trend was that the political and social systems of imperial Russia were

seen principally through the eyes of their critics. The impression was conveyed that the revolution in the form that it occurred was a more or less ineluctable outcome of this intellectual tradition. Such an interpretation tended to ignore the economic and social problems inherent in societal transformation, the extent to which Russia's problems resembled those of other societies in the process of transformation, and the alternative courses that Russia might have followed if the emperor had been less resistant to change or if the First World War had not taken such a toll.[6]

If historians were frustrated by lack of access to archives, economists were held back even more by the lack of statistical data on the size and rates of growth of the constituent elements of the Soviet economy. A major effort was made to construct statistical series on the basis of the limited data available, and a collaborative appraisal of Soviet statistics in 1947 provided a starting point for further study. Attention in these years was devoted less to the overall structure of the economy—and to this extent the totalitarian model did not play a large role in economics—than to its component elements. Studies of agriculture, of major segments of heavy industry, of wages, and of enterprise management, provided the basis for an evaluation of the ways in which Soviet planned economy differed from the market or mixed economies of the West.[7] The first attempt to provide a general account of Soviet economic performance was made at a conference of thirty-one specialists who sought to present their best judgment on the principal factors involved without attempting a comprehensive synthesis.[8]

Two efforts were made toward the end of this period to counterbalance the rather narrow monographic character of social science research and to provide a multi-disciplinary evaluation of long-term trends. A conference in the field of intellectual history produced a symposium that noted both similarities and differences between tsarist autocracy and Soviet totalitarianism, as well as significant continuities in intellectual and institutional development.[9] A second symposium concerned with societal transformation in Russia for the whole century after the emancipation of the serfs sought to distinguish between those trends common to all societies, those that could be accounted for by the particular characteristics of premodern Russia, and those that were attributable to the contingencies of political leadership and doctrines.[10] These collaborative efforts at synthesis sought to bring the study of the Soviet Union back into the framework of general history and comparative development, and to correct the tendency to view it as a society that had been derailed from its normal course.

The study of Eastern Europe developed more slowly than that of Russia and the Soviet Union in the early postwar years, and was less influenced by the totalitarian model. American social scientists had played an important role in planning American policy toward the countries of this region in both world crises—under the leadership of Archibald Cary Coolidge at the peace conferences in Paris in 1919-1920, and under that of Philip E. Mosely in the Department of State in 1943-1945—and they had a strong commitment to the view that the national self-deter-

mination and continued development as independent states of the countries of this region were the best guarantee of the welfare of their peoples and of the political stability of Europe. The prevailing academic opinion recognized Soviet security requirements, but believed that the extent and nature of Soviet domination in the postwar years was counterproductive for all concerned. Not only was the region itself under Soviet domination, but there was concern that even American research on these countries might become submerged in the burgeoning field of Soviet studies and hence neglected.[11]

There was indeed some danger of this, and while a number of important general surveys of the history and contemporary political and economic development of the East European countries were published in the years before 1960, there was little detailed analysis of their evolving institutional structures. Most social science research was concerned with rather limited topics of specialized local interest which did not contribute directly to social science perceptions. Research in the fields of political science, law, and international relations was particularly neglected. The restricted independence of these countries discouraged study of their institutions, and the new political structures that went under the name of "people's democracy" did not seem to be sufficiently distinctive to be deserving of scholarly attention. Several more general works of synthesis, however, served to meet the needs of a broader audience.[12]

There was more activity in the study of economic developments in Eastern Europe, and in the period 1945-1965 no less than 583 scholarly articles were published in this field. In addition to studies of national development, particular attention was devoted to long-term economic growth, problems of planning and management, the relation of agrarian reform to industrialization, questions of manpower.[13] Difficulties of access greatly limited work in sociology, but significant work was done in the field of demography.[14]

Soviet and East European Perceptions. The rapid growth in the United States of training and research relating to the Soviet orbit in the early postwar years was in no way matched by a comparable effort in the Soviet Union or the countries of Eastern Europe. Soviet scholars in this period were constrained both by Marxist-Leninist doctrine and by educational and research policies that in effect inhibited systematic study of American society.

Stalin and Zhdanov and other Soviet leaders had as early as 1946 established the orthodox view that "socialism" and "capitalism"--or, in the prevailing propaganda rhetoric, Soviet "democracy" and American "imperialism"--were locked in a combat that would ultimately be fatal for the latter, and this view changed only slowly after Stalin's death. Even after Khrushchev's assertion in 1956 that "socialism" would eventually prevail in the West without international war, there was only

a moderate relaxation in the atmosphere of antagonism and conflict. If the widely translated official manual on Marxism-Leninism, edited by a member of the Politburo, may be taken as official doctrine, "state-monopoly capitalism" was seen as prevailing in the U.S. and Western Europe and had "entered the period of its final downfall."[15] The Soviet Union was depicted as being on the point of surpassing its Western rivals, and it was flatly asserted that "in 1980 the national income per capita will exceed the U.S. future national income per capita by at least 50 percent."[16]

"State-monopoly capitalism" was the central concept in the Marxist-Leninist perception of the United States at this stage. In terms of this concept the American political system was perceived as entirely controlled by monopoly capital--usually identified as Wall Street, or the National Association of Manufacturers--which was assumed to be united in promoting the aggressive interests of capitalism. The government was considered to be simply an agent of business, pursuing policies based directly on instructions from the capitalists. Elections were regarded as a fraud, and public opinion without influence. Indeed, this conception of a straightforward class dictatorship made the Soviet view in many ways a mirror-image of "totalitarianism." In the course of time a somewhat more sophisticated view developed. The government was seen as coalescing with monopoly capital rather than simply obeying its orders, and divisions among rival groups of capitalists were noted, but this outlook retained most of its doctrinaire simplicity.[17]

This ideological framework did not provide much incentive for studying American society apart from recording the pathology of its rapid decline and preparing the obituary. There does not appear to have been any formal graduate study of the United States in these years, and teaching about American society was limited to the various state institutions that prepared students for service in diplomacy, foreign trade, and journalism.

Within the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, a limited amount of research was devoted to the United States. In history, a few general works were written on the periods of the revolution and the civil war, and a two-volume history of the United States was published in 1960.[18]

The only center devoted exclusively to the study of "capitalist" countries was the Academy's Institute of World Economics and World Politics, which published a journal of the same name. While the members of this institute were among the best-informed specialists on the West, the relatively few studies published by them were devoted to questions relating to the role of monopoly capitalism and fell strictly within the prevailing ideological parameters.[19]

An important exception was a study published in 1946 by E.S. Varga, the director of the institute, on Changes in the Economy of Capitalism as a Result of the Second World War. His interpretation ran counter

to prevailing orthodoxy in that it was more optimistic about the continued postwar prosperity of the United States and the West European countries, and did not anticipate an imminent crisis of capitalism. It was a relatively matter-of-fact account which turned out to be essentially correct in the light of subsequent events. It soon became the subject of a series of debates and recriminations which led in 1947 to the abolition of the institute and to Varga's demotion. Not until Varga finally recanted in 1949 was the institute reestablished as the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, and he resumed work as one of its members.[20]

The Varga controversy is of interest primarily as an indication of the extent to which ideological orthodoxy was imposed on scholarship in this period, especially when it was concerned with the non-socialist countries. The few works devoted to the United States and to the West generally in political thought and sociology were diatribes against "bourgeois falsifications" of the relevant subject rather than scholarly studies.

In the countries of Eastern Europe, social science research on the United States was even more restricted than in the Soviet Union. Most intellectual energies were absorbed in the problems of adjusting to the new conditions created by the Soviet-sponsored Communist parties, and there was no incentive to get involved in ideological controversies over questions relating to American society. In countries like Poland and Czechoslovakia, which in earlier years had had wide contacts with the United States, there was nevertheless a continuing interest in American affairs.[21]

II. The Era of Détente

In the years between the Geneva summit meeting in 1955 and the more general relaxation of tensions in the 1970's, leaders both in the United States and in the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe came to believe that their national interests were not being served by policies of studied antagonism. At the same time social scientists began to take a somewhat less parochial and more pragmatic view of their disciplines, and gained a greater appreciation of the complexities of modern societies and of the common structural features underlying the institutional differences.

East European and Soviet Perceptions. In the period of confrontation one looked to Moscow for the policies and initiatives which were equally binding on the countries of Eastern Europe, but starting in the 1960's it was the latter who were the innovators in the social sciences and the Soviet Union tended to follow their lead. Whether because the countries of Eastern Europe were closer in their intellectual traditions to the rapidly evolving West European countries, or because the cautious Soviet leaders used them as testing grounds for experimental innovations, it is with Eastern Europe that one must start in tracing the intellectual trends of the 1960's and 1970's.

In no field was this more the case than in the social sciences, where a thoroughgoing effort was made in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany to introduce the contemporary Western theory and practice of economics, sociology, and management and administration into the realm of research and policy which for some two decades had been dominated by a dogmatic Marxism-Leninism. The underlying motivation of this new ideological trend was a desire to reconcile the Marxist-Leninist doctrinal heritage with the realities of the postwar world. These realities included not only developments in economics and sociology but more fundamentally the advances in science and technology—most obviously nuclear power, computers, and automation—which were transforming the advanced industrial societies. This rapid advancement of knowledge was now recognized as underlying modern social transformation, and the new outlook soon came to be known as "the scientific-technological revolution"—nauchno-tekhnicheskaia revoliutsiia in Russian, or NTR for short.[22]

This recognition of the fundamental importance of knowledge ran counter to the accepted Marxist-Leninist teaching that science and technology, including the social sciences, were part of the superstructure of society which was in the final analysis determined by the economic structure which formed its base.[23] This relationship was now reversed, and in effect—one must say "in effect" because the change does not seem to have been fully confronted—science (which in Slavic languages means knowledge generally, not just the natural sciences) and technology (or perhaps more narrowly technique) are acknowledged as in the final analysis the base which determines the superstructure of political, economic, and social development. The closest that commentators seem to have come to an authoritative justification of this fundamental change is a statement by Marx himself, more an aside than a formal assertion, that as societies develop, production will change "from a simple labor process to a scientific process."[24]

As developed by writers in Eastern Europe, the advances in science and technology were seen as representing a revolutionary change in the possibilities for transforming the human condition. These advances lead to radical changes in the processes of production, require a large number of highly trained technicians, and will permit a reduction in the differences between mental and manual labor and between urban and rural life. Their effects also include a great increase in the availability of data for use by the social sciences in the solution of complex problems.

One of the early indications of Soviet receptivity to the new trend was the appearance in 1969 of a Russian translation of Jan Szczepański's Elementary Principles of Sociology, originally published in Warsaw in 1965. This was in effect a primer of contemporary sociology, predominantly American and West European, and drew extensively on Polish work since the 1950's. It contained few references to Marx and none to Lenin. Of more general relevance was Civilization at the

Crossroads: Social and Human Implications of the Scientific and Technological Revolution, published in Prague in 1966 (with an English edition in 1969), by Radovan Richta and his colleagues at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. This volume cites primarily Western work dating from the 1940's, and places no particular emphasis on Marxism-Leninism. It played, incidentally, an important role in the Czechoslovak events of 1968. Although the Prague reform movement was suppressed by the Soviet Union for reasons of national security, the Soviet and Czechoslovak academies of science collaborated five years later in publishing Man-Science-Technology: A Marxist Analysis of the Scientific-Technological Revolution (1973), a revised and extended version of Civilization at the Crossroads, which placed more emphasis on relating the new trends to the Marxist-Leninist tradition. In the course of the 1970's a wide range of studies relating to the NTR were published in all the countries of Eastern Europe.

An important role in the Soviet receptivity to these East European interpretations of contemporary social science was played by A.M. Rumiantsev. As editor of Kommunist (1955-1958), of Problems of Peace and Socialism (1958-1964), and as vice-president of the USSR Academy of Sciences (1967-1971), he was one of the principal authority figures under whose protection modern social science was revived in the Soviet Union. Rumiantsev wrote the introduction to the Soviet edition of Szczepański's Elementary Principles of Sociology, and was primarily responsible for the Soviet-Czechoslovak cooperative effort that produced Man-Science-Technology. In due course, many leading social scientists and publicists became associated with this trend.

In the meantime, Soviet theorists had since the 1950's been devoting increasing attention to the economic and social significance of the new developments in nuclear power, automation, and computers, and a brief reference to this subject appeared in the Communist Party Program of 1961. Throughout the 1960's the advocates of the NTR appeared to be in a minority among policy-makers, however, and in March 1970 Andrei D. Sakharov, Roy A. Medvedev, and V.F. Turchin wrote a letter to the Party leaders stressing the significance of this second industrial revolution and warning that the Soviet Union was steadily falling behind the United States in the application of science and technology.[25] The NTR finally became a dominant official theme when Brezhnev in his report to the 24th Congress of the CPSU in 1971 stated that "the task we face, comrades, is one of historical importance: organically to fuse the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution with the advantages of the socialist economic system, to unfold our own, intrinsically socialist, forms of fusing science and production."[26]

In the course of the 1970's a wide range of views has been expressed in Soviet publications regarding the NTR, and there are few areas of activity that have not been challenged to demonstrate that they are achieving the efficiency and productivity made possible by modern techniques. This literature includes much abstract theorizing that does not seem to represent a very efficient or productive use of newsprint. The discussion of the NTR is also limited to the period since the mid-20th century. In this sense it represents a Soviet version of what in the West is variously called high modernization, advanced industrial society, or "post-industrial" society. This is a convenient accommodation, since it avoids the controversies that would be involved in reinterpreting the earlier periods of Russian and Soviet history.[27]

A characteristic feature of this new trend is the greatly expanded interest in the advanced industrial societies and particularly in the United States. The specialists on American affairs in the Institute of World Economics and International Relations were transferred in 1967 to the newly formed Institute of the USA, under the leadership of Georgy Arbatov, who also heads the Scientific Council on the Economic, Political, and Ideological Problems of the United States, which since 1973 has coordinated research on the U.S.. Arbatov's close association with the Central Committee over the years has provided American studies both with the authority called for by the development of a sensitive field in the Soviet environment and also appropriate ideological guidance. The institute's research staff has grown to close to a hundred specialists drawn from many walks of Soviet life, and in influence and concentration of effort far outweighs any comparable research organization on Soviet affairs in the United States. The monthly journal USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology (1970 ff.) published by the new institute prints criticisms of many aspects of American life, usually in the form of reviews of some of the numerous self-critical books published in the U.S., but it also includes large numbers of objective descriptive articles. With a circulation of 38,000 in 1979, it is widely read by the Soviet elite. The institute also publishes numerous well-researched books on American theory and practice in many areas.[28]

American management and public administration is one of the subjects that has attracted most interest, both in the Soviet Union and in the countries of Eastern Europe. Despite the existence of massive central and enterprise bureaucracies in these countries, little systematic attention was devoted before the 1960's to the theory and practice of management. Many specialists were now sent to American business schools for training and research, and in due course institutions with curricula adapted from American models were established in these countries. A particular problem has been the inefficiency of the highly centralized planning systems, and the separation of research and development organizations from the enterprises concerned with pro-

duction. American business practice has become an important model in the search for more efficient organizational forms.[29] Similarly in the construction of computers and the adaptation of software to the needs of the users, American technology has been transferred wholesale.[30]

In social science research, the 1960's also saw the rapid diffusion first in Eastern Europe and then in the Soviet Union of a general acceptance of Western methods in economics and sociology and the allocation of extensive resources to original and relatively non-ideological research in these fields. Sociology in particular emerged from its position as a subdivision of Marxism-Leninism in the discipline of philosophy to become a large and self-sustaining enterprise. Sociological research has been mobilized by the government in its desire to obtain a more accurate knowledge of social conditions in the cities and the countryside free from ideological preconceptions, and this branch of scholarship has grown very rapidly.[31] Similarly, a discipline of political science emerged from the older category of "state and law," and sought to provide a behavioral dimension to a branch of scholarship that had been hitherto limited to the Central European tradition of jurisprudence.

It is important to recognize that the widespread diffusion of Western and especially American methods of social science research and their various applications in business and government represented not a desire to reproduce American society on Soviet or East European soil, but a search for answers in the American experience to the problems faced by these countries as they begin to confront the complexities of advanced modernization. Marxist-Leninist theory still maintained that in the long run "socialist" societies would be better able than "capitalist" to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the revolution in science and technology, but advocates of the NTR pointed out that this theoretical advantage could not be taken for granted and had to be demonstrated in the realm of practice. The statement of Richta and his colleagues that "socialism and communism stand or fall" on the basis of their ability to harness science and technology, raise productivity, and plan effectively for human betterment, was characteristic of this attitude.[32]

This trend in East European and Soviet thought that stresses the fundamental significance of the scientific and technological revolution has been dominant in the 1970's, and its support and encouragement from the central organs of party and government is well documented. At the same time, an important minority view which also has support at the highest party levels has warned against the dangers of indiscriminate borrowing from the West. This view was reinforced by the threat of the reforms proposed in the Prague Spring of 1968, and in the early 1970's led to some retrenchment of pro-Western attitudes.

The main concern of those who warn against Western influence and continue the dogmatic tradition of seeing Soviet-Western relations in primarily confrontational terms, is that the central controls which the Communist Party exercises over Soviet society will be weakened.[33] The targets of this criticism are not only the more extreme proposals of the Czechoslovak reformers to have party-approved candidates compete in parliamentary elections, but also proposals to loosen party controls over planning, administration, research, and production. Since most proposals in the NTR vein have to do with promoting greater administrative flexibility and managerial initiative, they have to run a long gauntlet of bureaucratic opposition and often emerge in a mangled form. This faction is also wary of efforts of theorists to unearth the writings of the young Marx, or indeed of any Marx other than the one enshrined in orthodox Marxism-Leninism. Such efforts, which are usually seen as initiated by East European writers under the influence of West European Communists or non-party Marxists, are labeled "right-wing revisionism."[34]

While both the majority and the minority tendencies in the contemporary Soviet leadership accept the need for Soviet society to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the NTR, they approach these opportunities in a spirit ranging from enthusiasm to caution. Many public statements bear the marks of compromise, and the resultant policies are by no means consistent. One form of compromise, widely adopted in the USSR as elsewhere, is for publications intended for mass consumption to stress relatively orthodox views, while discussions at a more pragmatic and sophisticated level receive more restricted circulation.

At the specialized level, for example, the interpretation of the concept of "state-monopoly capitalism" evolved to the point where it was not far off the mark as a description of the American political system. In contrast to earlier views, Soviet theorists now recognized that the government was a relatively independent political force which mediated between the various competing interest groups and had the capacity to impose its will on the "monopolies." The leading personnel of the government were described as professional civil servants rather than as agents of the monopolies, and it was recognized that the objective requirements of national interest were dominant in the determination of policy. Public opinion and more specifically elections were seen as influential in effecting changes in policy.[35]

Descriptions which placed this sophisticated view of "state-monopoly capitalism" in the context of doctrinaire Marxist-Leninist ideology gave particular emphasis to "the crisis of capitalism": the basic contradiction between the high level of production and the limited purchasing power of the exploited masses. This contradiction is seen as accentuated by the lack of centralized planning, despite efforts to postpone the crisis by promoting militarism and neocolonialism. In the long run, however, the crisis is described in terms of growing class

conflict. It is anticipated that the proletariat and the lower and middle strata of the bourgeoisie will form a coalition against the monopolies, and will join forces with the communist countries and the world revolutionary movement to defeat capitalism and reconstruct their society along socialist lines.[36]

American Perceptions. Thanks to the much greater access to sources made possible by the exchanges and to developments within the social sciences themselves, the main trend in the evolution of social science interpretations since 1960 has been a reduction in the concern with contrasts in ideologies and institutional forms and an increased effort to appreciate the common functions and processes performed by the differing structures. Yet it would be going too far to say that the latter approach has replaced the former in the course of two decades, for both views have evolved and have benefited from their interaction.

At a general level of interpretation, the view continuing from the 1950's that sees the Soviet Union in essentially confrontational terms is inclined to look on the period of Khrushchev's leadership as one that saw some relaxation of central controls and the years since 1964 as a reversion to earlier practices. This interpretation focuses on the efforts at de-Stalinization in the 1950's, the emphasis on housing and consumer goods, and the more liberal attitude toward experimental literature. This is contrasted to the later period marked by stronger central controls, more emphasis on law and order and on heavy industry, and a greater concern for national security. In this view the totalitarian model remains valid with only minor qualifications. The main division it sees in Soviet society is between the monolithic party and the dissidents, and it is inclined to regard the latter as the hope for the future. This outlook appears to be based on the assumption that Western pluralism is the only legitimate form for a modern government, and that any other system is anomalous and temporary.

The more moderate and pragmatic view is impressed with the growing diversity of points of view within Soviet society. The dissidents are seen as possibly reflecting in an extreme form some of the trends within the system, but as essentially outside of it and not affecting it significantly. This view notes the increasingly critical attitude toward orthodoxy starting in the late 1950's, and a much more realistic awareness of the relative position of Soviet society in the world and the problems it faces as it approaches the complexities of advanced modernization. Particularly impressive is the much freer discussion of economic and social issues, and extensive experimentation with new institutional forms.

In political science in particular, the main trend has been away from a primary emphasis on the totalitarian model and toward a concern with the policy processes and the many evidences of conflict and competition both within the government and the society generally and within the party.[37] Probably the most fundamental element of change in American

appraisals of Soviet politics is the view of the Communist Party not primarily as an instrument for transmitting orders from the top but rather as a means of communication both from the center to the peripheries and from the peripheries to the center. Soviet society is seen increasingly as comprising a plurality of institutions with varied strengths and interests, all seeking to play their role in the mobilization and allocation of skills and resources. The fact that this process takes place within a single party structure, and not by means of a multi-party system based on competitive elections as in the West, is now weighed against the similarities between the two systems as reflected in the structure of interest groups and the ways they influence policy. The debate in the United States between those who stress the differences in party structure and those who note similarities in the policy process raises the question whether one can think of "political participation" as a process no less significant in the communist countries than in those with multi-party systems.

More particularly, the question at issue is whether—given the fact that in complex societies the articulation and aggregation of conflicting interest groups is the central task of politics—a single party is that much less effective and equitable than several parties. Or to approach the matter from a different angle, the question is asked whether differences of opinion among groups of leaders within communist parties are not as great—or often much greater, as in China, for example—as those between major parties in pluralistic societies. However one comes out on these issues, among political scientists the chasm that used to divide single-party from multi-party systems no longer gapes, and functions have superseded forms as a focus of research interest.

While most social scientists would argue that the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe are still administered by oligarchical bureaucracies, they see them as evolving since the 1950's toward greater institutional pluralism. Study of the countries of Eastern Europe has generally followed a course parallel to the study of the USSR. Here again, there is a debate as to whether these countries should be seen primarily as colonies or provinces within a Soviet system, or as independent states with diverse interests and capabilities. The general trend has been for political scientists to be more impressed by the growing pluralism within and among these countries, as expressed by interest-group politics, and by a diversity of policies toward economic development, and ideology, and even foreign policy.[38] Many see these countries less as subject to Soviet domination, although the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was a clear indication of the limits to diversity, than as forerunners of change in the USSR. There is considerable evidence that diffusion of new thinking about economic and social reform, and even ideology, moves as much from the Eastern European countries to the Soviet Union as from center to periphery.

History is one of the social science disciplines that has benefited most from the American-Soviet academic exchanges, for the availability of archives has led to a reorientation of historical research from intellectual to political and institutional concerns. The questions now asked by historians have less to do with the clash of ideologies in Russia and the Soviet Union than with the evolution of policies toward the problems of political, economic, and social development that all societies face. This approach has tended to stress the continuities in Russian history and, only partly in jest, Peter I, Witte, and Stalin are sometimes referred to as the "holy trinity" of modernizing statesmen who at critical points in Russian history exerted extraordinary personal leadership in transforming Russian society.

The particular concerns of this approach are the implementation of specific reforms, the evolution of social classes and political institutions, and the reactions of leaders and interest groups to the multiple challenges represented by developments in the West. In this view the revolutions of 1905 and 1917 were less a conflict of ideologies than breakdowns brought about by the inability of the autocracy to adapt to changing conditions, and by the extraordinary pressures of war. The victory of the Bolsheviks over many other rivals is seen less as an outcome of Russian intellectual history, or as a bourgeoisie ineluctably ceding place to proletariat, than as a personal achievement of Lenin as a particularly astute leader manipulating social forces in a virtual vacuum of power. The emerging Soviet society is thus seen neither as a model for the rest of the world, nor as a return to Muscovite patrimonialism, but rather as one of many societies—no doubt among the largest and most influential—seeking to resolve, in terms of its own idiosyncratic heritage of institutions and values, the problems of societal transformation common to all.[39]

Similarly in historical work in the 1960's and 1970's on the countries of Eastern Europe, there has been much greater emphasis on the diversity of their different institutional heritages as well as on the common problems faced both before and since their interwar period of relative independence from neighboring great powers. As in the study of Russia and the Soviet Union, a much greater effort is made to see these countries in terms of their distinctive policies and problems rather than as reflections of an overarching political system—whether dynastic, democratic, or Soviet.[40]

Sociology and economics are the disciplines best equipped in terms of analytical concepts to see developments in the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe as particular examples of general trends, although these disciplines were among the least active in the study of these countries. In the 1970's there were probably no more than ten or fifteen sociologists and perhaps twice as many economists actively engaged in research on these countries as compared to a couple of hundred or more each in history and political science. Although scholars of neither discipline have been able to do much field work because of continued restrictions, they have had since the 1960's much greater access to data as well as extensive personal contacts with professional colleagues.

The problems that sociologists have been concerned with include the course of the demographic transition; the effect on social mobility of education, the course of industrialization, and income distribution; patterns of settlement; and the transformation of personal relations as families move from a rural to an urban environment. The interests of economists have included the changing role of agriculture, manufacturing and services in the national product; the share of the labor force in these three sectors; the allocation of national product to capital formation, consumption, and government; policies and instrumentalities designed to promote growth; and of course rates of growth in the different sectors of the economy.[41]

If one may venture to generalize about the findings of the considerable range of social and economic studies that have been made, it would probably be fair to say that policies of the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe are seen as differing from those in the West by concentrating their efforts in certain spheres at the expense of others. Areas of relatively high achievement include rates of growth of national product generally and especially of industrial production; proportion of the national product devoted to investment; rate of movement of the labor force from agriculture to industry; investment in public health, in higher education, and in scientific research and technology; and possibly also equality of income distribution (although on this point the evidence is unclear).

Areas of relatively low achievement include production of consumer goods and per capita consumption; productivity in agriculture; availability of secondary education (compensated for to a considerable degree by continuing education); managerial and productive efficiency generally; and provision for the legal enforcement of human rights.

This pattern is seen as strongly affected by the level of development--a belt-tightening operation, to a considerable extent successful, designed to close the gap separating East from West--but also affected by Marxist-Leninist ideology and by the behavior common to highly centralized bureaucratic oligarchies. The examples of Japan, Brazil, and Italy, among others, show that development gaps can be narrowed without the degree of political, economic, and social belt-tightening employed in countries under communist governments.[42]

One of the criticisms of area studies has been that while research has deepened our understanding of the countries of this region, it has not in turn contributed to the development of the social science disciplines. We may know more about urbanization or economic productivity in the Soviet Union, but has this knowledge been plowed back into the disciplines to enhance our understanding of urbanization or economic productivity as universal phenomena? The problem here lies less with area studies than with the social science disciplines. Their theoretical models, especially in political science, are more

suspicion. Historians, more often than not, are trained to get to the bottom of things through the evaluation of primary sources, and such skills are not readily transferred to intercultural comparisons. Historical studies in individual foreign areas may flourish, but on the whole they remain isolated from those in other areas and also from other disciplines.

Economics has been more hospitable to general and comparative studies, especially in the first couple of decades after 1945, but the reorientation of the discipline toward econometrics has in recent years tended to reduce the standing within the discipline of scholars studying foreign areas where the newer methods are not applicable. Economists specializing in countries where access to data is difficult are likely to become isolated professionally.

At the other end of the scale, linguistics and anthropology, and to a lesser degree sociology and psychology, are to a much greater extent concerned with the relation of the particular to the general. The study of universals in human societies is more a part of professional training, and individual studies at the Ph.D. level are more likely to be conducted in terms of themes and concepts that apply to all societies.

In this respect political science is at something of a crossroads. Its main tradition has been focused on American and Western political systems, and the comparison of other political systems with these. At the same time, the so-called "behavioral revolution" and also the influence of foreign area studies have led to a much greater concern for general concepts. The question of which concepts are in fact applicable to the political systems of all societies, however, is still being debated. In the rhetoric of the Cold War, it was common in the United States to contrast the democracy and civil liberties of the West with the totalitarianism of the Communist states. By stressing the particular type of political representation characteristic of Western societies, one could thus strengthen loyalty to one's own institutions and anathematize those of Communist states, while at the same time associating the latter with the fascist enemies of the Second World War. There has been of course a very close mirror-image of this rhetoric in the Soviet Union, preceding and to some extent inciting the American outlook, where "socialism" is contrasted to "capitalism" with unrelieved rigidity.

Concepts that are handy for cold war rhetoric are not very useful, however, for the study of societies in the process of transformation from a rural-agrarian to an urban-industrial way of life. Rather than using as analytical concepts the particular forms of representative government developed in the West, political scientists are turning increasingly to such concepts as political participation, interest groups, and bureaucratic politics, which can be applied to a greater or lesser degree to all societies. African tribes and Communist countries no less than France and the United States have interest groups competing for their share of resources.

While the conceptual limitations of the social sciences in the United States remain significant, and have been overcome to only a limited extent in the course of research on the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, the social sciences in the latter countries remain under greater constraints. To an even greater extent than in the United States, the answers to some of the most important questions—what are the universal attributes of societies in the process of transformation, and how do these interact with the institutional heritage of each society?—have been given in advance and are in principle not subject to discussion. It is true that these answers are set forth in such abstract terms that there is considerable leeway for interpretation, but the fact remains that some thirty-five years after the Second World War it is still not possible for social scientists from West and East to engage in scholarly discourse on the basis of common conceptual and theoretical assumptions.

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NOTES

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13. Nicholas Spulber, "Economics," Jelavich, op. cit., 163-182.

14. Irwin T. Sanders, "Sociology," Jelavich, op. cit., 225-248; and Paul Demeny, "Demography," Jelavich, op. cit., 183-198. See also the wide range of perceptions in Peter G. Filene, ed., American Views of Soviet Russia, 1917-1965 (1968); and Eugene Anschel, ed., American Appraisals of Soviet Russia, 1917-1977 (1978).

15. Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, ed. by O.V. Kuusinen (2nd rev. ed., 1963), 295, and more generally, 264-295.

16. Ibid., 694.

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18. B.G. Veber, I.S. Kremer, and A.S. Protopopov, "General History," Social Sciences in the USSR (1965), 49. This is a survey prepared by the USSR Academy of Sciences at the request of UNESCO, and published under the auspices of the International Social Science Council. Studies of changing Soviet views of two facets of the American scene are available in John M. Thompson, "Allied and American Intervention in Russia, 1918-1921," Rewriting Russian History, ed. by Cyril E. Black (2nd ed., 1962), 319-380; and Jeanne B. Howard, "Changing Opinions in the Soviet Union about American Educational Thinkers, 1920-1970" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1975).

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21. See, for example, the bibliography in Ameryka polnocna, ed. by M.M. Drozdowski (1975), 395-452, called to my attention by Orest Pelech, Princeton University Library.

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25. Andrei D. Sakharov, Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom (1970), 160-186.

26. 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, March 30-April 9, 1971 (1971), 69, emphasis in original.

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28. Morton Schwartz, Soviet Perceptions of the United States (1978) is concerned primarily with the work of the Institute of the USA and Canada; while Stephen P. Gilbert, Soviet Images of America (1977) draws on a wider range of Soviet views in regard to American foreign policy and military power. See also M.N. Bolkhovitinov, "The Present State of American Studies in the Soviet Union," American Studies Abroad, ed. by R.H. Walker (1975), 101-109.

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The US-USSR Textbook Study Project has been reviewing mutual perceptions as reflected in secondary-school textbooks, and is scheduled to publish a report in 1980.

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40. The important 11-volume series edited by Peter F. Sugar and Donald W. Treadgold on A History of East Central Europe (1974 ff.) provides the best guide to the subject and its historiography.

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42. See especially Allen Kassof, ed., Prospects for Soviet Society (1967); and also the very informative mimeographed newsletter on Sociology and Eastern Europe (1968-1974).

43. These issues are discussed in Roger E. Kanet, ed., The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies (1971); Alfred G. Meyer, "Comparative Politics and its Discontent: The Study of the USSR and Eastern Europe," Political Science and Area Studies, ed. by L.W. Pye (1975), 98-130; and Valerie Bunce and John M. Echols, III, "From Soviet Studies to Comparative Politics: The Unfinished Revolution," Soviet Studies, XXXI (January 1979), 43-55.

44. Major comparative studies include Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR (1964); Paul Hollander, Soviet and American Society: A Comparison (1973); Donald W. Treadgold, ed., Soviet and Chinese Communism: Similarities and Differences (1969); Cyril E. Black, Marius B. Jansen, Herbert S. Levine, Marion J. Levy, Jr., Henry Rosovsky, Gilbert Rozman, Henry D. Smith, II, and S. Frederick Starr, The Modernization of Japan and Russia: A Comparative Study (1975); and the seven volumes (1970-1977) written under the auspices of the ACLS Planning Group on Comparative Communist Studies, chaired by Robert C. Tucker, whose "On the Comparative Study of Communism," World Politics, XIX (January 1967), 242-257, formulates some of the problems in this field.

45. The papers of the US-USSR Textbook Study Project, referred to in footnote 36 above.

A BALANCE SHEET IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Loren R. Graham

One of the most frequent criticisms made of scientific exchanges between the Soviet Union and the United States is that the United States is being ripped off. A number of writers have charged that while the United States sends specialists in the humanities and the social sciences to the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union sends scientists and engineers to the United States. It is often further stated that the benefits in science and technology are so much greater for the Soviet Union than for the United States that the exchanges are grossly inequitable. An example of such an opinion is that voiced by Jack Anderson in a December 10, 1978, article entitled, "A Lopsided Scientific Exchange." Anderson charged that "we are being hornswoggled in a number of cultural and scientific exchange agreements."[1]

Is it really true that we are being ripped off in science and technology by the exchanges? For people who are already convinced that we are, it may be difficult to encourage a closer look. But a more careful examination would reveal some interesting and even surprising evidence. Jack Anderson based his article on a Congressional Research Service study that did not cite either one of the most careful studies by American scientists and engineers of the value of the exchange programs.[2] In this paper I will give primary attention to the evaluations of the exchanges by American scientists knowledgeable about Soviet research.

First, let us look at the quantitative aspects of the exchanges and then at the qualitative side. How correct is it to say that while social scientists and humanists predominate among American exchangees, scientists and engineers predominate among Soviet exchangees? If one looks only at the IREX exchange, such a conclusion seems justified. For this reason many American specialists in Soviet studies, familiar primarily with IREX, believe that the asymmetry of fields referred to here is correct. In the 1977-1978 exchange year, for example, among the 45 American participants on the US-USSR exchange of graduate students and young faculty, only four could be described as natural scientists or engineers, while of the 45 Soviet participants on the same exchange 40 could be so described.[3]

If one wishes to get a meaningful answer to the question of asymmetry in disciplines, however, one should look at the total figures for exchanges between the two countries, not just at IREX. The IREX exchange is, after all, the main channel to the Soviet Union for American specialists in Soviet studies. The benefits from that interaction are legion, and have been well described in other papers at this conference.

I will not expand on that theme, but stick to my assigned subject of science and technology in the exchanges.

The total number of Americans sent to the Soviet Union in 1977 by the bilateral agreements, all of which are in technical areas, and the National Academy of Sciences, whose exchange is overwhelmingly in the natural sciences and engineering, was in excess of 850.[4] If we compare this figure with the 71 Americans that IREX sent to the Soviet Union in 1977-1978, we see that it is simply not true to say that most American exchangees are in the humanities and social sciences.

The figures I have given so far are based on numbers of individuals who went to the Soviet Union, not on the amount of time each spent there. Since historians working in archives usually want more time in the USSR than physicists studying relativistic cosmology, the balance sheet moves back toward the social sciences and humanities when we base our analysis on man-months. Even from this standpoint, however, it is not correct to say that social scientists and humanists predominate among American exchangees. In 1977 the technical exchanges under the bilateral agreements and the National Academy of Sciences produced a total number of man-months spent by Americans in the Soviet Union in excess of 530; this figure is based on long-term visits and does not include 732 additional visits of less than 60 days.[5] The IREX exchanges had a total of about 500 man-months in the 1977-1978 academic year involving the 71 individuals mentioned earlier.[6]

Classifying researchers by field is difficult in some instances, and therefore the statistics I have given are susceptible to different forms of fine-tuning by different people. The references given in the notes to this paper will provide the necessary information for those people who would like to refine the statistics.[7] Even after the refinements have been made, however, my main point will still stand: at the present time most Americans who go to the Soviet Union on exchanges and cooperative programs are interested in technical problems, not Pushkin's poetry or the social consequences of Ivan the Terrible's reign.

As a summary, then, of the problem of distribution by fields, it seems to me that the most accurate way of describing the exchanges between the two countries is as follows: on both the American side and the Soviet side the predominant interests among exchangees during the last five or six years have been technological and scientific problems; almost all Soviet exchangees are involved in these fields, and a majority of American exchangees have similar interests.

Now let us go from the quantitative side of the question to the qualitative side. Is it accurate to say that the United States is so far ahead of the Soviet Union in science and technology that the benefits in this area are grossly unequal? If we want a meaningful answer to this question we should make a systematic inquiry among American scientists, asking them what their opinion is of Soviet research in their

fields and whether they have gained from contact with Soviet colleagues. In order to guard against bias, it would be important to question both participants in the exchanges between the two countries and also scientists who have never been a part of the exchanges but nonetheless are familiar with Soviet work in their fields; after all, it is possible that past participants would defend their activity in the exchanges just because they do not wish to admit that they wasted their time. Such inquiries were recently made by the National Academy of Sciences. It sent out computer-based questionnaires to all participants in the academy exchange since its initiation, and to all American hosts of Soviet scientists during the last five years. In addition, it questioned a group of distinguished American scientists--a number at the Nobel Prize level--about the value of Soviet scientific research; most of the latter had never participated in the exchanges.

Here are some of the results from the questionnaires. Seventy-five percent of the American scientists rated their experiences in the USSR as either outstanding or very good. Sixty percent of the participants agreed that the United States gains a lot scientifically by exchanges with the Soviet Union. Seventy-four percent of the participants stated that in their opinions they were able to gain access to the best facilities which the USSR has to offer. Eighty-four percent stated that there should be efforts to instigate joint research between the United States and the Soviet Union in their particular technical fields.[8]

Among the American scientists who hosted Soviet scientists in their laboratories here in the United States, eighty percent agreed that they and their institutions had benefited from the Soviet scientist's visit, while sixty percent praised the Soviet visitor as an "expert in his field" who "suggested new research procedures, introduced new ideas" and "imparted new knowledge." Eighty percent of the American scientists rated their Soviet guests as equal to or better than visiting scientists from other countries, including Western Europe.[9]

Among the non-participants who were questioned about the quality of Soviet science--all of them distinguished senior scientists--the general opinion of the value of Soviet work was somewhat lower than that of the participants, but there was still agreement that scientific exchanges between the two countries are scientifically valuable. The assessment here differed greatly according to the field of science. In mathematics and some fields of physics the American evaluators rated the Soviet scholarship as being thoroughly in step with the best work in the United States. In chemistry and biology the evaluations were much lower. Soviet science is obviously a heterogeneous collection of subfields of varying quality, and general statements about "Soviet science" conceal enormous field-by-field differences. Anyone wanting more detailed information about the quality of Soviet work in particular scientific fields might wish to study the results of the Kaysen report questionnaires, where the evaluations are broken down by discipline and research topic.

The overall conclusion of the Kaysen panel on the quality of Soviet science was that although American science is, on the whole, stronger than Soviet science, there is still a genuine scientific gain for the United States in having such exchanges. The fields of science are now so numerous and complex that there are always fields and subfields where Soviet scientists are doing things of interest to American scientists even though most American scientists agree that the United States leads in more of these fields than does the Soviet Union. And even in those fields where it is clear that the United States teaches more than it learns, it is important for Americans to know what the Soviets are doing. With exchanges in place and operating it is unlikely that surprises like that of Sputnik 22 years ago will sneak up on the American scientific community.[10]

Technology Transfer

Many past analyses of cooperation between the two countries have emphasized the topic of technology transfer.[11] It has often been said that the main reason the Soviet Union participates in exchanges is in order to gain access to superior American technology. Some American critics of the exchanges have described the visiting Soviets as vacuum cleaners sweeping up all the technical information they can find, and giving back little or nothing. Like many of the other criticisms of the exchanges, this one contains a serious aspect that deserves attention, but if it is accepted in the form in which it is often presented, it can have a paralyzing effect. It could lead to the lumping of all the various forms of exchange and cooperation together as being equally involved in technology transfer even though some of them have almost nothing to do with technology. It could lead to the cancellation of exchanges and programs which are valuable to the United States, both from the political and the scientific standpoints.

At the present time science and technology contacts between the two countries exist in a variety of forms. Some of these contacts contain considerable technology transfer, and some contain almost none. Several of the exchanges are in areas of fundamental science far removed from technology, others are in a middle range where both science and technology are involved, and some are primarily based on technology.[12] Examples of technology-based contacts are the commercial arrangements made between American companies and Soviet ministries. The IREX and interacademy exchanges, which have been analyzed far more thoroughly than any of the other contacts between the two countries, are the farthest removed from technology of all the exchange and joint research programs between the two countries. These two exchanges consist almost entirely of visits, research, and conferences among academic scholars. Almost no hardware and very little engineering design is involved in these two programs.

The answers to the questionnaires sent to Americans who have participated in the interacademy and IREX exchanges show that the description of the Soviet exchangees as people who scoop up information and give

nothing back is incorrect. (Although there are individual Soviet scientists who fit this description.) The majority of American scientists most closely involved in these exchanges have described them as a two-way street providing for mutual benefits in the interchange of ideas.[13]

In the bilateral agreements and particularly the commercial ventures technology transfer is a more important element, but even there the amount of significant technology that is transferred from the United States to the Soviet Union is probably exaggerated. From the very beginning the American negotiators of the bilateral agreements have protected valuable technology from accidental or undesirable transfer. For example, when the Soviets proposed an exchange in computer technology, the American negotiators replied with a proposed program on "Computer Usage in Management," and such a bilateral program currently exists. It does not involve advanced computer design and manufacture. As a channel of technology transfer it cannot be compared to the commercial sales of computers to the Soviet Union, which have occurred outside the framework of the formal exchanges and cooperative joint research programs.

Of course, some technology transfer does occur within the formal bilaterals and exchanges, and it is appropriate for the American administrators of the programs to examine this issue. In a few fields the gaps between fundamental research and applications are so small that inadvertent technology transfer is possible. Examples would be work in semiconductors and lasers, areas in which Soviet exchangees have been active.[14]

The amount of significant technology transfer that occurs through the interacademy exchange, IREX, and most of the bilateral programs is sufficiently restricted, however, that the problem can be adequately handled by more insistence by the American administrators on reciprocity in exchange, particularly in fundamental science, where the potential for American benefit is the greatest. On all the exchanges and agreements the United States should insist on its legitimate commercial interests, including copyright as well as patent rights, areas where the Soviet Union has accepted international conventions. There is some evidence that Americans are lethargic about protecting these rights within Soviet borders, restricting themselves usually to possible Soviet violations outside the Soviet Union.[15] Furthermore, it is clear that additional controls over strategically significant technology, such as those exercised by the Department of Commerce, are inevitable and proper elements of an unfortunately hostile world.

By carefully differentiating among the commercial, applied, and fundamental aspects of U.S.-Soviet science and technology contacts, further exchanges between the two countries are possible without significant accidental transfer of technology. On the commercial side, trade in nonstrategic technology between nations traditionally antagonistic is an entirely laudable and commercially beneficial goal.

Political Issues

So far I have looked at two questions concerning the scientific exchanges: how valuable are they scientifically? and how much technology transfer is involved? I have concluded from the recent studies that, on balance, the exchanges are valuable to the United States scientifically, although somewhat less so than to the Soviet Union. I have further concluded that the formal exchanges do not involve much technology transfer, although the commercial ventures do.

In my opinion, the most serious criticism of the scientific exchanges between the two countries is not based on questions of scientific reciprocity or on technology transfer. The more weighty question is whether Americans should support exchange programs which the Soviet government uses as reward systems for its politically orthodox scholars while suppressing dissent at home. I have spent a great deal of time considering this issue, and I know that many other Americans involved in the exchanges have as well. I have recently read several eloquent arguments in favor of refraining from cooperation with these programs on political grounds. An example of a serious and pungent article of this type was the one by Valentin Turchin last fall in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.[16] Reading that article I realized more clearly than ever that the time may come when many of us are so offended by Soviet actions that we no longer believe that we can ethically cooperate in these programs.

Except in extremity, however, it would be unwise for the United States government or the various exchange administrators to anticipate the actions of individual scholars by curtailing the programs on political grounds. As William Carey of the American Association for the Advancement of Science recently remarked at a congressional briefing:

> Individual members and institutions in the American scientific community can decide for themselves the limits to set on the quality and extent of their exchanges with the Soviets and they are doing precisely that. They do not need, nor want, governments to preempt these decisions. Nor do they want the government to choose scientific exchanges as the only weapon of retaliation, to the exclusion of other approaches.[17]

The exchange programs are presently helping us to learn about repressive conditions in Soviet scholarship and we are able to make more informed decisions about the proper responses. The irony of this situation should be noticed: some Americans who criticize exchanges with the Soviet Union because of political repressions are dependent on the exchanges for acquisition of information about those conditions. Twenty years ago if a Soviet researcher in one of the leading physics or mathematics institutes in Moscow were arrested, Americans might learn about it six months later, a year later, possible never. Today, if such a researcher is arrested we will know about it in several days,

and the chances are high that someone in the United States will know that individual personally. Protests by the international scientific community are difficult to organize without adequate information about current political events in Soviet scholarship. Scientific exchanges helped create communication networks and invisible colleges between the two countries and these institutions are now politically (as well as scientifically) significant.

The cancellation of scientific trips to the Soviet Union by Americans offended by Soviet actions toward dissidents is understandable and, under some conditions, commendable. Nonetheless, we need to ask what the ultimate results of our actions will be if we angrily and permanently spurn contacts with the Soviet scientific community. If joint programs no longer existed, what would irritated American scientists have left to walk out on? The creation of a situation in which no contacts remained between the two countries would obviously result in a loss of political and cultural influence. And unorthodox Soviet scientists would lose many of their personal contacts with the West.

Summary and Conclusions

The recent evaluations of scientific exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union show that these contacts are scientifically valuable to both countries. The problem of technology transfer, while somewhat troublesome, is not a formidable issue for the academic (as distinguished from the commercial) contacts. The most serious problem for the scientific exchanges is the issue of Soviet political repression of its scientific community, but at the present time the political benefits of continued cooperation outweigh the demerits. This situation could change, and the framework of the official exchanges should provide American scientists with unprejudiced leeway to make their own decisions about the ethical propriety of cooperation with the Soviet Union. The recent studies demonstrate that the majority opinion among the American scientific community is one of continuing support for these scientific exchanges.

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NOTES

1. Jack Anderson, "A Lopsided Scientific Exchange," The Washington Post, December 10, 1978, p. C7.

2. U.S.-Soviet Agreements and Relationships, Congressional Research Service, October 16, 1978. The most thorough studies of the exchanges yet produced are: C. Kaysen, chairman, Review of U.S.-U.S.S.R. Inter-academy Exchanges and Relations, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., 1977 (hereafter called the Kaysen report), and R.L. Garwin, chairman, A Review of Cooperation in Science and Technology Between the US and the USSR, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., 1977.

3. Annual Report, 1977/78, International Research and Exchanges Board, New York, 1979, pp. 42-44, 48-51.

4. See Loren R. Graham, "How Valuable are Scientific Exchanges with the Soviet Union?" Science, October 27, 1978, p. 384, and the Kaysen report. Also see Annual Report, 1977/78, IREX, p. 39.

5. In 1977 there were 234 total man-months under the ten bilateral agreements, and another approximately 300 man-months under the inter-academy exchanges. See Graham, op. cit., p. 385 and the Kaysen report, p. 43.

6. IREX in 1977-1978 sent Americans to the USSR for 97.5 man-months on the senior exchanges and slightly more than 400 man-months on the graduate student and young faculty exchange. IREX's Annual Report 1977/78, p. 39, and conversation with Daniel Matuszewski.

7. The best summary sources are the IREX annual reports, the Kaysen report, and Graham, op. cit., p. 385.

8. Kaysen report, pp. 194-208.

9. Kaysen report, pp. 231-240.

10. In addition to the reports already cited, other reports on Soviet science and/or US-USSR exchanges are the following: J.R. Thomas and U.M. Kruse-Vaucienne, ed., Soviet Science and Technology: Domestic and Foreign Perspectives, National Science Foundation, Washington, D.C., 1977; The Raised Curtain: Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Soviet-American Scholarly and Cultural Exchanges, Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1977; R.F. Byrnes, Soviet-American Academic Exchanges, 1958-1975, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1976;

Review of U.S.-U.S.S.R. Cooperative Agreements on Science and Technology: Special Oversight Report No. 6, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., 1976; A Progress Report on United States-Soviet Cooperative Programs by the Comptroller General of the United States, Washington, D.C., 1975; Background Materials on U.S.-U.S.S.R. Cooperative Agreements in Science and Technology, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., 1975; and the US-USSR Science and Technology Newsletter, Joint Commission, Division of International Programs, National Science Foundation.

11. See, for example, An Analysis of Export Control of U.S. Technology - A DOD Perspective, Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Washington, D.C., 1976; U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relations: The Interplay of Economics, Technology Transfer, and Diplomacy, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., 1973; Technology Transfer and Scientific Cooperation Between the United States and the Soviet Union: A Review, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., 1977.

12. At the present time there are 12 formal channels of science and technology contacts between the two nations: IREX, the National Academy of Sciences-Soviet Academy exchange, and 10 bilateral agreements (environment, space, scientific and technical cooperation, medicine and public health, agriculture, transportation, world oceans, atomic energy, energy, and housing). In addition, there are commercial agreements under article 4 of the bilateral agreement on scientific and technical cooperation. Approximately 60 American firms have signed agreements of "intent to cooperate" on business deals.

13. See the Kaysen report, p. 233.

14. See the Kaysen report, pp. 53-57.

15. In conversation with industrialists and legal specialists the Kaysen panel was told that "Western companies tend not to take legal action even when they believe their rights have been infringed upon by the U.S.S.R. simply because 'it is too great a hassle.' If Soviet commercial products utilizing patented information are exported, however, American and West European companies will sue more readily, lodging their complaints in the country of sale." Kaysen report, p. 169. It is also well known that Soviet institutions frequently reproduce American articles and books without permission.

16. Valentin Turchin, "Boycotting the Soviet Union," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 34, September 1978, pp. 7-11.

17. Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility, 1978 Annual Report, AAAS, Washington, D.C., 1979, p. 14.

THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF U.S.-EAST EUROPEAN ACADEMIC EXCHANGES

Charles Gati

As Pravda or one of its East European counterparts might put it, it was hardly accidental that the U.S. scholarly exchange with the several countries of Eastern Europe commenced in the immediate aftermath of the 1956 Hungarian and Polish uprisings. For the United States, the events of '56 signified the essential naïveté of earlier expectations about "liberation" and the "rollback" of Soviet power from the region.[1] By 1957-1958, with the high hopes of yesteryear shattered and the time for reappraisal clearly indicated, new questions began to be asked. Unwilling to assist the Hungarians and the Poles (and the East Berliners in 1953) and thus unable to do what the people of Eastern Europe seemed to want and expect, should the United States now seek the more limited goal of merely easing the burden of Soviet domination and one-party hegemony? To the extent it can, should the U.S. help reinforce already existing tendencies in Eastern Europe toward domestic toleration and regional diversity? Unable, in short, to transform the East European political order, should the U.S. at least try to reintroduce the Eastern half of Europe into the intellectual mainstream of all of Europe?

Twenty years later, these questions sound as remote as the affirmative answer is now self-evident. Yet, given the ideological zeal of the 1950's, it had to be a difficult task at that time to reduce so dramatically--and thus define in realistic terms--Western objectives. One who was not present at the creation can only have a vague sense of the dilemmas and debates, the outcome of which was to be the broad conclusion that doing something for the people of Eastern Europe was better than doing nothing by holding out for everything. The Left must have criticized that conclusion by suggesting that cultural engagement in Eastern Europe would be but a refined form of psychological warfare, still provocative, still subversive, ultimately conflict-producing with the Soviet Union. And the Right must have countered by noting that U.S. cultural engagement would only signify Western acceptance of the final division of Europe and that it would open our doors to their apparatchiki and spies.

That such views are so seldom encountered nowadays testified to the basic wisdom of the political choice made two decades ago. It is not that the scholarly or cultural exchanges no longer have any critics--they do and they should--but it seems that a consensus has since emerged in favor of peaceful engagement in and competitive coexistence with Eastern Europe, a concept and a policy within which the various

exchanges have come to play an important role. More than that, the exchanges provided the practical antecedent for the subsequent U.S. policy of bridge-building with the countries of Eastern Europe, a policy publicly proclaimed only during the Johnson administration in the mid-1960's.[2]

True, recently released evidence suggests that U.S. policymakers had come to terms with the impossibility of "liberation" as early as the late 1940's. Although many of them continued to entertain hopes about the fundamental transformation of political life in Eastern Europe, a significant National Security Council document (NSC 58)[3]—dated September 14, 1949—had identified the "more feasible immediate course" for the U.S. instead as the encouragement of "a heretical drifting-away process" from the Soviet Union. The document clearly distinguished between our "ultimate aim" (which was "the appearance in Eastern Europe of non-totalitarian administrations willing to accommodate themselves to, and participate in, the free world community") and "the only practical immediate expedient" of "fostering Communist heresy among the satellite states [and] encouraging the emergence of non-Stalinist regimes as temporary administrations."

No doubt primarily for political reasons, this more pragmatic definition of limited U.S. objectives was largely hidden from public view until the 1960's when it surfaced under the names of "peaceful engagement" or "bridge-building." And, almost immediately, it ran into difficulties. At first, in the second half of the 1960's, Vietnam tended to divert the attention of U.S. policymakers from Eastern Europe. Only minimal economic or political incentives were offered to induce the more willing of the East European states to move closer to the West on foreign policy issues or to liberalize their domestic political order. Later on, in the early 1970's, bridge-building gave way to a deliberate official posture of benign neglect in order to create a proper atmosphere for détente; the U.S. posture was deemed useful to alleviate Soviet fears about American intentions in Moscow's front yard.[4] While Eastern Europe was placed on the back burner of official U.S. policy, even then the exchange continued to build bridges, steadily expanding, regularizing institutional cooperation, successfully coping with a variety of political barriers, overcoming financial problems, and only occasionally reflecting the ups and downs of formal political relations. The exchange—like some of the East European scholars it dealt with—displayed a remarkable talent for "survival," perhaps because it operated within a non- or semi-governmental framework. It became the signpost of American intentions to build bridges with the countries of Eastern Europe.

Such stress on the political meaning rather than the purely academic content of the exchange probably requires additional amplification.

To begin with, one does not need to belittle scholarly achievements in Eastern Europe to note that the direct academic benefits to be derived from the East European program have always been seen as more modest than, and hence different from, those expected from the Soviet exchange. In the hard sciences in particular--from mathematics to space research--the Soviet Union seemed to have a lot to offer to American scholars; after all, the beginnings of the exchange coincided with Sputnik and with concurrent Western assessments of the highly advanced state of Soviet science. No such assessments were made, or could be made, of East European achievements and thus the very justification for the East European exchange differed from the Soviet program. Therefore, the primary justification was somewhat less academic and more political--even if the political goals were neither very specific nor obtrusive. They amounted to an emphasis on what Arnold Wolfers once called "milieu goals,"[5] meaning in this instance that the United States would participate in the shaping of a favorable environment for the return of East European scholarship into the European academic mainstream. In this sense, the U.S. was competing for cultural influence with the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe.

Two decades later, the U.S.-East European exchange ought to be evaluated primarily against this background. The specific question is whether the U.S. scholars who have gone to the area have contributed, directly or indirectly, to the improvement of scholarly standards in Eastern Europe and whether the East European scholars who have come here have acquired some appreciation for Western scholarship.

The evidence strongly suggests a positive answer. The exchange is likely to have contributed to the remarkable reemergence of sociology as a field of scholarly investigation in Eastern Europe. Using Western--indeed American--methodologies, East European sociologists have been publishing extensive studies during the past two decades on work habits, family relations, social mobility, cultural preferences, leisure time activities, the problems of aging, and other burning issues. Implicitly assuming that Marxism-Leninism provides no ultimate answer to all the problems of their increasingly modern societies, the East European sociologists (especially in Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, and in Czechoslovakia in 1967-1968) have been raising once taboo questions and reporting unconventional findings. While the theorizing in their monographs may lack originality or creativity--the important, though not only, exception to this is the Lukács group in Budapest--what is quite revealing is their reliance on modern American social science as inductive theory and the extensive use of increasingly sophisticated and invariably American methodologies.

In economics, too, the impact of American scholarship is both visible and significant. Even though Marxism-Leninism purports to be the science of economics, such critical works as Galbraith's on the problems of

capitalists as well as such comprehensive texts as Samuelson's have been translated into East European languages. In recent years, the terminology of economic studies has begun to change to include references to "interdependence," the "new international economic order," and, of course, to such once neglected concepts as supply and demand. At least in the more experimental East European states, where good economics is that which works, a good economist is now one who can skillfully and creatively apply Western findings and methods to the socialist setting. As a result, articles in the East European economic journals nowadays extensively quote American sources. As a result, too, some of the best work done by Yugoslav and Hungarian economists in particular has made them frequent lecturers at American colleges and universities. Finally, it should be reported that one Hungarian economist who spent several months at Columbia University a few years ago—a specialist in econometrics and modeling—has since been appointed head of the economics department of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, while one of his colleagues—who has taught economics at the University of California in Berkeley—is rector of the Karl Marx University in Budapest.

In the study of history, partly as a result of the debate in this country on the origins of the Cold War, there is a new willingness in Eastern Europe to come to terms with the complexities of more recent periods (such as the post-World War II coalition era). At the least, East European scholarly treatments of the postwar years is now far more comprehensive than it was ten or twenty years ago, including the treatment of such controversial topics as the history of the Polish social democrats or of the Hungarian smallholders. Perhaps more significantly, one can even encounter East European historians now who—troubled by remaining restrictions and taboos still in effect—are prepared to lead American scholars to forbidden material in the hope of getting it aired abroad. "If you make it public," one said, "then 'their' justification for censorship here will no longer make sense." Another historian spoke of the great satisfaction he would derive from the publication in the U.S. of a "bourgeois-objective" study of the postwar coalition era in Eastern Europe, because he could then write a critical review in a historical journal citing all the evidence he could not otherwise get into print.

Thus, some important changes are taking place in the study of sociology, economics, and history in Eastern Europe, changes to which U.S. exchange scholars have made a contribution. It should be stressed, in addition, that the East European scholars who meet us, talk with us, and exchange information with us also read what we write and use it in their own work. They know we will read what they publish and are influenced by their Western audience. In all the subfields of the social sciences, they privately acknowledge, the standard of excellence has been set by Western scholarship. As most of them envy the freedom of inquiry we have, they press—at times directly, more often in seemingly devious ways—for a less restrictive academic environment. At least partly

because of their desire to join the international community of scholars--an effort for which there is often regime support as well--they have managed to reduce the bombastic ideological content of their work; on the whole, they are in the process of reestablishing their presence in European culture and scholarship. Although neither the U.S. government, nor American and other Western scholars, nor IREX can be credited with creating this significant and somewhat surprising tendency, the exchange did--and can continue to--reinforce it by relying on a policy of incentives for good behavior and penalties for political belligerence or bureaucratic sabotage.

But what about the other side of the coin? Has our scholarship in the United States benefited equally from the exchange? Have we taken advantage of increasingly relaxed relations with the academies and the other scholarly institutes of Eastern Europe?

Given the dismal state of East European studies in the U.S.--a thorough account of which was recently given by Peter Sugar in The Washington Quarterly[6]--the accomplishments of the past two decades in this country may be summarized briefly as follows:

1. The study of one field--East European history--has made steady progress. The University of Washington Press has produced a series of fine books, including a first-rate synthesis of the politics of the interwar period, and some of the others--notably Columbia, Harvard, Indiana, and Princeton--have also published a number of excellent monographs. As some of the authors made use of East European archival sources and libraries, the exchange surely deserves recognition and credit.

2. To the extent that American scholars have gained access to East European archives and libraries, their publications appear to reflect greater familiarity with hitherto unavailable sources. Given the still incomparably greater freedom U.S. scholars have to interpret such data, some of what is published in this country about Eastern Europe probably surpasses the quality of East European scholarship.

3. The exchange has helped hundreds of U.S. scholars develop a "feel" for the region, something they could not have obtained from books and periodicals.

4. Compared to twenty years ago, the domination of the field by political émigrés has somewhat decreased, suggesting the possibility that East European studies may survive in the United States.

On the negative side, Sugar gave the following assessment of where we stand with East European studies in the U.S. today:

> ...the United States lacks the necessary number of East European specialists...[W]ithin a few years our country will have even fewer of them...A considerable percentage of those who now work in East European studies are in their fifties or older, and many of them were born outside the United States. Those who are somewhat younger are often second-generation Americans who acquired their area interest and often also some knowledge of a relevant language at home. The number of these people is diminishing by death and retirement, but also, unfortunately among the younger ones, because of lack of opportunity.[7]

The lack of adequate funding is only one part of the problem. Those who have served on various East European fellowship committees would also stress that the quality of applications in our field is generally poor and getting worse. Moreover, in three of the social sciences—economics, political science, and sociology—American scholars have not produced important works of synthesis about the region in many years: comprehensive works such as Spulber's on the economics of Eastern Europe or Brzezinski's The Soviet Bloc have not been matched, let alone surpassed. There are no satisfactory textbooks on any level, graduate or undergraduate, in any of these social science fields, and—as a 1979 survey sponsored by the ACLS-SSRC Joint Committee on Eastern Europe revealed—no major scholar in political science at least would or could write one. Surely we are worse off in this respect than we were ten or twenty years ago.

To repeat, the reason for the decline of East European studies in the United States is only partly a function of financial stringency. There is, in addition, an increasing de-emphasis at many universities on the East European part of their Soviet and East European program. Moreover, the unsettled—and unsettling—relationship between area studies and the behaviorally oriented social science departments makes it either extremely difficult to become, or not worth being, an East European area specialist. There is also the poor job market, of course, offering little or no hope for those genuinely interested in the region. All in all, whatever expertise we may have acquired about Eastern Europe during the last two decades is not and frequently cannot be put to good use.

Although the exchange is not to be faulted for these problems, it has unwittingly contributed to what may be called the current "thematic disorientation" in East European studies. Increasingly, American social scientists going to Eastern Europe have come to pursue topics which are politically safe, partly because that is what we are allowed to explore and partly because we want to be able to return for further research. It seems that we are inclined to study what we can in order to cover up what we don't know or cannot study. All too often, our knowledge is about something that is of secondary importance if not altogether irrelevant, yet we have a vested interest in insisting on its significance.

Consider one illustration: the Yugoslav system of self-management. As Yugoslavia is so very proud of this innovation, there has been no shortage, to say the least, of Yugoslav--and American--studies on the subject. The very careful student of self-management knows that, by and large, the system has not worked out well, primarily because Yugoslav workers do not take its participatory features very seriously. Yet one can read hundreds and hundreds of pages of description by Western scholars on how the system operates or is supposed to operate, only to be told--by the more conscientious scholars--that self-management has little to do with the actual working of the Yugoslav political or economic order. By devoting so much attention to this particular subject, we tend to affirm--at times directly, at times indirectly--official claims about self-management. Good scholarship should also focus on the admittedly controversial question: why such apparent discrepancy between official claims and reality?

There is no easy way to correct the distortion our thematic disorientation has introduced into East European studies. Younger scholars in particular are anxious to live abroad and spend time in the country of their professional interest--and be able to return. Our exchange authorities are understandably reluctant to encourage unduly sensitive topics. Academic departments in the social sciences expect hard data and field work. Foundations seldom support the writing of general works of synthesis, perhaps for the good reason that few East European specialists in the social sciences are qualified to undertake such tasks. Nor can we expect much help from our East European colleagues, of course, as they must shy away from asking the ultimate and highly controversial questions of who governs, on whose behalf, how, and why. In the end, then, we continue to raise the less important or less provocative questions about prevailing economic, political, and social conditions in Eastern Europe--and then pass on whatever answers we find to a declining number of scholars, students, and policymakers.

If IREX cannot be expected to "solve" the problems of East European studies in the U.S., perhaps it can help mitigate some of them. For example, works of synthesis might be encouraged and our thematic disorientation might be rectified by providing senior scholars the opportunity for travel and interviews throughout the region, to be followed by released time at one of the few remaining centers of East European studies in the United States or Western Europe (including RFE/RL headquarters in Munich) for research, reflection, and writing. IREX might also encourage applications for topics which in a narrow empirical sense are <u>less</u> researchable, but which do raise broad and important questions. After all, we know that East European politics is no longer "totalitarian," but we don't seem to know what it has become or indeed is becoming; we know that the East European economies do not completely fit the "command economy" model, but we don't seem to know what to make of their "second economies" and increasing acceptance of a system of supply and demand; and we know that social conditions and habits radically differ from earlier Marxist-Leninist expectations or from Soviet patterns, but we don't seem to know what the dynamics of the new social situation signify.

In short, the exchange may use the occasion of its twentieth birthday to find new ways to contribute to the revival of East European studies in this country. It has already done a remarkable job influencing, directly and indirectly, East European scholarship in Eastern Europe; it has been the pillar of U.S. bridge-building efforts in the region. In the next phase, it should help strengthen the study of Eastern Europe in the United States as well.

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NOTES

1. On the evolution of American policy towards Eastern Europe in the postwar world, see especially Bennett Kovrig, The Myth of Liberation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); John C. Campbell, American Policy Toward Communist Eastern Europe (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1965); Robert F. Byrnes, "Containment? Liberation? Coexistence? American Policy Toward East Central Europe," in Stephen D. Kertesz, ed., The Fate of East Central Europe (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1956), pp. 75-99; Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, "U.S. Foreign Policy in East Central Europe - A Study in Contradiction," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. IX, No. 1 (1957), pp. 60-71.

2. Cf. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Alternative to Partition: For a Broader Conception of America's Role in the World (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965) and Zbigniew Brzezinski and William E. Griffith, "Peaceful Engagement in Eastern Europe," Foreign Affairs, July 1961, pp. 642-654.

3. "TOP SECRET: United States Policy Toward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe (NSC 58)," as reprinted in Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, ed., Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy 1945-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), pp. 211-223.

4. Cf. Charles Gati, "The Forgotten Region," Foreign Policy, 19 (Summer 1975), pp. 135-145 and "Through 'Westernization' or Diplomacy? A Critique of American Approaches to Eastern Europe," in Jan F. Triska and Paul Cocks, ed., Political Development in Eastern Europe (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 315-333.

5. Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965), pp. 67-80.

6. Peter Sugar, "Area Studies in America: The State of East European Studies," The Washington Quarterly, I, 4 (Autumn 1978), pp. 86-98.

7. Ibid., p. 86.

A BALANCE SHEET OF SOVIET-AMERICAN EXCHANGES

Alexander Dallin

American academic exchanges with the Soviet Union began, as a formal and systematic activity, in 1958.*[1] At that time and ever since, different people have had different objectives in mind in promoting and pursuing them and varying expectations of (and accordingly, different criteria for determining) success and failure.[2]

The multiplicity of outlooks stems, at least partly, from the very nature of the program: as an academic activity regulated by government-to-government agreements, it is bound to have scholarly as well as political components. While the purposes for which scholars and students have participated in it have been rather obvious, there does not appear to have existed--then or now--any clear definition of objectives for which the United States government undertook it. Moreover, the "exchange"[3] has inevitably had several simultaneous functions--explicit and implied, purposive and unintended. It may be well, then, to begin by identifying some of these roles and expectations to see how they have fared.

Expert, Envoy, Agent, Dupe

One of the most insightful perspectives on academic exchanges was provided, early in their history, by Henry L. Roberts, then director of Columbia's Russian Institute.[4] He identified at least three different views--in essence, the arguments of their scholarly utility (for academic as well as national interests); the use of exchanges as a means of improving Soviet-American relations; and resort to the "weapon of intellect" as a way "to weaken or modify the hold of the Soviet regime" on its citizens. "These three views," he noted, "...have quite different objectives in mind, and quite different points of emphasis." The question was in effect whether the object of the program was to study, to impress, or to subvert.

In public discussions at the time the political calculus seemed uppermost. President Eisenhower spoke of the need for communication and human contact between peoples; Vice President Nixon declared himself in favor of exchanging ideas and comparing our ways of life--indeed, "breaking through the Iron Curtain wherever an opportunity is presented." The National Security Council in June 1956 identified a "vast possibility

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* I wish to express my gratitude to the Rockefeller Foundation for enabling me to draft this paper during a residency at its Conference and Study Center at the Villa Serbelloni, Bellagio (Italy).

for peaceful change" in the Soviet Union and implied that the U.S. could affect the process. Others saw the American exchange participant as ambassador, scholar, and tourist all at once.[5] Even in its recent attempt retrospectively to reconstruct what the purposes had been--in this instance, of scientific and technical exchanges--the so-called Kaysen panel of the National Academy of Sciences identified the implicit goals as establishing individual and institutional contact, learning about Soviet strengths and goals, and contributing to improved U.S.-Soviet relations (and "at a later date" achieving a "normalization" of scientific contacts between the two countries).[6]

The strictures and warnings too were almost entirely political. While the prevailing mood was one of optimism--a sense that Americans had at least as much to gain from the program as had the Soviet side--there were from the outset (and there have continued to be) jeremiahs predicting calamities: our scholars would be shown Potiomkin villages; our students would be brainwashed; the U.S. would be opened to penetration by enemy agents; Americans could not hold their own in discussions of ideology and ways of life. Participants were treated to lurid accounts of knockout drops and karate chops, and the program's administrators were suspected of being "at least" pink.[7]

From today's perspective, twenty years later, I am prepared to assert that (1) the program deserves to be judged in the first place by its explicit scholarly purposes of training and research; (2) on these grounds the judgment must be overwhelmingly positive; (3) once the range of political considerations is added, the balance sheet becomes even more unequivocally favorable; but (4) on all dimensions--learning, teaching, interacting, and providing "the other side" with similar opportunities--reality has turned out to be a good deal more subtle, and the impact less cosmic and less apocalyptic, more diffuse and more gradual than was assumed a generation ago; and naïve illusions--for instance, that contacts would either "threaten" or provoke a "disintegration" of the Soviet (or the American) system--have (or should have) yielded long since to a far more sophisticated set of assumptions about the effects of interaction, including both the acquisition of knowledge and the impact of experience on both sides.[8] As Allen Kassof has suggested, "the exchange experience has put an end to any romantic notion that 'understanding' can be attained very easily or that, as Americans and Russians get to know one another, their problems will evaporate."[9]

If this observer were to succumb to the habitual professional deformation of grading, the report card he would be tempted to award the academic exchanges would include an A- for the scholarly attainments of the participants, a B+ for their political and cultural roles; and an "Incomplete" (but with the expectation of a high grade) for the program's impact on the Soviet participants. These and some other dimensions will be discussed at greater length below.

Exchanges: What Have They Done for Us Lately?

The benefits for American competence and expertise have been both manifest and subtle.[10] Some sense of the impact is conveyed by the listing, recently sponsored by IREX, of thousands of articles and books produced by exchange participants with the benefit of whatever they learned in the USSR. Their topics range from the most esoteric curiosities in literary detective work and remote historical ephemera to starkly contemporary preoccupations with the Soviet leadership, Sino-Soviet relations, and the Soviet-American strategic balance.

Nor should we slight or belittle the worth of the scholarly products, either in their own right as contributions to the international pool of knowledge and thought, or as important efforts to understand and cope with challenges we all face, be it techniques of teaching foreign languages, alcoholism, environmental pollution, or the handling of juvenile delinquents.

Many of the dissertations, scholarly articles and books that have been produced as a result of exchanges have benefited from access to library holdings not available elsewhere, including Soviet dissertations (often citing archival sources not otherwise known or not always accessible), limited-circulation materials not normally sent abroad (including bulletins of lower levels of government, Party, and courts), and in spite of all the difficulties, Soviet historical and literary archives and other unpublished sources. Work on contemporary topics has frequently benefited from interviews and from the participant's ability to observe the system in operation, such as a local sport, a factory grievance committee, or a people's court in session.

If the general value of the experience for American scholarship is not in doubt--and neither are the benefits for linguistic facility, the participants' ability to function in a Soviet environment, or their familiarity with Soviet academic life, its personalities, organization, style, and conventions--how are we to gauge the gains for our understanding of the Soviet system and Soviet society? It seems best to ask what knowledge and insight have been acquired that we collectively might not otherwise have acquired or been sure of.

To this observer the outstanding contributions in this area are two:

first, a general feel for the Soviet scene--what the Russians call chut'ë--an instinct that enables you to make confident judgments about what is plausible and what is ludicrous. This includes the greater accuracy and range of personal observations, and the intuitive realism of analysis born of first-hand experience, which reduce the likelihood of misperception or misinterpretation of Soviet behavior;

and second, familiarity with the universe of informal behavior in the USSR. This dimension, which it is impossible to sense from published

sources, cannot be stressed too much: all too often Western discussions of Soviet attitudes and values, social relations, needs and wants, tensions and commitments, have been informed by guesswork, chancy extrapolations from dubious evidence, and, faute de mieux, touching trust in official Soviet pronouncements (or in its negative mirror image in the form of solzhenitsynshchina). Whether it is the "second economy" or the ability of Soviet citizens to circumvent official regulations; whether it is the ability to read between the lines of finely nuanced statements that seem to conceal more than they say; or whether it is first-hand evidence of serious differences among a superficially homogeneous population, be it over personal norms and priorities or more obviously economic and political issues (and what, in the last analysis, is not political in the Soviet Union?)--say, the rank order of grievances, such as red tape, the absence of privacy, vacuum cleaners, mothers-in-law, and the drabness of life; or the extent to which scientists, students, artists, or officials believe in the tenets of the official creed (and what this means and entails): there are no problems more important for our understanding of Soviet reality, and there is no group of specialists better qualified to provide it than the former participants in the academic (and perhaps artistic) exchanges.

Far from mouthing the traditional stereotypes about a bovine and monochrome mass, or echoing the simplicities of totalitarian omnipotence, most exchange participants, even when they have returned bitter about some of their experience, are likely to have incorporated into their thinking about the Soviet Union a greater recognition of elements of diversity and pluralism--as well as their limits--and a sense for the range of possible change--as well as the evidence of inertia and stagnation. It is a far richer, fuller, and more varied tableau of Soviet life than the American watching the news on his television screen between sips from his sixpack would ever suspect. And this, I submit, is an essential perspective that we will ignore at our peril.[11]

Among other things, this implies a vastly improved ability to gauge areas of Soviet strength and weakness. In science and technology, for instance, the exchanges (to quote the Kaysen report) have been "very significant in forging personal links between American and Soviet scientists and in providing at least a few American scientists with an understanding of the Soviet scientific establishment."[12] In oversimplified terms, this has meant an often positive assessment of the state of Soviet mathematics and some areas of physics, and a negative verdict on the current state of Soviet chemistry and biomedicine.[13]

Another point that strongly suggests itself from a review of exchange experiences is the cumulative, incremental gain from a continuing program. Whatever the merits of short-term visits (and for certain purposes they can be valuable), much of the deeper insight requires rapport, skills, and opportunities which come only with exposure to Soviet life over a protracted period of time--as well as the ability to check and compare impressions and reports over a number of years. It is a seriously erroneous proposition to argue (perhaps in the belief that this would

improve the American bargaining position vis-à-vis Soviet negotiators) that "the academic exchange program is far less essential for Russian studies than it was two decades ago."[14] I will be asserting below that in my judgment it appears as essential as ever.

A sketch of American benefits from the exchanges must of course deal not only with the political and cultural dimensions but also with their reciprocal aspects: whether we know it or not, we have benefited from Soviet academic visits to the United States, as will be discussed below.

Failures and Frustrations

Forgetting about the naïve political expectations of yesteryear, what has not been achieved in the exchanges: what have been some of the failures and frustrations?

As the standard list of American grievances has often been compiled and ventilated, there is scarcely anything new to be added here. One major area has been the obstacles in the way of access by American participants to certain archives, certain institutes, certain geographic areas, certain interviewees in the Soviet Union. Survey research has been virtually out of the question. Given the sweeping Soviet view of security, it is hardly surprising that a number of "political" topics have been ruled out. Still, it had not been anticipated that research on even remote diplomatic history would run into particular sensitivity; perhaps a bit less astounding has been Soviet nervousness on topics relating to religion and to nationalities.

Physical arrangements, beginning with housing and food, as well as placement of Americans in particular locations and institutions, have often provided grounds for complaint; so, for a number of years, did the ban on accompanying spouses and children. By and large these problems, however unpleasant, did not cause severe privation even if they negatively affected effectiveness, morale, and results.

Soviet bureaucracy, here as elsewhere, has of course made itself felt. Again and again it has operated in characteristically erratic and at times self-defeating and silly ways. While some rejections of topics and participants could somehow be explained, others have struck American administrators as pointless or bizarre. In addition, during the first ten or so years of the program, instances of harrassment, provocation, and in a number of cases expulsion of scholars and students were too widespread and bothersome to be dismissed as trifling or exceptional.[15]

In only a few of these problem areas was there comparable American behavior to invoke. In only a few instances did "communist" scholars have unique difficulty in using archival or library materials in the U.S. However, certain installations and certain topics were evidently ruled out by U.S. authorities on security grounds--something which curiously enough the Soviet side has not typically objected to.[16] There have evidently been some--relatively few--cases of actual misbehavior on each

side, which provided grounds for disciplinary or other action against particular scholars or students.

Whether rejections of topics, locales, and institutions by the American (or of course the Soviet) side have been based on sound considerations, I am unable to judge.

It is important to note that since about 1973 there have been significant improvements in many of the problem areas alluded to above. Though the reasons for this remain in dispute, one may suggest a coincidence of several developments: the overall improvement in Soviet-American relations; the effectiveness of techniques used by Americans in dealing with Soviet educational bureaucrats, including the use of "reciprocity"--e.g., reducing the roster of Soviet students admitted by a number equal to that of American students barred; an improvement in Soviet living conditions; perhaps greater Soviet eagerness to benefit from continuing exchanges; and probably some successful lobbying back home by former Soviet exchange participants and Soviet advocates of freer communication abroad.

Thus there have been virtually no expulsions and few reported instances of harrassment in the past five years or more. Access to Soviet archives has become somewhat--though not all that much--easier, as has photocopying and microfilming of materials. Spouses and children have been admitted in increasingly routine fashion. New locales and institutions have been added on the Soviet side, thus enlarging the circle of those, as it were, inducted into the international scholarly community. If initially the exchangees were essentially limited to Moscow and Leningrad, some have recently been assigned to Kiev, Erevan, Tbilisi, Tashkent, Vilnius, Dushanbe, Voronezh, Rostov, and elsewhere. Some topics that would never have been allowed in the fifties and sixties are now possible—in public administration, sociology, and anthropology, for instance; or in history, research on the tsarist police before 1917. American biographers of Stalin and Bukharin have recently gone on the exchange. With some shift in format towards more seminars and conferences, discussions have come to cover topics such as arms control, comparative U.S.-Soviet studies, China studies, and mutual perceptions. Some field work in anthropology has also begun.

Given the inertial resistance to change in the Soviet system, these are not insignificant improvements: it will not do to dismiss them as merely cosmetic. But of course difficulties do remain--and presumably will remain: if we were dealing with a different sort of system, no exchange agreements would be needed in the first place. Soviet decision-making remains unpredictable. The Soviet approach to security is unlikely to be much overhauled. On the other hand, it must be recognized that some of the remaining problems are not due to discrimination against Americans but apply equally to others seeking access, e.g., to Soviet records or permission to travel and interview. It is also true that some difficulties are rooted in Soviet administrative arrangements--such as the separate hierarchies of the Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Higher

and Specialized Secondary Education, and the Main Archival Administration--with rival jurisdicitons that are apt to prove singularly resistant to modification.

Some credit for the improvements achieved in recent years must also go to the Americans who have administered the programs: over the years, partly by trial and error, they have learned how to be most effective, how much pressure to apply without jeopardizing the agreements, how much persuasion to use, how to introduce new and often imaginative notions into agreements being renegotiated, and how to learn from our cumulative experience with different Soviet agencies, personalities, and bureaucratic routines.

Whatever the "principled" objections to the centralized administration of the Soviet-American exchange agreements, any alternative arrangements on the U.S. side would provide neither the skill that comes from experience, nor the leverage inherent in the ability to control placement of Soviet students and assure optimal conditions for American participants in the USSR.[17]

What remains to be examined later as the subject of repeated complaints is the problem of asymmetries--the actual gap in subject-matters studied and the ostensible one-sidedness in the benefits gained from the exchange.

The Soviet Side: Calculus and Impact

The Soviet authorities have of course also expected to benefit from the exchanges. They presumably believe that they are in fact benefiting. To cite this circumstance as an argument against continuing the exchanges is to miss a basic point. Like other forms of Soviet-American interaction--including trade and arms control--each side must expect to gain from the agreement: this is a precondition for its operation. Academic exchanges cannot be a zero-sum game.

Just what the internal Soviet calculus was or is, remains somewhat uncertain. It is safe to suggest that it too includes both a scholarly and a political component and that, in all likelihood, the saliency of the latter is even more prominent and decisive in the Soviet context than in the American. In any case, Moscow expects Soviet participants to learn--about the United States, about areas of science and technology where the U.S. is presumed to be ahead, and about the particular topics of the participants' research, be it on the fate of American Indians in the late 19th century or the agrarian policy in the first administration of FDR. Moscow also expects Soviet exchange participants to teach--both in the literal sense of delivering lectures where possible and appropriate (and sometimes, it would appear, even where inappropriate) and also in the sense of making a good impression on Americans, befriending them and showing those they meet in the United States that Soviet scholars and students are peace-loving, decent, and "cultured" human beings, displaying photographs of wives and children back home, and depositing tokens of good will in the form of bottles of stolichnaya, small jars of caviar, lapel pins, picture postcards, and unpainted wooden animals.[18]

There is reason to think that there have been differences of opinion within the Soviet elite over both the importance and benefits of the program and its likely costs. In particular (as Frederick Barghoorn suggested some years ago), "...it seems that within the highest Soviet decision-making circles there is a considerable range of opinion regarding the degree to which it is feasible or expedient for the Soviet Union to relax controls over contacts and communication between Soviet citizens and 'bourgeois' foreigners."[19] This will be important to bear in mind when we ask ourselves whose hand is being strengthened by the exchanges. At the same time it must be acknowledged that (in spite of occasional propagandistic assertions to the contrary in American media) there is no reason to think that Soviet decision-makers are "desperate" to develop or maintain academic and scientific contacts so as thereby to solve some of their own problems: we may presume that the best Soviet judgment is that the program is worthwhile, given the balance of costs and benefits, but not much more.

How to tell the impact of exchanges on the Soviet side raises problems of methodology and evidence that go beyond the framework of this paper. For our purposes, a few relatively superficial indicators may have to suffice. One formal measure of success relates to the career patterns of former exchange participants. No adequate listing appears to be available, but enough individual names have been identified to show that a substantial number of former Soviet participants later turn up as journalists posted abroad, diplomats assigned to international organizations or Soviet missions in the West, senior scholars and researchers, or academic administrators. Several became prorectors of research institutes (Rem Khokhlov, until his death in 1977 rector of Moscow State University, had earlier studied at Stanford University); at least one has been a Union Republic deputy minister. A considerable number have continued to publish in Soviet scholarly publications (and in a few cases in U.S. and other Western journals as well). In general, it is safe to say, going through the program has been a plus in their careers. But just what did they learn?

Occasionally a former exchangee will privately tell a visiting American how important an experience the exchange had been for him or her (very few Soviet students in the U.S. have been women). And a number of Americans also believe this to have been true.

> Five sources [one survey reports] volunteered the observation that Soviets who had been to the West could always be distinguished--by their receptivity to new ideas, and so forth--from those who had not...[as for] the impact of Western concepts and methods in the natural and social sciences, 30 respondents referred to specific changes in [Soviet] history and the social sciences resulting wholly or partly from exchanges.[20]

So far as acquaintance with the United States is concerned, the impact has understandably been considerable. It must not be assumed that it is invariably favorable to the U.S. (whether out of naïveté, such as the comment that conflicting editorials in different papers left the Soviet reader confused as to whom to believe; or out of correct observations regarding the high incidence of crime, the shallowness of cultural life, or the role of special interests in politics). But, it is safe to say, it is typically productive of a more sympathetic attitude (be it on account of the efficiency of supermarkets or the openness of individuals), and demonstrably valuable in permitting a more informed and rational Soviet analysis of American politics and society. While there is a baffling methodological conundrum—our inability to tell just what Soviet students of the U.S. would have been able to learn in any event from other sources, absent the academic exchange program—clearly the exchanges have made a substantial contribution to the formation of a fairly small but influential academic-political elite, symbolized by the staffs of the Academy's (Arbatov) Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada and the (Inozemtsev) Institute of World Economy and International Relations.[21]

Insofar as the academic research of Soviet scholars and students is concerned, it is easy to show the use of sources found by them in American libraries and archives in their dissertations, articles, and books. Only a little more difficult is the task of identifying concepts, methods, and ideas which exchange participants are likely to have picked up during their stay in the U.S. This is particularly apparent in such fields as quantification in the social sciences, and with such concepts as role conflicts and interest groups, notions of organization theory and systems analysis, methods of industrial management, studies of time budgets and small-group dynamics in sociology.[22]

What we find then is a fairly small but important academic and scientific elite whose members, as professionals in their several disciplines, have gained markedly from the exchanges. They are often willing to say so. But we must also try to feel the limits of impact. Perhaps Soviet-American relations provide a suitable example here. Just as in the United States a better, more informed, and more sophisticated knowledge of the Soviet Union has been largely confined to a rather circumscribed corps of specialists—in government, media, and academy—so in the Soviet Union too new insights and understanding regarding the U.S. have been limited in large measure to a distinct and rather small sector of the political and academic elites (and even they must at times engage in ritual genuflection before orthodox and even outrageous stereotypes). There thus remains a tension between the informed expert and others among the attentive public (including, for instance, some Party propagandists, police officials, and military spokesmen dealing with the U.S.) and an acute need for mass education.[23]

Harder to document but distinctly present is a more diffuse effect of the American experience (comprising both Soviet stints in the U.S. and American participants in the Soviet Union): the tacit function of the foreign academic colleague as establishing a higher norm of academic standards. As one Soviet historian remarked, "You keep us honest," and another admitted (after a few glasses of vodka), "Now when I write an article, I automatically have in mind: 'What will my American friends say about this?...'" They have in effect joined the international community of scholars: here we have the beginnings of precisely the sort of divided loyalty and professional "super-ego" that Stalin instinctively feared and fought fiercely.

It is perhaps impossible to say to what extent the exchanges play a role in shaping the tastes and attitudes of Soviet participants--perhaps reflected in their rush to some of the most expensive department stores as soon as they return to the West, but also in a profound conviction that the differences between the two systems must not be permitted to escalate into a nuclear inferno. That the impact is there is beyond dispute.

What strikes me as particularly important here is that, within the spectrum of people affected by contacts with the West, exposure to the U.S. (or to Americans in Russia) is most likely to strengthen the hand and increase the number of the "good guys" (and I will permit myself not to attempt to define them). In the Soviet context it has become easier, more legitimate and more "functional," as a consequence of the exchanges, to plead for easier travel abroad, easier access to archival and other sources, new methods of inquiry and analysis, and more generally for a more open system. And as a result of the experience more Soviet citizens are likely to be persuaded that these objectives are desirable or even necessary.

That this has been one of the (less tangible) effects, at least for a certain number of people, does not mean that this should be either an objective or a measure of the program. It is, I believe, proper for us to have in mind as an inevitable by-product of the exchanges, exposing Soviet scholars and students to more explicitly open and plural contexts, alternative approaches, techniques, and values--to experiences that would make better and more objective scholars of them (and incidentally may also lead them to rethink some of their own beliefs). Many of us would no doubt welcome such an outcome--especially if it is a concomitant of the program rather than its goal. It is not, I believe, proper to postulate as the exchanges' objective "injecting the infection of freedom and its liberating and mellowing influence at the very center and top of the Soviet system."[24]

Scholarship, Politics, and Morality

It has been said from time to time that there is a tension between the scholarly purposes and orientation of the exchanges and their political objectives, overtones, and manipulation. As one who has repeatedly objected to certain government-related practices and criteria (e.g., in the selection and recall of exchange participants) and one who fears and opposes outside interference in academic affairs, I am compelled to say that I find the presence of political elements in the exchange--on both sides--inherent and inevitable. I do not see how it could be otherwise, given the nature of the Soviet system and of academic life. This also means that the moral dilemmas are built into the situation and cannot be wished away. It is fatuous to present participants with the choice between being scholars or patriots--or with being either morally obtuse relativists or else missionaries of national beliefs.[25]

To recognize that there are bound to be political dimensions to the exchanges, however, is to beg the question. To say that the exchanges are bound to introduce Soviet scholars to new ideas and approaches; to convey to them an idea of life in the United States; or to establish channels of communication with colleagues (and others) in the Soviet Union, may mean either to register the obvious and the inevitable--or it may mean to elevate these purposes to prominence and priority in the entire program.

In retrospect it appears fortunate indeed that an uncommon measure of good sense prevailed in U.S. government councils when the academic exchanges first saw the light of day. The formula given in the Kaysen report in regard to interacademy exchanges in the sciences applies equally to the program here discussed:

> ...the decision to promote scientific interchange between the United States and the Soviet Union was largely a political one, justified both as an expression of improved Soviet-American relations, and as a process that would contribute to their further improvement. Yet, to be effective for any purpose, the exchanges had genuinely to serve the purposes of science.[26]

The executive director of IREX has properly acknowledged the importance--and the success--of this continuous effort "to insulate these exchanges from political pressures and preserve their integrity. The temptation to harness them to immediate diplomatic needs or to politicize them has thus far been successfully resisted."[27] More than twenty years ago, when the program was first launched, Henry Roberts provided a formula that has retained soundness and validity: to go by other than scholarly considerations in promoting the exchanges, he declared, would probably be self-defeating:

> for, unless educational exchange is carried out and judged as education, the consequence could be a degradation of education itself as a real and important index of the quality and vitality of a society.[28]

From the academic perspective, then, there is no justification for making the exchanges into a weapon--a tool for changing, let alone destroying, the Soviet system (assuming it were concluded that this could be done). However, no one should pretend to deny that every form of interaction--including trade, artistic contacts, challenges over "human rights," arms control agreements, and all the rest--can and perhaps must have an impact on Soviet attitudes toward the outside world, Soviet understanding of the external environment, and Soviet involvement in what a few years ago used to be called the "web of interaction." What this suggests is the equivalent of a Jeffersonian formula for academic exchanges: if every participant pursues his or her "own thing"--i.e., scholarly work--the pay-off will be maximal for the national interest and the common weal.

The experience of the past twenty years prompts the reassuring finding that academic programs have indeed proven to be the least politicized form of interaction between the two systems, in that they have been most immune to political fluctuations throughout the serious ups and downs of the intervening years. There is no need here to rehearse the record of negotiations and renegotiations: it suggests that both sides appear to have wanted it this way. True, it is easy to exaggerate this political virginity; if more mildly, political zigzags--one close analyst has shown--have often found reflection in the academic exchanges some two years later--a time-lag applicable both to improvements and to deteriorations.[29] But the fundamental integrity of the programs has not been impaired.

At the same time, it has been the view of virtually all those consulted in preparation for this paper that the approach to the exchanges within the U.S. government has been not only more obviously (and understandably) political than within the academic community, but also markedly more instrumental. At one level this creates little conflict: if the academics are primarily interested in learning, the government primarily seeks to teach--or better perhaps, to show and tell: so long as both activities are recognized to be legitimate, it is entirely possible to provide for, say, both archival research and exhibits and lectures. It is only when the government's approach to exchanges as a national strategy goes over the heads of institutions and individuals concerned to give primacy to public relations benefits and appearances, that trouble can result--as indeed it has, e.g., in the attempts to change numbers and categories of participants without considering the effects on quality or feasibility, or in some of the bilateral agreements hastily invented for extraneous political reasons at the Nixon-Brezhnev summits in 1972-1974.

The above argument has implications for the temptation to use these (and other) programs for "linkage" or "leverage" for other, essentially political issues. As stated above, the use of the exchanges as an instrument for purposes unrelated to academic ends and values is hard to justify; but any attempt to maximize freedom of access or greater recognition of scholarly standards--whether by persuasion or by pressure--is in principle entirely proper.

There is a broader political framework in which these issues can usefully be examined. Academic contacts are, after all, but a small though important element in a more pervasive Soviet set of alternative orientations and policies. It is essentially the choice between autarky and interaction, between self-isolation and international participation. Those who experienced the last years of Stalinism have no difficulty in grasping the difference between these options. Those who have, over the past generation, come into contact with the outside world, understand the importance of the underlying choice, too.

In the Soviet setting educational exchanges provide a legitimate arena in which the choice in favor of greater interrelatedness with the outside world can be manifested. Often, this may also signal a coded preference for more spontaneity, more permissiveness, more latitude in making choices and decisions. It may be asserted that, barring considerations of national security, it is in the American interest--and, in the long run, also in the interest of the Soviet population--to maximize contacts and transactions between us: we all stand to gain more from maximizing intercourse between the two societies and its members (more, that is, than the Soviet authorities stand to gain from it, and also more than if we do not engage in it). This calculus emphatically includes academic exchanges.[30]

It remains to identify some propitious conditions for maximizing the benefits suggested above. First and foremost, these are the autonomy and flexibility of the programs. This is not the place to reconstruct the record of relations between government, foundations, universities, and individuals in the field of scholarly exchanges (nor to explore possible alternative models). What is clear is that a delicate balance needs to be maintained, assuring on the one hand government involvement and commitment and on the other hand the independence of the program responsibly operated on behalf of the participating academic institutions. It is fortunate that it proved possible to develop--on the run--procedures and relations which proved acceptable to all the parties concerned. It is equally important to avoid, in the years ahead, either a withdrawal of governmental interest and support or any effort to "take over" what must be an agency by and for scholars.

At the same time, there is room for pioneering and further exploration along lines some of which the exchange program's administrators have already begun to outline. Changing patterns may well call for changing formats of exchanges in the years ahead. The "mix" of disciplines in the exchanges has already begun to change, and with changing prospects in the U.S. job market, perhaps fewer doctoral candidates in the "useless" disciplines will be selected for a year's stay in the Soviet Union and correspondingly more persons in previously neglected fields and other professions will be sent.[31] It is possible that more weight and resources will need to go to joint research projects involving both American and Soviet scholars and students. Greater flexibility on follow-up and

return visits may be in order. IREX probably should strive to do more for its scholars while they are in the Soviet Union. No doubt other ideas will be generated and discussed: it will be important for the program not to be frozen in its current mode but to endeavor to serve changing needs and opportunities.

Ever since the first exchange agreement was concluded there have been those who have proclaimed that all academic activity under the aegis of governments and governed by international agreements was an aberration, not only to be regretted but to be jettisoned as soon as possible. It goes without saying that in an ideal world academic contacts would thrive without such mediating institutions. Realistically, however, such a post-IREX era is nowhere in sight, and it would be a disservice to stress the need to dismantle the existing machinery or actually to begin the dismantling: like it or not, the need for it remains.

Costs and Benefits: The Bottom Line

Both communities involved--governmental and academic--are getting much of what we had wanted out of the scholarly exchanges. Experience in the Soviet Union has become an essential part of the training of young American specialists; it is important in attracting first-rate students into the field of Russian studies, in keeping them there, and in making them into superior specialists. The benefits in information and insight are unquestionable, as are the gains in the general competence of American analysts of Soviet affairs. We have been able to keep abreast of changes in Soviet reality, thanks to the exchanges, which we would otherwise not have been able to learn or observe. At the same time we have helped Soviet colleagues become better informed about their fields of specialization--and particularly, about the U.S.--and to become more innovative and skillful in the use of new concepts and techniques. We have been able to establish personal contacts that are important as channels of communication and informal vehicles in shaping attitudes. These and other benefits are solid and substantial. Others are more difficult to demonstrate but probably just as important in the long run.

Are we paying too heavy a price for these benefits? My own answer is an unequivocal "no." For one thing, there is no good way of measuring who pays--or who gains--more than the other in the realm of ideas. In many instances, the U.S. also benefits from Soviet learning, and vice versa. The very analogy of a financial ledger may be seriously flawed. There is, in any event, no evidence of striking benefits the Soviet side has derived by, say, recruiting agents, brainwashing students, or distorting U.S. perceptions of Soviet life and policy.

The principal arguments made in criticism of the existing arrangements focus on the notion of "asymmetry"--either in the professional interests of exchange participants, or in the worth of what they learn. It is

of course correct that the majority of Soviet exchangees have been in the sciences and engineering, whereas most Americans have been in fields such as history and literature. (The frequently cited figure of 90 percent for such a concentration among exchange participants on either side is a substantial exaggeration: current figures are closer to two-thirds.) Such a distribution is entirely understandable; in fact, it illustrates the underlying rationality of each side's approach to the exchanges. Far from reflecting any nefarious design, the asymmetries in the fields of students and scholars selected by each side show that each side selects and sends whom it wishes to send: for good reasons there are relatively few American science students who would wish--or would be well advised--to spend a year in a Soviet university or laboratory at an advanced stage of their graduate career. The fact that there are more American graduate students in history, political science, literature and linguistics eager to go to the Soviet Union seeking material for their doctoral dissertations, reflects the distribution of American academic programs on the Soviet Union and our own curiosities regarding it.[32]

As for the charges that in science and engineering the United States is being "stolen blind" by Soviet exchange participants, the substantive answer is more properly left to those professionally qualified to deal with it. From the vantage point of the present survey, there is considerable merit in the conclusions which the NAS panel reached, namely, that indeed the U.S. has on the whole been teaching the Soviet Union more than we have learned, but that (a) this should not be a significant criterion for gauging the value of the program, and (b) as Soviet science and technology make further strides, the future balance may be expected to shift toward greater parity in learning from each other.[33]

As was said earlier in this paper, there are other asymmetries that are real and, in some cases, serious. These include Soviet efforts to deny participation to scholars in certain fields of study they find sensitive. They also include labeling as "ideological subversion" behavior which Americans consider natural and proper in scholarly pursuits. They include the Soviet bureaucrats' profound suspicion of anything smacking of spontaneity. In the end, the lesson of past experience is to attempt to improve matters rather than to bemoan the problems. And the record is clear that improvements have been real and substantial. It must be remembered that, all in all, over the twenty years of the exchanges, the Soviet side has had to change to a far greater degree--to adapt itself, learn, alter procedures to meet criticism from the U.S., recognize inadequacies and ridiculous bureaucratic failures, and respond positively to reciprocal gestures from the U.S.--than has the American side.

Three other worries regarding the program should be mentioned here. One concerns the intrusion of the U.S. government into the lives of its citizens and into American academic life. To be sure, compared to the models of teacher and pupil sitting at the end of a log or of Socratic dialogues (which also attracted lethal retribution), the structures erected by extensive international negotiation are apt to evoke sighs of concern and regret. But surely the image of academic exchanges--of all things--giving rise to what one colleague delights in referring to as St. Petersburg-on-the-Potomac requires too much of a distortion of scale to be taken seriously, compared to the contracting activities of the Department of Defense, the surveillance of citizens by assorted security agencies, the interminable reporting requirements levied by HEW, IRS, and the rest of the regulatory alphabet soup. In my candid view this is a phony issue: all those in the field of Soviet or Slavic studies welcome (and many of us solicit) outside funds intended, at least in part, to attract people into a certain area of study and thereby contribute to and support a "distortion" in academic interests and resources at least as serious as that implicit in the Soviet-American exchange. So do all the other existing programs in this field, from NDEA to ACLS--and it is too bad that there is not more money to do it with!

Another worry concerns the moral problems of dealing with the Soviet authorities some of whose behavior many Americans are apt to consider outrageous. As one leading spokesman for Slavic studies in the U.S. put it, "The greatest cost we pay in accepting controlled cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union is granting respectability and dignity, parity and legitimacy to a government that denies the freedoms essential to civilized life."[34] One can acknowledge the sincerity and intensity of the conviction without sharing it. Indeed, any person must be free to declare himself or herself a conscientious objector to this--or any other--program that is morally too troublesome or costly to pursue. No doubt, many Americans have been similarly uncomfortable when it has come to contacts and dealings with other governments, be it in Uganda or South Africa or Chile. If indeed one were to consider all relations with the Soviet regime immoral, it would follow that we should neither sanction nor participate in the Olympic Games in Moscow, or any American exhibits or cultural performances there, or any other agreements, whether they deal with wildlife in the Bering Straits or cancer research: lest it become hypocrisy, morality applied demands consistency.

For those of us who, whatever our distaste, recognize that we--as individuals and as a nation--must deal with the Soviet Union and indeed have certain shared interests with it, the touchstone must be effectiveness--not scoring points, nor grandstanding, nor viewing exchange arrangements as a cameo of the eternal struggle between the forces of goodness and evil. And this means that programs such as this one must be judged in terms of results rather than abstractions.

In the end, the same approach must also inform our judgment on the painful question of "human rights." In recent years, as information about violations has multiplied, concern by individual scholars in the West has grown—about their own responsibility and often their ability to help Soviet colleagues under pressure or in distress.

There is room for differences here, and indeed individuals should properly act out of their personal convictions. But institutionally the soundest position, it seems to me, starts from the recognition that the exchanges must not become a political football for scores in other issue areas. As the report of the Twentieth Century Fund's task force concluded,

> The Task Force does not think that the U.S. Government should use the exchanges as an instrument of national policy in order to promote human rights within the Soviet Union. Such leverage would pervert the purposes of the exchange program, turning what is a nonpolitical exchange into a potentially dangerous political tool.

A good case can be made that cultural exchanges have in fact "indirectly had some effect within the Soviet Union in enlarging individual perceptions of and expectations about human rights."[35] As another close observer (and himself a former exchange participant) puts it,

> ...There is much evidence that the awareness of the international community is a contributing factor to Soviet restraint. Almost all Soviet scientists have favored the improvement of communications, and the dissidents in particular have stressed that their security is greater because of their links to the West.[36]

Under these circumstances, to cut the exchanges in retaliation for Soviet violations of human rights would mean to strengthen the position of those who would more willingly resort to harsher repression at home and sever exchanges abroad. As the report of the National Academy of Sciences' panel concluded, "maintenance of the exchange will do more to increase the freedom of scientists in the Soviet Union than cutting it off or reducing it substantially would do."[37] The same is true of other areas of scholarship as well as performing and creative arts and letters.

In practice, it has been shown, there are opportunities for the American side to take advantage of Soviet interest, of differences among Soviet participants and administrators, of tensions in Soviet society and government, so as to secure meaningful improvements of conditions.[38] If the results at times strike us as modest, they are nonetheless real. What is more, they are better than either confrontation or compliance would be likely to produce.

Twenty years of experience have taught us both the scope and the limits of the possible. We will continue to be a long way from seeing in Soviet-American contacts the sort of experiences eminent scholars and artists--an Erasmus or a Diderot, a Handel or a Hemingway--had abroad. If we must settle for a good deal less, the record nonetheless lends support to "a bias for hope": in their undramatic, at times plodding and often intangible ways, the exchanges have added considerably to our capacity to understand, to our ability to exert an influence, to our scholarly accomplishments, and to the muted dialogue within Soviet society in which we are, willy-nilly, silent participants.

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NOTES

1. On the history of academic contacts with the Soviet Union, see Robert F. Byrnes, Soviet-American Academic Exchanges, 1958-1975 (Indiana University Press, 1976), pp. 1-36; on the 1955-1958 period, see also the Twentieth Century Fund's Task Force on Soviet-American Scholarly and Cultural Exchanges, The Raised Curtain (Twentieth Century Fund, 1977), pp. 23, 27, 31ff, 66ff.

2. The best general survey, including the best bibliography, is in Byrnes, op. cit., in spite of a number of misleading and one-sided statements. See also the Twentieth Century Fund report cited above, including a background paper by Herbert Kupferberg, a serious but controversial document; the so-called Kaysen report (so cited hereinafter), dealing primarily with exchanges in science and technology: National Academy of Sciences (Board of International Scientific Exchange, Commission on International Relations, National Research Council), Review of U.S.-U.S.S.R. Interacademy Exchanges and Relations (Washington, D.C., September 1977). In addition to other sources cited below, valuable information is also contained in the annual reports of the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), the periodic reports of the Department of State Office of Soviet and East European Exchanges (while it was in existence), and congressional hearings and oversight reports.

3. The term "exchange," though no doubt here to stay, has some unfortunate connotations. As the Kaysen report (p. 19) aptly states, "interchange would come nearer to describing the process involved and would be less likely to convey the analogy with economic exchange. In an economic exchange the parties give up the goods they offer in trade and retain those they receive in return. In the interchange of ideas—scientific and other—neither side parts with its initial stock but adds to it what it receives. Indeed, the initial stock of 'knowledge' each side brings to the interchange...is itself changed by the transaction."

4. Henry L. Roberts, remarks at a celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, published as "Exchanging Scholars with the Soviet Union," Columbia University Forum, Spring 1958, pp. 28-31.

5. Institute of International Education (IIE), Committee on Educational Interchange Policy, Academic Exchanges With the Soviet Union (New York, October 1958), pp. 2-3, 12-13; Byrnes, pp. 36-37; Twentieth Century Fund, pp. 3, 23-24, 39ff; Nixon, commencement address at Lafayette College, June 7, 1956. Unlike the artistic exchanges, the academic program scarcely offered significant prospects of economic gain for either side.

6. Kaysen report, pp. 2, 26-27.

7. On some of the hostility from congressional and other sources in the years of McCarthyism, see the sources cited above. A good specimen for the 1960's is George Bailey, "Cultural Exchange As the Soviets Use It," The Reporter, April 7, 1966. For recent comments, see Theodore Draper in Commentary, February 1976 and subsequent issues.

8. This covers one area of hopes and fears on which I simply have no factual information: the use of either American or Soviet participants as informants or agents by either side. What indirect evidence there is suggests that this too has been a very minor problem--on the American side, because of the explicit and clear-cut opposition to such activities by the program's administrators, the participating scholars and their universities.

9. Allen H. Kassof, statement in United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Perceptions: United States and Soviet Union Relations (Government Printing Office, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Perceptions], p. 435.

Frederick C. Barghoorn, a premier advocate, student and victim of the exchanges, wrote as far back as 1967 that "those responsible for originating and conducting the American exchange program with the Soviet Union...have never been, so far as this writer is aware, under the illusion that exchanges could make a decisive contribution to the liberalization of communist society. They believe, as does this writer, that exchanges can only reinforce existing tendencies toward rationality, permissiveness, and openness." (Barghoorn, "Cultural Exchanges between Communist Countries and the United States," in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 372 [July 1967], p. 122.)

10. The Committee on the Future, which reviewed the first ten years of operations under the Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants and recommended its replacement by what became IREX, was emphatic about the benefits to individual scholars, universities and "the general standards of American Slavic scholarship." (Committee on the Future, "On Scholarly Exchanges and Relations...in 1970-1980," [1968], p. 7.)

11. This is not meant to suggest that similar insights could not be gained without going on the exchange. Nor does it imply that such conclusions are unanimous: both experiences and the strength of preconceptions vary. Nor does the above necessarily contradict Robert F. Byrnes's stress on the value of first-hand experience with the apparatus of repression.

Exchange participants are not necessarily unique in their experiences, either. Some foreign correspondents have had similar opportunities and insights, though many of them have not known Soviet citizens as intimately as would, e.g., those living together in the same dormitory over an entire academic year, with daily conversations about blat, BAM, Watergate, and the Nitty-Gritty Dirt Band. It should be remembered

that as a group U.S. foreign service personnel do not have equal exposure to Soviet citizens--partly because their official position inhibits public "cruising," and partly because embassy policy has often discouraged such contacts even where the individuals have had the curiosity, the drive, and the background to attempt it.

The above comments also imply that former exchange participants are likely to have a good sense for the elements of weakness and strain in the Soviet system; and a perception of the continuum of diversity, rather than a stark dichotomy between officialdom and dissent.

In an analysis of the views of American participants, two American political scientists concluded: "Historians and social scientists were much more conscious of barriers to communication interposed by political and ideological factors than were the natural scientists. They nevertheless felt that experience in Russia could be enormously valuable and even indispensable--partly just because it made potential specialists aware of the total pattern of which these barriers were a feature. A very strong statement of this position was made by a distinguished legal scholar who wrote that experience in 'socialist' countries was 'so important that I feel that what is written by those who have not been in socialist countries constitutes nothing more than interesting hypotheses for examination by others who can make the "field" trips to the East.' A young political scientist touched on an important benefit when he reported that, as a result of his contact with scholars at a research institute, he became fully aware for the first time of the differences in point of view among Soviet scholars working on the same subjects." (Frederick C. Barghoorn and Ellen Mickiewicz, "American Views of Soviet-American Exchanges of Persons," in Richard L. Merritt, ed., Communication in International Politics [University of Illinois Press, 1972], p. 157.) See also the less satisfactory report, Charles Kadushin et al., An Evaluation of the Experiences of Exchange Participants 1969-1970 through 1974-1975 [IREX, 1977], pp. 35-36; and Byrnes, pp. 167, 235.

12. Kaysen report, p. 10.

13. Loren R. Graham, "How Valuable Are Scientific Exchanges with the Soviet Union?" Science, October 27, 1978, pp. 384-85, a sound article.

14. Byrnes, p. 235; also p. 8. See also Byrnes's statement in Perceptions, p. 424. He made essentially the same statement when in 1969 he relinquished the direction of the Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants. (See U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, "International Negotiation--Exchanges of Scholars with the Soviet Union: Advantages and Dilemmas" [Government Printing Office, 1969], pp. 3, 5. By contrast, Graham (loc. cit., p. 387) describes the exchanges as "more important than ever" in the current phase of Soviet-American relations.

David Joravsky has complained that we have produced no Marco Polos or Tocquevilles: "Nothing exciting has come of the...exchanges" (Science, February 4, 1977, p. 480). At one time I might well have agreed, but

my present judgment differs sharply, because of the division of opinion among American analysts on the Soviet Union; because of the cumulative impact over time; because of the impact on the Soviet Union; as a basis for future developments; and because every generation must make its own rediscoveries.

15. On all these topics, see the Kaysen report, the Twentieth Century Fund report, and the Byrnes volume (chapter 6, factually the most detailed account, but open to some challenge in its interpretation).

16. The key may be Soviet insistence on "sovereignty" and "non-interference in internal affairs" (frequently, code references to foreign concern about "human rights"). Thus a recent Soviet article stresses alleged American violations of legal principles (usually an indicator of Soviet defensiveness); sovereignty presumably includes each side's right to decide what infringes on its concept of security. See V.S. Mikheev, "SSSR-SShA: Mezhdunarodno-pravovye printsipy sotrudnichestva v oblasti nauki i tekhniki," SShA, 1978, no. 10, pp. 14-25.

17. The benefits due to centralized administration are apparent if the American experience is compared to that of French and West German scholars and students, who lack comparable "leverage."

It has of course been possible for individual academic institutions in the United States to make their own arrangments directly with Soviet counterparts without going through the IREX or NAS mechanism. This may indeed be a growing phenomenon (in spite of the inherent financial and administrative difficulties involved). By and large, such direct bilateral arrangements may be most useful--and least detrimental to others--in areas outside of those covered by the basic graduate student and younger faculty exchange.

18. Some commentators have also suggested as additional Soviet goals the prestige that accrues to those who have been abroad, and the patronage of making such assignments possible as a reward for performance and behavior.

19. Barghoorn, "Cultural Exchanges," p. 121. See also Marvin L. Kalb, "The Cultural Exchange Gamble," The New Leader, December 21, 1959; and among recent Soviet commentaries in print, Mikheev, loc. cit.; I.V. Alpatova, "Sovetsko-amerikanskoe sotrudnichestvo v gumanitarnykh oblastiakh: problemy i perspektivy," SShA, 1978, no. 5, pp. 64-70; and N.V. Sivachev, on American lecturers in history at Moscow State University, in Komsomol'skaia Pravda, August 31, 1978.

20. Barghoorn and Mickiewicz, pp. 157-58.

21. For an interesting and systematic analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of their understanding of American affairs, see Morton Schwartz, The Soviet Perception of the United States (University of California Press, 1978).

22. The problems of Soviet gains in science and technology are discussed in a separate paper by Loren Graham.

23. If the Soviet-American analogy is to some extent misleading in exaggerating the rigidities or compartmentalization of American opinion, it also errs in the opposite direction: there is far greater popular sympathy for the U.S. among Soviet citizens than there is sympathy for Russians among rank-and-file Americans.

24. Byrnes, in Perceptions, p. 423. Elsewhere (in his Soviet-American Academic Exchanges, p. 239) he states approvingly that the exchanges "encourage dissidence and dissent."

25. See Joravsky's review of the Byrnes volume, in Science, February 4, 1977, pp. 480-81.

26. Kaysen report, p. 22.

27. Kassof, in Perceptions, pp. 438-39.

28. Roberts, loc. cit., p. 31.

29. Byrnes, Soviet-American Academic Exchanges, pp. 46-49.

30. On this point, see Alexander Dallin, "The Fruits of Interaction," Survey, no. 100 (Summer 1976), pp. 42-46; and Alexander Dallin, statement in testimony before U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Hearings... (September 19, 1978) (Government Printing Office, 1979).

31. In the last several years IREX has done an excellent job in providing opportunities for retraining in area studies for specialists in such fields as sociology, anthropology, economics, and law, preparatory to a research visit to the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. See the report by Gail W. Lapidus, "An Evaluation of the IREX Preparatory Fellowship Program" (October 1978).

32. Byrnes (p. 156) has made the valuable point that from the official and orthodox Soviet perspective, history, political science, and literature are indeed sensitive fields, too. On this question, see also Twentieth Century Fund, pp. 67-69.

33. Kaysen report, pp. 3, 168-71; Graham, p. 385. It is virtually certain that Soviet specialists have access to less "sensitive" equipment or know-how on university campuses than in commercial laboratories. It is of course uncertain how much of the same information would be available to Soviet specialists without the academic exchange.

For a sample of misleading reporting on this subject, see Jack Anderson, "A Lopsided Scientific Exchange," The Washington Post, December 10, 1978.

34. Byrnes, p. 242. Another and perhaps real concern is the extent to which exchange participants engage, consciously or otherwise, in self-censorship so as to optimize their chances for success. The problem is not limited to the exchanges. I find it impossible to assess its magnitude.

35. Twentieth Century Fund, pp. 11-12.

36. Graham, p. 387.

37. Kaysen report, p. 182; see also pp. 171-74. The same would be true of reducing the exchanges because free access is denied (Byrnes, in Perceptions, p. 424).

38. See Allen Kassof's review of the Byrnes book in American Historical Review, June 1977, p. 773.