ABSTRACT
        Noting that a shared social reality that is
constituted, sustained, and modified in symbolic interaction is
central to life in an organization, this paper contends that
contemporary developments in rhetorical theory make possible careful
descriptions of how discourse functions in maintaining and changing
that social reality. The paper demonstrates the interpreted nature of
experience and the interpreting function of talk in organizations.
From this foundation, it reviews how other rhetorical critics have
analyzed the "epistemic" function of rhetorical action. In
conclusion, it introduces a system of analysis based on metaphor use
that has been found to be appropriate for organizations and useful in
providing a better understanding of organizational reality and
discourse. (Author/FL)

RHETORIC, METAPHOR, AND ORGANIZATIONAL REALITY

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Many modern organizational theorists have adopted processual models of organizations as consensual social realities. Contemporary developments in rhetorical theory make possible careful descriptions of how discourse functions in maintaining and changing these social realities. In this paper we wish to demonstrate the interpreted nature of experience and the interpreting function of talk in organizations. From this foundation we will review how other rhetorical critics have analyzed this "epistemic" function of rhetorical action. Finally we will introduce a system of analysis based on metaphor use which we have found to be appropriate for organizations and useful in providing a better understanding of organizational reality and organizational discourse.

Nature of Organizations as Consensual Social Realities

Central to life in the organization is a shared social reality which is constituted, sustained and modified in symbolic interaction. Berger and Luckmann describe the processes by which this social reality evolves in their account of the social generation of knowledge.[1] Weick's discussion of the development of collective structures is a similar attempt to account for organizational integration.[2] Johnson has discussed at length communication's constitutive role in organizational integration and intelligence.[3] Hawes, likewise, defines communication's function: "to create and validate symbol systems which define social reality and regulate social action."[4]

Following Gidden's work on structuration, Siebold, Poole, and McPhee have made even clearer the processual nature of social reality in organizations.[5] They describe two levels of analysis. "Institutional analysis" studies the effect of rules on group behavior, i.e., how structure is reproduced. "Strategic

analysis" looks at the production of structure, i.e., how people use rules and resources to gain their ends. This structuration model highlights the interplay of institutional and strategic dimensions which constitute the organization. We share Siebold, Poole, and McPhee's interest in the simultaneous production and reproduction of structure, but we wish to further specify rhetoric's function in this process.

Assuming with Hawes that social collectivities are not reflected in communicative behavior but rather are that communicative behavior,[6] we wish to precisely formulate the ways in which organizational members come to experience and share a reality in communication. Such a fundamental exploration is aided by the philosophical work of Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer and the presentation of their work in communication literature by Hyde and Smith and Deetz.[7]

The notion that organizational members share a social reality is frequently taken to mean that members form subjective impressions of "real world" objects and events and that, over time, members are able to co-orient and share these impressions. When these "meanings" are adequately shared they no longer need to be negotiated and members can talk about objects and events and assume that others will know what they mean. In this view to have a social reality is to have a real world and a shared set of interpretations about it. Phenomenologists have shown that social reality is much more fundamental than this. They suggest that, rather than a person perceiving a world and then giving it an interpretation or meaning, perception is of an already meaningful (interpreted) world. Objects and events of the world are already thoroughly social. What things are in experience is what they are seen as in everyday activity. At the moment of perception objects, events, and actions are "real" as they appear in the context of organizational activities. For example, a manager might quickly glance at a half dozen letters of application in the morning mail. S/he might experience them as "letters,"

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"people looking for work," "a waste of time," "indicators of available personnel,"
and so forth. "Letters" and "available personnel" are more than mere physical
objects and are socially real in the organization. They are constructed and
shared realities which are directly perceived. The possibility of "white sheets
of paper with marks on them" appearing real as "letters" or "available personnel"
is interconnected with experiences of the national employment situation, positions
open in the company, the work to be done that day, and so forth. "Letters" would
not regularly be experienced as "white sheets of paper with marks on them," al-
though if questioned rigorously or if the life context were changed they might be
described this way. In every event to become aware of something is to become
aware of it as interpreted. Everyday actors in organizations so take this for
granted that only at times of disagreement or uncertainty do they explore the .
conditions under which the objects/events would or could come to be seen in the
way they are. Even in these cases the attempt to find the "correct" understanding
takes place within a more basic set of common understandings, expectations, and
past practices. In this sense social reality is assumed and continually repro-
ducted as the way things are. Rarely is it criticized or examined to see if
there are other perhaps preferable understood realities.

It ought to be quite clear from this example that the constant everyday
experience of always seeing something as something happens generally out of a
context of more basic interpretations and specifically in line with the project
or task in which the actor is engaged as an organization member.[8] In a concrete
situation, then, a pre-conscious interpretation takes place which presents the
world in terms of its possibility or serviceability for the actor as s/he engages
in life projects -- i.e., "letters" appear when looking at the morning mail,
"white sheets of paper" when considering ordering new stationery. Any subsequent
acts of thinking about the world or making assertions about its "real" nature
are dependent on these prior interpretations. These pre-conscious interpretive

acts which compose the world as it is seen are not isolated. They are grounded in an interconnected gestalt of thinkable possibilities indigenous to thinking and working in the organization and are connected in a broader sense to what we have come to call culture. When we say, then, that members of an organization share a social reality we are not simply saying that they share a view of the world and a way of talking about it; more fundamentally they share a world. What is thinkable, doable (in terms of possibility), is neither a matter of choice nor persuasion but serves as a background from which all choice and persuasion emerge.

Heidegger's description of the fore-structure of interpretation aids in discussing this background for experience in organizations.[9] Interpretation and understanding are grounded in a "fore-having." The "fore-having" is the totality of potential social practices, concepts, and thoughts which are possible in a socio-historical tradition. Out of this reservoir of shared meaning, the individual sharing of meaning arises. An organization is a particular structure appropriated from all of that which is thinkable. An organization's rules, normal operating procedures, and conceptual systems form what Heidegger calls a "fore-sight." This "fore-sight" serves an an interpretation of the "fore-having" (or one way it can be made explicit) and delimits what things will be seen as for the purposes of the organization and organizational interaction. As individuals approach everyday situations in the organization they appropriate the "fore-sight" as a "fore-conception." With the "fore-conception" things appear as particular things in the organizational context. With every act of conception therefore the entire fore-structure is brought to bear and is entailed. The sharing of this fore-structure by organizational members makes possible the commonality of meaning of actions and events (understanding them as in the same way) and serves as the context for the coordination of actions and resolution of disagreements and misunderstandings. All organizational rhetoric happens in and through this structure. An understanding of the way this fore-structure is actualized in an

organization is essential for the critic's understanding of the organization. Many organizational theorists working from a processual view identify the existence of this structure but do/can not describe it.

Since the fore-structure itself is not an object which can be made explicit in analysis, it must be described in the various forms in which it is manifested. Language use is such a point of entry. In originary speaking an intrinsic connection exists between language and understandable experience. While this connection is covered up in everyday language use, the connection is retained and can be brought out in careful analysis. Following the work of Heidegger, Gadamer was able to show the "linguisticality" of all understanding.[10] "Language is not only an object in our hands, it is the reservoir of tradition [a fore-having] and the medium in and through which we exist and perceive our world."[11] As reality is always an interpreted reality it is also already signified. Naming and interpreting are the same human act. When something appears as something it appears as named and, thus, interconnected with organizational possibilities which make it what it is for organizational members. Speaking is a gathering of the "fore-having" and attaching it to actions, events, and objects as they come to be experienced so that they have systemic meaning. Language makes possible a context, history, and future for things. It is intrinsically involved in things appearing in terms of their potential for use.

In the "everydayness" of speaking this constitutive (ontological) "force" is covered up. Words become objects of experience which represent other constituted objects of experience.[12] Everyday speaking and writing are derivative modes of the fundamental relation of language to reality. These derivative modes are essential to this analysis as they provide a text from which to work. The act of speaking is an ontic naming process which allows the analyst access to an ontological interpretive process. By exploring the "names" used, the structure of interconnected possibilities arising with the name can be displayed. These foregone possibilities

have counterparts in the pre-conscious realm. Analysis attempts to discover which "meanings", latent in the linguistic fore-structure, are and are not realized.

This discussion shows what it means to have a common social reality within the organization. The reality is in constant production and reproduction in organizational discourse and action. Linguistic expression both constitutes and represents experience and social reality. For the individual member, the phenomena of everyday life come to her/him as already meaningful within the context of that organization. From this basis of a meaningful world of which the individual is conscious, symbolic interaction between members allows them to negotiate, in a derivative mode (speaking or writing, for example), specific meanings. In its derivative form communication can be studied in terms of effectiveness, relational content, and directionality.

Rhetorical Analysis in Organizations

In light of this account of experience we can say that while speaking and writing in the organization perform instrumental functions such as transferring information and changing opinions, more fundamental processes are also at work. Rhetorical analysis, properly understood, may be better able to demonstrate these processes than scientific analysis. For as Gadamer showed: "the rhetorical and hermeneutic [interpretive] aspects of human linguisticality completely inter-penetrate each other."[13] Not all rhetorical critics have recognized this, for as Gadamer goes on, "It is a symptom of our failure to recognize this . . . [that] we think in terms of organizing a perfect and perfectly manipulated information—a turn modern rhetoric seems to have taken."[14]

Several modern rhetorical theorists have discussed rhetoric as "epistemic."[15] Their discussions are useful in describing how organizational rhetoric functions in regard to the fore-structure which makes possible a consensual social reality. Rhetoric does not primarily function in changing attitudes or views of the world

but effect, the very sense of what is real and what is true in the world. Rather
than review the extensive body of literature relevant here, we will just sketch
a concept of rhetoric as generative. Scott's work provides the best introduction
to an explanation of rhetoric's role in the reality construction process. "Rhetoric
may be the art of persuasion, that is, it may be seen from one angle as a practical
capacity to find means to ends on specific occasions; but rhetoric must also be
seen more broadly as a human potentiality to understand the human condition."[16]
Scott explains rhetoric's contribution to the understanding of how human action
is decisive, how it is a choice among possibilities. Our tradition provides us
with possibilities, and our "human condition" is the responsibility we have to
make what he describes as ethical choices. Hyde and Smith more explicitly describe
rhetoric's function. "If the hermeneutical situation [the fore-structure] is
the 'reservoir' of meaning, then rhetoric is the selecting tool for making-known
this meaning."[17] It is through speech that we reveal the possibilities the
situation makes available to us.

Given the formative character of rhetoric and the account of organizational
experience, revised concept of rhetorical criticism is needed. Clearly the
critic can neither understand the rhetorical acts nor engage in criticism without
entering into the "reality" of the organization. The characterization of rhetorical
criticism we have adopted is clearly presented in Hyde and Smith's recent article.

Criticism involves interpretation--an explication of the meaning of the
rhetorical act. This explication (e.g., "is this talk a 'statistical report'
or an 'attempt to impress the boss'?") requires an investigation of the structured
experience of the rhetor/member in the organization. The fore-structure of the
critic is also of interest since criticism is actually an interpretation of an
interpretation. As Hyde and Smith showed: "when the rhetorical critic makes-
known the meaning of this collection of rhetorical acts, the critic in turn
performs a similar conscious act, thereby becoming a critic and rhetor in the

same moment."[18] The understanding which arises in the dialectic of critic's and members' experience is of the relation of particular rhetorical acts to the meaning structure from which they arise and in which they make sense. In understanding, the experience drawn together and presented in the rhetorical action is deconstructed, showing what possibilities are opened by the action as well as those which are closed off. To see the rhetorical event's significance is to reveal the entailments or structural implications of the act in the organization's social reality.[19]

The principal difficulty confronting the critic is to find a way of entering the organizational reality which does not objectify both the critic and the interpretive function of rhetoric and yet which retains the distance of the critic so that the analysis may be "productive." Given the linguisticality of experience, everyday language use serves as an appropriate text for the rhetorical critic.[20] The actual analysis cannot be simply a content analysis since the experiential context for meaning would be lost.

A method is needed to analyze language use which would show in detail how talk functions to constitute the reality of a particular organization. Several theorists have conducted research in this area. McGee's and Bormann's work are of greatest interest to our study.

McGee's discussion of ideographs shows one way of looking at the manner in which our social reality is constituted through symbolic interaction. Ideographs ("liberty," "freedom") help constitute and regulate the social consciousness of a group; a particular ideograph implies a particular gestalt of attitudes and meanings for any member of that group. Ideographs are "one-term sums of an orientation . . . ."[21] To get an adequate description of a group, then, would involve:[22]

1. The isolation of the society's ideographs.

2. The exposure and analysis of the diachronic structure of the ideographs.

3. The synchronic analysis of all ideographs in a particular setting.

Bormann's analysis of fantasy themes is another attempt to understand the process of constituting social reality.[23] He describes chains of recurrent themes which are dramatized in group talk: "fantasy themes." These themes grow out of experiences of the group or group members, and are validated and extended to the extent that members identify with the drama. Interlocking patterns of these fantasy themes Bormann calls "rhetorical visions." These involve large groups of people in a common orientation. Fantasy theme analysis allows the rhetorical critic to see the evolution of group "reality." This involves synthesizing the rhetorical visions from transcripts of group talk, then casting these visions into a dramatical model: who were the players, what were the settings, scenarios, meanings, endings?

While both of these approaches are productive in specific analyses and help to demonstrate the way that symbolic actions affect social realities, their focus is on specific linguistic acts rather than the linguistic system as a whole. This makes them better at describing special events or concepts than everyday ones, and tends to make analyses somewhat ad hoc. Our interest is in investigating the systematicity of linguistic acts in organizations in order to understand both individual meanings and organization-wide integration. We find the analysis of metaphor use to be more helpful in explicating the fore-structure upon which meaning and integration are based.

Metaphors have already been shown to be important for the understanding of organizational reality in the works of Weick and Manning. Weick views metaphors as good indicators of the way members think of themselves and their jobs. Established metaphors can influence members' conceptualizations, and pose a threat to innovation to the extent that they are not seen as at least partially dis-

cretionary.[24] Manning describes more specifically the constituting force of language in organizations.[25] His later article is concerned with metaphor, simile, metonymy and synechdoche as model-building devices for organizational researchers.[26]

The power of metaphor has been found by Osborn and Ehninger to depend partially upon "qualifiers," forces which formulate lines of association which suggest how the metaphor should be understood.[27] These qualifiers depend upon the culture and tradition of the speaker and listener for their impact. Particularly potent are archetypal qualifiers, which appeal to pervasive, powerful images such as light and darkness, land and sea. Jamieson's recent metaphor analyses describe the use of these powerful figures in the speeches of individual rhetors.[28] This yields insight into the mind-sets of individuals, but her focus on intentionally constructed metaphors and the instrumental relation of the speaker to the audience does not parallel our interest in the more basic epistemic function of everyday talk in organizations.

Lakoff and Johnson's Account of Metaphor

Lakoff and Johnson's current work on metaphor goes further in describing the internal and external systematicity of metaphorical expressions and their relation to human experience.[29] They see metaphor as a pervasive, endemic part of our language. By analyzing the networks and systems of interlocking metaphors exhibited in language, they attempt to show that the conceptualization of the world is largely dependent upon systems of metaphors which are grounded in every-day experience. Connecting their description of metaphor use to the conception of social reality given by the phenomenologists allows a systematic analysis of social realities in organizations.

Lakoff and Johnson suggest that there are nonmetaphorical concepts that

emerge from direct experience. These include at least spatial orientations (up-down), ontological concepts arising in physical experience (entities, substances, persons), and structured experiences and activities (seeing, eating, moving). Metaphorical concepts are structured in terms of these basic concepts; a metaphor in the form A is B represents this conceptualization of one kind of object or experience in terms of another. In the language developed in this paper, metaphor presents one way seeing as is possible.

Metaphorical concepts fall into three categories: orientational metaphors (e.g., control is up: "I have control over him."); ontological metaphors (e.g., the mind is a machine: "We're turning out new ideas every day."); and structural metaphors (e.g., understanding is seeing: "I see what you're saying."). These metaphors have become sedimented through habitual use. Lakoff and Johnson call them "literal metaphors" to stress the point that while seeming literal, they depend upon a comparison between two different kinds of things.[30] This literalness is the everyday derivative mode in which the seeing as, and the entire fore-structure which makes that possible, is covered up.

Lakoff and Johnson describe these basic metaphors as fundamental in our language. A basic metaphor (e.g., time is money) "entails" other metaphors (e.g., time is valuable, time can be spent, saved, lost, etc.) due to the fore-structure of our experience. Complex networks of metaphors permeate our language, leading us to conceptualize things in certain ways. These metaphors are usually coherent, and can be traced back to fundamental forms of experience. For example, "more is up" ("the number of thefts skyrocketed") because we can see piles of things get higher as more are added. Inconsistent metaphors can be explained by tracing them to different realms of experience.

Metaphor Analysis in Organizations

Metaphor analysis in organizations begins with recording everyday talk within the organization. By isolating the metaphors (both "literal" and "novel") and casting them into the coherent structures Lakoff and Johnson describe, the researcher provides a base of data from which to explore the constitution of the organization's social reality.

The isolation of metaphors from organizational talk is possible due to the common forestructure out of which both the organizational members and the critic operate. This shared situation allows the critic to enter the organization and experience it as meaningful, and to recognize the metaphors in play. The critic sees the operation of a TIME is MONEY metaphor because s/he understands "money" and the nonmetaphorical features it entails. This understanding allows for a circular progression of identification of additional metaphors and their entailments. This hermeneutic circle which presupposes an interpreted (seen as) world is a generation of new implications for the organizational reality out of the meaningful world of the present under-standing.[31]

The reflexive nature of this analysis makes it difficult to present a sequential procedure for analysis. Instead we will develop a simple example to illustrate how Lakoff and Johnson's treatment of metaphors can be used to demonstrate the unified conceptual/experiential system which lends order to metaphor use. Due to its wide use and centrality to organizational life, the ORGANIZATION IS MACHINE metaphor is a good example for analysis.

The machine metaphor highlights the material-processor aspect of organizations and downplays structural change and humane ideation. It structures organizational experience of various activities, people and objects as input, power sources, interchangeable parts, breakdowns and repairs. For example:

"We need more input on that decision."
"The whole company needs an overhaul (tuneup)."
"Can you get this company running again."
"We're primed for a recession."
"We've got to get this thing cranked out."
"R and D needs retooling."

A sensitive observer overhearing organizational members talking in this way would have a good intuitive sense of how members experience life in the organization. This intuitive sense arises out of the observer's background understanding (forestructure) which makes possible the identification of the theme which ties the metaphors together, i.e., the overriding MACHINE metaphor. The sense of metaphors "hanging together" is referred to as "internal systematicity." Our analysis describes this coherence, thus, explicating what would otherwise be left to the intuition of the observer.

Internal systematicity is demonstrated by labeling the main metaphor (e.g., ORGANIZATION IS MACHINE) which integrates the particular occasions of metaphor use by members. In the ORGANIZATION IS MACHINE metaphor, the members' experience of the organization is structured by their shared and more clearly delineated understanding of machines. Members' experience of machines (which includes such things as what machines are, what can be done with them, how to fix them and so forth) is used to structure the as-yet-less-clearly-delineated experience of organizations. The conceptual power of the metaphor comes from this "directionality." The use of a metaphorical expression is made possible and has its power by an indirect reference to the main metaphor and the entire conceptual schema which structures experience with its use.

The example metaphor, ORGANIZATIONS ARE MACHINES, can be used to draw together expressions by which shared experience of machines can be seen to structure organizational experience.

Main Metaphor: Organization is machine

1) shared understanding: machine has interlocking parts

   organizational entailment: organization has interlocking parts

   Metaphors evidencing entailment:

   > "Everything is going like clockwork."
   > "He really threw a wrench into the works."
   > "Their timing is off."
   > "Something is in the wrong gear."

2) shared understanding: Friction is created as machineswork

   organizational entailment: Friction is created as organizations work

   metaphors evidencing entailment:

   > "Here come the rub."
   > "We're burning ourselves out."
   > "We'd better slow down and cool off."
   > "We're going to wear him down."
   > "Sparks fly when the boss shows up."

A number of metaphors may structure the member's experience of the
organization and the events in it. In addition to "organization is machine"
an organization might be seen as "family," "game," "building," or "person."
Each metaphorical system highlights certain aspects of organizational reality
and together they provide a rich structure for that reality. The shared
entailments of the main metaphors used by an organization compose an external
systematicity of metaphor use. External systematicity demonstrates areas
of experiential integration.

To illustrate external systematicity, we need to introduce a second
example. "Organization is Organism" is another possible main metaphor.
This metaphor characterizes the organization as a living, moving being.
The shared understanding of "living beings" allows members to structure
organizational experiences in terms of this more clearly delineated under-
standing of organisms. For example:

> "Circulate that memo to department heads."
> "We need to keep growing or die."
> "A good organization needs a heart and soul as well as mind."
> "Low morale is a cancer which can engulf us all."
> "We have to treat this problem if the org. is to survive."

Entailments of this main metaphor can also be worked out:

Main Metaphor: Organization is organism

shared understanding: Organisms have a survival instinct

Organizational entailment: organizations have a survival instinct

Metaphors evidencing entailment:

> "We'll sacrifice sales now to make it through the spring slump."
> "We have to change images to survive."
> "We have to let these workers go to save the company." ·
> "Product X is starving for ad support."

Both "organization is machine" and "organization is organism" highlight different aspects of experience and lead members to experience in different manners. But there are also areas in which our experience of organisms and machines are quite similar. Both require energy and both are bounded entities which process materials. These similarities provide the basis for the shared entailments which constitute external systematicity. The shared entailments allow members to talk about certain aspects of the organization using either or both (mixed) metaphors. For example:

Main metaphors: Organization is machine
                 Organization is organism

shared understandings: organisms are material processors
   machines are material processors

mutual organizational entailments: Organizations are material processors

Metaphors evidencing mutual entailment:

> "We have to digest those statistics in order to turn out a reasonable decision."

> "Accounting is searching for more input on that."

Each metaphor structures certain aspects of the member's experience, yet neither is reducible to the other. For example, ORGANIZATION IS MACHINE emphasizes the interchangeability of parts of the organization; ORGANIZATION IS ORGANISM does not allow for such easy substitutions. Shared entailments provide the coherence between the metaphors in play. Metaphor analysis can generate a "map" showing these connections.

Novel metaphors arise out of this background network of literal metaphors. They can be new ways of indicating the experiential structure (e.g., ORGANI-ZATION IS PERSON) already in play: "The company went on its hands and knees to its stockholders." Novel metaphors can also be seen to be extensions of existing main metaphors into new realms of entailments: "The organization, not taking government threats seriously, just batted its eyelashes and con-tinued to flirt with the law." Occasionally new main metaphors appear: "The firm dribbled alone aimlessly, eddying in small pools but never really reaching the main stream." Novel metaphors that seem to capture more essen-tially the continuing experiences of members become sedimented with use and form increasingly rich structures for subsequent organizational experience.

The example we have sketched is a superficial attempt to illustrate what would go into a metaphor analysis, therefore we have stressed metaphors which structure conceptualizations of the organization as a whole. In a

real organizational setting, analysis might focus upon a particular organizational problem, such as decision building, and describe in detail the metaphors in operation. For example, Smith has described the implications of the machine metaphor when applied to communication.[32] Conceptualizing communication difficulties as "breakdowns" leads to particular kinds of solutions to them and excludes the thinking about other kinds of solutions. Organismic conceptions would highlight other aspects of the communicative experience which lend themselves to other kinds of solution.

It is not always this simple. Metaphors such as ORGANIZATION IS MACHINE are usually complexes of simpler metaphors which we use to structure our experience of machines. It would be possible to break down these complexes into the more basic ontological, structural and activity metaphors described by Lakoff and Johnson. An important question then becomes, when does the analysis end? Theoretically, the analysis could continue indefinitely as the critic followed out the interconnected chains of metaphors. The termination of the analysis is determined by the critic's purpose in doing the analysis.

By isolating the predominant metaphors and their entailments, critics can describe the current reality and conceptions of members of the organization in varying degrees of detail. In addition, the critic can begin to spell out entailments which are latent in the overriding metaphor, but which are being ignored or downplayed by members. For example, if organizations are machines, what is the "oil" which allows them to run smoothly? Who decides when they need retooling or replacement? These kinds of questions are askable within the current framework of the organization. The value of this creative analysis is that it shows, not only what the current reality of the organization is like, but what other possibilities are open to it.

This is not to say that predictions could be made as to what would happen
in the future of the organization, but a format is provided for discussion
of what could _possibly_ happen.

Such knowledge would certainly be useful for the organizational critic.
The critic, having engaged in the interpretation and understanding dimen-
sions of "organizational criticism," is engaged in application. New possi-
bilities for expression and understanding are conceptualized. Limitations
of current metaphors (What is NOT machine-like about organizations) can be
revealed. The unproductive aspects of current metaphors can be balanced
by consideration of alternative entailments of all the metaphors in play.
If people are not interchangeable parts, perhaps consideration of other met-
aphors would be productive in thinking about the members of the organization--
ORGANIZATION IS FAMILY, or ORGANIZATION IS CONVERSATION. As critic, the analyst
sees new meaning in the phenomena of the organization, by virtue of these
new possibilities. S/he must now explicate these new possibilities for
consideration by members of the organization.[33] In this process, a reality
evolves and an organization is constituted.

Notes

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[3] Bonnie M. Johnson, Communication: The Process of Organizing (Boston:
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[4] Leonard Hawes, "Elements of a Model for Communication Processes," Quarterly
Journal of Speech, 59 (1973), 15.

[5] David Seibold, Scott Poole and Robert McPhee, "New Prospects for Research
in Small Group Communication," Current Perspectives on the Study of Small Group
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[6] Leonard Hawes, "Social Collectivities as Communication: A Perspective on
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[7] Martin Heidegger, Being and Time. trans. Macquarrie and Robinson (New York:
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Quarterly Journal of Speech, 65 (1979), 347-63; Stanley Deetz, "Words Without
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59 (1973), 40-51; and Deetz, "Conceptualizing Human Understanding: Gadamer's
Hermeneutics and American Communication Studies," Communication Quarterly, 26
(1978), 12-23.

[8] Heidegger, pp. 182 ff.

[9] Heidegger, pp. 191 ff.

[10] Gadamer, pp. 345 ff.

[11] Gadamer, _Philosophical Hermeneutics_, trans. and ed. Linge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 29.

[12] The distinction between representative and constitutive views of language is important but difficult. See Deetz, "Words Without Things."

[13] Gadamer, _Philosophical Hermeneutics_, p. 25.

[14] Gadamer, _Philosophical Hermeneutics_, pp. 25-26.

[15] For review see, Michael Leff, "In Search of Ariadne's Thread: A Review of the Recent Literature on Rhetorical Theory," _Central States Speech Journal_, 29 (1978), 73-91.

[16] Robert Scott, "On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic: Ten Years Later," _Central States Speech Journal_, 27 (1976), 266.

[17] Hyde and Smith, p. 354.

[18] Hyde and Smith, p. 357.

[19] For more on the nature of this implicative structure see, Deetz, "An Understanding of Science and a Hermeneutic Science of Understanding," _Journal of Communication_, 23 (1973), 139-159.

[20] We are defining our analysis as rhetorical in terms of our goals rather than object of analysis. This seems legitimate given the Report of the Committee on the Advancement of Rhetorical Criticism and the recent discussion by Barbara Sharf, "Rhetorical Analysis of Nonpublic Discourse," _Communication Quarterly_, 28 (1980).

[21] Michael McGee, "The 'Ideograph': A Link Between Rhetoric and Ideology," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 66 (1980), 1-16.

[22] McGee, p. 16.

[23] Ernest Bormann, "Fantasy and Rhetorical Vision: The Rhetorical Criticism of Social Reality," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 58 (1972), 396-407.

[24] Weick, p. 47-51.

[25] Peter Manning, "Talking and Becoming: A View of Organizational Socialization," Understanding Everyday Life, ed. Jack D. Douglas (Chicago: Aldine, 1970), pp. 239-258.

[26] Peter Manning, "Metaphors of the Field: Varieties of Organizational Discourse," Administrative Science Quarterly, 24 (1979), 660-71.

[27] Michael Osborn and Douglas Ehninger, "The Metaphor in Public Address," Speech Monographs, 29 (1962), 223-34.

[28] Kathleen Jamieson, "The Metaphoric Cluster in the Rhetoric of Pope Paul VI and Edmund G. Brown, Jr.," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 66 (1980), 51-72.

[29] George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, in press); also "Toward an Experientialist Philosophy," The Journal of Philosophy, in press; and "The Metaphorical Structure of the Human Conceptual System," Cognitive Science, in press.

[30] Lakoff and Johnson, "Experientalist Philosophy."

[31] This circular but formative character of interpretation is a major methodological issue. See Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp.

[32]Dennis Smith, "The Fallacy of the Communication'Breakdown'," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 56 (1970), 343-346.

[33]For a further discussion of the formative process of criticism, see, Lawrence Grossberg, "Marxist Dialectics and Rhetorical Criticism," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 65 (1979), 235-249.