

DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 178 584

TM 009 769

AUTHOR Pougiales, Pita; Kempner, Ken  
 TITLE Evaluation of Ideology: A Case Study of Social Change.  
 INSTITUTION Oregon Univ., Eugene. Center for Educational Policy and Management.  
 SPONS AGENCY Office of Education (DHEW), Washington, D.C. Women's Educational Equity Act Program.  
 PUB DATE Apr 79  
 NOTE 4pp.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association (63rd, San Francisco, California, April 8-12, 1979)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC02 Plus Postage.  
 DESCRIPTORS Beliefs; \*Change Agents; \*Change Strategies; Changing Attitudes; Educational Change; Evaluation Methods; Evaluators; Females; Goal Orientation; \*Justice; Models; \*Program Evaluation; Sex Fairness; \*Social Change; \*Social Values  
 IDENTIFIERS Womens Educational Equity Act

ABSTRACT

A theoretical model and a case study are described to support the premise that the ideological levels of members of a social change project must be identified in order to assess their potential for inducing change and to evaluate that change. A conceptual model of the development of a social justice ideology is formulated, and is described as being most pertinent to change projects. The change agents' ideology is classified in one of three developmental stages. By understanding a member's concept of social justice, the potential extent of change is gauged. Three parallel characteristics of change groups are identified: the ideological basis of change; the intended outcomes in terms of social change; and the change techniques. Data used in developing the ideological model are based on a project evaluation, funded by the Women's Educational Equity Act (WEEA) to increase the number of female public school administrators within a particular state. It is suggested that evaluation should encompass not only the goals and outcomes of a project, but also the ultimate goals, the justification for those goals, and the manner in which the goals are attained. Also, it is advocated that evaluation methods include an assessment of ideological concepts and social justice. (MH)

\*\*\*\*\*  
 \* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made \*  
 \* from the original document. \*  
 \*\*\*\*\*

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH  
EDUCATION & WELFARE  
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF  
EDUCATION

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRO-  
DUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM  
THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGIN-  
ATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS  
STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT  
THE OFFICIAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF  
EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY.

ED178584

TM009 769

EVALUATION OF IDEOLOGY:  
A CASE STUDY OF SOCIAL CHANGE

PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS  
MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

*Ken Kempner*  
*Rita Pougiales*

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES  
INFORMATION CENTER ERIC

By

Rita Pougiales  
Ken Kempner

Center for Educational Policy and Management  
University of Oregon  
Eugene, Oregon 97401

April 1979

Order of authorship was determined in a socially just manner by the toss of a coin. We wish to thank Dr. Jean Stockard with whom we co-authored a previous paper on this topic. We also thank Nancy Gubka for her editorial assistance.

The research reported herein was supported in part by funds from the Women's Educational Equity Act, Office of Education, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Opinions expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the policies or positions of the Office of Education, nor should any official endorsement of the report be inferred from the reporting agencies. Prepared for American Educational Research Association Annual Conference, San Francisco, California, 1979.

## EVALUATION OF IDEOLOGY:

### A CASE STUDY OF SOCIAL CHANGE

Planned social change projects are funded by their benefactors to conduct activities which will effect significant change. To determine the extent and effectiveness of a project's efforts, an evaluation is typically accomplished. In the evaluation of a project to increase the number of women in educational administration funded by the Women's Educational Equity Act (WEEA), the authors of this paper have found ideology to be a critical determinant of a change effort's ultimate effectiveness. Our basic premise is that only through identification of the ideological level of a social change project's members can their potential for inducing change be determined and an evaluation accomplished.

In this paper, a planned social change project is defined as any pre-meditated effort to alter the existent values and behaviors of individuals or groups of individuals. Social change occurs and is significant when, as defined by John Stuart Mill (1871: 94-95), "One custom or institution. . . from being a supposed primary necessity of social existence has passed into the rank of an universally stigmatized injustice and tyranny." This passage is complete when the customs, values and laws of the society and the behavior of the people reflect the belief that the previous customs or institutions were unjust.

Because planned change projects are treatments or interventions in the social system and not simple experimental treatments of individuals, we follow Riecken's and Boruch's (1974: 164) tripartite distinction of goals

to be considered in an evaluation. According to Riecken and Boruch, project goals can be classified as "performance," "instrumental," and "ultimate." At the performance stage, daily activities are accomplished to implement the instrumental goal. These instrumental goals provide, in turn, the "principal means" to accomplish the ultimate goals.

Often in the evaluation of change projects only the performance goals are considered and success is determined on the basis of how well the project members accomplish their daily tasks and objectives. For example, an evaluation limited to consideration of successful accomplishment of a project objective, such as the publication of a quarterly newsletter, does not examine the worth of the objective itself--publishing a newsletter. Competent evaluations must consider, therefore, not only the performance goal, publishing the newsletter, but also the instrumental goal, the worth of the newsletter. Finally, for an evaluation to provide a complete accounting of a project's social change efforts, the ultimate goals of the project must be evaluated. In this newsletter example, the evaluation of the ultimate goal would consider how well the newsletter assisted the project in effecting change.

Although evaluation of the three goal stages is necessary, consideration of the ultimate goal provides the method to determine the full extent of social change effected by a project. In this paper we will offer why consideration of the ideological development of a planned social change project and its members provides the best indication of the potential or past effectiveness of a project to induce social change. Even though the context of our work has been an educational change project, the following theoretical development

is generalizable beyond education issues and beyond sexism issues. Through an explanation of our theoretical framework we offer our concepts of ideological development, provide an example of our data analysis and discuss the implications. By understanding under what conditions change can be anticipated, not only can an effective evaluation be accomplished, but individuals who wish to effect social change should better be able to develop effective strategies.

### Theoretical and Conceptual Background

To determine the best methods to evaluate a project's goals and the strategies it employs we must understand first how social change can occur. Although there can be no certain procedures to discover the requisites of change and how to evaluate them, we have chosen a methodology which lies between dogmatic empiricism and theoretical abstraction. Heeding the advice of Donald T. Campbell (1975: 17), who reminds us that "in ordinary science, the one who designs the experiment also reads the meter," we do not limit our investigation to the hypothesis-test method. Because the scientist must select the methods and procedures to be used in an experiment, empirical verification must exclude what are assumed to be extraneous variables. Thomas Kuhn (1970: 59) comments on this subjective procedure by explaining that the choice of a "particular piece of apparatus and to use it in a particular way carries an assumption that only certain sorts of circumstances will arise." He likens this method to "puzzle solving" or "achieving the anticipated in a new way (p. 36)." When "members of a given community" operate within the strictures of a particular mind-set, Kuhn terms their "entire constellation of beliefs, values and techniques" a "paradigm (p. 175)."

A major methodological issue is, therefore, the need for researchers and experimenters to move beyond the parochialism of a specific paradigm and generate new concepts and new theories. Had Columbus not disregarded the scientific evidence of a flat world, he would not have sought funding for his experiment. Likewise, we must understand that we presently cling to paradigms that will seem as humorous to our descendants as our ancestors' paradigms now seem to us.

How then can we ever expect to move beyond our present paradigms to generate new concepts and theory? Because dogmatic adherence to the hypothesis-test-pronounce method keeps evaluators within the confines of anticipated solutions, we must devise methods that allow us to look outside of our paradigms. Whatever the methods may be to help us escape the narrowness of our paradigms, any single method cannot completely define reality. Norman Denzin maintains (1970: 26), and we agree, that "multiple methods" must be used "because each method reveals different aspects of empirical reality." In this approach to defining reality, Denzin echoes the sentiments of Webb, et al (1966: 174) who state, "There must be multiple operationalism. . .this means, obviously, that the notion of a single 'critical experiment' is erroneous." This concept of multiple methods or operationalism, also known as "triangulation" (Campbell and Fiske, 1959), has been expanded by Denzin (1970: 301) to include "varieties of data, investigators, and theories" in addition to methods. For our inquiry into the process of social change and its evaluation to be worthwhile we must employ, therefore, a variety of methods, data, theories and investigators.

### Building Theory

To see beyond the confines of our paradigms we must generate new concepts and use different methods to lead us to unanticipated findings. Building new theories is, therefore, an important issue in our inquiry into discovering the essential components of planned social change evaluations. Because much investigation concludes erroneously with the proclamation of new theory, we will initiate our inquiry by offering a definition of theory, as the term is commonly used in social science research.

With the current quantitative devotion by most researchers and evaluators in education and psychology, we have necessarily turned to other disciplines for a definition of theory and an explanation of how to build theory. Sociologist Norman Denzin (1966:6), for example, explains, "Rather than applying just a set of methodological principles to research strategies--which leads to an even greater gap between theory and method--I combine a theoretical perspective with a series of methodological rules." For Denzin (p. 5), theory is defined as an "integrated body of propositions the derivation of which leads to explanation of some social phenomena." Similarly, Robert Merton (1968:143) explains that "sociological theory refers to logically interconnected sets of propositions from which empirical uniformities can be derived."

Because we cannot yet derive "uniformities" from our inquiry, we consider our research to be, what Denzin calls "theory-work." He explains (1966:66):

What often passes for theory in sociology, however, is not theory. Instead there are various types of theory-work ranging from ad-hoc classificatory systems to categorical systems, taxonomies, and vaguely interrelated conceptual schemes.

Sociologists, however, are certainly not the only ones to blame for the development of unsubstantiated theory.

Our inquiry into understanding how best to evaluate the extent of change induced by a project is, therefore, theory-work which falls within the category of a conceptual framework. For Denzin (1966:67) a conceptual framework is developed when "descriptive categories are placed within a broad structure of both explicit and assumed propositions. . . The framework is yet too imprecise to permit the systematic derivation of propositions, but deductions are possible." On the basis of our experience with one social change project within the context of one funding effort (WEEA), we can hardly offer a completed theory. We do, however, offer a framework from which social change efforts can be evaluated and further research accomplished to develop completed theory.

The theory-work in this paper provides a conceptual framework for the evaluation of change projects which combines both qualitative and quantitative data. Although many researchers consider both types of data to be incompatible, Glaser and Strauss (1973:17) comment upon this "fundamental clash," by explaining, "What clash there is concerns the primacy of emphasis on verification or generation of theory." Whereas hypothesis testing and verification provide pronouncements of results, Glaser and Strauss (p. 40) suggest that when theory generation is the goal we must be "alert to emergent perspectives" that will help us develop our theory.

The generation of theory is made possible by what C. Wright Mills (1959: 211-212) calls "sociological imagination." This ability to "shift from one perspective to another" enables us to "build up an adequate view of a total society and its components (p. 211)." By limiting their vision to the hypothesis-



test-pronounce method, researchers and evaluators are excluding the myriad of alternative explanations that may be responsible for an effect. Through the generation of concepts and theory based on both qualitative and quantitative data, we can provide a better definition of reality to determine how best to evaluate a social change project.

A number of theoretical concepts have guided our understanding of the evaluation criteria necessary to determine the effect of ideology on social change projects. We first explore the concept of social justice, especially as formulated by John Rawls. Then, building on insights of theorists such as Jean Piaget, we suggest that individuals' cognitive processes and conceptions of justice may be understood by examining their behavior as well as their rationale for this behavior. From the work of Lawrence Kohlberg we also explore the influence of justice and morality on ideology. Finally, we cite evidence that individuals' ideology is related to their concepts of social justice which affects the extent of social change to be produced.

### Social Justice

The entire history of social improvement has been a series of transitions, by which one custom or institution after another, from being a supposed primary necessity of social existence, has passed into the rank of an universally stigmatized injustice and tyranny. So it has been with the distinctions of . . . nobles and serfs, patricians and plebians; and so it will be, and in part already is, with the aristocracies of colour, race, and sex.

--John Stuart Mill (1871: 94-95)

Only a limited amount of goods and services are ever available in a society and methods must be devised, therefore, to allocate these scarce

resources. Since the methods of distribution depend upon the values and moral code of those who have the power of distribution, the concept of social justice arises when the fairness of allocation is considered. When the methods of distribution are not universally seen as socially just, the "transition" from one "custom or institution" to another, to which Mill has referred, can begin.

In the evaluation of planned social change projects, which are presumably undertaken to create more equitable situations, the consideration of social justice is essential. To determine if a project can be effective or has been effective, the project must be evaluated upon its ability to assist in the process of "social improvement," as explained by Mill.

Because social justice is defined by the beliefs and values individuals hold, any conception of justice can be developed and considered rational for the individuals who share the same beliefs and values. This shared assumption or belief in justice is similar to Kuhn's concept of the paradigm in science. In both instances individuals operate within the strictures of a particular mind-set which, as Kuhn explains (1970:37), can "insulate" a community from "socially important problems." For example, in the creation of the American republic, the founders agreed that in their social change project all "men" were created equal. Unfortunately, the rationale for this justice was based upon the belief which meant only "men," and excluded women, slaves and other non-aristocratic outsiders from any consideration of this equality. In a similar manner, a narrowly defined social belief has limited a woman's opportunity to become an administrator in education. The

logic for the maintenance of the inequitable situation has been based upon the belief that educational administration is not a woman's role. Obviously, any conception of justice can be developed and considered rationale for individuals who share the same ideology.

Although we believe no universal concept of justice has yet been devised, effective evaluations must still judge a project's members upon their concepts of social justice. Even though justice is defined by beliefs and values of the dominant culture of a society, John Rawls (1971) offers two basic principles of justice which can be used as judgmental criteria in the evaluation of a project's concern over social justice. According to the theory, when individuals who are unaware of or "veiled" to their own position in society and knowledge of their fortunes, abilities, and intelligence assemble in an hypothetical "original position," they would choose Rawls's principles of justice (p. 12). This original position is defined as the "appropriate initial status quo, and thus the fundamental agreements reached in it are fair (p. 13)." The first principle states, basically, that every individual has an equal right to all basic liberties within the system of liberty for all. The second principle explains that social and economic inequalities are allowable only if such inequalities benefit the "least advantaged (p. 302-303)."

Rawls's principles of justice can be helpful criteria for evaluating a social change project, but we must remember that these principles are based upon certain assumptions made by Rawls. In the original position, for example, Rawls assumes that the choice of justice principles occurs behind

a "veil of ignorance," where no one "is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances (p. 12)." A further assumption of Rawls's is that individuals in the original position are "rational and mutually disinterested (p. 13)." This condition of a "well-ordered society, effectively regulated by a public conception of justice," establishes the basic assumptions under which the original position operates (p. 4-5). Even though Rawls's use of this abstract original position is an "expository device" to "envision our objectives from afar (p. 21-22)," we still have no assurance that participants in the original position who subscribe to different values or hold different political ideologies would always choose Rawls's principles of justice.

No matter how Rawls tries to have us believe the parties in the original positions are veiled to their place in society, their decisions of justice must be based upon their concepts of fairness and morality in their own society. Whatever the veil, individuals must bring their beliefs and values to the original position or they would be amoral beings, incapable of providing judgments of social justice. The parties to Rawls's original position can only provide justice as they perceive it from their own social customs and morals, whatever their fortunes or intelligence.

Rawls's theory is valuable for us, however, not only because of its worthy principles of justice, but from an analysis of the theory we can establish the criteria for judging the social justice concepts of a change project's members. Although Rawls's theory is as dependent upon assumptions

of social customs and morals as any other concept of justice, the theory does provide a basis to evaluate a change project members' conception of justice. By considering how a project deals overall with the "least advantaged" members of the society, for example, we can gauge the ultimate social effects of the project activities.

Our use of Rawls's theory must be limited, however, because although the theory provides a just method for the equitable distribution of resources, there appears no certainty in the theory that the propriety of use or production of resources will be questioned. Additionally, we are unsure that universally considered rational principles will emerge from the original position. As an example, Rawls's theory can tell us how the parties to the original position would equitably distribute Winnebago motor homes, but the theory does not tell us if the social value of having or producing Winnebagos will be considered. Even though Rawls includes the assumptions of the "veil of ignorance" and the consideration of a just amount of savings for future generations (p. 285), the rationale employed by the individuals in the original position depends upon the social beliefs they share. Even if all parties believe Winnebagos are a social necessity and that this commodity should be distributed on the basis of wealth (the current practice in our society), those with a different social perspective will still see this method of justice as irrational. In a critique of Rawls's theory, Robert Wolff (1977: 195) addresses this issue by explaining that the theory is "ideology, which is to say a prescription masquerading as a value-neutral analysis." Wolff further characterizes the theory "brusquely, as a philosophical apologia for an egalitarian brand of liberal welfare-state capitalism (p. 195)."

Although Rawls's theory is dependent upon assumptions which limit the applicability and universality of the theory, the principles of justice can serve as guidelines in the determination of the extent of change a social project can induce or has induced. Members of a social project need not subscribe to Rawls's principles of justice to be effective, but the manner in which the concepts of the "least advantaged" and "liberty" are considered can indicate how aware individuals are of their own biases. The developmental level of a social change project can be determined by the manner in which the members understand their values and consider the concept of social justice. Because there are, as yet, no universally accepted principles, individuals must become aware of their values and their beliefs and then attempt to derive principles of justice as logically as Rawls has done. By including a judgment of the manner in which a planned social change project and its members deal with the concept of justice in the methods they employ to effect change, we can determine if "social improvement" (using Mill's term) which abolishes unjust aristocracies is being accomplished.

### The Conceptual Framework of Ideology

#### Our Stage Development of the Framework

To develop a conceptual framework for the evaluation of planned social change projects we have sought theories and methods that would encompass judgments of the three goal stages of a project--performance, instrumental and ultimate. In formulating our framework we recognize that many evaluation

methodologies provide effective evaluations of performance and instrumental goals but do not adequately judge the ultimate goals of a project and indicate the extent of social change effected. Although the work by Stufflebeam, et al (1971), for example, focuses upon performance and instrumental goals for decision-making, this methodology does not sufficiently consider the ultimate social goals. As another example, Ernest House's work (1976), which considers Rawls's theory of justice to provide "a standard by which evaluations can be judged for their justice (p. 99)" does not comprehensively explain if the ultimate goals of a change project would be evaluated. To use Rawls's theory as a standard means acceptance of similar social assumptions, which have been characterized by Wolff as liberal-capitalist "apologia." In a similar manner, responsive (Stake, 1967) and value-free (Scriven, 1975) evaluation methodologies do not provide methods to judge the ultimate effects of social change projects.

In conceptualizing a framework that could judge the ultimate goals of a social change project we have begun with Piaget's (1953: xviii) concern over the "operational mechanisms" of cognitions rather than only the outcome of these cognitions. By placing the emphasis in our theory-work on the cognitive process, as Piaget has done, we have attempted to understand the values and interactions which influence the ultimate goals. Judgments of outcomes can provide only a partial description of reality when we understand that the ramifications of change projects should continue to be apparent in the future.

To create extensive, long-term change, projects should leave some continuing legacy of their efforts. An example of this legacy is when an educational change project (the one upon which our data is based) recruits

women to a doctoral program in educational administration. Because the women may need several years to complete their degrees and several more years to gain the necessary experience to become an administrator, the effects of the project's efforts may not be apparent for six or seven years. Additionally, assuming the project caused the recruitment of women to the doctoral program to become a priority activity for the institution, women who enter the program in the future will benefit from the legacy of change created by the project. The evaluation of a project only on the basis of its present outcomes would provide only a partial indication of change the project may induce. Because social change projects should leave a legacy of change after their funding has ended, it is essential that we estimate this legacy and its process of development in the evaluation of the full extent of a project's effect.

Only when we evaluate both the processes and outcomes of a change project can we completely determine the ultimate effect of a project. Evaluation of performance and instrumental goals can indicate only if a project completed its objectives. Through consideration of the ideology of a project's members, however, we can judge the social effect a project has made and will continue to make in the future.

Because we can never be certain of individuals' cognitive process and ideology from their response to a questionnaire or interview, for example, we have used multiple observations to indicate a change project members' ideology. Through the triangulation of indicators such as the manner in which the work was conducted, the rationale for policies and strategies, and



the behavioral outcomes of the project, we have been able to provide an analysis of the project members' values.

Whereas Kohlberg, whose ideas we shall next examine, uses a "pencil and paper" test of individuals' purported behavior to identify their level of cognitive moral development, we have used individuals' behavior in concrete situations to indicate their cognitions. We follow these procedures because we have limited confidence in data that were derived from **an interview** which predicts behavior from an abstract situation. Through observation of how members of a federally-funded social change project developed and instituted their change strategies we have been able to classify their cognitive processes on the basis of their concrete behavior in the actual social change situation.

### The Nature of Ideology

We have relied on the work of a number of theorists to understand how people's beliefs change as a result of environmental and interpersonal interaction, and how beliefs influence attitudes and behavior. While a full investigation of the beliefs of a project staff are clearly beyond the scope of any evaluator, certain values, particularly those that pertain to the stated goals of a project, are pertinent to an evaluation of the project.

Beliefs are intrinsic in human action and are essential in the interpretation of behavior. While beliefs have traditionally been overlooked in educational research, they reflect the values and cognitive understanding

from which people act and are, therefore, critical for an analysis of social change projects.

Daryl Bem defines beliefs as one's cognitive representation of the world. He describes beliefs as dependent upon "one's own sensory experience or upon a basic belief in the credibility of some external authority (Bem, 1970:5)." Beliefs also represent one's accumulated personal experiences and one's inherited cultural knowledge (Berger and Luckman, 1967).

We have chosen the term "ideology" to designate "an interlocking set of beliefs (Bowers, 1977: 35)" used to justify cultural maintenance or change. Ideology, as all beliefs, develops out of the personal experiences of individuals. According to Mannheim, "The ideological element in human thought. . . is always bound up with the existing life-situation of the thinker (Mannheim, 1936: 80)." Ideology is also the set of beliefs used to justify collective political behavior: "It is the direction of this will to change or to maintain, of the collective activity, which produces the guiding thread for the emergence of their problems, their concepts and their focus of thought (Mannheim, 1936: 4)." Ideology is comparable to Bem's notion of "first order beliefs based upon an unquestioned zero-order faith in some internal or external source of knowledge (Bem, 1970: 6-7)." In our framework, we will refer to both individual ideology and group ideology. Although the differences of individual ideology is never fully reflected in group decisions, we categorize group ideology on the basis of the consensual decisions.

Moral Beliefs as Ideology. In this conceptual framework, we are concerned about certain moral values, particularly the concept of justice as equity. We assume that the moralism of justice as equity is an ideology when it is used to justify social change. Because the change project we have analyzed attempted to achieve a more equitable situation for women in educational administration, we view the project members' beliefs regarding change as their ideology.

Kohlberg has done extensive theoretical work in the area of moral development. Drawing on the work of Piaget, Dewey, Mead, Rawls, and others, he has developed a theory which accounts for the development of moral reasoning. The concept of morality is central to this developmental schema: "morality is a natural product of a universal human tendency toward empathy or role taking, toward putting oneself in the shoes of other conscious beings. It is also a produce of a universal human concern for justice (Kohlberg, 1976: 675)." Human morality, then, is one's accumulated advancement toward an ideal form of justice. Kohlberg envisions advancement as extending from simple reciprocity to socially defined forms of justice, and finally, to the creation of a more just society.

Kohlberg's work has given us theoretical guidance and support for our evaluation framework. He explains that one's moral reasoning changes as a result of interpersonal and environmental interaction, and the social context in which one interacts. We assume that the dynamics of development that apply to moral reasoning can be applied to more specific ideological change; in our framework, one's conception of justice is comparable to moral reasoning.

Kohlberg's theory provides an understanding of how moral reasoning changes through a developmental process. Underlying Kohlberg's developmental model he envisions a dialectical process of "differentiation" and "integration" (Kohlberg, 1969: 390). When people experience an incongruous situation (differentiation), they adjust cognitively to reach a state of equilibrium (integration). This inherent process facilitates moral reasoning development as people experience beliefs or situations that are new.

Conditions for Moral Reasoning. Kohlberg describes moral development as a logical progression in reasoning that develops from two sources: role-taking opportunities and moral atmosphere. Role taking is a form of social interaction where the self is able to understand the reality of another in a behavioral and verbal exchange.<sup>1</sup>

The nature and frequency of role-taking opportunities influence the extent of moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1969: 402). It is in this empathic mode that people are able to understand conflicting points of view and generalize their judgments according to a broader social knowledge. Although one's understanding from such role-taking opportunities can be used for a variety of purposes, we assume that the change groups to which we refer have made a prior commitment to social justice.

We assume that members of a change project are more apt to change their moral beliefs or ideology if they are in a position to interact and assume the roles of others. For participants in a social change project, these role-taking opportunities come both within and outside of their project activities. As project members interact socially and philosophically they affect each

other's perceptions; likewise, when they interact with their target audiences they experience support or defiance for their beliefs. In either situation, they experience the role and attitudes they are attempting to change.

Some poignant examples of this process occurred during the anti-war and civil rights movements. An oft quoted incident in the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) typifies experiences that led women to form their own campaign for rights. In response to a paper regarding women's inequitable treatment which was presented to that organization, Stokely Carmichael commented, "The only position for women in SNCC is prone." A similar presentation by women in the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) elicited "storms of ridicule and verbal abuse." At a later SDS convention when women asked for a policy commitment to women's rights, they were thrown out of the convention (Hole & Levine, 1971: 403-405). In these cases, women's understanding of their sexual stereotyping and harassment came once they experienced the role of protagonist for their rights.

A similar situation occurs for social change efforts. In the interactions which are a part of a change effort, participants are in a position to assume other roles and develop an understanding or empathy for those in inequitable situations. One possible outcome from this role taking is that project participants would change their level of moral reasoning to match the inequities they experience.

These examples indicate priority of values individuals hold and illustrate how inconsistencies in values can occur (Schuman, 1973: 347-354). While an

individual might invoke principled rationales for certain changes, such reasoning may not be consistent with other inequities. The concept of priority of values implies that people's awareness and willingness to change rests on their experiences and other social and economic factors in their lives. The males involved in SDS and SNCC invoked their principles of social justice, although they were not willing or able to see their own repressive relationship with women. Their morality was situational and limited. Likewise, for funded change groups, while participants will invoke justifiable principles to denounce the inequitable situations they are trying to change, their reasoning can also be limited. For those involved in social change projects, it is essential to see beyond these situational values.

While role-taking opportunities do not guarantee that project participants will change or alter their moral reasoning, it is a necessary condition for such change. The essential point is that moral reasoning changes are facilitated when one has the opportunity to experience the inequities of others.

A second factor contributing to moral development is the moral atmosphere in which people live and work. The concept of moral atmosphere includes such variables as institutional setting, funding source, and values and background of participants. For example, in federally-funded projects, the guidelines established and the measures of accountability demanded of such projects impede their potential for change.

These two factors, role taking and moral atmosphere, are merged by Kohlberg to form a general factor of social participation; this includes both the extent and the nature of social learning and interaction,

Ideology and Action. While Kohlberg provides an understanding of the intrapersonal development of morality and limits his theory to the reasoning and cognitive level, we argue that beliefs do influence actions. There is evidence from analyses of social movements and social change agents that beliefs influence behavior. Clifford Geertz portrays ideology as a symbolic structure which guides a society, "It is when neither a society's most general cultural orientations nor its most down-to-earth, 'pragmatic' ones suffice any longer to provide an adequate image of political process that ideologies begin to become crucial as sources of sociopolitical meanings and attitudes (Geertz, 1973: 219)." Likewise, Ralph Turner observes, "the values held by the movement constituency affect selection of strategy both directly and indirectly (Turner, 1970: 151)."

In a study of change agents, Noel Tichy found that the congruence of values, cognitions and actions was highest for change agents who attempted the most dramatic social change (Tichy, 1974: 164-182). This group, which is labeled "Outside Pressure," showed the following congruent behavior: a high degree of societal criticism, a primary goal of "equalization of power," and unconventional tactics, such as mass demonstrations, confrontations, change in power structure, and civil disobedience. The other types of change agents, which were labeled "People Change," "Organizational Development," and "Analysis of the Top," share the following characteristics: a moderate to low degree of societal criticism, a primary goal of system efficiency and improvement of system problem solving, and conventional tactics such as training,

structural changes, role clarification, and technological innovations. The last three groups tended to be less congruent in their beliefs, cognitions and actions, and tended to stay within the parameter of the status quo in both their change attitudes and actions.

Tichy's survey demonstrates a correlation between beliefs and actions. Furthermore, the author suggests that the congruence of values and attitudes or cognitions influence the extent and nature of social action attempted. This is an important assumption in our framework of ideological development for change projects.

#### A Proposed Model

From our study of Rawls along with Kohlberg and Piaget, we have formulated a conceptual framework of ideological development. Kohlberg provides us with our basic assumptions of the intrapersonal dynamics of change in beliefs which include the interaction of environmental and interpersonal factors. Assuming the same dynamics, we focus on social justice as the particular ideology that is most pertinent for the investigation of change projects.

The concepts of justice held by a social change project's members enable us to classify their ideology within one of three developmental stages. By understanding how a change project's members consider the questions of social change and the inequities of the society, we can gauge the extent of change to be expected from the project. Although we are unable to determine the ultimate justice of a project, we can predict



under which levels of ideological development the most extensive social change will occur.

### Foundations of the Model

In our discussion, we will integrate three parallel characteristics of change groups: ideological basis of change, intended outcome in terms of social justice, and change techniques.

Ideological Basis of Change. We interpret the ideological basis of change by its variance from assumed values and mores. This variance requires a capacity to be socially critical, what Paulo Freire has called "conscientização" (Freire, 1968: 19), and what C.A. Bowers refers to as "cultural literacy" (Bowers, 1974). The capacity to be culturally critical is essential in a project's attempt to alter social practices and beliefs. The degree to which these capacities are present in a group will influence the nature of change. Unless a project can envision social change at the deepest "principle" level, the danger of superficial and temporary modification of cultural practices is likely (Barnett, 1942: 14-30).

We envision a continuum for this characteristic which would extend from an acceptance of cultural values to a critical awareness of those values. This critical awareness is not a rejection of values but provides an understanding of the social implications of these values. For our framework, we assume that the degree of cultural awareness is directly related to change strategies a project employs. If a project is characterized as high in its cultural awareness, then its change strategies

would reflect that awareness. The influence of role taking and moral atmosphere are critical in stimulating cultural awareness.

Consideration of Social Justice. When social justice is invoked, the assumed meaning varies from a simple reciprocity of punishment or reward to a more purposeful distribution of resources. We assume from Rawls that the most ideal form of justice would provide equal opportunity and access to resources, and assure redistribution of the inequitably allocated resources.

The nature of a project's intended degree of social justice would vary according to their intended change effort. A project that had not understood the latent value of inequality in the society would not attempt to equalize opportunity to sufficiently achieve full equity. For example, a project that attempts to equalize educational opportunities for women would fall short of an ideal goal of social justice if it were only intending to increase the number of female students in graduate school without also attempting to change the sex stereotyping in curriculum, administration and in teaching.

Kohlberg suggests a continuum for the concept of justice which extends from an assumption of an equitable social order to an assumption of a deficient, unequitable social order. The variance is in one's degree of cultural awareness and one's definition of justice; as one becomes more culturally critical and begins to see value deficiency in the social order, there is a growing concern for social justice.

Change Techniques. While the ideological basis of change and consideration of social justice are cognitive, change techniques are the

strategies and actions taken to achieve the intended change. While we do not want to be drawn into a discussion of the merits of a violent or a non-violent strategy, we recognize that the moral implications, whatever the choice, are significant (Turner, 1970). As Tichy found, techniques that defied conventional practices were used by those attempting to alter basic inequities in society while those groups that practiced more conventional techniques were primarily interested in having an organization run more efficiently.

We assume that change techniques, by themselves, are not a clear indicator of a project's ideology or potential success. When these techniques are considered along with the ideological basis for change, this analysis enables us to further determine the extent of change expected from a project.

#### Stages of Development

What we present as ideological levels for planned social change projects are not discrete categories. The levels help clarify the relationship between ideology and justice and show our proposed range of ideological development.

First level. Individuals at this level are characterized by little if no awareness or consideration of social justice and values. Change is justified on an efficient or mechanistic basis, not a value one. While a project goal may be desirable, the rationale for its implementation is efficiency or self-interest. There is no intended value change, but rather a replacement of one social form for a comparable one.

Second level. Individuals at this level are characterized by a reliance on the status quo as justification for change. While these individuals have a degree of cultural awareness, their impetus for change comes from the dominant culture. The change effort is a consensual, ethical redress and reflects the dominant cultural values. Justice, likewise, is defined by the values and interests of the dominant culture.

Third level. Individuals at this level are characterized by an awareness beyond a simple acceptance of the inherent values in society. Change is justified by principles of social justice which would mitigate the sources of inequality in social institutions and its customs and attitudes. Rather than only treat one aspect of a value (i.e., hiring procedures), the interconnecting social practices and attitudes would be changed.

#### Expectations of Change

The classification of a social change project on the basis of ideological development can indicate the potential for change a project can induce. This classification, thereby, can provide an evaluation of the ultimate project goals, the probable extent of change to be effected, and the legacy of change a project will create. Although we believe a project could be effective at each level of development, social change as previously defined can only be accomplished at the highest level. What type of change can then be expected from projects which operate at the different levels of ideological development?

First level. The inducement of social change at the first level of development is highly improbable. At this level of physical reciprocity only

an exchange of participants or methods with similar ideologies or techniques can be expected. Even though agents of change at this level may have different political allegiances than the keepers of the status quo, the change agents' dogmatic adherence to their cause will result only in the exchange of a new unjust ideology for the old unjust ideology.

In education, change that occurs at the first ideological level, such as mechanistic educational strategies that replace one bad method for another, can do little to accomplish meaningful social change. Technological innovations in education cannot create a more just situation when such innovations merely alter the instructional message which continues to reflect the inequalities of sex and race. These educational techniques that reflect social inequities become tools to assure the continuation of an unjust ideology.<sup>2</sup> Any such educational strategy can effectively meet the desired goals, but the goals may do nothing to address the inequities that exist in the present educational system. Such questions of social inequalities are not of concern to members of social change projects which operate at this first level of development. These problems are often deferred to other individuals or to other change projects in a manner similar to what Kuhn has observed in scientific research. Problems that do not fit a scientific paradigm are often "rejected as metaphysical, as the concern of another discipline," explains Kuhn (1970: 377).

New educational strategies can be successful, of course, as can any revolution. Unless the ideologies and assumptions that underlie these change efforts are examined, however, nothing more than an exchange of a new form for an old form can be expected.

Second level. At the second level of development change is allowable only within the strictures of the status quo. Because the preservation of the current social ideology is implicitly acknowledged, the only change to be accomplished is what the social system will allow. Individuals who operate at this second level of development are those who accept the customs, norms, morals and justice of the present system. Since justice is defined by the existent social ideology, individuals who operate at this mid-level develop strategies that will cause shifts within the social structure but never strategies that will cause significant social change. Change strategies at this level may include efforts to modify internal societal processes, but when the system's structure is the origin of inequities, mid-level attempts can accomplish only superficial change.

Funded interventions in this country typically occur at this second level. A variety of strategies to equalize social opportunities are developed from this perspective, but these efforts do not include changes to alter the social system's structure. In the extreme, money is allocated merely to reduce the injustice, while the inherent causes are not considered. Change agents are often committed to the status quo at this ideological level because their efforts are funded only if acceptable changes are planned. Revolutions are not usually funded by the government in power.

Change strategies in education at this level of development include, for example, those which only facilitate the interactions of individuals and groups within the present educational structure. Such efforts are devoted to

the determination of how limited educational resources can best be distributed instead of why the educational system perpetuates such inequities. Change is possible, but only to a limited extent; the internal processes of interaction can be altered but the inherent injustices in the educational system will remain. In a similar manner, government programs which patronize the poor never address the social system's role in causing the poverty initially. Although change efforts at this level of development can effectively meet their goals, change significant enough to alter the inequities in the social system cannot be accomplished.

Third level. Change agents that create strategies to question the morals, customs, values, and justice of the existent social ideology are those at the highest level of ideological development. By not passively accepting the status quo, change agents at this level are free to search for new ideologies and methods to create a more just society. Change agents who understand the bias of their own ideologies are able to maintain a cultural awareness which enables them to discard customs and morals that prevent the establishment of social justice.

Because concepts of justice are dependent upon ideology, individuals who are critically aware of their own ideology and values operate from the highest level of ideological development. Change agents who assess various ideologies, including their own, have the potential for accomplishing significant social change. Questions which consider the priority of values and the distinctions between wants and needs are those of concern for change agents at this highest level of development. Individuals at this

level will devise efforts to alter the causes of injustices through a critical analysis of the social structures that maintain inequities. In education, change agents who question the basic assumptions of the educational system, the funding structure of schools, the role of administrators, teachers, and students, and the worth of educational goods and services, are better able to plan strategies to change the inequities that exist.

### The Case Study

The data used in developing our framework was gathered by us as inside evaluators for a WEEA-funded change project which was housed at a major west coast university. The purpose of the project was to increase the number of women in public school administration within the state. We were hired six months after the project began to record the project's activities, to develop evaluative measurements of the project's success and to provide feedback to the staff on their actions.

One of the authors was hired to conduct an ethnographic study of the internal activities and process of the project while the other author was to develop instruments to measure the impact of the project on the state.<sup>3</sup> We expected to work as a team although our initial division of tasks delimited interaction. While our original concerns were limited to goals and activities of the project, our concerns broadened as we began to see the project in its larger social context. This change of focus reflected our shift from an emphasis on the performance and instrumental goals to a concern with the ultimate goals of the project.



What follows is a description of our experiences as evaluators and the development of our theoretical perspective. We will also provide examples of our data analysis and the use of our framework.

### Methodology

We achieved a synthesis in our methodologies and perspective during the initial months of working together. We were able to combine our interest in process and outcome into one broad perspective which accounted for both the quantifiable and empirical results and consequences of the project along with description of the beliefs and interactions of the people involved. In this initial perspective change agents and target groups were seen as engaged in an active and dialectical relationship. Because we believed that project members were guided by their ideologies, the process of strategy formulation was seen as important as the outcome of that strategy.

### Emergence of Ideological Focus

The project members' ideology became a focus as we noted changes of attitude and conflicts over certain beliefs. Also, as the project progressed, certain higher-order beliefs were used as rationale or incentive for activities. For example, when we first joined the project we noted a discrepancy in the members' beliefs regarding feminism. Members' responses varied from ignorance or a denial of being a feminist to an equally adamant statement of being a feminist. Within a year after this observation was made, every staff member called herself or himself a feminist (while there was still variance in their definition).

Based on this observation we developed other measures to test the presence of feminism. In addition to the field notes, a formal interview was conducted with each staff member regarding his/her feminist beliefs, a questionnaire was developed and administered to each staff member, and a group discussion was organized and facilitated by the authors. By using these multiple methods, we were able to check for both the presence and variety in this aspect of the members' ideology.

While we were able to clearly observe ideological changes in the members' concept of feminism, we wanted to see if that same developmental process applied to the more general concept of social justice. This concept seemed appropriate to apply to a change project which had made a prior commitment to equity. While equity may be assumed to be synonymous with justice, the social structural extent to which change agents envision justice can be varied. We chose to focus on the use and development of the concept of social justice because this ideology is a more powerful determinant of change. From this decision, we developed a theoretical perspective that has guided our conceptual framework. Our data for this analysis were drawn from the following sources: field notes, tapes of planning and debriefing meetings, formal project documents, and notes from informal interviews and conversations.

### Examples

As an example of the use of our framework, we will describe three general trends we observed in the project: shifts in target groups, increased responsiveness to the academic community, and a continual reluctance to commit the

project members to more extensive social goals. These examples provide indications of a level two group ideology.

As an example in the shift in target groups, one activity called for the development of training materials on sex-role socialization and stereotyping for a university extension program for practicing administrators. While one contact was made and was unsuccessful due to scheduling problems, the effort was dropped. In another activity, a class on sex equity was developed and taught for undergraduates in education. While the project members did conduct and fund the class for a number of terms, the class did not become part of the regular curriculum.

In both of these cases, the project members assumed that instituting these class offerings into the regular curriculum would help restructure the nature of administrative training. And in both cases direct interaction with the host center for purposes of adopting the courses into their curriculum was avoided. The decision not to persist in implementing changes with a primary target group reflects an acceptance of the status quo.

The experiences with the class are also an example of the project members' responsiveness to the academic community in which they were housed. A major outcome of the class was a decision to write a book on issues of sex equity in education which required a major commitment from the majority of the staff. While writing this book consumed a tremendous amount of time and energy, little was done to integrate the class into the regular curriculum, to negotiate with tenured faculty to teach it, or to incorporate any part of it into other course offerings. This example indicates a change in target groups from prac-

tioners to academics and a change of strategy from restructuring training programs to research. We interpret this as a level two ideology. In the face of potential conflict, the project members chose to abandon two activities that potentially would have altered the nature of administrative training.

Lastly, an example of the reluctance to commit the project to extensive social goals was a staff meeting discussion about the content and emphasis of the project's self-evaluation report. When the content of one chapter was described by the authors in terms of "social justice," a project member objected to that emphasis saying that the project was not funded to achieve that goal. The project member's priority was to present data to support the initial performance goals of the project rather than to present the results of the project in its ultimate social effect. This also is an example of level two ideology where some project staff have limited their concerns to the actual project activities and not to the impact of those activities.

#### Implications of Our Theory Work

The preceding theory-work and data examples have demonstrated how a project's ideology can be classified within one of three developmental stages to provide an evaluation of the ultimate social change a project can effect. The value of this conceptual framework is found in its capacity to assess a project's potential for change by looking beyond the immediate outcomes of the performance and the instrumental goals. Knowing the ideological level of a project allows us to understand the depth in which social change is considered by a project's members. This knowledge enables us to predict the degree of significant social change a project is capable of

inducing. Projects with different ideological levels will employ equally different change strategies which may have effect. Only at the highest level of ideological development, however, can we expect extensive changes in the social system.

The importance of our theory-work is that it allows us to understand the extent of social change we can expect from planned social change efforts, such as the WEEA projects. Because the change projects funded by WEEA operate at the middle level of development, we cannot expect significant changes in the status quo. This is a realistic prediction since the WEEA projects do not address the limitations of the present work structure in American society. Peter Drucker (1964: 130) identifies this problem and explains because Americans are socialized to achieve and become "number one," "'getting ahead' is seen as the exclusive criterion for success." This dissatisfaction is inherent in our social system because with a limited number of top positions the majority who want to be "number one" cannot fulfill their desire.

This concept can be illustrated with a pyramid (see diagram 1). In our American society the majority of positions with low status, power, and income are at the pyramid's base. The small percentage of highly sought "number one" positions, which are primarily accessible only to white males, are found at the pyramid's peak (Kempner, forthcoming).

Affirmative action and equal opportunity laws have attempted to remedy the inequities in the work structure by requiring women and minorities have access to all positions. Although these laws attempt to provide access to all vocational positions in society for women and minorities, the structure

Diagram 1

Work Structure Pyramid





Diagram 2

Top Position Accessibility



of the work system has not changed. Whereas, prior to equal access laws women and minorities were denied access to the top positions in society (solid line in diagram 2), these individuals have now joined white males in the race to the top of the work structure (dotted line in diagram 2).

The inherent dissatisfaction in American society, identified by Drucker, still exists even though affirmative action and equal rights legislation have theoretically opened access to women and minorities. The original, unjust ideology has been unchanged and the social structure established for and by white males remains. "Getting ahead" is still the criterion for success and the majority will continue to be dissatisfied. With the supposed full access to positions in the work structure for women and minorities, unless the number of top positions are increased, even a smaller percentage of individuals can become "number one."

Not only do the WEEA-funded projects fail to consider the inherent limitations of the present educational and work structures, they also do not consider the problem of sex stratification in the larger society. Because sexism in education reflects the sex stratification in other social institutions, projects which do not address this problem can have only limited long-range success. By limiting funding for sex equity programs in education to WEEA, the federal government may have effectively defused the opportunity to effect significant social change. WEEA may have become an effective mechanism to maintain the status quo by forcing change agents to compete for limited project money which can be used only for narrowly-defined strategies.

Change efforts that operate within the middle level of ideological development can do little but alter the internal aspects of a social system. With the knowledge that WEEA-funded projects operate at the middle level of ideological development, we can predict that change from these projects will not be extensive and cannot alter the aristocracy of sex.

In suggesting that only projects at the highest level of ideological development will be the most successful we do not advocate one method of change over another. Confrontation, awareness building, and economic incentives, for example, may be used in promoting change within any of the three levels we have delineated. It is the purpose behind change efforts that is important. If the underlying ideology involves a broad concern with social justice and if it includes a viewpoint that transcends the immediate situation we would predict that more effective change would be possible. The operation of social change activities at the highest level of ideological development provides the only manner in which the "aristocracies of colour, race and sex" can ever be overcome.

### Conclusions

In this paper we have suggested that it is not sufficient to evaluate only the performance and instrumental goals of a project and a project's immediate outcomes. Effective evaluation designs must assess the ultimate goals, the justification for the goals, and the manner in which the goals were met. Because the most effective social change projects must operate at the highest level of ideological development, evaluation designs must include an assessment of the concepts of ideology and social justice.



Present decision-oriented, responsive, and value-free evaluation methodologies can provide effective judgments of performance and instrumental goals for planned social change projects. Unless consideration is given to the project's ideology and conception of social justice, however, the real extent of a project's ultimate change efforts will not be provided.

Through the use of both qualitative and quantitative data, which consider the processes and outcomes of social change projects, effective evaluations can be accomplished. The importance of our conceptual framework is not only its focus upon ideology and social justice, but also its emphasis on the need to incorporate both quantitative and qualitative data to judge more than the immediate outcomes of the performance and instrumental goals. Through the richness of information qualitative data can provide in association with quantitative analyses, we can understand at which ideological level a project is operating to enable us to predict the extent of change a project can induce and the legacy of change it will leave.

We have used Denzin's term "theory-work" to describe our conceptualizations. In this theory-work we have attempted, therefore, to generate a conceptual framework, not verify conclusions. By not assuming specific outcomes in theory-work the researcher is able to break out of the confines of a particular paradigm to generate new concepts. Only by generating new concepts can we develop hypotheses and theories that offer new social perspectives. Through this method of conceptual generation we have found the consideration of the ideology of a project and its members to be essential in the evaluation of planned social change projects. Our theory-work offers a framework from which

additional research should be accomplished to refine concepts and ultimately lead to theory "from which empirical uniformities can be derived (Merton, 1968: 143)" and verified.

In justifying the use of our framework, we suggest that the traditional role of the evaluator must change. While evaluators have typically assumed the same social and evaluative paradigm a project prescribes, we suggest that an evaluator must be a critic of that paradigm and an advocate of change for social justice. Evaluators must stop assuming they are neutral investigators. If evaluators choose not to be explicit in their social values and intentions, we can only assume they favor maintenance of the status quo.

Evaluators are able to reveal, as we are attempting to do in this paper, the social and ideological context of change efforts, as a means to guide future change projects and research. We propose an advocacy role for evaluators which would allow the evaluators to use their data and insights to provide guidance to change efforts (Geilhufe, 1978: 202). While the field of educational research has adequate evaluative methods it is generally deficient of evaluators with sufficient social knowledge to judge the ultimate social effect of a change project.

Reference Notes

1. It should be noted that Kohlberg's use of the concept of role taking is narrower than G.H. Mead's original use of the term (Mind, Self and Society, ed. Charles W. Morris, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934).

In seeing role taking as a part of all social interaction, Mead implies that all people, even those with malevolent designs, take the role of the other.

2. Values clarification is an example of this kind of educational change. While the proponents of this technique claim it is a significant innovation, critics view it as merely a new process which perpetuates present values. See Alan Lockwood, "A Critical Review of Values Clarification," unpublished paper, University of Wisconsin at Madison.

3. For the complete exposition of these methodologies see: Ken Kempner, "A Conceptual Framework for the Evaluation of Planned Social Change," forthcoming PhD dissertation, University of Oregon, 1979; and Rita Pougiales, "A Case Study of A Social Change Project," forthcoming PhD dissertation, University of Oregon, 1979.

References

- Barnett, Homer. "Innovation and Social Change." American Anthropologist, 44, No. 1 (1942), 14-30.
- Bem, Daryl. Beliefs, Attitudes and Human Affairs. Belmont, California: Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1970.
- Berger, Peter and Thomas Luckman. The Social Construction of Reality. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1967.
- Bowers, C.A. Cultural Literacy for Freedom. Eugene, Oregon: Elan, 1974.
- Bowers, C.A. "Emergent Ideological Characteristics of Educational Policy." Teachers College Record, 79, No. 1 (September 1977), 33-54.
- Campbell, Donald T. "Assessing the Impact of Planned Social Change." Paper #8, Occasional Paper Series, Evaluation Center, College of Education, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, December 1976. Originally published in Social Research and Public Policies, ed. G.M. Lyons, Hanover, NH: Public Affairs Center, Dartmouth College, 1975.
- Campbell, Donald T. and Donald W. Fiske. "Convergent and Discriminant Validation by the Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix." Psychological Bulletin, 56 (1959) 81-105.
- Denzin, Norman K. The Research Act in Sociology: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods. London: Butterworth and Company, 1970.
- Drucker, Peter F. The Concept of the Corporation. New York: New American Library, 1964.
- Freire, Paulo. Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York: Seabury Press, 1968.
- Geertz, Clifford. The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books, 1973.
- Geilhufe, Nancy. "Discrimination Against Women in Jail: An Analysis of Advocacy Anthropology." Human Organization, 37, No. 2 (Summer 1978) 202-210.
- Glaser, Barney G. and Anselm L. Strauss. The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research. Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1967.
- Hole, Judith and Ellen Levine. Rebirth of Feminism. New York: Quadrangle Books, 1971.
- House, Ernest R. "Justice in Evaluation." In G.C. Glass (ed.), Evaluation Studies Review Annual, Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1976, 75-99.

- Kempner, Ken. "Context for Change: A Social Psychological Analysis. In Jean Stockard, et al, (eds.), Sex Equity in Education. San Francisco: Academic Press, forthcoming.
- Kohlberg, Lawrence. "Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization." In David Goslin (ed.), Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research. New York: Rand McNally, 1969.
- Kohlberg, Lawrence. "The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education." Phi Delta Kappan, (June 1975), 671-677.
- Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970.
- Mannheim, Karl. Ideology and Utopia. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1936.
- Merton, Robert K. Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: The Free Press, 1968.
- Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism. 4th Edition. London: Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer, 1871.
- Mills, C. Wright. The Sociological Imagination. New York: Grove Press, 1959.
- Piaget, Jean. Logic and Psychology. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1953.
- Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971.
- Riecken, Henry W. and Robert F. Boruch (eds.). Social Experimentation. New York: Academic Press, 1974.
- Scriven, Michael. "Evaluation Biases and its Control." Paper #4, Occasional Paper Series, Evaluation Center, College of Education, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, 1975.
- Schuman, Howard. "Attitudes vs. Actions, vs. Attitudes vs. Attitudes." Public Opinion Quarterly, Fall 1972, 347-354.
- Stake, Robert. "The Countenance of Educational Evaluation." Teachers College Record, 68 (1967) 523-540.
- Stufflebeam, Daniel, et al. Educational Evaluation and Decision-Making. Itasca, Ill.: F.E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1971.
- Tichy, Noel. "Agents of Planned Social Change: Congruence of Values, Cognitions, and Actions." Administrative Science Quarterly (June 1974) 164-182.

- Turner, Ralph. "Determinants of Social Movement Strategies." In Tamotso Shibutaini (ed.), Human Nature and Collective Behavior: Papers in Honor of Herbert Blumer. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970.
- Webb, Eugene, et al. Unobtrusive Measures: Nonreactive Research in the Social Sciences. Chicago: Rand, McNally and Company, 1972.
- Wolff, Robert Paul. Understanding Rawls: A Reconstruction and Critique of "A Theory of Justice." Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977.