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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is threefold: to recount the history of the Anacostia Community School Project (later renamed the Response to Educational Needs Project) in Washington, D.C. between 1967 and 1978; to analyze the events of the period in light of theories of historiographic and social scientific developments; and to provide lessons from the history that will be useful to policymakers in government, schools, and public interest groups. The study is arranged chronologically, with each successive chapter covering a cluster of relevant events. The author discusses: (1) the history of urban education; (2) the dynamics of organizational change; and (3) some alternative strategies. The project's birth, implementation, and change are discussed in detail. The project's goals included reviving the interest of citizens in their schools, retraining teachers, revising the curriculum to make it more relevant, providing marketable skills to students, allowing students to self pace their learning, and serving a section of the city where need was greatest. The ultimate demise of the project after 11 years was due to a number of factors including: (1) the lack of money; (2) the loss of community enthusiasm; (3) the resentment of the D.C. school personnel; and (4) the loss of a constituency. (Author/RLV)

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TURNING POINTS IN EDUCATIONAL POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

An Analytic History of the Response to Educational
Needs Project, 1968-1978

NIE-A 78-0070

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PREFACE

The history of American urban education began with the very early efforts of mushrooming cities like Boston and New York to provide schooling for the masses of newly arriving immigrants. The "one best system," the public or common schools, was sold as *the answer*: a centralized, efficient, available, and free education for all children, regardless of wealth, skills, race, national origin, or preparation.

But all massive approaches have weaknesses: clumsiness, an inability to respond to changes in patron preferences, cultural differences, and trends and improvements in pedagogy. Furthermore, large bureaucracies and local democracy are inherently at odds: the former stressing the rule of experts; the later, the demands of laypeople. When problems arise, like under-educated children, a stagnant teaching corps, and overcrowded and inadequately equipped classrooms, both parent/local people and central office decision-makers perceive themselves as particularly well prepared to act on the problems.

Local, neighborhood, and parent groups, being closest to the problems, demand more of a say in how the difficulties are defined, attacked, and ameliorated. Somehow, these people believe that if they are given more "control," more "input" into decision-making, then problems can be solved.

Meanwhile, professionals believe that more expertise, more organization, and more rule-making should help. If only rational plan-

ning models can be applied, fresh funds allocated, and new repertoires attempted, the ills of urban education can be erased, they contend. And when the federal government becomes a sponsor, then the two groups compete for the dollars and how they are to be spent.

All the above-mentioned elements are present in this history: a large school system (Washington, D.C. public schools), an activate black community (in the Anacostia area of the city), the federal government (President Lyndon Johnson, the Congress, U.S. Office of Education and National Institute of Education), and professionals working in the school system and for the community project.

What were they trying to do? To help the children of Anacostia to raise their basic reading and math skills, to provide money for community people to be paid as reading, math, and community organizing assistants, to upgrade the teaching of basic subjects (through staff development)—all the problems that even the most well-organized bureaucracies have trouble solving. Sounds like a large number of goals: it was! But once government asks community people what they need, the community folk tell them—and the list is often a long one.

What's new and interesting about this study? First, it is *comprehensive*, covering the turning-points, the actions of the D.C. public schools, NIE, USOE, and the Anacostia community itself. So while other innovation studies focus on a single school (like the one by Gross, Giaquinta, and Bernstein), or a single problem (the study of decentralization by LaNoue and Smith), or a particular level of government (Beryl Radin's analysis of civil rights in DHEW), this study treats historically *all levels* involved: President, Congress, the U.S. Office of Education,

the National Institute of Education, the local school district, and the local community).

Second, it is *longitudinal*: covering the decade between 1968 and 1978. This long time frame allows an analysis of not only the planning and early implementation of the Anacostia experiment, but the post-implementation phase as well. Much implementation research is too short-sighted, stopping with the first year or two. Such myopia robs the analyst of data on what happens (1) as *leadership changes*, (2) as *federal policy shifts*, as between liberal Lyndon Baines Johnson and Richard M. Nixon, liberal and conservative presidents, (3) as *national climate changes*, from liberal, free-wielding 1960s to hardnosed, traditionalist 1970s, (4) as *communities change*, from militant to more quiescent, (5) as *monies go from being available* to being tight, and (6) as *federal policies pertaining to the District of Columbia develop*. This era was an exciting one: the Anacostia Community School Project, later renamed the Response to Educational Needs Project, was but one of many national experiments in educational improvement.

The long-term analysis shows how the Anacostia project was different: it was located in Washington, D.C., right under the noses of the federal government, the President, legislature, and its bureaucratic agencies. Thus, not only do we learn much about the city's schools, communities, and changing outlooks, but we come to see how Congress and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare handled programs over time.

Third, this analysis is new because it uses numerous *social science disciplines*, including history, political science, policy analysis,

and organizational development. It would have been possible to study Anacostia with a single tool: let's say history. But to grasp the various components of the effort, over 10 years, we believe it is important to treat the project multi-disciplinarily, as a historical event; a case example of how federal-local politics work; an exemplar of how policy is made, changed, implemented, and institutionalized; and a study of the birth and growth of a new organization, the Anacostia program. For good measure, one should mention some changes in the technology of instructing children and adults, for the program focused on the improvement of reading and mathematics (using a method of Diagnosis, Prescription, and Individualization) and the development of staff skills (using an on-site, teacher training approach).

Finally, this study is useful because it shows the *anatomy of a "successful" innovation*, in contrast to the many "failures" at change reported in the implementation literature. By successful, we mean that over the 10 years, the project found a niche in the public schools, was fully implemented, and was institutionalized when the federal government's role subsided. While many programs fold when the outside dollars disappear, the Anacostia project had a longer lasting effect: staff were transferred to similar jobs, project elements were used elsewhere in the system, and the community of Anacostia received the notoriety and control it needed to improve its schools.

Such a large-scale project required a large-scale study: this effort took over two years and involved me in the lives of many people. I should like to thank them, as many as there is room for, by their location. In the Anacostia project, let me thank sincerely (and firstly)

Daniel W. Jackson, Jr., the last project director the program had. Dan was always tolerant of my probes; always candid. And we became something of friends as he counselled me, and I him, during the years of his tenure and beyond. Other members of his staff, Pearl E. Montague, Dr. Helen W. Turner, and Mary H. Johnson were able to provide information on their roles in the development of the Anacostia program. Finally, Eugene Kinlow welcomed me at meetings of the Anacostia Community School Board and talked with me over the telephone as questions came up.

The critical person, in linking the D.C. schools with the project during its early years, was William S. Rice, retired Assistant Superintendent for Region I (Anacostia), and Project Director, and strong advocate of community control. Mr. Rice welcomed us into his home where he talked long and hard about his career in the schools, detailing his role in rallying support for the program in the school system and in Congress.

Also in the D.C. public schools, I would like to acknowledge the help of Dr. James T. Guines, Associate Superintendent; Joan Brown, who worked in staff development and with the Competency Based Curriculum; and my old friend, former D.C. school superintendent, Barbara Sizemore, who met me for breakfast and discussed her years in the D.C. schools, her interest in decentralization, and her recollections of the Anacostia program.

The National Institute of Education commissioned the study. My thanks to two people: Howard Lesnick and George Sealey. Mr. Lesnick headed the evaluation team and was invaluable in providing feedback,

insight, and support during the two years. I am grateful to Howard for his patience and persistence. Mr. Sealey was the NIE project's last director for the Anacostia program (called RENP). George provided a strong advocacy for the effort and useful insights into its operation. Lois-ellin Datta read an initial draft; she was of enormous help in clarifying the research and writing.

Finally, a number of friends and colleagues should be mentioned. Professor Robert T. Nakamura of Dartmouth College has done extensive interviewing and writing on the topic; Arthur Korotkin and Michael Langsdorf were consultants on the final evaluation of the project and were helpful. While all these people helped, the results of the research are my own.

Bruce S. Cooper, Ph.D.

Norwich, Vermont
May 1, 1979

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE		1
Chapter		
I	<u>SETTING THE STAGE</u>	
	Introduction	1
	The Purposes of the Research	3
	Two Theoretical Perspectives	9
	The Structure of the Study	26
II	<u>BIRTH OF A PROJECT</u>	
	Taking a Perspective	27
	Announcing the Project	32
	Federal Actions and Local Reactions	38
	The Community Planned	43
	The Higher-Ups Act	46
	Converging Trends and the Birth of the Anacostia Project	49
	1. Changing Demography and the Anacostia Project	50
	2. Changing Federal Role and the Anacostia Project	58
	3. Changing District of Columbia- Federal Relationship	68
	4. Community Control and the Anacostia Program	71
	5. The Planning of Change and the Birth of the Anacostia Project	79
	GOALS: The "Gyroscope" of Change	81
	The Classical Planning Model and the Anacostia Project	8
	The Incremental Model and the Anacostia Project	86
	AUTHORITY: The Directing of Change	88

Chapter

(II)	RESOURCES: The Enablers of Change	92
	STABILITY: The Continuing of Change	94
	EVALUATION: The Renewing of Change	97
	Historical Summary	100
	Change Process Summary	101
III	<u>THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A PROJECT</u>	
	Introduction	105
	Some Conceptual Concerns	107
	The History of Project Implementation: 1969-76	117
	Decisions Made, Staff Deployed	119
	Many Levels, Much Structure: Governance and Supervision	125
	Fighting for Funding	139
	Change and Turmoil: The Transition at USOE to the Nixon Administration	142
	Philosophy and Structure	143
	External Relations	152
	Racial Policies	154
	A Local School Board is Elected	159
	The Ebb and Flow	166
	Federal Evaluation and Delay: 1970-1974	167
	The Community/D.C. School Relations	179
	Appeals and Compromises	182
	The Settlement	184
	Planning and Implementing--Again, 1972-1976	189
	The Continued Federal Role	203
	The Anacostia Experiment, 1972-1976: A Summary	208
IV	<u>CYCLE AND CHANGE: DILEMMAS OF IMPLEMENTATION</u>	
	Introduction	219
	New Leadership, New Programs	221

Chapter

(IV)	Creating a Management System	224
	Building Organizational Infra-Structure	243
	Continuing and Disseminating RENP: 1976-1979	278
	The New RENP Model	295
	1978-79: The Remains	300
	The Implementation and Closing of RENP	307
	An Historical Summary	307
	An Implementation Summary	311
	Lessons for Policy-Makers: Some Dilemmas	318

1

TURNING POINTS IN EDUCATIONAL POLICY IMPLEMENTATION:
An Analytic History of the Response to Educational Needs Project

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CHAPTER I
SETTING THE STAGE

Introduction

The purpose of this study is threefold: to recount the history of the Anacostia community school project between 1967 and 1978; to analyze the events of the period in light of theories of historiographic and social scientific developments; and to provide "lessons" from the history that will be easily useful to policy-makers in government, schools, and public interest groups.

The re-creation and explication of history are no mean feats, particularly when an eleven-year period is studied; when such large and diverse institutions as Congress, the White House, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and the District of Columbia Public Schools are involved; and when highly emotional issues like "community control," "federal funding," and "bureaucratic change" emerge. Historian Herbert Butterfield warned of the hazards when he wrote:

If the historian can rear himself up like a god or a judge, or stand as the avenger of the crimes of the past, then one can require that he shall be still more godlike and regard himself rather as the reconciler than as the avenger; taking it that his aim is to achieve the understanding of the men and parties and causes of the past, and that in this understanding, if it can be complete, all things will ultimately be reconciled.¹

Taking Butterfield's plea to heart, this researcher seeks to provide an accurate and "complete" story of the Anacostia program (called the Anacostia Community School Project between 1968 and 1972; the Response to Educational Needs Project, 1972-1977). The mission of the study, furthermore, is to reconcile the positions of various parties in the government and schools—not that enmity exists. Rather one finds differing viewpoints and philosophies, all of which become considerations for the historian.

Such accuracy is best accomplished by the tried and true techniques of the historian: careful interviewing with a host of participants who played diverse roles in the developments; the combing of records; and the application of theory and structure of organizational history.

Bias is bound to creep in; it's inevitable in any work of social science. Often, too, one must fight to prevent over-identification with participants, as one shares the turmoil and comes to understand their dilemmas. Perhaps the best antidote or safeguard is an informed reader who is given sufficient information in the study to make judgments for

¹ Herbert Butterfield, *The Whig Interpretation of History* (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1931), p. 2.

3

for him- or herself. Every effort is made, then, to be complete and open.

Another historian and student of American educational historiography, Sol Cohen, summed up the difficulties and partial remedy to the historian's problems when he wrote: "The past exists in its own right and demands to be understood on its own terms. . . . Which is to say that history may be a pack of tricks the living play on the dead, but it is surely, unless the historians remain vigilant, a pack of tricks the dead play on the living."² Though the participants in the program in Anacostia are, but in a few exceptions, still alive, their actions comprise a complex story that requires the vigilance and care that Cohen advises.³

The Purposes of the Research

The goals of this study converge around presenting the development in a clear way that makes sense. Thus, it is important that interpretation and lessons learned grow out of the events and trends as they occurred. In particular, the purposes are:

1. *To describe the step-by-step development of the Anacostia program.* It began with the federal effort to improve the schools in the District of Columbia, though forces were at work since the 19th century (e.g., local control) that influenced the late-1960s. It ended in 1978 with the changing of the program, the transferral of staff, and the impor-

²Sol Cohen, "The History of the History of American Education, 1900-1976: The Uses of the Past," *Harvard Educational Review*, Vol. 46, no. 3, p. 330.

³See, also, Pieter Geyl, *Use and Abuse of History* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1955), p. 70ff.

tant effects which are still being felt that one must attribute to this project. They include: (1) community involvement in school decision-making is a reality because of the program; (2) the Anacostia section of the nation's capital is no longer totally ignored by officials in the city and schools; (3) a number of pupils and teachers received the benefits of the staff development component of the project (working primarily in the vital skill areas of reading and mathematics); and (4) many of the project staff, though transferred to other jobs, have undoubtedly improved themselves professionally for having worked in the program.

The presentation of this goal, the historical development component, is done in straightforward style and in as much detail as needed without overpowering the reader's patience. Sources of information are cited, except where personal preferences or taste deny them.

2. *To analyze the social and political "landscape" of the program.*

An important way to order and understand the history is to place it in the complex inter-institutional world of the federal government, the District of Columbia public schools, and the Anacostia community, a mainly black and poor area of the city. Thus, an elaborate structure is used. It has two tiers, the federal governmental and local school levels. Within these institutions, too, are various participant groups with separate perspectives, goals, and ways of operating. They are the "policy-makers" including the President and Congress in the federal tier and the Superintendent, District school board, and later, the Anacostia Community School Board in the school system; the "implemen-

tors," who include the U.S. Office of Education (1968-1972) and the National Institute of Education (1972-78), with their program officers and staff in the federal government, and the school system and Anacostia staff locally. Finally, as shown in Figure 1, both governmental levels—federal and local—have their own "recipients," persons who are concerned about the function of these agencies and who, often, receive services. While all American citizens are, in fact, consumers of federal services, the citizens of the District of Columbia—and in particular, Anacostia—are recipients of the program under study here.

This complex history, then, can be analyzed within the "landscape" as portrayed in Figure 1. The interplay among the President, Congress, DHEW, and citizens (across the "A" row) parallels the similar relationship among School Board, Superintendent, central office, and Anacostia community (row "B"). This process, often called the policy-making system, typically moves from decision-making, to implementation, to delivery of service, though this paradigm as we shall see is an ideal rarely realized.⁴



The vertical relationships ("A" to "B"), between federal and local jurisdictions, are also very central to this history. The location of the District of Columbia and Anacostia schools in the nation's capital creates the possibility for direct face-to-face contact between concerned local citizens and U.S. Senators, and between school staff

⁴For a clear and interesting presentation of the inter-level policy-making process, see Mike M. Milstein, *Impact and Response: Federal Aid and State Educational Agencies* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1976), pp. 1-37; the classic treatment of the policy paradigm remains, Charles E. Lindblom, *The Policy-Making Process* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968).

FIGURE 1

THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LANDSCAPE

A Way of Analyzing the Anacostia Program



and U.S. Office of Education personnel. Though this relationship is not necessarily a regular occurrence, the accessibility of one party to the other becomes important in the history at key turning points.

Hence, our focus in this study is both *intra*-organizational (within DCPS, the federal government) and *inter*-organizational (as the levels of government influence one another).

Perspectives and goals vary as well: federal leaders in education tend to set broad missions, seek models which can be transferred to other schools, and hope to rectify state and local conditions which are inadequate and unequal. Local jurisdictions, on the other hand, must operate schools, teach children, look out for the efficiency and stability of the system. Thus, between federal and local levels, basic philosophical differences exist that must be understood in analyzing the history of programs like the Anacostia one.

Also, within organizations like the federal and local governments, there are specialized functions that create differing perspectives. Both levels of government have democratically elected legislative groups (Congress and School Board), executive functions (President, Superintendent), administrative staff (officials in USOE and NIE; in DCPS and the Anacostia project), and employees who carry out the programs (in USOE, NIE, DCPS, and Anacostia). In writing the history of the project each specialized group brings a set of needs and expectations to the job.

Thus, in analyzing this history, we must attempt to understand and interpret events from the viewpoint of the varying actors in their posts within their organizations—hence, the "landscape."

3. *To provide the basis for improved policy-making and implementation to leaders in government and schools.* The ultimate purpose of this study is practical: to inform those who use and lead our nation's schools and related agencies. The audience is elected officials, agency leaders, bureaucrats, interested publics, teachers, and school administrators, as well as the public.

One can learn from this study in several ways. First, the case history is exemplary. It teaches by providing a living situation in which the federal government attempted to help a local school system. Mistakes were made; corrections made; and outcomes obtained. While case studies suffer from idiosyncracies, they also allow readers to transfer what's useful to their own situation.

Second, an effort will be made to point out alternative ways of behaving, though this writer does not intend to lecture or to overdramatize. One must be careful not to generate desideratum from a single situation, though it would also be foolish not to exploit the lessons learned and to apply them where appropriate.

Third, since theories of policy-making and implementation are extant, such a study permits us to improve them. One can learn, then, from both the details and theory. Where appropriate, the researcher will show the use and improvement of conceptual materials as yet another way of informing policy-making. At no time, however, will theory overshadow the events, since the purpose here is mainly historical.

Two Theoretical Perspectives

The Anacostia community school experiment lends itself to two

complementary forms of analysis: historical and organizational. As history, it stands with a body of research on urban life; as organizational analysis, it falls into the category of "implementation" research, a new and growing field of inquiry which brings together policy studies and change in institutional life.

1. *Studying Urban History*: The Anacostia program is part of the history of the District of Columbia schools. As such, the developments should be understood in light of the historiography of education.

Diane Ravitch in her study of minority education in the United States explains quite convincingly that the study of educational history has gone through three phases, which we shall discuss and relate to the Anacostia school experiment. *First*, from 1880 to 1950, she contends, historians of education were not scholars; rather, they were "missionaries," believing in Ravitch's words that the public schools were "the highest realization of the democratic ideal, that they provided equal opportunity to all and rapid mobility to the deserving."⁵

Standing high among such writers was Ellwood P. Cubberley, who in 1919 wrote the much-read *Public Education in the United States*.⁶ In it, he justified his ideological commitment to public education under the guise of historical analysis; he wanted large, consolidated, and efficient schools. And people who stood in his way—blocking the progress of the "morality play" of public school development—were attacked

⁵Diane Ravitch, "On the History of Minority Group Education in the United States," *Teachers College Record* (December 1976), Vol. 78, no. 2, p. 211.

⁶Ellwood P. Cubberley, *Public Education in the United States* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1919).

as "enemies of democracy," and as "selfish men of small vision."⁷ Contemporary historian David B. Tyack summarizes those supporting and opposing public school growth—in the eyes of these early educational historians—as follows:⁸

<i>FOR</i>	<i>AGAINST</i>
"Citizens of the Republic"	Belonging to the old aristocratic class
Philanthropists and humanitarians	Politicians of small vision
Public men of vision	The ignorant, narrow-minded, and penurious
The intelligent workingmen in the cities	The non-English-speaking classes
"New-England men"	

During this first phase, then, it was common for historians of education zealously to defend the birth of public schools by attacking its detractors with such terms as "narrow," "ignorant," and "non-English-speaking." While their crusading spirit may be understandable, given their time and place in history, such polemics could hardly be called "history" of education.

In the 1950s and 1960s, historians awoke to the bias, narrowness, and falsity of earlier accounts of the beginnings and purposes of American schools, thus starting a second *phase* in the historiography of education. Lawrence A. Cremin in *The Wonderful World of Ellwood Patterson Cubberley*,⁹ leveled strong charges at earlier scholars,

⁷David B. Tyack, *The One Best System: A History of American Urban Education* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 80.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 80.

⁹Lawrence A. Cremin, *The Wonderful World of Ellwood Patterson Cubberley: An Essay on the Historiography of American Education* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964).

accusing them of "anachronism, parochialism, evangelism, and isolation from the mainstream of American historiography."¹⁰ Gradually, during the 1960s, the pendulum began to swing: what had once been sheer adoration for public schools became cynicism and even at times contempt. These New Critics, including writers like Katz, Schultz, Spring, Karier, and Greer,¹¹ believed "that public schooling has become a capitalist tool of indoctrination, that it has been purposefully used to stamp out cultural diversity, and that it has been slyly (or brutally) imposed on unwilling masses by arrogant reformers."¹²

Michael Katz, well-known and prolific neo-Marxist historian, in *Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools*, captures the development and essence of the revisionist camp: that the "basic structure" of education in the United States has not changed since about 1880. He continues:

I mean by the term [basic] that certain characteristics of American education today were also characteristic nearly a century ago; it is, and was, universal, tax-supported, free, and compulsory, bureaucratic, racist, and class-biased.¹³

So, for historians like Katz, what had been for years deemed social and educational "progress" had become indoctrination, control, and perpetuation of the capitalist system. Education, then, had become a tax-supported device for maintaining the inferior position for the poor and

¹⁰Sol Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 301.

¹¹Revisionist historians include Michael Katz, *The Irony of Early School Reform* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968); Michael Katz, *Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools* (New York: Praeger, 1971); Stanley Schultz, *The Culture Factory: Boston Public Schools, 1798-1860* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); Joel H. Spring, *Education and the Rise of the Corporate State* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972); Clarence J. Karier, *et al.*, *Roots of Crisis* (Chicago: University of Illinois, 1973); and Colin Greer, *The Great School Legend* (New York: Basic Books, 1972).

¹²Ravitch, *op. cit.*, p. 213. 22

¹³Katz, *Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools*, p. xx (emphases added).

the wealth and station of the rich.

Recently, educational historians have reassessed the neo-Marxian approach to educational historiography, initiating what I have called a *third* stage in the study of school history. Diane Ravitch, historian and critic, attacks *both* the early school apologists and the later neo-Marxian historians for their distorted and superficial view of the development of education. She explains:

Whereas the old concept was oversimplified in its optimism, the new concept—which permeates the work of contemporary New Left historians of education—is oversimplified in its cynicism. The former too easily proclaimed the inevitable triumph of democracy, equality, and opportunity; the latter too glibly perceives oppression, indoctrination, and conspiratorial behavior.¹⁴

In place of the "highly ideological" approaches to educational history—one explicating the "successes" of American schools; the other, its "failures"—Ravitch advocates (1) that each historical issue and period be treated separately, as a case for research, stressing no single trend, outcome, pat, or instant answer; (2) that where the education of poor, immigrant, black, Jewish, and Native American children led to mixed results—~~some making it, others~~ remaining as members of the underclass—the historian should declare the outcomes to be inconclusive, not "bad." And (3) that some groups decided not to be educated in the public system, nor to be assimilated: is this to be considered the failure of the common school system? Or the triumph of freedom of choice and thus pluralist values instead?

In her words, she explains: "Each group must be studied separately

¹⁴Ravitch, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

within the context of its own interests and with due consideration of the historical situation. . . . Each has its own educational needs, which have been met or not met in different ways; it is historically unjustified to assert that all have been crushed by their education into a homogeneous, deracinated mass."¹⁵ She is advocating, then, a particularistic, unbiased, and cross-national perspective. For while minorities have had difficulty gaining equality of opportunity in the United States, she explains, they are better off for the "benign" approach to assimilation over the "physical elimination" of other nations. (Gradual acceptance is better than extermination, Ravitch explains.)

While I sense that Ravitch is also heavily biased: *toward the status quo* in the United States, there is much to be gained from her advice for our study of the Anacostia program history. While she seems to be saying that things are really okay; look at what other minorities in Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia, and elsewhere have endured; wait and it will improve, her warning about ideological statements in the name of history is important. So while this author may be tempted at times to cast aspersions at the U.S. government for the problems in the nation's capital, one should instead heed Ravitch when she says:

To study the history of education of minority groups is to become aware of the inappropriateness of applying sweeping ideological labels to the diverse experience of all minorities. What is needed is more nuance and more discernment, not less. The task for historians of education today is to set aside tententious generalizations and to search for a sense of once-living people with once-vital aspirations, for the cultures within which they lives, and for the process by which they were educated.¹⁶

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 228.

This history is written with her advice in mind. Generalization will come only after events are illuminated; the events in Anacostia between 1968 and 1978 will stand on their own merit. The reader will determine what they prove about federal programs, urban schools, change in organizations, etc. Analysis will follow history with great care.

Thus, the purpose of this paper is neither to "praise" nor to "bury" Caesar but to describe and analyze the occurrences. If there is a bias, it runs more towards a cynicism concerning the ability of formal organizations—particularly large, public ones—to fulfill their role in society, rather than a skepticism about education in society generally. In the case of Anacostia, the doubt runs doubly deep, for two complex, changing, and pressured human organizations were involved: the U.S. Government including the White House, Congress, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; and the District of Columbia school system with its changing constituency from white to overwhelmingly black, its newly won rights to vote and to some self-determination, and its complex relationship between school board and superintendent, central office and Anacostia, community people and professionals.

If there is a major weakness in the historiography of education, in my opinion, it lies not with a level of cynicism or optimism, nor with one's neo-Marxist or pro-capitalist, stance; rather, historians seem unschooled in the *dynamics of large-scale organizations*—their behavior, problems, and unwillingness or inability to change. One might almost argue that there exists an "organizational imperative" which is stronger than local culture, politics, or pressures for reform. In a

sense, a full-scale bureaucracy, whether in the U.S.A. or elsewhere, behaves in much the same way. Historians must come to understand this fact of life: particularly if they are attempting to write the history of an institution like the American public schools,¹⁷

2. Studying Change in Organizations

Just as historiography is the means for the study of *events* in the development of Anacostia, so organizational analysis helps us to understand the *dynamics* of change and non-change in the District of Columbia schools. But while the history of the history of American education has been to some extent written,¹⁸ our background on the study of organizational change is yet in its infancy.¹⁹ In fact, the study of change in organizations is not yet a single field of inquiry; but rather, it goes by a number of names that overlap in concern: organizational behavior, organizational change, organizational development, implementation of planned change, and so on.

¹⁷It is true that historians like Michael Katz examine the school as a bureaucracy. But their approach, tools, and results, fail to explain in any systematic way the attempts to change large-scale social systems. Katz's term "incipient bureaucracy" indicates an interest in how organizations develop—that is, the impulse and conditions that create them—but he stops short of studying the activities of school systems once they are in place. See Michael B. Katz, *Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools*, particularly chapter 2, "The Emergence of Bureaucracy in Urban Education: The Boston Case, 1850-84," pp. 56-104.

¹⁸Sol Cohen and Diane Ravitch's articles show a level of knowledge and sophistication not present in the sociology of organizational change. Furthermore, historians are usually content to analyze while other social scientists of organizations tend to prescribe and guide, placing great responsibility on the field of organizational development that is not present in that of historiography.

¹⁹See Michael Fullan and Alan Pomfret, "Research on Curriculum and Instruction Implementation," *Review of Educational Research* (Spring 1977), Vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 335-397 for an overview of this field.

A metaphor stands central to the study of the implementation of change: that of the agents of change cajoling, pressuring, and even battering the stolid organization into an alteration of its behavior. Firmly, those inside the institution resist, banking hard on the ineffectiveness of the "trouble-makers" and the ability of insiders to hold fast against the demands of the new guard. The change agent arrives armed: with the latest techniques for assessing, planning, altering, and convincing those in authority to reallocate resources, change job descriptions, and reward those who do behave differently.

This description is a parody. But it is also a way of conceiving of the two elements of the process of change: of the organization as resistant, set in its ways; the change implementors as zany, new, active. And to some degree, the parody holds true. Those maintaining the organization—and those trying to change it—come at their jobs from two opposite viewpoints.

Organizational people have a stake in the way things are. Their jobs, promotion, satisfaction, and effectiveness, in part, depend on the regularity and clarity of their actions. Blau and Scott, in their classic *Formal Organizations*, explain the elements of such settings: first, organizations are "deliberately established for a certain purpose," requiring that the efforts of participants be "coordinated," that leaders "furnish incentives for others to join them for this purpose," and that "rules" govern behavior.²⁰ And since each organizational

²⁰Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, *Formal Organizations* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1962), pp. 1-12.

participant performs but a small part of the total activities of the formal organization, his or her part must fit into the total effort of the system. Blau and Scott summarize:

In an organization that has been formally established, a specialized administrative staff usually exists that is responsible for maintaining the organization as a going concern and for coordinating the activities of its members. Large and complex organizations require an especially elaborate administrative apparatus.²¹

Change agents have very different interests. They seek to alter the rules of the game, the performance of organizational members, of goals, and outputs. Fullan and Pomfret explain the extent of change that must occur before an innovation in a school is implemented:

. . . that regardless of who develops an innovation, when it is developed, or how it is developed, some implementation will have occurred at the point when certain new characteristics are actually in use in a social system. In particular, we will suggest that there are five dimensions of implementation in practice—*changes in materials, structure, role/behavior, knowledge and understanding, and value internalization*, all of these vis-à-vis an innovative idea or development.²²

It is no wonder, then, that organizational members resist. Such changes are so totalistic and threatening that anyone who perceives the innovations as threatening is bound to be fearful, recalcitrant, and at best cautious.

To date, historians of education seem unaware of the impact of major changes on those who must change their goals, knowledge and understanding, and most potently, their values. After all, participants

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

²² Fullan and Pomfret, *op. cit.*, p. 336.

were hired, socialized, promoted, and rewarded, under a different regimen. They are fearful about changing.

Change agents have their own interests, problems, and approaches. To understand the development of the Anacostia project, one must grasp the *modus operandi* of these experts. For while history gives meaning to events, organizational change analysis uncovers the motives, thoughts, and philosophies of communities, to alter the life in schools. We need, then, an anatomy of the change agent.

From the literature on change and implementation, and the numerous cases on change attempts,²³ we can derive the inner drives of innovators, or at least, we can impute the motives of these leaders. First, those who seek to change things *grasp power*—or, if they already have it (as was true of President Lyndon B. Johnson in the founding of the Anacostia program), they wield it in such a way as to motivate people, reallocate funds and other resources, etc. They must possess such authority; without it, they cannot hope to change anything.²⁴

Unfortunately, at least for them, federal intervention in local school problems lacks the direct authority and immediate legitimacy of other inside forms of organizational change. So to understand the change agent, one must not only understand his/her approaches; one must also be aware of the constraints on such actions.

Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky studied the issue of federal-

²³Fullan and Pomfret review sixteen cases of implementation in the area of curricular change alone.

²⁴See the fascinating example of authority in changing a city in Robert A. Caro, *The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York* (New York: Vintage, 1975).

local attempts to implement change in the case of the Oakland, California Economic Development Administration. They found a great physical and psychological distance between Washington, D.C. and Oakland, as the subtitle of their book *Implementation* indicates: "How Great Expectations in Washington are Dashed in Oakland." They found that the complexity of changing one institution by directives and incentives of another only multiplied the problems. They wrote:

No matter how the federal government is organized and reorganized, virtually all social problems will cut across the jurisdiction of different bureaus, departments, and overhead agencies. While the number of clearances could be cut down by organizing with a single set of programs in mind, there is no organizational arrangement that will minimize clearance for all programs, past and future. New entrants are likely to find, as did the EDA in Oakland, that they must fit into arrangements that have been made with other purposes in mind.²⁵

Thus, the control necessary to implement change is often denied to any single agency, as local, community, and federal groups share in the decision-making. In the "layer-cake" arrangement we call American federalism, there is bound to be the denial of control to any group, the sharing of power, and the confusion that results from too many power centers and no clear line of authority.

Second, change agents attempt to be *comprehensive*, working on the whole line of activities, from planning, through adoption, through implementation, and refinement. Furthermore, change agents must control a number of conditions, if their innovation is to work. For example, funds, staffing, materials, program, evaluation, space, and mission must be altered, in concert, if an alteration in the system is

²⁵ Pressman and Wildavsky, *Implementation*, p. 162.

to be effective. The comprehensiveness has been called a "seamless web," a set of integrally related events and conditions that make things change in a social system. Take the Oakland EDA again:

Considered as a whole, a program can be conceived of as a system in which each element is dependent on the other. Unless money is supplied, no facilities can be built, no new jobs can flow from them, and no minority personnel can be hired to fill them. A breakdown at one stage must be repaired, therefore, before it is possible to move on the next. The stages are related, however, from back to front as well as from front to back. Failure to agree on procedures for hiring minorities may lead the government to withhold funds, thus halting the construction. Program implementation thus becomes a seamless web.²⁶

But "putting it all together," controlling all the variables, gaining comprehensiveness is simply said but laboriously accomplished.

The complexity of tasks, particularly ones involving federal government, local schools, community, prevents easily accomplished comprehensiveness. Lindblom not only recognizes this problem but also incorporates this limitation in his ideology of organizational decision-making and change. He explains that a fully comprehensive approach "assumes intellectual capacities and sources of information that men simply do not possess, and it is even more absurd as an approach to policy when the time and money that can be allocated to a policy problem is limited."²⁷

Analysis of the history of the Anacostia program indicates a severe lack of comprehensiveness. It would be difficult to catalogue all the reasons, but two include: (1) Both the school district and the

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. xv.

²⁷ Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through'," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 19, Spring 1959, p. 85.

federal government, because of their budgeting and planning approaches, tend to treat new programs in one-, or at the most, two-year blocks. Innovations take more time. (2) Since both government and school system were unsure where the experimental community involvement program (later placed in Anacostia) would lead, it was difficult to coordinate the various resources to make it happen. And so on.

Third, change agents seek to relate a set of innovative actions to a set of hoped-for outcomes; they are *means-ends oriented*. In Lindblom's words, "means are conceived to be evaluated and chosen in the light of ends finally selected independently of and prior to the choice of means."²⁸ Thus, the history of the Anacostia program must be analyzed in terms of what the leadership intended, how they went about it, and finally, whether they achieve the results desired.

But, like in many large-scale social experiments in the social service sector, there was no single "leader" in the planning and execution of the program. In fact, leadership for the Anacostia project was provided at four levels: (1) from the grantee, the recipients of the federal help (the District of Columbia Public Schools); (2) the on-site project leadership (in the Response to Educational Needs Project/Anacostia Community School Project); (3) in the Anacostia community; and (4) the funding agency (USOE/NIE). Each of these units has some role in defining and implementing the project, though they do not all share the same perspectives. Below are listed the four layers and the outlooks of each:

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

<u>Layer</u>	<u>Group</u>	<u>Outlook</u>
1. GRANTEE: Recipient of grant	D.C. schools	Concern for funding to relieve local budgets; control, maintaining the "system." Centralized control.
2. PROJECT: Anacostia program staff	RENIP	Delivery of services; maintaining of control in the project; employment of staff; prerogatives at the organizational level.
3. COMMUNITY: Target of the project	Anacostia Community School Board	Concern for controlling the activities of professionals; also seeing that community people get jobs.
4. GRANTOR: Provider of funds	USOE, later NIE	Concern for accountability, results that are visible and transferable.

Leadership for this project came from each and all of these layers (D.C. schools, Anacostia staff, the community and its board, and the federal agencies); hence, as we move through the history, we shift our focus, to look at the various leaders, depending on what decisions are to be made.

But all leaders, wherever they may be lodged in the system, must be aware of a number of conditions in the school system, community, and federal government, as well as difficulties with the ends-means strategy itself, which complicate the process. Thus, quite apart from the particular historical view taken (whether Neo-Marxist, Pro-Capitalist, or even Particularistic), the realities of making change have a strong influence on outcomes.

The literature on policy formulation and organizational innovation indicates two perspectives on how the means-ends process is controlled. Both, to some extent, are conceptual "straw people," set up

only to be knocked over. But both types of policy-making/implementation are useful in describing the complexity of the attempts at organizational change.

First, the *rational-comprehensive* approach is used by many change agents when they begin, when they conceive of their role, and when they instruct others on how to operate. Here the analyst strives for "clarity of objectives, explicitness of evaluation, a high degree of comprehensive overview, and wherever possible, quantification of values."²⁹

Second, the *successive limited comparison* is indeed what practitioners practice, wherein small, careful, and maximally adjustable steps are taken to avoid mistakes and to allow time for the participants in the system to adjust to the change. Thus, the high level of rationality, type one above, is many times desirable but is often unattainable for all the reasons discussed here: complexity, lack of clear consensus, number of organizations involved, etc. Instead, programs like Anacostia are the result—not so much of long-term, controlled, and highly planned activities—but of a number of decisions made under the stress of the minute, under the pressure of unforeseen events, and under the compromise of varying groups and interests.³⁰

In *summary*, then, the development of the Anacostia program cannot be seen as simply a historical phenomenon. It must be studied in an organizational framework as well, one that considers the intent of leaders, the processes of planning, implementing, compromising, and starting again. Thus, the research perspective is more microscopic

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 79.

³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 80.

than is traditionally the approach of historians, as we dig beneath the trends and events to scrutinize the process.

The Lindblomian approach, furthermore, alerts us to look beyond the official statements, the intent, and the ideology of those who founded and supported the Anacostia program. While they may try to *wield power, be comprehensive, and relate means to ends*, we know from other cases that these attempts are rarely fulfilled. Yet we know, too, that failure to use a rational-comprehensive process is not a particular shortcoming of Anacostia; rather a more incremental, disjointed approach is not only more realistic but, to Lindblom, more desirable. Lindblom compares the two modes as follows:

Rational-Comprehensive

1. Clarification of values distinct from empirical analysis
2. Policy formulation is approached through means-ends analysis: First, ends are isolated, then means are sought
3. The test of a "good" policy is that it can be shown to be the most appropriate means to desired ends.
4. Analysis is comprehensive; every important relevant factor is taken into account
5. Theory is heavily relied upon

Successive Limited Comparisons

1. Selection of value goals are not separate but are closely intertwined with action
2. Since means and ends are not distinct, means-ends analysis is often limited
3. The test of a "good" policy is that various analysts agree that under the circumstances, it is good.
4. Analysis is drastically limited:
 - i. Important outcomes are neglected
 - ii. Important alternative policies are neglected
 - iii. Important affected values are neglected
5. A succession of comparisons greatly reduces or eliminates reliance on theory³¹

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

It is not that one is necessarily superior to the other; rather change agents seek to use a more rational mode and find themselves having to use a more incremental one. Each approach helps to explain a part of innovator behavior. And we shall use them, as such.

The Structure of the Study

We shall analyze the turning points in the development of the Anacostia experiment, 1968 to 1978. The study is arranged chronologically, with each successive chapter covering a cluster of relevant events. Within chapters, the events are presented, followed by a discussion of what happened and why. Comments are made in terms of (1) the history of urban education, (2) the dynamics of organizational change, and (3) some alternative strategies. What might have happened had other leaders acted? Why were the outcomes predictable/not predictable, based on who the participants were? And how were subsequent events related to earlier ones?

Where necessary, we depart from the immediate events to fill in background which is necessary to an understanding of outcomes. For example, in the next chapter, it is necessary to explain briefly the history of federal involvement in education and the changes in the District of Columbia that affected the Anacostia program. Such departures are only momentary and are related to the events under discussion.

CHAPTER II

BIRTH OF A PROJECTTaking a Perspective

The Anacostia project, Washington, D.C., was a child of the Great Society and a grandchild of the New Deal. Born of the concern of President Lyndon B. Johnson, it was designed like many other efforts to improve the education and lives of the nation's poor. As early as March 1964, Johnson rallied the American people as "citizens of the richest . . . nation in the history of the world to declare open war on poverty."¹ In his five-plus years as President, he initiated a plethora of social, educational, and community development programs—totalling \$23.9 billion in 1968.

Nor was the Anacostia experiment the first time Johnson had worried about the American city. In January 1966, in "The Rebirth of Our Cities," he presented to Congress a set of recommendations for urban reclamation, urging that "Congress, and this people, can set in motion forces of change in urban areas that will make them masterpieces of our civilization."² In particular, he stated: "I propose

¹Quoted in Sar A. Levitan, *The Great Society's Poor Law* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969), p. 3.

²Message from the President to Congress, January 26, 1966. HHR Doc. 368, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 1.

that we focus all the techniques and talents within our society on the crisis of the American city," in the form of special projects. He continued:

The demonstration should be of sufficient magnitude both in physical and social dimension to arrest blight and decay to entire neighborhoods. It must make a substantial impact within the coming few years on the development of the development of the entire city.³

A number of characteristics of Johnson's social and educational legislation are obvious here which are relevant to the Anacostia project. First, he had a great love of "experiments," "demonstrations," and "masterpieces" as approaches to the elimination of social ills. Anacostia, announced in 1967, was labelled a "showcase" attempt for other city school systems. Second, problems were treated (medically) as social diseases to be eradicated through proper dosages of government medication. Words like "blight," "decay," and "arrest" were common in the 1960s as means for "curing society's ills,"

Third, there was great optimism. After all, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his New Deal had saved the country from utter collapse in the 1930s, according to the liberal Democratic ideology of the time. Why could not also the Great Society be a tool for change in the 1960s? Capturing the spirit of the era were these often-cited words of novelist Thomas Wolfe:

. . . to every man his chance—to every man, regardless of his birth, his shining, golden opportunity—to every man the right to live, to work, to be himself, and to become whatever thing his manhood and his vision can combine to make him—this . . . is the promise of America.⁴

³ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁴ *Ibid.*

Fourth, while Johnson had great vision and inspiration, as is obvious from his goals, he provided little that was specific. The grand generalities of a better life, education, and economic opportunity rarely led to precision, programs, and outcomes. He inspired but rarely instructed. Anacostia's beginnings were similarly vague leading to similar difficulties of implementation, as we shall see.

Thus, the Anacostia experiment is best seen historically as part of a general movement of the 1960s, sharing with it the optimism, hopes, and problems of this period. As political scientist Norton E. Long explains:

The interesting possibility, and indeed the hope for a truly Great Society, lies in the possibility of some other device for achieving quality education than discrimination based on parental income and skin color. It would seem that a school system based on the resources of an entire metropolitan area might, like a great state university, achieve quality without depending upon the present method—and diversity as well.⁵

In this chapter, the birth of the Anacostia program is presented, involving the President, his advisors, a university professor, and the District of Columbia Public Schools. These events are, then, cast in a wider perspective. The origin of the project, then, is analyzed in light of five changes that affected education in the District of Columbia—and by implication, in other American cities and their school systems.

The five changes are the following:

⁵Norton E. Long, "Local and Private Initiatives in the Great Society," in *A Great Society?*, Bertram M. Gross (ed.) (New York: Basic Books, 1966), p. 99.

1. *White Flight and the Black Preponderance*: The changing racial composition of the D.C. schools during the period prior to and following the announcement of the Anacostia project stimulated the interest of top policy-makers.

2. *The Press for Community Involvement in Education*: The awakening of black communities to their interests had become a full-scale "movement" by 1967, with I.S. 201 and Ocean Hill-Brownsville—both news-worthy community control efforts in New York City—being two examples. It was believed that education could be best improved if the impoverished consumers of education in the urban community were given major control. The Anacostia project was but another example, though federally initiated.

3. *Equality through Law and Court Mandate*: Pressure to improve D.C. schools increased as part of a number of legislative and judicial requirements, in particular *Bowling vs. Sharpe* (1954) which made segregation by race unconstitutional in the District's schools; *Hobson vs. Hansen* (1967) which affected tracking, teacher assignment, and other race-related conditions; and the "home rule" momentum in the 1960s. All contributed to a climate of change and equality that made Anacostia's project possible.

4. *A New Federal-Local School Relationship*: The 1960s had seen a dramatic change in the willingness of the federal government to assist local schools, topped off by the passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (1965). This kind of direct subvention to the aid of poor children in schools set the stage for Johnson's pronouncements on the

District of Columbia public schools—and was a radical departure from the passive role of federal governments in U.S. schools in prior decades.

5. *A New Federal-District of Columbia Relationship*: From the nineteenth century to the 1960s, citizens of the District lived with total disenfranchisement: in local and federal elections. Johnson was dedicated to representation for D.C. and school boards, and community input seemed a good place to begin. And it is, thus, understandable why local community "governance" was a major component of the Anacostia program from the onset.

These changes (demographic, governmental, and interjurisdictional) did not "cause" the experiments in Anacostia; they provide a political, social, and historical context for its beginnings and for understanding it. In the following section, we describe the starting of the program and relate the events to the broader trends. Finally, in this chapter, an effort is made to discuss alternative means to initiating change: e.g., internally, at the community level, and from Congress, rather than from the Chief Executive, Lyndon B. Johnson. This final speculation is useful in a number of ways. First, it casts light on the strengths and liabilities of one form of change over others; second, it provides alternative policy options at each step in the history of Anacostia and by implication of other new programs. And third, modes of speculation are a first step in the exploration of better public policy-making, a means for "thinking out loud": if only one had done it differently.

Announcing the Project

On March 13, 1968, President Johnson announced a "major model school experiment in the District" and asked Congress for \$10 million to fund it.⁶ Work on this proposal went back nine months, to efforts by the D.C. public schools and the White House to improve education. In July of 1967, White House aides Stephen Pollak (Johnson advisor for District Affairs) and Douglas Cater (advisor on Health, Education and Welfare) were instructed to bring together government and university people who might be useful in drafting an educational program for the D.C. schools. Held at the Brookings Institution, the meeting included four aides from the White House, one official of the U.S. Bureau of the Budget, two D.C. school board members, and Professor A. Harry Passow of Teachers College, Columbia University who had submitted a report on the D.C. schools to the D.C. school board in June 1967. Using Professor Passow's report and recommendations as a guide, the group proposed a major effort to improve the schools—costing at least \$25 million.⁷ These men saw the D.C. schools becoming an "educational laboratory" on how urban school problems might be solved. No specific programs were outlined, only a federal commitment and a general goal of school betterment.

The agenda for the proposed effort had, to a great extent, been set by Professor Passow's examination of the city's schools. In *Toward Creating a Model Urban School System: A Study of the Washington, D.C. Schools*, Passow found a whole shopping list of educational woes,

⁶ President's Message on the District of Columbia, *Presidential Documents* 498, 502-503 (1968).

⁷ *The Washington Post*, April 27, 1972.

About Passow's writing on urban schools, Jennings explains:

These are the nerve centers of our society, the foci of our wealth, and of our intelligence, culture, and social and political power. They are also the location of our most impacted slums.¹⁰

The impact, then, of Passow's report seems clear: it set the stage for federal efforts by outlining the problems and some solutions.

During the summer of 1967, President Johnson took no action on the proposed D.C. schools effort. In the autumn, the locus of activity shifted from the White House staff to the U.S. Office of Education (HEW) where a Task Force was created. Headed by Dr. Harold Howe II, it recommended a "model educational system" in Washington, D.C.—again reflecting the tone and optimism of President Johnson. The belief was that if a large sum of money (\$10 million) was concentrated on a few urban schools, the results would likely be dramatic and would point the way for future change. The \$25 million price tag generated during the Brookings meeting was deemed at the U.S. Office as too high.

A special council would be created, according to U.S. Office of Education staff, to design and implement the new program in the District over a five-year period. The composition of the council was to include leading college presidents, deans, scholars, and other educational administrators. Foremost school superintendents would be asked to form a "national advisory committee" to oversee the project. According to *Washington Post* stories, the role of the District of Columbia public schools, parents, and citizens would be minimal. Rather, the D.C. Board

¹⁰F. G. Jennings, "Book Reviews," *Teachers College Record* (April, 1964), Vol. 65, no. 7, p. 643.

eighteen in all:⁸

1. Plummeting achievement scores of city-wide tests
2. A weak and often useless curriculum
3. An ever more segregated school system
4. Weak and poorly administered guidance services
5. Poor teacher in-service education and staff development
6. Inadequate use of educational specialists
7. Sloppy central administration
8. Inadequate, crowded, and antiquated school buildings
9. The misdirection of the board of education
10. Racial segregation as the result of tracking students
11. A soaring drop-out rate
12. The over-use of temporary teachers
13. Weak or non-existent assessment of staff
14. The absence of adequate preparation prior to staff promotion
15. No long-range educational planning
16. Cumbersome budgeting and ordering procedures
17. Weak communications between school and community
18. Weak relationship between schools and social welfare agencies.

The Passow report also made recommendations for correcting these problems, including such improvements as better organization, administration, procedures, and means for involving the community in school decision-making.

Passow has long been concerned about urban education, writing extensively about the importance of bettering schools for the nation's city children.⁹ In one published work, he singled out the urban school as deserving top priority when he wrote:

. . . almost one in every six elementary and secondary school children now now attends a public school in one of the sixteen largest American cities.

⁸Passow, *Toward Creating a Model Urban School System* (Columbia University, 1972), a report to the District of Columbia Board of Education.

⁹See A. Harry Passow (ed.), *Education in Depressed Areas* (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1963); and Passow *et al.*, (eds.) *Education of the Disadvantaged* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967).

of Education would approve it and the committee, council, and Office of Education would do the rest.¹¹

So, with the background work having been done at Brookings and the U.S. Office of Education, Johnson publicly announced the need to create a "model school experiment" in the city, citing the results of Professor Passow's study. A five-year effort, the program would be launched for \$10 million federal dollars. It would create, according to Johnson, a "beacon to the other school systems in the other cities of the Nation." But President Johnson and the White House staff had made some changes in the proposal since its days of planning in the U.S. Office. In particular, he announced a new concept in education, the "community school" which involved the families in poor neighborhoods in the activities of their schools. These community facilities would be available, according to the Johnson report, to citizens on a year-round basis for education and recreation.¹²

The other goals of the program were nine, all of which were reflective of Passow's criticisms of the schools. It appeared that Johnson pulled together a list of school reforms, all of which were likely important, and presented them *ad seriatum* to Congress for funds. The nine goals included:

1. Reviving the interest of citizens in their schools
2. Retraining of teachers
3. Bringing quality and up-to-date teaching methods to students
4. Revising the curriculum to make it more relevant
5. Providing marketable skills to students
6. Building alliances between possible employers and older students
7. Allowing students to self-pace their learning
8. Reducing truancy, drop-outs, and failure
9. Serving a section of the city where need was greatest.

¹¹The Washington Post, April 27, 1972.

¹²President's Message, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

The relationship between the Johnson goals and the Passow list of problems is reasonably clear. Just a few examples should suffice. Passow indicated weaknesses in the curriculum; Johnson suggested the revision of the class offerings and methods, both in quality (to make it more relevant) and substance (to teach marketable skills). Passow expressed concern about the poor quality of the teaching in D.C. schools; the President's message stressed the retraining of teachers. And where Passow pointed out the growing racial segregation, the increased barrier between school and community, and the deterioration of schools in poor areas of the city, Johnson aimed a number of goals at this galaxy of problems: increased citizen interest, targeting a poor and troubled neighborhood for special attention, and reducing student drop-outs and failures.

This broadside approach to social problem-solving (i.e., listing major goals without specific programmatic outcomes) was evidently typical of President Johnson's approach (and President Roosevelt's as well). He was rarely bothered by the need to spell out how; he instead told his aides, the legislature, and then the bureaucrats to give shape and specificity to the ideals. Political analyst Beryl A. Radin, in her book on the implementation of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, noted this tendency among liberal political leaders like John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. "The unified voice of the federal government defined a sweeping goal," she explained.

But the path to achieve that goal was mainly uncharted. Congress completed its work of legislative policy formulation and handed the law to the administration for an implementation stage. That stage was filled with unanswered, partially answered, or unasked questions. The uncertainty that accompanied the implementation of the civil rights policies was not

atypical of the period. The troops of the New Frontier tended to ignore the procedures by which policies are translated into programs.¹³

Later in this study, we shall speculate about the results of this broad-brush method of social change. Needless to say, more specificity would have been useful, though even policy analysts are divided over the need for comprehensiveness/rationality versus more practical and incremental modes.¹⁴ Had Johnson waited for precise programs, exact outcomes, and definite costs to emerge, his term of office might have ended without any results whatever. And perhaps Johnson's wisdom lay in not attempting to relate all means to particular ends, since this ends-means paradigm is almost never possible in the real world anyway.

The program for the District of Columbia schools, besides the broad goals and expectations listed above, specified the need for pre-school, early childhood, work opportunities for high school youth, staff retraining, and cooperative programs—among the educational service agencies in the District and federal government. Again, there was little that was premise; but the agenda for the schools was established and the U.S. Commissioner of Education, the D.C. schools, and other social agencies were charged to carry them out.¹⁵

Johnson planned initially to get funds to the D.C. schools quickly, by-passing the usually languid congressional approach, and use instead the United Planning Organization as a conduit for federal funds. While this method brought fast results, it turned out to be a mistake.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

For it raised the ire of key Congressmen who resented Johnson's slipperiness.

Federal Actions and Local Reactions

President Johnson had done his part: announced the effort, laid out its general goals, and generated the interest of bureaucrats in the U.S. Office of Education and the local public schools. Now the action shifted to the U.S. Office where Harold Howe II, recently appointed the nation's Commissioner of Education, began shaping Johnson's words into an actual program for the D.C. schools. Howe's task had three parts:

1. *He had to locate an area of the city for the "model school" experiment:* their decision to concentrate on a single area was based on the belief that massive funding and effort in a small area was better than spreading the resources more thinly.

2. *He had to generate a set of proposals—real programs—to fund and implement:* the general mandate from President Johnson was to be translated somehow by the Commissioner into a program that met the federal goals and was useful and acceptable to the local schools.

3. *He had to determine the locus of control:* it was unclear from the outset who should make decisions, plan, and oversee the project. This question of control was central to the progress of President Johnson's program.

At this point, April 1968, Commissioner Howe turned to the District of Columbia Public Schools, particularly Superintendent Manning

and to a university scholar and then staff member of the Ford Foundation, Mario Fantini.¹⁶ They selected the Anacostia area of the city for a number of reasons: it had enormous educational and social needs; it had received relatively little attention from reformers; it was undergoing rapid change as blacks from Urban Renewal areas (particularly Capitol Hill) were pressing for housing space in Anacostia; and, it was a geographically separate community in southeast Washington, isolated from the remainder of the city by the Anacostia River.

Accounts of how the decision of where to launch the model school was made are not entirely clear. LaNoue and Smith, in their study of decentralization in five cities, recount that "the effort was orchestrated by OE officials, with the D.C. school officials and community spokesman playing only a minor role."¹⁷ Evidence of the control of community constituents—and even public school leadership—is contained in a memorandum from OE official John F. Hughes to Commissioner Howe (April 1968):

. . . it is important that Manning [the D.C. Superintendent of School] make the right moves between now and the school board meeting of April 25. . . . Also, I think it important that Manning touch bases with the important leaders and organizations in D.C. . . .

I have advised Superintendent Manning in these terms and he seems agreeable. However, I think it would be important for you to continue the holding of his hand during the coming week to be sure all the proper moves are made.¹⁸

¹⁶Fantini had been an influential advocate of decentralization, involved in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville experiment in New York City; he had also published important works on the subject. See Mario D. Fantini, *et al.*, *Community Control and the Urban School* (New York: Praeger, 1970); and Fantini and Marilyn Gittel, *Decentralization: Achieving Reform* (New York: Praeger, 1973).

¹⁷George R. LaNoue and Bruce L. R. Smith, *The Politics of School Decentralization* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973), p. 104.

¹⁸Documents from the L.B.J. Library.

It is not uncommon for federal bureaucrats, who understand the national legislative and policy-making process well, to provide help to local leaders. And this form of "orchestration" is probably necessary if programs are to move successfully through the process of formulation, ratification, and implementation on schedule. But the early efforts of Office of Education leaders to maneuver the Anacostia program through the maze of policy-making seems a bit contradictory to the purposes of community involvement and local planning. Later, as the community and the school system became more involved, however, the locus of decision-making shifted to the D.C. schools and the community board.

On April 25, 1968, the Board of Education of the District of Columbia chose Anacostia as the site for the demonstration project—as the federal planners had hoped. Dr. Norman Nickens was made Project Director; Mario Fantini, head consultant to the project.¹⁹ Dr. Nickens was Director of the Model Schools Division, the city's first attempt at decentralization, dating back to June 17, 1964. Located in the Cardozo High School area, the Model Schools effort involved the use of community advisory boards and was funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity. Nickens appeared to be a logical choice, since he was experienced with community involvement programs in the District. The Model School Division, then, provided a prototype for the Anacostia project, as the philosophical description of the Division indicates:

¹⁹For a description of the Model School Division, see Larry Cuban, *Urban School Chiefs Under Fire* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1976), pp. 38-48.

With a subsystem as an unobstructed testing-ground, new programs can be developed, not in isolation, but in concert and on a proper scale, with provision for rapid feedback and rapid exploitation of new opportunities as they occur. The subsystem would have its own lay advisory council or "board," including members of the school staff, faculties of universities, and artists, musicians, writers, lawyers, etc.²⁰

Finally, Commissioner Howe had the problem of who should govern the project and how. Obviously, the U.S. Office of Education could not operate such a program, though advice and support could be provided. To simply turn the program over to the D.C. schools would do little to further the goals of community involvement and moderate self-determination. But no community group existed to bring into the equation. And even if there were, the D.C. public schools (school board, superintendent, and administrators) could not be overlooked.

The result was: Howe and other OE planners left open the issue of locus of control. There was little else they could do under the circumstances. Thus, in June 1968, the U.S. Office of Education sponsored a series of "Community Information Conferences" to find out what the program should be and how it was to be governed. Several hundred people attended, for the conference was well publicized in the newspapers, on the radio, and through appeals at church in the form of announcements from the pulpit, and in handbills. During the meetings in the Bethlehem Baptist Church, ten participants were selected to form the core group of the Ad Hoc Community Planning Council; the size was increased later to thirty-five members who were representative of the community.²¹ The

²⁰ President's Panel on Educational Research in Education, "Innovation and Experiment in Education" (Washington, D.C., 1964), p. 37.

²¹ From files kept in NIE by Nicosia: file on the Response to Educational Needs Project, 1967-1974.

major outcome of the meeting of the Council was a plan to hold month-long community workshops—an attempt, evidently, to insure that the needs of the community were heard and were translated into programs that were appropriate and widely supported.

It was clear that the locus of planning and conceptualization was no longer controlled by the White House and the U.S. Office of Education. It is unclear whether the shift of control was intended—as a part of the ideology of the community involvement approach—or was a set of steps unanticipated by President Johnson and the early OE planning group. It is evident, however, that once the community was brought in and given a task, the resulting program(s) would be evolving and different than those anticipated by Commissioner Howe and the Johnson staff.

Furthermore, another political force was to be reckoned with: the U.S. Congress, which had final control over federal funding for such an enterprise. In June 1968, the House Appropriations Committee reduced the promised (by D.C. school leadership and the OE staff) sum of \$10 million to only \$1 million.²² Acting program director Nickens reported that he was unsure of the effect of the drastic reduction, since the program details had not yet been worked out.

Why had Congress refused to honor the commitment made to the D.C. schools by the President and his agents? Certainly, the cost should not have scared them; the Great Society programs had cost billions of dollars for projects far more remote than the improvement

²² *Washington Post*, June 21, 1968.

of education in the schools of the nation's capital. In the hearings on the appropriations, it was evident that the program itself was not the problem. Rather, the lawmakers were reacting to the *way the program funds were requested*. Congressional feelings were hurt.

Representative William Huston Natcher, conservative Democrat from Kentucky, was chairing the subcommittee hearing for District of Columbia appropriations. Natcher questioned Commissioner Howe about the Anacostia budget item in particular, probably irked by the attempts of the White House and Office of Education to "end run" his subcommittee by working directly with HEW through the United Planning Organization. Further, the funds were already placed in a line item in the HEW/Office of Education budget. Evidently, Rep. Natcher saw such manipulation as yet another attempt by federal bureaucrats to control the program.²³ The result: only \$1 million was requested by the D.C. Appropriations Subcommittee.

The Community Planned

Despite the fiscal setback, July 1968 saw the all-out effort of the Anacostia community, some 280 strong, to determine the kind of program they wanted in their schools. A month-long workshop was held: cost, \$150,000 which came from the District of Columbia school's ESEA Title III budget. Participants from the community received a \$15-per-day stipend. They included parents, teachers, students, and at-large community people.

For \$25,000, General Learning Corporation provided technical

²³D.C. Appropriations for 1969, Hearings, p. 273.

assistance for these workshops.²⁴ Participants were divided into a series of task forces, ranging in interest from early childhood, through youth, to adult health and recreation. The early childhood task force, for example, developed "an early childhood unit: with comprehensive supportive services for both children and their families and a solid education program focused on preparing pre-school children for academic programs and developing a positive self-image."²⁵

The secondary task force worked to find techniques for building teacher-pupil relations, improve curriculum, and black history courses for the high school.²⁶ The task force on adult education, building on the notion of a "community school," explored the possibility of a comprehensive Adult Education Program, meeting the literacy, recreational, and social needs of the community's adults. And the youth task force group considered a wide range of needs expressed by young people; these included an interest in computer programming skills, sex education, guidance in vocational and business practices, and the creation of a youth advisory board to insure continued youth involvement.

Once the 28 workshop task forces drafted their proposals, a committee in late July was charged with the responsibility of writing a final report. Their product was reviewed and approved by the Anacostia Ad Hoc Community Planning Council, thus completing the community's

²⁴ *Washington Post*, January 5, 1970.

²⁵ *Washington Post*, January 5, and interviews.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

initial role in the drafting of the Anacostia program. The results were, as one might expect, a plea for recognition and help, a listing and elaboration of the educational and social problems in the Anacostia community, and the introduction of a formal mechanism for insuring continued community involvement. In particular, the proposal was divided as follows:

"What We Have"

- Overcrowding in the community and its schools
- Low educational achievement
- Inadequate housing
- Juvenile delinquency, truancy
- Inadequate educational opportunity

"What We Need"

- "A voice in creating and developing our educational system" (priority number one)
- Inservice education for teachers
- Better youth services
- Programs for adults in vocation, recreational and literacy
- pre-school programs for children and families
- and others.²⁷

Central to the entire proposal was the concept of community involvement, in particular, input in areas of school governance, curriculum development, seminars for laypeople, and so forth. The report requested the creation of an Anacostia Community School Board with decision-making powers: over staff, program, school operations, and policy. In the interim, the proposal suggested the creation of a Community Planning Council to negotiate the funding and implementation

²⁷ See "Anacostia Community School Project: A Proposal," August, 1968; and the earlier "Community Steering Committee for the Anacostia Demonstration of Excellence in Urban Education," July 24, 1968.

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²⁷ See "Anacostia Community School Project: A Proposal," August, 1968; and the earlier "Community Steering Committee for the Anacostia Demonstration of Excellence in Urban Education," July 24, 1968.

of the 28 recommendations that came from the Summer Workshop Task Forces, August, 1968.

The community planning phase was completed; remaining were the jobs of garnering federal dollars, obtaining school system approval and help, and the fleshing in of programs around the bones of task force plans. By all accounts, much had been accomplished. A quiescent community had been mobilized; needs had been presented, discussed, and focussed; a set of 28 different recommendations were drafted; and an instrument of community control—an Anacostia community board—emerged.

The Higher-Ups Act

Since the project required the cooperation and support of not only the Board of Education but also the Congress, the political landscape was somewhat more complex than in other school-community experiments. So while the House of Representatives reduced the funding support from \$10 million to \$1 million, the Senate went one step further: reducing the money promised to zero. Reactions from the Anacostia community and the White House were swift. Protest meetings were convened, with support from the planning group, community groups, and the public. A delegation went to meet with Congressmen and Senators, as a means of turning the decision around.

In the White House, aides worked to return the budget item to the agenda. President Johnson's aide, James Gaither, wrote to presidential lobbyist Michael Mantos, stressing the promise of Johnson to the Washington, D.C. school community. Gaither then drafted a speech for Senator Robert Byrd. The jest of which was: that the cutting of the

Anacostia budget item was a false economy; and that the project plans were the result of the work of "some of the best lawyers in Washington, as well as by Anacostia residents themselves."²⁸ Byrd's speech, the lobbying by presidential advisors, and the demonstrations by the community can be credited for the return of the \$5 million item to the Senate's appropriation measure.

In September, the Anacostia Community School Project was approved by the D.C. Board of Education; the proposal was then transferred to the U.S. Office of Education on September 18, 1968, for study and final appropriation of funds. Since the House had approved a \$1 million item and the Senate, a \$5 million one, a House-Senate Conference Committee met to hammer out the differences. And on October 10, President Lyndon Johnson signed the Appropriations Bill for the District of Columbia (Public Law 9473). In it was a \$1 million amount for the Anacostia project, a reduction from the \$25 million originally promised by the President, but the first of seven million plus dollars to be allocated to the program between 1968 and 1978 when federal funding ceased.

Other funds were also sought by the U.S. Office and the Office of Economic Opportunity—in a bureaucratic attempt to fund what the Congress had rejected.²⁹ An interagency group with representatives from various federal bureaus, circulated memoranda to alert agencies of the needs of the Anacostia program and the opportunities to help. The Office of Economic Opportunity, for one, tentatively, provided \$100,000 for the planning of the Early Childhood Unit, pending the

²⁸ *Washington Post*, April 27, 1972—a chronology of Anacostia events and interviews.

²⁹ *Washington Post* chronology, January 5, 1970.

acceptance of a proposal of the program component. Similar efforts were made to execute the recommendations of the Reading Task Force, as the planning phase came to an end.

Three major ends had been reached between July 1967 when White House aides met to conceptualized the D.C. program and October 10, 1968, when President Johnson signed the D.C. Appropriations Bill.

1. *The concept and precedent of community involvement were established:* the proposals were drafted by community task forces; the notion of a community planning and governing process was accepted, at least in principle; and the mechanism was begun to govern the new program in the planned Anacostia Community School Board,

2. *The goals of educational and social progress were stated:* in the 28 task force reports, the planners articulated the diverse and urgent needs of the Anacostia community—and by implication, other poor urban communities in the District of Columbia. Further, these groups established the bases for ameliorating these difficulties: programs for young children, youth, and adults in reading, recreation, and others.

3. *The funds, though somewhat reduced, were appropriated and the precedent established for federal funding of a community-controlled project in the D.C. schools:* the Congress provided a million dollars and various agencies chipped in additional money for the Anacostia program. In the decade to follow, over six million additional dollars was to be appropriated; this precedent was established earlier and made the Anacostia project possible.

In the remainder of this chapter, two forms of analysis will be

applied: (1) we raise the question, *How does one explain the creation of the Anacostia project?* The answer is sought through an analysis of change in the *historical* development of the nation's schools in general and the D.C. ones in particular.

(2) we raise the question, *How does the creation of this project compare with the planning of change in other organizations?* Implementation research makes much of the planning of programs: i.e., the generation of goals, objectives, means, and hoped-for outcomes. The answer is sought through *organizational* analysis of the beginnings of the effort that was to become the Anacostia Community School Project and later the Response to Educational Need Project.

While part one above provides information on the historical context, part two shows the planning of the Anacostia program in light of its later structural growth and decline. The former studies trends; the latter, processes and dynamics of complex social behavior. Both together allow us to understand the birth of the project in the D.C. public schools.

Converging Trends and the Birth of the Anacostia Project

The Anacostia program was not created in a vacuum. To understand its inception, one must place it into the context of urban educational history in the mid-1960s. We do not claim that these trends, as to be discussed below, were the cause or the instigator of the project. Instead we are saying that these trends are the necessary—but not sufficient—condition for the emergence of the school experiment. Without the combination of changes in the course of U.S. school history,

such a program would likely not have happened—at least in the way we now associate with the program. Furthermore, these trends seem to converge in the late-1960s, feeding on one another and creating a new condition which was greater than the separate effects of the four separate changes. They were:

1. *A change in the demographic composition of the city and its schools in general, the Anacostia community in particular;*
2. *The increased legitimacy and impact of federal involvement in local public schools, a trend that began in the 19th century but one that reached the climax in 1965 with the passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act;*
3. *The change in the political position of the District of Columbia with the advent of some home rule and federal recognition; and*
4. *The immediacy of "community control" as a potent form of educational and social reform in the 1960s, a trend began by black Americans in the South as a means to freedom and civil rights which spread to the North and West.*

Each historical trend will be presented and compared to the development of the Anacostia program.

1. Changing Demography and the Anacostia Project

Washington, D.C., was not different. It, like many of the nation's large cities, was rapidly taking the place of the rural South as the home of large numbers of the poor and black. Furthermore, changes within and among Northern (and some larger Southern) school districts had a profound effect on the demographics of public school

enrollment patterns.

The statistics on Washington, D.C. and its surrounding metropolitan (or suburban) area tell the story (see Table 1).

TABLE 1
RACIAL MAKE-UP OF WASHINGTON, D.C.
AND SUBURBAN SCHOOLS AND COMMUNITY, 1950-70

	<u>1950</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u>
Size of D.C.	802,178	763,956	756,510
Percentage change:	--	--	- 5.7%
Size of Suburbs	661,911	1,237,941	2,104,613
Percentage change:	--	--	+218%
TOTAL GROWTH	<u>1,474,089</u>	<u>2,001,897</u>	<u>2,861,123</u>
Percentage change:	--	--	+ 94%
Percentage of White D.C. Residents	64.5%	45.2%	28.0%
Percentage Black D.C. Residents	35.0%	43.9%	71.1%
Percentage White Pupils in D.C. Public Schools	68.3%	51.3%	9.7%
Percentage Black Pupils in D.C. Public Schools	31.7%	48.7%	90.3%

A number of facts are evident in these data. First, the city of Washington, D.C. lost population, some 6 percent over the two decades, while there was a remarkable 218 percent growth in the suburban ring in Northern Virginia and Southern Maryland which border on the District.³⁰

³⁰See LaNoue and Smith, *The Politics of Decentralization*, p. 89.

In all, the region grew nearly one-fold (94 percent) between 1950 and 1970 and the trend has likely continued. More importantly for our analysis, however, is the change in racial make-up of the city: black residents increased from 35 percent to 71 percent during this period with the concomitant diminution of whites. "White flight" was in evidence; so was the obvious fact that whites moving into Greater Washington decided *not* to reside in the city at all, as the suburbs increased two-fold and the city declined in size.

But while the city contained 270,182 whites in residence, only about ten percent of the children in the schools were white. The remainder of the white families enrolled their offspring in the private or parochial schools. And of the whites in public schools, most attended in the few predominately white schools in the "better sections" of town—mainly the Northwest.

The pattern, then, was a significant increase in black people in the District and an even greater jump in black pupil enrollment, while whites either fled the city, huddled in the Northeast, or utilized nonpublic—all conditions leading to the segregation of the public schools.³¹ And, likewise, greatly increased numbers meant a growing base for political power among black Washingtonians, as evidenced by the election later of black leadership in city hall, board of education, and city council.

It would mean little to speculate as to the causes of the movement of whites (and a growing number of black middle class) from the

³¹For a broader treatment of urban segregation, see James S. Coleman, *at al.*, *Trends in School Segregation* (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 1975).

city. Reasons often heard are: the *desegregation orders*, in this case the companion case to *Brown vs. Board of Education* (1954), i.e., D.C.'s *Bolling vs. Sharpe* (1954) which made the two-tier public schools illegal, and the so-called Judge Skelly Wright decision, *Hobson vs. Hansen* (1972), which outlawed a number of other segregationist practices like "tracking" of students, teacher assignment, higher spending in the city's whiter school, etc.; the *increase in crime* and other social problems; and the general *desire of Americans for more land and private, detached dwellings*. The development of major highways made commuting easy; the erection of new housing developments and even new towns (Reston, Virginia and Columbia, Maryland—two of the nation's most successful attempts at "instant village"), enticed families to suburbia in great numbers.

And, of course, the District of Columbia was not alone in its racial/demographic alterations. James S. Coleman and his colleagues studied the relationship between racial segregation and educational policies in American towns and cities. What they found, essentially, was that *desegregationist activities led to greater re-segregation*—and Washington, D.C. is no exception. In summary, Coleman found that residential segregation (recall D.C.'s white and black enclaves) *within cities* led to school segregation and made the unpopular busing decisions necessary. He writes:

School segregation in large cities coincides principally with residential segregation, but this is less true of smaller cities, towns, and rural areas. . . . In large cities, with large racially homogeneous residential areas, often including a black ghetto area, extensive reduction of segregation requires the

controversial policy of busing.³²

There is no evidence in Coleman's data that school integration leads to greater residential segregation, though he does believe that the desegregation of the city schools exacerbates white flight, leading to *increased between-system segregation*. He explains that such city-suburban segregation "was intensified when the desegregating city has a high proportion of blacks and when there was a high disparity in racial composition between suburbs and city."³³

Coleman constructed a simulation model for predicting the effects of school desegregation on the racial composition of a city. Starting with a 50%-50% balance black and white in this hypothetical city, what would be the impact over ten years of desegregation, he wondered? His data show (1) no absolute change in black population, regardless of whether schools are de-segregated or not; (2) a 15 percent loss of white because of white exodus where there is *no* desegregation; and (3) a 25 percent departure rate where desegregation *is attempted*. Beginning at 50-50, the hypothetical American city will be 65 percent black in ten years, without desegregation; 75 percent black, with integration attempts. He concludes:

Thus, in the long run (that is, 10 years, substantially) desegregation does, on the average, hasten the shift of the city to being predominately black; but the impact is not enormous, simply because it is (as best we can tell), a one-time acceleration which does not continue in subsequent years.³⁴

³² James S. Coleman, "Racial Segregation in the Schools: New Research with New Policy Implications," *Phi Delta Kappan* (October, 1975), p. 76.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

³⁴ For an exhaustive review of the desegregation research, see *The Desegregation Literature: A Critical Appraisal* (Washington, D.C.: The National Institute of Education, 1976); see also, Charles Wollenberg, *All Deliberate Speed: Segregation and Exclusion in California Schools* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1976) and Nancy H. St. John, *School Desegregation Outcomes for Children* (New York: John Wiley Sons, 1975).

It is not our purpose here to debate Coleman's results of his recommendations—that schools be integrated *across* city-suburban boundaries, that residential living patterns must be changed, and that the white exodus should be slowed through area-wide open enrollment, not busing. Rather, we hoped to show that the racial demography of American cities—virtually all Northern and some Southern ones (e.g., Atlanta)—had changed, as Washington, D.C.'s had; that the combination of forced desegregation attempts resulting from court decisions (*Bolling vs. Sharpe* and the Judge Skelly Wright decision, *Hobson vs. Hansen*) and the trend for whites to leave the city strongly changed the make-up of the nation's capital; and that the tendency of whites in the city to seek enrollment in private and parochial schools removed still more white children from the D.C. schools.

Thus, an important pre-condition for the introduction of the Anacostia community program was the growing predominance of black people in the District and vast majority in the public schools. The Anacostia community, located in Southeast Washington,³⁵ across the Anacostia River from official Washington, has been particularly affected in some ways like the rest of the city—in other ways, differently. That is, the city lost 1.3 percent population between 1960 and 1970 (and 6 percent of a twenty-year period; see Table 1); but Anacostia *gained* 26.5 percent. And this increase "tipped" the community to predominately black, from its white majority in a ten-year period, as shown in Table 2, as was true of all Washington.

³⁵For a history of the area, see Louise Daniel Hutchinson, *The Anacostia Story: 1608-1930* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1977).

TABLE 2
RACIAL CHANGE IN DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND
THE ANACOSTIA AREA

City	<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u>
City	763,956	756,510
Anacostia—Southeast	102,096	129,228
—Blacks	30,463 (29.8%)	114,859 (88.8%)
—Whites	70,863 (69.4%)	6,562 (5.1%)*

* Remaining percentages are Spanish-speaking, Asians, and Native Americans.

So while the District of Columbia had an increased black population to 71 percent, Anacostia was almost 90 percent black by 1970.³⁶ Stated in somewhat different terms, about 60,000 whites left the area while about 70,000 blacks moved in—all in a single decade. The impact on schools, gathered from interviews, indicated overcrowding in Anacostia, while space existed in the predominately white schools in the Northwest. Furthermore, the highly mobile nature of the families in the Southeast increased greatly the problems of providing a decent education for the students.

³⁶ Southeast Census tract data from U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Census of Population and Housing, 1960. Final Report PHC (1)—157 US GPO Wash DC 1962 and D.C. data: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1970: Vol. I, Characteristics of Population, Part 10, District of Columbia, US GPO Wash DC, 973.

Other social indices are also revealing. Unemployment and low-average family income were most common in regions like Anacostia, those with the largest number of black families. Data indicate in 1960, for example, that 12 percent of males and 15 percent females were unemployed. Mean income for the city is \$12,189 in 1970; in Anacostia, average family income is only \$9,779—and perhaps lower, since census analytic procedures tend to inflate mean incomes. Also, we must realize that any measure of central tendency obscures by definition the condition at the extremes of the distribution.

And it is a characteristic of the Anacostia community that there is a considerable mix of socioeconomic levels: thus the fair number of better-off people balances the number of seriously deprived. In the 1970 census, 12 percent of the total population had incomes below the national poverty level; of this group, 24.33 percent were receiving welfare help. The breakdown by census tract indicates the distribution of these conditions:

TABLE 3
POVERTY LEVEL AND PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FOR
ANACOSTIA CENSUS TRACT AREAS, 1970

Percentage of Families Below Poverty Level	<u>1970 Census Tract Area:</u>				
	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
% of all families	15.64%	21.35%	9.85%	5.83%	7.5%
Percentage families on Public Assistance	31.97%	33.9%	24.5 %	21.5 %	10.1%

To summarize this section, the Anacostia Community School Project was in part made possible by the vaulting needs of the neighborhood and its schools. By 1969, for example, elementary schools were severely overcrowded and had enrollments of 1,000 or more in eight of the nine cases. Among the eight most hard hit, two had doubled in size in nine years, and six had grown by fifty percent. The influx of about 70,000 black people,³⁷ many of whom were poor, un- or under-employed also attracted the attention of the planning group in the D.C. schools and the U.S. Office of Education. That is not to say that Anacostia was the only area in need of federal assistance; it was just that it was perhaps the most obvious.

2. Changing Federal Role and the Anacostia Project

If the community of Anacostia had the need—as we have just shown—the federal government had the resources to meet them. But, the willingness and ability of Congress, the President, and the executive agencies like the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to assist local school systems is a change in national posture and policy—a development, really, of the mid-twentieth century. In this section, we shall briefly relate the phases of federal aid to education, starting

³⁷ Housing surveys are good indicators of the state of a community, since real estate values and housing stock are tangible. Constance M. Green recounts how the "colored population, dispossessed by playgrounds, public buildings, parks and schools, were relocated in a remote section in the rear of Anacostia" in mainly public housing and apartments. In fact, 85 percent of the housing units in Anacostia were apartments. And 60 percent of the city's public housing was located in Anacostia. See Constance McLaughlin Green, *The Secret City* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 279. Data come from "Washington's Far Southeast '70," Report to Mayor Washington by the Office of Assistant to the Mayor for Housing Programs, Community Renewal Program, Summer 1970, p. 82.

in the era of the Articles of Confederation, ending with the Lyndon Johnson presidency. Our point is: that without a responsive—even proactive—federal government to stimulate, guide, legislate, and fund the Anacostia project, no program would have existed.

PHASE I...Federal Land and Local Schools: A national presence in American education was all but unknown in the 18th century. Since education and religion were inextricably intertwined and since there was no single overriding religion in the thirteen colonies (later states), the Founding Fathers quite wisely ducked the issue of education completely, leaving such efforts to local communities, churches, and ultimately, the parental conscience.³⁸

In its drafting of the Articles of Confederation in 1784, a committee of the Continental Congress headed by Thomas Jefferson attended to the use of western lands, allowing them access to the union as future states and, importantly for this discussion, for the creation of schools in the new areas. In Article III, Articles stated: "Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged." The result of this early commitment was the famous Northwest Ordinance: it provided that one out of every thirty-six sections (of 640 acres each) should be reserved "for the maintenance of public schools within the said township" when such lands are

³⁸For a discussion of this issue, see R. Freeman Butts, *The American Tradition in Religion and Education* (Boston: Beacon, 1950); R. Freeman Butts, *The Education of the West* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973); and Edmund Morgan, "Conflict and Consensus in the American Revolution," in S.G. Kurtz and J.H. Hutson, eds. *Essays on the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1973).

sold. Such an approach—the allocation of land sales for schools—was a reflection of the New England tradition of village schools set out in 1647 in the "Old Deluder, Satan" Act and Virginia's proposed system of public education that Jefferson drafted in 1779 and the House of Burgesses rejected.

In 1862, Vermont Congressman Justin S. Morrill, in a similar vain, proposed a system of land-grants for "practical" state colleges.³⁹ The land subsidy would support a college in each state which "without excluding other scientific and classical studies, and including military tactics" [would] "teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanical arts."⁴⁰

The land-related federal acts required a minimal effort and no national educational bureaucracy whatever, reflecting the dominant ideology in the United States well into the 20th century: that education is primarily a local and state affair.

PHASE II...The Federal Government as Educational Record-Keeper:

As the educational enterprise grew and flourished, it became necessary according to federal law-makers, to have a central organization to monitor its progress and provide information on its needs. On March 2, 1867, President Andrew Johnson signed into law a bill that created a Department of Education. Its role was quite benign: it was established,

³⁹Allan Nevins, *The Origins of the Land Grant Colleges and State Universities: A Brief Account of the Morrill Act of 1862 and Its Results* (Washington, D.C.: Civil War Centennial Commission, 1962; and Edward D. Eddy, Jr., *Colleges for Our Land and Our Time: The Land-Grant Idea in American Education* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1956).

⁴⁰Justin S. Morrill, *The Land-Grant Colleges* (Address at the University of Vermont, 28 June, 1893).

in the words of the act.

for the purpose of collecting such statistics . . . acts as shall show the condition and progress of education in the several States and Territories, and of diffusing such information respecting the organization and management of schools and school systems, and methods of teaching, as shall aid the people of the United States in the establishment and maintenance of efficient school systems, and otherwise promote the cause of education throughout the country.⁴¹

And the nation's first U.S. Commissioner of Education, Henry Barnard, was by one account "far more a scholarly data gatherer and reporter than he was an activist."⁴² The fact was: the United States was not yet ready for federal involvement. The issues that a strong national presence would confront—local racism, differentiation in funding, and denial of educational opportunity to many—were not yet to be solved by the government in Washington, D.C.

One might argue that at least during Phase II that the bones of a federal "bureaucracy" were laid down, even if the structure was pitifully small and impotent. But the very sense that the federal government should keep up with local education was a hopeful sign that action lay in the future. And needless to say that an Anacostia-type project would not have been created and funded under the "collecting" and counting that the Department of Education was first charged to do.

⁴¹Quoted from Donald R. Warren, *To Enforce Education: A History of the Founding Years of the United States Office of Education* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1974), p. 204. Warren recounts how, after but a few years, the Congress drastically reduced the tiny agencies budget and its status—from Department to Bureau (and now, President Carter is suggesting . . . a department again).

⁴²See R. Freeman Butts, *Public Education in the United States* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978), pp. 154-158.

PHASE III...Federal Help and Industrial Demands: It is clear to say that the growth of industry (commercial and agricultural) made an irreversible impact on schools.⁴³ And the need for a steady flow of capable workers for the mills and seaports of the nation placed a burden on the non-vocationally oriented public system. With the closing of the "golden doors" to the "teeming masses" of European immigrants, industry worried over the supply of workers.

The budding American labor movement and other groups like the farmers and some progressive educators, fearing a private system of trade schools dominated by big business, pressed for national bill to stimulate *public* vocational and trade schools. For example, the American Federation of Labor in 1915 was on guard in Illinois when a private State Board of Industrial Education was proposed by such groups as the National Association of Manufacturers and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. The AFL position read as follows:

Perhaps the most vicious element threatening to divert the movement of industrial education in our public schools from our American ideals of democracy in education, is the continuous effort made by the commercial interests to place industrial education under the direction of a distinctive board of management, separate from the board of administration governing the general education of the children. . . . Vocation school courses should at all times be under the guidance and control of school authorities having control of the general education of children. The unit system of administration is best adopted to educating our children properly for their future guidance as citizens and workers.⁴⁴

⁴³See Lawrence A. Cremin, *The Transformation of the School* (New York: Knopf, 1961); Raymond E. Callahan, *Education and the Cult of Efficiency* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); and Joseph M. Cronin, *Control of Urban Schools* (New York: The Free Press, 1972).

⁴⁴Marvin Lazerson and Norton W. Grubb (eds.), *American Education and Vocationalism: A Documentary History, 1870-1970* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1974), pp. 113-114.

Together with farm, reform, and some industrial groups, the labor movement was able to get President Wilson to appoint the Commission on National Aid to Vocational Education (1914) which led to the passage of the nation's first major piece of modern educational legislation: the Smith-Hughes Act of 1917.

Philosophically, the Act reacted to the need for (1) the conservation of natural resources, (2) the husbanding of scarce human resources, (3) the improvement of wage-earning power of American laborers, (4) frugal and wise investment of capital, and (5) the improvement of national prosperity through hard work.⁴⁵ In program, the Smith-Hughes Act provided federal dollars on a matching dollar-for-dollar basis for the salaries of agricultural teachers, home economics teachers, and college instruction in these vocationally related fields.

Structurally, then, the Act worked as many more recent federal aid bills did: federal categorical aid to local schools and regional or state officials, on a matching basis—the purpose of which is to stimulate change in a direction deemed important by the polity.

The Anacostia project compares directly with the Smith-Hughes Act of 1917 in a number of ways:

1. The federal government "intervened" in local school affairs, providing a program that school boards, administrators, and teachers may or may not have wanted initially.
2. Federal funds were involved; the assumption was that when local dollars will support the program—even when all external money were

⁴⁵ See Butts, *Public Education in the United States*, pp. 214-217.

gone. (But the Anacostia project was not set up to match dollar-for-dollar—federal and local; the hope was that when outside monies were used up, the D.C. school system would carry the program on.)

3. Federal funds went directly to support staff—in the case of Smith-Hughes, it was for teachers of home economics, the various trades and vocations, and agriculture; in the case of ACSP eventually the federal dollars paid for staff developers, community reading, mathematics, and relations aides.

4. The purpose of the programs in both cases (Smith-Hughes and Anacostia) was to provide resources for the improvement in education that local authorities could not—and in response to a national need. The former was aimed at producing a capable work force; the latter, the elimination of poverty through education.

So though the Smith-Hughes Act was hardly a general bill to improve schools nor an effort to provide equal educational opportunity for all, it was a big step in establishing certain precedents: one of federal involvement in local schools for a particular purpose; one of shared—national-local—responsibility for educational improvement; and one for federal support for certain teacher salaries. These were all extremely important precedents in the long road to the Anacostia program.

PHASE IV...Federal Involvement, Education, and the National Defense: During the 1940s and 1950s, certain congressional leadership and a succession of presidents attempted in vain to pass major federal legislation to overcome the two most obvious educational problems:

teacher and classroom shortages. Three issues prevented legislation from passing:

1. Federal aid to school districts that practiced racial segregation (Southern Democrats withdrew support from any bill that denied aid to their segregated schools).
2. Federal aid to nonpublic, parochial schools (civil liberties and public school groups refused to support a law that gave money to private schools).
3. Federal aid without federal control (conservative policy-makers resisted federal aid for fear of federal "strings").⁴⁶

These three stumbling-blocks—or the *three R's* of Race, Religion, and Republican conservatism—prevented Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy from obtaining a federal general aid bill to relieve the terrible over-crowding after World War II.

The only formula that seemed to work during this phase was this: to relate federal help to the national defense. That is, if the suggested program seemed in any way to improve the nation's defense posture, then such legislation might more easily pass Congress. In these years, then, Congress enacted the serviceman's Readjustment Act (1944), better known as the "G.I. Bill of Rights"; the National Science Foundation Act (1950) that recognized the relationship between defense and better

⁴⁶Several scholars have analyzed the failure of federal legislation during the period. See Norman C. Thomas, *Education in National Politics* (New York: McKay, 1975); Frank J. Munger and Richard F. Fenno, Jr., *National Politics and Federal Aid to Education* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1962); and Stephen K. Bailey and Edith K. Mosher, *ESEA: The Office of Education Administers a Law* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968), chaps. 1 and 2.

science and technology; the "impacted areas" bill (P.L. 81-815) in 1950 that helped schools servicing military bases and installations; and the National Defense Education Act (1958), following the launching of Sputnik, that supported the improvement of science teaching, counseling, foreign language instruction.⁴⁷

Though presented under the mantle of national defense and security, these federal laws, particularly the NDEA, were major alterations in federal involvement and aid. In one analyst's words,

NDEA was a breakthrough of major proportions. Substantial categorical assistance was made available to both public and private institutions at all levels of education, and students received direct aid in the form of grants and loans depending on their situation. USOE received responsibility for the operation of major programs, adding a new dimension to its role.⁴⁸

Thus, during Phase IV, the federal government responded to a dire need in schools: the improvement of education in the sciences and languages. And the federal bureaucracy was given a central role in the administration of the program. The federal presence had been greatly legitimated, laying the groundwork for the final phase and the Anacostia program.

PHASE V...The Federal Government and Educational Equality: With the advent of the New Frontier and Great Society, the federal government confronted the major restrictions to educational opportunity: racial segregation, poverty, and ignorance. Furthermore, Congress, the president, and the U.S. Office of Education were able to do something about

⁴⁷See Signey W. Tiedt, *The Role of the Federal Government in Education* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), chaps. 2, 6, and 7.

⁴⁸Thomas, *Education in American Politics*, p. 25.

these problems. Though the famous *Brown vs. Board of Education* decision (1954) outlawing racial separation in schools was over a decade old, and though the elimination of poverty was a stated objective of the nation, the distribution of educational (and economic) opportunities was still greatly skewed in favor of the white upper classes.

It was the political genius of President Lyndon B. Johnson that made passage of a landmark law possible, a bill that greatly expanded the role of the federal government and its funds. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 permanently changed the role of the federal government and set the immediate stage for the Anacostia project.

Johnson overcame the roadblocks, the 3 R's, by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964 first, taking pressure off Congress in their deliberations on ESEA; by giving the Catholic schools some ancillary services without offending the public school and civil liberties lobbyists; and by sweeping into office in 1964 with such a majority as to blast the Republicans out of a strong anti-education position in Congress.

ESEA and Anacostia had many characteristics in common. First, both recognized the importance of federal aid and programs in improving local schools. Second, the mission of both programs was the same: the betterment of education for poor, minority, and inner-city schools—though obviously, ESEA was broader than this goal. Third, both programs were created with only the vaguest and most general purposes in mind: the intent being, one assumes, to allow local authorities to fashion a program to fit their own needs. Fourth, both programs were designed to stimulate change locally, without the federal authorities

having to "take over" the education of America's young people. There is, then, the element of "seed money," of "carrot and stick," of "leading by enticement" that has come to characterize social policy-making and implementation—at the federal level.

Thus, needless to say, the Anacostia program would not have existed were it not for the active role of the president, Congress, and DHEW in helping local schools. Anacostia was the beneficiary of a two-hundred-year development in American history, as were a range of anti-poverty, anti-segregationist, and pro-opportunistic efforts during the Great Society era.⁴⁹ Not only did the government have the interest and desire to help those less well-educated and well off; but also the federal bureaucracy had grown to a point of being able to plan, support, and evaluate such programs.

3. Changing District of Columbia-Federal Relationship

In many ways, Washington, D.C. is the nation's greatest and saddest city. It houses the stately buildings and monuments of government; but it also until recently lacked the system of self-government associated with American democracy: elected mayor, city council, and board of education. Thus, without an electoral process, citizens were denied access to those officials who made public decisions. Instead, until 1968—concurrent with the creation of the Anacostia school experiment—the city was governed by a Commissioner, called Mayor, and a

⁴⁹The passage of federal programs during the Johnson era has become almost mythical—the number and profusion being so great. ESEA, for example, was aimed at the poor, as the law says: "In recognition of the special educational needs of children of low-income families . . . , the Congress hereby declares it to be the policy of the United States to provide financial assistance . . . to local educational agencies . . . to expand and improve their educational programs by various means which contribute particularly to meeting the special needs of educationally deprived children."

city council, all appointed by the president with senatorial confirmation. Citizens of D.C. were also denied a vote in presidential elections and had no representation in the House of Representatives.

The effect of non-representation, of having to appeal to Congress for funds and help, and of third-class citizenship can only be surmised. LaNoue and Smith have listed: "few prizes of office, weak party structures, and limited citizen interest in local politics"⁵⁰ as but few outcomes of "taxation without representation" in the District of Columbia. The psychological effects must have been strange as well: to live in the presence of power close to the White House and U.S. Capitol, executive agencies and Supreme Court, and yet be denied legitimate access to it all.

The 1960's saw, however, the beginnings of self-rule—and the Anacostia schools experiment must be seen as part of these democratizing efforts. Planners in the White House had somehow associated local self-determination—in school and other civil affairs—with the improvement of life generally for D.C. citizens. Hence, "community control," to be discussed in the next section, and D.C. self-government went together, as part of the same reform.

The road to self-rule had been a slow one. It began in 1783 when Congress—sealed up in the Pennsylvania State House (Philadelphia) by a band of mutinous Revolutionary War militiamen demanding back pay—determined that it must never turn over local control to any civil authority other than its own.⁵¹ Article I, Section B of the

⁵⁰ See LaNoue and Smith, *The Politics of Decentralisation*, p. 87.

⁵¹ See James S. Young, *The Washington Community* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 13-16.

Constitution gave exclusive rights of government over the district to the Congress. Voting rights and self-rule came 180-plus years later, as follows:

1. *Presidential balloting*: In 1964, Congress gave residents of the District of Columbia the right to vote in the election of president.

2. *Board of education elections*: In 1968, President Johnson signed P.L. 90-292 which created a locally elected school board for the first time.⁵²

3. *Representation in Congress*: In 1970, Congress allowed the District to send one member to the House of Representatives—though this official has *no vote*.

4. *Mayor-City Council authority*: In 1967, President Johnson created a city council-commissioner system which created the structure for self-rule without the rights to vote for these officials (Congress and the president appointed them). It was not until 1974 that the Mayor and City Council were elected by the citizenry.

In the late-1960s, President Johnson, determined to give the citizens of the nation's capital more freedom, created the framework for self-government. It is no wonder, then, that the Anacostia project was planned by the community it was to serve, was constructed so as to include a locally elected community school board, and was seen as the first "experiment," "model" and "showcase" in the city. Without this

⁵²Public Law 90-292, 90th Congress, H.R. 13042, April 22, 1968. For broader discussion of local governance, see Royce Hansen and Bernard H. Ross, *Governing the District of Columbia: An Introduction* (Washington, D.C.: Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies, 1968), Mass. and Washington, D.C.: Harvard-MIT Joint Center for Urban Studies and the Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies, 1963).

historical change—i.e., reversal of the ideology of 1783 and the U.S. Constitution—it is doubtful that the Anacostia project would have taken the form and function it did. We might argue, then, that the program in Anacostia was but one step in a process of self-governance, the taking of the trend but one step closer to the constituency.

4. Community Control and the Anacostia Program

Finally, one should see the development of the Anacostia effort as part of a nationwide trend toward the involvement of poor and minority communities in the governance of their schools. The trend was widespread and was touted the improvement of urban schools. Astute educational historian David B. Tyack put it this way:

. . . many members of outcast groups demanded community control by their own people in place of the traditional corporate model of governance which sought to rise above "interest groups"; they substituted self-determination as a goal instead of assimilation; they rejected "equality" if that mean Anglo-conformity, sameness, and familiar failure in the "one best system." To many blacks the schools were not "above politics" but part of the struggle for black power.⁵³

Perhaps the most graphic case of community control in modern American history was the I.S. 201 and Ocean Hill-Brownsville experiments in the New York City public schools. LaNoue and Smith's analysis of these efforts showed the following goal in New York City:⁵⁴

If there was any single dominant purpose in the decentralization movement, it was to increase participation in the making of school policy, especially by the poor and those not previously involved. In certain respects, that goal has been achieved. In general, decentralization has increased the number of participants and

⁵³Tyack, The One Best System, p. 284.

⁵⁴LaNoue and Smith, The Politics of Decentralization, p. 229. See also Marilyn Gittell, Participants and Participation: A Study of School Policy in New York City (New York: Center for Urban Education, 1967), and David Rogers, 110 Livingston Street (New York: Random House,

changed the character of successful school activists. The new activists are often upwardly mobile members of minority groups with few previous ties to city-wide politics or institutions.

Equally interesting, for our purposes, was the reaction of the local power structure to the attempts by poor people to influence—even control—the operation of schools. Strong in support of community participation were an array of interests, including foundations (Ford, Carnegie, Rockefeller, New York, Field, and Episcopal), university scholars (Professors Marilyn Gittell and Mario Fantini), and governmental agencies (New York state legislature and the State Education Department). Major resistance to decentralized power came from the United Federation of Teachers when their members were being summarily moved out of the black community, the Council of Supervisory Associations representing the school administrators and supervisors who found six of its members transferred, and two parent groups (the Public Education Association and United Parents Association) which represented mostly the middle-class and often white and Jewish neighborhoods.

The tactic of the decentralization groups was direct votes, control over the neighborhood boards and the placing of black teachers, administrators and lay leadership in the schools; the reaction of the teachers and supervisors' groups was a city-wide teachers' strike, one supported by school administrators (principals) and supervisors. One observer of the 1968 strike wrote:

The New York teachers' strike seems to me the worst disaster my native city has experienced in my lifetime—comparable in its economic impact to an earthquake that would destroy Manhattan below Chambers Street, much worse in its social effect than a major race riot.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ Martin Mayer, *The Teachers' Strike, New York, 1968* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 15.

And the popular reaction was similarly charged as the police tried to protect teachers from irate parents. "Shouts and curses—'kikes, nigger lover, scab'—quickly created symbolic identification that overwhelms rational consideration of the restructuring of school governance."⁵⁶

In Washington, D.C., attempts to involve community members was somewhat similar but markedly different than the New York experience. The point being, however: the Anacostia community school effort should be seen as part of a national movement to wrest power away from the school bureaucracy—believed to be in the hands of the white "power structure"—and to place in with the families and neighbors of the urban poor.⁵⁷

New York City and Washington, D.C.'s decentralization efforts (and I use "decentralization" to mean shifts in *both* administrative and decision-making control) were similar in the following ways:

1. They both involved poor, black families in specific areas of the respective cities. In New York, the communities included Ocean Hill-Brownsville in Brooklyn, a part of East Harlem, and Two Bridges in the Bronx. In the District of Columbia, the area, of course, was Anacostia

⁵⁶ LaHoue and Smith, *Politics of Decentralization*, p. 175.

⁵⁷ The ideology of "power to the people" is certainly not restricted to the community control of schools issue. Whenever localized groups felt impotent, there was a cry for the transfer of power to them. The first such organized effort in the modern American city came in the 1850s with the arrival of the Irish. The result was a shift from centralized "aristocratic rule" by the Yankee Brahmin families to "ward politics" which could be controlled by the smaller Irish communities. Michael Katz calls this shift from *noblesse oblige* to ward control—"democratic localism." See Katz, *Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools*, pp. 3-22.

which shared with the N.Y.C. neighborhoods the social conditions of over-crowding, poverty, and unemployment.

2. Both saw external funds and help as a means to stimulate school reform. A host of foundations and public funding agencies supported New York City's efforts. Ford Foundation, for example, gave \$1.4 million; federal leaders in the Office of Economic Opportunity gave some; and so later did the New York legislature. In Washington, D.C. funds for decentralization efforts came outside the public schools, particularly the U.S. Office of Education, and the National Institute of Education. The total of federal funds reached over \$7 million between 1968 and 1978.

3. Both efforts were stimulated and supported by social problems in the greater society. The 1960s were years of civil rights, anti-war, and social unrest. Following the death of the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., for example, cities were in riot, buildings were burned, and public officials were anxious to relieve the pressures in poor neighborhoods. The sight of unrest in the cities greatly sped up the support of government. By the time of the programs in Anacostia and New York City, the federal government had become so supportive of community involvement that a whole series of laws absolutely required it of localities if they were to receive federal funds: including the Community Mental Health Act of 1963, Title II of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Titles I and III of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, and the Demonstration Cities Act of 1966. Thus, the insistent demands of the poor—coupled with the high level of civil disturbance—created a milieu in which change might and did occur rapidly; the Anacostia and New York City experiments were but two attempts to solve problems

through the extension of the franchise, called "decentralization" in the 1960s.

4. Both projects were considered part of a philosophical/scholarly change in the management of schools. A number of noted scholars and social thinkers provided foundations, government, and private groups with the intellectual underpinnings that such movement often require. In fact, the size and scope of published material supporting "decentralization," "community control," and "community involvement" was startling. Even President Nixon as late as 1969, in his charge to the President's Commission on School Finance, commissioned a national study of alternative schools which this author completed in 1970.⁵⁸

These researchers, including professors A. Harry Passow and Mario Fantini in the Washington, D.C. program; Marilyn Gittell, McGeorge Bundy, and the Fleischman Commission Report in the New York City schools case, were active in laying out the arguments, providing an ideological perspective for attracting the attention of funding agencies and studying the projects in the two cities as they occurred. These efforts resembled in many ways the efforts of progressive educators in creating reform in the 1920s and 1930s.⁵⁹

But for every similarity, there were almost as many differences between the decentralization/community control efforts in the two cities.

These include:

⁵⁸See Bruce S. Cooper, *Free and Freedom Schools: A Survey of National Programs* (Washington, D.C.: The President's Commission on School Finance, 1970).

⁵⁹See Lawrence A. Cremin, *The Transformation of the School: Progressivism in American Education, 1876-1957* (New York: Knopf, 1961), and Patricia A. Graham, *Progressive Education: From Arcady to Academe* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1967).

1. The scale and impact of decentralization attempts were greatly different. The sheer size of New York City, its schools with over a million students, and its large well-organized minority and neighborhood groups dating, in some cases, back to the days of purely ward politics in the city make it very different from the District of Columbia where self-rule, local politics, and a sense of political efficacy came late (1960s and 1970s).⁶⁰ Further, one could not argue that the rather small, low-key, and orderly experiment in the District was of the significance and power of the New York City efforts to give control to patrons of urban schools. In fact, using any measure one might wish to muster—size, funding, people involved, level of conflict, impact, and even anxiety in the system—the two project settings are hardly comparable. (In part, the black-white/black-Jewish confrontation was avoided self-consciously by involving the Washington Teachers Union in the planning and by the fact that both families and unionists in D.C. were black, for example.)

2. The two cities were different in terms of who initiated and supported the experimentation. New York City was and is the home of the nation's major foundations—who incidently became interested in decentralization and upgrading of minority education in their city. The Ford and Carnegie foundations, for example, were helped in their efforts by the state legislature as well. But the District of Columbia had primarily one source—the federal government. And the hope of maintaining the help (and lobbying pressure) necessary for the long life of the program was small over time. In a sense, New York City had more

⁶⁰ See LaNoue and Smith, pp. 153-165.

resources and clout in New York City than D.C. had in D.C. And New York City carried more weight upstate in Albany than the District schools did over on "the Hill."

3. The cities were different, too, in their levels of minority and poor community leadership. With little opportunity to try their hand at leading, black citizens of the District were only beginning to attempt self-determination. In fact, we argue in this political history that the Anacostia Community School Project (later the Response to Education Needs Project) became a major training-ground for such leaders. In New York City, the strength of the I.S. 201 and Ocean Hill-Brownsville efforts, on the other hand, were the results of the already existing leadership in the parent communities,⁶¹ though one must concede that the strikes and city-wide reactions must have taught Rhody McCoy, the parents, and the civil rights leaders—as well as everyone in the country—something about the limits and potential of planned innovations in urban settings.

4. The relative impact of the two programs was vastly different. The New York City decentralization effort led to passage of the 1969 School Decentralization Law for New York City (Senate 5690; Assembly 7175). It required that the city be divided into between 20 and 33 separate elementary school districts—each having about 250,000 citizens and

⁶¹ LaNoue and Smith report on the skill of one community group which existed prior to decentralization: "In Ocean Hill-Brownsville, the anti-poverty agency, The Brownsville Community Council (BCC), was most responsible for conceptualizing an independent school board for the area and for negotiating a Ford demonstration grant. During the strikes, the BCC aided the local governing board with the tools of modern confrontation (soundtrucks, mimeograph machines, etc.) to consolidate the support of the parents" (p. 174).

20,000 school-age children: 6 decentralized districts in Manhattan, 6 in the Bronx, 11 in Brooklyn, 7 in Queens, and 1 in Staten Island (Richmond). Under the law, these sub-units had locally elected boards of education to set policy, handle budgets, and approve the choice of administrative personnel.

In Washington, D.C., the Anacostia project had a much weaker impact. It did not lead to the true decentralization of the city schools, though Superintendent Barbara Sizemore attempted to use Anacostia (Region I) as the model for the rest of the system. Congress did not follow up, as the state legislature in New York did, with major reorganization of the schools in D.C. The major results that remain, now that the Anacostia project itself is closed, is the continued efforts of the Region I (called still Anacostia) board of education.

One could argue, then, that historically the Anacostia program fell in the mainstream of 1960s reform—that of attempts to involve citizens of poor communities in the decision-making about their schools. It existed, in part, because of the changed political relationship between the federal government and local schools in general and the D.C. public schools and the federal government in particular. And had not the racial composition of the city and its schools shifted so dramatically in so short a time, then Congress, the D.C. schools, and other leaders (like President Johnson and U.S. Education Commissioner Harold Howe II) might not have attempted community-based reform anywhere, much less in the Anacostia section of the city.

Thus, the project was a creature of its times, of its place, and of its condition. That is not to say that such historical developments were inevitable—they rarely if ever were. But, given the mix of social

change and need, social climate, presidential and congressional proclivity for problem-solving, and educational ideology (some called it philosophy), the birth of the Anacostia project is at least explainable and placeable in the history of U.S. schools. We at least have a fix on these developments.

The Planning of Change and the Birth of the Anacostia Project

But to know the history of the beginnings of the program is not enough. For to explain history is not to make history. As explained in chapter one, the Anacostia project can only be fully understood if we treat it as a case of implementation research. Without the understanding of how large-scale organizations (like the U.S. Government and the District of Columbia schools) behave, internally and with one another interjurisdictionally, our analysis of the Anacostia program would be weakened.

In this section, then, we apply what is known from the research on implementation and change—within the political/social landscape discussed in the first chapter—to the genesis of the program. Three purposes are here served:

1. *Explaining the Dynamics of Planning*: This section applies the theories of social planning for implementation to the case. It places the events, described earlier, into a social science context; and it prepares the way for further analysis—since the effort to change large-scale systems is, in the words of Russell Ackoff, "a continuous process, . . . a complex set of interacting decisions that may be partitioned in many different ways."⁶²

⁶²Russell L. Ackoff, *A Concept of Corporate Planning* (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970), p. 3.

2. *Relating the Errors of Planning to Implementation Difficulties:*

Since planning and implementation are so closely interrelated, it is possible in this section to link difficulties in the planning process to likely outcomes. It is also possible to explain why these "errors," if indeed one should apply this label, were made. In other words, we can discuss the characteristics of change in large-scale, complex, public systems that hamper the kinds of implementation that change agents have long recommended.

3. *Recommending Other Approaches to Planning:* Since an avowed purpose of this study is that of informing policy-makers in the government, schools, and public, some advice will be useful in this section, advice on planning. But a caveat: we should know by now that any change effort is bound by its history—those trends and development that fostered it. Thus, from a perspective ten years later, it is treacherous to advise change agents today. The best we can do is present the results and general advice.

In an analysis of any attempt to implement a new program, to bring about change in an organization, the literature indicates five critical concerns—which form the structure for this section. By treating the birth of the Anacostia project in light of these concerns, we can accomplish the three goals listed above: those of explaining the dynamics of planning, relating early and late events, and laying the groundwork for making recommendations.

The five concerns are: (1) setting the *goals* to be implemented, (2) establishing the *authority* by which governance can occur, (3) allocating and husbanding the *resources* necessary to carry out the effort,

(4) insuring the *stability* so that participants can work in security and constancy, and (5) completing an accurate and timely *evaluation*, both intermittently and finally, to permit the program to correct errors and improve itself and the system in which it resides. We shall treat each of these five areas of concern, comparing each (its relevant literature) to the founding of the Anacostia community schools innovation.

GOALS: The "Gyroscope" of Change

Virtually everyone agrees: that knowing what one wants to do helps one to do it. That understanding the desired outcome, the intended results, the goals or purposes of a change effort are a necessary gyroscope in giving direction to any implementation attempt. Seems simple enough. Seems direct enough. In fact, the setting of goals, the very term "goal" itself, has become common parlance in modern American life. (We have our "career goals," "life goals," "educational goals," and "personal goals.")⁶³

In the implementation process, then, the establishment of programmatic direction is deemed vital. Neal Gross and colleagues, in their study of change in the Cambire School, found that the absence of goal clarity led to later confusion and non-implementation. The researchers explained:

When the teachers were asked about their understanding of the innovation just before they were requested to make their first efforts to implement it in January, most teachers still indi-

⁶³In fact, one of the major purposes of counselling in schools and psychotherapy is, it seems, to help clients clarify their goals and begin working towards those ends. A European colleague mentioned to me that Americans seem more "goal directed"—or at least they seek to be—than most other cultures.

cated confusion about it. And when we asked the teachers about the clarity of the innovation in May, just prior to our assessment of its degree of implementation, most teachers again indicated that they still had an ambiguous notion of what was expected of them. These findings suggest that the *clarity of an innovation to organizational members* needs to be taken into account in conceptual schemes designed to explain the success or failure of implementation efforts.⁶⁴

Matthew B. Miles and others suggest that the "problem" of goal confusion is endemic to school systems, more so perhaps than industrial corporations which always have "productivity" and "profits" to lean on when assessing collective purposes.⁶⁵ S. D. Sieber concurs, though he stresses the political environment as a key causal factor in distorting the purposes and goals of key participants. They cannot, in Sieber's thinking, do what they want to because of the highly public setting that educators exist in.⁶⁶

Whatever the reason for lack of goal clarity, and there are evidently from the literature many, the maxim: "be clear about your goals before you start" is many times repeated in the wisdom of organizational change. This "classical" mode of decision-making in organizations firmly rests, in fact, on the goal structure, as Lindblom's characterization here shows: "One is tempted," he states,

⁶⁴N. Gross, J.B. Giaquinta, and M. Bernstein, *Implementing Organizational Innovations: A Sociological Analysis of Planned Educational Change* (New York: Basic Books, 1971), p. 196.

⁶⁵Matthew B. Miles, "Some Properties of Schools as Social Systems," in *Change in School Systems*, G. Watson (ed.) (Washington, D.C.: National Training Laboratory, 1967), pp. 1-29.

⁶⁶S. D. Sieber, "Organizational Influences on Innovative Roles," in *Knowledge Production and Utilization in Educational Administration* (eds.), T. L. Eidell and J. M. Kitchel (Eugene, Oregon: Center for the Advanced Study of Educational Administration, 1968), pp. 120-142.

to think that policy is made through a sequence of steps (or a set of interlocked moves), such as:

- (a) *preliminary appraisal of or inquiry into the problem;*
- (b) *identification of goals or objectives;*
- (c) *canvassing of possible policies to achieve the goals;*
- and,
- (d) *choice or decision.*⁶⁷

This highly rationale, uni-directional, and means-ends-oriented approach to planning for change, when applied to the beginnings of the Anacostia project indicates: that the project was, in effect, terribly ill-planned, that the model of classical decision-making in public organizations is ill-conceived, or both.

We shall show that indeed there was much that could have been strengthened, made explicit about the project; thus, the rational model is somewhat helpful. But, further scrutiny of the times, mood, and setting indicates that under the circumstances, and with good reason, the planning phase was quite adequate. That as Charles Lindblom has explained, the short, proximate, and highly adjustable approach to planning, leaving much open to those "on the scene," is preferable in a community control project to the top-down, prescribed program planning.⁶⁸

The Classical Planning Model and the Anacostia Project

During the planning phase, it seems clear that the project that was to become Anacostia was *not* created after "appraisal," "goal-identification," "policy-canvassing," and "choice-making," as the model

⁶⁷ See Harold Lasswell's well-known set of planning, recommending, prescribing, invoking, applying, appraising, terminating in "The Public Interest," in C. J. Friedrich (ed.), *The Public Interest* (Nomos, 5), 1962.

⁶⁸ Charles E. Lindblom, *The Policy-Making Process* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), persuasively argues for an incremental approach over the more comprehensive one.

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requires. True, Professor Passow had assessed the conditions in the District of Columbia schools, finding a whole host of weaknesses and making a list of required corrections. But President Johnson was not one for slow, careful, and deliberate systemization of social plans. Besides, his passing on a shopping list of "goals," nine in all covering a range of problems (citizen interest, teacher training, new methods, better relations between school and community, students and employers, and reducing truancy/drop-outs, for example), to Dr. Harold Howe II, who in turn handed the planning to the District's schools who in turn gave the responsibility to the designated community) did not lend itself to comprehensive plan-making at all.

And once the planning was given to the Summer Workshops (June 1968), the centralized, comprehensive, and controlled form of expert planning was replaced by the release of community needs—many and diverse. Johnson's nine goals, if we can call these suggestions "goals," grew to the community's 28 "needs," each back by personal information from participants. They included infant, pre-school, child, adolescent, and adult programs covering a range of health, educational, and welfare needs.

Costs also grew. President Johnson mentioned \$10 million per year. An interim meeting at the Brookings Institution came up with a \$25 million price tag. And had the 28 Task Force reports been budgeted, the expenses would likely have gone yet higher.

In sum, then, the planning of the Anacostia project did not involve the kind of "classical" reasoning at all. Decision-making was *delayed* (between White House and community), was *shared* rather than

centralized (among actors in the White House, District school system, and Anacostia community), and *open-ended and inclusive*, rather than closed and exclusive (new goals could be and were added by the recipients of the services). So while classical planning requires closure, the planning characterized by the Anacostia effort was very different. Why? We can only surmise:

1. *Johnson's Style*: He was a leader of tremendous energy and impatience; to wait until every option was explored, costed, and simulated would have taken months and he wanted to help the D.C. school more rapidly.

2. *The Philosophy of Community Involvement*: The federal government, in response to a national trend, was committed to allowing the advocates and participants in community services to do their own planning, thus vitiating attempts at more controlled, centralized approaches.

3. *The Inter-Governmental Nature of the Project*: The more layers of government involved, the more likely the original system of goals will change. What is important in the White House looks different in the central office of the D.C. school—which is greatly altered in the community. Pressman and Wildavsky have explored the Washington, D.C.-Oakland relationship in their book on the Economic Development Administration. They found a great deal of slippage between federal goals and the implementation of programs locally, illustrating the differences between expectations locally and federally.⁶⁹

⁶⁹See Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, *Implementation* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1973).

4. *The Nature of Educational Reform*: Finally, goals in social service areas like education are rather easily stated—improved reading, better teaching, more cordial relationship between school and parents—but are not efficiently translatable into programs. Thus, no matter how precise the stated goals, both behavioral referents are difficult to obtain, record, and interpret. For example, while improved test scores are obtainable, it is harder to interpret whether they show progress system-wide or just a condition that existed somewhat independent of the educational process. And other equally important goals like home-school relations are almost impossible to document authoritatively.

The Incremental Model and the Anacostia Project

Charles E. Lindblom has argue that not only is the "classical means-ends model" unworkable in the real world—as we just saw with Anacostia—but it is also inappropriate, even just wrong for good planning and implementation. Lindblom's objections are many:

- that the comprehensive (classical) approach assumes that the plan is "the product of one mind" when indeed the outcome cannot always be controlled by a single omnipotent force;
- that planning, policy-making, and implementation are not simply—or perhaps even primarily—a technological process; but rather they are "distinctively political" in nature;
- that a plan may not be conceived by anyone in particular, but rather will be the result "of a political compromise among policy-makers, none of whom had in mind quite the problem to which the agreed policy is the solution";
- that plans are really real-world "accidents";
- that plans may not be planned at all but "spring from new opportunities" quite beyond the imagination and control of planners;
- and, sometimes, that "no policy" becomes a "policy," a "plan" in action without support or contest from persons involved.⁷⁰

⁷⁰ Charles E. Lindblom, *The Policy-Making Process*, p. 4.

For all these reasons, then, we should reexamine the starting of the project in Anacostia, not as simply a "failure" in the planning-implementation process but rather as a complex attempt at incremental, local planning.

It appears that President Johnson's main goal with the Anacostia project was to focus attention on the D.C. schools, to get the "ball rolling" toward plans, funds, and program, and to hand the effort over to others in the federal and local government and the community to flesh in the effort. Thus, he did not seem to wish to deliver a total package to the schools. Whether he realized, as Lindblom suggests, that such comprehensive efforts are almost always doomed, or not, we cannot tell.

It appears that those in the D.C. schools and the federal government were committed to on-site, community planning. Thus, to circumscribe the citizen effort with pre-planned programs would have been foolhardy and immediately apparent to the black community members involved. Hence, a flexible and adaptive approach to planning was appropriate.

Finally, in the intense and vital Johnsonian period in American government, it appears unlikely that anyone in the White House, D.C. schools, or the Anacostia community had the legitimacy or the power to "control" the birth and direction of the program. It had to evolve, change, adopt, and grow—if it was to be at all.

That is not to say that such approaches—incremental—are without problems. What Gross, *et al.*, Miles, Sieber, and many others are saying is true: unclear goals at the onset do create ambiguity, tension, and the chance for failure later on. But given the circumstances, the milieu, and the ideology of the times, it seems likely that Anacostia

was to be planned diffusely, by many, and over time—or not at all!

AUTHORITY: The Directing of Change

A second and equally vital concern of any planning effort is: *who should do what, when, and where?* Since change is often costly, time-consuming, and threatening to those involved, the issue of authority, the directing and regulation of implementation and change, is critical. In highly hierarchical, authoritarian organizations like the armed forces and private corporations, power and authority reside in the ranks above—the general staff or the board of directors/managers.⁷¹ In public, democratic, and social service organizations, however, the role of lay-input, lay-financing (through the taxation system), and even lay-control cannot be overlooked.

Public schools have worked hard over the last century at disarming the public and buffering, if not isolating, the professionals in the schools. At each level—systemic, building, classroom—elaborate mechanisms exist to dilute the will of the people. School superintendents can hide behind their expertise and their control over the information reaching their boards of education.⁷² Building principals and supervisors can blame "downtown" (the central office) while ignoring any particular parent and child. And teachers, operating in their invisible domain, behind the classroom door, are protected by the bureau-

⁷¹ Even the authority in big business is challenged recently by a combination of big unions, big government, and the growth of consumer power (the Ralph Nader movement, for example).

⁷² For a treatment of the school board-superintendent relationship, see Bruce S. Cooper, "Staff for School Boards," *Administrator's Notebook*, September 1971, pp. 1-4.

cracy, their expertise, and the job setting.

But in the 1960s, the "wall of protection" that so long had been built around the schools was weakened. Community groups challenged the control of superintendents, teachers, and administrators. The undisputed authority over school decision-making was in some places transferred to communities.

Not only did this shift from professional domination to lay involvement have meaning for our understanding of the process of planning and implementation; it also influences the way we see the Anacostia case. For control over the organizational change, up until the 1960s, had nearly always been assumed to be in the hands of the chief school official, much like the authority of the corporate manager. Note in the passage below the glib assumption about the legitimacy of leadership; Ackoff writes:

Planning is something we do in advance of taking action; that is, it is *anticipatory decision-making*. It is a process of deciding what to do and how to do it before action is required. If we desire a certain state of affairs at some future time and it takes time to decide what to do and how to do it, we must make the necessary decisions before taking action. If these decisions could be taken quickly without loss of efficiency, planning would not be required.⁷³

There is a strong assertive tone about his statements: the "we," the decision-making of "necessary decisions before taking actions," the total absence of values or concern about who should plan. It is just assumed that those in charge will plan and others will follow.

The problem often arises then: what if the decision-makers and the recipients of the service fail to agree on what to plan, how to

⁷³Russell Ackoff, *A Concept of Corporate Planning*, p. 2.

carry it out, and so forth? Is the program imposed? Lindblom anticipates the problems of disagreement, compromise, trade-off, and so forth that accompany any attempt to change an organization. That is, the issue of who should have authority over planning and implementation decisions is *not a given*; rather, it must be wrestled with, resolved and institutionalized. Lindblom writes:

In any case, a policy analyst [or planner] has to descend from a high level of abstraction-like freedom to lower-level values. . . . At this level clearly we do not all agree; and, as a further complication for any one person, values at this level are very much in conflict with each other. Some values have to be sacrificed to achieve others⁷⁴

Incrementalism acknowledges the validity of changes later in the process and by those closer to the scene of implementation. Hence, rough guidelines, versus completed and comprehensive goals, are not a sign of failure. Instead such flexibility is a meaningful reaction to the changed distribution of authority.

Clearly, the issue of locus of authority was central in the creation of the Anacostia program. The multi-jurisdictional quality of the effort—involving many groups in the political landscape such as Congress, White House, D.C. schools, and Anacostia community—insured some problems of planning, funding, implementing, and evaluation. Who had authority over what? Can the community determine how the millions of federal dollars were to be spent? Whose criteria for "success" and "failure" in the implementation of the project were to be used? Were these results to be acceptable to all parties?

Initially, it appeared as though control would remain with the

⁷⁴ Charles E. Lindblom, *The Policy-Making Process*, p. 17.

federal government, as White House and Office of Education staff members sought to create an advisory and control group to manage and evaluate the project. But, at the point where the experimental schools plan, the "national showcase" in the nation's capital, reached the public school offices, and Anacostia was selected as the site, the "rules of the game" changed. It became a community project.

With this shift from centralized federal control to local/school district control, the groundwork was laid for ten years of conflict and compromise over who was to do what, for what money. But like the goal issue discussed in the previous section, the question of shared authority, the "layer cake" or "marble cake" of federal-school district-Anacostia relations, was not to be easily resolved.⁷⁵ It was somehow endemic to shared public programs. The federal government had to maintain some control, as the source of money and the keepers of the public purse. The school district, given authority over the education of

⁷⁵To some extent, the shared governance of the Anacostia project resembles the American "federalist" system, the three-tiered system of federal, state, and local governance that is the hallmark of U.S. government. The problems of this tripartite approach have been much discussed in the literature on "intergovernmental relations." Authors have searched for a metaphor: Daniel Elazar conceptualized the system as a "layer cake," each having its own role and function. Grodzins, seeing the relationship as more of a "marble cake," stressed the *shared*, rather than the *separated*, function of government. See R. B. Vlaanderen, *Intergovernmental Relations and the Governance of Education* (Washington, D.C.: The President's Commission of School Finance, 1971); Ronald F. Campbell and Gerald R. Sroufe, "Toward a Rationale for Federal-State-Local Relations in Education," *Phi Delta Kappan* 46 (September 1965), pp. 2-7; Morton Grodzins, "The Federal System," in *Goals for Americans* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1960), ch. 12; and Daniel Elazar, *American Federalism: View from the States* (New York: Norton, 1966).

children, had to see that the centralized control over education was maintained. And the Anacostia community school board had to represent the needs of the poor community—as was its mandate and expectation. In no other way could this three-headed creature (the Anacostia governance system) stay alive, despite the problems of shared governance.

RESOURCES: The Enablers of Change

Whatever the goals, and no matter how clear the lines of authority, a new program cannot be launched without sufficient human capital, and financial resources. And since most systems (like the D.C. public schools) operate without extra financial and staff resources, the infusion of people, space, and dollars is usually necessary to create and maintain a *new* program.

Ronald Havelock, in his eminently useful manual on organizational change, explains the value of resources acquisition:

Resources come in many forms: they may be available as print materials, people, or products. . . . Before you can make intelligent decisions and choices about what changes should be made and how to make them, you and your client should have an adequate understanding of what has occurred, what is available, and what is potentially relevant and useful.⁷⁶

Russell Ackoff advises the following: "*Resources*: determination of the types, amounts of resources required, how they are to be generated or acquired, and how they are to be allocated to activities."⁷⁷ And Gross,

⁷⁶Ronald G. Havelock, *A Guide to Innovation in Education* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1970), p. 77.

⁷⁷Russell L. Ackoff, *A Concept of Corporate Planning*, p. 6.

et al., found that the absence of resources in the Cambire School was a key to the failure of that innovation.⁷⁸ Teachers, in their efforts to individualize instruction, needed "highly motivating self-instructional materials" which were not in evidence. Thus, Gross and others concluded that implementation required "the *availability of necessary materials and equipment,*"⁷⁹ very basic resources.

Analysis of the planning of the Anacostia experiment shows that the major source of resources was the federal government, since the D.C. schools were not in a position to finance the program out of general funds; that these dollars were "promised" first by President Johnson, then by the Brookings Institution meeting (with D.C. school officials in attendance); and that the Congress greatly reduced these resources, to but \$1 million, for the first year (up to \$7 million over the next ten years). But during the planning phase discussed in this chapter, money did not seem to be the greatest problem, since funds were located to hold the Workshops and to reimburse community participants \$15.00 per day.) and to pay a consulting firm to operate the summer meetings. These dollars came out of Title III; the goals of Anacostia planning and the ESEA program were perceived as being similar enough to permit this funding.

Problems of resource allocation did occur later in the history of the project and properly belong in the next chapter. Needless to say, dependence on any *outside-the-system finances* created problems, as federal agencies and Congress were not interested in a permanent arrangement of funding. Thus, the public schools had, somehow, to come up with

⁷⁸Gross, Giacquinta, and Bernstein, *Implementing Organizational Innovations*.

⁷⁹*Ibid.*, p. 196.

internal funds if the program was to survive. It was understood, though rarely mentioned, that the funding resources were "seed monies," "start-up costs," and could not be counted on over the long haul.

The provision of outside funds did allow the project to locate and hire other forms of educational resource: personnel, materials, space in building and for offices, and equipment. Our data analysis did not indicate problems with the availability of such staff and materials. In the next section—on stability—, we see, however, that the high turnover of staff did create problems; this loss of valuable resources was, quite clearly, related to other variables such as instability.

In sum, resources are a vital part of any change effort; Anacostia was no different. During the planning stage, sufficient funds were located to get the project under way. Later, however, the uncertainty of funding did create problems, as we shall see.

STABILITY: The Continuing of Change

No change effort is implemented and effective unless it is *secure* and *on-going*. Security, the first element of stability, refers to absence of threats, cut-backs, or sudden re-arrangements, all the conditions that prevent staff from working well, goals from being met (or even developed along the way), and programs from progressing. No organization works well with threat; new and innovative ones, even less so, since they have had less time to establish repertoires for dealing with new situations.

80

⁸⁰My study of the American free school—those countercultural attempts by families, students, and minority communities to operate their own new schools—shows the effect of instability on program, staff, funding, and survival. For an extensive treatment of the topic, see Bruce S. Cooper, *Free School Survival* (Minneapolis: Burgess Press, 1976).

Second, stability can be internal, the steady flow of resources, ideas, decision-making. And since each element of a new program is highly interrelated and inter-dependent with all others, these component parts must be coordinated or internal stability, homeostasis is lost.

In Oakland, the Economic Development Administration suffered, according to Pressman and Wildavsky, from external instability, as resources from outside the system (Oakland) did not lead to a secure working condition for staff and clients. Internally, too, the parts did not mesh; things just did not get done, happen, and the project failed.

Pressman and Wildavsky explain:

Considered as a whole, a program can be conceived of as a system in which each element is dependent on the other. Unless money [resources] is supplied, no facilities can be built, no new jobs can flow from them, and no minority personnel can be hired to fill them. A breakdown at one stage must be repaired, there, before it is possible to move on to the next. The stages are related, however, from back to front as well as from front to back. Failure to agree on procedures for hiring minorities may lead the government to withhold funds, thus halting the construction. Program implementation becomes a seamless web.⁸¹

This "seamless web" is highly delicate, if we may extend the metaphor, so that without care, stability, and constant resources, the program can, and often does, founder.

The early phase of the Anacostia project, while productive in terms of the development of task force reports, involvement of the community, and the eventual allocation of \$1 million of federal funds, laid the groundwork for later instability as earlier problems (discussed in the prior two sections of this chapter) were not to be denied. Goals

⁸¹ Pressman and Wildavsky, p. xv.

were not clarified until 1974 when the National Institute of Education, taking over for the U.S. Office of Education, forced the issue: no clear goals and programs—no money. . . And the problem of authority also led to difficulties, and, in this analyst's opinion, to the demise of the Anacostia project in 1978. All along, however, there were clear signs of instability, as to be discussed in the next two chapters, including:

Delays and interruptions of funding

High turnover of staff and project directors—nine to ten years

Slowness in getting on-site staff training center/labs set up

Long "phase-out" period accompanied by fear of job loss, transfers, and demotion.

And tensions/jealousies between D.C. school and project leadership in the later years (after the retirement of Regional Superintendent William Rice).

In sum, the need for stability in the implementation of new programs is vital, if the effort is to be put into action and maintained. Early actions in the Anacostia project indicated that the program received the initial burst of energy, resources, and care from the U.S. Office of Education, the White House, and Congress to get started. The community was involved. And new programmatic ideas (28 in all) were generated. It is later in the history of the project, then, that in the symptoms of instability set in, though the conditions were created during the planning phase for later problems: unclear federal expectations, too little money, and interrupted resource allocation and utilization.

EVALUATION: The Renewing of Change

Experimentation requires the benefits of constant feedback, fine-tuning, and adaptation, if it is to continue and fulfill its mission. That is, at all phases of development, an innovation must be evaluated, reviewed, and changed, not only "formal" statistical kinds of measurement of implementation and quality; but also "informal" look-and-see kinds of evaluation. For as leaders and staff become embroiled in the daily work to keep the experiment going, they may and often do lose sight of their overall purpose—and of how they might do things better.

Havelock suggests that "some provision should be made for re-inspection and re-evaluation of the innovation over time." Why? He explains:

This type of activity insures against slippage in the *quality* of the innovation as well as providing an added incentive and reminder that the innovation is still supposed to be in operation.⁸²

He advocates that the people doing the evaluations be "self-consciously objective" in their efforts, though their appraisal need not be "in the form of rigorous and detailed measurement and analysis."⁸³ A concise report of the "state of the innovation" with recommendations for improvement might be better, faster, and less threatening to leaders of the new program.

Gross, Giacquinta and Berstein found, in the same vein, that the lack of change "could be attributed to the following conditions," all of which showed the lack of feedback and evaluation:

⁸²Havelock, *A Guide to Innovation in Education*, p. 151.

⁸³*Ibid.*

- "ambiguities in the minds of directors and his administrative subordinates about the specific nature of the new role requirements for teachers;
- "the failure of administrators to provide *effective mechanisms* for teachers to obtain clarification about their role expectations; and
- "the failure of the staff to secure clarification about the innovation."⁸⁴

But the nature of feedback, interactions leading to adjustments in the implementation process, is far more complex even than the Gross *et al.* depiction: i.e., the process of continuous interactions and evaluations is far more complex than that of having a clear mind, giving clear directions, and building mechanisms for interaction.

Pressman and Wildavsky characterize the implementation process, in fact, as "complex chains of reciprocal interaction" wherein participants learn how their actions fit into the change process. They continue:

Hence, each part of the chain must be built with the others in view. *The separation of policy design from implementation is fatal.* It is no better than mindless implementation without a sense of direction. Though we can isolate policy and implementation for separate discussion, the purpose of our analysis is to bring them into closer correspondence with one another.⁸⁵

Thus, evaluation is the central glue that makes the implementation process possible; it gives the cohesion necessary for participants to adjust their behavior.

In this analysis of the Anacostia project, we see how difficult it is to discuss the role of evaluation, though we maintain that evaluation is a critical part of the change process. Already we see the

⁸⁴Gross *et al.*, *Implementing Organization Innovations*, p. 200.

⁸⁵Pressman and Wildavsky, *Implementation*, p. xvii.

"complex chains" of reciprocal interactions and dependencies that plagued the Oakland project emerging in the Anacostia one; they include:

1. *Multiple sources of authority*: the community board, city school board, city school board, and federal policy-makers all "shared" in the policy-making. Complexity of decision-making emerged.

2. *Multiple goals and expectations*: the project was conceived as a complex and varied response to the problems of the Anacostia community in education, health, recreation, and political clout. Thus, the many needs and constituencies created very complex sets of expectations.

3. *Multiple dependencies for direction*: the project depended for its direction on a series of decision-points, in Congress, in HEW, in DCPS, and in the community itself. Any one of these agents could slow, change, or stop the process of educational reform in the Anacostia schools. The feedback and evaluation among these groups was necessary if the program was to be planned and implemented.

The complexity of authority, expectations, and direction create conditions that compound problems of evaluation. Participants may not know to whom to look for direction, where to go for decisions, and who to believe. But these problems emerge later in the history of the project—though we need to recognize them from the onset.

This chapter recounts the history of the Anacostia project's birth, the actors, problems, and results. It does so in two contexts: one historical; the other, socio-organizational. This chapter, then, provides a context for understanding and analyzing the birth of Anacostia.

Historical Summary

The project clearly fell into the category of a whole set of educational and social changes going on in the 1960s. Like the Roosevelt New Deal, President Johnson had attempted to eliminate poverty, racism, illiteracy, and unemployment through actions of the federal government in the Great Society campaign.

But why did the educational experiment in Anacostia come about the way it did? Our trend analysis shows that the convergence of the *re-segregation* of the D.C. community and schools; the *changed attitude* of the federal government on aid to local schools generally and the D.C. schools in particular; and the *saliency of community control* as a means of improving schools, all led to the possibility of Anacostia.

It was the Passow report, the vagueness of Johnson's approach, and the willingness of the D.C. schools to allow the community to plan its own program that were the immediate causal factors in Anacostia's birth. We conclude, then:

- that the historical precedence for the Anacostia project was very much in evidence in America in the 1960s;
- that the ideas of a community schools project, to deal with the myriad of problems facing pre-schoolers, youth, and adults as Johnson explained, was not terribly radical or unusual at the time;
- that the way Johnson "planned," "set in motion," and then virtually "ignored" the project was also typical of his approach; and
- that the absence of specificity, at the White House, congressional, DHEW, or school system level was likewise typical of change efforts during this era.

This is not a roundhouse condemnation of the way Johnson and others put Anacostia into motion. Given the conditions and the circumstances, the project was well launched: plans made, community selected and involved; funds awarded; and general directions set. If, in fact, Johnson had presented a full-blown project, with detailed goals, approaches, job titles, and outcomes, we can be sure that he would have been condemned for "imposing a project" on a poor community; another example of whites oppressing blacks; and "the bureaucrats strike again!" His vagueness can also be censured, mainly by policy analysts, as "soft-headed" nondirected planning which leads to "confusion" and failure. This analyst does not make such broad statements; since given the immobility of large systems (and the performance of subsequent American presidents), the Anacostia effort was not bad.

Change Process Summary

The Anacostia project was also an attempt at planned implementation and change. As such, it falls under yet another set of principles and concerns: those of (1) GOAL SETTING, (2) AUTHORITY FOCUSING, (3) RESOURCE ALLOCATING, (4) STABILIZATION, and (5) EVALUATING, the first letters of the five terms forming the "GARSE." Any study of change, then, must treat these issues, and their impact on change and implementation.

1. *Goals*: It is obvious that goals did not get set in the sense that rational-comprehensive planners advocate. But how could they? Under the crush of time, the absence of any single planning agent (such authority being purposely shared and negotiated; see number two below), and the newness of the effort in the District of Columbia, one could not expect a pristine educational plan; it evolved.

2. *Authority*: A central purpose of the project was to take the planning away from the hired staff of the D.C. schools, the U.S. Office of Education, and to bring in, instead, "the community." This kind of community planning carried with it the authority to determine goals and to carry them out. But the Anacostia community board did not operate as a free agent, nor should it. Instead, it worked with the USOE and later NIE in its funding and program help; with the D.C. schools in staffing and location of program sites (the public schools of Anacostia); and with the constituent community. Lines of authority were bound to be somewhat confusing—and they were, particularly for top leaders in the project.

3. *Resources*: The project was and remained for its life an externally-funded effort with district in-kind money contributed. Since resources are essential to the life of any program (including money, space, personnel, materials), the dependent state of the Anacostia project was created during its early life and continued till its discontinuation in September 1978.

4. *Stability*: The project was dynamic, changing, evolutionary from the onset. This environment, in the D.C. schools, the federal bureaucracy, and certainly within the project, was to take its toll. But we have jumped ahead of this chapter, into the implementation phase.

5. *Evaluation*: Finally, projects need feedback from their environments: some systematic and measureable; others, informal and constant. This need was recognized early in the history of the Anacostia program. Dollars were set aside for a formative and summative evaluation, which

originally were to be handled by the program itself; later NIE decided for purposes of control and quality that the evaluations should be done by outside agencies, the job given later to Richard Gibboney Associates.

The conditions were ripe for problems, since there were no clear or established criteria for these evaluations. The differences of perspective, between the school district and the project, the community and the professionals, the federal government and the local school system were sometimes great, making good communications and effective evaluation difficult. These details will follow in later chapters.

* * * * *

Adlai Stevenson, in an address to the National School Boards Association, seemed to capture the needs, the problems, and even the solution to the relationship between national educational reform and implementation and the desires of local schools and communities. He said:

Education is a great national problem—incapable of a national solution. . . . The governmental function of education has been left to the locality, to the separate community, to the separate school board—in a vast country like this, the further you remove the responsibility for interest and concern and the sense of responsibility of the individual citizen, in the community. . . . What we need is more, not less, individual concern for education.

86

Surely the Anacostia project was born out of this concern: to bring the schools closer to the needs of the patron community and to introduce into the school system, a new force for change, the citizens themselves.

Such a change was not smoothly planned, implemented, and institutionalized. But it was a step toward creating among citizens (and educators) "more, not less, individual concern for education."

⁸⁶See H. W. Webb, "Emerging Patterns of Public Control in U.S. Education," *Canadian Educational Research Digest*, June 1968, Vol. 8, p. 118; and William G. Cunningham, "Citizen Participation: Antagonists or Allies," *Theory Into Practice*, Vol. 15, no. 4 (October 1976), pp. 274-283.

CHAPTER III

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A PROJECT

Introduction

The implementation of the Anacostia Community School Project began immediately. On January 15, 1969, with the approval of the U.S. Office of Education, the first major program was started: the Reading Component. Ninety-seven Community Reading Assistants were selected for training; these people were Anacostia laypeople; their jobs were to help area teachers in the instruction of reading.¹ The U.S. Office allocated grant funding of \$726,000 for the program which also included \$40,000 for the administration of the project—the hiring and continuance of a Reading Program Director.

And, by February 20, the 90 reading assistants who completed the 15 days of training were sworn in under the civil service regulations of the District of Columbia; and a second group of Community Reading Assistants were selected, to start training on February 24. The principal of the Turner Elementary School, Mr. Edward J. Edwards, Jr., was made Acting Director of the Reading Program, until a permanent appointment could be made.²

¹*The Washington Post* chronology, April 27, 1972.

²*The Washington Post*, February 9, 1969.

Thus, in less than two months, two major goals of the Anacostia program were implemented: a reading aide's component and a decentralized program of community governance. Both came off, according to all accounts, with little problem. Things appeared to be working as planned: (1) the community indicated its need, through its planning council; (2) the U.S. Office made suggestions and later approved the revised proposal; (3) funding was provided under a federal grant; (4) staff selected, trained, and deployed; and (5) an administrator was appointed to manage the program, with funding to cover salary and expenses.

So unlike some other federally sponsored programs (e.g., the Economic Development Administration analyzed by Pressman and Wildavsky, and the Cambire Elementary School experiment described by Gross and colleagues³), the Anacostia program began without a hitch. Despite the absence of a precise set of goals, options, outcome data, and analyses, the community control and reading aides components were in place shortly after they were approved and begun. While the project may not have been very rationally and comprehensively planned, and while the Anacostia project was to fall on hard times over the period 1969 to 1978, it started out quite positively.

This chapter, like the one before it, intends to analyze the implementation of the Anacostia project from two perspectives. First, it traces the history of the phase, detailing the events that marked the starting and maintaining of the project. Since the project had

³See Pressman and Wildavsky, *Implementation* (Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 1973); and Gross, Giacquinta, and Berstein, *Implementing Organizational Innovations* (New York: Basic Books, 1971).

several components (community control-decentralization, in-service education, lay participation in teaching), a number of historical threads must be traced. Second, the chapter examines the *process of implementation*, since to know the events is not to understand the dynamics of implementation. The literature on implementation—its stages, problems, and solutions—will be used to highlight the turning points in the development of the project. Important questions for this chapter include:

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT:

1. What program components emerged and how were they implemented?
2. How did the history of the several parts of the project relate to earlier developments in the field (e.g., history of decentralization/centralization, in-service education, and lay involvement)?
3. How did the history of the Anacostia project, 1967-1978, add to our understanding of the history of urban educational innovation and change?

ORGANIZATIONAL-CHANGE DEVELOPMENT:

1. How was the Anacostia project implemented/not implemented from 1969 to 1978?
2. How did the process of implementation/non-implementation relate to other attempts to change schools?
3. What have we learned about innovating and changing schools that is useful in other attempts at change implementation?
4. Was the project cost effective in comparison to other federal programs?

Some Conceptual Concerns

As was obvious during the planning stage, the Anacostia pro-

ject was not a single program but was rather a set of purposes loosely bound together under the rubric of "community school" experiment. The only "given" was the concept of community people playing a sizable role in the defining, implementation, and evaluation of any new program. This goal seemed uncontested—for the representatives of Anacostia were present, in one form or other, in every decision-making body in the ten-year history of the effort. While the name of the groups changed, the intent remained fixed: to give laypeople important influence in determining school policy. Between July 1968 and the present, community input was provided by five different groups, including Task Forces (July 1968), Community Steering Committee (July 1968), Anacostia Ad Hoc Community Planning Council (August 1968), Anacostia Community School Board (December 1969), and Region I Community School Board (September 1973 to present).

The other aspects of the project were not always present, obvious, or uncontested. This ambiguity raises, perhaps, the central question of the history of the program: *What is meant by the implementation of planned change in the District of Columbia schools and the Anacostia community?* What is the phenomenon or phenomena under study? When is a new program recognizably in place? Since much adaptation takes place, as the new project is forced to alter its structure, purposes, and outcomes in light of the demands of the system, it is hard to tell exactly when a program is historically "implemented."

This difficulty has not gone unnoticed by scholars who study change in organizations. The research problem may be explained in three ways: ones of *definition*, *cutting point*, and *completeness*.

1. *Defining the Implementation of Change*: When is a change, a change? How does one know a new effort when one sees it? The tendency in education to reinvent the wheel every so often, to change the name of something and call it an innovation, and to apply the term "innovation" to any change—all create problems in the study of implementation. Or in some cases, one assumes something new is implemented, only to find, as Charters and Jones did when they went to measure the new program, that they were confronting "the risk of appraising non-events. . . ." ⁴ Fullan and Pomfret, in their excellent review of implementation research, label this definitional problem quite aptly the "fidelity perspective." ⁵ They continue:

There are enormous definitional and methodological problems involved in considering which criteria and methods to use to assess whether an innovation has been implemented. . . . Implementation studies tend to display one of two main orientations. In the predominant orientation, the main intent is to determine the degree of implementation of an innovation in terms of the extent to which actual use of the innovation corresponds to the intended or planned use. ⁶

But how would a historian studying change in urban school know that a particular program was operating? How would a scholar by definition know that implementation had occurred, that as Pressman and Wildavsky helpfully provided, the following synonyms for implementation had been

⁴W. W. Charters, Jr. and J. Jones, "On the Risk of Appraising Non-events in Program Evaluation," *Educational Researcher*, 1973, Vol. 2, no. 11.

⁵I. Fullan and A. Pomfret, "Research on Curriculum and Instruction Implementation," *Review of Educational Research*, Winter 1977, Vol. 47, no. 1, pp. 335-397.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 345.

seen? "to IMPLEMENT: *Produce*: do; carry out; perform; execute; achieve; accomplish. *Complete*: effectuate; realize; bring about."⁷

Researcher after researcher has tried, somehow, to understand the term, to provide a real-life counterpart for it, and to be able to apply their operational definitions to the case under study. It would be unnecessary at this point to review all the attributes of the term "implementation" that have applied. Let me display but two well-known and important research designs that accomplish that end: (1) Evans and Scheffler devoted their efforts to the study of IPI Mathematics: whether the program had been implemented in schools. They developed an eleven-item scale in two main categories, *organizational* and *instructional*.⁸ The items by category were:

A. *Organizational*

1. Materials and space
2. Audio room
3. Scheduling
4. Monitoring

B. *Instructional*

5. Placement tests
6. Pretest/posttests
7. Curriculum Embedded Tests
8. Prescriptive writing
9. Classroom management
10. Student Self-Management
11. Planning session.

Taking six IPI Math schools, the authors assessed the degree of implementation by applying these 11 scale items; they found, by the way that four schools scored about 95 percent and two schools 78 percent.

⁷ *Roget's Thesaurus of English Words and Phrases*, revised edition. (New York: St. Martin's, 1964).

⁸ W. Evans and J. Scheffler, "Degree of Implementation: A First Approximation," paper to the American Educational Research Association, Chicago, April 1974.

Thus, by developing a method of relating their conception of the program to various classroom behaviors, they were able to determine levels of implementation. The definition, then, becomes not only a broad concept of the program, but also a set of sub-behaviors that could be studied separately and in the aggregate.⁹

(2) The most comprehensive single study of implementation to date, the Rand study of federal programs in classroom organization, bilingual programs, and reading project, etc., though somewhat weak in method, also attempted to define implementation by using a number of approaches, including:¹⁰

1. Perceived success in goal achievement by teachers (self-reporting)
2. Perceived fidelity to original proposal by teachers (self-reporting)
3. Reported change in behavior by teachers (self-reporting)
4. Reported difficulty of implementation (self-reporting)
5. Expected continuation of project after Federal funds expired (self-reporting).

Further definitional difficulty was introduced when the research team at Rand sought to show that the most successful projects were those that underwent "mutual adaptation," complicating still more the conceptual problem of defining what made up a particular innovation. For if a program became something new, something quite different from what the

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

¹⁰ A number of publications have resulted from the Rand data, including, for example, P. Berman and M. McLaughlin, "Implementation of Educational Innovation," *Educational Forum*, 1976, Vol. 40, no. 3, pp. 347-370; P. Berman and E. Pauly, *Federal Programs Supporting Educational Change, Vol. II: Factors Affecting Change Agents Projects* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1975); and M. McLaughlin, "Implementation as Mutual Adaptation: Change in Classroom Organization," *Teachers College Record*, 1976, Vol. 77, no. 3, pp. 339-351.

federal change agents intended, was it implemented or had it failed? Such are the problems that give gray hairs to scholars of implementation research and conceptualization.

At any rate, the historical problem of when a program is a program remain. The advantage of the Anacostia project, over such surveys as those conducted at Rand and by those like Evans and Schoffler's, is that there is but a single project which has been observed; thus, the weaknesses of self-reporting by participants have been overcome. Second, since our approach is longitudinal, over the period 1968 to 1978, we have the data to show the points of implementation and non-implementation as the "cross-sectional" work—or better yet, the survey studies—cannot provide. In fact, the very heart of the analysis of Anacostia rests with the relationship between federal, school district, and community actions *and* the implementation of the project. Hence, while some studies have glossed over the intricacies of implementation in favor of aggregate summaries of implementation/non-implementation at one point in time, our study, like Pressman and Wildavsky's of the Oakland EDA, takes a longer and more dynamic view.

Thus, our definition of implementation is an operational one: one that acknowledges that implementation is rarely total, permanent, or simple; one that rests on the belief that when programs such as community control, in-service education, and lay teaching are effectuated, then, by definition, implementation has occurred.

2. *Finding the Cutting Point in Implementation*: A related problem in the conceptualization of change and implementation: How does

one determine the point at which an innovation is in place? What is the appropriate cutting point? The agricultural sociologists in the 1950s confronted the same problem. Is a new development "diffused" when a farmer decides to plant a new strain of corn? When the planting is completed? When harvesting is over? Or when he/she is convinced psychologically that the new type of corn is superior to the old? Which point?

Policy researchers face the same issue. Since policy implementation is a long "chain" of events, leading from passage by a legislative body, to implantation in a bureaucracy, to acceptance by a relevant party, to start-up, and perhaps to permanency, the problem of determining when to call a policy implemented is a serious one. In 1884, the director of the powerful Union Pacific Railway, Charles Francis Adams, Jr., advised a representative to the U.S. House "that no matter what sort of bill you have, everything depends upon the men, who, so to speak, are inside of it, and who are to make it work. In the hands of the right men, any bill would product the desired results."¹¹ Adams recognized that forces beyond the control of the policy makers often determine how even the best legislation is carried out. He, further, understood that the regulation (and change) of something as complex as the American railroads required not a single action but a set of complex ones by a number of people.

Educational innovations are still more complex, for they require

¹¹ See Fullan and Pomfret, "Research on Curriculum and Instruction Implementation," p. 335. The quote is taken from G. Kolko, *Railroads and Regulation 1877-1916* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 37.

change often in the actions of teachers and children who work in the separate classrooms of a school system. So even though a school district may *adopt* an innovation, it is not implemented until teachers *use* it—not once but on a regular basis. The results of a major study on pre-school education, the Head Start Planned Variation models, twelve in all, showed that implementation varied widely *within sites*, more so even than among school systems and models. Lukas explained: Approximately 74 percent of the variance in rating within models occurred within sites: "This means that most of the differences in levels of implementation are among teachers, within sites. It appears then that some teachers are implementing the treatments better than others and that classes under the same treatment label have differing experiences."¹²

Conceptually, then, researchers face the ongoing problem of defining when a new program is executed. Even when the researcher is on-site, can interview participants, and gathers observational data, considerable difficulty accompanies the definition of implementation. Crowther examined a social studies innovation in Alberta; as might be expected, interview and observational information failed to agree, as this report by Fullan and Pomfret explains:

Finally, Crowther found that the principals' ratings did not correspond with the other two methods [trained outside observer data and teacher self-reporting data]. In light of the other measures, this discrepancy calls into question in value of relying on principals' knowledge of degree of implementation.

¹²C. Lukas, "Issues of Implementation in Head Start Planned Variation," in A. Rivlin and P. M. Timpane (eds.), *Planned Variation in Education* (in process).

In summary, there is reason to believe that some teachers might rate themselves inaccurately, although not necessarily in one direction, even on a specific scale. This inaccuracy, however, was only one point on a five-point scale.¹³

So even when it is believed that a new program is implemented, there exist great methodological difficulties in determining the "cutting point" beyond which implementation is in evidence.

3. *Completing the Implementation Process*: A final, but critical, definitional problem lies in determining when implementation is completed: when is a project in place, given that many innovations are executed in phases. How far down the road, from initiation to full implementation, must a new program go before it is considered fully in place? If, like the Anacostia project, the innovation has several components, goals, and programs, then when is the total program implemented? When community control is functioning? When the staff aides are working? When the in-school inservice projects are functioning? And, what if any one of these efforts is only partially functioning, then what?

In part, of course, the question is academic, given that nothing is ever ideal, complete, or perfect? But in part, the question is central to this study, for how one defines the completedness of the Anacostia Community School Project, later the Response to Educational Need Project, indicates how one judges the quality, process, and outcomes of the project. It's truly a matter of judgment to some degree.

¹³Fullan and Pomfret, p. 352; for the Crowther study, see F. Crowther, "Factors Affecting the Rate of Adoption of the 1971 Alberta Social Studies Curriculum for Elementary Schools" (University of Alberta, unpublished Master's Thesis, 1972).

Many of the studies examined for this chapter, including over 30 articles and books, indicate that "implementation" is most often seen as a single project—and often on a single dimension (teacher recollections of what had happened).

For example, the mean subscores were lower for "planning and evaluation" (.45), "teacher roles" (.66), "unit approach" (.55), and "parent involvement" (.29) than for items such as "physical setting" (.80), "grouping" (.84), "organization and use of time" (.85) and "student participation" (.86). With the exception of the last item, the elements most effectively implemented involve mostly structural change, whereas those least implemented tend to involve role changes.¹⁴

So even on a single program, a pre-school curriculum, the completeness of implementation was a matter of some concern, with results varying widely from .46 to .85, as means, with absolute differences still greater. With the Anacostia project, not only would there be much variation within programs but even greater differences among components.

We have no simple way around this difficulty. In part, it is *existential*: when is a program a program? In part, it is a matter of *judgment*: at this point, most reasonable people would consider the project in place. And in part, it is a matter of *bias*: this group would argue that the project is functioning because a percentage of the program components are functioning; another group would say "no," that unless there is more action, we'll close it down as a failure. And certainly during the 10-year history of the Anacostia effort, the

¹⁴ Fullan and Pomfret, p. 348. See W. Solomon *et al.*, "The Development, Use, and Importance of Instruments that Validly and Reliably Assess the Degree to which Experimental Programs are Implemented," CEMREL (St. Louis, no date).

biases played a part in its continuation—on faith and hope at times—and ultimately in its destruction when the system no longer wanted it—though it was functioning at the time. And as *social scientists*, we can make an argument about the relative implementedness of the program, as Solomon *et al.* did.

In the Anacostia case, then, many of the problems with "implementation" are overcome—or at least controlled. We have microscopic, month-by-month data on the history and organizational development; hence, the difficulty of survey statistics and contrary outcomes is minimized. We disaggregate the components of the project, acknowledging that innovations are often more complex than the literature presents. We are quite willing to say, at times, that part of the Anacostia project failed, while other components were accomplished.

Another distinct advantage our study has over others is the time line: while other studies tend to look once, we have the luxury of a ten-year perspective. Over that time, many "successful" projects would not look so good; while others, had the researcher returned to look, would have come to life after the program had apparently died. Thus, the completeness of our inquiry allows a level of certitude about outcomes that other less comprehensive analyses lack. Finally, we have a multitude of sources, both primary and secondary against which to test our outcomes.

THE HISTORY OF PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION: 1969-1976

The Anacostia project has several histories, each with a differ-

ent past, context, and outcome. While it comprises one "story," for research and analysis, it must be disaggregated. And while the total project took place within a single socio-political "landscape," as explained in previous chapters, with the same school system, community, and federal structure, various programmatic parts should be separated to allow maximum interpretation.

The three most important developments historically were: (1) Anacostia and Community Control; (2) Anacostia and Lay-Teaching; and (3) Anacostia and In-Service Staff Development. Within these topics of urban history are subsumed other interesting questions of funding, role of federal and school district decision-making in community affairs, and others. In particular, we seek to answer the following questions:

COMMUNITY CONTROL AND THE ANACOSTIA PROJECT:

1. How was the community control component implemented in 1969-1970?
2. How effective was the community school board in getting other components of the project implemented?
3. Over the nine-year period, what role did the community through its board play in decision-making that affected the course of the total project?
4. What were the limitations of community school boards (in particular, the Anacostia board) as a model for urban educational change? What does the history show?

LAY-TEACHING AND THE PROJECT:

1. How was the community reading/mathematics aides and home school liaison aids component implemented?
2. To what extent is the laypeople approach to changing schools a viable approach, from a historical perspective?

3. During the total period of development, what role did the aides (laypeople) play in the growth of the Anacostia/Response to Educational Need Project?
- 4..What were the strengths and liabilities of this approach to educational innovation (as compared with other approaches in other settings)?

STAFF DEVELOPMENT AND THE PROJECT:

1. How did staff development grow to be the major component of the Anacostia project?
2. How successfully was the model of in-service, on-site teacher improvement in the history of the project?
3. What was the promise and the weaknesses of the model?
4. Why was the role of in-service educator a hard one to maintain?

The treatment of these three sets of questions is done, as in the second chapter, roughly chronologically, with analysis made of the events as told. The care to provide the raw data, the "story," is intended to allow each reader to amass sufficient evidence to draw his/her own conclusions.

Decisions Made, Staff Deployed

As the introduction to this chapter indicates, the planning phase led to: the hiring and training of 90 Community Reading Aides, layfolk from Anacostia. The first real snag was encountered on Monday, February 24, 1969, when the Community Reading Aides, freshly trained, reported for work. It appeared that the classroom teachers in the selected Anacostia schools were not aware that they were to have classroom assistants—laypeople from the community in their rooms. Questions were raised: What were the aides to do in the classrooms? Who had assigned them there? Why were the regular classroom professionals

not included in the deployment and task decisions?¹⁵

On February 27, in response to the rising concern among teachers about their being ignored and to the feeling among Community Reading Aides that their position in the schools would be uncomfortable without teacher support, the leaders of the project called a meeting of all people involved. Present were William S. Rice, Director of the Special Projects Division of the public schools, Edward J. Edwards, Jr., Acting Director of the Reading Program, the teachers, and aides. Attempts were made to explain the purposes of the teacher aides: as a means of bringing the community closer to the schools, while giving an extra adult in the room to help with teaching and discipline.

The results of the gathering were mixed. A group of irate teachers, unconvinced by the discourse of the project leaders, walked out in protest; a second group remained silent; and a few, getting in the spirit of the community-school relations, praised the program as potentially very useful to them and the children.

Follow-up meetings were planned: with Washington Teachers' Union president, William Simmons, with individual teachers, and between William Rice and key leaders among the upset teachers.

The reverberations of the lay aides in classrooms continued to be felt, though nothing of the magnitude of the New York City confrontation occurred. The confrontation between lay and professional, in the instruction of children, has existed as long as there have been

¹⁵ *Post Chronicle.*

paid teachers. Much like the "who should control the schools issue?" where problems of professional versus community decision-making are at stake, this issue revolves more around the question: "who should *teach* the children?"

It is quite easy to understand the impulse in the case of the Anacostia community project: the community gained control over a large sum of money; they looked to provide better services for their children while at the same time providing jobs for the under- or unemployed citizens of the community; so they hired about 180 lay helpers, giving them some brief training and putting them in the classrooms with their children.

It is also logical to draw comparisons between the desire to help to teach one's own child and the history of American educational development. In fact, the very first schools which pre-date the American Revolution by a century or more were focused around the activities of mothers and fathers in the instruction of their children. The line between "family" and "school" was nonexistent.¹⁶ Lawrence A. Cremin, in his massive investigation of American education and the "colonial experience," directly links home and learning in the most simple way. Cremin writes:

¹⁶See "Extracts from the Diary of Josiah Cotton," *Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts*, XXVI (1927), p. 278. Data on "dame schools" are presented in "The Commonplace Book of Joseph Green (1675-1715)," *ibid.*, XXXIV (1943), p. 236; and the "Autobiography of Rev. John Barnard," (1766), *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, 3rd ser. V (1836), p. 178. In *Perfect Descriptions of Virginia*, the term "petty schools" is used (p. 15). Early references to "dame" and "petty schools" occurred in Charles Hoole's *A New Discovery of the Old Art of Teaching School* (London: Andrew Crook, 1660), p. 59; see also, Edmund Coote, *The English Schoole-Maister* (London: The Wildow Orwin, 1596).

And, indeed, when an occasional New England goodwife decided to teach reading on a regular basis in her kitchen and charge a modest fee, she thereby became a "dame school"; or, when an occasional Virginia family decided to have a servant (or tutor) undertake the task for its own and perhaps some neighbors' children, the servant became a "petty school." Such enterprises were schools, to be sure, but they were also household activities, and the easy shading of one into the other is a significant educational fact of the seventeenth century.¹⁷

Seymour W. Itzkoff explains the relationship in anthropological terms: that the need to build a continuity, between the home, school, and work cultures, lies at the very heart of the survival of culture as we know it. "The essence of human survival," he writes, "is society's capacity to transmit in fairly intact form the entire structure of cultural feeling, thought, and behavior to the next generation."¹⁸ It is no wonder, then, that once the Anacostia community received financial backing and the chance for self-determination, they would attempt to place community members in the classrooms. Besides the obvious fiscal benefits to these laypeople, then, there was the drive to bring coherence to the school-neighborhood division.

The tension between the professional teacher and the community (and its reading aides) has its antecedents in American educational history as well. As the role of teacher became more specialized, differentiated from the family members, and more self-conscious about its specialness, the antipathy grew. In the *Hoosier School-Master*, a fictitious but realistic account of the life of a frontier school teacher by Edward Eggleston, the author writes: "Want to be a school-master, do

¹⁷ Lawrence A. Cremin, *American Education: The Colonial Experience 1607-1783*, p. 129.

¹⁸ Seymour W. Itzkoff, *A New Public Education* (New York: David McKay, 1976), p. 20.

you? Well, what would *you* do in Flat Crick deistrict, I'd like to know? Why, the boys have driv off the last two, and licked the one afore them like blazes."¹⁹

It is no wonder, then, that a primary function of the bureaucracy, as it grew, was to protect and isolate the staff from the parents. The bigger the school district, the grander the bureaucracy; and the wider the distance between home and school. David Tyack describes the bureaucratic remedy: "consolidation of schools and the transportation of pupils, expert supervision by county superintendents, 'taking the schools out of politics,' professionally trained teachers," and so forth.²⁰ As the apparatus of the one best system was established, the family became cut off from the knowledge of what was taught in school and became less and less involved in the actual teaching of their own children.

The final wedge between teacher and parent was the teachers' union. When the bureaucratic model began to crack—it could no longer guarantee protection to staff and best financial benefits, the teachers turned to another model—the trade union one. Contract procedures replaced the top-down organizational directives as the primary mode of operation (though on day-to-day operations, teachers still were subject to bureaucratic control). The unity of the teachers' union functioned to protect the teacher, not only from the outside pressure of parents and community, but also from the caprice of the superintendent and school board.

¹⁹ Edward Eggleston, *The Hoosier School-Master* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1871), as cited in Tyack, *The One Best System*, p. 13.

²⁰ Tyack, *The One Best System*, p. 23.

Why, then, were the teachers in Washington, D.C. willing to tolerate the presence of laypeople in the schools?: with only a few walk-outs in protest initially, with no city-wide union action as in New York City in 1968, and with eventual cooperation—as the Community Reading (and later, Mathematics) Aides becoming an on-going part of the classroom life of D.C. teachers? The answer lies in three developments:

1. *Title I, ESEA*: The passage and implementation of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 had led to the presence of aides in schools; hence, the Anacostia project was not the first attempt at placing community people in schools. By 1969, the idea of aides was well accepted. The rub in the February 1969 assignment of aides to teachers—leading to the mild protest (a kind of wild-cat action, done without union leadership or consent) at the February 27th meeting—was more the oversight of Anacostia planners in not warning and involving classroom teachers than an ideological or political reaction to the presence of parents in classrooms.

2. *Black Teachers, Black Parents*: The racial barricades, with whites in the professional roles on one side, and the minority/immigrants on the other, had long been a fact of life in urban social services. Whether one was talking about the Protestants versus the newly-arrived Irish, the Jews and the Protestants, or the white professionals and the black clients, the problem of communication between groups generated distrust and even fear. In Washington, D.C., the issue was somewhat modified by the presence of large numbers of black teachers and administrators working with black families.

foci discussed above. Another characteristic of this project, during this era, and in the Washington, D.C. setting was the incredible instability of the environment: jobs were changed, people came and went, functions were defined and redefined. An analysis of staffing patterns indicates much about the working environment—the nature of the socio-political landscape.

We now relate the historical developments of the project to the evolution of structure, functions, roles, purposes, and inter-relationships:

1. *THE FEDERAL APPARATUS*: A vital step in the implementation story was the efforts of the U.S. Office of Education to administer the project. By 1969, when the Anacostia program began to operate, the U.S. Office had increased its size and involvement in such enterprise, beginning as early as 1917 with the passage of the Smith-Hughes Act (for vocational and technical education) and receiving its greatest boost from the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Act (for children who were impoverished and under-educated).

In fact, one could make the case that the *modus operandi* set by the administration of ESEA and other laws carried over to the efforts of the U.S. Office to provide guidance and oversight for the Anacostia program. The administrative approach can be characterized as the following: (1) the U.S. Office received a general mandate: to make the D.C. schools a kind of national urban showcase through the improvement of educational programs for various constituencies in the city; (2) the federal agency, working with school system and community

people, was to get the program underway, refining it as it went along. This sounds very much like the advice a major lobbyist for the ESEA bill, Andrew Beimiller of the powerful AFL-CIO, gave in 1964:

Let's get started . . . and get a bill [ESEA] through here, and begin to get some money into our school systems where we now know it is badly needs, and then we can take another look and get closer to the goal that both you and I want, and we make no bones about it that we want a general education bill.²²

This "taking another look" was very much in evidence as the U.S. Office participated in the implementation of the Anacostia program. (3) The federal agency reviewed each step of of the implementation process, using the review process as a way to help fashion the program components they were actually started. And (4) the agency provided formal evaluations during and at the end of the federal government's involvement of the program. This step—formative and summative evaluations—became standard procedure in many federally funded programs in the 1960s.

The actions of the federal government began immediately: as soon as the U.S. Office realized that the amount for Anacostia was much below what was promised and what was necessary, letters were sent to all members of the Interagency Group. The hope was to scrape up additional money from existing program funds. A review of the proposal was also carried out early (October, 1968) and the outcomes were highly supportive of launching the project.²³

²²See Samuel Halperin, "ESEA: Five Years Later," a speech reprinted in *Congressional Record*, September 9, 1970, H8492-H8494; and the classic, S.K. Bailey and E.K. Mosher, *ESEA: The Office of Education Administers A Law* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968); and Michael W. Kirst, "Federalism and Urban Education," *Education and Urban Society*, Vol. 39 (1970), pp. 623-40.

²³*The Washington Post Chronology*.

In December 1968, the federal Interagency Group met with representatives of the Anacostia Community Planning Council to discuss funding and support services that the federal agencies could provide. Dr. Ann O. Stemmler was assigned as the liaison with both the Interagency Group and the community planning council. The main topic—an early childhood development component for the Anacostia community—was discussed, with the help of the Public Health Service and other U.S. Office consultants. In January, 1969, the Reading Proposal (mentioned at the beginning of this chapter) was received and reviewed by the U.S. Office; funding was recommended, with three contingencies: the appointment of a reading director, a strengthening of the substantive parts of the program, and the addition of an evaluation. Accepted by the Reading Task Force (community based), the stipulations were included and the reading component was started. A grant award of \$726,000 was presented and the recruitment of 97 laypeople was made.

At this point, the relationship between the Anacostia Community School Project and the U.S. Office of Education was formalized. A memorandum was circulated, setting out the relationship: that "the Office of Education Administration of the Anacostia Community School Project will be carried out with the intent of making the District of Columbia government fully responsible and accountable for the operation of the project."²⁴

Thus, the formal structure was hierarchical: the project was

²⁴Memorandum from Acting Commissioner of Education Muirhead to Lessingner (Bureau of Elementary and Secondary Education) and Boyan (Bureau of Research), February 24, 1969

accountable to the school district; the school district of Washington, D.C., to the U.S. Office, though in practice, the interactions were far more direct. By spring—and the first anniversary of the project, the Reading component was functioning and work began on the Community Education Component. As with other proposals, the school system submitted the proposal to the U.S. Office which in turn requested clarification. Once revised, the proposal was resubmitted to the Office. By May 27, 1969, the third version of the Community Participation (Education) Proposal was passed by the Anacostia Community Planning Council and approved by the U.S. Office.

Within the U.S. Office of Education, a structure was created to support the project, an effort that seemed able to get decisions made and components launched. Dr. Stemmler, originally the chief liaison within the U.S. Office and between the Office and the project, was made Project Officer in February 1969. Her appointment was critical. It meant that the project was moved from the Division of Compensatory Education, where other programs were taking up much of the time of its head, Mr. John Hughes, to the Bureau of Research which was considered a supportive setting for such an educational experiment.

Dr. Stemmler's acumen as an administrator and advocate for the Anacostia experiment cannot be underestimated. She kept in contact with the work of the project, mainly through her relationship with William Rice (made Anacostia Community School Project Director in April 1969), and was willing, when problems arose, to take issue to the U.S. Commissioner for support. Dr. Stemmler was also skillful,

reports indicate, in presenting the case for the project before Congressional committees. In an interview, she explained the perception of her role:

Project Officers are usually supposed to monitor. My job description said I was to give technical assistance in *direct ways*. This was not a typical PO's job. I was not typical either. I was not a bureaucrat.

I visited the project a lot. I had a much closer relationship with it than other PO's had with their projects.²⁵

Though the career bureaucrats in the U.S. Office were likely to be hostile to the urban educational experiment in Anacostia, as they had been to other anti-poverty programs under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, we have clear evidence here that the new leaders like Dr. Stemmler were willing to provide community assistance to this project.

How was she able to take such a strong and positive role in the policy implementation process? How was she able to deal directly (and visit regularly) with the program in Anacostia? These questions lead us to a discussion of the federal agency "culture" and function, both of which were vital to the growth and continuation of the project.

Under the operational rules of the U.S. Office of Education and from analyses of this office by scholars, we learn that Project Officers and other personnel have enormous discretion in how they did their jobs. In part, this looseness was endemic to the working rules of the agency, rules that were often set down in the form of *guidelines*. Norman C. Thomas, in his analysis of the federal implementation process, explained that:

²⁵Interview data.

Guidelines have no official status and in USOE the term refers to a variety of published program materials. . . . There is no uniform format for USOE's guidelines nor were there any procedural requirements for developing them. Regulations were developed and promulgated following the enactment of legislation. Guidelines were usually issued shortly afterward and were reviewed and modified on an irregular basis. The absence of uniformities in format and procedures resulted in considerable variation in the utility of USOE's program guidelines.²⁶

Beryl A. Radin, in her analysis of the implementation of school desegregation policies in DHEW, noted the same freedom in putting new programs into action, a leeway that can lead to slippage and non-implementation in some cases but can also, in other circumstances, allow agency staff to take the initiative. She wrote: "The unified voice of the federal government defined a sweeping goal. But the path to achieve that goal was mainly uncharted. Congress completed its work of legislative policy formulation and handed the law to the administration for an implementation stage. That stage was filled with unanswered, partially answered, or unasked questions."

It was clear from our data on the Anacostia project that the working relationship between Dr. Stemmler, top U.S. Office leaders, and the highly respected Project Director, William Rice, made the early implementation a reality (particularly when contrasted with the problems in 1976 and 1977 when school district leaders became cool to the project and let it die).

²⁶ Norman C. Thomas, *Education in National Politics* (New York: McKay, 1975), p. 205. The vagueness of the making of guidelines prompted the issuing of the Green Report, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Special Subcommittee on Education, House Document No. 193, 90th Congress, 1st sess. (1967), pp. 401-20. See also Aaron Wildavsky, *The Politics of the Budgetary Process* (Boston: Little, 1964), for a discussion of how the funding and control over the budget allows federal agencies to control the implementation of new programs.

And the federal support continued: In June 1969, the U.S. Office awarded a sum of \$273,933 for two closely related purposes, the Community Participation Proposal and Project Organization. In operational terms, these efforts were designed to provide a central staff for the Anacostia project and to support the election of community members to the Anacostia Community School Board by December 1, 1969—the first community-wide elected board in Washington, D.C. school history. Also, other federal ideas were broached, including:

1. The Department of Defense offered a proposal to sponsor a summer camp at Camp Meade for potential drop-outs that could be used by children from Anacostia; the proposal was accepted by the U.S. Office of Education.

2. The anti-Poverty Program (CHASE) provided funds to maintain two libraries in Anacostia for eleven summer months in 1969.

3. A Summer Camp for Reading instruction was proposed to begin on July 7 to run for three weeks for 350 children.

4. A staff training session to last four weeks was proposed to instruct staff in Black Studies; it was approved by both the Anacostia Community Planning Council and the U.S. Office of Education

5. And as a kind of celebration and as an opportunity to show off the project, an "open house" was held on July 10, 1969. In attendance were many of the key leaders from the three levels of government: John F. Hughes, Director of Compensatory Education at USOE; Superintendent William Manning of the District of Columbia Public Schools;

Deputy Superintendent and former Acting Project Director Norman Nickens; and Chairperson Gilbert Hahn, D.C. Council.

If the Anacostia program had been able to continue growing, developing, and maturing under the direction of the U.S. Office of Education at the rate that we noted in the first year, it would have gone far to satisfy the needs of the community, the children, and the schools. In but a few months, to recapitulate, the federal structure, staffing, and function had been established, sufficient to provide vital resources, direction, and results. In summary, these were the Office's accomplishment in 1969:

1. *Funds*: Almost a million dollars had been appropriated and distributed. These funds went to the training of laypeople to be Community Reading Aides (90 in all), to the creation of a management system in the school district, with William Rice as Project Director; James Nutall, Deputy Director; Edward Edwards, Jr., Reading Program head; and support staff.

2. *Other Support*: Besides the dollars from Congress for the Anacostia experimental program, the U.S. Office, through its call to other federal agencies, attracted a surprising amount of interest and funds: from CHASE, the Department of Defense, for example. Thus, the Office became a conduit for other agencies to help the project.

3. *Lines of Authority*: Early on, the federal agency (USOE) centralized the relationship with the project in the Project Officer, Dr. Anne Stemmler, who worked directly with William Rice and the

Project. She saw her role as advocate: to support and sponsor—as well as to evaluate and hold accountable.

4. *Congruent Philosophy*: As far as we can tell, the mesh between the goals of the community leadership and those of the Project Officer were in concert: she encouraged the Community Planning Council to review and pass off on proposal; her office did likewise; and components of the program were worked out through negotiations (e.g., the Reading Proposal and the Community Participation Proposal). There seemed no dispute over the right or authority of the Community Council to exert control over policy-making.

5. *Joint Functioning*: It seemed that the Project and the U.S. Office each had a role to play and played it. While their tasks were, in many ways, quite different (one received and requested clarification while the Project staff pressed for the enactment of the various task force reports and others which they developed), the two levels functioned as a unit in determining the program.

Fighting for Funding

But, the life cycle of federally supported projects was but a single year, at which time, the program, its staff, Project Officers, and agencies must return to the legislature for continued support. This "cycle syndrome"—the milieu established by the uncertainty of starting to seek re-funding almost as soon as a program got funded initially—was a critical factor in the implementation history of this project. In July 1969, Nixon requested \$5,250,000 for the Fiscal Year

1970 for the Anacostia and "New Towns" programs—about half to go to the community school project. The House Appropriations Committee cut the request to only \$1 million, a move endorsed by the full House in H.R. 13111.²⁷

What started then was to become a familiar sight around the Anacostia project: protest, lobbying, public outcry, chest-beating and teeth-gnashing—all to force Congress to restore funding.

First, Rev. Coates, Anacostia Community Council chairperson, and D.C. Board of Education President, warned that without additional funding, the many planned programs would go uncompleted, including the early childhood, job training, health, and in-service educational programs.²⁸ Mr. William Rice, Project Director, then, held a press conference; he stated that unless the project received at least \$1.5 million, it would be unable to continue the Reading and Community Participation components. With but \$1 million, the existing programs would have to be reduced to eight months—or weakened. Third, the leadership brought out existing "data" to show the effectiveness and impact of the project, for the belief was that Congress wanted "proof" of the results of program implementation. For example, an article in the *Washington Post* explained that "mothers employed as reading aides" provided "personal attention to youngsters in overcrowded classrooms" which resulted in "increased reading ability, expressiveness, and a fresh interest in learning among their pupils."²⁹

²⁷ *The Washington Post*, July 23, 1969.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Washington Post*, August 7, 1969.

On August 11, the Anacostia Community Planning Council met with top leadership at the U.S. Office of Education, including Acting Deputy Director Peter Muirhead and John F. Hughes, Director of the Division of Compensatory Education. While the effort to gain new funding went on, the Contracts Division, Bureau of Research approved the Project Organization and Community Participation components—thus allowing the project to hire a full central staff and to hold elections for Anacostia Community School Board. So even while the spectre of budget cuts loomed, the project was able to continue building its governance and leadership groups.

In 1970 Fiscal Year, as in seven more, the project, through pressure and work, was able to maintain the financial support necessary for survival. In the crucial year under study, 1970 funding, the leaders of the project, particularly Mr. Rice, were able to bring key federal leaders to Anacostia to look at the program first hand. Included were Mr. Harley Dirks, chief clerk of the Labor HEW Subcommittee (chaired by Sen. Magnuson) of the House Committee on Education and Labor, visiting on September 22; and Representative John B. Dalenback, head of the Republican Task Force on Urban Education. The Anacostia project, then, picked up both liberal Democratic and moderate Republican support—the kind of help they were to need and get over and over again from Congress.³⁰

³⁰ *Washington Post* chronology.

Change and Turmoil: The Transition at USOE
to the Nixon Administration

The special relationship between the Anacostia project and the federal bureaucracy was not to remain stable during the 1970s. Changes in personnel at the U.S. Office occurred: Dr. Stemmler and Dr. Hughes left the Office, as did the U.S. Commissioner of Education, Dr. Allen, who was fired by President Nixon for criticizing the bombing of Cambodia. The project was moved from the Division of Research, to several other places, and finally placed in December 17, 1970, in the Office of Experimental Schools, under Robert Binswanger. A review of the project was ordered by the Bureau of the Budget's Director, Caspar Weinberger, though we have no hard data to confirm that the review was indeed an attempt to "kill" the project.

At any rate, it was obvious that the times had changed. The special attention provided by Dr. Stemmler and Dr. Hughes was gone; the top leadership, Sydney Marland, for example, were believed to be less supportive. And, in any event, the change of personnel involved with inter-jurisdictional relations was difficult, no matter how sympathetic the newcomers were to be. It took time, breaking in, and the need for data, all to allow the new U.S. Office staff to be of help to the developing project. And without the help, support, and structure from the federal level, local programs like the Anacostia one were very likely to have problems.

For under the formula of local initiative and federal oversight, a change in contact staff at the federal agency interrupts the communications, trust, and progress of programs.

2. *THE SCHOOL DISTRICT APPARATUS*: The Washington, D.C. Public Schools was the legal and organizational unit in which the Anacostia project existed. As such, the school system set the rules, hired and fired the staff, and was responsible for the education of the District's children. Hence, no history of the implementation of a public school innovation would be complete or even possible without consideration of the D.C. school system. And any discussion of the public schools must necessarily be set in a historical context of the last twenty years in the city's schools.

To say that the public schools of the nation's capital were undergoing major changes is to understate the obvious. Besides the demographic and social changes mentioned in earlier chapters, the school system itself went through enormous alterations in the ten years prior to the emergence of the Anacostia Community School Project. In fact, one should see the project as a logical extension of the developments already in progress when the project was presented by President Johnson and accepted by the D.C. schools.

Analysis of the 1958 to 1968 period suggests four shifts in the attitude, outlook, and performance of the city's public schools, each of which came to fruition with the implementation of the Anacostia project. Table 2 shows the changes (following page).

Philosophy and Structure

A native Nebraskan and former Omaha high school principal, Carl Hansen became D.C. school superintendent in 1958 where for nine years

TABLE 2
Shifts in Operations and Philosophy

	<u>1958</u>	<u>1968</u>
STRUCTURE	<i>Centralized:</i> Powerful supt., single board, weak community	<i>Decentralized:</i> Weaker supt., two boards, stronger community
EXTERNAL RELATIONS	<i>Closed:</i> Reluctance to deal with foundations, federal agencies	<i>Open:</i> Seeking of DHEW and foundation money, use of outside ideas, consultants, programs
ADAPTABILITY	<i>Rigid:</i> Unwillingness to accept new programs, ideas, methods	<i>Flexible:</i> Absorption of new ideas, programs, methods
RACIAL POLICY	<i>Segregated:</i> "Tracking," separate schools, inequality among schools	<i>Desegregated (attempts):</i> Court requirements, transfer of staff and students, through re-segregation due to "white/middle class flight"

he dominated—or to use his preferred terms, "heavily influenced"—the direction of the public schools. Usefully, we have both observations and personal accounts of Hansen's highly *centralized* control over affairs in D.C. educational politics. Larry Cuban wrote:

By 1963 Carl Hansen's educational philosophy and program dominated the system. It did so because Hansen dominated the decision-making. The superintendent and his staff defined the policy issues, produced the alternatives and research to support each alternative, drew up the formal agenda for each meeting, and recommended specific policy choices. The board of education complied. What Carl Hansen wanted from the board, he got; what he didn't want, the board seldom saw on the agenda. Hansen made sure the budget reflected the priorities. The superintendent's commitments to tracking and the Amidon Plan [strict disciplinary schools] permeated the system.³¹

A major tenet of his domination was the warding off of any attempt to wrest away control, though, certainly, a number of groups had tried. The board rarely got what it wanted, if its demands ran counter to the beliefs of the superintendent.

A private group, the Washington Action for Youth (WAY), in 1963 tried to alter the center of power and in so doing to eliminate such perceived problems as the "tracking" of pupils into separate programs (academic, vocational, general). Cuban felt that "discrediting school professionals would inevitably lead to the superintendent's losing his grip on the school decision-making machinery; Amidon and tracking would be ended."³²

Luckily, we have a personal account by Carl F. Hansen himself,

³¹ Larry Cuban, *Urban School Chiefs Under Fire* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 33.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 35.

an autobiography of great frankness and cynicism entitled: *Danger in Washington: The Story of My Twenty Years in the Public Schools in the Nation's Capital*. (The rather ambiguous title leaves unclear whether Hansen is the "danger" or was "in danger.") In his account of decentralization attempts, Hansen is vitriolically blunt. In his own words:

. . . the main test was whether decentralizing administration of a segment of a large school system will step up achievement, involve the parents more intimately with the schools, cut the umbilical cord with the central office so that the local administrators can use their hitherto repressed creative talents, and offer channels for the energies of inspired amateurs among judges, scientists, lonesome wives of busy executives, and headline seeking officials, all to the great pain and advantage of the Negro and the poor.

Completing his sarcastic analysis, Hansen continues.

The trouble is I saw only one measurable result, the *duplication* of administrative staffing, the *wastage* of money in paying for a special assistant superintendent for the division, for a covey of directors and assistants, and a full staff of secretaries, putting money into overhead that might be more beneficially used in the places where children live and work.³³

We can assume that Hansen represented much of official sentiment in the D.C. schools. The fear of the giving up of power, of allowing local communities to practice self-governance, was common in the system prior to 1966 or 1967. The failure of several experiments prior to Anacostia provide ample proof of the internal resistance to decentralization and the skill of leaders like Hansen in sabotaging them. The Model School Division, created by the Board of Education on June 17, 1964, appeared on the surface to be relaxing of centralized control.

³³ Carl F. Hansen, *Danger in Washington* (West Nyack, N.Y.: Parker Publishing, 1968), p. 136.

But a closer examination of the statements of the superintendent indicated that he was lured into the arrangement by the promise of funds from the White House, not by the attraction of giving up some of his authority. He talked "that much boot-licking was required" of Congress, the Ford Foundation, and other sources of money for the public schools. "I doubt that I have the instinct of a highwayman, but I am rapacious to a fault where the schools were concerned."³⁴ To assure his position of control in the Model Schools effort, Hansen appointed as acting assistant superintendent of the Model School Division his trusted compatriot, Norman Nickens.

Nickens presented guidelines, *supported by the superintendent*, to the group framing the guidelines for the Model School experiment; they read as follows:

The "model school system" remains an integral part of the regular school system

The Assistant Superintendent [Nickens] will have autonomy in the introduction of new programs; curriculum materials; supportive services; etc.; with the approval of the Superintendent and the Board of Education

The Assistant Superintendent will have autonomy in recommending the appointment of personnel beyond the regular budgetary staffing . . .

Existing school programs . . . will be implemented and expanded in the "model school system." We will use the best of existing school programs and not innovate for the sake of innovation or for change alone.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 128.

³⁵ "Model School System: A Preliminary Report," September 15, 1964, pp. 16-17.

The Nickens' recommendations effectively truncated the project before it began, preserving central authority. These guidelines circumscribed community control in virtually every key area of control: programming, staffing, support services, budgeting; and just to make sure the tone was understood, Nickens (acting for Hansen) underlined the approach: old and existing programs would be used, excluding perhaps the major input from outside the system. One should also note the absence of decision-making authority as vested in an outside agency, the absence of due process by which appeal might be made from the community to any outside agent.

Gone was any language about community board "autonomy." And the final document, incorporating the requests of Nickens and Hansen, requested that the community board should "advise" and "review" decisions, not make them.³⁶

The next attempt at decentralization in the D.C. schools, the Adams-Morgan project, showed some lessening of centralized control, but a concomitant increase in internacine fighting within the two juxtaposed communities themselves over control. True, by 1968, Carl Hansen was no longer superintendent, replaced by William R. Manning, who was also no friend of decentralization, but who seemed less potent in destroying or manipulating local change efforts.

Instead of one powerless board, as had been the fate of the Model School Division, the Adams-Morgan experiment seemed to prolifer-

³⁶"Innovation and Experiment in Education," President's Panel on Educational Research and Development, March 1964, p. 38: "Cooperative *direction* of a comprehensive experiment: was dropped and advise and review were used instead (emphasis added).

ate governing groups which argued and finally, one, the Adams-Morgan Federation, actually requested that the experiment be placed back under direct control of the D.C. Board of Education. The basis of the disagreements and eventual schism was familiar to observers of community control attempts: a split between lower-class blacks and liberal upper-middle-class whites. The initial program, started in September of 1967, reflected the values of the liberal whites, containing "team-teaching, abolition of formal classes and the substitution of informal learning groups, elimination of the usual classroom discipline, decorum, and grading, and a very loosely structured learning environments."³⁷ The poorer, black parents resented the upper-middle-class values being used on their children at the expense of the academic program.

In the summer following the project's first year, 1969, the decentralization experiment in the Adams-Morgan schools (in the area north of DuPont Circle) seemed to come apart: (1) the direct administration of the program by the Antioch College urban program broke down,³⁸ depriving the project of its external institutional support; (2) an opposition groups from within the community itself, developed, badly dividing the group and giving the school board (central) an opportunity to intervene against decentralization in the city's schools; (3) the legal authority in the District's schools, the Corporation Counsel, tentatively ruled that "public officials or bodies may not,

³⁷ LaNoue and Smith, *The Politics of Decentralization*, p. 97; see also, the first Annual Report of Morgan School.

³⁸ Milton Kotler, *Neighborhood Government: The Local Foundation of Political Life* (Indianapolis: The Bobbs Merrill Co., 1969).

without statutory authorization, delegate their governmental power." But the door was left open to decentralized power, in that the Counsel explained that the statutes do not "prevent the board of education from seeking and acting upon the opinions, views, advice, and recommendations of citizen groups of an advisory nature" so long as the final power resides with the school board. But the doubt casted by this decision weakened the position of the advocates of decentralization;

(4) 1969 saw the removal or death of key supporters, much as Anacostia lost Drs. Stemmler and Hughes. Kenneth W. Haskins, for example, had provided daily management of the project; he left and returned to school (Harvard School of Education); a little later, Bishop Marie Reed, president of the Morgan Community Board and respected local leader, died. Replacements, like the new Morgan School principal, John Anthony simply had less interest in the reform, leaving a leadership void in maintaining it. With strong advocates gone or dead, the internal divisiveness mentioned above splintered the project, as one leader (project Treasurer, Ms. Jeanne Walton) said:

. . . there are many enemies of community control of schools. Some of them are elsewhere in the country; some are in Washington, D.C.; some are in this community; but the most dangerous are sitting on this board.³⁹

So though the Adams-Morgan attempt to grant power to local citizens failed, it did so for very different reasons than its predecessor,

³⁹S LaNoue and Smith, *The Politics of Decentralization*, pp. 96-102.

the Model School Division. First, it was obvious that central office disliked the project; William Manning made no bones about it. But he, and his staff, saw the legitimacy of such attempts and were much less adept at strangling such programs than Carl F. Hansen. Second, the project blew apart internally, with the attempted blending of upper-white and lower-class black values clashing, both in terms of program likes (whites wanted a "free school" atmosphere while blacks preferred a more academic and black separatist program) and style. Third, the project worked for a year, with some obvious improvements in absenteeism, fewer broken windows in the schools, and a slight increase in reading scores despite a general decline in poor neighborhoods. It slid back after the project lost its leaders and momentum.

In sum, the District of Columbia schools had become much more willing to relinquish control, going from the highly controlled Model School Division, to the more decentralized Adams-Morgan effort, to Anacostia, which saw full elections, stability over time, and the involvement of some of D.C.'s up-and-coming leaders like the Rev. Coates who was a key figure in the city and community. In essence, the emergence of an Anacostia community-control experiment showed not only that decentralization was possible but also that the city schools were at least adaptable to the extent that they acknowledged and abided by the decisions of the Anacostia board, once it was elected and duly constituted.

Hence, besides a shift from *centralization* to *decentralization* between 1958 when Carl Hansen took over the superintendency to 1968-69

when the first Anacostia board was elected, the school district showed signs of a change from *rigidity* to *flexibility* (see Table 2, p. 144) in its approach to educational need. The examples of this unbending quality during the era of Hansen were many, right up to his last goodbye. After the famous *Hobson v. Hansen* decision, outlawing tracking, de facto segregation based on neighborhood schools, and segregated teacher assignments, the superintendent, Carl Hansen, requested that the board of education appeal the decision. When they refused, he quit—expecting, as in the past, that he would be reinstated and get his way. But the board stuck it out and he left.

External Relations

Yet another major change in the Washington, D.C. schools, leading up to the advent of Anacostia, was in the school system's relations with outside agencies. Hansen made his position on federal aid very clear: "For a five percent contribution, gain 100 percent control. This new doctrine updates the old one that he who controls the purse controls the policy."⁴⁰ He was making reference to the amount of perceived control exerted by the Office of Educational Opportunity which contributed but five percent to the Model School Division but used this leverage "to influence the management of *all* the schools."⁴¹

So while Hansen was not a prostitute when it came to getting money for the schools, he did not deny that he altered his behavior in order to get funds. My feeling is that he fought the outsiders,

⁴⁰ Carl F. Hansen, *Danger in Washington*, p. 110.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

tooth and nail, not really believing in the programs but taking the money nonetheless. His feelings, probably representative of many school leaders, ran so strong, concerning external intervention, that he saw federal "help" as a form of mind-control, of sheer imperialism. Thus, Hansen wrote:

One thing that comes clear out of my experience in Washington is that you can buy a lot of support with the federal dollar. Loyalty is on the market for a price. The people who have the authority to use the national treasury as a means of establishing *colonial control* over the minds of American citizens sometimes come up against an occasional honesty that must cause them to lose confidence in their ability to interpret the human spirit.⁴²

True, some of this anger may be an attempt to revenge those who took advantage of him, who cost him, Hansen, his job. But, certainly, Carl Hansen had every understanding that his book, *Danger in Washington*, would be used by other school leaders as a kind of learning manual, a contribution "to the improvement of the public schools, America's most important social institution."⁴³ Thus, he was not take totally as anger his feelings about external agencies, and their role in the improvement of schools.

Yet, by the time the Adams-Morgan effort was launched, the presence of outsiders was much more acceptable. Thinker-types like Christopher Jencks, Marcus Raskin, and Arthur Waskow, the later two being co-heads of the Institute for Policy Studies at Harvard, were admitted to meetings with Superintendent Hansen; the liberal college, Antioch, was established as the administrative unit for the project;

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 119.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. ix.

and a number of outside programs like Head Start and Follow Through were integrated into the Adams-Morgan project without incident.⁴⁴

So by the time the school system was called upon to accept outside help for the Anacostia effort, it was quite used to working with the federal government. As Chapter II of this work indicates, the city schools, William Manning, Superintendent, was willing to take the offer from the White House, the Brookings Institution meeting participants (Messrs. Pollak and Cater from the White House, DHEW, and others), and to participate in planning the Anacostia (later selected) program. Manning also turned to a community group for help in the planning—a move that his predecessor, Carl Hansen, would likely have avoided. And the implementation phase saw the D.C. schools pushing hard to keep and increase the project, while federal sources (Congress) held back on funding.

Racial Policies

No analysis of the Anacostia project would be complete without placing it in a context of school segregation, desegregation, and re-segregation. Near the end of his term of office, the superintendent of schools, Carl Hansen, was sued by a civil rights activist, Julius Hobson, (a class action) for unconstitutionally depriving the poor and black children of the city's schools of an equal education. Despite the language of the 1954 U.S. Supreme Court decision, *Bolling v. Sharpe*, which like its companion decision, *Brown v. Board of*

⁴⁴ LaNoue and Smith, *The Politics of Decentralization*, p. 101.

Education, ordered the desegregation of American public schools, the city schools of D.C. continued to deny an equal chance to poor and black pupils. Thus, in 1967, federal judge J. Skelly Wright specified the devices used in the capital to segregated and under-educate certain children and required that they be changed. Included in the landmark decisions were a disallowance of "the neighborhood school concept, the track system, unequal faculty assignments to schools, and optional school zones for some students."⁴⁵ The court, then, ordered in *Hobson v. Hansen*⁴⁶ that

- the tracking system be abolished,
- students be assigned to schools to achieve racial balance, not to support the neighborhood school concept,
- transportation be provided for children who wished to be transferred to less-crowded schools,
- zones for optional assignment be eliminated and fixed assignments be used to create racial balance, and
- teachers be assigned to schools to achieve faculty integration.

The impact of *Hobson v. Hansen*, among other things, was to create a condition in the District of Columbia schools where minority communities were made the focus of attention and where a project like the Anacostia experiment had a better chance of being planned and implemented. For, after all, the conditions of poor and black children in the nation's capital had been a disgrace for a century. Why

⁴⁵ LaNoue and Smith, *The Politics of Decentralization*, p. 93.

⁴⁶ *Hobson v. Hansen*, 269 Fed., Supp. 410 (1967). Needless to say, Carl Hansen was not pleased about the suit and about the pressure placed on him to change the schools. See *Danger in Washington*, chapters 2-6.

was it in the 1960s that action was taken?

— But an ironic reversal in logic and belief had occurred in the late 1960s: the rise of black pride and separatism—the belief among some leaders was that black identity and control was more important than integration as a goal. Thus, just as the central authority—school board, superintendent, forced by the courts, and legislatures—was beginning to attempt integration, the constituents (blacks and other minorities like the Chinese in San Francisco and the Mexican-Americans in Los Angeles) began to question the power of that authority. *Community power was challenging the very force that could lead to integration: centralization.*

This shift from a firm belief by liberals in a "national interest" taking precedence over local, more parochial to a commitment to localism was a national movement. Lieberman, for example, expresses the centralists view when he wrote that "national survival now requires educational policies which are not subject to local veto . . . it is becoming increasingly clear that local control cannot in practice be reconciled with the ideals of a democratic society."⁴⁷ Yet by the end of the 1960s, the worm had turned, and liberal whites and militant blacks were advocating community control—even (and perhaps particularly) if local power involved a separate, or, say, segregated community. In part this change occurred because integration had failed to happen anyway, and in part because the results of integration were seen as the loss of identity, pride, and

⁴⁷ Myron Lieberman, *The Future of Public Education* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 34.

and power—at the price of shared experiences with whites.⁴⁸

Certainly the creation of the Anacostia experiment was never seen as an effort to integrate the children of that community with other neighboring areas; there was no talk of busing children—in or out of the Southeast; there was no rhetoric about equality of educational opportunity through integration. In fact, the avowed purpose of the project from the outset was to give local school patrons control over some of the local decision-making. The language was very much in the separatist, community power tradition. It is hard to reconstruct the reasoning for this era and to determine precisely why the Anacostia project fell so clearly into the community control mentality and out of the integration approach. Perhaps the overwhelming majority of nonwhite in Washington, D.C. made real integration a myth, though the possibility of integrating suburban schools with urban ones was still conceivable though difficult, given the two-state/District of Columbia geo-politics. Perhaps liberal and black leadership was grabbing for what was available, local control, over the "dream" of integration. Or, perhaps, integration as an end had lost some of its appeal, though most civil rights leadership still slung to some belief in an integrated society, perhaps arrived at through separate and pluralists avenues, not integrated ones. Who knows?

But the fact remains: Anacostia was only possible in the context of the late 1960s when civil rights had focused national concern on poor and black people *and* when the ideal of community con-

⁴⁸See Leonard Fein, *The Ecology of the Public Schools: An Inquiry Into Community Control* (New York: Pegasus, 1971), p. 72.

control over against centralized integration had taken root. So while Superintendent Hansen was committed to 1950s-style integration, Supt. Manning, while no fan of local control, seemed much more willing to let it happen. To capture the flavor of Hansen's beliefs, one can turn again to his autobiography. He explained:

My view, admittedly sociologically unsophisticated, is simply that children are in school to be taught. Though they come in assorted sizes, shapes, and colors, they have one thing in common, the hope to mean something not only to themselves but also to others. What does race then have really to do with the ⁴⁹ children in our schools? Or anywhere else, for that matter?

This "black don't matter" attitude was not likely to be popular in the late 1960s, where race was seen as the critical characteristic of black people.

Thus, to summarize the changes in the school district of D.C. that made the implementation of the Anacostia project possible, we saw the move from a strict adherence to centralized power, a powerful superintendent, and clear attempts at bureaucratic control from the central office, through mild forms of experimentation (with the abortive Model School Division and Adams-Morgan projects) to the relatively uncontested support for citizen participation in the planning and execution of the Anacostia Community School Project in 1968-69. We saw the reluctance of the school system to allow outside agencies to become involved in the schools, through the presence of the Antioch-Putney administration of the Adams-Morgan effort, to the full involvement of President Johnson, White House staff, the U.S. Office of Education in

⁴⁹ Carl F. Hansen, *Danger in Washington*, p. 74.

the planning, funding, and implementation of Anacostia.

And, we saw the growing willingness of the school system to use adaptive, rather than, inflexible approaches to improvement of schools, as the ideology of an integrated school system gave way to support for a black community control experiment in Anacostia. The obvious failure of integration led, in part, to an attempt at separatist community control. Without all these changes, the Anacostia community project would likely have not been implemented—at least not in the form it did.

3. *THE LOCAL COMMUNITY APPARATUS:* The third tier in the implementation story, the Anacostia community piece, developed its own structure, function, philosophy, relationships, and staff, only after the federal and school district apparatus had done their part. But, for the purposes of this analysis, the local community level was vital: it is, after all, the most interesting and important part of the history.

A Local School Board is Elected

With the approval of the Community Participation Proposal, by the D.C. Public Schools and on August 22, 1969 by the Contracts Division of the Bureau of Research, the stage was set for holding of community-wide elections for community boards. The Westinghouse Learning Corporation, on a \$24,000 contract, was hired to run the elections. Thirty "campaign consultants" were employed from Howard University to oversee the process; one hundred local high school



students were hired to register voters for the election in a door-to-door drive, as well as supporters among the Community Reading Aides, the United Poverty Organization, CHASE, etc. In the first election, of the 6,005 registered parents from the Anacostia community, only 437 cast their ballots for board members. And of the 241 seats on the Anacostia Community Board and the school-based advisory boards, only 90 slots were filled. Another election was scheduled for December: again, a disappointing turnout, with 433 votes cast and leaving 13 seats on neighborhood boards yet vacant.

Despite the poor showing, blamed in part on the years of disenfranchisement suffered by all citizens of the District of Columbia, and despite the rumblings that the project did not have community support (a *Post* article⁵⁰), the Anacostia Community School Board, and many of the neighborhood boards (having responsibility for overseeing individual public schools), held their first meetings on February 28, 1970. The Westinghouse Learning Corporation acted as consultant to these meetings, giving advice on the election of Board officers and the setting of priorities. Mr. Emmett Brown was elected chairperson of the Anacostia Community School Board, succeeding Rev. Coates, who had acted as chair of the Ad Hoc Planning Council for 15 months.⁵¹

The slowness and the difficulty with which the community control component of the project was launched was indicative of the kind of problems which plagued the experiment during the 1969-1970 period. In part, the problems sprung from the slowness of the two other

⁵⁰*The Washington Post*, January 5, 1970.

⁵¹*The Washington Post*, March 1, 1970.

tiers—the funding and approval decisions were constantly delayed at the federal level; the civil service process for approving new staff in the D.C. school at the school district level. From April 25, 1968, when Anacostia was selected as the project site, and February 28, 1970, when the Anacostia Community School Board, duly constituted, finally met for the first time, twenty-two months had elapsed. While community participation had continued throughout this period, through a series of community councils, the fact that so much time was required was some indication of the difficulty of maintaining high citizen participation in a poor community. And since turnouts for nationally publicized elections in the United States tended to run somewhat low, it was no wonder that local elections, for sometimes little-known candidates, for a new and untested board, in a new and little-implemented project, were also poorly attended. The data showed over a five-year period that participation tended to increase, as the parents in Anacostia became used to the idea of having an impact on their schools through the locally-elected community boards. To review the elections, here is a breakdown:

<i>Date</i>	<i>Comments</i>
<i>1st Election:</i> November, 1969	Poor turnout; 6,005 registered with 482 votes; 151 seats out of 241 seats filled.
<i>2nd Election:</i> December, 1969	Better turnout; 432 additional voters participated; 3,332 students voted for their representatives; 141 Community Reading Aides and 352 teachers for their members on the board. ⁵²

⁵²The structure of the boards was highly complex, reflecting the desire to involve all major interests in the governing of the project. The parents, teachers, students, and community reading assistants each elected a representative to the Anacostia area board and to the

- 3rd Election:* November, 1971 Good turnout; 2,628 parents/residents voted, as compared to 2,318 for city school board candidates.
- 4th Election:* March, 1974 Strong turnout, highly controversial election with former Project Director, Calvin Lockridge, running for his own board and with a supporting slate. The Lockridge slate won and were eventually sealed—excluding Lockridge.
- 5th Election:* December, 1975 Good turnout; great concern for the regularization of procedures, new manuals for elections, petition dates, etc.
- 6th Election:* November, 1976 Weaker turnout; blamed on the lack of experience of Washington citizens all along; the absence of voter interest groups; no League of Women Voters, for example. Changing interest and change in project visibility. Taken for granted.⁵³

The creation of a new locally elected board system did not, of course, guarantee power to the community. Thus, the structure did not assume the function. In the case of the Anacostia local neighborhood boards (eleven) and the area board, their functions fell into three categories: (1) influencing the choice and behavior of staff, particularly the Project Director's; (2) influencing the program in the Anacostia schools; and (3) looking out for the general conditions in the schools—safety, equipment, space, etc. And all of these functions only were successful as the boards negotiated with the other two tiers, the D.C. Board of Education/superintendent's office and the federal

neighborhood board. A parent representative sat on the area board from each of the 11 project schools; four at-large members were elected; one Community Reading Aide (paid staff); plus three teacher and three student representatives, also were sent, making a wide cross-section of interests.

⁵³Two books explore the behavior of the voter in America. See Norman H. Nie, *et al.*, *The Changing American Voter* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976); and Angus Campbell, *et al.*, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974).

level, including Congress and the U.S. Office of Education/National Institute of Education. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the community boards depended on their own development, continuity, and strength.

Our data on boards themselves show an amazing level of continuity, as members who were elected to these boards seemed to return for reelection. The importance of returning members was obvious: the building of a base of expertness and the ability to see things through. Between 1969 when the first elections were held and 1974 (when the Calvin Lockridge slate was contested and split the constituency), the turnover on the boards was slight, as shown in Table 3.⁵⁴ There were people who, then, had participated in the Anacostia Community Planning Council (ACPC), the Institutes, and were later elected to the Anacostia Community School Board (ACSB) or had relatives (spouses) who were.

So while the structure of the Anacostia board remained relatively stable—though with 12 boards, on various sites, comprise of non-paid laypeople in a relatively poor community, there was bound to be some vacant seats over time—the reasons for this continuity was not totally clear. Various theories have been advanced. Perhaps the presence of a large (relatively) number of middle-class black people on the boards increased the likelihood that participants would have the time and energy to work on elected boards.⁵⁵ Perhaps the visi-

⁵⁴ See Dianne Pinderhughes, "The Struggle for An Ideological Perspective," Report to NIE, p. V-13, 1978.

⁵⁵ The Anacostia area of the city had a diverse socioeconomic mix; the boards seemed to attract middle-class black participants, men and women with backgrounds in the federal service, for example. See the occupations of the board heads, Table 3.

TABLE 3

Correlations in Planning Council and Community Board Membership (1969-1976)

	1969 ACSB	Feb. 1970 ACSB	Jan. 1973 ACSB	1974-75 ACSB	1975-76 ACSB	Nov. 1976 ACSB	Feb. 1977 ACSB
Aug. 1969 ACPC	5 ⁺	7	7	3	3	3	None
1969 ACSB		8	10	2	3	3	1
Feb. 1970 ACSB			10	2	3	3	None
Jan. 1973 ACSB				2	3	4	None
1974-75 ACSB					10	14	6
1975-76 ACSB						28*	13
Nov. 1976 ACSB							8

⁺The figures stand for the number of members which served on each board.

^{*}1975-76 indicates board at beginning of the academic year; November 1976 list included board members on the same board, but just before elections. Several changes and dropouts had taken place. Elections were held on the following dates: November-December 1969; November 1971; March 1974; December 1975; November 12, 1976.

bility and financial backing of the federal government attracted interest, with some participants, undoubtedly hoping to find jobs or help friends or relatives to find them. Not that nepotism was the rule. Or perhaps the immediacy of education for the upbringing and progress of their children gave involvement with a board a special attraction. And in some cases, working with the Anacostia board provided the exposure necessary for work on other boards—such as the D.C. Board of Education and city council (both such jobs were arranged such that a member received a salary).

Whatever the reason—and the questioning of motives is always risky business—the Anacostia project's community involvement component, like the earlier Community Reading Aides, became a strong part of life in the D.C. schools. These boards came to wield considerable power in the areas of staffing and policy, as mentioned above. But the project itself, its leadership, its program, and its continued funding, proved more problematic. Thus, to understand the meaning of true power in the process of educational policy-making, it is important to realize that unless the parties in question have the ability to regulate the (1) behavior of staff and the (2) flow of funds, then direction of a program is greatly hampered. We argue in the following section that despite a relatively constant and well-recognized community board system in the Anacostia project, the ability of the boards to govern was greatly limited by the instability of the professional leadership after the departure of William Rice and the problems with funding and review.

The Ebb and Flow

During the period 1969 to 1975, the implementation of the project went through a number of phases, and ebbing and flowing of problems and accomplishments. Furthermore, as the prior sections have indicated, the federal and school district levels became involved, in supporting and hampering the process. The phases between the starting of the program and its eventual full-implementation in 1976 can be divided into four phases: (1) The *start-up*, which we have discussed at some length, including the hiring and training of Community Reading Aides, and the election of the first community board; (2) The *evaluation* period in which the Nixon administration and the U.S. Office of Education carried on an extensive review of the project's finances, management, and program components, and found the project lacking. A decision to terminate the project was made and approved by the U.S. Commissioner of Education, Dr. Sidney Marland. (3) The *conflict/negotiations* period in which a public outcry, demonstrations, much publicity convinced the administration to reconstitute the project—but not to close it. And (4) a *replanning* phase wherein the name Response to Educational Need Project (RENP) was introduced and stronger standards were imposed. (The implementation and demise of RENP is analyzed in Chapter IV.)

The start-up of the project has been discussed. During the period 1968 to 1970, the project had accomplished the following:

1. *Laypeople Trained and Deployed*: On February 20, 1969, a group of community people were sworn in as Community Reading Aides and placed

in the schools; a reaction for teachers in the schools occurred; the problems were smoothed over; and the community staff were for the most part accepted in the schools.

2. *Community Boards Elected:* Since, from the onset, the community was involved in the planning of the project, the steps to the public election of a permanent Anacostia Community School Board, through the election of neighborhood boards, teacher, student, and staff representatives, was a logical one. Though it took several elections (November and December, 1969) to fill the 241 seats on the various local boards, they were more or less functional by February, 1970.

3. *Staff Leadership Assigned:* Two key posts were filled: that of Project Officer at the U.S. Office of Education, a key slot for maintaining support and funding, was assigned to Dr. Anne Stemmler, who was apparently helpful in advising the project staff and in troubleshooting within the U.S. Office. And that of Project Director, a full-time hired position within the D.C. public schools, finally given to long-time D.C. educator and leader, Mr. William Rice. Formally an assistant to the superintendent and Director of Special Projects, Mr. Rice was long experienced in dealing with the city school bureaucracy, had the respect of the community, and was a firm supporter of the project.

FEDERAL EVALUATION AND DELAY: 1970-1974

An important phase in the history of the Anacostia project occurred, beginning in 1970, when the Nixon administration carried



out a long and involved process of evaluating the program—as part of a decision to fund (or not to fund). Concurrently, the U.S. Office itself was changing, with the project witnessing a shift in federal management, philosophy, and finally, location. These events grew out of change of approach between the social and political liberalism of the Johnson administration and the more conservative outlook of the Nixon years. It all began, as it often did, with money: the funding of the project to be decided in December 1970 for the 1971-1972 fiscal year. The Congress had allocated \$5 million for Anacostia for a three-year period, a slight increase over earlier yearly amounts. But Director of the Bureau of the Budget, Caspar Weinberger, challenged the congressional item and ordered that the project be reviewed (on December 17, 1970), to be backed by the newly appointed U.S. Commissioner of Education, Sidney Marland. In charge was Robert Binswanger, Director of the Experimental School Program, the office to which the Anacostia project was transferred after the departure from the U.S. Office of both Drs. Anne Stemmler and John Hughes.

The Binswanger evaluation was not the first by the U.S. Office. In fact, Dr. Stemmler had produced a report in September, 1970, only a few months before the Bureau of the Budget chief, Mr. Weinburger, requested a new one, under different direction and auspice. The Stemmler document, entitled "Major Demonstrations: The Anacostia Community School Project," concluded that the project "is able to present clear evidence that it is effectively beginning to deliver on its complex mission."⁵⁶ True, this report was positive—but to say

⁵⁶ Ann Stemmler, Memo included in report entitled, "Major Demonstrations: The Anacostia Community School Project," September, 1970.

it was also tentative to a point of vagueness was also true. Note the conclusion states "is able"; but was it doing it? It can present "clear evidence" but did it? And what does it mean to "effectively begin"? And what about the "complex mission?"

Stemmler, apparently, was aware of her own circuitry, now, for she stated that the project was still in the process of becoming, of changing; she also seemed to recognize the limitations (and difficulties) of the implementation process, when she wrote in her report:

For while it is no simple matter to recognize that major changes in certain areas must be undertaken, it is another matter altogether to know exactly what these changes should consist of—and, moreover, how they should be implemented.

An interesting show of humility: the admission that it was hard, under such circumstances, to give advice, to know precisely what to do and how to do it. She left the final decision on program to the community, while the U.S. Office's role was coordinative, reviewing, and providing of technical assistance. Dr. Stemmler did not feel that the federal funding agency should mandate the project goals or programs. Her notion that the Anacostia project's goals were changing and developmental was quite different from the traditional view of planners—who should, as we discussed earlier (see Chapter II), determine goals and outcomes before a program was begun. Furthermore, later evaluators of the project were to call the project to task for *not clearly specifying the outcomes, for not determining the approaches to fulfilling the goals, and for not spelling out the criteria for evaluation* (success or failure) beforehand.

It is interesting from this perspective, a year later, to see how differently experts perceive their role, even under very similar circumstances. Stemmler was sympathetic to the project and believed in allowing communities some self-determination; Binswanger, as we shall see, was interested in showing results with data from the project, in producing outcomes ("models") that could be used elsewhere, and in examining the project in terms of cost effectiveness (was it efficiently using public funds?).

Other factors were affecting the Binswanger evaluation, many of which were problematic for the project in 1971. The main was delay. Since he was busy with many other responsibilities, he found the Anacostia one to be of lower priority and of sensitivity than other work had had to do. Furthermore, since evaluation designs had not been built into the project from the beginning, a newcomer—unaware of the history and style of the project—would have some difficulty in penetrating it and carrying on a full-scale review. Anacostia community school project staff were concerned as well; for they saw their advocates, Drs. Stemmler and Hughes depart and foresaw the stance of the Nixon administration as unsupportive of social programming for poor people. During the period of change-over, there were delays, stops and starts, such that the relationship between local community programs and federal officers was interrupted and uncertain. The suspicion, between program and federal agency, was bound to be a slowing factor in getting the project reviewed and funded. And the longer the delay, the harder to maintain quality,

177

and the more difficult it was to "look good" for a review. It was a vicious cycle, not atypical during review processes, particularly those that tend to linger.

A second factor was social; how can a basically white, middle-class set of bureaucrats evaluate a poor, and black, project? Once a report was written, the related problem was one of acceptability: getting the results in a form that would be useful and acceptable to the black leadership in the Anacostia program, the D.C. schools, and in Congress. But it was also unlikely that the Nixon administration would turn the evaluation study over entirely to blacks. Hence, the report was constructed by Robert Binswanger, with the help of various internal staff groups at the U.S. Office, and with outside help from a team from Clark College, Atlanta, Georgia, headed by the college's dean.

Other conditions made traditional evaluations—of input, process, and output—difficult, for the records kept by the project and the public schools were sorely inadequate. It appeared that the leadership was slow in getting the project's staff hired and trained (and an understaffed project was not likely to keep records). And the public school records were not easily divisible—between "project" and other activities in Anacostia schools. With what data they had, the evaluation group from the U.S. Office and Clark College ran into the further problem of finding criteria which would be acceptable to the Anacostia project staff and the U.S. Office staff who were financing the study. And since the project was only getting started—other than the community control and community aides parts,

it would and was hard to find measurable "output" measures, sign of the impact of such a program on children. Each research group came up with different results:

1. *The Finance Group*: Auditors from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare were upset that public agencies like the project and the D.C. schools kept such poor records. Though it was over a year before the HEW Audit Report was finally made public (July 1971), it provided some very damaging results for the life of the project. In brief, the report, as explained in Binswanger's termination memorandum, stated:

- The D.C. schools had mismanaged \$118,777 in a six-month period
- Some project funds had gone for the salaries of 13 teachers and aides who were not part of the Anacostia project
- Mayor Washington had used some of the project's money to pay for the city's criminal justice planning committee.⁵⁷

The "bottom line" of the financial report was: cancel the project immediately.

2. *The Achievement Group*: An internal group of evaluators attempted to relate program to achievement, "treatment to outcome," joined by a few professors of education. The report's tone was pretty grim: that the original purpose of the project would no longer be "an appropriate, productive, or intelligent disbursement of public monies." It

⁵⁷ Robert Binswanger, "Staff Memorandum on Overall Assessment of Anacostia Project with Recommendations for Action," September 30, 1971. The report was released, interestingly, during negotiations, in the *Washington Post*, October 20, 1971.

'continued:.

The failure of the project to produce demonstrable results despite the funds expended and the time involved gives little cause to believe that continuing the effort will effect successful achievement of the objectives. It would be unfair to the children involved in the project and to the immediate community to extend a project which shows no promise of delivery on its objectives.⁵⁸

Even though the Clark group and the internal researchers had little hard data to go on, they had made strong recommendations--perhaps out of a reaction that any program which appeared so badly managed and controlled must be bad.

3. *The Clark College Group*: The Southern Center for the Study of Public Policy at Clark College "damned the project with faint praise," as the old expression goes. That is, their report was interpreted by the Binswanger people as negative, for it pointed out some serious difficulties in the design and operation of the project. It also said, however, that the program had accomplished much to bringing education closer to the community and in being responsive thereto. Much of the blame was laid at the feet of the school district--for its slow hiring policies--and the U.S. Office for its failure to maintain close relationships with the project leadership, as well as Congress and the President for their failure to provide the necessary resources to strengthen the effort.

Robert Binswanger's report to the U.S. Commissioner, September 30, 1971, was highly critical of the project, unlike the Ann Stemmler

⁵⁷ Binswanger Report.

evaluation made 12 months earlier. Binswanger concluded that not only was it unsuccessful but the project was also unlikely to improve.

He wrote:

Furthermore, the review indicates that even if the project were revised or the objectives renewed, the managerial problems combined with the project's history make reform highly unlikely given a full understanding of all the circumstances and situations related to the project's original development and evolution.⁵⁹

The problems with the Anacostia Community School Project were legion. They included failures on the part of all concerned. For example, he stated:

1. *The U.S. Office's Role in Failure*: Six features of the U.S. Office-Anacostia Community School Project relationship were pointedly criticized.

- a. LACK OF A CLEAR RELATIONSHIP: Binswanger wrote that the history of the project saw the USOE assume "a primary leadership role . . ." which . . . "was never sharply defined or precisely clarified." The ambivalence was blamed for part of the failure, for it had a complex effect on the outcomes.
- b. OVER-DEPENDENCE ON FEDERAL AGENCIES: He further contended that the heavy role of the U.S. Office led to *overprotection* which "crippled the evolution of responsibility to such a degree that when faced with the actual decision-making for major items the Anacostia Project has been left without the capacity to act." [It is not entirely clear how "evolution" can be crippled.]
- c. UNLEAR GRANT EXTENSIONS: He stated that the agency gave additional grant funds, under the Anacostia project, without providing adequate guidelines, performance schedules, and outcome criteria.
- d. VAGUE FEED-BACK AND STANDARDS: He explained that status reports on the project's first year were "almost totally de-

⁵⁹Binswanger Memorandum.

void of criticism and there is no highlighting of the major problem areas or even anticipated areas for potential problems." In particular, Binswanger reported continuing problems, as noted by outside reviewers, such as those with "project design," "staff capability," and a "commitment on the part of the central administration of the D.C. public schools," which for some reason were not conveyed to the project leaders.

- e. OVER-SYMPATHY WITH THE PROJECT: Binswanger, further, accused the USOE reviewers of being too personally involved with the program they were to evaluate. He perhaps was reacting to the delicate position white bureaucrats were in when they dealt with the all-black community control experiment in the late 1960s. In part, this unwillingness to be highly critical may have stemmed from a sense of advocacy and support on the part of Drs. Stemmler and Hughes, former USOE project officer and division head respectively.
- f. SHIRKING OF DUTY: Almost, but not quite, the Binswanger report seemed to imply that Johnson Administration people at the U.S. Office had been negligent in riding herd on the program: by shifting it around to avoid unsympathetic bureaus, by avoiding any hard and tough oversight, and by getting emotionally involved with the "clients," the project staff at USOE had failed in its public and professional duty.

It is not uncommon for one national administration to take shots at the other—particularly when there is great contrast between the likes of Johnson's followed by Nixon's. If the purpose of Caspar Weinberger's request for review was to "kill" the project, then the Binswanger report was a likely consequence. President Nixon's deep antipathy toward social welfare (Roosevelt/Johnson-style) was no secret (recall Nixon's moves against the Office of Economic Opportunity generally).

Two clues may indicate the hidden purpose--though we do not have any inside information that the elimination of the Anacostia project was a foregone conclusion before the Binswanger review. First, data on the process and outcomes of the project, by all admissions, were scanty.

But one cannot prove that a program has failed without some proof: little if any was cited by either Dr. Stemmler or Mr. Binswanger. Second, the timing of the publicity about mismanagement of funds, as located by the HEW audit, may show that the evaluation was political in nature. Even though the auditors did their work in July 1971, the conclusions about diversion of dollars to other teachers and aides and to Mayor Washington's office did not hit the press until October, 1971, when the controversy over de-funding the project was in full swing. In defense of the 1971 review, it was also likely that there were major problems with the Anacostia project--not all of which were to be laid upon the federal bureaucrats. Our data show that given the problems of funding and refunding, of getting things done in the D.C. schools, the newly enfranchised community, and urban schools in general, the Anacostia project had gotten off to a good start and had become bogged down.

2. *The District of Columbia Public School Role:* The review looked at the public schools as well, a level of government with major responsibility for the education of children and the care of funds. Not unlike the federal role (under Stemmler and Hughes), the Binswanger research found four major weaknesses in the District of Columbia schools leadership of the Anacostia project: they included:

- a. WEAK LEADERSHIP: The D.C. public school administration, presumably the superintendent and school board, were criticized for not managing the project well and for apparently allowing the community to take control. Binswanger found that no single person or group of persons were in charge of the Anacostia project from the downtown office and control was non-existent or intermittent.

- b. FINANCIAL MISMANAGEMENT: According to the HEW audit, and reported by the Binswanger memorandum, funds were diverted from the Anacostia project to pay the salaries of 13 other teachers and aides in the school system. To Binswanger besides the obvious illegality of such actions (though no legal actions were taken), the loss of these dollars, some \$118,000 plus, was a symptom of the lack of control and central direction.
- c. WEAK COMMITMENT: All of the problems found by the Binswanger review--poor management, lack of direction financially, and shifting D.C. leadership which related to the project--showed the lack of commitment to the project. Binswanger reasoned that if the D.C. public school had really cared about the program, it would have provided more time and attention to it.
- d. IRRESPONSIBILITY: The overall picture, painted by the Binswanger memorandum, was that of a school system which was incapable and uninterested. It added up to, then, a level of irresponsibility which justified cancelling the project.

The case for closing the project was based, then, on a federal and school system inability to take the task seriously and to fulfill a legal and professional responsibility for control. The report stated:

It appears that the project developed a "hands off" policy by both central administration and board and thus the Anacostia Project or items directly related to it were rarely a topic of discussion at the highest council's [sic] of the public school system.⁶⁰

The theme of irresponsibility and carelessness, aimed at the Anacostia project, was often heard during the early Nixon administration years. Numerous liberal experiments were hoisted on the pitard of poor management, as a justification for cancellation. During the New Deal of the 1930s and the New Frontier-Great Society of the 1960s, presidents and agency leadership seem to have difficulty managing rapid change. It seemed that the urge to "get things done" took precedence over the care and details of operations. Perhaps, if history is our guide, social experimentation moves faster than the management systems

3. *The Anacostia Project's Role*: Finally, the Binswanger report took a hard and critical look at the project itself: its governance, results, and process. Here the bureaucratic "anger" directed at "community control" and urban school "politics" became most vitriolic.

The case against the school project took five forms:

- a. **FAILED GOALS**: The report contended that after three and a half years of operation, the Anacostia project had failed to show "the capacity for or is progressing toward the actualization of its originally stated goals." In non-jargon, it had failed. Binswanger's report stated that the project had not improved the reading of students nor had it established an adequate system of self-governance.
- b. **POOR CONCEPTUALIZATION**: Next the report leveled a charge that the project was poorly designed in the first place; it lacked the precision to make outcomes possible. The weak conception had led to weak management: absence of standards and procedures. Again the problem of poor documentation and evaluation were raised. "Lax administration has resulted in substantial unexpended funds in a given year's operations." "Major director positions have remained unmanned [or unwomened]."
- c. **POLITICAL GAMESPERSONSHIP**: Binswanger's evaluation concluded also that the project had ceased to be educational. It had become instead a return to the "ward" politics so common in the corrupt period in the early 1900s in American cities. Power, jobs, and money took precedence over children and learning, so he contended.
- d. **CAPTIVITY BY THE BUREAUCRACY**: In an apparent contradiction, the evaluation also implied that the project was not truly a "community control" effort; that instead, the program was controlled by the D.C. schools and the particular staff who were hired by the project. "Although most of the personnel reside in the community, the project suffers from the absence of dynamic involvement of a sizable portion of the community." (It is interesting that in c above, the report accused the project of over-politicization; in d, it's over-bureaucratization.)
- e. **MISDIRECTED EFFORTS**: Finally, the report indicated that the project was directing its energies in the "wrong" directions; that rather than working to bring the community into the educational process and to educate children better, the Anacostia program seemed concerned mainly about getting jobs for community people: Political patronage over educational achievement.

In summary, the Binswanger memo-report condemned the Anacostia project on all sides. It found that the program was poorly conceived and executed; that leaders in the U.S. Office, the D.C. schools, and the project itself were too imprecise in some cases and downright dishonest in others. The recommendation, from Robert Binswanger, head of the office of Experimental Programs, to Sidney Marland, U.S. Commissioner of Education, was to terminate. In the fall of 1971, the Commissioner accepted his subordinate's request. July 1972 was set as the end. The project received a year of grace, for to close the program down immediately was seen by Binswanger as "cruel and unnecessary."

The Community/D.C. School Reactions

The very forces that the Binswanger report found to be detriments to good programming became resources for a concerted community-school system response to the termination decision. The responses came from many quarters.

1. From the General Community: The Johnson years had seen the growth in federal programs in the Anacostia area: food stamps, medical programs, day care, and community centers. These groups feared that if the Anacostia Community School Project were closed, their programs would be next.

2. From the Anacostia Project Constituencies: The project itself had built a strong following of some 200 people who feared for their jobs. A leaflet read:

Our children will be deprived of their opportunity for a good education. Over 200 people will be added to the unemployment roles. Dollars will be drained from the Anacostia Community.

3. From the School Leaders: And the leaders, particularly William Rice, reacted. They "went public," the one thing a politically sensitive group like those at the U.S. Office cannot easily ignore. The Anacostia staff and boards called press conferences, gave statements to the Congress, and held meetings. Binswanger was the main target for the campaign: he was called insensitive and uncaring about the values of the community. A leaflet, "Stop the Murder of our Children," dramatized the problem.

The effort to keep the Anacostia project from loss of federal support reached a peak with a sit-in at the U.S. Office of Education in late October. Some 250 community people and Anacostia staff arranged a meeting with Binswanger. Transportation to the office was organized by Mr. Rice and used D.C. public school buses. There was much yelling, anger, and "mau-mauing," a term coined by Tom Wolf to describe what happens when a community group lets a bureaucrat have it.⁶¹ U.S. Office officials perceived the meeting as threatening, as embarrassing, and as going back on the original intent of the meeting. The crowd was tense and was not interested in any bureaucratic rationalizations for why the project had to end. One official recalled in an interview:

There were placards and chanting, and it really frightened many at HEW. It really shook up the HEW people. The demonstrators chanted they wanted actions, and the people who came were poor, that they were "the people." I remember it was a hot day, and even hotter in that room with all those people.

When federal officials tried to talk, they were shouted down. One person told him that: "If you don't tear it up, we don't assure you a safe passage out of this room." Some U.S. Office people saw the meeting as a planned effort to scare and influence them, not as a true and spontaneous outbreak of community feeling.

On October 29, 1971, the leaders of the Anacostia project made a presentation to the D.C. Board of Education which summarized the project's feelings about the proposed closing down of the program. The statement read:

⁶¹ Tom Wolfe, Mau-mauing the Flack Catcher.

What then should the funding source expect? What then is the mission of the project? We submit to this board that the most a funding source can expect is a value commensurate with its investment. We submit that the mission of the project is to fulfill the objectives of its proposal to the extent that monies and resources permit. We suggest these limits primarily because it seems as though the present representatives of our funding fathers are viewing our history and our objectives as though, in fact, a project of warm-bodied human beings was nonexistent.⁶²

This statement underlined the feelings of the Anacostia community leaders, as they dealt with the threat to their survival. It stressed that, in their opinion, the Office of Education had not considered the progress they'd made, the problems which were beyond the control of the program, and the level of human suffering among students and community staff members that would occur should the program be eliminated. The U.S. Office found the high level of inefficiency, poor operating procedures, and political plum-taking as condemning; the Anacostia leaders blamed the D.C. schools' hiring slowness and the U.S. Office's slowness in providing money as the cause of some of the problems. Moreover, the effort to hire community people, condemned by the U.S. Office evaluators, was seen as a primary and positive goal by the community boards and professional leaders. In essence, it appeared that the federal agents and the community leaders saw the world through different lenses: the federal staffers had less faith in community participants, were less open to community control; the community and project staffers resented the outside interference and judgment. The two sides of the argument might be expressed in

⁶² Presentation of the Anacostia Community School Project to the D.C. Board of Education, October 29, 1971, p. 2.

in tabular form as follows (see Table 4):

TABLE 4	
Two Perspectives on the Project	
<i>U.S. Office View</i>	<i>Anacostia View</i>
1. Project as employment agency	Project as involving the public
2. Money as bait to encourage participation	Poor people need money and should be paid for services
3. Inadequate progress toward community involvement	Much progress was made to fill the many boards
4. Low turn-out for elections as evidence of non-representation	Low turn-out as indicative of history of disenfranchisement
5. Absence of formal structure as a shortcoming	Informality worked better with poor people
6. Project as master-minded by the staff	Project a genuine expression of community needs
7. Need for more focus	Concern for handling the many problems of the schools in the Anacostia community
8. Desire for strict Research and Development approaches: a useful experiment	Need for remedial education, not experimentation

Appeals and Compromises

The demonstration and publicity seemed to work; the project was not simply cancelled and dead. Instead, the long process of appeal and bargaining began, leading to the closing of the Anacostia Community School Project but the emergence of the same project under a different name and egis, the Response to Educational Need Project (RENPN). After a flurry of letters and discussions, Binswanger put the whole case in one place, in a letter to Mr. Rice; the letter had five points:

- Point One:* To be important as an innovation, the project must be documented. "Such documentation is not present."
- Point Two:* To be significant, data must show that the project made a difference. "Such data is [sic] not present."
- Point Three:* Federal program must demonstrate effective management; but this one is weak: (1) "vital amounts of funds . . . were not spent"; (2) "significant numbers of staff positions were left vacant"; (3) "the use of \$118,777 of project funds for nonproject purposes was not only illegal but also resulted in a loss of those funds to the community."
- Point Four:* The program was to show how the community can help run the schools. "Evidence that the community has in fact played such a role in the project is lacking."
- Point Five:* Objectives were stated in all early documents. "There is a lack of evidence to substantiate significant progress toward the fulfillment of those objectives."

In December, 1971, the Anacostia project offered a rebuttal to those points, stating that (1) the U.S. Office of Education defined the project's objectives after the fact; (2) the lack of clear documentation was no reason to stop support for the project, for it's the federal agency's problem to find data, not the project's; (3) the objectives of the program had been met.

Primarily, the request explained that the two parties (the U.S. Office and Anacostia) saw the program differently: that if the U.S. Office came to understand the process of community involvement better, they would see how much progress had been made. In particular, the appeal requested that the funding be continued and that better management at all levels be constructed. For example, the request was for a U.S. Office Project Officer to be approved by the D.C. board of

education and the Anacostia community board. This individual would be empowered to make key decisions and to revitalize the program.⁶³

The means would be for the Project Officer to help in the generation of the data necessary to show success or failure. The Anacostia project's leaders still conceived of the relationship with federal agents as being mutually supportive and cooperative, as represented by the suggestion that the PO be jointly appointed; the U.S. Office's notion was one of more distance and criticism.

The U.S. Office changed its mind: it did not close down the project but altered it. Why? We can only put the picture together, piece by piece. First, the sit-in and adverse publicity was upsetting. Second, the internal problems between the U.S. Office and one of its programs reached Capitol Hill, with liberal Democrats requesting another chance for the project and with conservatives being nervous and embarrassed by the outcry. Third, the confrontation raised the spectre of white-black conflict again--on the heels of the 1960s with all its racial strife. Pressure mounted to cool the situation off. Third, some outsiders like lawyers from the firm of Covington and Burling wrote briefs which showed that the U.S. Office had not followed the correct administrative procedures in evaluating the project. The thought of a law suit against the federal agency and long litigation was not a pleasant one for the Nixon administration.

The Settlement

With tension mounting, the U.S. Office of Education began to realize that it could not likely terminate the project. Commissioner

⁶³"An Appeal to the Commissioner of Education to Reinstate Funding for the Anacostia Community School Project," December 3, 1971.

Sidney Marland appointed a task force to look into a solution, headed by Mr. Richard Fairley [no pun intended], a prominent black in the Office of Education. The compromise was a simple one: the U.S. Office would get to see the Anacostia Community School Project lose its identity and to negotiate the nature of its replacement. The D.C. project got to have a new and very similar program, renamed the Response to Educational Need Project, with the same community-elected board, employees, and general purpose.

The evaluation and decision to continue the project in a different form was made; but change did not stop there. The project continued to function, under a continuation grant until August 1972.⁶⁴ Thus, the 149 community people working as aides were kept on the project payroll. Seven additional schools were added to the project including Friendship, Garfield, Hendley, Leckie, Patterson, Simon, and Hart Junior High. The number of schools served had thus reached fourteen. And, the changes included a new superintendent, Ms. Barbara Sizemore, who decentralized the D.C. schools creating five regions. Region I was Anacostia; William Rice became the Region's superintendent while he finished his tenure as Project Director of the new Response to Educational Need Project. And just as negotiations for the RENP began, the responsibility for it was shifted to the newly created National Institute of Education.

Much can be learned about this episode in the history of the Anacostia project, much that is of value to researchers, evaluators

⁶⁴ *Washington Post*, January 2, 1972; *Washington Star*, January 1, 1972.

and policy-makers. First, *evaluation of real-world programs*, particularly those in highly political areas like urban schools, *cannot be done like the text-books say*. The steps of selecting criteria, gathering data, interpreting data, and reaching conclusions are clouded by conflict, particularly when either party (the evaluator or the evaluated) perceives that political ends are sought.

Second, *evaluation is highly ideological*. Regimes are often at stake, whether in the public sector where Republican and Democratic administrations vie with one another for power, or in the private corporate world where partisanship gives way to a test of personal authority. The Anacostia evaluation could never have been treated neutrally, not with the involvement of the White House, the highly political nature of federal agencies, and the lack of trust between whites and blacks, federal and local people.

Third, *evaluation is still a very primitive art form*. Social science research fails miserably to provide answers at the level of certitude necessary to make success/failure, fund/no-fund decisions. Data were often not available; but who should be penalized for that? Is the absence of data tantamount to failure? And whose failure is it? The project or the funding agency or the fiscal agent? The best that can be expected from evaluation research at the present time is some clear indication of whether the project is indeed functional, how it works, and what may be some outcomes. Descriptive studies (case studies, like this one) provide some of the answers. Survey research, too, is helpful, but only *after* there is some agree-

ment on the definitions of change and the legitimacy of the evaluation.

I tend to agree with Fullan and Pomfret, in their clever suggestion that evaluation research (as the implementation of change) is itself a highly social and interactive process--like the project under scrutiny. They explain: "Research has shown time and again that there is no substitute for the primacy of personal contact among implementers, and between implementers and planner/consultants, if the difficult process of unlearning old roles ~~and~~ learning new ones is to occur."⁶⁵ I would only add that an evaluation, in the absence of the same personal contact, human understanding, and involvement, is an exercise in futility.

Fourth, *the rationality of the process is unclear*. If one accepts the notion that the process of evaluation is a rational one, then it follows that once a project has been found wanting, it is cancelled. Right? But the politics of public programs also means that any given innovation quickly builds its own constituencies--in Congress, in the community, etc. And if the project leaders are willing to take their case to the public, the rationality of termination can be overcome by the pressure from irate publics. Since rational evaluation is primarily the function of a bureaucracy, or at least, of people who accept the legitimacy of the enterprise, the public furor, social protest, and conflict are often highly disruptive. The public outcry--probably engineered by the professional staff--was effective in the Anacostia case in saving the project from extinction

⁶⁵Michael Fullan and Alan Pomfret, "Research on Curriculum and Instruction Implementation," *Review of Educational Research*, Winter 1977, Vol. 47, no. 1, pp. 395-96.

and in buying at least five more years of life.

Fifth, *evaluation often contaminates the setting under study*. Intrusion for the purpose of study is well understood by anthropologists, who are aware that their presence--as scholars--changes the people under scrutiny. But there is little mention of this problem in the evaluation literature. Let me illustrate the difference between anthropological awareness and educational/evaluative naiveness.

Philip Mason, in his forward to O. Mannoni's study of the Malagasy, explains the impact of "outsiders":

In a static society [and an organizational setting strives toward stasis],--so long as it stays truly static--the individual is safely dependent on a complicated social system which, in the case of the Malagasy, usually includes not only living members of the group but dead ancestors and unborn posterity. The arrival of even one representative of a competitive society--immune from local forms of magic, blessed with a new magic of his own--threatens the peace of this primitive but complicated structure . . .⁶⁶

One could make an argument, that in some complex way, the actual activity of evaluation, as with a society, disrupts the normal function and shape of an innovation. Evaluators are only mildly aware of their presence in an on-going system. And in the case of the Anacostia project, the agency doing the research was also the source of funding; hence, it was impossible to separate the Binswanger evaluation from the impending decision to keep or stop support. And when there is much ideological "distance" between the social system (the project) and the agency doing the analysis, the disruptive quality of

⁶⁶O. Mannoni, *Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonialization* (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 10.

the research is heightened. At some point, one could argue, the outside group cannot get an accurate reading of the progress of a new program, simply because they are biased against the program on the one hand and the project is so unnerved by the presence of unfamiliar and "unfriendly" parties on the other.

And, sixth, *the value of the whole exercise (evaluation) is called into question.* With a weak data base, with a strong bias against community controlled project, and with the constraints of time and imminent decision-making, it was doubtful that the Binswanger report would be seen as unbiased and acceptable to the school system and the project. It started too late in the development of the project (after 30 months); it was seen as an unsympathetic party statement; and it was without firm data. Thus, the weight of proof, in such cases, tends to rest with the outside party; and if they cannot show failure, in undisputable ways, then one really questions the value of the evaluation enterprise altogether.

PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING--AGAIN, 1972-1976

Regardless of the theoretical function of evaluation in the implementation of change, the history of the Anacostia project shows not only the impact of action research, as just discussed, but also the potential of new programs growing from the ashes of old ones. We examine first the "transition period," the shift from (1) an old to a new program, (2) old to new project leaders, (3) old federal to new federal sponsorship, and (4) old to new staff. This reconstruction

took almost two years, from the fall of 1972 to the fall of 1974, before the Anacostia project, renamed the Response to Educational Need Project, would be accepted by the new federal agency, the National Institute of Education.

Second, we end this chapter in 1976 when the last Project Director, Mr. Daniel Jackson is hired, leaving the analysis of the dissolution of the project to the last chapter. Thus, in this section we provide the history of RENP: its planning and implementation, as contrasted to the earlier history of the Anacostia Community School Project. However, one must remember that for participants, the thick cord of continuity, between ACSP and RENP existed and conditioned their behavior. True, a large number of leaders, at all levels of government, were new, including the Project Directors at RENP, the federal leadership at the National Institute, and D.C. school officials, once William Rice retired. But the community and the schools--two most important groups--saw the past as important. And friends of the D.C. schools and the D.C. community were still strong in Congress and still made demands on NIE to keep the Anacostia effort in the budgets.

Planning the Response to Educational Need Project

Even though the Anacostia project was still operational, people were being paid, and the community control/community organization and reading aides components were functioning, the future of the project was being re-planned. During this two-year transitional period, a number of changes were to be made: (1) the *goals and direction* of the program components themselves were to be narrowed and altered in some

ways, as the interaction between the project and the National Institute continued; (2) the *programs* were to change to ones emphasizing "inservice training for teachers," as well as holding on to the Community Reading Aides, Community Organizers (and Community Mathematics Aides were also added); and (3) the *staff* was to change, as the program functions required. Though it was to take almost four years for all systems to be working, the re-planning and re-implementation phases worked toward these three ends. Hence, as was mentioned earlier, the new Anacostia project held on to some of the early purposes like community control and lay involvement in the classroom while adding others (e.g., on-site, in-service staff development).

Before discussing the new goals, programs, and staffing, we should mention the process by which the new was added or displaced the old: that is, the approach to program planning used by the National Institute of Education, as it took over the Anacostia project in 1972.

NIE in Contrast to USOE

The National Institute of Education "inherited" the shell of the Anacostia experiment, one that had undergone a painful evaluation, one that had existed on short-term extensions (perhaps a federal "hand-out" might be a better term). During the transition, a five-person Task Force (including an Anacostia board member, a representative from the D.C. school board, the superintendent's office, and the U.S. Office, with Ms. Elizabeth A. Abramowitz, chairperson) came up with a proposal labeled Phase I, which was accepted in principle, but which was not

funded pending further planning. At the U.S. Office, a number of people read the proposal, each making some suggestions. These delays led to some firings of Anacostia staff, including 75 Community Reading Assistants and 12 Community Organizers. And Mr. Julian West, from the special projects office of the D.C. schools, was made Acting Director until the new program was planned.

In September, 1972, the Anacostia program was transferred to the National Institute of Education, a newly created agency in DHEW dedicated to educational research. Whether policy-makers felt that the Anacostia project had great potential as a research effort, that the project needed a new kind of guidance, or whether they were not quite sure where to put it, it was not clear. At any rate, the new agency, NIE, got an old, but newly reconstituted, project--the Anacostia project.

1. *A Difference in Approach:* 1972 was very different from 1968; times had changed. The U.S. Office of Education, in its work on the Anacostia project in 1968-1969, had relied heavily on "the community" to plan the project, to hold institutes, to convene task forces, and to "plan" their own project. Once funds could be found--and were found--the component was funded. The role of the U.S. Office, as perhaps best typified by Dr. Ann Stemmler, was that of support, coordination--to strict control or oversight.

But, the Nixon administration, with the National Institute of Education, in 1972-1974, was a very different organization. The style was different as well. NIE required much more written material, review, revision, and more review: the process of refinement left little

to the imagination or to guess-work. The sequence went as follows:

--*Another evaluation was performed.* The BLK Group, headed by Dr. Eugene Beard, conducted a study of what NIE was confronting, the nature of the project, its strength and weaknesses. Again Beard found what other evaluators had learned: that the project had kept poor records, making study difficult. He concluded that the project had not really had a chance to succeed, for the management of it had been weak and inconsistent. He wrote: "The major evaluation finding was that the Anacostia Community School Project was so underfunded and understaffed at the central and component administration levels that adequate project management was impossible."⁶⁷ In other words, if the organizational structure and management system were improved, the project might likely work (October 1972).

--*NIE critiqued the Abramowitz task force report.* The Phase I process continued, as the Institute studied the task force report. More detail on the operation of the project was requested. Thus, the move toward more management regularity in the program was furthered (November 1972).

--*Operational Plan/Interim Report was submitted to NIE.* Acting Director Julian West sent his report on how the project would function and was operating to NIE; the major programmatic emphasis was no longer community control but changed to instructional improvement. (Either the community involvement was secure or there was a definite change in philosophy; my guess is a bit of both, though the Region I, Anacostia School Board was still functioning making an emphasis on community participation less of a priority)(February 1973) .

--NIE returned the Interim Report for more specificity. The formalized planning process continued, as NIE and the project interacted to make the program more precise. The West document of February was found wanting, in that clearer "program strategies," greater "research emphases," and better "management control" were requested. NIE suggested that the project get some help from consultants and people at NIE (March 1973).

--Revised proposal was submitted by new Director, Calvin Lockridge. With a legislative deadline upon them, NIE accepted the last proposal and made an agreement with the Project Director; there was a concern about missing the budget period and losing the tagged funds for the project (June 1973).

Out of this writing and rewriting had come a new project, one which stressed more traditional educational concerns: reading and achievement, and played down the community control. The shift in emphases caused some pressures to be exerted. Congress continued to support the project, at least those liberal leaders who saw the erosion of social welfare project under President Nixon as disturbing. This congressional pressure on NIE was poignant because of the National Institute's concern for continued support. On two occasions, Congress singled out the Anacostia experiment for special attention. In October 1972, the Senate Appropriations Committee emphasized the importance of the program and wrote: "The committee wishes . . . to mention its endorsement of the District of Columbia school project funded from this appropriation."⁶⁸ A year later, October 1973, the

⁶⁸ Senate Report 92-1297, October 12, 1972, pp. 30-31.

Senate committee was supportive of the program as a potential success and critical of NIE for not furthering the project's effort.⁶⁹

NIE thus put pressure on the project, through the review and revise process, to change the emphasis on the program: from one of community control to one of more academic and research characteristics. At one point, to meet the deadline of the June budget cut-off, Project Director Calvin Lockridge, for example, rewrote the project proposal using consultants and without clearing it with the community boards. It was accepted by NIE before the 30th June deadline.

But, the Anacostia community boards, the third force in this drama, had become disturbed in June 1973 over the lack of community involvement in the newly designed project. Lockridge lost his job, even though the project was funded.

Hence, the process of redefining the project, its goals and emphases, was not without its problems and casualties. Congress wanted action from NIE; NIE wanted a more accountable product from the Anacostia leadership; and the Anacostia community wanted more control from the Project Director. This triangle of tension, though often typical of any resigning effort, highlighted the differences in perspective among the four actors: Congress, NIE, the Project Director, and the community.

2. *A Difference in Program:* The change in goals, between the old and new projects, between what the U.S. Office had required and what NIE desired, led to different program emphases. First, the steps in

⁶⁹ Senate Report 93-414, October 2, 1973.

planning were different. Phase I, the "plan for planning" required in the "Plan for Proposal Development and Scope of Work," October 25, 1973, that the project lay out its operations, objectives, and criteria. This effort was carried out by a joint task force, composed of six members from the D.C. public schools, five members from the Anacostia Community School Board, two from the Council of School Officers, the school administrators' group, four from the Washington Teachers Union, seven from the staff of RENP, two from among the Community Reading specialists, two consultants, and one from NIE itself. The RENP Task Force was chaired by the Anacostia community board chairperson, Albert Pearsall.

In the subcommittee structure, the new RENP program emerged. They included reading instruction, mathematics, counseling--all traditional school areas--, as well as community organizations and education, management, and the implementation effort itself--Phase II.⁷⁰

Again, the NIE-style was evident. The Task Force met long and hard, some 85 people. They wrote, received appraisals, rewrote. In November, 1973, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed by NIE, the Anacostia board, and the D.C. schools. And almost five months from the time of the Task Force's beginnings, the "Proposal for a Cooperative School-Community Program to Foster Improved Academic Achievement Among the Children of Anacostia" was submitted to NIE. The date: February, 1974. Hence, from 1972 when NIE was created and was the recipient of the Anacostia program, till 1974 when a proposal was received and accepted, two years of work, assistance from NIE, outside

⁷⁰REN P Chronology.

and inside consultants, and stewardship had occurred. A memorandum from NIE summed up the feelings of the agency and its role: "After almost two years of very intensive work and, relative to other projects, massive technical assistance, a proposal was received in February 1974 that gives promise of being fundable."⁷¹ Contrast this two-year process with the speed of funding that was evident in 1969 when the community board was elected and the Community Reading Aides were trained and deployed to the schools in Anacostia.

3. *A Difference in Staffing:* No project was possible without the staff to carry it out. Over the two years of negotiations and writing, the staff had limped along, with a constantly changing cast of characters. Between September 1972, when NIE took over the federal liaison with the project, and 1976 when the program became fully operational, there were no less than six Project Directors of RENP. It seemed with the departure of William Rice, PD for three years, the leadership could not stabilize. This revolving door of project top leadership was both a result of other problems and a contributor to them. While Rice had the expertness, the respect within the system, and the relationships with key law-makers on the Hill, his successors did not all bring those skills and attributes to the post. Even if they had, they were not in the job long enough to build a project and carry it out. Not until the arrival of Mr. Dan Jackson, to be treated in the final chapter, did RENP receive the kind of long-term leadership it so desperately needed.

⁷¹Memorandum from Lois-ellin Datta, November 10, 1975.

The six Project Directors, their terms in the job, and their accomplishments/problems, are as follows:

1. JULIAN WEST When William Rice became Region I, Anacostia
 (Sept. 1972 to Community Superintendent, West was appointed
 March 1972: 7 Acting Director. Julian West's background
 months) included a life-time effort in the D.C. schools, in various jobs,
 including Assistant Superintendent, in the Special Project Office. He
 spent much of his time in the Project Director's slot negotiating with
 NIE and trying to balance the needs of the project with demands from
 NIE and the community. He was seen from the onset as temporary.

2. R. CALVIN LOCKRIDGE After a long search, the project hired Lock-
 (March 1973 to ridge, a civil rights activist from Chicago,
 August 1973: 6 former member of Rev. Martin Luther King,
 months) Jr.'s SCLC staff and a man who had little understanding of the deli-
 cacy of public school administration. He hired some of his own people
 and wrote a draft for NIE of the continuation proposal--all without
 consultation with the community school board. His "Systems Approach
 to Improved Academic Performance and Evaluation Design" fell short of
 fulfilling the requests of NIE and got him into trouble with his Ana-
 costia board (which had power to recommend his removal). Note also
 that the word "community involvement" or the like was entirely absent
 from his proposal title. In August, only 6 months after his arrival,
 the Anacostia board fired Mr. Lockridge. But he didn't go away. He
 later ran for community school board with an entire slate of his own.
 They won. But in the contested election, his slate was seated--but not
 Lockridge.

3. PETER LEWIS The former Community Relations staffer, Peter Lewis, was made Acting Project Director for 10 months. His task, too, was to participate in the redefining process with NIE. It is interesting that the board selected as their new director a man whose job had been project-community relations. His "Plan for Proposal Development" was submitted to NIE on October 25, 1973, as part of the Task Force effort; they then went to work on Phase II, the implementation plan. Lewis found, as had his predecessors, that coordinating community needs and NIE deadlines was a major problem. Lewis resigned out of frustration; the slot remained open for a few weeks.
4. VALERIE GREEN A former assistant principal in the D.C. schools, she was hired by a committee including Anacostia Superintendent William Rice, Gene Kinlow, community board chairperson, with the new Project Officer, George Sealey, sitting in as a non-voting member, and others. By the time she takes office, NIE has accepted the proposal and the implementation process was under way. Thus, she spent much of her time during the summer of 1974 and afterward working on the program components like teacher aides in math and reading, getting the job slots approved, and seeking approval at each step with her board. Some financial matters, too, were outstanding: who was to pay for what and how much. The RENP structure was constructed, including a new head for reading and a head for mathematics, replacing the single Director of Instruction; the Community Board was enlarged to 32 people, some elected directly to

the board and others appointed from their separate neighborhood boards. Ms. Green was fired by the board during the summer of 1975; the reason was a belief among the board that she was too slow getting the project implemented. Under her administration, the project gained more size and complexity, with new components and directors. The board was also enlarged.

5. EVELYN TAYLOR
(July 1975 to
October 1975:
3 months)

The next two Project Directors were acting: Ms. Taylor had been head of the Instructional Component. When they were disaggregated, she was Director of Reading. It became obvious to the board that she could not handle the administration of the project; the board, while carrying on a national search, hired Larry Riddick, also as an Acting Project Director, for six weeks until a permanent person could be located.

6. LARRY RIDDICK
(October 1975 to
November 1975:
1-1/2 months)

Mr. Riddick had held the post of summative evaluator. From all the data we have, he had little authority. Thus the Anacostia Community School Board took a strong role in handling the administration of the program. Under the leadership of Gene Kinlow, a federal employee himself, and chairperson of the Anacostia board since the sudden death (during an Anacostia meeting) of Albert Pearsall, chair from 1971 to 1974, the board, during the short tenure of Mr. Riddick, spent its time trying to find a permanent director.

Little comment is necessary concerning this parade of Project Directors. For we know just how important is innovation in the role of head person. Gross and colleagues, in their study of implementation of change, forcefully state the centrality of good management. Gross *et al.* explain that administrators (like these project directors) are "in the position to command an overall view of the organization" and thus can "give general direction to the *entire course* of implementation efforts." These leaders are, according to Gross and others, in "the best position to anticipate these problems and to set force in motion to minimize or overcome them. *It is management's responsibility to develop any overall strategy for change.*"⁷²

These researchers go so far as to prescribe, in one-two-three order, a set of "guidelines" for the management of change. They point out the importance of:

1. "Making the innovation clear to the staff members involved in implementation;
2. "Providing the training experiences required so that the staff will possess the capabilities needed to perform in accord with the innovation;
3. "Ensuring that the staff is willing to make the appropriate innovative effort;
4. "Making the necessary materials and equipment available for the implementation of the innovation; and
5. "Rearranging prevailing organizational arrangements that are incompatible with the innovation."⁷³

⁷² Neal Gross *et al.*, *Implementing Organizational Innovations: A Sociological Analysis of Planned Educational Change* (New York: Basic Books, 1971), p. 214.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

With such a key role, it was no wonder that the project during the four-year period between the leaving of Mr. Rice and the hiring of Mr. Jackson, had some problems getting things accomplished. Even if their environment had been stable, the funds steadily available, and a little luck was forthcoming, a change manager would have difficulty. In such a condition where six leaders came and went in four years, the likelihood of success was greatly reduced.

Other less senior staff were changing as well. As the program switched from the Anacostia Community School Project to the Response to Educational Need Project, the goals shifted--and so did the staffing. The heads of the various components were expanded, finally to include a Director for reading, math, and community organization. As the in-service, on-site idea emerged as a major goal, senior teacher/facilitators were hired. In the Parent Community Involvement (PCI) component grew, so too did the role of five senior community organizers who supervised some 24 Community Organizers in the neighborhood schools of Anacostia. These staff members worked hard to re-establish the neighborhood and community-wide school boards. During the winter of 1974, community elections were held to fill the slots on the boards. It was during these elections, in fact, that Calvin Lockridge and his slate of officers helped, through his skills and desire, to get hold of power in the community to focus attention on the electoral process. The March 1974 elections managed to fill the empty seats and recreate the ailing community participation focus of RENP. In April 1974, Mr. Kinlow was elected chairperson of the Anacostia regional board, with standing committees and staggered terms, as suggested by the project's

by-laws.

Change in personnel did not stop with the project, of course. At the top of the D.C. public schools, the superintendent was replaced, Superintendent Manning left and Ms. Barbara Sizemore from Chicago was hired. She brought with her a firm commitment to community involvement and the decentralization of the school system, much like she had witnessed in the Chicago public schools. She divided the school system into five regions (with Anacostia becoming Region I). In fact, Region I, already in place when she came, was her "model" for the city with a regional superintendent, regional board, and a tradition of self-determination already functioning, because of the efforts of the ACSP/RENIP.

The Continued Federal Role

While the internal staff and structure of the Response to Educational Needs Project was developing during 1973-1974, Congress and NIE continued to hold the project accountable for its expenditures. Conversely, the project attempted to fulfill its responsibilities and to insure that federal dollars--so vital to the life of the program--were allocated. Of course, the future of RENIP depended on the political and fiscal health of the National Institute, which on occasion had problems with Congress. While it is not our purpose to analyze the NIE-congressional interaction, we must mention the relationship where important to RENIP.

NIE's role was that of standard-setter. It held very high expectations for the newly-constituted project, bargaining for the

specificity it felt was necessary to build the project and to bring it back to life. At the point where time did not allow yet another re-write, the Institute moved to a set of conditions, 41 in all, that set the terms by which funds would be released (February 1974).

Meanwhile, NIE attempted to insure that funds would be ready to implement and sustain the project, once it was formulated. This was no mean feat in the tight area of the Nixon years. Emerson Elliott, Deputy Director of NIE, consulted with the Senate Labor-Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriations Subcommittee chief staffer, Harley Dirks. The hope was to get some supplemental appropriations for the program. Dirks showed a special interest in the project, at least partially out of personal commitment. He and Dom Ruscio expressed some interest in touring the Anacostia schools, up to 26 now within the project. (Ruscio was the staff person in the subcommittee for education.)⁷⁴ NIE sent Dirks and Ruscio a press release announcing the continuation grant for the project; the release signalled the senatorial committee and thus the Senate that NIE was supporting the project--an interest of some key liberals in the deliberative body.

The grant to the Response to Educational Needs Project was a healthy one. NIE authorized not only \$1 million dollars of unused funds from the Fiscal Year 1973--funds which the project during the year or two of planning and sorting out had been unable to spend--but also \$2.5 million new funds for the 1974 fiscal year. The dollars were given to support the five components of the project:

⁷⁴ *Washington Post*, March 12, 1974.

- Reading*: the improvement of students' reading achievement through inservice education for staff
- Mathematics*: same, through inservice in math.
- Parent Involvement*: the project was to build a strong school-community relationship through the community organizers and programs for the adults
- Management*: funds for use in maintaining a Project Director, and several assistants for reading, math, community organizations
- Evaluation*: these funds to support research during and after the NIE involvement to learn the results of the project and to disseminate the outcomes.

NIE was most concerned with achievement and research; the community, with community control and achievement, with research and evaluation of little interest. The result of the disagreement was a compromise, where funds were devoted to both research/evaluation and community involvement, with general agreement on the usefulness of reading and mathematics programs.

But 1975 was another story. NIE received a critical evaluation from the House Appropriations Committee in a report; the result was a large cut in the Institute's 1975 fiscal year budget.⁷⁵ The report attacked the agency for not adequately assisting "state and local agencies through the dissemination of research information and newly developed programs and practices." The impacts on RENP were two: first, the continued funding of the project may have been in danger. For as the fortunes of NIE were going, so went the support for RENP. More fundamentally, such pressure on the Institute to get information developed, used, and disseminated influenced the final phases of RENP, when the Institute pressed for a "model" or "plan" that could be "packaged" and made available and useful to other state, federal, and

⁷⁵ House Report 93-1140, June 24, 1972.

local jurisdictions. Certainly, the development and dissemination function was not new to NIE, for the federal educational agencies going back to the 19th century were charged with the gathering and diffusion of general and useful information to school leaders across the country. So this stress in Congress could be, and was, translated into policy at NIE, as the data (and final chapter of this study) show.

In September, the Senate was highly critical of the Institute and no funds were recommended for 1975 FY. Money was restored in the House-Senate Conference Committee, however; but just to indicate to NIE how attached certain key senators were to RENP, the committee praises the Anacostia project as an example of good federal-local programming, though it was unclear as to the data base for this contention.⁷⁶

Final Funding

In 1973-1974, the Project received \$2 million in back money (unspent from the former budget period) and \$2.25 million in new funds. These dollars were for Phase I, the planning and development phase of the project. But, with delays, it became clear that the project needed additional time for development, extending through the fall of 1975. A negotiation group from RENP, consisting of Regional Supt. William Rice, the key Directors from the project (Larry Riddick *et al.*), and three Anacostia community board members including chairperson Gene Kinlow, met with NIE. After study and negotiations, it was decided to

⁷⁶ Senate Report 93-1146, September 11, 1974, p. 84.

extend Phase I (implementation) to May 1976 while putting the project into use in 10 schools. The decision was made after study by NIE staff and outside researchers.

But NIE made certain provisions on the extension and continued funding. First, if by May 1976, the end of that school year, RENP was fully implemented, as learned through a formative (intermittent) evaluation, then another 12 months of support was available (total of 18 more months of money). If by May things weren't working, then NIE would stop support at the end of the 1976 academic year. Phase II, as the second year was called, was thus contingent on the successful implementation of Phase I. This form of contingent funding, which has been used by NIE almost from the time it inherited the Anacostia project, was perceived as a way of standard-setting: a way of providing deadlines and benchmarks for project performance. With Phase II, it was indicated that NIE had provided some \$7 million dollars to RENP.

If Phase II were reached, as it was, the budget for 1976 was to be \$2 million, plus another \$.5 million of carryover dollars. Actually, when all calculations and costs were figured, the sum of \$2,257,858 was reached.⁷⁷ In the transition from Phase I to Phase II, there was disagreement between the project and the federal agency as to the control over the second phase. RENP leadership maintained that if, and when, they were able to complete the implementation (Phase I), the next 12 months (or Phase II) would be funded automatically, with no strings attached. NIE argued that when they implemented the project by May, 1976, then the continuation in Phase II was again open to

⁷⁷Memorandum from Lois-ellin Data, July 2, 1976.

scrutiny, with the withholding of remaining dollars possible, should the project components weaken or collapse. NIE prevailed, causing some strain between the project and the Institute, the details of which fall in the final chapter under the Dan Jackson directorship (January 1976 and following).

In December 1974, on the eve of the full implementation of Phase I, the Institute, being consistent in its interest in evaluating and disseminating the results of the Response to Educational Needs Project, determined that the final evaluation of the project would be done, not by the D.C. schools and RENP, as originally planned, but by an outside (third) party, hired by the Institute. The belief was that the parties directly involved would be incapable--and did not have the staff--to carry out a scholarly and adequate research plan.

THE ANACOSTIA EXPERIMENT, 1972-1976: A SUMMARY AND IMPLEMENTATION RESEARCH

A useful way to summarize the development of the Anacostia program is to tie these changes in with the research on implementation. Such encapsulation and further analysis requires that we look at *the nature of change that preceded the creation of the project* (changes in federal outlooks, local structure, and the ideology of a black community). Second, as our history has so graphically shown, our summary of the implementation process, 1969 through 1975, requires that we discuss *the changes in the political environment, or landscape, during this period*: changes in the federal agencies, the D.C. public

schools, and the Anacostia project and staff. And third, we must reckon with the overpowering problems introduced by *the need to coordinate this complex environmental process*--in Congress, the U.S. Office/ National Institute of Education, the public schools, the Anacostia community, and project. And, finally, *the stultifying effects of delay*: the condition in which leaders cannot plan, participants lack confidence that a program will continue, and the morale is shaken by the unending wait for funding, approval of this and that, and the sense that nothing gets done. Delay, in the implementation of RENP, led to frustration, firings, and the inability to hold on to key staff. "At a glacial pace" becomes an exhibition of overstatement?

Change that Led to Change

This chapter discussed the alterations in D.C. schools, federal agencies, and general ideologies (integration, black power, social engineering come to mind) that made the Anacostia project a possibility--though trends do not actually create particular events. These changes occurred at three levels: in federal-to-local relations, the U.S. government had come over a century to the position that it had a large role to play in education. This trend peaked with the implementation of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 1965, the largest piece of educational legislation in the nation's history. Anacostia came out of the same mind set and had some of the same characteristics (laypeople in classrooms, for example).

In internal D.C. school relations, Anacostia benefited from a

number of changes: the ground-work (or grave-digging) had been done with the Model School Division and the Adam-Morgan effort; the impetus came from the growing black majority in the city, its schools, and among its staff and boards; and the rise of black solidarity--sometimes at the cost of integration of school attempts--made the choice of the Anacostia section of D.C. and the freedom given that community a reality.

The Anacostia community itself responded to a project like this one for several reasons: it provided jobs for some 200 laypeople and the opportunity for some direct governorship for again that many--on its many boards. Two important changes had occurred just prior to the project's introduction. The sudden crowdedness of the neighborhood and the schools made the need for a program obvious; second, the fifteen-year shift in the area from integrated black and white to practically all-black. Urban renewal in D.C. shifted the poor into the Anacostia community; but, importantly for the project, many of the middle-class blacks remained, providing a pool of sophisticated people from professional and semi-professional backgrounds to participate--and often to lead--the project.

So, the Anacostia project did not "just happen." Shifts in living patterns, changes in beliefs, and alterations in organizational outlooks all preceded--and made possible--the program.

What does the implementation literature add to this section? Little, I'm afraid, for innovations in education are often treated in research in an a-historical manner. They occur and are analyzed--without sufficient anchoring in the cultural and historical pasts of

the innovation. Thus, in their haste to understand the dynamics of change, scholars ignore the roots of it. My contention is: that research on implementation requires historical study as well. "Failures versus success," "fidelity," and "measured output" replace social and political trends and local culture as key variables. There is, in other words, an effort to treat implementation research in a non-culture bound, non-historical fashion, which explains, I believe, the rather flat, uninteresting, and useless body of research in the field. Pomfret and Fullan seem to totter on the brink of admitting the social, cultural, and historical relatedness of innovations to setting, when they wrote:

It should be clear by now that implementation is a highly complex process involving relationships between users and managers and among various groups of users, in a process characterized by inevitable conflict and by anticipated and unanticipated problems that should be prepared for prior to attempting implementation, and continually addressed during it.⁷⁸

What Fullan and Pomfret fall short of saying is that an understanding of the "highly complex process" may best be understood in a cultural and historical way, though of course social scientists could then move on to survey and analyze a cross section of projects, once the underpinnings in history were understood. Let me suggest LaNoue and Smith's book on the implementation of decentralization as a model. It covered the historical and socio-political background of decentralizing schools, looked at particular cases in five cities, and then, only then, generalized about the phenomenon.⁷⁹ Gross,

⁷⁸Michael Fullan and Alan Pomfret, "Research on Curriculum and Instruction Implementation," *Review of Educational Research* (Winter, 1977), Vol. 47, no. 1, p. 395.

⁷⁹George LaNoue and Bruce Smith, *The Politics of Decentralization* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973).

Giacquinta, and Bernstein, too, devote a chapter in their book on organizational innovation, number four, to "The Climate for Change . . ." which provides background on the experiment: They explain, "In this chapter we have presented a body of evidence that revealed that a very positive external and internal climate for change existed at Cambire, as we had anticipated, just prior to the announcement of the catalytic role model."⁸⁰

Without our knowledge of the "climate," the background, trends, and history of the setting, our understanding of the implementation attempt would be greatly lessened. We hope that this chapter on the Anacostia project's attempt at implementation provided sufficient data on the past, the setting, and the trends to inform the analysis.

Changes in the Landscape During Implementation

This chapter also analyzed the environment in which the project was implemented, the changing landscape in the Anacostia community, the project, the D.C. schools, and the federal groups involved. The period, 1968 to 1976, was one of great shifts at all levels: a change in national administrations, from the height of Democratic liberalism under Lyndon Johnson, to one of great fiscal and social conservatism under Richard Nixon. This change had great implications for a project like Anacostia. Further, the project itself was moved from (and with-in) the U.S. Office of Education, to the new National Institute of Education. Key staff contacts in the federal agencies changed, from

⁸⁰ Neal Gross, *et al.*, *Implementing Organizational Innovations* (New York: Basic Books, 1971), p. 88.

Dr. Stemmler to Mr. Binswanger, and finally, to George Sealy, a black man and former big city principal.

D.C. Schools changed. From a primarily white, centralized administration to one that was more sympathetic--and actually, encouraging, under Ms. Sizemore's superintendency. Staff came and went. The presence of Mr. William Rice, as assistant superintendent, Project Director, and later, as Region I (Anacostia) superintendent, was critical to the survival of the project, for he communicated effectively up the bureaucracy to the central superintendent, down to the building principals, and outward to the Senate, when funding was endangered.

And, of course, the project itself changed. Seven project directors served during the term of our analysis: six of whom came and went during a four-year period. Other staff were moved around as well. Internal structural movements occurred, as the project redefined itself--the office of instructional services became two, under a Director of Reading and a Director of Mathematics, for example, as math was being emphasized. The Anacostia board (main one) remained somewhat more stable, though the many neighborhood sub-boards did see considerable change, as the project leaders tried off and on to secure support through the parental participation component of the program.

Yet another way to understand the changes that occurred during the implementation of the project is to look at such things as purpose and funding levels. Here again, we are left to look almost

primarily at process variables. I would maintain that without data on the entire career of a case, particularly those as changing as the implementation of innovations, we cannot understand what happened--and--what went wrong.

The Coordination of Chaos

The need for synchronization in an unwieldy environment increased as each tier made decisions affecting the others, as funds were requested and approved a various agencies and levels, and as staff were requested, hired, and used. The sheer number of decision-points, of agents involved, and of potential stoppages greatly increased the likelihood of confusion, mis-firings and failure. The best analysis of this, to date, is the research by Pressman and Wildavsky. Though we too would like to be able to tabulate, with precision, the statistical representation of the number of decision points and probability of success, our research on RENP does not even allow that level of certitude. Why, because the number of agencies--over the 10 years of study--with the number of changes would increase the problem quotient exponentially, as Congress, the White House, the various federal agencies, the number of D.C. bureaucrats, and staff change. We could not, in this study, even figure out how to assign numbers to the diverse decision-makers, in their roles, over a long time period.

Just to show what we mean, for example: The community board had to approve a plan submitted to them by the Project Director(s); the decision had to be approved, or at least recognized, by the D.C.

superintendent and board; the proposal went to federal agencies, which made suggestions or, passed off on it. If Congress then was willing to help, and who knew if and when, then the project was funded.

But by the time the word got back to the project with staff requests, people found and hired, placed and trained, many, many months would have passed. And often depending on the environment, the project shifted emphasis, received various amounts of federal funding, and functioned well or less well. Each year, between 1969 and 1975, the effort to get the project organized, to fulfill the demands of the funding agency, and to hire and utilize staff became more difficult, leading to near collapse prior to the rebuilding done under the NIE years. By consulting with, and making demands on, the project, the Institute was able to hammer out a usable project, though the full implementation of this phase must wait until Chapter Four.

Hence, change in the environment--at federal, school district, and community/project levels--made implementation extremely difficult. For stability is vital during innovation. While this may sound like a contradiction, it seems true that new programs, more than others, need the security of sameness of staff, funding, and leadership to allow the dust to settle and new relationships to form.

The research on implementation takes note of this problem. For example, Zaltman *et al.*, Gross *et al.*, Charters and Pellegrin, and Washington,⁸¹ all note the importance of *feedback* during implementa-

⁸¹ See G. Zaltman, Duncan, R., & Holbek, J., *Innovations and Organizations* (Toronto: Wiley, 1973), pp. 70-78; W.W. Charters, Jr., and R. Pellegrin, "Barriers to the Innovative Process: Four Case Studies of Differentiated Staffing," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 1973, Vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 3-14; Gross *et al.*, *Implementing Organizational Innovations*, *op. cit.*; and Washington University, St. Louis, Mo., Center for Educational Field Studies, *An Evaluation of a Project for the Analysis . . .* (ERIC, #ED 054-966, 1970).

tion. Without a steady "reading" from the environment, possible only in a stable surrounding, projects flounder for want of appraisal and guidance. Seymour Saranson calls such feedback from the environment "vehicles of criticism."⁸²

Unfortunately, the bias in educational research away from longitudinal case analysis and toward cross-sectional survey studies robs us of the opportunity to study the development and change in the social-political environment of innovations. Hence, the same criticism I made in the section above--about the lack of historical study--holds true here: in the absence of detailed environmental research over time. It seemed before the new staff could get the new program operational an evaluation would find out, alas, that the project was not implemented and money should be withdrawn (people laid off, programs shut down, and so forth). A few months later, under a different staff, the process would start up again--with the hopes of success.

This cycle of federal/school district/community activity became an ironic reality at the Anacostia project, during the period 1970 to 1976, until things finally stabilized.

Other researchers have written about the problem of coordination. There is no need to state them all now. One might suffice:

... the extent to which an innovation will be implemented as planned depends upon the extent to which users are clear about it, the degree to which they are competent to perform it, whether appropriate materials are available, whether organizational structures are congruent with the innovation, and the extent to which users are motivated. The administration is in turn responsible for insuring the existence of these conditions through the establishment of effective retraining, experiences, and feedback mechanism. Note that this approach assumes relatively high a priori explicitness of an innovation.⁸³

⁸² Seymour Saranson, *The Creation of Settings and the Future Societies* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1972).

⁸³ Fullan and Pomfret, "Research on Curriculum and Instruction Research," p. 378.

And the authors of the above-cited paragraph are talking about relatively self-contained innovation, of the type that classroom teachers and curriculum planners attempt; what would be Fullan and Pomfret's advice to Anacostia leaders when project management include dealings with Congress, the D.C. schools, and a community which is in a position to make its governance felt.

The problem that arises, then, is one of diffuse authority, among federal, school system, and community/staff leadership. No one set of leaders can govern and implement without the others. Yet how does one get all the relevant power brokers in one place long enough to get things done. This ballooning of structure, of authority, created in the implementation of the Anacostia such grand problems of coordination and decision-making that it was any wonder that a program was implemented at all. It was, in fact, the major role of NIE during the later part of negotiations (1975-1976) to provide the center of authority, at NIE, to force more careful planning to occur. Hence, NIE, though with some local resentment, stated a "no-go" without clarity and without approval from the various power sources involved: D.C. schools, Anacostia boards, and NIE itself.

Delay: A Half-Known Risk

Finally, this chapter shows the need for, and the risks of, the delaying of funding and program. It was obviously necessary in 1974-1976, to stop the project in mid-air and to compel a reassessment, new planning, and the emergence of a new project. But mid-stream planning while a project was supposedly operating creates a

scary environment of uncertainty and confusion. Will a new project emerge? What will be my role in it? Will I have a job? Doesn't this reshaping mean that all my prior efforts have failed? Shouldn't I leave and seek employment elsewhere, while I can?

The history of implementation in this chapter ends with replanning and a new project, the Response to Educational Needs Project, a compromise between the closing of the effort altogether (or at least the withdrawal of federal support which likely led to closing) and reshaping it under a new title. The latter was selected, to a great extent because of the fuss kicked up by community members as led by some professional staff at the Anacostia project. But, any redirection is risky. Time undoubtedly will pass. And in the complex setting discussed in the section above, decision-making will be unusually slow and painful. No single actor can decide unilaterally.

And during this extended delay, in our case of over two years, the momentum was lost, staff left, and funds were unspent--all giving the project an aura of failure that would take time to erase. But this was the risk NIE was willing to take.

This chapter, then, has detailed the devolution of the Anacostia project, in its ever-changing environment in Washington, D.C. The following chapter analyzes the period 1976 to 1978, during which, under the leadership of Mr. Dan Jackson, the project was fully implemented.

CHAPTER IV

CYCLE AND CHANGE:

Dilemmas of ImplementationIntroduction

It becomes obvious in this chapter that the Anacostia experiment, between 1968 and 1978, was actually two somewhat distinct programs, held together by an extended period of metamorphosis. We have already described the first cycle, that burst of energy in 1969-1970 when the community of Anacostia, encouraged by such structures as the Ad Hoc Planning Council and the Anacostia Community School Board, began to assert its influence over the hiring and programming in the region's schools. We have also attempted to capture those transition years, from about 1971 through 1975, where constant change, the redefinition of what the project should be and how it would get funded, seemed to paralyze any attempt to continue the innovation. Project Directors came and left--some were only acting while at least one other was located after a national search (Mr. R. Calvin Lockridge); Community Reading Aides were hired and trained, only to be laid off when federal dollars ran low. And attempts to expand the program--to take in other purposes, such as youth services, health programming, staff development, and pre-school education,--were thwarted by the absence of new funds and the drive to put the components into

place. Even some of the well-organized community and neighborhood boards fell idle, without the help of the Parent Community Involvement thrust during the hiatus of 1972-1975.

The second cycle, which began with the replanning and new implementation process, showed very different inclinations. From our data, the efforts of Mr. Dan W. Jackson, Jr., his central staff, and the newly constituted Program Facilitators, Community Reading Aides, Community Mathematics Aides, and Community Organizers seemed to come together in a workable way: i.e., the aides, among other things, relieved the regular classroom teachers, who in turn, went into newly established Reading Centers and Mathematics Laboratories for, what we will call, "on-site inservice education," a form of staff development only now, in 1978-79, being implemented nation-wide through the Teacher Center legislation.

The second cycle ended, in the fall of 1978, when the last of the federal funds ended, and Mr. Jackson was mailed his "pink slip," thus finishing what had been an exciting, though greatly truncated stay in the D.C. schools. Why didn't the community rise up, as they had done in 1972, to yell down federal officials, embarrass Presidents, and mobilize the D.C. school hierarchy? Why had the community leadership, the D.C. school bureaucracy, and the staffers at NIE lost interest and move on to other programs? Why did the school district, in 1978, place the key Response to Educational Needs Project staff throughout the system: Mr. Jackson as principal, Kramer Junior High in the Anacostia area; Ms. Helen Johnson, former head of the reading

component, went to work with the Competency Based Curriculum project, under the Deputy Superintendent for Instructional Services; and Ms. Mary Turner, math director for RENP went to the Region I office?

In this chapter, then, we trace the implementation of RENP, in contrast to the earlier Anacostia Community School Project. We examine the history of this period, through its development and phasing out. Finally, we speculate as to the impact of the project: on the community, the D.C. schools, and on the concept of community-based innovations generally.

New Leadership, New Program

January, 1976, saw the beginning of the long-negotiated and long-planned program, the Response to Educational Needs Project. Daniel W. Jackson, Jr. was hired after a national search and began the work as Project Director--that of strengthening the still existing components while putting into action new parts as yet untried. He inherited the following:

1. *The Anacostia Community School Board*: The central board, under the chairmanship of Mr. Gene Kinlow, had been instrumental in hiring him (Mr. Jackson). It has participated in the negotiations with the federal government on continuation and had filled a major role in administering the project, in light of the weak and changing Project Directors who had worked on the project between 1973 and 1976.

2. *Neighborhood Boards*: Weak and ailing, many of the local boards had ceased to meet during the hiatus. Without attention from the

Parent/Community Involvement staff, these smaller boards had problems with regular meetings, the holding of elections to fill empty slots, and the effective carrying out of their roles.

3. *Community Aides*: Though the project had trained and used reading and later mathematics aides, laypeople from the local communities from 1969 on, the use of these staff had never been fully clarified. Also, many had been laid off during the budget crunch in 1975. There remained a need, then, to define the usefulness of these people and to place them in the schools. New aides were needed, to service the 14 Anacostia school sites.

4. *Management Staff*: With the comings and goings of Project Directors, there was much to strengthen the project's management. Roles of Reading and Mathematics coordinators, head of the Community Organization component, and several new jobs "at the top" of the project needed to be delineated. To prevent the loss of federal funds through managerial confusion, there also was need for stronger fiscal control. Overall leadership was necessary.


5. *In-School Program*: Without good, strong top-down control, the on-site aspects of the project had been weakened. Thus, though the project was committed to the improvement of reading and mathematics instruction in schools, there had not been the stability to carry out the goal. Mr. Jackson, then, was faced with the need to provide staff and program in the Anacostia project schools, 14 in number.

6. *Disseminating the Results*: NIE, during the course of the negotiations, had made it clear that its mission was to provide useful

models of educational improvement that could be used elsewhere. This charge had come repeatedly from Congress and the U.S. Commissioner of Education. So Jackson and NIE had to see that there were data, clarity of program purpose, and outcomes that could be "exported" to other regions of the D.C. schools and other school systems in the United States.

Thus, Jackson and the Anacostia board had their work ahead of them: to mend the wounds of almost four years of confusion, delay, negotiations, and reformulation. It is clear from our data on the term of Jackson's leadership that his strength was that of a manager --one who could make things happen through competency, follow-through, and clarity of purpose. He was not an innovator (a promulgator of wild new ideas); the Lyndon Johnson years of brave new projects for elimination of social problems were over. What Daniel W. Jackson, Jr., brought to the situation was managerial skill. And we know from the study of change that differing phases in change require differing types of leaders: an entrepreneur and charismatic leader to get things going and a systems manager to finish the task.

We return to Neal Gross and his colleagues for a schematic of what a manager of change must (or should) do. By applying the characteristics of this structure to the behavior of Jackson and the staff leadership of RENP, we have a way of presenting the history of the management and implementation of this stage of the project, 1976 to 1978. (See Figure 1, following page.)



Creating a Management System

The first thing Jackson did was to create a full-fledged project, including the filling of key posts in his administration, tightening the lines of authority, insuring that information--and thus accountability--flowed up to his office, and balancing the needs and demands of various sub-systems such as the mathematics and reading components to see that they received somewhat equal treatment. By doing these things, Jackson fulfilled many of the conceptual requirements of Gross and colleagues' notion of good change management. To quote Gross *et al.*: "Our case study suggests the importance of the need for a strategy which includes mechanisms for *effective feedback* between the initiators of the change and those who must implement it, and which maintains efficient problem-solving mechanisms for both anticipated and unanticipated issues

which arise during the period of attempted implementation."¹ Mr. Jackson built a system of feedback in a number of ways.

1. *Personal Meetings*: Mr. Jackson spent a great deal of time during his first few months meeting with and speaking to the staff of Anacostia schools. NIE Project Officer, Mr. George Sealey, attended some of these meetings and provided this researcher with careful records of what transpired. These minutes/site visit reports are a valuable data source and show much about Daniel W. Jackson, Jr.'s strategy for communicating and receiving feedback from the target group in the staff development process.

For example, Jackson appeared at the staff meeting of the Johnson Junior High School and was introduced to the teachers and administrators. He began his talk by explaining that he was new and that he "did not feel responsible for any of RENP's prior history." And despite the project's "somewhat stormy existence," he intended to "see that the project did continue." According to Sealey's notes, Jackson continued by laying out the most important grant "terms and conditions" from NIE as follows (quote):

1. Putting the program in place as described in the proposal.
2. Doing in four months what had not been accomplished in 18 months.
3. Accomplishing probably the most difficult grant term or condition which was a public relations job for parents and teachers.

Jackson made it clear in this meeting with the Johnson Junior High faculty that though RENP was experimental, that participation was "not voluntary but mandatory."

¹ Neal Gross *et al.*, *Implementing Organizational Innovations: A Sociological Analysis of Planned Educational Change* (New York: Basic Books, 1971), p. 215.

Then Jackson laid out the purpose and structure of the project, explaining that the program stressed the "diagnostic, prescriptive, individualized approach with the target change agent group being teachers." The philosophy of the program, then, was explained, according to Sealey's notes:

It is also a staff development program. It is structured this way in the belief that student's achievement will be enhanced by better informed teachers. Teachers should be able to diagnose problems and prescribe remedies. Basic tenets of the program are (1) that local site in-service training is more effective than off-site service training; (2) parents play a significant part in a child's learning and (3) Community Organizers (CO) can muster parental support through information dissemination and perform a referral service.²

Jackson, in this meeting and others, was doing a number of things. He was providing a vital link between those who were to be involved, the region's teachers, and the program. He was, through not only direct presentation but the question and answer period that followed, building a means for feed-back. And he was *clarifying* the project's goals, rules of participation, and intended outcomes to the teachers. And since the school's administration (and George Sealey from NIE) were also there, Jackson was establishing the importance of the project to those who were to participate.

As Figure 1 shows, the use of feedback mechanisms, the clarification of purpose, and the insistence of competence were all vital elements of a successful innovation. In so doing, Jackson was also taking care of a most important element, "motivation." For without the assertion of purpose and clarity, along with ground-rules that explained the "mandatory" role of teachers to RENP, it would have been

impossible to "motivate" the staff (see Grosset *al.* schematic, Figure 1).

2. *Organizational Structure*: Good feed-back is impossible without clear lines of authority. And clear lines of authority exist only when the organization is well structured and all posts are filled.

RENK and its precursor, the Anacostia Community School Project, had suffered from inadequate staff and poor organizational structure. What we mean by poor structure was the absence of clear lines of accountability, from the site, through the on-site supervisors, to the RENK coordinator, and finally to Mr. Jackson himself. Hence, Jackson worked hard to establish a management system, from site to himself, so that feed-back could occur. This system included staff, organized into units (or components), each with some supervisor who reported directly to Jackson.

Building-Level Structure: Since RENK had a multiple function, it had several organizational arrangements in the schools for carrying out its varied mission. *Staff development* was done by the Trainers of Teachers (TOT's, later called Program Facilitators), who were master and tenured teachers in the D.C. schools. He or she was assisted by one to four community aides. This unit performed the on-site staff development in either reading or mathematics. with the following four purposes (quote):

²NIE/RENK Monitor Site Visit Report, Johnson Junior High School, April 8, 1976, p. 2.

1. The diagnostic/prescriptive/individualized approach to teaching Reading and Mathematics is used. Individual profiles are developed for both teacher and student.
2. The RENP Reading and Mathematics programs are designed to complement the existing classroom curriculum.
3. RENP's program is teacher-oriented rather than student-oriented.
4. Teach staff development is on-site and is integrated into the regular school day.³

The role of the Community Mathematics and Community Reading Aides was, primarily to assist the regular classroom teacher when he/she was in the room; and when teachers were in the on-site reading and mathematics centers and laboratories, the aides had full responsibility for the students.

This component at the building level provided the major service to Anacostia teachers, a non-threatening arrangement to improve student skills in math and reading. Since the staff development program was immediately available (right down the hall), and since the staff of the program were not downtown supervisors but rather fellow teachers, the setting was conducive to the improvement of reading and math instruction. By 1976, of course, the notion of team teaching and peer teaching, the basic philosophy of which coincided with that of RENP, was well established in the United States.

The basic concept of peer/team teaching was that isolation in the egg-crate-style classroom cut the teacher off from interaction with other professionals, which led to stagnation, and to an eventual "burn-out"; the remedy was the grouping of professionals for collective growth. (Often, too, the groups comprised, as with RENP, a

³Daniel W. Jackson, Jr., "Seventh Quarterly Report on the Progress and Activities of the Response to Education Needs Project," January 2 to March 31, 1976, pp. 2-4.

master teacher, or "team leader" (RENP called them TOT's and later Program Facilitators), and a number of less experienced staff. Historically, the movement toward team arrangements began in Lexington, Massachusetts, wherein Harvard University and the local school district started the Franklin School Project; the year was 1957. A group of teachers--and their students--were placed into close proximity and involved "a redeployment of staff into closer working relations for the joint instruction of the same group of students."⁴

The idea of teachers working directly with other teachers, for mutual growth and better instruction, got a great boost by a report from the National Association of Secondary School Principals, written by J. Lloyd Trump in 1961.⁵ The so-called Trump Plan advocated a 40-20-40 percent breakdown in time in which students will spend 40 percent of the day in large group instruction by the entire team, 20 percent in seminars, and 40 percent, separate work. The teaching configurations, thus, require that teachers work together, watch, and learn from one another.

It is one simple step from "team teaching" to teachers teaching other teachers, a notion held central at RENP and more recently enacted into a national program by Congress. P.L. 94-482, an amendment to the higher education act, provided that "teachers, with the assistance of such consultants and experts as may be necessary, may--(A) develop and produce curricula . . . ; and (B) provide training to improve

⁴ See a historical account of team/peer teaching in S. Alexander Rippa, *Education in a Free Society: An American History*, 3rd edition (New York: Longman, 1978), pp. 361-65. Good analyses of "team teaching" are found in Judson T. Shaplin and Henry Olds, Jr. (eds.), *Team Teaching* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), Medill Bair and Richard G. Woodward, *Team Teaching in Action* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964).

⁵ J. Lloyd Trump and Dorsey Baynham, *Focus on Change: Guide to Better Schools* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1961).

the skills of teachers to enable such teachers to meet better the special educational needs of persons such teachers serve. . . ."⁶

And, of course, the notion of in-service education for staff has been with us a long time, though my recent survey of research on staff development indicates that most models have failed to improve the quality of instruction, primarily because these professional development approaches tend (1) to treat staff improvement as a personal matter to be met through continued graduate work or workshops of choice; (2) to provide only sporadic work that can easily be overlooked, or just tolerated, by the staff; and (3) to reward the quantity of continued education, not the quality; thus, teachers seek to amass degrees plus hours, rather than cohesive programs and changed behavior.

In a special issue of *Teachers College Record*, for example, Judith Schiffer summarizes the relationship between staff development and organizational growth:

. . . staff-development designs must provide for personal change. However, this in itself will not necessarily result in school renewal; the latter requires that *organizational adjustments be coordinated with person change*. Lack of attention to important organizational factors leads to frustration on the part of persons who are changing, a tendency to revert back to old behaviors, and, ultimately, failure to implement innovations.⁷

Thus, Schiffer advocates a close alignment between the development of the school and the improvement of its staff, one change supporting the

⁶See P.L. 94-482, Section 532.(a)(1), paragraphs (A) and (B).

⁷Judith Schiffer, "A Framework for Staff Development," *Teachers College Record*, September 1978, Vol. 80, no. 1, p. 9.

other. The Anacostia effort to help teachers did not stand alone; it was part of a region-wide effort to improve the schools in Anacostia. The "renewal," a favorite word of staff developers, was occurring concomitantly in both the schools and among the target teachers. The focus of the in-school part of the Anacostia program was the staff; and the project devoted most of its effort toward in-service improvement.

So the basic unit of the project, in the schools, was a teacher trainer, working with regular classroom staff, who were relieved for a few hours per week from duties in order to attend sessions in the labs and centers in each project school. The program itself involved a number of steps, as described by the leadership and confirmed by NIE site visitors:

Teacher Assessment: Before a teacher could be given in-service training, it was necessary to find out what aspects of reading or mathematics instruction needed improving. Called a "Letter of Inquiry," partially to keep it from sounding like a test, the teacher needs-assessment was given to learn what area teachers would like to improve. Next, an interview was held with each teacher; then the teacher was observed, by the TOT, to provide information for future learning plans.

Training Plans: Suggestions were then made for helping each teacher improve his/her math and reading instruction. Often, these plans involved the improvement of use of the methods of the project, particularly the diagnosis, prescribing, and individualization of student instruction. The diagnosis was done for each student, using

the Prescriptive Mathematics and Reading Tests. Also, a whole host of other reading tests were used, including the Phonic Mastery Test, the Botel Word Opposite Test, and several informal reading inventories. Since both prescriptive tests (reading and math) had items indexed to special activities in the Math Labs and Reading Centers, on-site, it was easy for the teachers to see how they were to change their behavior. They were helping actual students, in the labs and centers, while they themselves were learning how to improve their (the teachers') performance.

In-service Education: Once the teachers and students were inventoried, plans drawn up, and materials assembled, the actual in-service education could begin. In January 1976, shortly after Jackson's take-over of Project leadership, the in-service component (math and reading instruction for teachers) was in place in fifteen schools, as part of the Phase I portion of the project. As Table 1 indicates, five schools had *both* reading and math in-service programs; five had only reading; and six, only math.

TABLE 1 <u>In-service Components for Math and Reading in Anacostia Schools</u>	
<i>Reading Schools (N=10)</i>	<i>Mathematics Schools (N=10)</i>
<u>With both:</u>	
Simon	Simon
Birney	Birney
Congress Heights	Congress Heights
Johnson Jr. High	Johnson Jr. High
Ballou Sr. High	Ballou Sr. High
<u>With one:</u>	
Draper	Malcolm X
Friendship	Savoy
Garfield	Green
Moten	Hart
Hendly	Leckie

Additional schools were to be included during the Phase II period: they were McGogney, Patterson, Turner, plus two new junior highs, Hart and Doubllass. Staffing these schools, a problem that had plagued the project since its inception, was completed in each school, with some success. Jackson, with the help of the D.C. schools, had by April 1976 filled a total of 108 authorized positions, including TOT's, Aides, Trainers of Aides, Parent/Community Involvement aides, called Community Organizers. Table 2 shows the distribution of local school staff, by function.

<i>Components</i>	<i>Trainers</i>	<i>Aides</i>	<i>Comments</i>
Reading	10	40 (40)	Four aides per reading TOT
Mathematics	6	12	Shared among 10 sites
Trainer of Aides	3	-	Two in reading area; one in mathematics area
Community Organizers	-	10	One serving two schools on a shared basis
Community Relations Specialists	2	-	These two professionals operate the Information Dissemination and Referral Center (IDRC)

These eighty-three staff members, on-site in schools, were supported by a cadre of staff including the Project Director, assistant directors for Reading, Mathematics, and Parent/Community Involvement. When the project was fully implemented, by the end of 1976, the staffing pattern showed the comprehensiveness of the effort.

Community development, the center of RENP's major goals, was also conducted at the local school level, with supervisory back-up from the RENP managerial staff. Hence, at full implementation, the structure and lines of authority looked as follows: 12 Community Organizers, with 8 support staff including an Associate Director of the Parent/Community Involvement, a coordinator of Community Resources, a Program Assistant, two Senior Community Organizers, and other clerks, typists, and assistants. The function of the community outreach components was explained in this statement on the activities of the P/CI effort:

Specific activities were centered around (a) maintaining a core of parents who are well informed about the RENP operation and other educational issues, (b) effecting workshops with Local School Boards to assist in the interpretation of the Prescriptive Reading/Math Tests, and (c) coordinating the Local School Boards training needs assessment.⁸

Each local school, besides a paid staff, had a local school board which played a role in defining the issues to be handled by the school principal, teachers, as well as RENP staff. In the 11th Quarterly report, Jackson reported on the number of meetings, issues, and participants in these local school board gatherings (see Table 3).

Managerial and Supervisory Levels: Good management--feedback, control, and motivation--depends on the clarity of lines of control: a management system. Jackson constructed in some cases, or improved in others, the organization of the project, from the building level to his office. The project was divided into three parts: Reading, Mathematics, and Parent/Community Involvement. Each had its own hierarchy, its own lines of accountability, and its integrity, though

⁸ Jackson, "Final Report, Response to Educational Needs Project," August 1977, p. 19.

TABLE 3

SUMMARY OF LOCAL SCHOOL BOARD MEETINGS FOR 11TH QUARTER

SCHOOL	NUMBER OF MEETINGS	AVERAGE ATTENDANCE		SIGNIFICANT ISSUES
		BOARD	NON-BOARD	
Congress Heights	3	9	7	Unit task Force, RENP Phase-out, CTBS scores, Region I Testing
Birney	4	14	5	Lunch Program, Student Testing, Transitional 7th & 8th. Grades, RENP Phase-out
16th & Butler *	1	6	6	Local School Board Election (School moved to newly opened Wilkinson)
Savoy	5	5	3	Petition of building concerns and grievances
Friendship	4	11	4	Parental Involvement, By-Laws, School Safety
Ballou	4	22	8	General School Concerns
Hart	2	8	3	School trips; Principal's Report
Malcolm X	3	7	3	IBM Program, Pre-school program, RENP Lab.
Draper	1	8	2	Region I testing, RENP Progress, Title I, Maintenance Problems
Hendley	3	8	18	School Repairs, Support for Acting Principal, Open House Community Forum
Leckie	4	5	4	General School Concerns; School Safety
Simon	3	8	6	School Safety; RENP Progress, Teacher and Student Elections, Board Organization, Removal of Vendors
Garfield	2	7	0	Board Organization, General School Concerns
Green	4	3	4	Local School Board Function, Safety Issues
Wilkinson*	1	15	3	Local School Board Election; Board Organization

*16th & Butler moved to newly opened Wilkinson.

they all fed into Jackson's office, through a complex set of reporting devices to be discussed shortly.

The Reading Component: As we have already explained, this component involved 10 Trainers of Teachers, each working in an Anacostia school. Forty Community Reading Aides, laypeople from the community, worked with these trainers, four per professional. In the line of responsibility, the TOT's were given supervisory tasks over the Community Reading Aides--each trainer setting the schedule and agenda for the week's teacher training.

Three teachers, furthermore, work as Trainer of Aides, rotating among the 10 sites and forty aides, providing instruction in the methods of reading instruction: diagnosis, prescription, and individualized remedies. And at the central office of RENP, three additional staff were provided as directors and support: the Assistant Director of Reading and a full-time secretary, plus a one-half-time clerk-typist, shared with the Mathematics component.

The Mathematics Component: While initially given less attention than the somewhat older Reading component, the Math in-service program was over time given more staff and funding by Jackson. Again, there were Trainers of Teachers, later called Program Facilitators, who numbered six, to be shared among the schools. The one big difference between Math and Reading was the emphasis at the high school level. Due to a grant from the National Science Foundation, the Math Laboratory at Ballou High School was provided with a computer facility, overcoming the problem endemic to the RENP approach at the secondary school: that was, the Math and Reading components were primarily geared

to the elementary level. The use of the computer helped upgrade the level for older students.

Twelve aides in Mathematics were shared among the schools and among the teacher trainers. A secretary was full-time to handle the work of that component for the Assistant Director for Mathematics in the RENP office. And a clerk-typist was shared with the Reading component.

The Parent/Community Involvement Component: Under the rubric of P/CI were several functions, including lay community organizers (12), two supervisors called Senior Community Organizers, and a Program Assistant and Community Resource Coordinator whose job it was to operate the Information Dissemination and Referral Center which kept "abreast of activities and issue affecting the schools and community by regularly receiving information from such organizations and agencies as D.C. School Board, D.C. City Council, Department of Human Resources, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, D.C. citizens for Better Public Education, Inc., Region I Office, D.C. Schools, Police Department, Title I, etc."⁹ Once these data were collated at the Center, the community specialists were able to respond to requests from the community about education and other social services. Another community liaison function which this division fostered, and which was handled by the same staff, was the Business Agencies and Institutions (BAI) unit. Its purpose was build a strong relationship between Anacostia schools (particularly the secondary ones) and the region's businesses.

⁹Jackson, "Seventh Quarterly Report: Response to Educational Needs Project," April 30, 1976, p. 33.

Speakers from business were scheduled; "Student Intern Week" allowed more than 60 juniors in high school to serve in the offices of city councilmen and with heads of city agencies. And during the 1976 summer, 213 students were found summer jobs through the Business Agencies and Institutions unit in nursery schools, shops, print shops, and offices in Anacostia.

But the main purpose of the Parent/Community Involvement effort was to educate a group of laypeople in techniques of community organization and to support these staff in their efforts to relate the schools to the community and community needs to the decision-makers on boards and in educational positions. On a case-by-case basis, the Community Organizers visited the homes of project-related pupils.

The purpose was:

- to build support for community control in the schools
- to locate families who might like to run for office on the neighborhood and/or regional school boards
- to disseminate information about RENP, helping families relay their needs to the schools
- to provide educational services to children, referring them to the appropriate office or person who can handle their problems
- and to increase communication between "school" and "home."

In a memorandum to George Sealey, from one of his site visitors, dated March 18, 1976, we learn of how the liaison functions: A student has been suspended from Hart Junior High, an event about which a Community Organizer (CO) learns from a Trainer of Teachers. The CO made a visit to the student's home, spoke with him and his parent. Discussion centered around his returning to school the next day, his stopping of fighting (the reason he was suspended for three days), and

his failing work. The Community Organizer, according to this report, then:

. . . continued to talk casually with the young man. He had some very strong feelings about his school experiences during the current school year. It seems that his locker has been broken into several times and each time he lost all his notebook paper, clothing, and other items of value to him. After the young man had gotten several things off his chest, the CO returned to the issue of his coming back to school. She asked if he was ready to return, with his mother, and whether he was still set on "getting" the other young man who had provoked him. The Community Organizer said that if the boy was set on revenge, she would not talk with the assistant principal about readmitting him the next day. Unless she had his solemn promise to cease all hostilities and to provide the necessary materials to do his work, she would not intercede for him. He agreed. When the subject of his failing came up, the student felt that he would rather repeat the year than try in March to pull it out. The CO agreed to get him together with the counselor to discuss grades.¹⁰

On return to Hart Junior High, the site visitor noted that the Community Organizer met with the assistant principal concerning the student's disciplinary problem; he agreed to talk with the student and to arrange a meeting with his counselor. The CO then reported to the Trainer of Teachers on the progress of the student.

Thus, working with a single case, the Community Organizer met with the suspended student, his mother, the assistant principal, made an appointment with the guidance counselor, and set the works in motion for the readmission of the student. In a way, the Community Organizers functioned as home-school liaison, social workers, and trouble-shooters. Since problems with urban children so often involve the need for some direct communication with parents, a condition often carried out by teachers and principals in smaller rural and suburban schools, the

¹⁰ NIE/RENIP Monitors Site Visit Report Form, to George Sealey, March 8, 1976, p. 2.

Community Organizers performed a vital function in helping the Anacostia community relate to its schools.

Management and supervision, then, depended on a carefully structured project, with components for reading, math, community assistance, and management, and with the full employment of slots in the hierarchy. The best way to visualize the nature of the Anacostia "organization," if we can call it such, is to cross-tabulate the four *components* (Reading, Mathematics, Parent/Community Involvement, and Project Management) with the four *organizational functions*: Executive Leadership, Supervision, Paraprofessional Help, and Support Services. Using 1976 data, here is the staffing for each function, cross-tabulated with component (see Table 4).

The top leadership function was filled by the heads of the three components, reading, math, and P/CI. Within the management component itself, three top leaders were in charge, including the Project Director, the Associate Director for Management Services, and one for Educational Research and Planning. It was interesting that within "management" there were "managers," a concept not new to industry but one that was later coming in education and particularly "innovative" education. Long ago, President Madison mused that government cannot govern others until it can govern itself. The same may be true of educational services: Until a project can control its own top leadership, how can it possibly provide leadership for its many employees? Thus, the function of the three component heads and the three top leaders (Director and two Associate Directors) was that of coordinating, planning, and directing the functions of RENP.

TABLE 4

Staffing of RENP by Component and Organizational Function (N=108)

<u>PROGRAM FUNCTIONS</u>	<u>PROGRAM COMPONENTS</u>				<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Reading</u>	<u>Mathematics</u>	<u>Community Involvement</u>	<u>Management</u>	
<u>Executive Leadership</u>	1	1	1	3	6
<u>Supervision/Professional</u>	13	6	4	2	25
<u>Aides/Para-professional</u>	40	12	12	-	64
<u>Support Services</u> (secretaries, typists, etc.)	1.5	1.5	3	7	13
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
<u>TOTAL</u>	55.5	20.5	20	12	<u>108</u>

At the supervisory level, 25 TOT's (in-service teacher trainers) and other assorted professionals carried out the major mission of the project. These staff members, besides having line responsibility to their related directors, were also an important part of the direct service: teaching staff, working directly with the community through the Information Dissemination and Referral Center, as Senior Community Organizers, and coordinating the efforts within their school sites. (Later, Jackson had the Community Organizers reporting directly to the Teacher Trainers, giving better on-site supervision of all aides, reading, math, and community organizing.)

A vital part of the effort, in fact, one of the first put into action, was the Community Reading Aides; later, Math Aides and Community Organizers were added, creating a large (64 full-time aides in 1976) unit of para-professionals. Their roles have already been described: the Reading/Math aides worked in classrooms with students, providing coverage when the teachers went into the Math Labs and Reading Center. The Community Organizers functioned as home-school, and project-school liaison. If one compares the number of Reading with Math aides (40 to 12 respectively), it is obvious that the two program components were not given equal treatment. So in 1976, Daniel W. Jackson, Jr., made a special effort to balance the two parts, giving more staff and funds to Mathematics. Ideally, the project should have reached about 80 to 100 aides, with 40 to 50 per component. But since the aides required supervisory relations, it was also necessary to hire additional Math TOT's to work with the Community Math Aides, at an even greater expense. The Project Director managed to balance the two projects by

1977 when the Reduction in Force occurred, though it was not clear how long the balance could be maintained without large sums of outside funding.

Finally, RENP had a cadre of support staff--clerks, secretaries, typists, and receptionists--to handle the office for the project. As to be expected, the "management" or Executive Leadership component had the largest number of support staff, seven in all, while the Reading (1½) and Math (1½) and P/CI (3) had fewer. RENP had its own office, apart from the school's and Region I superintendent's. These staff were located there, working directly with the component heads for Reading, Math, P/CI and Management. This separation from the school district officialdom gave Jackson and his staff more freedom, though it also, inevitably, led to some distrust about what went on out there.

Building Organizational Infra-Structure

But the hiring of staff, the organization of employees into divisions, and the building of a hierarchy are not enough. There must be an effort to build a system of interaction, a means by which specialists in the organization know what others are doing and can fashion their behaviors in light of others' expectations. Project Director Dan Jackson, then, had the job of providing ways by which his highly divided staff could work together. This division, as we have shown, was both functional *and* geographic: among the sixteen to twenty school buildings and the central office of RENP; and among the various components such as Reading, Mathematics, and Parent/Community Involvement,

not to mention the Management component itself. Furthermore, since RENP was conceived as a community-school district effort, the dispersion of power included both professional, lay, and community people. Thus, the necessity for an organizational infra-structure was increased by the full-staffing and elaborating of program components. When the immediate *RENP staff* (108 in number in 1976) were considered in relationship to the 195 public *school teachers* in RENP schools, the 4,356 *target pupils*, and the related *school principals, assistant principals*, and Region I *administrators*, the size of the RENP enterprise had become large and significant, making feedback and communication critical.

How did Project Director Jackson and his staff bring all these people into the act?

THE UNIT TASK FORCE: In each target school, a Unit Task Force was created, a planning group which "interprets and adopts the RENP Reading, Mathematics, and Parent/Community Involvement programs to meet the instructional needs of that school."¹¹ On the task force were representatives of the parents, students, counselors, local school boards, as well as RENP building staff. In their once-per-month meetings, this group were charged with the responsibility of seeing that the program was implemented. The primary job of calling meetings and chairing them fell to the school principal, who saw to it that each school had its own ideosyncratic task force plan for the school. The plan included (1) a listing of task force members, (2) a profile of

¹¹ Jackson, "Seventh Quarterly Report," p. 9.

students and staff involved, (3) objectives for reading and mathematics, and (4) using the diagnostic/prescriptive approach, school-wide objectives in both the cognitive and affective domains, as well as for the community involvement component of RENP. Finally, a time chart was included in the task force plans--one that ordered the events necessary to carry out the proposal.

MESHING WITH OTHER AVAILABLE SERVICES: Since RENP was one of many educational programs available to Anacostia schools, Jackson wished to bring his project in close working relations with others' services, including ESEA Title I, Right-to-Read, Follow Through, Career Education, etc. In a series of meeting between component heads (Reading, Matr. Community Involvement) and Directors of other programs, leadership worked on services that were to be shared, on goals which they had in common, and the correlation of planning and activities in the future. In particular, Jackson's report explained:

More directly, it was determined that a large number of students who have been a part of the Nicholas Avenue Follow Through program now attend Savoy Elementary School. An effort is being made to identify former Follow Through students who are now participating in the RENP program, to determine how their progress in the RENP compares with that of students in the traditional classroom setting.¹²

Within each target school, the integration of RENP methods with school programs was attempted through individual conferences: profiles were discussed, plans generated, and methods discussed. On February 1, 1976, a "meshing formula" was completed by the Assistants to the Direc-

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 15.

tor for both Reading and Mathematics and were forward to NIE. These goal statements served several purposes: it saw to it that RENP was supportive of, and not duplicating, the already existing programs in Anacostia. It also gave direction to the RENP staff, particularly the teacher trainers and aides who worked most closely with the teachers.

COORDINATING RENP ACTIVITIES: The most constant working unit in the project was at the school level: the TOT's, Aides, Community Organizers, and the target teachers. This group of paid staff, furthermore had the Local School Board, and the related community/parent group to relate to. Weekly meetings among the professional/paid staff were held, including aides, CO's, and the Trainers of Teachers for Math and Reading, where both were present in a single school. At these gatherings, educational and social problems among students were discussed: students who were having home problems among students were discussed: students who were having home problems were referred to the Community Organizers; teacher concerns were brought up and dealt with, by the aides and TOT's for the particular subjects.

It was also the task of the Community Organizers to relay information to the parents and community: issues of problems with discipline, shortages of supply, damages to facilities. Often too, school professionals would use the pipeline to the Anacostia Community School Board, Region I, to get the "message" downtown to the central office of the D.C. schools.

But, by far, the most common activity in the Response to Educational Needs Project was the "delivery" of the in-service training

itself, involving interaction between the Trainers of Teachers, later renamed Program Facilitators, and the Region's classroom teachers; between the Aides and the teachers; and between the project staff and some students. For though RENP was *not* conceived as a direct service to area students, in fact, from our data it became clear that more and more students were being helped *directly* in the Reading Centers and Mathematics Laboratories. It became obvious, one assumes, that the Labs and Centers worked better when there were students actually using the materials, taking the tests, and learning from the in-service educational process. (A good analogy would be the presence of patients in "teaching hospitals" allowing interns and residents, as well as advanced fellows, to learn by doing--with real, sick people.)

The key interactions were as follows:

••• Between TOT's and Teachers In the Labs and Centers, the in-service education was to occur as teachers in Anacostia schools received help with their reading and mathematics instruction. Initially, each target teacher received a self-assessment, called the "Letter of Inquiry," which was later to be supplemented with other evaluation tools. Included were the "Inventory of Teachers' Knowledge of Reading," an instrument recommended by the International Reading Association. In math, a newly design tool (by the Directory of Mathematics-RENP) was to be administered to test teachers' understanding of a wide range of mathematical concepts. It was field-tested on non-RENP teachers and improved.

• But testing teachers was no simple act. Many refused to take

them. Meetings were held with area staff, the Washington Teachers Union, and RENP leaders. Once, it became clear that the results were for use by TOT's only--not to be handed over to the principals and other teacher supervisors--, the Union agreed. Some members held out, refusing to participate, maintaining that they didn't need "training." (The term reminded them of training pets.) The sense conveyed by the term also was an ipso facto indication of incompetence, to many teachers interviewed. After several meetings with teachers, it was made clear that RENP was a complement to existing supports for teacher improvement, not a supplanting of them. RENP was an effort to "facilitate" change and improvement, not force it. It was at this point, early in Dan Jackson's tenure in office, that the name Trainer of Teachers (TOT) was changed to Program Facilitator, to capture a shift in outward intent, and to make the medicine less bitter for teachers.

Once the teachers realized that they were to be helped, not tested and reported on, the process of staff assessment began. And, of course, without some form of assessment, it would have been difficult for the in-service component of RENP to function. It gave the Program Facilitators the opportunity to work with the teachers, beginning at points where the professionals were weakest.

At the same time, the Reading and Mathematics Aides (Instructional Aides, as they were called generically) prepared profiles for each student in the target teachers' classes, using the Prescriptive Reading Test (PRT) and the Prescriptive Mathematics Test (PMT). This testing, keyed to separate computational and reading skills, again complemented the existing city-wide tests which each student took

periodically. The difference was, however, that the Prescriptive tests (PRT and PMT) examined separate, disaggregated skills on a criteria referenced basis,¹³ rather than, as the standardized examinations did, the amassing of district-wide and nationally normed tests. The former (PRT/PMT) told one much about each child's deficiencies; the latter, much about the entire system's status, *vis-à-vis* other urban schools and all children taking the test across the country. The former were useful in helping individual students; the later, for setting overall policies.

With teacher needs and pupil profiles completed, conferences were held to set a personal plan for staff development for each teacher: incorporating the teachers' course of study, facilities from the labs and centers, and particular skills to be improved through close relations between Program Facilitators and the target staff. Three hours per week were scheduled in the on-site setting for workshops, individual work, and demonstrations, while the Instructional Aides

¹³In a debate between Robert L. Ebel and W. James Popham over Criteria versus Norm referenced testing, the major differences seemed to be those of specificity and usefulness in local settings, much as was discussed here above. Popham thrusts: "Since the major strength of a well-constructed criterion-referenced test is its sharpened descriptive quality, this problem [of weak descriptive power] is eliminated. The second deficit of norm-referenced achievement tests was that they failed to provide adequate instructional targets because of imprecise descriptions and an insufficient number of times per measured behavior." Ebel parries: "if pupil achievements are going to be judged ultimately in relative terms, why not judge them in relative terms immediately? And if the judgments are to be relative, items that most pupils answer correctly have little to say about relative amounts of achievement." See W. James Popham, "The Case for Criterion-Referenced Measurements," and Robert L. Ebel, "The Case for Norm-Referenced Measurement," *Educational Researcher*, Vol. No. 11 (December 1978), pp. 7 and 5, respectively.

remained in the regular classrooms to work on many of the same skills of reading and mathematics. Aides knew what to do, since they spent the week as an aide in the classrooms, helping the regular teacher. Regularly, too, the Instructional Aides would take their pupils into the Math Labs or Reading Centers, once the teacher, aide, and pupils had covered the same set of skills. Thus, the in-service educational program grew out of the needs of staff and students and were attended to by all--not just the teacher in a graduate course or workshop which were often unrelated to pupil needs and weaknesses.

Together, the teachers, Program Facilitators, with help from the RENP leadership, worked on the improvement of math and reading: in particular, in math, on techniques for classroom management, systems of numeration--place value, decimal system, expanded notation, with some extra work in computer programming in BASIC and BASIC Plus; in reading, again classroom management was important, along with word recognition skills, comprehension, work attack, syllabication; and questioning skills. At the secondary school level, it was determined to help not only math and English teachers, but related fields like science, social studies, and history as well. So project-related teachers were selected randomly, not by subject field. In the elementary schools, teachers usually taught several courses of study, and therefore directly benefitted from better reading/math teaching skills.

...Between RENP and Students

As the project matured, between 1975 and 1977, it gradually became more and more involved with the cognitive needs of Anacostia area students, though the project was never organized to handle large numbers, on a

regular basis. The RENP on-site, in-service model was intended to reach students through their teachers, in far larger numbers and for longer periods of time than a student-by-student approach. Right-to-Read, and other programs were better equipped to tutor and teach youngsters.

That is not saying that RENP ignored students. Not at all, for the major educational goal was "improving the reading and mathematics achievement levels of students a concentrated staff development program for teachers and through active parental and community participation in educational programs and issues."¹⁴ The large majority of students were reached "indirectly," through their teachers' improvement in reading/math instruction. A fair number, however, were ushered into the labs and centers regularly, for help with reading and math. Since all students in target classrooms had already had a Prescriptive Math or Reading Test, depending on the staff development regimen of his/her teacher, it was then easy to begin working with the students on the basis of educational need. In fact, some students, observed by this researcher, had become so involved with the Diagnosis/Prescription/Individualization approach that they knew, from their PRT/PMT scores, which were "keyed" to the learning activities in the labs and centers, which activity to perform next.

...Between Families and RENP Finally, at the school level the project was conceived and implemented to bring the families into the educational process. This ran counter, as we discussed earlier, to the trend in American education away from

¹⁴Final Report, p. 1.

lay control toward the professionalization of schooling. School-level parental and community involvement was attempted in a number of ways, with one single model becoming predominant. First, parents were elected to *Local School Boards*, one for each school in the Anacostia project. Each board had its own by-laws, Unit Task Force representation, a 1 representation on the regional Anacostia Community School Board. Further, announcements and concerns were sent to the *Information and Dissemination Center* for putting out a monthly "Calendar of Events," informing residents and parents of what resources and programs were available in the area. The center was also available to answer questions; according to RENP data, the center received 1,119 requests from parents concerning job training, legal aid, youth employment, RENP operations, regional information, drop-out prevention assistance, needy family services, and community agencies available in the area. Table 5 shows the breakdown of how parents made contact with RENP.

TABLE 5	
<u>Mode of Communication: Inquiries to RENP Through the Information Dissemination and Referral Center from Anacostia Parents, Jan. '76 - June '77</u>	
Referrals by:	Number
Telephone	274
Walk-in	126
Community Organizers	436
Community Agencies	40
Other	<u>243</u>
Total requests for information	1,119

Third, the *P/CI component* carried on formal activities to engage the families in each school. These included:

- A complete computerized mailing list of all parents was amassed, allowing the project to mail information on RENP directly to each parent who had a child in the project.
- Home visits to each family were made, making personal the aims of the program.)
- Community Organizers selected 100 target families for more intensive interaction (if a CO had two schools, he/she picked 50 families from the two school sites). The nucleus was provided with special information, as an experiment in grass-roots community-building.
- During the summer of 1976, at seven school sites, seven Parent/Community Summer Forums were held. In the fourteen hours of workshops, these parents and community people learned about the purposes of RENP, about ways of helping children with their reading/mathematics, and about problems in the community.
- Each Local School Board was supported and serviced by the Community Organizers in the schools: the CO's provided information on meetings, duties, issues, and ways of improving the school-community relationship. Help included work on by-laws, agendas for meetings, preparation of correspondence, record and minute keeping, and technical assistance for each local school group.

All of these efforts, each operating in separate schools with varying groups of parents and community members, fed into the region-wide Anacostia Community School Board--the only board of community people that was given total authority in the D.C. schools over personnel recommendations, programs, and budget. Thus, the power of the family, in its relationship to RENP, was heightened by the vested

authority of the school boards locally and the Anacostia board regionally. These forms of involvement were made real by the Memorandum of Understanding between the Community Board and the School Board of the District of Columbia, the foundation signed into practice on November 26, 1973 (and which expired the end of August, five years later, 1978).

The approved Agreement began with a careful delineation of what the Anacostia Common School Board could *not* do: including "directly submitting a budget to Congress, negotiating contracts . . . creating its own Board of Examiners," and making rules and operating procedures which were contrary to D.C. codes.¹⁵ The memorandum went on to explain the role of the Anacostia board and its relations to the D.C. system. Included were:

--The Anacostia board would operate the Anacostia School Division in cooperation with the D.C. board and central office staff, functioning through the Assistant Superintendent for Region I (Anacostia).

--"The Division will be operated within a framework of decentralization and community control affecting" many programs at various levels.

--"The Board [ACSB] will establish policy for planning, evaluating proposals, and proposal submission procedures for the division." Also, planning and evaluating will be done by the Anacostia board.

--"The Board will be responsible for all Division personnel." Applicants will be screened and hired by the Board, as long as funds from governmental sources are involved.

--"The Board will determine priorities for the expenditures of all governmentally funded programs in the project area concerning Division schools."

--"The ACSB will be able to receive *directly* educational funds from funding agencies and foundations . . . provided that complete accountability is established," and

--"The ACSD will retain its identity as the Anacostia Community School Division under any decentralization plan of the D.C. schools."

¹⁵See "Policy Agreement for the Administration of the Anacostia Community School Division," November 26, 1973, pp. 5-6.

In particular, the tasks of the community board were to establish policy relations with the D.C. board, with the Assistant Superintendent, and with all local boards. Procedures will be developed by the board, according to the Agreement, for reviewing the progress of the programs, for the implementation of proposals, and for their evaluation. An annual report will be submitted by the regional superintendent to the board and to the public. And in the area of fiscal responsibility, the Anacostia board was to be involved in the whole process of setting, approving, and implementing the budgets for the Division from all sources, including \$1,000 yearly for Anacostia board elections.

This document, which has expired as of August 31, 1978, was clearly the bedrock on which the Anacostia Community School Project/Response to Educational Needs Project rested. It acted as a kind of *Magna Carta* for the community, giving great influence and control over schools to the board. Furthermore, the document spelled out the nature of the delicate relations among key groups: the community, the board, the Assistant Superintendent, the D.C. board, and funding sources like Congress and foundations. Without it, the likelihood of the long history of community involvement would have been slim. It gave a legitimacy, a sense of structure, and a set of working rules for the self-governance of the program, one that had the force of law and contract.

Jackson's First Six Months: A Rhetrospective

Between January 1, 1976, and the end of the school year, Daniel Jackson, Project Director of RENP, had done what no leader had been able to do: to establish the community involvement, reading, and mathematics

parts of the project, building most importantly a management system to implement and govern these programs. As we have just shown, he was able to organize the divisions of the program--management, Parent/Community Involvement, Reading, and Math, all around the central concept of on-site staff development as a means of helping Anacostia pupils to improve their reading and mathematics. He was able to staff these components, having in place 108 people hired by the end of the third month of his administration (recall the slowness of the civil service regulations controlling hiring in the D.C. schools). And importantly, he had worked to establish mechanisms for interaction, between supervisors (Program Facilitators and Assistant Directors for Reading, Math, and Parent/Community Involvement) and staff in the schools (Instructional Aides and Community Organizers), between community and program (Information and Dissemination Center, for example), and between project and the D.C. schools. For ultimately, he explained, the implementation of RENP was a human relations problem (once the basic organizational restructuring had been accomplished).

One is struck, by the end of the 1976 school year, with two impressions. First, had Jackson come along earlier, had he been able to organize the project and implement it sooner, before the \$7 million was used up, the project would have been so much more important as an example of urban educational innovation. But, he was administering a project with a two-year life. Once Phase I was completed (NIE's first-year requirement for the implementation of the 62 grant stipulations), he had only Phase II, another year to complete and disseminate the experiment.

* Second, at a more microscopic level, using site visit reports, one is also impressed with the problems that any new project encounters. That is to say, no matter how well organized a program is, it still has difficulties in delivering the services intended. The shortcomings of the project can be summarized as follows:

1. *The Lack of Coordination and Timing:* With many program sites, staff, and purposes, it was inevitable that coordination would be a problem. Site visitor after site visitor noted the "wanton waste of time and a well-equipped facility"¹⁶ when schedules did not mesh. One observer found on a stop at the Johnson Junior High School:

The lab manager was in the lab alone. It seems that the teachers had on very short notice cancelled their periods. During the sixth period one teacher cancelled for what she indicated were "disciplinary reasons." No further explanation was given. The other teacher cancelled stating that because of classroom activities the lab session was "not needed."

The visitor had other specific concerns, including the lack of overt help from the school's principal who had not himself visited the Mathematic Lab in quite a while, and the seeming unwillingness of RENP to investigate the problems of implementing the program at this school.¹⁷

Similar problems of coordination seemed to exist with regard to the students' arrivals at the labs and centers. At Hart Junior High, another site examiner found these problems:

1. "When the students arrive, there seems to be little foreknowledge on the part of the TOT's as to which children are going to be sent."
2. "The TOT has only a general information as to what is going on currently in the teacher's classes prior to the students' arrival in the Lab."

¹⁶NIE/RENP Monitors Site Visit Report, March 18, 1976, p. 1.

¹⁷NIE/RENP Monitors Site Visit Report, March 23, 1976, p. 1.

3. "The selection process used by teachers to determine which students are sent to the lab is not worked out mutually with the TOT."
4. "The teacher sent some students and kept others; there was only an inkling of what they were doing in his class; and some students were retained by the teacher--for reasons known only to him."¹⁸

Since we do not have on-going data on the levels or continuation of these kinds of problems, it is difficult to know how many of these problems were solved. And of course, similar observations in any group of classrooms would likely show the difficulty of providing a high-quality education on any given day.

2. *Poor Pedagogical Practices*: Under the scrutiny of the outside observer, some in-class procedures appeared problematic. For example, one reviewer noted the "materials for the culminating activity were probably selected in haste from one of those ready-prepared exercises without a great deal of tailoring to the specific needs of either the class or the teacher." Or, "at the conclusion of the lesson, because the classes were about to change, there was little or no time for the teacher and the TOT to confer about what had occurred." Even, the report continued, "The teacher and the TOT also appeared to be working at cross purposes" (teacher wanted a show of retention of facts; the TOT, instead, was interested in skills).

3. *Personal Problems*: And, as with any social undertaking, RENP ran into (or, perhaps, brought to the surface) a number of problems which were bothering members of the target faculties. Perhaps, under the pressure for change that a program like RENP generated, the problems

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

that had lay dormant became active again. Take this comment by a site visitor to a school:

The monitor accompanies the TOT to a teacher conference. As it developed, the teacher with whom we met was so concerned with what he considered to be his very precarious standing with the school administrator that very little was accomplished by way of planning a mathematics program. The monitor's presence seemingly provided him with an audience to which he could tell his tale of woe.¹⁹

But the site visitors are not our only source of information on the operation of RENP during the period, 1975. Built into the project itself was a formative evaluation, to be done at the conclusion of Phase I--in fact, as a precondition for the continuation of the program. The contract went to Richard Gibboney Associates, a Philadelphia-based consulting firm. Gibboney and Associates investigated, in particular, the degree to which the three parts of the program were working: Reading, Math, and Parent/Community Involvement, studying, in particular, thirty of the original 62 grant terms and conditions, as shown in Table 6. It is not possible, or even necessary, to assess the *Formative Evaluation* at this point. Needless to say, for the historian, it provides some interesting information; but since it is highly concerned with the process of the program, it has some serious limitation. From these data, however, we do learn a great deal about the operation of RENP as of the end of the 1976 school year. Of the 30 items, 16 were completely implemented, prior to or during the administration of Project Director Dan Jackson, or 53 percent. While the evaluation provides an item-by-item breakdown, the version which I examined made little of the overall outcomes. How many "partial"

¹⁹ NIE/RENP Site Visitor Report Form, March 18, 1976.

TABLE 6

Summary of Formative Evaluation, RENP--1976²⁰

<i>Grant Term/Condition</i>	<i># of Criteria</i>	<i># Met</i>	<i>Level of Implementation</i>
MATH COMPONENT (12 items):			
1. <u>Used existing diagnostic instruments?</u>	1	all	Yes, Prescriptive Math Test.
2. <u>Stabilized program in 10 schools/students?</u>	5	2-all; 3-some	Partially
3. <u>Stabilized, 10 schools, for teachers?</u>	3	2-all; 1-some	Partially
4. <u>Meshed skill development & applications?</u>	2	all	Yes
5. <u>Integrated RENP into school program?</u>	2	all	Yes
6. <u>Staff assessed (Community Math Aides)?</u>	5	all	Yes
7. <u>Students assessed?</u>	4	3-all; 1-some	Partially
8. <u>Enabling objectives used?</u>	1	all	Yes
9. <u>Needs of students met?</u>	2	all	Yes
10. <u>Existing materials used in labs/centers?</u>	1	all	Yes
11. <u>Unit Task Force completed planning/math?</u>	6	all	Yes
12. <u>Teacher performance assessed?</u>	4	2-all; 2-some	Partially
READING COMPONENT (12 items):			
1. <u>Used existing reading curriculum?</u>	1	all	Yes
2. <u>Used existing diagnostic instruments (PRT)?</u>	1	all	Yes
3. <u>Staff (aides) assessed?</u>	5	all	Yes
4. <u>Teachers assessed?</u>	4	2-all; 2-some	Partially
5. <u>Integrate RENP into school program?</u>	2	all	Yes
6. <u>Skills and application meshed?</u>	2	1-all; 1-some	Partially
7. <u>Students assessed?</u>	4	3-all; 1-some	Partially
8. <u>All student needs met?</u>	2	all	Yes
9. <u>Enabling objectives used?</u>	1	all	Yes
10. <u>Unit Task Force plans (math) completed?</u>	6	all	Yes
11. <u>Stabilized program for children?</u>	5	5-some	Partially
12. <u>Operational for teachers?</u>	3	1-all; 2-some	Partially
PARENT/COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT COMPONENT (6 items):			
1. <u>Milestones established for implementation?</u>	5	2-all; 3-some	Partially
2. <u>Community Organizers assessed?</u>	6	5-all; 1-some	Partially
3. <u>Local/Anacostia board member profiles</u>	2	none	Little
4. <u>Business/institutional relations made?</u>	4	2-all; 2-some	Partially
5. <u>Community referral service established?</u>	2	all	Yes
6. <u>Unit Task Force plans made for P/CI?</u>	2	in some schools	Partially

implementations mean "complete" or "incomplete?" So while the criteria, observations, and outcomes were assiduously gathered and analyzed, it was hard to tell what it all added up to.

We can tell, however, that among the three components, the Parent and Community Involvement effort seemed least well established. Of the six items, including the establishment of milestones, assessment of Community Organizers, profiles of Local and Anacostia board members, relations with business/industry, community referrals, and Unit Task Force plans, only the referral service was fully implemented in 1976.

We know, then, that the professionally controlled areas, under the watchful eye of the school principals, teachers, and Program Facilitators, the Reading and Math components were greatly set up. For example, the Reading component's 12 terms and conditions were fulfilled in 8 cases, according to Gibboney's report, with the remaining being partially implemented. (Even the partials were in the main tilted in favor of implementation (see items 3, 7, and 12, Table 6.) Likewise, the Math component saw 7 out of 12 conditions fully met; the remaining 5 were in the main met, except for item 12 which was one criterion met but two, not met.

The less professionally controlled area, the Parent/Community Involvement one, was more problematic. The difficulty of getting the many local and central Anacostia boards elected, profiles made up on each of them, and their work begun is captured by the Gibboney Formative Evaluation Report. To illustrate how the criteria work and the contrast between Reading/Math where implementation was greater and

and the community part where it was somewhat less, let us take two Terms and Conditions, one from Reading and one from Parent/Community Involvement.

Here we shall present the original wording of the goal, the criteria for evaluating the goal (in shortened form), and the outcomes (in shortened form).

Item 4 (reading): Teachers Assessed:

"By February 1 [1976], almost all (estimated 171) will have been assessed for their strengths and weaknesses in teaching reading. An individual teacher's learning plan will be developed, showing what activities will be undertaken to bring teachers close to 100% competency. By March 1, most teachers will have been trained. With regard to their reading activities in the classrooms, they will know what they are doing in reading, why they are doing it, and show high levels of competency in implementing activities."

For this item, there were 4 criteria, including these:

1. *RENIP will develop competency criteria which are logical, specific, and understood.*
2. *Assessment will have been completed effectively on almost all teachers.*
3. *Training will be completed, using theory, application, demonstration, involvement, interaction, observation, and evaluation by the Trainers of Teachers with the teachers.*
4. *Teachers themselves will show awareness, demonstrate competency, and have positive attitudes toward their continued instructional improvement.*

Each criteria demanded a different research method, explained below:

1. Competency Criteria: Researchers reviewed the criteria; it is unclear as to the behavioral qualities for this part, though the existence of competencies may be sufficient.
2. Teacher Completion: Instruments were reviewed, TOT files scrutinized, and weekly reports studied. Again, it is hard to tell what a successfully assessed teacher looked like.
3. Teacher Training: TOT files were examined; 24 training sessions (19 on theory, feedback, and planning/5 on demonstration lessons) were observed by researchers, using a subsample of 36 percent of the

target teachers. Again, personal judgment about the success of these sessions was necessarily used, though there were clear referents for the behavior: sessions were held.

4. Teacher Feelings:

The impact of the sessions and program were studied through interviews with teachers, principals in all 10 schools. Teacher trainer reports were also studied. These psycho-social data on impact on staff lacked statistical specificity, though there was clear indications that teachers/principals were reacting to the program.

Finally, the research for the Formative Evaluation produced *results* or "evidence," as the report showed. But the document lacked details, for it stated only that the outcomes were favorable or unfavorable, as follows:

Criterion 1: Competencies:

The listing of the competencies showed that indeed they did exist; criterion 1 met.

Criterion 2: Assessment:

Letters of Inquiry, assessing understanding of project were sent to 115 target teachers; conferences were held with teachers; observations by TOT's with teachers; reports compiled; plans made. Here, the report becomes complex, since some TOT's had many more teachers to supervise, in more than one school. The results were mixed, as this quote from the report indicated:

"Specifically, of the 41 teachers with whom evaluators have interacted, 22 would have to be judged from their own statements in training sessions to be at the most rudimentary levels in relation to RENP's competency criteria."²¹

Criterion 3: Training:

Twenty-four teacher training sessions "clearly demonstrated high quality training in accordance with the criteria." Though the results, again, are highly subjective, it does appear that after one has seen a number of teaching sessions, the good and bad ones become apparent. A bit of hard data might be more convincing, however.

Criterion 4: Perceptions:

A positive attitude toward RENP was noted in these interviews with principals and target teachers. But since there were no pre-training data on attitudes and competence, it was difficult to determine real growth, though again if the majority of teachers come up to a minimum, training and contact must have changed their minds and abilities somewhat.

²¹ Formative Evaluation, p. 52.

It was clear from this research, by Gibboney Associates, that much progress had been made, though we cannot tell exactly how much. At any rate, a Reading program *for teachers* had been established and executed. The very presence of teachers, undergoing staff development, must be seen as a sign of success, given the eight prior years of the Anacostia project where some or no programs were available for this purpose.

When the Parent/Community Involvement example is juxtaposed, however, the outcome is slightly different. For example, in assessing the Community Organizers, item 2 under P/CI (see Table 6, p. 263), five of the criteria were met, one was not. Here again, we state the item verbatim, give the criteria, the methods, and, finally, the results.

Item 2 (community): Staff Assessed:

"By February 1, all P/CI staff will be assessed. Incompetent staff will be dismissed. By March 1, others will have received intensive training to bring them up to speed. Each Community Organizer will know clear what his/her role is, why they do what they do, and will demonstrate high levels of competency in their activities. By April 1, 1976, they will be recognized by parents, school, and staff as an integral part of the schools, functioning with unique duties contributing directly to the children's achievement."

For this item, 6 criteria were used, including:

1. *Community Organizers will be assessed.*
2. *Incompetents will be dismissed.*
3. *Training plans will be set and implemented.*
4. *CO's will know their role and will operate competently.*
5. *CO's will be recognized by school and community people*
6. *CO's will contribute to pupil achievement.*

These criteria require various methods, including:

1. Assessment Criterion: Folders were examined to see whether CO's had been assessed; but no clear method is presented to indicate the level of accomplishment. Was it possible to have a fully, somewhat, or non-existent assessment?
2. Dismissal Criterion: The Project Director, Mr. Jackson was interviewed. He was able to say who had been fired.
3. Training Criterion: Interviews were held with each CO. Little is mentioned about the nature of the interview or the range of the outcomes.
4. Role Criterion: CO's were interviewed; but no guidelines for analysis of outcomes are provided.
5. Recognition Criterion: A sample of parents, board members, and principals were interviewed; no criteria for recognition presented.
6. Achievement Criterion: Daily CO activities were monitored (2 days each); CO's were interviewed to see how they perceived their contribution to the achievement of students. But no direct link between CO actions and student outcomes was possible.

Finally, the report told of the outcomes of this inquiry, indicating that criteria 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 were met. Hence, *outcomes* were:

Criterion 1: CO Assessment:

From a review of folders and discussion with staff, it was evident that all CO's were assessed. But the level of assessment was not presented.

Criterion 2: Dismissal:

The research showed that staff were reduced in December and January, with the remaining judged competent. No exact numbers provided.

Criterion 3: Training:

From interviews, it was learned that the training program from CO's had not been implemented (lack of sufficient money was in part to blame). One particular skill that CO's needed, and desired, was that of report-writing. Hence, implementation was not complete in this category.

Criterion 4: Role Awareness:

Defining their role as "liaison between community and the schools," the 12 Community Organizers seemed aware of their task. The 4 CO's who were sampled, through monitoring, in a more in-depth way, seemed to have internalized the concept of their role. No precise measures of role awareness were offered in the Formative Evaluation, however.

Criterion 5: Recognition:

In every case, except one, the Community Organizers were recognized as available resource, by both school administrators and community/parents sampled.

Criterion 6: Achievement:

Monitors observed CO's working with students and families. CO's were involved with program development (for sex education, for example). But the nagging problem of linking these behaviors to improved academic/social achievement of children remains. Few research designs are effective in teasing out the particular impact of a single part of a total educational program: in-school, extra-curricular, home-school liaison, not to mention the unknowable role of genetic and socio-economic factors. We cannot fault the Gibboney Report for failing to make this connection; no one to date has been able--even James S. Coleman's massive study--to relate school/home/social factors to learning.

So while the Community Organizer criteria above show strong indications of implementation--and give us a view of what RENP was like during the 1976 period--the work with community school board members, according to the Formative Evaluation, was less successful. The purpose of this aspect of the project was to provide job profiles, training needs, training plans, and the implementation of training programs for the members of the Anacostia Community School Boards and the Local School Boards--the laypeople elected to serve in these bodies.

The methods to be used for analysis included (1) the review of assessment instruments, plans, and implementation efforts. (2) The review of each training plan: whether it was constructed and implemented. The results showed that the assessment, planning, and implementation for the project's school board members had not occurred. And we can only speculate as to the reasons: slowness in getting school board members elected; the problem of using the time of unpaid citizens from a poor community; the placing of this component low in the priorities

of the project; and the absence of a good model for training people to elected officials (after all, congressmen and women are not "trained" for their roles).

Cost Analyses

Yet another way of examining the implementation of the Response to Educational Needs Project is to weigh its cost effectiveness against other experimental programs and regular educational efforts in the schools. Michael T. Errecart and Donald D. Rogers studied costs at RENP for the school year 1976-1977, providing us with an opportunity to make such comparisons.

During the school year in question, the budget of RENP was about \$1.924 million, including the space donated by the D.C. public schools. The Errecart and Rogers' analyses separate the funding into four components, much as we have done in this study: Reading, Mathematics, Parent/Community Involvement, and General Management. As Table 6 indicates, the Reading effort was the largest and most costly (\$672,382); Math next (\$669,018); then the Management part (322,403); and finally, the Parent Involvement function (\$257,376).

But to know how much the project spent, by category, is hardly to analyze the cost effectiveness of it. Errecart and Rogers play the "divide and compare"²² game, in which the dollars are *divided* by (1) number of teachers served, (2) number of students served, and (3) number of buildings served, using laboratories for math and reading as

²²"RENP Costs Similar to Other Federal Comp-Ed Programs," prepared for the National Institute of Education, November, 1977.

the patient improved--or died--because of the treatment, or perhaps, because they would have bounced back or expired anyway. A recent study in England, in which half of severe coronary illness cases were placed in intensive care, half sent home, found that there was no significant difference in recovery rate between populations. A study of psychiatric patients likewise found that improvement seemed often to occur, regardless of therapy--with time.

With RENP, we shall never know whether dollars, spent in other ways, would have resulted in better staff development, better community participation, and better educated children. The best we can do, following on the studies by Errecart and Rogers, is to compare, contrast, and observe.

1. *Teachers Served*: What is the cost-per-teacher? Since RENP provides two kinds of services (Reading and Mathematics), it is possible to have a single teacher receiving a double treatment. The data on per-teacher costs looks as follows, according to Errecart and Rogers:

- \$34,396 for non-RENP classes,
- \$43,305 for a RENP class in which the teacher is trained in READING,
- \$41,829 for a RENP class in which the teacher is trained in MATHEMATICS,
- \$50,739 for a RENP class in which the teacher is trained in BOTH.

What do these figures tell us? Well, RENP costs about \$9,000 more per skill area taught than a regular classroom per year. But how much would it cost for the same teacher to go to graduate school or to special seminars provided at some expense by the school district? Is \$9,000 very much? We have no data on this, nor do we have any independent

measure of what such training is really worth: to teachers and children over a lifetime.

2. *Students Served*: Table 7 shows the costs per pupil of both control and experimental elementary schools by program. The average costs for Title I, ESEA, as contrasted to RENP, is interesting: about \$830 per pupil for RENP pupils; about \$130 for Title I. But Title I ESEA and RENP were very different programs: one was a compensatory educational effort *for students*; the other, a retraining program and community control experiments *for adults*. Are we not comparing oranges and avocados?

How do RENP per-pupil expenses compare to other federal programs? Taking an average cost per pupil for RENP across schools, in comparison to a range of other programs (see Table 8), one sees that RENP-mathematics only, or reading only were less costly than other projects, while RENP programs where both reading and math are taught puts costs at \$1,936 per pupil, among the highest of those compared. Only three Follow Through "models," the Culturally Democratic Learning Environment, Learning Systems Corp. Early Childhood, and Bank Street, cost more than RENP when both math and reading are taught. Early school education is expensive, as is staff development (what does it cost to product one doctor?).

When comparing RENP to other types of federal programming, Rogers concludes:

In recent years, annual Economic Opportunity Act Follow Through expenditures have been approximately \$50 million and have supported approximately 175 projects. A similar level of funding could support a similar number of RENPs. Because Follow Through has received continuous funding over a long period of time, because Follow Through

TABLE 7

CONTROL AND EXPERIMENTAL SCHOOL PER PUPIL EXPENDITURES BY FUNDING SOURCE⁽¹⁾

9-23-76 Enrollment	Control Elementary Schools	ESFA Title I	11-76 Expenditures per Pupil	Total Expenditures, Regular Budget	ESFA Title I	Other Federal Funds
746	Ketcham	Yes	839.00	1,022	140	89
647	McGonney	Yes	877.00	1,086	183	195
1,584	Moten	Yes	871.00	1,042	101	92
545	Patterson	No	804.00	951	NA	133
427	Randle Highlands	No	809.00	1,038	NA	60
730	Stanton	Yes	846.00	1,036	228	117
939	Turner	Yes	870.00	1,012	118	107
1,007	Washington Highland	Yes	803.00	953	106	88
	Average		839.88	1,017	146	104
	<u>Experimental Elementary Schools</u>					
786	Birney	Yes	822.00	1,079	138	279
671	Congress Heights	Yes	820.00	999	135	265
504	Draper	Yes	880.00	1,128	126	352
940	Friendship/Oxen Run	No	806.00	1,144	NA	147
803	Green	Yes	857.00	1,047	125	256
742	Hendley	Yes	853.00	1,041	142	262
656	Leckie	No	810.00	984	NA	250
761	Malcolm X	Yes	834.00	1,060	152	279
805	Savoy	Yes	824.00	992	74	261
675	Simon	Yes	867.00	1,042	84	269
	Average		837.30	1,052	122	262

TABLE 8
Program Average Cost Per Student

Program	Adjusted Average Cost per Student
Culturally Democratic Learning Environment Model ^a	\$2,699
Learning Systems Corp. Early Childhood Model ^a	2,441
Bank Street Model ^a	1,954
RENK (reading and mathematics)	1,936
Role Trade Model	1,918
Instructional Dimensions (reading and mathematics)	1,915
Michigan Study (reading and mathematics) ^b	1,828
RENK (reading only)	1,640
Instructional Dimensions (reading only)	1,611
Instructional Dimensions (mathematics only)	1,588
RENK (mathematics only)	1,580
Michigan Study (reading only)	1,580
Michigan Study (mathematics only) ^b	\$1,530

a. Follow Through models.

b. Estimated by assuming mathematics costs are 83 percent of reading costs.

had received continuous funding over a long period of time, because Follow Through has not been criticized as prohibitively expensive, and because RENK costs no more than Follow Through; it is reasonable to conclude that RENK would not be too expensive for direct federal support.²³

But there is a great difference between comparative costs per student for a federal program and costs to be borne internally by a school system. Could a school district justify an additional cost per pupil of between \$1,500 and \$2,000 if the money had to be supplied from the

²³Rogers, RENK Costs Similar to Other Federal Comp-Ed Programs, 1977, pp. 6-7.

operating budget?

3. *Buildings Served*: Since RENP was an on-site professional development project (as well as a community involvement one), one needs to know how much it cost per site and whether costs varied greatly among sites. Table 9 shows the costs per teacher for separate buildings.

Experimental School	Cost per Teacher		
	Reading	Mathematics	Both
Birney	\$8,018	8,717	16,735
Congress Heights	10,691	10,654	21,345
Draper	10,691	--	--
Friendship	9,622	8,717	18,339
Green	--	7,376	--
Hendley	8,747	--	--
Hart	8,748	--	--
Leckie	--	7,991	--
Malcolm X	--	7,991	--
Savoy	--	6,849	--
Simon	8,747	8,717	17,464

According to Rogers and Errecart data, there was some differentiation among experimental school costs, ranging from about \$7,000 to \$11,000, not a great spread when one considers that most of the money went to teachers (Program Facilitator salaries). Since staff were paid on the

basis of years of teaching and hours of graduate training, some differences must be anticipated. Furthermore, the Math Labs and Reading Centers served varying numbers of teachers in host schools. If one assumes 12 teachers per lab or center, then "a variation of one teacher produces about an 5 percent change in the per-class cost estimate (roughly \$640)."²⁴

What can we conclude about the costs of RENP over and against the costs of other such programs? First, RENP was expensive, though no more so than many other experiments of the 1960s and 1970s. After all, experimentation, whether in the sciences, technology, or social services tends to be costly. For while scientific efforts involve both salaries and hardware, social service delivery innovations require primarily the special efforts of trained and high-paid professionals. And when one places an additional burden or responsibility on an experiment-- that of *educating* children and *upgrading* the skills of adults, in addition to trying a new "model" or "approach"--then the costs are yet higher. For example, the RENP on-site in-service approach could have been tested for much less money: a few schools, with controls. But RENP was much more than a social science laboratory; it was an improvement effort as well.

Second, RENP was costly because it involved a large staff of regular teachers with long experience. The Program Facilitators were teachers who had been in the school system for a long time and who were near or at the top of the salary scale. Recall that in 1978, Mr. Dan Jackson and staff operated both an on-site and off-site staff develop-

²⁴ Errecart, Rogers, 1977, p. A-9.

ment effort with a budget of about \$160,000, as opposed to the \$1.9 million a few years earlier. True, the 1978 version lacked the community involvement component (though the Anacostia School Board was still operating), the reading and math aides (though they were elsewhere in the system as Title I aides), and the large administrative overhead (though Jackson had a core staff of reading, math, and managerial support).

As is often the case with federal projects, the years with funds tend to be rather lush; the years without, tight. During the years of "plenty," there is some incentive to do things in a more expensive fashion. When outside dollars fade, it is possible to "beg, borrow, and steal" some of the same services at much less cost. For example, it was nice for the Anacostia program to have its own office, its own telephones, equipment, etc. But once the cutbacks occurred, Jackson was able to operate out of the Friendship Learning Center, a public elementary school, for less money.

Hence, a word of caution. Leaders, decision-makers, and others interested in school experimentation should not shy away because of cost. RENP was costly, by the student, by the teacher, or by the school served. But this "divide and compare" approach is arbitrary, to a large extent. One cannot measure the other benefits: a well-trained teacher over a life-time career; a better educated child (see Table 10) over a life-time; or a more involved, active, and well-serviced community. Could one not divide the cost of the Anacostia experiment by the number of people in Anacostia? The costs would be a few dollars per person!

TABLE 10

Gains Between Fall, 1976 and Fall, 1977

READING TOTAL SCORE							MATHEMATICS TOTAL SCORE					
	N ¹	Points ²	S.E. ³	\$/Pts ⁴	Percen- ⁵ tiles	\$/PC ⁶	N	Points	S.E.	\$/Pts	Percen- tiles	\$/PC
4th												
REN P	70	14	2.8	112	+ 3	522	63	18	3.1	85	+ 1	1,580
NON-REN P	73	14	3.3	108	- 3	-	62	16	3.5	75	- 3	-
5th												
REN P	78	12	2.3	130	+10	156	63	9	2.7	171	0	-
NON-REN P	30	7	3.9	169	+ 1	1,987	28	17*	3.6	69	+13	91
6th												
REN P	46	10	3.2	156	+ 9	177	37	10	3.6	154	+ 3	513
NON-REN P	18	10	6.2	119	+ 4	297	10	14	6.7	85	+ 5	238
8th												
REN P	137	10*	1.8	156	+ 7	223	115	+10	2.1	154	+ 8	192
NON-REN P	80	+ 6	2.4	198	+ 0	-	63	+12	2.6	99	+10	119

¹ Number of students.

² Difference in average raw test scores between the two administrations, using the student as the unit of analysis.

³ Standard error of *average* difference.

⁴ Average cost per student ÷ average gain.

⁵ Average change in percentile.

⁶ Average cost per student ÷ average percentile gain if latter quantity is positive.

* Significant at the .10 level.

Or, what about the "learning" that went on for the system? Can one measure what the D.C. schools gained by having the project? How would one divide up the cost of new improve technology over time? And finally, if one sees the Anacostia project as an example of poor and black self-help and self-determination, then how can one measure the impact of RENP? Take, for example, the May, 1979, election of Mr. Eugene Kinlow, chairperson of the Anacostia Community School Board, to the Board of Education of the D.C. Public Schools. (The Rev. Mr. Coats had made a similar step earlier in the history of the project.) How can one attribute cost to such enfranchisement--the placing of an Anacostia leader on the city school board? After all, the emergence of political power for a community, not the raw power of demonstrations and sit-ins, but the organized power of representation on democratic bodies, cannot be given a price tag.

In this section, then, we have used the Gibboney Report and later financial analyses as ways of describing the Response to Educational Needs Project. We have learned the details of each component: Reading, Math, and Community/Parent Involvement, their function and costs. We have seen that in a few short months the project had gone from confusion to order, from non-implementation to implementation, from demise to organizational health. That is not to say that there were no problems. Rather, the scope of the difficulties with the implementation and management of the project were identified. And it was obviously impressive to the funding agency, NIE, to the extent that RENP was allowed to move from Phase I (planning and implementation) to Phase II (utilization and dissemination), as had been proposed during

the negotiation over the 62 grant terms and conditions set down by NIE and agreed upon by the D.C. school system and the RENP leaders.

Continuing and Disseminating RENP: 1976-79

But the positive Formative Report did not guarantee the continuation of RENP; in fact, the sense was that now that it had accomplished its task--the implementation of in-service education in Math and English and the involvement of parents and community in school operations--the project should be moved from experimental status, with federal support, to permanent status within the D.C. schools, without outside dollars. But it was also obvious during this period that the D.C. public schools were not going to come up with the money to maintain the project. So without some continued help from NIE (or some other source), the project would be "disseminated" and allowed to die. Hence, the urgency of negotiations, concerning the use of any remaining funds, overshadowed the period between late 1976 to early 1978. In a sense, RENP leadership had exchanged questions of management and implementation, during Phase I, for questions of survival and funding during the later phase.

Money: It became obvious early in Jackson's tenure as Project Director that without some additional money, the project would have to close--even before the end of the utilization and dissemination period. In February, 1976, the Project requested more money from the D.C. schools and NIE, prior to the summer when all staff support would end (for two months) before the 1977 dollars arrived. But until the results of the Formative Evaluation were available, NIE did not want

to commit itself for continuation. The time for that, Jackson was informed, was April 26, 1976, when Phase I to Phase II transition was to occur. No new funds were available. How then to husband the remaining dollars for Phase II? Of the \$660,000 Phase I money, some \$160,000 remained; these funds, rather than reverting to NIE, were reserved for the final stage of RENP (Phase II), the utilization and dissemination period. Ultimately, about \$80,000 were granted by NIE to operate the project during the 1977 school year; the remaining money was saved by NIE for the Summative, or final, evaluation and other work related to the publication of RENP materials and studies.

Staff: But, like during the earlier period of confusion, this uncertainty as to the future and the funding of RENP created staff problems. First, the Program Facilitators, Instructional Aides, and Community Organizers (as well as the management group) faced a two-month furlough in June 1976, while the Phase II plans were made and accepted by all parties. A compromise was reached: the taking of some monies from the end of RENP, June 1977, and using it during the summer of 1976. The project would then "close" in April, 1977, not June 1977. (The reasoning was that there might be funds "left over" at the very end that would allow the staff to be paid for the last few months of the 1977 academic years.

The tension led to resignations: five Program Facilitators left, returning to their regular classroom duties (since they were all tenured D.C. school teachers). Since the 1977 school year was about to begin, Mr. Jackson had to double up several of the existing Facilitators, giving them two schools to cover, until he could replace the five Program

Facilitators. By October, 1976, the Reading Facilitators were hired; but the newly expanded Math component required the creation of new positions: four were filled by October 1976 but the Birney School person was not hired till March 1977. (And as might be expected, the lateness of filling these posts meant that sufficient savings were realized to continue the project until June 18, 1977.)

Program: The approach to reading and mathematic continued, as had been refined the previous year--with some new staff. The Parent/Community Involvement component, however, was restructured in January 1977. The Project Director decided to place the Community Organizer staff member under the supervisory control of the on-site Program Facilitator for Math or Reading staff development. In Jackson's *Final Report*, he explained the advantage:

A Program Facilitator in each school was assigned as immediate supervisor of that school's Community Organizer, thereby developing a more cohesive and productive team. This improved the working relationships between the Instructional Team [Facilitators and Reading/Math aides] and the P/CI members, providing the Community Organizer with more direct knowledge of the Instructional program, improved the referral process, and provided a better management system.²⁵

With a full complement of staff, for the most part, the funding worked out until the middle of June, 1977; the only other problem remaining was that of the wording of the agreement between the D.C. schools and the National Institute of Education.

Superintendent Vincent Reed appointed Dr. James Guines (the D.C. Public School's Assistant Superintendent for Instruction) to talk with

²⁵ Daniel W. Jackson, Jr., *Final Report: Response to Educational Needs Project* (August, 1977), pp. 66-67.

NIE and to formulate the "dissemination" plan, the idea being to show how the school district would spread the methods and ideas of RENP around to other schools in the system. The discussion occurred during the spring of 1976.

On April 10, 1976, in its debate on the education legislation, H.B. 94-142, the House Appropriations Committee restated its commitment and support for the "dissemination" efforts of information learned from local school experiments. In June, the Senate made a similar request of NIE.²⁶ Importantly, for the first time, both houses of Congress failed to mention the D.C. schools project, RENP, in the Committees' reports. The special relationship between the project and key senators and representatives seemed to be changing. It appeared that RENP would no longer be able to get special support from Congress in the continuation or expansion of the Project.

A Brief Overview of 1976-1977, 1977-1978, and Beyond: Before plunging into the details of the two-and-a-half school years, 1976-1979, it might be useful to explain the transition of RENP from its former on-site educational program with a centralized Anacostia Community School Board, and Local School Board, through a consolidated off-site approach, to the current situation. Table 11 summarizes the changes mentioned above.

In summary, the three years here described show the gradual change and demise of the Response to Educational Needs Project, as federal involvement is diminished between 1977 and 1979. The project

²⁶ *House Report 94-142*, April 10, 1976, pp. 20-21; and *Senate Report 94-198*, June 18, 1976, p. 24.

went from having on-site labs and centers in 15 and later 14 schools in 1976-77, to no permanent sites in 1977-78 (staff came to the Project at Friendship Center and training staff toured the project schools for workshops), and finally to no RENP activities at all. Staffing saw a similar decline: 108 in 1976-77 to 4 to none under RENP. And the dollars declined from over \$600,000 to \$160,000 for core management staff of 4 to none.

YEAR	FORMAT	STAFFING	FUNDING
1976-1977	ON-SITE staff development; Community relations; and Anacostia/Local school boards	108 full-time; Directors, Program Facilitators, Community Organizers, Instruction Aides, Support staff.	About \$600,000 from NIE from Phase I
1977-1978	OFF-SITE staff development; augmented with in-school visits; Decentralization under D.C. schools	4 full-time: Director, Assist. Director Reading, Math staff developers at Friendship Center	\$160,000 from NIE from Phase II
1978-1979	No RENP Activity: staff development under Deputy Supt. for Instructional Services; Anacostia school board agreement expired; Local Boards continue	None: virtually all RENP staff re-assigned to classrooms, Regional office, or building administration	Depleted: no outside funds for staff development under RENP

That is not to say that all was obliterated. Not at all. Certain parts of the staff development, local decentralized control, and staffing remained, as we shall discuss shortly. Briefly, though, our research indicates the impact of RENP to be as follows:

1. *Refinement of In-service Education:* The Diagnostic/Prescriptive/Individualized approach to helping children learn math and reading, used by the RENP Facilitators and Aides has been carried on by the Competency Based Curriculum, which has much in common, a program sponsored by the D.C. school central office.

2. *School Decentralization:* Following the Model School Division and the Adams-Morgan project, the Anacostia Community Schools Project (Division) was a long-lasting attempt at giving patrons of schools' significant control over the way schools run. In 1978, the Local School Boards, part of RENP, were renamed the Neighborhood School Councils, and are now a fixture all across the city of Washington, D.C. The regional boards, i.e., the Anacostia Community School Board, are not so secure, for as of August, 1978, the agreement between D.C. public schools and the Anacostia community board has expired.

3. *Staffing:* But what happened to the 108 RENP staff members? They were not fired, as often happens when funds from the government run out. The aides were transferred to comparable Title I (ESEA) programs; the Program Facilitators went back into the classroom as regular teachers; and the Directors were assigned to responsible duties elsewhere in the school system. So, it seems clear that RENP training and experience was put to use in other roles in the city's schools.

4. *Organizational Learning:* Did the D.C. schools learn anything from their ten years of having the Anacostia experiment? This is a tough, but important, question. We can only speculate, though certainly the D.C. schools and more importantly the Anacostia neighbor-

hood, are not the same. The system treats the region differently, its people differently, and its children's needs more seriously, if the expenditure of funds and effort are any indication.

* * * * *

In a three-year period, 1976-77, 1977-78, and 1978-79, we are provided with an excellent opportunity to study the late history of an urban innovation, one that involved, as we have seen, the federal government (President, Congress, and DHEW), the local school district (D.C. Public Schools), and a local community (Anacostia). We can, in a capsule, analyze the full implementation (1976-77), the attempt at institutionalizing the program--keeping it going in some form--(1977-78), and its aftermath or impact (1978-79). Rarely, in the implementation of change research--in the history of innovation in education--is one afforded the chance to complete the cycle, from beginning to end.

In base relief, one can study the behavior of all parties concerned: the Congress, NIE, and most interestingly the D.C. schools, and the program itself. Quite obvious are the following questions:

-- Why was it not possible to continue the project, given the favorable review of the Formative Evaluation and the strong showing of the program?

-- Given the past reaction to attempted closing, why was more pressure from community and school system not employed to motivate the federal government and D.C. public schools?

-- And, since the project was not institutionalized as a permanent part of the D.C. school's staff development and decentralization efforts, what impact might the project have had on the school system?

-- Finally, what have we learned from the Anacostia/RENIP experience that is useful to decision-makers at all levels of government?

1976-77: RENP's First Full Year

During this school year, from every account, the project worked as it was conceived. The Reading, Math, and Parent and Community participation components were in full swing. Though this author does not have irrefutable "proof" that children learned significantly more as a result of RENP--though many undoubtedly were helped by a careful, well-executed effort to improve their reading and computational skills, we do know that a large number of Anacostia area school teachers, 230 in number, were given instruction in how to diagnose the academic problems of pupils (85 percent received such instruction in how to *diagnose* students' weaknesses); that 82 percent were given instruction in the process of using *materials* to help pupils; and that 82 percent were helped with the process of *individualizing instruction* to meet the reading and mathematical shortcomings.²⁷

In addition, staff were given in-service help with planning (69 percent of target teachers) and 60 percent learned more about *word recognition* and *study skills*, two key steps in helping children to improve their academic work. In the mathematics area, furthermore, 68 percent were helped through teacher development in understanding the *system of rational numbers*, 64 percent attended sessions on the teaching of the *system of whole numbers* and the *discovery method*, and 62 percent received help with the use of *Math Laboratories*. The somewhat weaker showing in math, over reading, may be explained, in part, by the smaller number of math Program Facilitators and Math Aides, a condition which Jackson worked to correct, given the limited funding and the slow-

²⁷ Jackson, Final Report, August 1977, pp. 72-75.

ness of hiring procedures in the D.C. schools.

Results of this effort were not complete, given the methodological difficulties of studying achievement among Anacostia children: the Summative Evaluation found that it was difficult to find a "control group," since these pupils placed in that category themselves had received other "treatments" such as Title I and Right-to-Read. Thus, it was hard to determine whether RENP students' relative improvement was small because of the weakness of RENP methods or the relative improvement of the control group due to other, but similar, attempts to improve their reading levels with another program. Further, it is not the purpose of this historical study to prove or disprove RENP but rather to study the implementation and devolution of the effort.

The RENP staff claim--and we have no reason to doubt their statements--that RENP pupils (some 76 percent of them) received the RENP approach in reading remediation, the diagnostic/prescriptive/individualize approach, mastering at least 50 percent of the identified skills which were identified on the Prescriptive Reading Test. In mathematic instruction, 70 percent were helped and mastered at least 50 percent of the skills as shown deficient on the Prescriptive Mathematics Test.²⁸ The use of the 50 percent cut-off was prescribed in the "Extension Proposal" received by NIE on June 11, 1976. It is likely, in fact, that some students went beyond 50 percent in their improvement, though this figure was deemed as a good benchmark by those who were drafting the criteria for success in 1976.

In the efforts to include the community, and particularly the

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

parents, RENP reported the following accomplishments:

- All parents of students in RENP received a letter, introducing them to the project.

- Each family was contacted by a Community Organizer, either in person or by phone.

- Each Community Organizer selected 100 families for more intensive support, providing a nucleus of highly involved people.

- Seven summer workshops were held in 1976, giving a full day for parental concerns to be aired and discussed.

- Community Organizers provided help to local and the Anacostia community board, disseminating information, helping with meetings, etc.

- These boards (the Local Community Boards and the Anacostia Community School Board) themselves were a main part of the community involvement component, making decisions on staff, program, and funding.

- The Information Dissemination and Referral Center helped the boards and parents with ready information on what resources were available to families in the area.

- The Parent/Community Involvement effort, along with the Reading and Math components, held over 52 workshops and open-houses in the 14 RENP school. Parents were taught how the Math Labs and Reading Centers worked and how to interpret test results and help their children.

- P/CI conducted training workshops for members of the 14 local school boards and the central Anacostia one.

- In the 18-month period, January 1976 to June 1977, the Dissemination and Referral Center, as well as the component itself, received and acted on 1,853 requests for assistance.

- A parent questionnaire, sent out by this component, were received and filled out by 120 sample families (at an 87 percent completeness level), giving valuable feedback to the project on its efforts.

- Other agencies received workshops and tours of the project, including D.C. public school board members and executives, University of Maryland graduate groups, the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics, and the International Reading Association. DHEW and the Black Educators Legislative Caucus also joined RENP for discussion and tours.

It was likely the strength of these components that allowed the project to continue during 1976-77 and gave the chance for the continu-

ation of the core administrative staff into the next school year. That is not to say that there were no problems. As mentioned earlier, the issue of funding for that previous summer (July-August, 1976) caused some consternation among the staff (the problem was solved by the lateness of filling posts allowed a surplus to develop). And, the most salient shadow hanging over the project and its personnel was: next year. What would happen to the various categories of staff? And what would happen to the methods and materials, Math Laboratories and Reading Centers? And would the NIE funds, in some small amount, be available from the Dissemination/Utilization and Summative Evaluation budgets to allow some continuation, in some form?

The transition from RENP to its use elsewhere in the system was discussed between NIE and the D.C. schools as the "Dissemination and Utilization Plan" was developed and approved. The three parties involved, the project, the D.C. schools, and the federal agency, NIE, all had different agendas, different purposes in setting up the 1977-78 program.

NIE: It was committed to the successful implementation, evaluation, and termination of federal financial involvement with the project, while at the same time maximizing the amount of dissemination and use possible. Mr. George Sealey, like his early predecessors, acted, in his role of NIE Project Manager for RENP, as an advocate for the project in the federal government. He helped the project to fulfill its mission, while holding it responsible for its progress. NIE had another central role: that of evaluation. It commissioned a formative evaluation to learn to what extent RENP had been implemented; under Howard Lesnick,

NIE also conducted a final or summative evaluation, to learn (1) what the impact of RENP had been on students, (2) what the history of RENP had taught us about urban educational reform (3) what we have learned about implementation research, and (4) what cost factors were involved in RENP, in comparison to other federal educational programs.

Hence, NIE was committed to the summative evaluation of the project, investigating the results, costs, implementation, history, and impact of RENP; to the spreading of the RENP approach to other schools, given the limitation of funds; and the termination of federal day-to-day oversight of the project.

D.C. schools: The office of the superintendent, Vincent Reed, and deputy, James Guines, hoped to utilize the model (RENP) while receiving the remainder of the Phase II funds. Furthermore, the D.C. school leadership seemed to desire to make the project more directly accountable to them, rather than operating in a semi-autonomous state where RENP leaders were organizationally and geographically somewhat separate from the direct lines of authority in the school district. The major question for the D.C. school leaders was, then: How can we continue the project at minimum cost to the school system while receiving the remainder of the NIE funds and while making the project more accountable to us?

The Anacostia Project: For the leaders of the program itself, the desire was to continue offering the in-service educational program, saving as many staff and as much materials from loss as possible. This involved a many-front effort: drafting a dissemination and utilization plan that would provide a means for continuing the program goals and

activities, in some less expensive form; fighting the Reduction in Force (PIF) order which appeared to single out RENP leaders was, then: How can the program and staff be maintained despite dwindling funds, and a Reduction in Force, while meshing the project with existing efforts and yet fulfilling the requirements of the funding agency?

In November and December, 1976, the school district and NIE began discussions of the final year of RENP, the one devoted to the use of the program throughout the system.²⁹ The initial proposal, dated November 10, was modest to a fault, involving a one-year commitment by the school system, to a three-school "field test," with only three grade levels per school involved. Thus, all but three of the Program Facilitators would be laid off. In addition, a Staff Development Center in each of the three schools, a step from the existing Math Labs and Reading Centers, was proposed by the school system. Much of the remainder of the proposal dealt with the language of the diagnostic/prescriptive/individualized approach.

The Final Proposal looked somewhat different: the continuation of RENP in the 14 schools, wherein the Centers and Labs would be "left intact and teachers who have been involved in the RENP experience will schedule their classes in such a manner that maximum utilization of the Reading Centers and Math Labs will be assured."³⁰ The remaining staff, most of whom would no longer be employed directly by RENP, would be able in their respective schools to a resource to staff there. In particular, the former Program Facilitators, the backbone of the on-site approach, were to be placed in the 16 formerly non-RENP schools

²⁹"Dissemination and Utilization Plan," Dec. 1976.

³⁰"Dissemination and Utilization Plan," December 20, 1976, p. 4.

in Anacostia.

But the greatest part of the formal staff development would be carried out in a more centralized training situation, in the Staff Development Center, located at the Friendship Educational Center, a new elementary school facility in the community. Besides housing the offices of the project, Friendship would provide space for in-service sessions. Teachers would then be given time during free/planning periods for teachers in their buildings. The wording of the agreement was: a Public Information Officer at Friendship would inform other DCPS staff about RENP and would "coordinate institutes, workshops, and Conferences for local and national school boards, superintendents, assistant superintendents, parents, supervisory personnel, and prospective teachers."³¹ The budget from the remaining "dissemination" funds at NIE was originally set at \$100,000 ("inefficiencies" in spending often led to surpluses in the end!). The negotiated budget, which included not only a Project Director, a Reading coordinator and a Math coordinator, was hiked to include an Assistant Director as well (the budget figure reached about \$155,000 for fiscal year 1977-78 for RENP).

The D.C. schools agreed to contribute in-kind services of 22 Facilitators, 41 Resource Teachers (teachers who were available under other budgets to help children with special needs in the buildings), and a secretary. The total of the District's school in-kind budget contribution was about \$1.6 million. The plan was approved January 10, 1977.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

The New RENP Model

At the end of the 1976-1977 school year, the Program Facilitators returned to their regular classrooms and the Reading Aides, Math Aides, and Community Organizers, for the most part found jobs in Title I and other positions for non-certified staff in the D.C. schools.³² Remaining, to implement the revised model, was Mr. Dan Jackson, Project Director; Ms. Pearl Montague, Assistant Director; Ms. Helen Turner, Reading Coordinator; and Ms. Mary Johnson, Math, plus some support staff provided by the school district at Friendship Center.

The revised model had the following components:

1. *Centralized In-service Education*: Each teacher, in the 31 Anacostia schools, had 3 to 5 free periods per week, allowing time for him/her to attend workshop sessions at the Friendship Center. The advantages of a single-site approach included ease of planning and staffing, ease of record-keeping, and the freshness for staff of entering a new, neutral environment for instruction. The disadvantages (making the former RENP approach of on-site training attractive) were the problem of coordinating the schedules and travel of staff from all over Anacostia region, the absence of immediate help which the on-site Centers and Labs provided, and the lack of direct contact with students during training, which RENP had afforded in 1976 to 1978.

³² During the Reduction in Force period, the union representing the non-certified staff was upset that many of these Reading and Math Aides, plus Community Organizers, had been on staff for up to nine years (dating back to the original training sessions of November 1969). They were being laid off while other aides elsewhere in the system who might have had only a few months or years seniority were not. It appeared to be the basis of a law suit. But, somehow, the school system absorbed all those para-professionals (Aides and Organizers) who wished to continue working. Data source: interview with president of union and Mr. Jackson.

2. *Roving On-Site Staff Development*: On a regular basis, sessions were held in various regional schools. Here the workshops were taken to the buildings, wherein teachers could attend sessions dealing with reading and mathematics instruction. The same Diagnostic/Prescriptive/Individualized approach was used: hence, sessions were devote to testing children in reading and math, working out a plan for helping the students. Jackson summarized the Friendship based, ans in-school based approach as follows:

Staff development sessions were conducted at the Staff Development Center, located in the Friendship Educational Center, two days per week, two and one-half hours per session. In addition, two days per week were set aside for on-site (at individual schools) staff development activities, ranging between two and six hours; and one day per week was set aside for planning, review, and conferences. However, the staff development sessions on Computer-Based learning/at the Ballou High School's Regional Computer Center/were conducted after school, between the hours of 3:00 and 5:00 p.m.³³

The in-school program was staffed by the core staff (Ms. Turner and Johnson) plus other supervisors and the Peer Assistants and Resource Teachers--working out of the Region I office. These Peer Assistants and Resource Teachers, working in each building, provided a means of following up on teachers and of observing the impact of the on-site workshops.

3. *Community Involvement*: By the school year 1977-78, the local school boards and the Region I Anacostia Community School Board were operating directly under the D.C. school's governance process and were no longer the direct and immediate concern of Mr. Jackson and the revised RENP model.

³³"Response to Educational Needs Project: A Final Report," September 1, 1978, p. 16:

How did the revised RENP approach work? It is hard to tell with great precision, since there was no systematic evaluation of it during or following the 1977-1978 school year. From Mr. Jackson's final report, this is how it worked and from whom. Principals were notified that RENP could provide two kinds of service: (1) teachers could come to the Friendship Educational Center, during their free periods--packaged to allow a planning period and a "covered" period when a physical education/arts teacher was covering the students to be placed back-to-back--for a two-and-one-half-hour workshop. (2) Teachers could attend on-site sessions, in their schools, on the topic of reading/math improvement. Since each principal was required to hold staff development programs during the school year, this resource was much appreciated by many principals.

Jackson reported on September 1, 1978, that "since October 1977, 1,447 teachers, administrators, and counselors have participated in the staff development activities, either at the Staff Development Center or on-site (at the school)."³⁴ Not only did Region I (Anacostia) staff attend: but also teachers and college students/professors came to these meetings.

While Jackson had no hard empirical data to confirm the contention that these sessions were beneficial, he did collect anecdotal comments from his participant evaluations. They read, for example, as follows: "Clearer understanding of instructional activity," "This has been one of the most informative sessions . . . things are beginning to come to light," "The information met my individual needs and interests

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

and can be used in the classroom," and "The session was informative and it gave me a chance to take a look at myself as to what type of classroom teacher I am."³⁵ Hence, the subjective data indicate that those "who have had an active involvement in this year's staff development efforts will provide more effective instructional leadership to students than those who were not involved."³⁶

* * * * *

During the latter part of the 1977-78 school year, Mr. Jackson and his staff attempted to save RENP. Letters were sent to the Region I office (Mr. Reuban Pierce, Regional Superintendent) and to Mr. Vincent Reed, D.C. school superintendent, but to little avail. NIE had no money left for RENP; the D.C. schools was unwilling or unable to help; and the Region I office had insufficient money to support the \$160,000 project alone. But why? Why was there no outcry from the "community"? Why was the school system silent when, in the past, a bit of agitation had stimulated Congress, DHEW, and the President (Nixon) to help? For, in the fall of 1978, Mr. Jackson and his staff were mailed form letters informing them that as of the 15th of September they were no longer employed. We can only speculate as to the changes that had occurred since the early 1970s that caused the project to "die" without a fight. They include:

1. *Changes in Community Control Ideologies:* The late 1960s, early 1970s, had been a period of intense social protest, when minorities

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

felt that direct action (marches, sit-ins, etc.) was the best--and perhaps, only--means to attract attention and stimulate governmental help. But the late 1970s was a different era. Blacks, and other minorities, had made some in-roads into the establishment. In the D.C. schools, for example, blacks occupied the key posts on the boards of education, superintendents' offices, and in classrooms. Since times were tight and funds even tighter, these protesters were more prone to hold onto what they had than to agitate for more. The uproarious 1960s-early 1970s had become the quiet and conservative late 1970s.

2. Usurpation of Protest by Professionals: An outcome of the civil rights and community control movement, perhaps unintended, was the growth of categories of minority professionalism in the United States. So while the protest period had witnessed poor and minority people banging at the doors to opportunity, the later era saw some of these same periods "coopted" inside the system against which they had agitated. In the Anacostia situation, many of the protest leaders had either been elected to boards (like the Local and Anacostia Community boards) or had been hired as Community Organizers and Instructional Aides. Thus, much of the vitality of the movement had been lost as key opinion leaders were no longer free to march and sing, since their jobs depended on more bureaucratic forms of protest--or no protest at all.

This usurpation is not new to the development of societies. One way of changing a society, while preserving it, has been to absorb the leadership and to silence the trouble-makers. This moderate form of change occurred nationally as a result of the civil rights movement, as minorities gain access to jobs and programs previously reserved for

the whites. The labor movement, in the 1920s to 1940s, had seen the same absorption process. As the passage of the Wagner Act (the 1935 National Labor Relations Act), the growth of the Department of Labor, and the unification of labor under the American Federation of Labor-Council of Labor Organizations occurred, the radical voice of labor had become a moderate and establishmentarian force in U.S. politics.

Thus, the Anacostia Community School Project and the Response to Educational Needs Project went the way of all social innovation: toward control and demise. What had begun as a radical experiment in community control, started during the Great Society by President Lyndon Johnson, nurtured by a needy community and by such black leaders as William Rice, and implemented, finally, by a consummate manager, Mr. Daniel Jackson, Jr., was now fully absorbed and silenced by a public school bureaucracy. The federal funds, amounting to over \$7 million over nine years, were depleted. The enticement to support the program, from the D.C. schools which needed federal help and from the community which needed jobs and a voice, was gone. So were the staff. So was the fervor.

1978-1979: The Remains

What was left of RENP? What was the outcome of it all? The *staff*, Jackson, Turner, Montague, and Johnson, were not fired. They were transferred, as was the fate of the Program Facilitators, Community Organizers, and Instructional (Reading and Mathematics) Aides. Mr. Jackson became the Acting Principal of the Kramer Junior High School located in the Anacostia community; Ms. Helen Turner was moved to

the Competency Based Curriculum office, a program very much like RENP which was operated by the Deputy Superintendent for Instructional Services; Ms. Pearl Montague was transferred to Adult Educational division of the D.C. schools; and Ms. Mary Johnson, former coordinator of the Math component, became a staff developer in the Region I office with Mr. Reuban Pierce, Regional Superintendent. All were given important jobs, in area roughly comparable to their managerial and academic experiences. All were given jobs which were no longer dependent on outside funding.

The RENP *approach to in-service education* did not cease. The Competency Based Curriculum, based in part on the approach used by RENP (Diagnostic/Prescriptive/Individualized), was now the central concept of the teaching of reading and math in the city's schools. While the on-site model was stopped at the local level, it is now a national priority, as indicated by recent legislation passed or proposed. The Teacher Center Act has already been mentioned: it resembles RENP in its emphasis on teachers helping teachers, on-site, in setting much like the now defunct Math Labs and Reading Centers established by the Anacostia project. In the wake of declining achievement among American students, Congress has proposed literacy legislation, including H.R. 15 and S. 1753 (Title II) in 1978. Table 11 shows the similarities between RENP and these bills.

An examination of RENP in comparison to this legislation is instructive. They all share an interest in the *improvement of reading and mathematics instruction through staff development using a diagnostic and prescriptive approach*. All have built into them a means for com-

TO H.R. 15 - NATIONAL READING AND MATHEMATICS IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM
AND S.1753 - TITLE II - BASIC SKILLS AND EDUCATIONAL PROFICIENCY

H.R. 15 - National Reading and Mathematics Improvement Program	Response to Educational Needs Project (RENP)	S.1753 - Basic Skills and Educational Proficiency
<p><u>Sec. 601 - Page 144</u> - Provides financial assistance to "projects designed to strengthen reading and mathematics instruction in elementary and secondary grades".</p>	<p>Designed to improve the reading and mathematics achievement levels of students in grades K through 12.</p>	<p><u>Sec. 201 - Page 116</u> - Encourages states to develop comprehensive and systematic plans for improving achievement in the basic skills.</p>
<p><u>Sec. 601, #4 - Page 145</u> - Provides for training of special reading and mathematics personnel and specialist.</p> <p><u>Sec. 603, page 149, 153</u> - Provides for preservice and inservice training programs for teachers, teacher aides and other ancillary educational personnel in order to enable such personnel to improve their ability to teach students to read or to do mathematics.</p> <p><u>Sec. 605 - Page 157</u> - Provides for inservice training for reading and mathematics program administrators and instructional personnel.</p>	<p>Provides a concentrated staff development program to teachers and administrators, providing them with the skills needed to improve students' reading and mathematics achievement levels - the staff development occurs during the regular school day, both at the school and at the Staff Development Center.</p>	<p><u>Sec. 204 - Page 120</u> - Provides for preservice and inservice training programs for teachers, teacher aides, and other ancillary educational personnel.</p> <p><u>Sec. 206 - Page 121</u> - Provides for inservice training programs for administrators, instructional personnel, and other staff members involved in instruction in basic skills.</p>
<p><u>Sec. 603 - Pages 152, 153, 155</u> - Provides for diagnostic testing of students to determine reading and mathematics deficiencies, as well as periodic testing to measure accurate reading and mathematics achievement.</p>	<p>Utilizes the diagnostic/prescriptive/individualized approach to student instruction - Teacher staff development is based on both teacher needs assessment, as well as, student needs based on the results of diagnostic testing; periodic testing is conducted and teacher staff development and student instruction are adjusted accordingly. Utilization of PMT/PRT results.</p>	<p><u>Sec. 205 - Page 119</u> - Provides for the assessment of school-wide needs to identify the instructional needs of children in basic skills.</p>

TABLE 11 (Cont.)

H.R. 15 - National Reading and Mathematics Improvement Program	Response to Educational Needs Project (RENP)	S.1753 - Basic Skills and Educational Proficiency
<p>Sec. 603 - Pages 155, 156 - Provides for training programs for parents so that they might assist their children; provides for the development of programs which would create a closer alliance between parents and teachers.</p>	<p>Provides for parent/community involvement through an information, dissemination and referral service; through parent workshops designed to help parents help their children, specifically in the areas of reading and mathematics; through involvement in and knowledge of school operations via Unit Task Forces, and local school boards, parent clubs, etc.; and through the development and dissemination of materials designed to help parents help their children at home.</p>	<p><u>Sec. 201 - Page 117</u> <u>Sec. 206 - Page 121</u> <u>Sec. 207 - Page 121-122</u> <u>Sec. 208 - Page 123</u> Provides for greater parent involvement through training programs to help their children.</p>
<p>Sec. 603 - Page 155 - "Provides for centers accessible to parents to provide materials and professional guidance".</p> <p>Sec. 603 - Pages 150, 155 - Provides for the dissemination to the educational community and the general public of information about the objectives, the program, and results achieved in the course of its implementation".</p> <p>Provides for the development and dissemination of materials that parents may use to help improve their children's performance.</p>	<p>Provides an Information, Dissemination and Referral Center which (1) develops and disseminates information to parents and the community concerning the RENP operation and pertinent educational issues, (2) provides a place where parents, community members, and students can obtain needed information concerning various community services.</p> <p>Develops and disseminates information concerning the RENP operation through workshops, seminars, and conferences on both a local and national level.</p>	<p><u>Sec. 201 - Page 117</u> <u>Sec. 206 - Page 122</u> "To develop means by which parents working with the schools can contribute to improving the educational achievement of their children". <u>Sec. 206 - Page 121</u> <u>Sec. 207 - Page 124</u> The development and dissemination of information relating to basic skills to local educational agencies and other organizations and institutions involved in programs of instruction in basic skills.</p>

TABLE 11 (Cont.)

H.R. 15 - National Reading and Mathematics Improvement Program	Response to Educational Needs Project (RENP)	S. 1753 - Basic Skills and Educational Proficiency
	Provides a workshop for teachers and administrators in the use of the computer in education.	<u>Sec. 208 - Page 122</u> - Provides for the use of technology in Basic Skills Instruction.
<u>Sec. 603 - Page 148</u> - Gives priority to "reading and mathematics programs which are already receiving federal financial assistance and show reasonable promise of achieving success".	RENP is currently being funded by the National Institute of Education. RENP has undergone both a formative and summative evaluation conducted by NIE.	<u>Sec. 211 - Page 124</u> "The National Institute of Education shall undertake a survey of teachers of basic skills to identify their level of training, the teaching methods they use in teaching basic skills, and the relative effectiveness of such methods.

munity involvement as a way to help the home to support the efforts of the school in teaching basic skills. All stress a means for spreading the news throughout the system, approaches to *dissemination and utilization* much like RENP's.

One could also argue that what teachers and former RENP staff learned will be with them forever, providing a reservoir of experience and skill that they can use. Similarly, the students who received help through RENP will go on to improved academic--and hopefully, occupational--life. And the school system learned, through RENP, the potentialities of in-service education in an on-site mode. This argument remains just that: a contention.

And *community involvement in education*, so much a part of the Anacostia experiment from the beginning, is still alive in the District of Columbia schools. Each school now has a Neighborhood School Council, much like the Local School Boards under RENP and ACSP. These Councils were designed to give families a way of expressing their concerns for the education of their children, at a level (building) that can make a difference.

The only aspect of the Anacostia project that is left hanging is that of the fate of the regional Anacostia Community School Board. Its agreement with the Board of Education, D.C. schools, expired in August 1978 and has not been renewed. Why? Perhaps, the Neighborhood Councils are sufficient, though this researcher favors the continuation and expansion of a regional *and* local approach. Boards like the Anacostia Community School Board which focus region-wide problems at the regional superintendents' level, are less easily ignored, while the 176

separate neighborhood councils (one per school) are more diffuse and helpless. This atomization of community voice may be, in fact, why the leaders of the D.C. public schools prefer to deal with many rather than fewer community boards. Also, past experience with local advisory boards is not totally positive. Principals at the local school level are more adept at neutralizing parental protest than are less personalized regional bodies. The experience of RENP indicates the difficulty of maintaining local school boards which are less visible and less likely to attract highly active and talented people. While the Anacostia Community School Board was well publicized, well noticed, and useful, the local boards tended to founder for lack of local interest (this statement is not true in all cases, only in comparison to the Anacostia regional board). This researcher, then, *urges the D.C. school board to renew the agreement of understanding between itself and the still-functioning Anacostia Community School Board (Region I)--and even, perhaps, to expand the idea to include regional boards in all six D.C. school geographic regions. These regional groups can provide.*

- a focus for concerns that many of the smaller, less powerful neighborhood boards cannot focus.
- an advisory and policy-making group that is available to the six regional superintendents. Thus, the decentralized system that Supt. Barbara Sizemore created in 1975 would be complete, with an administrative and review procedure located in each area of the city.
- an available community input device that is necessary to qualify for federal funds, under existing and new legislation.

THE IMPLEMENTATION AND CLOSING OF RENP:

Contributions to Research and Policy

What have we learned about educational change in urban schools that might be useful to researchers on implementation and to policy-makers in Congress, state legislatures, and local boards of education? And what new understandings of the history of urban innovation can be gleaned from the project as examined over a ten-year period, through periods of intense and slack activities, through times of much outside funding and little, through eras of social change and one of greater reluctance to change?

An Historical Summary

• There is a shortage of complete histories of urban school innovations, at least of ones of the length and complexity of the Anacostia effort. To date, most data were gathered on classroom experiments, with the external environment of school district, community, and federal funding agency ignored.³⁷ This history has the luxury of a long-time horizon and a focus on a complex political landscape including Congress, the President, DHEW, D.C. public schools, and the experiment (which includes elected boards and professional/para-professional staff).

As a case study, this research has its limitations. A single phenomenon is always idiosyncratic; and even the best attempts to relate the project to others' experiments fall short of comparability, since new programs in various educational settings vary widely and cannot simply be matched and related. Hence, the social scientist

³⁷ For a review of various types of innovations, see Fullan and Pomfret, "Research on Curriculum and Instruction Innovation," *Review of Educational Research* (Winter 1977), Vol. 47, no. 1, pp. 334-397.

must observe extreme caution, both in generalizing from a single history like this one and in trying to compare the RENP experiment with others.

With this warning in mind, I would like to sin in full view: to compare the history of RENP with what is a stereotypic new program in education. How was the Anacostia program "typical" of other historical developments in urban innovation? And how, based on a modal notion of what change looks like, was it not typical, whether better or worse?

Typicality: As we discussed in earlier chapters, the Anacostia project was component by component similar to experiments in other cities. Decentralized structure (wherein the administration of the schools was handled from a regional office), local community input (or sometimes, control), wherein a group of locally elected citizens make decisions on funds allocation, program, and staffing, and the mid-career development of staff have all been around for a while. Other school districts have tried one or more of these experiments, with varying results.³⁸

Even the notion of having the in-service educational experiences *on-site*, in the school buildings, available when teachers need them, is not new. The idea of "resource centers" has been around since the early 1960s, as has the use of "team teaching" which allows groups of peers to help one another while teaching the children.

³⁸ LaNoue and Smith, *The Politics of Decentralization*, discusses similar efforts in other city schools.

Uniqueness: The Anacostia program was atypical, not in its separate parts, but in the total composite of its program. Rarely have decentralized and community control been "packaged" along with on-site staff development and the use of community aides. In a sense, what the Anacostia program accomplished that other innovations have not is the near totality of its make-up: included was a system of *semi-autonomous boards of education*, starting at the school level (Local Community Boards) and leading to a regional board, the Anacostia Community School Board; a pair of *full-time administrators* (the regional superintendent and the RENP Project Officer); its own *philosophy and program* (the in-service and laypeople aides component) dedicated to the improvement of a basic set of reading and mathematics skills; *and run by a unique set of staff*, including Program Facilitators, Community Organizers, and Reading/Math Aides. The combination of features created an approach that was different from most other innovations in urban education which this researcher has seen; the establishment of a mini-system of education in Anacostia.

Yet other features were unique as well: the D.C. innovation had direct access to Congress and DHEW, a relationship which the project leadership learned to use to advantage when the U.S. Office attempted to stop the project. Thus, the Anacostia program attempted direct political action (lobbying, demonstrations) to keep its funding and support from the federal government. Quiet relationships also were built, for example, between Project Director William Rice, and Senator Warren Magnuson, head of the Senate Appropriations Sub-committee. This activity enabled the project to survive for almost ten years, a long time when compared to the short-life of other urban innovations

of the era. Few Johnson projects easily survived the Nixon administration's negative attitude toward social services support.

And finally, the history of RENP shows the amazing ability of a program to nearly die and to regain life and strength. By 1975, when Mr. Binswanger advised the closing of the Anacostia Community School Project, it looked as though it would be ended--or at least that federal dollars would stop. But, miraculously, it stayed alive, was headed by Mr. Dan Jackson, and implemented its components (in-service education in math and reading), community liaison, use of laypeople in classrooms, and continued lay control over key decision-making through the local and regional Anacostia boards. And even when a termination date had been set, it refused to die, going into another year (1977-78) with a smaller staff of four professionals but managed to continue providing off-site programs at the Friendship Educational Center and on-site (in the various 31 schools in the region) in staff development, with almost 1,450 teachers and administrators participating. And even when all federal funds were gone (1978-79), no one employed by RENP funds lost their jobs, being transferred to other related posts in the school system.

Thus, in the history of urban educational innovation, RENP must rank high in terms of longevity, persistence, and absorption. We do not mean to say that the impact was total and complete. We realized that under the best of all worlds, the D.C. schools would have picked up the cost of the project directly out of its regular budget. But we also know that funds were tight, that there was a fair amount of jealousy of (call it resentment against) the project, and that many of the functions of RENP had already been picked up by other offices

in the D.C. schools. The Competency Based Curriculum was, by 1978, using the same approach to reading/math in-service instruction (the diagnostic/prescriptive/individualized one); the local school board function was being handled, to some extent, by the newer Neighborhood School Councils; and lay aides were a permanent fixture, through funding from ESEA Title I, for example, which made RENP superfluous.

True, no one put all those above-mentioned elements together in quite the same tidy way as RENP; but the jobs were being done in the school system somewhere. RENP had succeeded, where other projects had not, in meshing its goals, approach, staffing, and program with existing approaches.

Historically, then, the Anacostia program takes its place, with other experiments in urban school change, as an effort to help teachers to improve the instruction of vital subjects like math and reading (RENP worked not only with reading and math teachers but with other related subject areas like science and social studies, since all teachers must help children learn to read and compute better--or all instruction and learning ceases). It was not attempting to change the social order, as revisionist historians would have liked; nor was it simply dedicated to the status quo. Rather it worked with the needs of staff to help with the basic academic weaknesses of children--a mild but vital accomplishment

An Implementation Summary

But to summarize the history of RENP is not sufficient, for it was also a case of the implementation of change in an urban setting. Existing research on the planning, implementation, and institutional-

ization of change, the vital turning points in the development of similar programs, lack several qualities that this RENP study has. First, we have analyzed the entire "natural history" of the project, from conception and planning, through early implementation, demise, and reimplementation, to final closing and the institutionalization of certain functions and staff. This long perspective is particularly valuable, since researchers tend to prefer a cross-sectional analysis (taking several studies at various stages of implementation for a one-shot survey).

Second, this study examines not only the immediate actors (RENP staff and supervisors) but also the next two tiers of people as well: D.C. school decision-makers and those at the U.S. Office and NIE. This complex social environment gives depth to the implementation research that more one- and two-dimensional studies lack.

Finally, this study disaggregates the various components of the project (decentralization, staff development, lay involvement), allowing for a variable form of implementation study, wherein some parts work and others don't. Much of the existing research on implementation tended to give a single label "implemented" or "not implemented," while our research is far more sensitive to the complexity of change in urban schools.

Thus, there was much about the Anacostia project, its creation, implementation, and aftermath, that was quite predictable--quite typical for change efforts. But, in some important ways, this implementation attempt was different. Here is a summary of some of the typicalities and specialness of RENP's development and termination.

Typicality: The beginnings of the Anacostia experiment were similar to a whole host of Great Society inventions. President Johnson made a commitment to help an ailing system, threw together a general purpose (to make the D.C. schools a model for urban educational improvement), ordered some staffer to come up with the details, promised some money, and threw the planning to the constituents. D.C. schools, determining that the Anacostia community was sufficiently "deprived," selected it as the target site, brought some local people together. The "people" in workshops, helped by a consulting firm and leaders from U.S. Office and the White House, produced a set of task force plans involving 28 different "needs," ranging from infancy to old age, from health, to education and welfare. Congress refused the large sum promised (\$10 million) and allocated \$1 million, supplemented by funds from other federal agencies. So much for planning! Not exactly the way one is taught to plan in social services planning programs.

But, like many fast and furious new programs, this one worked. While the cerebral planners wait and worry, the doers do. Johnson produced more in one term than most of the presidents, except Roosevelt (Franklin Delano, that is), in modern history. For shortly after the funds were available, the Anacostia Ad Hoc Planning Council approved a reading program using community aides--layfolk from the neighborhood. So what the project lacked in precision the plan made up for in incentive: money to hire poor people to learn a worthwhile skill--reading instruction--and to apply it to an obvious need (literacy for children). True, the regular classroom teachers were upset; but they got over it, particularly when the supervisors (and even the superintendent

himself) reprimanded them. So much for our theories of bureaucratic intransigence. Once a system has made up its mind, even to implement a new program, woe unto those who stand in its way.

Had the momentum continued--after the second group of aides were trained--had the project been able to fill its posts, produce its various (up to 28) plans, and count on continued funding without battle, and had the project been able to find a successor to Mr. William Rice, it might have continued to grow and prosper. But it was trapped: by a set of conditions beyond its control. The Nixon administration (specifically the Budget chief, Caspar Weinberger) ordered an evaluation of the project. Drs. Stemmler and Hughes, Project Officer and Division Head respectively, left their offices. There was a turnover in the project and the D.C. schools. Little data, to confirm the success or failure of the project, had been amassed, making the task of "proving" the success of the project difficult. Whatever the difficulties, the U.S. Office, with Mr. Robert Binswanger in charge, produced a negative evaluation on the project (poor federal management, over-sympathy with the program, unclear grant extensions, etc.), most of which were directed at the Johnson administration staff, not at the project per se. The result was an order to stop the project: one supported by Dr. Sidney Marland, the new U.S. Commissioner of Education.

Then all hell broke loose. In school district buses, an angry group of community people harangued the U.S. Office spokespeople, embarrassed the administration, and brought forth a compromise solution: a "new" project, one with another name, but with much the same focus--community involvement, community laypeople in the schools as employees, but a new emphasis on basic skills development through in-service

education. The Anacostia Community School Project became the Response to Educational Needs Project; the structure remained the same.

With a bit of new planning, stricter grant terms and conditions --perhaps Binswanger was right--the step-by-step process of revitalizing the moribund project began, with the arrival of Mr. Daniel Jackson, Jr., as Project Director (January 1976).

Implementation then came fast and heavy. In five months, Jackson hired Trainer of Teachers (later called Program Facilitators), set up rooms in 14 schools for the in-service development of teachers in reading and mathematics, the reuse of the Community Reading/Math Aides as helpers in the classrooms while the regular teachers went to the Centers and Labs for help. The rigor demanded by NIE was seen in the techniques used: clear goals, a consistent approach (using the Diagnostic/Prescriptive/Individualize methods), under a clear line of accountability, leading from the Director, to the coordinators for Reading, Math, and Parent/Community Involvement. Later, even the Community Organizers, laypeople who acted as liaison with Anacostia parents, were brought directly under the on-site Program Facilitators. No loose ends.

Impediments to implementation during the early phase, many of which were beyond the control of the project itself (changes in the national administration, loss of supportive personnel, slowness in the system's response to fill jobs), were overcome in 1976, by strong management. But without the direct intervention of the angry parents, demonstrating at DHEW, the project would never have received a second chance. So much for textbook formulas for the implementation of change, those which stress the rationality of the process.

The last 18 months tell a different story, as the program had a complete year (1976-77) in which 239 teachers received help in the instruction of reading and math, almost 5,000 children were given in reading and math, and the parent relations part contacted all RENP families, working more intensively with a sub-group. And, for the final year, 1977-78, the project was reduced to a core staff, which worked in a central site (Friendship Educational Center) and in appearances at 31 Anacostia schools to hold workshops at the principals' request. Even with a smaller contingent, the purposes could be met, though it could not continue without funds, and none were forthcoming.

Implementation research talks little about what happens after implementation.³⁹ Since few case studies treat actual programs that were implemented, few cover the later years. In the case of RENP, a combination of factors led to its termination:

1. *The Lack of Money:* To carry a program like RENP, which was a luxury in a hard-pressed urban school system, became difficult without outside funds. And, like many federal projects, this one was not created as a permanently sponsored activity of the federal government but as experiment, to be tried, proven, and disseminated. To go on for nearly 10 years, with federal funding, was impressive, in and of itself.

2. *The Loss of Community Enthusiasm:* The Anacostia community had changed much in ten years. A large number of special programs, in education and social services had been implemented there: community clinics, social welfare projects, self-help efforts, community museums,

³⁹ Bruce S. Cooper, "Beyond Implementation: A Study of Change in the District of Columbia Public Schools," a paper presented to the American Educational Research Association, Toronto, Ontario, March, 1978.

bicentennial projects. The excitement and novelty of the school control effort was no longer there. Perhaps, like the rest of the nation, Anacostia had seen the limitations of poor communities in their attempt to have "self-determination," especially with the financial and political power depending on outside agencies. And when the "helping hand" was withdrawn, the region had to depend on itself. As the District of Columbia was granted more home rule and the right to vote, the importance of a program like RENP lessened. How else can one explain the lack of reaction to the ending of RENP and the absence of community anger and action?

3. *The Resentment of the D.C. Schools:* School systems do not like being told that their existing programs are inadequate. The very existence of RENP was a symbol to the school district that its regular in-service programs were not sufficient to the needs of the system's teachers. So when the funding ran out and the project was to close, the top leaders in Region I and the central office were, in a way, relieved to be rid of RENP. Now the nagging reminder of their weaknesses would be removed. Now the Competency Based Curriculum would have no rivals. And now the system would function smoothly without a semi-autonomous unit to set a different pattern. True, when there was outside money, the District would swallow its pride and fight for the dollars; without the money, a major incentive was removed and the program could be terminated. But my assessment is that the negative feelings were far deeper: how else do you explain the inability of the Project Director to rally support for the seeking of additional money for RENP? And without a push from the top, the project could not on

its own expect to find money from other sources.

4. *Loss of Notice and a Constituency*: The smaller RENP became, the less clout it had in continuing its own existence. When 110 or so staff depended on the program, there was a sense of urgency about continuing the effort. Once all but four were laid off, the voice for survival became dim. Thus, the idea of "phasing out" a project accomplished the goal of effectively killing it, since once people leave, they are less interested.

LESSONS FOR POLICY-MAKERS: SOME DILEMMAS

A Practical Look at the RENP Experiment

RENP had a long and complex history, between 1968 when it was conceived and 1978 when the last staff members were transferred to new jobs in the D.C. schools. Advice, based on this history, cannot be simply derived or given. The case is just too confusing for that. Instead, in this section, we couch the advice in terms of the conditions (RENP developments) that spawned the advice in this first place. For to give out-of-hand, simplistic "rules for change agents," as some researchers have done, would be to violate the true meaning of the Anacostia effort and to mislead those entrusted with public decision-making.

At the same time, one does not wish to mystify or scare governments from trying to improve the schools under their jurisdiction. There are certainly enough educational problems, including a serious decline in educational attainment, re-segregation of education by race

and social standing, a precipitous rise in violence in schools, and an increased loss of public trust in the mission of the common school experience, to warrant continued governmental assistance--in a variety of forms.

We cannot, then, present advice in declarative form: e.g., "Make clear goals," "Reorganize staff," "Have feedback," and so forth. Instead, we present the lessons in the social context in which they were developed, in terms of the dilemmas of changing urban schools. Each "dilemma" is presented, discussed, related to events in the Anacostia experience, and phrased in terms of advice. Our hope is, of course, that the message is not lost in the flurry of qualifications and distinctions. That would be almost as bad as over-simplification.

Dilemmas, thus, should be treated as challenges, not as stone walls. The existential problem for any decision-maker in Congress, a government department, in school districts, or in educational communities is how to take the lessons from past innovations, however complex, and fashion new policies with new potentials from the new information. But all leaders confront such dilemmas; it depends how the policy-maker uses the information, how he or she views the dilemmas involved. John D. Aram, in his book on *Dilemmas of Administrative Behavior* and organizational leadership, states it this way:

An initial guide lies in the mental orientation of an individual toward action. One orientation is to experience the poles of a dilemma as choices extending outward from a situation. The person in this situation views the possibility of action in either direction and holds open the potential for action on either criterion. This position is an involved but initially uncommitted posture: it is maintaining an "interested partiality." Action is uninfluenced by one's previous actions and is related totally to the immediate situation.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ John D. Aram, *Dilemmas of Administrative Behavior* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976), p. 12.