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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the decision making process used by selected principals as they implemented the 1977 faculty desegregation plan of the Chicago Public Schools. A historical summary of the development of the plan, from the 1969 ultimatum issued to the Chicago Board of Education by the Attorney General's Office to the 1977 adoption of the plan is presented. The specific faculty desegregation policy is outlined and the procedures used by the Chicago Board of Education to implement this policy are described in detail. The role of the school principal is then analyzed. It is noted that the principal had access to the desegregation process at three points: notification of teachers; appeals procedure for those teachers who appealed on the basis of program needs of a school or data error cases; and maintenance of teacher distribution once the desegregation plan had been implemented. Administrative problems for principals that were not anticipated by the central administration are also described. (Author/MC)

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Managing Faculty Desegregation  
The Role and Response of  
Principals in Implementing a  
Faculty Desegregation Plan

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MANAGING FACULTY DESEGREGATION: THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES  
OF PRINCIPALS IN IMPLEMENTING A FACULTY DESEGREGATION PLAN

The purpose of this paper is to examine the decision-making process used by selected principals as they implemented the 1977 faculty desegregation plan of the Chicago Public Schools. We were interested specifically in the effects of the mandated plan on the decision-making behavior of the principal in his building. Due to the nature of the Chicago plan, each principal was forced to confront such administrative consequences as the loss of tenured faculty, the introduction of a new faculty, the supervision of involuntarily assigned but experienced faculty, and conflict between old and new faculty. Our goal was to understand better how the principal worked within the constraints imposed upon him by the desegregation plan. Or, to look at our goals another way, did the principals have the necessary discretion to implement the plan successfully in his building? The mixture of freedom and constraints within which the principal acts were the focus of our work.

As our colleagues, Professor Crowson and Morris indicated in their paper, it was not our sole intention to focus upon the problem of implementing the Chicago desegregation plan at the building level. It seems that we began our study at the same time that the Chicago faculty integration plan was initiated. Thus the handling of the plan by our principals became an area of natural focus as we collected our data. This was, however, just one of the areas of focus as we used an ethnographic methodology to improve our understanding of the principal's role.

In order to provide the necessary background to fully understand the problems faced by Chicago principals as they were asked to implement the

faculty desegregation plan. We will present an historical summary of the very complex plan. We will then outline the specific policies of the plan which the principals in the system were asked to implement. Finally, we will show examples from our data which help explain what principals did when faced with specific policies to implement.

#### Historical Development of the Desegregation Plan

On July 9, 1969, Chicago Board of Education President, Frank Whiston and Superintendent of Schools, James Redmond, each received the following ultimatum from the U.S. Attorney General's Office.

Dear Mr. Whiston and Dr. Redmond:

The Attorney General has received complaints in writing from Negro parents living in Chicago, Illinois complaining that their children have been deprived of the equal protection of the laws, on account of race, in the operation of the public schools of that city. . . .

In accordance with our responsibilities under Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, we have completed an examination of the Chicago Board's policies and practices of faculty and staff assignments. . . . This examination compels the conclusion that the school system's practices with respect to the assignment and transfer of faculty has had the effect of denying to Negro students the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Civil Right Act of 1964 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

3.

We are writing this letter to advise you of the results of our examination of the facts and to provide you with an opportunity to take appropriate steps to eliminate voluntarily the racially discriminatory practices we found in the operation of your school system. . . .

Sincerely,

Thomas A. Foran  
United States Attorney  
Northern District of  
Illinois

Jerris Leonard  
Assistant Attorney General  
Civil Rights Division

This ultimatum came as no real surprise to Whiston, Redmond or the Chicago School Board, but it was clear that they had a major controversy on their hands which, if not properly handled, was certain to lead to embarrassing lawsuits and loss of federal funds. Furthermore, it could conceivably trigger another teacher strike and possibly cause a total collapse of public education in Chicago.

Until the Justice Department ordered the Chicago Public Schools to desegregate its faculties no big-city school administration had ever taken a public stand on this issue. Most administrators had been avoiding leadership responsibilities in this vital area, just as they had in the area of student desegregation. Redmond decided to take a stand. His first action was to issue a statement denying the government's allegations. He put it this way:

We have never practiced segregation of faculty in Chicago, but we have permitted seniority choice of schools by our teachers. Race has never been a basis for assignment or transfer in Chicago.

Teacher transfer policy in the school system based on seniority, had become traditional through a long-standing agreement with the Teachers Union. Transfer policy consisted of

- (1) the privilege for new teachers to select a school anywhere there was an opening, and
- (2) the prerogative to request transfer after five months in a school.

This procedure created a system in which white teachers, who often started in an inner-city, black school could work their way out to assignments that were more desirable. This system also gave veteran teachers (black or white) a chance to work in a school close to their home.

Use of this teacher assignment procedure did, in fact, lead to real faculty segregation. In 1966, 35 percent of the city's schools had integrated faculties. In 1967, the figure rose to 43 percent but in 1968 it dropped back to 40 percent. These figures were based on a definition of integration in which 10 percent — but no more than 90 percent — of the teachers are white. The following table shows the faculty racial make-up of all Chicago schools from 1966-68.

Percent of White Teachers	Number of Schools		
	1966	1967	1968
100	292	209	214
90-99	65	85	64
10-90	217	250	238
1-10	34	31	70
0	15	10	12

These figures were, of course, critical to the Justice Department in 1969 when it presented its ultimatum to the Board. But in spite of these facts, there was reason to believe that much of this government action was politically motivated from the White House. Redmond, in fact, let it be known publicly that he resented what he labeled "bribe harassment from the federal government." Redmond pointed out to the press that back in 1965 there was a threat by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to withhold funds from the Chicago schools for a similar reason. A crisis was averted in that case by the intervention of Mayor Richard J. Daley, who prevailed upon President Lyndon Johnson to order his Commissioner of Education to retract the threat. Because Mayor Daley's influence in Washington had evaporated by 1969, no such simple solution was now possible.

Furthermore, Redmond and many Board members suspected that President Richard Nixon might be using the Chicago ultimatum to begin a campaign to stake out new ground in the broad field of civil rights enforcement. Some astute political observers noted that just prior to the Chicago confrontation, Nixon had ordered what appeared to be a slowdown in school desegregation in the South. Liberal critics, like New York Times columnist James Reston, had charged the administration with a "wavering commitment" to civil rights as a result of this seemingly abortive desegregation action. Because the Chicago ultimatum was issued on the same day as a similar Georgia order, some felt that the President was now trying to dispel the notion that he might be tolerant of delay in school integration cases.

Whatever the politics of the situation, the fact remained that the Board had to move ahead aggressively in preparing an answer to the Justice Department. The Board was in a difficult position with the federal government pushing it one way and the Union, the black community and special interest groups pushing it in other directions. The Union was particularly vocal at this time. In fact the Union went on record with its position that teacher transfer is a sacred right and it must not be tampered with. Furthermore the Union placed the blame for faculty segregation squarely on the board by reminding the Board that it presently had in effect a policy which allowed it to achieve integration of the type now being called for by the Justice Department.

Indeed the Board did have a policy giving it the power to appoint 10 percent of the teachers in each school. The Board had simply not used this power to achieve integration of school faculties. In practice, the provision would have allowed the Board to assign, to any individual school, teachers selected because their backgrounds and training represented a culture different from the majority of the children in the school. If the Board had implemented this policy, the Union claimed that there would by 1969 have been very few schools with all-white faculties.

It is instructive today to note the arguments presented in 1969 by the Board in defense of its not enforcing the 10 percent policy. The Board offered many reasons including (1) housing patterns, which found teachers opposed to transfer to avoid long commuting trips, (2) racial isolation, which caused teachers to lack experience and knowledge of unfamiliar cultures, (3) black consciousness, which caused many black teachers to consider the act of transferring to be "deserting the black



cause," (4) riots, demonstrations and boycotts which tended to reduce progress toward integration, and (5) the Illinois School Code which outlawed the consideration of race in teacher assignment. Implicit in the Justice Department ultimatum was an order to the Board to somehow overcome all of these obstacles so as to provide an equal educational opportunity for all children.

The fact remained that the school faculties were segregated and the Board was expected to respond to the Justice Department within two weeks of the ultimatum. After considerable public debate about the role of the Union in the negotiations and after a great deal of conjecture in the press, the Board adopted a fifteen point plan designed by Dr. Redmond which included a plan which would require the federal government to share in the cost of disestablishing the segregated pattern of faculty assignments. The major features of the plan were (1) to limit faculties in every school to 85 percent of any one race, (2) to change the transfer policy so that a teacher could apply within one year (rather than five months) and not until he had taught for two years in the system (rather than one) and (3) to ensure that experienced teachers enter the inner-city schools by offering additional pay as an incentive. The response to this plan by the Justice Department received in December 1969, was a shattering setback for the Board. The entire plan was rejected. It was felt in Chicago that the federal government was wrongly interfering in local control of the schools but that some alternative still had to be found to resolve the faculty desegregation issue.

Between December 1969 and late 1974, the Chicago Board worked with HEW and the Justice Department to develop a plan that would bring the

Chicago Public Schools into compliance with the Civil Rights Act. But no plan emerged. Thus in December, 1974, HEW informed the Board that a comprehensive compliance review would be made. By October 1975, it was clear that HEW was not going to be satisfied that the Chicago Schools were in compliance. HEW sent a letter to the Board announcing the following preliminary findings:

1. Faculties are assigned to schools attended by predominantly minority and nonminority group students in a way that confirms the racial identifiability of those schools,
2. minority group students have been denied equal educational opportunities, in that less qualified teachers have been disproportionately assigned to predominately minority group schools, and
3. equally effective educational services are not provided to national origin minority students.

The Board was given 60 days to respond with a new plan setting forth the remedial steps which will be taken to comply with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. This latest request for a plan seemed to provide the needed impetus to get this matter settled once and for all. During the next four months the plan, which was to be implemented in September, 1977 began to take shape. In February, 1976 the Board adopted a plan to integrate faculties which was to ensure that by September 1977, at least 80 to 85 percent of the schools would have had faculties between 30 and 70 percent white or minority. The following procedures were to have been established to carry out this goal: (1) assignment of all new teachers with regular or temporary certificates to schools in such a way that the

nonminority-minority ratio of the staffs would be enhanced or maintained, and (2) appointment of all teachers whose classifications changed from temporary certified teacher to regular certified teacher in such a way that the nonminority-minority ratio of the staff would be enhanced or maintained.

In addition to these compulsory components of the February, 1976 plan, there was also a voluntary transfer idea introduced in which teachers would be encouraged to change schools to aid integration.

The entire plan of February, 1976, including the voluntary component was found by HEW to be unacceptable. For this reason in April, 1976, HEW initiated administrative proceedings against the Board of Education for alleged non-compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. An administrative judge was appointed to preside at a full hearing. The Board became quite concerned and appointed a special committee to work with the Superintendent to develop a plan which would be adequate to avoid a court process. By January, 1977, after working effectively with the teachers Union and the Chicago Principals Association, the Board committee developed a plan it felt would be satisfactory to the administrative judge. The plan was designed to integrate faculties by September, 1977 in a way which would ensure that each school (1) would be between 35 and percent minority, (2) would have the same percentage of teachers with five or more years experience and (3) would have the same level of educational training. But the judge was still not satisfied with items one and three. He was satisfied, however, that the Board could implement the experience plan. A special consultant was brought in to continue the refinement of the plan. By May, 1977 the Chicago Board was able to adopt a plan for implementation of the provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that seemed

to include all of the components sought by the judge. In any event, it was decided by the Board to implement a plan involving the transfer of approximately 1,300 teachers by September, 1977. The exact policy and the implementation procedures for this plan are outlined in the next section of this paper.

### Policies and Implementation Procedures of the Plan

The role of the principal in the implementation of the 1977 faculty desegregation policy is the focus of this paper. Before the principal's role is analyzed, *we will outline the specific policy and* describe, step by step, the procedures used by the Board to implement the policy.

The Policy. The basic policy adopted by the Board in May, 1977 was outlined briefly above. Following is the official wording of the policy goals:

*The Board Shall*  
 To integrate the faculty of the Chicago Public Schools so that  
 by September, 1977

- (1) The racial/ethnic composition in each school will be
  - (a) no more than 65 percent nonminority and no less than 40 percent minority or (b) no more than 60 percent minority and no less than 35 percent minority.
- (2) The percentage of experienced teachers in each school will be between plus or minus 12 percent of the system-wide percentage of experienced teachers for each school type.

(3) The range of educational training of each faculty will be substantially the same as exists in the system as a whole.

In practice the goal of equal distribution <sup>of experience</sup> and training was easier to achieve throughout the system than was the racial goal. But each of these three factors was taken into consideration as procedures were developed to implement the policy. The Board was keenly aware and included in each of its public statements that education quality would not suffer as a result of the teacher redistribution. Effort was made to assure the public that no teacher was being assigned to a position for which he was not qualified.

Special consideration was given in the transfer policy to teachers 55 years or older. These teachers would be asked to transfer only if a school could not be brought into compliance without their moving. Also teachers in special programs were not moved unless appropriately qualified staff were available to maintain the quality of the programs.

Implementation Procedures. The policy goals were made public in May, 1977 but it was not until mid-June that actual procedures were developed to implement the faculty desegregation plan. Much anxiety built up, of course, as teachers waited to see if they would be transferred. For this reason the role of the principal became very important. He was the representative of the Board of Education closest to the teachers and the responsibility was placed directly upon him to carry out the notification of teachers who were to be reassigned. But before we discuss how the principal was involved, a brief description of the selection procedure will be presented.

A rational system was created to group teachers into categories from which eventual selection for transfer would be made. Each teacher was grouped by:

- (1) Status (regular certified or non-certified but full-time)
- (2) Race (minority or non-minority)
- (3) Seniority (Experienced was considered to be over five years and teachers were grouped in five year intervals)
- (4) training level.

After each teacher was grouped by these categories, he was assigned a random number within each level of seniority. Selection was made randomly by seniority group.

After selection of teachers was made, those chosen to move were matched on the basis of race, experience, type of certification, job function distance from original school, and training. At this point, teachers were assigned new schools with the aid of a computer.

On June 14-15, 1977, 1,706 teachers were advised that they would be reassigned for the term beginning September, 1977. It was at this step of the procedure that the principal became prominent. The principals received a letter from the General Superintendent, Dr. Joseph Hannon, which said in part:

You are requested to personally present (the enclosed) sealed envelope to each teacher who is to be transferred out, with as much privacy and individual attention as it is possible to provide within your school day schedule. Please remember the teachers who have not been selected for transfer are equally anxious, and after your official notification to those transferred, it will

be necessary for you to inform all the teachers that notification has been completed. It will not be an easy task, but our teachers will need all the support you and all the members of the administrative staff provide, now and throughout the next several months. This is the first step which we must take and it must be done as gently as possible.

Members of the staff and I wish to thank you for your help, for your understanding, and for your patience throughout a very difficult project for our school system. We will be available to assist you and all your teachers. . . in the finalization of the necessary teacher movement for September. You have our continued support and I wish you well during the next several days. . . .

The tone of this letter from Superintendent Hannon reveals the extreme delicacy of the announcement of the reassignment of teachers during June of 1977. It was also clear from this letter that the Superintendent realized that the principal was a key individual to the success of the desegregation program. The letter to the teachers was, in contrast, much more formal and did not seem to convey the same sense of appreciation as did the letter to the principals. Following are some excerpts from the letter to teachers from Dr. Hannon:

On May 25, 1977, the Board of Education of the City of Chicago adopted a plan to further implement the provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights <sup>Act</sup> ~~Act~~ of 1964.

Basic to this plan is the selection and notification of the teachers who are to be transferred to integrate our faculties in accordance with the compliance goals. . . . These teachers will

participate on a very direct and personal basis in the implementation of the plan and through reassignment will bring to an end an issue which has created confusion, misunderstanding, and anxiety in our schools and in our city.

In accordance with the procedures contained in the plan, you are hereby officially informed that you have been selected for reassignment. Your new assignment is indicated on the attached form. . . . Please indicate receipt of this notification by completing the form and returning it to your principal before the end of school on June 16, 1977. . . . You have our best wishes in your new assignment. You also have my sincere hope that you will derive many additional years of professional and personal satisfaction from your career in the Chicago Public Schools.

It is clear, when contrasting the two letters from Superintendent Hannon, that the principals were, in his mind, given a very sensitive task to complete. The way in which this was done will be discussed further in the next section of this paper.

As it turned out, the transfer orders to the 1,706 teachers did not accomplish the faculty desegregation goals upon which the Board had agreed. It was clear that the schools were not going to be in compliance for a number of reasons including computer error, personal hardship ~~appeals~~ and program needs. Data indicated that the system would be only 70 percent in compliance if further action were not taken to reassign additional teachers prior to September, 1977. Of the total of 1,706 people reassigned, almost one half (826) filed appeals.



Appeals were permitted for the three reasons mentioned above, namely, personal hardship, error, and program need. Guidelines and procedures for the appeal process were worked out prior to the announcement of reassignments and were, in fact, included with the reassignment letter of June 15, 1977. The large number of appeals by teachers was anticipated. For this reason a committee plan was created to hear the appeals. The personal hardship appeals procedure will be described followed by the program appeal procedure.

The faculty desegregation policy adopted by the Board in May, 1977 provided for a formal review process for personal hardship. A review committee was established to hear and decide appeals. This Committee was called the Personal Hardship Committee and consisted of eight members, four appointed by the Chicago Teachers Union and four appointed by the Superintendent. Appeals for hardship were initiated directly to the committee and were expected to deal with physical handicap or a unique personal situation. The Committee was allowed to develop its own criteria for hearing and reviewing cases. It was able to act autonomously with its decisions being final.

It is evident that the principal has been deliberately bypassed in the personal hardship appeal process. This has been done to prevent the principal's bias from influencing the Committee. But, in the program needs appeal process, the principal's role is crucial. The success of the plan depends on the principal's ability to determine whether the integrity of a program is in jeopardy as a result of reassignments of key teachers. The entire faculty desegregation plan is based on the assumption that quality of programs will not be sacrificed.

When the principal senses that a program is in danger the appeal procedure requires that the matter first be discussed with the local district superintendent. If the principal feels that the transfer of a teacher selected under the desegregation plan would result in the closing of a program or the elimination of services, an appeal may be made to the Special Monitoring Committee established under the plan. To fully inform the Committee, the principal is expected to provide a detailed explanation of his case. In the case of program appeals, the Committee's decision is not final. The district superintendent has the final say.

The final area for appeal is data error such as an inaccurate position number, or incorrect race. The principal is expected to complete the necessary paper work to correct the error. The appeal form is routed through the district superintendent to the Special Monitoring Committee. The district superintendent has the authority to overrule the Committee, if necessary, in cases where a determination of error is being made.

It was stated earlier that 826 teachers appealed their reassignments. Among these 856 people, there were 984 appeals. A total of 487 were based on personal hardship, 257 on data error, and 240 on program need. After all appeals were heard, 349 were granted with 107 in the personal hardship category, 123 errors and 119 related to program need. Due to the reduction in numbers of teachers reassigned because of appeals, 57 teachers no longer had a match so they were returned to their original schools. After subtracting all of the approved appeals and the teachers returned, the final figures show that 1,300 teachers were transferred.

The 1,300 teachers were not, however, sufficient to bring all of the schools into compliance by September, 1977. It was, therefore, necessary,

in August, to ask 452 additional teachers to move to new schools. This new group was afforded the same appeal courtesy given the original group of teachers. A total of approximately 1,600 teachers were reassigned prior to September 1977.

The reassignment of teachers in September, 1977 brought 96 percent of Chicago's schools within compliance on the racial composition criterion. That is, 96 percent of the schools had between 30 and 65 percent minority teachers. In the experience category 98.3 percent of the schools had faculties within 2 percentage points of the city-wide experience average. Finally, 84.9 percent of the schools were within 15 percent of the city-wide average on training level.

Following the reassignment of teachers in 1977, it became necessary for the Board to establish policy to maintain the faculty desegregation at its present level. Thus plans were made regarding future assignments, filling of vacancies and transfers. The transfer category is the only one which involves the school principal so it will be described more fully here.

It was clear that the transfer plan in operation for many years and written into the Board agreement with the Chicago Teachers Union would no longer be valid. Thus a new policy was proposed which specified that assignments would be made from a transfer list, only if, (1) such transfer improves the receiving school's percentage of minority teachers and non-minority teachers in relation to the city-wide average and (2) such transfer allows the sending school to remain within compliance. The important feature of this policy is that recruitment for the purpose of faculty desegregation would be encouraged. A program was established

(1) to identify teachers willing to transfer, (2) to encourage these teachers to visit prospective schools so that they can talk to the principals prior to accepting transfer and (3) to permit principals to visit teachers willing to transfer. Through implementation of this policy, integration is enhanced while at the same time the principal has a chance to improve the quality of instruction in his school.

Summary of the Principals Access to the Faculty Desegregation Process During the 1977 Implementation Period.

The principal had access to the desegregation process at several crucial points. They were:

1. Notification of teachers
2. Appeal procedure (Program needs and data error cases only)
3. Maintenance of teacher distribution (recruitment of teachers)

Examples from the Research Data

1. Notification of Teachers

In the Fall of 1977 a research team from the University of Illinois at Chicago Circle began observations of seven school principals. Each subject was accompanied by a researcher as they accomplished their daily tasks in school, at administrative meetings and at community events. Problems related to implementing the faculty desegregation plan, therefore, were observed within the larger context of the school day. The examples reported here were observed and recorded in this manner. As such, they do not represent a systematic sampling of events, but they do reveal some of the unanticipated consequences that implementing the desegregation

plan introduced into school administration. The perspective presented here is that of the building principal. The principal is the linking administrator between the teaching staff and the central bureaucracy. The problems encountered by the principals are inherent to the difficulties in translating policy from written instructions to school operations.

Our researchers were not yet on site when the first faculty group was informed that they would be assigned to new schools to create a racially balanced faculty in all schools. It was soon obvious to us, however, that many faculty refused to accept their new assignments, or failed to remain at their new school for very long. As one principal explained, they were "just not able to make the adjustment." At one school which drew students from a black population and housing project, two of thirteen white teachers refused to accept their assignment. Of the eleven who agreed to come to the new school, four had left the school by mid-year. One had taken a leave of absence to travel, one had returned to school full time, one had left teaching to go into business, and one took a leave of absence because of illness. In another school located in a white community, 16 black teachers remained in the school by mid-year out of 21 who were originally transferred. Those who left had either resigned, transferred to another school or taken a leave of absence. When teachers were on leave their position was not declared vacant for a period of five months. Principals had to find substitute teachers to replace them. Most often these interim positions were filled by Full Time Basis substitutes (FTBs). Many FTBs remained in these

positions after a vacancy was declared. During the Fall of 1977 it was decided to replace these FTBs with permanently assigned teachers on the basis of seniority. Many fully qualified teachers were unassigned and on lists for priority assignment. The FTBs were replaced by teachers from these lists. Assignments were to consider race in order to enhance the integration of faculty. The FTBs who were bumped in this manner were either able to bump other FTBs in the school system who had less seniority, or became day-to-day substitute teachers.

These circumstances of faculty assignment generated much uncertainty among faculty throughout the school system. Permanent teachers who had been transferred to schools where they refused to go or where they did not want to remain began to look for other openings within the system. The initial transfer became a "stop-over" transfer for these teachers. FTBs throughout the system feared that they would lose their position to either a permanent teacher or to another FTB with more seniority. Principals were observed to get daily phone inquiries from teachers seeking positions in the system. All faculty assignments had to be within racial guidelines so principals spoke of openings for a "white math teacher" or a "black special education" teacher.

Some of the situations that were observed over the school year point out the organizational dynamics of these policies. One principal had an undeclared vacancy in the business department because the black teacher who was transferred to the school refused the assignment. The vacancy was filled for several months by a black FTB. Then the FTB was bumped by a black teacher who had appealed his original transfer,

won the appeal, and took the assignment in this school. Some teachers who were not pleased with their transfer found assignments in special programs connected with district offices or the central administration. One black teacher accepted his transfer, then was re-assigned to a special curriculum project in the district. He retained priority rights to be re-assigned to the school position should the special assignment terminate. Teachers who were bumped from their positions complained that they received little help from the personnel office in finding new positions.

Every FTB in the system was aware that they were likely to be bumped. Some who were also on the priority lists hoped to get permanently assigned to their current positions. Principals were eager to have some FTBs permanently assigned and were hoping to see others go. They conversed frequently with persons from the personnel office trying to strike bargains about who would stay and who would leave. Because assignments were based on the system wide seniority system, the principals were unable to inform their teachers of their seniority rank. They had to await notification from the central office as to who would be bumped. It was not likely that the principals would know the teacher who would assume the position. It was difficult for the principals to find out about their new staff members, because the personnel records were kept downtown instead of in the schools. Principals were observed to call the new teacher's previous principal and to contact the downtown office to obtain information about the new staff. Principals voiced objections to receiving teachers that they felt were weak or troublesome. They were also frustrated when unable to get accurate information about the new staff. One principal began to

suspect that his school was being used as a "dumping ground" for troublesome teachers. He told the personnel officer, "You are my counselor. You are supposed to know what's going on and to help me deal with these assignments." The officer responded, "I know nothing. They just put these things on my desk and I have to handle it. I do my best to convey their feelings (about the assignment) to you." The principal reiterated, "Your job is to give me as much information as possible on these assignments." The officer replied, "Look, I just do it. These things come to me, and that's what I have to do. The thing is that I don't know anything more about these things than you do. I do not know either the receiving or sending principal. When a teacher has a problem, there is no dialogue, no information given to me. I am just told to handle it." The principal insists, "Well I can't let my school go down the drain. All these transfers to my school are not good. Now when it comes to someone like Emma Reynolds, I want her. But I need to know more about these others."

When assignments were made, they were often on a last minute basis. Teachers were told on Friday to report to a new school on Monday. Other teachers were told on Friday that they were out of a job as of Monday. The principals let the personnel officers know what they wanted, but had no confidence that their wishes would be considered. It was the people "downtown" who were making the decisions. The principals could plead with their personnel officers, but they had no control over the placements. They could neither put their teachers' minds at rest with reassurances that they would be staying, nor tell weak teachers that they would be leaving if they did not shape up.



Some teachers spent weeks unsure whether their position was secure. One teacher was told that she was "borderline" and that she might be bumped, or she might not. Then, after weeks of worry, she was told that she had been bumped. Then the teacher who was permanently assigned to her position refused the assignment, so she was allowed to stay on--at least for a while.

This uncertainty was particularly difficult on young teachers, early in their careers who were trying to break into teaching. The story of one young male illustrates the hardship. He was a white FTB teaching high school social studies in a black school. He was also coaching basketball and had made a considerable personal investment in the team. He was told on a Friday that he was being bumped, but that he was re-assigned to an elementary school in a black community because he had seniority over another FTB who was in that elementary school. The principal of the high school described him as "absolutely broken-hearted about this transfer. He took it very hard. He came to see me and cried and cried. He was terribly upset." The principal explained that he hated to lose him, but that his only hope was that the person who was bumping him would not accept the assignment. Although the transfer did go through, he was allowed to stay on as coach for the rest of the season. Later on he spoke with the principal again at a dance for the basketball team. He described his new school in the following way. He said that the school he is in is in an all black community and that most of the white teachers live on the other side of the city. When they are assigned to the school they "take one look at the situation, and then leave. They just don't know how to handle a situation that is that different culturally than

what they already know." He felt that his previous experience with black students prepared him for any position in either a white or black community. These other teachers are not as flexible. In a general sense, the uncertainties surrounding placement within the system are most problematic for the young teacher. Those who are not flexible and able to adapt to different cultures are finding it difficult to find placement in the school system.

Early in 1978 it was announced that there would be a second "go-round" of integration transfers. The new group would be voluntary transfers. Teachers could request transfers as long as they had a performance rating of three or above on a five point scale, and as long as their current school was in compliance with racial guidelines. The principals who were not in compliance were in the position of explaining to teachers seeking transfers why they could not have them. Several principals were observed to carefully scrutinize teachers that had been assigned to their schools under the plan. They intended to take full advantage of their right to turn them down. One principal explained that out of five white teachers who were assigned to her school, only two came. One of the five refused the position from the start. Two others refused the position after an interview with the principal. The principal explained during the interview what was expected of them. They were told that they would hand in lesson plans, prepare behavioral objectives and follow the continuous progress curriculum of the Board of Education. The principal said that he "quizzed them about their knowledge about continuous progress and found out that they didn't know anything about it." The interview dissuaded them from accepting the position. Two other teachers accepted the assignment. The

principal described the interview with one of them in the following way:

She is a white female who wanted the job very much. She is not somebody who is testing the system, but she is eager to do a good job. On records day she came and visited with me, and she went and talked with other teachers and spent time with them. Then she went and spent time with the class that she was going to take over and everything seemed to work out well. I expect the woman to work out. I like her attitude and her willingness to work hard. In a school like mine (serves a black community) I can do without missionaries. This woman has the desire to do well, but is not motivated by a missionary goal.

Other principals turned down teachers who were assigned to their schools. They were careful, however, to document the reasons for the rejection by visiting the teacher and watching them in the classroom first. They wanted to base the rejection on their observations of their teaching quality in order to avoid charges that they rejected teachers on the basis of race.

## II. Appeal Procedure

The principals' role in the appeals procedure was minimal, but the lengthy nature of the process created situations that the principals had to deal with. The rumor that some teachers were appealing and hoped to return made it difficult for their replacements to gain acceptance in some circumstances. Even long after the appeals process was over, principals had to respond to rumors that certain, favorite teachers who were trans-

ferred would return. Because so many teachers, black and white, who were transferred failed to win their appeal, those who did win were seen as recipients of special treatment and this created jealousy. One newly assigned principal told his assistant principal that they would receive a teacher who had won an appeal based on hardship. The teacher, who was black, claimed that it was too great a hardship to drive from her home on the south side to a school at the opposite end of the city. So she was being reassigned to a south side school that served a white community. She was bumping an FTB who had been assigned when the original teacher appealed his transfer. He had appealed on the basis of the hardship a long commute, but his grievance had been denied. The explanation of why the original teacher's appeal was denied whereas the new teacher's was successful never reached the school.

The relationships among returning faculty and the new staff were sometimes strained. In one school the music teacher, who had been at the school for years and was near retirement, was transferred to another school. He appealed and took a leave of absence during the appeal process. In the meantime, the principal found a young, energetic male to take his place. Soon the students and community were won over by the substitute. The original teacher then won the appeal and returned to the school to resume his old position. The principal felt badly about the young man, and kept him on as a day-to-day substitute. The young man kept the junior orchestra, and the older one took over the rest of the instrument program. The young man continued to enjoy great popularity among the students and the older one became jealous. Finally, in the spring the older one announced that he was retiring from teaching. He left a few

weeks later and was replaced by another music teacher. The new teacher assumed the position with great enthusiasm, immediately staying after school and coming early to prepare the students for graduation and other end of the year performances. The students, however, were angry. They had expected that the young man would become the music teacher after the older one retired. They resented the new music teacher. The students were white, the young man was white and the new music teacher was black. The principal stepped in to make peace among the students and the teachers.

The principal was observed in two conferences with student leaders from the music program. He told them that the new teacher was assigned because the Board of Education works according to a seniority system and that "with the Board of Education, seniority talks." He explained that the new teacher has "legal rights and a superior rating" from his previous position. Furthermore, he is black and the school is short blacks on the faculty. He asked the students to "give him a chance and work with him." He tried to get the students to sympathize with the new man's position. He said, "It hurts to be rejected off the bat. You are lucky to get this man. He has got a good record. He's got the seniority that the system requires so give him a chance." The students could sympathize with the new man, but they wanted the young one as their music teacher. They expressed their hope that if they took their case to the Board of Education, they might win the position for their favorite. The principal cautioned them against this plan. "If you draw the spotlight to Mr. M., the Board of Education may call him down for reassignment. You may not get the result you have in mind by creating a lot of publicity." And then he tried, again, to generate sympathy for the new man. He said,

"Consider this man. He used to be at Carter High School and now he's been uprooted and he's here." The students agreed to talk with the other students about giving the new man a chance.

Later a girl from the music program came to talk with the principal. She told him that it was hard having to adjust to so many new teachers this year. He expressed sympathy, but said that the students have no choice except to adjust. He said that no school has had a stable faculty this year. He explained again about seniority and the fact that the new teacher has a right to the position. She agreed to be helpful and support the new teacher.

While many teachers waited for the appeals procedure to take its course, others tried to get around the transfers through other means. Sometimes a principal would unknowingly become caught in the maneuverings of the teachers. One such case involved two white male teachers who were part of the original transfer group. One lived north and was transferred to a black school on the south side. The other lived south and was transferred to a black school near the city's center. They appealed their transfer on the basis of hardship due to the long commute and lost. But they did not give up. They found one another and hatched a plan to switch positions. In this way they could enhance integration, but closer to home. They approached their principals to make the switch. The principals agreed, but were not aware of the history of the appeal. Their district superintendents approved the switch, as it did not conflict with racial guidelines and the principals were willing. Because the principals were aware that there were long delays in paperwork due to the volume of reassignments, they allowed the switch to take place before the paperwork caught up.

Each teacher took up their new assignment. The principals were pleased, both men were good teachers. Then came the shock, the transfer was denied. The principal was called to discuss the situation with one of the central administrators who told her that she would have to see the director of personnel. "Why?" the principal asked, "This is a routine transfer and it falls within racial guidelines." Principals have always had the right to arrange such transfers. The administrator's cryptic comment was the principal's first hint that there was a history to this situation. He said, "Yes, if they would change their names, it would be easier." For some reason the switch was stopped when the names were identified. Technically, the principals could be in a lot of trouble for switching personnel before obtaining approval by the department of personnel.

Even routine personnel matters had come under the shadow of the faculty integration plan. Some principals became more cautious about personnel matters. They were observed to accept the directives of the personnel department as "fate" and take on the role of "messenger" through whom the decisions from "higher up" were passed. Others kept testing the system, searching for new loopholes that would let them have a hand in the selection and retention of their faculty.

### III. Maintenance of Teacher Distribution

In order to give the principals time to adjust without penalty, transferred teachers were protected from low ratings by their supervisors during the first year. Nevertheless, complaints from students, parents or other faculty about the transfer teachers could make their positions uncomfortable and their reputations suffer. The principals were anxious for the transfer teachers to adjust to the routines of their school and for good relationships to form between old and new faculty. They needed to help the transfer teachers

succeed in order to keep the racial balance of their staff within the guidelines and to stabilize their faculty so that the faculty would settle down into normal routines instead of worrying about the security of their position:

Parents were particularly critical of classrooms where there was a constant turnover of teachers. In one school parents complained to the press when three different teachers were assigned in succession to one one class during a three month period. Situations where one teacher did the teaching, but was replaced by another teacher who assigned grades, were particularly vulnerable to parent complaint. One principal re-assigned faculty within the school to prevent the turnover from concentrating in one or two classes. He explained that the original transfer teacher could not discipline the class at the start of the year. The "already unruly" class was then assigned to a new teacher. The principal stepped in and gave the unruly class to a veteran teacher in the school who was an excellent disciplinarian. The new teacher got the veteran teacher's already controlled classroom.

During the year there were many signs that the transfers and uncertainty of positions caused stress among the faculty. In one school, teachers were observed to form "black tables" and "white tables" in the faculty lunch area. In another school the principal expressed concern about a transfer teacher who was too much of a loner. Angry and unwilling to adjust, this teacher avoided interaction with both black and white faculty and complaints were beginning to come in from parents concerning her teaching style. At another school a teacher was observed to be constantly disorganized, ever afraid that he could not make the adjustment. When



some paperwork was overdue, he commented, "I know this year is bad enough, but I don't want you to think that I just didn't do it." As the faculties were aware of unhappy and frustrated fellows, they heard rumors of more severe incidents in other schools. There were stories of assaults by students, between faculty and with parents. The principals tried to keep these situations from creating racial camps within their own faculty.

In particular, the transfer teachers complained of the position and relationships they had "lost" when they left their previous school. The transfer teachers who approached their new position with enthusiasm and began to make a place for themselves in their new assignment often encountered the resentment of the old faculty who complained that they were being displaced by the newcomers.

The situation that both teachers and principals seemed to fear the most was that an incident involving a transfer teacher would blow up into a confrontation with the community. The following case presents an example of a situation in a school where there was a history of parent-school confrontation. Both the principal and the community were black. The transfer teacher, a white female, assumed the position willingly because dropping enrollments at her previous school endangered her position there. She had taught for several years and was given the highest performance rating at her previous school.

In January a researcher accompanied the principal to observe Miss Madison's fifth grade class. It was the principal's second visit to her class, and for the second time he noted that Miss Madison's lesson plans were sketchy. She listed activities, but did not have behavioral objectives or a means of evaluating student performance. This led to a conference where

the principal warned Madison that if her lessons were not tightened up she was likely to lose classroom control. Madison answered that she had discovered that "these children" have so many family problems that they have trouble learning. This angered the principal who said that he wanted good teachers, not social workers. A few weeks later, at another conference, the principal carefully inspected the teacher's lesson plans. Once again, the principal explained that Madison's "major role" was to "deal with academics and discipline." He added, "you cheat yourself when you blame other circumstances for interfering with your ability to teach the children." Madison claimed that she "never had these problems before." She said that she had a hard time finding out "how this school runs, as opposed to what I was used to." She had never before had to follow the Board of Education curriculum. She explained that she was angry with the Board of Education. She "thought that it was supposed to be all one system, that things vary greatly from school to school," and she feels like "it's starting out from year one."

In particular, she mentioned the attitude of parents. She explained that in her old school, the parents pretty much trusted the school to take care of school business and to manage the students. Here, on the other hand, she felt the parents were "breathing down my back." The parents were always questioning the teachers about what the teachers are doing. She said that she likes the fact that she can phone a parent, and that the parents speak English, but she does not like to be second guessed all of the time. Also, since she taught third grade before, she has had to develop new materials for the fifth grade. She emphasizes that it's "like being a brand new teacher." The principal concluded this conference by saying

that Madison's lesson plans had improved, but that she was still not focused enough in her class activities and that discipline in her class had to improve. His biggest complaint was that Madison seemed not to face issues squarely, but to look for other things to blame, "rather than getting down to doing the job that has to be done."

Several weeks later the principal received a call from a parent who said that while visiting the school she had overheard a student call Miss Madison a "white bitch" and Madison ignored this. The mother felt that the student should have been referred for disciplinary action. She felt that a teacher should not allow her students to be disrespectful. The principal told the parent that he was "quite disturbed." He had not been aware that this was happening, but he would "go right now and find out about it." He called Madison to his office and she confirmed that the event had occurred. She said that she had intended to speak with the girl's parents, rather than speak to the girl about it. The principal told her "you refer her to me, do not call the parents. Children in this school do not call a teacher that. You refer the children to me. It is ridiculous if I have to hear this from parents."

The principal called the girl's parents and held a conference with the girl and her mother that day. The girl admitted the incident and it was agreed to suspend the girl for five days. The mother said, "You can suspend her, and then I will take care of it." Then the Principal asked Madison for another conference. He told Madison, "Your classroom is completely out of control." Madison acknowledged this, but said she was "trying to deal with it through the parents and the children." She claimed to have talked to the girl's parents about the swearing situation. The principal

asked, "Yes, but how are you dealing with it?" He told her that she had been a highly ranked teacher before, so "Why do you have so much difficulty here? What kind of problems did you have in your other school?"

Madison replied, "Well, the parents did not come to the school all of the time there. They didn't speak English, and they left me alone." The principal wondered, "How can I help you?" Madison responded, "Well, you can help me by letting me know that you are going to support me." The principal insisted that first she must be in control of her class. They agreed that she would visit the classrooms of several superior teachers in the school so that she could get some ideas of how she might establish better classroom control. Later the principal said, "I've got to change her if I can, but she has to face things, not get hostile to me." He feels that Madison does not want to recognize that she is not performing and has to change in order to do her job. Madison still does not consider herself responsible for what has gone wrong. She either blames the children and their background or she blames the principal for failure to support. She still has not confronted the fact that there is something she is doing that is making things go wrong in the classroom.

Support for transferred faculty was extended in many ways by principals. One principal wrote notes of appreciation in recognition of faculty achievement. Another brought new faculty into all levels of the school organization, including club sponsorships, coaching assignments and department heads. Another chastised the PTA for its failure to credit a new faculty in a community newsletter which praised a new learning disabilities program which was designed by the new teacher. Principals also offered advice on career planning for new faculty. In particular, it was suggested that several outstanding black faculty consider administrative careers.

### Administrative Problems

The faculty desegregation plan created some administrative problems for principals that were not anticipated by the central administration. On several occasions principals were asked to provide statistical information about their staffs and were unsure whether they should submit data which included their most recent changes. One principal complained that a December survey of his staff was "pointless" because one-third of his teachers would be transferred the first week of January. The officer from the central administration explained that she had her orders to carry out, and that the census should be taken anyway. She added, "We will give them the misinformation and let them interpret it."

Because many transferred teachers were assigned to schools far from their homes, they complained of hardship because of long commuting hours. When the winter weather hit, teachers were caught in traffic snarls and snowstorms. The result was many late and absent teachers. The principals had to cover these classes, but could seldom get enough substitute teachers to assign each morning. This resulted in a system wide shortage of substitute teachers.

The change in faculty composition had impact on the formulas for distributing extra resources within the system. One principal of a school serving a black community where one-third of the students qualified for federal breakfast programs based on family income, complained that he was losing educational resources. By accepting white teachers with masters degrees, and thereby higher salaries, he had increased the per student expenditure of his school. As a consequence, his school no longer qualified for discretionary funds which were used to fund additional teaching positions. He seriously doubted whether his new staff could make as much difference to his learning program as additional staff would have made.

These complications are illustrative of the fallout that the desegregation plan had for the entire school system. Although principals tried to implement the plan, the unanticipated consequences had the effect of undermining their confidence in the central administration. The principals were left to solve these problems on their own. There was little support or assistance from "downtown." The principals, like the transferred faculty, had to adjust.