
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ABSTRACT

These papers make suggestions for further exploration into the problems of sex and gender research. Edmund Gordon presents a historical perspective on the sociopolitical implications of sex and gender and discusses attitudinal variables which affect the classification of women. Ann Lieberman describes the history of women in the work force, their problems and breakthroughs, and their prospects for the future. Robert Brannon compares the stereotyped roles which men have played in the past with their portrayals in the media today. He shows that today's male is facing difficulties as a result of the changing role of women. Maxine Greene discusses the role of women in literature and suggests that literature can provide a resource for women to remake and transcend the traditional conditioning of their roles. Maria New addresses the problem of ambiguous sex in the newborn, presenting biological antecedents, the diagnostic procedures, and the appropriate medical intervention. Elizabeth Hagen points out various reasons for inconsistencies in several areas of sex-difference research. Patrick Lee reviews some of the major theories of sex-role differentiation and mentions factors which should be taken into consideration in the development of a new theory of sex-role socialization. (Author/EB)

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Teachers College
Columbia University

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PERSPECTIVES ON SEX AND GENDER: Proceedings of a Multidisciplinary Conference

Introduction

The papers in this volume are a compendium of the presentations of a group of scholars who were invited to address "Perspectives on Sex and Gender: A Multidisciplinary Conference" at Teachers College, Columbia University, on May 19, 1977. This conference was sponsored by the General Assistance Center on Equal Educational Opportunity, the ERIC Clearinghouse on Urban Education, and the Institute for Urban and Minority Education.

The speakers were **Edmund Gordon**, Richard March Hoe Professor of Psychology and Education in the Department of Applied Human Development and Guidance, Teachers College, Professor of Pediatric Psychology at the College of Physicians and Surgeons, Columbia University, and Executive Director of the Institute for Urban and Minority Education; **Ann Lieberman**, Associate Professor in the Department of Curriculum and Teaching, Teachers College, and Associate Director of the Horace Mann-Lincoln Institute at Teachers College; **Robert Brannon**, Assistant Professor in the Department of Psychology, Brooklyn College, City University of New York; **Maxine Greene**, Professor of Philosophy and Education and William F. Russell Professor in the Foundations of Education, Teachers College, and Director of the Lincoln Center-Teachers College Project in the Arts and Humanities; **Maria New**, Division Head of Pediatric Endocrinology, Department of Pediatrics, New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center, Director of their Pediatric Clinical Research Center, and Assistant Director of the Clinical Research Center; **Elizabeth Hagen**, Professor of Psychology and Education and Director of the Division of Health Services, Sciences and Education, Teachers College; and **Patrick Lee**, Associate Professor of Education in the Program in Early Childhood Education, Teachers College.

The main focus of the day was to increase the participants' awareness of the problems of sex and gender and their implications for education. A brief summary of each paper follows.

Edmund Gordon's "Introductory Remarks" presents a historical perspective on the sociopolitical implications of sex and gender. The classification of women as a low-status minority group and the resultant inequities and conflicts are discussed in light of some of the attitudinal variables which affect them. Suggestions are made for the orientation of future research and service organizations such that attitudinal and policy changes may be effected.

Ann Lieberman's paper, "Women and Society," presents the history of women in the work force, their problems and breakthroughs, and their prospects for the future. It points out that until very recently the role of women in society has always been determined by men and their needs, and that even today attitudes persist which relegate women to "female" occupations and activities. The results of some of the research reported suggest areas to be addressed which range from the content of children's books to the number of women holding status positions in public school administration.

The next paper, "Male Sex Role: Definitions, Problems, and Sources," is based on a transcript of Robert Brannon's speech. Dr. Brannon presents a roster of the stereotyped roles which men have played in the past and are portrayed as playing in the media. He shows that today's male is in the difficult position of man without a model; the society has changed and new norms of behavior have not been established. It is apparent that studies of sex and gender problems should pay more attention to the difficulties which the male establishment is facing as a result of the changing role of women.

Maxine Greene's "The Lived World" addresses the role of women in literature. She discusses female writers, their works and their problems, and also points out how differently an author, whether male or female, handles a heroine, both in life and in death. Greene emphasizes the importance of individual perceptions and of the need for women to make choices which are in line with *their* perceived realities in *their* lived world. She reminds us that equity does not preclude diversity and that literature may provide a valuable resource for studying the subjective realities it reflects.

Maria New's paper, "Ambiguous Sex in the Newborn," is the one presentation which is rooted in hard science. New addresses the problem of ambiguous sex in the newborn, presenting the biological antecedents, the diagnostic procedures, and the appropriate medical intervention. The thrust of her paper is the importance of early diagnosis since, with proper medical attention, the child can grow up to be a normal adult so long as he or she is correctly identified before reaching eighteen months of age. (After eighteen months psychological problems arise from the difference in socialization of boys and girls.)

In "Sex Differences: Psychological Aspects," Elizabeth Hagen points out that the results reported in the literature are inconsistent and inconclusive for several reasons: (1) most of the studies were not specifically designed to examine sex differences, but the authors decided to report results separately by sex; (2) the instruments being used have been designed to minimize male-female differences rather than identify them; and (3) the researchers are sometimes combining constructs and sometimes considering them as a continuum where there is no evidence to support doing so. She discusses several popular areas of sex-difference research and points out some of the reasons for the inconsistencies. A strong case is made for improvement in the methods, measurement and reporting of sex-differences research.

The final paper is Patrick Lee's "Socialization for Sex Role Differentiation," in which Lee explains the basis and need for "cultural inventions" to serve as an organizing perspective, and goes on to review some of the major theories of sex role differentiation: (1) psychoanalytic theory; (2) social learning theory; and (3) cognitive developmental theory. From this point he mentions the factors which should be taken into consideration in the development of a new theory of sex-role socialization which would encompass the life span and be sensitive to environmental influences and individual differences. One of his considerations which is especially relevant to those interested in sex and gender differences is that any new theory should permit pluralism in sex identity rather than continue the implicit assumptions of established theories that there are only two "normal" sex-roles.

The authors of the papers presented in this volume have each made suggestions for areas which need further exploration; each has made a plea for future researchers to be more attentive in (1) asking the appropriate questions, (2) designing studies which will address the questions, (3) selecting and or developing instruments which will elicit the necessary data; (4) doing appropriate data analyses and reporting pertinent results; and (5) giving enough detail in reporting subject population and procedures so that they are clearly identifiable. Numbers (4) and (5) are especially important for those who wish to replicate studies and or reanalyze the data presented.

I hope that this group of articles will provide the reader with greater insight into the problems relative to sex and gender and, in addition, will inspire some to further thought and action in this area.

June Kallos
Teachers College
Columbia University

Introductory Remarks

Edmund W. Gordon

The history of modern societies has been marked by recurrent efforts at broadening the populations to which special privilege is assigned, or better, at reducing the populations who are deprived of opportunities that others are afforded. This trend in the development of human societies is probably best marked by the recurrent efforts at the redistribution of wealth; the movement has been slow but consistent in the direction of broadening the group of persons who either own wealth or at least share in the benefits of wealth through income. Although it doesn't explain all revolutions, some of the great revolutions of history have had the redistribution of wealth at their core.

The second thrust has been the effort at broadening political participation, that is, increasing the number and variety of persons who participate in political decision making. Here we can go back to the early efforts of tribal groups at elevating the elders of the community to positions of power and decision-making, thus tempering the total autonomy of the chief; or to the major political revolutions in history where the effort has been to enfranchise a larger proportion of the population. In very recent periods political participation by women and later by blacks has been at the core of the struggles to broaden political participation in general.

Similar trends can be seen in the effort to increase the number of persons who read and interpret the Scriptures. In fact, one of the central issues involved in the Protestant Reformation was the right to read the Scriptures and to interpret them for oneself, freeing persons from those interpretations that were meted out to them by the clergy. This effort at increasing the body and number of literate persons, persons who could read, was also stimulated by the expanding needs of industrializing societies for literate workers, that is, workers who could read directions and participate on a minimal level in the commerce of the community. These efforts were not, however, limited to the reading of the Scriptures or directions for limited travel, but came to be expressed in increased demands for participation in public policy determination. Thus, in the United States, a new system of government based on almost universal participation in public policy determination, that is, the participation of all property owners, originally, and subsequently the participation by all citizens, came to be the rule. Once these democratic forces had been set in motion, what we had were increasing efforts at obtaining civil rights for all persons in the society, and, again, it was initially for all males and later for women. When the Women's Suffrage movement combined with the antislavery movement and the abolitionist movement, what we were about was obtaining civil rights for all people, and, of course, expanding those rights to insure the protection of the rights and liberties of women and a number of ethnic minorities in the society.

In the most recent years, that is from the mid-nineteen-fifties, attention has focused most heavily on insuring equal rights to ethnic minorities, the rights of persons of the dominant minority ethnic groups in the society, to the use of public facilities, to equal education, and to equal job opportunities. Since the assertion of rights by one group tends to stimulate the assertion of rights by others, what we have also seen in this recent period is a variety of groups asserting their claim to be treated more fairly by society. Even more recently, we have seen a back and forth shift in the priority given to each of these groups.

Attention has recently been focused on the rights of several specific ethnic minorities, the rights of women, the rights of persons of less typical sex identifications, the rights of nonstandard English speakers and the rights of the handicapped. Since modern societies seem to have difficulty focusing comprehensively on all related problems or even on a single problem for any appreciable length of time, we seem to flip back and forth, giving priority to one of these problems today and another tomorrow. We sometimes find the categorical proponents of these issues competing. Some members of the black movement feel threatened by the women's movement. Some members of the women's movement feel threatened by the black movement, and either one may feel threatened by the growth of the gay movement, and all of these are now worried about the movements of the handicapped and nonstandard-English-speaking groups. As we look cautiously over our shoulders at one another, the forces that would do us all in are applauding our conflicts and continuing their exploitation of all these low status groups. Obviously the struggle is not for the rights of women or blacks or Native Americans or handicapped persons; the struggle is for the protection of the human rights of all persons and of all groups of persons.

In my view there are three fundamental impediments to the achievement of such protection for all. The first is the exploitative and reactionary political economy by which resources and power are controlled. The second is constrictive and distorting ignorance and misinformation. The third is the restrictive and recalcitrant attitudes and behaviors born of the influences of the former two. Let us discuss each briefly.

Behind most efforts at discrimination or the assertion of privilege for an isolated group is a concern with more greatly protecting the security of the group which is asserting privilege. Unfortunately, as societies become more complex, it is more and more difficult to establish security for oneself without exploiting another, so that if we look at the richer and poorer nations of the world, or the privileged and less privileged ethnic groups in society, or the privilege that men in our society have over women, one of the underlying factors is the concern that the privileged group has with securing and controlling and subsequently, with protecting its control of resources and power. Since it

is not sufficiently protective of my feeling of security with respect to resources that I be supplied for today and maybe one day ahead, I must supply myself for the indefinite future. To create this imaginary or real surplus reserve, I must depend upon the work, the talents, the cooperation, and the ignorance of other people. When one individual or group claims ownership of that reserve that is what I call exploitation. Alongside exploitation, of course, is the control of the economic and political decision making in the society, in ways that permit me to maintain those economic relationships that have served my best interests. In this way, a conservative approach to the status quo gets exaggerated into what we call a reactionary approach, where spokespersons for privileged groups go to extreme ends to control the political process, since the political process so greatly determines the nature of the economic processes. So underlying the competition or the continuing practice of group discrimination is this exaggerated concern for security, expressed in our society as economic security; the concern for the protection of that economic security and privilege is expressed through control of the political processes of the country, with primary attention on maintaining existing relationships. Obviously, if the positions of the lower-status people are to be changed, both exploitation and conservatism, or reactionary conservatism, must be done away with.

The second impediment is the constrictive and distorting ignorance or misinformation that dominates the society. Again, if one looks at the history of the disenfranchisement of blacks and the disenfranchisement of women, these efforts have always run corollary to major efforts at demeaning the status, the confidence, and the potentials of these groups, so that conceptions of superiority and inferiority get promulgated. Since they are promulgated by the same forces that are concerned primarily with maintaining exploitative advantage and privileged positions, the information which is made available must necessarily serve that purpose; this means that facts relating to sex differences or to ethnic differences are distorted in ways that either pit groups against one another, or at least justify the inferior position to which the low-status group has been assigned and in which it is held. It is not surprising that black people will be served less well by a society that believes they are less capable of functioning in that society, or that women will have less opportunities in a society that believes they are less capable than other members of the society of performing in, or serving, that society. This constrictive force operating on the opportunity structure for low-status persons can be modified only if the ideas that people hold are changed. One of the things that we should thus be concerned with in a conference such as our meeting today is providing the kind of correct information, or at least more balanced information, that can challenge some of the distortions that have been passed on as fact, in this instance with respect to differences in sex and gender.

Going hand in hand with ignorance and misinformation are restrictive and recalcitrant attitudes and behaviors, that is, attitudes and behaviors that restrict the opportunity of others; attitudes and practices that are so fixed that they dominate the thinking and behaviors of large numbers of persons. When we begin to think, though, about the ways in which attitudes get changed, we run into rather complicated processes. There is still considerable debate in the behavioral sciences with respect to whether we change attitudes and expect people's behaviors to follow, or whether we change the behaviors and expect the attitudes to follow. My own bias is in the direction of the latter. We can create experiences by which low-status people are provided the opportunity to function in society as other people do, and high status people are precluded from discriminating against or abusing or exploiting low status persons; to the extent that those conditions effectively prevail, and members have different and wholesome experiences in the new condition, the changed behaviors of persons will eventually result in changed attitudes.

I recognize, though, that this area of attitude change is probably the most difficult of our problems. It is considerably easier to pass laws that reduce, if they do not eliminate, exploitation and reactionary domination of politics. It is certainly possible to provide the information and educational experiences that have the potential for counteracting constrictive and distorting ignorance. But when it comes to the changing of attitudes that so much of a person's experience supports, we have a problem that requires the concerted efforts of all of the institutions in the society. To encourage that process, Teachers College and its Desegregation Assistance Centers will be working over the next several months and years, I suspect, to provide the information resources that many of these institutions need in order to change the opportunity-structure and ultimately to change the prejudicial attitudes. We will be trying to influence the policy decisions by which the society regulates an individual's opportunities and to influence the social processes by which persons of different gender identities, ethnic identities, and class identities are rewarded. Those activities that are necessary to effect changes in the way the system works become an important aspect of those activities of ours which are directed at effecting changes in people's attitudes.

In working on these three levels of problems, we are not talking about what we do for women or what we do for Puerto Ricans or what we do for blacks. We should be talking about what we do for people, because it is in the competition among these several groups that we find insufficient attention being given to these underlying factors. It is almost as if the society would encourage intergroup struggle in order to distract us from the problems that are common to all these groups.

So far we have talked primarily about the sociopolitical context, in which differences in sex and gender as well as a number of other status differences must be considered. With respect to the specific topic today, it is important that we help you understand why we have chosen to focus on both sex and gender as conceptual frames. We take the position that when we talk about sex differences, we are talking about biological differences in the structure and functioning of persons. When we talk about gender differences, we are talking about the social role differences, differences in the roles people learn to play or are forced to fill. As we listen to the papers through the conference, you will note that it appears that the sex differences are important and, in some instances, highly obvious, but that there are very few ways in which differences that adhere to biological sex limit the functioning and participation of the representatives of the two sexes. It is when we turn to differences in gender, that is, differences in the roles assigned to and imposed upon men and women in our society, that we find our greatest contributors to differences in opportunity, differences in the availability of resources, and differences in attitudes, treatments, and rewards. In other

words, "there are very few things that women cannot do simply because they are female, just as there are very few things that men cannot do simply because they are male, but there are many things that women have less opportunity to do, or that men, for that matter, are less rewarded for doing as a result of their gender."

In the course of our presentations we will be trying to deal with some of the facts, the knowledge base by which we may better understand these differences, be they biological or sociopsychological. We will also be trying to look at the differential meanings of gender and sex identity for males and females in our society. Underlying all of these concerns, of course, is our concern with the implications that this knowledge has for educational treatment and social opportunity.

Women and Society

Ann Lieberman

Historical Perspective

Women have always been indispensable in the American economy. During the colonial period women spun, made clothes, candles, and heavy necessary items of everyday life (Levine, 1974). Because of the Puritan ethic and continual labor shortages, women were involved in a wide variety of activities.

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, women and young girls comprised an overwhelming majority of industrial workers. The advent of "women's jobs" is a result of this long tradition. Employment that is sex-segregated is still with us.

The gradual increase of female employment came about as service-oriented jobs increased; again these were seen as women's jobs. But even within this context there were tremendous variations in different regions of the country. In the Midwest women were cornhuskers and trimmers were men. Yet in the Far West men were cornhuskers and trimmers were women (Levine, 1974). Regardless of the singularity of title, there was an income difference—and women earned less for the same job.

Historically, women's participation in the work force has been defined by men's needs. In the nineteenth century poor women worked in factories, while middle-class women were homemakers and mothers, doing extracurricular work in reform movements. By the 1870's, 5 percent of women were working as teachers. By 1900, five million women were employed as domestics, performed personal services, or were teaching. Today the culture still supports these jobs as suitable for women. Last year I was on a doctoral committee for a student who had examined children's books to see whether sex-role stereotypes had changed as a result of the women's movement. She found that Little Golden Books, which are mass produced and basically bought by working-class families, overwhelmingly describe women cooking and cleaning while their husbands go to work. Caldecott Award Books, which are purchased by middle- and upper-class people, showed some few women getting out of the house and working, while someone else took care of the children (Fraad, 1975).

In the nineteenth century, a big topic of concern was "women's true nature" and "women's place." Women were said to be morally strong but physically weak (Levine, 1974); today we say that women's true nature consists in their being strong in interpersonal relations, while not having the stamina or the personality for leadership positions. Our historical roots are deeply ingrained with cultural stereotypes, the good wife molded to her husband's interests. Today's counterpart is the wife who gives up her job so the husband can advance.

A woman's self-image often permitted her to be used as a "scab" during the initial unionization period. Yet women such as Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, who helped organize the early textile unions, were very much a part of this movement. Woman's view of herself as a second-class citizen has begun to change in the last several decades, especially in service oriented professions.

In the 1970s we have seen a dramatic change in the life cycle. Where women used to spend one third of their lives in child rearing, they now spend one seventh. That means they have six sevenths of their lives in which to participate in the adult world, to contribute, and, yes, to live fully.

There are four factors that have made these changes possible: 1) We now have control over reproduction. My two grandmothers had 11 and 15 children. My mother says she never saw her mother without a pregnant belly. 2) Women are now earning an increasing share of the family income. 3) Domestic responsibility has been eased by technology. Think what my grandparents would have done with Pampers. 4) The life span is increasing.

The Problems and the Breakthroughs

Since World War II, the growth in numbers of employed women has been continuous. Women now make up one-third of the labor force. Furthermore, three-fifths of those working women are married. Despite these gains the relative position of professional women has declined consistently. In 1972, the Fleishman Commission reported that senior administrative posts were held exclusively by men. In education, too, the same decline is evident. In 1928, 55 percent of elementary school principals were women; by 1968 that figure had fallen to 22 percent, and, in the last two years the number of female high school principals has dropped from 3 percent to 1.57 percent.

One of my students did her dissertation on female superintendents. Her description of attending the AASA convention of superintendents is priceless. She was taken for a bar maid, a wife, a secretary, or a Girl Friday. All she was trying to find out was whether there were any female superintendents. There are. They represent .6 percent of the total number of superintendents in the nation (Crosby, 1972).

The reasons for the apparent rise of women in male professions when there is a decline in actual numbers is complicated by many factors. For one thing, it is clear that the professions are still sex-stereotyped. Female professions have resulted from extensions of the traditional nurturing and helping role functions. Professional associations have aided "female professions" in gaining status. Nurses now have several degrees and women in large numbers are seeking advanced degrees. Of the Teachers College students seeking advanced degrees, 65 percent are women.

The breakthroughs have come slowly, but they *are* coming. Today's women do entertain the idea that there is a wide variety of options. I thought of only teaching and social work. My three daughters look at life and they say, what am I best suited for? One is becoming a lawyer, and one wants to do something in communications. But their vision is broad and unhampered by stereotypic thinking.

Women have been less likely than men to choose and

study for professions which interest them and where they might have satisfying careers. Females tend to avoid professions which require long periods of preparation, but this is slowly changing.

Women's commitment to careers has been hampered by their larger commitment to marriage. This, too, is slowly changing. Last week on Bess Myerson's TV show, "Woman Is," it was fascinating to see two adolescent girls who appeared to think about little other than boys, yet both stated that their major concerns were to have a profession and be able to take care of themselves, and that marriage was not high on their list. This would never have happened in my generation. The joke was that you went to college to find a man.

There are no easy answers to these problems. Commitment to work will probably increase with a greater amount of education. On the other hand, the priorities of our society are such that many women will be frustrated in their attempts to gain access to the professions. Encouragement by relatives, professors, and teachers has been very significant for female students. In my generation, our mentors were males. Hopefully there will be more and more female models in this generation.

We know very little about this. It seems, however, that upon entering professions women establish a new sense of themselves. First they internalize an occupational role, then they identify with the profession.

The Prospects

To begin to understand women in American society, one must recognize that it has been a history of fitting into the man's world by taking care of the nurturing and helping. These traits then became associated with certain professions—*female* professions. In today's society many people are choosing to have fewer children or to have none at all. Those women who do have children find they have many years to themselves after child-rearing responsibilities have been met.

The historical time we live in affects our expectations and behavior. Each generation has a unique pattern of experiences as they progress through the life cycle. People my age, in their forties, have one foot in the traditional "marriage, children, then work" syndrome. However, people in their twenties and thirties are experiencing a different set of expectations.

Increasingly women clearly expect to work as well as marry. More women think about are participating in the "male" professions. New patterns of family life now seem possible; some women are postponing marriage, postponing children or not marrying. Many different patterns exist. Women who remain single until age 35 are not unusual any more. Dual career families exist and are being studied. In some cases men follow their wives rather than the other way around. A Columbia student studied ninety couples who live in separate domiciles. The wife may work in Boston, while the husband is in Philadelphia. This pattern was unthinkable ten years ago.

There is an increasing awareness that the social myth of women being good only as nurturers is slowly disappearing. There is an ever increasing possibility that we can become aware of our own internalization of the stereotypes our society has led us to believe exist—that we can become highly educated, work at interesting jobs and even change them. We need to be ever vigilant that we are indeed a part of a social revolution that can bring greater wholeness to both men and women. Our vigilance must also lead us to connect to the larger issues of full employment and full participation of all oppressed minorities, not just women. James Oppenheim said it beautifully as he wrote about women textile workers in Lowell, Massachusetts, in 1912:

> As we come marching, marching, we battle too for men
> For they are someone's children and we mother them again
> Our lives shall not be sweated from birth until life closes
> Hearts slave as well as bodies: Give us bread, but give us roses.

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MALE SEX ROLE: Definitions, Problems and Sources

Robert Brannon

I'd like to talk about my particular area of interest. When you see TV talk shows nowadays, you often hear women saying such things as "I'm no women's libber," or more frequently, "I've always been liberated, I was liberated long before there was this movement"; they then follow this disclaimer with some pretty strong assertions. Of course they feel that a woman should get the same pay as a man for doing the same work. There is no reason why a woman can't have a top-flight job, so it is annoying that television and movies often portray women as mere scatter-brained sex objects. Like the little French children who didn't know they were speaking French, it seems that almost everyone today is thinking and talking about things that would have been called very radical ten years ago, but that read like a checklist of the major ideas suggested by the women's movement. There may never have been a movement with so few publicly identified adherents which has had so great an impact on the public attitude about very fundamental aspects of life in such a relatively short period of time. Now much the same thing is happening in the realm of social science.

The women's movement first thrust itself rather aggressively and assertively into the lives of sociologists, psychologists, and other social scientists around 1969 or 1970. It was to demand changes which would have practical, economic, and even ethical implications in other reform movements. But there was nothing very profound from a strictly scientific point of view. The very first social scientists, almost invariably women, who began methodically and scientifically to study the issues of gender and sex roles, the pervasiveness of sex stereotypes, attitudes about women and men, and the long-ignored dynamics of sex role socialization, were not uncommonly stigmatized by their colleagues. They were regarded as faddists or at best as mere applied researchers who were getting involved, carried away perhaps with transitory social reforms, and abandoning the study of fundamental behavioral issues such as external locus of control or the conditioning of smooth muscle tissue or acquiescent response bias.

Today, in early or mid-1977, it's very safe to say that the scientific investigation of sex and gender has become the hottest and most exciting area in all of social science. When I say that, I do not refer primarily to the explosion of articles and new journals in this area, although, of course, such activity is one indication. Nor am I referring primarily to the current flurry of interest in the topic of biological sex differences, which although it has generated a great amount of rhetoric in recent years and continues to fascinate both newspaper feature writers and many professionals, has not led to many significant discoveries. While all the material is certainly not yet in on that issue, the bulk of scientific evidence indicates that males and females differ biologically only in the obvious and long celebrated physical ways, and not even quite so much as most psychologists were willing to assert ten or fifteen years ago. I refer you to Maccoby and Jacklin's (1974) monumental study of sex differences of substance up to that date.

What I am referring to when I say that the topic of sex and gender is the most intellectually exciting topic today is a set of ideas about sex and sex-type behavior which are fundamentally simple and yet difficult to fully grasp at first because they are so broadly explanatory and so antithetical to a great deal of what professional social scientists have been saying and thinking about for so many years. Now these ideas are not actually new; if one looks back they may be found imbedded in many of the early writings of such people as Karen Klein and Margaret Mead, yet they have only recently emerged in the systematic and persuasive form which is generally termed "role-theory." The basic propositions of scientific sex-role theory which can be clearly identified are these: the placement of individuals in the social categories of male and female is in a very basic sense imposed from without, even though that original assignment to categories is usually keyed to physiological characteristics. Nonetheless, it is imposed on our minds. And, despite the very long and intensive process of sex-role socialization which has evolved to teach each of us exactly what we should and should not do as upstanding card-carrying members of our own sex, individuals vary tremendously in how they manage to play their assigned sex role. This variation in ability to live up to what is expected of us as a female or as a male is very closely related to our popularity, our social acceptance, our so-called adjustment to society, and indeed to our level of life happiness.

Another perhaps more fundamental proposition is that even successful role-playing of this sort is not only ultimately an artificial achievement and a laborious re-creation of a personality pattern that is, in some sense, prefabricated or predetermined, but also prevents one from ever discovering what he or she is best suited to do as an individual. Another ground rule of this emerging role perspective is that in addition to this intrinsically mechanical aspect of long term role-playing, the particular constellations of traits that are encouraged as masculine in Western culture are not intrinsically healthy, nor related to happiness, nor conducive to becoming a flexible adaptive person. And, similarly, the constellations of traits referred to as feminine in our Western culture are not necessarily healthy, not likely to lead to long-term happiness for the individual, and not conducive to being an effective, self-reliant person.

According to this emerging view of sex-typed behavior as essentially a role-playing phenomenon, sex roles are one of the most basic and perhaps the most broadly significant of all systematic influences upon human behavior. That is a global statement but it still seems to me that sex roles are, in some very basic sense, the framework around which so much else is laid down and built in the life course of a child; they are the basic social reality around which each of us has been asked to build our lives. An epistemological question, which occurs to people who look at science and what science studies, is, "How is it that an influence which is so unbelievably broad and powerful in the entire range of human activity has been totally ignored for so many years by professionally trained scientists who were ostensibly devoting themselves to understanding every factor that plays a significant role in human behavior?"

The record is clear on this remarkable omission as evidenced by the index and/or table of contents in any introductory social science textbook that was published more than five or six years ago: not only will you find no reference to a concept specifically labeled "sex roles," but you will find relatively little material which can be translated into a sex role perspective. There is quite simply no mention of the dominance of life patterning according to sex, nor of the shaping, the dynamics, the strain, and the unhappiness which is engendered by failing to live up to the cruel demands of sex roles in adolescence. Very little that is there can serve as the empirical foundation for a science of sex roles, despite the fact that we have studied human beings for thousands of years. How could it be that so basic a phenomenon is so little studied?

The irony deepens since there is minimal treatment of any behavioral issues that might develop into what I would refer to as the male sex role. There has been very little treatment of the basic forces that have been directly exerted upon men, and yet, because of men's social dominance, power, and influence they have noticeably influenced everyone, and indeed the ground rules by which our society is organized. The explanation that I would offer for the remarkable lack of scientific attention to this basic phenomenon is that sex roles in general and the male sex role in particular were understudied for many decades, not in spite of, but precisely because of this monumental pervasive influence upon social value as we know it.

There is an old folk saying which crystallizes this idea: "Fish will be the very last to discover the ocean." This seems to me to be a powerful metaphor about how human beings direct their attention, what they notice, and what they think about. The influence of the dynamics of masculinity upon Western civilization was not noted by social scientists until very recently, precisely because the particular preoccupations, assumptions, values, and special emphases are so completely pervasive, ubiquitous, and influential throughout Western intellectual tradition. They have not been seen because scholars, like the fish immersed deep in the ocean, could not see the medium in which they were moving. The concepts in which they themselves had been trained and socialized were extremely difficult to disentangle from social scientific thinking because of the pervasiveness of their influence. Our entire Western intellectual civilization has been dominated by males throughout recorded history, and every man or woman who is alive today grew up as completely surrounded by this cultural domination by men and by men's preoccupations as the fish are by the ocean. All that we know about the world are the things that have been considered important by people who write books, who structure our curricula, and who, by the mere process of deciding what is worthy of intellectual pursuit, direct our thinking. Recorded history [illegible] filled with men's accomplishments, with wars fought and offices held; as feminists have pointed out, [illegible] history [illegible] as the word, "his story."

[illegible] to devote themselves [illegible] issues of economic concern, of status [illegible] and of many other things that are intrinsic to the [illegible] clearly [illegible] thinking [illegible] and per[illegible] around the [illegible] Although re[illegible] social [illegible] females for [illegible] than fe[illegible] preferred [illegible] What might [illegible] fact about [illegible] behavior [illegible] what men do [illegible] and yet the deep-seated [illegible] remained an enigma to social scientists. One of the [illegible] that I read on the subject of war [illegible] pertinent comment: "We know everything about war except one thing, and that is why it continues." The same can be said about the many other things that social scientists have studied with sophisticated methods: (1) competition and competitiveness, which so clearly dominate our own American culture; (2) status striving, the phenomenon of keeping up with or getting ahead of the Joneses. Sociologists study this endlessly and yet the origins of this compulsion have never been satisfactorily determined; (3) homophobia, the irrational fear so many men have that any action of theirs might be interpreted by someone else as homosexuality; (4) rape, a social issue of enormous and recurrent consequence, and yet almost nothing can be said regarding the motivations. The largest studies yet done on male rapists concluded, to the astonishment of most, that insofar as the researcher could ascertain, the average rapist was virtually identical with the average man.

Beyond saying, "Here is how we study these phenomena," we must consider the question of why these people do these things. They don't make sense in any of the usual kind of mechanisms with which social scientists understand and explain behavior: economic models, utilitarian self-interest, subjective expected probability, favorable outcome, and all the computer simulated models of behavior; they can't account for the stunningly irrational forces which so clearly have dominated the behavior of so many people. When called on to answer that question there is often a scientific shrug of the shoulders, accompanied by, "Well, that just seems to be human nature. That is just the way people really are." Many of us in social sciences are convinced that the most constant and indeed the only correct answer to these basic questions about human behavior does not lie in our genes, in our hormones, or in some faded drawings on the wall in a cave somewhere in Mesopotamia; it lies in something invisible which constantly surrounds us. To borrow a metaphor from a poem by Yeats, "We have to learn to tell the dancer from the dance." We've been looking at the dancers and not noticing the choreography, the invisible pattern of irresistible pressures

which shapes and directs the behavior of each dancer, this phenomenon which we are now identifying as sex roles.

When I began to look at the male role a couple of years ago, coming out of focusing upon and reading what was being written by other social scientists about the newly emerging awareness of women's potentials, I was somewhat reluctant to look closely at the male case. I don't know what the sources of the resistance were except that an inward look invariably opens rooms and requires an assessment, a personal evaluation, the process did become personal in looking at my own life and the lives of other men. I think I came to see what I could not at first have dreamt: that I and virtually every other man I know have been limited and diverted from whatever our real potentials as human beings might have been by our need to live up to the cultural dictates of masculinity and manliness. I used the word "limited" there, and stopped short of saying that men are oppressed by the male role, because to use a word like oppressed implies some sort of complaint on the part of those who are far less oppressed than others.

White males very obviously possess power and privilege in comparison with blacks, women, children, and every other minority in our society. We are and have always been the main oppressors of other people. To make that statement and to make some comparisons is not the end of the story, because wounds are wounds and there are millions of people who have suffered the limitations of living up to an impossible standard of masculinity. Due to the simple fact that men have been so predominantly in control of society up to the present time, this list of wounded includes all of us, both male and female. We have all suffered directly or indirectly from the strains and stresses imposed upon people by the male sex role. What then is this male sex role? What is the pattern that I and other young men and indeed older men and all of us have been immersed in, have been forced to try to live up to?

A great deal of my own thinking and research over the past couple of years has centered on trying to analyze the deeper requirements or themes that exist in the male sex role, and it does appear that there are generalizations to be made, that there are certain commonalities and rules. But there are also options and different routes to the same end. Very briefly, to sketch out my own thinking about this issue, it seems that although any division is ultimately arbitrary, one can identify four themes which are apparent in what might be called the mainstream of masculinity in the United States and Europe. The first theme or dimension that is important is determining who is masculine. The usual requirement is that there be "no sissy stuff." More explicitly, there is a peculiar aversion to, or stigmatization or fear of, anything which seems vaguely feminine. Now that is not entirely circular, because it seems that men fear and run from anything that appears feminine more than women run from things that appear masculine. Evidence of this as a guide to whether someone is highly masculine is seen virtually across the board. In men's styles and fashions and occupations, anything which is largely dominated by women is viewed as somewhat suspect by the average person, as something that a "real man" would not be engaged in. Something so innocuous as a color, if it's stereotyped as feminine, will be avoided by men, unless a certain amount of pressure builds up and men suddenly all take to it at once, as happened with the color pink. When I was in high school, no man would ever wear pink, then suddenly everyone had to wear pink. Similarly, when men started to wear long hair, the first few were really stigmatized. They had reasons for a symbolic protest, but soon it became more acceptable and the line eroded. But until that line erodes there's a tremendous tendency to pull back from it and stay away from it.

Manufacturers have known for decades that men need and want cosmetics, toiletries, and various kinds of beauty aids. There used to be a big underground market for women's toiletries, which men were supposedly buying for their wives or for their mothers. When I went to Boy Scout camp, a lot of boys had spray net. At that time there was no hair spray for men, but if you wanted to use it, there was always some hidden in the bottom of a duffel bag. I remember some boys being teased unmercifully for using that product. Well, eventually manufacturers discovered how to overcome this. They now put out men's perfumes and other beauty aids, but they label them in great big letters that you can see a block away: FOR MEN, and they name them something like "Brute."

Now, moving away from what might be seen as superficial things to personality variables, one problem area is being open about your emotions, expressing vulnerability when you feel it. We see this as something that men have an intense aversion to. You watch movies where there are attempts by men to break down and dissolve barriers, to reach out to each other and express what they are really feeling; these are invariably cut short by someone saying, "Stiffen up there, old man, stiff upper lip and all that," a short-circuiting of a human process. Research on self-disclosure reveals that men simply don't say much of a personal nature about themselves to other men, and least of all to women. They say less than do women and are less self-disclosing about the basic facts of their lives. Certainly anything that would make them (I should say us) appear vulnerable or expose our real motivations and our dreams and our hopes is something that we have little patience for in others. I still remember watching "Dragnet" as a child; some poor unfortunate person would be trying to spill out her story and grim-faced Sergeant Friday would say "Just the facts, lady. We just want the facts." Perhaps the most basic element of "no sissy stuff" is the almost incredible aversion to and fear of anything which might be construed in any way as being homosexual. There is simply an astonishing degree of vigilance about this, and boys quite literally grow up being afraid that they are, in their own vernacular, "queer" or "fag." Children on the street where I live call each other by these names. I don't think that I knew what a homosexual was when I first heard people being called "fags" and "queers." In college I noticed that people were labeled as homosexual because of things so simple as how they carried their books. I remember once looking out the window, watching a friend walk by. He was carrying his books against his chest, and someone said: "Would you look at that fruit! What a 'fag.'" From then on I was always very careful to carry my books down by my side.

I was astonished and delighted a few years ago when a national survey showed that more than half (a majority) of the American males who were surveyed answered "yes" to the question, "Have you at any time in your life had any fear or concern that you might be a latent homosexual?" I certainly did. I remember feeling these strange impulses to touch my friends or roommates in college, to maybe hug them or put my arm around their shoulder. These things weren't done. And I had as a cross to bear that I had the makings of a homosexual, that I was one of "those." To

discover that most men at some point in life have exactly this fear, repressed until one gets into men's consciousness-raising groups where it is a basic topic of conversation, was a relief. There is an enormous prohibition that our society puts upon any display of affection between men. Men are the people to take seriously and to compete with but not to be emotionally intimate with and if one feels any impulse to move toward another male, then it's interpreted as homosexuality.

Cross-culturally, I think what differs is where the line is drawn as to what is suspect. In England and the United States, for example, a wide variety of things around touching are very strictly prohibited. In the Mediterranean and many other cultures the line is drawn differently; kissing and embracing are considered quite masculine. But I think that even in those cultures there are things which are taboo and which would immediately make men become suspect. It's also interesting to note who gets around certain taboos. For example jocks – people who are viewed as ultimately masculine – hit each other on the ass when they've won a game, although they would never do it in any other context. But there they're safe.

A second dimension which seems to be a part of the recipe of masculinity in our culture is something that I refer to as being "big wheel" or, more explicitly, the strong need to be looked up to, to achieve status and respect in some way for something that one has done. Now that is quite general. Obviously, it's best, according to some psychologists, if you can be looked up to by everyone. It's very masculine to be admired. The richest man in the world, if you remember the TV series, "The Millionaire," was an unseen benefactor; you knew only the deep gravelly voice and the idleness with which he toyed with his life, tossing out a million dollars, to make it clear that his money made him a real man. And there is a sense in which success in large quantities is enormously masculine. Many things which are not considered very masculine in and of themselves, like playing the piano or the violin, become quite acceptably masculine if one is the world's greatest. The world's greatest anything is in fact a highly masculine status to acquire and the average person who can't achieve this global or national prominence continues to strive for it in preference to other alternatives. Thus, men become executives and anxiously acquire the "trappings" of status and power, usually spending more than they can afford in order to appear more prosperous than they really are.

For those who, for reasons of social class or race or age or other factors, cannot really get anywhere in the dimension of finance and objective real world status, other things simply take their place. The things that men will compete over, such as status, are varied when one goes from one subgroup to another. The entire movie *Cool Hand Luke* was really about this. It dealt with what men compete for in prison where they have no money and they have no occupation; they compete over who can eat the most eggs or who can do anything first or longest or best. It's competition over masculinity and nothing else. When you get on the subway and are annoyed that you can't read the map because someone has spray painted all over it and indeed all over the subway system, you're seeing a manifestation of a very intense struggle for masculine self-respect in the subgroup of graffiti artists, people who have found an accessible medium because the mainstream cultural way of making a lot of money is not open to them. In an article about graffiti artists in *New York Magazine*, I read that some of them are folk-heroes from whom people actually seek autographs. A guy named Stay Cool supposedly started the custom which has now become such a public nuisance. From the perspective of being seen by peers and contemporaries as a real man, the spray painting of subways and other public places makes an enormous amount of sense, however little sense it makes otherwise.

It's fascinating to go from subculture to subculture to see what it is that is accorded respect and status, and you'll see men fighting it out over just those things. In the subculture of humanistic psychology, things which are considered feminine by the general public, such as sensitivity, warmth, and empathy, are highly respected.

The need to be looked up to is very basic to the male role because it's so difficult to achieve this at certain points in one's life, especially when one's young. When you are in a disadvantaged category, this need accounts for many things. The theme that marriage manuals warn young women about, "the fragile male ego," is a direct consequence of this. "Play a game of pine pong or bowling. For God's sake, don't win accidentally, because the whole evening will be ruined, he'll sulk for the rest of the evening." Unfortunately, it is very often true. Why are men such babies about such things? Well, again, it makes a certain amount of psychological sense. We are immersed in a world that is constantly telling us that if you're anything, you're going to be looked up to. You have to have respect, to be admired for something. When almost every way of attaining this goal is withheld, and all sources bear the same incessant message, and you see men who are respected, can handle themselves and do everything, it is logical to have a craving need to be looked up to by someone, to be a big man in at least one person's eyes. The traditional nuclear family marriage, in which the husband is king, is another reflection of exactly this theme. You may be a sanitation man to the outside world, but in your house you can at least fulfill the culturally created need to be admired and looked up to whether you deserve it or not.

More can be said about that, but let us move on to the third dimension, which I see as an interesting contrast to the second. It's hard to pin down. It might be described as an aura of toughness, confidence, and self-reliance. It's not an achievement. It has nothing to do with money or respect or a sense of what you've done. It's more of a style; an air about you which people recognize as masculine and which causes them to respond to you as a very masculine person even if you are penniless and jobless. And some of the most popular movies that Hollywood has ever produced portray men in exactly this role – for example, *The African Queen*, with Humphrey Bogart. Here you have a drunken riverboat captain who comes across as a real man simply because of this masculine style. The other night, I saw one of my favorites, *From Here to Eternity*, with Montgomery Clift and Frank Sinatra. Pruitt was so tough, so sure of himself, that the entire Army couldn't crush him, and my heart went out to him. Even though he was just a scrawny little private, it was very clear that he was a real man. The audience was left feeling that the people who were trying to bully him were not real men. Think of Paul Newman in *Cool Hand Luke*, of Marlon Brando in *A Streetcar Named Desire*, or John Wayne in almost anything, and you see men who have not achieved a great deal in the coin of the realm or the currency of the world, and yet they are quintessentially masculine. Young men look at

the silver screen in darkened movie theatres and really believe that that's what's expected of them and that that is what they should be able to be.

I remember very vividly watching a movie called *High Noon* with Gary Cooper. Seven desperadoes come into town and he spends almost the entire movie trying to find someone who will help him fight them, but everyone has reasons for copping out. His girlfriend tells him to run away and live but he'd rather fight and die than run. At the climactic moment he walks down the dusty main street with dust swirling about; you see seven figures coming down the street and then there's a blaze of gunshots, a twenty-minute epic battle at the end of which he stands alone. The camera pans up showing him against the sky, and the seven bad men are dead. Now, of course, everyone comes out and shakes his hand. His girl comes back to him. The townspeople congratulate him and he takes Rudyard Kipling's advice and treats success and disaster, those two impossibles, just the same. He doesn't show any more emotion after having done this than he did when it looked as if his death was imminent. I watched this as a ninety-eight pound weakling, a fourteen-year-old-boy, and really thought, "That's what a man is. That's what I should be doing." It never occurred to me to look down the road at my friends, and see that none of them was like Gary Cooper and I didn't know anyone who was. And yet this image was being sold. I feel that it is a deep part of our strong cultural sense of what a man is. This commercially projected image continues to permeate men's lives in adulthood and marriage. In its place, the right amount of family concern is acceptable, and you are not penalized for it. But by this cultural stereotype the man who is a devoted father is seen as too actively concerned about something that is perceived as basically feminine.

Finally, the fourth dimension. Maybe it's less important than the others, but it's there. While these other things have some positive cultural elements (you know it's not bad to be confident or decisive or courageous or wealthy), there is also a negative element in what we see as manly and masculine. This element includes such dimensions as aggressiveness, competitiveness, daring, and even violence; a cluster of traits that would fall into the general grouping that Karen Horney identified as moving against people. To some extent antisocial aggressiveness is seen as masculine. The hint of a willingness or a need to hurt, to confront, to outwit, to defeat is a somber grid that is woven into the fabric of what we consider a masculine person. There's evidence of this in recent experiments with electric shock. It occurs in our language. I remember my father telling me in a mixed message (which was totally wasted on me), "Son, never start fights, but always finish them," the idea being that you aren't supposed to go out and tip your hand too much by being overtly aggressive (that is seen as being a bully), but a real man should always be ready and when the other person gives him a chance, he knocks his block off. I was counseled to follow this as a good strategy for life. You see it fused into our conceptions of sexuality and what is masculine behavior.

The fusing of manliness and aggressiveness and even violence with sexuality is deep and pervasive. When you see Rhett Butler in *Gone With The Wind* lift a protesting Scarlett O'Hara and run up that spiral staircase into the velvety darkness with her in his arms, and the next morning, you see a beatific smile on her face after a night of passion, it is obvious that she got what she longed for and wanted and you know that she is now deeply in love. In *A Streetcar Named Desire*, Marlon Brando, after a similar episode of domestic violence, says, "But wasn't we happy, baby? Didn't I drag you down from the white columns and make those colored lights flash?" And her eyes glaze over as the idea of this aggressiveness and sexuality overwhelms her. And this is, I think, very deeply intertwined with our adulthood; for those of us who came to adulthood a few years ago, it may be there inextricably, for the long term.

There is some sense of this role-playing around sex and aggression as being a byproduct that our culture has left with us, that is deeply rooted. I suggest that it's not a big leap from those scenes to the writings of Norman Mailer, in which outright rape is seen as manly and desirable, to the statements which have come from men who have actually committed rape. One man who had raped forty women described it this way: "It was a good no-nonsense fuck. You know, no bullshit. Broads want it that way too, but you know they can't just come right out and ask for it. So it was really great, you know." This sense, this conception that these victims were pleased and turned on by his attentions, I suggest are not far from what is portrayed as part of the male sex role in movies such as *Gone with the Wind*.

The average man may stop short of rape, or hellraising of the sort that we see in the movies, but we like even our average man to have some traits indicating that he may not be completely domesticated, is not a total Milquetoast. In each man there's some residual hint of the wild beast, the smoldering volcano beneath the grey flannel suit, and when a man is completely without this, when there is no trace or any hint that he might be an animal, then in some sense he loses the stereotypic little edge of masculinity in the eyes of most of us; the spike has gone out of the punch and some of the aura of excitement is missing.

Now, having suggested these four dimensions of our cultural male role, we are in a position to speak briefly about what the formula for masculinity is. I would suggest that it's not a simple additive process but a dynamic of the first one that I mentioned, "no sissy stuff," which is an imperative. There is no way to avoid it. If you come across as a sissy, then other things such as how much money you have become irrelevant. One complication is that if you have very high standing as an athlete or as a very wealthy man you can be allowed a few things that might otherwise be viewed as "sissy-like." This is perhaps the only partial exception. But if you get past the first hurdle, you reach the second and third dimensions, that of the big wheel, the need to be looked up to, and the style of manly confidence. These are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but most men seem to have put their chips in either one basket or the other. In talking about stereotypically acceptable masculine figures during my interviews and studies with men, either they are high on the respect dimension or on the other dimension of confidence and self reliance. I'll skip over being aggressive, which I see as a supplementary sort of thing which can add a few points if you are just below the norm in other dimensions. In my studies, Richard Speck and Charles Manson were not quite seen as "real men," but they were seen as quite masculine. There was no question in anyone's mind that they were very masculine figures, simply on the basis of having committed mass murders.

One final reference to movies. *Cat on a Hot Tin Roof* makes my point about dynamics rather well because the

different routes to manliness are right there, both the way to succeed and the ways to fail. The one who has made it by the success dimension is Big Daddy, so memorably played by Burl Ives, who says, "It's lucky I'm a mighty wealthy man." It's very clear that he uses his money as his one big stepping-stone to being seen as a masculine figure who dominates the family and the movie. He talks about buying a young mistress, and it's clear to him that his money is all he really needs. At the other extreme, precisely the other extreme, is his son Rick, played by Paul Newman. Rick is a hopeless alcoholic, a guy who is dependent on his father's largess. And yet there is something about that role, his complete indifference to other people, his self-reliance, his confidence, his manly style, which makes him a very appealing, masculine figure to most moviegoers, in spite of the fact that they may not approve of many of the things that he is doing.

So there you have two of the alternate routes to manliness: the achievement and the style. There are a couple of figures who very clearly fail to achieve a manly dimension. One is the other son, Goober, who has what seems like the prerequisite of success; he is a wealthy lawyer, but there is something about him that rubs most audiences the wrong way. There is something underhanded and nondirect, soft, about him, and you just know that those soft white hands of his are never going to sink their fingers into that rich Delta soil. He is never going to inherit the farm; he's not man enough to get it. And then of course, there is the figure of the football player, whom you never see. The point here is that no matter how masculine you are, if you have crossed over that sacred line of "no sissy stuff" or appeared to be homosexual, as Skipper did, then you are, in essence, stigmatized. The story we hear about the missing Skipper is redolent with the inference that he was simply a sham, a facade. Maggie says, "On the outside he was big and strong, but on the inside he was all jelly. He broke like a rotten stick when the going got tough." And it was clear that it was his implied homosexuality that was the real key to his lack of manliness.

In closing, I would like to discuss another area in which I'm increasingly interested: the psychohistory of masculinity. There is a field now that is called psychohistory which, to my disappointment, is focused mainly upon the playing out of Freudian notions upon the historical past. I'll leave that to its separate place, but I'm enormously impressed by the fruitfulness of looking at masculinity and the male role as the proximate cause of many events in the distant and recent past. And I would recommend to you a chapter on Vietnam by Mark Franken Vestow in his book *The Male Machine*. He shows in detail that Lyndon Baines Johnson's incredible insecurity about his manliness and masculinity, more than economic, political, or other considerations, was the reason why thousands and thousands of Americans died in Vietnam long after it had become clear that the war could not be won. Johnson clearly identified the dove position with sissiness and femininity, and no amount of logic, statistics, or persuasive argument could overcome this basic insecurity on his part. When he was told that one member of his administration who had formerly been a hawk was moving toward a dove position, he thought a second and said, "Well, he has to squat to piss." This was Johnson's earthy euphemism for femininity, the idea that this man was becoming a woman. When Spiro Agnew called Charles Goodell the Christine Jorgensen of the Republican Party for opposing the war in Vietnam, it's very clear that in the thinking of these people, femininity and peace were being equated. I think that this is something that traditional historians have not been looking at.

Finally, this list of the limitations of cultural masculinity may sound negative, but it's very positive in one sense: until we had this awareness of the things that men have lost by buying into the male role, there was really no apparent way to organize men, to enlist them in the fight for the abolition of sex roles. You can't get men to come to a meeting to hear what swines they are, and at the beginning of the feminist movement that is all they were offered. This analysis, in terms of feminist analysis of the male sex role, offers the carrot rather than the stick, and I've seen a large number of men who are deeply drawn by what they have missed in their life-long acculturation into masculinity.

The future, I think, is bright, and we have to face a struggle for the substantial reduction of sex roles which have been here for generations. There is a line in Ann Hurt's essay, "The Vaginal Orgasm," to the effect that there are liberated women today, that even the most radical feminist is taking the painful first step out of centuries of femininity and down the long, long road to individuality. There is certainly no liberated man as yet. I'm not a liberated man. I don't know any. I don't expect any in the near future. I do believe that there are no individual solutions to the sex role issue. I'd like to identify myself as having benefited from being a part of the feminist movement. I wouldn't be thinking of things I am now had it not been for those who are putting other parts of the picture into place. I would very much like to pay my dues in that respect and see myself as part of what is not an individual analysis of scientists, but a world-wide effort to understand sex roles and what they've done to us. I think that the fight against sex roles is not a fad, but has come from something deep and structural in our culture, that it's hand in glove with other movements against our traditional way of life. It's certainly not, as some critics are charging, a sign of decadence, but is very much in the tradition of previous fights against other kinds of injustice and inequality. It is not a pendulant sort of phenomenon in which things are moving toward what might be called androgeny and are going to swing back inevitably toward some sort of sex-role polarization. You hear that idea a lot, and it's sheer nonsense. I think that the historical trends are simply irreversible. We are still only a few decades away from the time when muscles, brawn, size, and strength made a big difference in social dominance. It doesn't make a great deal of difference today and yet we are still left with the residual social manifestations of a time when it did. The essential irrelevance of brawn as a valuable distinction between people, and the increasing necessity of brain power, must be recognized in addition to the requirement that the world stop consigning the female half of the population to having no alternative or socially sanctioned life style other than that of raising more children. All of these things are irreversible long term trends which in no way could be turned back, and which are inevitably predetermined the sex role movement as if there had been a mathematical quorum dictating that it would occur and could not be reversed. As a poet once wrote: "... It's difficult at a time when we look around us and don't see any evidences of a real change." We must comprehend that we cannot be stopped. And I think that there can be and will be a life after sex roles.

The Lived World

Maxine Green

"The world," writes Merleau-Ponty, "is not what I think but what I live through." He is describing the ways in which human consciousness opens itself to things, the ways in which—as embodied consciousnesses—we are in the world. He speaks of a perceptual reality that underlies our cognitive structures, of a primordial landscape in which we are present to ourselves.

I want to talk about the lived worlds of women and about perceptual realities because I am so sharply aware of the degree to which they are obscured by sex and gender roles. I am convinced that the imposition of these roles makes us falsify our sense of ourselves. Muriel Rukeyser says something to this effect when, in one of her poems, she writes of "myself, split open, unable to speak, in exile from myself." And a few lines later: "No more masks! No more mythologies!" In "The Laugh of Medusa," Helene Cixous describes a "unique empire" that has been hidden, and women who "have wandered in circles, confined to the narrow room in which they've been given a deadly brainwashing." I want to point to some of the deformations due to masking and confinement in the hope that they can be repaired. My concern is for the release of individual capacities now suppressed, for the development of free and autonomous personalities. It seems to me that these require an intensified critical awareness of our relation to ourselves and to our culture, a clarified sense of our own realities.

Now it is clear enough that we encounter each other in everyday life by means of roles, patterns of behavior that are habitualized, consciously or unconsciously learned. But what *is* everyday life? It is important to recall that it constitutes an *interpreted* reality—"interpreted by men," say Berger and Luckmann, "and subjectively meaningful to them as a coherent world." As soon as we become habituated in the use of language, as soon as we begin transmuting perceived shapes and presences into symbolic forms, we become participants in that world. This means that we begin interpreting our experiences with the aid of a "stock of knowledge at hand," recipes made available by the culture for making sense of things and of other human beings, for defining our situations as we live. It is interesting that Berger and Luckmann talk of a "reality interpreted by *men*," because the constructs normally used for mapping and interpreting the common-sense world are largely those defined by males. It seems evident that, whenever they were developed, the dominant modes of ordering and categorizing experiences of private as well as public life have been functions of largely male perspectives—because, in Western culture, males have been the dominant group, the ones in power. And I include experiences of family life and childbirth as well as work, business, politics, and war. Alfred Schutz says that those who are born in any group tend to accept "the ready-made standardized scheme of the cultural pattern handed down . . . by ancestors, teachers, and authorities as an unquestioned and unquestionable guide in all the situations which normally occur within the social world." In other words, the recipes, the interpretations, are treated as wholly trustworthy; they are taken for granted, "in the absence of evidence to the contrary." Inevitably, they are internalized by women as well as men. Once internalized, even such constructs as those having to do with subordination, natural inferiority, and unequally distributed rights are taken for granted. They are objectified, then externalized. They begin to appear as objective characteristics of an objectively existent world.

When Anais Nin writes that "my maternal self is in conflict with my creative self," when she says that "creativity and femininity" seem incompatible, or that "acts of independence are likely to be punished by desertion," on some level she is reporting such phenomena as *givens*. On some level, she is unable to recall that they have been constituted, that they are part of an *interpreted* reality, that (as Helen Cixous puts it) "woman has always functioned 'within' the discourse of man. . . . " So it is with the fictional Edna Pontellier in Kate Chopin's *The Awakening*. She is listening to her husband moving about his room, "every sound indicating impatience and irritation."

> Another time she would have gone in at his request. She would, through habit, have yielded to his desire; not with any sense of submission or obedience to his compelling wishes, but unthinkingly, as we walk, move, sit, stand, go through the daily treadmill of the life which has been portioned out to us.

She accedes "unthinkingly." This means she takes for granted, not simply the reality of male domination and conjugal rights, but a vision of life as a treadmill, of a fate "portioned out" in a fashion that has nothing to do with choice. These notions are associated with sex roles, not with the sexuality of the woman concerned, not with the body as an "original source of perspective," the means by which subjectivity enters the world. Because they have to do with roles and not perceived realities, they connect with the everyday or common-sense realities in which people live most of their lives. They tend, therefore, to overwhelm or to suppress a variety of alternative interpretations, alternative realities—like those of art, or dream, or play. They do so because the conceived world, the constructed world, is so frequently at odds with the perceived world; and it is difficult, especially for women, to grant perceived realities the integrity they deserve.

Consider Edna Pontellier again—beginning her life on a Kentucky plantation, grasping her space at first through a bodily situation that involved a sea of grass through which she could run, which she could feel. As Merleau-Ponty would see it, the smells and colors of that place were "themselves different modalities of [her] co-existence with the world." The distances, the different points in the spaces of the plantation were "relations between those points and a central perspective," the body of the little girl. In any case, this was where Edna came in touch with the world, where she first grasped it in a here-and-now sense. And this was where, at ten years old, Edna had a fantasy love affair with a cavalry officer and, when threatened by the stern prayers of her Presbyterian father, ran to take refuge in the grass. Then the social world takes

over: she marries, begins playing the role of wife, taking on what the author describes as a "fictitious self." Her awakening occurs at the seashore, when she turns away from the Creole mother-women and responds to a flirtatious young man. For the first time she begins "to realize her position in the universe as a human being." More significantly, she is seduced by the voice of the sea, "inviting the soul to wander for a spell in abysses of solitude; to lose itself in mazes of inward contemplation." She confuses the stirring of a long-suppressed sexuality with a hidden authenticity, the emergence of a true self; and at length, in despair at abandonment, in fear of possible promiscuity, in defiance of the "soul's slavery" of domesticity, she swims out to sea and drowns. Her suicide is not only due to repression and depression, although it can be explained that way. It is due also to the falsification occasioned by the role she was forced to play, given the late nineteenth-century moment, her social class, her husband's demands. It is, in part, a crisis of meaningfulness: she has no way of grounding what she feels; she has no way of confronting her own relationship to the world.

Merleau-Ponty says that "the experience of perception is our presence at the moment when things, truths, values are constituted for us." He writes that "perception is a nascent logos"; that "it teaches us, outside all dogmatism, the true conditions of objectivity itself, that it summons us to the tasks of knowledge and action." It is not simply that perceptual experience is in some sense primordial, that it refers to our original landscapes, the background of our lived lives. Nor is it simply that perception remains foundational to a developing rationality. Perceptual reality ought always to be considered one of the multiple realities available to us: a recognizable set of experiences, once they are reflected upon, characterized by a distinctive mode of attention, one too many people have repressed or refused. I believe that the ability to come in touch with "the moment when things, truths, values are constituted for us" permits us to break some of the hold of the taken-for-granted when it comes to the already constituted categories by which we interpret the world. In the case of Edna Pontellier, an ability to remain grounded in her earliest relations to her surroundings might have given her some awareness of the way she had built up a meaningful world. It might have kept her in touch with her own perspective, her own vantage point, and allowed her to resist the arbitrariness, the distortions of some of the roles she was forced to play. The spiritualization of women like Edna, the infantilization, the mystification that convinced her of inevitability: all these might have been allayed if she had been somehow able to realize that she lived in a constructed reality, that it was possible to choose along with others, possible even to transcend.

My sense of the oppressiveness of gender roles does not move me to think about recovering a "natural," spontaneous, untrammeled self uncorrupted by the world. I cannot conceive Edna Pontellier or Anaïs Nin or anyone else existing as a human being apart from social relations and social roles. My point has to do with what William James calls the "sense of our own reality, that sense of our own life which we at every moment possess." He talks about the things that have "intimate and continuous connection" with our lives, things whose reality we do not doubt. And he says that the world of those living realities becomes the "hook from which the rest dangles, the absolute support." Without a sense of those realities, we are likely to lose touch with our own projects, to become "invisible" in Ralph Ellison's sense, to think of ourselves as others define us, not as we create ourselves.

If we can be present to ourselves and look through perspectives rooted in our own reality, we may be in a position to confront arbitrariness and oppression. The alternative may be the narcissism, egotism, touchiness, and the rest that Simone de Beauvoir attributes to powerlessness. Talking about the woman who is shut up in the kitchen or boudoir, de Beauvoir says that, since she is deprived "of all possibility of concrete communication with others," she experiences no solidarity. "She could hardly be expected, then, to transcend herself toward the general welfare. She stays obstinately within the one realm that is familiar to her, where she can control things and in the midst of which she enjoys a precarious sovereignty." Such a person is seldom able to grasp the masculine universe "which she respects from afar, without daring to venture into it." She develops a magical conception of reality which she projects into the male world; "the course of events seems to her to be inevitable. . . ." I think of the narrator of Grace Paley's story, "The Used Boy Raisers," listening to her present husband and her ex-husband (whom she names "Pallid" and "Livid") battling over religion. She is drawn into their quarrel when they remind her that she is Jewish; and she tells them that she believes in the Diaspora and is against Israel "on technical grounds," because she objects to the Jews being like every other temporal nationality. She says:

> Jews have one hope only — to remain a remnant in the basement of world affairs — no, I mean something else — a splinter in the toe of civilizations, a victim to aggravate the conscience.
>
> Livid and Pallid were astonished at my outburst, since I rarely express my opinion on any serious matter but only live out my destiny, which is to be, until my expiration date, laughingly the servant of man.

It may be that she is associating her own plight as a woman with what she sees as the proper destiny of the Jews; but what is striking is the presentation of a woman who stays obstinately in her own realm, who submits to what she thinks of as her destiny. She says marriage "just ties a man down"; she organizes the "greedy day" with its tasks of motherhood and domesticity; she watches her husband from a distance, moving off "on paths which are not my concern." There are others, so many others in and out of literature. The difficulty is (as it was for Edna, and for Nora in *The Doll's House*) that their justifications are always in the hands of others. They keep waiting for male approval, male gratitude, male support. Without grounding, without a sense of themselves, they live, at best, in a kind of negation. They are not self-conscious enough, self-reflective enough, sisterly enough to undo the work of socialization; their personal development is necessarily frustrated; they are submerged in their roles.

Again, if we are in touch with ourselves and in concrete communication with others, we have a ground against which to consider the mystifications that work on us, the inequities that prevail even today in this presumably liberated time. I believe that it is necessary to look into the darkness, into the terrible blankness that creeps over so many women's lives, into the wells of victimization and powerlessness. I am never surprised, for some reason, to discover in many books written by women that the death of a female heroine creates no stir in the universe. Consider

Edna Pontellier's suicide. There is no scene of recognition, not even a funeral scene. Think of Lily Bart's suicide in *The House of Mirth*. There is a slight, sad stirring on Selden's part; a small leaf has fallen from a tree. Consider *To the Lighthouse* and the death of Mrs. Ramsay, who is the glowing, ambivalent center of the first section of the book. The second section, called "Time Passes," deals with dark nights and an empty house, the winds, and the waves. Suddenly, parenthetically, there are the following sentences: "Mr. Ramsay stumbling along a passage stretched his arms out one dark morning; but, Mrs. Ramsay having died rather suddenly the night before, he stretched his arms out. They remained empty." I am not saying that all women's deaths go unnoticed in women's novels (although I would note that there is undoubtedly more suicide and madness in women's literature than in men's). I am suggesting that there is no female version of a Hamlet in women's literature, no one telling a friend like Horatio to absent herself from felicity a while "to tell my story." Nor, in women's literature, is there normally an Ishmael who escapes to tell, to give the tragedy some meaning under the sky. I suspect that is what Virginia Woolf had in mind when she conceived her fiction about Shakespeare's sister. Contemplating a woman of the sixteenth century with the capacity to render the human condition in a play, Woolf writes that any such woman "would certainly have gone crazed, shot herself, or ended her days in some lonely cottage outside the village, half witch, half wizard, feared and mocked at." Perhaps this is part of our perceived reality too.

But there are other ills, more remediable ills, to be confronted by the woman grounded enough to see. Listen to Virginia Woolf again, this time comparing the difficulties faced by a woman writer with those plaguing men.

> The indifference of the world which Keats and Flaubert and other men of genius have found so hard to bear was in her case not indifference but hostility. The world did not say to her as it said to them, Write if you choose; it makes no difference to me. The world said with a guffaw, Write? What's the good of your writing? Here the psychologists . . . might come to our help, I thought, looking again at the blank spaces on the shelves. For surely it is time that the effect of discouragement on the mind of the artist should be measured, as I have seen a dairy company measure the effect of ordinary milk and Grade A milk upon the body of the rat.

To change the universe of discourse for an instant, listen to Catharine R. Stimpson, talking about National Endowment for the Arts grants to men and women:

> If census data show 66 percent of musicians are male, 88 percent of individual NEA grants are to men. On the other hand, if census data show 63 percent of painters and sculptors are male, they got but 60 percent of the individual grants. Of the three sample years, 1972 was the best for women as a whole, which may show an effect of the women's movement and the new consciousness about sex roles. In 1970, women received just under 15 percent of the individual awards, in 1968 about 18 percent. A preliminary conclusion that might be drawn is that NEA has not only reflected but sustained a masculinized ideology of the working artist. Microcosm may nurture macrocosm.

And then Stimpson goes on to talk about the way male perspectives have dominated the arts and distorted "our visions of sex and gender." This is simply because men and women have dissimilar experiences which affect their perceptions of themselves and of each other; and, until women are given full access to the arts, their range will be limited, their complexities less than they should be. Again, this is part of what has to be confronted, not as part of a "given" and unchangeable reality, but as a problematic application of gender categories, at odds with our sense of what is real.

Again, I am arguing for an intensified awareness of our own realities, the shape of our own lived worlds. Not only might this make possible a clear perception of the arbitrariness, the absurdity (as well as the inequity) involved in genderizing such fields as the arts, the sciences, yes, and school administration. It might also provoke us into confrontations of our authentic corporeal selves. As is well known, women writers—and, particularly, feminist writers—have diversified approaches to the biosocial nature of women. Please note, I am not now speaking of sex or gender roles; I am speaking of sexuality, the distinctiveness of the body that carries subjectivity into the world. As I do so, I want to try to separate what we think about it from the manifold stereotypes, those that associate it with biological destiny, with evil, with the spiritual, the passive, the irrational. And, certainly, I want to distinguish it from the kind of male view exemplified by Harry Wilborne in William Faulkner's *The Wild Palms*. In that book, Harry muses "on that efficiency of women in the mechanics, the domiciling of cohabitation. Not thrift, not husbandry, something far beyond that, who (the entire race of them) employed with infallible instinct, a completely sincere celebrated rapport for the type and nature of male partner and situation. . . ."

Alice Rossi, writing in a recent *Daedalus*, uses a "biosocial perspective" through which to consider some of the new egalitarian ideologies that deny innate sex differences and demand that fathers play equal roles when it comes to child care. Making the point that "sex is an invariant ascription from birth to death," she goes on to talk about the cultural determinists among social scientists and activists, who (she says) "confuse equality with identity and diversity with inequality." Diversity, she writes, "is a biological fact, while equality is a political, ethical, and social precept." It is not necessary to recapitulate Rossi's interesting and complex argument in order to make the point based partly on the grounds of studies in endocrinology and physiology, which argues for the central place of women in parenting. She talks about innate predispositions on the part of mothers to relate intensely to their infants, about the influence upon women of hormonal cyclicity, pregnancy, and birth. At no time does she recommend that all women have children, although she does recommend that women who choose to have children avoid giving them over to communal childrearing centers, where youngsters may become "neglected, joyless creatures." And she does acknowledge the social deprivation of many women and argue for social support systems of many kinds.

I bring this article up not merely for its intrinsic importance but also because it seems to me to relate to the themes I have been trying to explore. The confusion Rossi talks about—the confusion of diversity with equality—is a function of the general tendency to permit cultural factors to overwhelm the lived world. Once we come in touch, not only with the lived world but also with our primordial landscapes and with our coporeal involvements, we cannot avoid coming in touch with our sexuality as well. After all, our distinctiveness as sexual beings affects the ways in

which we grasp the world around us; it influences the modalities of our "co-existence" with that world. Domination by our sex *roles*, I am convinced, is what moves so many of us to deny or belittle or lament our sexual reality. Current calls for anti-sexism are heard in the domain of social reality; they have much the same effect as traditional expressions of shame and guilt. The consequence is, very often, that we divert attention from significant questions of family policy and child-care policy to misplaced calls for equity. Nothing I have said—and nothing Alice Rossi has said—is meant to suggest that one way of life is best or that all women who choose to bear children should forever give up ideas of working or composing or becoming Shakespeare's sisters. Again, it is a matter of grounding, of rooting our choices in perceived realities, in what we grasp as our own lived worlds.

There is another modern novel that deals with some of this, albeit in a mysterious and troubling way: *Surfacing*, by the Canadian writer Margaret Atwood. The heroine is Canadian, returning from a long sojourn in the United States to the wilderness where she grew up. In search of her lost father, she is accompanied by three sophisticated, urban friends; but she is absorbed in the recovery of her own past, her own landscape, as she is in struggling against all labels, falsifications and, finally, all enclosures. An abortion she has had signifies victimization to her; American hunters on the lake signify male violation and destruction; ordinary language signifies deformation. She dreams of rejecting passivity by having a baby herself, "squatting on old newspapers in a corner alone; or on leaves, dry leaves, a heap of them. . . ." Alone on her island, she slips out of her clothes, out of human habitation, into inchoateness, a pantheist reality—what she thinks of as her own space, her ritual plunge. And finally:

> This above all, to refuse to be a victim. Unless I can do that I can do nothing. I have to recant, to give up the old belief that I am powerless and because of it nothing I can do will ever hurt anyone. A lie which was always more disastrous than the truth would have been. The word games, the winning and losing games are finished; at the moment there are no others but they will have to be invented, withdrawing is no longer possible and the alternative is death. I drop the blanket on the floor and go into my dismantled room. My spare clothes are here, knife slashes in them but I can still wear them. I dress, clumsily, unfamiliar with buttons; I reenter my own time.

Her lover appears on the shore, "a mediator, an ambassador, offering me something: captivity in any of its forms, a new freedom?" She knows she must return to words and houses, that they may well fail again. And the only way back she can find is through a freely chosen pregnancy.

This is extreme, of course. The reality explored may be the reality of psychosis; again, salvation lies somewhere in the past, in a retracing of the trail. But the dissonance between the narrator's perceived landscape and the taken for granted world of gender roles and power is brutally clear. What happens when ordinary barriers are breached, accepted forms destroyed? If alternative constructs are not devised, madness may be the consequence. Where is the freedom that is not linked to manipulative power? How do we go about remaking the constituted world?

Catharine Stimpson talks about a need for "a compensatory consciousness about sex, gender, and culture," and a recovery of women's contributions to the arts of the past. Carol Gould talks of the importance of demystification and "the elimination of . . . those illusions that bind us to exploitation." Virginia Woolf talks of living "in the presence of reality"—and having a "room of one's own." It is clear that the interest in socialization, in sex-typing, in role differentiation has led to notable discoveries. We understand more than we ever have about what has frustrated the self-identification of women, what has prevented free choosing in an open world. Many of the inquiries have had the effect of moving certain women to reexamination of their own presuppositions, their own roles. There has been—and there must be—an increasing effort to transform teaching practice, to revise teaching materials, to invent new approaches to work and play.

I believe all this must be supplemented by the kind of emancipatory thinking which enables us to confront the ways in which we have constructed our social reality—and to regain touch with our lived worlds. Like Virginia Woolf, I believe in the power of imaginative literature, of novels that allow one to see "more intensely afterwards," that make the world seem "bared of its covering and given an intenser life." A good work of fiction, writes Sartre, is an "exigence and a gift"; also, it is an act of faith.

> And if I am given this world with its injustices, it is not so that I might contemplate them coldly, but that I might animate them with my indignation, that I might disclose them with their nature as injustices, that is, as abuses to be suppressed. Thus, the writer's universe will only reveal itself in all its depth to the examination, the admiration, and the indignation of the reader. . . .

To read Muriel Rukeyser or Grace Paley or Virginia Woolf is to be given a gift, which we can receive if we are attentive, if we are willing to bracket out everydayness, conformity, and fear. Moreover, as Sartre also says, the work of art is an act of confidence in human freedom. Freedom is the power of vision and the power to choose. It involves the capacity to assess situations in such a way that lacks can be defined, openings identified, possibilities revealed. It is realized only when action is taken to repair the lacks, to move through the openings, to try to pursue real possibilities. One of the strengths of imaginative literature is that it can enable us to assume new standpoints on what we take for granted, to animate certain constructs with our indignation, so that we can see them as sources of the injustice that plagues us, see them, not as givens, but as constituted by human beings and changeable by human beings. The imaginative leap can lead to the leap that is *praxis*, the effort to remake and transcend.

This is another dimension of the effort to define sexual equality in the modern age. The aesthetic and the imaginative can never substitute for social scientific or biosocial inquiry, although they may provoke new modes of inquiry because of the manner in which imaginative forms present a reality ordinarily obscured. Without articulation, without expression, the perceived world is in some way nullified; until given significant form, it holds no significance except in the prereflective domain. That is why literature may provide a resource, an inroad into a province of meaning that is associated, not so much with the "reality interpreted by men and subjectively meaningful to them," but with the world of the "nascent logos," the lived world of women. And considering that world, I choose to end with more lines from Muriel Rukeyser, these from "Kathe Kollwitz":

> What would happen if one woman told the truth about her life?
> The world would split open

Ambiguous Sex in the Newborn: Genital Anomalies

Maria I. New

Although it is a rare problem, ambiguous sex in the newborn is an emergency. The decision as to sex assignment at birth has obvious lifelong implications; in addition to establishing legal sex, it determines the type of socialization the child will be given and its eventual gender role identification. A rational approach to the problem permits a careful assessment of it and a judicious choice of sex assignment.

Early sexual identification can be divided into several aspects which appear in the chronological order shown in Figure 1.

FIGURE 1

Aspects of sexual identification as they appear chronologically



It can be noted that the nursery room sex which is the key in the child's later gender role depends on the external genitalia generally evaluated by an obstetrician's glance in the delivery room. When all aspects of sexual identification are the same (isosexual), then the nursery room sex assignment is correct. However, in situations in which all aspects of sexual identification are not alike, the external body sex may be misleading.

A. *Female Pseudohermaphroditism*

A common and representative example is the infant female pseudohermaphrodite with congenital adrenal hyperplasia (New, 1968:395). In this disorder the fetal adrenal produces excess androgens which cause the external genitalia in the female to masculinize. A superficial visual examination, such as an obstetrician's glance in the delivery room, results in identification of the child as a male.

Using the above scheme (Figure 1) the sexual identification would be as follows (Figure 2):

FIGURE 2

Female pseudohermaphrodite due to congenital adrenal hyperplasia with incorrect assignment to male sex at birth.



The assignment of this infant to the male sex is particularly tragic, since with proper treatment the infant could become a reproductive female capable of marriage and motherhood. The error could have been avoided by a systematic approach to the problem. The *gonadal sex* can be ascertained by means of a buccal smear to determine whether the infant is chromatin positive (bears at least two X chromosomes) or chromatin negative (bears only one X chromosome).

Gonadal sex (Figure 2) is difficult to ascertain without exploratory laparotomy except in the case of congenital adrenal hyperplasia, which can be identified by other means (see below). *Internal body sex* (Figure 2) can be evaluated by a vaginogram which may demonstrate an indentation in the contrast medium produced by the cervix. This is good evidence for the presence of a uterus.

The diagnosis of female pseudohermaphroditism due to congenital adrenal hyperplasia can be made readily, if suspected, by two tests: (1) buccal smear indicating female genetic sex, and (2) a measurement of urinary 17-ketosteroids which are metabolites of the adrenal androgens excreted into the urine. In congenital adrenal hyperplasia, the urinary 17-ketosteroids are markedly increased because adrenal androgens are overproduced.

Congenital adrenal hyperplasia is an inborn error of metabolism transmitted by an autosomal recessive gene, in which there is a specific defect of steroid hydroxylation. Administration of hydrocortisone in proper amounts sup-

presses the excessive androgen production and permits normal growth and development. Since the genetic, gonadal, and internal body sex are normal, repair of the external genitalia and medical treatment complete restoration to female function. This is a deficiency disease requiring lifelong medical therapy. The plastic surgery repair of the external genitalia can be postponed until puberty if the clitoris is not so large that it represents a disturbing malformation to the mother or child and affects the gender role of the child. If the clitoris is relatively small and the mother is not upset by its presence, it frequently is inconspicuous at puberty when it is obscured by pubic hair, and clitorectomy may not be necessary. Repair of the labial fusion and urogenital sinus should always be postponed until regular sexual intercourse occurs to prevent recurrence of the labial fusion.

Ambiguous genitalia due to congenital adrenal hyperplasia is the most common intersex problem seen (Wilkins, 1972:282). Because female pseudohermaphroditism due to congenital adrenal hyperplasia is a correctable condition, in which pregnancy is possible, it is essential that female sex is assigned as early as possible. It is better to delay telling the parents and other relatives the sex of the baby until proper systematic diagnostic tests are carried out than to make an impulsive erroneous diagnosis. The two tests necessary, the buccal smear and the 17-ketosteroids, can be carried out in 48 hours, a time worth waiting for the proper lifelong sex assignment. Should the female with congenital adrenal hyperplasia be misdiagnosed as a male, it is inadvisable to change the sex after one and a half years of age; ample evidence exists that such a change is ineffective in changing the gender role identification of the child after eighteen months of socialization (Money, 1968:539).

Female pseudohermaphroditism with external genitalia similar to the female with congenital adrenal hyperplasia may result from the administration of androgens or progestational hormones to the mother during the first trimester of pregnancy (VanWyk, 1968:592). The diagnostic tests are the same. In this case, however, the urinary 17-ketosteroids are not elevated. Treatment consists only of surgical correction.

B. *Male Pseudohermaphroditism*

The diagnostic approach to female pseudohermaphroditism indicated above may be utilized for male pseudohermaphroditism as well. The steps for complete male differentiation may be enumerated as follows (Federman, 1959:105):

1. Gonadal differentiation into testis.
2. Repression of Mullerian duct precursors of uterus and fallopian tubes.
3. Development of vas deferens, seminal vesicle, and epididymis from Wolffian duct anlage.
4. Phallic growth.
5. Posterior migration of labio-scrotal folds so that phallus is anterior to scrotum.
6. Midline fusion of urethra.
7. Descent of testes.

Failure of any of these steps constitutes a form of male pseudohermaphroditism. However, undescended testes and first degree hypospadias are common anomalies, readily recognized and not usually classified as problems of ambiguous sex. Generally, the male pseudohermaphrodite has a small phallus with marked hypospadias and chordee. He may show other evidences of failure of male differentiation such as the presence of vagina and uterus. The fetal testis has two major roles in the sexual differentiation of the male. The first is the production of testosterone to cause the masculinization of the external genitalia and growth of Wolffian elements. The second is the production of a nonsteroidal substance to suppress the development of the uterus. Clinical examples of failure of the fetal testis in each and both of these functions have been recorded. There are clinical syndromes which may be familial in which the male pseudohermaphrodite shows the following pattern:

Genetic sex — MALE – 46 XY — chromatin negative

Gonadal sex — MALE — testes

Body sex — internal — male

external — ambiguous or more female

The male pseudohermaphrodite may present this clinical picture because of an enzymatic defect in synthesis of testosterone (New, 1970:1930). Thus all the aspects of sexual differentiation dependent on fetal testosterone are absent, but the uterine development is suppressed because that step in differentiation is not testosterone-dependent. An example of such a male is the patient with deficiency of 3 β-ol-dehydrogenase, an enzyme necessary for testosterone synthesis (Bongiovanni, 1962:2086).

Forms of gonadal dysgenesis may demonstrate failure of the fetal testis in both its functions. Such a patient usually shows a chromosomal mosaicism with XY/XO. This male would be chromatin negative. He may have a testis and a streak gonad, a uterus and fallopian tubes, and ambiguous genitalia. Diagnosis of this condition, termed mixed gonadal dysgenesis, usually requires exploratory laparotomy (Federman, 1959:137).

Testicular feminization. The most extreme form of male pseudohermaphroditism, testicular feminization, demonstrates no sexual ambiguity at all. The patient appears to be an *unambiguous* female. In this disorder, there is total unresponsiveness of the tissues to the testosterone produced in normal quantities by the testis. The result is an apparent and virtual testosterone deficiency. Thus the only step of male differentiation accomplished by the fetal testis is the non-testosterone dependent one, i.e., uterus suppression. Thus the male with testicular feminization appears to be a perfect female, but he has no uterus; and at puberty the testes may descend. Although the children are always raised as females, the diagnosis of male pseudohermaphroditism is made at puberty when there is amenorrhea and the absence of uterus is discovered. The diagnosis may be suspected in a female infant if another female in the family has been recognized, because it is a familial disorder. The only treatment required in these patients is castration since there is a high risk of malignancy in the undescended testis after thirty years of age. In the scheme the following events would be documented:

Genetic sex — MALE — 46/XY chromatin negative

Gonadal sex — MALE — testes (undescended)

Body sex — internal — no uterus or vas deferens

external — female

always assigned to female sex

C. *True Hermaphroditism*

Patients with true hermaphroditism have both gonadal tissues—testis and ovary. Their genetic sex is usually female 46 XX, but they may demonstrate mosaicism with XX XY. The internal and external genitalia follow no sex pattern. The diagnosis is usually made by exploratory laparotomy.

Sex assignment in male pseudohermaphroditism and in true hermaphroditism: The assignment of sex and sex of rearing should depend on the prospect for best sexual function. If a male pseudohermaphrodite has a phallus so small that surgical correction for sexual function is impossible, then a *female* sex assignment should be made—irrespective of genetic or gonadal sex. Fertility is rarely possible for male pseudohermaphrodites because the Wolffian structures, vas deferens, epididymis are rarely well formed. Proof of the presence of testis should not constitute sufficient evidence for male sex assignment.

Since the decision in the delivery room as to sex assignment is so important, it should receive careful deliberation and a systematic diagnostic approach. There is no in-between gender in our society. The physician must make the best decision and try to educate the family to the biological and cultural continuity between male and female. Having made the sex assignment, the physician should assure the family it was the correct and best one. In intersex disorders, the geneticist, the pediatrician, the internist, the endocrinologist, the surgeon, and the psychiatrist, cooperating as a team, can give patients the maximum benefit of their experience and offer the optimal solution to the problem.

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SEX DIFFERENCES: Psychological Aspects

Elizabeth Hagen

I found the preparation for this presentation to be an extremely frustrating experience. My frustrations did not arise from a scarcity of literature on sex differences. There are thousands of pages in numerous journals reporting on sex differences of various kinds. Rather, my frustrations stem from the lack of consistency in findings on sex differences, the poor quality of the research, and the poor reporting of research in this area. How can one discuss the psychological basis of sex differences when one can find few sex differences in psychological attributes which have been replicated, and when one has very little confidence in the research? Let me review several aspects of the literature on sex differences that trouble me.

After one has categorized the results of the studies, one is left with contradictory findings about sex differences. When the results of studies are as inconsistent as these are, one would like to be able to examine the methodology and samples used to try to determine the reasons underlying the discrepant findings. Most of the studies are so poorly reported that it is impossible to determine the relevant characteristics of the samples used or of the settings in which the study was done. Many of the studies that report findings on sex differences were not primarily designed to study sex differences. The authors of these studies decided to report their findings separately by males and by females and these are the sources for most of the reported sex differences. In addition, most of the studies that have reported on sex differences in aptitudes or achievement have used instruments that have been constructed to minimize or eliminate sex differences in performance. If one wants to study sex differences in aptitudes or achievements, then one should use materials and tasks that are likely to maximize these differences. It is only through the use of these kinds of materials that one will be able to determine what kinds of content or mental processes yield significant differences in performance between the two sexes. To construct such instruments would require a well-developed theoretical base but such a base has been sadly lacking in the majority of studies on sex differences. At this time, I think the evidence on sex differences is so tenuous that there are few valid statements that can be made about them. Therefore, I will talk about the myths, beliefs, and stereotypes that relate to sex differences.

Maccoby and Jacklin (1974), in their extensive review of the literature on sex differences, classified them under the headings of (1) myths—those that were not supported by research; (2) documented beliefs—those that they judged the literature supported; and (3) undocumented beliefs—those that were either untested or for which results were so ambiguous that no definitive statements could be made about them. Let me use their categories to discuss the status of the field.

First, the myths. One common myth is that females are more social than males. The findings of various studies simply do not support this statement. A few studies have shown that the friendship patterns of males and females differ, with the males showing a wide range of friendships or acquaintance relationships, and females tending to have restricted friendship patterns. But even this difference in pattern of social relations is not well established. In addition, the difference is more probably attributable to differences in rearing and controlling males and females in the family than to any basic pyschological differences between males and females.

A second myth is that females are more suggestible than males. There is nothing in the literature that would support this statement. Laboratory experiments on suggestibility reveal no sex-differences in suggestibility.

A third myth is that females have lower self-esteem or confidence or poorer self-concepts than males. It is extremely difficult to compare the studies that investigated these attributes. First, the definitions of the attributes and the operations used to appraise them have varied across studies. The settings in which the studies have been conducted have varied. It is no wonder that the findings have been extremely inconsistent. One of the major weaknesses of the studies is that the investigators have tended to view self-esteem or self-concept as unitary traits that are constant across settings. A little thought about our own behavior could be enlightening. If one thinks about the variety of tasks and variety of settings that each of us faces in life, it should be quite clear that each of us has a high level of self-esteem or self-confidence or self-concept when faced with certain tasks or certain settings and a lower level when faced with others. In others words, we have a number of different self-concepts. There is absolutely no evidence that females rate themselves lower in self-esteem in a larger number of settings than do males.

I could go on discussing similar areas; however, nothing would be gained by it. In summation, there is no support for any of the following statements: (1) Males have internal locus of control, females external locus of control; (2) Males are superior in solving high level cognitive problems whereas females are superior at rote learning; (3) Males are more analytic in their thinking, females more holistic; (4) Males are field independent, females field dependent; and (5) Males have a higher level of achievement motivation than females. Numbers 4 and 5 merit special comment because they illustrate clearly some of the serious difficulties with the research in the field. Field dependence-independence is usually appraised by the Rod and Frame Test or the Embedded Figures Test. Both of these tests load heavily on a spatio-visual reasoning factor. It is well known that females score lower on spatio-visual tasks than do males. Can females then be judged as more field dependent than males when the appraisal of the attribute is heavily contaminated with another ability? My answer is no. One would have to compare male and female groups that are equal on basic spatio-visual reasoning skills to determine whether these are differences in field depend-

ence-independence. If one controls for spatio-visual ability, then one will most likely find the sex differences in field dependence-independence will disappear.

The literature on achievement motivation is equally suspect, or at least people's reading of it is. In laboratory studies, under neutral conditions, females reveal either a higher achievement motivation level than males or one that is equal to that of males. If the stimulus used to appraise achievement motivation is presented under conditions designed to arouse competitiveness or ego threat, then males tend to increase their levels of achievement motivation more than do females. Most of the statements about sex differences in such studies do not support the statements. The findings could just as well be interpreted as differential responses to laboratory induced factors. It should also be recognized that all measuring instruments have ceilings and that the person who starts low on a scale has more room to increase than one who starts high on the scale.

Better data on achievement motivation can be obtained by examining the large data base on correlations between predictors of achievement and criteria of performance. This data base unequivocally reveals that correlations for females are significantly higher than those for males. In other words, females consistently show levels of achievement that would have been predicted from previous known factors. Certainly these correlational data indicate that achievement motivation is as high or higher in females than it is in males.

The myths related to sex differences are not easily dispelled. Although they have no basis in fact, they continue to influence how and what people think about males and females; thus, they continue to contribute to stereotypes about sex-roles and sex differences. It is important to recognize this, because the stereotypes influence how people behave toward males and females.

Now let us examine some of the sex differences that are, supposedly, more unambiguously supported by the research literature. First we will discuss sex differences in verbal ability. The findings have been rather consistent that females perform better than males on tests of spelling, language usage, and effectiveness of expression. The findings have been less consistent on tests of verbal ability, and when differences have been found, they have generally been small, less than one-half of a standard deviation. Although the differences may have been statistically significant, the smallness of the difference is not reflected in observable behavioral differences. Most of the discussions of these differences focus on mean scores for males and females and completely ignore differences in variability of performance. Males tend to show greater variability in performance on verbal tests than do females; therefore you tend to find more boys with extreme scores. This accounts for the finding that there are more boys in remedial reading classes than girls and a few more boys than girls in gifted classes. One serious limitation in the literature is the tendency to treat verbal ability as a single unitary ability when it is actually a collection of a number of somewhat independent abilities. Another serious limitation of the literature is that most of the instruments that have been used to appraise verbal ability are those in which items have been selected to minimize sex differences in total score. It seems obvious to state that these are inappropriate instruments to appraise sex differences in verbal ability.

To me the most interesting areas in which consistent sex differences have been found are spatio-visual reasoning and mechanical reasoning. Although there are many instruments purporting to measure spatio-visual ability, the correlations among the instruments are modest, indicating that we are not dealing with a single, unitary ability but a collection of abilities. Some spatio-visual tasks can be solved verbally, and on these types of tasks one finds no consistent sex differences. Other spatio-visual tasks are too complex and too novel to express in verbal terms. As one investigator stated, "Have you ever tried to describe a spiral staircase using only words?" It is on these latter tasks that one finds consistent and large sex differences, with males generally scoring higher than females. Why this is so is not clear. The evidence indicates that many spatio-visual tasks represent novel stimuli for the examinee. There is a large practice effect on these types of tasks with examinees scoring much higher on a second administration than on the first. This indicates that experience with materials is a factor in performance. Educational programs that have focused on training people in problem solving using spatio-visual tasks have also succeeded in raising examinees' scores. Although both males and females increase their levels of performance, repeated testing or educational programs do not significantly reduce the difference between male and female performance.

These differences in performance have led to the generation of a number of interesting hypotheses about underlying causes of the differences, but no one of the hypotheses has been adequately tested as yet. Some hypothesize that the sex differences are entirely due to cultural influences that affect the types of activities that males and females engage in. Schools, in general, pay little or no attention to the development of spatio-visual or mechanical abilities. Advocates of the cultural hypothesis believe that the sex differences in performance of spatio-visual tasks will disappear as females are encouraged in schools and out of schools to engage in experiences that develop these abilities. At the present time there is no adequate evidence to support or refute these claims. The second hypothesis is based on genetic differences between males and females. It has been stated that spatio-visual abilities are sex-linked hereditary characteristics and are determined at birth. Recent brain research indicates that there are biological differences in brain development between males and females. According to these researchers, spatio-visual stimuli are typically processed by the right hemisphere of the brain whereas verbal and quantitative stimuli are processed by the left hemisphere. Some of these researchers state that the left hemisphere develops faster in females than in males and that lateralization or specialization in function of the two hemispheres develops earlier and more frequently in males than in females. According to one researcher, most females do not develop lateralization of function at all. These are interesting hypotheses, but there is one observation that bothers me. If the left hemisphere develops faster than the right in females and if the left hemisphere processes both verbal and quantitative stimuli, then why don't females show exceptional mathematical talent?

I think that by now I have made my major point, which is that in spite of the large volume of literature, we have little or no sound evidence on sex differences in abilities, achievement, or personality. To get this evidence, the research needs to have a better theoretical orientation and better instrumentation. Until we do have better evidence on sex differences, I think it best not to speculate about

underlying psychological or biological explanations for unknown differences.

In closing, I do want to state that stereotypes about sex roles and sex differences are alive and well. Recent research in industry has indicated clearly that the stereotypes lead to expectations of how males and females will act and behave. If they act contrary to the stereotype, both supervisors and subordinates will rate their performance as unsatisfactory. This has important implications, particularly for women as they attempt to assume careers and positions that were typically occupied by males. There is a real need for research in this area, both in understanding how the stereotypes are formed and in learning how to destroy them.

Socialization for Sex-Role Differentiation

Patrick C. Lee

Socialization for sex-role differentiation is a large and complex topic which cannot be fully covered in a short paper. I have adopted an organizing perspective which, I hope, will shed light on the topic without doing too much damage to its inherent complexity. From this perspective, differentiated sex roles are viewed as *cultural inventions*, and socialization as the process of implementing those inventions. Let me begin by briefly describing what I mean by cultural inventions.

Human cultures invent ways of thinking about human beings. That is, they invent roles to which given types of people are assigned, regardless of individual variation within the types. Two illustrations will help to support and clarify this notion.

First, different cultures have different ways of thinking about the same biological groupings. For example, how old people are thought about depends on their cultural membership. In Chinese society old people are objects of reverence and respect. In American society they are often viewed as useless and as aesthetically unappealing. Certainly there are fewer advantages to growing old in America than in China. The traditional Eskimo view of old people is a rather extreme one. Among the Eskimos, old people have traditionally been expected to commit suicide voluntarily so as not to be a burden on the community. This example dramatically illustrates the point that different cultures invent different ways of thinking about the same kinds of people, whether those people be biologically old, biologically young, biologically male, or biologically female.

A second support for the notion that roles are cultural inventions can be found by looking at the same culture at two different points in time. Basic changes in information, technology, social organization, or economics often change the way a particular culture views a certain group. For example, American culture has reinvented its way of thinking about young children in the last twenty years. Early childhood specialists used to define young children primarily as social-emotional beings without any significant intellectual resources or needs. However, since the widespread acceptance of Piaget's theory, all of us have given intellectual development a central place in our conception of young children. In fact, it has become a central part of our thinking about their emerging sex identities as well, as we shall see below in discussing Kohlberg's ideas about sex-role socialization. The point here is that new and persuasive information about early childhood has required us to reinvent our way of thinking about young children, that is, to modify our perception of the young child's role in its social and physical milieu. Young children are biologically unchanged. What has changed is our way of thinking about them.

Similarly, sex role is a cultural invention. It is a way of thinking about biological males and females. It is also a way of telling biological males and females how they should think about themselves or, to put it most simply, what they are.

If we can accept the proposition that sex role is a cultural invention, i.e., a set of ideas about biological males and females, then one key to understanding "socialization for sex role differentiation," the title of this paper, is to examine the ideas we have about males and females, the origin of these ideas in human development, and how these ideas can be reinvented. I'd like to speak briefly to each of these points.

First, I'll review the major Western theories of sex-role differentiation. These are the most prototypical summaries, collectively, of our ideas about sex role. In the case of one theory, psychoanalysis, we have an important origin as well as summary of these ideas. Incidentally, it should be mentioned that the theories themselves are cultural inventions, that is, ways of thinking about people and, on a second level of abstraction, ways of thinking about ways of thinking about people.

After reviewing these major theories, I'll close the paper by discussing several dimensions of human existence and experience which the theories have essentially ignored. My position is that our ways of thinking about the sexes can be reinvented only through the systematic incorporation of these neglected dimensions into a more comprehensive and open-ended conceptualization of sex role and identity.

The three basic Western theories of sex-role differentiation are developmental and social-psychological in nature. Psychoanalytic theory is primarily a description of the *emotional* organization of sex identity. Social-learning theory describes the *behavioral* and *social* organization of sex identity. Cognitive-developmental theory is addressed to the *intellectual* organization of sex identity. Let me review briefly what each theory or family of theories says about sex-role socialization and differentiation.

Psychoanalysis began more as a theory of differentiation than of socialization, although later theorists such as Karen Horney (1967) and Talcott Parsons (1955) did much to translate the basic Freudian psychodynamic system into a sociodynamic one. But let's start with Freud's version. For Freud, sex-role acquisition was anchored in two key developmental events: the early attachment between mother and child and the Oedipal complex.

According to Freud the infant views the mother primarily as a *love* object, and only secondarily as an *identification* object. That is, the infant operates on the formula that "I love my mother" rather than "I am like my mother." But to love is to be active, and, in Freud's view, activity is a property of masculinity. Accordingly, infant males and females share an early "masculine" approach to the world. It is only with the second developmental event that their psychological differentiation takes a marked form. At four or five years of age children discover that one kind of child, the boy, has a penis and the other kind

of child, the girl, does not have one. The discovery of this anatomical discrepancy leads to the castration complex.

For girls the complex takes the form of "penis envy" and propels them into the Oedipal period. This second major developmental event poses a number of difficult tasks for the girl. She must transform her penis envy into a desire for a baby (called by Freud "the penis child"); she must switch her love object from mother to father; change her mother from a love object to an identification object; and displace her new-found libidinal attachment from the father to a future exogamous male.

As portrayed by Freud, then, female development is a difficult path: the young female starts as "masculine," discovers she has lost her masculinity through a fantasied loss of penis, and then must reverse her phallic developmental direction to accept vaginal femininity. This last step is accomplished only with great difficulty, delaying resolution of the Oedipal conflict and adequate superego formation. It also results in many women retaining what Freud calls a phallic component of masculine striving in their personality and sexuality.

The development of masculine identity, however, is much simpler. For boys the castration complex takes the form of "castration anxiety" and propels them out of the Oedipal period. Castration anxiety, i.e., the fear of losing one's penis, motivates the boy to sublimate the erotic component of his love for the mother, although he retains her as a love object. It also motivates a defensive identification with the father. Thus, the boy keeps his mother's love, subverts his father's aggression, gains the father as an identification object, and saves his penis. The boy starts as masculine in his early orientation to the mother, discovers that he still has his penis, i.e., his masculinity, and does what is necessary to retain his penis by internalizing paternal prohibitions against sexuality. The typical boy's development of masculine identity, as described by Freud, is less complex than the typical girl's development of feminine identity. Free of the need to undergo major developmental transformations, male development is rather straightforward and less likely to include deviant components.

It was from formulations such as these that Freud developed the "Anatomy is Destiny" principle, one which is still widely accepted by Western society, although our commitment to it becomes more sentimental and less operational with each passing season. The paradox in Freud's theory is that both male and female destiny is a function of male anatomy, that is, the highly valued penis. Female destiny is determined less by *present* female anatomy than by *absent* male anatomy.

Thus, for Freud, the standard masculine character is assertive, active, straightforward, and well developed morally. The female character is passive, receptive, and nurturant when healthy; and ambivalent, conflicted, full of masculine striving and underdeveloped morally when unhealthy. These are the cultural inventions of Freud's theory, that is, the ideal types which the theory expects biological males and females to approximate.

There have been rather drastic reformulations of Freud's interpretation by other analysts, particularly by Melanie Klein and Karen Horney. Klein (1928) sharply reversed Freud's phallocentric anatomical speculations and devised a few of her own. Klein postulated the mother as primarily an identification object and secondarily a love object. Thus, the first identification of boys and girls is feminine, *not* masculine. This leads to the boy feeling subsequent envies more keenly than the girl. He has breast envy, womb envy (because he cannot bear children), and a general envy of the basic substance and contents of the mother's body. Like Freud, Klein retained the basic notion that human personality and sex identity are grounded in anatomy. But her anatomical reference point was the mother's body (female anatomy), rather than the father's body (male anatomy).

Horney (1967) brought a more positive and culturally relativistic interpretation to the "Anatomy is Destiny" formula. She postulated that girls have penis envy and boys have breast envy. But rather than viewing these envies as predisposing to psychopathology, she saw them as predisposing children to attraction to the characteristics of the opposite sex. Horney also stressed the importance of cultural factors in the formation of sex identity. Her clinical practice led her to invoke the status arrangements of the sexes in society as a central part of "feminine psychology." The problems she noticed in her female patients, i.e., passivity, masochism, and feelings of inferiority, were viewed as reflections of the inferior social status assigned to women, rather than as anatomically based. Her culturalist persuasion ultimately forced her to break with Freud, while Klein's continuing commitment to anatomy enabled her to remain in the Freudian camp.

What has been the legacy of psychoanalytic theory? It has left us with several elaborate ways of thinking about human males and females; and it has attached the emotional values of psychological health and illness to these ways of thinking, thus making them remarkably resistant to change. As a set of ideas about men and women, psychoanalytic theory has had an extraordinarily conservative influence, despite the revisionist efforts of analysts like Horney and Klein. Although its purpose, as a theory of human psychology, was to *describe what is* as a mental health enterprise, it ended up *prescribing what ought to be*.

Let me now move to the second major Western theory of sex-role socialization and differentiation. *Social-learning theory* makes two basic assumptions about the development of sex identity. First, sex roles are culturally determined. They vary from culture to culture and, as far as the theory is concerned, they are essentially independent of biology and/or anatomy. The second assumption is that the child *learns* his or her culturally prescribed sex role. It does not emerge dynamically from the child's anatomical substrate. Social-learning theory, then, is more a theory of sex-role socialization and less a theory of sex-role differentiation (see Bandaur and Walters, 1963; Mischel; 1966, 1970).

According to social-learning theory there are two basic processes which govern the learning of one's role: reinforcement and modeling. The first process describes how children adopt the behavior of one sex over the other as a result of differential reinforcement. Society responds differently to many behaviors according to the sex of the child behaving. Boys and girls soon recognize that positive or negative social response to a class of behaviors is contingent upon their gender. Although they perform many of the same behaviors, they often do so with different frequencies or in different situations. In some few areas the discrepancy between boys' and girls' behavior frequencies may be extreme and cross-situational. In behavioral domains where the societal insistence on sex typing is less rigorous, the frequencies may be indistinguishable, and sex

differences may be manifest only in the way behaviors are patterned, if at all.

The second basic process for learning one's sex role is through modeling, i.e., the tendency for children to match their behaviors to those of available models. Behavioral matching covers a continuum ranging from direct imitation of modeled behavior; through disinhibition, i.e., expressing behavior which belongs to the same general category as modeled behavior; to countermitation and inhibition, that is, not behaving like a model does.

Anyone can be a model, although the most common models tend to be a child's parents, other important adults (e.g., teachers), friends and agemates, and media personalities. What makes a model effective has not been definitively determined, but there seems to be a rough consensus that an effective model has these characteristics: (1) availability, (2) status or power, (3) perceived similarity - this explains the tendency for children to adopt same-sex models, although the tendency is stronger for boys than for girls, (4) nurturance or friendliness, and (5) whether the model's behavior is rewarded or punished. A sixth characteristic of an effective model, I would suspect, although the literature does not make much of this, is that an adult *present* himself or herself as a model to the child. This presentation of self, accompanied by contingent reinforcement, can be a powerful combination for learning, especially if the presenting person has several of the other characteristics of an effective model, e.g., status and similarity.

It is, then, through the systematic presentation of same-sex models, backed up by direct instruction, expectations, and contingent reinforcement, that boys and girls adopt, respectively, male and female behavior repertoires. Social-learning theory itself is essentially content free: it simply describes the principles whereby behaviors are learned. The models and behaviors typed as masculine or feminine are determined by social consensus, not by theory. Thus the theory, unlike psychoanalytic theory, does not specify what sex roles ought to be, only the processes whereby they come into being. Children adopt those sex roles which are systematically presented to them, regardless of the culturally determined form or content of the roles.

Our society, for a variety of reasons, seems less able now than in the past to systematically present sex roles to boys and girls. The whole process of cultural transmission of sex roles is becoming rather unsystematic. Thus, it is common for children to respond to many sex-role models, some of which conflict with others. No child is a replica of any one model but is, among other things, a dynamic blending of the full range of available models to which he or she attends.

A final point about social-learning theory is that, as a cultural invention, it approaches a kind of chameleon purity. As culture reinvents itself, the theory is reinvented—its power to predict behavior is completely dependent upon the frequencies and conditions under which behaviors are perceived to occur in human society. As society changes, presumably reinforcement contingencies and the characteristics of available models change. When these change, the sex-role outcomes predicted by social-learning theory change accordingly.

The third major Western theory I'd like to discuss is cognitive-developmental theory. This theory makes the assumption that social and physical concepts are structurally parallel. Thus the acquisition of sex-role concepts follows the same cognitive rules as the acquisition of any concept. Using this as his starting point, Lawrence Kohlberg has argued rather persuasively that, if Piaget's theory accurately describes the development of physical concepts, such as conservation of weight and volume, then the same theoretical principles must describe the development of social concepts, such as sex identity. Kohlberg has invented the notion of *gender constancy* as the sex-role analogue of Piaget's earlier theoretical invention, widely known as physical conservation (see Kohlberg, 1966; Kohlberg and Zigler, 1967; Kohlberg and Ullian, 1975).

To be able to conserve a physical property, according to Piaget, means that one must be able to recognize that a given property remains invariant despite changes in other perceptually related properties. Thus, a cat remains a cat, even if a dog's mask is put on it. Its "catness" remains unchanged, although its appearance may change. This is an example of qualitative or generic conservation. Similarly, the amount of clay in a ball remains the same even if one drastically alters its appearance by flattening it into a pancake. This is an example of quantitative conservation. In parallel fashion, a girl remains a girl, even if she puts on a boy's clothes, plays boys' games, or temporarily allows herself to be called by a boy's name. The reason for this is that one's gender is an anatomical invariant, which does not change even though more superficial indicators of gender may vary. This is an example of "social conservation" or, more specifically, what Kohlberg calls gender constancy.

According to cognitive-developmental theory, preoperational children do not have gender constancy. That is, they can be tricked into thinking that one's gender is a function of irrelevant criteria like clothing, behavior, games, etc., because they do not yet understand that gender is a fixed and invariant anatomical characteristic. Thus cognitive-developmental theory attempts to explain sex-role acquisition in terms of cognitive maturation. It describes how sex identity is cognitively organized by young human beings, just as psychoanalytic and social-learning theories, respectively, purport to explain how sex identity is emotionally and socially organized by children.

The foregoing raises a developmental question: how does the child arrive at gender constancy? That is, how do girls take on a constant identity as girls and boys a constant identity as boys? Kohlberg views sex-role differentiation as beginning at birth with the assignment of a gender label to the child—the infant is designated as a "boy" or a "girl." The first developmental period is characterized by the child's inability to consistently apply the appropriate gender label to oneself and others. This inability, however, is accompanied by an increasing recognition that gender label is an important human descriptor. This period lasts until about three years of age.

The second period is entered when the child learns and accepts the gender label applied to him or her and can use it with consistent accuracy. At this point the label becomes an important cognitive organizer of personal and social reality, because, according to Kohlberg, gender is the only fixed aspect of the child's identity. Kohlberg maintains that the child does *not* learn masculine or feminine preferences through exposure to male or female models or as a result of differential reinforcement contingencies; but that children actively select models and selectively attend to reinforcements as a result of their sex-role preferences. Thus Kohlberg's invention is a complete reversal of the

social-learning formula. The reversal is grounded in the postulation of gender identity as a key organizer of reality for the child. Once the assigned gender label is accepted, the child assumes prime responsibility for his or her sex role socialization. Maccoby and Jacklin call this phenomenon "self socialization" (1974: 364-365).

The boy, for example, does not want to be masculine because he is reinforced for masculine behavior; but he finds masculine behavior itself reinforcing because it is consistent with his emerging gender identity as a male. Girls, however, do not seem to find feminine behavior as rewarding, thus failing to cooperate with Kohlberg's theory. Interestingly enough, he explains this away by maintaining that sex identity is more of a cognitive process for boys and more of a social imitation process for girls. This is a bit embarrassing to the theory, but it does say something for the intelligence of the young girl that she is not prepared to cognitively embrace an identity which is transparently inferior even in the eyes of young children.

The third stage is entered when the child achieves full gender constancy. This occurs around the onset of concrete operational thinking. Once children realize their gender is fixed in anatomy and not subject to the vagaries of dress, behavior, games, etc., the cognitive precondition for a reduction in stereotyped thinking has emerged. Stereotypes are necessary to preoperational children because they confirm their unstable gender identity, and they conform to their relatively crude way of classifying reality. With increasing cognitive sophistication, however, children adopt a much more elaborate grasp of the extensive and intensive properties of class and a diminished reliance on stereotyped thinking.

Gender-constant children differentiate between the sexes on the basis of genital anatomy. If appropriately socialized at this point, they are prepared *not* to differentiate between the sexes on other, irrelevant grounds, such as behavior or dress. Kohlberg's theory is often misinterpreted as meaning exactly the opposite of this. But, despite popular misconceptions, the consolidation of gender constancy does not imply consolidation of stereotyped thinking. On the contrary, Kohlberg sees it as a necessary but not sufficient condition to developing beyond stereotyped thinking.

As a way of looking at the sex role, cognitive-developmental theory offers two important insights. First, it gives us an idea of how one's sex identity is cognitively organized—no small outcome, since an adaptive peculiarity of the human species is its remarkable intelligence. In retrospect it is amazing how little attention had been given to the way people conceptualized themselves as males and females prior to the introduction of Kohlberg's theory. Obviously, people think about sex role, sex identity, and sex differences, but prior to Kohlberg, there had been no systematic attempt to understand the intricacies of this self-evident phenomenon. Second, Kohlberg's theory recognizes the child's active initiative in sex-role socialization. Psychoanalytic theory traps the child in anatomy, and social-learning theory portrays children as essentially passive recipients of social input. Unlike these other theories, cognitive-developmental theory posits the child as an active, curious, acquisitive creature, albeit one whose imagination is constrained by the laws of cognitive development.

Before leaving Kohlberg's theory it should be mentioned that it is not the best possible invention for understanding how sex identity is cognitively organized. There is one major reason for this, and it accounts, or one should say it *fails* to account, for at least half the variance of what the theory purports to explain. Since the theory fails to account for the cognitive organization of female sex role identity, it is only half an invention. In this respect, it has good company in psychoanalytic theory. Freud himself admitted from time to time that "feminine psychology," as it was then called, puzzled him greatly; he referred to female sex identity as "a dark continent for psychology" (1926: 212) and as "veiled in an impenetrable obscurity" (1905: 151). Ernest Jones (1955: 468) reports that Freud once remarked to a colleague, Marie Bonaparte: "The great question that has never been answered and which I have not yet been able to answer, despite my thirty years of research into the feminine soul is: What does a woman want?"

Our most important theories about sex differentiation, then, leave much to be desired. Most of us already know that the sex roles themselves are not particularly useful ways of thinking about the sexes, but this review of the major Western theories of sex-role socialization indicates that we do not even have useful ways of thinking about the sex roles. Not only must we invent new ways of thinking about the sexes, but apparently we must also invent new ways of thinking about the new inventions.

At this point I wish I could offer a fully developed alternative way of thinking about the sexes, but I'm afraid I cannot. In its place, however, I would like to mention several considerations which would have to go into the invention of a new theory (or theories) of sex-role socialization.

The established theories focus on individual ontogenetic development to the exclusion of larger cultural and historical considerations. The *micro*-environment of mother-child dyad, family and immediate life space, is undeniably important in the individual's development; but a fully formed theory of sex-role acquisition must recognize the *macro*-environment of cultural and historic context. Changes in technology, information, economics, and basic modes of social organization generate new norms against which one's behavior is evaluated by society and oneself. This historical-cultural dimension is almost totally ignored by the three major theories described above.

The established theories also have a bias toward static or equilibrated units of personality and development, such as traits, habits, and stages. This sort of bias leads to the reification of ideal types, norms, and end points in development, as though human life were more a stasis than a process. In fact the process of being human normatively involves inconsistency, conflict, asynchrony, change, and disequilibrium. Moreover, these are not necessarily experienced as subjectively painful or abnormal, but are often viewed as refreshing or very much a part of day-to-day living. To describe these process variables as either deviant or transitional is to describe away most of human experience and development. In the last few years a small body of dialectic thought on sex identity has appeared. At present it is insufficiently developed, but it has begun to recognize the normative reality of dialectic tension in human growth and experience (e.g., Hefner, Rebecca, and Oleshansky, 1975).

A third consideration, closely related to the previous one, is the reciprocally active posture of the person and the person's environment. Growing children have a mutually constructive and antagonistic relationship with their envi-

ronment, a dimension which is given insufficient recognition by psychoanalytic and social-learning theories, both of which are "drive reduction" formulations. Cognitive developmental theory is less negligent in this respect, although it seems to overstate the active role of the male child and understate the female child's degree of activity vis-à-vis their respective environments. If it were to take a genuinely interactive view of female sex-role acquisition, cognitive-developmental theory would have considerably less difficulty explaining its own findings.

The major existing theories also tend to view sex-role development as restricted to childhood and adolescence. Thus, a fourth consideration in theory building would be the incorporation of the total life span. Although development throughout the life span has received increasing recognition by general personality theorists in the last several years, it has barely scratched the surface of our thinking about sex role and identity.

A final consideration for the invention of new theory would be the recognition of pluralism in sex identity. The established theories are based on the implicit assumption that there are only two "normal" sex roles and that departures from these are either deviant or insufficiently frequent to merit serious attention. This is an extraordinarily limited and limiting assumption. New theory would have to address sex identity as a patterned configuration of shifting components, processes, and situations. It would have to abandon the assumption that two biological genotypes necessarily dictate two polarized cultural phenotypes.

In the absence of these several considerations, most past and present research on sex differences must be viewed with skepticism. The wrong questions continue to be asked, and after decades of confusing answers, one has to conclude that social scientists ask the same tired questions and invoke the same established theories themselves. It is difficult to imagine any other area of scientific inquiry which has remained as doggedly insensitive to the chaotic findings generated by its own cherished hypotheses. It is time to invent new hypotheses, new questions, and new theoretical perspectives on sex role. Or, to put it more simply, it is time to invent new ways of thinking about the sexes.

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