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ABSTRACT

The Response to Educational Needs Project (RENP, formerly the Anacostia Community School Project) provides an opportunity to study the adoption, implementation, and institutionalization of plans for improvement of a group of schools in the District of Columbia. The related theory and research on the implementation of change in organizations is reviewed as it applies to the RENP. The three phases of RENP development: adoption, implementation, and institutionalization, are analyzed using the theory described. The greatest emphasis is placed on the theory of the institutionalization of change. Suggestions to policy makers about changes in inservice education, community involvement, and the administration of innovation are made. The potentialities and pitfalls of externally initiated change are also discussed. (MC)

BEYOND IMPLEMENTATION:

Analysis of Change in the District of Columbia Public Schools

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Paper presented to the 1978 American Educational Research Association meeting in Toronto, Ontario, Canada. The research was supported by the National Institute of Education, through a subcontract with Richard Gibboney Associates.

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PREFACE

This study is part of a six-part analysis of the Response to Educational Needs Project, an innovative program to help poor children in the Washington, D.C. Public Schools. It looks primarily at the program innovation--its creation, development, and implementation, its problems and its successes.

Also, it is an exploratory case of organizational change, applying the various theories of innovation to the details of the program. As such, the study is useful to theorists of organizational behavior, as well as those who are on the firing line.

This study would not have been possible without the help of leaders in the public schools, Dr. Jim Guines, Ms. Joan Brown, and former superintendent, Ms. Barbara Sizemore. Participants in the experiment were open to our probes. Mr. Eugene Kinlow, head of the Anacostia board, talked to us after a board meeting; Ms. Pearl Montigue and other RENP staff were helpful. And very importantly, Mr. Dan Jackson, Project Director, spent numerous hours over the phone and in person, talking with us and allowing us to see the reports and memoranda.

We owe a particular thanks to the staff at the National Institute of Education and Gibboney Associates who were respectively the funding agency and contractor. Ms. Loisellin Datta and Mr. Howard Lesnick of NIE took particular

interest in the research, encouraging us to think through the issues and to disseminate the results. Mr. George Sealy, program officer at NIE, had a clear and useful view of the progress of the innovation. His assistance was invaluable. We must thank Mr. Michael Langsdorf and Dr. Richard Gibboney for involving us in the research on RENP; their counsel has been helpful in clarifying the research questions and in writing reports. I would also like to express my admiration and thanks to Professor Robert Nakamura of Dartmouth College, who invited me to do this part of the final study and who provided insights into the details and theories considered. These people were most helpful, though the opinions and approaches are my own.

To my wife Nancy, my children, Phoebe, Jessica, and Shoshi, I express appreciation for their emotional help as well.

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Task 5

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I. INTRODUCTION

This study analyzes a ten-year effort to improve a group of schools in the District of Columbia. It focuses on the activities of "change agents," their strategies and the impact of their actions on school and community participants. Of greatest importance to the analysis are the end results: the nature of permanent institutional re-arrangements that follow from the adoption and implementation of new organizational purposes, roles, routines, and structures. As is mentioned in the Task 5 Requirements for Proposal (RFP), this study treats a number of particular points, including:

1. What was the effect of various efforts of "change agents" inside the federal government and the public schools to create new programs for poor students in Washington, D.C.?

2. How did the enfranchisement of poor community members on the Anacostia Community School Board (later, the Region I

board) alter the "balance of forces" in the system? What power did they and do these elected community people have in influencing policy in Anacostia?

3. What has been and is the working relationship among the major actor groups (public school hierarchy, Region board, Region Superintendent, and Project Director) under the Anacostia decentralization experiment?

4. What is the impact of a "moderate" innovation like the Anacostia school's project, as opposed to more radical attempts such as "educational vouchers" or whole-system alterations?

Of course, not all outcomes of the effort to create and maintain the Response to Educati[illegible] Needs Project (RENP) were intended, that is planned and executed; some results both good and bad, evolved and were unanticipated by decision-makers while others were desired but failed because of the lack of funds, will, or both. And still other components of RENP were tried for a while and were not incorporated into the long-term operations of the school system.

This case study clarifies what happened--that is, what is different about the public schools in the Anacostia community of the District of Columbia since RENP began and what the future may hold. Though the analysis starts at the beginning, 1967, and proceeds through the labor pains of birth and development to 1977, it emphasizes the current situation with RENP. But since organizational change is an organic process, we analyze the entire career of the innovation: its

planning, implementation, and institutionalization as well.

Thus, the Response to Educational Needs Project is a useful case study of change in schools for the following audiences:

1. White House and Congressional planners and decision-makers who might wish in the future to attempt educational change;

2. District of Columbia Public School leaders who must decide not only the fate of RENP in the future but also the dissemination possibilities for other city schools;

3. Participants in the project from the community and school system as well; and

4. Social scientists interested in theories of organization change and resistance.

Why is the case interesting? It is complex, long-lasting, and somewhat typical of an idealistic 1960's-style innovation which survived into the more hard-nosed late 1970s. Its complexity comes from its mission, its structure, and most certainly from the diverse agents who created and molded it, for RENP (formerly the Anacostia Community School Project, Washington, D.C.) was not the brainchild of any single group of educational planners. Rather, it was created and shaped by an array of people working in a number of settings, including the White House, Congress, federal bureaucracies, the District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS), the black communities, the universities. It was not born whole.

Rather it took shape as various leaders made choices, sought support, and made compromises.

It grew from a vague idea of helping the ailing public school system in the nation's capital to specific programs with diverse goals, developing irregularly through phases over a ten-year period. In operational form by 1976, RENP consisted of inservice centers located in 14 public schools (12 elementary, 1 junior and 1 high school), staffed by 24 full-time reading and mathematics specialists whose task it was to provide on-site job development for elementary and secondary teachers in their buildings. Reading centers and mathematics laboratories were established and materials developed, based on the Diagnostic/Prescriptive/Individualized Approach to reading and math teaching. Program Facilitators, full-time, tenured specialists, headed these centers; aides hired from the Anacostia community worked with classes to allow teachers to attend workshops in the labs and centers; and community organizaers, also Anacostia laypeople, helped increase the communication between the schools and the neighborhoods. These activities were overseen by the RENP director and component heads for math and reading who were housed in a RENP office in Anacostia, an isolated corner of the nation's capital, located in the South East, across the Anacostia River.

Besides the in-school program, RENP was designed to foster community involvement; the Anacostia Community School Board was created and given strong advisory authority over

the RENP schools and their programs. When, under the Superintendent Sizemore administration, the city schools were divided into administrative "regions" (much like Chicago where Mrs. Sizemore had worked formerly), Region I, Anacostia, was placed under the community advisory authority of the existing Anacostia board of elected community people. A Regional Superintendent, in this case for Region I, worked in much the same relationship with his/her board as the city-wide superintendent did with the District of Columbia Board of Education.

The above description is that of the Response to Educational Needs Project as of 1976-77. It has had an interesting history, as urban school innovations go. It also has an interesting future, now that federal funding is being withdrawn and the program (and its various components) must sink or swim based on internal acceptance and funding. What will remain of RENP when the outside dollars, running as high as a million per year, diminish? Why study this case? What can we contribute to the growing body of literature and research on organizational change? What advice might we give to the school leaders in the District of Columbia for the future of the project? And what can this case study contribute to the art (and the emerging science) of change agentry, as outside agencies like the federal and state governments and internal leadership like school boards and superintendents, not to mention citizen groups, seek to alter American schools?

Why study RENP? For several reasons. First, unlike many attempts at educational innovation,[1] it survived through the phases of the planning process and was put into "actual use."[2] That is, RENP (then the Anacostia Community School Project) was developed, adopted, implemented, and now shows signs of being in part assimilated into the operational procedures of the school system. Thus, between March 1968 when President Lyndon B. Johnson announced the p[redacted]as a "major model school experiment in the District"[3] and August 1977 when the school system saw the withdrawal of most federal support for the in-school program, sufficient activities had occurred to warrant an in-depth examination of not only the processes of implementation, already studied at length by other researchers,[4] but also attempts at the institutionalization of change, the permanent and secure integration of innovations into the on-going operations of the organization. Since many federal, state, and foundation-supported programs face the eventuality of "going it alone," without the help of these outside agencies, this problem of changing a program from temporary, experimental, or pilot status to "regular" status takes on something of a universal quality.

Second, RENP is located in Washington, D.C., close to the source of federal funding and grant supervision. As such, it enjoys the interesting condition of operating directly under the Congress. The relationship in some ways is prototypical of the federal-local interaction without the

mediation of state government and regional offices of Department of Health, Education and Welfare which often administer federal grants. It allows, then, a special relationship to develop between leaders in the community and the public schools and key Senators and House members on vital committees, particularly Appropriations and D.C. Affairs. Furthermore, the administering agency, at first the U.S. Office of Education, and later the National Institute of Education, is more accessible to local officials than would typically be the case in the federal-local relationship. While few if any other American school systems have such close proximity to the entire federal policy and appropriations machinery, this case is helpful and informative because it puts all the segments of educational change in one place for study: the legislature, executive, receiving school system, public in contact, and participants in the innovation as well.[5]

Third, RENP was by most standards a moderate educational innovation, one that was adopted with little battling over mission. Few critics argued against the improvement of inservice training for teachers of reading and mathematics nor the need to improve schools in Anacostia. Rather the confusion and problems surround more "administrative" matters: operationalizing goals, levels of funding, foci of control, the logistics of getting started, and difficulty of dealing with the varied groups (Congress, school system, community unions, and community board)--not the trauma of radical change. Thus, RENP and its predecessor, ACSP, fit nicely

into the notion of incremental planned change, the approach most favored by establishment figures in government and education.[6] One cannot attribute the problems of making changes in the RENP situation, then, to the radicalness of the ideas nor their threats to the continuation of the system. But rather, the resistance and problems are of a more mundane nature, or, in Pressman and Wildavsky's words, are of "a prosaic and everyday character."[7] Decision-makers in Washington, D.C. schools and federal agencies may find the case a useful and generalizable one, then, for little that is truly extra-ordinary occurred.

Finally, this chapter adds to a growing body of literature and theory on planned change in organizations, an opus of great importance but of little clarity. Since in such research to a great extent each organizational setting and innovation is unique; each time frame is different; and each research method and approach is peculiar to the innovation under examination, we are unable to find an adequate and widely acceptable theory of organizational change. Instead, this chapter takes a case, RENP, and analyzes it in terms of current knowledge and takes the theory a step further.

The research method is <u>case study</u>, an approach that has gained some respectability among social scientists of late.[8] It involves (1) an intensive look at a single (or comparable) phenomena, (2) taken at a single point in time or over time, (3) by following the program longitudinally or by researching back through time. In the case of our

RENP investigation, we started interviewing, observing, and reading documents in 1977, a decade after the project was first discussed by Professor A. Harry Passow in his report to the D.C. Board of Education and Brookings institution held meetings on the situation in D.C. schools.[9]

The list of interviewees for this study is found in the appendix. They include administrators in the school system, currently and in the past; teacher and administrator union leaders, past and present; RENP directors and staff; members of the Region 1 community board; National Institute of Education personnel; and representatives of independent agencies like the D.C. Citizens United for Better Public Education.[10] Types of documents scrutinized include (specific documents are footnoted in the text later in the chapter) reports on RENP by school system official, NIE, and outside consultants; newspaper accounts on RENP and the school system of relevance; and inter- and intra-organizational memoranda of which there was much. Since bureaucracies generate materials routinely and increase their efforts where conflict and negotiations are involved (perhaps to state their position concretely and to project their agencies), we were the beneficiaries of the results of these modus operandi.

We observed the work of several Program Facilitators and Aides in an elementary school and Ballou High School, the meeting of the Region 1 (Anacostia) Community School Board, and Dan Jackson (RENP director) in the RENP office. These observations were not systematic; instead they gave a

notions of "mutual adaptation,"[15] a construct posited by McLaughlin to explain the interaction between innovation and organization: between RENP and the public schools, in this case.

Our notion is that these accommodative actions take place, not only at the point of implementation, but all along (during the planning, implementing, and incorporating stages as well); but that "mutual adaptation" alone is not sufficient to explain the decision-makers in action. We introduce, in addition, the idea of "investment" and "incentive," much in the vein of political economic analysis: Actor groups weigh the level of "sunk costs"--running from minimal during the planning-adoption phase (where little staff, time and dollars are involved) through implementation[16] (where outside funds cover much of the costs but system investment increases) to institutionalization (where investment is high but so is dependence and constituency pressure to maintain the services and the hired staff).

The incentive to innovate, to implement, and to keep changes in staff, procedures, program, facilities, and so on is compared to the resistance to change inherent in any ongoing system: e.g., organizations will not change since to do so is an admission by individual members that they have failed; that they might be replaced by people more skilled than they, and that if they remain, they must try new routines which must be learned and mastered. It was outside agencies

feeling for the setting, the actors, and the issues, an advantage a researcher would not have were he/she to do such a study after the program had closed.

A word or two more about the case method: it has several uses that are relevant to an analysis of implementation and institutionalization of RENP. First, case analysis has been found helpful in "grounded theory generation," a method by which theory building begins, Glaser and Strauss explain, with the evolution of "abstract categories and their properties,"[11] as an exploratory phase of theoretical inquiry. Next, they contend, as data analysis begins, "each incident is compared with other incidents, or with properties of a category, in terms of as many similarities and differences as possible . . ."[12] Glaser and Strauss continue:

> The constant comparison of incidents in this manner tends to result in the creation of a "developmental" theory. It especially facilitates the generation of theories of process, sequence, and change pertaining to organizations, positions, and social interaction.[13]

This kind of exercise--grounded theory generation--is described by Michel Crozier as "an indispensable phase of scientific development. At this stage," he continues:

> The most important thing is to elaborate the problem . . . by developing systems of propositions still close to the concrete, but going beyond the affirmation of banal interdependencies, and appearing solid and significant enough to be tested in a later phase.[14]

In particular, we analyze the development of RENP in light of current theories of change, expanding the basic

like the U.S. Office of Education and the National Institute of Education which enticed change with funds, promises of better results, or in the case of RENP/ACSP, the enfranchisement of new constituencies which pressured for change.

It is the process of enticement and investment leading to mutual adaptation that forms the theoretical center of the analysis of RENP in this chapter. It contributes to an understanding of the dynamics of change, based on the particular case. Once these "categories" and "properties," to use Glaser and Strauss's terms, are applied, the opportunity exists for theories of change, grounded in the RENP case, to be propounded.

A second use for case method is a preliminary one: "case studies can suggest predictor-criterion relationships that can later be verified through statistics."[17] Ann K. Pasanella, in her discussion of the Rand studies, offers this as a major reason for attempting case studies. Furthermore, practitioners can learn the details of a case situation that statistical surveying obscures; and researchers can understand both "typical" and "deviant" situations that also would be "washed out" by most statistical analysis.[18]

Finally, a number of decisions about the future of RENP remain to be decided; data on RENP qua RENP might be useful to decision-makers in the public schools, Anacostia community and other communities in Washington, D.C., who might be trying to innovate, as well as the federal government which has invested so heavily in the project.

This chapter has three sections to follow: First, an exploration of the related theory and research on the implementation of change in organization is reviewed and augmented to apply to this case. Second, the three phases of ACSP/RENP development are analyzed, using the grounded theory from the first section. Primary emphasis is placed on the final phase, institutionalization of change, however. This phase has been least explored in other studies, deals with the important question of permanency of change, and completes the change cycle, from inception to incorporation. The last section makes concrete suggestions to policy-makers in the District of Columbia and elsewhere. What have we learned about changes in inservice education, community involvement, and the administration of innovation that others may use? What are the potentialities and pitfalls of externally initiated change?

II. THEORY AND THE CASE

Though the study of the implementation of change in organizations has become a major concern for researchers, there is a conspicuous absence of acceptable paradigms for analyzing the phenomenon.[19] Certain attributes are useful as starting points, however, and can be applied to this study of RENP. They include the notion that change is an interactive process; between innovation and organization setting, and that change occurs in stages. We discuss these

characteristics in turn and use them to structure this chapter.

Change as Forms of Social Interaction

Change is a process, a dynamic set of organizational actions; it is also the somewhat unpredictable result of interaction between the new program and the organizational setting in which the change occurs. That is, organizational change is not, as Ronald Havelock and others posit,[20] a rationalistic construct to be carried out in a controlled situation. Nor is it an automatic procedure like the diffusion of a new strain of corn or new kinds of medicine, as Everett Roger's "diffusion of innovation" model portrays.[21] Instead, change involves the two-way impact of purposes between the host system and the intended innovation. Milbrey Wallin McLaughlin, in her review of five books in the Rand Change Study series, puts it this way:

> Contrary to the assumptions underlying many change strategies and federal change policies, we found that implementation did not involve merely the direct and straightforward application of an educational technology or plan. Implementation was a dynamic organizational process that was shaped over time by interactions between project goals and methods and the institutional setting. As such, it was neither automatic nor certain.[22]

More specifically, in some cases both innovation and organizational setting change, "mutually adapt" to one another, a situation which is not necessarily a compromise of quality or intent on the part of either party. Rather, McLaughlin

seems to indicate that in some situations both the project and the setting are improved by their accommodation to the goals of the other. Whether this is the case or not, the study of change as interactive is a useful heuristic.

As shown in Table 1, however, "mutual adaptation" (cell A) is but one of four possible kinds of interaction. If the institutional setting remains unchanged, then McLaughlin terms this form of interaction "cooptation"--as the system merely bends the innovation to its use without changing the local staff behaviors or the institutional setting, as shown in cell B. If, on the other hand, the organization accepts the innovation as is, without making alterations, then "technical learning" has occurred. This category seems most unclear in her construct, perhaps because she cannot seem to accept the possibility that organizations can and do change in response to incentives without altering the innovation. That is, the term "implementation" is missing from the typology.

TABLE I

Nature of Organization-Innovation Interaction in the Change Process: A Model

Organizational Change?	Project Change? Yes	Project Change? No
Yes	A Mutual Adaptation	C Technological Learning /Implementation?/
No	B Cooptation	D Nonimplementation

Finally, cell D shows "nonimplementation," a situation where the program fails to fit into the setting and the organization remains as is.[23]

For our purposes in analyzing the Response to Educational Needs Project between 1967 and 1977, the idea of "mutual adaptation" appears most appropriate. And what is even more interesting about our case is the presence of three-way accommodation among the participants in the innovation (RENP directors, board members, aides, Program Facilitators), the organizational setting (leaders of the District of Columbia schools), and the funding organization (staff members of the U.S. Office of Education and the National Institute of Education). At times, in the adaptation process, the interactions showed two agents combining to deal with the third. The result over time was that the behaviors of all three were modified in relationship to the others, as this chapter will show. For example, RENP in part responded to mandates from NIE to implement certain components of the program, the school system of the District of Columbia accommodated part of the RENP program and its staff (while rejecting others) into regular district functions, and NIE departed from its regular mission of supporting research to monitor and respond to the pressures and needs of the Anacostia community-based program, RENP. In McLaughlin's words, then, programs are often successfully carried out where "project goals and methods were modified to suit the needs and interests of local staff and in which that staff changed to meet

the requirements of the project."[24] In the round robin of RENP-NIE-DCPS interactions, there was much evidence of mutual adaptation going on.

A Step Beyond McLaughlin

But while this concept may be useful in a very general sense in analyzing the interactions of new programs and their settings, it has a number of serious limitations. First, the "either-or" character of the typology makes measurement and analysis difficult. How does one know when "changes" occur? How major do these alterations have to be to be called "adaptations?" What if the innovation changes greatly and the setting only a little? Is the "mutual" or only slightly "mutual?" And is not the very presence of a new program in the repertoire of the host system to be considered a change in it? Second, systems and innovations are constantly in a state of flux anyway, as key leaders come and go and general actor knowledge; maturation, and sophistication increase. Can one attribute such independent changes, both in the innovation and the organization staff, to the interactive effect of the two social units or might such changes have happened without the presence of the other party? Since McLaughlin's data were gathered from classrooms behavior primarily, the locus of activities is more predictable and narrow than the RENP situation.

Finally, even if we realize that there is some relationship between program and system, that they are

influencing one another in some way (e.g., allowing the other to improve), the problem still remains of describing the evolution and quality of the interaction. Furthermore, we should not discount the resistance that many systems exhibit to changing their routines, for individuals within them find their present activity to meet their individual needs. Also they are busy carrying out their regular duties and may find learning and doing new procedures to be costly in human energy and distracting from the performance of all tasks.

Why then do systems attempt to innovate? How can outside agencies stimulate change? A political economy model as propounded by scholars like Anthony Downs and Mancur Olson would say that it is perfectly rational for actors to continue doing what they currently do, for these efforts are responses to their environment as is: When outside federal decision-makers ask these staff members to change, without also altering the working environment, the incentive system, the in-system person would be "irrational," if not foolish, to abandon established actions which are pressing to try something new--and less pressing--on faith.[25] Also, since outsiders cannot guarantee that the new way is really better, the technology of educational practice and evaluation being what it is, the change agents face the recalcitrance of people in the organization.[26]

With the three organizations (RENP, DCPS and NIE) actually playing a role in the case, the resistance at first resided in the school system, vis-à-vis the federal agency;

later, when ACSP and RENP were functioning, these innovation exhibited resistance to suggestions from NIE, since their members had a stake in what they were doing.

We can say, then, that a rational actor will react to his/her environment and that these decision-makers will make an assessment of their collective investment in the innovation. By investment is meant the level of funds, time, prestige, staff, space, materials, etc. committed or used to date on the innovation. The assumption is that if actors in a system have expended scarce resources on a program, then the incentive exists to maintain or expand the program. Likewise, external agencies place funds and credibility on the line when they invest in a new program. Certainly, NIE was vulnerable and was expected by Congress and other watchdog groups to support RENP. An incentive, then, is a motivating factor--financial, psychological, political--to pursue a course of action.

Whatever the reasons for initiating the change, whatever the incentive system looks like, and whatever the nature of the mutual adaptation, there seems to be three phases in the change process.

The Phases of Change

Research also indicates that many planned efforts to alter organizational behavior go through roughly three stages: First, to use the phrase of Berman and McLaughlin, is a planning-adoption phase wherein a decision is reached to try a

new approach and to define it initially. Second, the adoption effort may lead to implementation, the actual beginning of a new program or approach. Finally, the functioning program may undergo incorporation (Berman and McLaughlin's term[27]--or we prefer institutionalization--into the on-going operation of the organization.

We are primarily concerned about the final phase, the permanent and long-last outcomes of the decade-long effort, RENP. So why bother to include the first eight turgid years during which the project struggled to define itself, put staff in the field, hold on to a director (there were nine), and provide services to teachers and thus to children? For these reasons? The change process is not, after all, the last crowing achievement of the task of improving organizations; it is a somewhat continuous, interconnected, and long-term effort. One cannot understand the institutionalization period without some knowledge of the intent, problems, and details of the formative periods. Clues which we might pick up at the last phase of the change process must be tested or at least understood by retrospective analysis; the clues may well be part of trends, extant from the onset. (Similarly, perhaps, the investigation of the course of human psychological growth depends on data from childhood and adolescence, as well as information on the adult psyche.)

Is it not too early to evaluate the change process in the case of RENP, even though the program components have only been functioning fully for about a year--out of its

much longer life? Life in organizations is not necessarily linear. RENP made more progress in 1976 than in all other years combined: leadership stabilized, staff were trained, teachers were taught, and a system of accountability wherein staff reported to school-based Program Facilitators who in turn reported to RENP directors was in place. And the gradual withdrawal of funds in 1977 stimulated the public school system to absorb and use some program components, staff (sometimes with title changes), and to continue recognizing the adhering to the decisions of the community school board (Region I board).

So while the transition to institutional status for RENP is recently occurring in the Fall of 1977, it is enough of an event to warrant and to complete the study of the "life cycle" of organizational innovation begun in 1967. Lessons for future change agents can be noted; an evolved model of organizational change is in evidence; both the "failures" and the "successes" are present for analysis; and though there are no clear-cut data on the impact of RENP on students (an important output variable), there is evidence that the project is in place and the institution, DCPS, is a different system for having had RENP.

The phases of adoption, implementation, and institutionalization each have their own particular problems, questions, and dynamics for research and require shifts in conceptualization to understand.

1. Adoption: Social systems are stimulated to change

because of internal unrest (dissidents within the organization), external pressures, or both. A number of problems accompany the initiation of change: who should do the planning? the government, the community, the public schools, consultants? Who should be asked to approve the outcomes? On what scale--financial and temporal--should new programs be cast? What purposes should be considered? Before a plan can be adopted, in effect, basic rules of the game (who should play, by whose rules, in what arena, to what ends?) must evolve; otherwise, the activities have no shape, direction, parameters.[28]

An analysis of the planning and adoption of the Anacostia project (later RENP) is interesting because rules were not pre-established nor were they arrived at easily. We see, then, the anatomy of early planning as groups government, school system, black community, university consultants participate in setting the basic rules of the process. Nothing is preordained, "given," or easily accepted. We see the sparks fly and the structure of the new innovation emerge; and we are surprised that anything was put together, considering the number of interest groups, the diversity of expectations, and the lack of direction. Herein lies another fascinating quality of early ACSP/RENP. Despite the initial difficulties, it did in fact begin implementation, though with more problems in evidence than might have occurred had the adoption phase gone more smoothly and more consensus been attained. We learn that in spite of the worst laid plans of

men and mice, things are accomplished.

2. Implementation: The transition from planning to doing requires many of the qualities we associate with formal organization: jobs must be specified and filled; routines established and tried; space occupied and used; materials created and utilized; and a vertical division of responsibility (people doing specific tasks together) evolved and accepted. Notions of efficiency are introduced as staff become accountable to peers and superiors. Problems during the implementation phase often involve questions of regularity and the legitimacy of authority. Who should lead the program (an insider from DCPS; a new face, full- or part-time) and with what responsibilities? What program components should be started and in what order? And overall, is there sufficient routinization in the relationships between the new project and its working environment to sustain organizational attainment?

Again, in the RENP case, many of these queries would be answered as no; yet somehow over an eight-year period, between 1968 and 1976, gradual implementation was accomplished. But each part of the innovation (community aides, community organizers, community school board, and inservice training) was stabilized with great effort. Again, this case provides data on how to and not to implement new programs. Continued support from Congress which made the program possible was maintained, in part, because of political access and pressure

and through an interesting alliance between the project and its host, the public school system. We can see, then, in time lapse pictures, the slow emergence of RENP as a functioning innovation, taking many years to be implemented.

3. Institutionalization: What happens when the external funding diminishes? What lasting effects of the program may remain in the workings of the public schools and what have change agents learned from the ten-year process? Lasting change in organizations occurs when one or more of the following characteristics is altered in a more or less permanent way: First, the mission of the organization changes because of the presence of the innovation; this meshing of program values and systems values is only a preliminary but important step. In the case of RENP, merging of missions was evident in two areas, the involvement of community leaders in school operations (through the Anacostia Community School Board, later the Region I board); and the incorporation of RENP approaches to inservice education into the office of the Deputy Superintendent for Instructional Services.

Second, institutionalization is evident when new jobs are created and maintained, for lasting change in organizations is not possible unless at least some members are expected to perform differently. These roles may be new or may be recasting of existing ones. In either case, some actors must have new responsibilities as evidence of institutionalized change. During RENP, four new roles were created:

Program Facilitators (the master teachers who taught reading or math to other teachers), Community Aides, Community Organizers, and community board members. The first type were professionals, certified and tenured; the community staff were not and found the transfer from federal funding to DCPS support more difficult though most all were absorbed into non-RENP posts. And the community members of the board continued as permanent parts of the governance of the District schools, Region I.

Third, institutionalization occurs when routines change in a permanent way; this aspect corresponds, of course, to the presence of new roles--new roles defined by new functions. Does the system now "do" something differently in an on-going way than it did before? It appears that inservice education and school governance in Region I are now permanently different than they were prior to the coming of RENP, both evidence of change in the school system.

Fourth, institutionalization occurs when the organizational structure is altered in an on-going way. It is the change in structure that sustains the staff and the program. By structure we mean the location of the program in the organizational chart, its relationship with the hierarchy, its status in the budget, and its place in the communications system. Whereas RENP was outside the day-to-day workings of DCPS, its offices isolated from downtown operations, and its staff somewhat cut off from the flow of information among top decision-makers (board of education, superintendents,

and their deputies) during the implementation phase, one sign of final institutionalization was the meshing of organizational and program structures. RENP was afixed to the office of the Deputy Superintendent, was supported by in-kind funds in the regular budget, and at each level of the system, staff were accountable to administrative heads. Organization integration had occurred.

It is true, however, that RENP was not absorbed whole and as was. Adaptations in staff, function, and purpose was evident, as the McLaughlin model predicted. But the investment in RENP after ten years was great enough to sustain it into its final phase. A professional constituency including Director Dan Jackson, teachers, and other staff emerged; also and equally important, a lay pressure group developed, led by the Region I board and supported by a rather diffuse constituency from the community. Eventually, it was a combination of pressure, the needs of DCPS to fulfill the needs of children of Anacostia to improved education, and the fit between RENP and DCPS mission that paved the way for systems incorporation of the project.

PHASE 1

Planning the Anacostia Experiment

Underlying all efforts to promote planned change is the belief, perhaps the ideology, that there is a direct relationship between the style of planning and the outcome

of the effort. That is, approach determines outcome. RENP is a good case to test this notion, for a number of approaches were tried and the outcomes were somewhat different from what might have been expected.

Two approaches will be characterized, applied, and generalized from. First, the Rational Planning Approach (which will be called Type A) involves a high reliance on "efficient decision-making, goal-setting, and option-building"[29] to be done by educational experts. Problems are often reduced to technical levels and solved through design and careful implementation. If only the policy-makers would take a Type A tack, the argument goes, the changes in organizations could be completed successfully. It is the public and the politics of policy enactment that prevent efficient planning and execution, so the Type A line of reasoning goes.

Second, the Participative-Advocacy Approach (Type B) rests on the notion that organizations should be changed by the clients of the organization. In fact, it is the technocrats, experts, and outside consultants, having a stake in the status quo, who only perpetuate the existing problems. Planning must be controlled--or at least highly influenced--by the recipients of social services, in order to guarantee that goals are congruent with the needs of the group.[30] Social problems, according to Type B thinking, cannot be reduced to matters of technique; they stem from deeper socio-political difficulties that only the enfranchisement of the patrons of these social services can correct. Advocacy,

community involvement, democratic processes, and redistribution of power lie at the heart of Type B approaches to changing organizations.

So while Type A stresses control, rationality, and professionalism Type B emphasizes participation, broad-based decision-making, and the sanctity of those being planned for. Type A planners impose values on the system; Type B solicits indigenous opinion and supports community involvement and control of the outcomes. The former places primacy on "the plan"; the latter, on "the process." Type A seeks efficiency and orderly change while Type B is more concerned about engaging the patron community even if this approach is less smooth. And Type A has great faith in top-down control (the rule of the experts); Type B believes in a kind of raw democracy: so though it may take longer and be somewhat sloppier, client groups learn best and benefit most if they are given significant control over the planning and implementing of change.

Interestingly, in the case of RENP, both approaches were attempted and abandoned for reasons to be detailed later. A third model emerged, though perhaps not self-consciously one we shall call Type C, which is characterized by neither high rationality nor lay input; rather the goal becomes the survival and the maintenance of the project and the behavior becomes that of coalition building between professionals and community people, political actions directed at funding sources (Congress and DHEW), and a strong survival

reflex. Each group--the community leadership and the formal organizational hierarchy--gives up sole claim to control the project, compromising sole authority in order to save the program from the loss of funds and existence. Here practicality takes precedence over claims to professional expertise and rationality on the one hand (Type A) and over the belief that only the "people" can determine what they need on the other (Type B). The Type C approach in the District of Columbia was greatly aided by the presence of Congress, the press, and the U.S. Office of Education, ready targets for the political efforts of the local coalition.[31]

Successfully, then, over an eight-year period, Type C behavior was able to maintain federal funding support, despite the rather slow start which characterized the project. But by 1976, and the formative evaluation required as part of NIE's evaluation of the project, it was clear that RENP was indeed a functioning program: inservice education was underway in 14 schools; aides and community organizers from Anacostia were doing their respective tasks; and the community school board was making significant decisions in areas ranging from Region 1 superintendency hirings to building maintenance and safety. RENP had bought time, and the long-range effects were the incorporation of change into the ongoing functions of DCPS. Time made the difference and Type C behavior had helped secure that time.

In this section, we detail the following developments in RENP's early history:

1. At the onset, both Type A and Type B planning approaches were attempted and abandoned. We focus on the forces that undermined these efforts.

2. A Type C approach resulted, giving time for the various program components to develop.

3. Over time, commitment was solidified; the project adjusted to being in the school system; and conversely the system came to depend on RENP. It was this mutuality of outlook and interest that prepared RENP for institutionalization in 1977, a topic to be discussed in a later section.

The Experts Gear Up

The Project was conceived by a diverse group of experts starting in 1967; school district and lay input was to be unimportant. As originally conceived, the program would be developed, introduced into the public schools, and monitored by teams of outsiders who were deemed by the planners as "experts" in urban education.

In June 1967, the school board of the District of Columbia received from a "scribbler," Professor A. Harry Passow, Teacher College-Columbia University, a consultant's report that assessed problems in the public schools of the District and recommended major reforms.[32] A month later, at a meeting held in the Brookings Institution, White House staffers (including Stephen Pollak, Presidential advisor for District Affairs and Douglas Cater, advisor for HEW) were joined by officials from the U.S. Bureau of the Budget, and two D.C.

school board members. The decision was made to seek administration support for financing the Passow recommendations, at a cost of $25 million. The District's school would be designated an "educational laboratory," (interesting choice of terms), underlining the technical approach to problem solving. President Lyndon B. Johnson took no action on the recommendation, perhaps being too busy with the re-organization of the D.C. government to allow a publicly-elected school board to be constituted.[33]

The scene shifted to the U.S. Office of Education at President Johnson's request where Dr. Harold Howe II chaired a task force that recommended the creation of a "model educational system" in Washington at a cost of $10 million. The suggestions from the Brookings meeting were deemed too expensive and too controversial. Again, as earlier, these task force members conceived of their role as professional outside planners; local participation was to be small; development of the new plan would be done by a "special council" over a five-year period.[34] This group would be selected from among outstanding deans of education, college president, and school administrators. Another group of external--though more practical--experts, ten large city superintendents, were to act as a "national advisory coundil." Once the District of Columbia school board approved the U.S. Office plan, its control would be slight.

In the fall of 1967, President Johnson presented a message on the District; included was a request for $10

million for the "major model school experiment," following some of the Passow report recommendations. In particular, Johnson stated nine goals, several programs, and one "new concept" for the new program. Goals included reviving interest of citizens in schools, retraining teachers, bringing students the best in teaching methods and materials, revising the curriculum, equipping graduates to find jobs, seeking alliances between schools and employers, giving students a chance to learn at their own pace, and serving a section of the city where the needs were greatest. The proposed programs, for example, include pre-school and early childhood efforts, work opportunities for high school students, counseling and health services, regular retraining for teachers, and cooperative efforts between schools and other agencies in the District. A new concept was described, a "community school" wherein families are involved in year-round education and recreation at the schools in their neighborhoods. Community service agencies, the Distrcit's school system, and the U.S. Commissioner of Education are to develop the "large-scale school experiment."[35]

On March 13, 1968, Commissioner Howe urged District school officials to propose programs to meet the President's recommendations. He explained that these proposals can be written with help from consultants, that he wll take an "advisory role only and that the "local education authoriries will take the leadership role." Why the 180-degree turn on

the task of the outside experts is not totally clear; D.C. school superintendent Manning turned to the Community Council, a group representing 75 local organizations) created to implement the Passow Report, to select a demonstration site in the District for federal funding.[36]

So much for outside experts and the control of the professional planners: from here on out, the decision process and the implementation of change will be alternately controlled and ultimately shared by a variety of agents in federal, local, school, and community settings. Much can be said as to why Howe passed the decision-making to Manning and why Manning turned to a community council--comprised of representatives from various D.C. groups. In part it was the times. The late sixties was characterized by intense black awareness reaching a crescendo with the assassination of the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., the popularity of the Autobiography of Malcolm X,[37] and the conflugations in urban centers. It is unlikely that a RENP-like project would have been implemented without some community support. This awareness is present in Johnson's message on the District in 1968 and in Manning's choice of whom to appoint to the planning group (on the Passow Report).

Second, it was unclear whether the U.S. Office of Education or the White House had "a program" in mind; Johnson's grab-bag of nine goals, five approaches, and the "new concept" of the community school sounded much like a compilation of every current idea in educational reform rolled into

one: pre-school through adult education, better teaching, more marketable skills, community involvement if not control, and self-paced learning. To use the parlance of the period, the new program would have elements of "open education," "schools without walls," "community schools," and "career education."[38] When the U.S. Commissioner took up the effort, he did nothing to focus the Johnson statement but rather passed it to the District of Columbia.

Third, perhaps Howe was unwilling to impose a solution, despite the statements of the early planners that external planning and monitoring groups would be in charge. The decade of "social engineering" was winding down in the face of rising doubt about the legitimacy of federal involvement in local education. (President Johnson was to announce his withdrawal from politics later that year in the face of opposition on the Vietnam war.) And, in terms of building school district and local community commitment, the delegation of planning activities to the DCPS makes sense.

As we mentioned earlier, the problem of motivating established systems to change--or at least to start planning--is a crucial one. How does a change agent build a sense of commitment to a new idea, particularly if this new program is introduced by outside agencies and is unfamiliar to the organization? In the case of RENP, at least four incentives to invest in the innovation were in evidence: First, large sums of money were mentioned, $25 million initially (recall that D.C. school board members were present

at the Brookings gathering) and then $10 million for the first year with more likely to follow. The newly elected D.C. school board could hardly overlook such a sum. Since planning an innovation requires the time and effort of very few staff, the return on investment is high. Second, Howe's request that D.C. school leaders fashion the program and the U.S. Office would react gives ample opportunity for local choice-making. Having a say in the creation of an innovation is a strong enticement to become involved. And since local leaders have at least some list of problems to be addressed, the opportunity to act on their preferences serves as some incentive. Third, there was every indication that the new program would be given financial support quickly. As we mentioned earlier, organizational members are often unwilling to change behaviors because of the immediacy of their day-to-day interaction with the existing work environment. The push from the White House, USOE, and now the superintendent is a clue to the priority of the program and an incentive to act favorably. Even the most resistant school member can sense the urgency of federal actions which take some precedence over regular routines. Fourth, Howe's shift in planning activities from his federal agency to the local school system is an indicator of later control over the new programs. In organizational language, the power to plan is seen as a first step toward major control over the later workings of the new program. Promised local control is a strong enticement to invest for school systems jealous of their local perogatives.

The Locals Take Over

Type B planning involves the users in the planning of their program; in the case of early REMP, these consumers were first the school members and ultimately the parents and community participants. Undoubtedly, constituency planning and adoption is less efficient (lay people likely know less about how to organize a change, plan a curriculum, work through the procedures of local and federal bureaucracies, establish their own priorities and leaders); but the experience of doing an experimental program becomes an important first step in helping communities take an active interest in controlling their lives.

That is not to say that DCPS abdicated control or responsibility for the new program; not at all. But a considerable amount of input was afforded the locals through the planning councils, workshops, and votes allowed them, as we shall explain. Furthermore, the role of the federal agencies--USOE, Congress, the White House--was not a passive one. In particular, in April 1968, the head of USOE's compensatory education section, John F. Hughes, urged in a memorandum to Commissioner Howe that the U.S. Office should be more active in developing the new plan for the District. (Agencies cannot relinquish control so easily.) Hughes, evidently with the consent of Howe, hired Mario Fantini, a consultant experienced in community control experiments, to write a proposal "in clear terms" so that the D.C. school board would understand and approve, while at the same time providing a pro-

fessional liaison with the planning efforts in the school system. Further, Hughes asked Howe to "continue holding his /D.C. Superintendent Manning's/ hand during the coming week to be sure that all the proper moves are made."[39]

Besides this agency control that Howe and Hughes pursued, the Congress through its appropriations process later played an enormous role in setting the fiscal boundaries around the new innovation. The $25 million first batted around was slimmed to $10 million and was eventually set at $1 million by Congress, as part, we gather, of a general austerity move that many Johnson programs faced as the cost of the Vietnam war rose in the late sixties.

Thus, the planning of RENP is not clearly Type B (under constituency control) nor as earlier Type A (done by experts); it is instead a rather ill-defined overlapping approach which began on March 13, 1968, when Howe passed the planning process to Manning and continued--on a take-and-give basis--throughout the next nine years. It was not simply that the federal and local agents were to share the task of planning and implementing the new program; it was rather, as we shall analyze, the unclear roles that each would assume.

On April 4, the assassination of Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., produced large-scale civil disorder in the District and provided a strong impetus to bring community groups into the planning. Since the Community Council represented 75 organizations in the District, and was already in existence, it was brought together to take the first step: the

selection of a demonstration site. Included also were school leaders, the Mayor's office, Federal City College. An ad hoc group of the Council suggested the Douglass Junior High School area in Anacostia, a section of the city which had evidently been neglected and faced overcrowding because of rapid growth in numbers of school children in the late sixties (due in part to the removal of poor families from the Capitol Hill area when urban renewal began there).[40] The D.C. board of education approved the site, appointed Dr. Norman Nickens, Director of Model School Division and Executive Assistant Superintendent, as the Project Director, and hired Dr. Fantini as chief consultant. Meetings were held in June with D.C. teachers, principals, and unions as a prologue to a "Community Information Conference" on June 15, 1968, a direct effort to engage people from the Anacostia community serviced by Ballou High School, Douglass Junior High, and Moten, Nichols, Birney, and Stanton elementary schools. Advertised on radio, the press, through handbills, and announcements in churches and community organizations brought several hundred people to the Bethlehem Baptist Church, rev. Mr. Coates, pastor.

At the meeting, a committee of ten participants was selected as community representatives to form an Ad Hoc Community Planning Council; later the number was increased to thirty-five. The Planning Council made plans for a month-long workshop which was financed by funds (not from Congress, since the bill for early RENP was yet to pass, but) from Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Title III, dollars already awarded

to the District schools. Some 280 parents, teachers, students, and community attended; each was paid a $15 daily stipend, and the General Learning Corporation "catered" the workshop (cost: $25,000).

The actual planning of the Anacostia project took place in task forces, comprised of workshop participants who studied a broad range of educational services, roughly paralleling President Johnson's list of goals: pre-school, youth, and adult programs, community schools, techniques to improve pupil-teacher relations, and so forth. Although there was some name calling and conflict among groups (the parents wanted principals to make teachers to teach children better, for example), reports indicated that the sessions were serious, hardworking, and productive.[41] By August 1968, the recommendations of the July workshops were submitted to a committee representing all workshops, reviewed, and approved by the Ad Hoc Community Planning Council. As expected, the proposal listed a large number of problems (in a section called "What We Have"), twenty-eight solutions (in "What We Need") including, at the top of the list, community participation in areas of governance, curriculum, and recreation. Other suggestions were made including improved inservice education for staff. With the help of General Learning Corporation, the workshops produced this document with a price tag of $15 million. The D.C. school board approved the Anacostia Community School Project, as it was called, and forwarded it to the U.S. Office of Education. The date was

September 18, 1968, and the formal planning phase was over. It seemed that community and educational constituents, with help from consultants and when organized into working groups, were able to produce a document. It probably cost more to involve virtually everyone concerned, both in effort and money. But the voice of the community was clear: it wanted control.

Maneuverings in the Federal Government

While the U.S. Office was requesting a proposal from the District schools--and was to receive one costing a husky $15 million, the Congress had other ideas. During the July workshops, for example, the Senate ignored the House vote of one million dollars for Anacostia and recommended no funding whatever. Pressure was exerted on the Senate from the community which held rallies, made noise, and sent delegations to meet with Senators. The White House lobbyists reminded the Senators of Johnson's promise; and Senator Robert Byrd, after making a strong speech in favor of the proposed project, is credited with restoring the funds at a level of $5 million. A House-Senate Conference was held where the differences between the $1 million voted by the House and the Senate's $5 million was resolved. On October 10, President Johnson signed the Appropriations Bill for the District of Columbia (P.L. 94-73) which included $1 million for the Anacostia Community School Project. Some of the initial resentment in the Senate, evidently occurred because Johnson

had attempted to bypass Congress earlier, going through the United Planning Organization, a local conduit for federal dollars from the Office of Economic Opportunity to the District; now, however, it appeared that the Congressional Appropriations process had control, a fact of much significance over the next nine years. For ACSP/RENP would have regularly to return to the Congress for funding, the access in part controlled by the U.S. Office of Education, and later, the National Institute of Education, as they prepared budgets and programs.

The relationship between RENP, Congress, and the NIE is treated in depth in other chapters. For our purposes in this chapter, however, Congressional-local interaction is important in two ways: First, the pattern of behavior, with Congress reducing and often eliminating funds for Anacostia, the community lay leadership, in concert with school administrators and teachers, lobbying directly with Congress and indirectly through the Office of Health, Education and Welfare, is prototypical of actions taken over and over again, as the project--in varying stages--fought to survive. Second, we see in these activities the first example (one of many) of Type C approaches to change. That is, both the professionals in planning and implementation in the District and the community participants set aside differences, formed a coalition, and moved to pressure the funding sources to keep the Anacostia project alive. Neither the "experts" nor the "people" exercised sole control; both needed each other, a form

of mutual adaptability (in slightly different form) that McLaughlin found central in her research on the implementation of change in other settings. The underlying values that explain Type C actions here are neither strictly professional nor solely participative. They seem rather to be strategic, overtly political, public, and direct, sharing the wile of the savvy planner with the style of the community pressure group. Rarely have professional educators directly marched on the Federal government, a technique hardly recommended in courses on social service planning. And rarely have large communities of poor and black people organized themselves so rapidly (the summer workshops with pay were a great encouragement) and moved so adroitly in favor of their program.

Summary

During the planning phase of the change process, the major objectives include (1) delimiting who should do the planning, (2) deciding on who should approve the plan, (3) focusing the plan to address problems, (4) locating the resources to carry out the plan, and, overall (5) setting the rules of the game for later program implementation. Case data show that these ends were only partially met during this phase and would be an impediment to rapid and thorough implementation in the next. Some of the reasons are as follows:

1. Federal agency experts and decision-makers were ambivalent about the appropriate role for local constituencies. At first, the White House, university and USOE planners wanted unfettered control; later they brought in the leaders in the D.C. schools and the community. Yet they still hoped to retain control, a desire which is understandable given their position in the government operation and their knowledge of how the White House and Congress functioned in funding local programs. The fundamental issues of who should plan and who should make major policy decisions--important decisions during the planning/adoption phase--had not been made. Over the next nine years, between 1968 and 1977, RENP would witness conflict over these questions. It was just these problems that led to Type C approaches to change in the school system, as RENP and DCPS attempted to define their roles in the implementation and institutionalization of the new program.

2. Broad goals led to vague programs. Typically, large-scale planning efforts begin with sweeping goal statements, both as a means of attracting attention of potentially interested parties and as a way of building large coalitions, i.e., leaders often avoid being too precise in their purposes for fear of losing allies.[42] President Johnson's shopping list approach, reflected in the proliferation of workshops, resolutions, and plans, led to high expectations and an extremely expensive and complex set of requests.

The problem of nonspecificity and later complexity cause major problems when these "plans" became attempts at "programs."

3. Programs were planned before funds were available. The carrot and stick (promises of anywhere from $25 to $10 million for program) were extended early as an attention-getting device and as a way to encourage initial investment. Unfortunately, the agencies doing the enticing (i.e., the White House and U.S. Office of Education) were not the ones allocating the funds. And funds were not in hand prior to the summer workshops and proposal writing. Hence, the constituent planners were allowed, if not encouraged, by General Learning Corporation to "blue sky" in their task forces and come up with recommendations which later could not be met. This pattern of stimulating expectations and costs and then having to cut back continued into the implementation period, making it difficult to sustain programs and hold on to staff.

4. Funds were allocated for only a roughly defined "program" in Anacostia. While reason three above--that plans were laid before dollars were available--occurred in this case, so too did Congress give a $1 million carte blanche to the District schools to set up a program in Anacostia. Over the next eight years, in fact, there was little agreement on exactly what "the project" entailed. This condition led to the difficulty of implementing a program which had only sketchily

been drawn and around which great conflict would arise.[43]

The planning phase had superficially been completed, leaving the next phase highly vulnerable to misinterpretation and confusion. And basic rule setting had been only partially accomplished, though a basic plan had been set and funded.

PHASE 2

Implementing the Anacostia Program

Fullan and Pomfret, in their extensive review of research on the implementation of educational programs, explain that "implementation refers to the actual use of an innovation or what an innovation consists of in practice,"[44] differentiating it from adoption which they see as the intent or the decision to implement. Pressman and Wildavsky in their book Implementation provide a more comprehensive definition. They explain that "a verb like 'implement' must have an object like "policy." Policy in turn refers to both an intent to change something and the "actual behavior" that accompanies the desire. Further, they say, there must be a pre- and post-implementation perspective.[45] For if the program, or whatever, is already being carried out, then implementation is unnecessary.

For example, if Anacostia parents already had considerable control over their schools, then what is there to change? Also, if nothing is happening (in Anacostia, for example), then what is there to study? a thought in some planner or

Anacostia resident's mind? Thus, to summarize Pressman and Wildavsky's thesis, implementation is a set of purposeful behaviors that indicate a changed organizational routine over a specified period of time. It is purposeful in the sense that someone attempted to do it, though the outcome may be only in part anticipated. Implementation has a behavioral component; one can see it or at least evidence of its being present (proxies will do, as when residents of Southern California conserve water without being aware they are doing so). It is organizational in nature, though not always. And it occurs over a time span, for as Pressman and Wildavsky explain, implementation involves a pre- and post-perspective, from before a change to afterwards.

In the case of the Anacostia community project, implementation involved changes in school governance, as the community voted for a local school board which was granted considerable power over the hiring of the administrators (within RENP itself and in Region I generally); in inservice education, as full-time teacher trainers instructed classroom teachers in new techniques, whether these new approaches to teaching of reading and mathematics were effective or not; and in paraprofessional activities as Anacostia laypeople were hired as full-time classroom aides and community-school liaisons.

Of course, these three components were not implemented easily or quickly; this section details the history of implementation between 1968 when the funds were allocated and 1977 when all three parts were in place. We characterize the process of accomplishing these goals and the problems encountered

therewith. Why did it take so long? Eight years is a long time in the history of an organization. How was the program able to maintain Federal financial support and school system interest despite the obvious slowness of implementation? And what were the positive outcomes of the extended implementation time that prepared the way for institutionalization--the permanent absorption of parts of the project into the regular life of the District's schools in the Anacostia area?

The Characteristics of RENP Implementation

While the earlier stage, planning/adoption, required only minimal organizational structure (workshops, a few meetings, no permanent roles or commitments) over a relatively short period (a few months during the summer and fall of 1968), implementation called upon the school system to change its mission, functions, and roles for perhaps a school year or more (when the Federal funds diminish, of course, the program may be dismantled: implementation does not necessarily mean security). Hence, implementation behaviors are often undistinguishable from other organizational activities: such as staff being hired, curricular materials being developed, teachers being retrained, and school policy being made, for example.

But the implementation phase of the Anacostia innovation was delayed by numerous problems. They fall roughly into three categories, as follows:

1. The Nature of the Innovation: Had the intended program been a simple, clear, and easily recognized effort, it might have been carried out with greater dispatch. But since it was vague and complex, it was not quickly implemented. First, the innovation was actually many innovations, combined under a single rubric. Some 28 recommendations grew from the task forces of the summer planning workshops, each having a constituency and each having some legitimate basis for implementation. The time necessary to winnow the number down by 1976 to four major components (inservice education, classroom aides, community organizers, and the community governing board) was certainly a factor in delaying full operations of the ACSP/RENP. Second, each component required a somewhat different set of actors, skills, and approaches. The sheer number and complexity of the details involved made implementation greatly complicated.[46] Third, each component was started up separately, requiring repeated time and energy. It was as though the leaders had to start over, doing not one innovation but many. Trial and error characterized much of this effort. And fourth, these components each encountered some resistance; the greater the number and location of these innovations, the greater the opportunity to upset some group of actors in the school system, the community, the union, and the innovation staff as well.

2. The Complexity of the Approval Process: Acceptance by the school system and USOE in the fall of 1968 did not mean

clear sailing. Each program component had a long journey to final approval: by a planning task force, the Ad Hoc Planning Council, the DCPS, the Inter-Agency Group in the U.S. Office of Education, a mechanism established to gather Federal funds for the project and the project staff at USOE. Each decision-point was a potential source of delay, as revisions of proposals were sometimes requested. Also, the appropriation of Federal funds presented a problem. Dollars for the Anacostia project were short, requiring Federal bureaucrats to scramble around in search of other uncommitted funds to bolster the sagging budget of ACSP/RENP. Since Federal funding was done yearly, the repetition of review, increases and decreases in amounts, and the Federal expectation of results in a few short months only added to the frustration of starting program components. With each review and funding cycle, the role of the Federal agencies, particularly the National Institute of Education after 1971, grew. When Congress put pressure on NIE to implement and maintain certain aspects of RENP, the NIE staff in turn made demands for results on RENP staff--if funds were to be forthcoming. The negotiations process, going on for about five years, was a slow and tedious one.

3. The Fluidity of the Organizational Environments: Over an eight-year period, the Anacostia project as an emerging organization underwent numerous changes in leadership and structure. This situation undoubtedly prevented the kind

of constancy of purpose and direction from developing. For example, only two project directors, William S. Rice and Dan Jackson, remained in the post for more than a year, the shortest duration being six weeks, in fact. Other roles also changed, not only in encumbents but also in function. Even the number and location of school sites was shifting as the years went by. The Federal agencies which funded the innovation, likewise, were not constant. The big change occurred when the Anacostia project was switched, along with some other "experimental" programs, to the new research agency in DHEW, the National Institute of Education (NIE) from the U.S. Office of Education (the details of NIE purpose and function are discussed in another chapter). Whether old OE or new NIE would have handled the project any differently over time cannot be determined. It is obvious that the newness of NIE, its rather tenuous relationship with Congress, and hence its vulnerability to pressure from both Congressmen and RENP-related petitioners were factors in how it dealt with the project, a topic to be discussed below. Of course, the District of Columbia Public Schools underwent great changes between 1968 and 1977; most lie outside the purview of this study. Occasionally in the analysis, mention will be made of some change in the school system (such as the division of the school district into areas, the legitimation of community involvement, and the turnover of superintendents), where necessary.

Despite these three problems--the complexity of the innovations, the complexity of the approval process, and the fludity of the organizational settings--RENP was implemented over time. In effect, the quagmire of early planning was tidied up, programs were designed, approved, funded, and put into action. RENP as an organization did stabilize, as did its relations with the District school system and the National Institute. That is to say, the three abovementioned difficulties were not insurmountable; though had not the funding remained for eight rather lean years, giving ample chance for failure and recovery, the project would have collapsed. It was, in fact, the pressure for deadlines and accomplishment, a kind of organizational "behavior modification," that in part forced some components to be implemented; others like the community board had some broad-based support--and such ample time to grow and develop--that NIE played less of a role in bolstering that effort.

The following sections provide the case materials on RENP implementation. The information and analysis are divided into rough time frames including the early activity and stagnation, the middle period when NIE became involved and the program was essentially re-planned, re-approved, and re-implemented; and the final period during which the Phase 1 and Phase 2 led to full implementation of the components now associated with RENP. At the conclusion of this segment, an analysis of the impact of extended implementation will be presented, as a preface to the discussion of institutionalization.

Full Steam Ahead

Action began immediately to implement the new project. Priority, interestingly, was given to those program components which most related to community involvement, in particular, the training and placement of Community Reading Aides, or CRA's; the Community Participation portion led over time to workshops, elections, and the creation of the Anacostia Community School Board; and the project hired community organizers effort, again using laypeople hired from the area. It is no great mystery as to why these efforts were extended first. The representatives of the community had been given significant responsibility during the Type B planning phase (selected, placed on task forces, on decision-making bodies like the Ad Hoc Community Planning Council, and told that their views were important). Jobs in the poor, overcrowded, black community were scarce, especially positions in white collar jobs like assisting in classrooms. Thus, the pressure to convert Federal funds into local jobs had mounted. Further, the ideology of the period, the era of Ocean Hill-Brownsville and other community control experiments, gave credence to the demands for implementation of community-related components. And as could be predicted, the first roadblock was the resistance of regular classroom teachers in receiving elementary schools to the unannounced arrival of uncertified community people, as we shall see.

In October 1968, a million dollars was appropriated

for the Anacostia project. Since funding was lower than was requested, the project proposal was sent to all members of the Inter-Agency Group with covering letters from the U.S. Office requesting that other HEW agencies offer support and funding. In November, the Reading Task Force prepared the Reading Proposal with the help of General Learning Corporation. It was presented to the Ad Hoc Planning Committee in December and was immeidately approved; by January, 1969, the proposal was submitted to the U.S. Office, reviewed, and approved with the following three contingencies: a Reading Project Director be appointed; the substantive reading approaches be strengthened; and an evaluation component be added. The Reading Task Force agreed and recruitment of Community Reading Specialists (CRA) began: on January 15, 97 community lay-persons were selected for the first cycle of training. Funds to support the effort totalled $726,000, of which $40,000 was to administer the overall project. In February, a final group of 90 CRA's completed a fifteen-day training period and were sworn in under Federal civil service regulations on February 20.[47] Edward J. Edward, Jr., Principal of Turner Elementary Schools, served as Acting Director of the Reading Program, pending the selection of a permanent director.

All seemed well, as these newly trained staff prepared to enter the schools and the Anacostia project moved into its office facilities. On February 24, when the first

group of Community Reading Assistants reported for work, local classroom teachers were confused and raised questions about what the function of these paraprofessional was to be. (These functions had not been spelled out in the proposals and ~~USOE~~.) Who would supervise these assistants? What would they do? Why weren't the school teachers notified? A meeting was held on February 27 at the insistence of teachers; a group of teachers who apparently felt left out indicated their discontentment by walking out of the meeting. Others remained, airing their grievances against the way the program was being handled. Still others, it seems, supported the goals of the project and praised it. The Ad Hoc Community Planning Council, when it heard of the problems in the schools, planned meetings in each school to iron out difficulties; the Council was helped in this effort by William Rice, Director of Special Programs for the District schools, who met privately with persons involved to help soothe the introduction of CRA's, and by William Simons, President, Washington Teachers' Union, who also helped by reassuring teachers.

Several months later, on May 26, teachers again demonstrated their discontentment with the community people in the school by walking out of a PTA meeting; the incident was triggered by a request by Rev. James Coates, chairperson of the Community Planning Council and President of the D.C. Board of Education, that only parents be allowed to speak in the meeting. Two days later, DCPS Superintendent Manning hand-carried 31 warning/reprimand letters and personally and

publicly delivered them to the offending teachers at Birney Elementary School for their alleged misconduct at the PTA gathering. Teachers reacted by filing complaints with the Teachers' Union that they were not afforded due process before written reprimands were issued (such letters became a permanent part of the teachers' personnel files). The cause of the walkout, evidently, centered around a number of complaints, including a lack of information about the Anacostia Projeet, dissatisfaction with the way the Community Reading Aides were introduced into the schools and the absence of teacher involvement in the decision, and the allegation that the Rev. Mr. Coates was in a conflict of interest situation as head of the Anacostia community board and president of the city-wide school board. Superintendent Manning, during the grievance review process, stated that the letters were in fact a "warning" and would not go into the files of teachers. Some teacher appealed to the Board of Education and one other transferred to another region of the city to work.

In the flurry of initial energy to get the Anacostia program underway, a number of weaknesses appeared. First, the environment had not been prepared; host teachers in the schools were informed after the community sides had been introduced into the buildings. Second, there was no real administrative mechanism for supervising the teachers, since the leadership of the total project was only getting started. This raised questions as to the accountability and direction

of the program. Third, the purpose of the aides had not yet become apparent. Were they simply another pair of hands in the classroom? Or did they have a special job? Later, of course, when the regular classroom teachers were provided with inservice programs, the aides were invaluable in relieving the classroom staff to attend workshops in the Center and Labs. Until the inservice component got underway some five years later, however, the Community Reading Aides often lacked a particular role, though many worked well during this period with the teachers, according to interviews.

A second component of the Anacostia experiment, also involving community participation, was the Community School Board. The effort had begun in 1968 when Superintendent Manning turned to community representatives to fashion a Proposal for submission to the U.S. Office. The community involvement functioned continued, in various forms, to the point where elections were decisive in seating laypeople of the Anacostia Community School Board (it took several elections to obtain sufficient votes to fill the slots available).

In November, 1968, after the Project was approved and funded, the Ad Hoc Community Planning Council (ACPC) represented the interests of the community, however one might define those "interests." It approved the Reading Proposal; the Community Education Component, which contained programs to involve and teach members of the Anacostia area about their schools and other social service; and other components such

as the Early Childhood Program, adult education program, and Street Academy. In June 1969, the Project received a grant of $273,933 which included money for the Community Participation Proposal, providing in part for the election of a local school board by December 1, 1969. At Howard University, in preparation for elections, a conference was held on "community schools." Prior to the elections, the Westinghouse Learning Corporation (a competitor of General Learning Corporation), was hired to run the school board election; thirty "campaign consultants" from Howard University and 100 high school students registered local residents for the vote and help supervise the elections. But the voting was disappointing, with only 437 out of 6,005 registered people voting, filling only 90 seats out of the 241 on neighborhood (Local School Boards) and community-wide Anacostia Community School Board. Another election was planned for December; the low turnout can be explained by the historical disinfranchisement and ingrown apathy and was not unique to the District of Columbia. On February 28, 1970, the Anacostia Community School Board held its first meeting; Westinghouse Learning help, supervising and giving advice; Emmett Brown is elected Chairperson. Local boards at several elementary schools participate in making decisions on building changes, lunch periods, and so forth, though it appeared that many such local boards remained inactive during the period of 1969-1975.

The Wheels Stop Turning

Following this burst of energy which led to the training of CRA's, the election of school board members, and various other short-term programs (e.g., the four-week Black Studies Planning Workshop and the Summer Day Camp for Reading involving 600 children), the project entered a five-year period of some confusion and dysfunction. It is difficult to attribute the malaise to any particular cause; rather a whole set of conditions contribute to the loss of momentum.

1. The Nixon administration seemed less sympathetic. Caspar Weinberger, for example, as Director of the Bureau of the Budget, requested that the U.S. Office of Education to review the project, since the funding had reached a requested amount of $5 million.

2. Close scrutiny showed serious weaknesses in the Project during 1971. HEW Audit Agency found that DCPS had mismanaged $118;777 of Project funds; the design and operation of the project were in doubt, according to an interpretation of an outside evaluation; and project supervision was found wanting.

3. In October, 1971, Binswanger recommended that the Project be phased out, initiating an extended period of negotiations, pressure on USOE from community and Congressional friends of the project, and short-term financial extensions. This "planning under the gun" (45 days to produce

an acceptable new proposal or else!) increased the difficulty of stabilizing the project.

4. Energy was diverted from the operation of the Project to lobbying for its survival. Demonstrations, letters, Memorandum of Law, and statements by outside groups like the D.C. Citizens and others accused the Binswanger decision of being precipitous, arbitrary, and lacking in understanding. Hence, general agitation replaced attempts to further implement the project.

5. Further evaluations were made, concluding in October 1972 "that the Anacostia Community School Project was so underfunded and understaffed at the central and component administration levels that adequate project management was impossible." A vicious cycle was established: Federal agencies found the project inadequate, threatened to withdraw funds, making improvements difficult, which in turn were evaluated and found wanting.

The confusion extended to all agents involved with the Anacostia project. At the Federal level, following the Nixon election, the project had no Federal project officer or office. Thus, the project operated without guidance, without the benefit of external direction, and without a Federal data-gathering center. Binswanger's interest was experimental schools, not Anacostia; but he inherited the project and was seen as unsympathetic. He kept the project on a string, handing out

30 days of funds at a time. The project directors came and went, as shown in Table 2. There was an attempt to bring in an outsider, Calvin Lockridge, but he did not survive. In August 1972, 75 Community Reading Assistants and 12 Community Organizers were released since Federal funds were inadequate to pay them. And the U.S. Office gave up the project; the newly created National Institute of Education, the educational research branch of DHEW, was given the Anacostia project, along with several other experimental programs.

How did the Project survive this period? What can we learn about the politics of urban change from this period in ACSP history. First, the supporters of the project "went public," lobbying directly for the continuation of the program. While this tactic is not always successful, particularly when the funding agency is many miles away, in the case of ACSP/RENP, direct appeals to government departments and senators on the Appropriations Committee proved effective in the long run. The insecure position of NIE, vis-à-vis Congress, and the close relationship that developed between certain key senators (like Warren G. Magnuson, Chairman of Appropriations Subcommittee), and the D.C. project, provided a point of leverage for continuation. NIE was expected by Congress to help the program, even if it meant acting in opposition to the expectations of the Nixon administration.

For example, when Binswanger recommended cancellation of the project (October 1971) and U.S. Commissioner of

TABLE 2

Project Directors by Term, Months on the Job, and Background, April 1968 - Fall 1977

DIRECTORS	TERM ON THE JOB	DESCRIPTION OF STATUS AND BACKGROUND
1. Norman Nickens	April 1968-April 1969 (12 months in job)	Part-time director; also associate superintendent of DCPS--hired within system
2. William Rice	April 1969-Sept. 1972 (41 months)	Full-time; former Director of Special Project of DCPS--hired inside system
3. Julian West	Sept. 1972-March 1973 (7 months)	Full-time; former assistant to Supt. in DCPS Special Projects Office; acting director and insider
4. R. Calvin Lockridge	March 1973-Aug. 1973 (6 months)	Full-time; former civil rights leader in Chicago; hired from outside
5. Peter A. Lewis	Aug. 1973-June 1974 (10 months)	Full-time but acting; former community relations person for RENP; insider
6. Valerie Green	June 1974-July 1975 (13 months)	Full-time; Assistant principal of DCPS junior high school; insider
7. Evelyn Taylor	July 1975-Oct. 1975 (3 months)	Full-time but acting; former head of Instructional component for RENP; insider
8. Larry Riddick	Oct. 1975-Nov. 1975 (1½ months)	Full-time but acting; head of Summative evaluation for RENP; new to DCPS; outsider
9. Dan Jackson	January 1976-present, Fall 1977	Full-time; former business man; outsider to system and to public schools.

Education Sidney Marland accepted the request, a coalition formed, including project staff and community groups. These protesters held public meetings, press conferences, petitions, and circulated leaflets. One leaflet read: "Our children will be deprived of their opportunity for a good education.. Over 200 people will be added to the unemployment rolls. Dollars will be drained from the Anacostia Community."[48] Other agencies and organizations were pressed for support such as Federal City College and the Urban League; the D.C. Board of Education and Superintendent Hugh Scott explained that they "join in unanimous indignation at the abrupt termination of the Anacostia Community School Project . . . it is an insult to the right of self-determination for the black citizens of the District of Columbia, and an abortive attempt to kill the model of excellence in urban education being developed for other Anacostia-like communities across the country."

Two hundred supporters of the project, driven in three public school buses, held a protest meeting at the U.S. Office, an event covered by television and the press. When Binswanger attempted to speak, he was shouted down. He did finally get to defend the decision, and others in favor of ACSP spoke, including Rev. James Coates. Binswanger subsequently provided funding for the project for an other 45 days to allow an appeal to Marland. The decision was interpreted by community board chairperson Emmet Brown as a chance to correct the project's problems and to gain additional support from NIE. In a final decision of the appeal, Commissioner Marland took with

one hand and gave with the other: he supported the decision of Binswanger, bringing into doubt the continuation of the experiment after August 1972; but Marland also made new money available for planning (the cycle begins again) through a five-person Task Froce. Again, this group came up with a Proposal, submitted it to USOE, received approval in principle, but was denied funds pending further planning.[49]

In September, USOE handed control over ACSP--now renamed the Response to Educational Needs Project--to the National Institute of Education. In Congress, the appropriations that launched NIE included suggested funds for RENP; the Senate Appropriations Committee noted in its report: "The committee . . . wishes to mention its endorsement of the District of Columbia school project funded from this appropriation." NIE read the meaning of this suggestion and sought to salvage the Anacostia experiment.

A New Lease on Life

The direct political pressure applied to NIE, by both Congress and local protestors, paid off; RENP was given a two-year period to do more planning, reorganizing, and to be implemented--a moratorium. The D.C. public school leaders remained interested in RENP, in part because of their heavy investment in the project. Salaries, and hence, jobs depended on outside funds. The Anacostia community had a stake in their boards and their locally elected officials. The enticement to support the program came from the promise of

continued--and even additional-funding, though many fought just to maintain the program and the staff already committed. Thus, participants from the project and related decision-makers from the school system were willing to persist, to go again and again through the negotiations process with the National Institute; they were willing to forego some program goals to gain others, hence, narrowing the mission of RENP; and they were willing to take their time--two years--to try again.

This raises the question: Do organizations learn? Do they "generate new 'official' responses to environmental changes that go beyond simple stimulus-response adaptation, to impound the results of the experience of new routine, or to generalize from one new experience to others?"[50] There is evidence in the second round of the planning and implementation of the Anacostia program that indeed there was much that both NIE and the internal planners in the public system had learned, things that were seen and done differently. This section presents the data on the period 1972 to 1976, a period when the Response to Educational Needs Project was put into operation.

One way of determining what the organizations involved with RENP learned is to compare their efforts in the latter years of planning/implementing (1972-1977) to the earlier period (1967-1972), already detailed. Of course, the RENP phase, as opposed to the ACSP one, did not happen de novo; when RENP began there was much already accomplished. For example, the community school board had functioned for a

number of years; the classroom teachers had become used to some laypeople in the schools as aides; and the District of Columbia school system was long experienced with the project. But, nonetheless, the Federal agency and local planners interacted differently in some of the following areas: funding, number of planners involved, level and type of Federal control over local project, scope of planned goals, style of Federal-local interaction, time span used in planning, and so forth. See Table 3.

(In this discussion, for ease of identification, the project for the first years--1967-1969--will be called the Anacostia Community School Project; the program during the later time, 1972 and following, will be called the Response to Educational Needs Project.)

In contrast to the early planning/implementation, it appears that much was learned in the techniques of "change agentry," as data on the Washington, D.C. experiment shows. In a real sense, the outside agency, NIE, returned to a modified form of Type A planning approaches; the return was to the control by the "experts," the review staff at the Institute and outside consultants whom the Federal agency and/or the District of Columbia leaders might choose. Everyone seemed to learn that the implementation of change depends on clear goals, specificity of design, and accountability of procedures: that change does not usually happen through casual though well-meaning activities.

TABLE 3

Characteristics of Organizational "Learning" in Evidence in Project-Federal Agency Interaction

CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERACTION	ACSP: OLD PLANNING (1967-68)	RENP: NEW PLANNING (1972-75)
1. Level of Federal involvement and control	Moderate; turned over to DCPS and task forces, with consultative help	Major; NIE approved each step and assisted in formulation
2. Funding point	Project given carte blanche initially; funded in large, vague categories	Precise; line item, operational funding only after plans approved for specified duration
3. Time span	A few months; planning done in summer workshops; rapid initially	Over two years; step-by-step
4. Local dependence on Federal agency	Moderate; local Ad Hoc Planning Council operated somewhat independently	Heavy; NIE project officer sat ex-officio on meetings; day-by-day assistance
5. Number-diversity of local planners	Large; high community input; 75 organizational representatives; open to community; some professional (teachers) and union groups excluded	Small; 26-person force; professional staff help; all constituency groups involved, including non-RENP people
6. Type and scope of program goals	Broad; whole spectrum; e.g., youth, health, aged, recreation; no focus. Generally socio-political and educational	Focused; narrow; related to in-school education
7. Role of evaluation	Minimal; mentioned as afterthought; unclear time frame for evaluation	Major; built-in; obvious from onset; clear time-table; funding contingent

Between January 1972 and the spring of 1975, a cycle of proposal submissions, review, re-writing, and re-submissions was carried out. It was clear that until RENP was fully planned and specified, funds (other than basic maintenance of administrative and program staff dollars) would be withheld. The cycle went as follows: A five-person Task Force, headed by Elizabeth A. Abramowitz, produced a plan with the title Response to Educational Needs Project. It was submitted to NIE in August 1972, was approved in principle but funding awaited further planning.[51] This response should be contrasted to the 1968 events in which USOE funded programs after a single submission. The NIE critique of the Abramowitz document requested greater operational detail.

In February 1973, Acting RENP Director Julian West offered the Operational Plan/Interim Report to NIE; the primary goal of the document was improved instruction with only secondary emphasis on community involvement. It included staff development and resource centers. Perhaps the presence of the Anacostia community board made continued discussion of community participation less vital, though the tension between pedagogical and community involvement goals persisted in RENP throughout its history. Again, NIE responded with a request for more adequate program strategies, greater need for research and evaluation, and the suggestion that consultants and NIE staff be used in re-writing the proposal. Unlike the ACSP approach, RENP was expected to build in evaluation, not an unexpected request given NIE's research and development orienta-

tion.

The next project director, Calvin Lockridge, in June 1973 submitted a Pre-Implementation Plan to NIE; he was fired in a battle with the ACSB and some administrative restructuring occurred. A larger RENP Task Force was convened, with representatives from the community, teachers' and administrators' union, school board, RENP staff, NIE, reading specialists, and RENP consultants appointed. Note that this planning group is far more comprehensive, involving parties like teachers and administrators who were excluded from the 1968 effort. Also, efforts were made to solicit the opinion of other principals and teachers not on the Task Force at luncheons, on questionnaires, and at meetings. In February 1974, a "Proposal for a Cooperative School--Community Program to Foster Improved Academic Achievement Among the Children of Anacostia" was given to NIE (note the title contains both the community and achievement orientation). The response for the National Institute staff was: "After almost two years of very intensive work and (relative to other projects) massive technical assistance, a proposal was received in February 1974 that gives promise of being fundable."[34]

Rather than to require still another re-write, NIE moved to a different approach: the Institute presented 62 specific grant terms and conditions, creating a kind of adversary situation wherein negotiating could occur. The federal agency had come a long way from the earlier approval process. Rather than granting requests, as earlier USOE had done, NIE

insisted on an interactive relationship, formalizing the mutual adaptation that followed. In the spring of 1974, then, the grant was awarded, authorizing RENP to use some $2.million USOE "carry-over" balance plus an additional $2.25 million in new 1974 (Fiscal Year) NIE dollars. The components of RENP were now reading, mathematics, parent involvement, management, and evaluation, a much truncated list from the 28 recommendations produced by the Summer Task Forces of 1968. The overall mission of RENP, as perceived by NIE, was specified as "improving the reading and mathematics achievement to the level of non-inner-city children" in grades Kindergarten through 12.

The funding was awarded with two strictures not imposed on earlier grant awards. First, NIE imposed a form of "contingent funding," requiring that grant conditions be met and on evidence that reasonable levels of implementation be achieved before funds were released; even the language is contractual. Before submitting its final funding proposal, RENP had an in-house formative evaluation done; later, a summative evaluation was to be completed by the District of Columbia school system (one change NIE made was to request outside evaluations). The attempts to ascertain the extent and quality of implementation and to pin continued support of these results was a very different approach from earlier forms of accountability where, at times, the Federal project officers seem quite unconcerned about the project.

Second, the project was given time restraints by NIE. The

agency had originally expected the project to be underway in a single year, 1974; another year of summative evaluation was to follow (1975). RENP requested two years of implementation, stating that the program would be executed by June 1975, and the evaluation year would be contemporaneous with the second year. A fall-back year, 1976-77, was then suggested by reviewers. Interestingly, the ACSP had never known about an ending date; the project had instead lived on a "hand-to-mouth" year-by-year basis. The specificity of how the money would be released and for what duration provided time parameters for the project's staff and DCPS officials.

Implementation proceeded with the hiring of 24 community organizers and 5 senior community organizers to supervise (May 1974); a new Project Director, Valarie Green, was selected following the resignation of Peter Lewis (see Table 1). During the summer of 1974, Green worked to develop and gain approval for reading/mathematics programs, establish positions for Trainers of Teachers for the inservice components, and setting up centers and labs for the reading and mathematics programs. Administrative heads for reading and math components were hired during the academic year 1975 and attempts were made to equalize the reading and math emphases (reading had taken precedence). Green was dismissed; conflict with staff and slowness of implementation were reasons given. The Acting Director was then former head of Reading Component, Evelyn Taylor; she is then replaced by Larry Riddick, a second Acting Director, for six weeks, allowing time for a national search.

In fall 1975, NIE conducted an interrim evaluation of RENP; weaknesses were spelled out as follows: problems with leadership turnover and quality of instruction, qualifications and abilities of aides, poor definition of roles of aides in schools, nonimplementation of mathematics component. Also, there was turmoil in the public schools. Superintendent Sizemore was having problems; the school system was not responding to a request by the General Accounting Office Audit on RENP use of funds; and funds were not being spent because of delays in implementation. But NIE was somewhat restrained since the RENP funds were given as a grant, not a contract (the evaluation procedures were later used to give some Federal direction).

Also, in the fall of 1975, DCPS began negotiating for a grant extension. Based on requests from external reviewers, a contingent extension was granted: If RENP achieved implementation by May 1976, then they would receive yet another year of NIE funds; if not, the money would be withdrawn in July 1976, ending Phase 2 of RENP. At that time, total funding from NIE was to be about $7 million allocated between September 1972 and June 1977.

So whether through direct denial of grant funds, through measuring out funds as work is done, or through the control of the evaluation, NIE took a strong part in seeing that implementation took place. (See the Task 4 chapter which discusses NIE commitment to research and evaluation.) Even the last year and a half, between mid-1975 when DCPS

was negotiating a continuance of RENP and the final effort to implement and disseminate the results elsewhere in the system, the national agency engaged in an effort to supply help through outside evaluators (e.g., Gibboney Associates) and funding for results, not promises.

In January 1976, Dan Jackson was hired as Project Director, a man with extensive business experience and an outsider to the DCPS. He began filling in the gaps in implementation: For example, Jackson reorganized and "evened out" the resources between mathematics and reading programs in host schools; he placed the Community Organizers in each school directly accountable to the teacher trainers (Program Facilitators), experienced, tenured staff memebers who operate the Labs and Centers in each building. Other key personnel were changed.[35] Jackson also negotiated with NIE over the conditions of the grant. For example, when NIE refused to provide summer training money for salaries of RENP staff, causing the likely furloughing of personnel, Jackson went public, attacking NIE in the Washington Post.

According to information from two sources, by 1975-1976 school year, RENP was fully implemented. The Gibboney Associates formative evaluation and on-site visits by NIE project observers both recorded extensive to moderate activities associated with implementation. In the Final Formative Evaluation Report, outside evaluators found that the math labs and reading centers in 10 Anacostia area schools were functioning well for teachers (inservice) and students; that

each school (10) had a Unit Task Force of RENP staff, principal, and related teachers which produced a Plan for using and monitoring RENP techniques in the building; that in many cases the local school boards at each school were elected and functioning; that the Parent/Community Involvement component, staffed by the community organizers, was in place, recognized by relevant local actors, and was functioning; and that relations between RENP schools and their communities was good. Similarly, observations made by NIE staff during 1976 recorded that Math and Reading programs were functioning in 14 area schools (see Table 4); these evaluators also spoke with RENP staff, principals, representatives of the Washington Teachers' Union, community aides and organizers, and classrooms teachers. The data show a high degree of implementation, as new staff, routines, and materials were extant in the schools.

Thus, over a ten-year period, though ACSP had been only minimally implemented, a project called RENP had been designed, approved, staffed, and implemented. The project included (1) a management component comprised of Dan Jackson, Director, component Directors for Reading and Mathematics and Parent/Community Involvement, (2) Mathematics and Reading Inservice Education program through Labs and Centers in the schools, (3) a Community Involvement Component including Local School Boards and a school-based Unit Task Force, and (4) a regionwide elected school board, the Region I Board. In 1977, with the diminution of Federal funding, however,

TABLE 4

RENP Schools....Staff/Student Involvement by Grade

SCHOOLS	INSTRUCTIONAL COMPONENT					
	READING COMPONENT			MATHEMATICS COMPONENT		
	TARGET GRADES	NUMBER OF TEACHERS	NUMBER OF STUDENTS	TARGET GRADES	NUMBER OF TEACHERS	NUMBER OF STUDENTS
Ballou Sr. High**	10	12	887	10	12	867
Hart Jr. High**	8,9	12	414	8,9	15	756
ELEMENTARY						
Birney**		12	287		12	295
Congress Heights°**	4,5,6	9	253	4,5,6	9	253
Draper	4,5,6	9	232			
Friendship**	K-6	12	284	K-6	12	322
Garfield	4,5,6	10	277			
Green				4,5,6	14	348
Hendley	4,5,6	11	293			
Leckie				K-6	12	330
Malcolm X				4,5,6	11	284
Savoy				4,5,6	14	414
Simon°**	4,5,6	11	273	4,5,6	11	273
16th & Butler	K-6	13	342			
TOTAL		111	3,542		122	4,142

° Schools with the same target population in Reading and Mathematics.

** Schools with the RENP Reading and Mathematics programs, as reported in Final Report of RENP (Aug. 1977): Total Number of Teachers = 233 ..... Total Number of Students = 7,684

the Project faced its final problem, the integration of RENP activities into the on-going function of the District of Columbia school system.

PHASE 3

The Institutionalization of Change

What occurs when Federal dollars are withdrawn? Are there lasting effects of the project that inform our understanding of change agentry in urban school systems? Does the external interventionist approach constitute an effective mode of bringing about change in large-scale systems? Are there lessons from the RENP experience that are useful in other situations? These questions and others are treated in this section.

The Effects of Long-Term Implementation

Before analyzing the institutionalization of change in DCPS, we need to discuss the impact of almost ten years of struggle, failure, rejuvination, re-planning, and final implementation--in other words, the effects of the prior experience of the ACSP and RENP on the final phase. There are five:

1. The hardening of commitment: Had planning and implementation gone quickly and smoothly (which they did not, as the prior section demonstrates), the attention paid to the Anacostia experiment might have been minimal ("Oh, yes,

isn't RENP that program for poor kids? Whatever happened to it?"). Instead, the extended period of negotiations forced key actors in the Superintendent's office, on Capitol Hill, in the DHEW, and in the community to deal with implementation--and now, institutionalization--over time. It is not that change agents should necessarily seek to extend the implementation process; the chances of extinction are greatly increased by repeated failure. But, an unintended outcome of the lengthy history of RENP was the hardening of commitment of DCPS to preserve the project, of NIE to get it implemented and evaluate it, of the community to lobby and preserve it and the jobs it entails, and of some key lawmakers in Congress to pressure for its continuance.

2. The building of system investment: In terms of our change construct, the lengthy and turbulent process of planning and implementation raised the investment costs for all parties concerned. The Federal government sunk millions of dollars into the project, not to mention the reputation of such agencies as NIE. Key liberals in Congress had invested in RENP's continuance because of a general commitment to the education of poor and black children and their desire to counter the conservative and restrictive inclinations of the Nixon Administration. DCPS was under considerable pressure to equalize the distribution of resources among the District's schools; RENP funneled funds into the schools for poorer children in the Anacostia community. Furthermore, a large number

of DCPS employees were paid under the RENP grant. Pressure to maintain this commitment raised the investment level for the system.

Albert Hirschman in his book on organizational behavior puts it still another way: Organizational members have a high incentive to use their voice, to express themselves publicly, when exit from the system is not possible. That is, in Hirschman's word, "The individual feels that leaving a certain group," in this case RENP, "carries a high price with it /the price of finding a new job/, even though no specific sanction is imposed."[52] Thus, for staff, the investment in RENP was obvious: employment. For community staff members, support of RENP was doubly imperative, for jobs as aides and community organizers were very difficult to find. Barring "exit," the participants were highly loyal to the program, having a high investment in it. For non-employed community laypeople, the option to exit the Anacostia schools was minimal; they either supported (through votes and protests) the continuation of the project (even after Federal funds were removed) or faced the further downgrading of their children's schools.

3. Eliminating the "fear of the unknown": It is believed that systems refuse to alter their behavior, to change, out of fear of the unknown: that a new routine or approach will be worse than the existing one and therefore it is in the interest of participants to hold doggedly to their current

practices. In more personal terms, individual members at various levels in an organization wish to maintain their existing behavior because they find it satisfying and effective for their assigned task. In organizational terms, the social unit reinforces on-going activities through the sameness (or change) in the environment. Hence, organizations must do more than "tell" their members to change: the environment--job description, reward system, other interdependent jobs--itself must change. Organizational participants learn to read the signals from their immediate environment; subtle changes in job title, expectation and location are likely to upset the individual (and also the environment in which he/she works).

But, in the decade of RENP, there was ample time to dispel concern over the outcome of the project. Local teachers came to know, if not to trust, the project. The aides became familiar faces around the school; the teacher trainers, who were themselves veteran teachers in the system, became known quantities; and the community boards, the most consistent force among the RENP/ACSP components, had become a given in regional decision-making (at least in Region I). Thus, one unintended but useful outcome of the extended implementation period was the familiarity that was associated with the project, easing somewhat the process of institutionalization.

4. Finding an acceptable and effective staff head: Most projects have only a short time to locate a good director;

the success and failure thus depends on making the right choice early on. In the case of RENP, nine directors and a host of subordinates came and went. The decade of planning and implementing allowed a number of leaders to try the job and leave. Finally, Dan Jackson was recruited and appeared to have the right combination of operational efficiency and rapport with the community to survive and to get the job done. Hence, a long period of operation allowed a trial and error search for a good set of leaders. It also permitted the system to experiment with "insiders" and "outsiders."[53] (See Richard O. Carlson on Ex. Succession.)

5. Adjusting the experiment to the organizational setting: The incorporation of RENP into the regular processes of the District of Columbia school system depended on the aligning of goals, structures, roles, and routines such that the innovation could be absorbed. This fine tuning could not be done quickly; rather the mutual adaptation process required that the two parties get into phase with one another. The experiment had to build its own constituency, test its own approaches, and refine its activities. The host system had to come to appreciate, and even need, the new program, find a slot in the organization for it (and its staff), and adjust itself (the system) to accommodate the new program. This aligning took time; RENP/ACSP had nearly a decade to become a familiar, important, and appreciated part of the system's repertoire.

Institutionalization Explained and Made Operational

As was mentioned earlier, the change process in organizations involves a planning, implementing, and incorporating phase, each having its own purposes, problems, and activities. While the initial stage required that basic rules be established and plans to be made and the second phase rested on initiating the actual organizational behavior over time, the final stage had as its purpose the meshing of new programs with the organizational setting in a somewhat permanent fashion. The temporary, experimental quality of the program was displaced by acceptance and a legitimate function in the system. One test of the endurance of a new project is whether, when outside props are knocked out, the program stands on its own bottom. Are there sufficient internal resources and interest to sustain it, in some form or another, or does the system dismiss the effort and return to former behavior? If the new program is scuttled, then one might assert that its impact is limited to only those staff and children who were involved with it. If the program is integrated into the system, however, in some distinguishable and meaningful way (not just using the name, for example), then the benefits of the project become available to members and clients over a much longer time period. As students of change, we are of course interested in maximizing the impact of programs deemed useful, and we thus value the steps that might lead to permanency,

In the analysis of the 1976-1977 period of RENP, we see steps being taken that could be interpreted as incorporation. The fall of 1977 was the onset of the period best characterized by the name of the report that guided it: the "Utilization and Dissemination Model." It is premature to state with too much certainty what will happen. At the time of this writing, however, the new school year was six weeks started and it had become apparent what the nature of the institutionalized RENP effort would be. Already, the NIE had provided about $140,000 to pay for the transition, thus easing the Federal government out and encouraging still further commitment from the school system. Already, as we shall discuss, RENP had moved into "rent free" quarters in the Friendship Center, its director, Dan Jackson, had been placed into a line relationship under the Deputy Superintendent for the Instructional Services, and his staff had been identified. Already, certain activities in Region I had been established which were akin to RENP, under Jackson's guidance. And, under the "Utilization and Dissemination Plan," a system for involving 16 other Region I schools, staff, and programs were devised and underway; these efforts were supported financially by "in-kind" resources from the District of Columbia public schools, totalling some $1.6 million.

Finally, the guiding principle employed by most systems confront by demands for permanent change is as follows: utilize new elements which "cost" the system the least in scarce resources, since new programs (without new funds) require

the organization to divert money, staff, energy from existing programs. Another way to put this: systems will divert resources where there is greatest certainty of results, the greatest political trade-offs for doing so, and the least cost. Certain elements of RENP fit this equation and are being institutionalized into the DCPS; others are being rejected by the system. It is the comparing of "accepted" and "rejected" components of RENP that provide a clue as to the inner logic of program institutionalization. What is it about certain staff positions, let's take the Community Aides and Community Organizers, that make it difficult though possible for the school system to absorb them, whereas the jobs of Program Facilitators and Project Director are continued in some form?

There are four criteria for institutionalization that are apparent in the analysis of these case data:

1. The meshing of goals and approach: During the 10-year history of RENP/ACSP, the purposes were refined and narrowed to a point where the project (RENP) and the organization (DCPS) have reached some congruence of mission. Without that meeting of minds, so to speak, the system would easily have closed down the program when the external incentives were removed.

2. The meshing of organizational structures: The internal operation of an organization demands that its component parts, to a great extent, work together. It is the very nature

of the "organic" quality of organization. Thus, RENP had to find a niche, be afix somewhere in the school system or perish. The locating of RENP in the organizational structure in turn required that RENP be in consonance with the purposes of the system without either duplicating existing programs or threatening them. RENP found a home in the office of the Deputy Superintendent of Instructional Services and the office of the Region I superintendent.

3. The meshing of roles and job categories: Permanent status in an organization requires that the staff fit into the occupational structure of that system. "Temporary" or "provisional" certification (school personnel are often required to be licensed, certified, or in some way given official standing) must give way to full-time status if the new program is to be institutionalized.[54] Otherwise, the employee is subject to dismissal easily and enjoys little job security/protection. In school systems where tenure and union affiliation largely determine the stability of jobs, the importance of the congruence between project job descriptions/titles and those of the regular school system cannot be underestimated. The Program Facilitator (teacher trainers) were all tenured and were guaranteed employment; the aides were not, though they were members of AFSCME. Dan Jackson, like many managers and non-tenured newcomers to the DCPS, had little security beyond the clauses in his contract.

4. The meshing of RENP-DCPS program, materials, and facilities: Finally, the institutionalization of change involves the acceptance and integration of the actual program (its particular routines, use of materials, facilities, if any) with the similar functions of the system. Yet, the unique quality of the innovation, once incorporated, must continue to exist, if nothing more than in the philosophy and consciousness of the participants. Changes in program involve alterations in the professional behavior of staff: e.g., how they diagnose and treat children in teaching them to read or cipher; how leaders in the school system make vital decisions such as selecting a Regional Superintendent; or how they use centers and labs for instruction.

A Brief History

The final phase of the change process, in the case of RENP, was distinguished by many of the same organizational behaviors as earlier stages: the terms and conditions were negotiated among NIE and RENP-DCPS, both sides attempted to maximize their own goals, and finally, both accommodated in some ways to the other.

DCPS Superintendent Vincent E. Reed asked Dr. James Guines, Deputy Superintendent for Instructional Services, to head the school system's effort: he submitted to NIE a blueprint for utilizing and disseminating (NIE suggested the terms) RENP during the 1977-1978 school year. The purpose

of the document was to detail how the project might best be extended to other schools and other "audiences" outside the District of Columbia. DCPS was asked by NIE to explain the level of school system commitment of finances and personnel to the continuation of the project; to establish priorities among the various "candidates" (i.e., components like math labs and reading centers); and to lay out the steps ("milestones") in institutionalizing the program. Drafts of the plan were submitted, reviewed by internal and external (to NIE) readers and the comments passed along to Dr. Guines and Mr. Jackson.

One reviewer, in critiquing an early draft, found that:

> Overall, the technical proposal lacks clarity and cohesiveness and does not address critical questions such as: What is to be accomplished? How is it to be accomplished? What methods are to be utilized? What outcomes are expected? And who is the target audience?[55]

A meeting was held (December 10, 1976) with DCPS, NIE and outside reviewers attending. The result of the "negotiations" seemed consistent with our notions of organizational behavior. Dr. Guines reiterated that the school system could not be obligated to take on additional financial burdens by the continuation of RENP; rather "it was pointed out that some of the possible options did not necessarily require major fiscal requirements."[56] He did state, however, that the District and RENP were committed to the use and circulation of the lessons of the project, as NIE suggested. The give and take and diffusion showed the school system attempting to continue the program while committing the least number of new

staff and new costs; this approach seems highly rational, considering the financial condition of the District, its interest in continuing RENP, and its desire to gain the funds designated for the final phase. Yet, the Final Proposal did promise to continue much of RENP in conjunction with regular curricular and staff development programs of the District of Columbia schools. That is, the RENP approach to staff development (using in-school teacher trainers) was to be grafted on to the major curricular development which had already been approved by the school board and the superintendent--the Competency Based Curriculum. The 14 schools where RENP Centers and Labs were already functioning were to be "left in tact and teachers who have been involved in the RENP experience will schedule their classes in such a manner that maximum utilization of the Reading Center and Math Lab will be assured."[57] Other staff (not formerly in RENP) could use the resources for similar purposes. Furthermore, the Plan explains, the Program Facilitators were to be assigned to the 16 remaining schools in Region I, thus disseminating RENP to all the buildings in Anacostia. Additional training would also be available at a Staff Development Center housed at the Friendship Educational Center where the Project Director, Dan Jackson, would have his offices.

The broader dissemination function would be carried out by a Public Information Officer at Friendship who would inform other DCPS staff about RENP and would "coordinate institutes, workshops, and Conferences for local and national

school boards, superintendents, assistant superintendents, regional superintendents, parents, supervisory personnel, and prospective teachers. . ."[58] The budget for the use and dissemination proposal called for the $100,000 Federal funds to go for the Instructional Component (for reading and math directors and administration); Educational Materials ($9,398.25) would come from the District's budget; the remaining staff, including the Project Director, 5 instruction team members, 22 Facilitators, 41 Resource Teachers, and a secretary (totalling about $1.6 million) would be picked up by the DCPS in-kind.

On January 10, 1977, the Plan was approved. It is the implementing of this proposal, as well as other outcomes, that forms the data base for this section. We shall examine the four RENP components (community school boards, inservice education, community aide and organization, and RENP administration in terms of their goals, structure, roles, and program (i.e, routines, materials, and facilities). The purpose is to ascertain what has changed in the school system that can be attributed to the presence of RENP: changes in behavior as well as outlooks of participants. That is:

1. What new and permanent modes of community expression are available now that were not before the existence of RENP?

2. What new organizational arrangements exist and remain in the school system that were not found before?

3. What new procedures, rules governing member behavior, and facilities/materials will likely endure because of RENP?

Institutionalization of Community Involvement

The Anacostia project was certainly not unique in its purpose of extending community involvement--if not control--over school affairs to laypeople, particularly poor and black folk. The 1960s were characterized by efforts on the part of communities to gain a voice in school affairs, met by administrative reorganization to bring school decision-makers closer to the "communities" they served. The former arrangement was called "community control"; the latter, "school decentralization." Together, these reforms were seen as means to overcome the distance between the governed and the governing. "In part, the quest for urban decentralization and greater community participation in decision-making," political scientists George LaNoue and Bruce Smith explain,

> reflect the awakening political consciousness of big-city black and Spanish-speaking citizens. The appeal of the idea also stemmed in part from cultural trends stressing the importance of individual autonomy and self-expression.[59]

Nationwide support for community involvement/organizational decentralization came from conservatives who saw these reforms as Jeffersonian and anti-socialistic in spirit; from radicals and liberals who yearned to "free the people" from the bonds of bureaucracy; and from bureaucrats themselves as they tried to cultivate a vocal constituency in the lay community. Even Republicans, LaNoue and Smith report, favored decentralization and community control as ways of breaking up the Democratic stranglehold on the cities.[60]

Washington, D.C., in many respects, was not different; the impulse to decentralize and bring the community into the decision-making was strong, perhaps stronger in some ways than many other cities, for the District had not previously enjoyed even the right to vote for school leaders in the 20th century. Not until the passage of P.L. 90-292 did the election of school boards become a reality--and the year was 1968! So when President Johnson announced in the same year that a model school project (as the Anacostia program was first referred to as) would contain elements of community involvement, it was both an extremely important development and a very novel one, having implications for ease of implementation of the Anacostia community involvement component and the likelihood that the reforms inherent in the elected community boards would persevere.

Our analysis indicates that the Region I board had become by 1977 an active and permanent part of the governance of the District of Columbia schools in Anacostia. That is, it had been institutionalized into the regular workings of the system, was taking a role in decision-making in Region I (not simply RENP) and was guaranteed, in all likelihood, to continue. What power did and does the Board have? On paper, the Region I Community School Board would only make recommendations to the central DCPS Board of Education on matters of personnel and policy. But in practice, by all accounts, it had enormous influence. For example, in the fall of 1977, the job of Region I superintendent, deputy regional super-

intendent, and two assistants were filled by candidates screened; interviewed, and "hired" by the community board. Rubin Pierce, principal of Ballou High School in Anacostia, was selected as Regional Superintendent by the Board. His associates, likewise, were the choices of the Board. In interviews, we learned that to date no such decisions of the Board had been overturned by the D.C. Board.

At least seven reasons explain the success of the community involvement component of RENP, leading to the permanent establishment of the Community Board. These factors not only detail the Board's development, they also give a slice of the history of the project, though today, certainly, the Board is not simply identified with RENP but with Region I (the Anacostia community) generally. First, there were 10 years of tradition behind the Board and its role. From the onset, as we mentioned in parts one and two of this chapter, the "community participation" aspect was stressed. To recapitulate, the goal of community education and the importance of community participation were mentioned in 1968 by President Johnson and were planned with the help of decentralization experts and advocates like Mario Fantini (from the Ford Foundation and supporter of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville Community control experiment in New York City). During the summer of 1968, community representatives were a vital part of the planning workshops, the task forces, and the Planning Council. In December 1969, elections were held for the Anacostia Community School Board, though several days of balloting

were necessary to "get out the vote." The unfamiliarity of the hundreds of candidates, the newness of voting for officials in the District, and the cumbersomeness of the registration/voting process were possible causes of the poor turnout. And in 1973, with the creation of Region I, the community participation component was renamed the Region I Community School Board. See Table 5 for a list of the representative bodies involved:

TABLE 5

Succession of Community Representative Bodies in Anacostia, 1968-1977

TITLE	DATE
1. Task Forces (community workshops; invited)	July 1968
2. Community Steering Committee	July 1968
3. Anacostia Ad Hoc Community Planning Council	August 1968
4. Anacostia Community School Board (elected)	December 1969
5. Region I Community School Board (elected)	Sept. 1973-Present

A second reason for the implementation/institutionalization of the representative boards was its broad base of

support in the District of Columbia. Unlike New York City's community participation effort which was marred by conflict and a retaliatory teachers' strike, the Anacostia experiment was upheld by the Washington Teachers' Union, whose president, William Simon, recalls that his union was involved on the planning committees, gave general support and consciously tried to prevent a confrontation like in New York. Perhaps the moderate tone of the Anacostia community leaders, the absence of organized anger and agitation, and so forth, allowed the teachers to be partners and not adversaries in the process. The superintendent's office, during this period, was filled by a succession of leaders who backed the idea of bringing parents and community layfolk into the decision-making, though most stopped short of giving Anacostia residents "control" over their schools. For example, as early as 1969, Superintendent Hugh J. Scott stated:

> There should be more community involvement in the schools, but not control. I don't support having local boards across the city.[61]

But by the time of the Anacostia board, its election and functions, the District had witnessed at least two other experiments with community involvement--the Model School Division in the neighborhood around the Cardozo High School (1964) and the Adams-Morgan Community Council's School Committee (1967).[62] And when Superintendent Barbara Sizemore, formerly of Chicago, organizationally decentralized the school district,

the notion of the community as a legitimate participant in school affairs had taken hold. Particularly during the planning of RENP, 1972, a special effort was made to include all groups with a vested interest in school operations in Anacostia: the parents, students, teachers and administrators (their separate unions), central office, and Federal project officials (from NIE).

Third, decentralization in Anacostia was greatly simplified by the racial demography of the city and the pupil makeup of the school district. By the late 1960s, as shown in Table 6, large numbers of whites had moved to the suburbs, the percentage of blacks in the District had reached 71 percent, and black children constituted about 95% of the pupils in public schools.

TABLE 6

Shifts in Racial Composition of The District of Columbia, Metro Region and Public Schools, 1950-1970

	1950	1960	1970
Washington, D.C. (all residents)	802,178	763,956	756,510
Metropolitan Washington	661,911	1,237,941	2,104,613
Total	1,474,089	2,001,897	2,861,123
Washington, D.C.			
% Black in city	35%	54%	71%
% Black in schools	52%	79.5%	95.4%

Similarly, the school board, first elected in 1968, was black, as was the majority of staff and administrators. Hence, all the major constituencies--parents, pupils, staff, and board--were largely black, avoiding the white-black debacle that plagued decentralization efforts in school systems like New York City's. Thus, Washington, D.C. managed, quite self-consciously, to avoid the nasty New York City confrontation, described by LaNoue and Smith as follows:

> As one [New York state] legislative person put it, 'The difference between the 1968 and 1969 session was the difference between disagreement and real rancor!' As strikes polarized feelings between blacks and Jews, one of the strongest liberal coalitions in the country was shattered. The UFT (United Federation of Teachers) ended its criticism of the 'archaic, ineffective' school bureaucracy and gave up its abstract commitment to decentralization to form an alliance with the CSA (Council of Supervisors and Administrators) and the Central Trades Labor Council. Bruised from the demonstration district debacle and facing re-election, Mayor Lindsay declined further leadership of the decentralization forces. The school board, with its new pro-decentralization members, was barely able to agree long enough to produce the plan required by state law.[63]

It's not that black community people and black bureaucrats do not fight; rather, the racial issue was removed as an important irritant in the interactions among school people, community people, and the city leadership.

A fourth reason contributing to the institutionalization of community involvement/decentralization of power highlights a major difference between the Anacostia community and many others: the presence of a stable middle-class black group in Anacostia who had not abandoned the local public schools.

These middle-income citizens, vocal, active, and possessing the skills (or quickly learning them) of managing local school affairs, made an enormous difference in the power of the board and its ability to influence local policy. Particularly during the phase when Anacostia Project directors were coming and going with great rapidity and the Federal agencies (mainly the Office of Education) were ignoring ACPS, the community board was called on to give guidance to the program. The chairperson of the board was especially important and by and large these people were educated, professional, and middle class. (Research by David Minar on suburban schools indicates that the talent of professionals on school boards is an important resource to these communities.)[64] Table 6 lists the chairpersons of the community board (Region I board) over the nine years (1968-1977), their occupations, and in some cases, other comments about them.

TABLE 7

Names and Characteristics of Chairpeople of the Anacostia School Boards 1968-1977

NAME	YEARS OF SERVICE	OCCUPATION	OTHER DATA
Rev. James Coates Anacostia Community Planning Council	1968-1969	Minister	Later elected to B.C. School Board & City Council — 1st elected
Emmett Brown	1969-1971	Retired	---
Albert Pearsall	1971-1974	Gov't employee; on board of M.L. King Center	Died in office
Eugene Kinlow	1974-Pres.	DHEW--U.S. Office of Education	Still in office

The regular members of the board, as well, often were from middle-class backgrounds. Furthermore, some of these people were encouraged to participate in community board activities--to devote the time and effort to the task--by the chance to run for other public offices, using the experience and exposure of public service to advantage. The Rev. James Coates was, perhaps, the prime example. Meetings of the Anacostia Planning Group were held in his church; he served as Community School Board chairperson; he was also elected to the D.C. Board of Education; and he now serves on the D.C. City Council.

Yet another, a fifth, contributing factor to board success was the partnership that developed between the school leadership serving the Anacostia community and the community lay leadership. Since a primary function of the community boards was (and is) the supervision of the activities of the Region's administrators (particularly the RENP Project Director and staff and the Region I superintendent and staff), it was essential that the planning, implementing, and incorporating actions be done jointly. They were, for the most part. In fact, the relationship between the elected board members and the hired administrators in RENP mirrored the interactions in the DCPS: school board and general superintendent. Thus, the RENP experiment did not involve a new or radical approach to citizen participation in the governance of a public service. Rather, the Community School Board approach replicated the school board-superintendent model which is the accepted practice throughout the nation. Perhaps, the sta-

bility of the school board in Anacostia lies in its conforming to the recognized professional-elected official model. (Admittedly, the Region I Board does not have final say; the D.C. Board of Education has that. But in practice, the community-elected group is rarely overturned and thus functions as its own board of education.)

Sixth, the Planning Council, Anacostia Community School Board, and now the Region I board had access to relatively large sums of Federal dollars throughout its 10-year history. In a poor community and in a school bureaucracy as well, the control over budget meant power, legitimacy, and a reason to be. Initially, the promise of $25 million, later $10 million, and finally, $1 million for year one enabled the project to command the attention of members of the community, to bring them to summer workshops at $15 per day, and to enlist their loyalty. Some of these folks were in turn hired as Community Reading Aides and Community Organizers. Hence, the funds (totalling almost $7 million) allowed the new board to "buy off" some potential dissidents and to give focus to activities: how to allocate the money. Through the writing, submitting, and rewriting process, the boards learned the techniques of grant-getting and the problems of balancing the myriad demands of their own constituency. Funding efforts were a kind of workshop in urban school governance and finance. Even when the funds themselves were diminished by 1977, the Region I board was in control of hiring and firing key administrators and overseeing the operation of local schools; hence, the budget

per se was greatly reduced but the authority over jobs with large salaries remained, making a commitment to continued participation as board members attractive and interesting.

Finally, seventh, the permanent incorporation of the Region I board into DCPS governance was accomplished easily because the innovation did not cost the school system any money. In times when District funds were short, the proposal to continue the role of a community board was attractive because of its price tag.

In sum, the continuation of the community school board as a permanent component of the District or Columbia school system was made possible by its long existence, in various forms, as an arena for community sentiment and decision-making; by its broad community and professional support, unlike its counterparts in other cities; by its black constituency in a nearly all-black school system; by the presence of a committed middle class who were willing to invest time and energy into self-governance for the Anacostia community; by the working relationship between school and Federal agency professionals and the community members; by the funds and power the board had almost from the onset of the project; and by the absence of real dollar costs to the system for the continuation of the community boards--and also, incidentally but similarly, the local school boards in each of the 30 Anacostia schools (see Table 8 for location and concerns of local boards).

We do not wish to give the impression, however; that the community boards had total control or that there were not

TABLE 8

Summary of September Local School Board Meetings*

LOCAL SCHOOL BOARD	NO. OF BOARD MEMBERS PRESENT	NO. NON-BOARD MEMBERS PRESENT	SIGNIFICANT ISSUES
Friendship	9	37	Safety, Helping Hand Program
Garfield	8	1	Goals for Coming Year; Fund Raising Projects
Moten	8	2	RENP; Election; Parent Participation
Savoy	8	2	Raincoats for Students; Playground; Election
Birney	4	8	PA System; Security Guard; School Plans
Congress Heights	14	12	School Budget; Terrell School; Title I and RENP; Special Students from Simon
Douglass	5	3	Election; RENP
Draper	6	2	Organizational Meeting
Malcolm X	9	13	Budget Hearing
Hart	8	2	Election; School Concerns

*Ninth Quarterly Report on the Progress and Activities of the Response to Educational Needs Project, October 31, 1976.

forces at work in the system that countered their authority. There were. The road from Ad Hoc Planning Council to Region I Board was a long one, as the sections on planning and implementing have shown. The board effort was certainly made more difficult by the near total lack of precision in the original President Johnson plan for the District's schools. It was apparent that no one had a clear view of how it would go. Would the community "take over" the so[illegible] Would there be so much inexperience that the community would exhibit total apathy? No one knew. President Johnson, evidently, had a habit of creaming off good ideas from the Federal departments, pushing them, and throwing them back to the agencies for implementation. ACSP was treated in much this way; and so was the community involvement purpose. Once the program was launched, the environment was so unstable that no one was sure how much authority the community board actually had; whether the Federal government would supply the funds; and whether the actions of the Anacostia board, staff, and program were satisfactory. The fear of losing the project, while it galvinized support in some cases, also complicated the problem of community governance. In effect, the same confusion that affected the early history of the project had its impact on the board as well.

Also, one should not overestimate the policy-making power of any single body in the complex school setting: true, the Region I board had tremendous influence on the replacement of top Regional personnel, as we have discussed. But on major

policy issues, the rules of decision-making required the assent of the D.C. school board, the Congress when major funding was involved, the courts, and the professional staff to deliver the services. Rapid changes in the schools, furthermore, definitely affected the free reign of a community board. For example, the prerogatives of any local governing board in the District of Columbia were constrained by several important court decisions. In Bolling vs. Sharp (1954), the companion decision to Brown vs. Board of Education (1955) for the District under the 15th--not the 14th Amendment--the U.S. Supreme Court found the two "divisions" in the schools (Division 1 for white staff and students; Division 2 for blacks) created a highly segregated system and ordered the immediate merging of the divisions and the desegregation of the public schools. Such a city-wide mandate from the courts, with additional pressure from President Eisenhower, led to school desegregation, but also to tracking within schools, thus allowing integrated schools to serve the needs of the various academic levels in the building, or so the argument went.

In 1967, civil rights leader Julius W. Hobson initiated a class action suit against the schools and particularly Superintendent Carl F. Hansen; Judge J. Skelly Wright of the U.S. Court of Appeals ruled that the track system was discriminatory, since intraschool segregation by race and class had occurred. He ordered that the tracking system be abolished and that free bus transportation be made available to children

wishing to transfer from crowded (black) schools to less crowded (white) ones. The perhaps unintended result of both the Bolling vs. Sharp and, more dramatically, the Hobsen vs. Hansen decisions was to concentrate power in the central office and school board as officials worked to comply with the 5% limit (i.e., no D.C. public school can vary more than 5% above or below the per-building median on per-pupil expenditure). LaNoue and Smith point out, for example, that the reassignment of 120 teachers in May 1972 to further compliance was an act of a strong, centralized--not decentralized--school system. Hobson himself, according to LaNoue and Smith, was said to believe:

> . . . the quest for equality might put an end to talk of community control, for only a strong central administration can devise and implement a workable program for allocating school resources equally across the District. . . . In theory, equalization could be combined with local control (or widened community participation). But in practice, fiscal control and policy control have usually not been easily separable.[65]

Still another limitation on the authority of the Anacostia community board--and any local board--was the "civil service" tradition so central to the public employ in the District of Columbia. So while the community boards had clout with the top administrators in the Region, the influence on regular teachers and other staff was severely limited by inpenetrability of the civil service ranks.

But despite the long history of confusion, the external social and political forces, and the general problems of

making organizational changes, the Region I school board is very much a reality in Anacostia. Its goals--community involvement in school decision-making--have sufficiently jibed with those of the school system that the board is now a legitimate part of the governing process. A regular mechanism of elections is permanently established for replacing members on the Region I Board; perpetuity is assured. The system looks to the board for advice on personnel, program, building upkeep and other needs. The Region I superintendent, currently Rubin Pierce, owes his job to the Board; he attends their meetings, just as Vincent Reed attends meetings of the D.C. Board; principals' jobs, too, are in some real way dependent on the local school boards, though their existence and activities are somewhat less constant. (It takes longer to establish 30 smaller boards centered around the 30 Anacostia area schools than one Region I board, or so it seems.) Hence, we conclude, the institutionalization of community involvement in the Region I boards is a result of the funding, activities, and attention that the Anacostia community received through the existence of the Anacostia Community School Project-Response to Educational Needs Project, 1967 to 1977.

Institutionalization of Inservice Training

A brief history: At the point of full implementation in 1976, the inservice staff development component involved 14 schools (1 high school, 1 junior high school, and 12 elementary); 122 teacher trainees in mathematics, 111 teacher

trainees in reading, working indirectly through these staff members with some 4,142 students in mathematics and about 3,351 pupils in reading (though direct instruction of youngsters was not a primary goal of RENP). Our purpose here is not to detail the actual program nor to evaluate the outcomes but rather to consider these activities as part of the overall change process (other sections of the final evaluation discuss the impact of RENP on student learning and self-concepts). It is sufficient to mention that the RENP pedagogical method in math involved: (1) individualized instruction and student problem-solving, (2) a diagnostic and prescriptive technique, (3) the application of mathematics to other fields like business, consumer skills, career planning, and social studies, and (4) the covering of such basic concepts as whole number, rational numbers, sets, linear measurement, and elementary mathematical reasoning. In reading, the RENP approach consisted of (1) listening, speaking, and writing skills improvement, (2) use of instructional materials, test-taking skill building, and classroom management, (3) effective planning, diagnosis, and individualized instruction, and (4) word recognition, comprehension, and developmental reading.

But, as discussed in earlier sections, the inservice training compo nent was not fully implemented until the eighth year of the project. First, the program trained the lay reading assistant (1968-69), placed them in classrooms, and only later used them to relieve the classroom teachers to attend training sessions in the math labs and reading

centers; this development grew out of the replanned project in 1973-75 when the National Institute of Education inherited the program from the U.S. Office of Education and retitled it RENP. Hence, RENP qua RENP involved 16 staff developers (at first called Trainers of Teachers, later Program Facilitators), 60 instructional aides, and 14 Community Organizers.

In order to analyze the process of final institutionalization of the inservice component, then, we shall examine four aspects of the program: the transition of staff functions from federally supported RENP roles to regular line-item supported staff in the DCPS; the incorporation of RENP techniques into the repertoire of the school system; the placement of inservice educational facilities in permanent quarters in Anacostia schools; and the integration of RENP staff development materials into standard use in the system. It is the permanent use of staff, techniques, facilities and materials that forms the heart of our analysis of change in the school system resulting from the advent of the Response to Educational Needs Project (though the term per se is not used--"staff development" is the name one hears when phoning the headquarters of the project).

The Incorporation of Inservice Staff

RENP involved primarily three groups of personnel: inservice educators, aides and organizers from the community, and the management staff (the last group will be discussed in the next section under project management).

First, the "Utilization and Dissemination Plan" states, that ". . . beginning in September 1977, the D.C. School System will utilize the training and expertise that has been acquired by the present Program Facilitators by assigning them to the sixteen (16) remaining schools in Region I which have not received the RENP treatment, thus, regionalizing the RENP concept in Region I . . ."[66] In actuality, however, the Program Facilitators have been placed in available classrooms throughout the system and their function of inservice educators has been, for the most part, taken over by two groups not previously affiliated with RENP: the Resource Teachers and Peer Teachers. The former, numbering 60 in the fall of 1977, are teachers who usually worked at-large in schools with students, helping them with special problems. Under the reconstituted and incorporated RENP, these staff are now asked to work with other teachers, holding inservice sessions in the individual buildings. The Peer Teaching Program, operating out of the Region I office, provides an opportunity for RENP-like inservice support to be available to Region teachers when they come to the Friendship Center for inservice help. And in some as yet undetermined situations, building principals are allowing former Program Facilitators--who have returned to classroom teaching (at salaries below those received while those personnel were Program Facilitators with RENP)--to function during free periods as inservice leaders, though no data are available to confirm this arrangement.

It is interesting that the role of inservice leaders has not often gone to Program Facilitators but primarily to

other school district staff who themselves have a loosely defined role in the school system. Obviously, the costs to the school system of using onboard staff is minimal, relieving the DCPS budget (now that Federal funds are gone) of carrying some 26 Program Facilitators at salaries higher than regular classroom teachers receive. Also, the press for staff to do RENP-like inservice development was sufficient to enlist in the Region I buildings the use of the Resource Teachers, a group of staff with some "slack" in their schedules and a rather loosely defined job description. This form of mutual adaptation, wherein the RENP effort receives inservice staffing and the school system cuts a position (Program Facilitator) which is costly--seems quite ingenious if, of course, it works well this year (additional time and data are required to answer the query).

In addition, staff at the Friendship Educational Center, a new elementary school in Anacostia, conduct inservice workshops for teachers from all over Region I. These staff include, as mentioned above, the Peer Teachers who are paid from regular DCPS budget categories and who work out of the Region I superintendent's office, and the "central staff" of former RENP to be discussed later (they include Dan Jackson, Project Director; Mary Johnson, Director of the Math Component; and Helen Turner, Director of the Reading Component). During free periods, teachers leave their assigned schools and come to the Friendship Educational Center for a few hours of inservice activities--a modification of the RENP approach

of in-school staff development. We shall discuss the mechanics of the inservice program shortly.

Second, the fate of the Community Math and Reading Aides and lay Community Organizers: No mention of the community aides and organizers was made in the "Utilization and Dissemination Plan." In the spring of 1977, the District of Columbia schools issued a Reduction in Force (RIF) for employees of RENP only, an order which was challenged legally through the appeals process. Usually, when a Reduction of Force was requested, it pertained to a whole category of employees across the school system. Meanwhile, the Region I Board attempted to find jobs for the Program Facilitators and Aides. Also, Local 20 of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), AFL-CIO, who represented the Aides and Community Organizers, considered a law suit to stop the firing of these RENP staff members. By September 1977, somehow, the school system absorbed all but five of these employees in aides jobs elsewhere in the District schools, as Title I (Elementary and Secondary Education Act) classroom aides, for example. The five not employed voluntarily withdrew their names. Thus, while this component of RENP--the paraprofessional staff--was not institutionalized into the system, these previously unemployed and untrained community people, some with nine years seniority, have now found work in the school system, an unintended outcome of the RENP experiment but a worthwhile one nonetheless. The jobs of community liaison and classroom assistant are still

being performed but under different aegis, as will be discussed under the new RENP techniques. (The Program Facilitators, because they had tenure before taking jobs with RENP, were returned to their classrooms, at a reduced salary since they were not longer supervisors.)

Third, the management staff of the project was given a primary function in the utilization plan. It stated:

> A Director, working under the supervision of the Associate Superintendent of Instruction, will have day-to-day supervision of this effort with the assistance of a Director of Reading and a Director of Math.[67]

But because these staff members, Dan Jackson, Mary Johnson, and Helen Turner, were funded by a Federal grant of about $140,000 from NIE, it is too early to tell where in the system they will be incorporated. Their function, besides that of supervising the in-school efforts of the Resource Teachers, is to run weekly workshops for teachers who come to the Friendship Educational Center, is to handle the general dissemination of the program, and to publicize it to school principals, encouraging them to send staff down to the Center for help and to organize the in-school component of the project.

The Institutionalization of RENP Techniques

Initially, the Anacostia project had no particular approach or even a stated set of goals--other than the most general desire to improve education in Washington, D.C. schools, to make the system a "model school system," a "beacon" to other urban systems, a "laboratory" (all these terms were

used by President Johnson and others). Later, during the redefining that accompanied Phase 1 and Phase 2 (1974-76), the purpose became that of: ". . . improving the reading and mathematics achievement levels of students, through a concentrated staff development program for teachers . . ." which "emphasizes the diagnostic/prescriptive/individualized approach to teacher staff development and student instruction."[68]

Thus, in the implementation stage, 1976-77, the RENP approach was quite clearly "academic" in nature, or at least could be termed "cognitive"--providing teachers with the skills to help the children learn the basics: reading and mathematics. In part, this shift from many goals (including getting along better with teachers, getting marketable skills, improving their relations with possible employers) to specific and academic ones was a sign of the times. All across the nation, families (particularly poor and minority ones) were demanding that the school move "back to basics" and the Anacostia community was no different. Also, the RENP approach to teacher training was similar to national trends in staff education: that is, the process stressed that the means should reflect the goals or ends. How does a teacher figure out what the ends are? He/she "diagnoses" (first) the child's "problem." Then, a set of activities are utilized to correct the weakness and retesting/diagnosing are done.

This paradigm, based on a rational, means-ends construct, can be traced to the theories of B. F. Skinner and other neo-

behaviorists. Often using the linearity and interconnectedness (not to mention the terminology) of computer programming, writers like Robert Glaser explain:

> Once the content and the component repertoires involved in terminal objectives and subobjectives are described, and once the entering behavior of the student is also described, a precise instructional process can be implemented.[69]

The process of instruction is thus sequential. It links the intervening steps to the proposed outcomes; and the sought after outcomes are behavioral--observable and measureable--in nature.

The "curriculum" of the RENP inservice program for the teachers was the diagnostic/prescriptive/individualized method to be used with the students. Thus, the inservice program consisted primarily of introducing and practicing the techniques of reading/math instruction, techniques premised on the neo-behaviorist framework, though greatly simplified. As but one example, consider the following criterion for implementation of the plan for teacher training (all quoted from the Formative Evaluation):

> By February 1, a detailed plan for training teachers to mesh children's skill development and functional applications will have been prepared.
>
> The plan shall be implemented; Trainers of Teachers shall be training teachers:
>
> - to diagnose individual student's skills
> - to group students of similar needs for instruction
> - to plan instruction for groups and individuals based upon diagnosis

- to teach skills within an applied developmental context in the regular reading /math/ period and in the content areas.[70]

Or, in the language of the Seventh Quarterly Report of RENP (all quoted):

1. All teachers, irrespective of their areas of specialization, are expected to possess the following capabilities:

   a. Teachers will be able to diagnose reading and mathematics problems /based on the Prescriptive Math, and Prescriptive Reading Test and other measure/.

   b. Teachers will be able to design basic individual prescriptions for diagnosed problems.

   c. Teachers will have a knowledge of the service available to deal with identified problems.

   d. Teachers will be able to spot problems and deal with them at the lowest possible level.

   e. Teachers will be able to deal with heterogeneous groupings in their learning center in the classroom.[71]

The underlying rationale of the diagnostic/prescriptive/individualized approach, again, is (1) that instruction must be linked to needs and desired outcomes--the ends-means relationship; (2) that treatments must be sequenced (see item d above: "deal with them," the problem, "at the lowest possible level" before going on to higher and more difficult material); and (3) that instruction must be individually tailored to the learner--much as the computer assisted instruction is capable of branching to meet the special problems of children.

In 1977, when the staff development approach of RENP was meshed with the school system-wide instructional approach

called the Competency Based Curriculum (CBC), the fit was an easy one. Why? Because RENP methods and CBC approaches are both based on the same rationale: the neo-behaviorists' contention that learning is structured around a means-end paradigm. In the "Utilization and Dissemination Plan" adopted by RENP, the school system, and NIE, the language is amazingly similar, and we quote:[72]

> The following skills have been identified as being necessary in order to effectively implement the Competency Based Curriculum, and to assist teachers in dealing with students' reading and mathematics needs.
>
> - Diagnostic/prescriptive/individualized instruction (Model: diagnosis, prescription, application)
> - Testing-taking skills
> - Utilization of instructional materials
> - Establishing learning centers and learning situations
> - Correlating instructional materials, activities, games, etc., to the objectives of the Criteria Reference Tests (PMT and PRT)
> - Re-writing instructional objectives into behavioral objectives
> - Writing and categorizing behavioral objectives within the three domains (affective, cognitive, and psycho-motor--Bloom's Taxonomy of Objectives)
> - Establishing behavioral objectives relative to their competencies under the five skill classification categories:
>
> (1) analytical skills, (2) consumer/producer skills, (3) communication skills, (4) social and political skills, (5) self-actualization skills.

Thus, it seems clear that the institutionalization of the Anacostia project was greatly facilitated by the nature of its

program. It did, in other words, fit nicely into the DCPS approach to teaching children, the CBC, and thus to the in-service training of staff. Had the approach been vastly different, the project might have found incorporation to be more difficult.

Emerging, furthermore, over a ten-year period, was an arrangement involving full-time and in-school teacher education. In each target school, a reading center and/or mathematics laboratory was established, staffed by Program Facilitator and aides who relieved teachers for work in the labs and centers. The commitment in RENP was to an on-site staff and help which was constantly available for teacher development. In September 1977, however, a major change in program configuration was made: at the Friendship Educational Center, an on-going teacher workshop was established wherein teachers left their assigned building, reported to Friendship, and participated in sessions headed by the reading and math component directors.

The techniques works as follows: building principals are notified each month of the workshops available at Friendship. Dan Jackson explained that he and his administrative staff met with all Region I principals in groups and individually, "selling the principals on the staff development opportunities that are open to their staff under release time."[73] Principals then schedule their staff so that a teacher could put together his/her free period and a contiguous period when a special (art, music, physical education) teacher takes the

teacher's class. With two classes back-to-back, the teacher reports to the Friendship Educational Center, where with about 10 to 12 other teachers, they participate in a workshop mainly concerned with the individualization of instruction and the Competency Based Education approach which is now a major part of the DCPS staff development curriculum.

There is much to be said in analyzing the new RENP staff development approach utilizing in 1977 both the in-school training of teachers by Peer Teachers and Resource Teachers and in the off-site use of Friendship Center. First, further research is necessary, comparing the results of each setting on teacher re-education and student achievement. Which site is better, given the cost of operating a single, centralized program versus 30 such smaller programs in the 30 Anacostia region schools? What trade-offs are there in quality between the Resource and Peer Teachers who operate without much direct supervision from the Jackson administrators yet who are close and convenient to the teachers, and the Friendship staff who are well-coordinated and have much more experience in in-service education for staff? Is the abandonment of a primary emphasis on on-site full-time inservice education a major loss in the essence of the RENP approach?

Obviously, a few weeks into the new arrangement is too early to tell whether the mixed approach (of on-site and off-site education) is superior to last year's on-site arrangement alone in the 14 schools. The location of inservice programs in the home schools has had certain advantages--though it is

difficult to quantify them for purposes of comparison. Such training is always there and convenient. It can allow teachers to seek immediate assistance from the teacher trainer when questions arise; just in terms of time in training and consistency of it, there is no easy substitute for on-site staff development. But the cost of maintaining Program Facilitators in 30 schools (or more if all of the school system is included) is very high, way beyond what the DCPS can afford, especially without massive infusions of money from an outside agency. Second, there is some benefit for teachers to "getting away" from familiar surroundings to learn something new. There is a great incentive to use the few precious hours weekly at Friendship to work on improving skills in the teaching of mathematics and reading. And since these teachers have been sent to Friendship with the blessing of their principla, there is added visibility and expectations to work on teaching skills.

The training staff--i.e., Ms. Turner and Ms. Johnson--have a good opportunity to practice and perfect their presentation and teaching skills while working in discrete time blocks with teachers, in a neutral setting away from the interruptions and distractions of in-school life. Thus far, Dan Jackson reports that over 100 teachers have come to Friendship; the idea of sending teachers there for additional work has caught on; and he is most hopeful that the interest will be maintained.

Also, it should be remembered that while the Friendship

component is operating, the in-school component is also functioning, allowing ideas to be presented and demonstrated at Friendship and practiced on-site. The reinforcing qualities of the two-site approach has potential; only further observation and study will indicate if this dual method is working. Next year, of course, when the $140,000 of Federal support is spent, the Friendship segment must be assumed by the school district or be closed down.

A further word about on-site and off-site approaches: it is unlikely that there is a significant difference between the two. Rather, the critical variable is availability, quality, and of course, use. Whether the training situation is located down the hall or down the street seems less critical than what happens in the session itself. Our survey of literature done for Task O shows little clear evidence in the literature that in-school versus university-based versus out-of-school locations for staff development are superior. Perhaps, research on student achievement done by Gibboney Associates will reveal some differences.

Short of clear data on student progress, it seems likely that teacher involvement and units of time spent in staff development are good proximate goals for the new RENP. Since RENP was partially integrated into the school system through use of Peer and Resource Teachers and off-site workshops at Friendship using Directors of Reading and Math, it seems worthwhile to continue supporting the two-pronged approach. It certainly seems superior to the traditional teacher workship which often comes two or three times a year when students

are dismissed, staff report to large-scale sessions, and then business as usual. The attraction of the new RENP method is as follows:

1. Teachers desiring additional work on reading, and mathematics (diagnosing, prescribing, and treating students with problems) have a place to go, people with whom to work, a method (the Competency Based Curriculum), and tools. They only have to check with their principal, arrange their time such that their free period and a relief period with a music, physical education, or art teacher are juxtaposed, and go over to Friendship.

2. Teachers have in-house people (Peer and Resource Teachers) to observe and help them, based on what the teachers learned at the Center or on their own.

3. Principals now have a resource for helping "weak," "new," or otherwise "limited" teachers, both as part of regular staff evaluation or simply as a means of assistance. Referring a teacher to Friendship is a relatively non-threatening way of improving teacher performance, bringing to bear a team of specialists who are not part of the culture of the school. Whether performance in the sessions at Friendship is monitored and reported back to the teacher's building supervisors is as yet unclear. We would make a plea that serious consideration be given to making results of the workshops disclosure-free--thus, allowing the teacher to work on improving performance without fear of job loss or denial of tenure.

The Institutionalization of Inservice Facilities and Materials

In the past, most school systems have devoted only minimal "space" and "materials" to the improvement of staff performance: a "pedagogical" or professional library with books and manuals, a teachers' workroom, and that was about it. The Federal government has recognized this oversight and has worked to correct the problem, e.g., the Teacher Center Program under Public Law 94-482 (October 12, 1976) which, in the words of the Act,

> may develop and produce curricula designed to meet the educational needs of the persons in the community, area, or state being served, including the use of educational research findings or new or improved methods, practices, and techniques in the development of such curricula; and provide training to improve the skills of teachers to enable such teachers to meet better the special educational needs of persons such teachers serve . . .[74]

The Response to Educational Needs Project, though pre-dating the act, provided a "place" and a "process" for the improvement of teacher performance. In each of the "target schools," rooms were set aside as a Math Laboratory and/or Reading Center, and at Ballou High School a computer facility was included in the Math Lab. These rooms functioned as the special and identifiable places where RENP activities occurred. In keeping with the many goals of the project, the rooms served many functions: first, they were the places to which staff reported for inservice education. The rooms were equipped with learning materials for staff use, much of which was geared to

diagnostic, prescription, and treatment of student reading/math problems. That is, using the Prescriptive Math Test (PMT) and Prescriptive Reading Test (PRT), the teacher trainers showed staff how to translate a student's weaknesses on the tests to practical exercises to correct the problems. The labs and centers we visited had each test component coded; likewise each remediation activity was similarly coded so that a teacher trainee could relate the test item to the appropriate teaching exercise and post test. Second, the centers and labs were available to students. In the words of the RENP Final Report (August 1977),

> On a regular basis, reading and mathematics students attending the centers and laboratories were administered individualized entry and exit skills test, utilizing paper and pencil, manipulatives, and games. Moreover, the Project was able to determine the extent to which these students had mastered skills missed on the PRT/PMT based upon the skills reinforced in the center and laboratories as reflected on the student's learning plan, and upon the teacher's assessment of the student's application of skills learned as reflected by classroom tests, oral presentations, and the student's ability to move to the next level of difficulty.[75]

Having students and teachers working together in the labs and centers not only created a realistic setting for inservice education, it also meant that these rooms serviced a number of students directly--as well as teachers from reading, math, history, science, industrial arts, and vocational training. Third, the centers/labs were the administrative sites in the schools for RENP; they were the "offices" for the project. Only in some cases, according to the Formative Evaluation,

were the rooms adequate in size, lighting, and location for the task. In a number of other situations, the settings were deemed by the Gibboney Associates visiting teams to be inadequate:

> . . . one of these /centers/ shares the classroom with Title I and an evening school business class. Of the other four, one is in an auditorium with persistent noise and no security for materials; one is in a former storage room where conditions are cramped and fewer than an ideal number ot students are served; one is in a teachers' lounge where noise is a minor inhibiting factor; and one is a small room occasionally used by counselors and teachers.[76]

The formative evaluation team concluded that the teacher trainers had made the best use possible of the surroundings, only five were found both secure and separate and thus adequate. We did not investigate whether additional classrooms were added to the number of good ones, for the few we visited were large and well-suited to the needs of the program.

In the summer of 1977, when the RIF was ordered and the negotiations began for the acceptance of a utilization and dissemination plan, the labs and centers in the 14 or so schools were closed and the diagnosis, prescription, and treatment materials were assembled and moved to Friendship. The reason given was security: that the district could not guarantee the safety of the materials.

In September 1977, the plan for the new program was to urge all 30 principals in Region I to set aside a room for math and one for reading, to be used as labs and centers, and the stored materials including tests, workbooks, exercises,

boxed materials, manipulative materials, games, and so on would be distributed as schools requested them, until the materials were all gone. Then other instructional paraphernalia would be made or assembled from existing stores in the system. Recent interviews with the Project Director indicate that the process of establishing resource rooms for math and reading has just begun. Principals are busy and the request from the project office is considered of lower priority than many other daily jobs. Without the full-time presence of the Program Facilitator, the functioning of the inservice program depends on the project's central staff in the on-site visits. Once, however, a room for each skill area is established, the likelihood of maintaining it are high. First, teachers may become used to having a place to go, to have materials available, and to have access to help on a regular basis from the Resource Teachers, working with the project directors on-site. Second, the initial cost in funds and energy to set up a room are small; many schools undoubtedly have space for a math and reading resource center--as well as one for science, music, art, and social studies. With the rather clear decline in pupil population, even in more crowded areas like Anacostia with new construction being completed, the chance of having an extra room or two increases. Third, RENP tried to work with only a cross-section of staff from various disciplines. A number of informants wished that the labs and centers would be open to the entire school; in the secondary schools, these rooms should and often were operated by the

English and Math departments, though the materials and the diagnostic, prescriptive, and treatment approach was basically geared for much younger children. In particular the skills hierarchy in math, for example, was only arranged for the basic operations of arithmetic--not algebra, geometry, or calculus, though the testing and teaching materials might be geared for the upper grades. Also, the Program Facilitators and aides were often trained for elementary teaching and might not fit into the new secondary program.

At any rate, the institutionalization of the labs, centers, and materials can be accomplished with little difficulty, once the personnel and management are in place. For the one thing public schools have today is space; perhaps along with the library, the schools of the Anacostia community will also have a place to help staff improve their teaching of reading and math--as well as a place where students can report for additional work in basic subjects.

The Institutionalization of the Project Administration

From the onset of the Anacostia project, the program has had some difficulty with internal management. The Project Directors came and went; the supporting administrative slots were created and changed, often before staff could be hired to fill them. The jobs were often ill-defined and lines of accountability were unclear. Furthermore, the structure of the Project itself made internal directions difficult: (1) there were multiple sites, as many as two centers/labs in 14 schools; (2) the Director was accountable to a number of inside and

outside agencies (including the Region I board, the Region I superintendent, and key people in the funding agency, NIE); (3) the Director had no clear and direct line into the central hierarchy of the DCPS; and on-site lines of authority were unclear for a while, with Community Organizers accountable to no one on-site, the role of the principal of the school remaining unclear, and the high and junior high (at Ballou and Hart, respectively) department chairpeople (Math and English, though all disciplines contributed trainees by lottery to RENP) remaining important but outside the RENP framework.

It is no wonder, then, that during the negotiations and replanning in Phase 1, Phase 2, and the "utilization and dissemination" phase, the Federal agency involved and DCPS administrators spent a large amount of time specifying the nature of the "management system" for the Project. To a large extent, as we shall show, the institutionalization of change in the school system results from the meshing of the structure of the staff development project with the structure of the school system.

On February 13, 1976, the National Institute of Education specified the grants and conditions for the fiscal year 1976, numbering 62 in all. Eleven of these specified management requirements, including (1) "an internal semi-annual evaluation system of all personnel at every level," (2) funding for "evaluating implementation and program quality," (3) the instillation of a Management Information System for

financial, accounting, scheduling, progress monitoring, etc., (4) the hiring of key staff under NIE and DCPS review quickly, (5) the use of technical assistance in setting up the management system, (6) the coordination of RENP with other federally funded programs like Right to Read, Title I), (7) the keeping of monthly accounts of all expenses, (8) the guaranteeing of access to the project by outside evaluators in doing the Formative and Summative Evaluation, (9) the guaranteeing of the right to review prior of evaluation instruments and milestone activities by RENP and the school district, (10) the setting of terms and conditions of date overrides; and (11) the setting of dates of completion of tasks under Phase 1.

It is evident from our research that efforts were made during 1976-1977 and in the following school year to tighten the control over the project: to create procedures for operating the program, to make subordinates accountable to administrators above them, and to establish reporting times and means. This was true not only for the work of RENP staff (the internal workings of the project) but also in the relationship between the project and the school system. For example, in each RENP school, the Program Facilitator (1976) was given primary responsibility for the operation of the on-site training, with aides and Community Organizers reporting directly to him/her. In turn, these PF's reported to their component heads, whether math or reading. These supervisors, in turn, reported to the central head, the Project Director, who was responsible to the Region I board and the

Regional Superintendent. The RENP head did not officially report or have a formal relationship with anyone "downtown," other than through the Regional Superintendent.

When the reorganization came in the summer of 1977, a clear effort was made to afix the program to the overall structure of the school system: in particular, as shown in Figure 1, the Director was placed on the organization chart under the staff development head in the system, the Deputy Superintendent for Instructional Services (Dr. Jim Guines), giving the program a label, a slot, an identity that large systems require to recognize and deal with a new program. Functionally, however, Dan Jackson works most regularly under Ruben Pierce, Region I Superintendent, and the Region I board, though this relationship has become less intense, now that Region I board is concerned about the workings of the entire region and the areas of control under RENP are smaller. Funds from NIE are all committed and the hiring of community people has ended.

Thus, as Mr. Dan Jackson urged, the board should not see itself as a RENP board but a Region I governing body. In earlier phases, the Anacostia board had a million dollars or more yearly to oversee, large numbers of local staff, and often a void to fill. In the 1977 situation, however, the project is operating under the central office, the school building principals, and is much more closely managed. This is not to say that the Region I board ignores the staff development project. Rather it handles this concern along with

FIGURE 1

The New and Old Structuring of the Anacostia Project: Relations among the Central, Regional and Building Offices



many others.

So while RENP in the earlier phase, 1975-77, was a kind of shadow organization, with its own separated administrative offices, its own separate board (ACSB), and no direct tie-in to the downtown offices of Superintendent Vincent Reed, it now is linked up with the established power structure: under Guines, under Pierce, under the Region I board, and in each building, under the school building principals. Since the principals are called on to schedule in-school and out-of-school workshops at the Friendship Educational Center, they are given a major responsibility in the operation of the inservice program. What has happened in the process of mutual adaptation of RENP and DCPS structures is the recognition of the lines of authority, mainly from downtown to the Region, from the Region to the principal, and then to teachers. The project is now accommodated, to some extent, into the structure at each level.

1. Downtown: The project links into the staff development office of the system. To what extent Dr. Guines brings Mr. Jackson into the flow of information, decision-making, and planning is not yet clear. Certainly, as the Region I project is seen as delivering the Competency Based Curriculum to the schools, the need to coordinate the efforts of Ms. Joan Brown, director of staff development in Guines's office, with the activities of the program in Region I under Mr. Jackson increases.

2. Region I: The project, because of its long history and association with the community board (which in turn selected the Region Superintendent), is directly accountable to the Regional Board and the superintendent. In a sense, the board sees the project as its own and understands its workings. Thus, Dan Jackson is accountable on an administrative basis, day to day, to Regional Superintendent Pierce and in policy issues, as is Pierce, to the board. The nature of this relationship and its perpetuity is as yet unknown. When the Federal funds to pay Jackson and his immediate staff are gone, the project may lose its administration and thus likely die for want of a head. If the school system absorbs the positions, as we suggest it does, then the final institutionalization of the management of the REND experiment will be complete.

3. Region I schools: At the building level, the Project comes directly under the principal, as do all activities on the premises. The scheduling of "release time" so that teachers can report to the Friendship Educational Center for workshops and the setting up of labs for math instruction and centers for reading improvement, their staffing (with Resource and Peer Teachers) and their availability for visiting workshops with Jackson's central stff--all rest with the efforts of the principal. Our assumption is that once the centers/labs are established and a routine for release time and visitations are established, the responsibilities of the building principals will be minimal--though it is too early

to tell.

As this discussion shows, there are many questions that remain to be answered in the final institutionalization of the inservice program:

1. Release-time Program.

How often and with what regularity will Region I teachers receive inservice development? To some extent, re-education of professionals requires some connected, constant, and reinforcing learning. Should staff drop in for an occasional couple hours, let's say once or twice per year, the chances of stimulating real change in teaching behavior may be small. If, however, teachers receive some on-going attention at Friendship, backed up with in-school help by Resource Teachers in the labs and center, the possibilities of sustaining changes in the teaching of reading and mathematics are increased. Additional research is needed.

How can the Project be sure that all teachers get serviced? The coordination problem, involving the scheduling of Specialist Teachers (in music, art, physical education) to relieve regular classroom teachers, the matching of teacher with appropriate workshops, and the strain of a small number of inservice trainers attempting to work with the Region's many teachers are all major problems for the centralized approach to inservice education. The advantage, however, is the presence in Region I of a full-time, committed office which not only presents an approach, the Competency Based

Curriculum, but a means for delivery of the message, the Friendship Center workshops.

2. In-School Program.

How can one central staff under Jackson stimulate the creation of center, labs, and in-school staffing in 30 Region I schools? As we discussed in the introduction to this chapter, organizations tend to continue in established routines and change only under some pressure and the realization of failure under current conditions. Jackson and his staff face the problem of selling the project in 30 schools and then servicing those schools with workshops. The need for more staff at Friendship is obvious, though the costs are also evident.

How can staff in the schools be held accountable to a distant supervisor? If the building principal takes primary responsibility for the staffing of the labs and centers, seeing that staff can and do use them (or perhaps delegating the job to high/junior high department chairpeople or reading/math coordinators in the elementary schools), the Jackson staff will be relieved of trying to be in 30 places at once. The Unit Task Forces (comprised of the principal, parents, students, and project staff like the Resource and Peer Teachers) might assume responsibility for opening, equipping, and operating the centers/labs. At any rate, the problem of accountability in so many locations is ever-present.

The strong incentive principals have to using the project, both on- and off-site, rests with the real absence of alternatives. There is little on-going, available staff development. Using the project relieves the problem for principals, as they evaluate and attempt to improve their staff. Hence, what began as an experiment, over ten years, becomes an established resource to the schools, though much research on the effects on the new project arrangement needs doing before we can know the outcomes of the on-site/off-site combined approach.

III. ADVICE TO THE CHANGE AGENT: AN ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

What has the analysis of the development of the Response to Educational Needs Project taught us about the process of change: its difficulties, its techniques, and its future? A few things seem clear: first, no single change strategy is appropriate; a flexible and adaptive one is called for. Second, as the setting for change is altered, the strategy of change agents must adjust. Third, the change agent, whether a particular individual or a group of individuals working in a foundation, state or federal agency, or a leader within a given organization, must over time provide a stable and constant relationship with those being asked to innovate.

But how does a change agent determine the right strategy? What practical advice is forthcoming from a case such

as RENP? Milbrey W. McLaughlin provides a good starting point, as we have shown in this study: the innovation accommodates itself to the roles, needs, and structure of the host system. Also, the system changes to adapt itself to the new program. And the outside agency (agencies) develop in the precision of demands placed on the experimental program as contingent on continued Federal funding and help.

But for the practitioner, the McLaughlin idea is only a first step. It requires further refinement before advice can be given with relevance and clarity. Hence, we maintain that at least two additional variables must be understood before the notion of "mutual adaptation" becomes usable. In particular, (1) what leadership style is appropriate under what circumstances? And (2) what levels of the host organization should be involved as the decision-making process unfolds?

1. Adaptive Change Leadership

We know that the techniques of leading a change process must be case and time specific, that is, adaptive to the conditions in the organization under consideration. Korman, in his discussion of the Ohio State study of Initiating Structure and Consideration, explains:

> What is needed . . . in future concurrent (and predictive) studies is not just recognition of this factor of "situational determinants" but, rather, a systematic conceptualization of situational variance as it might relate to leadership behavior.[77]

But how does one conceptualize the variation in change situa-

tions?

From dependence to independence: One way of understanding the dimension of organizational readiness and ability to change is to think about the independence of the system. Could it change without outside help? If an idea for change were introduced or suggested, would the organization be receptive and capable of implementing the innovation without much help? If so, then the organization is relatively "mature"[78] and able to act independently. If not, then the system is dependent upon initial assistance and enticement. In the case of the Anacostia project, the District of Columbia schools were seen--with some good reason--to be "immature" and dependent in 1967. It was President Johnson's (and other's) belief that without the infusion of large sums of money and technical help, the schools would not improve.

But this dependent relationship--both financially and technically--cannot continue forever. At some point, DCPS must take over the responsibility for the operation of the experiment or it will not be a long-term change. Hence, one way of conceptualizing the "situational variation" is along a continuum from "dependent" to "independent." Hersey and Blanchard put this idea in terms of an "immaturity" to "maturity" dimension. They conceive of these conditions in terms of the willingness and ability of people to change; plus, Chris Argyris contends that "as people mature over

time they move from a passive state to a state of increasing activity, from dependency on others to relative independence . . ."[79]

It appears both from the RENP data and from theoretical considerations offered by Hersey and Blanchard, leaders for change can provide two major types of help: Technical/Substantive which Hersey-Blanchard call Task Behavior, and Interactional/Supportive, i.e., Relationship Behavior.[80] The former may be defined as those activities which specify particular patterns of activities for those receiving the direction. They tend to focus on techniques, deployment of resources, and organizational goals. The latter, Relationship Behavior, is concerned with the socio-emotional support that a person may need, particularly when they are under the strain of implementing a new program. The one type of help is instrumental--having as its goal the completion of the job, new competencies, new outcomes; the other type is more concerned with the feelings, the psychological life, and the affective domain of the participants. Without "feeling good" or "positive" about oneself and the role one is playing in an experiment, the argument goes, the participants will not perform well. It is possible to place both these behaviors on a continuum, from High Task to Low Task orientation--from High Interrelational to Low. It is also possible for change agents to employ both types of behavior simultaneously, raising the opportunity to build a four-cell construct (see Figure 2).

The notion is that as the organization being changed "matures," that is, becomes more activated to help itself and be independent, it requires differing combinations of Technical and Inter-social support from the change leadership. At first, the change agent should be precise, task-oriented, and direct--spelling out what the innovation can and could be, what particular funding, consultative help are available and perhaps centrally, what the goals of the change are to be. Without this clarity and directness--this Task Behavior--the organizational leadership cannot grasp what the outside change agent wants or whether the system can honestly get into the process. (It's better to find out early than late that the experiment is unacceptable.)



FIGURE 2--A Situational Paradigm for Change Agent Style and Organizational Maturity*

*This construct is an adaptation of the "Situational Leadership Theory" of Hersey and Blanchard.

It is too early to worry about socio-emotional support, since no relationship has yet been built and there is no agreement to attempt a change (hence, to admit the change agent) in the first place. Thus as shown in Quadrant 1 (Q 1), the Task behavior is high and the Relational, low.

Second, once the commitment to engage in the change process is forthcoming,[81] the leaders of the effort, both inside the system and from the intervening agency, work on the innovating: planning and implementing it. Here both dimensions are "high"--Task and Relationship Behaviors are appropriate. The change agent is, thus, both highly directive--giving all the advice and assistance possible--and sensitive to the needs of the actors and the needs of the culture in which the organization decision-makers work. To press only the Task Behavior is to appear dictatorial and insensitive and to increase the likelihood of resistance and the chance of failure. The strong-arm approach was tried, for example, by the U.S. Office of Education in the compliance case in Chicago, when the city schools were found to be racially segregated and the officials--without telling U.S. Commissioner Frank Keppel--threatened to withdraw millions of dollars of Federal aid from Richard John Daley's city. A call to the White House, to President Johnson, who owed his election to Daley, slowed the intervention and stop the "innovation" and led, it is believed, to the resignation of Commissioner Keppel. No effort to understand the political culture of the city was in evidence until it was too late.

Third, as the organization becomes technically competent and able to handle the new innovation, the need for high Task Behavior diminishes; the system is more "mature" and the directive role of the change agents can be withdrawn, though some psychological support is important to give the new program leaders feedback and the assurance that they are doing the job well. Hersey and Blanchard call the High Relational/Low Behavior "style 3," and describe that participants

> . . . now share in decision-making through two-way communication and much facilitating behavior from the leader since the /participants/ have the ability and knowledge to do the task.[82]

Hence, the interaction between change agents and those involved remains high but the nature of the relationship changes from one of substantive direction and help to more one of a partner, a cooperator in the process.

Finally, quadrant 4 (Figure 2) shows Low on both Interaction and Task, as the change agent helps the local leaders to "run their own show" through "delegation." Help is available as needed; involvement in the change activities is minimal--say quarterly or monthly for reporting on progress. Should a problem arise, however, the change agents would be available to help; but regular Task and Relationship Behaviors are low, in preparation for complete withdrawal.

The characteristics of the change agent-organizational leader(s) interaction at each stage are as follows: (1)When the Task Behavior is high and the Relationship is low, Hersey

and Blanchard call this style "telling"; (2) When both Task and Relational activities are high, they call it "selling"; (3) Then when Relationship is high and the Task has declined, the term "participating" is used; (4) finally, "delegating" is applied to the low involvement of the change staff in the operation of the implemented program.

2. Adaptation "Down the Line"

A second weakness of the McLaughlin approach is that it fails to specify where in the organization the accommodation is taking place. Since, by definition, "organization" means levels of responsibility, ranging from "top" decision-makers, through "middle" level supervisors, down to "primary" service deliverers; we must assume that "mutual adaptation" involves adjustment down the line. Thus, as the planning and implementation of change occurs, staff change their behavior throughout the system; otherwise, one might maintain that true adaptation has not occurred.

The change agents, then, are all those people who share in the creation of a new organizational routine. The process may begin with "outsiders," people from a Federal agency, the Congress, the White House, who initiate the idea. They in turn entice members of the host organization (the school system, in this case) to try new techniques of inservice education, school governance, student instruction, for example. The supervisors of these activities adopt these new approaches,

directing and guiding the teachers under them to use new methods. Also, new staff may be hired to help. And the accommodation trickles down (or laterally) in the organization, as each tier implements its part of the new program.

Peter Lorange and Richard Vancil in their discussion of strategic corporate planning and change believe that the process actually goes on in cycles and at varying levels within the system.[83] First, as shown in Figure 3, the top decision-makers state their educational objectives in light of the new program idea; they then request a plan, much as Superintendent Manning in 1968 requested that the community planning task forces evolve a set of programs for Anacostia. The locus of activity, as shown in Figure 3, shifts down a level as intermediate leaders define the goals of their school programs and fix a price tag to achieve the goals; in RENP planning, the task forces and Ad Hoc Planning Council generate proposals for early childhood, adult, and school-age programs at a cost of $25 million.

The process then returns to the upper ranks for approval and refinement; then the broad goals become specific objectives and strategies. Again, so the cycle goes, the locus moves back down to the middle ranks and finally into the schools themselves where, in the case of RENP, new staff are identified and programs are outlined. It becomes clear, looking at the Vancil-Lorange model, that often in the early days of the Anacostia project, the cycles were not completed. That is, the top, middle, and lower ranks were not always in



FIGURE 3: Steps in Planning Process by Levels of Change Agents

*Adapted from a model of planning of Richard F. Vancil and Peter Lorange, "Strategic Planning in Diversified Companies," Harvard Business Review (January-February, 1975), pp. 26-27.

contact and the flow of information and accountability was not maintained. Thus, the Vancil-Lorange process presents an idealized schema to which the Anacostia effort can be compared.

In the next section, we take the development of Anacostia Community School Project/Response to Educational Needs Project and summarize its development in terms of the models just presented.

The "Situational Change Agent" Model and RENP Development

If we apply the adopted Hersey-Blanchard paradigm to the ten-year history of RENP, we find some interesting results and some basis for making practical suggestions:

A. The Planning/Adopting Period: The model as adapted for change agent actions suggests that the U.S. Office of Education should intervene in the D.C. public school system in a certain manner: that it should begin by "telling" the system what it wants, what goals it holds dear, what technical help it can offer, and what funds are available. These data would allow the leaders in the system, in the community, and in the Anacostia schools themselves to determine what they need and to what extent they will begin behaving as the change agents suggest. Thus, Task Orientation is high and Interactional is low.

In particular, there should be specificity of goals, limits of funding and personal resources, and constant, stable relationship such that the planning and adoption of

the program can occur. This planning involves four areas of concern, each separate yet interrelated with the other:

1. Program Planning: The change agents should help the local leadership to determine what kind of program it wants, either by introducing a new idea or technology and having the locals respond or by working alongside the locals to help them decide. Again specificity is vital. What will be the goals of the program? Its scope? Who will it reach? How will one know that an innovation is successful (evaluative criteria)? How long will it take to set it up and get it going? What new materials and facilities will be needed? All these questions and others must be answered before the Task Behavior can end.

2. Personnel Planning: Based on the definition and function of the program, the staff must be considered. If possible, these staff should be placed in standard slots in the system or new, approved, and if possible certified/licensed and tenurable positions must be created. Where should these personnel be hired from? the community, the district, outside the district? What precise function will they fulfill? Will there be time limits set and understood on length of employment or will they be considered permanent? Task Behavior on the part of the change agents can do much to facilitate the identification of new jobs, the writing of job descriptions and the phasing of hiring (and if necessary, the removal of staff, once the jobs are done).

3. Governance Planning: Since some new programs like Anacostia have as a basic goal the "sharing" of political control over the innovation itself, the delimitation of loci of decision-making and scope of authority is central to the planning of change. What governing procedure is to be established? What "channels" do decisions go through? Who has first, intermediate, and final authority? Is there a mechanism for democratic control? What redress or appeal procedures are built in? These, and other questions concerning the governing of the new program, are important considerations in the planning process.

4. Financial Planning: Introducing a new program requires the allocation of funds; if the dollars are externally supplied and are earmarked for the purpose of the program, the need to manage and account for the money is vital. Thus, not only must the funding be dispersed in a way supportive of the ends of the program, it must also be accounted for and monitored. Obviously, one of the primary jobs of the decision-makers in the creation of a new program is the budgeting of funds to make the goals of the program possible. But, how much should be spent on staff--permanent versus temporary? How much should be used for "system overhead" and hwo much should be used to hire new staff? What part of the overall funding should be set aside for evaluation/dissemination? What if Federal funds (or other outside funds if an external change agent is involved) are delayed or cut off? Is there sufficient commitment--plus other funding

sources--that can be tapped?

In all four of these planning areas--programming, personnel, governance, and budgeting--the outside change agent can contribute valuable knowledge either directly or through consultants. The goal of this first stage, again, is to provide basic data for an intelligent, informed decision on the part of system leadership to attempt a change. High Task Behavior seems central, while the need for initial socio-emotional support can wait till the system has evaluated the facts and figures thoroughly.

With the Anacostia experiment, a number of factors limited the ability of decision-makers to gather sufficient information to make an informed decision on what to change. The system was not presented with an innovation per se; rather it received the "spirit" of change, including ideas on community involvement, help for the pre-schooler, the meshing of school and the business community, and other parts of a compendium on recent school improvements. It was not that the change agents withheld information. No, the change agents after the initial period of scribbler and expert activity, believed that the district should plan its own model program; the DCPS in turn brought in the constituencies, consultants, and started a process of change. Once Summer Workshops (1967) were set in motion, a barrage of recommendations came forth at a cost of some $25 million. Thus, while the system needed more Task Behavior from the change agents in the U.S. Office of Education, they received instead an open-

ended planning system ("catered" workshops by General Learning Corporation) and few limitations. What could the U.S. Office handle and what would the Congress fund? How precise can goals be when the funds for the project were not even yet allocated? Since no program was generated, other than a notion of community participation and community aides in classrooms, it was hard to set personnel standards and descriptions. Most importantly, it was hard to see how the program goals and those of the Distrcit came together. Without congruence, would the system support the project in the long run?

It appears that despite the confusion of earliest Anacostia efforts, the program was given some shape and secured funding over a ten-year period. The school system needed the funds; the top decision-makers, in the board and the superintendent's office were in no position to refuse them, especially since much of the money would go to hire nonprofessional members of the selected site of the program and would satisfy in part the desire of local poor folks to be part of school decision-making and programs.

B. The Implementing Period: During initial implementation, the need for all kinds of help from change agents is obvious. All the newness of staff, procedures, programs, funding, organizational structuring and governance places a strain on the participants; they require both a high level of Task and Relationship support. The elements of this help

include, on the Task dimension:

1. Constant introduction of new ideas, methods, approaches, as the participants wrestle with the logistics of new programs. In the case of Anacostia project, the U.S. Office hired outside groups to assist; they also worked closely with the program--at least initially. After 1969, however, it appeared that technical assistance was slow in coming, such that between 1969 and 1975, the program seemed to run into serious trouble. Project Directors came and went; the accountability for funding was lax and some $119,000 was not accounted for; the in-school program had ceased to make progress; and the overall morale was low.

2. Constant need for feedback and interim evaluation. Part of both Task and Interrelational behavior is the means to communicate--between those directly involved in operating the innovation and those charged with helping it. This channel was only partly open during the 5-year hiatus. In the U.S. Office, the role of project liaison with the Anacostia Community School Project was at times vacant, at other times apparently of little importance. Thus, the link between the top of the change agent system and the program did not promote the vital process of support and adaptation so important if the project is to improve. No regular reporting mechamisms--quarterly and monthly reports--were in evidence. Thus, the change agents had no way of regularly assessing progress; the participants had no sense that anyone cared

and was available to help. It was not until the administration of Project Director Dan Jackson that the 11 regular and the one final reports were generated.

On the Relationship dimension, the elements of help are:

3: Constant emotional and social support. With irregular involvement from top officials at USOE and the DCPS, the project members at times must have felt all alone. Then, at the time of refuding, the Federal and school system leadership would suddenly rediscover the program and make demands. When funding is linked to performance--without constant Relationship Behavior, the interaction becomes a veiled threat, perverting the real purposes of this form of change agent behavior ("either you shape up now or we'll cut off your money," is the nature of the interaction).

It was not until Binswanger made the decision to cut off funding in October 1971 that the project was called to task and the process of re-assessing and replanning occurred. The Response to Educational Needs Project was then created within the new agency, the National Institute of Education. The change agent procedures started over, with high Task Behavior (see Figure 2) as NIE pressured the school system to shape up and the Congress pressured NIE to continue and improve RENP.

Specific Task Behavior led to the delineation of the new (old) project, including clearer specification of goals (to student reading and math improvement, community involve-

ment, and staff inservice), precise program design, accountability procedures--all laid out through mutual adaptation in the 62 grant terms and condition (February 1974). Then, with the help of the NIE staff, outside consultants, and DCPS, the program entered a phase of high Task and high Relationship behavior. Limits in terms of "contingencies" were placed on the program: If you reach certain milestones, additional dollars will be forthcoming. The Phase 1 period, including much of 1975, is devoted to intense planning; Phase 2, 1976, was set aside for implementation, with the understanding that if the program was in place, the funding period would go through school year 1977. This form of Task Behavior set the boundaries of outside involvement and established criteria for approval, evaluation, and further action. Based on these structures, the outside change agents could then work closely in supporting (Relational Behavior) the efforts of school personnel.

The Relationship help came in 1976-1977 through a number of interactions. The NIE project officer, George Sealy, a black man and former New York City school principal, made regular visits to the school labs and centers. His purpose at first was primarily to provide both Task and emotional support. But as the project got into full swing, his visits became more of a Relationship-building and maintaining nature. Similarly, in his relationship to the Anacostia community board (Region I), Mr. Sealy would attend the board meetings, not because he had any authority or even that he made many

substantive contributions to its deliberations and decision-making, but rather as a sign to the community and the board that the government supported their efforts at self-determination. And in the last year, prior to the incorporation of elements of RENP into the system, Mr. Sealy's interactions--on both Task and Relationship--were low, the fourth phase in the "Situational Change Agent" model. There was less need, though interaction was maintained. Regular Quarterly Reports were published by Mr. Jackson and his staff--a means of informing the outside world of the progress of the program and the chance for systematic feedback on problems from NIE but the hierarchy in the school system as well. Finally, in 1978, all outside involvement will cease. The role of change agent will no longer be a formal one; NIE will no longer be directly concerned with inservice training and community involvement under the Response to Educational Needs Project. Hence, the cycle of intervention and withdrawal will have been completed after some ten years.

C. The Incorporation Period: What may endure? The Region I Board of Education, certainly. It is a formalized part of school governance in the nation's capital. It has power to recommend on key staff positions in Anacostia; its word has almost final authority, as the central D.C. Board has never yet turned down a candidate whom the Region I body recommended. Over the state of schools in the community, the

board (and their local school board counterparts) has the power to discuss, recommend, and perhaps most importantly, to publicize any difficiencies in plant, staff, or program. Minutes from these meetings indicate an intense interest in the quality of life, the safety of children, and the functioning of the programs.

The inservice component is less clear. It is our belief that under Dan Jackson, the training of teachers in their schools and at the Friendship Education Center will survive. The school system has a training approach, the Competency Based Curriculum, but it has no delivery system to egual the work of Mr. Jackson and his staff. Principals and department chairpeople are showing renewed interest in this form of inservice--a place to send their staff and a method for their training. Major scheduling and logistical difficulties have been overcome, allow teachers at least a few times per month to visit Friendship and on a more regular basis to use the Math Labs and Reading Centers, in those schools with these facilities in place.

Questions still remain:

1. Will there be funds next year to pay Dan Jackson and his staff next year?

   Based on his performance and competency, we believe so. But budgets are budgets and the answer cannot be taken for granted.

2. Will the Math Labs and Reading Centers be established in all schools in Anacostia and perhaps throughout the city?

The problem of coordinating and motivating school principals remains. Help from central office and constant prodding from Jackson might make these facilities available. Without them, it may be hard to maintain in-service education. A place to work is vital.

3. With all teachers receive sufficient training to make a difference?

This is the major question. Only longitudinal research on the activities and outcomes of teachers in classrooms will tell, though a utilization rate should show who, where, and how often teachers come in contact with in-service staff and what they are exposed to.

Some Rules for Change Agents

Using the notion of "mutual adaptation" and the "Situational Change Agent" approach, we can make a few specific suggestions for those so bold as to attempt to change schools. We mention "mutual accommodation" here because we realize that any new idea is going to be mediated by local conditions--or likely to be rejected outright. We advocate a situational approach because the type of intervention must be geared to the condition of the participants, varying from highly dependent on outside help (a state called "immaturity" but Hersey and Blanchard) to highly independent and able to

carry on a change without continued involvement.

The advice to change agents is presented in a two-column format for easy reference:

SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE AGENT ACTIONS:

CATEGORIZED BY STAGES AND BY TYPES OF BEHAVIOR

I. PLANNING: Defining the Program

Task Behavior (high)	Relationship Behavior (low)
1. Specify goals of new program--or at least its general tone and allow local planners to take over.	1. Provide little but sufficient support to allow the innovation to be presented and understood
2. Allow organization to react and modify it; top level approval is vital.	2. Maintain a stable relationship with planning participants.
3. Insist before planning is over on clarity and specificity.	3. Be flexible in adapting program goals to local needs and "culture."
4. Present extent of help to be available; lay out funds and expertise.	
5. Determine and work with the likely constituency of program; the process for ratification; and rules for its operation.	

II. IMPLEMENTING: Activating the Program

Task Behavior (high)	Relationship Behavior (high)
1. Provide for technical assistance in: --operationalizing program goals and objectives; --hiring and training staff; --developing materials;	1. Interact regularly with staff and leaders. 2. Listen and be empathetic about problems. 3. Reassure leaders that problems may not be unique or insurmountable. 4. Be available when needed.
2. Control the funding, so that money is available when needed.	5. Provide a stable center for help and control.
3. Use funding as a way of building accountability.	

Task Behavior (low)	Relationship Behavior (high)
4. End heavy technical help as project needs less assistance.	6. Continue socio-emotional support as mentioned in 1 to 5 above.
5. Trouble-shoot--assess and react to particular problems.	

Task Behavior (low)	Relationship Behavior (low)
1. Provide some funds and help, to aid the incorporation of program into the system.	1. Continue seeing staff on a regular but infrequent basis.

2. Trouble-shoot.	2. Reassure the school system leaders that aspects of the innovation are worth continuing and expanding.
3. Disseminate "findings" from program to other schools in the system and elsewhere.	3. Act as a possible mediator between institutionalized program and its school system.
4. Support continued monitoring and evaluation--if useful.	4. Support notions of renewal: improving the innovation or possibly introducing new ideas--thus, starting the change cycle again.

Practical Suggestions for the Future of the Project

What might we as outside researchers suggest as to the continuation of the program, as it is currently institutionalized?

1. To the District of Columbia Public Schools, we urge that the supervisors of the project be maintained. Over a ten-year period the process of inservice education, now divided between off-site training at the Friendship Educational Center and the in-school labs and centers, has been refined and fits nicely into the chain of command and needs of the school system. The superintendent and principals of Region I schools now have a resource that they have never had before: a place to send staff for the improvement of performance, teacher trainers who can instruct staff in the use of the Competency Based Curriculum, and materials in and out of school that are specifically designed for this mission. Without the

supervisors and coordinators in Dan Jackson's office, however, the process would flounder for want of direction. Thus the DCPS should pick up the $140,000 of Federal funding to maintain the office.

Now that the training model is tried and true, it should be implemented throughout the school system. Other regions should share in the expertise of the Anacostia approach. That is, both the "community involvement" approach inherent in the Region I elected school board, and the "staff development" approach, as discussed above, have great potential for making the school system more responsive to the needs of the "community" and the teachers alike.

2. To the Congress, White House, and DHEW, we urge that similar models be tried in other cities. With the firm guidance that RENP received between 1975 and 1977 and with specific goals and proposals called for, we believe that there now exists sufficient change agent skill to implement the RENP approach with much less confusion and agony. It would be a shame to discard this body of knowledge.

3. To both the school system and the outside change agents, we urge the continuation of the study of organizational change. The research base and conceptual models (which assisted us in this study) can and should be applied and augmented in other settings. Only then can change agentry be refined and improved.

-END-

NOTES

[1]A number of social scientists have noted that often the effects of an innovation are believed minimal--when in fact the innovation was never given a chance; that is, the innovation was never really implemented. For an interesting discussion of this problem, see W. W. Charters, Jr., and J. Jones, "On the Risk of Appraising Non-events in Program Evaluation," Educational Researcher, 1973, 2(11). See also, J. Goodlad and M. F. Klein, et al., Behind the Classroom Door (Worthington, Ohio: Jones, 1970).

[2]Other research has shown the sheer difficulty in changing schools in the first place. These post morta on school experimentation include Neal Gross et al., Implementing Organizational Innovations: A Sociological Analysis of Planned Educational Change (New York: Basic Books, 1971); and D. Cohen, "Social Experiments with Schools: What Has Been Learned," in A. Rivlin and P. M. Tampane (Eds.), Planned Variation in Education (in progress). See also P. Dalin, Strategies for Innovation in Education, Case Studies of Educational Innovation (Vol. 4). (Paris: Organization for Cooperation and Development, 1973.)

[3]President's Message on the District of Columbia, 4 Presidential Documents 498, 502-03 (1968).

[4]See the lengthy and useful essay on change in school curriculum and instruction, Michael Fullan and Alan Pomfret, "Research on Curriculum and Instruction Implementation," Review of Educational Research (Winter 1977), Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 335-397.

[5]It appears that little research has been done on the direct lobbying effort of communities and school systems on the source of federal dollars--the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Most politiking is evidently done through national organizations like the National Educational Association, the American Federation of Teachers (AFL-CIO), and the National School Boards Association.

[6]Incrementalism is a favorite model of policy analysists. See Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through'," Public Administration Review, Vol. 19, Spring 1959, pp. 79-88.

[7]Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland; or Why It's Amazing that Federal Programs Work at All, This Being a Saga of the Economic Development Administration as Told by Two Sympathetic Observers Who Seek to Build Morals on a Foundation of Ruined Hopes (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1973), p. xii.

[8]For a nice description and rationale for the case approach, see Sevryn Bruyn, The Human Perspective on Sociology (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966).

[9]A. Harry Passow, Toward Creating a Model Public School System: A Study of the Washington, D.C. Public Schools (the "Passow Report"), Columbia Teachers College, New York, September 1967.

[10]Semi-structured interviews were used. That is, we met with various informants and asked a set of questions which covered basically the same territory: What did they know about the development of RENP? What problems were incurred? Why did certain problems occur and how were they handled? What seems to be happening now and in the future? We did not standardize the list of queries for two reasons. First, each respondent had a different role in the program and a different perspective on it. We needed to probe more deeply than an established set of questions allowed. Also, set questionnaires require clearance by the Office of Management and Budget which takes a long time. For a discussion of the focused interview, see Robert K. Merton et al., The Focused Interview: A Manual of Problems and Procedures (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956).

[11]Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1967), p. 31.

[12]Ibid., p. 31.

[13]Ibid., p. 32.

[14]Michael Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 4.

[15]The term is used by Milbrey W. McLaughlin, "Implementation as Mutual Adaptation: Change in Classroom Organization," Teachers College Record, 1976, Vol. 77, No. 3, pp. 339-351.

[16]Fullan and Pomfret, op. cit., p. 381, presents a model for the stages in the innovation process, including Initial & Adoption, Planning for Implementation, and Implementation. We have added the final stage, Institutionalization.

[17]Ann K. Pasanell, "A Review," Proceedings of the National Academy of Education, Vol. 4, 1977, p. 129.

[18]Ibid., p. 130.

[19]Fullan and Pomfret conclude in their summary of innovations research that

> A great deal of work remains to be done on conceptualizing the meaning and processes of implementation, on gathering and analyzing data on different aspects of the process, on assessing the consequences of different strategies, and on deriving specific policy recommendations at all levels of the political and educational system (op. cit., p. 397).

[20]Ronald G. Havelock, A Guide to Innovation in Education (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Institute for Social Research, 1970).

[21]E. Rogers and F. Shoemaker, Communication of Innovations: A Cross Cultural Study (2nd ed.), (New York: The Free Press, 1971).

[22]Milbrey Wallin McLaughlin, "Implementation as Mutual Adaptation: Change in Classroom Organization," in Walter Williams and Richard F. Elmore, Social Program Implementation (New York: Academic Press, 1976), p. 169.

[23]For a presentation of the process of mutual accommodation, see Paul Berman, Peter W. Greenwood, Milbrey W. McLaughlin, and John Pincus, Executive Summary in Federal Programs Supporting Educational Change (5 volumes), Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, 1974-1975), Vol. 5.

[24]McLaughlin, op. cit., p. 169.

[25]See, for example, Mancur Olsen, "Evaluating Performance in the Public Sector," in D. G. Sullivan et al. (Eds.) How America Is Ruled (New York: John Wiley, forthcoming).

[26]It is extremely difficult, evidently, to measure output when one is dealing with the intangibles of "public goods." What is the ascribed value of an educated child, for example? Olsen explains: "This paper will argue that governments are in fact as well as by reputation usually inefficient, and that this is mainly because they deal with collective goods and externalities" (p. 359). How could one direct change without a criterion for "efficiency"?

[27]P. Berman and M. McLaughlin, "Implementation of Educational Innovation," Educational Forum, 1976, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 347-370.

[28]Social movements confront similar problems as they seek to mobilize support and initiate actions to gain their ends. For a discussion of "social movements" as the first step in social change, see Bruce S. Cooper, Free School Survival (Minneapolis: Burgess Press, 1976), particularly chapter 2.

[29]Bruce S. Cooper, "Perspectives on Educational Planning," Educational Planning, Vol. 3, No. 2 (October, 1976), p. 92. For a general discussion of rational planning approaches, see E. C. Banfield, "Planning" in J. Gould and W. L. Kolb (eds.), A Dictionary of the Social Sciences (New York: The Free Press, 1974); R. Ackoff, A Concept of Corporate Planning (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970), p. 2ff; and R. G. Tugwell, "A Study of Planning as a Scientific Endeavor," Fiftieth Annual Report of the Michigan Academy of Science, Arts, and Letters (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1948).

[30]A most popular and persuasive proponent of "people planning" was Saul Alinsky. See his Reveille for Radicals (New York: Vintage, 1969).

[31]The response to Type C approaches to planning, on the part of federal agencies, included treating the process in an "adversary" way and, thus, bargaining with the local officials. The condition allowed both parties to state their expectations and needs and to provide a process for resolving differences. The 62 grant conditions, laid down by NIE in 1975, are good examples of this mentality. Money if forthcoming when certain contingencies are met.

[32]Passow, op. cit.

[33] See Martha Derthick, City Politics in Washington, D.C. (Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Harvard-MIT Joint Center for Urban Studies and the Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies, 1963); R. M. Jackson, The Machinery of Local Government (London: Macmillan and Co., 1968), pp. 13-16. Also, since 1986, citizens of the District have voted for school board under P.L. 90-292, 90th Congress, H.R. 13042, April 22, 1968.

[34] The Washington Post, April 27, 1972.

[35] Johnson's Message on the District of Columbia, op. cit., 1968.

[36] Letter from Harold Howe to Congressman William Natcher, April 1, 1968, reprinted from the documentary file of the Anacostia Community Schools Project Appeal to U.S. Commissioner of Education, Sydney Marland, Jr.

[37] The Autobiography of Malcolm X (New York: Grove Press, 1966).

[38] For an overview of these reforms, see Bruce S. Cooper, "Alternative Schools and the Free School Movement," in Steve Goodman (Ed.), The Handbook on Contemporary Education (New York: Bowkar, 1976).

[39] The Washington Post, April 27, 1972.

[40] The Washington Post, July 16, 1968.

[41] The Washington Post, January 5, 1970, and interviews.

[42] The tension exists between the need for precision to help with making programs operational and the requirement that programs remain vague in order to attract a wide array of supporters.

[43] For a discussion of the importance of precision, as seen from a corporate viewpoint, see Richard B. Vancil and Peter Lorange, "Strategic Planning in Diversified Companies," Harvard Business Review, January-February 1975, who state:

> The first cycle of a formal planning process serves a dual purpose: (1) to develop a tentative set of agreements between corporate management and division managers about overall strategy and goals, and thereby (2) to provide focus for the more detailed planning in the next cycle (p. 29).

[44] Pullan and Pomfret, op. cit., p. 336.

[45] Pressman and Wildavsky, op. cit., p. xiv.

[46] See Chapter 5, "The Complexity of Joint Action," in Pressman and Wildavsky, ibid., pp. 87-124; see also, Richard F. Elmore, "Design of the Follow Through Experiment," in Alice M. Rivlin and P. Timpane (Eds.), Planned Variation in Education: Should We Try Harder? (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975), pp. 39-40.

[47] The Washington Post chronology of RENP events.

[48] Staff Memorandum on Overall Assessment of Anacostia Project with Recommendations for Action, September 30, 1971, by Robert B. Binswanter, in Anacostia appeal documents. See an account by other analysts: George R. LaNoue and Bruce L. R. Smith, The Politics of Decentralization (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973), pp. 103-104.

[49] The Washington Post, October 22, 1971; Washington Star, October 22, 1971.

[50] Mariann Jelinek, "Institutionalizing Innovation," (unpublished dissertation, Harvard Business School, 1976), p. 1.

[51] NIE documents.

[52] See Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Declines in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 98.

[53] Carlson reports that the choice of "insider" versus "outsider" for a position explains much about the expectation of the organization: insiders generally signal continuation of current practices with only minor change; outside leaders are often brought in to change things more drastically. RENP

tried both, though generally they fell back on insiders when outsiders came on too strong. See Richard O. Carlson, Executive Succession and Organizational Change (Chicago: Midwest Administration Center, University of Chicago, 1967).

[54]Ms. Joan Brown, head of Staff Development for DCPS, contrasted RENP with her domain, the Competency Based Curriculum. She explained that RENP was temporary and separate to her for many reasons: its was a "project" while CBC was policy; RENP was a "response" while CBC was a program; the whole tone of RENP in other words was 1960s and prevented it from surviving without incorporation (interview).

[55]Inhouse Memorandum, November 30, 1976.

[56]Minutes of a meeting with NIE, DCPS, and RENP staff to clarify the Dissemination/Utilization Plan, December 10, 1976.

[57]Dissemination and Utilization Plan, December 20, 1976, p. 4.

[58]Ibid., p. 11.

[59]LaNoue and Smith, op. cit., p. 1.

[60]Ibid., p. 2.

[61]Quoted in The Washington Post, March 2, 1971.

[62]See LaNoue and Smith, op. cit., pp. 95-102; and Larry Cuban, Urban School Chiefs Under Fire (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), pp. 38-48.

[63]LaNoue and Smith, op. cit., pp. 179-180.

[64]David Minar, "Community Basis of Conflict in School System Politics," American Sociological Review, Vol. 31 (1966), pp. 822-35.

[65]LaNoue and Smith, op. cit., p. 110.

[66] Utilization and Dessemination Plan, December 20, 1976, p. 6.

[67] Ibid., p. 12.

[68] Final Report, Response to Educational Needs Project, August 1977, p. 13.

[69] Robert Glaser, "The Design of Instruction," in The Changing American School, John I. Goodlad (Ed.), The Sixty-Fifth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 226.

[70] Formative Evaluation, Gibboney Associates, 1977, p. 58.

[71] Seventh Quarterly Report, p. 19.

[72] Op. cit., pp. 2-3.

[73] Personal interview.

[74] P.L. 94-482, Teacher Training Programs, "Teacher Center," section 532.(a) (2) (B).

[75] Final Report, p. 70.

[76] Formative Evaluation, p. 75.

[77] A. K. Korman, "'Consideration,' 'Initiating Structure,' and Organizational Criteria--A Review," Personnel Psychology: A Journal of Applied Research, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Winter 1966), p. 349ff.

[78] Paul Hersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard, Management of Organizational Behavior: Utilizing Human Resrouces (3rd ed.), (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1977), pp. 162-163, use the term with reference to organizational members; we apply it to the organization.

[79] See Chris Argyris, Personality and Organization (New

York: Harper & Row, 1957); Interpersonal Competence and Organizational Effectiveness (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1962); and Integrating the Individual and the Organization (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964).

[80] Hersey and Blanchard, op. cit., p. 163.

[81] Havelock discusses the importance of "trust" as a first step in the change process. We maintain that "trust" develops only as the change agent and others work together and the decision to work together precedes the opportunity to build trust. In the Havelock approach, the top leadership has already come to trust the outside change consultant and then the consultant must build trust with those down the line. But the preceding question, how did the agent get admitted to the system in the first place is based on high Task interaction (qualification of consultants, recommendations, reputation, and skill). See Ronald Havelock, op. cit.

[82] Hersey and Blanchard, op. cit., p. 169.

[83] See Richard F. Vancil and Peter Lorange, Strategic Planning Systems (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977), pp. 22-46.