NONVOTING, AGE AND MASS MEDIA USE

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Recent evidence testifying that mass media may exert significant influences on American voting behavior has led to a comprehensive re-examination of the nature of political communication behavior per se, as well as its functional antecedents and potential consequences. One emerging and promising area of inquiry focuses upon the role communication behavior may play in political participation, particularly with regard to voter turnout.

Voter abstention has of course become a popular topic of late, given that the proportion of eligible citizens actually casting ballots in national elections has steadily declined in recent years, dropping to 53 percent in 1976. Blame for this has been popularly attributed to various forms of public alienation, presumably resulting from perceptions of rising corruption in government, declining morality, reduced communication between government and governed, as well as "negatively biased" portrayals of politics in the press. Actually, a more empirically based view shows that much of the drop in turnout is readily explained by population dynamics, most notably by the rapidly expanding proportion of 18- to 35-year-olds within our society, an age segment traditionally above the norm in abstention, coupled with the recent enfranchisement of 18- to 21-year-olds.

However, neither the popular "alienation" view nor the population-based explanation tells much about how and why citizens decide to vote or not, or about the role of a host of additional factors, including communicatory ones, in affecting turnout.

Traditional thinking has typified nonvoters as likelier to be young, less educated, less affluent, single, female, geographically mobile, generally

more socially and politically uninvolved, more alientated from political institutions and processes, and less likely to attend to news and other public affairs-related media content. In gross descriptive terms this across-the-board prognosis is probably not too wide of the mark. It follows from a somewhat simplistic yet logical assumption that nonvoters, for a variety of underlying reasons, are less integrated into the political system and see themselves as having less at stake in the outcome of elections.

However, recent literature on political as well as communication behavior presents a number of more sophisticated models based upon either systemic or individual level factors aimed at explaining turnout.

Systemic factors obviously include registration and residency requirements as well as the actual procedures involved in voting. Also, degree of electoral competitiveness has been shown to be significant: "close" elections typically provide higher turnouts (Key, 1951; Burnham, 1965). Kim, Petrocik, and Enokson (1975), utilizing a unique multi-variate design, compared the relative weight of legal, competitive and aggregated individual factors on voter turnout across states, and found each factor yielding independent and important contributions to turnout.

However, of greater import here are individual-level predictors of turnout, the most direct of which appear to be psychological and social orientations, including communicatory ones, toward voting and politics as well as social participation in general.

For example, Olson (1972) reports empirical support from a survey of Indianapolis residents for what he terms a "social participation" theory of voting behavior. Moderate associations were found between prior membership in nonpolitical social organizations -- e.g. voluntary associations, com-

munity and church groups -- and voter turnout when age, education level, political interest, party identification, and mass media and interpersonal communication behaviors were controlled for. Olson hypothesizes a causal flow in which higher education level leads to greater involvement in voluntary organizations, resulting in higher voter turnout.

More revealing from a communication perspective was a cross-cultural study of eligible voters (Nie, Powell and Prewitt, 1969), finding that the direct impact of socio-economic characteristics on political participation, including voting, was attenuated by five "attitude sets" held by individuals toward the political system: sense of citizen duty, political efficacy, political knowledge, perceived importance of political outcomes, and attentiveness to mass media political content. Organizational membership and labor force participation also showed a substantial independent effect on participation.

Moreover, Burstein (1972) presents data in support of a causal model of political participation based more upon requisites of social structure. The best predictors of overall participation, including voting, were those locating the individual in social networks, primarily organizational involvement and attention to political media content. Socioeconomic status predicted participation less well, and demographics predicted least of all. Burstein argues that his individual level data support what other aggregate level studies have found -- that when communication behavior is included, it is typically the best predictor of political participation. Lovin-Smith (1976), in examining a respecification of both the Nie et al. and Burstein models, found media use to affect participation positively, and also found the relationship to be non-recursive, in that among females participation had

a return effect on media use. No significant return effect was found among males, however.

While the above studies appear to relegate age and other demographics to a secondary role of serving as descriptive locators of turnout, they should not be readily dismissed. Age becomes a particularly important variable in this regard if we assume that political socialization is not a process which ends of late adolescence, but rather continues over the life cycle. Circumstances, agents of socialization, and the context and content of learning may change, but the basic processes of coping with changing social and physical environments remain. The growing emphasis on socialization as a lifetime process (cf. Brim and Wheeler, 1966; McLeod and O'Keefe, 1972; Jennings and Niemi, 1974; Chaffee, 1976) has brought less concern for age per se as a critical variable and more concern with the differentiated variable of life-cycle position pertinent to a given set of behaviors and roles. After one leaves adolescence, age may become less relevant than the differing life styles and demands associated with marriage, changing occupations, childraising, etc. Nonetheless, age level may serve as a ready indicator of these positions.

There are also increasing arguments for looking at age groups as strata much in the sense of social class. Riley and Foner (1968), Riley, Johnson and Foner (1972) and Foner (1974) develop a theory of age stratification which assumes that age "'locates' individuals or groups of people in the social structure." Age strata are viewed as layers which cut across the whole society, just as class strata do, but order people and roles by age rather than by economic position. Age-related differences may result from the psychological and physiological aging process, or from generational cohort differences.

Age strata typically serve as an important basis for distribution of political power, Foner notes. The young are likelier to have less power, and to share different political attitudes than older citizens.

Much earlier research dwelled upon a posited relationship between age and voter turnout. Data over the years have clearly shown that young persons are the least likely to vote, the middle-aged the most likely, and citizens over age 65 somewhat less likely than the middle-aged. However, an inference from this that people slowly gain interest in politics and voting until reaching a peak in their fifties, and then begin a decline, is of course questionable. The data in these earlier studies were gathered at one point in time, and are by no means an adequate measure of longitudinal change. Numerous other variables related to voter turnout, among them education, income, and sex, also vary across age within our society.

For example, in an examination of voting and other forms of participation over position in the life cycle, Verba and Nie (1972) present data rather strongly suggesting that the frequently found "decline" in voting among persons over age 65 may be more a reflection of particular status characteristics found among that age group within our society. Correcting for education and income over age groups resulted in a consistent rate of voting after age 50, peaking in fact after 65.

Glenn and Grimes (1968) employed both cross-sectional and cohort data to find that political interest increased from middle to advanced age, and voter turnout remained almost constant when sex and education were controlled for. They argue that their findings go against the so-called "disengagement" hypothesis that transition to old age is marked by a progressive disengagement of citizens from social interactions, possibly leading to less awareness

of issues confronting the society. Rather, Glenn and Grimes postulate that political interest and activity may be in part a function of freedom from more pressing duties of life. The young adult is apt to be highly involved in pursuing an education, establishing social and occupational roles, and seeking social companionship. Following marriage, family responsibilities begin to increase, and often occupational ones do the same. Political issues may seem relatively remote as a result. However, as one approaches the late forties and fifties, family demands diminish as children leave home, and upward striving in occupation begins to level off. Fewer options for leisure activity exist than in younger years, although more time is available. Political activity then, according to Glenn and Grimes, becomes for some people a functional substitute for earlier preoccupations. Thus, variation in distracting influences may contribute to change in political activity, and in part explain variation in voter turnout over the life cycle. Other sources of influence certainly exist. The young may be more subject to political cross-pressures, which are thought to arouse conflict and reduce political activity. Campbell et al. (1960) suggest that strengthened party identification over the years makes voting more likely as a result of increased loyalty.

Hout and Knoke (1975) used multivariate techniques to identify effects of age, cohort and time period on voter turnout, finding each an important influence when education, religion, sex, occupation, region, race and class were controlled for. Voter turnout was decidely low below age 33 and over age 73 when the above factors were accounted for.

In terms of political attitudes, a cohort analysis by Cutler and Kaufman (1975) suggests that increased ideological conservatism is not necessarily a

function of aging, but rather that older cohorts started out with more politically conservative views, and have tended to stick with them. Agnello (1973) found that feelings of political powerlessness decrease between age 21 and the mid-forties, and then begin to increase again with age.

Changes in patterns of political behavior, including communication behavior and voting, deserve to be examined more cohesively over the life cycle, particularly in the context of asking which of the factors described in the studies above influence voting at which stages. Further light can be shed on the viability of the above models by investigating factors associated with turnout within life cycle stages. A crucial factor for our purposes is that of media usage.

Mass communication behaviors themselves also may be assumed to change over the life cycle. As people grow in age and experiences, their needs for news, information, and entertainment change, as do the media forms they pursue in satisfaction of these needs. The consequences of media usage are also likely to change over the years. Yet there is scant empirical evidence directly supporting such seemingly obvious assumptions. Chaffee and Wilson (1975) contend that despite the popular tendency to include age as an item in mass communication audience survey questionnaires, minimal use is made analytically of the variable in its own right. Rather, age is usually "controlled out" as the researcher pursues seemingly more interesting variables. The few studies in which media audiences have been examined across age categories typically present rudimentary "time spent with" and "importance of" constructs of media use, and fail to control for the impact of differing levels of education, income, marital status, and the like within age cohorts. Moreover, the studies generally ignore specific

content areas within media, choosing instead for example to depict "general television viewing" as one gross category of usage, and "television news viewing" as a somewhat more particular grouping. It may be more productive to focus on one particular media content area, such as politics, and trace a number of variables related to political media usage over age categories.

The recent concern with the socialization of young first-time eligible voters has lead to some intriguing research comparing political communication orientations of 18- to 24-year-olds against those of older voters taken as a group.

The impact of prior communication behavior on voter turnout has been perhaps most cogently explored from a socialization perspective by Blumler and McLeod (1974) in a study of the behavior of young first-time electors during the 1970 British General Election. The authors found that measures of interpersonal and mass media communication orientations of young eligible voters during the campaign accounted for between 13 and 28 percent of the variance in turnout, depending upon respondents' party preferences. Dispositional, attitudinal and motivational variables accounted for between 12 and 17 percent. When young eligibles were compared against old, media use, interpersonal communication, and dispositional variables accounted for more variance in turnout among the former. Structural factors, including socio-economic status, marital status, and sex accounted for more variance among older voters. Blumler and McLeod conclude that, at least among first-time eligible voters, "communication matters just as much as anything else does," and argue that the traditional "limited effects" model of communication influence (cf. Klapper, 1960) simply does not hold up insofar as the impact of communication on turnout, and probably other political orientations, is concerned.

In a similar vein, O'Keefe (1976) presents data from a 1972 Ohio study suggesting that associations between turnout and other factors, including communication, vary across the life cycle. Table A summarizes key results from the study by indicating the proportion of variance explained in turnout by each independent variable, and the grouped amount of variance explained by each of the seven sets of factors studied. Within the 18- to 24-year-old group, political media orientations explained the largest share of variation in voter turnout (6.3 percent), and within that set reliance upon newspapers and magazines as decision aids contributed the most variance. Mass communication orientations thus emerged as a primary predictor of turnout among the young, much as it did in the Blumler-McLeod study. The next most powerful set of factors was political disposition (5.5 percent).

Among 25- to 34-year-olds, the dominant role of media was replaced by that of political dispositions. Media ranked second, accounting for 3.1 percent at the variance. More substantial changes occurred among the 35- to 64-year-olds, with the main predictors of turnout being political disposition (12 to 15 percent of variance explains), followed by structural characteristics, and status characteristics. Clearly, changes in predictors of turnout, and presumably reasons for voting, occurred between the young adult years and the middle years, when the decision to vote may become more dependent upon already-formed dispositions. Turnout among those over 65, on the other hand, was most accounted for by political disposition (14.1 percent), followed by media orientations (6.1 percent). The rise in association between media orientation and turnout among those 65 and over may in part be a consequence of greater social isolation of this group. The elderly

with greater interest in politics, whether for reasons associated with politics serving as a functional substitute for other activities or not, may find greater political stimulation from media use than from social contacts. The media may become more prominent in the lives of older persons, replacing activities and social contacts more common in earlier years.

Thus, what the young eligible voter has learned from media and parents, combined with his trust in politicians, may be more important in determining turnout than other factors. The middle-aged and older voters may act more in line with dispositions formed over the years as a result of previous voting and other political experiences, and may rely less on media. Voting in later years also appears more tied to status within the community.

The above research substantiates a view that not only does voter turnout vary across the life cycle, but that different demographic, sociological and psychological variables are related to turnout at specific life cycle stages. Mass communication behavior appears a more important factor early in political life, and again in later years. To obtain a more complete picture of the relationship between communication and turnout, it seems necessary to also examine communication behaviors within both voter and nonvoter groups over stages of political life. The research on mass media uses by voters, and the consequences of such, is quite extensive (See, for example, Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954; Klapper, 1960; Converse, 1966; Blumler and McQuail, 1969; Atkin, 1973; McLeod, Becker and Byrnes 1974; Mendelsohn and O'Keefe, 1976). And, some of the more recent research has shown concern with age differences in voting and communication behavior, particularly in terms of comparing young first-time voters to older ones (See, for example, Blumler and McLeod, 1975; O'Keefe, Becker, and McLeod,

1976; Chaffee and Becker, 1976; McLeod, Brown, Becker, and Ziemke, 1977). However, scant attention has been given to describing communication or more general characteristics of the nonvoting population. One landmark volume, Voting and Nonvoting (Lang and Lang, 1968), is incisive in its discussions of media use and nonvoting, but places the issue into the somewhat limited context of the impact of election result forecasts prior to poll closings on abstention.

This paper attempts to extend and elaborate upon the above research by taking as its point of departure the investigation of motivations and media uses underlying nonvoting behavior. The aim is to examine nonvoters as a population subgroup in terms of the motivations these individuals may have for their inactivity and to associate those motivations with media orientations over the life cycle.

If reasons for not voting and media orientations do vary with age, the problem becomes one of investigating the relationship between media orientations and nonvoting reasons within age categories. Such investigation also requires the control of certain variables which might be expected to affect both media orientations and nonvoting reasons within age groups, and which more importantly may affect the relationship between the two within age groups. For these preliminary analyses, two such control variables will be considered: political interest and level of education. Both have emerged as important predictors of both media use and nonvoting in the previous research cited above.

METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS

The data reported below were generated from a national survey of nonvoters conducted in July 1976 by the polling firm of Peter Hart and Associates. Multi-stage area sampling techniques, combined with interviewee screening procedures, were used to arrive at a final sample of 1,486 respondents identified as nonvoters in the sense of their either: (1) having failed to vote regularly for reasons other than legal requirements in the previous four national elections, or (2) indicating that there was a 50-50 chance or less that they would vote in the 1976 presidential election. While there is a problem of validity in that the study relied completely upon respondents' self-assessments of their past voting history and 1976 election behavior, there is no reason to suspect that the sample as a whole does not reflect a representative group of individuals less likely to participate in politics through voting. A demographic profile of the sample is presented in Table 1.

For the purposes here, analyses will be limited to a series of items ascertaining respondents' reasons for not voting and certain characteristics of their mass media behavior, in addition to age, political interest, and education.

Reasons for not voting were assessed by asking respondents to rate the importance of each of eleven items culled from a larger list of 18 items on the basis of their face validity, variance, and a cluster analysis. The items reflected the following rationales for not voting: (1) cynicism toward candidates; (2) inability to discriminate between candidates; (3) distrust of candidates; (4) distrust of government; (5) general lack of concern with politics; (6) inefficacy of voting; (7) lack of objective information about candidates; (8) feeling generally unqualified to vote;

(9) difficulty in registering to vote; (10) inconvenient poll hours; and (11) inconvenient poll locations. Specific items appear in Table 2.

Generally, the first six can be classified as "substantive" reasons for not voting largely inyolving negative reactions against candidates, government and/or the political system. Perceived lack of information or general qualifications reflect a more neutral stance based in part on inability to attain and/or process information. The last three center on "technicalities", or matters of convenience, regarding the actual voting process.

The most important reasons for abstention over the sample as a whole were those associated with distrust and cynicism toward candidates, lack of concern with politics, and lack of information about candidates, while those least important had bearing on hardships encountered in registering or getting to the polls (Table 2). With respect to age, the emphasis given substantive reasons and lack of information declined steadily from young to old. Eighteen to 24-year-olds consistently rated these reasons as more important than did any other cohort. Nonvoters aged 65 and over, however, rated candidate cynicism and inefficacy more important than did the middle-aged, and emphasized lack of qualification and, as expected, inconvenience of polling places moreso than any other age group.

One might have expected the young to place more weight upon registration requirements than the old, but that was not found. Perhaps registration campaigns aimed at making the process as simple as possible, primarily with the young in mind, at least made the point that the process was a relatively easy one.

In sum, the young, followed somewhat distantly by the elderly, attached

greater importance to items reflecting a general disaffection with electoral processes. Whether this is more a function of youth itself or of generational differences cannot be properly addressed with the data here. However, surveys of voting populations over the years have generally found the young to have lesser feelings of political trust and efficacy than older voters, suggesting maturational influence. Quite the same phenomenon may be taking place among nonvoters, albeit perhaps to a greater degree. The rank orders of mean scores of the reasons were quite consistent within each age cohort.

Various orientations of nonvoters to politically relevant mass media content were measured through a series of rather standard items relating to respondents' national television network news exposure, their attention to televised political news items, the extent to which they perceived television news as helpful in understanding what candidates stand for, and the degree to which they perceived television news as biased or fair in presenting political information. A series of analogous items were asked vis a vis newspaper political content. (See Table 3 for specific items.) In addition, respondents listed their main source for news and information about politics.

The profile of nonvoters' mass media orientations does not differ markedly from that regularly found for voters (Table 3). Exposure to newspapers and television news and attention to political news content generally increases with age, education and political interest.

Eighteen to 24-year-old nonvoters and those 65 and over saw both television and newspapers as less helpful and television as less fair than other respondents. Political interest increased over the life cycle among nonvoters, as it has been found to do among voters.

Within each age group, the more educated and politically interested indicated greater newspaper and television news exposure, attention to political news, and perceptions of being helped by news media in better understanding the candidates. However, they rated both newspaper and television as being less fair in treatment of political matters than did the overall sample.

Television emerges as by far the prime political information medium for nonvoters. Half or more of the nonvoters in all age groups listed television as their main source of political information (Table 4), and newspapers were listed by less than a quarter of the respondents, barely edging out radio. This finding goes against results obtained from past samples of voters in which newspapers are usually ranked only slightly below television. Television appears especially relied upon by nonvoters over age 50. Eighteen to 24-year-olds indicated greater preference for magazines than older respondents, a result consistent with research on voters.

In order to assess the relationships between media orientations and reasons for not voting, the media orientations along with education and political interest were inserted into a multiple linear regression analysis of their relative impacts on each of the nonvoting reasons. These analyses were repeated within each of the four age groups.

Over the sample as a whole, interest in politics emerges as the most consistent predictor of substantive reasons for abstention (Table 5). The more politically interested nonvoters were, the less import they attached to candidate cynicism and indiscrimination, distrust of candidates and government, inefficacy of voting and lack of political concern, regardless of education level or media orientations. Highly interested nonvoters

are thus unlikely to be classifiable as a congregation of concerned-yet-disenchanted citizens who choose not to vote out of contempt for general malaise with electoral processes.

On the other hand, the data do not quite so firmly dispell the argument that the news media "alienate" citizens into modes of lesser political involvement. While the results for newspaper orientations square somewhat with the familiar hypothesis of mass media usage supporting positive political inclinations, the data for television are quite divergent. Most striking is the finding that increased attention to televised political news is positively associated with nearly all substantive reasons for not voting. The greater attention viewers paid to stories about national politics, the higher they rated candidate cynicism and indiscrimination, distrust in candidates and government, and inefficacy of voting. While only the standardized regression coefficients for candidate and government distrust were significant, the overall consistency of these results is marked. Moreover, perceived helpfulness of television in understanding candidates maintains low, yet positive, associations with all substantive reasons. Fairness of television in political matters is more troublesome, yielding coefficients mixed in directionality with the substantive rationales, e.g. a negative and significant relationship with candidate distrust but a positive and significant relationship with political unconcern.

On the other hand, level of exposure to network television news and newspaper exposure and attention were quite consistent in yielding low order negative coefficients with substantive reasons. And, the more fair and helpful readers found newspapers to be, the less important they rated substantive reasons, a finding that was statistically significant in

several cases.

In general, then, expectations of newspapers as being fair, and the perceived effect of newspapers in terms of their helpfulness, were associated with decreased importance of political disaffection and malaise. But, the activity of greater attendance to televised political news was associated with an increased importance of negative attitudes toward politics. A partial explanation for this discrepancy may well lie, of course, in the divergent natures of the two news media. Even a high level of attention to television news is apt to provide only a surface view of often complex political issues and personalities, emphasizing "blacks and whites" at the expense of thoughtful shades of gray. Such superficiality, accompanied by the obvious fact that bad news is more interesting than good, may promote and/or reinforce negative feelings toward politics.

Media orientations were paramount in predicting the importance of lack of objective information as a criterion for not voting, following much the same pattern as described above. However, level of education emerged as the key predictor of "convenience" reasons for not voting, with the more educated significantly less likely to rate registration difficulties or inconvenience of polling places as important.

The results of the regression analyses within each age cohort (Tables 6 through 9) generally match those for the sample as a whole. However, the relative impact of media orientations on reasons for abstention varies with age. For instance, political interest emerged as a quite weak predictor among 18- to 24-year-olds while attention to televised political news was generally the strongest. Again, the more

attention to television news, the greater the importance attached to candidate distrust, inefficacy of voting, and lack of information. Not only does it appear that media usages are intrinsic in predicting voting versus nonvoting among young voters, but also in explaining motivations for abstention. This is particularly noteworthy given that the young scored lowest among all age groups in exposure and attention to television and newspapers. Perhaps in the absence of other political stimuli, including years of experience to draw from, even a modest amount of media encounter yields significant impact.

Political interest regains its status in predicting nonvoting reasons among older respondents. Media orientations are only sporadically well-associated with abstention reasons among 25- to 34- year olds, and within the 35- to 64-year-old group newspaper fairness is the only media variable consistently and significantly related to nonvoting rationales. However, importance of government distrust over the middle years appears less a function of interest or education than of media orientation. Among age 65 and over nonvoters, television attention showing markedly high positive coefficients with substantive nonvoting reasons, particularly those pertaining to distrust. These results bear out the increased predictability of turnout by media usages among both the young and the elderly found in earlier research, and point to a potentially critical role for attention to televised news vis a vis reasons for abstention.

DISCUSSION

Recent literature on political behavior suggests several models attempting to account for variation in voter turnout. Individual level predictors which have been among the most successful in explaining voter participation and abstention include age and political communication behavior. When appropriate controls are introduced, voter turnout increases linearly with age, and higher levels of politically relevant mass media usage typically correlate positively with turnout. Recent findings also indicate media usage to be a particularly powerful predictor of turnout among first-time eligible voters, and to a lesser but nonetheless sizable extent among citizens age 65 and over. While previous investigations have to some extent explored media use characteristics of the voting population, a fuller understanding of turnout and communication processes may evolve from inspection of media use among nonvoters over the life cycle, particularly as related to motivations for not voting. Reasons for abstention and media use patterns were found to vary with age in this study, as did the nature of the relationship between media orientations and specific reasons for not voting.

Specifically, media orientations were more predictive of abstention reasons among 18- to 24-year olds and those age 65 and over than for middle age groups. Moreover, greater attention to televised political news was found positively associated with political distrust and other forms of disaffection as abstention reasons. However, the more fair and helpful vis a vis politics newspapers were perceived as being, the less import nonvoters gave to such reasons.

This study is of course limited in using a cross-sectional design;

cohort and longitudinal analyses would enhance the inferences to be made from these data. It is clear, however, that development of political orientations such as turnout over the life cycle deserves much closer attention than it has received in the past.

The oft-supported generalization that greater public affairs media use encourages voting particularly deserves a closer look. Finer delineation between such orientations as exposure and attention, as well as credibility and helpfulness, within each medium may provide a clearer picture of precisely what kinds of usages are associated with specific influences.

Greater clarification may well also be found in examining the various gratifications sought by nonvoters, particularly the young and the elderly, in their political communication usages, and the extent to which they rely on mass media for assistance in forming political beliefs, values and behaviors.

For instance, one key distinction in terms of information seeking between newspapers and television centers around selectivity. The regular newspaper reader can more easily pick and choose content consistent with existing interests and views. Politically disinterested readers can readily avoid political stories, and the more interested can select those of particular relevance or supportive of given attitudes. During a campaign, this selectivity may aid in processing of information about candidates on attributes of concern. For the regular television news attender, however, such selectivity is cognitively more difficult. The politically disinterested viewer who wants to "keep up with the news" in general may find political content hard to avoid. Cognitively tuning out one uninteresting story on a well-paced news program often leads to missing the next as well. Thus the heavy viewer disinterested in and/or disaffected with politics is likely

to get a fair dosage of it regardless, particularly during peak campaign periods, and perhaps with disagreeable effects. More politically interested news viewers attempting to evaluate candidates may find themselves in much the same situation: potential voters with a preferred candidate and seeking reinforcement are likely to also view content favorable to the opposition; and, those literally undecided not only receive candidate comparisons on attributes of importance to them, but on other attributes as well, perhaps in some cases hindering discrimination between candidates.

In addition, nonvoters holding negative views toward candidates and government may seek out televised political news for its relative simplicity of presentation which allows them to seek reinforcement and justification for their views. In addition, the aim for balanced coverage of political personalities and issues may give an appearance of blandness, leading to viewer perceptions of "all candidates being alike." Similarly, time allocated by the networks to extraneous campaign events and "hoopla" (Patterson and McClure, 1972) may lessen in viewers' eyes the critical import of voting and elections. This is not to say that newspapers necessarily exhibit continuous studied insight into the workings of politics, but most observers, including network news producers, would agree that print media do provide greater depth and insight into the complexities of politics.

Continuing research in this realm should focus more on those groups for whom communication seems to matter the most vis a vis abstention. The life-cycle approach used here has identified two such segments -- the young emerging electorate and the oldest, and presumably most politically ex-

perienced, citizens. While at first blush they appear as quite disparate cohorts, commonalities have been found here. However, the reasons underlying the similarities may be quite different. For example, among the young, media may be sought out in a limited way as a readily available agent of political learning, particularly during campaigns, and specific gratifications may result. For the age 65 and over cohort, increased social isolation may lead to greater reliance on media as a source of political interaction, increasing the relevance of mass communications in their political participation. Among nonvoters, in each of the two age groups, the markedly positive relationship between attention to televised political news and political disaffection and malaise may result from the differences in television and newspaper presentation formats discussed above. In particular, consider that most campaign media presentations aim at the largest block of voters -- the 25- to 64-year-olds -- and emphasize issues pertinent to them. The young and the elderly viewing the campaign in broad strokes on television news may perceive that others are the main ones being addressed and courted, adding to disenchantment. Greater attention to newspapers may allow these "out-groups" more selectivity in choosing stories speaking to their immediate concerns, and lead to greater satisfaction.

Some interesting consequences for future study of the political system may result, whether the trends here are primarily generational or a result of aging processes. For instance, if the association between media use and turnout among young voters is mainly a function of young inexperienced citizens seeking out readily available sources of political information and influence, it is important that we acknowledge the role of the media as a political learning device and investigate the specific uses made of media

in that regard, and the consequences which derive. If, on the other hand, the media use-turnout relationship is more based upon generational differences, we may expect the role of the media to increase as present-day young voters mature. Presumably, this might be coupled with a decline in the role of social and organizational involvement, value-oriented political commitments, party affiliations and the like in affecting turnout. The media in a literal sense could become a foundation for a "new politics." One suspects, however, that the trend may reflect both cohort and generational changes; subsequent research should turn to unravelling the relative impacts of each within particular circumstances.

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TABLE A
REGRESSION ANALYSES OF VOTER TURNOUT, BY AGE

	18-24 (n=353) Δr^2	25-34 (n=431) Δr^2	35-49 (n=482) Δr^2	50-64 (n=419) Δr^2	65+ (n=281) Δr^2
Political dispositions (Total)	.055	.145	.122	.147	.141
Concern over voting	.041	.101	.087	.099	.137
Concern over outcome	.002	.002	.001	.000	.000
Political interest	.007	.034	.006	.030	.003
Political knowledge	.003	.001	.003	.013	.001
Party identification	.001	.006	.025	.006	.001
Political system values (Total)	.037	.025	.015	.007	.026
Political powerlessness	.001	.006	.002	.001	.000
Altruism of politicians	.002	.007	.000	.000	.000
Trust in politicians	.020	.010	.001	.002	.015
Political alienation	.009	.010	.000	.003	.004
Political understanding	.000	.000	.010	.000	.008
Efficacy of voting	.006	.001	.002	.002	.001
Political media orientations (Total)	.063	.031	.019	.007	.061
News media exposure	.002	.002	.016	.002	.008
Television reliance	.001	.008	.002	.000	.002
Newspaper reliance	.029	.017	.000	.002	.007
Magazine reliance	.026	.002	.001	.002	.035
Media fairness	.004	.003	.000	.001	.010
Interpersonal communication (Total)	.007	.010	.003	.003	.001
Campaign discussion	.001	.003	.001	.001	.001
Interpersonal reliance	.006	.005	.001	.000	.000
Cross-pressure	.004	.003	.002	.002	.001
Parental characteristics (Total)	.015	.015	.012	.006	.012
Father's political interest	.006	.002	.001	.000	.000
Father's political discussion	.009	.013	.000	.002	.005
Freedom to discuss	.000	.000	.011	.004	.007
Structural characteristics (Total)	.023	.009	.057	.032	.055
Length of residence	.009	.001	.042	.013	.003
Neighborhood satisfaction	.003	.003	.007	.000	.000
Marital status	.006	.006	.002	.016	.004
Sex	.002	.000	.000	.003	.029
Organizational membership	.000	.000	.006	.002	.019
Status characteristics (Total)	.001	.006	.019	.013	.009
Occupation	.000	.000	.011	.000	.008
Education	.000	.004	.004	.002	.001
Income	.001	.002	.004	.011	.001
R^2	.224	.243	.250	.216	.310

[1]From O'Keefe, 1976.

TABLE 1

An Overview of the Sample

(N=1486)

Sex	
Men	48%
Women	52
Race	
White	73%
Black	17
Oriental	1
Hispanic/Chicano	8
Other	1
Age	
18-24	21%
25-34	34
35-49	20
50-64	14
65+	11
Marital Status	
Married	60%
Single	40
Income	
Under $10,000	51%
$10,000-14,999	23
$15,000 and over	26
Education	
0-8 years	21%
9-12 years	61
College	19
Party Identification	
Democratic	43%
Independent	28
Republican	29

TABLE 2

MEAN SCORES FOR
REASONS FOR NOT VOTING BY AGE

	18-24 (n=307)	25-34 (n=505)	35-64 * (n=508)	65+ (n=158)	Total Sample (n=1486)
Candidate cynicism[1]	1.93	1.82	1.72	1.80	1.81
Candidate indiscrimination[2]	1.85	1.73	1.67	1.64	1.73
Candidate distrust[3]	2.20	2.16	2.08	2.07	2.14
Government distrust[4]	1.81	1.76	1.62	1.56	1.70
Political unconcern[5]	1.79	1.75	1.77	1.75	1.77
Inefficacy of voting[6]	1.75	1.72	1.66	1.69	1.71
Information lack[7]	1.83	1.80	1.68	1.65	1.75
Unqualified to vote[8]	1.49	1.45	1.38	1.53	1.45
Registration difficulty[9]	1.31	1.28	1.32	1.30	1.30
Poll hours inconvenient[10]	1.28	1.21	1.28	1.27	1.26
Poll place inconvenient[11]	1.23	1.16	1.22	1.30	1.21

* 35- to 49-year-olds and 50- to 64-year-olds were combined for these analyses.

[1]"Watergate proved that elected officials are only out for themselves."

[2]"All candidates seem pretty much the same."

[3]"Candidates say one thing and then do another."

[4]"The government seems to act too secretly."

[5]"I just don't bother with politics."

[6]"One person's vote really won't make any difference."

[7]"It is hard to find reliable and unbiased information on the candidates."

[8]"I don't feel qualified to vote."

[9]"The registration rules make it difficult for people to register."

[10]"I couldn't get to the polls during voting hours."

[11]"The location of the polling place is inconvenient."

All items scored 1 = "Not very important;" 2 = "Somewhat important;" 3 = "Very important."

TABLE 3

MEDIA ORIENTATIONS, POLITICAL INTEREST AND EDUCATION, BY AGE

	18-24 (n=307)	25-34 (n=505)	35-64 (n=309)	65+ (n=158)	Total Sample (n=1486)
Television Fairness[1]	1.84	1.92	1.95	1.87	1.91
Hi Int.	1.71	1.86	1.98	1.71	1.86
Hi Ed.	1.63	1.85	1.83	1.71	1.79
Television Exposure[2]	2.00	2.16	2.30	2.50	2.21
Hi Int.	2.32	2.31	2.64	2.69	2.47
Hi Ed.	2.13	2.28	2.43	2.50	2.29
Television Attention[3]	1.82	1.97	1.99	2.03	1.95
Hi Int.	2.41	2.58	2.53	2.42	2.52
Hi Ed.	1.98	2.27	2.18	2.23	2.18
Television Helpfulness[4]	2.11	2.20	2.18	2.16	2.17
Hi Int.	2.14	2.27	2.37	2.55	2.32
Hi Ed.	2.05	2.26	2.39	2.25	2.25
Newspaper Fairness[5]	1.81	1.81	1.84	1.93	1.83
Hi Int.	1.69	1.66	1.76	1.74	1.71
Hi Ed.	1.62	1.58	1.61	1.86	1.61
Newspaper Exposure[6]	1.95	2.05	2.20	2.32	2.10
Hi Int.	2.16	2.08	2.34	2.42	2.23
Hi Ed.	2.27	2.08	2.45	2.36	2.20
Newspaper Attention[7]	1.63	1.68	1.70	1.69	1.68
Hi Int.	2.22	2.08	2.10	2.18	2.12
Hi Ed.	1.87	1.91	1.89	1.87	1.88
Newspaper Helpfulness[8]	2.20	2.25	2.22	2.15	2.22
Hi Int.	2.37	2.30	2.29	2.46	2.32
Hi Ed.	2.30	2.38	2.25	2.18	2.32
Education[9]	2.18	2.18	1.79	1.39	1.96
Hi Int.	2.31	2.41	1.97	1.58	2.15
Hi Ed.	----	----	----	----	----
Political Interest[10]	1.88	2.01	2.00	1.91	1.97
Hi Int.	----	----	----	----	----
Hi Ed.	2.14	2.26	2.33	2.50	2.26

(Continued---)

TABLE 3
Continued

[1]Generally speaking, would you say that the information about politics you get from television is biased and slanted, or that it is objective and fair?
(3 levels, 1 = "biased")

[2]The national network news is on TV in the early evening. National network news is shown five days a week, Monday through Friday. In a typical five-day week, how many days do you usually watch at least one of these news-casts?
(3 levels, 1 = low)

[3]When you are watching the news on television, and stories about national politics come on, do you usually pay very close attention to the story, pay some attention to find out what it is about, pay a little attention, or pay no attention to it at all?
(3 levels, 1 = low)

[4]Has the presentation of this year's presidential campaign on television made it easier or harder for you to understand what the candidates stand for?
(3 levels, 1 = "harder")

[5]Generally speaking, would you say that the information about politics you get from the newspapers is biased and slanted or that it is objective and fair?
(3 levels, 1 = "biased")

[6]In a typical seven day week, how many days would you say you get a chance to read the daily newspaper--if any at all?
(3 levels, 1 = low)

[7]When you come across stories about politics in your newspaper, do you usually read the complete story, read enough of the story to know what it is about, read a little of it, or read none of it?
(3 levels, 1 = low)

[8]Has reading about this year's presidential campaign in the newspapers made it easier, or harder, for you to understand what the candidates stand for?
(3 levels, 1 = "harder")

[9]What is the highest grade or year of regular school or college you have attended?
(3 levels, 1 = low)

[10]How interested are you in national politics and national affairs--are you very interested, somewhat interested, only slightly interested, or not interested at all?
(3 levels, 1 = low)

TABLE 4

MAIN SOURCE FOR POLITICAL INFORMATION BY AGE[1]

(N=1486)

	18-24 (n=307)	25-34 (n=505)	35-64 (n=508)	65+ (n=158)
Magazines	7%	7%	3%	1%
Other People	14	11	9	11
Television	50	49	56	57
Newspapers	9	16	20	13
Radio	15	11	9	10
None	5	6	3	7

[1] "Which one of these sources do you count on most for news and information about national politics--magazines, talking with people, television, newspapers, or radio?"

TABLE 5

REGRESSION ANALYSES OF NONVOTING REASONS, BY EDUCATION, INTEREST AND MEDIA ORIENTATIONS
(Base N=1486)

	Television				Newspapers				Educa-	Polit.	R^2
	Fair-ness	Expo-sure	Atten-tion	Help-ful	Fair-ness	Expo-sure	Atten-tion	Help-ful	tion	Int.	
Candidate cynicism	-.07[a] (-.02)	-.03 (-.01)	-.03 (.04)	-.02 (.03)	-.08[a] (-.09)[a]	.03 (.03)	-.03 (.01)	-.06 (-.06)	-.09[b] (-.07)[a]	-.18[b] (-.18)[b]	.05
Candidate indiscrimination	-.06 (-.02)	-.09[b] (-.05)	-.08[a] (.01)	-.08[a] (.01)	-.05 (-.05)	-.05 (-.02)	-.12[b] (-.06)	-.14[b] (-.12)[b]	-.07[a] (-.04)	-.14[b] (-.10)[b]	.05
Candidate distrust	-.09[b] (-.09)[a]	-.10[b] (-.08)[a]	-.02 (.08)[a]	-.04 (.04)	-.05 (-.01)	-.03 (-.01)	-.08[a] (-.05)	-.11[b] (-.10)[b]	-.06 (-.04)	-.13[b] (-.12)[b]	.05
Government distrust	-.04 (.02)	-.07[a] (-.07)	.03 (.09)[a]	-.06 (.00)	-.08[a] (-.09)[a]	-.04 (-.03)	-.01 (.01)	-.11[b] (-.10)[b]	-.03 (-.02)	-.07[a] (-.08)[a]	.03
Political unconcern	.05 (.09)[a]	-.11[b] (-.04)	-.22[b] (-.09)[a]	-.05 (.01)	.00 (-.09)[a]	-.08[a] (-.04)	-.22[b] (-.11)[b]	-.09[b] (-.05)	-.17[b] (-.11)[b]	-.27[b] (-.17)[b]	.12
Inefficacy of voting	-.02 (-.02)	-.07[a] (-.04)	-.06 (.04)	-.04 (.01)	-.00 (-.01)	-.04 (-.02)	-.11[b] (-.05)	-.08[a] (-.06)	-.12[b] (-.08)[a]	-.19[b] (-.17)[b]	.05
Information lack	-.14[b] (-.04)	-.04 (-.04)	.05 (.08)[a]	-.17[b] (-.08)[a]	-.16[b] (-.11)[b]	-.07[a] (-.06)	.00 (.00)	-.19[b] (-.14)[b]	.04 (.02)	.02 (.00)	.08
Unqualified to vote	.06 (.07)	.00 (.04)	-.10[b] (-.08)[a]	-.01 (.00)	.03 (-.03)	-.08[a] (-.07)[a]	-.09[b] (-.04)	-.03 (-.02)	-.08[a] (-.05)	-.07[a] (-.01)	.03
Registration difficulty	.02 (.01)	-.02 (-.02)	-.01 (.02)	-.07[a] (-.03)	.03 (.03)	-.05 (-.03)	-.02 (.01)	-.10[b] (-.09)[a]	-.09[b] (-.07)[a]	-.03 (-.00)	.02
Poll hours inconvenient	.00 (.02)	-.04 (-.06)	.06 (.06)	-.03 (-.06)	-.01 (-.02)	-.04 (-.04)	.04 (.02)	.01 (.04)	-.03 (-.04)	.06 (.05)	.02
Poll place inconvenient	.04 (.03)	-.00 (-.01)	-.01 (-.01)	.01 (.02)	.04 (.01)	-.00 (.01)	-.01 (.00)	-.01 (-.03)	-.09[b] (-.09)[b]	.01 (.04)	.01

[a] p .05
[b] p .01

Upper value in each cell represents zero-order Pearson r.
Lower value (in parenthesis) represents standardized regression coefficient.

TABLE 6

REGRESSION ANALYSES OF NONVOTING REASONS, BY EDUCATION, INTEREST AND MEDIA ORIENTATIONS AMONG 18- to 24- YEAR OLDS (Base N=307)

	Television				Newspapers						
	Fairness	Exposure	Attention	Helpful	Fairness	Exposure	Attention	Helpful	Education	Polit. Int.	R^2
Candidate cynicism	.01 (.00)	-.01 (-.03)	.06 (.11)	.02 (.01)	-.02 (-.02)	.12 (.12)	.03 (.04)	.03 (.01)	.02 (.02)	-.10 (-.17)	.04
Candidate indiscrimination	-.01 (-.02)	-.04 (-.03)	-.01 (.05)	-.03 (.01)	.03 (.06)	-.03 (-.01)	-.06 (-.03)	-.11 (-.11)	.01 (.03)	-.08 (-.08)	.02
Candidate distrust	-.12 (-.14)	-.14 (-.12)	.03 (.16)[a]	.02 (.08)	-.05 (-.00)	.02 (.04)	-.10 (-.07)	-.07 (-.07)	-.08 (-.06)	-.16[a] (-.18)[a]	.08
Government distrust	-.10 (-.07)	-.10 (-.08)	-.10 (-.05)	-.13 (-.07)	-.10 (-.03)	.05 (.11)	-.02 (.08)	-.18[a] (-.15)	-.07 (-.10)	-.13 (-.10)	.08
Political unconcern	.07 (.10)	-.04 (.02)	-.30[b] (-.20)[a]	-.04 (.02)	-.01 (-.04)	-.01 (.04)	-.27[b] (-.16)[a]	-.14 (-.11)	-.14 (-.11)	-.21[b] (-.02)	.15
Inefficacy of voting	-.05 (-.02)	-.09 (-.07)	.02 (.14)	-.10 (-.04)	-.04 (-.03)	.04 (.09)	-.15[a] (-.14)	-.13 (-.13)	-.10 (-.11)	-.09 (-.04)	.07
Information lack	-.12 (-.04)	-.04 (-.07)	.17[a] (.16)	-.17[a] (-.10)	-.13 (-.08)	-.10 (-.08)	.10 (.03)	-.13 (-.09)	.08 (.04)	.13 (.08)	.10
Unqualified to vote	.07 (-.00)	.06 (.09)	-.07 (-.10)	-.03 (-.04)	.15[a] (.17)[a]	-.05 (-.03)	-.02 (.03)	-.05 (-.05)	-.05 (-.03)	-.04 (-.01)	.05
Registration difficulty	.05 (.04)	-.02 (-.02)	-.02 (.03)	.00 (.05)	.01 (.02)	-.00 (-.04)	.01 (.07)	-.13 (-.16)[a]	-.05 (-.04)	-.11 (-.11)	.04
Poll hours inconvenient	.08 (.10)	-.07 (-.11)	.09 (.12)	-.01 (-.01)	.00 (-.02)	.07 (.11)	.09 (.10)	-.04 (-.09)	-.03 (-.02)	-.06 (-.11)	.05
Poll place inconvenient	.05 (.01)	.01 (-.01)	.03 (.05)	.03 (.05)	.07 (.08)	.16[a] (.21)[b]	.05 (.09)	-.09 (-.19)[a]	-.11 (-.12)	-.08 (-.10)	.08

[a] p .05

[b] p .01

Upper value in each cell represents zero-order Pearson r.

Lower value (in parenthesis) represents standardized regression coefficient.

TABLE 7

REGRESSION ANALYSES OF NONVOTING REASONS, BY EDUCATION, INTEREST AND MEDIA ORIENTATIONS AMONG 25- TO 34- YEAR OLDS (Base N=505)

	Television				Newspapers				Educa-	Polit.	R^2
	Fair- ness	Expo- sure	Atten- tion	Help- ful	Fair- ness	Expo- sure	Atten- tion	Help- ful	tion	Int.	
Candidate cynicism	-.09 (-.04)	-.07 (-.04)	-.08 (.02)	-.02 (.04)	-.09 (-.11)	.00 (.01)	-.05 (.01)	-.07 (-.08)	-.17[b] (-.16)[b]	-.18[b] (-.16)[b]	.07
Candidate in discrimination	-.05 (-.05)	-.01 (.04)	-.14[a] (-.04)	-.10 (-.01)	-.03 (-.03)	-.11 (-.10)	-.15[b] (-.07)	-.17[b] (-.13)	-.14[a] (-.08)	-.15[b] (-.11)	.08
Candidate distrust	.10 (-.17)[a]	-.02 (.01)	-.06 (.03)	-.05 (.02)	-.00 (.07)	-.07 (-.07)	-.09 (-.05)	-.10 (-.07)	-.13[a] (-.09)	-.14[a] (-.13)[a]	.06
Government distrust	-.08 (-.06)	.00 (.02)	.01 (.07)	-.05 (.06)	-.04 (-.03)	-.02 (-.02)	.00 (.04)	-.16[b] (-.19)[b]	-.06 (-.04)	-.12[a] (-.16)[a]	.06
Political unconcern	.07 (.04)	-.10 (-.04)	-.27[b] (-.14)[a]	-.02 (-.01)	.06 (-.03)	-.08 (-.07)	-.20[b] (-.07)	-.05 (-.02)	-.19[b] (-.10)	-.26[b] (-.15)[a]	.12
Inefficacy of voting	-.03 (-.10)	-.02 (.01)	-.02 (.05)	.03 (.07)	.05 (.08)	-.03 (-.05)	.02 (.08)	-.03 (-.06)	-.13[a] (-.11)	-.17[b] (-.19)[b]	.06
Information lack	-.17[b] (-.08)	-.02 (.00)	.02 (.02)	-.16[b] (-.03)	-.19[b] (-.13)	-.14[a] (-.13)[b]	-.01 (.01)	-.24[b] (-.21)[b]	.01 (.01)	.02 (-.03)	.11
Unqualified to vote	.05 (.08)	.02 (.05)	-.14[a] (-.15)[a]	.01 (.02)	-.01 (-.07)	-.07 (-.06)	-.08 (-.02)	.01 (.01)	-.03 (-.00)	-.04 (.02)	.03
Registration difficulty	.00 (-.05)	-.04 (-.00)	-.10 (-.11)	-.09 (-.02)	.07 (.10)	-.06 (-.06)	.00 (.08)	-.15[b] (-.13)[a]	-.03 (.02)	-.05 (-.03)	.04
Poll hours inconvenient	-.11 (-.14)	-.00 (-.01)	.07 (-.00)	-.04 (-.08)	-.05 (.08)	-.11 (-.13)[a]	.07 (.03)	.04 (.09)	.07 (.05)	.14[a] (.11)	.05
Poll place inconvenient	.03 (-.06)	-.00 (.02)	.06 (-.13)	-.00 (.03)	.08 (.12)	-.15[b] (-.14)[a]	-.01 (.03)	-.06 (-.06)	.00 (.03)	.09 (.13)[a]	.05

[a] p .05
[b] p .01

Upper value in each cell represents zero-order Pearson r.
Lower value (in parenthesis) represents standardized regression coefficient.

TABLE 8

REGRESSION ANALYSES OF NONVOTING REASONS, BY EDUCATION, INTEREST AND MEDIA ORIENTATIONS AMONG 35- TO 64- YEAR OLDS (Base N=508)

	Television				Newspapers				Educa-tion	Polit. Int.	R^2
	Fair-ness	Expo-sure	Atten-tion	Help-ful	Fair-ness	Expo-sure	Atten-tion	Help-ful			
Candidate cynicism	-.06	.00	-.05	.02	-.10	.06	-.05	-.04	-.11	-.13[a]	.06
	(.03)	(.06)	(-.02)	(.08)	(-.14)[a]	(.10)	(-.03)	(-.07)	(-.13)[a]	(-.13)[a]	
Candidate indiscrimination	-.08	-.19[b]	-.12[a]	-.07	-.11	-.01	-.13[a]	-.15[b]	-.08	-.07	.08
	(.02)	(-.14)[a]	(-.05)	(.03)	(-.13)	(.04)	(-.07)	(-.12)	(-.08)	(.01)	
Candidate distrust	-.0[illegible]	-.13[a]	-.05	-.04	-.10	.00[illegible]	-.0[illegible]	-.13[a]	-.05	-.09	.05
	(.01)	(-.10)	(.03)	(.08)	(-.10)	(.03)	(-.05)	(-.15)[a]	(-.05)	(-.06)	
Government distrust	.05	-.05	.13[a]	-.04	-.09	-.06	-.00	-.06	-.08	.06	.06
	(.18)[a]	(-.09)	(.15)[a]	(-.03)	(-.19)[b]	(-.04)	(-.03)	(-.06)	(-.09)	(.04)	
Political unconcern	.00	-.17[b]	-.20[b]	-.08	-.03	-.12[a]	-.22[b]	-.08	-.[illegible]3[a]	-.28[b]	.13
	(.11)	(-.06)	(-.08)	(-.03)	(-.14)[a]	(-.07)	(-.10)	(-.00)	(-.06)	(-.20)[b]	
Inefficacy of voting	.00	-.09	-.17[b]	-.07	-.04	-.08	-.18[b]	-.08	-.10	-.18[b]	.07
	(.10)	(-.00)	(-.10)	(-.03)	(-.14)[a]	(-.04)	(-.10)	(-.02)	(-.06)	(-.12)[a]	
Information lack	.13[a]	-.01	.03	-.14[a]	-.16[b]	.03	.01	-.19[b]	.00	.03	.06
	(-.01)	(.00)	(.04)	(-.06)	(-.14)[a]	(.03)	(.01)	(-.15)[a]	(-.02)	(.02)	
Unqualified to vote	.03	-.03	-.10	-.01	-.03	.12[a]	-.11	-.02	-.11	-.05	.04
	(.11)	(-.02)	(-.08)	(-.01)	(-.12)	(-.08)	(-.06)	(.00)	(-.08)	(-.00)	
Registration Difficulty	.03	.02	.08	-.08	.02	-.03	-.04	-.06	-.16[b]	.09	.06
	(.03)	(.00)	(.09)	(-.08)	(-.01)	(.01)	(-.08)	(-.02)	(-.17)[b]	(.12)	
Poll hours inconvenient	.04	-.04	.10	-.04	.02	-.03	.04	.01	-.12[a]	.05	.04
	(.05)	(-.08)	(.10)	(-.09)	(-.01)	(-.01)	(.03)	(.05)	(-.13)[a]	(.06)	
Poll place inconvenient	.06	-.03	.02	-.01	.00		.00	.06	-.11	.04	.03
	(.10)	(-.05)	(.00)	(-.04)	(-.07)	(.01)	(-.00)	(.08)	(-.12)[a]	(.06)	

[a] p .05

[b] p .01

Upper value in each cell represents zero-order Pearson r.
Lower value (in parenthesis) represents standardized coefficient.

TABLE 9

REGRESSION ANALYSES OF NONVOTING REASONS, BY EDUCATION, INTEREST AND MEDIA ORIENTATIONS AMONG 65+ - YEAR OLDS (Base N=158)

	Television				Newspapers				Educa-tion	Polit. Int.	R^2
	Fair-ness	Expo-sure	Atten-tion	Help-ful	Fair-ness	Expo-sure	Atten-tion	Help-ful			
Candidate cynicism	-.08	-.06	.14	-.24[a]	-.10	-.12	-.01	-.25[a]	-.11	-.39[b]	.27
	(-.02)	(.00)	(.20)	(-.07)	(.04)	(-.14)	(.10)	(-.17)	(.01)	(-.41)[b]	
Candidate indiscrimination	-.04	-.04	.14	-.12	-.05	.00	-.14	-.11	-.15	-.43[b]	.25
	(.01)	(-.00)	(.27)[a]	(.02)	(-.07)	(.05)	(-.11)	(-.04)	(-.03)	(-.44)[b]	
Candidate distrust	-.04	-.04	.20	-.19	-.03	.01	.02	-.12	-.13	-.21	.14
	(-.03)	(-.03)	(.26)[a]	(-.13)	(.02)	(.03)	(.02)	(-.06)	(-.11)	(-.18)	
Government distrust	.05	-.08	.23[a]	-.06	-.02	-.11	-.06	.04	-.13	-.15	.16
	(.21)	(-.10)	(.36)[b]	(-.06)	(.20)	(-.08)	(-.15)	(.09)	(-.04)	(-.12)	
Political unconcern	.11	-.14	-.02	-.13	-.03	-.11	-.21	-.19	-.33[b]	-.37[b]	.27
	(.29)	(-.08)	(.16)	(.02)	(-.26)	(-.02)	(-.18)	(-.17)	(-.22)	(-.22)	
Inefficacy of voting	.02	-.20	.04	-.09	.03	-.14	-.22[a]	-.13	-.25[a]	-.46[b]	.28
	(.05)	(-.14)	(.21)	(.10)	(-.05)	(-.03)	(-.15)	(-.12)	(-.06)	(-.40)[b]	
Information lack	-.08	-.13	.10	-.30[b]	-.14	.04	-.12	-.14	-.08	-.16	.17
	(.14)	(-.15)	(.22)	(-.25)[a]	(-.22)	(.11)	(-.17)	(.01)	(-.06)	(-.05)	
Unqualified to vote	.15	-.09	-.09	.03	.01	-.07	-.19	-.08	-.21	-.22[a]	.13
	(.32)	(-.05)	(.03)	(.04)	(-.26)	(.00)	(-.17)	(-.07)	(-.12)	(-.11)	
Registration difficulty	.00	-.12	.04	-.13	.05	-.14	-.10	.02	-.18	-.17	.08
	(-.02)	(-.04)	(.13)	(-.13)	(.04)	(-.08)	(-.06)	(.06)	(-.12)	(-.08)	
Poll hours inconvenient	.06	-.04	-.07	-.01	-.04	-.04	-.10	.08	-.00	.08	.07
	(.25)	(-.06)	(-.01)	(-.07)	(-.25)	(-.02)	(-.17)	(.13)	(.01)	(.15)	
Poll place inconvenient	.05	.00	.02	.05	-.06	.11	-.12	.11	-.15	.03	.12
	(.20)	(-.02)	(.11)	(.01)	(-.27)	(.18)	(-.25)	(.15)	(-.17)	(-.05)	

[a] $p < .05$

[b] $p < .01$

Upper value in each cell represents zero-order Pearson r.

Lower value (in parenthesis) represents standardized coefficient.