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ABSTRACT

The shifting political milieu which surrounded and conditioned all of Illinois' educational endeavors in the half century after 1870 is discussed. Studies of those elements of society which have influenced the development of schools have often neglected the political milieu that affects educational policy-making at the state level. The political milieu of any state plays an important role in determining the destinies of its state-supported educational institutions. Examination of the shifting relationships, objectives, and values within the Illinois government which affected its allocation process between 1870 and 1890 may provide a valuable approach to understanding the development of public education at every level. Between 1870 and 1900 the legislature was criticized for corruption and procedural sloppiness, and the general disorderliness of its meetings did little to encourage careful consideration by merit of issues concerning state-supported education. The community centeredness of American life before the 20th century resulted in a belief in "economy in government" and, consequently, a slow rate of increase in state appropriations. Another significant influence on the allocation of state funds in the late 1890s was the near dictatorship in state politics by Illinois farmers. The emergence of numerous organizations beginning in the mid 1890s combined with a substantial change in the appropriation process itself to push state spending steadily upward through the first decade of the 20th century. (Author/BK)

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**PARTISANS AND PROVINCIALS:
THE POLITICAL MILIEU OF STATE-SUPPORTED
EDUCATION IN ILLINOIS, 1870-1920**

by

Jon F. McKenna*

**YALE HIGHER EDUCATION PROGRAM
WORKING PAPER**

YHEP-5

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PARTISANS AND PROVINCIALS: THE POLITICAL MILIEU OF
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Perhaps the safest generalization one might make about the direction of American educational historiography in the past decade or so is that scholars have been looking increasingly not only into the schools, but beyond them as well, exploring those elements in society at large which have influenced their development. We have learned a great deal about who supported and opposed education at various levels and for what reasons. Yet it seems to me that an important element has too often been slighted in works focussing upon institutions whose income derives substantially from state funds. Simply expressed, we have neglected to consider the manner in which every state's political milieu constantly conditions the development of every institution dependent upon state resources.

For purposes of analysis the political milieu might best be seen as composed of two inter-related elements: one being the complex process by which individual states allocate resources to carry out their various functions and responsibilities, and the second being any societal values or patterns of life within particular states that influence this process. I presume that political environments may differ significantly between states at any given moment, and that both the allocation processes and the values that help shape them are subject to change over time. Thus their impact upon state-supported educational institutions might reasonably be expected to vary substantially from one period to another. Expressed in other terms, these institutions and their overtly active friends and enemies do not alone determine their respective destinies; the political milieu of any state which sustains them also plays a

role, the consequences of which may range anywhere from placing insurmountable barriers in their paths to providing openings they might exploit for impressive gains.

Over the years several political scientists have called attention to the absence of materials linking "state politics" with publicly supported education; not surprisingly, then, this discipline has spawned the few systematic efforts to connect the two. In a 1968 bibliographical essay on "The Politics of Higher Education," Samuel K. Gove and Barbara Whiteside Solomon reported finding little work that explored "the relationship between higher education and the state political situation." Reviewing the same subject seven years later, Gove and Carol Everly Floyd detected only slight improvement.¹ The first of several books that have analyzed the tie between state politics and lower-level schools was Schoolmen and Politics: A Study of State Aid to Education in the Northeast (1962.) Here, however, the authors did no more than note the impact that allocation processes have upon "educational finance (policy-making)." They concentrated instead upon the interaction among educational interests within eight states and their appeals to state governments.² Subsequent monographs have either embraced a similar approach³ or have used quantitative techniques in an attempt to correlate educational expenditures and policies with such variables as states' average per capita income, their percentage of urban population, partisan competition within a state legislature, and legislators' interaction with interest groups, their leadership status, and their educational attainment.⁴ Only in State Politics and the Public Schools: An Exploratory Analysis (1964) does it appear that anyone has truly attempted to penetrate the political milieu that affects educational policy-making. The book's treatment of Missouri is particularly strong in this regard, but even there one learns little about how the milieu may have changed over time.⁵

Any state's educational budgets and policies derive from a complex of social, economic, intellectual and political factors within it and the broader world. The following propounds no formula for invariably unraveling the immensely complicated relationship between these elements. It analyzes only the process by which Illinois allocated resources in the half century after 1870 and does so on the presumption that these primarily political factors set inviolable limits upon educational policies and thus merit investigation. Without some understanding of shifting relationships, procedures, values and objectives between and within branches of government, one is at a loss to explain why, for example, proposals generating derision in one period met ready approval in another. Here the focus is upon governors, House speakers, appropriation committees and such themes as economy in government; references to specific educational policies and educational institutions are largely incidental. Ideally many of the questions raised and the answers offered ought only to sharpen one's judgments upon educational issues in Illinois during these years; they need not always be dealt with explicitly. Yet, in this instance, since the conditioning environment has so often been slighted, there may well be value in confronting it in a direct and sustained manner.

II

An examination of the allocation process in Illinois might appropriately begin with a look at the relative importance and characteristics of the government's legislative and executive branches. During debate in 1870 constitutional convention on the proper distribution of power between the two, delegate James Washburn defended the position that remained ascendant for years. According to him, the privilege of inaugurating and maturing policy belonged exclusively to the General Assembly. "It would be an usurpation by the governor to exercise the power. . . . The duty of the governor is to

execute policy not to say what the policy shall be."6 Nineteenth-century governors rarely used their veto power and only occasionally proposed and worked for passage of legislation. For the most part, too, they interfered little before the 1890's with the General Assembly's organization at the beginning of each session.7

Thus, although the 1870 constitution formally enlarged executive powers, the legislature overshadowed all governors before 1900 and many later ones as well. Press and public alike acknowledged the Assembly's dominance and focused there the bulk of attention allotted state government. After the 1850's leading Chicago dailies sent at least one reporter to Springfield for the sessions; some downstate papers also kept correspondents on the scene, and others presented telegraphic summaries. In the post-Civil War years many newspapers abandoned fealty to party in favor of a more independent position. Reporters in their employ came to see themselves as defenders of public rather than of partisan interests. In this capacity they maintained a detached and suspicious attitude toward those in the state legislature.8

Certain conditions and issues continually attracted attention over the years; a review of them will in some instances reveal the legislature's character, in others merely its popular image. To begin with, those who chronicled events in the General Assembly generally had a low estimate of the average solon's mental power. The Champaign County Gazette, for example, asserted in 1871 that dozens of legislators were incapable of understanding matters under debate.9 Several years later Springfield Journal carried the following: Pennsylvania papers had recently been boasting that their state had the "champion idiot" in the Speaker's chair,

but the Harrisburg paper, in view of [Illinois] Speaker [Elijah M.] Haines's recent remarkable decision . . . that . . . striking out the 'enacting words' of a bill only kills the first section, now throws

up the sponge, frankly confessing that [Illinois rather than Pennsylvania enjoys] the proud distinction of having placed the greatest ass in the country in the Speaker's chair . . . ¹⁰

Throughout the period charges of corruption pursued the Illinois legislature, just as they did those of other states and the national congress. Before the 1870 constitution limited the enactment of special legislation, journalists dwelled constantly on the large number of assemblymen who supposedly favored any measure in return for a "consideration." One reporter even suggested that mealtime seating arrangements at Springfield's Leland Hotel indicated whether or not a man would "deal" with lobbyists. ¹¹ "Sand-baggers" or "regulators," bills ostensibly to correct abuses by business but really designed to extract a fee for preventing passage, appeared as early as the 1870's and by 1903 composed about fifteen percent of all legislation introduced. ¹² Anytime liquor, traction, or utility interests tried either to block or pass measures, allegations of bribery became rampant. ¹³ Illinois's General Assembly received national publicity around the turn of the century for its "jackpot," a fund supposedly made up from contributions by those interested mainly in regulating bills, utilities or transportation. ¹⁴ Governor Charles S. Deneen testified before the United States Senate that nearly all this type legislation met its fate in the final two days of each session, and that afterward the treasurer of the "jackpot" distributed it according to the legislators' "helpfulness" in the closing hours. ¹⁵

After 1870, criticism abounded over the length and expense of legislative sessions. Most observers attributed the problem to mass absenteeism and short work weeks. A Prairie Farmer correspondent in the mid-1870's argued that absence rates of from thirty to fifty percent at Saturday, Monday, and Tuesday sessions and extensive junkets by committee chairmen severely slowed the conduct of business. ¹⁶ Before 1889 members received five dollars for every day of the

session, but most were present for only a few hours three or four days a week. Speaking in facetious tones, the Springfield Journal explained the situation:

The members are model family men. Their dear wives and darling babies must not be neglected so they generally begin scampering home about Thursday and get back Tuesday and Wednesday. When they do get back they are so tired they can do nothing till next week.¹⁷

A number of papers and legislators spoke out against flagrant absenteeism. The Tribune once examined 201 roll calls in the House and found that while Cook County representatives had missed an average of forty percent, those from rural areas had an even poorer record. One member went unrecorded on 159 votes and another on 149.¹⁸ Reporters relished taking to task legislators who, they insisted, went to Springfield not to work but "to recruit, to rest, to smoke, to sample the 'buttermilk,' to see the elephant, to associate with the 'big guns,' . . . [and] to be known as the Honorable Jedediah Jenkses" ¹⁹ In time, salary reductions were used to punish absenteeism, but short work weeks at the beginning of each session followed by marathon ones at the end became a hallowed tradition in Illinois.²⁰

Legislators' personal foibles naturally did little to promote orderly procedure and devotion to dispassionate discourse. More than a few incidents of physical conflict marred proceedings on the floor of both House and Senate, but the House, surely because it had three times as many members, enjoyed a special reputation for inattentiveness and disorder.²¹ "Business . . . [proceeded] very slowly, and language, English and Indian, proper and improper, talk, gas, speeches about nothing . . . [were] the order of the day." Seven-eighths of the members reportedly buried themselves in newspapers, books and letters, or engaged in conversation. Only rarely could one "find more than a dozen members paying the slightest attention to . . . business."²² Even though the legislative work load became heaviest at the very end of each session, all

restraints vanished in the House on closing night:

[P]aper wads were flying, now and then some member sent hurtling through the hot air his file of printed . . . bills, and all the while there was that confusion of sound, laughter, a sort of bedlam, in which laws were being enacted.²³

In the Senate lax enforcement of the rule restricting the floor to members kept the performance there little above that of the House. Important business proceeded amidst visiting women and children, lobbyists, clerks, and news-boys hawking their papers.²⁴

Clearly many procedural rules, including those for the adoption of legislation, were never strictly observed. Just after the Civil War a Pantagraph correspondent noted that motions and resolutions passed with half a dozen yeas. When Representative John Perrin protested in 1882 the advancement of an appropriation for Illinois State Normal University in the absence of a quorum, the House speaker responded that at least half the state's statutes had been adopted under similar circumstances.²⁵ Evidence of continued laxity appeared in Governor Deneen's February 1912 warning that a special legislative session might be needed to correct procedural flaws in a multitude of bills since the state supreme court had just used that basis to invalidate an appropriation for the state university.²⁶

During the Civil War, Illinois Republicans and Democrats disagreed strongly about a number of war-related issues, including the rights of black people: this conflict provided a basis for the unity both parties briefly demonstrated in the state legislature. When these issues faded from prominence after 1865 and no others replaced them, the greatest incentive to party solidarity vanished. By 1871 no acknowledged leader reigned in either house of the General Assembly. In late February that year the Pantagraph reported that men voted "together or separately as their judgment indicates, without regard to party affiliation . . ." One might watch "speeches and votes . . . for days . . . without finding any indication of the party with which . . . members . . .

[were] affiliated."²⁷ Not surprisingly, then, electioneering for state office often came to consist, for the minority party at least, of charging the opposition with excessive spending, corruption and mismanagement of state institutions.²⁸

Democrats utilized this line most often because between the end of the Civil War and 1890, with the exception of the 1875, 1877 and 1885 General Assemblies, Republicans controlled both the executive and legislative branches. Throughout this period, too, many Illinois Democrats tried to capitalize on potentially divisive cultural issues such as higher minimum fees for liquor licenses in 1883 and the Edwards compulsory education law of 1889. Their success with these was limited, however, since a number of legislators followed the party leadership's directives only in voting for officers of the General Assembly, United States Senators, and upon confirmation of trustees of state institutions. Caucuses called by both parties in May 1879 illustrated the situation. Democratic headmen sought unity against a deficiency bill for the Joliet penitentiary, while Republicans wanted to plan the disposition of business for the rest of the term. Each failed in its purpose and barely avoided a fight as individual Democrats and Republicans adamantly refused cooperation. A survey of votes in the Illinois legislature during the 1895 and 1899 sessions showed the amount of party voting on matters of public policy to be almost infinitesimal.²⁹

The impotence of traditional party organizations led during the 1890's to the development of a more cohesive controlling power. Instead of depending upon the party caucus for decisions, members began forming strong combinations with enough votes to carry the caucus from its very first meeting each session. The dominant faction of the majority party, known as the "combine" or "organization," could then make final decisions on officers, committees, patronage, and the conduct of business. This authority in turn reinforced the "combine's" position and aided it in controlling other legislator's actions.

A look at post-1898 election parleying among Republican senators reveals how this system took shape for the upcoming session. Two groups vied for the allegiance of a majority of their thirty-four party members. By early January when the legislature met to organize, the group closely aligned with Governor John R. Tanner had established supremacy, but only after promising an organizer of the rival faction, commanded by Henry M. Dunlap of Champaign County, the position of president pro-tem. Eight senators in Dunlap's group boycotted the caucus and held a separate meeting of their own at which they agreed not to vote in the full senate elections; in the end only five of them abstained and the caucus nominees won handily. Members of the majority Republican clique had agreed even before the party caucus on the distribution of patronage and the composition of the crucial steering committee and committee on committees. Thus, those in the Dunlap faction, though members of the majority party, were as much outside the power structure as any Democrat.³⁰

In 1899 only two Republican factions challenged one another, and the weaker did not consider looking beyond its party ranks for support in organizing the senate. Although these conditions and inhibitions protected the "combine's" rule for a time, they vanished during the first two decades of the twentieth century. It mattered hardly at all that Republicans enjoyed solid majorities in every legislative session but one during these years, for each party developed at least three factions. Since many times the only discernable enmities were those between factions of the same party, alliances across party lines became common. As governors began to take a more direct role in the legislative process, they too plunged headlong into the intra-party conflicts, trying to win control through the distribution of patronage and by campaigning against the reelection of those in opposition cliques. Not surprisingly politicians' preoccupation with these struggles for supremacy meant that many issues of general interest

received only indifferent consideration while others suffered when turned into battlegrounds for factional conflict.³¹

Procedural rules and customs in the Illinois General Assembly invested certain positions with large responsibility in the legislative process. Throughout this period the House speaker undoubtedly wielded more power than any other legislator. His formal responsibilities of making committee appointments, guiding discussions, and helping to determine the order of business as a member of the steering committee were easily matched by informal ones. For decades Illinois speakers throttled minorities and, at times, majorities with a "gavel rule" as autocratic as any in the nation. The tradition went virtually unchallenged, too, until 1903 when a speaker had to flee for safety from enraged members after ignoring a legitimate motion for a roll call vote.³²

In their domain committee chairmen were nearly as dictatorial as the speaker. This, combined with typically infrequent, poorly attended, and largely perfunctory committee meetings, allowed the chairmen a large role in determining the destiny of legislation referred to their committees.³³ Still, the sponsor of a bill always assumed primary responsibility for its adoption. He had to urge committee chairmen for a favorable report and then to attract sufficient support from the whole House or Senate to pass a measure on its second and third readings.

This was not the easiest of tasks, for although some senators and representatives judged legislation on its merits, the majority never studied pending questions to reach an independent decision on how to vote. It became common practice, at least around 1900, to vote "yea" on any proposition only if the sponsoring legislator gave his personal assurance that it was "all right." Consequently, the success of any General Assembly member in turning a bill into law rested upon a combination of factors: how hard he worked, his popularity and skill in maneuvering, and what he was willing to do in turn for fellow legislators.³⁴

Observers of the General Assembly continually bemoaned the prevalence of vote swapping by legislators. In summing up those who served in the 1877 session, the Tribune charged that "their ideas of legislation never rose above making an appropriation on a trade. Each man gave or withheld his vote according to the support he got for some local job of his own. . . ."³⁵ Almost twenty years later, after a trip to Springfield to test sentiment toward the state university, a trustee reported to the institution's president that she had heard enough to disgust her with political methods. "Men say openly they must vote for or against a measure not because it is right or wrong but because they must secure the man's vote for their measure by voting for his." By all indications the practice continued well into the twentieth century.³⁶

To this point attention has been focused on general features of the legislature such as reputed corruption, sloppy procedures, the extent of party control, and the powers and responsibilities of those occupying various positions. The relevance of these matters for the welfare of state-supported education, although indirect, is undeniable. At the least they make quite fanciful any supposition that legislative procedures encouraged, or even permitted, the careful consideration of issues on their merits. That such was rarely the case will become even clearer as the process by which Illinois allocated funds comes under scrutiny.

III

A state almost always resolves whether it will possess good or bad roads, prisons, common schools, or universities in ostensibly fiscal terms. For example, the problem of what rank and duties the University of Illinois's College of Agriculture should have turned up in Springfield during the 1899 General Assembly in the form of a bill granting \$150,000 for a new building. Thus, given the legislative system that then prevailed, the chances of Illinois leaping from oblivion to the front rank of agricultural education in America turned,

initially, it would seem, upon reports issued by the House and Senate appropriations committees.

The impact of state finances on institutional growth demands a crash of something more than the course money bills followed from introduction to the governor's desk. Fully as important as the appropriation process were the conditions and values which circumscribed it. The most important condition was the community centeredness of life in America before the twentieth century. Properly employed this concept offers insights even into some of the aberrant legislative practices described above. Individual legislators perceived themselves as emissaries from the community, deputed to defend its interest. So long as they accomplished this, the pervasive apathy toward state government and the moderate standards of rectitude imposed upon politicians protected them from punishment at the polls for such peccadilloes as absenteeism or rowdy behavior. Retribution came swiftly, though, to the man who flagrantly ignored the desires or flouted the values of his constituents.

Simply stated, people without interests beyond their communities expected little from the state government. Thus it made good sense that such government be limited in its activity and, like any good citizen, frugal in expenditures. The significance of this attitude for state-supported education cannot possibly be exaggerated. No other single factor aids so much in explaining the course of its development as the phenomenon of "economy in government."³⁷

Early in the 1895 legislative session Alexander McLean, a trustee of the state university, sent President Andrew S. Draper a letter that might just as easily have been written any time between 1870 and 1920; a similar situation always prevailed. McLean had scouted around Springfield and found there only a modest sum in the state treasury and no disposition on the part of political leaders to exceed resources on hand. The House appropriations committee chairman, Tom Needles, had told the trustee that while he bore no hostility

toward the university, he believed available funds should be divided on a pro rata basis among all public institutions, none getting a large appropriation. Something of an alternative did exist; Mr. Needles might have suggested raising the tax rate to satisfy the university's requests. To do so, however, would surely have doomed the Honorable Representative to a short tenure at his appropriations committee post. In the words of a contemporary House speaker, "there is nothing the people of Illinois are so sensitive of as the subject of taxation." A vote favoring an increase in the rate was for decades the most damning blot imaginable on a General Assembly member's record.³⁸

Certainly the aversion to taxation found no root in a populace's grinding poverty or constantly excessive monetary demands by the state government. In the late 1830's Illinois, along with a number of other states, had fallen deeply in debt as depression sent glimmering ambitious internal improvement schemes. The constitution of 1848, however, placed the state on a strict austerity program, reducing salaries of public officials and instituting a two mill tax designed to pay off over sixteen million dollars in obligations. Official retirement of the debt did not come until the early 1880's, but developments in the 1850's reduced it to a pittance and completely restored the state's credit. On the eve of the Civil War Illinois stood first among the states in corn and wheat production. By the early 1870's thirty million tillable acres, the best transportation network in the Union, and a rapidly increasing population justified references to Illinois as "the Empire State of the West."³⁹ Meanwhile, state government, by comparison, had shrunk to nearly invisible proportions; it took only slightly more than one-fifteenth of the total tax levy, the balance going to counties, towns, and cities. Had the legislature in 1873 consented to all requests presented, and these included funds to finish or begin nine buildings, the average cost per capita would have been but forty-four cents.⁴⁰

Yet the pressure against meeting such seemingly meager demands always proved unbearable in these years. The long-standing Jeffersonian principle of limited and frugal government claimed many supporters. Among them stood the Illinois State Register, Springfield's Democratic daily. In 1881 it advised that "within the limits of simplicity and frugality there is abundant room for the exercise of all governmental functions which the good of the state and the people demand, indeed it is not too much to say that within these limits all good government is possible." Reportedly, every community had plenty of "croakers" who gushed a "diarrhea of words" against public projects each year at tax paying time. An 1872 convention of Illinois farmers, placed special emphasis upon an immediate reduction of public spending "to the end that taxation be reduced to the lowest possible limit."⁴¹ Virtually everyone paid homage to the economy idea: witness the Pantagraph advising that "a prodigal expenditure would be an unbearable hardship, and cause much dissatisfaction," or the State Board of Charities' observation that "the people desire and demand retrenchment in all branches of public service."⁴²

Not surprisingly, then, state appropriations remained almost static throughout the latter portion of the nineteenth century. During the post-Civil War years the state established six new institutions for various purposes. All were housed by the mid-1870s and for a full decade biennial expenditures fluctuated between six and seven million dollars. The first nine million dollar appropriation came in 1893, and the total increased slowly in increments averaging only a little more than one million dollars every other year through 1905. In 1907 the legislature approved the expenditure of over twenty million dollars for the next two years, but even then Illinois' average per capita expenditure for all state purposes was only \$1.58, less than half that of Wisconsin and New York, and not a fourth that of Minnesota. Perhaps the modern

era did not truly begin until 1911 when the sum appropriated climbed to \$29.5 million, a thirty-one percent increase over the previous biennium. By that time significant numbers of citizens were looking beyond their communities and finding problems for the state to solve.⁴³

Every Illinois constitution has required the General Assembly to consider financial provisions for state institutions at every regularly scheduled session. This work quickly took on a routine or system, the basic outlines of which changed little from the nineteenth through the mid-twentieth centuries. Within this general framework, however, there have been modifications, many of them quite significant since the system itself determines in some degree the sums allotted to meet the state's responsibilities.

The appropriation process has always begun with those in charge of each state institution asking for a specific amount of money to carry on their work during the succeeding two years. Before creation of the Board of State Commissioners of Public Charities in 1869, appropriation requests and their disposition were strictly a matter between state institutions and the state government. The Illinois Charities Board, though, the fourth such body in the country, had a full-time, paid secretary and the responsibility of visiting all charitable and, until 1875, all higher educational institutions semi-annually and advising the General Assembly on their financial needs. By its second biennial report the Board had lost its inhibitions about making detailed recommendations to a legislature jealous of its prerogatives. For the balance of the 1870's and throughout at least the next decade it tried to mediate between the aspirations of institutional managers and a parsimonious state government.⁴⁴

From the beginning the Board accepted without protest the necessity of a stable state tax levy. After receiving estimates of institutional needs in the fall of 1872, it called the leaders together and appealed to them for a

voluntary and equitable reduction of nearly fifty percent in their askings. Many complied, and over the years the Board kept pressure on institutions to pare requests while warning the legislature against reducing appropriations below the levels it recommended.

. . . [W]e have attempted to . . . point out to members of the General Assembly, who may not be familiar with the condition[s] . . . and needs of the state institutions the points at which . . . reductions may be made, if necessary without the infliction of positive injury. Should the reductions which have been suggested be agreed to, the only evil which will result will be the temporary inconvenience arising from delay in the execution of some cherished project. . . . But we fear that it will not be possible to reduce the estimates still further without detriment and loss.⁴⁶

Time and again the Board squelched requests for new construction and involved itself with the most minute sums.

All this might have worked out well enough had other elements in the appropriation process readily accepted the Charity Board's conclusions. Governors offered no trouble. Although the constitution assigned to them the task of presenting a budget every other year, these were rudimentary at best until after adoption of the state's Civil Administrative Code in 1917.⁴⁷ Using only a few paragraphs in their biennial message to the legislature at the beginning of each session, governors usually endorsed the Board's work and, after 1875, proposed some unelaborated figures for prisons and educational institutions not under its purview. They did refer in effusive terms to the various state-supported institutions, commending their work and predicting brilliant futures for them; the sums suggested, however, were invariably far too modest to do more than preserve the status quo. Whether or not the legislature paid the slightest attention to the chief executives' advice seems to have caused them little concern. As noted above, the governors, with the possible exception of John Peter Altgeld, played insignificant roles in the legislative process before 1900. The General Assembly accepted responsibility for appropriations and showed no desire to shift the burden elsewhere.⁴⁸

Along every step that a money bill traversed in the nineteenth century, pressure for economy appeared. Neither the Board of Charities recommendations nor the post 1875 requests of educational institutions met a gracious reception in the legislature.⁴⁹ The appropriations committees especially cut and slashed the bills with near abandon. According to a Pantagraph reporter in March 1875, it was utterly impossible to tell one day what they would do the next. For example, a measure granting money to the state reform school at Pontiac had been approved one night and then, without any new information being offered, been decreased by \$15,000 the next.⁵⁰ When completed, the committees reported the results of their work to the floor of the legislature for final action. Although in later years this stage evolved into a merely routine operation, during the 1870s and 1880s it was the scene of heated exchanges that ground out the final dimensions of appropriation bills. So, after the probably downward revision of institutional requests by the Board of Charities and by such legislative committees as those on state institutions, buildings and grounds, and appropriations, the amendments offered on the bills' second reading in the House and Senate tried to force the totals still lower.

In these decades the attacks on state institutions invariably originated with Democratic spokesmen. Their party shared little in the institutions' management because in nearly every instance Republican governors had appointed Republican trustees. Democrats thus felt free to press for economy in expenditures and to allege Republican venality, duplicity, and extravagance in operating the institutions, hoping thereby to tip in their favor the narrow balance between the two parties that prevailed in Illinois through the 1880s. While their motives were partisan and their actions perhaps irresponsible, Democrats did appeal to the deeper values of the electorate and, at least partially, to the realities of life in the state at the time.

The charge frequently appeared that state institutions served only the section in which they were located or only more wealthy citizens.⁵¹ Except for higher and teacher education, however, the argument that the state had no business sponsoring institutions turned up rarely. Most Democrats simply insisted that Republican managers requested excessive sums which they wasted upon lavish furnishings and the preservation of their party's power. Referring on occasion to appropriation bills as "treasury grabbing implements" or "blood suckers" and commending the "grit" of those opposing them, the strongly partisan Springfield Register, harped constantly upon the extravagance theme. Noting that as much as one-third of the funds allowed state institutions went for salaries, it suggested these could be halved without impairing efficiency.⁵²

In April 1883 the Register warned that officers of state institutions were visiting the capital to secure appropriations that would eventually aid Senator John A. Logan's quest for the Republican presidential nomination. Democrats should "watch every item with vigilance," opposing any new requests and reducing the total of 1881. "Special attention should be paid to bills for constructing buildings and buying lands . . . ; [they would] be justified in resorting to any measure and parliamentary tactic to keep the appropriations down."⁵³

The impact of these recurring Democratic attacks on the House and Senate floor during the first two decades after the Civil War cannot be precisely measured. The most extreme of the proposed reductions, some clearly malevolent and spiteful, damaged the will and morale of the institutions' leadership even when they failed to pass. Unquestionably, too, in tapping so vigorously the pervasive desire for economy the Democratic strategy did reduce the sums that otherwise would have gone to the institutions. Yet, the party's success had limits; these stemmed both from its overall minority position and an

inability to enlist all Democrats in the campaign for reduced expenditures. Very simply, party bonds did not have enough strength to challenge those of locality.

Any Democrat with a state institution in his district would defend it with his vote and probably with his voice. This led to intraparty conflicts in the legislature and to strictures in the loyal Democratic press against the violation of party discipline and the supposed existence of "appropriations rings." A typical incident took place in the House on 27 May 1881 when Francis M. Youngblood, representing the district that contained Southern Illinois Normal University and "the leader of one of the [Democratic] factions," lashed out against those of his party who had just urged a cut in support for the southern normal. He "depreciated the attempt of some would-be leaders on the Democratic side of the House to array that party against the Normal Schools and the appropriations for state institutions" when "the sentiment of the masses . . . [adhering to the party] favored reasonable appropriations" for them. Those attacked then took the floor, denounced Youngblood's "brand of Democracy," charged him with excessive absenteeism and blamed the Republicans for the long session rather than their own harrasing tactics. "By this time considerable bad blood had been aroused on the Democratic side . . . by such a public washing of their party dirty linen, while the Republicans were enjoying the performance amazingly."⁵⁴

During the 1879 General Assembly, the Springfield Register editorialized that Democrats would "do well to oppose all appropriation bills" and expressed regret that "the vicious system of considering state institutions as merely machines to distribute the bounty of the state is so extensive that [even] some Democrats" took part in it.⁵⁵ In other words, they participated in the "rings" (a far more popular expression at the time than "log rolling") supposedly formed each session to secure appropriations for state institutions. Specu-

lation abounded on both the pervasiveness and morality of "rings." The Bloomington Pantagraph, with two state institutions in its immediate vicinity, presented a revealing discussing of the question in April 1871.

Most naturally the members representing various localities had the bills for . . . [nearby] institutions in their personal care. They knew most about them, and justly felt under obligations to look after them. How could it be otherwise than that they should gravitate together and vote for an interest which was really equally common to them and to the whole state [?]

The editorial continued, arguing that obviously men associated with one another in obedience to the interests of those who elected them; "if this was not right, true local representation is a humbug not worth contending for." Indeed, the representative "ought to take advantage of parliamentary tactics which lead to benefits for his constituents or he might as well have stayed home."⁵⁶

Democrats did not so much take exception to the idea of local representation as to the assumption that the whole state shared an interest in state sponsored institutions. Republicans, in fact, argued that many Democratic members with such institutions in their districts did not even demonstrate sufficient breadth of vision to join a "ring." Rather, their refrain ran, according to the title of an article in the Springfield Journal, "Economy for Others and Profuse Liberality for Ourselves." Two stories in a single column in the Democratic Bloomington Bulletin illustrated the situation perfectly; one gloated over \$50,000 denied the Elgin Insane hospital and another pleaded in "highly colored" language for \$15,000 to relieve crowded conditions at neighboring Illinois State Normal University.

Many Democratic papers and legislators from counties with state institutions behaved in the same way, anxious to establish an economy record for their party, but "ready to exercise the most . . . [abundant] generosity" toward interests at home. Once, in the midst of a tirade by Senator William P.

Callon, Democrat of Morgan County, against the Republicans' fiscal immoderation, a fellow senator under attack interrupted to point out the irony of such an indictment coming from a man whose county bloomed only because it possessed institutions for the insane, blind, and deaf and dumb and thus claimed almost half the funds dispensed from the state treasury each biennium. He could think of no logical reason why the people of that district would elect a Democrat of Callon's stripe except that former inmates, "in a measure recovered from their ailment [had] settled in the area and exercised the franchise."⁵⁷

Republicans and any others working for state institutions had a limited arsenal of weapons to draw upon. They employed satire and hyperbole when it seemed appropriate; sometimes they claimed the wealth, pride, and humaneness of Illinois demanded state institutions of top rank and forewarned that expenses for them would continue to increase. But these arguments left those back in the communities unmoved, and so the plea resorted to most often was for a "true economy," something ideally dependent upon thorough investigation and analysis and an attempt to balance the various interests' needs with the public's desire for economy. Invoked, all along the appropriation process, this completely subjective criterion came at each stage to have increasing emphasis simply upon economy until finally, in order to salvage something, those managing institutional appropriation bills often had to interrupt a barrage of debilitating amendments from the floor and themselves suggest further reductions as a compromise.⁵⁸

If, indeed, many elements in the state political process changed after 1890, one did not. The demand for economy remained. In years of prosperity and depression alike the call for stable or lower taxes, public salaries, and appropriations could always be heard. The Republican-controlled legislative steering committees concluded before the session got well underway in

1895 to permit no increase in spending; the next biennium the same group in the House decided to allow no appropriations for new buildings.⁵⁹

Certain legislators had a reputation for supporting low appropriations regardless of need. Senator Henry M. Dunlap of the state university's district once wrote President Draper that two of the three men on the Senate appropriations subcommittee to consider the university's bill were "close fisted economists of the kind that if you ask for \$50 they want you to get along with \$20 or \$25." He graciously promised to see about getting them shifted to the subcommittee on normal schools. In his memoirs, Illinois' turn-of-the-century governor, Richard Yates, remembered his administration as a "prosaic affair" that could best be summed up in one word -- "economy." Almost two decades later, paying homage to the same ideal, legislators denied the pleas of the state teachers' association for more state aid to schools saying, "taxes [are] up to their limit; any [thing] additional would be an unbearable burden." By this time, too, pressure groups strongly reinforced the predilections of penny-pinching representatives.⁶⁰

Yet, even in the face of such sentiment, state expenditures did increase in the 1890s and leaped forward after 1909. Obviously the state's swiftly expanding population meant more criminals and more dependants to be watched after. This cannot be the full explanation, though, for once it started upward, spending advanced much more rapidly than the population. Some individuals interested in more liberal public spending tried to break down the predominant practice of rating government on a rigid scale of highest marks for lowest expenditures. Although their impact is virtually impossible to measure, perhaps the multitude of statements akin to the following by State Superintendent of Public Instruction Francis Blair in 1912 had some impact: "a public tax is the greatest instrument ever devised by man to promote human welfare. It is a method of doing for my neighbor what I am under

obligation to do. . . ."61 But still, granting this, why did certain of the state's responsibilities enjoy quite substantial increases in funds while others received only modest increments?

IV

The best explanation can perhaps be found in a development Governor Altgeld discussed before the first meeting of the Illinois State Farmers' Institute Association in January 1896. They were living, the Governor asserted, in an age of consolidation, a period when many groups in society had concentrated their power in an effort to achieve goals particularly important to them. He warned farmers that while they might well retain old Democratic and Republican loyalties on strictly political questions, they were "twenty-five years behind the times" in failing to coalesce on issues significant to them all as a group. 62

Whether they learned the lesson from Altgeld or somewhere else, Illinois farmers went in about five years from utter ciphers to near dictators in state politics, and they did it without so much as a nod to the Populist Party. Instead they moved just as Altgeld had indicated they must, working through special interest groups, applying pressure upon the government in steady, determined, and increasingly sophisticated ways. A look at the State Dairy Association in the 1890's reveals how it slowly matured into a force of some consequence. The dairymen enjoyed a bit of an advantage over their fellow agriculturists since the organization of their industry aligned them sharply with some businessmen, the creamery operators and commission men, and against other businessmen, the oleomargarine manufacturers. Thus they could learn from the inside how more experienced political manipulators went about their work.

Reports presented at the Association's annual meetings indicate that in 1891 a margarine labeling law failed because many "farmer legislators" lacked information on the great injury the margarine industry worked on the dairy interest. Four years later the Association wanted state dairy inspectors and

it cooperated with the Elgin Board of Trade and the Chicago Produce Exchange in trying to secure them. All three organizations had representatives in Springfield, the Produce Exchange alone keeping between two and three there most of the session. They met with the Governor and the agriculture and appropriations committees in both houses; they spent a large sum distributing literature, including 2,500 circular letters from the Dairy Association. Again, however, the favored bill met defeat, this time supposedly the consequence of too few letters from dairymen to their representatives and "gold" being "sent down" by the opposition.⁶³

The 1897 Association meeting featured an address by W. H. Thurston, editor of the Farmers' Review, on how the organization could become ". . . a Power in the State." Until then, he felt, the membership had been too small and too concentrated in the northern section of the state. In the future dairymen ought to seek members in every one of Illinois's 2,600 towns and to pursue only two broad objectives: an "extension of dairy knowledge and [the] obtaining [of] wise legislation along dairy lines The Association would then be really representative of the dairy interests of the state, and any appropriation needed for its work could be obtained."⁶⁴

In 1889 the General Assembly finally passed legislation controlling the oleomargarine industry although within less than a year the state supreme court declared it unconstitutional. Even so, Senator Aspinwall of Freeport, appeared at the 1900 Dairymen's convention to congratulate them on a good attempt, and, in passing, to make some observations on the operation of the political system. Assuring them of the "marvelous" work they had done, he indicated with his hands how high his stack of mail from dairymen reached. "Those of us at Springfield enacting legislation for your benefit, we are there as your servants, and when you desire certain legislation you are likely to get what you want." Toward the end of his remarks Aspinwall made the same point

Altgeld had: "It don't [sic] make any difference whether the State is democrat or republican . . .," needed legislation would always pass.⁶⁵

Early in the twentieth century innumerable groups got together, much as had the Dairymen, to make their voices heard. Another senator reported that during the 1903 session, representatives of reform groups "crowded the hotels" and "consumed with their eloquence more than half . . . the time . . ." of the committees." The legislators, regardless of party, faction, or even a penchant for corruption, tended to react more positively toward someone speaking for a constituency, and the best way to demonstrate this was with large quantities of supporting letters. The legislature, after all, did almost no creative work; it responded or "served" as Senator Aspinwall would have it. Besides needing a constituency, an advocate of legislation had to keep constantly alert to developments at the capital, and, most importantly, give the appearance of speaking for everyone interested in a particular question. Time and again the absence of unity allowed legislators to argue the futility of acting when those most involved in an issue could not decide among themselves on the best solution.⁶⁶

Of course the nature of some issues, such as the total appropriations each biennium, precluded any chance for unity. Then the interest groups clashed head on, pitting their strength and tactical ingenuity against one another. A fine example of this type of conflict, which developed rapidly after 1900, occurred in 1921. The Illinois Manufacturers' Association that year set itself firmly against any tax increase while the Illinois State Teachers' Association announced as its major goal a multi-million dollar expansion in state aid to public schools. When the I.M.A. organized a rally at the capital for early May, the I.S.T.A. countered with a similar demonstration, drawing not only upon its own membership, but cooperating with the Chicago Teachers' Federation, which donated \$6,000 for the affair, the Illinois Federation of Women's Clubs,

the Illinois P.T.A., the Rotary, the Lions, the Chicago Women's Club, and the Women's City Club. With over 600 school children, teachers, and friends, they paraded to the statehouse where their spokesmen interviewed Governor Len Small. Later, after their banquet, about two hundred of the education partisans went over to the I.M.A. meeting site for a confrontation and some heckling. In the end, as might be expected, the legislature approved an increase in school aid somewhere between the I.M.A. and I.S.T.A. recommendations.⁶⁷

The emergence of numerous organizations in the mid 1890s and after and their pursuit of various objectives through the state legislature did not alone push state spending steadily upward. The appropriation process itself changed significantly about the time these new groups began presenting their demands. The argument has been made that this process had helped keep state expenditures static throughout most of the nineteenth century; by the twentieth, however, it had begun performing precisely the opposite function. For years those Democratic attacks on the floor of both houses had taken their toll on spending bills, at the least intimidating reviewing committees and sometimes actually forcing reductions. These forays slowed in the 1880s and then disappeared entirely during the next decade.⁶⁸ The reasons for this are not altogether clear, but there is evidence that many Democrats in the legislature changed their attitudes toward state institutions in the early 1890s as a consequence of Governor Altgeld's leadership and his appointment of party members to many of the institutions' boards of control. After 1896, as the importance of party in state politics continued to decline and Democrats could elect only skeleton crews to the legislature, the attacks never recurred. From then on bills appropriating millions of dollars customarily came to the floor in the closing days of each session and passed on both the second and third readings without a murmur of dissent or discussion.⁶⁹

The absence of debate meant that the appropriations committees in the House and Senate controlled the fate of money bills since they were always the last to consider them. In 1899 after the House committee had cut an item from the state university's bill, President Draper reminded a wifed trustee how "idle" it would be to attempt overruling the committee on the House floor. Several years later when alumni were writing in behalf of another University bill, two received letters from House members attesting to the committee's power, the most emphatic stating, "On all matters of appropriations, the Committee on Appropriations of the house has absolute authority. I know of no instance in which the house has not followed the suggestions of this committee."⁷⁰

Of course, a number of other committees continued to concern themselves, at least indirectly, with funds going to meet the state's commitments. For instance, beginning in the early 1880s a joint committee visited all state educational institutions and others checked into charitable and penal work. Yet their reports, when submitted at all, were commonly tardy, cursory, and poorly written, and sometimes openly deferential to the appropriations committee. In short, they had no discernible effect.⁷¹

That the appropriations committees gained new authority did not necessarily dictate a rise in spending, although, admittedly, anyone seeking funds could concentrate attention there without worrying so much about the rest of the legislature. The important question here is how seriously the committees inspected requests and how hard they tried to hold back spending. The writer knows of only two studies that examine the Illinois appropriations process in the early twentieth century before its transformation by the 1917 Civil Administrative Code Act; the more valuable is an obscure staff report apparently done in late 1915 for the state's Efficiency and Economy Committee. Betraying

a strong bias in favor of rigid economy, it laid all blame for Illinois's mounting expenditures upon the appropriations process. Aside from this, the report provides a useful analysis that can be confirmed at a number of points by other sources.⁷²

For the most part legislators from districts with state institutions continued after 1900 to act as their advocates in Springfield. They introduced the appropriations bills drafted by institutional leaders and tried to get them through intact. The motives for this remained about the same as in the nineteenth century: constituents looked upon the institutions as assets to the locality, and the winning of requested support helped a legislator establish a reputation as an effective representative, something obviously useful at election time. As a consequence of such close identification with a particular institution, however, assemblymen had to be quite circumspect in criticizing appropriations for anything else lest they invite retribution against their own pets.⁷³

The appropriations committees, always maintaining a tight schedule in order to dispatch their work, appeared to one observer as the only part of the whole legislature with any effective leadership.⁷⁴ This they indeed had, but hardly a leadership that fostered serious review or revision of money bills. In the first place, legislators diligently sought appointment to these powerful committees, and in time this led to their becoming quite unwieldy, the House committee in 1915 numbering forty-three and the Senate forty, or almost eighty percent of the latter body. All information came from two sources, testimony before the committees by those interested in pending bills and appropriations subcommittee reports. Working without a staff, these subcommittees, which first appeared in the late 1890's, usually sloughed their assignments, sometimes because a bill's sponsor served on them, sometimes simply because members lacked the necessary time, interest, or experience to do

a thorough job. Likewise, testimony before the whole committee rarely provided the type of information needed to make intelligent decisions. This mattered little, however, since chairmen habitually scheduled meetings at times conflicting with the work of other committees and happily conducted business with only a handful of members present.⁷⁵

The staff report of the Efficiency and Economy Committee detailed with indignation the ways in which this "chaotic" system allowed aggressive leaders of state institutions, "sometimes selected for their political prowess," so many opportunities to win "unwarranted" appropriations. No one seemed to care what the total expenditures for a biennium would be or how a particular institution had expended funds in the past. Although surely an unsympathetic chairman would not have permitted it, poorly attended appropriations committee meetings reportedly enabled a few members especially friendly towards and institution to "stack" a session and thus assure endorsement of its original fund requests, even if, by some rare chance, a subcommittee had offered criticism.⁷⁶ Others shared this general interpretation. The head of a charitable institution testified that "the best mixer got the best appropriations." A statement in 1918 by David Felmley, President of Illinois State Normal University, suggests the most potent combination to have been a politically astute institutional head backed by strong group support: "the money received by different institutions. . . [has] been largely determined by the amount of influence . . . [they] could bring to bear upon members of the legislature; consequently the institution in this state with the best organization has been enabled to secure appropriations altogether out of proportion to its needs."⁷⁷

Although the General Assembly had once readily accepted the duty of watching total state spending, this changed in the twentieth century. As governors began asserting themselves more decisively in the legislative process after 1900, they steadily took over budgetary responsibilities. Many

gubernatorial candidates made the rapid rise in government costs their leading campaign issue, so naturally the press and public felt justified in taking them to task for not correcting the condition. Governor Edward G. Dunne, under attack on just this count, protested in late 1915 that the only instrument available to him for controlling expenditures was the veto which both he and his immediate predecessors had used quite freely. Finding this weapon too blunt, Dunne had tried to refine it by broadly interpreting the constitutional amendment permitting item vetoes as also including the power to reduce specific appropriations. Unfortunately the state supreme court had just invalidated this practice. Clearly perturbed, Dunne argued that governors could satisfy the public's expectations only if given more authority, perhaps even power to propose appropriation bills.⁷⁸ Dunne's suggestion put him very much in step with the burgeoning nation-wide movement toward centralization and consolidation in government, a movement that had been gathering force in Illinois for many years.⁷⁹

One can discover numerous proposals in post Civil War Illinois designed to centralize authority and make government more efficient. The actual adoption of legislation in pursuance of this goal did not come in significant measure, however, until late in the first decade of the twentieth century. In 1909 the State Board of Administration replaced individual governing boards of the state charities; the next General Assembly reorganized the prison system and put the state under the most inclusive civil service law in the nation. Progress in this direction continued in 1913 with legislation consolidating authority over utilities, roads, fish and game, and establishing an eight-man legislative committee on efficiency and economy in government.⁸⁰

This committee, aided by a staff of political scientists drawn primarily from the state university, produced within two years a hefty volume of background papers and recommendations as well as drafts of implementing legislation.

Embodied with some modifications in the Civil Administration Code Act of 1917, the committee's proposals radically altered the organization of state government. Prevailing administrative theory emphasized "scientific" or "business" methods which enlarged executive department powers and put them more securely under the governor's direction. The Code legislation eliminated over 100 boards, commissions, and other agencies, and instead located most governmental functions within nine departments, the directors of which received appointment from the governor and reported to him. ⁸¹

Naturally the allocation process underwent substantial modification. State institutions within one of the Code Departments could no longer write and work for their own financial legislation. Fund requests went not to the General Assembly but to the Director of Finance who aided the governor in drawing up a detailed budget for each biennium. In the early years of the Code's operation the executive branch struck rabidly at any institutional attempts to overthrow the governor's recommendations by appealing over his head to the legislature. Decried as enclaves of parochialism, both the General Assembly and individual boards of control suffered eclipse; the first being reduced to merely criticizing the executive's budgetary work, the second simply passing from the scene with a solitary exception. Only the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois remained free and unhampered, outside the Code's authority. ⁸²

V

The major objectives of this discussion have been to analyze the shifting political milieu which surrounded and conditioned all of Illinois' educational endeavors in the half century after 1870 and to demonstrate, by way of the extended case study presented, the value of such an approach for understanding the development of public education at every level. Knowledge of the conditioning environment allows one to distinguish more effectively the reasons why state

sponsored education took shape as it did. By establishing how the political system operated and what it would permit at particular times, the researcher can assess the strategy, skill, and objectives of education's spokesmen with increased precision and confidence.

NOTES

1. Samuel K. Gove and Barbara Whiteside Solomon, "The Politics of Higher Education: A Bibliographic Essay," Journal of Higher Education, XXXIX (April 1968), 181-95; Samuel K. Gove and Carol Everly Floyd, "Research on Higher Education Administration and Policy: An Uneven Report," Public Administration Review, 35 (January-February 1975), 111-18. In the latter the authors observe that "research on the state governmental and political environment in which the public university operates is less well developed than is research on the university as a formal organization." (p. 111).
2. S. K. Bailey, R. T. Frost, P. E. Marsh, and R. C. Wood, Schoolmen and Politics: A Study of State Aid to Education in the Northeast (Syracuse, N.Y., 1962), see especially pp. 13, 29, 104.
3. Laurence Iannaccone, Politics in Education (New York, 1967).
4. Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), Thomas R. Dye, "Government Structure, Urban Environment and Educational Policy," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 11 (August 1967), 353-80, Ira Sharkansky, Spending in the American States (Chicago, 1968), and especially Harmon Zeigler and Karl F. Johnson, The Politics of Education in the States (Indianapolis, 1972). Writing on "The Politics of American Education," [in Review of Research in Education, Vol. I, (eds.) Fred N. Kerlinger and John B. Carroll (Itasca, Ill, 1974)] Paul E. Peterson finds this literature "far from satisfactory, for it has . . . severe methodological and conceptual difficulties." See pp. 369-71; the quotation is at p. 371.
5. N. A. Masters, R. H. Salisbury, and T. H. Eliot. State Politics and the Public Schools: An Exploratory Analysis (New York, 1964). Salisbury was primarily responsible for the portion on Missouri; Illinois and Michigan are also treated in this volume.
6. Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Illinois, . . . (Springfield, 1870), I, 759 as quoted in Ernest L. Bogart and John M. Mathews, The Modern Commonwealth, 1893-1918, The Centennial History of Illinois, V (Chicago, 1922), 221.
7. Niels J. Debel, The Veto Power of the Governor of Illinois, University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, VI, Nos. 1 & 2 (Urbana, 1917), 87; A. L. Rowen, "Personal Reminiscences of Joseph W. Fifer, An Interview with the Former Governor and a Description of His Times," Illinois Blue Book, 1925-26 (Springfield, 1925), 295.
8. Chicago papers were undoubtedly harsher and more merciless in their allegations than those in other sections of the state, though the latter rarely defended the legislature. Downstate papers, unlike the Chicago press, did sometimes argue that Illinois's legislatures compared favorably with those in other states. For instances of this see the Bloomington Pantagraph, 20 February 1871, 9 April 1872, and 5 May 1873; also the Illinois State Journal throughout January 1899. Some reporters seem

- actually to have tried deliberately to antagonize the General Assembly, but few succeeded as well as Frank E. Nevins of the Chicago Tribune. In April 1879 the House, in a fit of rage and frustration, had him arrested and imprisoned for refusing to identify his source for charging the existence of wide-ranging corruption in their body. Others surely made more enemies than friends with columns that candidly described such matters as the lawmakers' appearance, speaking ability, and general effectiveness. Bloomington Pantagraph, 1,3,6,14 February 1871, 11, 24 February 1874, 26 January 1876.
9. 1 March 1871.
 10. As quoted in the Bloomington Pantagraph, 20 March 1875.
 11. Chicago Tribune, 10 March 1869.
 12. Ibid. 14 February 1879, 12 March 1881, 6 June 1885; Paul A. Reinsch, ed., Readings on American State Government (New York, 1911), 77; C. S. Raymond, "Lorimer Scandals," American Magazine, 70 (September 1910), 570-84.
 13. Chicago Tribune, 18 February 1883; Illinois State Journal, 23, 26 May 1883, hereinafter Springfield Journal; Chicago Tribune 2,3,4, 16 May 1895 as cited in Harvey Wish, "Altgeld and the Progressive Tradition," American Historical Review, XLVI (July 1941), 825.
 14. Ed Buritt Smith, "Street Railway Legislation in Illinois," Atlantic Monthly, XCIII (January 1904), 109-18, Charles C. Russell, "What Are You Going to Do About It? The Jackpot in the Illinois Legislature," Cosmopolitan, XLIX (September 1910), 366-78, as cited in Ralph A. Straetz, "The Progressive Movement in Illinois, 1910-1916," (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Illinois, 1951), 24.
 15. Straetz, "Progressive Movement in Illinois," 22; C. S. Raymond, "Lorimer Scandals," 583, reported that "jack-pot" participants received between \$500 and \$20,000 per session.
 16. 17 April 1875.
 17. 11 April 1885.
 18. 26 April 1877; see also Springfield Journal, 6 May 1879 and 16 April 1885.
 19. Springfield Journal, 11 April 1885.
 20. Of 361 bills that negotiated both houses in 1921, 315 received final passage in the closing 72 hours during which the legislature was almost continuously in session. During the 1923 General Assembly almost 40 percent of all movement on legislation took place in the last two weeks of the term. Shelby Singleton, "Illinois Legislative Session of 1921," American Political Science Review, XV (November 1921), 582-91; Leonard D. White, "Legislative Process in Illinois," National Municipal Review, XII (November 1923), 712-19.

21. Bloomington Pantagraph, 18 March 1871; Springfield Journal, 29 May 1883, 1 April 1885; Illinois State Register, 19 May 1883, hereinafter Springfield Register.
22. Bloomington Pantagraph, 14 February 1871, 28 January 1869.
23. Brand Whitlock, Forty Years of It (New York, 1914), 96; see the Springfield Journal, 30 May 1881 for a similar description.
24. Francis W. Parker, "A State Legislature Seen from Within," Christendom, I (27 June 1903), 493. The Chicago attorney and state senator who authored this useful eight part series was unique in that he took time to record his impressions of the legislative system. Also, based on a reading of incoming presidential correspondence at the University of Illinois, he seems to have been the only legislator who ever wrote in advance of a session for material that would enable him "to properly consider any such business as may be likely to come before the legislature. . . with regard to. . . [the] University." Parker to A. S. Draper, Draper Papers, 12 August 1902, 2/4/1, Box 13, University of Illinois Archives, hereinafter UIA.
25. 28 January 1869; Springfield Register; 26 April 1882.
26. Stratz, "Progressive Movement in Illinois," 192.
27. 12 January, 21 February 1871.
28. Bogart and Thompson, Industrial State, 118.
29. Springfield Register, 21 May 1879; A. Lawrence Lowell, "The Influence of Party Upon Legislation in England and America," Annual Report of the American Historical Association, 1901, (Washington, 1902), I, 338-39. Lowell labeled as a "party vote" only those on which 90% of each party took different sides.
30. Springfield Register, 2, 4 January 1899; Springfield Journal, 4, 5 January 1899; Paul S. Reinsch, American Legislatures and Legislative Methods (New York, 1907), 242.
31. Straetz, "Progressive Movement in Illinois," 46, 427; George Fitch, "Politics in Illinois," Colliers, LIV (24 October 1914), 21, 22; Robert C. Moore, "The Legislative Campaign," Illinois Teacher, X (September 1921), 5; Howard P. Castle, "Executive Usurpation in Illinois," Assembly Bulletin, V (August 1921), 3-5; White, "Legislative Process in Illinois," 716; Reinsch, American Legislatures, 238.
32. Chicago Tribune, 31 March, 12 April 1875; Reinsch, State Government, 74, 75; Parker, "Legislature from Within," (2 May 1903), 98.
33. A. S. Draper to H. M. Dunlap, 27 March 1899, Draper Papers, 2/4/1, Box 4, UIA; Parker, "Legislature from Within," (20 June 1903), 442, 443; Reinsch, American Legislatures, 257; "Introduction: Report of the Efficiency and Economy Committee. . .," Senate Journal (1919), 1769.

34. Parker, "Legislature from Within," (27 June 1903), 494; White, "Legislative Process in Illinois," 717-19.
35. 25 May 1877.
36. Lucy Flower to A. S. Draper, 14 March 1895, Draper Papers, 2/4/1, Box 5, UIA; Parker, "Legislature from Within," (27 June 1903), 496; Assembly Bulletin, I, (21 June 1915).
37. Robert Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York, 1967), 4-6.
38. Alexander McLean to A. S. Draper, 28 February 1895, Draper Papers, 2/4/1, Box 11, UIA; statement by Elijah Haines quoted in the Springfield Register, 15 April 1885.
39. Arthur C. Cole The Era of the Civil War, 1848-1870, The Centennial History of Illinois, III (Springfield, 1922), 91-92; "Biennial Message of Governor Shelby Cullom, January 5, 1881," Illinois Reports (1881), I, A3; Robert E. Ankli, "Agricultural Growth in Antebellum Illinois," Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society, LXII (Winter 1970), 390; Springfield Journal, 28 January 1873.
40. "Third Biennial Report of the Board of Commissioners of Public Charities," Illinois Reports (1875), II, 45; Springfield Journal, 17 March 1873; "Inaugural Message of Governor Shelby M. Cullom," Illinois Reports (1877), I, Part I, 314 for a similar estimate of the per capita cost of state government.
41. Springfield Register, 5 January 1881; Champaign County Gazette, 15 February 1871; Illinois State Farmers' Association, Proceedings, Second Annual Meeting (n.p., 1873), 101; see also Solon J. Buck, The Granger Movement. . . 1870-1880 (Cambridge, Mass., 1913), 94.
42. Bloomington Pantagraph, 12 March 1877; "Third Biennial Report of the Board of Charities," Illinois Reports (1875), II, 46.
43. Report of the Efficiency and Economy Committee. . . (Chicago, 1915), 1050, 1051; John A. Fairlie, "Taxation in Illinois," American Economic Review, I (September 1911), 530.
44. "Second Biennial Report of the Board of Charities," Illinois Reports, (1873), III, 147; "Third Biennial Report of the Board of Charities," Ibid. (1875) II, 14; "Fourth Biennial Report of the Board of Charities," Ibid. (1877) II, Part I, 11-13, 23.
45. "Second Biennial Report of the Board of Charities," Ibid. (1873), III, 145-46.
46. "Third Biennial Report of the Board of Charities," Ibid. (1875), II, 46.
47. Article V, Section 6 of the 1870 Illinois constitution, under which the state operated for just over one hundred years, did not contain the word "budget" but did provide that the Governor at the commencement of each regular session "present estimates of the amount of money required to be raised by taxation for all purposes."

48. The statement regarding the nature of 'governors' budgets and their attitudes toward state institutions is based on a reading of their biennial messages to the General Assembly from 1860 to 1920. These can be found in Illinois Reports and the Journals of the House and Senate.
49. See the Bloomington Pantagraph, 26 February 1875 on the legislature's antipathy for the Board of Charities.
50. Bloomington Pantagraph, 12 March 1875.
51. Springfield Register, 15 April 1885 on the insane hospitals.
52. Ibid., 28 May, 21 May 1881, 18 September 1880.
53. Springfield Register, 12, 14 April 1883.
54. Springfield Journal, 28 May 1881; Springfield Register, 28 May 1881.
55. Springfield Register, 21 May 1879.
56. Bloomington Pantagraph, 5 April 1871; see the Springfield Journal 24 March 1873 for another editorial on "rings" which stressed the word's ubiquity and confirmed to the necessity of "combinations" for the passage of legislation.
57. Springfield Journal, 14 May 1881; Bloomington Pantagraph, 14 April 1879.
58. Springfield Journal, 17 March 1873; Bloomington Pantagraph, 1 March 1877, 25 May 1881; "Biennial Message of Governor Richard Oglesby, January 5, 1887," Illinois Reports (1887), I, A25; "Biennial Message of Governor Richard Oglesby, January 9, 1889," Ibid. (1889) I, A19; "Biennial Message of Governor Shelby Cullom, January 3, 1883," Ibid. (1883), I, A2.
59. Orange Judd Farmer, 16 February 1895, 166; Nelson W. Graham to A. S. Draper, 15 February 1895, Draper Papers, 2/4/1, Box 6, UIA; Eugene Davenport to H. B. Gurler and others, 12 May 1897, Dean's Letterbooks, 8/1/1, Box 3, UIA.
60. Richard Yates, Serving the Republic, John H. Krenkel (ed.), (Danville, Ill., 1968), 111. The quotation concerning legislators opposition to higher taxes in 1917 is from Robert C. Moore's testimony before the education committee of the 1920 Constitutional Convention. Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention. . . , compiled by William S. Gray, et. al. (Springfield, 1922), 556. Moore was then secretary of the Illinois State Teachers' Association.
61. Francis G. Blair, "Editorial," Educational Press Bulletin (June 1912), no pagination.
62. Report of the Illinois Farmers' Institute, 1896 (Springfield, 1896), 17-20.

- 63. Illinois State Dairymen's Association, Annual Report, 1892 (Springfield, 1892), 182; Ibid., 1895 (Springfield, 1895), 23, 276; Ibid., 1896 (Springfield, 1896), 100, 132-38.
- 64. Ibid., 1897 (Springfield, 1897), 202-05; for a similarly expansive notion of how an organization might increase its power and influence see the remarks of the Rev. Jenkin Lloyd Jones, president of the Illinois Conference of Charities (founded November, 1896), at that group's 1898 annual meeting. Fifteenth Biennial Report of the Board of State Commissioners of Public Charities... (Springfield, 1899), 326.
- 65. Illinois State Dairymen's Association, Annual Report, 1900 (Elgin, 1900), 153-54.
- 66. Parker, "Legislature from Within," (25 July 1903), 663-65; Reinsch, American Legislatures, 253, 276-77, 282; for evidence that reform groups generally understood these groundrules see Fifteenth Biennial Report of the Board of State Commissioners of Charities..., 319, 321, and Sixteenth Biennial Report of the Board of State Commissioners of Public Charities... (Springfield, 1900), 262.
- 67. Illinois Teacher, IX (May 1921), 114-16.
- 68. This generalization about attacks from the floor of the legislature is based upon an examination of House and Senate Journals for the period.
- 69. Parker, "Legislature from Within," (27 June 1903), 295; "Introduction: Report of the Efficiency and Economy Committee...", 1763. Finley F. Bell, "The Illinois Budget," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, LXII (November 1915), 76.
- 70. A. S. Draper to Lucy Flower, 7 April 1899, Draper Papers, 2/4/3, Box 4, UIA; Rep. Franklin S. Catlin to Avery Brundage, 17 May 1913, Rep. Isaac S. Rothchild to Lorado Taft, 17 May 1913 both in James Papers, 2/5/3, Box 30, UIA.
- 71. This statement is founded upon a general impression gained from the legislative journals and a reading of the Joint Committee to visit Educational Institutions "Reports" over a forty year period. Confirmation of this view may be found in Bogart and Mathews, The Modern Commonwealth, 316. For deference to the appropriations committees see especially the Committee to Visit Educational Institutions, "Report," House Journal (1895), 552.
- 72. Bell, "The Illinois Budget," 73-85; the more valuable is "Introduction: Report of the Efficiency and Economy Committee...", 1753-1825. On 20 June 1919, just as the session drew to a close, Senator Walter I. Manny, the man who had headed the Efficiency and Economy Committee, noted that an examination of the House and Senate Journals revealed the above portion of the Committee's Report had never been presented to the General Assembly. The reason becomes clear enough upon reading the document; the intensely critical attitude toward the legislature might easily have fostered a sufficiently strong reaction to endanger adoption of the Civil Administrative Code Act implementing the Committee's major recommendations. See Senate Journal (1919), 1753.

73. "Introduction: Report of the Efficiency and Economy Committee. . .," 1776, 1775; Parker, "Legislature from Within," (20 June 1903), 441.
74. White, "Legislative Process in Illinois," 718.
75. Senate Journal (1897), 292; "Introduction: Report of the Efficiency and Economy Committee. . .," 1768-69; Bell, "The Illinois Budget," 74, 79.
76. "Introduction: Report of the Efficiency and Economy Committee. . .," 1763, 1767, 1768, 1774.
77. Bell, "The Illinois Budget," 75; Felmley to F. W. Shepardson, 27 December 1918, Felmley Papers, Illinois State University Archives; see confirmation of Felmley's point in Assembly Bulletin; II (October 1917), 3.
78. Paris (Illinois) Beacon, 25 June 1913, filed in E. J. James Papers, "Clippings File," UJA; Debel, Veto Power, 87, 88, 119-24; House and Senate Journals, First and Second Special Sessions (1915-16), 8.
79. Samuel P. Hays, "Social Analysis of American Political History, 1880-1920," Political Science Quarterly, 80 (September 1965), 383.
80. Bogart and Mathews, The Modern Commonwealth, 279; John A. Fairlie, "The Illinois Legislature of 1913," Journal of Political Economy, XXI (December 1913), 937. In 1913 the legislature also asked the newly formed legislative reference bureau to prepare a detailed budget for the next biennium which would compare institutional requests with previous allocations; the next General Assembly did pare some appropriation bills but total spending continued its upward climb. Bell, "The Illinois Budget," 79-82; John A. Fairlie, "Budget Methods in Illinois," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, LXII (November 1915), 88-90.
81. Frank O. Lowden, "Problems of Civil Administration in Illinois," North American Review, 210 (August 1919), 186..
82. Walter F. Dodd, "Illinois Legislature of 1917," American Political Science Review, XI (November 1917), 713; Bell, "The Illinois Budget," 83-84.

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