ABSTRACT
              Four theoretical approaches to moral/citizenship
education are described and compared. Positive and negative aspects
of the cognitive-decision, developmental, prosocial, and values
approaches are discussed and ways of relating the four approaches to
each other are suggested. The first approach, cognitive-decision, is
distinctive for its examination of the concept of practical reason.
It includes claims about morality and offers a specific moral/civil
theory based upon liberty, dignity, equality, and fairness. It
maintains that the objective of moral/citizenship education is to
instruct students in the nature of making moral and civic decisions.
The second approach, developmental, favors a moral theory which
maintains that there exists a set of sequential and irreversible
moral stages through which human beings go and that students must be
guided to higher stages until they reach rational autonomy. The third
approach, the prosocial, stresses research on specific kinds of
altruistic behavior and alteration of student behavior in a prosocial
direction. The fourth approach, values, focuses upon helping students
become aware of and act upon their values, although there is
significant disagreement among proponents of this approach whether or
not any set of values might be good or bad in a moral sense.
References are included in the document. (Author/DB)

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THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO MORAL/CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

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I

At the National Conference on Planning for Moral/Citizenship
Education,[1] there was a remarkable emphasis given to the theoretical
aspects of moral/citizenship education. The emphasis was given
not to show respect to theorists in the field but to see if they
have provided a foundation on which research and program planning
in the area might rest. To this end the Conference discussed what
it took to be four different theoretical approaches, which it
labeled "Cognitive-Decision," "Developmental," "Prosocial," and
"Values." The Conference concentrated on these 1) because of
their impact (as measured by publications, research, and develop-
ment of instructional materials) and 2) because of their being
nonsectarian and, insofar, compatible with public education legal
requirements.[2]

The Cognitive-Decision Approach has its proponents mainly
among philosophers, e.g., R.S. Peters,[3] John Wilson,[4] and Jerrold
R. Coombs[5]; whereas the other theories have had their proponents
among psychologists---the Developmental Approach being advocated by
Lawrence Kohlberg and his associates,[6] the Prosocial Approach being

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urged by Ervin Staub[7] and others, and the Values Approach being
maintained by Louis E. Raths,[8] Milton Rokeach,[9] and others. The
Conference, however, did not find that this split between philo-
sophical and psychological authors created an intellectual chasm.
After all, it observed that the Cognitive-Decision Approach has
made some psychological claims and the other approaches have made
some philosophical claims. Nevertheless, the Conference did not
pretend that the four approaches do not have serious differences
among themselves. While the Conference did not attempt to specify
these differences, it did conclude that an issue for those con-
cerned with the theoretical aspects of moral/citizenship education
is to determine if and how the four approaches might be interre-
lated so that the strengths of one might complement the respective
strengths of the others.[10] This was not the only issue which the
Conference raised for those interested in the theoretical aspects
of moral/citizenship education, but it was the one whose resolution
would affect the answer to at least one of the other issues.

II

To locate the strengths, as well as the weaknesses, of the
various approaches, one will do well to look at the general tenets
of each of them. The Cognitive-Decision Approach includes certain
claims about morality.[11] A moral act is a rationally justifiable

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act. A rationally justified act is one determined by a rational decision, which is a decision that logically follows from a set of practical premises. A set of practical premises consists of statements of two sorts, factual and normative. Factual statements are descriptions or explanations of what exists while normative statements are either rules or principles. In this context a rule prescribes a specific course of action while a principle simply asserts a standard for justifying one or more rules.[12] How principles may be justified is not generally settled. Some philosophers argue that principles may be justified by the concept of self-interest[13] or that of action,[14] whereas others contend that principles may be justified by appeals to a way of life.[15] In any event, Cognitive-Decision theorists usually agree upon such principles as liberty, dignity, equality, and fairness.[16] According to the Cognitive-Decision Approach, then, the objective of moral/citizenship education is to instruct students in the nature of making moral/civil decisions, to help them learn how to discover and justify moral/civil principles and rules, to help develop in them a disposition to locate and consider facts related to possible actions, and to help engender in them the attitudes requisite for acting upon rational decisions. While learning to act rationally is not one and the same as citizenship education, it is central to such education in modern Western democracies.

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For the Developmental Approach morality is profoundly, though
not completely, concerned with thinking about what one should do.
The courses of action which a person might entertain are contin-
gent mainly upon his psychological equipment and the historical
milieu in which he lives. The principles and rules which a person
follows in deciding what to do are typically, if not always, prod-
ucts of the culture in which he lives. But the standpoint from
which a person views a principle or rule--whether from the stand-
point of self-interest, social authority, rational autonomy, or
whatever--is a function of a social-psychological stage in which he
is when he considers the principle or rule. A social-psychological
stage shaping one's view of principles and rules is a moral stage.
According to the Developmental Approach there is evidence which
indicates that there is a set of sequential and irreversible moral
stages through which human beings might go.[17] In the early stages
principles and rules are looked upon from the position of self-
interest; in the middle stages they are seen from the stance of
social authority; and in the late stages they are regarded from
the standpoint of rational autonomy. The members of some cultures
develop no farther than the middle stages, but some members of
other cultures do develop through the late stages. The task of
moral education, consequently, is to guide a student from the
moral stage in which he presently is to the next stage until he

has reached the highest development pertinent to him. In a modern
Western democracy rational autonomy seems appropriate as an ideal,
if not a realistic, goal of moral development.

Rather than relying upon a distinctive theory of morality
or citizenship, the Prosocial Approach is concerned with only
selected aspects of them; for it is primarily interested in pro-
social behavior, i.e., any behavior that benefits another person.[18]
Thus, it addresses behavior which is altruistic but not that which
is significant for just oneself; and it speaks to impulsive, con-
scious-stricken, rational, and law-abiding behaviors only as they
benefit second parties. While the Prosocial Approach is not con-
cerned with all facets of morality and citizenship, it has under-
taken empirical research highly pertinent to moral/citizenship
education. It has investigated the prosocial importance of
traditional socializing conditions, e.g., affection, reasoning,
and modeling. It has inquired into the motivations of prosocial
behavior. And it has explored the question of whether or not a
person who behaves prosocially in given contexts will behave pro-
socially in other contexts. At any rate, an objective of moral/
citizenship education, according to the Prosocial Approach, is to
alter the behavior of students in a prosocial direction. This
objective is agreeable to modern Western democracy although it is
not especially relevant to it.

The Values Approach, by contrast, focuses upon what it takes to be the central fact of moral and civil life: values. Through and from his experiences, this approach claims, a human being normally acquires guides of his behavior. These guides may take the forms of purposes, attitudes, feelings, beliefs, and other psychological factors; and they may be consciously held or not. For the Values Approach a value is any psychological factor of any person which tends to direct some of his behavior.[19] The proponents of the Values Approach noticeably disagree among themselves as to whether or not any value or any set of values of a person might be good or bad in a moral sense, but many of the proponents do agree that the set of values held by a person should be internally consistent. For the Values Approach the objective of moral/citizenship education is to help a student to become conscious of his values at a given time, to help him clarify whatever values he holds at a given point, and to prepare him to live deliberately and fully by the values which he has at a given moment. This purpose, though compatible with modern Western democracy, is not distinctively related to it.

The Cognitive-Decision Approach offers several advantages. 1) Through its careful analysis of justifiable action, this Approach offers a clarification of practical reason, which seems relevant to any comprehensive account of morality and which seems ingredient to standard accounts of citizenship in modern Western

democracies. 2) While the Cognitive-Decision Approach concentrates upon the concept of justifiable action, it does not separate the concept from other factors of morality; rather, it develops the concept as the keystone of a type of moral/civil theory, viz., one that centers around rational autonomy.[20] Thus, it provides those interested in moral/citizenship education a needed theoretical structure. 3) The educational proposals of the Cognitive-Decision Approach are likely to displease some members of the scholastic and political establishments; for, by emphasizing the place of reason within moral/citizenship education, they might be subject to charges of secularism and elitism. Nevertheless, the proposals are in keeping with the modern Western democratic tradition, which stresses the importance, in moral and civil affairs, of the individual's ability to act rationally. The proposals, then, are likely at least to make sense to the members of the scholastic and political establishments. Despite these advantages the Cognitive-Decision Approach has a pair of weaknesses. First, it has given but cursory attention to the moral development of students. It recognizes that children cannot act rationally in the way that adults can, and it recognizes that moral/citizenship education can be seen as a type of development. Even so, it has not formulated a set of moral developmental stages. Second, the Cognitive-Decision Approach has not adequately resolved the paradox of teaching morality. That is, it has not satisfactorily determined

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whether or not the teaching o morality might have to involve an immoral method; or, more specifically, it has not determined whether or not the teaching of rational decision making must ever be accompanied or preceded by indoctrination, conditioning, or some other seemingly anti-rational method. Some proponents of the approach concede that some indoctrination or conditioning might be necessary at the beginning, but others argue against this modest concession.[21]

The most obvious strength of the Developmental Approach lies in its treatment of the moral development of the individual. It has delineated the various stages of such development and has clarified the major relationships among these stages. Furthermore, it has confirmed its formulation of the individual's moral development by widely recognized and accepted empirical research. As a result the Developmental Approach provides a theoretical framework which is of a kind pertinent to any serious discussion of moral/ citizenship education and which, at the same time, has a grounding in fact. Another advantage of the Developmental Approach is that it explicitly links its view of individual moral development to a specific type of moral/civil theory and, thereby, furnishes another theoretical structure useful in examinations of moral/ citizenship education. The kind of moral/civil theory upon which this approach depends is one taking rational autonomy as its

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chief principle. Hence, it should be noted, the Developmental
and the Cognitive-Decision Approaches share the same sort of moral/
civil theory.[22] Finally, the Developmental Approach is attractive
because its educational recommendations fall, as already indicated,
within the tradition of modern Western democracy and, insofar, are
likely to make sense to the scholastic and political establishments.
Two flaws in this approach are notable. Although it relies heavily
upon the concepts of reason and autonomy, it has not explained
them as rigorously and fully as they might and should have been.
Thus, one occasionally finds this approach's claims about rational
autonomy to be somewhat questionable.[23] A second weak-spot is
that the Developmental Approach also fails to resolve the paradox
of teaching morality. It seems to be generally opposed to the
employment of indoctrination, conditioning, propaganda, etc.; but
it does not, as far as one can tell, make evident how students in
the stages of social authority or of self-interest can be instructed
without some pedagogical reliance upon some anti-rational methods.[24]

A strongpoint of the Prosocial Approach is its tendency to be
specific. Rather than being concerned with moral behavior in gen-
eral or with prosocial behavior in general, it dwells upon specific
varieties of prosocial behavior, e.g., altruistic and conscientious
behaviors. Thus, it offers those interested in moral/citizenship
education conclusions which provide guidance in educating students

in specific types of behavior. A related advantage of the Prosocial Approach is that it has endeavored to base its investigations of prosocial behavior on facts obtained by rigorous empirical procedures. The claims which it offers, therefore, are about prosocial behavior as it is in fact, not just as it is in conception; and they are claims which may be accorded, at least initially, validity. Nevertheless, there are several difficulties in the Prosocial Approach. The first is that this approach does not employ a definite moral/civil theory. Because it does not make use of a specific moral/civil theory, it does not indicate the moral or political importance of prosocial behavior. Hence, it fails to show if such behavior is central to moral and political life or if it is just a major or minor good in such life. And it fails to determine whether or not there are any limits on the worth or rightness of prosocial behavior. Is slavish prosocial behavior just as good or correct as autonomous prosocial behavior? Also, because this approach does not involve a definite moral/civil theory, it does not enable those concerned with moral/citizenship education to see what behaviors other than prosocial ones should be fostered. The second difficulty with the Prosocial Approach is that it does not tie its subject matter to a theory of moral development. Indeed, the vast bulk of its research, which pertains to children, says little about stages of moral development. Because

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it lacks a theory of moral development, it does not address certain
questions. For instance, it does not address the question of
whether or not one type of prosocial behavior is more or less
important in one moral stage of life than another; and it does
not speak to the question of whether or not a specific type of
prosocial behavior in one moral stage of life is the same as it
might be in another stage. The third difficulty is that the educa-
tional recommendations by the Prosocial Approach are appropriate
to education in societies of various moral/civil traditions and,
therefore, are not especially significant of modern Western
democracy. Because they are not especially relevant to modern
Western democracy, they fail to give guidance concerning this
nation's moral/civil tradition.

The Values Approach has at least two commendable points. The
more obvious one is that this approach proposes that educators
help students become cognizant of their values. After all, intelli-
gent moral and civic behavior presupposes that one is aware of
the psychological factors influencing one's behavior. The other
attractive point is that the Values Approach has contributed to
the clarification of the so-called "process" of valuing; that is,
it has helped explain what it means to act deliberately with
respect to a set of values. One of the weaknesses of the Values
Approach pertains to its treatment of its central concept: It

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has not fully clarified its conception of value. While it has
defined the term "value," it has not explored the logical implica-
tions of its definition of the term. For instance, it has not
examined the possible moral commitments contained within the idea
of a guide of behavior. If the values approach had been more
careful and more nearly complete in its definition of "value," it
would have been in a position to have a consensus in answering
the question of whether or not a value may be judged good or bad;
for it would have seen that a guide of behavior is necessarily
good or bad depending upon its success and efficiency and depend-
ing, in addition, upon where it directs the given behavior. If,
furthermore, the Values Approach had better defined "value" than
it did, it would have been able to see that internal consistency
is not the only appropriate standard for assessing a set of values.
A thoroughgoing discussion of the idea of a guide of behavior
would have had at least entertained the criteria of universal-
izability, comprehensiveness, human dignity, and equality. Another
deficiency in the Values Approach is that it has not attempted to
make use of a moral/civil theory; at most, it has leaned in the
direction of individual relativity. Because this approach does
not utilize a moral/civil theory, it is not able to recommend
what educators should do once they have gotten their students'
values clarified. Values clarification by itself is not enough

for moral/citizenship education. Al Capone and Adolph Hitler appear
to have been cognizant of their respective sets of values; further-
more, they seem to have acted deliberately by their respective
sets of values. It is dubious, however, that moral/citizenship
education should turn out Al Capones and Adolph Hitlers. This
leads to still another lack in the Values Approach. The educational
proposals of this approach, being suitable to societies of different
moral/civil traditions, do not specifically address modern Western
democracy. Hence, they do not furnish direction bearing on this
nation's moral/civil tradition.

III

It will be helpful to summarize the positive and negative
points just made about the four theoretical approaches of concern.
The Cognitive-Decision Approach, it will be remembered, provides
a thorough examina ion of the concept of practical reason, which
none of the other approaches seems to furnish. It offers a
specific moral/civil theory. The same sort of theory is also
presented by the Developmental Approach, but no distinctive type
of moral/civil theory is stated by either the Prosocial or Values
Approach. Finally, the proposals for moral/citizenship education
made by the Cognitive-Decision Approach are obviously in keeping
with the tenets of modern Western democracy. Similar proposals

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have been made by the Developmental Approach, but the proposals
made by the Prosocial and Values Approaches are not especially
significant of modern Western democracy. In contrast with the
other various approaches, the Developmental furnishes a well-formu-
lated and empirically substantiated theory of moral development;
the Prosocial provides much research concentrated upon specific
kinds of prosocial behavior; and the Values offers a notable body
of research dealing with the psychological factors directing
behavior, including the "process" of valuing.

In view of this summary one may suggest a way to relate the
four approaches so that they complement each other. It seems plain
that the Cognitive-Devision and the Developmental Approaches may
be merged to their mutual benefit. The analysis of practical
reason embedded in the Cognitive-Decision Approach will strengthen
the formulation of rational autonomy found in the Developmental,
whereas the discussion of and research into moral development by
the Developmental Approach will bolster the desultory treatment
of such development by the Cognitive-Decision Approach. Moreover,
these two approaches share the same sort of moral/civil theory;
and their respective proposals for moral/citizenship education
seem largely compatible with one another. For convenience, a mer-
ger of these two approaches will be called "the Cognitive Develop-
mental Approach."[25] It also appears evident that the Prosocial
and Values Approaches may be utilized to contribute to the

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Cognitive Developmental Approach. Certainly, the studies of pro-
social behavior by the Prosocial theorists would be useful to the
Cognitive Developmental Approach; and the work on values and the
recommendations for value clarification by the Values theorists
would be helpful to the Cognitive Developmental Approach.

There are prima facie grounds for assuming that the Cognitive
Developmental Approach would be acceptable to the proponents of the
Cognitive-Decision and the Developmental Approaches. Some advo-
cates of the Cognitive-Decision Approach favorably refer to the
investigations into moral development undertaken by those pursuing
the Developmental Approach.[26] And whenever the proponents of the
Developmental Approach appeal to a philosophical view of practical
reason, they refer to one which may be found in the thinking of
Cognitive-Decision theorists. Nevertheless, it should not be con-
cluded that an acceptable marriage of the Cognitive-Decision and
the Developmental Approaches can be made without certain adjustments
by one or both of the parties. It has already been mentioned that
neither the Cognitive-Decision theorists nor the Developmental
theorists have satisfactorily resolved the paradox of teaching
morality. And it should now be remarked that an adequate resolution
of this paradox presupposes some modifications within the Cogni-
tive-Decision and the Developmental Approaches. This paradox, of
course, must be satisfactorily resolved whether the Cognitive-
Decision and the Developmental Approaches are to be merged or not.

At any rate, it is suggested that in the future advocates of these
two approaches re-examine their respective treatments of the para-
dox and that they jointly discuss their views on the matter.

If such advocates reach a sound conclusion on the paradox,
they will do more than bring their two approaches closer together.
They will also settle another issue which was raised by the National
Conference on Planning for Moral/Citizenship Education, namely,
the issue of indoctrination.[27] The members of the Conference were
inclined to oppose the use of indoctrination in moral/citizenship
education, but they were generally uncertain if it could be avoided
and on what grounds it should be. Thus, a sound resolution of the
paradox of teaching morality would settle the issue of indoctrination
by providing a basis for ruling out indoctrination or, conceivably,
by establishing a basis for including it.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The Conference was held June 4-6, 1976, in Philadelphia, Pa. It was directed by Russell A. Hill and was supported by Research for Better Schools, Inc., in conjunction with the National Institute of Education.

2. Joan D. Wallace (Ed.), Selected Readings in Moral Education (Philadelphia, Pa.: Research for Better Schools, Inc., 1976), p. v.

3. R.S. Peters, Ethics and Education (Atlanta, Ga.: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1967).

4. John Wilson, Moral Education and the Curriculum (Oxford, Eng.: Pergamon Press, 1969).

5. Jerrold R. Coombs, "Objectives of Value Analysis"; in Values Education: Rationale, Strategies, and Procedures, ed. Lawrence E. Metcalf (Washington, D.C.: National Council for the Social Studies, 1971), pp. 1-28.

6. Lawrence Kohlberg, "Moral Education in the Schools: A Developmental View," The School Review, LXXIV (1966), 1-30.

7. Ervin Staub, The Development of Prosocial Behavior in Children (Anderson, Ind.: Warner Modular Publications, 1973).

8. Louis E. Raths, Exploring Moral Values (Pleasantville, N.Y.: Warren Schloat Productions, 1969).

9. Milton Rokeach, "Toward a Philosophy of Value Education"; in Values Education: Theory/Practice/Problems/Prospects, ed.

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John Meyer et al. (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1975), pp. 117-126.

10. Joan D. Wallace (Ed.), Report on the National Conference on Planning for Moral/Citizenship Education (Philadelphia, Pa.: Research for Better Schools, Inc., 1976), pp. 28-29.

11. Cf. R.S. Peters, Psychology and Ethical Development (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1974), pp. 281-293.

12. Vid. Marcus G. Singer, "Moral Rules and Principles"; in Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. A.I. Melden (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958), pp. 160-197.

13. Cf. Robert G. Olson, The Morality of Self-Interest (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1965).

14. Cf. Alan Gewirth, "The 'Is-Ought' Problem Resolved," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, XLVII (1973-74), 34-61.

15. Cf. R.M. Hare, The Language of Morals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), esp. pp. 56-78.

16. Cf. Peters, Psychology and Ethical Development, op. cit., pp. 286-293.

17. Cf. Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Cognitive-Development Approach to Moral Education," Phi Delta Kappan, LVI (1975), esp. 670-671.

18. The definition comes from Ervin Staub, "The Development of Prosocial Behavior in Children"; in Selected Readings in Moral Education, ed. Joan D. Wallace, op. cit., p. 75.

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19. Cf. L. Raths, M. Harmin, and S. Simon, <u>Values</u> <u>and</u> <u>Teach-</u><u>ing</u> (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1966), p. 27.

20. Vid. Alan Gewirth, "Morality and Autonomy in Education"; in <u>Educational</u> <u>Judgments</u>: <u>Papers</u> <u>in</u> <u>the</u> <u>Philosophy</u> <u>of</u> <u>Education,</u> ed. James F. Doyle (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), pp. 33-45.

21. Cf. I.A. Snook (Ed.), <u>Concepts</u> <u>of</u> <u>Indoctrination</u> (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972).

22. Cf. Kohlberg, "The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education," <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., pp. 672-673.

23. Consider this argument by Kohlberg, "The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education," <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. 673: "Why are decisions based on universal principles of justice better decisions? Because they are decisions on which all moral men could agree." The difficulty with the argument is that it leaves the concept of a moral man vague. Not knowing what is meant here by "moral men," one cannot tell that all moral men could agree with decisions based on universal principles of justice. From various references in his writings, Kohlberg seems to mean by a moral man what John Rawls does; but, if he does, he needs to show why this conception of a moral man is an acceptable one.

24. For a brief discussion of this point, vid. James E. McClellan, <u>Philosophy</u> <u>of</u> <u>Education</u> (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976), pp. 152-154.

25. Kohlberg, of course, describes his own developmental position as "cognitive-developmental." He does not mean, however,

that his position is necessarily a blend of the Cognitive-Decision Approach and the Developmental Approach.

26. E.g., R.S. Peters, "Freedom and the Development of the Free Man"; in Educational Judgments, ed. James F. Doyle, op. cit., pp. 119-142.

27. Cf. Wallace, Report on the National Conference on Planning for Moral/Citizenship Education, op. cit., p. 24.