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ABSTRACT

In 1976, the Board of Foreign Scholarships brought together Fulbright-Hays alumni of the last 30 years (students, scholars, and teachers who had studied in a foreign country under the auspices of the program established in the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1946. Their purpose was a comprehensive review and assessment of international exchange efforts generally, and specifically those of the Fulbright-Hays program. At ten regional meetings, the topics of discussion were alumni involvement, program implementation, exchange objectives, government and private roles, institutional commitment, the impact of exchange on foreign affairs, professional development and an international community of scholars, and intercultural communication and personal development. Excerpts from the international convocation addresses are included, as is a list of the members of the Board of Foreign Scholarships. (MSE)

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# A Process of Global Enlightenment

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# **A Process of Global Enlightenment**

International Education:  
Link for Human Understanding

A report of the Bicentennial project  
marking the thirtieth anniversary  
of the educational exchange program  
under the Fulbright-Hays Act.

Sponsored by the Board  
of Foreign Scholarships

Edited by Robert J. Armbruster

November, 1976

### ***In Appreciation***

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
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*A Process of Global Enlightenment*  
*Section I*



U.S. Costs 1947-1976 (est.)

Chart A



In 1975, the Presidentially appointed Board of Foreign Scholarships, which supervises the Fulbright-Hays program of international educational exchanges administered by the Department of State, began planning a project to observe two events: the national Bicentennial and the thirtieth anniversary of the Fulbright-Hays program.

The Board decided it would seek to bring together for a comprehensive review and assessment of international exchange efforts generally and of the program specifically those men and women from America and elsewhere who knew the program best: Fulbright-Hays alumni—students, scholars, teachers who had studied in a foreign country under the program's auspices at various times over the past thirty years. This "strategic survey," to use the words of James H. Billington, director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and a Board member, would be the first attempt in the history of the program to have a substantial number of Fulbrighters share their experiences and insights with one another and with other international authorities who would be invited to participate in the project.

In April and May of 1976, the Board's plans for the project, called "International Education: Link for Human Understanding," were realized. At ten one-day regional conferences hosted by universities and colleges throughout the country, and during a three-day convocation at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C., 250 scholars, statesmen, and journalists from 33 countries assembled to discuss the future of international exchange and to hear individual presentations on a number of relevant topics related to the arts and humanities, science and technology, the social sciences, public affairs, and the media.

The regional meetings and the national convocation also allowed for considerable informal interchange of ideas and opinions by the participants. As with their foreign study experiences themselves, these casual contacts were



frequently among the most stimulating and rewarding.

Those attending the Washington gathering also met and were greeted by the men whose names the program bears, former Senator J. William Fulbright and the then Representative Wayne Hays.

During an afternoon session away from the Smithsonian, on Capitol Hill, where participants gathered in Congressional hearing rooms to discuss various aspects of the program, Congressman Hays addressed the group briefly and expressed his continuing support for educational and cultural exchange and his strong approval of the idea of an ongoing Fulbright-Hays alumni organization. He told the group his only regret about the program is that it has suffered from "financial anemia."

Senator Fulbright's remarks on the first day of the convocation are reproduced on pages 27-30.

As a report of the Bicentennial-Thirtieth Anniversary project, this publication also includes substantial excerpts from many of the other convocation addresses, a summary of some of the discussions at the regional meetings, and a statement of conclusions and recommendations fashioned by the participants at the conclusion of the convocation.

Throughout the project, on the ten campuses and at the Smithsonian, there was expressed universal enthusiasm for and confidence in the Fulbright-Hays program. With respect to the ability of the nations of the world to recognize their collective need for cooperation and interdependence and to reject force and violence as means of settling international disputes, both the scholarly presentations and the participant discussions were a blend of cautious optimism and deep pessimism.

Convocation Chairman Billington spoke of the Fulbright-Hays program as being "representative of much of the best in America—free individual scholarship; the accumulation and diffusion of knowledge by free individuals in the pursuit of truth . . . It is not just tourism, but serious, sustained, in-depth exchange by individuals, and it is, above all, focused on people."

The power of such personal relationships is what Senator Fulbright had in mind when he made his initial proposal for an international exchange effort immediately after World War II.

The Fulbright Act of 1946 reflected both the practicality and the idealism of its sponsor, then a freshman Senator from Arkansas. When the war ended, the United States had an enormous amount of property in foreign countries—food, communications equipment, trucks, and other materials of use to the countries as they began to rebuild. In selling these to foreign governments, the United States accepted what in effect were IOUs. Senator Fulbright's bill called for using a portion of the proceeds of these sales to enable Americans to travel to other countries and to learn and understand more about them, and to enable citizens of those countries to come to the United

States for a similar purpose.

"It occurred to me as World War II was ending," Senator Fulbright told convocation participants at their concluding luncheon, "that in order to create a constituency for the concept of a United Nations we needed a program of this kind, in which people from all over the world could come to know one another and to understand and respect the traditions and cultures and values of other people."

His conviction that such a program held great promise was the result of his own experience studying abroad. "Fifty-one years ago as a very young twenty-year-old hillbilly from the Ozarks, I received a Rhodes Scholarship, and this completely transformed my life. The cultural shock of moving from Fayetteville to Oxford, overnight, when I'd never seen even Washington or New York, was very great."

In the years that followed that initial experience abroad, he concluded that "the way to get some order in the world, and peace in the world, is through this type of approach, in which the people, while they preserve their individual customs, nevertheless find means to reconcile their differences and to accommodate those differences without resorting to the use of force."

"I can't help but say," he told the luncheon guests, "that this necessity is much greater now than it has ever been in history. The ingenuity of man in inventing such power of destruction as the hydrogen bomb makes it absolutely essential that this movement proceed. The alternative seems to be utterly intolerable and disastrous."

Senator Fulbright expressed his belief that it is America that most needs the effects of international exchange; not just for cultural reasons but "because we are large, powerful, and potentially dangerous we need to be civilized and humanized more than anyone else."

He also pointed out that the program has become a truly mutual one in which the United States and other countries have a mutual interest. Bilingual Commissions in 44 of the 122 participating countries administer the programs overseas. They are equally composed of distinguished national educators and cultural leaders and Americans from the resident American community and U.S. Embassy. Twenty-two of those 44 countries are now sharing the costs of the program for their countries. The Federal Republic of Germany, for example, contributes 80 per cent of the total program costs for that country, and Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and New Zealand each contribute as much as 50 per cent.

The Fulbright Act became law on August 1, 1946, and just over a year later the first students arrived in their host countries. Still, the Act authorized only the use of the foreign credits, not appropriations of U.S. dollars. With help from the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation, the program got underway and, in 1948, with passage of the U.S. Information and Educa-

tional Exchange Act, was broadened and appropriations authorized.

In the decade that followed, a number of bills became law that moved the cause of educational exchange forward. Then in 1961 came passage of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act, co-sponsored by Senator Fulbright and Representative Hays.

The act was the most comprehensive of all congressional actions on the subject, consolidating previous laws and adding new features that strengthened the program and helped to promote American studies abroad and foreign language and area studies in schools and colleges in the United States. The purpose of the act, as stated, is:

to enable the Government of the United States to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries by means of educational and cultural exchange; to strengthen the ties which unite us with other nations by demonstrating the educational and cultural interests, developments, and achievements of the people of the United States and other nations, and the contributions being made toward a peaceful and more fruitful life for people throughout the world; to promote international cooperation for educational and cultural advancement; and thus to assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic, and peaceful relations between the United States and the other countries of the world.

(See Chart A, page 2 for cost of the program to the U.S. Government.)

*The Regional Meetings*

*Section II*



The ten regional meetings and the national convocation in Washington followed similar program patterns: addresses by distinguished scholars and other international opinion leaders; group discussions about educational exchange; and a plenary session.

Out of the regional discussions came hundreds of observations and dozens of recommendations related to a series of topics outlined in advance by the Board of Foreign Scholarships for consideration during the meetings.

The spirit, tone, and quality of these discussions satisfied the admonition of James Billington at the convocation's opening session: "The essence is not just the published results but the process of discussion itself."

## **Alumni Involvement**

On the subject—the desirability of making greater use of the insights, talents, and experience of former Fulbright-Hays scholars, through an alumni association—there was wide agreement.

Out of the first regional gathering at the College of William and Mary in Williamsburg, Virginia, came the following resolution, later endorsed by most of the other regional meetings:

"Resolved that a Fulbright-Hays Alumni Association be formed to support and further the principles and purposes of the Fulbright Hays Act."

The recommendation to establish an alumni association was based on the following assumptions of the organizing committee:

There appears to be a softening of support in Congress for continued funding of scholar and student exchanges at their former levels. This trend seems to have less to do with the success or value of exchange programs than with changing priorities in the international sphere and with economic hardship on the domestic scene.

Those agencies responsible for administering international exchange programs funded by

the government are prohibited by law from engaging in lobbying activity or in indirect pressures to counteract the above tendency.

Until now, no organized attempt has been made to muster the support of those who have for years received the most benefit from such exchanges, i.e., the former grantees.

A bank of information about the exchange program has been acquired by those responsible for awarding the grants, but little use has been made of it to help former grantees maintain any sense of common identity or any ongoing commitment to the host country in which they served.

Greater use can be made of the personal experiences of many former grantees in helping ease the adjustments for new grantees, particularly in countries where no binational commission exists to serve that function.

Much more can be done to enable students, teachers, and researchers to continue to build on their overseas learning experience after they return from their service abroad. An active network of communication among former grantees can serve to strengthen bonds of cooperation within the international scholarly community. At present no means exists for keeping in close contact with those former grantees within one's own discipline, let alone with scholars in other fields that may share strong interests in particular geographic regions.

For these reasons and others it appears that a mechanism to foster ongoing contact and concentrated support for the continuation of exchanges is needed, and that an "alumni association" might form the basis for such activity.

Comments related to alumni involvement beyond those incorporated in the above statement included the following:

- Alumni could be productively involved in the selection and program-planning processes, including the interviewing of candidates.
- A State Department grant should be sought to develop the alumni mailing list, prepare a national roster, and provide for communication and organization.
- The question of organizing alumni on a national or regional basis needs further exploration.
- Alumni could do more to educate the public on matters of foreign affairs and national interdependence.
- Consideration should be given to associate memberships for non-Fulbrighters interested in or engaged professionally in international exchange.
- One Fulbright-Hays alumnus proposed that "Fulbrighters themselves could support the program by each contributing one dollar a month, thereby providing an additional \$1.38 million annually."

## **Implementation of the Program**

Some of the observations and recommendations made in this area are reported under other headings in this report.

Discussions centered on the balance of appointments made among senior and junior scholars and among men and women and other minorities. Views were expressed on the balance between science and technology on the one hand and the humanities and social sciences on the other and between basic

research and teaching, and on the need to continue exchanges with developed countries while expanding the program with developing nations.

Greater attention to the orientation process—both for U.S. scholars going abroad and foreign scholars coming to the U.S.—was also a major concern.

Other suggestions included the following:

- When an American lecturer goes to a specific country, a lecturer from that country should take his place.
- There is a need for better language preparation and for better orientation in advance of a visit.
- The duration of a visit should be somewhat longer for younger scholars than for more established scholars, who find it more difficult to be away for extended periods.
- The initial evaluation questionnaire should be rewritten, and additional follow-up should be established, and a bibliography of work by Fulbright scholars should be compiled and made available.
- The goal of continuity in institutional participation—Fulbrighters going to the same institution year after year—was cited as a valid one, but one that should not deprive other institutions of the presence of Fulbright visitors. (Special concern was expressed that an effort be made to include private colleges, state colleges and universities, as well as community colleges, and not just the nation's most prestigious institutions).
- The idea of exchanging other non-university professionals (school teachers, journalists, lawyers, etc.) should be explored, and the program should enlist more generalists and fewer specialists.
- A successful candidate should be notified of his or her appointment a year in advance in order to prepare adequately.
- Foreign graduate students should not be sent to the U.S. for education and training which is of sufficient quality in their home countries.
- Greater use should be made of information in the final reports of returning scholars and of debriefing sessions.
- Increased flexibility in funding arrangements—stipends geared to the host country, possibly more money for dependents' travel and less for those on sabbaticals.
- Length of stays should be from six months to two years.
- Grants should be tax-free to both researchers and lecturers.
- The balance between graduate students and senior scholars should be maintained.

## Objectives of International Educational and Cultural Exchange

In terms of objectives, the participants enunciated two curiously contradictory conclusions: that 1) while benefits should accrue to a host nation and its institutions from the presence of a visiting scholar, 2) the program's overall emphasis should be on knowledge-sharing among individuals and not on the use of a visitor's technical expertise for the direct furtherance of a host nation's development.

Stated another way by a different group, "The program should not be used to supply cheap consultants." An example was cited of a country requesting a Fulbright scholar because it needs expertise in undersea drilling for oil. The group concluded, "The country should hire professional consultants as needed, but could use a Fulbright scholar to teach such technology in a university."

Other recommended objectives included:

- emphasizing subjects related to pressing world problems: the environment, food, population, transportation, etc.
- focusing on different goals in different parts of the world: for example, in Europe, on an active exchange of information at the technical level; in developing countries, on a culturally related and intellectually broadening experience.
- attempting to have foreign scholars widely distributed across the U.S. in many different kinds of institutions. Hence the recommendation that the program support exchange agreements between particular schools in the U.S. and in other countries.

## The Government and Private Roles in Exchanges

Acknowledging the desirability of private exchange efforts, the participants agreed that these should not be considered substitutes for major programs such as Fulbright-Hays, which must rely on government support. There was some skepticism expressed toward the notion of increased private participation—specifically a fear that corporate sponsorship might impose rigid objectives or restrictions on a scholar's activity. Some participants felt that the Fulbright program should be kept separate from any private program.

Conferees expressed the hope that along with continued—even expanded—U.S. financial commitment to the Fulbright-Hays program would come greater financial support from other countries.

One regional group recommended the establishment by the Board of Foreign Scholarships of a commission of public officials and private members to review the objectives, programs, and historical experiences of the



Fulbright-Hays program. The commission's review would include public hearings in various centers throughout the country.

commission's review would include public hearings in various centers throughout the country.

The U.S. government was also urged to provide more complete and timely information about the Fulbright-Hays program and to explore ways of increasing its prestige, perhaps by having notifications of awards come from members of Congress. Earlier announcements of openings and awards, it was felt, could ease the problems of participants, their institutions, and their host institutions.

At least one group recommended that American embassies and foreign governments both be more involved in host country orientation efforts for visiting students and scholars.

While it is widely recognized that the Fulbright-Hays program has remained free of involvement with intelligence-mission agencies, one regional group reemphasized the view that "the Fulbright scholar should be a free and independent scholar [and felt] that it is contrary to the purposes of the Fulbright program to involve the scholar in any clandestine intelligence-gathering activities."

One participant observed that "in order to have the expertise and informed public opinion needed for an effective foreign policy, the United States requires a stronger program in the field of international relations. Only the federal government could provide the leadership and the funding to sponsor the requisite educational effort. Without such an effort it is truly difficult to make and conduct effective foreign policies in an environment characterized either by popular ignorance and apathy or by volatile and emotional swings of attitude and behavior . . ."

### **Institutional Commitment to International Exchange**

There is a need to facilitate the use of a returning scholar's experience by his institution, according to several of the regional groups. Some felt it desirable for institutions to provide means for individuals who share interests in a common subject area to come together regularly to discuss the impact of their exchange experiences on their teaching, their studies, and their lives.

Others commented on the impediments placed on scholars by some institutions: loss of seniority and tenure, and of promotion and retirement benefits. One group urged that institutional performance—that is, how well they cooperate in the area of exchange—be taken into account when new appointments are considered, and that the Board of Foreign Scholarships assist scholars in negotiating with their institutions when opportunities for international study are offered.

## **The Impact of Educational Exchange on International Affairs**

Participants' observations in this area ranged all the way from "[Educational Exchange] is the best U.S. foreign investment since the Louisiana Purchase" to "in some ways the United States has had worse relations with countries that know us well (Cuba and Mexico, for example) than with countries that do not know us so well."

It was generally agreed that the impact of international educational exchange on world affairs—specifically international relations—is exceedingly difficult, perhaps impossible, to assess; and that such impact is necessarily long term and difficult to discern rather than instant and obvious. In this perspective, "The program should be viewed with a sense of satisfaction and pride."

"Perhaps," one speaker noted, "the only thing that can be expected of educational exchange is the simple opportunity for lengthy exposure to foreign people, culture, and problems." What an individual will make of this exposure cannot be anticipated, but, the speaker observed, educational exchange enables the participants "to expand the populations of our minds, so that our intellectual referents are no longer those bound to our own culture."

## **Professional Development and an International Community of Scholars**

Throughout the discussions there were frequent references to the impact of exchange in both of these areas—professional growth and the creation of an international community of scholars.

One group reported: "Scholars, junior and senior, were enabled to complete dissertations or other research, to obtain ideas and materials for further research and publication, to observe relevant projects in unfamiliar settings, and to establish international professional contacts. Their teaching at home was enriched by new techniques, new content, new courses, even new fields of study."

A speaker warned, however, that a tendency may exist for educational exchange to become a means by which institutions in developing countries are "colonized" by forms of American scholarship.

Reference was made to the ability of the Fulbright-Hays program to "dissolve barriers of prejudice and professional isolation," and to the participants' achievement of "maturity and self-confidence which could not have been gained in any other way."

One group observed that "the professional development of the foreign and international community of scholars is of vital importance to the U.S. be-

cause it promotes the standards of free inquiry and keeps open the lines of communication even when national policies diverge.”

A broad recommendation to promote increasing foreign language instruction in schools and to institute other measures to further “internationalize” America’s educational institutions came from one regional group.

## **Intercultural Communication and Personal Development**

Personal growth—for the participant and his family—was repeatedly cited as a major benefit of educational exchange. Several groups noted that among the most lasting and significant contacts made while abroad were those of the spouses and children.

At the same time, it was suggested that too often the exchange visitor (in America and elsewhere) is limited, or limits himself, to a relatively few personal contacts, preferring to bury himself in research rather than to lecture and otherwise circulate. Hence, his impact on wider intercultural communication is less significant than it might be.

“My year abroad was an irreplaceable experience,” one participant observed, “chiefly in sharpening my awareness of American attitudes and institutions.”

## **Regional Meetings**

| <b>Site</b>  | <b>Coordinator</b> | <b>Date</b>  |
|--|--------------------|--------------|
| Brown University   | Robert A. Reichley | May 8, 1976  |
| University of California,<br>San Diego   | David E. Ryer      | May 15, 1976 |
| University of Chicago  | Peter Hayward      | May 6, 1976  |
| University of Colorado   | R. Curtis Johnson  | May 14, 1976 |
| Georgia State University<br>(In cooperation with<br>Emory University,<br>Morehouse College,<br>and Georgia Institute<br>of Technology) | William S. Patrick | May 5, 1976  |
| Miami University   | John E. Dolibois   | May 12, 1976 |

|                                |                     |                |
|--------------------------------|---------------------|----------------|
| University of Oregon           | Clarence E. Thurber | May 7, 1976    |
| Stanford University            | A. Lee Zeigler      | April 23, 1976 |
| University of Texas,<br>Austin | Floyd S. Brandt     | May 10, 1976   |
| College of William<br>and Mary | James C. Livingston | April 23, 1976 |

*The International Convocation*  
*Section III*



Fourteen addresses by distinguished scholars, journalists, and other international opinion leaders, plus a filmed interview with British author Arthur C. Clarke, constituted the major portion of the three-day convocation in Washington.

Substantial excerpts from these presentations—taken in most instances from transcripts rather than prepared texts—appear on the following pages, prefaced by remarks from Senator Fulbright that opened the convocation and a keynote address by John Richardson, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs at the Department of State.

Several recurring themes running through the presentations were summarized at one point in the proceedings by Convocation Chairman Billington: "One was the variety of perspectives—from the perspective of the mosquito to the perspective of the frontier beyond outer space.

"There was the theme of a certain retreat from freedom in the world generally and in media communication in particular, thereby putting a greater burden on exchange programs.

"The respect for variety and pluralism—and the link between different branches of knowledge—is yet another most important theme. There was hardly a presentation that didn't stress the interaction of different disciplines.

"Also the links between cultures, between different and often complementary human needs, between children and parents, between formal education and mass media, and between the present and the past."

In his comments prefatory to his keynote address, Secretary Richardson referred to the convocation as an occasion for commemoration rather than celebration. "It seems appropriate," he said, "that our mood should be one of introspection, our task one of exploring shared experience, our goal one of defining new measures by which to discern the emerging global community, rather than a gathering of noise, fireworks, paper hats, and self-congratula-

tions about supposed accomplishments. For while much has been accomplished toward mutual understanding, and thus there is much to celebrate, so much remains to be done that it is sober stock-taking rather than euphoria which should characterize our approach."

The seriousness called for by the keynote speaker pervaded the addresses throughout the three days.

During the session devoted to the Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences, Urie Bronfenbrenner stressed the opportunities to learn from other societies by reporting on a revealing cross-cultural study of children in 17 countries. Among its tentative findings: that to develop an enduring involvement of adults in the lives of children requires social policies and practices that provide opportunity, status, encouragement, example, and approval for parenthood on the part of the general population. "We in the United States are not taking this conclusion very seriously," he said. "From an international perspective, we are now the only modern industrialized nation in the world that doesn't insure guaranteed minimal income for families with young children. And we are the only industrialized nation that doesn't provide substitute care for families in which both parents work."

Roberto de Oliveira Campos commented on the forlorn hope that political and economic development might go hand in hand so that the promotion of the latter would advance the cause of the former. "Democracy," he said, "like nationalism, is a word of compulsive force. It is also considered a natural and desirable form of organization, since most regimes label themselves 'democracies.' In practice, however, no more than two score of the 140-odd nations comprising our political universe can be regarded as representative democracies in the Western sense of the word. Authoritarianism in different degrees and grades, is the preponderant form of political organization.

This, he added, makes it important to distinguish between authoritarian-totalist and authoritarian-liberal regimes; in the latter, some basic freedoms are preserved and the system is considered transitional rather than ideologically valid.

The difficulty of developing countries in maintaining democratic procedures derives, he said, from the attempt to modernize politically in an age of mass society and to mobilize resources for accelerated investment in an age of mass consumption.

International exchange programs such as Fulbright-Hays, he concluded, can help in "humanizing authoritarianism—a more rewarding task than pouting over the apparent demise of democratic institutions in the underdeveloped world."

Michael Confino emphasized the role of the humanities generally and history specifically in confronting contemporary problems. "There is a tendency," he said, "to treat as scientific and technological problems that are

essentially social and cultural such as ecology, economic development, the worldwide trend of growing political centralization, and the arms race". He also noted that provincialism "breeds some of the worst features in both scholarship and international relations."

Jay Saunders Redding likewise stressed the need for humanistic approaches as well as scientific and technological approaches to the pressing world problems. Too many people agree, he said, with the "silly opinion" expressed in a recent editorial: "If technology and science can produce such miracles as smokeless combustion engines and pocket-size computers, it is altogether reasonable to expect that the same scientific and technological energy can be brought to bear on other problems threatening civilization."

In that session of the convocation devoted specifically to Science and Technology, Attallah Kappas, speaking of "Medicine and the Social Matrix," said the evidence is clear that it is the poor within this nation and the poor nations of the world that suffer the highest rate of illness and disease and that receive the most uneven medical care.

Care must be taken by emerging nations, he said, not to copy slavishly the medical care systems of industrialized countries. "The pattern of medical education in modern nations focuses on curative rather than preventive medicine and fosters, therefore, an outlook and a style of practice which underdeveloped nations can ill afford and which offer little likelihood of having a major impact on their widespread health problems."

Alva Myrdal during this session argued for increased support for and participation in peace research throughout the world. The range of academic interests related to peace and conflict resolution is extremely broad, she said; sufficiently broad to attract young scholars in many disciplines. "What our world needs today," she concluded, "is a large-scale transfer of intellectual talent from military research to research for peace and development."

Physicist Charles H. Townes contrasted the new knowledge and material progress achieved in the past 30 years with the discouraging problems of today, including "overpopulation, pollution and deterioration of the environment—by-products of some of the hoped-for material success—along with resource shortages and the obvious limits to our world and of man's wisdom . . ."

Given "adequate ethical and spiritual qualities," an atmosphere of "intellectual interest and curiosity," and "collaboration and easy communication between those who are learning or making new discoveries," his projections for the future were optimistic.

During the session on Public Affairs, Max Jakobson in developing his theme of interdependence and nationalism focused on the contradiction in those two words and in other post-World War II developments. "The fragmentation of political authority seems to go against the grain of economic and techno-



logical progress; the revival of nationalism flies in the face of the growing interdependence between states. The consequences of modern technology overflow national boundaries, and the satellites circling our globe make a mockery of sovereignty."

David Nicol concentrated on the role of "Emerging States in World Affairs," pointing out that "for the first time in modern times, the small nations of Africa and Asia have acquired membership in the community of nations with a voice in all matters of concern to them." He called the Afro-Asian policy of non-alignment "a positive underlining of the concept of interdependence embodied in the United Nations charter.

"The Afro-Asian states have introduced flexibility into world affairs and have thus helped to reverse the trend toward global bi-polarity."

Miguel Aleman Velasco spoke of an urgent interdisciplinary need for social communication, and said a primary function of the media is to "help arrange the disappearance of the inequalities which threaten world peace." He said our "satellite-based epoch" should help to guarantee modern man's right to the free access of information.

Jerrold K. Footlick warned of a reduction in communications through the world press in recent years because of increased censorship and other obstructions to the flow of information. In many ways, he said, educational exchange is freer and more effective than the world's press in sharing information.

James B. Reston said the reduction in international news is a result of the decision by newspapers to fill their expensive newsprint pages more and more with national or local news. Also, "as the interdependence of nations has grown, the number of correspondents going from the West into the developing world has decreased." Another impediment to citizen understanding of the "causes of human turmoil and human conflict," Reston said, is the journalistic tradition of focusing on the conflict itself rather than the underlying causes. A new generation of journalists is making progress in overcoming this tendency, he said.

The final segment of the convocation, entitled Projections for the Future, included optimistic outlooks from Zbigniew Brzezinski and Arthur C. Clarke and a pessimistic view from Harold R. Isaacs. Isaacs sees a world of "closed and closing societies" in which "systems of control penetrate the remotest refuges of learning, the laboratories of the purest of the 'pure' scientists."

"The planet becomes more and more a planet without visas for exchange students and scholars, and conditions of study and inquiry grow more and more constricted and narrowed."

Brzezinski expressed his optimism about the future of democracy in the world in these terms: "The redistribution of political power tends to precede the redistribution of economic opportunity . . . A true reading of the political

and social evolution of our own society would indicate that in the last 100 years our democracy has become deeper and more widespread because of increased political participation resulting in the redistribution of social and economic opportunities. This is what has made our democracy vital and enduring . . . It is a process which produces complications, antagonisms, and tensions, but historically it is a process not to be feared but to be welcomed."

Brzezinski said the world faces "an ever-growing need for an intellectual class that is global in its outlook, global in its historical perspective, and universal in its values. It points to one overriding conclusion: that the Fulbright program has an enlarged agenda ahead of itself and an even more imperative mission to fulfill."

In his filmed interview, Clarke focused on a future wherein the impact on society of communications—via radio, television, computers, satellites—will exceed everything we've known to date; a "space age of communications," he called it. He expressed his optimism both specifically—that the mere vastness and variety of communications networks will preclude centralization and control by the state—and generally—that mankind will survive. "I wouldn't be writing so many books about the future unless I thought there would be a future," he said.

In the area of educational exchange, Clarke said he can foresee wide networks of scholarly communications. "I can see a great reduction in physical travelling . . . You cannot communicate properly with people you have never met. But once you have met, you can communicate by letter, electronically, or whatever. It's more effective and will cut routine travel, which is such a bore."

## **International Convocation Statement**

*The following statement was adopted by the participants on the final day of the three-day convocation in Washington.*

Thirty years ago the Congress of the United States embarked on an unprecedented act of faith in education as a constructive force in international affairs—the Fulbright-Hays program.

Since then 120,000 individuals from 122 countries—among them 41,000 Americans—have participated in these international educational exchanges.

Increasingly citizens of other nations are sharing the cost of this program with American citizens.

This spring, in Washington as well as in 10 regional meetings throughout the country, 1500 American and foreign scholars, teachers, and students joined to reexamine the foundations and to discuss the future of this endeavor.

In major addresses internationally-renowned scholars recognized the ex-

traordinary prestige and significance of this activity.

The program has been immensely valuable to the individual participants. But it has been even more important in enhancing international perspective and understanding.

We affirm the need for a government-funded program of international cultural and educational exchange. We urge the support by the United States Government be continued and increased to demonstrate the ongoing commitment of the American people to this vital link for human understanding.

We also urge efforts be made to stimulate additional support from the private sector as well as increased participation by other governments.

This convocation recognizes the contributions of Fulbright-Hays scholars, teachers, and students over the last 30 years. It is even more cognizant of the challenges that lie ahead in an ever-changing world. The program must encourage greater involvement of newly emerged nations, minorities and women, and must continue to maintain its quality and its dedication to academic freedom and inquiry.

The 41,000 American alumni of the Fulbright-Hays program are prepared to make major contributions to the future conduct of educational exchanges by drawing on their collective talent, experience and enthusiasm.

Therefore, we request the Board of Foreign Scholarships take the necessary steps to assist in the establishment of a Fulbright-Hays alumni association to support and further the principles and purposes of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961.

## *Convocation Addresses*

### *Section IV*



*"The Process of Humanizing Mankind"*

*J. William Fulbright; Chairman, Bicentennial Thirtieth Anniversary Project; Counsel, Hogan & Hartson; Washington, D.C.*

The presence here of so many distinguished people from all regions of the world renews my hope in the future of our civilization. I hope you all will forgive me if I say I think this is an important and significant program. It is the one activity which has made tolerable so many of the frustrations of political life.

It is a happy coincidence that the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Educational Exchange Program occurs in this Bicentennial year, both of which we celebrate in this convocation.

Many of the distinguished visitors who join us here today represent communities older and more experienced than the United States. But as our guests are aware, our ancestors came from many of their countries, bringing with them the cultural traditions and values of their older and more mature societies, so even though we are only 200 years old, we are the beneficiaries of the social and political values and traditions which their people achieved through centuries of struggle to humanize and civilize that fascinating and difficult animal known as homo sapiens.

International educational exchange is the most significant current project designed to continue the process of humanizing mankind to the point, we would hope, that men can learn to live in peace—eventually even to cooperate in constructive activities rather than compete in a mindless contest of mutual destruction.

Since the invention of nuclear weapons, that contest can only lead to indescribable catastrophe—and surely will, unless we can change the attitudes of

people toward other people with different cultural values and political systems, and unless we can persuade people to accept reason rather than force as the means to adjust or reconcile their differences.

Since earliest times there have been only two ways of establishing peace and order in human groups—violent coercion and the forging of ties of sentiment among the members. In primitive conditions questions of ownership, territory, the forming of groups and their leadership were decided solely by superior force. But in the course of evolution—over many thousands of years—the use of force became modified. Gradually the rules and restraints which we know as law were introduced, forging random groups into communities. In due course the idea of “citizenship” came into being, vesting in those who possessed it certain rights and degrees of security as to their lives and possessions.

As these incipient communities evolved, bonds of mutual loyalty and kinship came into being among their members, reducing though not eliminating the necessity of coercion for the maintenance of internal peace and order. Although only a minority of the nations of the world today are governed by democratic consent and the rule of law in the sense in which we understand and practice these concepts, all but a few are communities to the extent that their people acquiesce in the regimes which rule them; that is, they at least do not have to be controlled by overwhelming force. Modern nations, with few exceptions, are held together primarily by the consent of their members, by their sense of kinship and nationhood, and only incidentally by their internal police forces.

The progress of national communities leaves much to be desired, but it is very impressive indeed in comparison with the relations between nations, which are still governed primarily by coercion and only incidentally by rules of law and ties of common sentiment. We have, to be sure, evolved beyond the age of the tooth and claw in our international relations, but most of the progress has been in the field of military technology and very little indeed in the shaping of those ties of common sentiment which make a community.

Twice in this century efforts have been made to bring unrestrained national rivalries under the civilized rules of an international community. It is sometimes said that the League of Nations failed and that the United Nations has been ineffective because they were excessively visionary and idealistic—as if they had been undertaken in wholesale disregard for the tried and true methods of the past. In fact, they were undertaken only when the traditional methods of coercion culminated in wars which destroyed tens of millions of human lives. In relation to the needs of the human race, the League and the United Nations were far from excessively idealistic; both represented very modest efforts indeed to lay the foundations of an international community in a world of anarchy and violence.

It is not our needs but our capacities that have been exceeded by the modest experiments in international organization which have been undertaken in this century. The central question about the United Nations—more exactly about the international security community envisioned in the United Nations Charter—is not whether we need it but whether we are capable of making it work. We are caught in this respect in a dilemma: Can we devise means of disciplining the primitive impulse to violence in international relations which are both bold enough to eliminate or reduce the danger of nuclear war and modest enough to be within the limits of feasibility imposed by the present state of human cultural evolution?

There is no ready answer to this dilemma but there is hope, and that hope consists primarily in the promise of education for narrowing the gap between our needs and our capacities, for accelerating the cultural evolution of the human race. If our lives are to be made reasonably secure in this nuclear age, there is no alternative to an international community capable of making and enforcing civilized rules of international conduct, enforceable upon great nations as well as small ones. To this great end we must try to expand the boundaries of human wisdom, empathy and perception, and there is no way of doing that except through education. We surely cannot hope to expand the boundaries of human wisdom by force and violence. Education is a slow-moving but powerful force. It may not be fast enough or strong enough to save us from catastrophe, but it is the strongest force available for that purpose, and its proper place, therefore, is not at the periphery but at the center of international relations.

We should consider trans-national educational exchange not solely or even primarily as an intellectual or academic experience but as the most effective means (in the words of Albert Einstein) "to deliver mankind from the menace of war."

When we consider the incalculable destruction of the great wars of this century, and the fact that today nations around the world are feverishly expending more than \$250 billion of their limited resources on preparation for war, is it not logical and sensible that instead of the relative pittance which we devote to international cultural exchanges, we should make this a major activity, warranting at least one percent of the amount devoted to military preparations?

Suppose, for example, that the United States, instead of the \$50 million appropriated annually for international cultural activities, should increase this effort to the amount being spent on one trident submarine, and that gradually tens of thousands of persons would be enabled to live and study among the people of lands other than their own. If this were administered efficiently, as it has been in the past, what would be the response of other countries, especially those which now look with disfavor upon and are reluc-

tant to engage in extensive exchanges of their citizens?

I believe such countries would recognize that they could not afford to remain aloof from a massive program designed to destroy the suspicion, the prejudices and the hatred that have so long afflicted mankind. I believe the pressure would become irresistible, and that every country which has pride and confidence in its traditions and culture would wish to participate, to take part in such a movement, and to be considered worthy of recognition and acceptance as a civilized community.

No country would relish the idea that its way of life—its social, political and economic practices—will not stand examination, and that its culture has nothing to offer the human community. The truth is that all societies do have something of value, be it ever so small, to contribute to the ongoing efforts of man to improve his condition on this earth and to prevent his ultimate destruction by the astonishingly powerful forces which he has invented. It is significant that all countries, even though they denigrate the United Nations, nevertheless do not wish to be left out of it.

The expectation of recurrent warfare has restrained many countries from allowing exchanges, but so long as the deterrence of wholesale nuclear incineration is effective, there is no need for such restraint. And if the deterrence fails, then it doesn't matter much anyway. The truth is that over a period of time the massive exchange of present and future generations of men and women will cause the present differences in ideologies and cultures to be recognized as less significant to people than their common humanity and their need to live in peace with their fellowmen.

In view of the current low estate of the United Nations, you may think this suggestion whimsical, but are we to accept the inevitability of nuclear war and do nothing about it? If not the educational exchanges, then what better means is there to change the attitudes of men—what better way is there to break the pattern of recurrent violence and destruction which all of us have seen in this war-torn 20th Century?

### *"Preparing for a Human Community"*

*John Richardson, Jr.; Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs;  
Department of State; Washington, D.C.*

Many people are inclined to think of the United States as a young nation. Many Americans excuse our mistakes on the grounds of our alleged youth. Observers from abroad refer to the youthful American culture. It is suggested that the American nation, while technologically advanced, is still in its social and intellectual infancy. Yet metaphors that compare nations to the growth



stages of a human being are always misleading, for the growth of a nation is not a biological process, and in this instance to think of the United States as a young nation is particularly misleading.

In truth, the United States is, politically speaking, one of the oldest countries in the world. How many nations have survived for two centuries under the same constitution, the same form of governance, with which they began? While the far older *cultures* of Europe or Asia have been passing through their republics, empires, and dynasties, the United States has continued to function under the Constitution upon which it settled in 1788. Only Britain's constitutional system may be said to be older.

We are a young nation culturally, but we are by modern standards a very old nation politically. It is this remarkable continuity, the flexibility that made this continuity possible, and the stubborn pursuit of the goals originally stated that we celebrate as a nation this year.

In this context, the United States has been engaged in educational exchange for 200 years. Only those nations that were the product of massive transplantations of people, of new settlements and moving frontiers, can be said to have exchanged so much education with others, for the very shaping of our history, as of the history of other settlement societies (such as Australia or Argentina or Canada or Brazil), has been a massive demonstration of the efficacy of educational exchange.

No other nation has received so large an influx of immigrants in relation to the original population as has the United States, and every act of immigration was an educational exchange. Each time a new settler sought to adjust to the new environment of that which was labeled the New World, both settler and the settlers here before him experienced educational exchange.

The American Revolution itself, drawing upon the ideas of John Locke and Thomas Hobbes, of Rousseau and Montesquieu, was testimony to the transfer of ideas from one continent to another. In time, ideas would flow back to Europe, Asia, and Africa from the New World. As the American Constitution helped shape the Constitution of Belgium in 1830, as Alexis de Tocqueville took back from his American tour concepts that helped shape his vision of a new France, as the young G. K. van Hogendorp drafted the first constitution for the Netherlands after a visit to America, so too has the modern United States provided stimulation for ferment, change, and perhaps even new perspectives on goals to others of the world's peoples.

For the United States has not simply been a laboratory in which the impact of high technology upon society can be observed, as true as this also may be. Can anyone question that, for good or ill, positively or negatively, much of the world's educational interchange has arisen from a dialogue with the United States?

Perhaps I may be forgiven for thinking that this interchange, plus the influ-

ence of the United States, has been more for good than for ill, more positive than negative. Let me put the question counterfactually: Had there been no United States for these 200 years, had there been no America with which the rest of the world might engage in interchange, had there been no search for a mutuality of interests, can anyone really think that the world would be a freer place, a better place, for that absence? I think not.

And it is in this sense, then, that we celebrate 200 years of shared history. But what of today.

There can be no question that the program so closely associated with the name of J. William Fulbright (and since 1961 with that of Wayne Hays) has been successful in a number of ways.

Over 120,000 scholars have experienced—intensively and extensively—an educational and social environment other than their own. (See Charts B and C, pages 38 and 39, for number of participants by year and category.) Literally thousands of Americans have broken out of the parochialism engendered by the vast size of their nation and its distance from most other societies.

But the significance of the Fulbright program does not rest in size alone—even though it probably is the largest planned program of educational exchange in the history of the world. The results, in fact, are surely more in the realm of quality than quantity, precisely because one can never hope to measure accurately the impact of any interchange of ideas. But we can be confident that most who participated in the Fulbright program have become even better motivated, even more knowledgeable and insightful people for doing so.

For the Fulbright program has helped to teach many Americans a form of “global coping” which is essential to survival today. The phrase is that of Stephen K. Bailey of the American Council on Education, and I believe is an apt one.

Just as a liberal education, pursued to its conclusions, should provide young men and women with a sense of confidence, with an understanding that they can solve problems as they confront them—that they can keep options open in their lives to move from business to education to foreign affairs, for example, so that they need not feel themselves locked into a single career—so too does a liberal education conducted internationally encourage a sense of ease with the world. To cope globally is an imperative of the educated man or woman, for it means the ability to discern reality through the dust thrown up by clashing ideologies, ethnocentrism, fears, and hostilities. More than any other program the one we commemorate today has met this imperative.

Let me use “imperative” in another mode. Through programs of international education, we all come to understand what one scholar has called “the cultural imperatives” of different cultures. Rather than assuming that all

societies rank various cultural qualities similarly, we learn that one values theater above ballet, another soccer above poetry, another achievement above spiritual development, another tradition above change. We know that the rank order of each society's cultural imperatives will differ, of course; for one may learn this in the classroom, even in front of a television set. But he who knows this only as an abstraction, in the manner of the bookish, cannot truly understand the depth of emotion or the complexity of reason that stands behind these differing patterns of belief and conviction and the differing patterns of reasoning, as well, that underlie our varying perceptions of the world.

Ultimately, mutual understanding does rest upon perceptions, not upon hard, clear realities. What people believe to be true is far more important in understanding human affairs than "the true facts" as demonstrated by any number of careful monographs. And one can understand the variety of these perceptions, their power to move people to extraordinary heights and depths, only through direct person-to-person experience.

Educational exchange programs help preserve each of us from isolation, help to make each of us aware of the perceptions of others, help open doors and develop new options for our societies. Higher education in the United States is older than the nation; there were nine degree-granting colleges at the time of the American Revolution (there were not nine universities in England until the end of the last century). Higher education is also more outreaching than the nation as a whole. This year there were nearly 180,000 foreign students enrolled in universities and colleges in the United States. These foreign students are an invaluable national resource, not alone to their own homelands but to the United States as well; for their presence on our campuses works against our isolation, our parochialism, and our tendency to be preoccupied with our own domestic problems. The presence of 20,000 Iranian students in the United States surely brings to us more information about Iran than any other mode or source of information. The presence of American Rhodes, Marshall, and Fulbright scholars in the United Kingdom, taken collectively, is an incalculable force for constructive American relationships in that island nation.

Unhappily, we must face the fact that the United States is becoming increasingly isolated linguistically. Against this development work such programs as the Fulbright. Many Americans now find that the world has come to them, in that it has learned their language. The American can travel in Europe, Asia, or Africa with little fear of not finding someone who can understand him, whether he speaks in the rhythms of Iowa, the Deep South, or New England.

This has led shortsighted Americans to argue that we no longer have a national need for language training, that science, commerce, and industry

can progress without parsing sentences in a foreign tongue. The number of college undergraduates studying languages other than English is decreasing by 15 percent annually; only one student in 20 is enrolled in a course which provides insights into non-North American cultures; only 5 percent of students in teacher education programs are receiving any foreign-area training; the number of American students who study abroad has been cut in half in the last three years.

In the face of such appalling shrinkage, programs in international education are in no sense frills—they are essential to cultural and, indeed, political survival. For how else does one come to understand that another language also encapsulates another form of thought, that perceptions of the world—of right and wrong, good and bad, strong and weak—*do* legitimately differ, that national goals are *not* interchangeable?

A particular, and specific, benefit that has flowed from international educational programs has been our growing awareness that the United States is not unique.

For many years the trend of our scholarship, especially in history and literature, was to argue for American uniqueness, for "exceptionalism," by which the American story was one set apart from the world. Such views were helpful as the nation was striving to separate itself from other cultures of which it was once a part.

To be sure, many aspects of the American experience *are* unique—the remarkable mobility of the American, the presence of great natural abundance, the century and a half of security from foreign invasion that embraced the period 1815 to 1942. But emphasis on this uniqueness led us to think of ourselves as a people *apart* and (some no doubt also thought) *above* others. It also led scholars in other nations to conclude that the American experience held little that was relevant for them.

In recent years, as a result of experiences abroad, especially by our practitioners in the humanities and the social sciences, and of the presence here of scholars from these disciplines but of other nationalities, we have increasingly become aware of the comparative dimensions in the human story, of the ways in which the American experience might be compared to others. As our history has become more and more relevant to the curricula of other nations, so has the experience of other nations become more meaningful to us.

In the future, the Fulbright program might well emphasize even more the comparative dimension in the human agenda. To fail to participate in the world is to behave irresponsibly; for an American to deprive himself or herself of the ability to see the national experience in its world context is self-inflicted myopia; not to prepare oneself with the knowledge by which one may participate in society intelligently in a democracy based upon the consent of the governed—a consent that cannot be assigned to anyone else but

that must be exercised individually, at the polls, in the classroom, in the community; and in the face of the media—is a form of intellectual treason.

Of course, I am speaking of an elite group, of those in any society who have the curiosity, the tenacity, and the ability to take an interest in matters outside their daily routine. It does not bother me to see this as an elite group, for I feel that there is a process underway centering in various elites which is tending to produce a new transnational consensus at many levels.

I see many hopeful signs that indeed we are moving, however tortuously, toward human community.

To begin with, I think we can discern a relatively new transnational consensus (among the socially aware): that governments ought to promote the general welfare of those they govern, not merely enlarge their own and the nation's power.

There are other emerging points of general agreement: that starvation anywhere is unacceptable; that torture by governments anywhere is unacceptable; that the use of nuclear and biological weapons is unacceptable; and that political, cultural, and ideological diversity (within some limits) ought to be tolerated.

And although they are far from agreed on specifics, there is an increasingly generalized consensus among thinking people that it is necessary to face up to ecological trade-offs: that there are limits to growth, or at least to unregulated growth, especially of population and pollution.

It is also only in recent history that certain categories of knowledge have come to be unquestionable by the nonexpert: physics, biology, chemistry, mathematics. Are not these additional potent elements both of a universal language and of a universally accepted reality?

Also, there is another new community of belief, shared by nearly all who are concerned with such matters: that certain principles of behavior are generally valid and broadly applicable, such as various generalizations in the fields of psychology, anthropology, geography, and comparative religion.

And we have recently discovered—the human family has discovered—that a rapidly growing variety of technologies are workable almost anywhere; think, for example, of such fields as medicine, communications engineering, data processing, organizational management. We even widely share the insight that the more serious problems of technological transfer are fundamentally cultural and educational.

Besides such features of the planetary landscape that most of us see pretty much the same way, there is a new shared awareness that represents an additional new force pressing in the direction of human community: I call it the emerging planetary consciousness. It has developed in the last 10 to 15 years, as a result of human ventures into space (we can all visualize that universal image of the planet earth photographed from the moon); as a result

of the rapid transmission of visual images by print and electronic journalism; as a result of multinational print periodicals; from the realization that the earth's resources are finite; from the multinational distribution of books; from planetary sharing of the products of the creative arts and of cultural artifacts; and from the emergence of a jetsetting superculture of businessmen, scientists, academics, journalists, international civil servants, and performing artists whose ties to any one country are increasingly subordinated to other loyalties—these are some of the elements of the new planetary awareness, much more readily shared in my children's generation than in mine. It is summed up in the *new* cliché that the peoples of the world and their institutions as well as their economics and even their ways of thinking and believing are, whether we like it or not, interdependent.

Many transnational organizations contribute to this process of global enlightenment, this emerging planetary consciousness, but even more directly to the ever-thickening fabric of human relations—economic, social, and cultural—which increasingly blurs the line between domestic and foreign affairs in all of our countries.

Whether functioning bilaterally, regionally, or globally, there are few organizations of any kind, either governmental or nongovernmental, even in such a large country as the United States, which do not have some international involvement and impact.

The huge multinational corporations are only one example, with their unrivaled ability to transfer technology as well as to pose problems of sovereignty and their enormous power to interchange, motivate, and educate people, to generate new capital and resources—as well as to disrupt traditional cultural patterns and to overwhelm traditional economies.

Other, less noticed actors on the world scene have long since escaped the confines of national boundaries. Every profession, from medicine to farming and from banking to city planning, has its international dimension, through which its members broaden their horizons and sharpen their sensitivity to cultural and ideological differences and commonalities. So do trade union organizations, museums, educational groups, sports, and other recreational activities—all are now as multinational as Coca Cola, depending, in other words, on resources beyond those of any one country for essential elements of their strength, competence, or capacity for service.

And in nearly every case, these international activities contribute to the global learning process whereby powerful individuals in every country are coming to see each other as human beings instead of foreign devils, as competitors instead of enemies, as collaborators instead of aggressors, as people who are understandably different rather than dangerously malevolent.

What, then, of the future? Will a transnational consensus become effective? Will we learn to master the media which would separate us as well as join us

by placing labels upon us? Will we learn to listen more carefully to one another? I believe so, for mine is the report of an optimist.

I am optimistic that we will not slip into intellectual isolationism, and my confidence is based on part on our shared dynamism. Our friends from other lands will not permit us to do so. Perhaps the truly unique element in the Fulbright program is its binational nature, in which we have been partners for these 30 years with so many nations in a common cause.

Much of the time and effort of statesmen and diplomats is devoted to resolving immediate political, economic, and military disputes. This may have been inescapable amid the atmosphere of storm and stress characteristic of international relations since 1946. But none of us can afford to be so preoccupied that he fails to recognize this historic moment—*this* moment, today, when our world is radically changing into an interacting whole, wherein the capacity to manage the political, economic, and security issues before us is increasingly dependent upon, and limited by, our grasp of the human dimension, or ability to relate as human beings.


We must give that human dimension much more attention. Only through adopting attitudes and pursuing approaches which encourage a new sense of human community can we assure that the global changes underway will work to the benefit of all mankind. To build toward a reconstituted global community will require not so much new forms of world government as new forms of interaction among nations, not the weakening of traditional national loyalties in which we all take just pride but the strengthening of our global commitment and citizenship.

We must think anew about educational exchange programs, so that they may be fresh, significant, exciting, and ultimately true to our mutual needs. We must commit our intellectual, creative, and communicative energies to this task.

We have seen the earth from the moon. Now we must make internal that vision, seeing ourselves "as riders on the earth together," so that the erosion of the ancient barriers between nations can begin in earnest.

# Participants, 1949-1975

## Chart B






## Errata Sheet - A Process of Global Enlightenment

The numbers appearing on the four bars in Chart C, page 39, should be reversed. The correct figures for each category are:

|                   | <u>Foreign</u> | <u>U.S</u> |
|-------------------|----------------|------------|
| Students          | 45,168         | 19,125     |
| Teachers          | 14,588         | 7,713      |
| Lecturers         | 3,140          | 9,016      |
| Research Scholars | 11,470         | 4,469      |

# Participants, by Category of Grant

Chart C



## Humanities, Arts, Social Sciences

### *"America's Children and Families: An International Perspective"*

*Urie Bronfenbrenner; Professor of Human Development and Family Studies;  
Cornell University; Ithaca, New York*

Upon this second centennial of our Republic, I propose we look to the future, by examining the present. For the future of the republic is already before us. We can see it in the state and conditions of life, for those who will be our leaders and productive citizens tomorrow, the children of today, and, I would emphasize, those responsible for their care.

For what is happening to our children, and especially their caretakers, now, will determine the quality of the next generation of Americans, as we enter our third century.

\* \* \*

One of the principal benefits of studying other societies is increased knowledge and understanding of our own society. This was certainly not our objective, however, when, 20 years ago, my Cornell colleague, Professor Edward C. Devereux and I began our cross-cultural studies of socialization, the process of making human beings human. At that time we were concerned with the basic scientific problem in our field, the effect of family structure on psychological development.

\* \* \*

More and more Americans, from 80-year-olds to infants, were spending more and more time primarily with persons their own age. What, we asked, is the significance of this trend for the development of the next generation? And just what impact does the peer group have on a child's behavior?

In an attempt to answer these questions, we devised an experiment which has now been conducted in 17 different countries. It involves presenting 12-year-old children with a series of conflict situations, or moral dilemmas, in which they have to choose whether they will go along in behavior being urged by their friends, but disapproved of by adults.

\* \* \*

The societies in which the children gave the most moral, or conforming, responses were [in descending order]: USSR, Hungary, South Korea, Czechoslovakia, Brazil, Poland, Iceland, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, West Germany, United Kingdom—the Scottish and the English data were very similar—the USA, Israel, Holland, Sweden, Switzerland.

\* \* \*

This led us to a study in the United States, in which we were interested to learn what happened to children who were, as we termed it, peer oriented versus adult oriented.

What we learned was somewhat disturbing. The more children were in the company of their peers as opposed to with their parents and other adults, the more chameleon-like they were. They responded to social pressures, whatever wind was blowing. Second, they tended not to have very many interests. Third, if the degree was actually severe, and there were few adults in their lives, they tended to border on genuine antisocial behavior; dropping out of school, minor delinquencies, more serious delinquencies, and finally, a situation in which the children were unable to engage effectively in the most basic human function, thought. They had difficulty in conceptualizing and communicating ideas.

We then looked back at our data to discover, once again, something we had already observed, that the trends in the American data were more and more away from adult involvement in the lives of children, toward peer involvement in the lives of children.

We asked ourselves why. And to answer the question we undertook an analysis of the census data on families and children since World War II in the United States.

What those data documented much more dramatically than even I had expected was the demise of the family, the progressive fragmentation and isolation of the family in American society.

\* \* \*

As a last step, we asked ourselves, cross-culturally, what are the factors that influence the extent to which adults become committed to the lives of children?

And our tentative finding—because this research is still in progress in five nations—is this: to develop the enduring involvement of adults in the lives of children requires social policies and practices that provide opportunity, status, encouragement, example and approval for parenthood, not only on the part of parents, but on the part of the general population.

We in the United States are not taking that conclusion very seriously. From an international perspective, we are now the only modern industrialized nation that does not insure health care for families with young children. We are the only modern industrialized nation in the world that doesn't insure guaranteed minimal income for families with young children. And we are the only industrialized nation that doesn't provide substitute care for families in which both parents work.

\* \* \*

We still have much to learn from our more mature neighbors. That is an important lesson to learn, as we continue to do scholarly work together.

*"Development Economics: Common Sense, Science, or Art?"*

*Roberto de Oliveira Campos; Ambassador to the United Kingdom; Brazil*

It was somehow hoped, by most of us, that political and economic development might go hand in hand so that promotion of the latter would, in some way, advance the cause of the former.

\* \* \*

Democracy, like nationalism, is a word of compulsive force. Although from the viewpoint of western societies it embodies the natural and most desirable form of political organization, its practice is the exception, rather than the rule, in the modern world.

The compelling force of the word is such that the field is strewn with semantic pitfalls. For example, communist countries dominated by totalitarian dictatorships call themselves "people's democracies." And some governments, labeled as reactionaries by western liberal intelligentsia, do allow, in fact, a great deal more of private liberties—choosing a job, moving within and outside the country, expressing personal dissent—than many regimes described as progressive.

Liberalism is a doctrine for determining what governments should and should not do. The majority of the developing countries of the third world either have never known democracy or have relapsed into authoritarian rule, although many of them remain culturally committed to democratic values and institutions.

Of the 140-odd nations composing the current political universe, no more than two score could be identified as representative democracies in the western sense of the word.

We might, thus, talk of the normalcy of the abnormal. While we would all like to think of authoritarianism as a symptom of pathological behavior, it remains the most prevalent form of political organization.

This makes it extremely important to distinguish between different forms of authoritarianism. Using a semantic paradox, one might talk, for instance, of authoritarian totalist and authoritarian liberal regimes.

The first have no regular rotation of leadership, insist on ideological compulsion, resort generally to centralized planning, do not accept private enterprise, or the plural party system, and leave little room for personal choices of association and occupation.

The authoritarian liberal regime may preserve some of the conventional characteristics of western democracies—rotation of leadership, freedom of movement and of personal opinion, plural party systems, and a mixed economy in which private enterprise plays a role.

\* \* \*

The difficulty of developing countries in maintaining democratic procedures derives from their attempt to modernize politically in an age of mass vote and mass society, and to mobilize resources for accelerated investment in an age of mass consumption. Western democratic societies had a much more gradual process: mass democracy was preceded by a period of political training with limited voting franchises, and industrialization was well advanced before the onset of the distributory pressures of the welfare state.

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Indeed, in the future, humanizing authoritarianism may prove a more rewarding task than pouting over the apparent demise of the democratic institutions in the underdeveloped world.

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The Fulbright Program is particularly well placed, perhaps not to arrive at providing ultimate answers, but, at least to help in formulating the relevant questions.

#### ***"History and the Humanities in Modern Culture"***


*Michael Confino; Professor of History; Director, Russian and East European Research Center; Tel Aviv University, Israel*

The knowledge of history deepens our understanding of man, of man in society, of his multiform reality, his endless potentialities. We write and read history as we enjoy reading literature seriously, and, above all, as we seek in real life to meet people, to know and to understand them in order to learn what we would not have known without meeting this or that man or woman, this or that scholar or scientist.

This points to an important contribution of exchange programs—aiding in bringing people together. Thus, history, as one of its essential humanistic functions, enriches our inner universe with cultural values derived from the past. (I use the term "cultural values" here in a very broad sense to designate everything which pertains to truth, beauty and the reality of human life; everything we can know, perceive and understand—from the most elementary to the most complicated facts of civilization: artifacts, works of art, concepts and feelings.)

\* \* \*


In today's advanced industrial societies, man is dominated by technocracy and surrounded by the invading ugliness of a hostile environment. He cannot avoid or ignore social conflicts, racial tensions, and economic stress. In the process of overcoming them and mobilizing more and more technology to fight the disastrous by-products of technology itself, we are apt to forget that this fight is waged not only for the physical survival of man, but also for the salvation of man's mind and human culture. In this respect, only the humanities can give to man a sense of purpose, an understanding of the course of



**Distribution of American and Foreign Academic Exchange Participants by State (1952-1975)**

| State         | U.S.  | Foreign | State            | U.S.  | Foreign |
|---------------|-------|---------|------------------|-------|---------|
| 1 Alabama     | 231   | 204     | 16 Kansas        | 544   | 1,431   |
| 2 Alaska      | 19    | 11      | 17 Kentucky      | 306   | 188     |
| 3 Arizona     | 272   | 416     | 18 Louisiana     | 320   | 433     |
| 4 Arkansas    | 143   | 164     | 19 Maine         | 209   | 211     |
| 5 California  | 4,560 | 7,920   | 20 Maryland      | 656   | 840     |
| 6 Colorado    | 567   | 1,289   | 21 Massachusetts | 1,870 | 5,511   |
| 7 Connecticut | 976   | 1,604   | 22 Michigan      | 1,586 | 3,397   |
| 8 Delaware    | 129   | 114     | 23 Minnesota     | 967   | 1,577   |
| 9 Florida     | 534   | 725     | 24 Mississippi   | 156   | 80      |
| 10 Georgia    | 355   | 534     | 25 Missouri      | 663   | 794     |
| 11 Hawaii     | 197   | 93      | 26 Montana       | 156   | 115     |
| 12 Idaho      | 129   | 53      | 27 Nebraska      | 250   | 216     |
| 13 Illinois   | 2,037 | 4,572   | 28 Nevada        | 70    | 15      |
| 14 Indiana    | 933   | 2,288   | 29 New Hampshire | 198   | 195     |
| 15 Iowa       | 558   | 943     | 30 New Jersey    | 1,427 | 1,716   |

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| State             | U.S.  | Foreign | State                   | U.S.   | Foreign |
|-------------------|-------|---------|-------------------------|--------|---------|
| 31 New Mexico     | 209   | 197     | 46 Virginia             | 597    | 538     |
| 32 New York       | 5,290 | 8,927   | 47 Washington           | 802    | 1,444   |
| 33 North Carolina | 626   | 958     | 48 West Virginia        | 149    | 105     |
| 34 North Dakota   | 128   | 65      | 49 Wisconsin            | 907    | 2,090   |
| 35 Ohio           | 1,396 | 3,103   | 50 Wyoming              | 85     | 56      |
| 36 Oklahoma       | 314   | 321     | 51 District of Columbia | 428    | 1,292   |
| 37 Oregon         | 601   | 967     | 52 Puerto Rico          | 75     | 1,387   |
| 38 Pennsylvania   | 2,008 | 3,811   | 53 Virgin Islands       | 5      | 1       |
| 39 Rhode Island   | 268   | 452     | 54 Guam                 | 3      | -       |
| 40 South Carolina | 209   | 180     | 55 Panama Canal Zone    | 1      | -       |
| 41 South Dakota   | 147   | 75      | 56 Multistate           | -      | 2,677   |
| 42 Tennessee      | 374   | 551     | 57 Outside U.S.         | 61     | 142     |
| 43 Texas          | 983   | 2,116   |                         |        |         |
| 44 Utah           | 234   | 297     |                         |        |         |
| 45 Vermont        | 148   | 190     | Grand Total             | 37,066 | 69,591  |

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human history, of its own history, and of the particular segment it represents in the broad course of events. Sometimes, much more than that is needed to make acceptable the existential absurdity arising from the fact that we have to defend ourselves not only from the diseases of our environment in society, but also from the remedies we use to heal them.

Further proof of our growing estrangement from a comprehension of man can be seen in the tendency to treat as scientific and technological, problems that are essentially social, political, and cultural such as ecology, economic development, the worldwide trend of growing political centralization, the arms race, etc. Although raised by man's new scientific and technical capability, such problems can only be solved at the level of social organization, political direction, and cultural norms. In other words, the real problems are not scientific and technological, but social, political and cultural.

And for a better understanding of our real needs, as well as the proper means to satisfy them, the humanities and history can contribute valuably to enlighten and educate not only small elites of people, but also large numbers of men and women.

Consequently, the humanities should be reinstated as an essential part of the individual's education at all levels of learning and instruction. Only the humanities can provide him with an understanding of himself and his time. We have already paid too heavy a price for the fallacious suspicions nurtured toward the humanities on the ground that they were "unproductive." And we shall be paying a much heavier price as, ironically enough, production decreases worldwide.

The humanities are essential to solving the problems that confront us and are far from being an embellishment grafted onto the practical and professional studies of the individual. The humanities are concerned with perhaps the most important question of our times: the search for a meaningful and, consequently, a satisfying and non-violent life. This is not, as our unfortunate jargon has it, "a marginal benefit."

Quite the contrary: Today's increased leisure means more "free time" and also various types of freedom for huge masses of people who do not know how to live with this freedom because of their poor humanistic culture.

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Scholarship today is tending to become compartmentalized, increasingly specialized so that its various fields are increasingly unintelligible even to their nearest neighbors. This potentially dangerous trend makes it essential for scholars and scientists to find a common language, a mutually understandable discourse, a unifying cultural ground. One way to achieve this is to cultivate the humanities as that kind of common ground for modern scholars, scientists, and leaders. This would permit a development of more comprehensive patterns of thought and a common discourse, and would contribute

to overcoming the pitfalls of cultural atomization. I would assume that scientists, too, feel the growing need for such a quest. And to that end we need means, tools, organization.

International exchange programs have greatly contributed to mutual understanding and scholarship. Today, they are more important than ever for the achievement of the many cultural tasks centered on the humanities which I have previously noted. They fulfill an essential role in everyday life and in scholarship by creating possibilities to communicate and to overcome national or professional barriers. They are, and should remain in the future, one of the most important ways of avoiding parochialism and provincialism, which breed some of the worst modern diseases in scholarship as well as in international relations. These international exchange programs are also a fundamental expression of a most important feature of scholarly activity: freedom, and especially the freedom to travel, which is of paramount importance for the scholar and contributes, also, to the eradication of narrow and self-centered views.

Everything today pleads in favor of more cooperation, not isolation. For this cooperation has a major role to play in the future in spreading and strengthening a human, humane, and humanizing scholarship.

***"The Humanities, Humanism, and Human Beings"***

*Jay Saunders Redding; Ernest White Professor of American Studies and Humane Letters, Emeritus; Cornell University; Ithaca, New York*

Presently, the humanities are conceived of as embracing not only literature, philosophy, history and art, but practically all of the so-called social sciences as well. Because of this inclusion of the social sciences, which came late into the field of intellectual disciplines, an argument has developed between the spokesman for what C. P. Snow characterized as "two different cultures, two different opposing worlds."

On one side of the argument are those who think of the social sciences as exercises in quantification, and who believe that the inclusion of the information and the application of the tools and the methods of the sciences, whether social or natural, threaten the intellectual and moral authority that the humanities have traditionally brought to bear. They disapprove of and reject all the findings of a recent historical study which, they protest, is so distorted by the application of cliometrics as to be practically worthless. They deplore the grounding of aesthetic judgments, and especially judgments on literature, in psychology, and the application of mechanics to the practice of the arts. And who is to say that these spokesmen are entirely wrong?

On the other side are those who argue that the creative work of human beings—their speculations, their relations and behavior to each other, their

values, their aspirations and their place in the universe—are the substance of the humanities, and that this substance and the studies that probe it are well served by the information, the methods, and the tools of science and technology.

The disagreement between the two sides is both cause and effect. It is the effect of C. P. Snow's unfortunate projection of two worlds in hostile confrontation, and it is the cause of the disassociation of the humanities and the sciences. The international community of scholars does not need this added to the score of problems it faces. One notes—though not simply in passing—that the international cadre of science scholars having broken the genetic code, learned to manipulate and alter the genetic structure of living things, and even, perhaps, acquired the ability to create new forms of life, face a complex of problems. As Bryce Rensberger stated in the *New York Times* "they have confronted humanity with ethical dilemmas." And ethical dilemmas, even when rooted in scientific achievements, are scarcely problems that have scientific or technological solutions. Indeed, ethical problems can only be identified after humanistic inquiry and can be resolved only with the help of humanistic insights.

The scientists who convened in California nearly a year ago gave no professional recognition to this fact. And back in the 1940's, only a handful joined Professors Oppenheimer and Urey in expressing concern over the humanitarian implications of the atomic bomb which they helped to create. The majority who helped with the accomplishment of the bomb felt and said that their work with it was done. They thought that the political implications for all mankind were not their concern, but the exclusive concern of humanists.

This is not a put-down of scientists and technologists. Far from it. They have materially enriched human life, and if their accomplishments have contributed to the disassociation between technology, science and humanities, it is not entirely the fault of scientists and technologists.

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But let the community of scholars take heed. Scientific and technical accomplishments have opened new frontiers of empiricism for humanistic endeavor. Though still only dimly defined, these frontiers are made manifest by the very terms that mark them: cliometrics, cognitive dissidence, econosphere, psychobiography—terms so new that none of them can be found in dictionaries published before 1965.

But no matter what their literal meaning, every one of them connotes the coming together of the concerns of humanists with the means and methods of scientists in an almost symbiotic relationship, which should assure the survival of both humanists and scientists in a world that is one. And that one world is sufficient justification for a continuing exchange and a periodic convocation of international scholars.

## Science and Technology

### *"Medicine and the Social Matrix"*

*Attallah Kappas; Professor and Physician-in-Chief; Rockefeller University Hospital; New York, New York*

Throughout history and across civilizations, social class—that is, economic class—has clearly been a significant factor in determining who receives what quality of medical care.

Authors going back to antiquity have pointed out the increased incidence of ill health among the poor. The bulk of these writings was oriented to the idea of improving the health of the poor, because not to do so would be to waste a national economic resource.

This mercantilistic view of medical care was widespread in Europe in the 17th through the 19th centuries, and eventually led to a variety of types of national health policies.

But rarely was the idea expressed that good health was the natural right of everyone including the poor. Rather, health care was something distributed to the poor by the upper classes, partly for humanitarian reasons, but more so, for the purposes of economic production.

The evidence documenting the inverse relationship between economic class and rates of illness is clear, and the historical fact of disproportionate rates of disease, as well as the uneven delivery of medical care among the poor, continues today even in the most affluent nations.

The poor suffer staggering rates of nearly every malady known to man: cardiovascular disease, rheumatic fever, diabetes, cancer, rheumatism, dental disorders, infant mortality, schizophrenia and many others.

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While it is evident that the poor have much more than their share of illness, there remains the matter of medical care, itself. What happens when they reach the hospital?

One can do no better in answering this question than to quote some of the vivid exposition by Anselm L. Strauss in "Medical Ghetto" (*Where Medicine Fails*, A. L. Strauss ed., Aldine Pub. 1970, pp. 9-26).

First, they do not even reach the hospital as often as do the middle class or the affluent. The frequency of medical visits for poor children in the crucial years before puberty is nearly 80 percent less than that of children from middle class families.

Private health insurance should, presumably, normalize this situation, yet the poor are three times as unlikely to have health policies as the non-poor,

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and those who do hold such policies are more likely to be hospitalized with multiple rather than single diseases and, thus, to exhaust their protection earlier. Curiously, cash differences are not so great; that is, when the poor pay directly for their medical care, their expenditures are not much less than those of the affluent.

As nations become urbanized and industrialized, medicine, increasingly, is practiced in hospitals in metropolitan areas. Hospitals and their clinics, however, are not always conveniently situated for the poor. But even when they are, they are commonly underutilized.

There are two major reasons, apart from economics, for this: First, the organizational structure of medicine presents something of a hindrance to the ready use of health care facilities by the poor. Large buildings, intense specialization, a complex division of labor, and a frequently cumbersome bureaucracy provide an aspect of formidableness and impersonality to which the poor are especially vulnerable. Moreover, hospitals and clinics are organized around patterns of work efficiency, determined largely from the professional staff point of view. Only infrequently are they planned to minimize the potential confusions of patients.

The anxieties of long waits for medical care, of being shunted for tests from one laboratory to another without explanation, of receiving cryptic or insensitive instruction, are sufficient to adversely affect the attitudes and self-esteem and even the symptoms of poor patients.

While affluent patients know how, to some extent, to operate within such a milieu, or else have their own champions in the form of private physicians, the poor do not, and they suffer because of it.

The second reason for underutilization of medical care facilities by the poor is related to their life-style. Professional medical workers are, themselves, middle class, and they naturally have middle class assumptions and outlooks. They assume that the poor, like themselves, have regular meals, lead orderly lives, try to support their families, try to keep healthy and plan for the future. The fact is that the poor tend to live in the present, and that their lives are uncertain and dominated by recurring crises.

To them, a careful concern about health and a sense of regard about their bodies seem unrealistic in the immediacy of their daily lives. They face the very pressing problems of just getting by. Thus, they seek medical assistance only when absolutely necessary, and those symptoms of ill health which are not incapacitating are commonly ignored.

The consequence is a debilitating cycle, resulting in the poor reaching a health care facility much later than they should with advanced states of illness or waiting until they are actually emergency cases before seeking help.

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A second aspect of the relation of medicine and society concerns health

care in the international setting. That the science and the technology of medicine transcend national boundaries is nearly axiomatic. This is reflected in the establishment of rapid forms of communication, involving international journals and other media, a worldwide distribution of the industrial output of medical products, and an increasing tendency of underdeveloped nations to organize systems of medical education and health care distribution characteristic of that of the industrialized countries.

This global diffusion of the knowledge and techniques of modern medicine is, of course, good, and we may anticipate an overall improvement in worldwide health care as a result of it.

Still, while this general expectation may be true, certain disjunctive elements exist in the international context of medicine and may impair the establishment of adequate health care systems in certain areas of the world. These elements function in a similar manner to social class and medicine. For in truth, when comparing developed and underdeveloped countries, we are clearly dealing with different class structures and social and economic configurations.

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The patterns on mortality and morbidity in developed nations, for example, have shifted markedly from a preponderance of infectious disorders, to a variety of chronic and degenerative illnesses, including a spectrum of complex behavioral problems.

By contrast, underdeveloped nations display significantly different patterns of health risks. The traditional diseases in the history of man remain prominent in these countries.

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There are other implications of these differences, as well. First, to paraphrase John Knowles, president of the Rockefeller Foundation ("American Medicine and World Health 1976," *Ann. Int. Med.* 84:483-485, 1976), the industrialized well-developed nations must recognize that the world of infectious disease is getting smaller.

He reminds us that we live in an increasingly interdependent world; that regional food shortages and surging population growth have global consequences; that 30 times more money is spent on military weapons than on aid to developing countries; and, that international travel is increasing at a rapid rate.

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It follows that if the wealthy nations of the world are to devise reasonable national health policies for themselves it is essential that they include in their planning the health considerations of those underdeveloped countries with the highest rates of infectious diseases.

A second implication of the differences in health risks between various

countries concerns the ability of the industrialized and affluent nations to provide responsible world medical leadership.

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Massive reductions in morbidity and mortality can be achieved in many poor nations by the broad application of public health measures to disease problems. But unhappily, the striving of the medical education systems in many of these nations has been to eliminate those comparable institutions which have evolved in the industrialized countries.

The pattern of medical education in modern nations, however, focuses on curative rather than preventative medicine, and it fosters, therefore, an outlook and a style of practice which underdeveloped nations can ill afford, and which offer little likelihood of having a major impact on their widespread health problems.

This represents a most unfortunate example of the lack of international coordination in world medicine. There are many reasons for this, but among them, clearly, must be included what Knowles has referred to as a sort of isolationism on the part of the medically advanced countries.

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Medicine is still influenced by the notion of the single cause. It is not used to thinking of disease in terms of multi-causality. The elements of the social matrix of human life, as applied to health problems, however, do not fit easily into a single causal framework.

It is clear, for example, that the factors of social change, involving the disruption of established cultural patterns, bring about many conditions conducive to illness, and, certainly, the etiology of disease is altered as occupational structures change.

Yet many physicians ignore life-style, economic class, and a host of other social elements, and regard as unimportant the relationships between these factors and the conditions of illness in their patients.

Physicians may be justified in this attitude in terms of the immediately curative actions that can be applied to individual patients. But this attitude is not justified when viewed in terms of the actions medical professionals must take to institute longer-range preventive health measures in the general society.

My second point is captured by the wisdom found in a statement made by a well-known malarialogist. "If you want to control mosquitoes, you must learn to think like a mosquito."

Applied to matters of medicine, thinking like a mosquito requires that medical professionals develop and use their empathic capabilities to discover and take into account the meanings of the life situations enveloping the population groups whom they serve. They must understand the nature of the interaction of patients with their social environment, and they must try to

educate their patients so that they become able to connect their life organization and perceptions to health priorities and programs.

Physicians must take the lead in expanding the concept of medical community to include not only those professionals working in the sciences or involved in the delivery of medical care, but also those in society for whom medical science and medical services exist.

***"Peace Research and Military Technology"***

*Alva Myrdal; Ambassador, former Cabinet Minister; Sweden*

The scholarship program that carries the name of Senator Fulbright has aroused enthusiasm and carried inspiration to many, many thousands of young people around the world.

Little attention and little money have been devoted to peace research, while enormous expenditures of both human and financial resources have been made on behalf of perfecting war and the tools of war.

Young scholars particularly should be led to understand that when choosing an academic career they have open to them both the traditional routes of study and the newly opened fields of peace research. And they should be assured that these newer fields are equally or more stimulating intellectually than the others.

If the young people continue to choose in a passive way, they are apt to be led consistently to serve the war machines rather than any efforts on behalf of peace. Such has been the fate of a vast number of workers in research and development.

The "military brain drain" is a phenomenon that is practically unresearched, as to its impact, and it's even taboo for critical attention.

Peace research is opening several new frontiers of knowledge. It's not a single discipline in and by itself. In its many varieties, it is more or less closely related to several of the old established disciplines from ethnology and anthropology to individual and social psychology; from political science to economics; from electronics to space engineering; yes, from chemistry of war agents to the medicine of prophylaxis and protection against war-caused damage. So there is plenty to choose from.

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The newest branch of peace research, the so-called critical anti-establishment school has largely developed at European centers. They represent the counterpart to the 1968 student protests. They might have much to contribute if and when enough brilliant people enter the field, and if and when their critical interest becomes directed toward proposing practical political alternatives.



The most urgent branch of peace research, though, is the one that builds up a whole armory of critical tools against what constitutes the greatest and most direct danger to peace, the military establishments. For most peace research efforts to date have not sought or found the channels that lead to the policymakers. Very few have really come close to having any impact at all on political decisions as to the arms race, as against disarmament. And I think that is exactly what should be done. To do so would revive motivation on the part of the researchers. Although they should deal absolutely objectively with facts and theories, they should select as most urgent these fields where they can serve the disarmers more than the weaponizers.

There are beginnings of such research, but it is more difficult to find money for it, and that is one reason why I believe the Fulbright program should widen its interests to this field.

This kind of research should be pursued more under an international perspective. The circumstances which made possible such a course for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) are quite interesting. Sweden was just about to celebrate its 150 years of unbroken peace. (The last shot the Swedish Army ever fired was in a so-called police action in the wake of the wars against Napoleon, in August, 1814, against Norway.) Brotherly cooperation has since marked the relationships between the two countries, so we could not raise a monument to old enmity. Therefore, the Prime Minister was persuaded and he, in turn, persuaded the Minister of Finance to set aside funds—it's a little bit more than \$1 million annually now—for an international and independent institute for research serving the purposes of peace. And now its production covers some one and one-half yards on the library shelves—in most university libraries, I hope—and in most foreign offices and defense departments around the world.

It has an international board and an international staff. Its two directors have been British, not Swedish.

Following the recommendations of its funding commission, the Institute has so far concentrated its research mostly on problems of armament, disarmament and arms regulation.

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I'm not suggesting that research workers should propose a world plan for general and complete disarmament. But they could very well set up in a stepladder fashion different scenarios that would move in that direction.

Peace engineering is a joint field for social scientists and those with natural science or engineering training. It is most appropriately suited for people that have a young and forward-looking perspective. They must be inspired by internationalism, not serve more of the nationalism that is poisoning our thinking.

Senator Fulbright made a very telling statement on this topic in the Senate

in 1967:

"The universities might have formed an effective counterweight to the military-industrial complex by strengthening their emphasis on the traditional values of our democracy, but many of our leading universities have, instead, joined the monolithic, adding greatly to its power and influence.

"Disappointing though it is, the adherence of the professors is not greatly surprising. No less than businessmen, workers and politicians, professors like money and influence. Having traditionally been deprived of both, they welcome the contracts and consultantships offered by the military establishments."

I'd like to underscore that, and I'd like to be even bolder and raise a question to the future generation of research workers in this field as prospective members of this great fellowship group: Even if we can't create more of a link for human understanding, in international policies is it not possible that the scientists, collectively, will increasingly demand that the resources at their command be utilized for constructive purposes which in the final instance will serve such international, peace-promoting ideals?

Many of them have unfettered their imaginations and started to discuss how great strides of progress might be taken if peace were their priority aim. And there are even some signs of a rebellion on the part of scientists and technicians against being used for the impure purposes of producing, for instance, chemical and nuclear means of killing man and his environment on an ever larger scale.

And so, my final conclusion is this: What our world needs today is a large-scale transfer of intellectual talent from military research to research for peace and development.

It would simultaneously reduce the momentum in the qualitative competition for new weapons, which is the truly dangerous element in the arms race, and it would energize the development work for satisfying human needs. The true yardstick for research and development work is whether they really serve progress, not just hasten the course towards enmity and mutual destruction.

### *"Science and the Necessities of the World Enterprise"*

*Charles H. Townes; Professor of Physics; University of California; Berkeley, California*

Thirty years ago the world had just emerged from a great tragedy. There was a new hope, a new opportunity for world harmony, some real evidence of coming progress, and an increasing thrust in man's efforts to understand

himself and his world. The United Nations had just been born and we looked forward to its forum for negotiations and agreements which might help the world deal with the inevitable problems of adjustments between nations. The power of science had come into mankind's consciousness as never before; this power seemed almost magical and omnipotent to many, it was prominently contributing on many fronts to development of the future, and all peoples were eager to promote its spread and win some of its supposedly inevitable benefits.

In that setting, the Fulbright Program was launched with great vision and at the same time with great practicality. It made possible the exchange of scholars and knowledge, and personal connections between some of the thoughtful and creative elements of all countries. But how different is the common outlook now.

Many of us have been among the fortunate thousands of individuals who have participated in the exchange of scholars between nations, and still benefit from this experience. A substantial part of the hoped-for rebuilding of the structures and economies of nations so damaged by war has occurred. A great deal of new knowledge and material progress has been achieved—not uniformly throughout our world but at least widely. There is, nevertheless, a strong feeling of disillusionment and discouragement. Rampant and sometimes bitter nationalism, further wars, abuse of the United Nations—that dream of world organization—overpopulation, pollution and deterioration of the environment—by-products of some of the hoped-for material success—along with resource shortages and the obvious limits to our world and of man's wisdom confront us now almost everywhere. Science and technology have lost some of their savor, and for some even taken on the aspects of dangerous phenomena to be exorcised or at least carefully contained.

There is no doubt that the world had too simple and easy a view of the possibilities and course of progress, and many were relying too easily on some wizardry of science and technology to solve both man's needs and his irascibility. Clearly there were misconceptions about the nature of and the road to man's wellbeing. Clearly, we scientists, flushed with a few successes and a new respect for the ideas and approach which we ourselves respected, were overly tempted to allow or even encourage too great expectations of science and its applications. Undoubtedly, we deserve some of the popular skepticism which is born of disillusionment.

If pride comes before a fall, it is just as true that humility comes before an upswing. Humility is both necessary and blessed. But if past times might have been tempered with more realism and more modest expectations, for the present time, when difficulties and discouragement press on us so insistently, it is also important that we maintain the vision and faith which

inspire and keep us pointed in the right directions.

The interchange of scholars, of information, and of discoveries between nations which has been so effectively sponsored by the Fulbright Program is based on two general premises: (1) personal contact between peoples and with other national cultures increases international friendship and sympathy, and hence improves the chances of world-harmony; (2) an increase and worldwide sharing of knowledge will help improve man's condition. It is of course possible to doubt these premises. On occasion, familiarity can breed dislike and disharmony, and knowledge or the spread of knowledge can be misused or have unexpected and unfortunate effects. The complex of causes which shape man's condition always afford opportunities for question and reexamination, and this too is part of the role of scholarship and exploration. Certainly, only the naively provincial could believe that opportunities for friendship and knowledge will in themselves solve man's problems, overlooking all other human phenomena including moral and spiritual perspectives. However, the multiple friendships established by international exchanges have surely had substantial beneficial effects. And only the naively provincial can believe now that knowledge or science are inimical to human wellbeing. The half-felt, half-expressed idea that man had some pristine past in which neither he nor his environment suffered any affronts, a past now being spoiled by modern technology, can emerge only from a very incomplete grasp of history.

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Senator Fulbright has written of a "new era in international relations" after the second world war. "Military conflicts with nuclear weapons," he noted, "had been proved to be unacceptable and therefore some way other than military power had to be found to arbitrate differences among nations." Of the situation today, he says "we must consider the importance of the international community and the links for understanding if we are to meet and overcome the challenges that are the realities of our world."

Our newer realities are no less insistent than the problem of nuclear war—together they make international cooperation all the more critical—but fortunately, they lead us immediately into many more positive collaborative efforts than the grim avoidance of nuclear war.

The development of modern communication and transportation make it much more difficult psychologically or practically to ignore the severe inequities of opportunities and of resources which have always been with us. On a worldwide basis, we must expect such communication to increase steadily in variety and depth.

The impact of man's growth in numbers and in demands, coupled with an increased understanding of ecological interdependence and the effects of pollution or environmental change highlight at least three points

1. We must understand more about environmental interactions, and quickly. Otherwise we can easily take, with the best of reasons, just the wrong steps.
2. We must act cooperatively, with imperative plans, and on a worldwide basis to defend our remarkable environment, and therefore mankind.
3. Diversity of flora and fauna, and hence probably of peoples and nations, is an essential part of a healthy world, and one with evolutionary flexibility.

It is obvious that continued population growth can outstrip any wiser or more efficient use of resources we may wish to envisage. However, since population growth has at present perhaps more to do with sociology and economics than with science and technology, I want to focus primarily on resources. In spite of some elaborate computer calculations made, I think, on questionable assumptions, our apparent shortages are not, in my judgment, basic in the sense that they are unavoidable. They will likely be alleviated by a variety of methods—conservation, substitution, and new technology. Energy and all the chemical elements (or materials) are around us in abundance. More or less by definition, no certain prediction can be made of future discoveries. However, probabilities can be estimated and, given a variety of reasonable avenues of progress, human ingenuity usually finds a practical one. There is no known basic reason we cannot efficiently utilize sunlight, or the abundant and probably benign form of nuclear energy associated with fusion. Even nature's marvelous photosynthesis might be made much more efficient for man's use. But there is the problem of time; we need more understanding, more wit, and more work. These matters challenge all nations, and the more their scholars and inventors help each other, the sooner will useful solutions be available.

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That the world is small and shrinking, and that no man is an island, are not new ideas. But they are made ever more cogent by recent developments. It is high time for such ideas to command our thinking, and in this I believe a development of the last two decades has been remarkably important—space exploration. While manifesting some aspects of national rivalry, I believe it has largely represented a healthy rivalry. Perhaps more than anything else made by man, spacecraft defy definition of national boundaries. From space, one inevitably sees one world—beautiful, tightly bound together, and limited in size. Yet on beyond, there is an infinite frontier we can explore together, and one which can be expected to affect increasingly our views and our culture.

Increasing awareness of the earth's and of man's limitations is a great asset rather than a discouragement. There is plenty of reason to hope for

success in solving the physical problems of mankind, or hence the world enterprise to provide not only the necessities but also a dignified and human existence for all.

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But we need more knowledge and better technology, not less, and it is those on marginal economies which need them most. There is not too much time--no time at all if population growth is not checked--and rapid progress requires collaboration and easy communication between those who are learning or making new discoveries.

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Scientific progress in the last 30 years has been great, in the last 200 years multi-revolutionary. Man's views of his universe and himself have been frequently changed by these revolutions. We now understand a great deal, and yet still so little. We have a remarkable knowledge, yet only a very partial one about such basic things as the nature of matter and its interactions. From physics and astronomy we now have substantial evidence on the origins and history of our universe, yet severe dilemmas. The meanings of the strange constant parameters of our universe are still almost complete mysteries. In the same state are many of the mechanisms of life or its origins, on which almost all sciences bear.

Insight into such questions not only gives mankind inspiration and satisfaction; scientific discoveries in these or other directions provide a necessary background for applied science and human action, and from time to time reveal important and unexpected keys to success in taking care of man's physical needs. And in these directions--the realms of scientific discovery and the human mind--our world is not small. It invites us and extends beyond any limit which can presently be envisaged.

## Public Affairs

### *"The Conflict between Integration and Nationalism"*

*Max Jakobson; Ambassador; Managing Director, Council of Economic Organizations in Finland*

The world situation is usually analyzed in terms of conflict: the clash between ideologies, the struggle between social classes, the rivalry between power blocs, the contrast between rich and poor nations. Yet cutting across all such divisions there is today another type of conflict, a contradiction between two powerful tendencies affecting both relations between nations and developments within different societies. This is the contradiction between the continuing concentration of economic power and the fragmentation of political authority, between the growing interdependence of nations and the resurgence of military nationalism, between the universal and the unique.

It is customary to dismiss the small states as negligible quantities in international politics—more pawns on the chessboard of a power struggle in which armed force is the ultimate arbiter of the fate of nations. Even the United Nations Charter, while proclaiming the sovereign equality of its member states, recognizes the existence of a hierarchy based on power by granting the Big Five the right of veto and permanent seats on the Security Council. Half a century of uninterrupted war or preparation for war has conditioned us to accept the view that in international affairs divisions count for more than votes.

In this respect the Conference of European Security and Cooperation represents a new departure. It was the first major international conference which actually functioned in accordance with the principle of the sovereign equality of its participants. No privileges were granted to the Big Powers; all decisions were made by consensus. As the European Conference now is about to evolve into a permanent system of consultation and cooperation, its procedures are likely to have a lasting influence on the conduct of international relations.

It would be naive to believe or to pretend that such an international conference, or the declaration of principles issued by it, could affect the facts of power underlying the relations between nations. But it would be vulgar to dismiss them as having no importance whatsoever. The European Conference was significant, I believe, not because it changed reality, but because it reflected a changing climate of opinion regarding the fundamental character of international relations.

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On the eve of the Second World War there were in Europe twenty-one minor states, all pursuing a policy of neutrality or at least non-alignment, each hoping to avoid being drawn into the field of impending battle between the Big Powers. In the end, only five succeeded in keeping out of war; three of them, Spain, Portugal and Ireland, had geography on their side; the two others, Sweden and Switzerland had a long-standing tradition of neutrality. All others were first occupied by Axis forces and then liberated by the victorious Allies. The one exception was Finland which, though a belligerent, was neither occupied nor liberated.

The pattern created by force of arms on the whole prevailed after the end of the war. The three Baltic states ceased to exist as sovereign nations altogether. None of the other states that had experienced occupation and liberation reverted to neutrality or non-alignment. Each of them, by varying degrees of free will, became allied to its liberator, whose forces, in most cases, stayed on as protectors. Only the states which had not been occupied remained outside the post-war alliances.

In the aftermath of the Second World War the chances of the small states following an independent course were not rated high. The Big Five, according to the UN Charter, were supposed to look after the security of all: they were in President Roosevelt's phrase the "Five Policemen of the World." The history of the United States, which had emerged from the war as the most powerful country of the world, was believed to point the way of the future: The nations of Western Europe were urged to merge into a United States of their own. East of the Elbe, the Communist states already appeared permanently frozen into a vast monolithic entity under tight central rule. Political trends were expected everywhere to follow in the direction pointed by economic and technological development—towards ever greater units. This was regarded by most not only as inevitable but also as desirable: Nationalism was hopelessly obsolete, ideologies were dead, and different social systems were expected gradually to converge toward similar patterns determined by ideologically neutral technological factors.

We now see that things have not turned out that way. The United Nations is not what it was supposed to be, and perhaps we should not be too unhappy, for surely none of us would wish Roosevelt's Five Policemen to maintain law and order in the world. In any case we hear now fewer complaints about the evils of the veto and more about the tyranny of the majority of poor and weak states.

Indeed, there are more independent nations today than ever before, and no one talks of a United States of Europe. The experiences of the European Economic Community have shattered the belief that greater political unity would more or less automatically grow out of economic integration. The goal of monetary union has been postponed.



In the Communist world, too, a similar process of disintegration is evident. The fierce independence of Peking and Belgrade, and the Romanian policy of going its own way, have been for some time part of the established pattern of world politics. But we now also witness the emergence of a new protestant movement among the Communists in Western Europe, where one party after another has hoisted the national colors of its own country. The frequency with which Moscow continues to denounce the nationalist heresy indicates the depth of the problem.

Nationalism, far from obsolete, is indeed alive and well, as can be seen at every major international conference. At the Law of the Seas Conference, for instance, the idea of sharing the resources of the ocean bed beyond national control as "a common heritage of mankind" has faded into the background, while the main thrust of the negotiations has been toward extending the national control of coastal states over larger parts of the oceans. Similarly, the demands for a New Economic World Order put forth by the developing nations emphasize, as a first priority, the right of each nation to dispose of its own natural resources. Sovereignty is indeed the last refuge of the poor and the weak.

It may seem paradoxical that the poor nations, while asking for a New Deal on a world-wide scale, at the same time by their own actions weaken the international institutions, above all the United Nations, which are needed for carrying out a redistribution of wealth between nations. Surely a New Economic World Order could be created only through a strengthening of the authority of international institutions, just as on a national level policies designed to achieve greater social justice require a strong central government. But what is happening today is not the creation of a new order but the crumbling of the old.

The international system constructed at the end of the Second World War, with its principal institutions such as the United Nations Organization and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), was effectively backed by the military power and world-wide political influence of the United States. Its aim was to achieve the greatest possible freedom of international trade, based on fixed currency rates regulated by the IMF and on a strong and convertible dollar. It was assumed that an infusion of western capital and technical aid, in quantities that the donors could painlessly spare, would enable the poor countries of the Third World to take off on a steep curve of economic development. It was a system that implied strong confidence in the superiority of the social and economic values of western industrial societies.

Today, after Vietnam, the limitations of American power have become apparent. The dollar is no longer what it used to be, and the floating rates of exchange tend to elude international control. The IMF, like the UN itself, is

languishing. The multinational corporations—offsprings of liberalized trade—are coming under increasing attack. The efficacy of development aid, in its present form, is viewed with growing skepticism. And the values of western industrial societies are being strongly challenged, not least in the western world itself.

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The present relationship between the superpowers differs in a fundamental way from the historical precedents so often referred to. Traditionally, great powers formed alliances against a third power and were kept together only for so long as they had a common enemy. Today, the common enemy of the Soviet Union and the United States is not a third power but nuclear war itself: an enemy which is not likely to go away. As a result, the immense accumulation of nuclear arms in the hands of the superpowers has acquired a curiously abstract character. More and more nuclear arms are being produced and new ones developed and perfected for their deterrent effect—that is, in order not to be used. The nuclear arsenals are not readily available as means for the achievement of political ends.

Living as we do in the shadow of the balance of terror we have had to learn a new perception of the character of international conflict. We are no longer preoccupied with the classical issues of international politics—disputes between states about frontiers and territories or rival claims for the physical control over populations and resources or strategic routes, the kind of issues that dominated the international scene from the Congress of Vienna to the end of the Second World War.

The acquisition of territory no longer brings security or even economic advantage and it usually creates political problems. The Americans did not go on fighting in Indochina in order to keep hold of a country but to get out of it. The Russians did not send their troops into Czechoslovakia in order to control its territory. The issue of Berlin is not related to its strategic or material importance.

The biggest shock suffered by the Western World in recent years was caused, not by military conflict, but by the sudden rise in oil prices. The issues with which we are preoccupied today are the uncertainties of the situation in Spain and Portugal, the mysteries of the power struggle in China, the consequences of the poor harvest in the Soviet Union, the American presidential election, racial tension in Southern Africa, the role of the Communist parties in Italy and France: in short not conflicts or disputes between states but rather political, social, and economic developments which tend to spill over national borders.

In dealing with such issues, it is no longer enough to count divisions to assess the strength of states; economic vitality, social cohesion, political stability, cultural maturity also matter. Size is not decisive: bigness in some

cases may even be a handicap. We all know that there are big nations, which are independent in name only, while some small nations are able to assert themselves even in adverse circumstances.

There are puzzling and even disturbing contradictions in all this. The fragmentation of political authority seems to go against the grain of economic and technological progress; the revival of nationalism flies in the face of the growing interdependence between states. The consequences of modern technology overflow national boundaries, and the satellites circling our globe make a mockery of sovereignty.

Nationalism, however, is only a surface manifestation of a deeper current that cuts across national divisions. On all levels, there is a growing rebellion against the tyranny of large-scale units. People do not want their lives to be run from far away by faceless men in central bureaucracies or big organizations or vast industrial enterprises. They wish to take part in the decisions that shape their lives and their future.

In the aftermath of the Second World War the overwhelming demand was for recognition of the validity of universal human rights and values. We now have moved onto a new level: the demand is for recognition of the particular rights and values, not only of nations and peoples, but also of regions, minorities, and other special groups including the right to be different. The emphasis has shifted from the essential unity of all men to the great diversity of the human race. Mankind or Europe or the Third World or proletarian internationalism are abstractions; nations, peoples, tribes, communities, villages are living realities. To recognize this fact is not to reject the need for international cooperation. This need is surely today greater than ever before. But there is also a greater awareness of the necessity to base international cooperation on genuine respect for the rights of each participant. For the small states, this is a message of modest hope.

### *"Emerging States in World Affairs"*

*Davidson Nicol; Executive Director; United Nations Institute for Training and Research; Sierra Leone*

The founders of the United Nations have wisely recognized the indivisibility of international peace and security; the necessity of equal rights and self-determination of peoples everywhere; and the interdependence of economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems. The main purpose of the UN, as stated in the first article of the Charter, is to achieve international cooperation in these three areas.

Initially, during the first decade of the Cold War, the focus of concern was

mostly on issues of international peace and security.

But with the subsequent admission of Afro-Asian states into the United Nations, issues of human rights, self-determination and economic development were accorded equal priority with the related problem of world peace.

We have now reached a stage at which major crises in different areas have induced new awareness of the gravity, complexity and interrelatedness of the global problems of food and population, energy and natural resources, trade and transfer of technology, and the impact of development upon the environment.

The ad hoc world conferences organized in the past few years signify the serious effort being made to establish a more equitable system of interdependence through mutual accommodation among the diverse components of the international community.

The division of the world into conflicting ideological, political, and economic camps has undergone considerable change in the past 30 years.

There was at first the concept of the two worlds, East and West, divided by an Iron Curtain which is now, mercifully we hope, getting rusty.

Subsequently, there emerged, also a Third World consisting of the non-white peoples of Africa and Asia, the Latin American nations and socialist Yugoslavia.

With the advent of détente, the classic division has now been between an already divided, developed world and the grouping of developing countries; the north-south division between the wealthy, industrial north and the poorer, tropical south.

Within the group of developing countries there is now a relatively new category; a Fourth World, consisting of the least developed countries, most of them in Africa.

This belated recognition of the deprived as a case for special attention has been accompanied by a greater conceptual and practical refinement of the distinction between wealth and development.

Development is now seen largely in terms of the use of advanced technology, because today some of the developing countries with marketable, natural resources are far wealthier than many of the developed countries with advanced technology.

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We have, in the United Nations, an ideal universal center for harmonization of divergent interests. Its main organs provide for a dynamic interplay among the diverse groupings of a regional, economic, and political character.

The focal position of the United Nations Secretary General under the Charter has been used with consummate skill by each incumbent, not only to implement the agreed-on policies effectively, but also to serve as an

impartial intermediary between states and as a spokesman for the entire organization.

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The General Assembly itself has urged member states and international organizations to give "all possible assistance" to the African nationalists struggling against colonial rule and racial injustice.

It is in this connection that the major powers, which still maintain special links with these countries and, therefore, a leverage with the recalcitrant regimes, could play a crucial role for peaceful change.

The Western powers in the Security Council have acknowledged their common objectives with the African states concerning the need to abolish apartheid and colonialism, but they have not agreed to use all the necessary means of international pressure to induce change.

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Any move by the United States and other major powers with commercial ties to South Africa, towards the sanctionist approach of the majority of states, would undoubtedly help to build an effective common strategy for peaceful change in the whole area.

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The most difficult situations for both the UN and the Organization for African Unity have been the internal conflicts of African states. One of the greatest challenges faced by the newly independent states all over the world—and particularly in Africa—is that of nation building, the creation of a common sense of nationhood among disparate ethnic groups and the acceleration of economic development and modernization.

The political and economic problems of small states and the remedies open to them have been extensively studied by the UN Institute for Training and Research and other international organizations.

It is now widely recognized that adequate regional development and effective bargaining with the developed world can hardly take place without cooperative arrangements among neighboring countries and without sustained solidarity among raw material producers and other developing countries.

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Finally, in today's world of interdependence, no state, large or small, is immune to external influences. An important element of modern diplomacy is, therefore, to minimize, if not exclude, the negative aspects and to channel the positive ones towards the goals of the international community.

Naturally, the smaller states have a limited capacity to fend off foreign interference in their affairs, unless they form a common front.

Accordingly, most of the developing countries of the Third World have institutionalized their solidarity by forming the non-aligned group for polit-

ical affairs, the group of 77 for economic affairs, and regional organizations for all aspects within their own areas.

Success in this regard will depend not only on the efforts of African states themselves, within this group, but also, significantly, on the cooperation of the global powers; by exercising the utmost restraints in intra-African disputes, as in that of Angola, and by responding fully to the requests of the international community for liberation assistance and development aid.

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All these are examples of the more conspicuous diplomatic linkages and crosscurrents among states. Equally significant are the complex transnational links of an intellectual, scientific, cultural and commercial character which constitute the warp and woof of the international community.

The capacity of a responsible communication media to strengthen these international bonds is unlimited. Most impressive has been the influence of educational exchanges upon international understanding.

It is gratifying to celebrate the unsurpassed record of the Fulbright-Hays program, which has broadened the international horizons of so many leaders in developed and developing societies.

## Media

### *"Two Levels of Communication"*

*Miguel Aleman Velasco; Executive Vice President, TELEVISA, S.A.; Mexico*

The fragmentation of social groups and of nations according to their development must be taken into consideration in any analysis of formulae leading to viable solutions. Various international groups and academic study groups accept this point of view. A primary function of the media is to help arrange the disappearance of the inequalities which threaten world peace. The mass media as channels of education must deal with objectively identifiable realities.

Advancing technology makes these courses of action more urgent than ever although these problems exist and were even partially solved in the past in societies as remotely removed from the West as our own Mexican pre-Colombian society. Unfortunately, radio and other media frequently resort to criteria and methodologies which do not suit their countries of origin, or they accept foreign influences which are rejected by the masses because they violate reality. Nevertheless we do live in a "satellite-based" epoch which should help to guarantee man's right to the free access to information that is timely and true.

### *"Putting the Wraps on the Press"*

*Jerrold K. Footlick; General Editor; Newsweek Magazine; New York, New York*

*(Substituting for Osborn Elliott, Editor-in-Chief and Chairman of the Board, Newsweek.)*

I was once fortunate enough to receive a fellowship to study abroad. It was not, as it happened, a Fulbright, but the academic year I spent at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), and the months that I spent traveling, both before and after that academic year, were among the most rewarding of my life.

At the LSE, I was designated as a research student. This category included many of us who had graduate degrees and were not going to further credit, and we had a Research Student's Common Room on, as I remember, the fourth floor of the building. I think it's safe to say I spent at least as much time in there, as I spent in any classroom or seminar room. This could not

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be attributed to a lack of interest in more purely academic affairs, because in that room were gathered young men and women like me from all over the world, from countries that were newly independent, from areas that were then colonies and are now independent.

In that room, we sipped tea and munched biscuits and talked and argued endlessly, and I think I learned more during those hours than I ever learned in any other room at any one time. I received, for the first time, some indication from what is fair to assume were the future leaders of these countries—how they felt about their role, their identity in the world, and how they felt about the United States.

I tried often enough, here I know, to clear up what I perceived to be their misunderstandings of the country in which I had grown up, and they attempted to do the same for me. We did not always agree. In fact, it's fair to say that we probably disagreed more often than we agreed. But there really is little doubt that we came away with a better understanding of each other and each other's countries.

From that direct experience, I say with considerable confidence that international education and international education exchange are critical elements in making this world in which we live function.

It could be argued that exchanges are the best routes to international understanding. They provide tens of thousands of one-to-one relationships of the kind I've described, developed by professors and students working in foreign countries, all of them geometrically increased when the fellowship holders return to their own countries and share with others what they have learned. Let's compare. Is it better than the type of communication that results from the efforts of the press?

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Rather than more communication through the world press, we seem to be facing less in recent years.

Some governments maintain either specific censorship, or make reporting as difficult as possible.

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*Newsweek* correspondents have been jailed and expelled and cut off from sources in just the last few years, on every continent except, perhaps Antarctica—and I understand the penguins are very suspicious even now.

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A recent report, by Amnesty International, suggests that 67 journalists have been detained or, as the report said, have disappeared in 17 countries—and that's only the ones that they know about.

Almost all of the journalists, according to the report, are "detained in violation of Article XIX of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which asserts the right of everyone to receive and impart

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information through any media. Many of the journalists are held without charge or trial. Some have been subjected to torture."

But we, in the United States, do not merely point our finger at other countries. I do not, and I don't think my colleagues here do. The United States Congress has under consideration a bill known as S-1, which can make a crime of most of the investigative reporting that has led to exposure of the serious scandals in our government during recent years. Under that act, officials will often be courting imprisonment if they speak to us, and we the same if we publish material about government illegalities.

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If communications are not free, it's clearly not good for international relations or educational exchange. I suppose we can look at this as the half-empty and half-full bottle. There seems to be more freedom of communications than when kings ruled by Divine Right. There seems to be better communication than there was in the Middle Ages. We could, perhaps, agree to that.

But since we have more literacy in the world—as low as it is in some places—more literacy, more technology, satellites that can move information rapidly, it seems that our communications are swifter but not necessarily surer. It just ought to be better.

One brief optimistic note, not related to the press necessarily: It seems to me that the exchange of scholars—cultural exchange, in general—is freer than the international dissemination of information through the press. These programs work, and they need to be sustained and nourished.

### *"The Press and International Understanding"*

*James B. Reston; Columnist and Director; The New York Times; Washington, D.C.*

If you look at the press of the world today, you have to conclude that censorship is growing, even in the free world. There are conflicts growing even in this country between the First Amendment of the Constitution, guaranteeing a free press, and the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, guaranteeing a free trial.

Even in this country at the present time, we find an extraordinary paradox; namely, that from the beginning of the war in Vietnam through Watergate, these not being the two most glorious chapters in the history of America, the press has been in the center of the controversy.

It is one of the great chapters of the American free press, and yet we have come out of it, more criticized, more in contention in the courts, in the Con-

gress, and in the Executive branch of the government than ever before.

It is perfectly obvious what the miraculous communications of the modern world could do for human education and understanding if they would.

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The first thing to say about the communication of news in the world is that it is essentially national. We find, increasingly, even in this country, that the news, as newsprint gets more and more expensive and the competition of television gets more and more savage, the press tends to concentrate more and more on national news and even upon local news.

If you could measure the cost of newsprint in this country, I think you would find that as it goes up in cost, the percentage of foreign news published, even in our best papers, declines in the same proportion.

This is a problem. We on the *New York Times*, for example, put two million words a day through our hands. From that two million words, we select 100,000 words, and we are deeply divided, I and my colleagues, as to what that 100,000 words should be.

The tendency in even a great paper like the *Times* right now is not to print more and more documents as more and more important documents come out, but actually to print, under the pressure of economics, fewer and fewer of the germinal documents in contemporary history.

The *Times of London*, which invented the idea of being the newspaper of record, does not now even pretend to print the documents or to keep the historical record of the world.

Second, most of the news that is circulated around the world today is dominated by western sources; that is, by the Associated Press, the United Press International, Reuter's, and France Press. There are, of course, in other areas of the world dominated by the dictorial countries with different systems, agencies like Tass that serve different communities. But we have no really independent locally oriented or continentally oriented Latin American agency. We have, as yet, no really effective African or Asian news agency. And it seems to me as a reporter in this country that this is a great pity, because as our economic difficulties in the West grow, the tendency of the press here is to send fewer and fewer correspondents into the world.

As the interdependence of nations—and need thereof—has grown, the number of correspondents going from the West into the developing world has decreased. It may be only in Japan that the number of correspondents going abroad has increased in the last decade or so.

Third, I would point out to you that when we do cover the news of the world—and this is not only a criticism of our own press; it's a kind of disease in the journalism of the world—the news we report is essentially the news of contention and of what went wrong in whatever country we are reporting from. This is understandable, historically, in this country. My generation of

reporters learned what we call police blotter journalism; that is, we went to the police court and took down off the police blotter the crimes or misdemeanors that had happened that day, and that is essentially what we reported; that, together with the news of conflict coming from the county court-houses.

When this country in the thirties became more centralized under Roosevelt in this city, the country boys came to Washington and applied that same technique of reporting what was in conflict, what had gone wrong. And with the outbreak of the Second World War, when the United States finally put its power behind its ideals, and we went into the world, we tended to do the same thing. The result is that though we have made considerable progress on this point, in our coverage of the world we are still applying those old techniques.

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There was a period of almost 15 years when Vietnam dominated the news of American papers. That war ended for us but not, alas, for many other people a little over a year ago, and now, you never hear anything about Vietnam.

Suddenly, however, the center of the world has become Angola and, tomorrow, Rhodesia, I suppose. And I frankly don't know what we're to do about this problem of the modern definition of news. It is very close to human nature, I'm sorry to say. We talk, primarily, about the people who went wrong, the people in trouble, and the press does the same thing.

In the press today we're also absolutely fascinated by the past and fascinated by what is secret. The Secretary of State spent about two and a half months when détente became an issue trying to compose a careful definition of U.S.-Soviet relations, and went to San Francisco and finally delivered a really conceptual speech about these relations. Probably because it was not classified, the press of the country paid very little attention to it. He then went two weeks later to London for a meeting of the heads of our missions in Europe. There they had rather a casual exchange of information on the same subject of East-West relations. A copy of that discussion was composed by a secretary, who sent a precis of it back here, and it leaked. This became a great journalistic scoop, and though it was far less precise, far less dependable than the original document, it became a world issue.

So we have that kind of problem. And here, again, it's easier to define the problem than to say what is to be done about it. I don't, however, want to leave this in a hopeless state or be too negative about it.

There are some hopeful trends. There is a new generation of press journalists rising in this country. They are in an odd situation. First, the radio took away from the newspaper the task of being the first purveyor of the news. Then along came television and took away the great descriptive story. So even if a newspaper reporter can write in iambic pentameter, it is very hard for him

to compete, say, in the description of the burial of Jack Kennedy when 90 million people have watched the occasion on television . . . . That you cannot compete with.

Therefore, a thoughtful rising generation of reporters in the press is realizing that they must begin to pay far more attention to the causes of human turmoil and human conflict. And I see these young men coming up, and I must say, I'm very hopeful about what they may do.

## Projections for the Future

### *"Global Political Transformation"*

*Zbigniew Brzezinski; Herbert Lehman Professor of Government; Director of the Research Institute on International Change; Columbia University; New York, New York*

The Fulbright program came at a time that paralleled and in some ways even implicitly reflected a phase of our history that was dominated by manifest American paramountcy in world affairs.

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It was a creative period in the sense that in the immediate post-war years the United States launched a major architectural effort designed to shape new and enduring international arrangements, and it did in fact create a new and more cooperative international system. The new system replaced an earlier system, largely European in scope and London financed, and it was that system which collapsed under the cumulative blows of World War I, the Great Depression and World War II.

The system which replaced it, largely created from these shores, was now Atlantic in scope. It was American protected and largely New York financed, and it was a truly international system in the sense that it involved a series of institutions, a series of relationships, a series of procedural practices and a set of underlying political, as well as philosophical assumptions. It was an international system in the sense that it provided a basic framework for the inter-relationship of nations, for the flow of money, for the distribution of power. But it was at the same time a system still largely based on cultural, political homogeneity of the western Eurocentric world.

Since the creation of that system, more than two billion people have been added to the human community and, equally important, more than 100 new nation states have arisen and have either become or are striving to become, participants in the international political process.

This change is far reaching, and it has implications for the nature of the international system, for our own societies, and very much for our future.

Demographic growth is producing a much more congested world, and a world which has become much more interactive. But it is also producing a world increasingly askew in terms of its demographic distributions. For the truly rapid growth is in those parts of the world on which the international system created in 1945 has not been based: in Asia, in Latin America, in Africa. It is producing societies whose populations increasingly outnumber the Eurocentric world. More important for the future, these are societies in

which the young part of the population is a higher percentage of the total than is the case in the West. On the average the percentage of the population under 15 is close to twice as high in these parts of the world than in what is customarily described as the West. And this has obvious and far reaching implications for the future.

It means not only that these are the more populated parts of the world, but it means that these are parts of the world increasingly inhabited by younger, more productive peoples, whereas our own societies will increasingly in the decades ahead have larger and larger proportions of their population either engaging less in productive activity or more generally dependent on others for their continued social existence. This is bound to affect the cultural style, the mood, and the quality or character of our lives.

At the same time the appearance of many new states itself creates pressures on the existing international system; pressures for change, for adjustment, and for accommodation. As a consequence, the existing international system is faced with a number of significant pressures as well as changes. First, simply that the existing international system cannot accommodate all would-be participants, nor can it any longer exclude some of them from participation. The former proposition applies particularly to the new states, which claim, and in my judgment with justification, that not all the existing international arrangements are based on the principle of equity, and that they do have a right to a larger share of political power and influence.

It also means that a number of states which excluded themselves earlier from the international system or in some cases were deliberately excluded—notably the Communist states—now can assert with a greater degree of validity and political effectiveness their claim to participation as well. The existing international system is, consequently under severe stress, and some parts of it are in jeopardy.

Secondly, as a result of these changes, the American position in the world is itself changing significantly. When the Fulbright Act was born the United States was paramount. Today its role is pivotal, but no longer paramount. It no longer can dominate, it no longer can impose its will. But at the same time we should have no illusions about the continued centrality of the American role. The American role remains pivotal in the sense that America remains the single most important influence for good or for evil, through acts of commission as well as of omission. Thus what the United States does or does not do in response to the problems already mentioned remains quite central to the ability of the international system to move forward, to adjust, to accommodate, to reform and to make itself historically relevant. And the international system is highly dependent on the degree to which the United States itself dedicates itself to such a task.

The role of the West, more generally in the context of the international

system, is shifting from that of direct political domination to that of essentially technological leadership and (potentially) of humanistic inspiration. This is a vital change, for the international system as we've understood it for the last 200 years, has been dominated by the West and particularly by Europe. That political domination has come to an end. But the West still remains the vital, the innovative, the technologically creative part of the world community. There is no denying that, and this gives the West a creative role to play provided that capacity is linked to its ability also to project the relevant humanistic and spiritual message.

This in turn pertains as much to what the West does internationally in relationship to its own societies, as what the West does externally in relationship to global problems. It means in any case a profound redefinition of the historical role and the global purpose of the West in world affairs.

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With the United States no longer paramount, though still pivotal, the international scene is witnessing the appearance of a number of key regional hegemonic powers which exercise regional influence on their neighbors, either cooperative or antagonistic in character but a decisive influence nonetheless. The role of Brazil in Latin America is increasingly that of a hegemon, welcomed by others in some cases, feared by others in some cases. The same is true of Iran, in that arc of states spanning South Asia and the Middle East. The same is true in a more limited sense for the time being in the case of Nigeria in Western Africa. The same may be true of India in South Asia. The same is potentially true of Indonesia in Southeast Asia.

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The rising demands for the new world economic order reflect the appearance of new and dominant global values. It is probably no exaggeration to postulate that the principal organizing and motivating idea of the nineteenth century, which made for political change and mobilized political action, was the idea of liberty. This is what moved nations and peoples, what created heroes and villains. Today increasingly the motivating idea is either equity or, more generally, equality. This is becoming the dominant motive of political preoccupations. And on the international scene it is taking the shape of a rising crescendo of demands for a new world economic order.

A true reading of the political and social evolution of our own society would indicate that in the last 100 years our democracy has become deeper and more widespread because of increased political participation resulting in the redistribution of political power, and with it the redistribution of social and economic opportunities. This is what has made our democracy vital and enduring. It is this process which makes me profoundly optimistic about the future of democracy. It is a process which produces complications, antagonisms, and tensions, but historically it is a process not to be feared but to be

welcomed.

In the shorter run it does produce increased tensions and increased conflicts. Its cumulative immediate effect is to match the enduring East-West conflict of the last thirty years, which has so dominated world affairs, with the surfacing and increasingly dominant North-South conflict. And thus the pattern of world conflicts has become increasingly more complicated.

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These intersections may take place in other parts of the world in the future and they indicate, therefore, that the process of world change, while hopeful in its longer range historical thrust, does pose the gravest short-term dangers to international stability, and requires a response that not only deals with these problems on their merits, but also sees them in a wider historical perspective.

Some of the dangers inherent in this change are ominous. They could involve in some cases the fragmentation of internal order in some key societies, largely because the international community in some cases will be unable to respond to the internal problems of the societies concerned or because these societies will have so walled themselves off from international change as to make themselves anachronistic and more susceptible to pent up and accumulating internal changes. I have in mind, as an example of the first, the cumulative dangers posed by social and economic pressures on the ability of the Indian system to survive. I have in mind in the latter case the accumulated political national pressures within the Soviet Union which perhaps is not changing as rapidly as it might. And in either case, internal disruptions and conflicts which in both cases seem likely prospects for the 80's, would reverberate on the international scene producing anxieties and ambiguities.

More generally, a longer-range danger pertains to the international system as well. We face the increasing prospect of nuclear proliferation which is today almost impossible to avoid. Such proliferation, in the context of the dispersal of political power, the rise of regionally hegemonic powers, and the intersections of East-West and North-South conflicts is infinitely more dangerous than it would have been ten or even fifteen years ago. It is one of the paradoxes of our time that the most likely states to acquire nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future are the poor and not the rich states: the states that cannot afford them and yet will have them, rather than the states that can afford them and feel that they do not need them. And this paradox highlights the inherent instability of the international system in the context of its fundamental historical transformation.

What are the implications of this for us in terms of the present and the future? In some ways the implications are as simple as they are monumental. They call for nothing less than again a massive architectural effort at shaping a new international system—simultaneously on every one of the major fronts



of world affairs. They call for an effort to create a new international system more encompassing, more cooperative, and susceptible to the promotion of change. The international system we created in 1945 was designed to promote peace in reaction to the wars which preceded it. The international system we need today must be designed to promote progress. The international system created in 1945 was designed to create free trade in reaction to the obstacles which produced the depression. The international system we need to create today has to address itself to problems of economic equity. These are problems of enormous scope. They will mean that we in this country will have to cooperate much more closely than we think possible with the Europeans and the Japanese in shaping macroeconomic policies that coordinate more closely with our internal domestic economic policies. Otherwise, the international scene will lack the necessary ingredient of political economic stability in that part of the world which is still pivotal to the progress of the rest of the world.

But these efforts will have to be matched at the same time by simultaneous efforts to increase the scope of North-South cooperation. To absorb and introduce into the international system as full-fledged members and participants those newer states or emerging states which are willing and ready to participate as shapers and doers in the international system and not merely as its objects. It will require far-reaching reform of international institutions. It will mean major redistribution of votes and rights. It will mean a basic rearrangement of responsibilities. It will mean significant shifts in personnel policies and distribution of key slots in many international organizations. And it will mean for our own society implementation of promises grudgingly made and still far from being implemented. Finally, it will mean pursuit of better East-West relations, but with a more sophisticated realization that the East-West relationship is both conflictual by history and cooperative by necessity. For while there are profound ideological historical differences that separate us, there are overriding imperatives that unite us. And the public has to be aware of both dimensions in order to provide sustained and intelligent support for policies that will be realistic. And all of that will be necessary—imperatively necessary—to prevent what otherwise seems likely, namely increasing fragmentation as the needed change takes place in the absence of the required institutional framework. Change is occurring and I welcome it, but it lacks the framework in order to give it stability. And only by responding on all these levels can we move towards the provision of the needed framework. Only then will we take the giant step necessary towards a global community.

But what do we mean when we use those two words? A global community begins to emerge when there is a system of at least minimal shared values and a growing awareness of the reality of interdependence; only if there is a

sharing of some common rules and some common institutions; only if there is an awareness and a sense that we are operating with reasonably equitable partaking of social and economic benefits.

This is a very complex mix of subjective and objective conditions, and it creates an ever-growing need for an intellectual class that is global in its outlook, global in its historical perspective, and universal in its values. It points to one overriding conclusion: that the Fulbright program has an enlarged agenda ahead of itself and an even more imperative mission to fulfill.

### *"Communications and the Future"*

*Arthur C. Clarke; Author; United Kingdom*

I know that television is used very often as a drug—just entertainment or a way to kill time—yet at the same time it is a wonderful educational medium. In the field of education, in research, and in all types of cultural activity it is just the beginning.

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I have the unique experience of having the only television set in my entire country (Sri Lanka) picking up the educational programs broadcasting in India. Consequently, the villagers are certain of a sort of mass education by TV satellite—on family planning and hygiene among other subjects. It has been a fascinating educational experience. It's also a fascinating social experience having the only TV set in the country; you should see my liquor bill.

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Information pollution is a big problem and TV does contribute to it. I wouldn't say I'm trying to get away from this kind of thing by my underwater exploration or by my investigations of space. But underwater you can't take your worries with you. I think it is because we are back to where we belong. We are born of the sea. In that weightless environment, you shed your weight and with it you shed many of your cares. It is a strange feeling. You feel a great sense of joy and relaxation underwater. You can't take your worries with you. You can be terrified underwater, but you can't be worried under the water.

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Looking ahead thirty years we see, partly as a result of satellites and partly as a result of the incredible developments of solid state electronics—which enable us to squeeze inconceivable amounts of processing circuitry into a thing as big as a matchbox—a great flexibility in the transfer and processing of information.

I was up at MIT [Massachusetts Institute of Technology] to speak at the centennial of the telephone last week and I saw Doctor Marvin Minsky's

laboratory, and there they have a television screen and a typewriter console in front of it. Through this, everyone in a single field of interest can talk to each other wherever they are. When they come in the morning they can press a button and ask who knows where I can find something on such and such. This comes up on the screens in all the various laboratories, and then answers start coming in because the memory—the circuits—can handle enormous amounts of information and can transmit and exchange books, diagrams, anything.

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I can see the time some ten years or so where there would be satellite networks devoted entirely to scholarship. For example, you could have all the world's libraries accessible through communication satellites, so anybody with the right console could call for any information anywhere, any library. Now this is a purely mechanical device but just think of the value of it to scholarship. Some scholars on the other side of the two cultures' gap decry technology, and technology is oversold, but technology is absolutely vital. I suggested in a paper I gave a few years ago that the Renaissance may have been triggered by the simple technical invention of spectacles, which at once doubled or tripled the effective working lives of the medieval scholars. Imagine the revolution that would be produced if any scholar could have in his home essentially all the world's information just by pressing a button.

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The expansion of these facilities and also their cheapness, and perhaps the existence of many alternative systems of distribution will give it much greater flexibility and will make it very hard for the state to control all these systems.

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I think on the whole—insofar as this technology is not neutral—it does favor free exchange of information. For example, direct dialing in Europe has made it impossible for the state to control what people say to people in other countries. This is a very important political factor. Anybody can go to any telephone box anywhere and dial anybody as long as they have the money for it. I happened to be in Vienna for the United Nations conference on peaceful uses of space on the day Czechoslovakia was invaded. The Czech delegates were in the corner with their transistor radios finding out what was really happening in their country. Radio passes over all frontiers and it is very hard to censor or control it. And in the Third World, the transistor radio has been the greatest information revolution because it by-passed printing. You get to people who never learned to read.

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With respect to educational exchange programs, I can see a great reduction in physical traveling made possible by the new technology. People will be able to stay at home and do a vast amount of interacting. You cannot com-

municate properly with people you haven't met. So some travel will still be essential. But once you have met, you can communicate by letter, electronics, whatever, much more effectively. The age of satellites will cut routine travel which is such a bore.

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We are going to have some overall world systems—some global weather systems, global communications systems—but at the same time we will have thousands, maybe millions of cultural groups which are interacting with each other, preserving their identity and communicating effectively. As the systems become cheaper, all the people speaking their own language—even a very obscure language—may be able to talk to each other wherever they may be in the world.

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Over 100 years ago the United States was really created by two inventions: the railroad and the electric telegraph. Before those inventions you couldn't really have a United States. After those inventions, it was inevitable. Now we are seeing on a global scale an almost exact parallel. Instead of the railroad and the telegraph, it is the jet plane and the communication satellite fulfilling the same role—sort of making this one world.

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There may be an enormous cultural avalanche one day as we succeed in detecting and deciphering intelligent messages from space, as I'm sure we will. It may be a one-way process just as the Renaissance discovered Greek culture. We couldn't send any messages back to the Greeks, but all of their culture sort of descended on us through translation. So the culture and scientific knowledge of some superior-intelligence may descend on us even if it takes thousands of years to travel to us. I wouldn't be writing so many books about the future unless I thought there was to be a future. When I am asked about our future chances, I make a rather facetious answer; namely, that I think we have a 51 percent chance of survival. I think one should be an optimist because then there is hope that one will achieve a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Looking into space gives one perhaps a better perspective on our position in the universe. And if you look at the stars and think of the immensity of space and wonder who or what is watching us out there, where we are in the hierarchy of the universe—are we nearer the angels or the apes—it prevents you from getting too conceited. At the same time you shouldn't overdo it. You should be quite proud of what we've done but we should realize also we have a great deal more to do and we have made appalling mistakes. The future is unlimited. There are no limits to growth, because this is just the beginning of our exploration on the universe.

### *"The Closing Societies"*

*Harold R. Isaacs; Professor of Political Science; Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Cambridge, Massachusetts*

Between 1854 and 1949, some 22,000 Chinese came to the United States to study at American colleges and universities. In China, American and other foreign missionaries founded schools which by the end of that period had produced about 250,000 graduates. In 1937, when Japan's all-out invasion of China ushered in the epoch of the Second World War, there were more than 13,000 Americans living and working in China, many of them businessmen bent on profit, but many among them also teachers, scholars, journalists, bent on sharing and acquiring knowledge. With all its differences, this too, was a massive exchange of people and ideas that left visible marks on the cultures of the two countries and on the minds of generations of people who learned things about each other during a sustained experience of contact and mutual discovery.

How one judges the effect of such an exchange depends on when and where one stands on the rim of observation, under what light and from what angle the "facts" are seen, and what the expectations of it were and are. The effects of the Chinese-American exchange during those decades were many and many-sided, but it would be difficult to suggest now that they served as a "link for human understanding" or in "the development of a world community," not, at least, in the sense that we might wishfully want to understand those phrases. The Americans and Chinese who shared in or were influenced by the experience of this exchange also shared in the making of the ultimately disastrous outcomes: severance and hostility and the confrontation of irreconcilable systems of politics, economics, and human values. The point here is that the period marked by this great exchange of people and ideas between China and the West, and particularly America, was a period in which the actualities were shaped by the cynical politics and brute force of freebooting imperialist power in which the United States joined along with all the other Western powers and Japan.

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Compared to the U.S.-China experience, the Fulbright-Hays program shows much larger numbers and a wider spread around the world in a much shorter period of time: 40,000 Americans and 74,000 citizens of 122 countries in programs of educational exchange during the last thirty years. As with China, one can assume that many—perhaps most, of these individuals were affected by the exchange in life-changing ways. Each one of them has had, alongside the given program of study or inquiry, the chance to experience the saving grace or crushing disenchantment of close personal contact with the

society and people of the host country. Some are won to lifelong commitments of friendship and mutual interests; other are baffled, repelled, even embittered by the encounter. The varieties of such experience have never been studied enough.

Again, none of this takes place in a vacuum but in the context of shaping political forces and events. These have their impact in the large, but are no less part of each person's own experience. Foreign students and scholars who came to the United States during these three decades had an incomparable opportunity to see at close range how this society went through the convulsions of change in the patterns of race relations, how it responded to the crises of the Vietnam war, and finally how it dealt with the unfolding drama of Watergate. Some no doubt went home believing they had witnessed part of the decline, if not nearly the fall, of American civilization. Others may have been able to see in these events remarkably impressive evidence of surviving health, strength, and recuperative capacity in the American system. Many thousands, of course, did not go home at all, but took every means they could to remain and make their lives here, an ultimately decisive comment on their experience.

Americans who went abroad as part of this experience also became witnesses of critical history, especially in the new states of Asia and Africa. What began in Asia and Africa beginning thirty years ago is the collapse of the colonial empires and the white supremacy system was a massive opening into the world for millions of hitherto isolated, subjected, and subordinated people. Tens, dozens, scores of new states came into being, most of them committed, at least formally, to the creation of new and freer political institutions to replace the tyrannies of the past. This too came out of an "exchange" of a kind of a generation or two before. The rhetoric of colonial counter-assertion of human worth and equal political rights came not out of any of the autocratic and tyranny-ridden traditions that victimized Asia and Africa, but out of the revolutionary, liberal-humanistic, and nationalistic counter-traditions of 19th century Europe itself.

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But if ever there was a chance that colonial tyranny could be replaced by anything resembling open politics, it withered early. This was—in some partial but incalculable measure—due to the failure of the United States to act on its professions. If there was a chance in the immediate aftermath of World War II for the United States, at that moment the dominant world power, to bolster open politics in the new states of Asia and Africa, that chance was not taken. The United States did not support the nationalist movements when it was time to do so. When it finally came around to trying to bolster up some post-colonial client, the right moment had usually long since passed, the client turned out to be someone like Nguyen Van Thieu (as earlier in China it

had been Chiang Kai-shek), and the governing American officials that successful policy could rest on brute force alone. This event—Vietnam, and again just recently the Ford-Kissinger offer of Angola as a new pit to fall into, an invitation which the American Congress and people fortunately did not accept. By this time, of course, in the Russian-Chinese-American grabs for influence in Africa or elsewhere in the post-colonial world, open politics, or even the promise of it, has nothing any longer to do with the case. For, it also has to be said, if ever there was a chance that colonial nationalism in Asia and Africa could flower by its own roots and nurture into democratic or even into minimally open or humane political systems, the chance flickered only most briefly and in only a few places.

In China there never was any pretense to anything open in the “freedom” that Mao brought with him to power. China’s great mass was added to the vast already-closed Communist empire in Russia and Eastern Europe; the profound fissures that subsequently opened within came out of deep-laid nationalist faults, not out of any of the differences between the Russian and Chinese styles of building gulag societies. Such pretenses as there were elsewhere in the post-colonial world faded quickly. The fragile shoots of democratic-style politics that did grow out of some colonial soil in a few places, as in the Philippines and India, lived a somewhat longer but sickly life, withering and dying with hardly a twitch after barely twenty-five years.

Today no scholar, no educator, no eager student, with or without a Fulbright grant, can follow his own bent in any of these countries any more, or for that matter almost anywhere in the world outside the shrinking sphere of surviving democratic political systems in Europe and North America. Much as they differ, all but perhaps two dozen of the world’s 150 ex-colonial states are now governed in greater or lesser degree by closed political systems of one kind or another, from total orders of control and mobilization, as in China, to ineffectual little satrapies maintained only by a bloody-handed palace guard, as in Uganda. Never have more “liberated” people become more subject to more tyrannies in the name of achieving more freedom, or in so short a period of time.

Along with the “larger” facts of power and economics that govern world politics, these are the conditions and paradoxes that dominate the near foreground of what lies ahead. For those concerned with “international education,” “links for human understanding,” and “world community,” they become central among all the facts that confront us.

There is no way of blinking away any of these larger impinging questions. On what basis will surviving democratic systems in the North Atlantic region continue to survive in an overwhelming non-democratic and anti-democratic world pressing its own claims to inter-continental power even while it is torn

itself by its own major and minor conflicts? What new pecking orders of power will emerge from the great fragmentation of politics in most of the world, or what new pluralisms? And somehow we must try to imagine these outcomes under still larger shadows that will not go away: the implicit threat of some nuclear final solution to our current power struggles, and/or the onset of new conquests by science to bedevil humankind still further, especially at the frontiers of biochemistry where approaching new knowledge promises to put in the hands of men of power who already control so many human lives the ultimate power to control life itself. One realizes that international understanders, forgers of human links, builders of world community probably have to proceed as if these prospects were not as real as they actually are, and that it is a matter of how much time there is in which to seek alternative outcomes.

In any case, the nearer facts of life and outlooks are bleak enough. Authoritarian politics are by definition in conflict with the goals of free and open education, scholarship, inquiry, art, cultural development in almost all its forms. In the world of closed and closing societies, systems of control penetrate the remotest monastic refuges of learning, the laboratories of the purest of "pure" scientists. The planet becomes more and more a planet without visas for exchange students and scholars, conditions of study and inquiry grow more and more constricted and narrowed. The flow becomes a trickle and is finally confined to those individuals and purists deemed safe or harmless, or is finally cut off altogether. Abuse of the role of the travelling scholar/writer and even missionary by American intelligence agencies has contributed substantially to the growth of suspicious hostility in many countries, but has served more as justification than cause for restraints that so many regimes imposed to serve their own political defensive or offensive ends. Meanwhile, as "human rights" decay and disappear and make victims of more and more non-conformers and non-belongers to dominant regional, tribal, religious and other power groups, representatives of all these states continue sending representatives year after year to conference after conference held to discuss and promote exchanges of persons and ideas at what can best be called "international understanding."

In the United States, where the last best hopes of democratic survival still lie, we come to a bicentennial anniversary in a condition of crisis that brings all our democratic professions under acute and constant and aggravated question. It is a question that seems almost now to turn on whether our national democratic ethos will finally succeed in imposing itself as fact on forces and conditions in our society that would, if they could, keep it a fiction. We are finally engaged in trying to see how—and if—we can integrate our society and to assure to *all* of its members in fact the equality of status and opportunity which in profession they have always theoretically enjoyed, and



to see if government can in fact be of, by, and for all the people, assuring the free choice of those who elect and the accountability of those who are elected.

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Last time around—also a matter of only a few decades—it took history's most destructive war to keep the Nazi and the Japanese generals from deciding what further direction world politics should take. No such "remedy" is now reasonably available. No other is in sight. For at least two centuries now, the notion that *education* would enable human beings to improve their state has remained a prime article of faith for all who remained convinced that knowledge and reason would and could prevail in human affairs. Now that conviction is painfully weaker and we are much less sure than we were that we know what education is in our own society, much less in the rest of the world. We are even less able to know what *international* education is. In what political context? In and for open societies or for closing or closed ones? To create what sets of values, for whom and for what? Until we can answer these questions for ourselves more effectively than we have until now, I do not know what answers we can make through any process of exchange with the rest of the world. The key word of the next thirty years in any case is not likely to be *education*. More likely, for philosophers and educators, and geologists too, and for us all, it will be *survival*. The question will be on what terms.

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laboratory, and there they have a television screen and a typewriter console in front of it. Through this, everyone in a single field of interest can talk to each other wherever they are. When they come in the morning they can press a button and ask who knows where I can find something on such and such. This comes up on the screens in all the various laboratories, and then answers start coming in because the memory—the circuits—can handle enormous amounts of information and can transmit and exchange books, diagrams, anything.

\* \* \*

I can see the time some ten years or so where there would be satellite networks devoted entirely to scholarship. For example, you could have all the world's libraries accessible through communication satellites, so anybody with the right console could call for any information anywhere, any library. Now this is a purely mechanical device but just think of the value of it to scholarship. Some scholars on the other side of the two cultures' gap decrie technology, and technology is oversold, but technology is absolutely vital. I suggested in a paper I gave a few years ago that the Renaissance may have been triggered by the simple technical invention of spectacles, which at once doubled or tripled the effective working lives of the medieval scholars. Imagine the revolution that would be produced if any scholar could have in his home essentially all the world's information just by pressing a button.

\* \* \*

The expansion of these facilities and also their cheapness, and perhaps the existence of many alternative systems of distribution will give it much greater flexibility and will make it very hard for the state to control all these systems.

\* \* \*

I think on the whole—insofar as this technology is not neutral—it does favor free exchange of information. For example, direct dialing in Europe has made it impossible for the state to control what people say to people in other countries. This is a very important political factor. Anybody can go to any telephone box anywhere and dial anybody as long as they have the money for it. I happened to be in Vienna for the United Nations conference on peaceful uses of space on the day Czechoslovakia was invaded. The Czech delegates were in the corner with their transistor radios finding out what was really happening in their country. Radio passes over all frontiers and it is very hard to censor or control it. And in the Third World, the transistor radio has been the greatest information revolution because it by-passed printing. You get to people who never learned to read.

\* \* \*

With respect to educational exchange programs, I can see a great reduction in physical traveling made possible by the new technology. People will be able to stay at home and do a vast amount of interacting. You cannot com-



municate properly with people you haven't met. So some travel will still be essential. But once you have met, you can communicate by letter, electronics, whatever, much more effectively. The age of satellites will cut routine travel which is such a bore.

\* \* \*

We are going to have some overall world systems—some global weather systems, global communications systems—but at the same time we will have thousands, maybe millions of cultural groups which are interacting with each other, preserving their identity and communicating effectively. As the systems become cheaper, all the people speaking their own language—even a very obscure language—may be able to talk to each other wherever they may be in the world.

\* \* \*

Over 100 years ago the United States was really created by two inventions: the railroad and the electric telegraph. Before those inventions you couldn't really have a United States. After those inventions, it was inevitable. Now we are seeing on a global scale an almost exact parallel. Instead of the railroad and the telegraph, it is the jet plane and the communication satellite fulfilling the same role—sort of making this one world.

\* \* \*

There may be an enormous cultural avalanche one day as we succeed in detecting and deciphering intelligent messages from space, as I'm sure we will. It may be a one-way process just as the Renaissance discovered Greek culture. We couldn't send any messages back to the Greeks, but all of their culture sort of descended on us through translation. So the culture and scientific knowledge of some superior-intelligence may descend on us even if it takes thousands of years to travel to us. I wouldn't be writing so many books about the future unless I thought there was to be a future. When I am asked about our future chances, I make a rather facetious answer; namely, that I think we have a 51 percent chance of survival. I think one should be an optimist because then there is hope that one will achieve a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Looking into space gives one perhaps a better perspective on our position in the universe. And if you look at the stars and think of the immensity of space and wonder who or what is watching us out there, where we are in the hierarchy of the universe—are we nearer the angels or the apes—it prevents you from getting too conceited. At the same time you shouldn't overdo it. You should be quite proud of what we've done but we should realize also we have a great deal more to do and we have made appalling mistakes. The future is unlimited. There are no limits to growth, because this is just the beginning of our exploration on the universe.

### *"The Closing Societies"*

*Harold R. Isaacs; Professor of Political Science; Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Cambridge, Massachusetts*

Between 1854 and 1949, some 22,000 Chinese came to the United States to study at American colleges and universities. In China, American and other foreign missionaries founded schools which by the end of that period had produced about 250,000 graduates. In 1937, when Japan's all-out invasion of China ushered in the epoch of the Second World War, there were more than 13,000 Americans living and working in China, many of them businessmen bent on profit, but many among them also teachers, scholars, journalists, bent on sharing and acquiring knowledge. With all its differences, this too, was a massive exchange of people and ideas that left visible marks on the cultures of the two countries and on the minds of generations of people who learned things about each other during a sustained experience of contact and mutual discovery.

How one judges the effect of such an exchange depends on when and where one stands on the rim of observation, under what light and from what angle the "facts" are seen, and what the expectations of it were and are. The effects of the Chinese-American exchange during those decades were many and many-sided, but it would be difficult to suggest now that they served as a "link for human understanding" or in "the development of a world community," not, at least, in the sense that we might wishfully want to understand those phrases. The Americans and Chinese who shared in or were influenced by the experience of this exchange also shared in the making of the ultimately disastrous outcomes: severance and hostility and the confrontation of irreconcilable systems of politics, economics, and human values. The point here is that the period marked by this great exchange of people and ideas between China and the West, and particularly America, was a period in which the actualities were shaped by the cynical politics and brute force of freebooting imperialist power in which the United States joined along with all the other Western powers and Japan.

\* \* \*

Compared to the U.S.-China experience, the Fulbright-Hays program shows much larger numbers and a wider spread around the world in a much shorter period of time: 40,000 Americans and 74,000 citizens of 122 countries in programs of educational exchange during the last thirty years. As with China, one can assume that many, perhaps most, of these individuals were affected by the exchange in life-changing ways. Each one of them has had, alongside the given program of study or inquiry, the chance to experience the saving grace or crushing disenchantment of close personal contact with the

society and people of the host country. Some are won to lifelong commitments of friendship and mutual interests; other are baffled, repelled, even embittered by the encounter. The varieties of such experience have never been studied enough.

Again, none of this takes place in a vacuum but in the context of shaping political forces and events. These have their impact in the large, but are no less part of each person's own experience. Foreign students and scholars who came to the United States during these three decades had an incomparable opportunity to see at close range how this society went through the convulsions of change in the patterns of race relations, how it responded to the crises of the Vietnam war, and finally how it dealt with the unfolding drama of Watergate. Some no doubt went home believing they had witnessed part of the decline, if not nearly the fall, of American civilization. Others may have been able to see in these events remarkably impressive evidence of surviving health, strength, and recuperative capacity in the American system. Many thousands, of course, did not go home at all, but took every means they could to remain and make their lives here, an ultimately decisive comment on their experience.

Americans who went abroad as part of this experience also became witnesses of critical history, especially in the new states of Asia and Africa. What began in Asia and Africa beginning thirty years ago is the collapse of the colonial empires and the white supremacy system was a massive opening into the world for millions of hitherto isolated, subjected, and subordinated people. Tens, dozens, scores of new states came into being, most of them committed, at least formally, to the creation of new and freer political institutions to replace the tyrannies of the past. This too came out of an "exchange" of a kind of a generation or two before. The rhetoric of colonial counter-assessment of human worth and equal political rights came not out of any of the autocratic and tyranny-ridden traditions that victimized Asia and Africa, but out of the revolutionary, liberal-humanistic, and nationalistic counter-traditions of 19th century Europe itself.

\* \* \*

But if ever there was a chance that colonial tyranny could be replaced by anything resembling open politics, it withered early. This was—in some partial but incalculable measure—due to the failure of the United States to act on its professions. If there was a chance in the immediate aftermath of World War II for the United States, as that moment the dominant world power, to foster open politics in the new states of Asia and Africa, that chance was not taken. The United States did not support the nationalist movements when it was time to do so. When it finally came around to trying to bolster up some post-colonial client, the right moment had usually long since passed, the client turned out to be someone like Nguyen Van Thieu (as earlier in China it

had been Chiang Kai-shek), and the governing American policy (that successful policy could rest on brute force alone). This eventuality (Vietnam, and again just recently the Ford-Kissinger offer of Angola as a new pit to fall into, an invitation which the American Congress and people fortunately did not accept). By this time, of course, in the Russian-Chinese-American grabs for influence in Africa or elsewhere in the post-colonial world, open politics, or even the promise of it, has nothing any longer to do with the case. For, it also has to be said, if ever there was a chance that colonial nationalism in Asia and Africa could flower by its own roots and nurture into democratic or even into minimally open or humane political systems, the chance flickered only most briefly and in only a few places.

In China there never was any pretense to anything open in the "freedom" that Mao brought with him to power. China's great mass was added to the vast already-closed Communist empire in Russia and Eastern Europe; the profound fissures that subsequently opened within came out of deep-laid nationalist faults, not out of any of the differences between the Russian and Chinese styles of building gulag societies. Such pretenses as there were elsewhere in the post-colonial world faded quickly. The fragile shoots of democratic-style politics that did grow out of some colonial soil in a few places, as in the Philippines and India, lived a somewhat longer but sickly life, withering and dying with hardly a twitch after barely twenty-five years.

Today no scholar, no educator, no eager student, with or without a Fulbright grant, can follow his own bent in any of these countries any more, or for that matter almost anywhere in the world outside the shrinking sphere of surviving democratic political systems in Europe and North America. Much as they differ, all but perhaps two dozen of the world's 150 ex-colonial states are now governed in greater or lesser degree by closed political systems of one kind or another, from total orders of control and mobilization, as in China, to ineffectual little satrapies maintained only by a bloody-handed palace guard, as in Uganda. Never have more "liberated" people become more subject to more tyrannies in the name of achieving more freedom, or in so short a period of time.

Along with the "larger" facts of power and economics that govern world politics, these are the conditions and paradoxes that dominate the near foreground of what lies ahead. For those concerned with "international education," "links for human understanding," and "world community," they become central among all the facts that confront us.

There is no way of blinking away any of these larger impinging questions. On what basis will surviving democratic systems in the North Atlantic region continue to survive in an overwhelming non-democratic and anti-democratic world pressing its own claims to inter-continental power even while it is torn

itself by its own major and minor conflicts? What new pecking orders of power will emerge from the great fragmentation of politics in most of the world, or what new pluralisms? And somehow we must try to imagine these outcomes under still larger shadows that will not go away: the implicit threat of some nuclear final solution to our current power struggles, and/or the onset of new conquests by science to bedevil humankind still further, especially at the frontiers of biochemistry where approaching new knowledge promises to put in the hands of men of power who already control so many human lives the ultimate power to control life itself. One realizes that international understanders, forgers of humanlinks, builders of world community probably have to proceed as if these prospects were not as real as they actually are, and that it is a matter of how much time there is in which to seek alternative outcomes.

In any case, the nearer facts of life and outlooks are bleak enough. Authoritarian politics are by definition in conflict with the goals of free and open education, scholarship, inquiry, art, cultural development in almost all its forms. In the world of closed and closing societies, systems of control penetrate the remotest monastic refuges of learning, the laboratories of the purest of "pure" scientists. The planet becomes more and more a planet without visas for exchange students and scholars, conditions of study and inquiry grow more and more constricted and narrowed. The flow becomes a trickle and is finally confined to those individuals and purists deemed safe or harmless, or is finally cut off altogether. Abuse of the role of the travelling scholar/writer and even missionary by American intelligence agencies has contributed substantially to the growth of suspicious hostility in many countries, but has served more as justification than cause for restraints that so many regimes imposed to serve their own political defensive or offensive ends. Meanwhile, as "human rights" decay and disappear and make victims of more and more non-conformers and non-belongers to dominant regional, tribal, religious and other power groups, representatives of all the states continue sending representatives year after year to conference after conference held to discuss and promote exchanges of persons and ideas at what can best be called "international understanding."

In the United States, where the last best hopes of democratic survival still lie, we come to a bicentennial anniversary in a condition of crisis that brings all our democratic professions under acute and constant and aggravated question. It is a question that seems almost now to turn on whether our national democratic ethos will finally succeed in imposing itself as fact on forces and conditions in our society that would, if they could, keep it a fiction. We are finally engaged in trying to see how—and if—we can integrate our society and to assure to *all* of its members in fact the equality of status and opportunity which in profession they have always theoretically enjoyed, and

to see if government can in fact be of, by, and for all the people, assuring the free choice of those who elect and the accountability of those who are elected.

\* \* \*

Last time around—also a matter of only a few decades—it took history's most destructive war to keep the Nazi and the Japanese generals from deciding what further direction world politics should take. No such "remedy" is now reasonably available. No other is in sight. For at least two centuries now, the notion that *education* would enable human beings to improve their state has remained a prime article of faith for all who remained convinced that knowledge and reason would and could prevail in human affairs. Now that conviction is painfully weaker and we are much less sure than we were that we know what education is in our own society, much less in the rest of the world. We are even less able to know what *international* education is. In what political context? In and for open societies or for closing or closed ones? To create what kinds of values, for whom and for what? Until we can answer these questions for ourselves more effectively than we have until now, I do not know what answers we can make through any process of exchange with the rest of the world. The key word of the next thirty years in any case is not likely to be *education*. More likely, for philosophers and educators, and geologists too, and for us all, it will be *survival*. The question will be on what terms.

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