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ABSTRACT

A large-scale, national survey of college and university professors was conducted in 1975, supported by the National Institute of Education. The data were collected from more than 3,500 faculty members, and include 400 separate items from each respondent. The study tapped faculty opinion on such matters as unionization, bargaining agents, the university's response to and priorities in austerity, the argument over affirmative action, equality vs. meritocracy in the university, the nature of the academic enterprise, perception of one's own role(s), the value placed on various faculty responsibilities, teaching versus research, the failings of the American university, domestic social, political, and economic matters, and foreign policy issues. Faculty views are presented in three perspectives: as compared with faculty opinion at earlier times, compared with public opinion, and analyzed by age, sex, and academic rank of the respondents. (MSE)

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VOLUME I

FINAL REPORT

Survey of the Social, Political, and Educational Perspectives
of
American College and University Faculty

National Institute of Education Project Number 3-3053

Project Directors: Everett Carl Ladd, Jr.
Director, Social Science Data Center
and Professor of Political Science
University of Connecticut

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Institution Administering Grant Funds:

University of Connecticut
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The research reported herein was performed pursuant to a grant contract with the National Institute of Education, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Contractors undertaking such projects under Government sponsorship are encouraged to express freely their professional judgment in the conduct of the project. Points of view or opinions stated do not, therefore, necessarily represent official National Institute of Education position or policy.

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PREFACE

In April 1973, we submitted to the National Institute of Education a request for research support. We proposed to conduct a national survey of American college and university professors. Several considerations were identified as of primary importance in justifying this new survey and in specifying its focus.

We noted that it was not until 1969 that a large-scale, omnibus, national survey of U.S. faculty had been conducted. Universities had become primary social institutions but the sociopolitical orientations of their members had not been systematically examined--even though the survey tool was being regularly employed as a means of inquiring into public opinion generally. We argued that the place of the contemporary university had become such that students of American society and politics should include the university within the bounds of their theoretical and empirical data gathering perview.

More specifically, we emphasized the importance of attending to faculty opinion in the context of a changing environment. The 1969 Carnegie Commission on Higher Education "snapshot" of faculty opinions and perspectives was taken at a time when campus protests and demonstrations were the dominant concern. By 1973, however, academe had clearly entered a new era, with a distinctive agenda. Austerity had begun to command attention as much as protests did a half decade earlier. In the context of fiscal austerity, loss of public confidence or at least enthusiasm, and growing pessimism, a number of new or

greatly extended areas of conflict had appeared. We noted, for example, that as recently as the mid-1960s unionization of college and university professors was not seriously discussed. But by the early 1970s it had become a major issue and a subject of contention.

To understand universities, to be able to anticipate the types of responses they will make to the demands upon them, to be able to assess their performance generally, one must understand the social, political, and educational commitments of the people who direct them--meaning here most notably the half million men and women who are employed full-time in professorial positions.

We also noted in our April 1973 proposal that in the course of research which we had already conducted on faculty opinion a number of areas of inquiry had been identified requiring further survey examination. The principal publication based on the first phase of our examination of the American academic community is The Divided Academy: Professors and Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1975).

The survey which we proposed in April 1973 was, after extensive developmental work, administered in the Spring of 1975. We believe that all of our objectives in undertaking this survey have been accomplished. This report provides discussion of our many specific findings and as well details procedures followed in the conduct of the survey.

We decided in the Summer of 1975 to place great emphasis upon the rapid dissemination of our survey findings. All too often, the

results of such investigations are made public so long after the date of data collection that their value to people with policy responsibilities in the area greatly diminished. We came to agreement with the editors of The Chronicle of Higher Education on a series of 36 articles, to be published by them from September 1975 through May 1976 on a weekly basis. A considerable burden was placed on us and on our staff by this decision to engage in so much analysis and writing in so compressed a period.

Now, looking back upon this publication experience, we are extremely pleased with it. Data from a national survey of more than 3,500 college and university professors, including some 400 separate items of information on each respondent, collected between March and June of 1975, were presented to the national higher education community through a principal and respected publication beginning in September 1975.

The response from the higher education community has been extremely supportive. We have received more than 400 professional communications from educators expressing their appreciation with the design of the survey and the presentation of its findings. We have distributed 225 copies of a technical report describing survey methodology. We have received more than 25 separate requests for the entire dataset, including one from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (Ann Arbor) which wishes to enter it in its national archive. We have completed special tabulations upon request for more than 50 graduate students, faculty, administrators, and governmental officials.

In short, there has been a very clear expression of interest in the survey, a very strong acknowledgement of its value, by people throughout the higher education community. The importance of regular, systematic survey research in the area has been amply demonstrated.

This report brings together analysis completed over the past nine months for presentation in the Chronicle series. We are engaged in further research with the data which will be presented in a scholarly monograph. Having attended first, then, to prompt communication to the higher education community, we will continue a more elaborate analysis for specialists.

We wish to express our deep appreciation to the National Institute of Education for supporting this study.

PART I

INTRODUCTION

SECTION 1

Portrait of the American Academic: An Introduction

In the Spring of last year, a large national sample of college and university professors were asked to express their opinions on major social and political questions facing the United States, and on important "domestic" issues confronting higher education. They were asked, too, to describe themselves--their backgrounds, career experiences, attainments, aspirations, the norms guiding their professional lives. In this report we will elaborate on the survey findings.

The political importance of academics.

What is supposedly the classic mountain climber's defense of his pursuit--"because it is there"--does not offer sufficient reason for an attempt to scale a group's opinions. We initiated this new study the academic mind not simply because the latter "is there" and naturally of some interest to those of us who comprise it, but because the academy, its occupants and intellectual neighbors have come to play vastly expanded roles in the contemporary United States. A number of observers have used the term postindustrial to describe the

American social setting now emerging as the New Deal era passes into history. The common theme in these various depictions is the massive growth of the science-technology-knowledge sector and of the intellectual stratum.

Familiar though they are, the statistical reflections of this growth remain impressive. In 1940, total federal expenditures, for scientific research and development were just \$74 million; by 1974, such expenditures stood at \$17.9 billion. The federal government spent \$343 million on education at all levels in 1940, while state and local governments were expending \$2.638 billion. Thirty-five years later, federal expenditures for education had climbed to \$9.6 billion and those of state and local government to \$62.2 billion. All institutions of higher education in the United States spent approximately \$674 million on the eve of World War II; by 1974, they were expending some \$34.7 billion. Over this 35 year span, the number of students enrolled in the country's colleges and universities jumped from 1.5 to 8.5 million. And the ranks of those having attended college were swelled by 26 million persons, increasing from 9 million in 1940 to 35 million in 1974.

Such data bespeak broader, and deeper, changes in American society: The insatiable demands of advanced technology for the products of scientific research; a vast transformation in the mix of occupations and hence in the type of training required; a level of affluence such as to permit segments of the mass public, of a size wholly lacking any

historical precedent, to participate, albeit imperfectly, in the world of ideas. As a result, the intellectual stratum and its attendant institutions have experienced an extraordinary growth--not just in numbers but as well in importance, in the centrality of their position, in the scope of their links to, and claims, upon public policy.

As these changes have occurred, it has become necessary to grant the importance of the interest configurations which they entail. We have long been accustomed to thinking of business and labor as interest groups. Even now, though, we are probably less inclined to recognize the educational and scientific communities as interest collectivities. But they are that--and critical ones. This means not only that they reveal shared interests, not only that they make claim upon other groups through government for programs and policies reflective of such interests; but as well that the views they hold, the actions they take, the problems they confront, the divisions and tensions and conflicts they manifest, are highly consequential for the society.

It may seem a curious time to write about the growth and importance of the various components of the intellectual stratum. The mood around academe these days is alleged to be rather dark and gloomy. This current malaise may reflect woes of the whole economy, and our sharing in a great national funk. Apart from this though, nothing in an argument for secular advances in centrality need suggest an absence of problems. Quite the contrary. One would expect growth and the achievement of a central place in the society to be problem-stimulating:

more actors, more demands, more dissensus, higher stakes, higher expectations, vastly enlarge requirements.

We undertook the new survey of faculty opinion not just to satisfy "in the family" curiosity, then, but because academics, as a prominent part of the intellectual stratum, have become over the past quarter century a highly consequential element of American society.

Scope of the inquiry

The questionnaire which we employed is a long one. It tapped faculty opinion on a host of the most compelling campus concerns and controversies. Should the professoriate unionize? For what ends, with what consequences? If there is to be a bargaining agent, who should it be--AAUP, AFT, NEA, or someone else? What should be the university's response to austerity? If cuts must be made, what should be the first, and the last, to go? How do faculty assess the argument over affirmative action? How are the sometimes competing claims of the "ideas" of equality and meritocracy weighed and reconciled? What views do professors hold as to the nature of the academic enterprise? What role(s) do they see themselves performing? What sorts of activities by faculty are currently too highly, or conversely too lowly, valued? How are the claims of teaching and research evaluated? What model do our respondents hold up for the "verray parfit, gentil" academic? What are the most substantial failings of the contemporary American university?

Because of the central involvement of academics in symbolic formulations for the society--in setting the political agenda, accounting

for the performance of the various institutions, providing a language together with a body of concepts and precepts which serve to interpret the sociopolitical system and the culture, and in communicating these "shadows" to succeeding generations of students--their general ideological perspectives and policy commitments seemed to merit special attention. We examined faculty views on the range of domestic social and economic matters, and on foreign policy issues. How well, or poorly, is the American polity performing? What sorts of new governmental responses are required? What are the lessons of Watergate and Vietnam? What are the boundaries of U.S. responsibilities in world affairs? What is the appropriate American role in the international community, and how should it be acted out?

What do the principal ideological configurations within the professoriate look like? How strong are the contending camps? What is the strength and the direction of the partisan commitments of American academics? How active are they in public affairs? How do they assess their public influence, vis-a-vis other groups?

Comparing faculty opinion

In reporting on these and a bundle of related matters, we will be occupied with three sets of comparisons. First, the views of faculty in 1975 will be compared to those of the professoriate at earlier points in time. Neither the academy nor the country have been tranquil places this past decade. What sorts of changes have occurred in the professors' views of their careers, their calling, their institution, their society?

Two other large national surveys of academics--that sponsored by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education in 1969, and the one conducted by the American Council on Education in 1973--promote these time comparisons.

We will also regularly compare the opinions of faculty to those of the American public and of various subgroups within the general population. The 1975 professorial survey included a number of questions posed at about the same point in time to other groups in separate nation-wide studies.

Finally, the perspectives of many cohorts within the professoriate will be compared. American academics manifest some important commonalities, evidence a distinctive outlook; but they remain much divided internally. How do faculty at different types of institutions react to the prospects of unionization? How much at odds are groups defined by age and academic rank in their assessments of university performance and the state of the scholarly profession. To what extent do women and men in the professoriate disagree on issues surrounding the affirmative action controversy?

It is important to make these several comparisons, because they often yield sharply contrasting perspectives. One gets, for example, some sense of the shape of faculty social and political thinking from the fact that in Spring 1975 a solid majority (59 percent) favored legalizing the use of marijuana, the preference of just 20 percent of general public and of 43 percent of all college graduates in the country

(National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, Spring 1975). Academics, then, are distinctively more "liberal" than other groups in the population on this--as indeed they are on virtually the entire range of social issues.

But when we begin to compare cohorts within the faculty, we get a very different sense of the academic mind. Breaking the professoriate down into groups defined by just one variable--scholarly discipline--we see immense differences on the marijuana question (as, again, on almost all social and political controversies). Massive majorities of social scientists, reaching 82 percent among sociologists and 79 percent among social psychologists, endorsed legalization of marijuana; while faculty in the applied professional fields were decisively opposed to legalization--58 percent against, 42 percent for in engineering, 53-47 percent in business administration, 70-30 percent in the college of agriculture faculties. We commonly find greater opinion difference among the various disciplines within the professoriate than we can locate among the most grossly differentiated subgroups (e.g., rich and poor, young and old, whites and blacks) in the general public.

Welcome to ambiguity

If we have one fault to find with many reports on surveys published in the country's newspapers, it is that they suggest a clarity and a decisiveness typically absent from the real world of public opinion.

Much of the commentary here will dwell on the tentativeness, complexity, and self-contradiction of faculty opinion--for such features are usually found when one gets beneath the surface of opinion distributions.

The matter of faculty unrest and pessimism in the face of austerity and other sundry academic woes is a good case in point. Our survey surely provides an abundance of data pointing to professorial unease if not despair. When two-thirds of the faculty hold to the view that

Table 1. The Unhappy Professoriate

". . . has the status of the academic profession increased, declined, or stayed roughly the same over the past decade?"

Increased significantly	1%
Increased moderately	11%
Stayed the same	23%
Declined moderately	46%
Declined significantly	18%

"If an election for a collective bargaining agent were to be held now at your institution, how would you vote?"

For a collective bargaining agent / those favoring AAUP, AFT, NEA, and some other bargaining agent, combined /	71%
For "no agent"	29%

the status of their profession has declined in recent years (Table 1), and seven in ten are sufficiently dissatisfied with things as they are to indicate approval of a move to unionism--which would constitute the single most substantial change in the last quarter century in the way universities do business--the mood is hardly euphoric. It would be easy to write of "the unhappy professoriate"--but it would be wrong.

Table 2 gives us a very different picture. Fifty-eight percent of professors believe their personal economic position has gotten better

recently, while only 21 percent find that it has declined. Eighty-seven percent think they made the right career choice, and would again choose

Table 2. The Happy Professoriate

"Has your own economic position as a member of the academic profession improved, worsened, or stayed roughly the same over the past five years?"

Improved markedly	17%
Improved moderately	41%
Stayed the same	22%
Worsened somewhat	16%
Worsened significantly	5%

"If you were to begin your career again, would you still want to be a college professor?"

Definitely yes	49%
Probably yes	38%
Probably no	10%
Definitely no	2%

"In general, how do you feel about the institution at which you are now a faculty member?"

Very good place for me	50%
Fairly good place for me	41%
Not a good place for me	9%

". . . how successful do you consider yourself in your career?"

Very successful	28%
Fairly successful	65%
Fairly unsuccessful	6%
Very unsuccessful	1

academe if they were starting anew. The vast majority of faculty are similarly satisfied with the school at which they teach, and all but the proverbial handful consider themselves successful people. Behold, in a time of national gloom, the happy professoriate!

In fact, American academics are at once highly satisfied and very unsatisfied. The complexity and the contradiction in faculty opinion will receive continuing attention.

PART II

AN OVERVIEW PORTRAIT OF THE PROFESSION

Section 2

The Social Character of Academe

Who enters the professoriate? What, specifically, is the mix in class background, sex, ethnicity, place of birth, and the like, of the roughly 400,000 full-time faculty at America's 2,600 colleges and universities? Since we will be attending at considerable length in this report to the opinions of academics, it seems appropriate here at the outset to describe the group's social character.

Religious background

The 1975 survey permits, for the first time, a detailed portrait of the ethnic and religious background of professors. Before this we had precise information only on the basic religious breakdown--the percentage of Catholic, Protestant and Jewish parentage. Those distributions, confirmed anew by our 1975 survey, show a strikingly large representation of Jews, compared to their proportion of the public at large, and a clear if more modest underrepresentation of Catholics (Table 1).

Table 1. Religious background of faculty, and of the general public (row percentages)

	<u>Jewish</u>	<u>Catholic</u>	<u>Protestant</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>None</u>
<u>Faculty</u>					
All (1969)*	9	18	66	4	3
All (1975)	10	18	63	5	5
Under 35 years of age	12	21	59	4	5
At major colleges and universities**	17	12	62	5	5
<u>General Public</u>					
All***	3	27	67	1	3
College-educated***	7	26	63	1	3

*All faculty data reported in this series are from the 1975 Ladd-Lipset survey unless otherwise specifically indicated. Data from the 1969 Carnegie Commission survey of the American professoriate are introduced here for comparative purposes; further analysis on religious background can be found in Ladd and Lipset, The Divided Academy: Professors and Politics (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1975).

**Schools classified by a three variable Index of School Quality, based upon (1) academic selectivity (SAT scores required for admission); (2) affluence (total institutional expenditures, adjusted for the number of students); and (3) research commitment (total institutional expenditures for research, again adjusted for the number of students).

***Data from the 1973, 1974 and 1975 National Opinion Research Center (NORC) General Social Surveys.

Just three percent of the U.S. population, Jews are one-tenth of the professoriate, and one-sixth of the faculties of the major research-oriented colleges and universities. In sharp contrast, Catholics are about one-quarter of the general populace, a bit less than one-fifth of the faculty, and little more than one-tenth of the major school professoriate.

These rather general statistics show people of Protestant background to be represented among academics at roughly their proportion in the nation. In fact, we can now establish, some Protestant denominations are relatively heavy, others very light contributors. The various groups of Baptists comprise the "religion raised" for 24 percent of all Americans, but for only nine percent of academics. In a strict statistical sense, then, Baptists are much more underrepresented than Catholics.

Table 2. Proportion of faculty, and general public, raised in the respective Protestant denominations (row percentages)

	<u>Baptist</u>	<u>Methodist</u>	<u>Lutheran</u>	<u>Presbyterian</u>	<u>Episcopalian</u>	<u>Other Protestant</u>
<u>Faculty</u>						
All	9	14	7	17	6	9
At major colleges and universities	7	12	6	19	9	10
<u>General Public</u>						
All	24	15	9	5	2	10
College-educated*	14	15	8	11	6	8

*Data from the 1973, 1974 and 1975 NORC General Social Surveys.

At the other end of the continuum, the Calvinist denominations (Presbyterians, and the New England Congregationalists), and the Episcopalians have entered the faculty in numbers which exceed their share of the populace generally by a margin comparable to that found in the case of Jews. Persons of Presbyterian, Episcopalian and Jewish background, ten percent of the country's population, are one-quarter of all college-educated Americans, one-third of the professoriate and nearly half of major school faculties. Presbyterians and Episcopalians outnumber Catholics at the most prestigious universities by a margin somewhere between two and three to one.

Ethnic background

In ethnic origin, the faculty naturally reflect the population from which they come, but as with religious background, they depart notably in certain instances. By far the largest of these departures involves blacks. At about 11 percent of the general public, blacks are only three percent of academics, with that proportion essentially unchanged over the last decade. Blacks are no more heavily represented in the young faculty cohorts than in the older, and they remain clustered at schools of the lower range.

Persons tracing their ancestry back to the British Isles and northern Europe comprise a full three-quarters of the professoriate, substantially higher than their 60 percent of the population at large (Table 3). In fact, however, the English, Scots and Welsh account for all of this margin. The Irish are somewhat underrepresented, especially it seems

Table 3. Ethnic background of faculty and of the general public* (column percentages)

	<u>Faculty</u>				<u>General Public</u>	
	<u>All</u>	<u>Under 35 years</u>	<u>Over 55 years</u>	<u>At major colleges</u>	<u>All</u>	<u>college-educated</u>
<u>Ethnic Origin</u>						
English, Scot, Welsh	27	35	40	39	20	29
Irish	9	8	8	7	12	12
Protestant	5	3	4	4	7	X
Catholic	4	5	4	3	5	X
German, Austrian	24	25	21	20	22	19
Scandinavian	4	4	5	6	6	5
Italian	3	3	3	3	6	5
Central and East European	11	13	11	15	8	12
Jewish	7	7	9	12	2	X
Protestant & Catholic	4	6	2	3	6	X
Other European	7	7	9	6	6	7
Latin American	1	2	-	1	4	1
Black	3	2	2	2	11	5
Other Countries	2	2	1	2	7	5

*We have drawn these data on the ethnic makeup of the American populace from a variety of sources. Most useful are the General Social Surveys, 1973, 1974, and 1975, of the National Opinion Research Center. We also drew upon U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Characteristics of the Population by Ethnic Origin: March 1972 and 1971," Current Population Reports, P-20, No. 249 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973). Approximately 20 percent of the population are of backgrounds sufficiently mixed so that they cannot be placed in any single "country of origin" category, and those people have been excluded from our presentation. We can say that about three-quarters of this group are white Protestants of mixed European backgrounds, and one-sixth are white Catholics of mixed European ancestry.

"X" means the number of cases are too few for reliable analysis.

among the faculties of the major research-oriented universities. East Europeans are heavily represented in academe, but this is accounted for wholly by East European Jews. People of Italian ancestry are a much smaller proportion of the professoriate than of the public. So, too, are Latin Americans.

With a few notable exceptions, little has happened to the American professoriate, in terms of its ethnic-religious makeup, in the years since World War II. There has been extraordinary growth, of course, but the succeeding waves of newcomers closely resemble those who came before. Professors who entered the teaching profession in the 1920s and 1930s are, in basic ethnic makeup, similar to those who came in during the expansion of the sixties. The proportion Jewish did surge upward, as barriers which long confronted Jews were dismantled and the group generally moved upward in socioeconomic status. The percentage of Catholic parentage has also increased, and Catholics are now 21 percent of academics under 35 years of age, compared to just 13 percent of those over age 55. But continuities in ethnocultural makeup are, on the whole, far more striking than the changes.

Patterns within academe

There are some interesting differences in where members of the various ethnic and religious groups have chosen--or have been required by the opportunities extended--to locate. We divided all colleges and universities in our sample into four quality groups, defined by how selective they are in admitting students, their overall institutional

resources (total budget adjusted to a per student expenditure base), and their research commitment (research expenditures, again adjusted to the number of students); and inquired about characteristics of faculty in each stratum. Professors reared in the high status Protestant denominations, and those from Jewish families, are relatively most numerous in the major research institutions, and their numbers decline sharply with movement down the school quality ladder. Lower status Protestants, and Catholics, show exactly the opposite pattern. The direction of these variations is hardly surprising, but their extent is striking. Catholics, for example, are twice as high a proportion of the "Tier 4" schools (lowest standing, according to our index) as of Tier 1 institutions. British-descended professors are 39 percent of the faculty at the most prestigious institutions, just 30 percent in the lowest stratum. The Irish, on the other hand, are seven percent of the Tier 1 faculties, 15 percent of the Tier 4.

Baptists (religious background, not present religion) make up half the total faculty of colleges of agriculture, but are less than one-fifth of humanists. Congregationalists and Presbyterians are 22 percent of natural scientists, only 13 percent of professors of education. Jews are one-seventh of all social scientists, nearly one-fourth of faculty in medicine; but are just one percent of all academics in the agriculture fields. In general, high status Protestants and Jews are most heavily represented in the liberal arts and sciences, while lower status Protestants are relatively more numerous in the applied professional disciplines. The pattern for Catholics is much more mixed.

Sources of the ethnic distributions

The over- and underrepresentation of the various ethnocultural groups within the faculty, compared to their proportions in the general public, seems to have three distinct causes.

1. The impact of social class. Offspring of parents possessing high socioeconomic status have a distinct advantage over their lower status counterparts in the quest for an academic position. Travel and cosmopolitan experiences are more likely to be part of their childhood; so, too, are books and a related smattering of intellectual activities. More often than not, they attend better primary and secondary schools, get into better colleges--and if they go onto graduate work, secure admission to one of the research-oriented institutions which train the major college faculties.

This is relevant here because ethnic and religious groups vary so sharply in composite social class. And without exception, those of the lowest class position are the most underrepresented, while those of the highest socioeconomic status are the most overrepresented.

For example, just 10 percent of white Baptists in the nation's labor force, and 15 percent of Catholics, hold professional positions; as against 26 percent of Presbyterians, 27 percent of Episcopalians and 30 percent of Jews. Ten percent of Baptists and 13 percent of Catholics are college graduates, a status acquired by 30 percent of Presbyterians, 32 percent of Episcopalians, and 34 percent of Jews. Fifty-eight percent of white Baptists describe themselves as "lower" or "working" class, the standing accepted by only a third of Presbyterians.

2. The impact of ethnic group culture. It is highly unlikely that all of the variation we have located in the rate of ethnic-religious group entry into the professoriate result from economic position and its immediate consequences. We know, for example, that while Jewish Americans now occupy very high socioeconomic status, this has come rather recently, since World War II. Jews were six or seven percent of those entering the faculty in the 1930s--twice their proportion in the general public--when their overall social class position was still low. Until recently, a larger proportion of Jewish academics, than of the rest of the faculty, had fathers who had not graduated from high school.

So more than class and the opportunities it can confer is involved. And a wide assortment of observers have found that "something else" in elements of a group's culture, such as the emphasis placed upon acquiring intellectual skills--in the first instance, literacy--and in the value attached to intellectual attainment.

Intellectualism has long been associated with Jewishness. But Jews are not alone in this orientation. We have noted the heavy representation in the faculty of Presbyterians and Congregationalists, denominations growing out of Calvinism; and it is probably not coincidental that Calvinism stressed the need for an educated ministry and popular literacy in order to understand the Bible. The Calvinist Scots were, after the Jews, the second literate people in Europe. The Puritans of colonial Massachusetts exhibited strong concern for general, and as well for higher education.

3. The impact of discrimination. A number of groups, among them Jews, Catholics, and blacks, have encountered "direct" discrimination in student admissions and faculty hiring, apart from "indirect" discrimination manifesting itself in limits on general social and economic opportunity. Some of this has been completely eradicated, while other elements of it remain. Our point here is simply that raw discriminatory treatment cannot be ignored in accounting for ethnic representation in the professoriate.

American academics are far from being a microcosm of the general populace, in religious and ethnic background. When faculty are compared to the middle classes from which they so disproportionately come, however, the fit becomes much closer. More than anything else, the ethnic makeup of the faculty reflects the group's class origins.

SECTION 3

Faculty Women: Little Gain in Status

The proportion of women in the professoriate is inching upward, from 19 percent in 1969, to 20 percent in 1973, and now to 21 percent in 1975; and the gains have actually been rather striking over the past three years within the slim crop of new entrants fresh out of graduate school. Women are now nearly a third of all full-time faculty under age 30, by far their largest share ever of this professorial "entering class."

But after a half decade of considerable ferment surrounding their position in academe, women as a group occupy very much the same status as they did in 1969. They spend more of their time in the classroom than do the four-fifths of the professoriate who are men, earn less money, write fewer articles and books, exhibit less interest in research, receive less research support. They show a striking pattern of "segregation" in terms of their rank, where they teach, and what they teach. By all objective measures, then, the female professoriate is a deprived group, vis-a-vis male academics.

Still, women are not especially unhappy with matters professional. As they look at the standing of higher education, their own economic

positions, the adequacy of the schools at which they teach, and their personal academic performances, they are--that is, they profess to be--no more dissatisfied than men. Indeed, they are perhaps a bit more satisfied.

Some of these elements involving the position of academic women are rather widely recognized, others little known or discussed. All receive careful documentation from an extensive body of survey material, including not only our 1975 survey, but as well that of the American Council on Education conducted in 1973, and the 1969 Carnegie Commission survey. We continue our profile of the professoriate by comparing the status of the men and women in it.

Academic status

The women who enter the faculty come from somewhat higher social backgrounds than do their male counterparts--in a profession which is notably middle to upper-middle class in family background. For example, just 21 percent of the women, as against 27 percent of the men, are the children of blue-collar workers. Twenty-eight percent of the women say their families were economically "below average" or "poor" at the time they were in high school, while a significantly higher 38 percent of male faculty perceive themselves coming from such circumstances.

Even though they started from a somewhat higher social position, women entering the professoriate have wound up in less prestigious schools. In 1975, women are only one-sixth of all academics in the major research universities, but they are a full third of the faculty in schools of the lowest scholarly standing. For the entire professoriate, there is a strong correlation between family background and the niche

found in the profession: people from families of high socioeconomic status (SES) gain admission to the major graduate schools in far higher proportions than their low SES counterparts, and subsequently occupy higher proportions of the professoriate at major universities. But women, presumably through some mix of discrimination and cultural imperatives, go against the grain-- starting out from a higher socioeconomic position than men and ending up at less prestigious, more teaching- and less research-oriented, places.

The data in Table 1 show the relative deprivation of women in the faculty. Not only are they just one-fifth of the total, but those who have entered the professoriate continue to occupy a much weaker position in the world of scholarship. Thirty-four percent of male faculty are full professors,

Table 1. Professional status of men and women in the faculty (column percentages)

	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
Full professors	34 (29)*	18 (13)*
Teach 11 hours or more per week	45 (37)	58 (52)
Publications last two years:		
None	46 (48)	61 (73)
5 or more	12 (12)	4 (3)
Received no research grants in the last year	54 (62)	73 (85)
At lower tier (3 and 4) colleges and universities	53 (50)	64 (68)

*The data in parentheses are from the 1969 Carnegie Commission survey. All other data are from the 1975 Ladd-Lipset survey.

the status of only 18 percent of the women. Nearly half of the former, compared to only a quarter of the latter, reported receiving some form of research grant in the past year. As a group, the women teach a lot more and write a lot less. Table 1 suggests that the gap between the sexes in these elements of scholarly standing shrank only slightly over the past half decade, if at all.

Even more striking than the overall distributions are those for young academics. The distance between men and women under 35 years of age is in all instances as great as that between older male and female academics. For example, just 15 percent of these younger men are instructors, the status of 41 percent of the women; while 21 percent of the men had reached the ranks of associate or full professors, compared to but eight percent of the women. Fourteen percent among men in the "under 35" cohort, as against three percent of women, reported a high rate (here five or more works in the past two years) of publication.

Where and what they teach

We have long known that women in the professoriate are not spread evenly across the various disciplines, just as they are a disproportionate share of the faculty in certain types of schools. The pattern of "segregation" revealed by Table 2 is still noteworthy. Women are only five percent of all natural science faculty at major research universities. On the other hand, they comprise a full half of all academics teaching at lower-tier schools in a cluster of applied disciplines which historically have been "women's" fields--education, library science, nursing, child development and home economics. Again, our data suggest

that changes in the distribution of academic women, by field and type of school, are occurring very slowly, if at all.

Table 2. Location of women faculty, by discipline group and type of school (row percentages)

	<u>1969*</u>	<u>1975</u>
Natural sciences:		
major universities	5	5
middle tier	7	11
lower tier	13	10
Social sciences:		
major universities	13	18
middle tier	20	19
lower tier	26	28
Applied "women's" fields:		
major universities	37	43
middle tier	44	39
lower tier	51	50

* The 1969 data are from the Carnegie Commission survey.

We have said almost nothing about the salary of women in the professoriate, as it relates to the whole matter of sex discrimination, primarily because this complex question has been handled so nicely in a recent piece by Alan Bayer and Helen Astin (Science, 23 May 1975, pp. 796-802). They report that in 1972-1973 the average salary of academic women was \$3,000 less than that of men; and that much of this gap resulted from differences

in rank, years of employment, field of specialization, involvement in research, and university setting. That is, women are disproportionately in the lower-paying sectors.

Women and the research culture

Whatever their niche in academe, however, women are less involved in research activities than are their male counterparts--and what is more interesting, they profess to have much less interest in research. For example, just 30 percent of women holding the rank of full professor, over 40 years of age, at major universities, in the social sciences and humanities, said they were more interested in research than in teaching; the position of 52 percent of men holding these same attributes (1969 Carnegie data). Thirty-eight percent of men under age 40, at lower tier schools, assistant professors, in the natural sciences, voiced a preference for research. Only 13 percent of similarly-situated women had the same research interest. As we have discussed these data with our colleagues--male and female--we have received scores of fascinating explanations for the pattern. One thing seems clear: while various socially-imposed constraints--such as family responsibilities--might intrude to prevent women from doing research, they cannot stop women from wanting to do research. And part of the reason why academic women get less research support and publish less is because they are less interested in the research enterprise. It is easy to say that the reasons for this are at least in part "cultural," and while this almost certainly is true, it just as certainly isn't very helpful.

Dissatisfaction

Academic women are not doing as well as academic men by a host of criteria, but they are no more dissatisfied (or no less content). If anything, it is the other way. Two-thirds of the women think the status of the academic profession has declined in recent years, as do two-thirds of the men. Twenty-two percent of male faculty believe their own economic position has worsened of late, a view held by just 13 percent of women in academe. (Since the salaries of women, while still lower than those of men, have been increasing a bit faster recently, there is some objective basis for these perceptions.) Thirty-one percent of men in the faculty feel they would be better off at some other college or university, the view of 28 percent of women. Young women on the whole are much more dissatisfied than their senior colleagues--but young men are even more unhappy. Forty-five percent of men under 35 years of age would rather be at some other institution; thirty-nine percent of their female age-mates feel this way. Seven percent of young male faculty describe themselves as professionally "unsuccessful," a label worn by only four percent of young women in academe.

Professional needs and priorities

As they look around at themselves and their careers, and consider the question of what would be the biggest incentive to move to another university, academic women and men show that they have a lot in common, and some notable differences.

Some things matter a lot to a large segment of the professoriate, male and female alike, in terms of incentives to relocate. Higher pay and job security stand out here. Other things, such as getting fewer

administrative responsibilities and the chance for better housing, are not critical for many people, whatever their age or sex (Table 3). Getting a

Table 3. Incentives in seeking a new position; the preferences of academic men and women
(percentage describing each of the following as "essential" or "very important" if they were to consider a new position)

	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men</u>
Higher salary	44 (47)*	48 (51)*
Higher rank	29 (40)	25 (33)
Tenure	43 (47)	44 (45)
Less pressure to publish	18 (18)	16 (13)
More time for research	29 (32)	28 (32)
Small teaching load	29 (30)	29 (26)
More opportunities to teach	22 (29)	18 (14)
Opportunity to teach graduate students	23 (32)	27 (31)
Less administrative responsibilities	11 (10)	15 (15)
More administrative responsibilities	12 (26)	9 (8)
Better students	33 (37)	36 (36)
Better colleagues	31 (38)	31 (36)
Good job for spouse	39 (50)	22 (29)
Better community	30 (36)	31 (36)
Better schools for my children	19 (20)	26 (28)
Better research facilities	24 (32)	26 (33)
Better chance for advancement	40 (48)	31 (43)
Better housing	16 (15)	14 (17)

*All data in this table are from the 1975 Ladd-Lipset survey. The data in parentheses are for faculty under 35 years of age. The other are for all faculty.

good job for their spouses, however, is essential to 39 percent of academic women, while the active concern of just 22 percent of the men. Young women are much more inclined than young men (29 compared to 14 percent) to emphasize the importance of "more opportunities to teach"! And the quest for more administrative responsibilities is a critical consideration for a full quarter of all women under age 35, in sharp contrast to less than one-tenth of their male age-mates. Less attracted by the research culture, women--especially the younger among them--are drawn more to teaching and administration. Perhaps the opportunity for personal interaction, which teaching affords, and the chance to change the direction of universities, offered by responsible administrative positions, are decisive.

Women do bring different perspectives than men to academic life, at least at this point in time, and their arrival in greater numbers could signal some substantial changes. But increased representation of women is coming slowly, and in an era of a relatively young faculty and "zero educational growth," will continue to come slowly.

SECTION 4

Academic Men and Women: Attitudinal and Behavioral Differences

Perhaps the most outstanding change in American academe during the 1970s has been the steady increase in the proportion of women faculty. This is particularly noteworthy among young appointees. According to Alan Cartter, the most persistent student of economic and demographic trends in academe, women now do as well as men in hirings of those coming out of graduate school. Our own national survey indicates that 37 percent of faculty under 30 years of age are female, a larger percentage than they are among recent cohorts of graduate students.

Given the changes in sex ratios in the American professoriate, it is important to analyze what differences, if any, exist between men and women in their attitudes and behavior.

Teaching and Research

Past studies of faculty and graduate students have revealed that women show more interest in teaching than research than men do. This pattern still continues. Twenty-eight percent of men, as contrasted to 17 of women state that their interests lie primarily in research. Among younger faculty, those under 35, preference for research rose to 23 percent, still far below

the figure for younger males, 38 percent. Comparable variations between the sexes occurred among faculty at low-teaching load graduate-research oriented universities and those at colleges which place a much greater emphasis on teaching.

The sex linked differences also held up within most broad discipline categories, with the exception of the social sciences. Thus the preference ratio for research for males compared to females is 37 to 15 in the natural sciences, 21 to 8 among professional school faculty, 24 to 16 for humanists, but reverses to 34 to 42 in the social sciences. The greater orientation towards research among female social scientists may be related to the fact that they also turn out to be much more committed to the ideology of the women's liberation movement than their colleagues in other fields. Perhaps as a result, they have also rejected other traditional feminine orientations, which have been reflected in the preference of female academics for the less competitive person-related teaching role.

The more positive attitude of women towards teaching shows up in the responses to a number of other questions. Thus 46 percent of women as contrasted to 34 of men "strongly agree" that "teaching effectiveness, not publications, should be the primary criterion for promotion." A third of the male faculty and a quarter of the females agree: "No one can be a good teacher unless he or she is involved in research." It is clear, of course, that these variations in attitudes are linked to actual behavior. Fully three-fifths of the women (61 percent) as compared to less than half of the men, 46 percent, indicated that they had not published anything during the past two years. Over a quarter of the men, 26 percent, and 12 of the women, reported three or more publications during that period.

Similar variations show up with respect to the answers to questions dealing with orientations to scholarship. Women were more disposed than men to favor "softer," more "humanistic," approaches. Forty-six percent of the male faculty as compared to 33 of the female agreed with the statement: "It is more important for a scholar to be precise and rigorous than it is for him to be speculative and intuitive." Over a fifth of the male faculty, 21 percent, gave answers which placed them in the extremely rigorous category on the "role of scholar" scale, as compared to 15 percent of the women. As with the reactions to teaching, these differences also exist within the various discipline categories, again excepting the social sciences.

Cultural Styles

Male and female faculty vary in their cultural tastes along the lines associated with traditional sex roles. Men (25 percent) were more likely than women (15) to report never or almost never attending a concert or a play. Conversely, over half the women (54) as contrasted to 36 percent of the men indicated they rarely if ever went to athletic events. Women were much more likely to read cultural magazines than men. The latter, on the other hand, were more disposed to read various business journals regularly.

Differences of this type were as true of younger faculty as older. Thus almost half of the women, 48 percent, under 35 said they rarely, if ever attended an athletic event, as compared to 36 percent of the men. The corresponding figures for those 55 years of age and older are 60 and 43. Again 29 percent of the young males and 17 of the female counterparts hardly ever attended plays; among older faculty those totally disdaining the theatre number 13 and 22 percent.

General Political and Social Views

Past studies of the relationship of sex to social and political issues among the general public indicated that women were more concerned with morality and peace issues than men. To some extent, it can be reported that such variations also differentiate among faculty in the mid-seventies. Men (54 percent) were more likely to oppose "laws forbidding the distribution of pornography" than women (44). A larger proportion of male faculty (40 percent) reported that they were for a "military victory" in Vietnam in the early days of U.S. intervention there than women (27).

The early more pacific position of women faculty on the Vietnam War does not reflect a greater disposition on their part to support more liberal or left positions. If anything, men as a group were slightly more liberal than women on the questions which formed the liberalism-conservatism scale, even though men are more likely to be found in the politically more conservative disciplines (natural sciences and high-status independent and business related professional schools) than women (humanities and people-related professional schools) and are older on the average.

Basically, however, there is relatively little variation between male and female faculty on general political issues. Thus 7 percent of each strongly agree, while 28 percent of the females and 26 of the males "strongly disagree" with the statement: "Poverty in the United States is due to the cultural and psychological problems of the poor." Thirty-one percent of the women and 29 percent of the men feel that "Big corporations should be taken out of private ownership and run in the public interest." Almost three-fifths of both sexes "strongly agree" that "Everything possible should be done to protect the rights of those accused of crime." Again, an identical

percentage, 58 percent of each, favored the legalization of marijuana. The two sexes provided an almost identical response pattern when asked to give their opinion of "communism as a social system." Eleven percent of the women and 10 of the men chose "It's the worst kind of all," while 4 percent of the women and 3 percent of the men said "It's a good type of social system." Forty-three percent of each said "It's all right for some countries." They had the same opinions on defense spending. An identical percentage, 27, of both sexes disagreed with the statement: "The United States is spending too much money for defense and military purposes." In 1972, there was not even a percentage point difference between the sexes in their presidential vote. Female faculty, however, appeared slightly more positive to Gerald Ford (33 percent) than male (31) in 1975.

Women, curiously, are more likely to be identified partisans than men. Thus 48 percent of the women indicated they think of themselves as Democrats or Republicans, while only 41 of the men reported a partisan commitment.

The lack of difference in political orientations between male and female faculty may help account for the amazing similarity in the automobiles they own. An identical percentage, 66, of both sexes own an American car. Thirty-seven percent of the men and 36 of the women drive large autos. Men show a slightly higher preference than women for General Motors cars (28-26). Women are more favorable to Chrysler products (20-17). The distribution of foreign car ownership is also almost identical, with two small exceptions, men favor Volkswagens more than women (11-8); women are more attracted to Japanese cars (8-6). But basically the distributions through the range of possible patterns of ownership are highly comparable, much like their politics.

Racial and Minority Issues

In 1969, when the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education polled a very large national sample of faculty, there was no difference in the responses of the two sexes to questions dealing with proposals to improve the situation of blacks or minorities generally. Only 22 percent of the men and 21 of the women agreed that "normal academic requirements should be relaxed in appointing members of minority groups to faculty here." Almost twice as many felt that "more minority groups of undergraduates should be admitted here even if it means relaxing the normal academic standards for admission," but the reactions of the two sexes were once more almost identical, 39 and 38 percents.

By 1975, when we again polled American professors, the consciousness and concern of women faculty for the situation of minorities generally and women in particular had risen. On a variety of questions, they differed from their male colleagues in showing greater sympathy for the situation of minorities, and for affirmative action to improve their own position. Thus only 27 percent of the women as compared to 36 percent of the men strongly agreed that the United States has made "meaningful progress over the past twenty years toward achieving equality of opportunity for black Americans." On the other hand, there was little difference related to sex on the school busing issue. Slightly less than half the faculty, 49 percent of the women and 47 percent of the men favored busing to achieve elementary school integration.

Women were relatively more favorably disposed to favor equal rights for lesbians and homosexuals than men. A fifth, 20 percent of the former and 27

percent of the latter felt that "lesbians and homosexuals should not be permitted to teach in the schools." Over half the female professors, 51 percent, as compared to 42 percent of their male colleagues strongly opposed any barriers related to sexual tendencies.

When it came to questions bearing directly on the situation of women, however, sharp sex-linked differences showed up. Over two thirds of the female faculty (65 percent) agreed that "colleges and universities for the most part have not applied meritocratic standards in the past," while a majority, 53 percent, of the males disagreed, seemingly feeling that women had been treated fairly. Given these variations of response, it is not surprising perhaps that a difference of 28 percent occurred between the responses of the two sexes to the statement: "There is no way to determine what is the 'best' academically. 'Meritocracy' is a smokescreen behind which faculty have hidden in promoting discriminatory practices." Fully 68 percent of the women agreed; 60 percent of the men disagreed. Almost a quarter of the women strongly agreed, compared to only 8 percent of the men. Conversely, 21 percent of the men strongly disagreed compared to 8 percent of the women. Female faculty also differed from their male colleagues in being more prone to believe that "Most American colleges are racist whether they mean to be or not" by 51 to 40 percent.

"Push comes to shove" in the variation of response to questions concerning the existence of "significant underrepresentation" of blacks and women. Almost all faculty, 96 percent of women and 94 percent of men, agreed that such underrepresentation exists in the case of blacks, and 92 of the women and 86 of the men felt the same way about the situation of women. It is noteworthy, however, that only 26 percent of the females and 17 of the males believed that "preferential treatment in the recruitment

process is needed to correct this problem" for women, while there was very little sex-linked difference in advocating preferential treatment for blacks; 26 percent of the women favored such a policy as compared to 22 of the men. Almost all the women who supported preferential treatment for their own sex backed it for blacks as well, while some males were for giving special help to blacks but not to women.

The evidence from the survey suggests that although most female faculty believe that their sex has not been treated fairly in academe, that as a group they are not more disposed than men to support special remedies to make up for past discrimination. This impression is reinforced by the reactions to the agree-disagree item: "The need to increase the representation of blacks, women, and various other minorities on the faculty is such as to justify use of 'benign' quotas." More than three fifths, 61 percent, of the women disagreed with this statement, somewhat less than the 67 percent of the men.

Curiously male faculty show up as slightly more liberal than female in replying to questions dealing with special preferences for minority students. Thus a larger proportion of men, 63 percent, than of women, 59 percent, agreed that "It may be necessary in order to increase opportunities for minority students, to admit some whose prior academic records fall below those of competing white students, by conventional academic criteria."

Finally, it may be noted that there was almost no sex related variation with respect to the issue of whether "faculty unionization improves academic opportunities for women." A goodly majority, 57 percent, of both sexes said that it does, but women were only slightly more disposed, (2 percent) than men, to feel this way.

Conclusions

The evidence from the 1975 survey reiterates our earlier finding derived from analysis of the 1969 Carnegie Commission study that males and females on college faculty differ little with respect to their general social and political orientations. The increase in the proportion of women academics has not liberalized the professoriate, and contrary to the fears of some, it has not reduced the support for competitive meritocratic standards. Female faculty do feel, correctly in our judgment, that scholars of their sex have not been treated fairly in the past. But contrary to the ideology expressed by some of the more militant spokesmen for women's rights in academe, the large majority of them concur with a somewhat larger majority of males, in rejecting special forms of affirmative action for women or blacks, which would undercut the application of rigorously competitive standards in job placement or tenure decisions.

The relative absence of major sex related differences with respect to the treatment of women and minorities holds up within discipline categories with the significant exception of the social sciences. Women in the social sciences were much more likely to reject the meritocratic response than those in other areas, i.e., in the humanities, natural sciences, or professional fields. Given the fact that social scientists appear to predominate among the activist core of women's liberation groups in higher education, it may be that the ideology of these organizations more accurately reflects the sentiments of their social science members and followers than those of female faculty in the less politically relevant and involved subjects.

TABLE I

Selected Opinions of Men and Women Faculty

<u>Opinion and Research</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
Strongly Agree that Teaching Effectiveness, not Publications, Should Be Main Criterion for Promotion	46	34
Agree that No One Can Be a Good Teacher Unless he or She is Actively Involved in Research	25	34
Recent Work is Pure or Basic Research	44	31
Work is Hard or Rigorous	50	28
Work is Soft or Qualitative	36	53
Prefer Research to Teaching	28	17
<u>Political and Social Issues</u>		
Voted for McGovern in 1972	63	63
Positive Attitude to Gerald Ford	31	32.5
Oppose Homosexual Teachers	27	20
Legalize Marijuana	58	58
Outlaw Pornography	46	56
U.S. Withdraw from Vietnam From Start	39	48
<u>Minority and Women's Issues</u>		
Most American Colleges are Racist	40	51
Colleges have not applied meritocratic in past	48	68
Meritocracy is a "smokescreen" concealing discrimination	40	68
Need to increase blacks and women on faculty justifies use of "benign" quotas	33	39
Admission Standards may need to be reduced for minority students	63	59

TABLE I CONTINUED

<u>Minority and Women's Issues</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
May have to use different grading standards for underprivileged students	31	51
Favor Preferential Hiring Treatment for Women	17	26
Favor Preferential Hiring Treatment for Blacks	21	26

TABLE II

Controlling for Age

	AGE							
	<u>35 or less</u>		<u>35-44</u>		<u>45-54</u>		<u>55+</u>	
<u>Scholarly Approach</u>	M	W	M	W	M	W	M	W
Rigorous	25	43	13	34	10	31	16	28
Soft	30	20	39	23	36	24	36	29
<u>Work Preference</u>								
Research	38	23	28	15	24	14	17	13
Teaching	62	77	72	85	76	86	83	87
<u>Attend a Concert</u>								
Rarely or Never	26	20	26	13	24	17	18	8
<u>Attend Athletic Event</u>								
Rarely or Never	36	48	34	54	36	58	43	60

Controlling for Discipline

	<u>Social Science</u>		<u>Humanities</u>		<u>Natural Science</u>		<u>Independent & Person-Bus. Related Professions</u>		<u>Person-Related Professions</u>	
	M	W	M	W	M	W	M	W	M	W
	Most Liberal Quintile on Lib-Con Scale	35	42	33	30	14	11	5	9	11
<u>Meritocracy-Equalitarian Scale</u>										
Most Meritocratic Quintile	13	11	16	11	22	19	26	20	10	8
Most Equalitarian Quintile	28	41	29	31	15	16	8	16	20	24

SECTION 5

The Political Liberalism of the Profession

American academics comprise the most politically liberal occupational stratum in the United States. This general conclusion, which we and others have discussed before, receives powerful confirmation from the 1975 faculty survey.

But if professors stand to the left politically of other occupational groups--and indeed of most identifiable cohorts in the population--they are very much children of their society. They manifest values, expectations, orientations to government, moods and concerns which cut broadly across the American public.

Many citizens are now troubled by perceived inadequacies in public performance, but few favor radical changes in the constitutional order. Much the same applies to the faculty. The liberal professoriate is very far indeed from being a hotbed of radicalism.

Voting

Empirical data showing the disproportionate liberalism of American academics now reaches back a half century. We know, for example, that

professors have given a higher measure of support to Democratic and left third party presidential nominees than has the entire electorate in every contest since the onset of the New Deal. If comparison is made to their "class equals"--to other members of the professional middle classes--the "pro liberal candidate" leanings of faculty members becomes even more striking. Fifty-seven percent of professors backed FDR in 1944, compared to 39 percent of all those in professional and managerial occupations. In 1956, Adlai Stevenson received the votes of 62 percent of academics, but of just 32 percent of all professionals and 31 percent of the college educated. George McGovern was the choice of only 31 percent of professionals and 37 percent of college-trained Americans, while 57 percent of academics supported him.

Race

Today, faculty show up more in favor of liberal and equalitarian policies than any general educational or occupational cohort in the population on virtually the entire range of issues. We see this position clearly in a controversy which touches an especially raw nerve in contemporary American politics--school busing to achieve racial integration. A National Opinion Research Center survey conducted in the Spring of 1975 indicated that only 18 percent of the public favored busing on behalf of integration, and a Harris survey found essentially the same distribution--21 percent in favor, 79 percent opposed--a few months later. No more than one fourth of any occupational stratum

backed busing, and no more than one fifth of whites in any of these categories endorsed it. Among respondents to the 1975 faculty survey, however, a group in which blacks are only three percent of the total, 47 percent favored busing to obtain "racial integration of the public elementary schools."

Table 1. Position of the faculty and the general public on busing to achieve public school integration

	Favor busing	Oppose busing
<u>Faculty</u>	47	53
<u>General public*</u>		
All	18	82
College graduates	24	76
Professionals	22	78
Managers	10	90
Clerical workers	14	86
Skilled wage workers	16	84
Semi-skilled and unskilled workers	21	79

*Data on the general public are from the 1975 National Opinion Research Center General Social Survey.

Other social issues

Various other social issues show an equally wide, or wider gulf between professors and the general public. Fifty-two percent of academics oppose any and all legal restraint on the distribution of

pornography. Only 11 percent of the American public take this view, ranging from a high of 17 percent among college graduates and 14 percent of those in professional occupations, to just eight percent among clerical workers. The legalization of marijuana was endorsed, in the Spring of 1975, by just 21 percent of the general public, by 45 percent of college graduates, 39 percent of all professionals, and 16 percent of semi-skilled and unskilled workers; but by 58 percent of the professoriate.

Public spending

Academics are more inclined than the general public, by a modest margin, to favor public spending for health, education and welfare measures, and they are substantially more supportive of such expenditures than other segments of the middle classes. Almost two-thirds (63 percent) of the faculty, for example, maintain that spending for welfare programs should either be sustained at the present levels or increased, the view of 55 percent of the public at large, of 51 percent of professionals, and of just 44 percent of people in managerial and administrative positions. Seventy percent of professors want to increase expenditures for urban problems; 56 percent in the general public take this position.

The withdrawal of support for active U.S. involvement in world affairs, spurred in part by the tragedy of our Indochina intervention, and partly by a desire to "tend our own garden" in a time of economic difficulty, is a striking element in contemporary American opinion.

We see this withdrawal among academics as among other strata. Still, the liberalism of professors leaves them notably more supportive of foreign aid programs than Americans generally. Seventy-seven percent of the public, 73 percent of college graduates, and 82 percent of skilled wage workers now want to cut spending for foreign aid. A strikingly high 57 percent of professors favor a reduction of foreign assistance, but the proportion is still well below that of other groups.

The debate over military spending by no means fits neatly into the liberal-conservative divide, but congressional liberals have been much more active in pushing for cuts in the defense budget, while conservatives have rather uniformly opposed reductions. The reasons are apparent. Defense spending is business-sector directed, and liberals who want to increase allocations of social programs see the military outlay as a possible place to get dollars which are in short supply. Besides this, liberals are generally more skeptical about the defense establishment. In this context, we would expect faculty, a notably liberal group, to be notably in favor of defense cuts. And they are indeed. About seven faculty members in ten want to reduce military spending. Only one third of the general public, and one fourth of the semi-skilled and unskilled work force, hold to this position.

Table 2. Position of the faculty and the general public on military spending

	Sustain or increase military spending	Cut military spending
<u>Faculty</u>	31	69
<u>General public</u>		
All	67	33
College graduates	48	52
Professionals	52	48
Managers	64	36
Clerical workers	66	34
Skilled wage workers	66	34
Semi-skilled and unskilled workers	74	26

Liberal, yes; radical, no

"Radical" is an especially ambiguous word. It has no fixed substantive reference, rather connotes only a relationship. A political radical is one who calls for basic change in the constituted order (economic, social, political) of a country. Thus, a person who tried to establish free enterprise in the U.S.S.R. would surely be a radical, while someone actively promoting the old socialist goal of common control of the means of production would fairly be labeled radical in the United States.

As a group, American academics are notably inclined to liberal policies, but most faculty liberals are far from supporting demands for basic change in the constituent arrangements of the society. It would be surprising indeed, in a country where one constitutional edifice has stood with singularly high public support for two centuries, to find any occupational cohort manifesting a heavy proportion of adherents to a radical critique. Here, such surprise is avoided. American academics are children of their society, and most of them, like most of their fellow citizens, support the prevailing economic and political order.

There are, nonetheless, bona fide radicals within the faculty; and if they are a relatively small proportion of the whole, they almost certainly constitute a greater proportion in the professoriate than do their counterparts in any other mass profession.

How do you identify a radical in the contemporary American sociopolitical context? Well, if surveys are your thing, you look at responses to certain types of questions. No matter how carefully this is done, there will always be ample opportunity to quibble. The most we can hope for is to suggest the rough proportion adhering to a radical critique.

About one-sixth of academics offer a coherently radical criticism of the country's economic arrangements. We find, for example, that 18 percent of the faculty favor much higher inheritance taxes to prevent the passing on of family fortunes, believe that there should

be a top limit on incomes "so that no one can earn too much more than others," and support the nationalization of major American business corporations.

What does one make of this? In one sense, it is a variant of the old perceptual question, "Is the glass half full, or half empty?" Most faculty do not support radical departures from prevailing economic arrangements—even though a majority would like to see a continuance of efforts to get more equalitarian policies. On the other hand, the fact that 18 percent of professors endorse a series of steps which would constitute a radical departure in the economic sector, designed to achieve some variant of socialism, is rather striking when one notes that no more than seven or eight percent of the general public lend this verbal support to such changes.

The radicalism defined by a professed willingness to move toward socialism does not, of course, suggest any challenge to democratic procedures. One can favor socialism, and steadfastly insist that it should be "voted in," pursued through the established constitutional structure. Most of our socialists take exactly this position. We wondered, then, what proportion of the faculty were seriously disenchanted, not with aspects of the economic order but with the basic operation of the American polity.

Very few professors are, in this sense, "political radicals." Just what the proportion is seen to be is a function of the precise measures employed. The following, though, is a fair approximation of what emerges when one follows a variety of analytic routes. Only

three percent of the professoriate took the view in Spring 1975 that the political system is failing badly in meeting the country's problems, that "meaningful change" is precluded by regular American political procedures, and that the use of violence to achieve political goals can be justified in the United States. This tiny cohort of political radicals within academe is largely of the left rather than of the right; but its size, not its substantive policy preferences, is the distinctive feature.

The academic profession is notably inclined to liberal and egalitarian social programs. Certainly no other mass occupational cohort—and "mass" is the relevant comparison, for there are some 400,000 full-time faculty—approaches its liberalism. But it is hardly a radical profession. Most of its members entertain no notion of sweeping economic or political change. The elderly matron who fears she must hide her democratic silver because a professor is around can be reassured.

SECTION 6

The Aging Professoriate: A Changing Political Philosophy

What are the implications of the findings from the 1975 survey of faculty attitudes for the future behavior of American academe? To what extent can we anticipate professorial views in the future?

Relatively few will be employed in academe in the next 15 years who are not already in the system. The age structure within higher education has been in the process of moving consistently upward from the low median level of under 40 reached during the late 1960s. As a result of the enormous expansion which occurred during that decade, almost three fifths, 58 percent, of the faculty are under 45 years of age.

The "golden age" of expansion is unfortunately over, because of a sharp decline in both the numbers in the college age cohort and financial support. The low birth rate of the 1960s means many fewer students in the 1980s. Relatively few faculty will retire in the next 10 years. The 55 plus age group comprises only 17 percent, as contrasted to 25 percent in the 45-54 year old group, 34 percent in the 35-44 category, and 24 percent under 35.

It is obvious that the number of vacancies for new faculty will be quite small between now and 1990. Allan Cartter who has probably done more to analyze the implications of these demographic factors than anyone else has estimated that the median age of faculty, which was 39 in 1970, will increase to

48 by 1990. As he points out: "The dramatic change between today and 1990, under current trends, would be the virtual disappearance of the under 35 age group from the teaching ranks."

These demographic trends imply a sharp change in character of academe. From an institution in which most of the faculty are young, it is becoming one which may be characterized as a gerontocracy, one in which the values, attitudes and behavior of the older generations will dominate.

Age Related Behavior

Looking at the views of the 1975 sample differentiated by age suggests that academe will be dominated for some time to come by the faculty generations who were liberalized or radicalized by the events and climate of the late '60s and early '70s. On question after question, there is a steady progression from left to right in tandem with increased age.

In the 1972 election, 74 percent of those under 35 reported having voted for McGovern as contrasted to 64 for the 35-44 group, 61 for those 45-54 years old, and 50 percent among the 55 plus. The proportion identifying as Republican declines from 37 among the oldest cohort to 18 among those under 35 years of age. On the liberalism-conservatism scale, 32 percent of those over 55 are located in the most conservative quintile, as contrasted to 14 percent among those under 35.

The pattern is equally dramatic with respect to specific questions dealing with social issues. Close to three fifths, 59 percent, of those under 35 "strongly disagree" with a ban on homosexuals teaching in the public schools, as contrasted to 31 percent among those 55 or older. An overwhelming majority of the oldest group, 60 percent, favored laws against pornography, an opinion shared by only 36 percent of those under 35. Close to three quarters, 71 percent, of the young

faculty would legalize marijuana, while a majority, 57 percent, of those over 55 would continue to prohibit its use.

Generational differences are equally dramatic with respect to the campus issues of the 1960s. Fully 41 percent of those over 55 "strongly agree" with the statement: "Students who disrupt the functioning of a college should be expelled or suspended," as compared to only 16 percent among faculty under 35. Similarly, 13 percent of the younger faculty and 42 percent of the older ones were in favor of a ban on student demonstrations on campus.

Age also discriminates sharply between supporters and opponents of collective bargaining. Almost four fifths, 79 percent, of those under 35 supported collective bargaining as contrasted to 57 percent among faculty 55 years or older.

Though younger faculty are clearly more liberal with respect to social and political matters, the rights of students within academe, and the need for collective bargaining, they differ little from their elders with respect to competitive achievement standards. Thus the percentages who agreed that arguments about the need for meritocratic standards constitute a "smokescreen" concealing discriminatory practices within higher education are almost identical for each age group, about 45 percent. Those who felt that salary increases should be based largely on merit criteria form 51 percent of the under 35 group and 49 percent of the 55 plus. About the same percentage of the very young, 65, as of the oldest category, 68, were opposed to "benign quotas" to remedy past discrimination against minorities and women. Those under 35 were only slightly more favorably disposed, 63 percent, than those over 55, 59 percent, to efforts to reduce admission standards to increase the enrollment of minority students. Again, there is almost no variation among age cohorts with respect to opinion about applying different standards of grading to those from deprived backgrounds.

Over two-thirds of the oldest faculty cohort, 67 percent, and 71 percent of the youngest were opposed to relaxing standards.

Activities

Although most surveys of undergraduate opinion report that they regard younger faculty as more interested in students, as more dedicated to teaching, than their elders, the survey data suggest that this is not so. The cohorts of younger faculty, recently out of the research oriented graduate schools and presumably including many who still hope to secure tenure or to gain a post in a major department, are more oriented towards research and less committed to teaching than their older colleagues. Over twice the proportion of the youngest category, 35 percent, said they prefer research to teaching as among the oldest group, 16 percent. Youth is clearly related to propensity to publish. Well over half, 58 percent, of those 55 years or older had not published anything in the last two years as contrasted to 43 percent in the under 35 cohort. In reporting what conditions might possibly attract them to move to another institution, 62 percent of those under 35 said "more time for research" as contrasted to 52 percent among those 45-54 years old, and 42 percent for faculty 55 or older. Similarly 63 percent of the youngest group said that a "small teaching load" would be a favorable consideration, compared to 55 percent among the oldest cohort. Not surprisingly, a much larger proportion of the very young, 32 percent, than of the old, 19 percent, were opposed to basing promotion on teaching ability.

Since only a small minority of the faculty can be at major centers of research and graduate training, it is perhaps to be expected that younger faculty were less happy with their current institution than older ones, who

presumably have become reconciled to the fact that they will spend the rest of their career at whatever type of school they are now in. Thus, 44 percent of those under 35 said that they would be more satisfied at another college, while only 18 percent of professors 55 or older felt this way.

Young faculty not only are more likely than their elders to emphasize research than teaching, they also are more disposed to emphasize rigorous or "hard" rather than humanistic or "soft" methods in their disciplines. Among those under 35, 39 percent preferred "hard" approaches, while among the 55 plus group, only 25 percent have the same emphasis. On the other hand, the younger were also more likely (77 percent) to say they liked "new and wild ideas" than the old, 62 percent.

Styles of Life

Within academe as outside, age also differentiates general values and styles of life. Younger faculty, those under 35, were much less likely (34 percent) to attend a religious service once a month or more than older ones, 50 percent for those 55 or over. The latter cohort, more conservative generally, were more disposed to only own American made cars, 68 percent, than the youngest one, 52 percent. Conversely, 29 percent of the youngest group owned only foreign cars as compared to 15 percent among those 55 or older. Older professors attended concert and plays more frequently than younger ones. The latter, however, were more likely to go to athletic events.

Other Variables

Although age is clearly one of the major variables differentiating faculty opinion and behavior, to observe its full impact it is necessary to examine the variations in relation to other major correlates of faculty behavior such as

discipline, institutional type, or sex. Combining age with these other factors demonstrates that they exert powerful and independent effects on political orientations and educational issues.

Within each institutional status level, the youngest faculty stand to the left of the oldest by decisive, and on the whole remarkably consistent, margins. Thus only 15 percent of those under 35 in the high tier institutions voted for Richard Nixon, as compared to 31 percent of the faculty 55 and over, in such institutions. Among those at low tier schools, however, 33 percent of the youngest cohort voted for Nixon, while a majority, 56 percent of the oldest age group, backed the G.O.P. candidate.

The same pattern recurs with more academic issues. Thus though only 25 percent of all faculty reported preferring teaching to research, among those at Tier I, the major universities, 60 percent of faculty under 35 would emphasize research, a percentage which declines to 40 for those over 55. Fully 85 percent of the youngest cohort at these institutions have published in the last two years, as have 73 percent of the oldest category. At Tier III institutions, only 4 percent of those over 55 would rather do research, while the proportion who preferred research among faculty under 35 years old is only 16 percent. One third of the latter, 32 percent, have published recently, as have 22 percent of the older professors.

Holding discipline constant strengthens the relationship between age and methodological orientations, particularly within the social and natural sciences. Fully 43 percent of social scientists under 35 chose the rigorous or hard end of the methodological scale, as contrasted to 15 among those 55 or older. Among natural scientists, the age related range is from 80 to 52 percent.

Relating age to discipline shows that among social scientists, under 35 years

of age, 40 percent fall in the most liberal quintile and 6 percent in the most conservative one on the liberalism-conservatism scale. Conversely, among faculty 55 and older in professional fields, 48 percent are in the most conservative fifth and only 7 percent in the most liberal segment.

When the different age cohorts are analyzed within each sex group, interesting variations occur with respect to the position and rights of women. Thus, over 90 percent of the women agreed that their sex is underrepresented on faculties. The variation from young to old is 94 to 91 percent. Among men, however, the range is from 90 percent among those under 35 to 81 among those 55 or older. Examining the replies to questions which form the meritocratic-equalitarian attitude scale again shows a much wider age related variation among female faculty than among males. Thus 39 percent of the youngest male cohort, those under 35, fall in the two most equalitarian quintiles as contrasted to 33 percent among those 55 plus. But fully 59 percent of the youngest females are in the same two most equalitarian quintiles, compared to 45 percent for women 55 years or older. But such sex related age differences do not show up with respect to non-minority or sex related political issues.

Conclusions

As noted, academe entered a "no growth" period in the 1970s, and probably will begin to decline in absolute size on the faculty as well as student level in the '80s. With a relatively young senior faculty, the entrance rate for the next two decades will be very low. The experiences and commitments formed by the large majority, still under 45 years old, should continue to inform academic orientations for a long time to come. Radicalized or liberalized by the Vietnam War protest period, they appear to many to form the most left oriented socially critical cohorts ever seen in the profession.

The striking relationship between age and political orientations found among the faculty in the mid '70s is, however, not new. All surveys of faculty opinion have revealed age linked variations that are much greater than those found among the general public. The first comprehensive national study of faculty political opinions, Lazarsfeld's and Thielens' analysis of social scientists' reactions to academic freedom issues which became salient in the McCarthy era, 20 years ago, found very large age-related differences. In 1952, a slight majority, 51 percent, of social scientists, 60 or over, voted for Eisenhower, the choice of only 26 percent of their colleagues under 40 years of age. Four years earlier, when 8 percent of social scientists had cast their ballots for left-wing third-party candidates--either Henry Wallace or Norman Thomas--fully 17 percent of those under 30 had backed these minority nominees, as contrasted with but 3 percent among those over 60.

The 1969 Carnegie Survey of the entire professoriate revealed the same age progression. Over half, 51 percent, of faculty then under 30 years of age scored in the two most liberal quintiles on the liberalism-conservatism scale we constructed for that study, compared with just a quarter, 24 percent, of those 60 and over.

A look at the various studies completed since 1955 indicates a steady increase in conservatism from the youngest to the oldest strata in each period. Thus, the percentage of social scientists voting for liberal or left candidates in the 1950s was considerably higher among those who had attended college in the late '40s than among the older protest "generation of the 1930s," and there is a steady decline in liberal to left views associated with increasing age. This pattern occurred even though those faculty who were undergraduates in the

1930s were more likely to report having belonged to "controversial political groups" while in college than those educated later.

The Carnegie 1969 survey, much like the current one, revealed the same age relationship for the faculty as a whole. Those who were in college in the Depression and immediate post-Depression years reported having been somewhat more "left" as students than any other college-age cohort up to the late '60s. But those who attended college in the conservative atmosphere of the "silent" 1950s were proportionately much more left or liberal than those who completed their undergraduate studies in the "radical" climate of the 1930s. It is likely that the more liberal to left young faculty interviewed in the 1955 survey were among those who showed up 15 to 20 years later in the 1969 and 1975 studies as among the relatively more moderate faculty, as compared to the young.

Since every study shows an essentially linear, age-related progression, it may be argued that the decisive considerations affecting the orientations of different age groups reflect social and psychological concomitants of growing older, more than variations in experiences and climate of opinion when they were young.

Given the fact the faculty of the 1980s and 1990s will have a much higher median age than those of the 1960s and early 1970s, it may be anticipated that academe will be relatively more conservative, that a smaller proportion will be involved in research, and that the numbers welcoming "new and wild ideas" will be smaller.

The specific future views of today's faculty will, of course, reflect larger unpredictable developments in American political culture. Aging will not necessarily be accompanied by "conservatizing" in any fixed ideological sense of the term. A variety of evidence drawn from national polls indicates that the center of public

opinion has generally moved left from the 1930s to the 1970s. Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford have supported policies with respect to welfare, Keynesian economics, and state payment for medical care that Republicans once denounced as outright socialism. Busing to achieve integration apart, support for minority and women's rights has grown steadily among the population.

Hence, even though older faculty may be much more conservative relative to younger ones at any given time, they also will probably be more liberal in an absolute sense than when they finished their student days. But whatever the political climate in the 1980s or '90s, those who entered the professoriate since 1960 and who will numerically continue to dominate academe for decades to come will be relatively less receptive to the change-directed thrusts of future times than they were at the start of their careers. Other occupations, more open to youth, may come to the fore as sources of political reform ideas and leadership. There may also be an opportunity for non-academic centers of research to take the lead in scholarly innovation, much as occurred in other societies when universities stagnated numerically, and not illogically, intellectually as well.

TABLE I

AGE AND SELECTED ATTRIBUTES

	<u>Under 35</u>	<u>35-44</u>	<u>45-54</u>	<u>55 Plus</u>
Voted McGovern in 1972	74	64	61	50
Identified Republicans	18	25	29	37
Most Conservative Quintile	14	20	23	32
Big Corporations Should be Nationalized	35	28	27	25
Lesbians and Homosexuals Should Not Teach	14	25	27	40
Oppose Anti-Pornography Laws	66	51	48	40
Use of Marijuana Should be Legalized	71	60	53	44
Disruptive Students Should be Expelled	56	67	65	72
Student Demonstrations Have No Place on a College Campus	13	24	26	42
Favor Collective Bargaining	79	69	70	57
Meritocracy is a Smokescreen Concealing Discriminatory Practices	46	46	40	45
Salary Increases Should be Based on Academic Merit	51	47	44	49
Award Tenure Only by Most Demanding National Standards	64	67	70	77
Need to Increase Blacks, Women and Other Minorities Justifies "Benign Quotas"	35	36	36	32
Reduce Admission Standards to Increase Opportunities for Minority Students	63	64	64	59
Prefer Research to Teaching	35	26	23	16
No Publications in Last Two Years	43	46	52	58
Three or More Publications in Last Two Years	29	25	22	21
More Time for Research Important	62	57	52	42
Prefer "Hard" to "Soft" Approaches	39	30	26	25
Like New and Wild Ideas	77	72	68	62
Attend Religious Services at Least Once a Month	34	41	43	50
Own Only American Car(s)	52	51	60	68
Own Only Foreign Car(s)	29	26	16	15
Own a General Motors Car	25	25	29	38
Own a Compact Car	48	39	32	34
Own a Large Car	30	37	39	44
Rarely or Never Attend a Concert	25	23	22	16
Rarely or Never Attend an Athletic Event	38	38	41	47

SECTION 7

The Self-Critical University

"Few institutions are so conservative as the universities," Clark Kerr wrote a decade and a half ago, "about their own affairs while their members are so liberal about the affairs of others" According to Kerr, professors were substantially more change-supporting, from a liberal posture, than were most groups in the U.S.; but at the same time they were strongly committed to the maintenance of practices and traditions which had grown up--some over a long period of time--with regard to the internal operations of universities.

Today, Kerr's opinion about the external orientations of faculty remains valid. But as for the professoriate-as-guild notion which underlay the commentary on academics as institutional conservatives, only a portion of it can still be seen in our survey findings.

Indeed, the striking feature of contemporary faculty thinking about intramural affairs is the encouragement given to significant change, not the resistance to it; the intense samokritika or self-criticism, rather than

complacency. The prevailing professorial mood on campus issues is not aptly described as "conservative."

Illustrations of how critical and change-directed professors are with regard to their home institutions are all around.

Various proposals to "democratize" the university by bringing students into institutional decision making have been offered in the wake of the campus unrest of the latter 1960s. For the most part, such proposals have called for students to share power with the faculty in judgments on the curriculum, admissions policy, discipline, and academic appointments. Professors have hardly been enthusiastic about surrendering their prerogatives in these areas, but they have given considerably more backing to the proposed changes than has the general public--according to the surveys of Gallup and others. As we will demonstrate later in this report, faculty are now substantially more willing to accept limitations on their intramural authority than they were in 1969.

Student protests and demonstrations altered campus life considerably in the late 1960s and early 1970s. American academics were both ambivalent and sharply divided in their reaction to this activism; but comparison of surveys of professors and the public at large indicates that the former were far less hostile to the protests than the latter--even though the public was comparatively unaffected.

The introduction of unionization represents an extensive and rapidly occurring shift in the way universities are ordered for collective decision making. That large numbers of faculty have continued to resist this change seems less surprising or striking than the readiness of many of their colleagues to accommodate a distinctly new mode of professional organization.

The self-critical professoriate

While we lack precisely comparable data, we doubt very much that there is another group of professionals in the United States as critical of the enterprise they direct as professors are of universities and higher education. Complacent, faculty are not.

For example, universities are given low marks for their efforts--or the lack thereof --in advancing equalitarian objectives. Forty-two percent of academics agree with the charge that "most American colleges and universities are racist, whether they mean to be or not"; only 23 percent strongly disagree with this depiction.

Professors don't think they have done a very good job for their students. Nearly three-fourths of them argue that the quality of undergraduate education has "suffered significantly" because of an excessive commitment of money and energy to research. Faculty overspecialization is held responsible for a deterioration of "the typical undergraduate curriculum"--by 56 percent of all academics. Forty-six percent hold their profession accountable for the development of a situation in which "many of the best students can no longer find meaning in science and scholarship."

Questions posed in the 1969 Carnegie survey but not in our recent inquiry further demonstrate how widespread the samokritika is. Exactly two-thirds of the faculty agreed in 1969 that "most professors" in graduate departments "exploit" their students to advance their own research. Fifty-nine percent were of the opinion then that large-scale research "has become more a source of money and prestige for researchers than an effective way of advancing knowledge."

And we know that since 1969 American academics have become more, not less, critical of their profession. The Carnegie study found, for example,

47 percent of professors agreeing that many of their most rewarded colleagues had attained their status "by being 'operators' rather than by their scholarly or scientific contributions." Six years later the proportion had risen to 71 percent. In 1969, 52 percent of academics accepted one of the harshest criticisms that can^{be} leveled at a profession supposedly dedicated to spurring intellectual interest--that "most American colleges reward conformity and crush student creativity." By 1975 the proportion agreeing had moved up even further, to 56 percent. Only 10 percent strongly disagreed that such was the impact of academic life.

Sources of self-criticism

Professorial dissatisfactions with university performance are of two primary varieties, each with a distinctive origin. There is, on the one hand, criticism of the academy for being insufficiently equalitarian: For example, colleges have not done enough, fast enough, to open doors to women, blacks, and other minorities; or, they have not shared power broadly enough, as with students and junior faculty.

Here, the correlation is almost exclusively with general sociopolitical ideology. Professors with liberal to left political views offer the criticism, while their more conservative brethren reject the charge. Other aspects of the faculty member's status and identity--such as his age, sex, discipline, scholarly interests, and the type of institution at which he teaches--are just not independently significant.

The assertion that most American colleges and universities are racist provides a good case in point. Accepted by 42 percent of all faculty, this criticism is offered by 67 percent of the most liberal quintile in the professoriate but by just 21 percent of the most conservative cohort. No other variable produces more than slight departures from the pattern thus set. Academics most closely associated with the research culture of universities, for instance, consistently disagree with the racism charge to a greater degree than their teaching-directed colleagues, but the differences thus located within each ideological grouping are slight.

Table 1. Response of faculty to the allegation of university racism; by sociopolitical ideology, and research vs. teaching interest.

	"Most American colleges and universities are racist, whether they mean to be or not"	
	<u>Percent agreeing</u>	<u>Percent disagreeing</u>
<u>Most liberal</u> faculty (all)	67	33
Those teaching-oriented	68	32
Those research-oriented	63	37
<u>Liberal</u> faculty (all)	51	49
Those teaching-oriented	53	47
Those research-oriented	45	55
<u>Middle-of-the-road</u> faculty (all)	42	58
Those teaching-oriented	44	56
Those research-oriented	36	64
<u>Conservative</u> faculty (all)	32	68
Those teaching-oriented	34	66
Those research-oriented	27	73

Table 1 (continued). Response of faculty to the allegation of university racism; by sociopolitical ideology, and research vs. teaching interest.

"Most American colleges and universities are racist, whether they mean to be or not"

	<u>Percent agreeing</u>	<u>Percent disagreeing</u>
<u>Most conservative</u> faculty (all)	21	79
Those teaching-oriented	22	78
Those research-oriented	18	82

Criticism of the intellectual thrust

The charge that universities are not doing their strictly academic job very well is rather different than the one we have just been considering, and it has a somewhat different collection of proponents.

We created an "academic performance" scale, measuring composite response to a series of five highly intercorrelated items: that the undergraduate curriculum has suffered from faculty over-specialization; that university performance has turned many of the best students from science and scholarship; that many of the leading lights of academe arrive at their positions by being "operators" rather than through their intellectual contributions; that an overemphasis on research has done real damage to the quality of undergraduate teaching; and that overall most American colleges manage to "reward conformity and crush student creativity." Ideology plays a part in determining receptivity to this critique, but another set of variables also intervene significantly.

Academics who are the most inclined to criticize American social performance on the grounds it is insufficiently equalitarian are also the most critical of the academic performance of their home institutions. An image of the university as conformist, overspecialized, and not responsive enough to the student "underclass" has an apparent base in general ideological commitments, and this base is evident here. Thus, 55 percent of the most liberal faculty score in the two "most critical" quintiles defined by the Academic Performance scale, compared to just 34 percent of the most conservative faculty.

Table 2. Positions of faculty on the Academic Performance scale, by ideology and scholarly attainment

<u>Liberalism-Conservatism Scale</u>	<u>Percent least critical</u>	<u>Percent most critical</u>
Most liberal	30	55
Liberal	37	45
Middle-of-the-road	41	39
Conservative	42	38
Most conservative	46	34
 <u>Publications, last two years</u>		
None	32	47
1 - 2	42	42
3 - 4	45	37
5 - 10	52	28
More than 10	58	26

Table 2 (continued). Positions of faculty on the Academic Performance scale, by ideology and scholarly attainment .

<u>Standing of the school at which the faculty member teaches</u>	<u>Percent most critical</u>	<u>Percent most critical</u>
Tier 4 (lowest)	32	48
Tier 3	38	45
Tier 2	41	39
Tier 1 (highest)	47	34

These criticisms of academic performance have yet another dimension, however, for they strike at the core of the research university. "Too specialized," "too research-committed," "the successes are the 'operators',"-- such charges are directed primarily at the elite stratum, at the most highly attaining faculty, at the research edifice erected over the past three decades. One would expect professors in the research culture to be less sympathetic to attacks on their handiwork than academics outside.

This is indeed the case. Only 26 percent of the most highly publishing faculty show up in the two "most critical" quintiles of the Academic Performance scale, as compared to 47 percent of those not publishing at all. Forty-eight percent of junior college professors, but just 34 percent of their counterparts at the major research universities, are thus recorded.

Ideology and group interests

Liberal faculty outside the research culture and conservative academics inside it are not at all cross-pressured. Both the ideology and the academic interests of the former incline them to strong criticism of the research university's performance; while ideology and self-interest lead the latter to reject such criticism. Table 3 shows how diametrically opposite the response of these two cohorts is, and how solidly each comes down on its own side of the issue.

Table 3. Positions of faculty on the Academic Performance scale, by ideology and university setting (percent scoring in the two "most critical" quintiles)

	Status of the school at which the faculty member teaches			
	Tier 4 (lowest)	Tier 3	Tier 2	Tier 1 (highest)
<u>Liberalism-Conservatism Scale</u>				
Most liberal	71	55	52	40
Liberal	57	44	40	35
Middle-of-the-road	45	40	36	31
Conservative	39	37	35	30
Most conservative	38	35	28	20

In contrast, liberal faculty in the research culture and conservative academics committed to the teaching model are intensely cross-pressured. Ideology pushes each group in opposite directions, academic norms and self-interest

in the opposite direction. As a result each of these two groups splits evenly on the academic performance critique. We find that the proportion of highly conservative professors at junior colleges, and that of very liberal faculty at major research universities accepting (and rejecting) the critique is exactly the same.

Conclusions

The typical faculty member in the United States is not radical, either in his approach to the society or to the university. But he is critical, change-supporting, in favor of liberal solutions--both outside the academy and within it.

The American professoriate today does not at all resemble a unified guild, opposed to any and all calls for change in the university. Rather, it is a big polyglot profession, one which has experienced extraordinary change, and one which is deeply divided as to the appropriate course of the enterprise of higher education.

Now in 1976, we must thus paraphrase/observation ^{the} Clark Kerr made thirteen years ago in the Godkin Lectures: "No institution, perhaps, is so liberal as the university about its own affairs while its members are as well so liberal about the affairs of others."

Section 8

Academe: A Teaching Profession, Not a Scholarly One

The popular assumption seems to be that American academics are a body of scholars, men and women who do their research and then report their findings to the intellectual or scientific communities. Many faculty, of course, behave in just this fashion. But as a description of the profession, it is seriously flawed. Most academics think of themselves as "teachers" and "professionals," not as "scholars" and "intellectuals"--and they perform accordingly.

Scholarship

As data on the number of articles in professional journals and the number of academic books published yearly testify, faculty are producing a prodigious volume of printed words. But this torrent is gushing forth from relatively few pens. Over half of all those employed full-time in professorial positions have never brought to publication any sort of book, written or edited, singularly or in collaboration with others. (The stipulation "full-time" is important, because the proportion involved in scholarship becomes much lower when the various groups of part-time faculty are included.) More than one-third have never published

an article. Half of the American professoriate have not published anything, or had anything accepted for publication, in the last two years. More than a quarter of all full-time academics have never published a word anywhere, at any time in their careers.

Most of those who fall within the ranks of the "publishers" have written relatively little. Only 15 percent of professors have attained what might be considered a substantial number of monographic publications--three or more--and just one-fifth have published more than ten articles over their years in academe. Lest it be thought that young academics, not having yet begun, make these composite figures somewhat deceiving, we show in Table 1 the publications profile of professors 45-54 years of age. These academics who are well into their careers do not, as a group, look very different from their younger colleagues. The few who publish a lot have built up longer lists, of course, and the

Table 1. Numbers of scholarly publications of American faculty (column percentages)

	All faculty	Faculty ages 45-54	Faculty at major colleges and universities
<u>Books/monographs</u> authored or edited, alone or in collaboration			
None	54	46	42
1-2	31	32	35
3-4	8	12	11
5 or more	7	10	12
<u>Articles</u>			
None	34	34	11
1-2	22	21	14
3-4	11	10	12
5-10	14	12	18
11-20	9	9	18
More than 20	10	14	27

Table 1 (continued). Numbers of scholarly publications of American faculty (column percentages)

	<u>All faculty</u>	<u>Faculty ages 45-54</u>	<u>Faculty at major colleges and universities</u>
<u>Total publications, last two years</u>			
None	49	52	19
1-2	27	26	31
3-4	14	13	27
5-10	8	7	8
More than 10	2	2	6

infrequent publishers may have added an item or two, but that is all.

Outside the natural sciences, those who write a large number of articles and those who publish many books are, with few exceptions, the same people. For example, 80 percent of all humanists who have published 20 or more articles have also published three or more books; and more than three-fourths of humanists who have written at least five books have published at least five scholarly articles. The pattern is very different in the natural science disciplines where, we know, journal articles are the normal form of scholarship. Forty percent of natural scientists with 20 or more professional articles to their credit have never written or edited a book, and another 34 percent of these high publishers have produced only one or two books.

In all, about one-fourth of the American professoriate have published extensively--which for the sake of statistical representation we have

construed as ten or more articles and/or three or more monographs. Half the faculty either don't publish at all, or manage only two or three items over their careers. The remaining fourth might be considered in the "moderate" range of publications.

Have we been dwelling too much on numbers? Isn't it possible for Professor X to labor a whole career on one monograph, and thereby build a monument to scholarship, while Professor Y produces fifty articles not worth the sacrifice of a single tree? Of course. The type of survey data with which we are working captures numbers, not quality. We would still insist that publication of articles and books is the primary mode of scholarly exchange in most disciplines, and that it is meaningful to note that half of the faculty rarely if ever engage in this exchange.

There are massive variations in the simple rates of publication--leaving aside the matter of quality--of faculty by type of institution. We classified all colleges and universities by an index of academic standing, and then broke the raw scores into four groups. Eighty percent of the Tier 4 (lowest standing) academics reported they had rarely or never published, compared to 55 percent of their Tier 3 colleagues, 40 percent of faculty at Tier 2 schools, and 22 percent of those in Tier 1. More than half of the professors at Tier 1 institutions, as against fewer than one out of ten in Tier 4 schools, had achieved what we defined above as a high level of publications.

Teaching

American academics have been criticized frequently for not spending much time with their students, for fleeing the classroom for the laboratory. While there is surely some basis for this charge, it must be pointed out that a majority of faculty are very actively engaged in teaching. Half of all professors spent ten or more hours per week in the classroom, in formal instruction, during the 1975 Spring term. One-third taught thirteen or more hours a week, while only one-sixth had four hours or less of classroom contact each week.

Table 2. Teaching loads of faculty, spring term 1975

<u>Hours taught</u>	<u>All faculty</u>	<u>Faculty at major colleges and universities</u>	<u>Faculty at lower tier (4) colleges and universities</u>
None	6	9	2
1-4	11	24	5
5-6	13	24	4
7-8	8	13	3
9-10	14	15	5
11-12	16	7	12
13-16	19	5	41
17-20	7	1	14
21 or more	5	1	12

There are the expected variations by type of school. Nearly six in ten of the faculty at major universities taught six hour or less each

week; only one-tenth of academics at lower tier schools spent so little time in the classroom.

For the faculty as a whole, teaching loads increased slightly between 1969 and 1975. Forty-one percent of academics, for example, taught 11 hours or more a week in Spring 1969; by Spring 1975, the proportion had risen to 47 percent. The median number of classroom hours shifted upward from nine to ten.

Faculty in the humanities and fine arts, and those in business administration, teach more than anyone else. Professors in medicine, notably a research field, teach less than anyone else in academe. The faculties of colleges of agriculture also spend little time in the classroom, reflecting in part the presence of big agricultural experimentation station contingents.

Preferences

Academics as a group spend a fairly modest amount of their time in research and scholarship, much of it in teaching. And they want it this way. Only four percent of the professoriate indicate their interests lie heavily in research. Another 21 percent express an interest in both teaching and research, but with a "leaning" toward the latter. For the remaining three-fourths of academics, the personal preference is for teaching. For every one professor strongly devoted to research purposes there are nine others heavily committed to teaching.

Table 3. Teaching vs. research preferences of faculty, and self-definition of academic role

	<u>All faculty</u>	<u>Faculty at major universities</u>	<u>Faculty at lower tier (4) colleges</u>
<u>Preferences principally in teaching or research?</u>			
Very heavily in research	4	9	1
In both, leaning toward research	21	41	6
In both, leaning toward teaching	38	37	29
Very heavily in teaching	37	13	65
<u>Which term best describes your academic role?</u>			
Intellectual	7	10	4
Scholar	10	16	3
Scientist	11	22	3
Professional	27	29	25
Teacher	44	23	65

Respondents to our survey were asked to indicate which among a series of categories best (and most poorly) identified their academic role. The terms fitted into two larger groupings. "Intellectual," "scholar" and "scientist" all speak to a primary involvement in the research enterprise. "Professional" and "teacher," on the other hand, suggest a concentration in the classroom or in administration, in communicating knowledge rather than in developing new knowledge. There are obvious reasons for a

research-inclined humanist to reject the label "scientist," but discipline-related orientations pose no such resistance to "scholar" or "intellectual." Most if not all fields seemed to find at least one category in each group where the research-scholarship commitment could be comfortably expressed.

Only 28 percent of all academics think of themselves performing a knowledge-generating role. Nearly half identify as teachers. A surprisingly high 85 percent of faculty find in intellectual-scholar-scientist the poorest description of their role. Only five percent think "teacher" is the poorest descriptor.

These data suggest a number of nuances in term-affect which might profitably be considered at another time. It is enough to note that most academics seem to readily identify with terms which imply a primary involvement in knowledge-transmission rather than knowledge-generation, in the teaching rather than the research culture.

Again, there are major differences by type of school. Sixty-five percent of professors at the lower tier institutions call themselves teachers, the self-description of only 23 percent of faculty at the major universities.

Young academics are notably more inclined to identify themselves as scholars or scientists than are their more senior colleagues. This suggests that a significant secular shift in role definition may be occurring. Just thirty-nine percent of professors under age 35, compared to 49 percent of those 55 years of age and older, find "teacher" the best descriptor.

There is every indication of a pretty good fit between what faculty want to do--with regard to teaching and research--and what they are required to do. For example, those who say their personal interests are heavily in research have very light teaching loads--the median is five hours per week--while those who are principally interested in teaching get a chance to teach a lot, with the median at 13 hours a week. We do not overlook the possibility of some benign deception: professors who must teach a lot saying, "Oh, well, I really prefer teaching anyway." And there is that one-tenth of one percent of the professoriate who are committed to research but are required to teach 21 or more hours each week! On the whole, though, the fit is a good one.

What we see confirmed, quite clearly, is that American academics constitute a teaching profession, not a scholarly profession. Within the larger teaching order, there is a scholarly subsection, located disproportionately at a relatively small number of research-directed universities. Among the majority who teach a lot and publish little, we find a perhaps surprisingly ready acceptance of the primacy and the legitimacy of the teaching role.

PART III

PROFESSIONAL STATUS AND CONCERNS

Section 9

Faculty Attitudes and Approaches Toward Work

How do professors vary in their attitudes toward their work? What do they like to do? Academics clearly differ with respect to the aspects of the job they prefer, and the way they like to work.

Research or Teaching

In spite of the widely held image that research is the primary activity valued on the American campus, only 25 percent of those polled indicated that their interests are primarily in research (4 percent "very heavily"), while the remaining three-quarters reported a greater commitment to teaching (37 percent heavily). The weak dedication to research is also reflected in the fact that only 32 percent agreed with the statement that "No one can be a good teacher unless he or she is actively involved in research," and that 71 percent felt that "quality of undergraduate education has suffered significantly." because of "excessive commitment to research."

The commitment to teaching extends to agreement by three-quarters of the faculty (74 percent) with the statement:

"Teaching effectiveness, not publications, should be the primary criterion for promotion of faculty." Even more surprising, perhaps, to those who think that faculty place a supreme value on peer judgments of research competence as the sole criterion for evaluating performance is the fact that 73 percent stated that "Faculty promotions should be based in part on formal student evaluations of their teachers."

Those most involved in teaching, those located disproportionately at lower-tier, non-university institutions, of course, are most committed to teaching. Yet half of the faculty in the highest tier schools, and a majority, 54 percent, in universities prefer teaching to research. Younger faculty, more recently out of graduate school, show more interest in the research side of the job than their older colleagues. About 30 percent of those under 40 reported a preference for research, as compared to 17 percent for faculty 50 and over. But the great majority of those under 30 years of age indicated a primary interest in teaching. A larger minority of men are more research oriented (28 percent) than of women (17). Our research has indicated that liberals are much more likely to favor research than conservatives. Thus, one third of the faculty who fall in the most liberal fifth on the liberalism-conservatism scale indicated a preference for research over teaching. Conversely, over four-fifths,

81 percent, of the most conservative quintile are more disposed to teaching than research. Yet, again, it should be noted that most liberals prefer teaching to research.

But if the large majority of American faculty believe that the teaching side of their job is more important than research, that they and their colleagues should be evaluated primarily as teachers, the evidence also indicates that higher education as an institution esteems research more highly. Those who prefer research to teaching, who are, of course, also the people who do more research, publish more, etc., receive much higher salaries than their colleagues who are more committed to, and are more involved in teaching. Thus 23 percent of those who prefer research to teaching earn over \$25,000 a year; only 9 percent of those who emphasize teaching are in the same bracket. Or to put it another way, close to half of those who receive \$25,000 or more see the job primarily as a research position, while over three-quarters of those with lower salaries would emphasize teaching. These variations hold up when we control for other relevant factors such as quality of school, age, or discipline.

Scholarly Approach

Academe is also divided with respect to a preference for a "hard" or "soft" approach to work in their discipline. Previous research indicated that this distinction is a meaningful one in almost all fields from Physics to English.

And our faculty respondents, regardless of discipline, located themselves on this dimension in response to the question: "In most academic fields, scholars vary between a more 'rigorous,' 'hard,' or scientific approach on the one hand, and a more 'qualitative,' 'soft,' or humanistic approach on the other. How would you locate your approach on the 'hard-soft' continuum within your discipline?"

Forty-five percent placed themselves on the "hard" or "rigorous" side, 39 described their approach as "soft" or "humanistic," while 16 chose the middle position on the scale.

As might be expected, variations among disciplines proved to differentiate responses to this choice more than any other factor. Those in the "scientific" fields, physical, biological, medicine, and engineering, had the highest proportions placing themselves on the "hard" side, ranging from 68 percent for medicine to 88 for the biological sciences. Yet 12 percent of the physical scientists and 21 of the medical school faculty described their approach as "soft." Over three-^{fifths} of those in the humanities said their approach is "soft" or "humanistic." Fully 18 percent of them indicated they were "hard" or "rigorous." Half the social scientists placed themselves in the "hard" category; 36 percent were "soft."

To a surprising degree, this distinction turned out to also overlap considerably with the teaching-research dimension.

Thus, among those who described themselves as primarily in research, 86 percent said their approach to their discipline was "rigorous," "hard" or scientific. Only 9 percent saw themselves as soft. Conversely, the "teachers" divided evenly, 43 percent of them were on the rigorous side of the continuum, 41 on the qualitative one, while 17 chose the middle position.

Rate of publication was also strongly linked to scholarly approach. Two-thirds of those who reported five or more publications in the past two years were hard, as contrasted to half among those who had one to four publications, and but a third among those with no publications.

Given these results, it should be evident that faculty favoring the "hard" approach were located disproportionately at more prestigious institutions, and earned higher salaries, expectations borne out by the data. Males were more likely to favor rigorous methods (50 percent) than do females (28). Young faculty, those under 40, were significantly more hard line methodologically than older ones.

The correlation pattern breaks down, however, when political and social views are introduced. Conservative and Republican faculty were more favorable to hard approaches than were liberal and Democratic ones. Thus 25 percent of those in the most conservative quintile on our liberalism-conservatism scale reported their approach as hard or rigorous as contrasted to 15 percent among those in the most liberal fifth.

Here we have an interesting and significant cross-pressure situation. Political orientation is correlated with scholarly approach, quite independently of other factors. Conservatives preferred to teach more than liberals, teachers chose soft approaches much more than researchers, but conservatives were more hard line. Those who published more were both rigorous in their approach and liberal in their politics. Yet liberals were much "softer" methodologically than conservatives.

This, of course, produces the situation that three-fifths of the liberals, who prefer teaching, were on the soft side of the methodological continuum, while 71 percent of the conservatives, who favor research, were preponderantly committed to hard or rigorous approaches.

These findings are reinforced by the answers to the questions concerning propensity to speculate wildly. We asked our respondents to react to the statements: "I like new and wild ideas," and "I do not like speculative theories not firmly grounded in hard data." Among the demographic and institutional characteristics, age turned out to correlate most highly with responses to these questions. Over four-fifths, 82 percent, of those under 30 years of age reacted positively to "wild ideas," while 57 percent of professors 60 and over had comparable views. Those primarily in research were somewhat more favorable (80 percent) than "teachers" (70 percent). Replies did not vary much by

discipline with the exception of the fact that law school professors were by far the least favorable to speculation and wild ideas. Political views, however, did make a considerable difference. Liberals were much more disposed to favor "new and wild ideas" and "speculative theories not firmly grounded on hard data" than conservatives.

Competition

Recent articles in the press and a spate of books have pointed up the competitive nature of academic life. The pressure on scholars to compete for prizes, status, grants and higher salaries supposedly lead to the kinds of practices described by James Watson in The Double Helix. The emphasis on competition is justified by sociologists of science as necessary to motivate researchers to work long hours under constant pressure. The results of such competition presumably are scholarly progress, as well as the cases of faculty cheating and plagiarism which receive media attention.

When queried on the subject, the academic community turned out to be evenly divided in its estimation of the value of competition in stimulating intellectual creativity. Only half (or as many as half) agreed with the statement: "The more competitive a scholarly community becomes, the more likely it is to discover new knowledge, or otherwise to progress."

The proportion of faculty viewing competition positively increased when the question was put in terms of its effect on students or society. Over three-fifths, 62 percent,

said that "The recent revival of competition for grades among students is beneficial, because this competition spurs student to work harder." Almost two-thirds agreed that "American society will advance most if each individual is competitively motivated."

When we first planned this survey, we hypothesized that successful highly productive research-involved faculty in upper tier universities would tend to look favorably on meritocratic scholarly competitive values, but since the same kind of people tend to be liberal politically, that they would be more negative with respect to the value of competitiveness for the larger society. Conversely, we assumed that the more teaching oriented professors, largely located in lower tier institutions, and heavily favorable to unionization, would be more negative with respect to competition within higher education.

In fact, our hypotheses turned out in the main to be incorrect. Lower tier faculty were more favorable toward scholarly competition (52 percent) than high tier ones (46 percent). Professors in the applied professional schools were much more supportive of intramural competitiveness (64 percent) than those in the natural sciences (53), or the social sciences and humanities (38 each). The factors related to competition in the larger society were similar.

These results point clearly to the principal correlate of feelings about competition among academics, general

social ideology. Among faculty whose attitudes place them in the most liberal quintile, 26 percent felt that scholarly competition is beneficial, as contrasted to 67 percent holding such views among the most conservative fifth. The relationship is even greater with respect to competition in society. Fully 91 percent of the most conservative group saw competition advancing American society, as contrasted to but 24 percent among the most liberal.

Although our initial assumption that many in academe would favor intramural competition, while opposing it extramurally did not hold up for the entire sample, there were two small but interesting groups who did not hold consistent views on competition. One professor in ten approved of competition among scholars, but opposed it for the larger society. Almost one in four, 23 percent, had positive views about competition in society, but rejected it within the university.

Who are these people? The pro-university-anti-society competition group is composed much more of liberals than conservatives, while those favoring competition in the society, but not in the university tend to be more conservative. The first group contains the largest percentage committed to research among the four categories of attitudes towards competition inside or outside. The second group is most disposed to teaching. Thus our expectation that academe contains a liberal-research oriented group which views

scholarly contribution in positive terms, but rejects it for society turned out to have some validity, but clearly it is a minority phenomenon and does not involve a significant segment of academe.

TABLE I
STYLES OF ACADEMIC WORK

	<u>WORK PREFERENCE</u>		<u>METHODOLOGY</u>	
	<u>TEACHING</u>	<u>RESEARCH</u>	<u>HARD</u>	<u>SOFT</u>
<u>TIER</u>				
High	90	50	53	32
Middle	70	30	47	37
Low	50	10	40	44
<u>AGE</u>				
20-39	69	31	49	35
40-49	76	24	42	41
50+	83	17	38	46
<u>SEX</u>				
Female	83	17	28	53
Male	72	28	50	36
<u>RELIGION</u>				
Jewish	62	38	49	39
Catholic	78	22	43	39
Protestant	76	24	44	41
<u>PUBLICATIONS/LAST 2 YEARS</u>				
None	91	9	35	46
1-4	66	34	51	35
5+	33	67	66	20
<u>POLITICAL IDEOLOGY SCALE</u>				
Liberal	68	32	40	44
Middle	75	25	45	43
Conservative	80	20	49	34

TABLE 11

ATTITUDES TOWARD INTRAMURAL AND EXTRAMURAL COMPETITION

	<u>1*</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>
<u>PIER</u>				
High	36	10	23	32
Middle	40	9	23	28
Low	42	10	23	25
<u>DISCIPLINE</u>				
Social Science	25	13	19	42
Humanities	29	13	20	38
Natural Science	44	8	26	23
Applied/Professions	57	8	24	11
<u>RELIGION</u>				
Jewish	31	12	15	42
Catholic	44	12	20	24
Protestant	41	8	25	26
<u>HARD OR SOFT APPROACH</u>				
Soft	35	10	21	34
Middle	36	11	25	28
Hard	47	8	24	21
<u>POLITICAL IDEOLOGY SCALE</u>				
Most Liberal	12	14	12	63
Liberal	26	13	24	37
Middle	43	8	26	23
Conservative	54	7	27	13
Most Conservative	63	4	28	5

- *1 = Favor Societal Competition and Favor University Competition
- 2 = Against Societal Competition and Favor University Competition
- 3 = Favor Societal Competition and Against University Competition
- 4 = Against Societal Competition and Against University Competition

SECTION 10

Faculty Self-Definitions of Role

College professors, as we have seen, are a disparate lot. They vary enormously in background, in what they do, in the type of institution for which they work, in their personal cultures and consumption styles, and in social and political views. How do they see themselves? What is the biggest facet of their occupational self-identification? To deal with this question, we told our respondents: "Some faculty are inclined to think of themselves 'as intellectuals.' Others find 'scholar,' 'scientist,' 'teacher,' or 'professional' more satisfactory descriptors." They were then asked which of these five terms describes them best and which is the poorest.

Surprisingly, perhaps, to those who consider the academic world as the core of intellectuality, close to half of the professors in America prefer to think of themselves as teachers (44 percent), while the second most valued term is professional (33). Only 12 percent selected "intellectual" as the best self-description, about the same proportion as chose scholar or scientist. Conversely, 46 percent said "intellectual" most poorly described their activities

as compared to a veritable handful (5 percent) who found teacher the poorest descriptive term among the five; while 11 percent most resented being identified as professionals or scientists and 15 percent took most umbrage at the term scientist.

What is the source of such variations in self-identification? Academic field is clearly relevant, but it does not explain most of the variance. Every disciplinary group, except for medicine, agriculture and the biological sciences, contains more people who preferred to describe themselves as teachers than anything else. Only 28 percent of the physical scientists saw themselves as "scientists," as did a tenth of the social scientists, while 14 percent preferred to see themselves as intellectuals. Humanists (21 percent) revealed the greatest desire to be identified as intellectuals, but fully half of them would rather be known as teachers, as would a majority (53 percent) of the faculty in business schools.

The negative choices of those in the various fields are equally revealing. Few in any subject picked teaching as the worst description of their status. Humanists, not surprisingly, said that the word which least well describes them is scientist (68 percent), but intellectual was in second place. Social scientists objected most to being called intellectuals (38 percent), while 32 percent of them saw scientist as the least apt phrase describing their activities. Slightly over half of all the natural scientists (51) and those in professional school faculties (52) said that intellectual was the poorest description of their role in academe.

Some institutional and personal background factors also differentiate responses to the self-images questions. Thus Jews were much more likely than non-Jews (20-10) to identify themselves as intellectuals, while close to two-fifths of the professors of Gentile background compared to one quarter of the Jews saw 'intellectual' as the least appropriate term to describe them.

The higher the social origins of academics, the more likely they are to prefer to be known as intellectuals; the lower their socio-economic background, the more disposed they are to choose "teacher" as the best descriptor of their activities. The pattern for those who emphasized scholar or scientist as the preferred term generally resembled that for intellectual, while identified "professionals" resembled "teachers" with respect to such background variables.

These relationships also appeared with respect to school quality. The higher the academic tier, the greater the proportion of those positively identifying as intellectuals, scholars or scientists, and the smaller the proportion seeing themselves as teachers. Thus, identified teachers constitute 23 percent of those in Tier I, 37 in Tier II, 44 in Tier III, and 65 in Tier IV. Conversely, 38 percent of those in Tier I prefer to be seen as scholars or scientists compared to but 6 percent in Tier IV.

The rate of publication is also related to self-identification in comparable ways. Almost three-fifths of those who published 5 or more items in the past two years see themselves as intellectuals, scholars or scientists, as contrasted to a seventh among non-publishers.

Attitudes of the Identity Groups

Self-identification proved to be strongly correlated with social, political, and academic views, as well as with behavior. In general, self-identified intellectuals were most disposed to left opinions followed by the scholars, while those who perceived themselves as scientists, professionals, or teachers were relatively conservative.

In 1972, McGovern received 86 percent of the votes of self-ascribed intellectuals, 78 from the scholars, 64 from the scientists, 62 from the teachers and 55 from the professionals. In 1968, 8 percent of the intellectuals and 4 percent of the scholars voted for the obscure left third party candidates, much more than they secured from those who preferred other labels.

Gerald Ford was viewed in positive terms in 1975 by only 13 percent of the intellectuals and 21 percent of the scholars. His favorable vote among the scientists was 28, among teachers, 33 and professionals, 38.

Occupational self-images correlated strikingly with attitudes toward the Vietnam War at the start of U.S. involvement. Over half, 56 percent, of the intellectuals reported having been opposed to any American participation from the start of the war, as contrasted to 41 percent of the scholars, 39 percent of the scientists, 36 of the teachers and 34 of the professionals.

It is possible that these sharp variations in views of the different identity groups are a function of the fact that intellectuals and scholars are found largely among social scientists and humanists,

the most politically liberal discipline groupings, while self-proclaimed scientists and professionals come disproportionately from the more conservative natural science and applied professional fields. Looking at the variations in response among faculty within discipline categories, however, affirms that occupational self-identity operates independently.

Among social scientists, McGovern received 93 percent of the intellectuals' votes, 84 percent of the scholars and 80 percent of the professionals. Among those in the natural sciences, 65 percent of those who called themselves "scientists," backed the South Dakota senator, as contrasted to 80 percent of the intellectuals and scholars. Professional school faculty who described themselves as "professionals" voted overwhelmingly (97 percent) for Richard Nixon, as contrasted to but three tenths for the Republican candidate among their professional school colleagues who identified as intellectuals or scholars.

The variations in distributions were equally striking with respect to general propensity for liberal or conservative reactions as measured by the liberalism-conservatism scale. Among those teaching the humanities, 44 percent of the identified intellectuals were in the most liberal fifth of the faculty, while only 1 percent placed in the most conservative quintile. Among the "scholars" in this discipline grouping, 32 percent fell in the most liberal segment, which 4 percent were located in the most conservative fifth. By contrast, however, fully 25 percent of those who described themselves as professionals were in the least liberal quintile.

Academic Concerns

Occupational identity, of course, also affected attitudes toward academic issues and styles of work. Thus 30 percent of the intellectuals and 20 percent of the teachers strongly agreed that "I like new and wild ideas." Conversely, 69 percent of the intellectuals and 54 percent of the teachers disagreed with the statement: "I do not like fancy, speculative theories that are not firmly grounded in hard data."

Almost half the intellectuals, 48.5 percent, described their work as primarily theoretical, rather than substantive or experimental, as did 35 percent of the scholars. By contrast, only 17 percent of the scientists took this position, not much different from the 20 percent of the professionals and teachers.

The relations to discipline differed somewhat when the question is to describe one's approach as rigorous or hard compared to qualitative or soft. Fully 92 percent of the scientists, 58 of the scholars, and 42 of the professionals described their work as rigorous or hard, as contrasted to 35 percent of the teachers and 32 of the intellectuals.

Self-identified teachers, quite naturally, revealed an almost unanimous preference (95 percent) for teaching as against research. Professionals also were heavily inclined towards teaching (74 percent). Majority votes for research, however, were cast by scientists (69) and scholars (56). Surprisingly, perhaps, the intellectuals, who as a group are heavily involved in publications, revealed a majority (56 percent) who said they preferred teaching to research.

These identifications also are associated with cultural style. Intellectuals led in proportions regularly attending concerts or plays, but brought up the rear with respect to going to sports events. They also were much more likely than those who chose other identities to read cultural and political opinion journals. To point up the differences it may be noted that 32 percent of the scientists and 22 of the teachers rarely or never read any cultural magazine as compared to 10 percent of the intellectuals. The corresponding figures for political opinion organs are 66, 50, 39.

Worst Self Description

The responses to the worst self-description question produced comparable correlations with attitudes and behavior. Thus only 28 percent of those who said the term intellectual described them least well had a negative attitude towards Gerald Ford as compared to 53 percent among those who strongly rejected being described as teachers or professionals.

Three fifths of those who took most umbrage at being described as scientists described their style of academic work as "soft" or "qualitative," as contrasted to 28 percent among those who said the term "intellectual" is the poorest descriptor of their activities.

What is an Intellectual?

To understand the linkage between the concept of the intellectual and critical socio-political views, it is necessary to recognize that the very word itself first appeared as a noun in France, at the time of the Dreyfus case, and was used soon thereafter in the United States, as a political term in much the same way. In

France, "The Manifesto of the Intellectuals" supporting Dreyfus was a left-wing appeal and for many years thereafter it was used to mean left-wing writers, academics, and the like. Similarly, the broader concept, the intelligentsia emerged in the mid-nineteenth century in eastern Europe, primarily in Czarist Russia, where it meant the educated, progressive, oppositionist strata, not the educated or professional classes generally.

Although the words seemingly have lost their explicit political character over the years, a variety of surveys here and abroad indicate that they have continued to have a political connotation, much as is suggested by the data of our recent survey. Conservatives and businessmen have seen the intellectuals and intelligentsia as hostile, and conservative intellectuals often reject the word.

But beyond explicit reference to politics, many use or apply the word intellectual, not to all involved in creative work in art, scholarship, science, and formulating ideas generally, but to generalists, to those who seek to critically apply knowledge and culture to evaluations of basic values. By such criteria a physicist, novelist, or sociologist is only an intellectual if he or she seek to address larger moral evaluative questions, to move beyond the technical limits of their disciplines. By so doing, of course, they cease being professionals and experts.

The other terms, professional, teacher, scholar, and scientist, each imply a technical limited craft which has rules of competency and the goal of objectivity. One is not supposed to speak out as

a professional, teacher, scientist, or scholar, except in those areas in which one is professionally competent. As an intellectual, however, one is obligated to take part in partisan controversy.

Given these variations in the past and present meanings and images associated with the five terms we submitted to our respondents, it is perhaps not surprising that those who chose to describe themselves as intellectuals are the most involved in the larger political culture, are the most liberal, like "wild ideas," and prefer "soft" or non-rigorous approaches to knowledge.

TABLE I

Occupational Identification of Academics*

	<u>Best</u>	<u>Poorest</u>
Intellectual	11	40
Scholar	12	15
Scientist	11	37
Professional	32	11
Teacher	44	5

* Adds to more than 100 percent because of some multiple responses.

TABLE II

Best Occupational Identification By Discipline*

	<u>Social Sciences</u>	<u>Humanities</u>	<u>Natural Sciences</u>	<u>Professionals</u>
Intellectual	14	21	6	5
Scholar	21	19	10	7
Scientist	10	1	33	9
Professional	32	24	20	42
Teacher	33	49	42	49

* Adds to more than 100 percent because of some multiple responses.

TABLE III

Attitudes By Identity Groups

	<u>Intellectuals</u>	<u>Scholars</u>	<u>Scientists</u>	<u>Professionals</u>	<u>Teachers</u>
<u>72 Vote</u>					
McGovern	86	78	64	55	62
Nixon	13	21	35	45	37
<u>Opinion of Gerald Ford</u>					
Positive	13	21	28	38	33
Neutral	23	29	33	32	30
Negative	64	50	39	31	37
<u>Attitude to Vietnam War</u>					
<u>Start</u>					
Withdrawal	56	41	39	34	36
Military Victory	16	23	27	37	34
<u>Opinion of New and Wild Ideas</u>					
Strongly Agree	30	22	22	20	19
<u>Work is Theoretical</u>	48.5	35	17	19	20
<u>Work is Rigorous</u>	32	58	92	43	35
<u>Prefer Teaching to Research</u>	56	44	31	74	95

SECTION 11

Perceptions of the Profession

The professoriate today is both troubled and content. And it appears to have ample reason for each of these facets of its collective mood.

Nowhere is this made more dramatically evident than in the economic arena. Few observers of American higher education need look to this report for confirmation of the presence of economic woes. But in other important regards, the faculty continue to occupy a very fortunate economic position--and they know it.

What professors earn

The American Association of University Professors reports annually on what colleges pay their faculty. AAUP's review last spring showed professorial salaries losing the battle with inflation, as real earnings fell, from the preceding year, by seven percent. (The average academic year salary of all faculty was \$16,403.) Such information points to real problems for the profession. Still, we need to look beyond these data to get a complete picture of the current economic status of academics. Just as total family income, rather than compensation of individual workers, provides the most revealing assessment of the economic position of Americans generally, so we must look to family income to see how well, or poorly, academics are actually doing.

They are not doing badly. This we must record, at the risk of seeming traitors to our class. The median family income of faculty

Table 1. Family income, 1974, faculty and the general public (column percentages)

	<u>Faculty</u>	<u>General Public</u>	
		<u>All</u>	<u>College Graduates*</u>
Under \$10,000	2	36	16
\$10,000-\$14,999	12	24	17
\$15,000-\$19,999	21	28	37
\$20,000-\$24,999	22		
\$25,000-\$29,999	16	10	26
\$30,000-\$39,999	17		
\$40,000-\$49,999	6	1	4
\$50,000 and higher	4		

* Refers to families in which the head has completed at least four years of college. Data on the general public are from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Money Income and Poverty Status of Families and Persons in the United States: 1974," Current Population Reports (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975).

in 1974 was about \$23,000. More than one-fourth reported income over \$30,000, while one-tenth took in over \$40,000 from all sources. This income structure compares rather favorably not only with that of the general public--where the 1974 family median was \$12,836--but as well with the income of the most highly compensated professional and managerial cohorts within the American populace. Forty-three percent of professors

reported 1974 family income in excess of \$25,000--the economic level reached by just 30 percent of all families whose heads had finished four or more years of college. The median for professorial families was about \$3,500 higher than that of families generally where the head occupied a professional position.

Many faculty realize substantial income beyond their basic salary. About one quarter of the total report that they earn at least 20 percent over and above their institutional base, while another fourth earn 10-19 percent above it. In some disciplines, the figures are much higher. Fifty-five percent of academics in business administration, for example, receive compensation from outside sources which is at least 20 percent of their basic university salary; for 19 percent of these business school professors, outside earnings total 50 percent or more of the base.

Engineering faculty have lots of opportunity to do outside consulting, and 58 percent of them claim that such consulting is a significant source of supplementary earnings. Thirty-six percent of academics based in schools of education find consulting a major source of extra compensation. Humanists are at the other end of the continuum. Few of them get much from consulting, or from research salaries and payments. For a decisive majority in the humanities, it is either summer teaching or nothing extra.

With lower base salaries and far fewer chances for supplementary income, faculty in the humanities and the fine arts bring up the rear in the academic salary march. Social scientists do better than natural scientists, indeed better than anyone else in the old liberal arts and sciences core

of the university. And professors in the applied professional fields do best of all. At the head of the pack, to no one's surprise, are

Table 2. Median family income, 1974,
faculty and the general public

<u>Faculty</u>	
All	\$23,000
Medicine	\$40,000
Business Administration	\$28,000
Education	\$26,000
Engineering	\$25,500
Social Science	\$24,500
Biological Science	\$23,000
Physical Science	\$22,500
Fine Arts	\$21,000
Humanities	\$21,000
<u>General Public</u>	
All	\$12,836
Professionals	\$19,441
Managers and Administrators	\$19,707
College Graduates	\$20,124

medical school faculty, reporting family incomes with a median of \$40,000. While we have too few cases to report on it reliably, law school professors almost certainly take second place with ease.

Table 2 makes evident the importance of the "applied vs. liberal arts" distinction. In some instances, notably medicine, institutional

salaries are higher in the applied sector, but most of the variance between these two spheres is accounted for by outside sources. Institutional base salaries are as high for biological and physical scientists as they are for faculty in education and business administration. The primary applied fields are linked up to client groups outside who provide opportunities for consulting, private practice, and research-related support. In a sense, the social sciences are closer to the applied fields than any other group of arts and sciences disciplines. A notably higher proportion of social scientists, for example, reported some paid consulting over the past two years.

Income and satisfaction

American academics now have unusual opportunities to supplement their base salaries. And two-salary families have become increasingly common of late within the professoriate, as they have throughout the public generally and in the professional middle classes. The margin between the institutional salaries of professors, then, and their total family incomes, is rather wide, and has probably been stretching over the past decade. It is for this reason that the current assault on academe of inflation and austerity has not yet produced notable discomfit regarding overall personal economic status. We thus can understand these otherwise anomalous occurrences: at the very time (Spring 1975) the AAUP was issuing a report on the profession showing a seven percent decline in the purchasing power of faculty salaries, a report appropriately

entitled "Two Steps Backward"; 58 percent of a representative national sample of professors were saying that their own economic position had been improving, while 22 percent were finding that it had stayed the same, and only 21 percent were reporting a decline.

Academe faces some serious economic problems, but the overall economic standing of the professoriate is strong, compared to most segments of the professional middle classes. Faculty appear to be acknowledging this when they testify to a high measure of personal satisfaction.

In the introduction to this report we noted that about nine professors in ten say they are happy with their choice of career and the school at which they teach, and that they think of themselves as successful people.

The academic malaise

The above isn't meant to suggest that most academics know only of bliss--because that simply is not the case--rather to indicate that the high dudgeon evident among faculty these days is far from unbroken, and that its origins are by no means exclusively economic.

The same academics who think that they personally are doing well are down in the dumps over the state of the profession. They don't think it is getting enough money, but their concerns are much broader:

▶ Sixty-four percent believe the general status of the academic profession has declined in recent years.

▶ Seventy-one percent argue that the organization of academic life is such that many of the best paid professors achieve their position by

being "operators" rather than through their scholarly contributions--up from the 48 percent holding this view in 1969.

▶ Nearly three academics in every five insist that most American colleges "crush student creativity."

▶ Half of the faculty believe that many of the best students can no longer find any meaning in science and scholarship.

So large numbers of American academics think they personally are doing well, economically and otherwise, but they despair for their profession. It isn't getting enough economic sustenance, but it is making a mess of things generally, where dollars are not the issue, and its standing is falling off. The "profession assessment" mood of faculty was by no means bubblingly optimistic in 1969, in the midst of campus unrest. It has managed, however, to get a good bit darker over the past six years.

Personal contentment and "system" despair

There is a striking parallel between the mood we have found among faculty, comprising personal satisfaction and "systemic" unease, and that which others have observed within the general public. In 1971, Albert H. Cantril and Charles W. Roll, Jr. described (Hopes and Fears of the American People, Washington, D.C, Potomic Associates, p. 51) the national mood as "one of seeming paradox: grave apprehension about the state of the nation juxtaposed against a tempered sense of personal achievement and optimism."

Three years later, William Watts and Lloyd A. Free (State of the Nation, 1974, Washington, D.C., Potomic Associates, p. 8) detected this same tension in a heightened form. About eight out of ten in the populace

expressed satisfaction with the work they do, more than seven in ten with their standard of living and their housing situation. Forty-five percent stated that "In terms of . . . personal happiness and satisfaction" they were better off than a year earlier, while only 14 percent felt they were worse off. The average citizen not only thought he was better off at present than he had been in the past, but that in the future his personal circumstance would be better still.

When the citizen looked at the larger social system, however, he turned pessimist. Things were already worse than they had been, and in the future they were likely to slide back further still.

Obviously, these data--faculty and public--are not directly comparable, but a link seems evident. What might be the common precipitant of this "inside-outside" tension?

Contemporary America, for all its economic difficulties, is an extraordinarily rich society, and it has done rather well by many, although not by any means all, of its citizenry. This is true of the professoriate. And individuals perceive this reality in evaluating their personal standing.

But institutional performance within higher education, as within the larger society, is inevitably imperfect. Heightened expectations make system failings--ever more widely publicized and discussed--appear increasingly intolerable. And the very success at the level of personal provisions serves to underscore the paucity of collective attainments.

Specifically, many in the faculty find that their personal situation has gotten better, but they doubt that the enterprise of higher education is better. And this, as much or more than austerity, is troubling them.

SECTION 12

Perceptions of Individual Occupational Requirements

American academics are generally happy with their choice of careers. Eighty-eight percent of them, for example, maintain that, were they to begin anew, they would still want to be college professors. Only two percent are certain they would not again choose the professoriate, while another ten percent doubt that they would.

But if their attachment to the profession remains strong, faculty are much less confident that they have found the right niche within higher education. Thirty-one percent think they would be more satisfied at some other college, while 44 percent believe they could be equally content elsewhere. Just a quarter (26 percent) of all professors argue that they probably would not be as satisfied with life at another university. And only one faculty member in every two (54 percent) was prepared to assert, in response to a second question, that his home institution "is a very good place for me."

The satisfied and the dissatisfied

It will come as no surprise that young academics--as low people on the status hierarchy of the schools at which they teach, their careers still before them, with both the confidence and the critical bent that recent entry to a profession can sustain--are markedly less satisfied with their present employer than are their older colleagues. Nor is it remarkable

Table 1. Faculty satisfaction with their home institution, by age

	<u>Percent agreeing "it is a very good place for me"</u>	<u>Percent maintaining that they could probably be more satisfied with life at another college or university</u>
Those under 30 years of age	37	45
30-39	46	38
40-49	54	29
50-59	64	24
60 years and older	72	14

that those well compensated display more affection for the compensator than faculty at the lower income levels.

It may, however, seem at least slightly paradoxical that professors on the staffs of junior colleges profess greater attachment to their home institutions than do academics at the major research universities. Two-thirds of the former, compared to just half the latter, bestow the

commendation, " a very good place for me," on the schools at which they teach. Thirty-one percent of major university faculty believe they would be happier elsewhere, in contrast to only 21 percent of junior college teachers.

Once again we are back to expectations. Professors at elite colleges and universities are more highly rewarded than are their counterparts at schools of the teaching culture, but they expect much greater rewards. More cosmopolitan, they find the prospects of relocating less troubling, and have a higher regard for their own market value. So they are less satisfied with their home institutions and less loyal to them, even though they are, by all objective criteria, the best treated group in the professoriate.

Looking at publication records, we see this same thing. Academics who do not publish scholarly books and articles are the least rewarded group in the profession, but they are the most loyal to the schools employing them. And they are the most convinced that they have settled in at "a very good place."

What is likely to summon the moving van?

If a move to another college is to be made, what are the prime attractions? "If you were to seek another position elsewhere," we asked our respondents, "what importance would you attach to each of the following?" Some 18 conditions--from "higher salary" to "better schools for my children"--were then listed, to be evaluated as "essential," "very

important," "somewhat important," "not important or detrimental," or "already attained and hence not a factor." It should be noted that this exercise was far from simply academic for many of our respondents. Twenty-one percent reported that they had received at least one job offer in the past two years, while another 30 percent said they had received "a serious inquiry about their availability for another position."

For professors, as undoubtedly for people in most occupations, money talks. Eighty-two percent listed "higher salary" as important in a decision to relocate, with 25 percent describing more money as "essential" and another 22 percent as "very important." No other condition was as much emphasized.

One other came close, however--tenure. Two-thirds (65 percent) of the faculty find it important in considering a move, only 11 percent "not important."

The intensity of professorial concern with tenure is quite striking. Because we knew that some two-thirds of our respondents would be tenured (a proportion which turned out to be 69 percent), we offered an additional evaluative category: "since the condition is already attained, it is not a factor." A fifty year old professor who has held tenure for 15 years might place a high value on this status, might balk at labeling it unimportant in the context of a move; but still he would not, we felt, want to describe the condition as critical in moving since he has already long possessed it. So we gave him an opportunity to state: "tenure is important to me, but since I already enjoy it, I really am not likely to be induced to move by its being offered."

We were only partly right. One third of the tenured faculty did in fact choose the latter option, while eight percent stated that the question of tenure just was not important to them. But so intense is the professorial attachment to tenure that 60 percent of those who already had it still listed it as important in deciding whether or not to move. Critics of the tenure system, beware!

Table 2. The relative importance of various conditions to faculty as they assess the possibility of a move (row percentages)

	<u>Not important*</u>	<u>Somewhat important</u>	<u>Essential or very important</u>
Higher salary	18	35	47
Tenure	34	21	44
Better students	35	29	35
Ligher teaching load	39	26	27
Greater opportunities to advance	45	23	32
Better colleagues	45	25	31
Higher rank	45	30	26
More time for research	46	26	28
Better community in which to live	49	21	31
Opportunity to teach graduate students	49	30	26
Better research facilities	52	22	26
A good job for spouse	61	14	25
Better schools for the kids	62	14	24
Better housing	66	20	15
Less administrative responsibility	67	19	14
Less pressure to publish	68	17	16

*Those describing the condition as unimportant or detrimental, and those placing a high value on the condition but listing it as unimportant in considering a move because it has already been attained, are here combined.

As befits a profession primarily oriented to teaching rather than to research, such conditions as more time for research and better research facilities are relatively lowly valued in the context of a move. Some professors, we will see, place exceptional emphasis on these conditions, but most do not.

On the whole, factors outside the job situation per se--such as better schools for the kids, a better community in which to live, and a good job for the spouse--are not highly emphasized as a move is contemplated. Even here, though, there are significant minorities in the professoriate who consider them essential. Ten percent of the faculty, for example, state that they simply would not consider a new job which did not carry with it a better school setting for their children.

Age groups

At different stages in one's career, different things seem important. Partly this is because the objective situation typically evolves in an ordered fashion. Getting a higher academic rank matters more to faculty in their late twenties and early thirties than to colleagues in their fifties because most of the former have not reached the top of the ladder while the latter generally have. The contrasting emphasis also results from shifts in mood and commitment inherent in the aging process itself. An invitation to charge ahead often seems more attractive at age 30 than at age 60.

In Table 3, we show the emphases of the several age strata by subtracting the proportion of the entire faculty describing the condition as important from the proportion of the age cohort so specifying. Thus, for faculty in their fifties the score under "a good job for spouse" is -12--indicating that the proportion here deeming this important is 12 percent lower than is the percentage for the entire professoriate.

What most faculty begin in their fifties to want most in a job--

Table 3. The relative importance of various conditions in considering a move, faculty by age; (percentages shown are those arrived at by subtracting the proportion of the entire faculty describing the condition as important from the portion of the indicated group making this assessment)

	Age			
	30-39	40-49	50-59	Over 60 years
Less pressure to publish	0	-1	+ 3	+ 5
Better students	+ 1	-1	- 4	- 5
Higher salary	+ 2	+3	- 6	- 7
Tenure	+ 7	0	-11	-13
Better community in which to live	+ 7	0	- 9	-13
More time for research	+ 7	-1	- 8	-15
Better research facilities	+ 9	0	-12	-20
A good job for spouse	+10	0	-12	-26

*The under 30 cohort closely resembles the 30-39 age group, and in the interest of space has been excluded from this table.

and hence begin to stress as important in a possible move--is less.

Things like higher salary and tenure get less emphasis, of course, because

the values have been substantially attained if not fully realized. But what is more striking, they become markedly less attracted by the prospects of new scholarly opportunities. Better research facilities and more time for research diminish notably in their appeal.

It is often assumed that faculty in the later years of their careers become more interested in community setting--for example, in finding a place removed from severe northern winters. Undoubtedly something of this occurs in some people, but it is the youngest academics who place the greatest stress on finding a better community in which to live. This concern of the latter appears due in part to the fact they are raising families, and partly to the lack of strong ties to the communities in which they presently reside. In any case, it is the young, not the old, who are the more interested in finding a better physical or community setting.

That a marked swing toward two-job families has been occurring is well known. Within the professional middle class, this is due not simply to economics, but as well to the extension of norms associated with the woman's movement emphasizing the importance of the woman being able to pursue her own career opportunities. The impact of this shift is very much evident in the faculty. "A good job for my spouse" is listed as an "essential" or a "very important" consideration when a new job is contemplated by just 14 percent of academics over age 60--who came of age in a very different cultural milieu--by 27 percent of those in their fifties, by 37 percent of those in their forties, but by 49 percent

of faculty in their thirties, and 58 percent of those in their late twenties.

Highly attaining scholars

What possible enticements are likely to be critical in persuading the most highly attaining academics to pack their bags? In considering this question, we employed a series of different definitions of high achievement, and report on the basis of one which is generally representative: the high achievers are here defined as those who publish a lot (five or more scholarly books or articles in the preceding two years) and who hold positions at the major research universities.

Salary is important, but then it always is. More money was listed by 76 percent of this group as a significant consideration. The next four factors in order of importance, however, are all related to the intellectual calibre of the school being considered in the move and the research opportunities it makes available: more time for research, better students, better research facilities, and better colleagues. Already well situated, this group continues to look for a more scholarly challenging setting.

The most important non-academic value for these high achievers--and it is very important--is community setting. Sixty percent of them indicated that a better community in which to live would be consequential in considering a move.

Faculty in the teaching culture

The "shopping list" of professors primarily oriented to teaching and at lower tier colleges is very different. Like most other academics, they assign first place among the possible enticements in a move to higher salary. But their other priority items are also mostly of the immediate, "nuts and bolts," job-related sort: tenure, a reduced teaching load, a better chance for promotion, and higher rank. They do share one emphasis besides salary with the major university scholars. Sixty-five percent of both groups list the prospect of better students as an important inducement to move.

Table 4. The six most important inducements to move; faculty by type of institution and orientation to teaching or research (the numbers in parentheses are the percentages listing the condition as important.)

	<u>Research faculty, major universities</u>		<u>Teaching faculty, lower tier colleges</u>
Higher salary	(76)	Higher salary	(84)
More time for research	(69)	Tenure	(72)
Better students	(65)	Better students	(65)
Better research facilities	(64)	Smaller teaching load	(60)
Better colleagues	(63)	Better chance for advancement	(59)
Better community	(60)	Higher rank	(57)

Fish out of water

Some faculty appear to suffer especially from their location in a college setting where "their thing" is lowly valued, or where they are asked to do something which they can't do or don't wish to do.

Research-oriented professors at lower tier, teaching-directed schools are a notable case in point. They are the only group we have found for whom "more money" is not the most often cited inducement to move. This group assigns first place to a more scholarly environment: 85 percent describe a reduced teaching load as important; 83 percent give this standing to better students; 79 percent so designate more time for research; 75 percent place this emphasis on better colleagues. These research-aspiring faculty at teaching colleges are starved for research and scholarly opportunities. They want to acquire them more than anything else.

Men and women

The 80 percent of the faculty who are males and the 20 percent who are females want much the same sorts of things from their jobs, and hence make the same claims when they consider relocating. Indeed, there are just two conditions on which they differ significantly. Thirty-nine percent of the women, compared to only 22 percent of the men, indicate that "a good job for my spouse" is an "essential" or "very important" consideration in a move. And women in the professoriate feel they have less chance to get ahead. Forty percent of them, in contrast to 31

percent of the men, list "a better chance for advancement" as very important in relocating.

Conclusions

Strongly attached to their profession, American academics are on the whole weakly attached to the institutions at which they presently teach. Their "mobility potential" thus is very high.

The diversity of the professoriate has frequently been commented upon in this **report**. It shows up sharply when we ask the question--"What would it take to get you to move?" The answers given differ greatly across the many strata and cohorts. More money is well nigh a universal pursuit, but outside that the variety in emphasis is extraordinary. Such structure as there is thus defines itself: The research-committed and scholarly attaining faculty seek an ever more challenging and rewarding scholarly setting; while teaching oriented professors, recognizing that their "market value" is lower, aspire to job advancement and job security.

SECTION 13

Perceptions of Power and Influence in America

American academics consider their profession very weak, even inconsequential, in public affairs. The intellectual community, including professors together with other scientists, leading writers, and men and women of letters, is seen by faculty to have less influence over the direction of public life than virtually any other "contending" stratum. Businessmen, labor leaders, high civil servants, congressmen, the federal executive, journalists, party leaders, wealthy families, military officialdom--all are perceived as vastly more muscular in their public influence.

Intellectuals in Postindustrial Society

It surely cannot be said that power, like beauty, is merely in the eyes of the beholder, but various groups in America do entertain vastly different notions of how power and influence are now distributed. We sought the perceptions of professors on this matter.

One of the questions we wanted to explore is whether faculty generally agree with a large and diverse body of social commentators who see the intellectual stratum picking up influence in contemporary society. Sociologist

Daniel Bell, who can claim intellectual paternity for postindustrialism, argues that knowledge becomes the primary resource in the emergent social order--just as land was in pre-industrial times and machinery in the industrial era; that universities and research institutes become the distinctive "social locus"; and that scientists, researchers, and other members of the intelligentsia take their place as dominant figures. Starting from various other intellectual perspectives and concerns, John Kenneth Galbraith, C. Wright Mills, Alain Touraine, Irving Kristol, Robert Nisbet, Theodore White, Samuel Huntington, Noam Chomsky, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, among others, have emphasized the growing prominence and influence of the intellectual community or of certain subgroups within it.

It is clear, however, that most faculty members do not think of themselves as part of an ascendant stratum. Only 14 percent of all academics believe that intellectuals have a high measure of influence in shaping public policy in the United States. In contrast, 73 percent of professors feel that the influence of business executives is high, and 62 percent attribute high influence to labor officials.

Table 1. Faculty Perceptions of the Public
Influence of Selected Social Groups

(row percentages)

<u>Group</u>	<u>Degree of Influence</u>		
	<u>High</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Low</u>
Business leaders	73	21	5
Union leaders	62	32	6
Wealthy families	53	29	18
High civil servants	40	44	16
Intellectuals	14	38	48

The faculty's low regard for its own influence seems in part to reflect the "poor little me" and the "paranoia" tendencies evident among many groups in the population. Reporting on the "American Leadership Study" conducted by Columbia University's Bureau of Applied Social Research, Carol H. Weiss noted a general inclination among elite cohorts to rank their own influence lower than what other elites ascribe to them. In particular, she observed a tendency to assign more influence to rivals, or groups to which one is unsympathetic, than to one's own group. In this 1971-72 survey, labor leaders saw businessmen exerting more influence than did other strata, and much more than did business leaders themselves. Corporation executives returned the compliment, ascribing higher influence to labor and lesser power to themselves.

With faculty as with the various elites interviewed by the Columbia investigators, assessments of one's own influence and that of rivals reflect fears rather than wishes. Professors are not alone in remembering battles lost rather than battles won.

If most groups tend to undervalue their own position, intellectuals are nonetheless unusually self-effacing. Those interviewed by the Columbia researchers ranked their power over public affairs dead last, while other elites saw intellectuals occupying a much stronger position, somewhere in the middle of the pack among the groups assessed. In our 1975 study, professors put themselves in fourteenth place--with fourteen groups being evaluated.

So it is striking that in two separate surveys, when essentially the same question was posed, intellectuals found themselves

singularly lacking social and political influence. We have no survey data on how other elites perceive the public influence of the intellectual community today but, as we have noted, in 1972 a variety of other groups did not share the low assessment intellectuals offered of their position.

Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Wagner Thielens, Jr., in their study of academic social scientists in the mid-1950s, came up with a finding which appears to parallel our own. They asked how faculty thought a typical businessman, a congressman, and a college trustee would rank these four occupations, in terms of the esteem in which he holds each: a college professor, the manager of a branch bank, an account executive in an advertising agency, and a lawyer. The majority of those answering felt that businessmen and congressmen would put faculty in last place, and they were only slightly more confident as to the response of college trustees. This involves perceptions of occupational prestige, of course, while in our 1975 surveys we are focusing on assessments of the power and influence. Still, all of these data suggest that American intellectuals consider themselves especially lowly valued by their fellow citizens, feel put upon and disadvantaged in American society. The fact that there is an abundance of data contradicting this self-perception--for example, showing that Americans actually consider college professors an especially prestigious occupational stratum--has seemingly done nothing to alter the sense of being undervalued.

There has been endless speculation as to why professors and other intellectuals consider themselves notably unrecognized and uninfluential in their own land. Some observers note the persistence of a glorified

image of the standing of European intellectuals, serving as a point of comparison. Others attend to the sheer fact of numbers--that with 400,000 full-time college faculty in the United States, and with the group widely dispersed geographically, it is impossible for the average professor to have as much direct contact with other segments of the elite, particularly with those who wield political power, as do most European intellectuals.

One additional factor may account for the strikingly low assessment professors offer of their influence and that of other intellectuals. Charles Kadushin argues (in The American Intellectual Elite) that the policy influence of the intellectual community, such as it is, applies indirectly rather than directly. It involves the process of defining social problems, formulating the political agenda, contributing to changes in values--and communicating these to larger segments of the public. And it maybe expected that any group with a high measure of indirect influence will be rather unimpressed with what it has because such influence is so intangible, so lacking in concrete testimony to its utility. The enterprise of defining issues and values--to the extent that it is performed by members of the intellectual community--goes on in a world quite removed from that of immediate political decision making. There may indeed be a "trickling down" from the idea formulation and articulation of academics to the concrete policy actions of public officials, but academics do their work largely in isolation from the "men of proximate power" and it is hardly surprising that they question the weight of their airy legacy.

Professors and other members of the intellectual stratum are more numerous today--absolutely and relatively--than at any other time in history. And as **we will discuss in greater detail later, faculty not only** possess substantial resources for political involvement but they employ these to a notable extent: they are unusually participant in public affairs. Furthermore, the persuasive concepts of postindustrialism suggest a society in which knowledge is an ever more important resource and the people of knowledge ever more important political actors. In the face of all of this, however, when professors are asked to assess group influence in public affairs, they conclude that intellectuals are singularly impotent. There is a striking gap between the theoretical calling of intellectuals to power and their perceived coming only to a place of ineffectuality.

Variations within Academe

Faculty are by no means all of one mind in their perceptions of group influence. Internal variations are very large--but at the same time exceedingly easy to locate because they stem mostly from a single source.

We had entertained a number of competing hypotheses as to the origins of intramural differences in perceptions of group power.

▶ Might there not be big variations by scholarly standing and attainment? Would not leading faculty at major universities--with broad opportunities for access to the principal institutions of American society--think of intellectuals as a more efficacious group than would lesser academic lights?

▶ Shouldn't discipline be critical with, for example, "worldly" social scientists, increasingly drawn into governmental roles, much more sanguine about the influence of intellectuals than "irrelevant" humanists?

► Or would politics in fact be the key. Would we once again find perceptions warped mightily by the prism of political values?

Only the latter hypothesis received confirmation. When political orientation--position along the general liberalism-conservatism continuum--is held constant, professors at elite universities and their counterparts at community colleges, high publishers and those who don't write at all, researchers who get government grants and teachers without access to federal largess, social scientists, humanists, engineers and biologists, the young and the old, those happy with their academic positions and their disgruntled colleagues--all show essentially the same view of the social influence of the intellectual stratum and its relative standing vis-a-vis other elites.

But liberals and conservatives hold to very different interpretations.

The most liberal academics think intellectuals are extremely weak and conservative strata, such as business leaders, very strong. Conservative faculty, on the other hand, perceive much less relative deprivation in the position of intellectuals, and are much more likely to downplay the influence of corporate executives and other conservative cohorts outside the university.

For example, half of all Democrats in the faculty consider the public influence of intellectuals to be low, while only one-tenth think it is high. But just over one-third of academic Republicans rank intellectuals low, and over a fourth believe intellectuals are very influential.

Most professors (79 percent) consider business executives more influential than intellectuals in shaping the course of American public

policy, but some (12 percent) think the influence of these two strata is roughly the same, and nearly the same number (9 percent) believe intellectuals actually rank higher than businessmen. These three groups are in no way distinguished by age, type of institution, professional attainments, or any such attributes. But 60 percent of those rating intellectuals higher than corporation leader are from the ranks of the most conservative faculty, whereas just 31 percent of the "business high, intellectuals low" group are conservatives--by the same measure employed above.

Welcome to Paranoia

What we have here, of course, is another instance of the paranoia tendency. Liberal faculty think conservative bastions, and notably the "complex" defined by the military and industry, are running the show, while the "good guys"--intellectuals, the leading communications media, and labor officials--are weak. Conservative professors, however, believe their "enemies" are ascendant: union leaders, the liberal national newspapers and TV news departments. They find businessmen, the military, and the very rich much less strong. Both liberals and conservatives in academe put intellectuals at the bottom of the pile in terms of influence--indicating that "poor little me" feelings cut across the profession--but conservatives see a much flatter shape to the influence pyramid than do liberals. Conservatives believe influence over public affairs is more equitably distributed; they are more inclined to descriptions of the U.S. as pluralistic, while liberals come more readily to visions of power elites.

Table 2. Faculty perceptions of the relative policy influence of various strata, by general political philosophy*
(column percentages)

	<u>Most Liberal Faculty</u>	<u>Most Conservative Faculty</u>
1. (most influential)	President/staff	President/staff
2.	Business leaders	Union leaders
3.	Military leaders	Major newspapers
4.	Wealthy families	Congressmen
5.	Congressmen	TV news
6.	Cabinet	Cabinet
7.	Party leaders	Business leaders
8.	Union leaders	Party leaders
9.	Major newspapers	Civil servants
10.	Civil servants	News magazines
11.	TV news	Military leaders
12.	News magazines	Wealthy families
13.	Public opinion	Public opinion
14. (least influential)	Intellectuals	Intellectuals

*The question reads: "Here is a list of some groups and institutions in our society. How would you rate the influence of each of these groups in the setting of public policy in the United States: Cabinet members, assistant secretaries; executives of large corporations; high federal civil servants; intellectuals (university professors, social scientists, leading writers); labor union leaders; the major newspapers; members of Congress; military leaders, the Pentagon; news magazines; opinion of mass publics; political party leaders; the President and White House staff; television news departments; very wealthy individuals and families."

Elite perceptions of influence--1972 and 1975

We know of only two survey instances in which elite strata have been asked their assessments of the public policy influence of the groups and institutions listed in Table 2: our 1975 faculty inquiry and the 1971-1972 Columbia

leadership study. That the question has been posed in comparable form only these two times is consequential--because the responses are so very different, and yet without instances for comparison we cannot say whether time or group accounts for the difference.

Investigators from Columbia's Bureau of Applied Social Research interviewed some 500 national leaders, drawn from business, labor, Congress, the political parties, the federal executive, and public affairs organizations. The responses of this group, in 1971 and 1972, "describe the operation of the political system in terms much like those offered in an elementary civics textbook" (quoting Carol H. Weiss' 1972 report on the findings). The official, legitimate, decision-making bodies of government are at the top. Wealthy individuals and families are at the bottom. There is no support for interpretations of power and influence in the U.S. which emphasize a military-industrial complex, or any other power elite, behind the scenes manipulating on behalf of special interests sort of structure. ". . . the formal organs of government, leavened by public opinion and the media that inform public opinion, are perceived by these 500 leaders as the major determiners of government policy. . . Weiss, 1972."

The faculty picture in 1975 portrays another world. The legitimate-- in the sense of constitutionally recognized--governmental units are seen to be often outranked by special interests: business leaders more influential than congressmen, military officials more than the cabinet or party leaders. Public opinion, and the instruments of popular communication, are near the bottom in policy impact. From a "textbook civics" interpretation,

we move to one stressing the dominance of special interest, minoritarian, extra-governmental, military-industrial groups over the fabric of American public policy.

Table 3. Faculty and national leader perceptions of the relative policy influence of various strata (column percentages)

	1971-72 national leadership study respondents*	1975 faculty study respondents*
1. (most influential)	President/staff	President/staff
2.	Congressmen	Business leaders
3.	Public opinion	Congressmen
4.	Cabinet	Military leaders
5.	Media	Union leaders
6.	Union leaders	Cabinet
7.	Civil servants	Party leaders
8.	Financial leaders	Major newspapers
9.	Corporation executives	Wealthy families
10.	Intellectuals	TV news
11.	Interest groups	Civil servants
12.	State/local party leaders	News magazines
13.	Military leaders	Public opinion
14. (least influential)	Wealthy families	Intellectuals

*There are some variations in question format from one study to the other, but basic commonalities are sufficient to permit this comparison.

It would be our guess--but it is only a guess--that the passage of time accounts for little of this extraordinary difference in interpretation, that professors simply see things differently than do the elites interviewed by the Columbia investigators.

However this may be, we have yet another datum bearing on the weakening of citizenry confidence in the performance of the American system. When a group as strategically placed in the communication of ideas as the faculty states so emphatically that American democracy "ain't what it should be," that special interests outrank many of the formal government units and public opinion in shaping national policies--and it should be noted that social scientists are even more of this opinion--it can hardly be inconsequential.

PART IV

ISSUES OF THE UNIVERSITY

SECTION 14

The Debate Over Equality and Meritocracy

Americans, Tocqueville wrote in the Democracy, are a people seized by the idea of equality. They would forever chase it and define their nation in the process. At various stages in U.S. development, equality has been seen to mean different things, to require different public responses for its advancement. Equality has continued to be a powerful standard, while the conflicts it has engendered have shifted greatly from one epoch to another.

Academics are much caught up in the contemporary stage of the debate over equality and inequality, in their capacities as citizens and as members of the "idea generating" community, of course, but as well in the operations of their "home" institutions.

Equality and Meritocracy

Over the last decade or so, many faculty have struggled with the problem of implementing two sets of values or objectives which do not

rest easily with one another:

▶ That the university should strive to function as a meritocracy, refusing to recognize such factors as sex, race, religion, and family background--either positively or negatively--rewarding only academic ability and performance;

▶ That the university should mobilize its resources in the interest of advancing equality and moving previously underrepresented groups to a position of parity, while reducing the range of distinctions and the human loss perceived following upon commitment to individualistic competition.

It was a British sociologist, Michael Young, who gave frequency to the term "meritocracy" some two decades ago. Written as a social science addition to a literary tradition stretching from More to Bellamy to Orwell, The Rise of the Meritocracy purports to chronicle from the perspective of the year 2033 the triumph of the principle of individual intellectual achievement as the vehicle for stratifying society--and then its rejection in a "populist" revolt.

The idea of meritocratic selection, of course, is an old one, and for much of its history has been seen a liberating, progressive, even radical ally of the idea of equality. When individuals are rejected out of hand because of some element of their background, when they are discriminated against because of their social class or sex or race or political inclinations, insistence that they should be admitted to a position solely on the basis of their ability to perform in it at the

appropriate level can be seen--has, in fact, often been seen--as the necessary extension of equality of opportunity. Such was, for instance, the perception of Felix Frankfurter, when he wrote eloquently of the liberating impact of meritocracy in his student days at Harvard Law School: "What mattered was excellence in your profession to which your father or your face was equally irrelevant. And so rich man, poor man, were just irrelevant titles to the equation of human relations. The thing that mattered was what you did professionally." Randolph Bourne, a Columbia graduate and one of the most creative and celebrated young socialist intellectuals of the pre-World War I years, offered a similar argument: "Scholarship is fundamentally democratic. Before the bar of marks and grades, penniless adventurer and rich man's son stand equal."

In recent years, however, many observers have come to perceive and emphasize an antagonism between the ideas of meritocracy and equality. Such arguments have developed at various levels--although all involve in some fashion what Daniel Bell has called "the redefinition of equality" in terms of end result. John Rawls' much-discussed A Theory of Justice offers a broad philosophical rejection of the idea of meritocracy and its accompanying conception of equality. "Equality of opportunity means an equal chance to leave the less fortunate behind in the personal quest for influence and social position." To treat all persons in a truly equal fashion "society must give more attention to those with fewer native assets and to those born into the less favorable social position."

Others provide a less philosophically expansive but still sociologically substantial critique, stressing that the meritocratic vision is just too raw and competitive, injuring the self-esteem of the losers, encouraging undue self-righteousness among the winners, promoting a level of interpersonal rivalry which mocks social humaneness.

For still others, the case against meritocracy is best captured in Lyndon Johnson's 1965 imagery involving a shackled runner. Is it reasonable to start a race between two runners with the legs of one shackled and those of the other free, and then half way into the contest to stop it, to loose the previously bound candidate, and then to declare that the test will proceed with scrupulous attendance to individual ability? Isn't it the case, inevitably, that the meritocracy standard gets introduced too late?

So the issue has been firmly joined as to whether the meritocracy standard is attractive and whether or not it is generally compatible with the claims of equality. There is a subordinate question--by no means unimportant by itself--of how closely any institution has successfully approximated the claims of meritocracy.

These issues have struck the academy with special force. As we have pointed out in a ~~number of our~~ ^{publications,} faculty as a group are notably committed in their general sociopolitical ideology to the extension of equalitarian values. But at the same time, the sense that advances in science and scholarship depend upon strict adherence to the quality of performance, and that intellectual life especially should aspire to a universalism which

rejects all particularistic group appeals, has received major stimulus and growth within American higher education in the twentieth century.

Is university life meritocratic?

In view of the basic push and pull of these values, it is hardly surprising that faculty are sharply divided over questions involving merit and equality, while at the same time more than a little ambivalent. It does appear that in contests between the two sets of values, meritocracy has been losing some ground in recent years. But the strongest overall impression we bring from an examination of the survey data is that of the continuing power of the meritocratic standard--throughout the reaches of what is a very diverse professoriate.

Faculty divide evenly on the question of whether universities have in fact generally behaved meritocratically. Forty-nine percent argue that places of higher education have for the most part applied meritocratic standards, while 51 percent claim that they have not. To some extent here, wish is mother to perception--the more meritocratically inclined the faculty, the more likely they are to see actual performance in that direction. But such interest-related differences in perception are not massive. Nearly 40 percent of all professors who most strongly want to see meritocratic judgments prevail believe that they have not in fact triumphed.

The variations by type of school in which the faculty member teaches are not great. Forty-four percent of professors at elite research-oriented universities, as compare to 56 percent of those on the staff of junior

colleges, argue that college and university life has on the whole not been meritocratic.

By far the biggest group differences in perception are evident in the cases of blacks and women. More than half of the white males in the professoriate think their institutions have been faithful to the principle of merit; nearly three-fourths of black academics and two-thirds of the women maintain they have not.

Is the meritocratic standard desirable?

Academics come down most strongly on the side of merit in its tussles with equality on questions involving their own hiring and reward. Ninety-five percent of professors acknowledge a major underrepresentation of blacks in faculty ranks, and more than 80 percent describe this problem as serious. The proportions are only slightly lower when the question shifts to the representation of women. But only one-fourth to one-third--the proportion varying with question wording--endorse use of "benign" quotas or preferential treatment in the recruitment process to correct the imbalance, whereas something between two-thirds and three-fourths argue that "strict adherence to the merit standard, not preferential treatment, is the appropriate remedy."

Seven academics in ten argue that before awarding tenure, the members of a department should satisfy themselves that the candidate "is the most deserving by the most demanding national standards which can be applied." About half of the professoriate take the position that salary increases should be determined strictly by merit, even though in a time of scarce

resources this requires "denying increases to many faculty of lower scholarly attainment."

A competitive structure for academic life similarly finds strong support. Three-fifths of the faculty endorse scholarly competition as an appropriate part of the intellectual environment. Almost two-thirds applaud the revival of competition for grades among students, on the grounds this "spurs students to work harder."

Faculty are most inclined to side with equality over achievement in the operation of their home institutions in the case of student admission. Nearly two-thirds agree that to increase opportunities for minority students, it may be appropriate to admit some whose prior academic records fall below those of competing white students by conventional academic criteria.

While here as elsewhere practice may dip below the proclaimed standard, faculty almost unanimously reject the notion of departing from the academic merit to achieve increased representation of certain political perspectives. Fewer than one faculty member in every twenty will claim that any preference should be afforded "radicals" or "conservatives" in order to give them more representation in professorial ranks.

Some increase in the preference for equality when it collides with the principle of merit can be seen over the past decade. The 1969 Carnegie survey explored academic support for preferential hiring of minority faculty, and preferential admission of minority students--as did our own 1975 inquiry. Question wording was not the same from one study to

the next, but was very nearly the same, and meaningful comparison can probably be made. It appears that backing for nonmeritocratic measures to increase the representation of minority faculty rose by at least 10 percentage points over this six year period, while the jump was perhaps twice as great on the question of preferential admission of minority students.

"Class interests," ideology, and academic norms

The very large differences which we find among faculty on a range of equality-meritocracy issues within the university have three distinct sets of precipitants. There are, of course, a variety of specific group interests bearing on the resolution of these controversies. General sociopolitical ideology also intrudes strongly, and in an independent fashion. There is as well a third significant contributor--involving a set of professional norms which operate independent of liberalism-conservatism and of palpable group interests.

Discussion of the interaction of these three clusters of variables will be continued in the next section.

We find a high intercorrelation, the clear presence of an equality-meritocracy dimension cutting across a range of items bearing on university policy. Individual questions in the cluster, however, impact with special force on certain faculty groups, and the latter respond accordingly.

For example:

▶ Professors who publish heavily are not notably more inclined to the meritocracy side of things on questions of affirmative action than are

nonpublishers, but the issue of basing salary increases strictly on "academic merit" produces a massive difference by level of publications. Seventy-nine percent of those with more than 10 scholarly publications in the last two years opt for salary by merit, compared to just 37 percent of faculty not publishing at all.

► Blacks and whites in the professoriate are little differentiated on tenure and salary standards. Black academics, however, are much less inclined than are their white colleagues to rely on the merit principle to advance minority representation in faculty and student ranks.

On the whole, though, the distribution of faculty opinion on equality-meritocracy issues is rather modestly influenced by such group-specific interests, as Tables 1 and 2 indicate. For example, while most women don't believe universities have managed to operate as meritocracies, they are about as inclined as are men to want them to be such.

"Class interests" carry us only so far toward an accounting for intra-faculty differences, and it is not nearly so far as one might readily expect.

Table 1. Faculty differences on university response to minorities issues, by race, sex and academic status

	<u>Oppose use of "benign" quotas to increase minority faculty representation</u>	<u>Oppose use of preferential treatment to increase minority student admissions</u>	<u>Favor merit principle as solution to under-representation of women</u>	<u>Favor merit principle as solution to under-representation of blacks</u>
<u>Race</u>				
White	67	38	83	79
Black	44	23	57	50
<u>Sex</u>				
Male	67	37	83	79
Female	61	41	74	74
<u>Age</u>				
55 and older	68	41	84	82
45-54	64	36	83	80
35-44	64	36	81	75
Under 35	64	37	78	74
<u>Publications (last two years)</u>				
More than 10	73	46	88	86
5-10	63	31	81	75
3-4	67	33	79	76
1-2	61	34	78	73
None	68	42	84	81
<u>School Quality</u>				
1. Tier 1	64	31	78	72
2.	66	36	79	75
3.	63	37	83	78
4. Tier 4	68	44	85	83
<u>Basic Institutional Salary</u>				
\$25,000 and over	71	35	84	77
\$17,000-\$24,999	65	38	83	79
\$12,000-\$16,999	66	36	80	76
Under \$12,000	63	43	79	77

Table 2. Faculty differences on other equality-meritocracy issues, by race, sex and academic status

	Agree, before awarding tenure, faculty of a department or college should satisfy themselves that the candidate for tenure is the most deserving by the most demanding national standards which can be applied.	Agree, in a time of scarce resources, salary increases should be awarded on the basis of academic merit, even though this means denying increases to many faculty of lower scholarly attainment.
<u>Publications (last two years)</u>		
More than 10	84	79
5-10	78	65
3-4	72	64
1-2	66	50
None	69	37
<u>School Quality</u>		
1. Tier 1	73	58
2.	70	57
3.	67	49
4. Tier 4	68	33
<u>Basic Institutional Salary</u>		
\$25,000 or more	80	65
\$17,000-\$24,999	71	45
\$12,000-\$16,999	62	47
Under \$12,000	72	41
<u>Age</u>		
55 and older	77	49
45-54	70	43
35-44	68	47
Under 35	64	51
<u>Sex</u>		
Male	69	50
Female	71	40
<u>Race</u>		
White	69	47
Black	67	43

SECTION 15

Perspectives on Equality and Meritocracy: Their Determinants

General sociopolitical ideology, more than any other factor, determines the response of faculty to questions of equality and meritocracy within the university. This is perhaps not surprising, since a relatively strong inclination to equalitarian values--the key component of liberalism--for the society at large might be expected to carry with it a commitment to equalitarianism within the academy.

But professors' definitions of their scholarly commitments and professional roles also shape their perspectives on the various campus issues of equality vs. meritocracy, strongly and in a fashion quite independent of their general social values.

When the effects of liberalism-conservatism and scholarly role are accounted for, the specific group interests so often invoked in discussions of the controversy--of women as opposed to men, of blacks compared to whites, of those notably successful by the prevailing rules of the academic game in contrast to those especially unsuccessful--appear relatively unimportant.

Liberalism-Conservatism

If you know a faculty member's position on national issues, you have the best available guide to his or her stance on the intramural equality-meritocracy argument.

Six specific issues discussed in ~~the preceding section~~ provided us with the raw material for constructing a campus equality-meritocracy scale. These involved questions of whether nonmeritocratic standards should be employed in hiring and in student admissions to increase the representation of minorities, whether salary should be determined strictly by academic merit, even if this has the consequence of shutting out the least successful, and whether the tenure decision should be based on the candidate's conformity to the most professionally exacting national criteria. In constructing this scale and in thereby differentiating the professoriate, we do not mean to suggest that the values of equality and meritocracy are always mutually exclusive, or are perceived as being such. We do maintain that in some instances the advance of one set of values comes at the expense of the other; and faculty scoring at the opposite ends of the equality-meritocracy scale are indicating their preference when the issue is thus joined. A professor located at the "equality" end of the scale is not necessarily hostile to the claims of "meritocracy," but he commonly opts for the former in those campus controversies pitting the two positions.

Professorial liberals--by all reasonable measures--are vastly more inclined to the equalitarian side of the campus debate. For example, sixty-two percent of academics who always vote a straight Democratic ticket score in the "most equalitarian" quintiles of our scale, compared to just

seven percent of the regular Republicans. Only 15 percent of the most liberal faculty (the latter classification determined by a composite liberalism-conservatism measure for national issues) locate themselves on the meritocracy end of our scale, as against 64 percent of their very conservative colleagues.

Table 1. Positions of faculty on the equality-meritocracy scale, by their stance on national issues (row percentages)

		<u>Most equalitarian</u>	<u>Most meritocratic</u>
<u>Voting</u>			
	Always straight Democratic ticket	62	28
	Usually straight Democratic	54	32
	Most often Democratic, but frequently other	44	38
	Regularly split	33	46
	Most often Republican but frequently other	33	44
	Usually straight Republican	29	59
	Always straight Republican ticket	7	79
<u>Liberalism-Conservatism</u>			
	Most liberal	71	15
	1	54	29
	2	39	42
	3	32	48
	4	21	64
	Most conservative		
	5		

The strength of this relationship between national policy views and those on the intramural meritocracy argument is in no way diminished or otherwise altered by restricting analysis to the various "demographic" groups in the faculty, on an individual group basis. Thus, it holds as much for women as for men, for business school professors as for social scientists, for faculty at elite research universities and those at junior colleges, for the young and old alike.

National equalitarians, campus meritocrats

Although the link between commitment to the value of equality in the society and within the academy is, expectedly, very strong, the two sets of issues are distinct. They obviously impact differently, the former raising the question of equality in the context of broad public policy, the latter as it applies "at home," in contention with other values of immediate consequence to the faculty respondents themselves.

A majority of professors adopt consistent stands--in the sense that their relative position on equality inside the academy is matched by their relative position on the value outside. There are, however, some faculty who combine notably non-congruent responses in these two sectors; for example, those who are the strongest proponents of extending equality in the larger society but are in the ranks of those most resistant to the claims of equality when these clash with the merit principle in their own institutions.

As one measure, 11 percent of respondents to our national faculty survey who score in the two most supportive quintiles of an economic equalization measure, for the society--a measure comprising such issues as whether it

should be public policy to reduce income differences among Americans, and whether much higher inheritance taxes should be imposed to minimize the passing on of large family fortunes--are in the two most pro-merit, anti-equality categories of the meritocracy scale. Twelve percent of conversely, are the professoriate, //among the most resistant to extensions of economic equality outside but are the most equalitarian within the academy.

Faculty who are national equalitarians but campus meritocrats manifest a high level of scholarly achievement (table 2). They are disproportionately / better at the

Table 2. Distribution of faculty by selected variables; national equalitarians, campus meritocrats; and national conservatives, campus equalitarians (column percentages)

	<u>Those who are conservative vis-à-vis equality, society; pro-equality, university</u>	<u>Those who are pro-equality, society; pro-meritocracy, university</u>
<u>Sex</u>		
(percent female)	32	11
<u>Primary commitment to:</u>		
teaching	84	41
research	16	59
<u>Publications last two years:</u>		
none	63	40
1 - 2	25	26
3 - 4	8	20
5 or more	4	14
<u>School Quality:</u>		
4 (lowest)	43	26
3	24	23
2	17	20
1 (highest)	16	32

Table 2 (continued). Distribution of faculty by selected variables; national equalitarians, campus meritocrats; and national conservatives, campus equalitarians (column percentages)

<u>Field (selected):</u>	<u>Those who are conservative vis-a-vis equality, society; pro-equality, university</u>	<u>Those who are pro-equality, society; pro-meritocracy, university</u>
social sciences	14	19
humanities	14	23
physical sciences	10	18
biological sciences	4	11
education	10	4
business	9	1
miscellaneous applied professional fields	19	6
<u>Liberalism-Conservatism Scale</u>		
most conservative	66	19
most liberal	9	58

schools, are more research oriented, publish more, and are located in the disciplines which form the core of the liberal arts curriculum.

A group of senior, largely male, research-directed, highly productive academics who generally endorse liberal programs in the national arena, then, they strongly endorse the idea of meritocracy within the university. It is, after all, quintessentially their idea, part of the university climate in which they have excelled.

In contrast, that one-ninth of the faculty conservative on extending economic equality in the society but highly equalitarian on university

matters comes disproportionately from the teaching, nonscholarly culture of schools of lesser academic standing. Members of this group respond favorably to campus demands for equality not because of their underlying liberalism but in spite of its absence—because they believe they have been poorly served by the idea of meritocracy or because they believe it is simply not their idea. A group of generally conservative women constitutes a large slice of this opinion cohort.

General ideological convictions loom large in locating the faculty on campus equality-meritocracy, but for these two groups with noncongruent positions on equality inside the university and beyond it, quite tangible matters of self-interest and academic experience appear decisive.

Definition of Scholarly Style

We asked faculty to assess a series of statements bearing upon their personal sense of their scholarly role and professional style. Their responses to five of these proved to be highly intercorrelated, and we created a scale comprised of them:

▶ It is more important for a scholar to be precise and rigorous in his thought than speculative and intuitive.

▶ Careful scholarship is that which provides us with hard data, independent of our subjective desires, wishes, and biases.

▶ Scholars must be emotionally neutral and impartial toward their ideas if these ideas are to stand a fair chance of ultimately being proved valid.

▶ I don't believe in rigorously formulating hypotheses and experiments before carrying out my research.

▶ I do not like fancy, speculative theories that are not firmly grounded in hard data.

There is a strong relationship between position on the "scholarly style" scale and on the equality-meritocracy measure. Faculty defining their approach as "hard," "rigorous," and "impartial," are much more inclined to the meritocracy side of things, while their "speculative," "intuitive" and "committed" colleagues give much more support for the equalitarian standard. Thus, 61 percent of faculty who reject the definition of good scholarship as rigorous and emotionally neutral show up among the most equalitarian, compared to just 27 percent of their hard data, rigor and precision aspiring brethren.

Table 3. Positions of faculty on the equality-meritocracy scale, by their stance on the "scholarly style" measure (row percentages)

<u>Scholarly Style</u>	<u>Most equalitarian</u>	<u>Most meritocratic</u>
1. (most speculative, intuitive)	61	21
2.	48	34
3.	44	40
4.	35	49
5. (most rigorous, hard)	27	58

The scholarly style scale has an obvious disciplinary link, since "hard data," "rigor," "precision" and "neutrality" are more familiar terms for natural scientists than for humanists. But in fact, the contrasting styles find their respective partisans in large numbers in

every substantial stratum of the multiversity. Among humanists, 35 percent identify their approach as primarily "rigorous"; the comparable percentages are 39 for social scientists, 41 for physical scientists, and 43 for faculty in business. Forty-two percent of the most highly publishing academics, 38 percent of those not publishing at all, 38 percent at elite universities and 36 percent at community colleges espouse the hard data, emotional neutrality style.

We also find that the above-specified relationship between style and position on the meritocracy-equality controversy is independently significant, operating apart from general sociopolitical ideology or academic status. When the positions of faculty are defined both by ideology and scholarly style, we get an unusually powerful differentiation of equality-meritocracy perspectives. As table 4 shows, when ideology is held constant, each gradation along the scholarly style measure produces a consistent movement on the equality-meritocracy dimension. Hold style constant, and liberalism-conservatism interacts this way with campus merit-equality preferences.

Table 4. Proportions of the faculty "most equalitarian" on the equality-meritocracy scale, by general ideology and scholarly style

	1 (Most liberal)	<u>Liberalism-Conservatism</u>			5 (Most conservative)
		2	3	4	
<u>Scholarly Style Scale</u>					
1 (most speculative, intuitive)	81	69	58	49	31
2	74	59	49	31	26
3	73	55	38	30	24
4	72	45	28	26	19
5 (most rigorous, hard)	48	45	25	24	13

Among the most liberal faculty, 81 percent of those inclined to a "speculative" style are highly equalitarian, compared to 48 percent of those committed to a "rigorous" approach. Within the "most rigorous" professorial quintile, 48 percent of the very liberal academics are strongly equalitarian, as against just 13 percent of the most conservative teachers.

Conclusions

It is easy to see why faculty liberals are equalitarians in the campus controversies. It is much harder to account for the strong, independent relationship of scholarly style to equality-meritocracy issues, but a few observations can be made.

Professors partake of national sociopolitical ideology, and their positions thus defined importantly influence their responses to a range of campus issues. At the same time, however, they share in academic ideologies. We will have more to say about the latter in ensuing sections of this report.

The sense that a scholar should aim for maximum rigor in his work, that he should aspire to a kind of emotional neutrality vis-à-vis his findings so as to encourage unbiased scrutiny of them, that scholarly advances require strict adherence to precision and method--these are all part of a rich although diffuse professional ideology which has been articulated over the past century. The view that the scholarly world should aim for universalistic rather than particularistic standards generally, and especially that academics should judge themselves and their students primarily in terms of intellectual competence, also is part of this broad

ideology-model--of a world view closely associated with the development of modern science.

There is, in short, a professional ideology, adherence to which inclines one to both the "rigorous" end of our scholarly style continuum and to the meritocracy pole on the equality-meritocracy scale.

At the same time, there are dissenting academic ideologies, and there are instances where the claims of general social values conflict with professional norms. A faculty member strongly wedded to liberal and equalitarian values and to the academic ideology suggested above is apt to feel cross pressured and ambivalent in the campus equality-meritocracy argument.

In the latter controversy, faculty are divided in part by their assessment of how the claims of equality and meritocracy will affect them personally, or will impact upon the interests of groups with which they identify. But the divisions within the professoriate are not so much between men and women, blacks and whites, young faculty and old, the tenured and those without job security, as they are among groups defined by the intersection of societal and academic norms or ideology.

SECTION 16

Academic Freedom: The Intelligence Heritability Debate

The late 1960s and early 1970s generated especially intense debates over the importance, requirements, and limits of academic freedom. Today, in contrast, university communities are preoccupied with problems of an economic sort. But if there has been some weakening in immediate intensity, issues relating to academic freedom remain important to faculty, and in this section we explore professors' assessments of them.

Should any subjects be off-limits to faculty research? Are there instances in which a political test should be applied--in which the potential political consequences of a line of inquiry are such that the inquiry should be discontinued, perhaps even prohibited?

The Genetic Basis of Human Intelligence

In a long article published in the Harvard Educational Review in 1969, Arthur Jensen brought together a body of research findings which suggested that intelligence differences among individuals owed more to heredity than to environment. Two years later, Richard Herrnstein argued in the pages of the Atlantic Monthly that existing data supported the view that IQ

differences among individuals are mostly accounted for by genetic inheritance. These two publications, more than any others, became the focal points in a stormy debate which extended to questioning the very propriety of research on the genetic basis of intelligence. While Jensen and Herrnstein were most visible and were subjected to strong criticism and to harassment that received nation-wide attention, scholars on a large number of campuses became targets as the argument proceeded.

It was the racial implications--real or alleged--of these studies which provided the heat to the debate. Was research on the genetic basis of intelligence implicitly if not explicitly racist, and thereby beyond the bounds of academic freedom. Beyond this, as David Cohen observed in an essay in Commentary, work such as Herrnstein's "questioned the traditional liberal idea that stupidity results from the inheritance of poverty, contending instead that poverty results from the inheritance of stupidity."

We asked faculty to comment not on the merit of various studies in this area--a subject on which most could have no informed opinion--but on the academic freedom dimension. Should any barriers be put in the way of research on heredity and intelligence?

Eleven percent of the professoriate took the stand that "academic research on the genetic bases of differences in intelligence should not be permitted, because it serves to sustain a fundamentally racist perspective [emphasis added here]." The vast majority, 89 percent, disagreed. Eighteen percent of the faculty were supportive of a lesser

barrier before such genetic research, that it "should be discouraged because it can easily serve to reinforce racial prejudices." And 26 percent of all academics expressed a willingness to entertain at least some restrictions, when they disagreed with the proposition that "academic research on the genetic bases of differences in intelligence should encounter no limitations at all."

Table 1. Faculty opinion on restrictions upon research involving heredity and intelligence (column percentages)

	<u>Such research should be prohibited</u>	<u>Such research should be discouraged</u>	<u>Such research should encounter no limitations</u>
Strongly agree	4	5	45
Agree with reservations	7	13	29
Disagree with reservations	28	30	17
Strongly disagree	62	52	9

Since a principal charge was that the work of Jensen, Herrnstein, and others clashed with liberal values, and since the most vociferous faculty and student critics were associated with the left, we expected some association between general political ideology and response to the question of restrictions on intelligence heritability research. We found none.

The most liberal academics, and their most conservative colleagues, reveal virtually identical distributions of opinion on all of the questions referred to above. For example, 72 percent of the very liberal

Table 2. Faculty opinion on intelligence heritability research, by political ideology (row percentages)

<u>Liberalism- Conservatism Scale positions</u>	<u>Agree, such research should be prohibited</u>	<u>Agree, such research should be discouraged</u>	<u>Disagree, such research should encounter no limitations</u>
1. (Most liberal)	10	19	28
2	9	16	24
3	14	20	27
4	13	19	26
5 (Most conservative)	10	16	26

cohort insisted that work on heredity and intelligence should be subjected to no restrictions at all, the view of an essentially identical 74 percent of the very conservative academics.

So many of the university controversies we have examined reflect the push and pull of broad ideological perspectives derived from issues of the society. The genetic research question is strikingly cut off from such links.

The Research Culture

professoriate
The/is very strongly opposed to all restrictions on research into heritability and intelligence, so we should not expect any group within it to manifest strong support for restraints. By far the largest intra-faculty differences which we do encounter involve groups defined by participation-- or the lack thereof--in the research culture. Whatever their politics,

academics who are themselves highly active in the research world oppose restrictions on studies of genetic inheritance, while those outside the research culture are less troubled by the prospect of such restraints.

Fewer than one in ten among faculty who publish very heavily think universities should discourage studies of heredity and IQ, compared to almost one-fourth of the non-publishers. Twenty-six percent of

Table 3. Faculty opinion on intelligence heritability research by scholarly activities (row percentages)

	<u>Agree, such research should be prohibited</u>	<u>Agree, such research should be discouraged</u>	<u>Disagree, such research should encounter no limitations</u>
<u>Scholarly publications (last 2 years)</u>			
None	14	23	31
1-2	10	18	28
3-4	6	12	23
5-10	5	10	21
More than 10	5	8	17
<u>Preference - research or teaching</u>			
Heavily in teaching	13	22	31
Both/leaning to teaching	11	18	26
Both/leaning to research	8	15	22
Heavily in research	6	9	17
Faculty who are non-publishers, interested in teaching, at lower-tier colleges			
	16	26	33
Faculty who are high publishers, interested in research, at major research-directed universities			
	4	6	15

professors who publish not at all, who locate their professional interests in teaching and who are at institutions of low scholarly standing agree that inquiries into the genetic basis of intelligence should be discouraged. Only six percent of academics who publish extensively, whose interests are primarily in research, and who teach at a major university, take this view.

It should be noted that these relationships remain exactly the same when sociopolitical ideology is held constant. For example, 14 percent of nonpublishing liberals and 14 percent of nonpublishing conservatives maintain that universities should prohibit genetic research dealing with intelligence; whereas only 5 percent of high publishing faculty, liberals and conservatives alike, take this stance.

There can be no doubt that people in some sense "of the left" assumed leadership in the criticisms of the work of Jensen, Herrnstein, et al., but for the rank and file of faculty there are no differences by political stance when it comes to defending academic freedom in this area. A willingness to accept restrictions comes primarily from a relative unconcern with effects on the research culture. Here is an academic variant of an old finding bearing on support for civil liberties in the general public. A number of studies have shown that people who see themselves at least potentially in a circumstance where their freedom of expression, for instance, might come under attack are more sensitive to and hence supportive of the general protection of civil liberties. Research faculty, confronted with the question of restrictions on research

into heredity and intelligence, seem to respond "there, but for the grace of" It matters. It involves their world.

An unusual discipline array

Because it seems to pose a matter of scholarly self-interest rather than general ideological inclinations, the academic freedom question we have been examining provokes an unusual set of relationships with field or discipline. Social scientists are the most liberal discipline cohort, and the one seemingly the most supportive of measures to eliminate prejudicial actions vis-a-vis black Americans. But their work encompasses a variety of sensitive issues like that of heredity and intelligence, and they come down more strongly on the academic freedom side than do faculty in any other discipline. Biological scientists and humanists are close to social scientists here.

On the other hand, academics in such applied professional fields as business administration, engineering and agriculture, much more conservative in political ideology and generally less receptive to appeals based on the allegation of racial discrimination, are notably less opposed to restrictions on research ^{into} / the genetic basis of differences in intelligence. Presumably this is because the latter is much more an "academic" issue for them.

We constructed a composite measure of support for academic freedom in the heritability of intelligence area of inquiry--one which incorporated the three separate questions we posed on the subject and the intensity

of response. In Table 4, faculty in the various disciplines are arrayed by their responses on this measure. We also show

Table 4. Faculty opinion on intelligence heritability research, composite academic freedom measure; and on the charge that most universities are racist; by academic discipline (percentages)

<u>Discipline</u>	<u>Academic freedom measure</u>		<u>Agree, most American colleges and universities are racist, whether or not they mean to be</u>
	<u>Unequivocally opposed to any restriction on the freedom of inquiry</u>	<u>Supportive of at least some restriction</u>	
Social sciences	51	21	52
Humanities	47	26	48
Biological sciences	45	23	31
Education	41	32	43
Physical sciences	37	27	37
Business administration	36	28	35
Engineering	30	28	38
Agriculture	30	38	23
Miscellaneous applied professional fields	25	43	39

the proportion of each field agreeing with the charge that most U.S. institutions of higher learning are in fact racist, whether consciously or not.

More social scientists than members of any other field believe that universities are guilty of racism; but more social scientists unequivocally defend the unrestricted right to conduct research on the genetic basis of

intelligence differences. Professors in agriculture, engineering, and various other applied professional disciplines are much less inclined to find universities guilty of racism--but they are as well much less of the view that unimpeded inquiry into the genetic basis of variations in intelligence involves a core academic freedom principle.

Conclusions

The question of restrictions on intelligence heritability research has been defined by faculty as a special type of academic freedom issue. The professoriate thus divides in a fashion which has nothing to do with its ideological predilection/^sbearing on the substance of the heritability argument.

It is striking to note how very different the responses are to the question of restrictions on classified weapons research. The latter might at first appear similar to the matter we have been discussing since it poses the issue of restraining professional research activity and has a clear external referent. But weapons research is not perceived as posing an academic freedom type of problem, and the faculty division is largely shaped by political inclinations. That is, liberals strongly reject the propriety of classified weapons research on campus, while conservatives strongly defend it. The variations in response by discipline--once ideology is held constant--are modest, and those relating to participation in the research culture nonexistent.

So many of the debates within academe potentially involve both professional norms and sociopolitical ideology. The "decision" as to where, among these two provinces, a specific issue falls is highly consequential to the substance of the conclusions reached.

SECTION 17

What is the Appropriate Student Role in University Affairs?

Much of the student activism of the latter half of the 1960s was directed at external targets--notably at U.S. military involvement in Indochina and at those directing that intervention. But there were campus objectives as well, including an increase in "student power," a broadening of student participation in university decision making.

Now in 1976, student activism has waned, and with this has come a weakening of the argument over the appropriate boundaries of student involvement. What, though, has happened to opinion on the subject?

In The New Morality, Daniel Yankelovich and Ruth Clark have reminded us that an important shift in behavior need not be the product of a parallel reversal in attitudes. Any thought that after the campus turmoil of the 1960s we have come back to the status quo ante, they demonstrate, is very wide of the mark. "The /Vietnam/ war was vivid and traumatic while it lasted, but the enduring heritage of the 1960s is the new social values that grew on the nation's campuses during the same fateful period and now have grown stronger and more powerful."

The student movement is now moribund, while in the 1960s it was muscular; yet a bundle of cultural norms and values associated with and largely confined to the movement have been taken up by the mainstream of young Americans.

Faculty opinion on "student power"

We wondered whether faculty views relating to student involvement have followed a similar pattern. Has there been, that is, a secular "liberalizing" of attitudes, even while the shift from war-induced activism to austerity-induced quiescence has dampened overt action and debate?

Professors are indeed now inclined to accept a broader student role in university affairs than they were in 1969. Seven years ago, according to Carnegie Commission survey data, only six percent of all academics were willing to endorse student voting power in decisions on "faculty appointment and promotion," while by 1975 the proportion had risen to 14 percent. Only 28 percent favored "little or no role" for students in this area, compared to 55 percent in 1969. Questions on the appropriate limits of undergraduates' involvement in student admissions policy, in curricular decisions, in setting bachelor's degree requirements, and in matters of student discipline all show this same shift of opinion.

Table 1. Faculty opinion on student role
in university affairs, 1969 and 1975
(column percentages)

<u>Appropriate role for undergraduates:</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1975</u>
... in faculty appointment and promotion		
control	--	1
voting power on committees	6	13
formal consultation	15	30
informal consultation	25	30
little or no role	55	28
... in student admissions policy		
control	--	1
voting power on committees	13	20
formal consultation	24	32
informal consultation	28	26
little or no role	35	22
... in student discipline decisions		
control	14	14
voting power on committees	49	53
formal consultation	25	23
informal consultation	9	7
little or no role	4	3
 Faculty promotion should be based in part on formal <u>student evaluations</u>		
agree	57	73
disagree	43	27

By the mid-1970s, only ten percent of all professors were maintaining that undergraduates should be largely excluded (only "informal consultation," or "little or no role") from decisions on student discipline. Forty-six percent favored their exclusion from judgments involving the provision and content of courses, 47 percent from the setting of bachelor's requirements, and 48 percent from student admissions decisions. Even in the area where their own fortunes are most directly involved--faculty hiring and promotion--only 28 percent of academics professed to want students totally excluded, while another 30 percent endorsed near exclusion--the role limited to informal consultation. Thirty percent of the faculty wanted students to be "formally consulted" in these professorial hiring judgments and, as we noted, 14 percent believed undergraduates should actually have the vote.

Some observers may note that it is one thing for faculty to state that students should have a given role in university affairs, and something quite different for them to actually confer the power in their home college setting. We agree. It is still important that a large and increasing proportion of academics endorse the principle of admitting undergraduates in some serious fashion into areas of university decision making which have been historically the exclusive preserve of faculty and administrators.

Faculty generations and opinion on student role

The latest entrants into the professoriate--men and women who were themselves students during the activist 1960s--give the greatest support

for an amplified student voice, but the liberalizing described above has occurred because of a shift in all professorial generations.

In Table 2, we compare the responses of academics on the question of student involvement in faculty hiring-promotion decisions, in 1969 and in 1975, by the time periods in which our respondents entered college teaching. Six faculty "generations" are referred to here--those of the 1930s, 1940s, 1950s, early 1960s, late 1960s, and the 1970s--distinguished not only by age but by the potentially "formative events" of the respective student and early faculty years. Respondents in 1969 and those in 1975

Table 2. Faculty opinion on the appropriate student role in professorial hiring-promotion decisions, 1969 and 1975, by the years of entry into the professoriate

<u>Faculty generation</u>	<u>Student role in faculty hiring and promotion should be:</u>				
	<u>Control</u>	<u>Voting power on committees</u>	<u>Formal consultation</u>	<u>Informal consultation</u>	<u>No role</u>
<u>The 1930s</u>					
1969	1	3	8	24	64
1975	1	4	17	35	45
<u>The 1940s</u>					
1969	-	4	12	25	60
1975	1	8	23	32	38
<u>The 1950s</u>					
1969	-	4	15	25	55
1975	-	11	29	33	28
<u>The early 1960s</u>					
1969	-	8	16	25	48
1975	-	14	34	26	25
<u>The late 1960s</u>					
1969	-	9	21	25	44
1975	-	18	34	28	21
<u>The 1970s</u>					
1975	1	18	37	28	16

alike show a steady increase in support for greater student involvement with movement from the oldest to the youngest cohort. And within each cohort, there is a pronounced swing over this six-year span, toward greater backing for student participation.

It seems clear that a fairly uniform shift took place across the entire professoriate. The faculty is now notably more supportive of extended undergraduate involvement not so much because of the influx of young academics as because of a change of mind encompassing all ranks. It is also evident that the varying levels of support which we find in each survey year are largely a product of factors associated with aging, rather than manifestations of unique generational experiences. Whatever was happening in universities in the years when they were coming of age academically, professors seem here to show little effect. The younger the group, the more inclined it is to favor an increased student role.

In other work, we have noted a link between aging and political perspectives--with the younger cohorts the more liberally inclined. But age is not, in the context of faculty opinion on student involvement in university decision making, a simple surrogate for political orientation. When ideology is held constant, as Table 3 shows, the relationship of age to position on the student role question remains undiminished. Among liberal faculty, only 17 percent of the youngest cohort score in the two "least supportive" quintiles of the Student Role Scale--a composite measure including five separate variables cited above--compared to 51 percent of the "over age sixty" group. For conservative academics, the

progression runs from 41 percent "least supportive" among those academics 30 years of age, to 71 percent among the oldest cohort.

Table 3. Faculty positions on the student role scale-- percentages scoring in the two "least supportive" quintiles-- by age and ideology.

<u>Age</u>	<u>Ideology</u>	
	<u>Liberal faculty</u>	<u>Conservative faculty</u>
under 30	17	41
30-39	21	48
40-49	24	50
50-59	32	56
60 years and older	51	71

Presumably young faculty give more backing to student involvement in the making of decisions for the university because they feel closer to the student population from whose ranks they have more recently departed. With aging, both psychological and social distance appear to increase.

Scholarly role and involvement

Political preferences and age aside, faculty vary in their receptivity to participation by undergraduates in university decisions by their sense of their academic role. Those who are primarily committed to teaching, who think of themselves as teachers rather than as intellectuals or scientists, and who define their scholarly style as "speculative" and "intuitive" rather than of the "rigorous," "emotionally neutral," and "hard data" variety, are much more willing to admit undergraduates to positions of responsibility in the university decision process. For example,

Table 4. Positions of faculty on the student role scale--percentage "least supportive"--by academic role and involvement, and ideology

	Ideology		
	All faculty	Liberal faculty	Conservative faculty
<u>Commitment:</u>			
heavily in research	50	43	60
both/leaning to research	44	32	57
both/leaning to teaching	34	21	51
heavily in teaching	30	18	46
<u>Best descriptors of academic role:</u>			
scientist	52	34	68
intellectual	41	32	63
scholar	41	30	59
professional	37	25	44
teacher	33	19	39
<u>Scholarly style measure:</u>			
1. (most rigorous, hard)	50	34	62
2.	43	31	55
3.	39	23	50
4.	34	26	43
5. (most speculative, intuitive)	28	18	42

68 percent of conservative academics who think of themselves as scientists score in the "least supportive" quintiles on student role, as against 39 percent of conservatives who take the label "teacher." Forty-three percent of liberals heavily committed to research, but only 18 percent of their politically like-minded brethren strongly inclined to teaching, show up within the least supportive categories vis-a-vis an expanded student role.

Once again, we encounter elements of academic ideology that operate apart from sociopolitical ideology. There is a configuration of opinion in which support for "teaching" and for "students" are closely entwined. Similarly, but at the opposite pole, a sense of the research mission carries with it a commitment to a more hierarchical, less fraternal with regard to students, idea of a university.

Conclusions

There are few divisions in faculty opinion on intra-university matters not touched by general social ideology. And the argument over how much say students should have in various aspects of institutional decision making is not one of the rare exceptions. Professorial liberals are, as a group, strongly inclined to give undergraduates more recognition, while conservatives are rather sharply opposed. The same higher commitment to equalitarian values which leads the liberal to favor extending social welfare programs in the larger society brings him to be more supportive of egalitarianism within the university. Thus, a quarter (25 percent) of the most liberal academics favor giving students at least voting power in committees charged with overseeing faculty hiring and promotion, compared to just one twentieth (6 percent) of the most conservative professors. Eighty-four percent of the former, but only 54 percent of the latter, want a major student voice in matters of student discipline.

But ideology does not operate alone in differentiating faculty opinion on these issues. Age, and academic style, role and emphasis,

also are major independent contributors. Together, these three sets of variables account for most of the variation we find in the faculty on questions of how heavily students should be brought into university decisions.

SECTION 18

Retrenchment in the University: Changing Priorities

When there are insufficient resources to go around and the fabled "hard choices" must be made, one learns where people really place their priorities. If this proposition is correct--and it probably is at least partially--the austerity which now grips American higher education should provide a very good opportunity to test priorities.

We asked faculty to indicate "where among the following areas of university expenditure you believe cutbacks must be most vigorously resisted, and where cutbacks can most readily be accommodated," to the extent that "an era of relative austerity requires that such choices be made." The list of areas included funds for libraries and laboratories, faculty salaries, the number of senior faculty, of junior faculty, of support staff, funds for athletics and related student activities, for assistance to students, funds directed primarily to the teaching program, and those committed primarily to research support.

Whither the ax?

In only one of the areas which we covered did faculty show general agreement that here indeed is a prime candidate for reductions. Seventy-three percent of all professors listed athletics and associated student activities as among the first to be cut back. That a big majority took this position is hardly surprising. The athletic program is "someone else's turf" for most academics, and faculty have never considered it central to the mission of the university.

There is some surprise--and for the research sectors of academe, a real basis of concern--in the willingness of faculty to turn

Table 1. If fiscal cutbacks must be made, where?

	<u>Should be among the first to be cut</u>	<u>Occupies an intermediate position</u>	<u>Should be among the last to be cut</u>
Funds for athletics and related student activities	73	22	5
Number of support staff	41	50	10
Funds directed primarily to research support	30	57	13
Financial assistance to students	10	50	40
Number of junior faculty	9	67	24
Number of senior faculty	9	57	33
Faculty salaries	4	48	49
Funds for libraries and laboratories	4	38	58
Funds directed primarily to the teaching program	5	36	59

very early to research dollars in search of savings. Forty-one percent of our respondents listed support staff (laboratory assistants, secretaries, and the like) as among the first to be cut, and thirty percent saw funds directed to research activities generally occupying this position. Only 10 percent and 13 percent of professors respectively argued that these areas should be among the last to feel the financial squeeze.

On the other hand, academics were the most protective of student-related activities--more so even than of their own salaries. Nearly three faculty members in every five put funds directed to the teaching program generally and to libraries and laboratories specifically as among the very last to feel the effects of retrenchment. Slightly fewer than half argued that professorial salaries should thus be immune, and only one-third made this claim for the number of senior faculty.

More specifically, thirty-one percent of academics maintained that faculty salaries should occupy a lower priority than funds for the teaching program, while only 21 percent argued the reverse (with 49 percent prepared to grant them equal priority). Forty-four percent of our respondents placed funds for the teaching program above the number of senior faculty as claimants for scarce dollars; only 17 percent would turn this priority order around.

In one sense, we have been prepared for these distributions. That large majorities of faculty think of themselves as teachers rather than researchers, have more interest in teaching than in research, and

contribute little to original scholarship has been brought out in earlier discussion. Still, the strength of the commitment to the teaching enterprise, here manifested by a willingness to protect it above all others as cuts must be made, is indeed striking.

The vulnerability of research

So much has been said in recent years about the supposed professorial love affair with research and the faculty's disinterest in teaching. Professors, it has been charged, really don't like to teach. They want to retreat to their laboratories and studies and watch the rest of the world drift by. The teaching mission of the university, in this commonly-held view, is in serious trouble.

In fact, in a time of scarce resources, it is the research function which seems, at least potentially, in jeopardy. When push comes to shove, the American professoriate is prepared to ax research-related expenditures.

Faculty assign funds "directed primarily to the research program" a higher priority than support for athletics--but that is all. Every other principal sector of university expenditures, outside of plant maintenance which we did not consider, is given a higher standing than research--in the event funding cuts must be made.

Sixty-four percent of professors believe that funds for libraries and labs deserve higher priority than funds for the research program. Only six percent would reverse this order. The comparable percentages, when one introduces dollars for the teaching program, are 61 and 7.

Table 2. The matter of priorities in the event cuts must be made:
funds for research vs. other sectors of university spending

<u>Compared to:</u>	<u>Percentage of faculty describing research expenditures as</u>		
	<u>Lower priority</u>	<u>Higher priority</u>	<u>The same priority</u>
Funds for libraries and laboratories	64	6	31
Funds directed primarily to the teaching program	61	7	32
Faculty salaries	57	9	35
Financial assistance to students	49	12	39
Number of senior faculty	46	13	40
Number of junior faculty	41	14	44
Funds for athletics and related student activities	12	55	34

Forty-nine percent give financial assistance to students a higher priority than support for research programs, while only 12 percent rank research a more deserving claimant.

Even within the major research universities, this general rank-ordering of priorities is maintained. To be sure, the research program finds more support in the scholarly centers, but decisive majorities of faculty even there state that if choices must be made, the teaching sector must be served. At elite universities, forty-seven percent of all

faculty give funds for the teaching program a higher priority than dollars for research; only eight percent would reverse this ordering, while 45 percent give the two equal emphasis as contestants for support.

Table 3. Faculty priorities, funds for teaching vs. funds for research, by type of school

	Percentage of faculty assigning <u>research</u> the following priorities, vis-a-vis <u>teaching</u> , in the event cuts must be made		
	<u>Higher</u>	<u>Lower</u>	<u>The same</u>
Tier 1 universities	8	47	45
Tier 2	7	59	35
Tier 3	6	64	29
Tier 4 colleges	6	71	23

Class interests

Beneath the general ordering of priorities we have described, there is a plethora of specific group interests which move faculty into conflicting positions. Most of these are entirely straight-forward, and need only be noted briefly.

► Young faculty and their older colleagues are in general agreement, but on the matter of cutting junior staff as opposed to senior staff position there is very sharp disagreement--in the direction predicted by "class" interests.

► Professors who publish a lot are vastly more supportive of sustaining institutional research expenditures than are their non-publishing colleagues. Thirty-nine percent of those who have not published any

scholarly books or articles in the past two years maintain that dollars for research programs should be among the first to feel the ax, while only eight percent of this group think such expenditures should be the last to be reduced. Among academics with ten or more publications in the last two years, just 15 percent want to cut research expenditures first, and 22 percent want to defend these expenditures to the last.

▶ Academics who think of themselves as "teachers" are by a dramatic margin the most willing to ax research expenditures. Self-described "scholars" and "scientists" are the stoutest defenders of the research enterprise. Professors who consider themselves "intellectuals" and "professionals" occupy intermediate positions.

▶ Only seven percent of the entire professoriate argue that funds for research should take precedence over expenditures for the teaching program. As would be expected, this group is concentrated in the "research culture." It is composed primarily of highly publishing, highly attaining, and highly rewarded faculty.

Ideological interests

We also find that judgments as to where cuts should be made in university spending are influenced by general sociopolitical ideology. This is most notably evident whenever the budget-cutting issue touches an equalitarianism. Faculty liberals are much less willing than are conservatives to require needy students to share in austerity. Sixty-three percent of the most liberal quintile in academe insist that funds

for student assistance be among the last to feel the ax; only four percent of this group would put these funds among the first to be reduced. At the other end of the ideological continuum, only 13 percent of the most conservative professors want to give maximum protection to student aid dollars, while 42 percent consider them among the prime targets if cuts must be imposed.

Table 4. Faculty positions on priorities in budget cutting, by sociopolitical ideology (row percentages)

<u>Liberalism- Conservatism Scale</u>	<u>Student financial assistance</u>		<u>Number of junior faculty</u>		<u>Funds for teaching programs</u>	
	<u>last to be cut</u>	<u>first to be cut</u>	<u>last to be cut</u>	<u>first to be cut</u>	<u>last to be cut</u>	<u>first to be cut</u>
Quintile 1 (most liberal)	63	4	32	5	64	4
Quintile 2	49	7	28	8	56	7
Quintile 3	35	9	20	8	59	4
Quintile 4	16	23	20	13	60	5
Quintile 5 (most conservative)	13	42	19	13	57	5

The issue of reductions in the number of junior vs. senior faculty shows this same division by ideology, although in a less pronounced form. Liberals are themselves no more junior than are conservatives, but they are less willing to countenance reductions in the number of junior staff

positions. The relationship is reversed on the matter of senior staff-- with conservatives more opposed than liberals to cutbacks.

The question of priorities in terms of cuts in teaching program funds provides an interesting little example of cross pressures. It becomes evident that faculty liberals are comprised disproportionately of those who share in the research culture: they come in greater than average proportions from major universities and from the ranks of the scholarly attaining. Conservatives, on the other hand, are found in greater numbers in the teaching sectors of academe-- in the lower-tier colleges and among those who are primarily committed to teaching rather than research. But at the same time, to cut funds for the teaching program is an inequalitarian act--when there are other choices such as faculty salaries and the research program. The upshot of this is that the most liberal quintile in the professoriate is a bit more for maintaining teaching-related spending than is the more teaching-oriented "most conservative" cohort.

Conclusions

The "class" interests and the ideological interests are certainly present. But these seem relatively less interesting and less important when they are considered in the context of the larger message faculty are sending vis-a-vis program cutbacks. A profession frequently maligned for its preoccupation with research and its disinterest in students has insisted--in a survey assuring the anonymity of individuals, so that we can be reasonably confident there is no "playing to the house"-- that it wishes to defend the teaching enterprise, at the expense of research endeavors if used be.

SECTION 19

The Growth of Unions in Academe

Almost six decades ago, in 1918, Thorstein Veblen categorically asserted that professors would never join trade unions and engage in collective bargaining because of "a feeling among them that their salaries are not of the nature of wages, and that there would be a species of moral obliquity implied in overtly dealing with the matter." Veblen's observation could have been repeated for the next half century. Suddenly, the dike broke in the late 60's and academic unionism emerged as a growing force. In 1968, the faculty of the 20-campus City University of New York voted to be represented by collective bargaining agents, the first major victory for faculty unionism. By the beginning of 1976, agents have been chosen to represent faculty for 294 institutions, encompassing over 410 campuses. Approximately 95,000 faculty out of 400,000 are currently employed at unionized schools, organized by three national bodies, the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) affiliated to the AFL-CIO, the National Education Association (NEA), and the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), as well as by various unaffiliated faculty associations.

Opinion surveys suggest that American faculty are more disposed to accept collective bargaining than the number of institutions now covered by contracts would indicate, and that the proportions so favorable

have been growing steadily. Thus nearly three-fifths (59 percent) of all academics queried in the 1969 Carnegie Commission on Higher Education survey gave general endorsement to the principle of collective bargaining by rejecting the negatively worded proposition that "collective bargaining by faculty has no place in a college or university." In 1973, an American Council on Education survey posed the same "collective bargaining has no place..." proposition and found that probargaining sentiment had increased to 66 percent. Two years later, in 1975, we repeated this question and found a further small increase in favorable views, to 69 percent.

Support for the assumption that this negatively worded question actually taps willingness to support faculty unionism is indicated by the response of our respondents as to how they would vote if a collective bargaining election were to be held at their institutions. Seventy-two percent stated that they would vote for an agent. Those who responded this way were very largely the same people who disagreed with the "collective bargaining has no place..." item.

On more demanding questions, where pro-unionism required approval of strike action by faculty, the survey data also points to an increase in support for collective faculty action. In 1969, slightly less than half, 47 percent, agreed with the statement "there are circumstances in which a strike would be a legitimate means of collective action for faculty members." Six years later, the percentage voicing approval of use of the strike weapon has risen, as reflected in the response to three questions: 57 percent disagreed with the statement: "Because it is non-professional conduct, faculty should not engage in militant actions such as strikes or picketing;" 60 percent rejected the proposition, "Because it is not apt to produce results, faculty should not engage in militant action such as strikes or picketing;" and 66 percent agreed that collective bargaining requires "a willingness on the part of faculty to strike, should negotiations reach an impasse."

The growth of faculty unionism, in the context of increasing austerity for higher education, promises to be the source of the most important intramural conflicts in academe in the next decade. The faculty organizations reveal an increasing willingness to use the strike weapon. This fall the AFT was involved in a three week strike at the eight campus City Colleges of Chicago. An AAUP affiliate conducted a walk-out at the University of Bridgeport and secured an agency-shop, requiring all faculty members to pay the equivalent of dues to the organization whether they joined or not. The NEA also called a strike at the start of the academic year at Rhode Island Junior College. Other strikes have occurred this year at various community colleges.

Unionism has continued to grow gradually. The faculty at two major universities, Washington^(Seattle) and Boston, voted for the AAUP towards the end of the 1974-75 school year. In that year, 17 institutions approved collective bargaining. This past fall, professors at 15 institutions chose collective bargaining agents, 9 the NEA, including the 15 campus Massachusetts Community College System, two the AFT, two independent associations, one an AAUP unit, and one, Kent State, a merged AAUP-NEA group.

A number of collective bargaining elections are on the agenda for this spring. Schools involved include Pennsylvania State University, where the NEA is seeking certification, the University of Pittsburgh, and the Connecticut State Colleges, which will be contested by all three groups, the AAUP, the NEA, and the AFT, the University of Nebraska, where the AAUP has asked for an election, and the two campuses of the University of Massachusetts, where the AAUP and the NEA are in competition.

The story of union victories in collective bargaining contests is not an unbroken one. Faculty at 51 institutions have voted against being represented by bargaining agents, 9 during 1974-75, and 6 this past fall.

Most of the schools which have turned down collective bargaining are privately supported, a fact which may reflect faculty judgment that unions are less able to secure further salary increases out of the budget of private schools than from the funds available to public bodies. It may be noted that 90 percent of the faculty working under collective bargaining are in publicly supported institutions, though these comprise two-thirds of the total population.

The limited number of institutions covered by collective bargaining as compared to the overwhelming pro-union sentiment reported in surveys to some degree reflects the fact that only half the states have passed legislation providing for the selection of agents to bargain on behalf of college faculty in public institutions. Over 90 percent of the schools which were under collective bargaining during the 1974-75 school year were in the 23 states which had enabling legislation. The gap between pro-union feeling as reflected in faculty surveys and union organization points up the enormous potential for further growth.

At the moment, each of the three national organizations only include a small proportion of their prospective membership. According to a recent study by Gary Jones, the AFT claims 40,000 college faculty members in 273 college locals, 92 of which have bargaining rights. The NEA reports 54,000 members at institutions of higher education (15,196 of whom belong to a New York State unit which though still affiliated to both the NEA and the AFT has voted to break with the NEA), who belong to 354 locals, including 149 which are bargaining agents. The 80,000 members of the AAUP belong to 1,365 chapters. Unlike the AFT and the NEA units, the vast majority of AAUP chapters do not yet aspire to become bargaining agents, continuing the past reluctance of the organization to become involved in collective bargaining. Only 35 AAUP chapters, which include 9,000 of its members, have won bargaining rights.

The location of the 294 institutions which have selected bargaining agents as of January 1, 1976 tells us a great deal about the sources of the

appeal of faculty unionism. Approximately three-quarters of all such campuses, are two year colleges, although these schools form only a third of all institutions of higher learning in the country. Few of the schools which have turned down bargaining are two year ones. The four year colleges which have voted for collective bargaining are predominantly among lower tier schools. Within multi-campus institutions, which have opted for unionization, such as the City and State Universities of New York and the University of Hawaii, the pattern noted here is evident in the results of their collective bargaining elections and membership data.

Support for unionization has been weakest on their graduate-training research oriented campuses, and strongest in two-year affiliates, followed by the four year non-graduate units. In the first collective bargaining election at the City University of New York in 1968 among regular line faculty, 46 percent of those at the Graduate Center voted for "No representative," 37 percent opted for a then unaffiliated group, the Legislative Conference, and only 17 percent backed the AFT. At the other extreme in the CUNY system, the two year colleges, only 10 percent preferred "no representation," 32 percent chose the independent organization, and a majority of 58 percent supported the AFT.

Turning to the data from our 1975 survey, we find that all the indicators of academic status and accomplishments correlate in the same way for individuals, as is indicated in Table I, below. Faculty at universities are from 11 to 14 percent less pro-union than those at four year colleges, who in turn are somewhat less well disposed to collective bargaining than those at two year institutions. Professors at the highest tier schools are 9 to 15 percent less positive about collective bargaining than those in the lowest tier. The best paid academics are the least favorable to unionization. Less than half, 40 to 48 percent, of those earning over 35,000 dollars a year endorse collective bargaining, or

would vote for a union, as contrasted to 75 to 80 percent among those earning under 10,000 dollars. Professors who teach 4 or less hours per week are from 14 to 21 percent more opposed to collective bargaining than those who spend 9 or more hours in the classroom. Those who have published 5 or more items in the last two years are 10 percent less positive than those who have not published anything in this period. Faculty who report their principal activity as research are 15 to 24 percent less pro-union than those mainly involved in teaching. Younger faculty, those under 30 years in age, are from 10 to 24 percent more pro-union than the oldest cohort, those 60 or over. The lowest ranked faculty, instructors, are from 6 to 14 percent more favorably inclined than full professors. Not surprisingly, faculty who report themselves to be full time administrators, heads of research institutes, and department chairmen, are much less enthusiastic about faculty unionization than others.

The relationship between academic status and preference for unionization among college faculty testify to the effect of "class interests" among academics. Those employed in the lower tier of academe--in terms of scholarly prestige, teaching loads, opportunity to work with graduate students, economic benefits, autonomy, strength of faculty self-government institutions compared to administrative power--are most disposed to favor organized collective action. Conversely, those at major schools, not only have higher salaries, lighter and more interesting teaching responsibilities, and more research opportunities, they are basically much less "employees," much more the controlling force in their institutions, than are their colleagues at less prestigious places, and are least favorable. In the upper reaches of academe, faculty generally have acquired almost all the power to choose new employees (colleagues), to judge whether they should be retained (given tenure), and to a lesser but still substantial degree, to determine individual salary increases. They are, therefore,

much less likely to view the university administration and trustees as their employer. All this is another way of stating that major-college faculty have possessed in significant measure the independence and self-control characteristic of a highly professional occupational cohort. As David Riesman has noted, their situation gives them the freedom "one associates with artists and free-floating intellectuals, with the cooperative-competitive collegiality...of a research group, a private medical clinic, or the partners in an elite law firm."

"We are the university" is a valid description of the standing of professors at the top of the academic hierarchy, but it decidedly does not hold for teachers at many lesser institutions. This is clearly an important reason why faculty receptivity to unionization has been lowest at major universities and increases steadily as academic prestige declines.

The relative weakness of faculty unionism at major colleges and universities is not solely a function of a more privileged economic and power position. The more research-oriented culture of academe is inherently meritocratic. Faculty are awarded with tenure, promotions and salaries from within, and by research grants and honorific awards from without, according to judgements made about their scholarly activities. There is a clear cut clash between the interests and values of highly achieving academics and the normative system of trade unionism. The latter is largely egalitarian. Unions seek to limit salary and other differences among those doing similar work, using seniority as the prime basis for differentiation. Initial appointments to a position are usually defined by unions as probationary, but once the appointee has demonstrated competence by some recognized minimum standard by a defined period of time, he may not be fired or denied job security (tenure) simply because someone better qualified becomes available. Unions press for increases in benefits for entire

categories of employees. They seek to reduce the employer's power to differentially reward employees (discriminate among them) as a means of reducing arbitrary employer power.

The general outlook of faculty unions, explicitly of the AFT and NEA, but increasingly also of the AAUP when it acts as a collective bargaining agent, is clearly relevant to the position and needs of faculty at lower tier colleges. As noted, faculty have much less autonomy at such institutions. Because there is little or no research activity, faculty may be judged differentially only in terms of teaching competence and school service, much as in a high school. There are few external sources of recognition, such as competitive job offers dictated by national judgments about ability in a discipline. In this context unions are a way of pressing for higher income and other benefits that will come for the collectivity or not at all.

Looked at another way, the egalitarian-collectivity norms of unionism are more congruent with those which have prevailed in the "semi professions," such as school teaching and nursing, than in the full-fledged professions. A primary distinction between the professions and the semi-professions involves the so-called "replaceability factor," Doctors, lawyers and scholars are not viewed as readily interchangeable. In contrast, as Amitai Etzioni has pointed out, a good nurse or public-school teacher can more easily be replaced by another person with the same basic training and performance record. Faculty at lower-tier primarily teaching institutions, regardless of the extent and quality of their training, are in a position more comparable to one of the semi-professional than the professions. To extend the egalitarian-collectivity trade union policies successfully applied in elementary and high schools to the research-oriented graduate training part of academe clearly would undermine their current practice. The scholarly productive faculty logically should be opposed to intramural

changes that will reduce the emphasis on meritocracy, and the ability of the academically successful to determine who will gain permanent status (tenure) in their institutions on highly selective competitive criteria, which as in other competitive activities which emphasize a "star system", e.g., professional sports, the theatre, literature, the arts generally, imply the rejection of those who, though competent, are not potential "stars." Many of them see these competitive cruel aspects of the system as desirable ways of motivating the successful to continue to innovate and the able young to work hard to prove themselves.

Evidence sustaining this interpretation of the sources of lesser enthusiasm for faculty unionism is provided by the data of our 1975 survey, presented in Table II below. Faculty who view competition in the scholarly community positively are more opposed to collective bargaining than those who disagree with this view. Those who would award salary increases "on the basis of academic merit, even though this means denying increases to many faculty of lower scholarly attainment" are more inclined to oppose unionization than those who oppose this principle. Those who feel that seniority or age should be the "only basis for salary differences among faculty in the same rank" are more pro union than those who oppose this view. Similar differences occur with respect to views that tenure should only be awarded to those judged to be "the most deserving by the most demanding national standards that can be applied." Conversely, those who believe that "teaching effectiveness--not publications--should be the primary criterion for faculty promotions" are more favorable to collective bargaining than those who oppose this emphasis.

A principal source of the cleavage within academe over the desirability of collective bargaining is clearly status within the profession. All factors associated with prestige, type of institution, research attainments and involvements, salary, rank, age, are correlated with lesser support for

collective bargaining and unionization. And views identified with support for a competitive, meritocratic, star system are also associated with this orientation. Yet though these relations are consistent and recurrent, it is also important to note that even among the privileged and successful who favor meritocracy, a majority has gradually come to support unionization. This latter finding, which may be linked to the decline in real income of many faculty, is probably the most important of all, for more than any other it suggests that unionization is the wave of academe's future.

Objective Factors and Opinions of Collective Bargaining and Unionization

	<u>Disagree, Collective Bar-</u> <u>gaining has no place on</u> <u>campus</u>	<u>Favor a Bar-</u> <u>gaining Agent</u>
<u>School Type</u>		
University	61	61
4-Year Institution	72	75
2-Year Institution	76	81
<u>Tier of School</u>		
High	64	65
Middle	67	65
Low	73	80
<u>Basic Institutional Salary</u>		
\$35,000 +	48	40
\$30,000-34,999	52	52
\$25,000-29,999	56	64
\$20,000-24,999	68	74
\$17,000-19,999	68	75
\$14,000-16,999	73	75
\$12,000-13,999	76	74
\$10,000-11,999	80	79
\$7,000-9,999	80	75
Less than \$7,000 *	--	--
*Too few cases for reliable estimate.		
<u>Hours Per Week of Teaching</u>		
4 or less	59	56
5-8	68	70
9 and more	73	77
<u>Published in Last Two Years</u>		
5+	61	65
1-4	71	70
None	70	75
<u>Principal Activity</u>		
Research	57	52
Teaching	72	76
Administration	54	54
<u>Age</u>		
60-99	57	69
50-59	61	69
40-49	71	75
30-39	74	72
20-29	83	79
<u>Rank</u>		
Professor	62	69
Associate Professor	70	71
Assistant Professor	74	74
Instructor	76	76

TABLE II

Faculty Attitudes and Opinions of Collective Bargaining and Unionization

	<u>Disagree, Collective Bar-</u> <u>gaining has no place on</u> <u>campus</u>	<u>Favor a Bar-</u> <u>gaining Agent</u>
<u>Scholarly competition is</u> <u>destructive to an intellectual</u> <u>environment</u>		
Strongly Agree	77	81
Agree With Reservations	72	74
Disagree With Reservations	69	71
Disagree Strongly	62	64
<u>Base salary increases on merit</u>		
Strongly Agree	52	61
Agree With Reservations	66	68
Disagree With Reservations	76	77
Disagree Strongly	79	81
<u>Base salary differences solely on</u> <u>age or seniority</u>		
Strongly Agree	73	81
Agree With Reservations	77	83
Disagree With Reservations	73	76
Disagree Strongly	64	66
<u>Base tenure on most demanding</u> <u>national standards</u>		
Strongly Agree	62	66
Agree With Reservations	69	73
Disagree With Reservations	77	77
Disagree Strongly	75	80
<u>Teaching effectiveness-not publi-</u> <u>cations-should be primary criterion</u> <u>for faculty promotion</u>		
Strongly Agree	71	75
Agree With Reservations	72	73
Disagree With Reservations	65	66
Disagree Strongly	62	66

SECTION 20

The Derivation of Support for Faculty Unionism

As we have noted, academic unionism is still primarily a phenomenon of the lower tier of academe, two year community colleges, and four year publicly supported institutions which emphasize undergraduate teaching, have high teaching loads and exhibit little or no interest in faculty research. The responses of individuals in our sample survey indicated that support for collective bargaining is strongest among those who have lower salaries and have higher teaching loads.

Political Ideology

Yet the factors which correlate most highly with positive attitudes toward faculty unionism are not indicators of institutional status which are associated with union victories in bargaining elections, but general political ideology.

The more liberal faculty are with respect to general socio-political issues, the more likely they are to favor collective bargaining in higher education. As shown in Table I, below, 89 percent of those whose views place them in most liberal quintile on the liberalism-conservatism scale

favor collective bargaining as contrasted to 49 percent among those in the most conservative fifth. Strong Democrats are much more favorable, 83 percent, than strong Republicans, 48 percent. Almost all of the faculty, 92 percent, who report that they took part "often" in anti-war demonstrations during the Vietnam War endorse collective bargaining and faculty unionism. These findings, of course, are not surprising, considering the traditional association of support for trade unionism with liberal political views.

What makes these results anomalous, however, is the fact that liberal-left political orientations within academe are associated with high academic status, while faculty at low tier institutions are the most conservative. The sources of the relative greater liberalism of the most highly achieving in academe have been discussed **earlier**, notably in our book, The Divided Academy. Basically they involve a general tendency of those who are most concerned with intellectual and scientific innovation, with being in the avant-garde of their discipline, to also be disposed to reject the traditional and established in society generally. Conversely, those primarily oriented to teaching, a role which emphasizes transmitting what is known and accepted, tend to be the more conservative. The source of the greater social discontent to be found among high tier scholars, therefore, is clearly not deprivation, but intellectuality.

The more liberal scholars, who are located in the most prestigious universities, in which faculty have more power, are better paid, and teach fewer hours, than their more conservative peers, however have more complaints about their institutional situation. The more liberal the

faculty member the more likely he is to report that his institution is not a good place for him, or that he would be better off at another school. This relationship holds up within each institutional status category. That is, liberal views are associated with negative feelings about the respondents' institution among faculty at major universities, as for those at lower tier institutions.

Curiously, though the more left disposed faculty are more likely to dislike their particular institution than conservatives, the reverse relationship holds with respect to attitude toward the profession. In response to the question: "If you were to begin your career again, would you still want to be a college professor?" faculty whose views place them in the most liberal quintile on the liberalism-conservatism scale are most likely to say, "definitely Yes", while those who fall in the most conservative fifth are more disposed to say "No" than any other group. This response pattern holds up within each institutional status level. Seemingly, the most left oriented faculty prefer being a professor to other occupations, but are more prone to dislike the particular institution they are at than others. Conversely, conservative academics feel less happy with their choice of occupation, perhaps because so many of their colleagues are liberals, but are less complaining about their institutional situation.

Although institutional and professional discontent are associated in opposite ways with political orientation, both appear, however, to contribute independently to the support for collective bargaining. Those faculty who dislike their profession, or are more negative about their

institution are most disposed to favor collective bargaining. Thus professors who answer "Definitely No" to whether they would choose to be a professor if they could make a fresh start" are 14 percent more supportive of union representation than those who reply "Definitely yes." Similarly academics who report that their institution is a "very good" place for them are 20 points less favorable than those who say it is "not good." Faculty who say that they would be more satisfied at a different school are 14 points more disposed to endorse collective bargaining than those who believe they would be less happy at some other institution. Those reporting that faculty have little power to influence university policies are 18 points more supportive of unionism than those who disagree with this view.

These indicators of satisfaction with academe are not a function of location within the profession. Faculty at high tier schools, major universities, respond in almost the same way as those in middle and low tier colleges to the question as to whether they would want to be a professor if they were beginning their career anew. The identical percentage, 51, reply, "definitely yes" in all three categories. A higher proportion, 58 percent, of those at lower tier institutions say that their institution is a very good place than those at high tier universities. Those at low tier schools are only slightly less likely to say that they believe they would be better off at another institution, 28 percent as compared to 31. The difference in evaluations of faculty power between high and low tier professors is relatively small, only 7 percent.

Within each status level, the more discontented are, of course, more favorable to faculty unionism. Thus, 89 percent of faculty at low tier

colleges who do not consider their institution a good place for them report they would vote for a faculty bargaining agent as contrasted to 59 percent among faculty at high tier universities who look upon their campus as a very good place. But as noted, those in the least unionized sector, composed largely of schools which are more prestigious and have more favorable working conditions, are not more discontented than those in the most organized category, composed largely of low prestige institutions.

General political ideology and career position join together to affect the views of faculty to produce large and decisive differences. At the extremes, only 31 percent of the most conservative faculty earning over \$25,000 a year favor collective bargaining as contrasted to 87 percent of the most liberal whose income is under \$12,000. Similarly, 35 percent of those with five or more publications in the past two years who are very conservative support union organization, while 94 percent of non-publishers in the most liberal fifth are pro-union. Less than half, 46 percent, of highly conservative faculty, over 60 years old, back unionism, compared to 92 percent of the most liberal group, under 30 years old.

Clearly ideological orientation and objective indicators of academic status, including age, independently affect propensity to back unionization. When we hold constant indicators of academic prestige, the more liberal are decidedly more favorable than the more conservative in a consistent fashion. Again holding constant ideological orientations, higher the status of a professor the less supportive he is of the need for collective bargaining. In general ideological orientation appears much more important than status in affecting attitudes on these issues.

What complicates the development of unionization in higher education is, as we have seen, that academics at the less prestigious institutions, more involved in teaching than in scholarship, are decidedly more conservative in their political views generally--hence ideologically less receptive to the norms of unionization--than their major university, more research-oriented colleagues. Conversely, professors at upper tier schools are also cross-pressured with regard to faculty unionism: their liberalism inclines them to support it; but the general structure of their academic values, **as we discussed before, are in opposit** .

But in spite of our findings that ideological orienta correlates more highly with support of unionism than academic status, the fact remains that faculty unions have made greatest progress in lower tier institutions.

The greater strength of faculty unionism at the relatively conservative bottom rather than at the more liberal top of academe clearly requires more explanation. As we see it, the pattern may be explained by the sharp variation in the job situation of faculty at different levels. Only 5 percent at lower tier schools, compared to 30 percent at major universities, received salaries of over \$25,000 in 1975. Three-quarters of the faculty in lower range schools had received no research support of any kind in the 12 months preceding our survey, as contrasted to 67 percent with research funding among those at high tier institutions. Only 7 percent of those at major schools, as contrasted to 67 percent in lower tier ones, taught 13 or more hours per week.

Discipline

Scholarly discipline, as has been noted previously, is one of the most important factors distinguishing liberals and conservatives, and attitudes toward collective bargaining issues vary much the same way.

The most liberal field groupings, the social sciences and the humanities, are also highly favorable to collective bargaining. Conversely, professors in the more conservative disciplines, those in the applied professional schools closely tied to the commercial world, and in the medical and law schools, linked to the traditional independent free professions, are least supportive.

Faculty in two professional fields deviate somewhat from this pattern. Education school professors are high in support of faculty unionism, yet as a group they are less liberal politically than those in the social sciences and humanities. The reason for this seeming deviation from the relationship between liberal views and support for unionism is that education faculty are heavily located in lower tier more pro-union colleges, and also have strong ties to teachers in the K-12 public school system, largely organized by the NEA and the AFT. The other field which upsets the relationship is business, which also is more pro-union than the predominantly conservative views of faculty in the field would imply. As yet, we have no satisfactory interpretation for this anomaly.

The linkage between liberal social views and sympathy for collective faculty organization may help explain the increased endorsement of unionism in elections in the more privileged research oriented sector. By appealing to liberal political values in the context of today's economic austerity, faculty unions should win more elections at Ph.D. awarding universities to add to the current list, which includes the Universities of Washington, Rutgers, Hawaii, Wayne State, SUNY, Temple, Boston, and others. Indicative of this trend is the fact that close to one-third of the faculty at the University of California at Berkeley belong to the two major faculty unions on that campus, the independent Faculty Association and an AFT local. Observers at the Berkeley scene anticipate that a majority of the faculty at this distinguished institution will vote for a bargaining agent, when the California legislature passes collective bargaining legislation. And if Berkeley and other campuses of the University of California accept collective bargaining, others among the high prestige state institutions will probably follow.

TABLE I
Political Behavior and Faculty Unionism (Percent)

	<u>Favor Collective Bargaining</u>	<u>Would Vote For A Union</u>
<u>Liberalism-Conservatism</u>		
Most Liberal Fifth	89	88
Most Conservative Fifth	49	55
<u>Party Sentiment</u>		
Strong Democrat	83	85
Strong Republican	48	45
<u>'72 Presidential Vote</u>		
Left Third Party	87	90
McGovern	78	80
Nixon	53	59
<u>Took Part in Anti-Vietnam Demonstration</u>		
Often	93	93
From Time to Time	87	85
Rarely	75	76
Never	62	67

TABLE II

Attitudes Towards Academe and Unionism (Percent)

<u>Attitudes</u>	<u>Favor Collective Bargaining</u>	<u>Would Vote for a Union</u>
<u>'If you were to begin your career again, would you be professor?'</u>		
Definitely YES	66	70
Definitely NO	80	78
<u>Is your institution a good place for you?'</u>		
Very good	64	68
Fairly good	73	76
Not good	84	84
<u>Satisfaction at Another School</u>		
More	63	67
Equally	68	71
Less	77	78

TABLE III

Discipline and Attitudes Towards Unionism and Politics (Percent)

<u>Discipline</u>	<u>Favor Collective Bargaining</u>	<u>Would Vote For An Agent</u>	<u>Liberal</u>
Social Sciences	79	78	79
Humanities	77	80	77
Physical Sciences	66	72	59
Biological Sciences	61	63	55
Education	74	82	58
Business	65	63	32
Engineering	53	57	34
Agriculture	34	29	25
Medicine	50	41	53
Law	46	46	53

SECTION 21

Characteristics of Faculty Union Constituencies

Although just under 100,000 faculty and other non-teaching professionals in higher education are employed in institutions covered by collective bargaining, fully 72 percent of those who replied to our survey stated that they would vote for a collective bargaining agent, if an election were to be held now at their institution. As indicated in Table I, the AAUP, the weakest of the three national organizations, has the greatest support with 28 percent, the AFT is in second place with 18 percent, 14 percent prefer other potential bargaining agents, particularly local unaffiliated groups, and only 12 percent opt for the NEA. If we differentiate between faculty at schools which have had collective bargaining elections and others, the potential strength of the AAUP increases, while the NEA loses heavily (see Table I).

A clue to the growing strength of the AAUP may lie in the fact that it is perceived as the most professional and least union-like group. This image comes through in the responses to a series of questions inquiring about the perceptions faculty have of each national body (see Table II). The AAUP is clearly identified as the

most professional and least militant association. The AFT and the NEA are more likely to be seen as school teachers' organizations. They vary considerably, however, in other aspects of their image. The AFT is perceived as the most militant, radical and politicized of the three, and as the least professional group. The NEA falls between the AAUP and the AFT on most of these items.

Some insight into the factors affecting support or opposition to each of the collective bargaining agencies may be supplied by examining what faculty who prefer each have to say about their favorite organization as compared to the other two. Thus 60 to 65 percent of the AFT supporters identify the NEA and the AAUP as "conservative" organizations, a characterization rejected by a large majority of those who back these groups. Relatively few, however, see the AFT as conservative. Sizable minorities of AAUP (39 percent) and NEA (47) voters describe the AFT as "radical", an identity which 75 percent of AFT supporters reject. Still it may be noted that the 25 percent of AFT voters who feel that their preferred bargaining agent is radical considerably exceeds the proportion of all faculty who see the AAUP or NEA in these terms. A large majority of faculty who reject the AFT see it as "too politicized." Many fewer describe its rivals in these terms. Over two-thirds of the supporters of each bargaining alternative identify the AFT as "militant." Relatively few characterize the AAUP or NEA this way. Only 7 percent of AAUP supporters and 25 percent of the NEA's see the organization they back as "militant." The overwhelming majority of those who prefer the AAUP (90)

or the NEA (75) describe each of the groups as a "professional society," a term rejected for the AFT by two-thirds of its adherents. The majority of those who would vote for the NEA (53) or the AFT (67) characterize the AAUP as "elitist", a term accepted by only (or as much as) one third of its supporters.

These responses sustain the explanation for the AAUP's appeal as resting in its image as the most academic, and least "militant" of the three organizations, and "elitist" in composition. Conversely, the second most popular group, the AFT, is perceived in terms which should appeal to those who are looking for militant unionism. The relative weakness of the NEA may lie in the fact that it is neither fish nor fowl, identified largely as a school teachers' group, which is not a militant union.

These interpretations of the varying appeals of the different bargaining agents are reinforced by the variations in the way their supporters answered questions concerning the appropriateness of the strike weapon and picketing in academe (see Table III). Over half of the supporters of the AFT (54 percent) strongly disagree with the statement: "Because it is non-professional conduct, faculty should not engage in militant actions such as strikes or picketing." The corresponding figure for those who prefer the NEA is 36 percent, while only a quarter of AAUP backers, less than half the AFT figure, hold this view. The variations in opinion on two other questions dealing with strikes are similar, as indicated in Table III. It is clear that those who would vote for the AAUP have a much less militant view of what is involved in academic collective bargaining, than supporters of the NEA, who are in turn less favorable to the use of the strike or picketing weapons than those who prefer the AFT.

Who Votes For Each?

Examining the profile of support for the three faculty organizations points up some of the factors underlying the way in which academe has reacted to unionization (see Table IV). The strength of the AAUP, the least union-like organization, resembles the pattern of support for the anti-bargaining, "No Agent" alternative. Both choices appeal least to lower tier faculty, while the AFT and the NEA find the large majority of their supporters on that level. The AAUP and "No Agent" alternatives are very weak in two-year colleges; the NEA and the AFT are strong among them, with the NEA in the lead. The AAUP's most decisive advantage over its rivals is in the private sector. Almost half the faculty in such schools say they would vote for the AAUP, with 38 percent favoring "No Agent." Only 10 percent in these largely unorganized institutions report a preference for the AFT or NEA.

Turning to the relationship of academic role to faculty propensity to support the various options, we find, not surprisingly, that close to half of those who report their principal activity as "administration" favor "No Agent", while over a quarter support the AAUP. Research involved faculty resemble administrators in their opposition to being represented by an agent (48 percent), but over a third (37 percent) favor the AAUP. The NEA and the AFT, together, are backed by only 7 percent of the faculty who are primarily in research. The picture is, of course, reversed among those who see their role as teachers. Over three-quarters of them (76 percent) would vote for an agent, 44 percent for the AFT and NEA, as against 28 for the AAUP. This pattern is reiterated with respect to variations in teaching loads. Among those reporting class hours of

four or less per week, 44 percent would vote for "No Agent", 30 for the AAUP, and only 16 for the AFT and NEA. Those with heavy loads, 13 or more hours per week, are much less disposed to favor "No Agent," and look with more favor on the NEA or the AFT than the AAUP. As might be expected, AAUP support increases with rate of publications, while the NEA and AFT draw more heavily among the non-publishers.

The similarities in support base for the AAUP and "No Agent," on one hand, and for the NEA and the AFT, on the other, with respect to the academic status and research involvements of their electorates, break down completely when ideological orientation is considered. The AAUP's strength increases the more liberal the faculty, 35 percent of the most liberal fifth support it, as compared to 19 among the most conservative quintile. Endorsement of the "No Agent" position, correlates strikingly with increasing conservatism, the range between the most conservative and most liberal quintiles is from 45 to 18 percent. AFT support is even more strongly related to liberal orientations than that of the AAUP. Only 7 percent among the arch conservative faculty back the AFT, as contrasted to 32 among the most liberal. Ideological orientations are much less important in differentiating NEA backing, but that organization clearly appeals least to the strong liberals, and has more support among conservatives. Other indicators of liberal-left opinion, such as party allegiance, and attitudes on race related issues are associated in much the same way with preference for one of the three national bodies or "No Agent."

In essence, the competition among the various collective bargaining alternatives varies within academic status and ideological orientation groupings. In upper tier, major research oriented universities, the effective choice is between the AAUP and "No Agent." The same pattern exists among privately supported institutions generally. Conversely, at two-year colleges, the contest is largely between the AFT and the NEA. Within these different contexts, ideological orientation plays a major role in affecting choices. The same pattern occurs when we differentiate by institutional status. Among upper tier faculty, as indicated in Table V, liberals tend to support the AAUP, while conservatives oppose any form of collective bargaining. Moving down the academic status ladder changes the nature of the choice. Liberals endorse the AFT, while the more conservative opt more for the NEA, if they favor a bargaining agent, or vote for "No Agent."

The link between the factors associated with a "No Agent" vote and support for the AAUP shows up clearly in the way in which the disciplines vary in their bargaining preferences. In those fields in which the "No Agent" alternative receives its most substantial support, medicine, law, agriculture, engineering, business and the biological sciences, the AAUP receives many more votes than the combined total for the AFT and the NEA. Thus in the most conservative sector of academe, agricultural schools, 73 percent of whose faculty prefer "No Agent", the AAUP is backed by 16 percent as against 5 for the NEA and AFT. In the schools of the free professions, where the "No Agent" choice is endorsed by a majority of the faculty, AAUP supporters outnumber NEA and AFT ones by 23 to 7 percent in law, and by 28 to 5 in medicine.

At the other extreme, among education school faculty, where "No Agent" is weakest, receiving only 18 percent of the choices, the NEA and the AFT

supporters overwhelm AAUP ones by 42 to 27 percent. Faculty in the humanities and social sciences, who give "No Agent" only a fifth of their vote, and are in the most politically liberal fields, furnish the largest discipline base for the AFT, although the AAUP, attractive to upper tier liberals, is strong among them as well.

The data presented here, not only serve to account for the diverse patterns of support for the three national organizations competing to represent faculty, they also help to explain some of the reasons why 72 percent of the faculty indicate a willingness to vote for an agent, while as yet less than 25 percent are represented by a union. It is evident that the attitudes of many who would vote for a particular organization could lead them to reject another, should their preferred one not be on the ballot. Many AAUP supporters see it as an alternative to militant unionism as represented by the AFT or to involvement in organizations linked to school teachers in the K-12 system. Given the fact, however, that the principal unorganized campuses are in middle and high tier institutions and in the private sector, the AAUP clearly has the greatest potential for growth. Whether that potential is converted into bargaining election strength is uncertain, however, given the fact that the AAUP lags far behind its rivals in financial and organizational resources. Unionization and collective bargaining are extremely costly, and the membership of the AAUP have still not shown that they are willing to pay the price in the form of much higher dues.

TABLE I
Electoral Choices in a Future Collective Bargaining Election
(Column Percentages)

<u>Bargaining Election Options</u>	<u>All Faculty</u>	<u>Faculty at Schools Which Have Not Had An Election</u>
AAUP	28	31
AFT	18	18
NEA	12	8
Other Agents*	14	13
No Agent	28	29

* Other Agents largely include independent unaffiliated local faculty associations and affiliates of state civil service groups.

TABLE II
Faculty Images of the Three Bargaining Agents
(Column Percentages)

<u>Images</u>	<u>AAUP</u>	<u>AFT</u>	<u>NEA</u>
Professional Society	87	24	59
Militant Group	9	67	19
School Teachers Organization	47	79	89
Too Heavily Politicized	15	56	38
Unprofessional	5	39	17
Elitist	48	6	10
Radical	6	40	9
Conservative	49	9	40
Undemocratic	49	23	17

TABLE III
Attitudes to Strikes
(Column Percentages)

<u>Strike Attitudes</u>	<u>AAUP</u>	<u>NEA</u>	<u>AFT</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>No Agent</u>
<u>Professionalism Means Faculty Should Not Engage in Strikes and Picketing</u>					
Strongly Agree	13	14	4	18	39
Agree With Reservations	26	21	11	14	32
Disagree With Reservations	36	29	31	34	19
Strongly Disagree	25	36	54	23	10
<u>Organizing Requires a Willingness to Strike When Impasse Reached</u>					
Strongly Agree	27	32	46	24	27
Agree With Reservations	39	33	35	37	35
Disagree With Reservations	25	24	13	26	24
Strongly Disagree	9	11	6	13	15
<u>Once They Do Not Produce Results Faculty Should Not Engage in Strikes and Picketing</u>					
Strongly Agree	9	11	2	14	24
Agree With Reservations	28	25	18	29	33
Disagree With Reservations	43	30	32	33	32
Strongly Disagree	19	33	48	24	11

TABLE IV

Profile of Support for Collective Bargaining Alternatives

(Row Percentages)

<u>Factor</u>	<u>AAUP</u>	<u>NEA</u>	<u>AFT</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>No Agent</u>
<u>Level</u>					
Highest	34	7	12	12	35
Middle	40	5	11	9	35
Lowest	19	18	25	17	21
<u>Type of School</u>					
University	38	6	8	9	39
4-Yr. Institution	35	9	18	14	25
2-Yr. Institution	9	23	30	20	19
<u>Public or Private</u>					
Public	25	13	20	15	26
Private	47	3	7	5	38
<u>Salary</u>					
Below \$12,000	42	12	13	9	25
\$12,000-16,999	31	13	19	11	25
\$17,000-24,999	23	12	20	18	26
\$25,000+	28	7	9	12	43
<u>Rank</u>					
Instructor	21	14	23	17	24
Asst. Professor	31	13	18	11	26
Assoc. Professor	31	14	15	11	29
Professor	27	7	18	17	31
<u>Principal Activity</u>					
Administration	26	8	8	12	46
Teaching	28	13	21	14	24
Research	37	3	4	8	48
<u>Hours Per Week of Teaching</u>					
4 or Less	30	9	7	11	44
5-8	37	9	14	9	30
9-12	32	9	22	14	23
13+	18	18	23	18	23
<u>Published in Last 2 Years</u>					
None	23	15	21	16	25
1-4	33	8	16	12	30
5+	39	5	11	8	12

TABLE IV
(Continued)

Factor	<u>AAUP</u>	<u>NEA</u>	<u>AFT</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>No Agent</u>
<u>Teaching Field</u>					
Social Sciences	27	13	25	12	21
Humanities	35	7	23	15	20
Physical Sciences	30	12	17	13	28
Biological Sciences	30	7	19	6	37
Education	27	21	21	13	18
Business	22	9	11	17	37
Engineering	20	12	5	20	43
Law	23	7	0	16	54
Medicine	28	4	1	8	59
Agriculture	16	3	2	8	71
<u>Liberalism-Conservatism Scale</u>					
Most Liberal	35	8	32	13	12
Somewhat Liberal	34	11	24	13	18
Middle	34	12	15	13	26
Somewhat Conservative	22	15	15	14	34
Most Conservative	19	12	7	16	45
<u>Party Sentiment</u>					
Strong Democrat	30	11	28	15	15
Independent	30	13	14	13	30
Strong Republican	12	15	8	11	55
Other Party	14	0	48	14	24
<u>Priority Treatment Scale</u>					
Strongly For Remedial Action	31	10	29	15	15
Strongly Against Remedial Action	22	14	14	16	35

TABLE V

Relationship Between Institutional Status and Political Ideology and
Preference for Different Bargaining Alternatives

(Row Percentages)

<u>Ideology</u>	<u>HIGH TIER</u>				
	<u>AAUP</u>	<u>NEA</u>	<u>AFT</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>No Agent</u>
Liberal	40	5	19	12	23
Middle	37	7	10	14	32
Conservative	26	7	3	9	55

<u>Ideology</u>	<u>MIDDLE TIER</u>				
	<u>AAUP</u>	<u>NEA</u>	<u>AFT</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>No Agent</u>
Liberal	48	6	19	9	18
Middle	42	5	5	9	39
Conservative	29	5	5	9	52

<u>Ideology</u>	<u>LOW TIER</u>				
	<u>AAUP</u>	<u>NEA</u>	<u>AFT</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>No Agent</u>
Liberal	21	15	39	15	9
Middle	30	20	23	14	16
Conservative	15	20	17	19	29

SECTION 22

Characteristics of Faculty Union Activists

The outcome of the intramural conflict among the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), the National Education Association (NEA), and the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) will largely be decided by the policies and images projected by their members and officers. An examination of the organizations reveals a great deal about the disparate character of each.

Commitment to Unionism

There can be little doubt that AFT members, activists (meeting attenders) and local officers are much more committed to faculty unionism than those active in its competitors. Thus 71 percent of AFT members, 82 percent of those who report attending meetings and 89 percent of the officers "strongly disagree" that "Collective bargaining by faculty members has no place in a college or university." The corresponding percentages for the NEA are 48, 54, and 54, while for the AAUP, they are 39, 42, 47. Or to put it the other way, a majority of NEA members, close to half of those active in its college level affiliates, and even larger percentages of those involved in the AAUP either are opposed to formal collective bargaining (about 20-25 percent) or while favoring it have some reservations (27-35 percent).

Similar differences occur with respect to approval of the use of the strike weapon and picketing in higher education. The range of variation among the officers of the three organizations in response to the statement: "Because it is non-professional conduct, faculty should not engage in militant actions such as strikes and picketing" is very great. Twice the proportion of AFT officials (72 percent) voice "strong disagreement" as NEA or AAUP leaders. The same pattern exists among members and activists. As many as 46 percent of those who attend NEA meetings, 33 percent of AAUP activists, and only 14 percent in the AFT agree that faculty should not strike or picket. Similarly 55 percent of the AFT executives, 37 percent of the NEA and 29 of the AAUP voice strong agreement that "Collective bargaining for faculty is meaningless without a willingness on the part of the faculty to strike, should negotiations reach an impasse." In general, of course, the more involved people are in one of the collective bargaining bodies, the more supportive they are of militancy.

Images of the Unions

The differences among those involved in each group are also strikingly evident in their varying images of their own organizations. Large majorities of AFT members (69), activists (74) and officers (77) identify their union as "militant". The proportions in the NEA who see their association in these terms are much smaller, 23, 33, and 34, while very few among AAUP people describe their group as "militant", 7, 8, and 9. Conversely, as might be expected, few in any category of AFT people portray it as "conservative," while strikingly large minorities (35-45 percent) in both the NEA and AAUP see their own group that way. These variations in self-perception correspond to the ways in which those

involved in each see the others. Thus majorities of AFT members and leaders identify the NEA and AAUP as conservative and non-militant. Few in the NEA (around 10 percent) describe the AFT as conservative, while close to half portray it as "radical" and 70 percent as "militant". Most NEA people, however, see the AAUP as conservative, few as radical or as militant. AAUP adherents by a large majority (70) describe the AFT as "militant," about 40 percent see it as "radical," and less than 10 as conservative. A large proportion, around 40, report the NEA as conservative, relatively few see it as either militant, or radical. Interestingly, large minorities of NEA (37 percent) and AFT (32) members see their own organizations as "too much politicized," a criticism levied by very few AAUP members (7) on their group. Three-fifths of the NEA and AAUP adherents describe the AFT in these negative terms; the NEA is subjected to the same criticism by about a third of those who belong to its rivals; while only 15 percent of NEA and AFT people look on the AAUP as overly politicized.

There is a similar degree of relative consensus about the application of the term "elitist". Over two-thirds of those involved in the AFT, half in the NEA, and a third in the AAUP, see the latter as "elitist". Very few in any category identify the NEA or AFT in these terms.

The differences in the attitudes toward collective bargaining and union tactics and in images of three competing agencies among members, activists, and officials point up the enormous variations in the appeal of each. The core group of the AFT, explicitly formed as a trade union, and affiliated to the AFL-CIO, want a militant union, which behaves like unions do in other industries. The NEA and AAUP, on the other hand, were established as professional associations, an identification the large majority of their members and leaders still cherish. Over 90 percent of

those in the AAUP and 70 in the NEA describe their associations as a "professional society," a characterization rejected by 62 percent of AFT adherents for their organization. The former groups only came to accept the role as collective bargaining agents very recently, during the middle sixties in the case of NEA, and not until 1972 for the AAUP. In large part, the former responded to the growth of AFT trade-unionism in the public school K-12 system, the latter to the rapid success of the AFT and NEA in higher education from 1968 to 1972.

The variations in past orientations to collective bargaining and trade unionism continue to inform the outlook of those involved in the three organizations in spite of the strong commitment which the NEA and AAUP have made to collective bargaining. Studies of school teacher members of the AFT and NEA in communities in which they co-exist indicate that the latter are less militant and more conservative in their trade-union and social attitudes than the former. Among college faculty, it is clear that a large proportion of AAUP and NEA adherents and leaders are still relatively ambivalent about collective bargaining on campus. They see it as necessary under present conditions, but presumably prefer a moderate, professional, non-politicized brand of unionism on campus, as contrasted to the alternative form identified with the AFT.

Ideological Orientations

The preceding discussion of the sources of the preferences for different collective bargaining alternatives noted that the AAUP, strongest in the upper tiers of academe, where support for any form of collective bargaining has been weakest, draws its potential electoral

support from the more liberal faculty in these schools, while the more conservative reject all forms of collective bargaining. Moving down the academic status ladder, support for collective bargaining steadily increases, with the AFT appealing to the more liberal professors, the NEA to the more conservative.

These differences in ideological orientation show up even more strikingly among the members, activists, and adherents of the three groups. Those involved in the AFT are the most left disposed of all, led in this direction by their officers. Thus 82 percent of the leaders and 76 percent of the members voted for George McGovern in 1972. Only 6 percent in both categories identify themselves as Republicans. Over half (52 percent) of AFT officers fall in the most liberal quintile on both the liberalism-conservatism and the economic equalization attitude scales. From 7 to 10 percent are in the most conservative fifth on the two scales. AFT members, while still decisively more liberal than the average professor, are significantly more conservative than their leaders. About a third of the rank-and-file are in the most liberal quintile on these scales.

Those involved in their rival for lower-tier support, the NEA, are dramatically different. A majority (53 percent) of officers and those attending meetings report having voted for Richard Nixon in 1972, as did 44 percent of the membership. Over a fifth of the NEA officers are Republicans, as are 15 percent of the membership. The picture with respect to placement of NEA leaders on the liberalism-conservatism and equalization scales is also diametrically opposite to that for the AFT.

Only 10 to 15 percent have attitudes which place them in the most liberal quintile, while a third fall in the most conservative one. The membership is somewhat less conservative than their leaders.

AAUP officers and activists show up almost as liberal politically as those in the AFT. Over four-fifths in both AAUP groups voted for McGovern. Only a tenth are Republicans. Two-fifths of the officers and a third of the activists fall into the most liberal fifth on the liberalism-conservatism scale, while only 7 percent are in the most conservative quintile. The picture with respect to the economic equalization scale is similar. The pattern is somewhat different, however, for the inactive mass membership. Although more liberal than the faculty as a whole, AAUP members are much more conservative than their officers or those who attend meetings. Less than a quarter of the members are in the most liberal fifth on the two scales, while 15-16 percent have attitudes which place them in the most conservative quintile.

The relatively greater liberalism of AAUP adherents and officers, as contrasted to the views of the faculty as a whole and to those in the NEA, is probably related to the fact that prior to its acceptance of the role of collective bargaining agent, the association took as its major task the protection of academic freedom in higher education. It was founded in 1915 largely in order to mobilize support for faculty suffering discrimination for unpopular, largely left-related views. Presumably this task led the AAUP to appeal more heavily to the more liberally inclined, an interpretation suggested by a number of earlier studies of their membership in the 1950s and 60s.

The variations in the political orientations of the members, activists, and officers of the three faculty collective bargaining associations also are reflected in the striking differences in their propensity for political activism. In a later section, we will discuss the finding that, among faculty, degree of liberalism correlates strongly with participation in politics. And in harmony with that generalization, those involved in the highly liberal-left AFT are more politically active than the somewhat less liberal AAUPers, who in turn exhibit a much higher rate of participation than NEA people.

Implications for the Future

As the three faculty unions move into the second half of the 1970s, they face the fact that although a majority of the professoriate favor collective bargaining, no one of them comes close to having majority support. Organizing campaigns are costly, and the intense rivalry among them often makes it difficult for any one or more to precipitate a collective bargaining election with the certainty of winning it in many schools. State collective bargaining laws usually require a run-off between the two leading choices, including "No Agent," in situations in which no one has received an absolute majority in the first election. In a number of instances, groups which have lost out in an election have continued to organize, criticizing the actions of their victorious rivals, and have called for new elections. Such contests have sometimes resulted in a reversal, as in the University of Hawaii and the New Jersey State College system.

The pressures are strong on the associations to form alliances or even to merge. This has occurred in a number of places. The most noteworthy mergers took place in New York where AFT and NEA affiliates united first in the City University and later in the State University. That unification, however, is becoming unstuck since the unified New York statewide body affiliated to both the AFT and NEA is in the process of withdrawing from the latter organization. More recently, NEA and AAUP affiliates have merged or formed working alliances in a number of places including the University of Hawaii, Kent State, Northern Iowa and the California University and State College System.

At the moment, a major issue is which of these groups, if any, AAUP affiliates will merge or work together with. As noted earlier, the AFT and NEA tend to draw their strength from the lower tier of academe, community colleges, and publicly supported colleges which do not emphasize research or doctoral work. AAUP strength increases among the largely as yet unorganized more research involved faculty and institutions and in the private sector. But although the AAUP has the greatest potential for growth, it lacks the funds, experience, and rank-and-file and leadership commitment, to take advantage of its opportunities.

The data presented here point to some factors which should affect which groups merge or work together. On an ideological level, there is reason for expecting cooperation between the AFT and AAUP. Both draw from the more liberal elements in the profession. On the basis of conception of the role of a faculty representation association, the members and leaders of the NEA and the AAUP have more in common. The

empirical reality, as evidenced in the recent mergers and splits, point to the probability for increased cooperation between the NEA and the A.S.P., to an alliance between the wealthy multi-million member professional organization of school teachers and the relatively poor professional organization of professors, both of whom were forced reluctantly into the collective bargaining arena, and whose members and local leaders still shy away from total identification of their association as a trade union.

TABLE I

Images of the Three Organizations

Images	AFT			NEA			AAUP		
	Members	Meeting Attenders	Officers	Members	Meeting Attenders	Officers	Members	Meeting Attenders	Officers
<u>"Militant Group"</u>									
AFT	69	74	77						
NEA	15	15	15	69	71	71	69	70	69
AAUP	5	4	6	23	33	34	20	15	15
				11	4	4	7	8	9
<u>"Conservative"</u>									
AFT	10	6	6						
NEA	54	71	70	9	10	12	8	7	7
AAUP	61	75	78	39	34	39	38	37	38
				56	65	69	45	43	39
<u>"Radical"</u>									
AFT	23	20	14						
NEA	6	10	8	46	45	47	40	37	40
AAUP	4	3	4	11	8	7	7	3	3
				7	5	4	2	2	2
<u>"Too Much Politicized"</u>									
AFT	32	25	20						
NEA	33	42	43	64	52	59	58	52	50
AAUP	15	14	11	37	30	30	36	30	32
				16	12	14	7	7	5
<u>"Elitist"</u>									
AFT	4	1	1						
NEA	13	4	4	6	3	0	5	6	4
AAUP	64	74	70	8	3	3	9	8	7
				52	48	48	38	36	33

TABLE II
Political Orientations

	<u>AFT</u>			<u>NEA</u>			<u>AAUP</u>		
	<u>Members</u>	<u>Meeting Attenders</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Members</u>	<u>Meeting Attenders</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Members</u>	<u>Meeting Attenders</u>	<u>Officers</u>
<u>1972 Vote</u>									
Left-Third Party	2	7	3	0	0	0	0	1	1
McGovern	76	77	82	56	47	47	73	82	83
Nixon	22	21	15	44	53	53	27	18	16
<u>Party Identification</u>									
Democrat	36	42	49	26	28	33	36	39	45
Independent	57	49	46	60	54	46	55	50	43
Republican	6	9	6	15	17	21	9	11	12
<u>Liberalism-Conservatism Scale</u>									
Most Liberal Quintile	29	38	52	12	12	10	23	34	40
Most Conservative Quintile	15	17	7	23	30	35	16	8	7
<u>Political Activism Scale</u>									
Very High	27	35	48	12	9	11	19	24	25
Very Low	20	21	10	38	41	46	29	22	21

SECTION 23

The Impact of Collective Bargaining on Academe

What difference does unionization make? This issue has been debated from New York to Honolulu, from Miami to Seattle, wherever collective bargaining elections have been held. It has also been the subject of a number of investigations by the growing number of scholars concerned with academic unionism.

In spite of the controversial nature of the topic, there is a surprising degree of consensus on the subject.

1. Salaries. Unionized schools have achieved higher increases. In a study of changes over a five year period, comparing 1968-69 to 1972-73, unionized with non-union schools, Robert Birnbaum concludes "faculty collective bargaining may be regarded as a cause of increased compensation levels."

2. Equalization. The emphasis of the faculty unions, particularly the AFT and NEA, on seniority, time-in-the-rank, and across the board increases, rather than merit, in salary determination has been partially implemented on a number of unionized campuses. As Joseph Garbarino indicates: "Faculty unions' effect on salaries has in general been

inversely proportional to the level of salaries before unionization." That is, the lower-paid ranks and institutions within the same system have benefited most.

3. Tenure. Unions have also sought to limit the power of those who award tenure, both senior faculty and administrators. NEA and AAUP affiliates, in particular, have argued that new appointments should be defined as "probationary" ones, a policy which implies a claim to permanency for anyone who can demonstrate over a defined period of time that he or she can handle the job. It is difficult to evaluate whether collective bargaining has made it easier to get tenure, since unionization has occurred during a period of sharply declining job opportunities and a consequent effort to heighten standards in a "buyer's market." Unions have, however, increased elements of due-process and public scrutiny into the tenure granting mechanisms, and have made the whole process more time-consuming. A study at the City University of New York found that the "vast majority of all grievances concerned reappointment with or without tenure." In evaluating the effects of unionization, David Riesman has concluded "that procedures for assessment of faculty, for tenure, and for the handling of grievances make it extremely difficult, at times, nearly impossible, to raise the level of faculty quality...."

4. Governance. There has been an inherent shift in power from academic self-government bodies to the unions. Since "faculty power" prior to unionization varied with institutional status, collective bargaining has resulted in an increase in faculty influence in the low-tier colleges. In middle-level schools, it is questionable whether much of a power shift has occurred. On all levels, however, collective

bargaining has brought about an emphasis on more formalized procedures, i.e., a shift from informal consultative relations with administration to more bureaucratic regularized ones. Joseph Garbarino notes that unionization is resulting in "a diminution in the role of the senates as there is a reduction in the range and importance of matters left to senate procedure." Gary Jones finds that "collective bargaining reduces the power of the president's office". This loss is particularly evident in public institutions since negotiations in many cases "are carried out primarily with agents of the state government," and more generally, as noted, administrators have less power to make merit increases.

5. Adversary Relationships. Some observers contend that faculty unionization has increased the sense of an adversary relationship between faculty and administrators, on one hand, and between faculty unions and the representatives of the student body, on the other. It seems clear that the adversary relationship inherent in the very conception of collective bargaining does change the role and image of university administrators. Prior to bargaining, they have often publicly acted as negotiators for the faculty with trustees and/or state authorities. With unionization, they form part of the "management team" in the negotiating situation, and are responsible for the legally binding contract which is the result. They become, as the unions insist, representatives of management who seek to protect management's prerogatives and rights. Thus a self-confirming prophecy comes into play. The union representatives deal with management (administration) in a constant battle over interpretation of the contract.

Students, as the "consumers" of the product sold by higher education, are concerned with securing better teaching, more time from the faculty, an increased share of the limited budget for student facilities, and as low tuition as possible. In a number of unionized schools, student leaders have attacked higher pay packages and have sought increased formal influence on tenure and promotion decisions. The unions, in turn, have opposed student involvement in the evaluation of faculty teaching abilities, and generally resisted their participation in the collective bargaining process. A recent study by Frank Kemerer and J. Victor Baldrige reports that "student leaders around the country...almost uniformly consider faculty unionism a threat" to their influence.

The extent to which these five consequences apply varies considerably in different institutions. But the variations generally are not related to which faculty union holds collective bargaining rights. Although as we have seen, the groups differ considerably with respect to their emphasis on traditional union as against professional association policies, two recent studies by Virginia Lussier and by Kemerer and Baldrige agree with the results of an earlier one by us that knowing which national body a given bargaining agent is affiliated to is of relatively little value in explaining the policies pursued in bargaining. Seemingly the structural logic of the relationship determines union behavior.

Faculty Views

In our recent survey, faculty were asked to react to a series of statements about the consequences of collective bargaining. In general, professors view them in the same fashion as those who have studied the situation on various campuses. Thus, a large majority, 78 percent, believe

"Collective bargaining is likely to bring higher salaries and improved benefits." By a small majority, 54 percent, they agree that "Individual salary bargaining for merit increases is bad for college faculty as a group." An overwhelming number, 78 percent, however, reject the extreme formulation that "The only basis for salary differentiation among faculty in the same rank at a given institution should be age or seniority."

In evaluating the effect of unionization, they agree with the scholarly consensus that the less privileged groups are most advantaged by unionization. Thus 56 percent say "Faculty unionization benefits persons in the junior ranks more than senior staff." A comparable percentage, 57, feel "Faculty unionization improves academic opportunities for women."

Many faculty see the emphasis in collective bargaining on formalizing procedures and relationships negatively. There is considerable support, 64 percent, for the conclusion: "Faculty unions have made it more difficult for schools to deny tenure." That this development is not viewed positively by many may be seen in the fact that 55 percent of all professors disagree that "Non-tenured faculty need the assurance of fair treatment at the point where the tenure decision is made, and only an employee organization can provide this." The same percentage believe: "Collective bargaining tends to substitute seniority for merit and lower the standards for tenure appointments." An even larger majority, 62 percent, also agree that "Collective bargaining results in overemphasis on rules and regulations." Most faculty see unionization as creating an adversary relationship within academe, since 69 percent say: "Collective bargaining reduces collegiality between administrators and faculty."

The negative feelings voiced by varying majorities to increased bureaucratization and tensions with administration do not imply that they are satisfied with the status-quo in academic governance or that they do not see any advantages in an adversary relationship. Almost two-thirds, 64 percent, accept the conclusion: "Faculties have little real power to influence university policies, since the traditional 'self-government' institutions such as faculty senates or councils are typically ineffective." And by an even larger majority, 83 percent, they agree that "Union grievance procedures serve to protect the faculty against arbitrary action by administration officials."

Finally, it may be noted that faculty desire to use unionization for greater power or protection for themselves does not extend to their students. Over three quarters, 78 percent, reject the proposal put forth by many student groups that "student representatives should be allowed to take part in collective bargaining negotiations."

The responses to these questions produce a clear pattern. The majority believe that unionization will benefit them, economically. They favor the presumed reduction in the "arbitrary" power of administrators. Conversely, however, collective bargaining produces the negative consequences of increased bureaucratization, the reduction of personnel standards, and adversary relations with administration.

Union Orientations

Not surprisingly, there is a strong relationship between collective bargaining election preferences and opinions as to the consequences of collective bargaining. Those who would vote for "No Agent," of course, consistently exhibit the most negative attitude while AFT supporters are most

positive about the impact of unionization. AAUP voters are generally consistently less enthusiastic than those who prefer the NEA, while those who favor "other" unaffiliated agents resemble the AAUP supporters in many of their views.

A few examples of such differences may suffice to make the point. On the proposition that "Collective bargaining reduces collegiality between administrators and faculty," the percents agreeing are, for "No Agent," 89, for "Other Agents," 82, for the AAUP, 69, for the NEA, 60, and for the AFT, 43. In reply to the statement that it "results in overemphasis on rules and regulations," the results are for "No Agent," 85, for "Other Agents", 61, for the AAUP, 62, for the NEA, 50, and for the AFT, 34. Agreement that collective bargaining results in higher salaries is for "No Agent," 48, for "Other Agents," 81, for the AAUP, 83, for the NEA, 88, and for the AFT, 94. And finally the range of opinion agreeing that non-tenured faculty require the protection of an employee organization runs from 17 for "No Agent," 46 for "Other Agents", 43 for the AAUP, 64, for the NEA, to 74 for the AFT.

These variations are consistent with the findings reported ~~pre-~~viously concerning the relative propensity to support militant unionization among the competing organizations.

Union-Non-Union Schools

To what extent does actual experience with collective bargaining affect these views? Since the large majority of organized campuses are in lower tier institutions, contrasting the opinions of faculty at schools with collective bargaining with all others would largely involve comparing

lower tier faculty with those at major schools. To avoid this confusion of variables, we have looked at the attitudes of faculty at union and non-union schools within the two lower tiers, 3 and 4.

Faculty at schools with collective bargaining differ consistently from those at other institutions on a few questions. Unionized faculty are more likely to feel that bargaining results in "higher salaries and improved benefits" than their non-unionized peers. There is also a consistent difference within the two tiers in favor of the belief that grievance procedures protect faculty against arbitrary administrative action by faculty at unionized institutions. The latter are also more prone to feel that non-tenured faculty need unionization to assure them of fair treatment in the tenure decision.

Unionized faculty are, however, more negative than those who have not experienced collective bargaining on two issues, the belief that bargaining results in "overemphasis on rules and regulations," and that it "reduces collegiality between administrators and faculty."

Conclusions

Both academic students of faculty unionization and faculty at large agree about the impact of collective bargaining on higher education. On the positive side is its effect on salaries, and on the introduction of formal due process protecting faculty from arbitrary administrative action. On the negative are the manifold implications of more bureaucratized institutions and increased adversary relationships among the estates of the university. Given the probability that austerity will continue to affect academe, and thus give priority to economic concerns, unionization may be expected to continue to grow.

TABLE I

Collective Bargaining Preferences and the Effects of Unionization

<u>ITEMS</u>	<u>All Faculty</u>	<u>Would Vote For</u>				
		<u>AFT</u>	<u>NEA</u>	<u>AAUP</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>NO AGENT</u>
Bargaining results in higher salaries	76	94	88	83	81	48
Individual salary bargaining is bad	54	68	66	51	66	39
Thin rank salary differentiation could be based on age or seniority	22	39	30	14	27	14
Unionization benefits senior faculty most	56	48	50	62	54	60
Unionization improves opportunities for women	57	76	69	57	57	37
Unionization makes it more difficult to lose tenure	64	67	72	62	66	58
Part-tenured need pro- tection of a faculty organization	45	74	64	43	46	17
Bargaining substitutes seniority for merit and lowers tenure standards	58	27	44	60	60	81
Bargaining results in emphasis on rules	62	34	50	62	61	85
Bargaining reduces legality between administration and faculty	69	43	60	69	72	89
Democratic self-govern- ment is ineffective	64	80	73	66	56	51
Unions protect faculty against arbitrary admin- istrative action	83	94	88	87	85	67
Student representatives should be allowed to participate in bargain-	23	32	25	22	19	15

VOLUME II

FINAL REPORT

**Survey of the Social, Political, and Educational Perspectives
of
American College and University Faculty**

National Institute of Education Project Number 3-3053

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PART V

THE POLITICS OF ACADEMICS

SECTION 24

The Extent and Predictability of Political Divisions in Academe

Imagine for a moment two groups of Americans diametrically opposed on most of the salient issues of the day. Let us call them the Alphas and the Omegas. Two-thirds of the Alphas favor more governmental control of the economy, while two-thirds of the Omegas oppose such increased regulation. Nearly eighty percent of the former believe it should be public policy to reduce income differences between Americans; just over one-third of the latter support this position. Busing to achieve racial integration is endorsed by 65 percent of the Alphas, but by only 29 percent of the Omegas. More than three-fourths of the Omegas favor capital punishment, while only one-third of the Alphas are willing to see the death penalty employed, even in the case of premeditated murder. Three-fifths of the Omegas believe that if an American is a card-carrying Communist he should not be allowed to hold public office; four-fifths of the Alphas oppose any such restraint on political participation by Communists. Whereas two-thirds of the Alphas oppose any and all legislation forbidding the distribution of pornography, two-thirds of the Omegas want at least some governmental restraint on the circulation of pornographic materials. In the 1972

presidential election, about 60 percent of the Omegas backed Richard Nixon, while 80 percent of the Alphas voted for George McGovern.

The Alphas are, then, by any American comparison an exceptionally liberal collection of people. The Omegas are vastly and consistently more conservative. The gap separating these two groups in public policy expectations appears unbridgeable.

Imagine further that both the Alphas and the Omegas are mostly white, upper-middle class men, and that each group has a median age of 42 years. Finally, to make things even more interesting, imagine that the Alphas and the Omegas work for one and the same organization, and that they receive roughly the same level of compensation for their services.

Even though we have been looking at such data for a number of years, we still find ourselves reacting to their recitation as though it were a political fairy tale. In fact, of course, the Alphas and the Omegas are real people--two groups of college professors distinguished only by academic discipline. The Alphas are the rank and file of social scientists, while the Omegas are faculty in the applied professional fields of engineering, the agricultural sciences, business administration, and health (excluding medicine and dentistry).

The divided academy

We may safely assume that every profession, every occupational cohort, comprises within its membership some differences in political outlook. The striking features of divisions among faculty are their extent and their predictability.

The academic profession is more liberal politically than any other large occupational group in the United States. It is also a much divided profession. By exploring these divisions we discover not only the complexity of professorial political opinion, but also something of the "internal logic" of the organization of the professoriate and American higher education.

Discipline

Clark Kerr once described the contemporary American university as "a city of infinite variety" (The Uses of the University, 1966, p. 41). The metaphor is a good one, and surely the principal neighborhoods in this city are the academic fields. Just as disciplines or departments organize the scholarly life of the university, so they serve to order the immense variety in political perspectives found within the professoriate.

The several academic fields are arrayed in a neat progression from the most liberal discipline group to the most conservative--running from the social sciences to the humanities, through the natural sciences, on to business administration, engineering, the smaller applied professional schools such as nursing, and finally to agriculture. Matters of civil liberties, policies affecting the position of blacks and other minorities, social welfare programs, government regulation of the economy: Whenever the issue poses in a clear-cut fashion the conventional liberal-conservative dimension, we find the fields arranged in essentially the same order, separated clearly, rather uniformly and, comparing the positions of the extremes, massively.

Table 1. Political views of faculty,
by discipline (row percentages)

<u>Field</u>	<u>Opposed to capital punishment</u>	<u>Favoring busing to achieve integration</u>	<u>Favoring policies to reduce income differences in U.S.</u>
Social Sciences	64	65	78
Humanities	56	52	73
Fine Arts	46	49	55
All Faculty	43	47	58
Physical Sciences	41	46	59
Education	40	47	60
Biological Sciences	36	36	52
Medicine	35	46	56
Business Administration	27	30	33
Engineering	26	28	43
Miscellaneous Applied Fields	23	31	39
Agricultural Sciences	19	26	32

Sixty-five percent of faculty in the social sciences, and 51 percent of those in the fine arts, indicated in the Spring of 1975 that they favored more governmental regulation of the economy. At the other end of the continuum, only 30 percent of engineers, and 26 percent of faculty in business administration, supported increased federal regulation. Sixty-five percent of social scientists, 46 percent of physical scientists, 30 percent of

academics in schools of business administration, and just 26 percent of professors in the agricultural sciences, endorsed busing to attain racial integration of the public schools.

When we refer to the liberalism of social scientists and the conservatism of professors in the applied professional disciplines, we are making an internal, intra-faculty comparison. Social scientists are also seen to be highly supportive of liberal and egalitarian programs when compared to the American public, but faculty in the applied fields look rather more middle-of-the-road or moderately conservative in the larger context of public opinion. Busing, for example, is favored by 65 percent of those academics whose disciplines involve them directly with social questions, a rather striking figure when one notes that only 18 percent of Americans generally, and 24 percent of the college-educated, profess support for school busing. On the other hand, the distribution among agriculture faculty--26 percent for, 74 percent against busing--fits into the mainstream of national opinion on the question.

Magnitude

Basic population groups in the society--whites and blacks; the young and the old; Protestants, Catholics, and Jews; the prosperous and the poor--are no more sharply distinguished on major national issues than professors in the various academic departments. Often, indeed, they are less so. Such comparisons should not be carried too far: One important reason why general population subgroups are not more clearly set apart in political

opinions is precisely because they are general, because they contain collections of people who are different in so many ways, even though they all possess the designated characteristic. Still, the fact that the faculty in social science and their engineering colleagues are more dissimilar in some basic political commitments than are members of such grossly differentiated groups as the affluent and the poor or blacks and whites is striking testimony to the prominence of disciplines in university life.

There is less "opinion distance" between white and black Americans on the question of school busing than between professors in the social sciences and their colleagues in colleges of agriculture. Four-fifths of humanists voted for George McGovern in 1972, compared to one quarter of agriculture faculty, a difference of roughly fifty percentage points; this compares to the 14 points separating high income (\$25,000 per year and more) and low income (under \$4,000 per year) voters, and the 40 percent difference between Protestants and Jews in the national electorate.

Last spring, fifty-six percent of faculty in business administration favored cutting expenditures for welfare programs, the position of 22 percent of social scientists. The margin between these two groups of professors, then, was 34 percent. At this same time, 28 percent of respondents from the poorest families--those with annual incomes under \$4,000--endorsed cuts in welfare spending, as did 59 percent of their economic opposites,

Table 2. Positions of the faculty and the general public on welfare spending (row percentages)

	<u>Cut spending</u>	<u>Keep as is</u>	<u>Increase spending</u>
<u>Faculty-all</u>	37	37	26
Social scientists	22	33	45
Humanists	26	40	35
Physical scientists	41	42	17
Biological scientists	41	38	21
Business administration faculty	56	34	10
Agriculture faculty	58	34	8
<u>General public-all*</u>	46	30	23
College graduates	45	33	22
Grade school educated	44	28	28
Low income persons (under \$4,000 a year)	28	32	41
Upper income persons (\$25,000 a year and higher)	59	27	15
Whites	49	30	21
Blacks	13	30	57

*Data on the general public are from the 1975 National Opinion Research Center General Social Survey.

the most prosperous Americans, those coming from families where the annual income exceeded \$25,000. The margin here was 31 percent. The differences between social scientists and humanists on the one hand, and engineering and agriculture faculty on the other, are as great on the issue of welfare spending as those separating the prosperous and the poor in the larger society.

As a footnote here, it is striking to note that a higher proportion of poor Americans than of social science professors favored reducing welfare expenditures. O mighty Marx! dost thou lie so low?

Structure and politics

Discipline and type of school constitute the key structural elements in the world of higher education. The importance of type of institution has been treated ^{report,} throughout this / and we will come back to it again, as we will to discipline, in subsequent sections. Both of these variables differentiate faculty political opinions so sharply because they so tightly define the range of professional experiences.

Discipline "walls" have been getting stronger, following upon the increased specialization and bureaucratization of the university.

The subject matter of the various fields, we have found, attracts persons of very disparate political orientations--with those entering the social sciences, for example, notably more inclined to liberal policies and social reform. And once within a field, faculty members become subject to powerful professional socialization impulses. Discipline subcultures reach far beyond the political dimension, but they are linked up to proclivities toward sharply contrasting political stances. The nature of the substantive focus of the social disciplines, directed as it is to social problems, failures in societal performance, the impact of inequities on various social strata, and the like, understandably shapes the political subculture of these fields; in much the same way, the close linkage of such applied subjects as business administration and engineering to the business world,

business problems, and business values, influences the political component of these disciplinary subcultures.

Once these phenomena bred of recruitment and subject matter are underway, an elaborate process of reinforcement comes into play. As Paul Lazarsfeld and Wagner Thielens, Jr. noted two decades ago, "any group which inclines to a professional ethos . . . will tend to reinforce it by mutual interaction."

The ideological bent of a discipline subculture thus is not a casual thing. It possesses "staying power." And the organization it imposes on "day-to-day" faculty opinion serves as one prime factor accounting for the exceptional predictability of divisions within a professoriate which, for all its predominant liberalism vis-a-vis other groups, remains sharply divided.

SECTION 25

Faculty Politics: The Role of Discipline and Type of School

Academic discipline and type of school constitute the key structural elements in the world of higher education. Together they identify exceptional variety in intellectual concerns, academic or professional roles and responsibilities, recruitment patterns, social perspectives, academic interests and academic status.

This subject is a big one, too large, indeed, to be treated with thoroughness in any **summary report**. But let us review some notable aspects of the diversity which institutional setting and field define.

Recruitment

Schools of very high academic standing draw their faculty disproportionately from the higher socioeconomic strata in the country. Fifty-one percent of professors at institutions of the highest scholarly reputation are the children of men who held professional or managerial positions, or who were owners of large businesses. Thirty-eight percent are the children of college graduates--the status of at most six percent of all Americans of the same generational mix.

With movement from elite universities to schools of lower academic standing, the proportion of the faculty from high status backgrounds drops off steadily.* Just 20 percent of professors at the lowest tier institutions are children of college graduates, a figure still high in the context of the general public, of course, but well below the 38 percent figure for "Tier I" academics.

People of high socioeconomic standing seem able in the aggregate to provide their offspring with more of the skills and experiences suited to high occupational attainment in the society. Something of this general phenomenon is evident within the professoriate.

The record of Jews in Western democratic countries, and especially in the United States, is one of very high intellectual achievement. We see further evidence of this in both the representation and the location of Jews in academe. Ten percent of all faculty describe their "religion raised" as Jewish, although Jews are only three percent of the U.S. population. Within the professoriate, Jews are located disproportionately at the major institutions. Twenty-four percent of professors at "Tier I" universities are Jewish, while only ten percent of the faculty at these schools are of Catholic background. At the institutions of the

*

Colleges and universities have been classified on the basis of a three-item index of academic standing, including SAT scores required for admission (selectivity), research expenditures adjusted for the number of students (research), and total institutional expenditures, also adjusted to a per student basis (affluence). All colleges were arrayed on this index with raw scores ranging from 3 (highest standing) to 27 (lowest). In this article, the raw scores have been collapsed to form seven general categories.

Table 1. Backgrounds of faculty, by type of school at which they teach, and by their discipline (row percentages)

Type of school	Father's socioeconomic position		Religion raised		Sex
	%	%	%	%	%
	Professional & managerial occupations	College graduates	Catholic	Jewish	Female
Tier 1 (highest standing)	51	38	10	24	8
2	44	34	15	19	17
3	44	35	14	8	18
4	43	33	18	10	18
5	40	26	19	5	24
6	35	22	17	6	20
7 (lowest standing)	24	20	24	6	27
<u>Discipline</u>					
Social Sciences	44	35	16	14	19
Humanities	47	33	25	9	25
Fine Arts	46	24	14	9	24
Law*	49	38	18	25	3
Physical Sciences	40	29	17	11	9
Biological Sciences	42	30	13	9	14
Medicine*	56	45	14	22	6
Education	35	15	18	11	23
Business	34	25	24	9	18
Engineering	36	23	16	8	2
Applied professional	29	17	25	3	54
Agriculture*	17	13	9	1	-

*Data on faculty in Law, Medicine and Agriculture are from the 1969 Carnegie Commission survey, because the number of cases in the smaller 1975 survey makes reliable estimates impossible.

lowest standing, these proportions are reversed: 24 percent of the faculty are of Catholic background, six percent Jewish.

Women are notably underrepresented on the staffs of elite universities. At "Tier 1" schools, they make up only one third as high a proportion of the faculty as they do at "Tier 7" institutions.

The academic disciplines present widely differing "mixes" in terms of the social origins of their members. For example, 24 percent of law school faculty and 21 percent in medicine are of Jewish background. At the other end of the continuum is agriculture, where just one percent are Jewish. The early attraction which law and medicine held for Jews, as professions at once prestigious and least subject to the prejudices of employers, has carried over into teaching and research. It is not surprising, in view of the limitations which were applied to Jews in agriculture historically within Christian Europe, that they are today largely absent from the faculties of agricultural schools and are significantly underrepresented in fields linked to the soil or agriculture--such as earth sciences, botany, and zoology. Their relatively high representation in the social sciences, compared to the humanities and the natural sciences, seems to be related to the attraction reform-oriented politics has held for secularized Western Jews.

In class background, professors of medicine and agriculture occupy opposite poles; 45 percent of the former, as against just 13 percent of the latter, come from families in which the father was a college graduate. The fathers of only 17 percent of agriculture school faculty held

professional and managerial occupations, in contrast to 56 percent of medical school professors. Liberal arts and sciences faculty on the whole are drawn from higher social backgrounds than are their counterparts in the business and applied professional fields.

Academic position and attainments

That faculty in the major research universities manifest higher levels of scholarly attainment and academic rewards than their colleagues at lower-tier, teaching institutions, is well understood. The extent of the variation is nonetheless striking.

Just 10 percent of professors at Tier 1 universities reported not having published any scholarly books or articles in the two years preceding our survey, while 35 percent had published at least five works. At Tier 7 institutions (exclusively junior colleges), in contrast, 81 percent had not published at all and only two percent had brought five or more items to publication.

Seventy-nine percent of Tier 1 faculty had received financial support for research activities from some source in the preceding year, and 66 percent had recently done paid consulting. The proportions drop off sharply with movement down the academic ladder, reaching just 22 percent and 36 percent respectively among junior college professors.

The variation in teaching load is immense. Only five percent of the academics at major research universities are in class 13 hours or more each week, as compared to 67 percent of Tier 7 professors. Nearly half of Tier 1 faculty teach only four hours, or less, per week.

The strictly financial rewards differ greatly with type of institution. At Tier 1 schools in academic year 1974-75, 33 percent of the full-time faculty received basic institutional salaries of \$25,000 or higher. The proportion was between five and eight percent at lower-tier colleges. Nine percent of Tier 1 professors reported institutional salaries in excess of \$35,000; five percent of those at Tier 2 schools, 3 percent at Tier 3, but only a fraction of one percent of faculty elsewhere gained this much compensation.

In terms of "future prospects," the salary variations are even greater. What can professors expect to earn in their peak years? Seventeen percent of faculty over 50 years of age in Tier 1 schools now receive over \$35,000 a year compared to 12 percent of their counterparts at Tier 2 institutions, 6 percent at Tier 3, and almost no one at colleges of the Tier 4 through 7 range.

(Table 2 goes here)

It is all called "higher education," but the variety of experience and performance is extraordinary. Academics at the major research universities and their counterparts at lower-tier, teaching-directed colleges obviously do not have the same types of jobs--in the sense of basic conditions of employment.

American higher education is a notably stratified system. Internal differences by tier in function and reward are very great. And the progress of lower status social groups, we have seen, has been recorded first in academe's lower reaches. Elite universities refers to scholarly

standing, but as well captures marked inequalities in social access and resource distribution.

Variations associated with discipline are naturally very different, but they are also substantial. Base academic salaries are lowest in the fine arts and the humanities--fields in which faculty also have the fewest opportunities for outside money, as through consulting and research grants. Professors in medicine and law are surely the financial princes of academe (although we do not report distributions from the 1975 survey because of the small number of respondents from these disciplines).

Business administration, the fine arts, various applied professional fields such as nursing and library science, are clearly the fields of heaviest teaching responsibilities. Medical scientists and law faculty

Table 2. Academic position and attainments of faculty, by type of school at which they teach, and by discipline (row percentages)

Type of school	Publications last 2 years		% Receiving research support	% Teaching 13 hours or more per week	Salary	
	% None	% 5 or more			% Earning over \$25,000	Median
Tier 1 (highest standing)	10	35	79	5	33	\$21,300
2	21	21	63	9	29	\$19,900
3	27	19	62	9	15	\$16,900
4	39	13	49	16	11	\$15,700
5	51	6	37	22	5	\$15,800
6	52	5	30	23	8	\$15,600
7 (lowest standing)	81	2	22	67	5	\$16,300
<u>Discipline</u>						
Social Sciences	42	11	51	22	12	\$17,200
Humanities	46	9	37	21	8	\$15,800
Fine Arts	66	8	32	51	6	\$15,900
Law*	41	10	35	3	**	**
Physical Sciences	45	13	48	34	11	\$17,300
Biological Sciences	36	21	61	34	15	\$18,500
Medicine*	17	34	72	10	**	**
Education	52	6	33	26	9	\$18,000
Business	62	5	33	46	7	\$17,500
Engineering	45	18	62	33	17	\$19,800
Applied Professional	70	4	23	47	8	\$16,500
Agriculture*	36	22	60	28	**	**

*Data on faculty in Law, Medicine and Agriculture are from the 1969 Carnegie Commission survey, because the number of cases in the smaller 1975 survey makes reliable estimates impossible.

**Data not available, because of insufficient cases in the 1975 survey.

teach the least. Social scientists and humanists spend significantly less time in class each week than do their laboratory-oriented colleagues of the natural sciences.

Social perspectives

Although they are the most highly rewarded economically, in professional opportunities, and in status, faculty at research universities are also the most supportive--compared to their colleagues at other types of schools--of liberal and equalitarian change in the society. We see this across the entire range of social questions.

Table 3. Social perspectives of faculty,
by the type of school at which they teach
(row percentages)

	% Conservative (Liberalism- Conservatism Scale), <u>Quintiles 4 & 5</u>	% Nixon voters, <u>1972</u>	% Pro-meritocracy (Meritocracy- Equality Scale), <u>Quintiles 1 & 2</u>
Tier 1 (highest)	32	22	51
2	33	27	42
3	38	35	43
4	41	37	42
5	40	36	37
6	45	37	42
7 (lowest)	52	45	37

Just 32 percent of faculty at Tier 1 institutions, for example, score in the two "most conservative" quintiles of our composite Liberalism-Conservatism scale. Fifty-two percent of professors at Tier 7 schools are so recorded. The level of electoral backing for Richard M. Nixon in 1972 shows a substantial increase with movement from major research universities (where he was supported by only 22 percent of the faculty) to the junior colleges (where 45 percent of all professors voted for him).

We developed at some length in our the Divided Academy, the case that the "class theory of politics" is fundamentally inappropriate to an understanding of political divisions in academe. The "top" of the academic community is more liberal than the "bottom," not because, of course, its members are more advantaged in salary, research opportunities, and various perquisites of academic life; but seemingly because within the top, roles and orientations are closer to those of the ideal intellectual. It is intellectuality, not class interests, which accounts for the disproportionate commitment of academics to a liberal, pro-taxian, change-supporting politics.

There are a variety of issues before universities which contain both the general liberalism-conservatism dimension and some strictly intramural concerns. Equality-meritocracy is one of these. Here, an interesting inversion takes place. Faculty at the research universities are drawn by their general liberalism to support extensions of equality, but at the same time are led by their academic norms to sustain the meritocratic

ideal. Somewhat paradoxically, professors at lower tier institutions, more conservative in their general social and economic views, are more inclined to favor extensions of equality in higher education--for example, by altering criteria for faculty hiring and student admission on behalf of more minority representation.

Conclusions

Discipline and type of school together account for a very high proportion of the variation in social perspectives of academics. This is so because they are such powerful factors in differentiating the whole higher education experience--recruitment patterns, recognition and rewards, substantive concerns, and the like.

Faculty in the social sciences are consistently more supportive of liberal-equality perspectives than are their natural science colleagues, with the latter in turn more liberal than professors in the applied professional fields. This same persisting progression is evident across tiers, and the two variables exert independent influence. Social scientists at major universities are a notably liberal group in academe, and stand very far indeed from professors in the applied professional fields at lower-tier, teaching-directed institutions.

Table 4. Social perspectives of faculty,
by tier and discipline

	<u>Major colleges and universities</u>	<u>Middle-tier colleges and universities</u>	<u>Lower-tier colleges</u>
(Percent most liberal, Liberalism-Conservatism scale)			
Social sciences	65	61	56
Natural sciences	44	35	33
Applied professional fields	27	16	9
(Percent voting Republican for President, 1972)			
Social sciences	13	16	25
Natural sciences	32	41	48
Applied professional fields	45	55	65

SECTION 26

The Politics of the Scholarly Elite

Survey data have located American academics on the left, liberal, reform or progressive side of the political spectrum as compared to all other occupationally defined strata. Strikingly, this conclusion is not a new one. Speaking to graduating classes at a number of American colleges in 1873, Whitelaw Reid, then editor of the New York Tribune and former abolitionist leader, told his audience that American academics had demonstrated that they were in the center of "radical" criticism of social institutions, that the political role of the faculty is to be the critic of the "established." A decade or so later, James Bryce, in The American Commonwealth, noted that college faculty "are at present among the most potent forces making for progress." Their influence "tells primarily on their pupils and indirectly on the circles to which those pupils belong, or in which they work when they have left college. One is amused by the bitterness - affected scorn - trying to disguise real fear - with which 'college professors' are denounced by the professional politicians as unpractical, visionary, pharisaical, 'kid-gloved,' 'high-toned,' 'un-American.'" During the

1890's, historian of academe, Laurence Veysey, reports "faculty opposition to imperialism ... was observed as general all over the country." Leading academics continued to engage in antiwar agitation during the Spanish-American War and urged independence for the Philippines during the Filipino insurrection. A turn of the century article in The Atlantic Monthly commented that college professors had acquired a reputation for taking obstructionist political positions, and reported they were being denounced as "traitors," and their utterances were credited as being "largely responsible for the assassination of President McKinley." Whitelaw Reid who had praised the anti-establishment role of American scholars in 1873, changed his evaluation, but not his estimate of that role in a speech in 1901, saying that it was a misfortune for the country that its college "instructors are out of sympathy with its history with its development, and with the men who made the one and are guiding the other."

Comparable, sometimes more extreme evaluations of the political orientation of American faculty, have been made for various periods in the twentieth century. They basically support Richard Hofstadter's estimate that "at least from the Progressive era, onward, the political commitment of the majority of the intellectual leadership in the United States has been to causes that might be variously described as liberal (in the American sense of the word), progressive or radical." Even during the period of McCarthyism, a study of the beliefs and behavior of American social scientists by Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Wagner Thielens, Jr. concluded that they, living within a predominantly left of center community, were relatively unintimidated, that it was more dangerous for the career of an

academic to be a public supporter of McCarthy on a college campus than to be a bitter opponent. And, most recently, John Kenneth Galbraith was able to boast in 1971 that "It was the universities - not the trade unions, not the free-lance intellectuals, nor the press, nor the businessmen... which led the opposition to the Vietnam war, which forced the retirement of President Johnson, which are forcing the pace of our present withdrawal from Vietnam, which are leading the battle against the great corporations on the issue of pollution, and which at the last Congressional elections retired a score or more of the more egregious time-servers, military sycophants and hawks."

These repeated descriptions of a left-leaning politically influential faculty which has played a continuing role in fostering social reform and social change in America have been sharply challenged in the past decade by a variety of leftist critics such as Noam Chomsky, Alvin Gouldner, Louis Kampf, Staughton Lynd, and Alan Wolfe, supported by assorted "radical caucuses" in different disciplines. The radicals perceive an academe that is preponderantly establishment oriented, at best apolitical and impervious to social injustice, and at worst, collaborative with the powers that be. As Alvin Gouldner put it, writing of the dominant orientation in sociology, "it is disposed to place itself and its technical skills at the service of the status quo, and to help maintain it in all the practical ways sociology can."

The radical critique has been illustrated by pointing to the example of prominent scientists who have played leading roles in producing weaponry for the armed forces or to social scientists who have collaborated with a variety of "conservative" foreign, military and domestic policies, or seemingly have defended the status quo.

The image of a conservative academe, or of one which has no preponderant direction may also be sustained by opinion data. As we noted at length in our recent book, The Divided Academy: Professors and Politics (McGraw-Hill, 1975), academe, though clearly more liberal than other strata, is not a radical, left, or even liberal group, if by such descriptions is meant that it is overwhelmingly on one side of the ideological spectrum on all issues.

The research on the opinions and political behavior of academe clearly points to a sharply divided population. Thus, when asked on various surveys in the late 60's and the 70's to identify themselves as left, liberal, middle-of-the-road or conservatives, slightly less than half said they were left or liberal. By a small majority, they described themselves as middle-of-the-road or conservative. (Various surveys of the general population find twice as many identified conservatives as liberals.) In 1972, 43 percent of the faculty voted for Richard Nixon for President. Two decades earlier, the presumed hero of intellectualdom, Adlai Stevenson, was opposed by 44 percent of academe.

The faculty also has been divided on various domestic issues. Thus the 1969 Carnegie Commission survey found that less than half of the professors, 46 percent, supported busing to achieve "racial integration of the public elementary schools." Our 1975 survey shows the profession still sharply divided on the issue with 53 percent opposed to busing. Current attitudes toward capital punishment and pornography also reveal a divided academy. Almost half the professoriate both support capital punishment and favor laws "forbidding the distribution of pornography." A small majority, 55 percent, do not believe that "poverty can be eliminated within ten years if it were given a high national priority."

If American academe is in fact sharply divided in its political views, if close to half the profession supports the conservative position on many of the major issues of the day, and 45 percent have voted for the Republican candidate for President against Democratic nominees, closely identified with campus support such as Adlai Stevenson and George McGovern, how has it been possible for both sophisticated intellectual commentators and conservative political and business leaders to repeatedly identify the professoriate with the left in American life?

The answer to this dilemma is simple and has been documented repeatedly in research on academic opinion. Those segments of the professoriate which are most prominent and/or influential, and whose discipline concerns most involve them in dealing with public policy, have been the most left-inclined segment of the profession. Specifically, left views, actions, and voting behavior, are most prevalent among the more scholarly productive professors at the most prestigious universities, those at the center of the research-graduate training culture, and among social scientists, who professionally must speak to key issues of public policy.

The earliest large-scale opinion study of academe, one dealing with belief in God and various religious values conducted by James Laska in 1913 found academic eminence associated with unbelief. Four decades later in 1955, Lazarsfeld and Thielens reported a comparable relationship between academic achievement and attitudes toward civil liberties for unpopular political groups, as well as in voting behavior in the 1952 elections. In 1966, a National Opinion Research Center survey by Edward Noll and Peter Rossi found: "Roughly four out of five faculty members from high quality schools consider themselves liberal as compared to only 45 percent

of those at low quality schools. On the other hand, there are only 16 percent of the individuals from high quality schools who claim to be conservative, but 40 percent from low quality schools say they are conservative." Our own analysis of the massive 1966 Carnegie Commission survey reiterated these relationships. As of the spring of 1969, for example, 49 percent of faculty at lower tier institutions still either supported the Nixon policies in Vietnam or favored escalation, as contrasted to but 26 percent at major universities.

These findings, which are representative of results from a myriad of questions bearing on an immense variety of issues over many decades demonstrate that the sources of opinion distribution in academe differ greatly from those found in society generally, and within other occupational groups, where almost invariably conservative views and Republican sympathies are associated with higher status and income. In academe, liberal to left socially critical orientations are linked to professional success, to recognition for creative scholarship. These results attest to the validity of hypotheses about the politics of academe put forward by analysts such as Thorstein Veblen, Joseph Schumpeter, C. P. Snow and Paul Lazarsfeld, who suggested that the emphasis on creativity and innovation central to the concept of modern scholarship, is related to rejection of the established, the traditional, the conventional in society at large. As Veblen noted in 1919: "The first requisite for constructive work in modern science, and indeed for any work of inquiry that shall bring enduring results, is a skeptical frame of mind. The enterprising skeptic alone can be counted on to

further the increase of knowledge in any skeptical fashion... [T]he skepticism that goes to make him an effectual factor in the increase and diffusion of knowledge among men involves a loss of that peace of mind that is the birthright of the safe and sane quietist. He becomes a disturber of the intellectual peace."

Academic discipline also separates the conservative from the liberal. This is well known to all who inhabit the university and we will not belabor it here, other than to note its magnitude. In 1968, Richard Nixon received 20 percent of the vote among social scientists, 39 percent in the natural sciences, 55 percent among faculty in business schools and 62 percent in agriculture schools. This distribution of sentiment is reiterated on all opinion variables. A study of the signers of anti-Vietnam war ads in the New York Times found social scientists most highly represented in proportion to the numbers, with humanists second as a group, followed by natural scientists, with professors in applied subjects far behind. And clearly the furthest left group, the social scientists, have the greatest potential for political influence.

Thus, while it is possible to argue that academe as a whole does not contain a liberal majority, its most publicly visible and politically influential segment, social science professors at major universities, is to the far left of a profession whose views are considerably more liberal than other segments of American society. Conversely, however, it includes many conservatives, who, however, are concentrated in the least visible part of the academy, the lower status teaching institutions, and among applied professionals, the least politically involved group. These differences are brought out anew in the results of our 1975 survey.

Table 1. Selected attitudes of faculty at different level institutions

- 1) "Differences in income between people in the United States should be reduced."

<u>Academic Status Group*</u>	<u>Percent Agreeing</u>
Major Universities	65
Lower Tier Colleges	52
Social Scientists in Major Universities	78
Applied Professional Faculty in Lower Tier Colleges**	33
<u>All Faculty</u>	<u>58</u>

- 2) "Racial integration of the public elementary schools should be achieved, even if it requires busing."

<u>Academic Status Group</u>	<u>Percent Agreeing</u>
Major Universities	55
Lower Tier Colleges	40
Social Scientists in Major Universities	63
Applied Professional Faculty in Lower Tier Colleges	18
<u>All Faculty</u>	<u>47</u>

- 3) "Capital punishment should be retained for crimes such as kidnapping and premeditated murder."

<u>Academic Status Group</u>	<u>Percent Agreeing</u>
Major Universities	47
Lower Tier Colleges	69
Social Scientists in Major Universities	32
Applied Professional Faculty in Lower Tier Colleges	88
<u>All Faculty</u>	<u>57</u>

- 4) "Do you think we are spending too much on welfare, too little money, or about the right amount?"

<u>Academic Status Group</u>	<u>Percent "Too Much"</u>
Major Universities	31
Lower Tier Colleges	47
Social Scientists in Major Universities	25
Applied Professional Faculty in Lower Tier Colleges	65
<u>All Faculty</u>	37

*We divided institutions into four status categories on criteria reported earlier.

** Applied Professional Faculty include business school, engineering, agriculture and other applied professionals.

The differences between social scientists in high status institutions; the most liberal of all, and applied professionals in the lowest status category schools, the most conservative of all, are of a magnitude rarely found in opinion research. The range of difference in their response pattern runs from 40 to 56 percent on various questions. Clearly, we still have a divided academy.

SECTION 27

The Political Participation of Academics

The political importance of the four hundred thousand college faculty as a liberal, preponderantly Democratic group goes far beyond their role as voters or as people who may influence their ten million students. They are among the politically most active groups in the population. The extent of that participation may be seen in Table 1, below.

Table 1
Percentage Engaged in Different Acts of Political Participation (Percentages)

Type	Faculty	Verba and Nie		Harris	
		U.S. Population*	College Educated	U.S. Population***	College Educated
Stood as Candidate for Office	7	X	X	X	X
Involved in Affairs of Political Party	28.5	8**	19**	12	19
Assisted or Worked for Candidates	49	26	43	14	23
Campaign Contributor	69	13	33	33	50
Active in Public Policy Groups	45	8**	19**	X	X

Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, Participation in America (New York: Harper and Row, 1972). We are indebted to Professor Verba for supplying us with the information on the college educated which is not in the book.

** Verba and Nie combined involvement in political parties and non-party political action groups.

*** Confidence and Concern: Citizens View American Government. A Survey of Public Attitudes (Sub-Committee on Operations, U.S. Senate, December 3, 1973).

It is clear that professors take their responsibilities as citizens more seriously than most other Americans. Presumably this reflects a number of factors--that their educational level makes them more sensitive to the consequences of public policy, that they have many of the skills needed in politics, i.e., speaking and writing, and that their job permits them to take time away from other possible tasks to attend meetings, write memoranda, and campaign generally. But whatever the reasons which underlie their propensity, professors are the activists par excellence.

The academics, of course, vary greatly among themselves. Not surprisingly, those in the most politically relevant disciplines, the social sciences, are much more active than the humanists, who in turn are more involved than the natural sciences, while those in the applied professional fields show the lowest levels of participation. Thus, over two fifths of the social scientists, 41 percent, have been active in political party affairs. The corresponding percentages for humanists are 35, for natural scientists, 24, and for those in the applied professions, 19. Over three-fifths of the social scientists reported having assisted in political campaigns, fully 20 percent more than among those in the applied fields, a pattern which holds up for all forms of participation, as indicated in Table 2, below, relating discipline to participation on a political activism scale.

Table 2
 Relationship of Involvement in Campus Activities to
 Participation in Civic Politics (Percentages)

Political Activity	Department Affairs Involvement:		University Affairs Involvement:	
	Heavy	Not Involved	Heavy	Not Involved
Involved in Affairs of a Political Party	32	22	46	18
Assisted or Worked for Candidates	53	39	58	36
Campaign Contributor	70	55	79	58
Active in Public Policy Groups	48	35	60	35

Political participation among faculty appears to be a generalized phenomenon, one that includes campus politics as well. Those who report themselves "heavily involved" in department or university affairs are much more likely to take part in civic politics than those less active intramurally. Over one-third, thirty-six percent, of faculty who have served as department chairmen during the past five years place high on our political involvement scale which combines seven questions, while only 22 percent of non-chairmen fall in this category. The results are similar with respect to membership in an elected faculty governance body. Thirty-five percent of those who have served in such an office exhibit maximum political participation in civic politics as compared to 21 percent among the rest of the faculty. Professors would seem to illustrate

David Riesman's law of "the more, the more," that is, that the people who do more in one arena do more in another. Seemingly, political skills and interests are reinforcing and transferable.

The law of "the more, the more," breaks down, however, with respect to commitment to research. Faculty who report their interests as heavily in research are less likely to place high with respect to civic politics activism (21 percent) than those who describe their interests as mixed, more research than teaching (27), who in turn, are less politically active than the other mixed group, those who are more interested in teaching than research (32). Professors who see their interests as primarily in teaching, however, resemble the researchers, in that only 20 percent of them are high in political participation.

This pattern is reiterated when we use publication record as the indicator of involvement in research. Those who published the most, e.g., five or more articles or books in the last two years, reveal a lower level of participation in political party affairs (23 percent), than those with a moderate record, one or two publications (35 percent). The latter, however, tend to be more active in the party of their choice than those without any publications (26 percent). High publishers are also lower than moderate ones in involvement in campus activities, while those who do not publish are about as low as the heavy publishers. Devoting a great deal of time to research and writing seemingly limits the time available for other activities. The low level

of participation by the teachers may reflect the fact that a large teaching load limits time available for any other non-classroom activity, or that they are a particularly parochial group.

Political Orientation

The high level of faculty political activity benefits the liberal and Democratic political forces, not only because academics are more liberal and Democratic than other strata, but also because liberal and Democratic faculty are more involved politically than their conservative colleagues. Thus, 45 percent of those whose attitudes on domestic issues place them in the most liberal quintile are in the high category in partisan political involvement. Conversely, only 18 percent of the most conservative fifth of the faculty are high in partisan political activity. A similar pattern occurs with respect to foreign policy. Those who score high with respect to support for detente policies are much more active than those who are low on the detente scale.

The picture is somewhat different with respect to intensity of partisan attachments. Less than three percent of the faculty report always voting straight Democratic or Republican, 2.2 percent for the former and but 0.4 for the G.O.P. Sixteen percent, however, describe themselves as "strong Democrats," as contrasted to 4 percent, "strong Republicans." The straight party supporters reveal the highest level of political activity. Almost

half of the latter (45 percent) score high on our gross political involvement scale. The proportion of highly involved activists is lowest (18 percent) among the quarter of the sample who do not report themselves as having any partisan preference, i.e., regularly splitting their ballot between both parties. Among the remainder, 30 percent of those who "usually" or "often" vote Democratic are high on activism, compared to but 17 percent among those faculty who, while not unqualifiedly partisan, tend to vote Republican.

It is noteworthy that this pattern of differentially high rates of participation by the most committed of both parties breaks down partially with respect to participation in non-partisan groups seeking to influence public policy. Half those who regularly, often, or usually, support the Democrats report having worked for such groups, a figure which drops to 46 percent among the non-partisans. Republican supporters, however, are much less inclined to become involved in these activities. The proportion indicating involvement decreases with Republican commitment, reaching a low of 21 percent for those who vote a straight G.O.P. ticket.

Table 3
Relationship of Ideology to Diverse Forms
of Participation (Percentages)

<u>Activities</u>	<u>Most Liberal Fifth</u>	<u>Most Conservative Fifth</u>
Involved in Affairs of a Political Party	48	19
Assisted or Worked for Candidates	69	41
Campaign Contributor	88	56
Active in Public Policy Groups	68	31

It is interesting to note that among the politically active faculty, the liberals and Democrats are much more likely than the conservatives and Republicans to be involved on a national level, while conservative participation is concentrated more on a state and local community level. Thus, we find that half of those in the most conservative fifth of the faculty on the Liberalism-Conservatism scale are in the category of locally involved, as contrasted to 31 percent of the most liberal faculty. Conversely, 41 percent of the latter fall in the category of the nationally active, while only 23 percent of the most conservative are in this group. Almost two-thirds of the most committed Republicans are high in local activism, as contrasted to 28 percent for the equivalently partisan Democrats.

These differences may be related to the fact that liberals and Democrats are disproportionately located in major

universities with their connections to Washington and New York, while the main centers of conservative and Republican strength in academe are lower-tier colleges, whose faculty presumably are oriented more to the local communities in which they are situated than to national centers of influence. The participation reported by over half, 52 percent, of those in lower-tier colleges is limited to the local community level, compared to 32 percent by those at major universities.

The image of academe as preponderantly liberal and Democratic, held by outsiders, is clearly enhanced by the differential patterns of participation. Republicans and conservatives are not only a minority within the campus, they are less likely than their ideological and partisan rivals to do much, or to contribute money, to foster their political attachments.

Table 4

Relationship of Political Activism to Selected Factors

	<u>Gross Political Involvement Scale</u>		
	<u>High</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Low</u>
<u>Teaching Field</u>			
Social Science	42	32	26
Humanities	27	35	38
Natural Science	21	38	42
Applied Professional	17	36	48
<u>Involvement in University Affairs</u>			
Heavily	45	33	22
Moderately	28	37	35
Slightly	19	36	45
<u>Political Ideology Scale</u>			
Most Liberal	45	37	18
Most Conservative	18	33	50
<u>Voting Patterns</u>			
Straight Democratic	43	27	30
Usually Democratic	35	35	30
Often Democratic	25	38	37
Split Tickets	19	37	44
Often Republican	15	34	51
Usually Republican	20	33	46
Straight Republican*	(58)	(22)	(20)

* Too few cases for reliable estimate

Consultantships

When we shift from looking at diverse forms of voluntary participation in politics to experience in official positions, such as consultantships to government agencies or service on government boards, committees and task forces, the differentials in favor of liberals and Democrats decline sharply, a fact which

may reflect the extent to which public officials, particularly in Republican administrations, have sought to secure partisan and ideological balance by appointing more conservative and Republican faculty to such posts. It may also be an outcome of the fact that many consultants and task force members must be drawn from the ranks of faculty in the applied professions, i.e., the more conservative disciplines.

The proportion of the most liberal quintile who have been members of official committees, boards or task forces, is about the same as that of conservatives, 21 to 20 percent. Among those who regularly vote the Democratic ticket, 34 percent have been consultants; among straight G.O.P. supporters, 30 percent have held such posts. Many more of the small group of committed Republicans, 53 percent, than of Democrats, 26 percent, have served on government boards, committees, and task forces.

Conclusion

Academe constitutes a massive force in favor of liberal domestic, pacifist, and antimilitarist policies. Although there is a large conservative minority within it, and the Republican party can occasionally mobilize significant support, e.g., the 43 percent who voted for Richard Nixon in 1972, the weight of academe, particularly as reflected within the major universities and among the most politically active is preponderantly far to the left of the American public. Richard Hofstadter's conclusion as of 1963 that "the political commitment of the majority of the intellectual

leadership in the United States has been to causes that might be variously described as liberal (in the American use of that word), progressive, or radical" remains an accurate description of the situation 12 years later.

SECTION 28

Political Party Support Among Faculty

The American professoriate is a Democratic sea, dotted with Republican islands. Even this metaphor is excessively kind to the GOP position in academe, for the party's modest territory is already awash and is steadily eroding.

Republican fortunes hardly appear robust, now in late 1975, anywhere in the electorate. The Democrats hold margins of 2-1 in Congress and 3-1 in governorships, while Democratic identifiers outnumber Republicans by roughly 2-1 (41 percent to 22 percent, with 36 percent calling themselves independents) among the nation's voters. Still, the GOP controls the White House, as it has for fifteen of the thirty years since World War II. If the 1974 elections were a debacle for their party, Republican congressional and gubernatorial candidates have contested rather evenly with their Democratic opponents over the past quarter century. It is hard to find an occupational stratum in which the performance and prospects of the Grand Old Party are as gloomy as they are among the upper-middle class professionals who comprise the faculty.

Only 12 percent of all professors think of themselves as Republicans. Twenty-eight percent of college graduates generally adopt the label Republican, according to the 1975 General Social Survey of the National

Opinion Research Center. Less than one-fifth (19 percent) of academics regularly vote for Republican candidates, while more than half (56 percent) are usually in the Democratic camp, and the remaining quarter are inveterate ticket-splitters.

Faculty have given Democratic presidential nominees a higher measure of support than has the general public in every presidential election since the 1930s, and have consistently outdone manual workers in Democratic fealty since the first Eisenhower-Stevenson contest. The 1972 election was a Nixon landslide within the public at large, but a McGovern landslide of comparable proportions among professors.

Generational Change

The Democratic margin in academe is getting bigger. Each succeeding "generation" of academics provides greater Democratic support--or, more precisely, is less receptive to the Republicans--than its predecessor. No comparable generational change, it should be noted, is evident in the public. A number of data bear out this view, that newcomers to the faculty have proved to be more Democratic than earlier entrants, but none more directly than simple partisan distributions by age cohort.

Faculty who were 5 years of age and older in 1975, entrants into the profession in the 1930s and 1940s, are disproportionately Democratic, but comprise a healthy GOP minority. About half of the group regularly favor candidates of the Democracy; more than a fourth, however, typically back Republican contenders. One-fifth of this cohort identify with the Republican party, only ten percent below the proportion of Democratic identifiers.

Table 1. Democratic and Republican Support,
Faculty by Age (row percentages)

<u>Faculty who are:</u>	<u>Regularly vote Democratic</u>	<u>Regularly vote Republican</u>	<u>Republican identifiers</u>	<u>1972 McGovern voters</u>
55 years of age and older	49	28	19	50
45-54 years	58	21	13	61
35-44 years	58	16	12	64
Under 35 years of age	58	14	8	74

With each succeeding cohort, Republican support tumbles. Among faculty under age 35, those who embarked upon their careers in the late 1960s and in the 1970s, just 14 percent usually vote Republican, half the proportion in the oldest age group. Only eight percent of the latest faculty generation consider themselves Republicans. It has been a long, steep slide indeed for the GOP since 1929, when the party held an apparently secure majority among academics.

Locating the Republican Islands

Even this picture of the GOP position in academe fails to convey the full state of Republican decline. For when we seek out the areas of relative Republican strength, we find them in the sectors of least political impact: in the less scholarly and less prestigious colleges, and in the applied professional disciplines.

Professors in the social sciences and in the humanities are charged, by their subject specialty, with interpreting polity, society and culture. Faculty at major research-directed universities typically enjoy the widest forums for their pronouncements, and generally have

Table 2. Democratic and Republican Support, Faculty by Discipline and Type of Institution (row percentages)

<u>Faculty who are:</u>	<u>Regularly vote Democratic</u>	<u>Regularly vote Republican</u>	<u>Republican identifiers</u>	<u>1972 McGovern voters</u>
Social Scientists and humanists				
Tier 1 schools*	80	5	5	87
Tier 2 schools	78	8	6	83
Tier 3 schools	74	14	7	74
Natural Scientists				
Tier 1 schools	62	14	9	68
Tier 2 schools	52	20	13	59
Tier 3 schools	53	20	14	60
Applied professional faculty				
Tier 1 schools	41	30	19	55
Tier 2 schools	35	32	25	45
Tier 3 schools	29	32	24	27

*Raw scores yielded by our Index of School Quality have here been collapsed into three categories: Tier 1 (major research-oriented colleges and universities); Tier 2; and Tier 3 (the least scholarly prestigious, least affluent, teaching-oriented colleges).

available the greatest resources to advance their scholarship. And it is precisely the academics located by the intersection of these characteristics--social scientists and humanists at the research centers--who support the Republicans least. Only five percent of them "always," "usually," or at least "most often" vote for Republican nominees. Only five percent of them are Republican identifiers. And just ten percent in this stratum voted for Richard Nixon in 1972. The GOP, then, is down and almost out, in terms of allegiance within that sector of the academy which, through its teaching and writing, exerts the greatest influence upon political thinking.

We observed at the outset of this ~~section~~ that even the Republican islands are awash. Such applied professional disciplines as engineering, agriculture and business administration, as the fields generally most conservative, have long displayed the highest Republican fealty. That support is still evident in 1975, but its erosion is extraordinary. Only among business-applied faculty at lower tier colleges do regular Republican voters outnumber regular Democrats, and even here the margin is a scant three percent.

A decade ago, the applied professional disciplines stood as secure GOP bases. They are that no longer. Even in 1972, when the Democratic presidential nominee stood to the left of a majority of his party, and of a large majority of academics in this cluster of disciplines, the Republicans failed to carry the day decisively.

Part of the Republican problem is, quite simply, ideology. The Republicans nationally are the more conservative of the two main parties, while even the most conservative academic disciplines appear more nearly centrist when the views of their members are located among the general populace. The decline of Republican fortunes throughout the intellectual community does not wholly result, however, from an ideological disjunction. As we will argue **in the section which immediately follows,** the GOP suffers inordinately from its reputation as a party bereft of any positive and coherent program, as a purely reactive alignment.

One final observation should be made on the weakness of the Republican position in academe. As though it were not enough that only one-fifth of the faculty are regular Republican voters, and that those who are tend to be concentrated in the disciplines which have little to say about politics and in institutions little involved in research, publication, and the training of aspirants for places among national elites, the party must also contend with the fact that its adherents are less active politically than are Democratic partisans. Forty-five percent of strong Democratic identifiers are among that quartile of the entire faculty most heavily engaged in public affairs--as in running for office, directing party business, serving as a consultant to government agencies, and the like. Only 26 percent of strong Republican partisans manifest a comparably high level of public involvement.

Independents and the Decline of Party

A good bit of discussion currently is directed to the weakening of party organization and partisan attachments in the U.S. It is noted, for example, that more than one-third of all Americans (36 percent, according to the 1975 NORC survey) now eschew any partisan home and consider themselves independents. Forty-two percent of college graduates called themselves independents in the spring of 1975--making this the largest "party," compared to just 30 percent identifying as Democrats and 28 percent as Republicans.

Not only are larger numbers of voters taking up the label independent, but we are seeing as well an increase in independent electoral behavior--specifically in split-ticket voting. In 1948 elections, 38 percent of the electorate split their tickets. In 1960, the figure was 34 percent. But the proportion rose rapidly over the 1960s, nearing two-thirds (62 percent) of the total in 1972.

At first glance, the professoriate seems to present a case of "this, only more so." An extraordinary 57 percent of academics identify as independents. But if the general public, to a much higher degree than ever before, has taken both to calling themselves independents and to marching back and forth with wild abandon across party lines, professors display only the former. Faculty are, in fact, remarkably "orthodox" or party-regular in their electoral behavior. Ninety-nine percent of self-described "strong" Democrats, and 94 percent of all Democratic identifiers, regularly vote for their party's nominees. Ninety-eight

percent of strong Republicans usually back Republican candidates. What is more impressive, large majorities of self-described independents who say they "lean" slightly toward the Democrats in fact regularly generate sweeping Democratic pluralities. Republican-leaning independents provide comparably consistent backing for the GOP.

Table 3. Candidate Voting of Faculty,
by Partisan Self-identification
(row percentages)

Faculty who identify as:	Regular Democratic Voters	Regular Republican Voters	For McGovern, 1972	For Humphrey, 1968
Strong Democrats	99	0	95	95
Democrats (all identifiers)	94	1	89	88
Independents-leaning Democratic	78	1	84	80
Independents-"no lean"	21	7	49	36
Independents-leaning Republican	4	58	15	14
Republicans (all identifiers)	1	74	13	8
Strong Republicans	0	98	5	3

Eighty-two percent of Democratic identifiers in the faculty voted both for Hubert Humphrey in 1968 and for George McGovern in 1972; 87 percent of self-proclaimed Republicans endorsed Richard Nixon in each of these contests. This is a level of party regularity notably above what one finds

for Democratic or Republican identifiers within the public in the several pairs of consecutive elections over the past decade and a half.

The professoriate, then, manifests a rather high degree of party regularity, in the absence of a high measure of party loyalty. Academics think of themselves as independent--of party organization appeals, of strong emotional ties to party labels, of dependence upon cues provided by party leaders. But they are an issue-conscious, even ideological group, and ideology guides them fairly consistently to Democratic nominees (in the case of the majority) or to the Republicans (for a minority). In the next ~~section~~ we explore the ideological worlds of the several groups of party adherents in the faculty, and the types of presidential candidate preferences to which academics are thereby led.

SECTION 29

The Ideological Characteristics of Republican and Democratic Partisans in Academe

Democratic adherents in the faculty stand to left politically of rank-and-file Democratic supporters on the entire range of contemporary issues. Closer examination, however, reveals two sharply contrasting patterns within this general relationship.

► On business vs. labor and tax-spend questions of the sort that came to the fore with the New Deal, the "opinion distance" between faculty Democrats and all Democrats is modest; and both these groups are on one side while Republicans--in the professoriate and in the entire electorate--occupy the other.

► On newer social and cultural issues, professorial Democrats are separated from their party's rank and file by massive margins--so much so that what one opposes the other supports. Republican academics hold views on such matters which are much closer to those of the Democratic rank and file than are the opinions of Democratic professors.

These patterns involving elite and mass opinion are interesting in themselves. But they take on greater importance when one notes similar relationships elsewhere. After comparing the views of 1972 Democratic and Republican presidential convention delegates to those of all backers of the two parties, for example, Professor Jeane Kirkpatrick reported exactly the same associations.

Social and cultural issues

Issues such as race, drugs, pollution control, protests by students, women's rights, and abortion differ fundamentally from the old gut economic matters of the New Deal period, and this broad cluster of "social issues" has now assumed a very prominent place in the American political agenda.

Academics generally give notable support to more egalitarian, liberal and change-sustaining positions on these issues. But Republican identifiers in the faculty for the most part come down on the same side as the public at large--Democrats and Republicans alike. All three strata, in the Spring of 1975, opposed the legalization of marijuana, insisted that there should be legislation restricting the flow of pornographic material, wanted to retain capital punishment for crimes such as kidnapping and murder, strongly rejected school busing on behalf of integration.

In each such instance, faculty Democrats took the opposing position, and by a very large margin. Seventy-two percent of academics strongly identifying with the Democrats endorsed busing, the stance of just 22 percent of "strong Democrats" in the national electorate. The view that defense spending should be cut--certainly linked to a continuing protest against the fruits of U.S. military intervention in Indochina--was held by 83 percent of strong faculty Democrats, but by only 35 percent of their counterparts in the public at large.

Table 1. Positions on selected social issues,
Republican and Democratic identifiers, Faculty and Public*
(row percentages)

	Favor school busing <u>for integration</u>	Favor legalizing <u>marijuana</u>	Favor cutting <u>military spending</u>
Strong Democrats, Faculty	72	75	83
Strong Democrats, Public	22	18	35
Strong Republicans, Faculty	15	19	34
Strong Republicans, Public	9	11	25

*Data on the general public are from the 1975 General Social Survey of the National Opinion Research Center.

Drawing on the major surveys of rank-and-file voters and 1972 presidential convention delegates by the University of Michigan's Center for Political Studies, Jeane Kirkpatrick located an exactly comparable pattern across the whole array of social issues. For example, 66 percent of Democratic delegates supported school busing, as compared to 15 percent of all Democratic identifiers (Fall 1972), five percent of GOP adherents, and eight percent of Republican delegates. She concluded that for this range of issues, "the difference between Democratic mass and elite so far exceeded the norms that . . . the Democratic elite and rank and file were found on opposite sides and the Republican elite held views which were more representative of the views and values of rank and file Democrats than were the views of Democratic delegates."

Traditional New Deal Issues

If issues involving cultural and social change have taken on special prominence in recent years, those of public spending for social welfare, support for demands of organized labor or corporate business, and the like, have by no means disappeared. On these traditional New Deal questions, it is a matter of Democrats vs. Republicans, rather than faculty Democrats vs. the field. Public spending for health care, to meet urban problems, and for welfare, receive endorsement from large majorities of professorial Democrats and all Democrats, while encountering strong opposition from Republicans--both in academe and in the society at large.

Table 2. Positions on selected issues of public spending, Republican and Democratic identifiers, Faculty and Public (row percentages)

	<u>Cut welfare spending</u>	<u>Increase spending on urban problems</u>	<u>Increase spending for health care</u>
Strong Democrats, Faculty	14	89	90
Strong Democrats, Public	34	65	75
Strong Republicans, Public	61	48	50
Strong Republicans, Faculty	70	37	45

The Republican and Democratic faculty cohorts occupy polar positions on these issues, with the former actually more conservative than the GOP rank and file and the latter more liberal than the Democratic citizenry party.

Again, there are parallel findings from Kirkpatrick's study of presidential convention delegates. She reported the persistence of a "New Deal consensus," uniting party elite and mass, on such matters as "inflation, union leaders and business interests."

Delegates to the 1972 Democratic National Convention were chosen through a highly specialized--and much debated--set of procedures, and in response to efforts on behalf of various presidential contenders, notably George McGovern who amassed majority delegate support. Faculty Democrats obviously came to their positions through entirely distinct processes.

Still, as one compares the Kirkpatrick data and those from our faculty study, acknowledging that these two surveys are three years apart, the following seems likely: if the 1972 Democratic Convention delegation had been drawn randomly from the ranks of faculty Democrats, it would have had a policy profile almost identical to that of the delegation in fact selected through elaborate, nation-wide processes. And it would have been equally unrepresentative of the party's rank and file. Why? What is happening?

In the New Deal era, the Democratic citizenry party, disproportionately "have-nots," more strongly back changes of the sort liberalism than specified than did affluent, college and professional cohorts in the party. By the 1970s, however, the socioeconomic position of a large proportion of Democrats had greatly improved, and the majority had moved back from the sharp cutting edge of liberal-egalitarian change. A host of issues involving the collision of old and new political cultures had become prominent on the agenda.

The perspectives of the new political culture comprise the contemporary extensions of liberalism. Support for these approaches has been strongest not among lower income groups, but rather among the upper middle class professionals who form the expanding intelligentsia in postindustrial America. There is an ongoing clash between broad segments of the mass public and the intelligentsia--the latter including the Democratic majority in the professoriate and the new middle class activists who were dominant at the 1972 Democratic Convention--extending across the entire arena of social and cultural change.

Polarization

Republican and Democratic faculty appear sharply at odds on a wide assortment of issues. At the same time, supporters of the two parties within the general public are only modestly distinguished. The "faculty parties," but not the citizenry parties, are polarized.

This point is best conveyed through a simple measure we call "party distance." It is computed by finding the difference between the percentage of Republicans backing a given measure, and the proportion of Democrats in favor of it. If 70 percent of both party groups back Proposition X, the party distance score is 0; if 98 percent of Republicans and only two percent of Democrats support the proposition, party distance is 96.

On every issue, party distance is vastly greater for faculty Democrats and Republicans than for rank-and-file partisans. Scores for the former typically are on the order of 30-45 points, for the latter 5 to 10.

Table 3. Party distance, Democratic and Republican Supporters, Faculty and General Public

	<u>Faculty Republicans & Democrats</u>	<u>General Public Republicans & Democrats</u>
Whether busing should be used to achieve integration	42	9
Whether capital punishment should be retained	43	10
Whether marijuana should be legalized	38	7
Whether cuts should be made in defense spending	34	5
Whether cuts should be made in welfare spending	44	10

In part, polarization of the faculty parties simply indicates a response common to ideologically inclined cohorts. When a group pays close attention to issues and their interrelationship, it is more likely to formulate a consistent set of responses and to be very sensitive to the consequences of each individual policy matter.

But something beyond this is at work. The American polity has had to absorb over the past decade an extraordinary array of deeply divisive issues and events. In the face of this, party ranks and file have not polarized but party elites have. Republican and Democratic cohorts in the profession apparently reflect a trend toward greater policy distinctiveness evident among more activist and informed party cohorts generally.

Republicans and Conservatives

The Republican party has an obvious problem in universities, where the political center of gravity stands notably to the left of what it does in the general public. Its difficulty, however, goes even deeper. Whereas faculty liberals solidly support the Democrats, faculty conservatives--a smaller band anyway--much more frequently defect from the GOP.

Table 4. Party support of Faculty liberals and conservatives (column percentages)

<u>Percentage who:</u>	<u>Most liberal faculty quintile*</u>	<u>Most conservative faculty quintile*</u>
Identify as Democrats or as "leaning Democratic"	88	20
Identify as independents, "no lean"	7	14
Identify as Republicans or as "leaning Republican"	2	66
Regularly vote Democratic	89	13
Regularly vote Republican	1	50
Regularly split ticket	8	37

*Only a fraction of one percent of the most conservative faculty indicate support for any third party. On the other hand, 2.6 percent of the most liberal cohort indicate that they regularly vote for a left third party, and 3.2 percent claim identification with such a party.

Only two percent of the most liberal academic cohort have Republican leanings, while 20 percent of the most conservative stratum identify with the Democrats. Eighty-nine percent of the liberals regularly support

Democratic nominees. Just half of the conservatives are typically in the GOP camp. An extraordinary 37 percent of this group, compared to only eight percent of the liberals, are habitual ticket-splitters.

That the Republicans can't secure support among professorial liberals is hardly surprising. That they can't count on solid bloc support from conservatives points to a special weakness in academe.

The most conservative quintile in the faculty, it should be noted, does indeed possess solid conservative credentials. Seventy-seven percent of this group, for example, want to cut welfare spending; only four percent favor any increases. Ninety-four percent are against busing for school integration. And Richard Nixon received the votes of 94 percent of this cohort in 1972. Still, only half of them are regular Republican voters.

Two factors appear to us most directly responsible for the exceptional Republican weakness in academe, symbolized by the party's failure to hold securely even its natural allies. First, a high measure of estrangement has developed, whereby the GOP is seen as a vehicle uncongenial to intellectual interests, if not hostile to intellectuals.

Then, too, the party lacks any coherent public philosophy, comparable to the business nationalism of the old Republican majority or the governmental nationalism of the New Deal Democrats. Being an essentially reactive party produces weakness generally, but nowhere more so than among intellectuals looking for focus, clarity, direction, for an enhancing idea.

The Republican Malaise

The Grand Old Party is weaker today than at any time since its rise to prominence before the Civil War, weaker even than during the dark days of the Depression.

Nothing has contributed more to this Republican decline than the party's failure to maintain support within the intellectual stratum. College students and the college-educated generally, as well as academics, now give less support to the Republicans than ever before--at least since the advent of survey data.

Because this broad intellectual stratum is now so vastly expanded and plays so large a role in shaping the boundaries and substance of political debate, the GOP weakness within it is especially consequential. All those who are inclined to favor a vital, competitive two-party system have reason to ponder the increasing inability of the Republicans to attract support among the college cohorts, among the idea-generating segments of postindustrial America.

SECTION 30

Ideological Orientations and Journal Readership

Thoughtful analysis of survey data often serves to establish precise relationships which otherwise could only be guessed at, enlarges and sharpens our understanding of social phenomena. Only rarely does it absolutely confound our expectations. We have just encountered an instance of the latter, however, and in a somewhat unlikely place--as we explored faculty readership of journals of social, political, economic and cultural commentary.

Journal readership: What determines how much?

Professors read the professional journals of their respective disciplines, of course, but when they want general information and opinion on the political order, business and economic affairs, social and cultural life, where do they turn? And with what frequency? How different are the mixes of journals relied upon by faculty in the many "houses" of the multiversity?

Academics vary greatly in how much they read such publications as Harper's, Business Week, the New Republic, National Review, the New York Times, and Saturday Review. We assigned all faculty to five response

categories in a summary index of journal readership--from quintile 1, which comprises those who almost completely ignore these journals (the full list of which is contained in Table 2); along to the fifth quintile, containing professors who read very heavily among these periodicals.

It was our expectation that the more intellectually inclined and achieving academics would distinguish themselves as notably high journal consumers. But this proved not to be the case. Twenty-two percent of professors at elite universities scored in the "highest readership" quintile defined by the index, compared to 21 percent of those at junior colleges. Faculty who described themselves as "intellectuals" read no more widely across these publications than those who considered themselves "teachers." There is no difference in the level of journal readership between professors primarily involved in research and those heavily committed to teaching. High publishers read no more (among periodicals of social, political and cultural commentary) than those who publish not at all. Eighteen percent of academics who (a) are heavily into research, (b) publish extensively, and (c) receive extramural funding to advance their scholarship, appear in the high readership category--compared to 20 percent of all professors. That the level of readership of these general periodicals is not, contrary to our expectations, at all a function of intellectuality is confirmed by analysis of the entire range of publications individually, as well as collectively through indices.

We see still further evidence of this lack of relationship when we look at religious background. Professors of Jewish parentage show up

especially high in all measures of intellectuality and intellectual attainment, but they score no higher in level of journal readership than academics raised in any of the principal Protestant denominations or as Catholics.

Analysis of the survey data revealed a lot of other blind alleys.

For example:

▶ There is no relationship between any facet of social background and the frequency of journal readership.

▶ The link between political perspectives--in the sense of Republican or Democratic, liberal or conservative--and level of reading is so weak as to be essentially unrelated to variations in the latter.

▶ There are some differences in gross readership by discipline, with social scientists and humanists, for example, scoring higher than natural scientists. But the field differences are not large or consistent, and appear in large measure a product of the fact that any listing of journals must get skewed somewhat toward one set of subjects and against others.

Thus, the New York Review of Books is surely an important general publication of cultural and social commentary, but it is also to some extent an "in our field" periodical for many humanists.

Enter the activists.

Only one set of variables, among all those examined in our survey, has any significant independent relationship with level of journal readership, but this relationship is exceptionally strong. The more activist faculty members are, the more they try to influence the course of events in the

university and in the society, the more heavily they read journals of social, political, economic and cultural commentary.

We arrayed academics along a continuum of political involvement or activism. On the one end are professors who consistently eschew any and all efforts to shape the external world through giving money to campaigns, working for candidates, running for office, serving on government boards, assisting nonparty groups seeking to affect public policy, and the like. At the other are faculty most participant in these areas. Thirty-five percent of those totally inactive politically are in the lowest readership quintile, compared to just 1 percent of the most politically active. Fifty-six percent of the latter, on the other hand, score in the highest readership quintile, where only 10 percent of politically inactive faculty are found. The link between activism and readership shown in Table 1 is very unusual in the world of social data--in terms of its symmetry, its strength and coherence.

Table 1. Relationship between political activism and level of journal readership (row percentages)

<u>Political activism</u>	<u>Journal readership</u>	
	<u>Lowest quintile</u>	<u>Highest quintile</u>
1 (low)	35	10
2	23	11
3	23	15
4	15	20
5	13	29
6	8	40
7	6	44
8 (high)	1	56

This general conclusion--that the readers are the activists--is sustained not only for the entire range of periodicals examined, but for every subgroup within the list. The relationship is as strong in the case of the cultural journals, such as Atlantic, Saturday Review, the New York Review of Books, and the American Scholar, as with the "news" periodicals, including Time, Newsweek, U.S. News and the New York Times.

That we have located a response in journal reading (or information seeking) dictated by an inclination to activism generally is indicated by other measures. Faculty highly participant in university affairs are, in similar fashion, disproportionately high readers of all of these sets of journals.

Academics who see their professional work tightly bounded by the specific demands and concerns of their respective disciplines read much less widely among these general periodicals. Those describing themselves as "scientists," who think of their scholarship as "pure," "basic," or "hard," attend much less to the journals of social comment than do other professors. This holds across the entire array of disciplines. Thus among social scientists, the minority (10 percent) who claim that scientist best represents them--rather than teacher, professional, intellectual, or scholar--read much less in these periodicals than do their colleagues. Only 11 percent score in the highest readership quintile, as compared to 30 percent of other social scientists.

Those who read most widely among periodicals of general commentary are led to do so not by some special measure of intellectuality--as we had expected--but rather by a special interest in doing things to influence

the flow of decisions and events. If one wishes to shape the world, one must know the world. The social-political-cultural journals serve the latter need. The same impulse to activism is an impulse to applied social knowledge.

We must be careful about the adjective "applied," because most of the periodicals listed in Table 2 are far removed from the "how to do it" school of Popular Mechanics and Building Better Birdhouses. Commentary, the New York Review of Books, Fortune, the Times, Saturday Review, and the like, are periodicals of serious intellectual content. But they are all "of the world," rather than of the discipline, and they appeal most to those faculty who in some measure want to influence things of the world.

We obviously have not measured how much academics read generally. We have said nothing about involvement in the scholarly-scientific literature of the respective fields. We assume, although our data do not permit us to state definitely, that professors pursuing "pure" science and scholarship are as much, perhaps more, devoted to the printed word as their colleagues, but they give primacy to the literature of the discipline.

Journals: the most read.

Time can claim a higher proportion of regular readers among academics than any other serious journal of news and comment. Thirty-eight percent of professors read it regularly, while another 41 percent attend to it occasionally. The New York Times occupies third place, after Newsweek, an extraordinary compliment to a daily paper printed only in New York.

Science is the most widely followed of the more specialized journals, although its audience is understandably skewed sharply toward the natural sciences. Saturday Review, the New Yorker, and the New York Review of Books have the largest academic readerships among the culture journals, read regularly by, respectively, 16, 15, and 11 percent of all professors. Journals of political opinion and policy analysis reach relatively small faculty audiences. The New Republic is followed regularly by 6 percent and occasionally by another 25 percent. Commentary, an influential publication, is read regularly by only 2 percent of academics, from time to time by 12 percent more.

Table 2. Rank ordering of selected journals*, by the size of their regular readership, all faculty and those at major universities

	<u>All faculty</u>	<u>Faculty at major universities</u>
1. (most read)	Time	New York Times
2.	Newsweek	Time
3.	New York Times	Science
4.	Science	Newsweek
5.	Saturday Review	New Yorker
6.	New Yorker	New York Review of Books
7.	U.S. News	Saturday Review
8.	Wall Street Journal	Wall Street Journal
9.	New York Review of Books	U.S. News
10.	Harper's	New Republic
11.	Business Week	Harper's
12.	Playboy	Washington Post
13.	Atlantic	Atlantic
14.	New Republic	Playboy
15.	Fortune	Business Week
16.	Nation	Daedalus
17.	Washington Post	Commentary
18.	Daedalus	Fortune
19.	American Scholar	Nation
20.	National Review	Foreign Affairs
21.	Foreign Affairs	American Scholar
22.	Commentary	Public Interest
23.	Encounter	National Review
24.	Foreign Policy	Encounter
25.	Public Interest	Foreign Policy

*We have located the serious journals of opinion and information which stand

at the top of their respective areas: business, political opinion, news, culture. We have not sought to measure the relative standing of all lower circulation publications in each of these areas. Thus, The Public Interest occupies 25th place only in the Table 2 grouping, not 25th in some larger list of such periodicals.

Among faculty at the major research-directed universities, Table 2 shows, a somewhat different rank-ordering of journals emerges. The most notable shift, at least symbolically, is the elevated status of the Times. It is read more widely than any other periodical.

Who reads what?

The United States does not have a national newspaper--a daily publication read by some substantial slice of the population, or of leadership strata, across the country. For corporation executives, of course, the Wall Street Journal does perform this national paper function. Among faculty, the Times makes a run at it, and from one important perspective actually succeeds.

The New York Times blankets the college and university scene in the Northeast, with its regular readership comprising 56 percent of all professors. Among the region's social scientists, those whose subject matter involves them directly with the performance of the social order, 76 percent read the Times daily (another 19 percent occasionally, only 5 percent not at all). The periodicals with the next highest readership, Time and Newsweek, are attended to in a regular fashion by only one third of this group. The Washington Post, harder to come by, of course, is read daily by only 4 percent of northeastern social scientists.

Outside the northeastern states, the Times' audience is naturally much smaller: 17 percent of all faculty in the Midwest, 15 percent in the South, 9 percent in the western states. But at the top of academe, nationally as in the Northeast, the Times holds impressive sway. It is read regularly by 40 percent of professors at major universities throughout the country, and by a quite extraordinary 54 percent of social scientists and humanists of high scholarly attainment at these schools. No other publication approaches the New York Times in level of readership among this group. Only the Times approximates common currency.

While it is hard to be precise as to the impact, we assume that where faculty (or any other group) get their information on social matters is consequential--because the various periodicals naturally display distinct interpretation and selection. Apart from gross readership, groups within the professoriate differ greatly in information sources.

Disciplines are a notable case in point. The variations here are entirely in the expected direction, but are still impressive in their extent. For example, 84 percent of business school faculty are heavy readers of the journals of commentary on economic affairs, compared to just 11 percent of humanists. Only 18 percent of business administration professors show up in the two high readership quintiles defined by the cultural journals index, while 55 percent of humanists are in these categories.

Journal readership and political opinion.

Since the cultural journals manifest a generally critical and liberal posture vis-a-vis the society, while business affairs periodicals are

largely conservative and supportive, the fact that liberal arts professors are heavy readers of the former and applied professional field faculty of the latter appears as one more component shaping the distinctive discipline political cultures. The subject matter of a field inclines its members to materials distinguished not only by specific professional concerns, but as well by general political coloration.

Academics are not, of course, simply pushed along in journal selection by discipline-related interests. Personal political perspectives loom very large. Conservatives and liberals seek out periodicals congenial to their respective viewpoints--and in the process, presumably, serve to reinforce and round out these perspectives.

Seventy percent of the regular academic readership of Fortune comes from the ranks of the most conservative faculty (defined by our composite liberalism-conservatism scale), as do 70 percent of the readers of the National Review. Seventy-eight percent of the New Republic's regular professorial readers are from the most liberal faculty cohorts. Only eight percent are academic conservatives. The New York Review of Books draws 66 percent of its followers from the most liberal faculty.

Some of the most interesting material on ideological selection comes from looking at academics whose reading habits depart sharply from those of their discipline colleagues. Social scientists and humanists generally are not, we have noted, heavy readers of business periodicals, but 8 percent do partake extensively. Professors in the applied professional fields as a group pay relatively little attention to the culture journals; 6 percent,

however, are heavy readers. These two groups of "deviating" academics hold to very different political views than do the rest of their discipline colleagues, as Table 3 shows. The liberal arts professors who choose

Table 3. Position of faculty on the Liberalism-Conservatism Scale, by discipline and journal readership (row percentages)

	<u>Liberal*</u>	<u>Conservative*</u>
All applied professional faculty	15	68
Applied professional faculty who are heavy readers of culture journals	36	41
All social scientists and humanists	61	22
Social scientists and humanists who are heavy readers of business journals	29	51

*We have omitted the "middle of the road" category, so row percentages do not add to 100.

business periodicals are vastly more conservative than other members of these fields; while academics in the applied professional subjects who select cultural journals are a far more conservative group than others of their colleagues.

Conclusions.

Which came first: ideology or journal selection? Surely there is an interaction, but just as surely prior ideological leanings are decisive. Liberals seek out journals which state things they want to read, and conservatives do the same.

Together, activism, discipline, and ideology pretty much explain journal readership among academics. Activists read more heavily in these journals of social commentary than do other professors, because "knowledge is power." Field of specialization pushes faculty toward one cluster of these general periodicals or another. And the sharing of political views plays a very large part in bringing together a journal and the individual professor.

SECTION 31

Culture and Politics: Automobile Buying as a Case Study

Academe clearly differs from other occupations in its interests and style of life. Earlier, we saw that one fifth of academics, or over 100,000, report reading The New York Times regularly, while another 45 percent read it occasionally, a fact which means over 10 percent of the daily circulation of that paper of record comes from faculty. Close to two-fifths read Time regularly, while about one third see Newsweek on a weekly basis. Conversely only 7 percent look at each issue of Playboy.

Academics, not surprisingly, are relatively heavy consumers of high culture. Over a quarter, 27 percent, report going to a concert at least once a month, and another 51 percent attend a few times a year. Similarly, 22 percent see a play at least once a month and an additional 56 percent go a few times a year. Only a fifth of the faculty indicate that they attend plays or concerts once a year or less.

Yet when asked about athletic events, which draw tens of thousands to football and baseball stadiums or basketball courts, forty percent report minimal or no attendance. A slightly

higher percentage, 42, rarely or never go to church. Clearly the worlds of academe and those of most other people are quite different.

To find such variations with respect to reading habits and cultural tastes will not surprise many. Equally obvious, perhaps, to residents of university communities, is the fact that academics have a propensity to own foreign made cars. Fully 42 percent of them reported owning a foreign car in 1975, while only 18.5 percent of all cars on American roads in 1974 were foreign. While 42 percent owned at least one foreign car, almost half of them, 19 percent, had a foreign car in addition to an American one, and the majority of the faculty, 56 percent, owned only American cars. Two percent of our sample did not have any car.

Types of Car Owners

The correlates of these variations in car habits are almost as intriguing as the differences in propensity to support different faculty unions, to be a liberal or a conservative, or to favor or oppose meritocratic policies on campus. Car purchases turn out to be almost a proclamation of a social-political-religious orientation or style of life. On question after question, those who own one or more American car are the most conservative, conventional, and the least involved in "high culture." Those who own a foreign car as well as an American one are somewhat less conservative, followed in a more liberal direction by faculty owning one or more foreign cars. The small category of those who do not own any car are the most liberal or non-conventional of all.

These differences show up in many ways. Only 13 percent of the No Car group voted for Richard Nixon in 1972, as did 18 percent of the foreign only, 36 of the mixed, and 45 percent of the American only group. Car ownership also shows significant differences in feelings about Gerald Ford. The percentages reacting positively to him in 1975 were 36 for American-only owners, 32 for both kinds, 17 for foreign only, and 15 for no car. These reactions, of course, reflect underlying predispositions toward liberalism or conservatism. The owners of American cars are clearly the most conservative. Forty-eight percent of the only American group and 46 percent of those who own both an American and foreign car fall into the two most conservative quintiles on the liberalism-conservatism scale. Conversely, only 26 percent of the all foreign group are in the two conservative quintiles, as contrasted to but 18 percent of the no car group.

The choice of an American or foreign car is also strongly related to attitudes toward foreign policy. Only a third, 34 percent, of faculty who own only American cars fall into the two most supportive quintiles on our scale measuring attitudes toward detente. Conversely, almost three-fifths of those who own foreign cars are favorable to detente.

Car ownership naturally differentiates attitudes toward faculty unionism. Those who abstained completely from owning cars are the least likely (16 percent) to indicate they would vote for "no agent" in a collective bargaining election, and reveal the highest percentage, 36, in support of the AFT. At the other

extreme, the American-only buyers are highest in support for "no agents" 31, and the lowest for the AFT, 16.

Comparing these groups by their cultural behavior again points to the extent to which taste in automobiles is linked to other values. Almost half of the American-only faculty reported attending a church service at least once a month, as did 43 percent of those who own both types; 25 percent of the all foreign group and 21 percent among those who do not own cars report the same frequency of church attendance. As might be expected, similar divisions occur with respect to frequency of attending concerts, with the all Americans lowest in attendance. For athletic events, the no car group is by far the lowest. The no car group is also the least likely to read business-related magazines and most disposed to subscribe to cultural journals, a pattern followed in second place by the foreign only group. Those who own only American cars are highest in readership of business journals and lowest for cultural ones.

Occupational self-image correlates somewhat with car ownership. Those who identify themselves as intellectuals, scholars and scientists, are more likely to own foreign-made vehicles. Conversely, a self-description as a "professional" is associated more with possession of American cars.

Given the linkage between patterns of preference for American and foreign cars and general socio-political attitudes, one would expect to find that most of the factors which differentiate liberals from conservatives also divide American car owners from foreign car owners, with the small group who own no car corresponding

to the far left politically.

Essentially, the results bear out this expectation. Thus 40 percent of the no car group prefer research to teaching, as do 32 percent of the foreign only, 27 of the mixed category, and 22 percent of only American owners. As a group, those who do not own any car are much more likely to be at prestigious schools than the owners of American made cars. Only two fifths of American car owners are in the more politically liberal fields, the social sciences and the humanities, as contrasted to three-fifths of those who own foreign vehicles only or do not have a car. Younger faculty are more likely to own no car or to have a foreign one, while increased age is associated with a propensity to drive an American vehicle.

Types of Automobiles

The growth in the demand for foreign cars has brought about a considerable increase in the manufacture of compact and subcompact vehicles designed to compete with those made abroad. The increased demand for such cars has been linked to the higher cost of gasoline. Yet if we examine the variations in the values and traits of those whose first or only car is a small American one with those who own a large one, we see that these two groups vary in much the same way as do owners of American and foreign cars.

The owners of large American cars are somewhat more conservative than those who drive American-made compacts, who in turn are more conservative than owners of foreign made automobiles. These differences hold up with respect to position on the liberalism-conservatism scale, 1972 Presidential vote, attitude towards

Gerald Ford, cultural tastes, attendance at religious services, academic preferences, and scholarly behavior. For example, 29 percent of those whose first or only car is a small American one prefer research to teaching as contrasted to 20 percent among large car owners. Among owners of American cars, those who drive compacts are more likely to describe themselves as intellectuals, scholars or scientists, than those who prefer large cars whose self-images tend to be that of professionals or teachers.

Which cars do they own?

Looking at preferences for specific automobile companies yields interesting but curious results. It is difficult to draw reliable conclusions, since the numbers in our sample who report owning some foreign brands are often quite small. Yet the variations are suggestive and worth reporting, if only to illustrate in detail how taste in consumption goods may be related to other values.

Among American companies, General Motors, the largest by far, stands out as appealing most to more conservative faculty. In general, G.M. owners are the most conservative in terms of responses to the items in the liberalism-conservatism scale than those who own Ford, AMC or Chrysler products. Almost half, 49 percent, of those who drive G.M. cars as their first or only vehicle, voted for Richard Nixon in 1972, as contrasted to 40 percent among Ford owners, and 37 percent among those who prefer Chrysler products. The same patterns among the Big Three hold up with respect to attitudes toward Gerald Ford and Barry Goldwater. Those who bought their primary car from G.M.

reveal the lowest percentage, 22, to identify themselves as an intellectual, scholar, or scientist, as contrasted to 24 percent among Ford owners, 30 for users of Chrysler products, and 34 for American Motors. Almost half (49 percent) of American Motors buyers report attending an athletic event once a year or less, as contrasted to 40 percent for Chrysler people, 38 for Ford owners, and 32 for General Motors.

In reporting on foreign cars, we can only report on striking variations, given the small numbers involved for any given company except for Volkswagen (11 percent), Volvo (5), or Japanese cars considered as a group (7). Owners of Swedish cars have the most liberal views of all, a fact which suggests left disposed faculty may associate Saabs and Volvos with Swedish socialism. Saab owners appear to differ quite a bit from those who buy Volvos. The former are much more liberal in their social and political attitudes than the latter. Almost every driver of a Saab (98 percent) reported having voted for George McGovern in 1972 as contrasted to 80 percent among Volvo owners. Eighty-four percent of Saab drivers have a negative reaction to Gerald Ford, while only 55 percent of Volvo owners give the same response. Well over half, 57 percent, of Saab owners fall into the most liberal quintile, while the equivalent figure for the Volvo people is 32. Among owners of German cars, those who drive Mercedes were more for McGovern (82 percent) than were Porsche people (76) or the much larger group of Volkswagen owners (74). Mercedes owners are also much less favorable towards Gerald Ford (12) than are those who own Volkswagens (27). Those who can afford

a Mercedes show up as more liberal, 32 percent in the highest quintile, than Volkswagen drivers (26). We did not differentiate in coding car ownership for the different Japanese companies. It may be noted however that those who own Japanese vehicles (seven percent of the entire sample) are more liberal on the whole than the average owner of an American vehicle, but considerably more conservative than those who prefer Swedish or German cars.

Conclusion

It is difficult to know what to make of these differences, except to suggest that a loose pattern appears to exist, popularity or sales appeal is associated with more conservative social views and less "intellectual" orientations. These patterns hold up in comparing the majority who own an American car with those who have only a foreign made vehicle, users of General Motors products with those who own other American cars, and within other national contexts, Volvo owners with Saab owners, and Volkswagen with Mercedes. And finally last but certainly not least relevant are the two percent who refuse to own a car and turn out to be the most liberal to left in social views, the least religious, the most involved in "high" culture and scholarly research activities, the least interested in sports and the least committed to teaching.

TABLE I

Faculty Attitudes and Car Ownership Patterns

	<u>Only U.S.</u>	<u>U.S. + Foreign</u>	<u>Only Foreign</u>	<u>No Car</u>
<u>2 Vote</u>				
McGovern	55	64	81	87
Nixon	45	36	18	13
<u>Attitude to Gerald Ford</u>				
Positive	36	32	17	15
Neutral	32	30	28	25
Negative	33	38	55	60
<u>Liberalism-Conservatism Scale (Quintiles)</u>				
Most Liberal	15	17	30	31
Liberal	19	22	25	28
Middle	19	15	19	23
Conservative	22	22	17	11
Most Conservative	26	24	9	7
<u>Attitude Scale (Quintiles)</u>				
Very Positive	14	16	30	28
Favorable	20	22	16	13
Center	18	17	17	14
Less Favorable	23	27	29	31
Very Negative	25	19	30	28
<u>Collective Bargaining Preference</u>				
AFT	16	17	23	36
AAUP	28	25	35	18
NEA	12	13	9	9
Other Agent	13	18	12	22
No Agent	31	27	22	16
<u>Church Attendance</u>				
Once a month or more	49	43	25	21
<u>Church Attendance</u>				
Once a month or more	26	22	34	31
<u>Religious Event</u>				
Once a month or more	28	21	18	5
<u>Most Self-Description</u>				
Intellectual, Scholar or Scientist	26	29	35	35
Professional or Teacher	78	73	68	60

TABLE I continues

TABLE I continued

	<u>Only U.S.</u>	<u>U.S. + Foreign</u>	<u>Only Foreign</u>	<u>No Car</u>
<u>Prefer Teaching or Research</u>				
Research	22	27	32	40
Teaching	78	73	68	60
<u>Discipline</u>				
Social Sciences	19	21	26	19
Humanities	21	20	33	39
Natural Sciences	27	30	26	25
Education	8	9	5	2
Business	8	7	4	4
Engineering	6	7	4	4
Other Professions	15	14	8	4
Agriculture	3	2	1	1

TABLE II

Faculty Attitudes and Size of Primary Car
(U.S. Cars Only)

	<u>Small Car</u>	<u>Large Car</u>
<u>1972 Vote</u>		
McGovern	68	53
Nixon	32	46
<u>Attitude to Gerald Ford</u>		
Positive	30	37
Neutral	31	31
Negative	39	32
<u>Liberalism-Conservatism Scale Quintiles</u>		
Most Liberal	22	13
Liberal	21	18
Middle	21	17
Conservative	20	24
Most Conservative	16	28
<u>Prefer Teaching or Research</u>		
Research	29	20
Teaching	71	80
<u>Best Self-Description</u>		
Intellectual, Scholar or Scientist	32	24
Professional or Teacher	68	76

SECTION 32

Perspectives on Watergate

The acts and events forever linked as "Watergate" comprise one of the causes célèbres of American politics. In the aftermath of Watergate, faculty were asked to assess the precipitants and implications of this debacle.

Most academics are inclined to attribute Watergate to serious failings of the political order. Watergate cannot be dismissed, they argue, as a temporary aberration, as a tragic departure brought about largely by the inadequacies of one occupant of the White House or one unique, not to be repeated set of circumstances.

More than 80 percent of the faculty maintain that "Watergate testifies to the dangers inherent in the steady growth of presidential power over the last several decades." Three-fourths of the professoriate insist that the scandal reveals a number of "basic weaknesses" in American institutions. At the same time, seven faculty members in ten refuse to accept the argument that Watergate occurred primarily because of Richard Nixon, and that nothing comparable would have taken place under another president. And the suggestion that "a mentality of suspicion" nurtured by developments peculiar to the late 1960's,

especially the Vietnam war, stands as a primary cause of Watergate is rejected by two-thirds of all academics. The source is seen as systemic, rooted in elements of a political order rather than in specific individuals and events.

Seven months after President Ford issued an unconditional pardon to Richard Nixon, the decision remained highly unpopular among faculty. Seventy-one percent of them, compared to roughly 60 percent of the general public, held to the view that Ford should not have issued the pardon as he did.

Seeing Watergate through a political prism

Some observers have maintained that the slow process of drawing out evidence on Watergate, from Judge John Sirica's courtroom in early 1973 through the House Judiciary Committee impeachment hearings in the summer of 1974, served finally to unite the country, to produce something as close to consensus as can be imagined on such a thorny issue. A good bit can be said on behalf of this interpretation. Still, it should not be carried too far. Watergate suggests quite disparate things to different groups of Americans. For many in the public and in the professoriate, the events continue to be filtered through elaborate perceptual prisms built of ideology or political preference.

In the fall of 1974, interviewers from the University of Michigan's Center for Political Studies probed a large cross section of Americans concerning Watergate, impeachment, resignation and pardon. While a large majority supported the Judiciary Committee's decision to impeach

Nixon, nearly 30 percent--40,000,000 voting-age Americans, if one extrapolates from the survey to the populace--disapproved of impeachment. Over one-fourth of the electorate regretted Nixon's resignation, arguing variously that he was not guilty, that he may have been wrong on Watergate but was generally doing a good job, that he was unfairly treated by the press and that he had been made to suffer too much.

The varying assessments of Watergate-related developments were not scattered randomly across the citizenry. Conservative Republicans were vastly more inclined to side with Nixon, to reject the Judiciary Committee decisions, and the like. And at the other pole, liberal Democrats were much more critical of the former President and the decision to pardon him, more supportive of the House impeachment hearings than the public generally.

Looking to academics, we find much this same bending by ideological prisms of light reflected from Watergate. Only 15 percent of faculty strongly identifying with the Democratic party approved Ford's pardon of Nixon, compared to 74 percent of strong Republicans. Three percent of the most liberal academics--as classified by our eight-item liberalism-conservatism scale for national issues--endorsed the pardon, in sharp contrast to the 69 percent approval among the most conservative professors.

Liberals in the faculty are much more inclined than conservatives to see broad systemic causes and consequences in Watergate. For example, eighty-six

percent of the most liberal professors, but only 55 percent of those most conservative, argued that Watergate reveals basic weaknesses in American institutions.

Table 1. Positions of faculty on Watergate-related issues, by general political ideology

	<u>Very liberal faculty</u>	<u>Very conservative faculty</u>
Agree, Watergate reveals basic weaknesses in American institutions	86	55
Agree, Watergate resulted from the growth of presidential power in recent years	92	61
Agree, Watergate would not have occurred under another President	40	13
Agree, the pardon of Nixon was justified	3	69
Agree, the media much exaggerated Watergate	7	82

Only in part facetiously, we observe that liberal academics are wont to find the causes of Watergate everywhere, and conservatives nowhere. The most liberal cohort believes, by overwhelming 9 to 1 margins, that Watergate occurred because of the excessive growth of presidential power and because of fundamental inadequacies in American institutions. But at the same time, 40 percent of this group insist

that Watergate occurred primarily because of Richard Nixon. Conservatives are much less inclined to see systemic breakdowns--and they are less willing to fault the individual, Richard Nixon. This says, primarily, that liberal to left academics are vastly more troubled by Watergate than their conservative colleagues. Once again, ideology is mother to interpretation.

The Press and Watergate

The role of the communications media in Watergate's unfolding rather sharply divides professors as, apparently, it divides substantial segments of the general public. Thirty-six percent of all academics maintained that the scandal received "excessive, exaggerated treatment" by newspapers and television. Just 14 percent of those who voted for George McGovern in 1972 offered this criticism of the media, compared to 74 percent of professors who voted for Richard Nixon. Eighty-two percent of the most conservative group of academics charged the press with dwelling too much on Watergate, with exaggerating its significance. Ninety-three percent of the most liberal faculty rejected this charge.

Judgments as to the role of the press

The division between liberal and conservative academics over the media's performance during Watergate appears to be just one battle in a larger war. Economics and technology have worked together to reduce the number of units primarily engaged in the dissemination of information on public affairs, and to enlarge dramatically the audiences of some

of these units. There were, for example, 800 fewer daily newspapers in 1974 than there had been in 1909. And the audiences reached by network news programs dwarfed those attained by any news source in days gone by. At the same time, increased education and leisure have enlarged the audience for the communication of ideas. So a relatively small number of national news media now reach very large slices of the public, and serve as the primary interpreters of the big world outside. It is hardly surprising, in this context, that people with strong political preferences frequently find themselves highly concerned with communication media performance.

Liberals and conservatives in the faculty are sharply at odds in their assessments of what the media should be doing and how it is in fact doing its job. Liberals are, on the whole, satisfied with the performance of the press. They want it to be more aggressive in its pursuit of governmental malpractice, more subjective, more a major force for reform. Conservatives are vastly more dissatisfied with the media. Believing that it is hopelessly in the liberal camp, they urge "straight news reporting," an effort to hide existing biases. They do not like an adversary relationship between the press and government. And they do not believe the media should concern itself with reform.

Eight faculty members in ten within the most conservative cohort argue that newsmen should try to avoid any ideological point of view in their reporting, the position of just half the conservatives. Seventy five percent of the conservatives strongly agree that the task of

the press should be solely "to convey information." Only 28 percent of faculty in the most liberal cohort take this position. Three-fourths of the liberals, compared to just one-third of the conservatives, endorse an adversary relationship between the media and the state.

Table 2. Positions of faculty on the role of the media, by general political ideology

	<u>Very liberal faculty</u>	<u>All faculty</u>	<u>Very conservative faculty</u>
Strongly agree, major role of media simply to convey information	28	50	75
Agree, adversary relationship, media-government, best for country	76	51	20
Agree, the media should play major role in reform	91	75	51
Agree, newsmen should be given immunity from subpoena	82	59	32

We have summarized the positions of faculty on matters relating to media role in a six-item scale. Scoring in the categories at one end of this measure are those who favor an activist press, at odds with "the powers," pushing the cause of reform. Recorded at the opposite pole are academics endorsing neutral, "straight-news" reporting, nonreformist, nonoppositionist communications media. Seventy-five percent of the most liberal faculty give broad endorsement to an activist media, as

defined above, the stance of only seven percent of the academic conservatives. The relationship between general liberalism-conservatism and support or opposition vis-a-vis media activism is exceptionally strong and consistent. The more liberal the faculty cohort in national affairs, the more likely the group is to champion a reformist, activist press.

There has been a good bit of argument in recent years as to whether the national communications media are predominantly liberal in their political thrust. That argument will doubtless go on. Faculty liberals and conservatives, however, seem in a curious fashion to have reached agreement on the matter. The liberals are happy with media performance and endorse an activist posture, apparently confident that activism will be for policy objectives they find congenial. Conservatives in the professoriate, troubled over the present directions, seem to agree with the liberals that an activist press will not actively pursue conservative goals.

SECTION 33

Perspectives on the Vietnam War

American academe, both students and faculty, probably had its most direct impact on American politics with its opposition to the Vietnam war. Though the protests of the students received more attention than the activities of their teachers, there can be little doubt that the faculty turned against the war earlier than other strata, including students.

In 1966 a National Opinion Research Center survey of faculty opinion, reported a small majority opposed to the Vietnam policy, most of them favoring reduction or curtailment of American involvement. Surveys of public and college student opinion taken at the time found substantial majorities in support of American intervention. Not until 1968 did both show majorities against Lyndon Johnson's policies.

The spring 1969 Carnegie Commission survey of the professoriate reported three-fifths, a substantial majority, in favor of withdrawing all troops immediately (19 percent) or of a proposal to end the war through a coalition government with the Communists (41 percent) as contrasted with 33 percent who supported the then Nixon policy of Vietnamization or the 7 percent who favored

"committing whatever forces are necessary to defeat the Communists." A Gallup survey of public opinion taken eight months later found 56 percent endorsing either Vietnamization or "more military force". An October 1969 national survey of students found 50 percent approving "The way President Nixon is handling the situation in Vietnam," while 44 percent were opposed. Three years later, our 1972 faculty survey found a decisive majority, 57 percent of the faculty, in support of immediate American withdrawal while 34 percent still supported Vietnamization.

In our 1975 faculty survey, we sought to retrospectively explore the extent of faculty involvement in opposition to the war. Clearly, responses as to past attitudes and behavior are less reliable than those gathered about ongoing events. Some indication that faculty responses in 1975 were reliable, however, may be seen in the answers to the query as to the position of our respondents at the time the war first became an issue. Almost half, 45 percent, indicated some degree of opposition to American participation in its early period, while 37 percent acknowledged having supported intervention, with 18 percent placing themselves in undecided or ambivalent categories. This retrospective report is quite close to the distribution of faculty opinion reported by N.O.R.C. in 1966. By the end of direct U.S. involvement, the opposition had increased to include four-fifths of the faculty.

What are the sources of academe's opposition to the war? Why did it come earlier and remain greater than other strata? The answer seems to lie in the same factors that predispose American faculty to a greater and more consistent ideological liberalism than other groups. For an analysis of the 1975 survey indicates a very high relationship between having liberal attitudes on general socio-economic issues and attitudes toward the Vietnam war, as shown in the response pattern in Table 1.

TABLE 1

Relationship between Attitudes on Selected Political Issues
and Attitudes toward the Vietnam War

<u>Political Issues</u>	<u>Favored Complete Withdrawal at Start of U.S. Intervention</u>	<u>Favored Everything to Win a Military Victory toward End of Direct U.S. In- tervention</u>
1) Differences in income between people in the U.S. should be reduced.	74	25
2) Big corporations should be taken out of private ownership and run in the public interest.	44	11
3) Racial integration of the public elementary schools should be achieved, even if it requires busing.	62	16
4) Capital punishment should [not] be retained for crimes such as kidnapping and premeditated murder.	63	5
5) There should be no laws forbidding the distribution of pornography.	65	26
6) The use of marijuana should be legalized.	73	19
7) Party Preference	(Democrat) 76	(Republican) 25

The response pattern revealed in Table 1 points up the consistency of academe's ideological orientations. Compared to most other groups, faculty are more likely to respond in ideological terms. That is, if we know an individual's political position on two or three issues, we are more likely to successfully predict his attitude on others if he is a professor than if he is in another less ideologically involved profession. Academe's response to the Vietnam war, therefore, was an extension of its ideological liberalism to that issue.

Reactions to the war, however, probably led to more intense feelings and political activity than any other issue. When asked about their involvement in political activities related to the war, substantial segments indicated their position, pro or anti, had not simply been a passive one.

TABLE 2

Faculty Involvement in Activities

Related to the Vietnam War

	<u>Percent Involved</u>	
	<u>Often or From Time to Time</u>	<u>Never</u>
Wrote to public official.	27	55
Signed a published petition.	41	43
Wrote to a publication.	9	81
Took part in meetings of organizations.	27	55
Took part in demonstrations.	21	66
Tried to convince others to change their position.	61	16

The record of active participation reported by our sample points up the intensity of feeling within the academic community. Translating percentages into absolute numbers indicates that close to 200,000 faculty wrote to a public official, signed a published statement, or attended meetings of organizations concerned with the war and that about 125,000 personally took part in demonstrations. A smaller but still substantial minority reported having done these things a number of times.

As might be expected, most of this activity was on the anti-war side. Thus, the 45 percent who indicated opposition to U.S. involvement from the beginning were three times as likely to have signed a published petition as the 37 percent who initially looked favorably on intervention. The early opponents of the war were also three times as likely to have taken part in war-related meetings as the supporters.

The dramatic character of the variation in the behavior of the pro- and anti-war faculty is pointed up by their reports as to the extent of the involvement in war related political activity of those who took extreme positions at the beginning and the end of American participation. In Table 3 we compare such activities by the 25 percent who were totally against any involvement at the start with the 10 percent who still took a hard line in support of efforts to attain military victory at the end.

TABLE 3

Participation in War-Related Activities By
 Faculty Strongly Opposed to U.S. Intervention From
 Start and by Those Still Strongly in Favor of All Efforts to
 Secure a Military Victory at the End

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Strongly Against Involvement at Start</u>		<u>Everything for Military Victory at End</u>	
	<u>Amount of Participation</u>			
	<u>Often & From Time to Time</u>	<u>Never</u>	<u>Often & From Time to Time</u>	<u>Never</u>
1) Wrote to key congressmen or the President or some other government official about the war.	45%	37%	16%	68%
2) Signed a published petition expressing an opinion on the war.	67	21	15	68
3) Wrote to a newspaper or other publication about the war.	18		4	
4) Took part in meetings of groups or organizations concerned with the war.	49	35	9	76
5) Tried to convince people individually to change their position on the war.	82	7	43	33

These data present a dramatic picture of the role of American academe during the Vietnam war. Not only were American faculty more opposed to the war from the start than any other segment of the population, including their students, but the majority of the strongly anti-war faculty put their influence, reputation,

and time on the line to halt intervention. Fully two-thirds signed published statements, almost half attended meetings and wrote to public officials. Conversely, however, the pro-war minority, who held on to their convictions to the bitter end, were much less disposed to take such actions. Three-quarters of them never attended a single meeting concerned with the war; two-thirds neither wrote to a public official nor signed a statement on the war. Little wonder then that the public and college students, alike, received the impression of an almost unanimously anti-war professoriate. The impact of the massive anti-war segment of academe was even greater than these statistics suggest, for in line with our earlier analyses of the greater propensity for liberal to left socially critical politics of the more scholarly eminent faculty at the most prestigious institutions, anti-war sentiment and activism was concentrated among these more visible and influential segments. Thus, among faculty at major universities only 10 percent supported the war from the start as contrasted to 46 percent among those at lower tier colleges.

Discipline affiliation also affected attitude from the beginning of U.S. involvement. Three-fifths of the social scientists and 55 percent of the humanists queried in our survey indicate having been opposed to U.S. involvement from the beginning of the war. The corresponding figure for natural scientists is 40 percent and for applied professional fields it is 30 percent.

These factors continued to divide the opinion of faculty at the end of American participation. Only 10 percent of faculty in the social sciences and the humanities reported were still in favor of efforts to secure military victory rather than withdrawal while 30 percent of the natural scientists and almost half, 49 percent, of those in applied professional fields, continued to support the military victory position. Comparing faculty by quality of school

finds 42 percent in the lowest tier colleges backing "military victory" at the end of the conflict compared to 15 percent at major universities.

The picture is clear. Academe, because it is disproportionately liberal, led all other population segments in opposition to the Vietnam war from the start to the end; faculty opponents were much more active in diverse ways than supporters, and were drawn from the most prestigious and visible sectors of the profession.

SECTION 34

Perspectives on Foreign Affairs

The disastrous outcome of United States involvement in Vietnam has sharply undermined national self-confidence with respect to continued commitment to an internationalist and interventionist foreign policy. Americans now doubt their country's ability to play the leading role in a system of alliances designed to prevent the expansion of Communism. Similarly the failure of U.S. policies to foster economic growth and democratic institutions in the less developed countries, together with the criticisms of the United States by the leaders of many of these nations, has led to a sharp decline in support for foreign aid. And the combination of foreign policy failures and economic recession has undermined American willingness to pay for an expensive defense establishment.

Academics had once been in the lead of those committed to an internationalist program, particularly efforts to enhance economic growth and populist institutions abroad. But as we pointed out in the last section, American faculty took the lead in opposing the Vietnam war, and as a group so strongly engaged might have been notably influenced by the debacle. What is the current mood of the professoriate?

The answer, as revealed by responses to the 1975 survey is clear. Faculty have lost their enthusiasm for a strong American world leadership role, do not believe in the need for or possibility of an aggressive anti-Communist foreign policy, are less committed to foreign aid, and would like to curtail military spending.

The Cold War and Detente

Some "revisionist" historians have long argued that the U.S. bears major responsibility for the massive tensions which developed between east and west after World War II. Now, in an atmosphere of national self-criticism following Vietnam, many academics have come to accept at least part of this critique. Fifty-four percent of faculty, for example, assert that "the United States exaggerated the Communist threat in order to justify the Cold War." Only 36 percent of professors are inclined to place blame for the Cold War largely on "Soviet hostility to the West."

Academics strongly support efforts toward accommodation with the U.S.S.R. and other Communist nations. More than two-thirds of them favor increasing U.S. efforts to negotiate arms control with the Soviet Union. Two-thirds would encourage American business firms to invest in Communist nations, and more than half believe the United States should give technological aid to Communist countries "to help them in their industrial development." Nearly nine out of ten in the faculty think the American economic embargo against Cuba should be ended.

The responses to these and other similar questions clearly point up the erosion of support for anti-Communism as a foreign policy. The bulk of the American professoriate simply does not see the justification for an activist anti-Communist approach. It is détente-minded, and wants the United States to do a great deal to secure good relations with Communist countries. Underlying this mood is the fact that Communism is no longer seen as a particularly bad social system. Thus when asked, "Thinking about all the different types of social systems in the world today, which of these statements comes closest to how you feel about Communism," professors responded as follows:

It's the worst kind of all	11%
It's bad, but no worse than some others	43
It's all right for some countries	43
It's a good type of social system	4

Tolerance or even support for Communism as being all right for other countries, particularly poor ones, has undoubtedly increased in recent years. Thus in 1969, only 20 percent of those queried in the Carnegie Commission's survey agreed that a "Communist regime is probably necessary for progress in underdeveloped countries." This figure may be contrasted to the 43 percent in 1975 who believe that "Communism is all right for some countries."

Intervention

Reactions to the Vietnam experience, and the diffusion of broad opposition to an activist role by the U.S. in world affairs fostered by the anti-Vietnam war movement, have clearly pressed academe into a broadly isolationist posture, one going beyond anti-anti-Communism as such. Thus

a majority, 51 percent, favor reducing the number of American troops in Europe who are "part of the NATO commitment." A comparable majority show a similar lack of enthusiasm for "applying economic sanctions against countries whose policies we disapprove of." Over two-fifths favor doing less to try "to settle disputes between other countries, such as Turkey and Greece."

Whenever the question raises the matter of whether the U.S. should intervene forcibly in the world outside, faculty display a decided preference for drawing back. Seventy percent believe their country should end any and all efforts toward military or political subversion of Communist governments. Only 21 percent find it proper to use the CIA "to help support governments friendly to the U.S. and to try to undermine autocratic governments." Professors are much more willing to see American soldiers employed in the event the Soviet Union invaded West Germany or West Berlin than in almost any other potential trouble spot, but only half favor commitment of U.S. ground forces even in this hypothetical instance of Soviet troops attacking Western Europe.

Defense spending

Supportive of détente and opposed to an interventionist posture, academics are, not surprisingly, strongly inclined to reduce the level of U.S. defense spending. Nearly three-fourths of the faculty believe their country is spending too much for national defense. Fewer than one in ten want to increase spending on "the military armaments and defense." Over half of the faculty are untroubled by the Soviet Union's

reaching (present reality or prospect) parity in military strength with the United States. Only one-quarter of all academics endorse an all-out effort by the U.S. to maintain (or achieve) military supremacy.

Foreign aid

The desire to reduce the American commitment abroad also applies to foreign aid. A substantial majority, 57 percent believe that the U.S. is spending too much money on foreign aid, as contrasted to but eight percent who believe too little is being spent in this area. When a somewhat comparable question asked about commitment to give "economic aid to poorer countries to help their standard of living," the proportion favoring doing more increased--but only to 30 percent of the total. Their reactions do not reflect a general faculty unwillingness to approve increased spending since fully three-quarters think the U.S. is spending too little on improving and protecting the environment, or the nation's health; 70 percent believe more should be expended on "solving the problems of the big cities"; and two-thirds favor higher expenditures to halt the rising crime rate. Clearly the American professoriate remains liberal with regard to domestic spending. Its mood of retrenchment applies only to foreigners and to the military.

Variations on a National Theme

The increased strength of the new isolationism is, of course, not limited to academe. Opinion polls of the general population taken by Gallup, Harris, and the National Opinion Research Center also indicate

increased opposition to U.S. commitments abroad and to foreign aid. Thus the 1975 NORC survey of public attitudes found that 77 percent of the public believed the U.S. is spending too much on foreign aid, putting them ahead of the 57 percent of the faculty with comparable opinions. But, it should be noted, only one third of the public maintained our military spending level was too high, as contrasted to 69 percent among the faculty. Professors, though hostile to foreign aid in the majority, have a larger internationalist minority than does the general public; while the latter remains more sympathetic to the funding claims of the military than does the professoriate.

Once again, the Political Prism

That a mood, best summarized by détente and withdrawal, has enveloped the faculty in the years of après Vietnam is apparent. But it should be stressed that these new perceptions are bent mightily as they are filtered through the general liberal and conservative ideological perspective of academics.

Faculty liberals are markedly more resistant to military spending than are conservatives, much more in favor of accommodation with the U.S.S.R., less supportive of American military intervention anywhere in the world. Ninety-four percent of professors comprising the most liberal quintile--as measured by an eight item Liberalism-Conservatism scale for domestic issues--favor cutting defense spending; 66 percent of conservative faculty oppose such cuts. Ninety percent of the liberals,

as against just 18 percent of the conservatives, want to end the U.S. economic embargo against Cuba. Sixty-one percent of liberals, compared to 31 percent of conservatives, think the U.S.S.R. should be able to buy wheat and other commodities from the U.S. "at favorable prices." About 19 out of every 20 with the most liberal cohort believe attempts

Table 1. Positions of Faculty on Foreign Affairs and Defense Issues, by General Ideological Stance

	<u>Very liberal faculty</u>	<u>Very conservative faculty</u>
Favor cuts in military spending	94	34
Favor letting the U.S.S.R. reach military parity with the U.S.	84	27
Agree the U.S. exaggerated the Communist threat to justify the Cold War	83	26
Favor ending the U.S. economic embargo against Cuba	90	18
Favor letting the U.S.S.R. buy wheat and other commodities at favorable prices	61	31
Favor giving technological aid to Communist countries	82	29
Favor ending efforts toward military and political subversion of Communist governments	94	38
Favor using U.S. troops to defend West Germany in case of Soviet attack	39	61

at military and political subversion vis-à-vis Communist governments should be ended; 62 percent of conservatives insist such efforts form a legitimate part of American foreign policy. A large majority (61 percent) of conservatives are willing to employ U.S. troops in Germany's defense in the event of a Soviet attack, while only a minority of liberals (39 percent) would defend the west European heartland with American soldiers. Only on the question of foreign aid are liberals more willing than conservatives to intervene in the world outside.

The challenge to Gerald Ford's quest for renomination, coming from Republican conservatives, involves foreign policy issues to a substantial degree. Conservatives are unhappy with *détente*, as carried ahead by the Ford Administration, following the inauguration of this approach by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. Faculty conservatives, surely, strongly reject many of the policies associated with the attempt at Soviet-American rapprochement.

It is striking to see how sensitive a matter *détente* is among the ideologically situated. Within the mass public, there are only modest links between domestic policy preferences and these foreign policy concerns. But among faculty, the linkage of domestic liberalism-conservatism to position on *détente* is exceptionally strong. Only five percent of the most liberal faculty resist the *détente* initiatives--measured here by a ten-item scale--while 80 percent strongly endorse it. Conservatives present the mirror image of this distribution: 86 percent reject *détente*, and only six percent of them approve of it.

Table 2. Positions of Faculty on Détente,
by General Ideological Stance

	<u>Anti-détente</u>	<u>Strongly Pro-détente</u>
Very liberal faculty	5	80
Liberal faculty	17	61
Middle-of-the-road faculty	37	38
Conservative faculty	60	23
Very conservative faculty	86	6

The New Isolationism

Big events, it may safely be asserted, have important consequences. The decade-long U.S. intervention in Indochina was surely a "big event," and it stands as a watershed in American foreign policy thinking. Together with the economic downturn of the 1970s, it has contributed to an inclination "to cultivate one's own garden," to the resurgence of a type of isolationism.

Spend less for defense and for foreign aid. Strike an accommodation with the Soviet Union. Cut back heavily on American intervention in the world outside. These central elements of the new mood find adherence in the professoriate.

But foreign policy judgments reflect underlying ideological commitments, especially for a group of "idea people" like the faculty.

Academics are disproportionately liberal, compared to most other cohorts in the population, and faculty liberals have swung heavily away from anti-Communism--to which they were perhaps less / viscerally attached / than conservatives-- as a pillar of U.S. foreign policy. Conservatives remain actively hostile to the U.S.S.R., continue to support heavy defense spending, are much more willing to commit American forces abroad.

Probably for the first time in the post-World War II era, faculty conservatives are now cast in some fairly consistent fashion in the role of interventionists. The one notable exception is economic assistance for needy countries, which remains a liberal value and an area of liberal interventionism. For the most part, liberal academics urge the withdrawal of the U.S. from efforts to sustain a pax Americana.

SECTION 35

Perspectives on the Middle East Conflict

The most potentially divisive political issue for American academe is the Middle East conflict. Although college faculty and intellectuals generally in the United States have a consistent record of backing American support for the state of Israel and professorial support for the Arab cause has been very weak, the evidence suggests that this pattern may be in the process of changing. Given the shift in the position of the international left political community, including many of the intellectuals among them, to an anti-Israeli position, the question must be raised whether comparable developments are occurring here, whether or not the increase in militant liberal-left, isolationist and anti-militarist sentiments among American college faculty, which occurred in the past decade, has affected their support for the American commitment to Israel. The answer, like all efforts to specify attitudes towards a complex issue, is not simple.

At first glance, it would appear that as a group American college faculty remain among the staunchest supporters of the Jewish state in the country. A solid majority, 57 percent of the respondents, indicate that their "sympathies lie predominantly with Israel," as contrasted to the 8 percent who are pro-Arab. But 34 percent refused to make a choice. Faculty support for the Jewish state appears to be about the same or slightly below the level among the college-educated generally (Harris finds them 60 percent for Israel), but somewhat above that reported among the general public where pro-Israeli feelings have hovered around 50 percent in surveys conducted by Gallup, Harris and Yankelovich. Pro-Arab sentiments in the general population are about the same low level as among the professoriate.

Strong pro-Israeli sentiments are apparent in faculty responses to a number of other questions. An overwhelming majority, 76 percent, reject the Arab contention, recently advanced in the U.N. resolution that Israel is "a racist and imperialist country." A comparably large percentage of the faculty, 77, assert that "Israel has a right to keep the city of Jerusalem as its capital." Almost three-quarters, 73 percent, believe that the United States should continue "to supply Israel with weapons and military equipment;" 58 percent, however, would have us refuse "to sell arms and military equipment to Saudi Arabia." Only 13 percent feel

that "Guerrilla activities on the part of the Palestinian Arabs are justified because there is no other way for them to bring their grievances to the attention of the world." Yet almost two-thirds, 65 percent, approve of Israel's right "to retaliate against the Arabs whenever Arab guerrillas commit an act of terrorism."

The picture of an intensely pro-Israeli academe suggested by these responses is, however, countered by the clear unwillingness of the majority to have the U.S. do little more to aid the Jewish state than send it arms and equipment. Less than a third, 31 percent, feel that if Israel "were threatened with defeat" that the U.S. should help it with "air support" or "ground troops". The proportion who believe that "If the United Nations were to vote to expel Israel, the U.S. should withdraw from the U.N. in protest" is comparably small, 32 percent. Almost half the professors, 46 percent, do not agree with the statement that the "U.S. has an unquestioned moral obligation to prevent the destruction of the state of Israel."

The majority of the faculty clearly do not see Israel as an American ally who must be protected from destruction. In spite of their sympathies for the beleaguered state, they favor American pressure on Israel to make major concessions. Overall, almost two-thirds, 64 percent, believe that "The U.S. should pursue a more neutral and even-handed policy in the Middle-East." Half of the respondents agree that

"The U.S. should apply pressure on Israel to give in more to Arab demands." The price that the majority feels Israel should pay is clear: 56 percent feel that it should give up "most of the territory it gained from the Arabs" in the Six Day War, in spite of its security needs; 64 percent believe that the "Arabs should be allowed to set up a separate nation of Palestine on the West Bank of the Jordan River."

The response pattern of academe toward the Middle East conflict may appear to be contradictory. In fact, the seeming confusion is probably typical of public reactions on most issues. Almost all policy matters are invariably more complicated than is suggested by the replies to any one or two questions designed to locate respondents as positive or negative on a specific view or proposal. People are rarely unqualifiedly racist or not, liberal or conservative, isolationist or interventionist, pro-Israeli or pro-Arab. If issues are complicated, if specific proposals may work under some conditions and not under others, there is clearly no reason to expect or desire the public or academe to have simple unqualified reactions.

If one looks carefully at the responses reported here, it is possible to detect an underlying syndrome of attitudes of a large number of professors on Middle East and foreign policy questions. On one hand, as indicated in the last section, they strongly seek a reduction of international tensions, support cuts in military expenditures, favor

detente with the Soviet Union, and hope that America can avoid foreign entanglements which might involve it in another war, limited or not. On the other hand, many of those who are predisposed this way remain sympathetic to Israel, and hope the Jewish state will survive and prosper. The first set of preferences, however, appear to outweigh the second.

These orientations result in a majority faculty opinion which wants the U.S. to do all it can to press the conflicting parties to make peace in the Middle East. Hence, we find majority sentiment for a "more neutral and even-handed policy" by the U.S., for American pressure on Israel "to give in more to Arab demands," for Israel to yield territory, etc. The strong post-Vietnam isolationist or anti-war sentiments among the faculty lead to opposition to American direct military intervention even if necessary to avoid the "defeat and destruction" of Israel. But at the same time, a large majority remains much more favorable to Israel than the Arabs, would supply it with the weapons to defend itself, while opposed to selling arms to the Arabs, and hopes that Israel can hold on to Jerusalem. Viewed in these terms, these responses are not inconsistent. But they do represent a retreat from an endorsement of the pre-Vietnam position of the United States to do all it can to help its allies against aggression.

Jewish Concerns

To give a full account of academic sentiment on the Middle East question, however, it is necessary to point out some implications of the fact that a significant minority, 10 percent, are Jewish. As might be expected, Jewish professors are more supportive of Israel than their non-Jewish colleagues. The differences, however, are staggering. Thus, almost two-thirds of the Jews would favor direct American military intervention to prevent Israel from destruction as contrasted to 20 percent of non-Jews; 92 percent of the Jews believe that the U.S. has "an unquestioned moral obligation to prevent the destruction of the state of Israel," a belief held by less than half of the Gentile professors; 72 percent of the Jews oppose "American pressure on Israel to give in more to Arab demands," as contrasted to 47 percent among non-Jews; 71 percent of the Jews are against our pursuing "a more neutral and even-handed policy," while only 21 percent of others hold this view; 60 percent of the Jews believe that the U.S. should withdraw from the U.N. in protest if Israel is expelled, compared to but 30 percent among non-Jewish faculty, and so on.

Ideological Sources of Diversity

The opposition of the majority of non-Jewish faculty to treating Israel as an ally is clearly linked to the strength of anti-war and anti-militarist sentiments among them, feelings which were accentuated during the Vietnam War. Such pacifist orientations, as noted earlier, are

correlated with liberal social and political attitudes. It is not surprising, therefore, to learn that holding left-liberal values within academe are also associated with lessened enthusiasm for Israel, much as they were linked to opposition to South Vietnam. In the table below, we present the relationship between political beliefs as reflected by position on a liberalism-conservatism scale constructed from attitude items with position on an Israel support scale developed from responses to questions bearing on the Middle East. As is evident from the data in the table, those whose attitudes place them in the most liberal quintile of the sample are least favorable to support of the Jewish state.

Position of the Most Liberal and Most Conservative Quintile on Israel Support Scale Among Non-Jews

<u>Israel Support Scale</u>	<u>Most Liberal</u>	<u>Most Conservative</u>
High	30%	67%
Low	70	33

Given the fact, noted in previous sections, that liberals are to be found disproportionately in major universities and in social science departments, while conservative strength is located most heavily in lower tier colleges and in the applied professional schools and departments, it is not surprising that the same factors differentiate with respect to opinion on the Middle East. Over three-fifths,

61 percent of ^{nonJewish} faculty in applied professional schools at lower-tier colleges, may be classified as high on the Israel support scale as contrasted to 42 percent of social science professors of Christian parentage at major universities.

The same ideological variables differentiate among Jews. While as noted, the overwhelming majority of Jewish academics are intensely pro-Israel, the most liberal among them are somewhat more qualified in their support than the more conservative. Seemingly the events which have placed much of the international left in opposition to Israel have also affected the opinions of American leftists, both Jewish and non-Jewish, toward the Middle East conflict, although less powerfully here than abroad. The association of Israel with the United States and the developed world generally, while the Arabs are positioned as part of the anti-imperialist left oriented Third World, makes those on the left identify support for Israel as a conservative stance.

These findings suggest that an awkward situation may be in the making with respect to relations between Jewish and non-Jewish professors, and students as well. Jewish faculty, as compared to their non-Jewish colleagues, are more likely to be found in major universities and to be more heavily liberal in their socio-political attitudes. (Some of the reasons for both are explored in some detail in our recently published book, The Divided Academy). But non-Jews who are liberal and in major universities are less friendly to Israel than other segments of academe. As we have seen,

the vast majority of Jewish academics, whether liberal or not, are intensely concerned for the survival of Israel. But ironically circumstances now place them in a potentially hostile environment with respect to these values.

The situation is clearly one which is fraught with possibilities for bitter conflict, given the propensity of academics to ideological politics, and to acting out their political beliefs. Should future political events threaten the survival of Israel or press the U.S. to become more directly involved as a participant in the Middle East conflict, one may anticipate a campus so sharply divided on these issues that the conflicts of the late 1960's will appear as relatively peaceful by contrast.

PART VI

CONCLUSIONS

SECTION 36

Epilogue: Portrait of the Profession

In assessing any institution, group or process, the matter of vantage point is critical. What one sees depends upon where one stands.

In the work we have done based upon the National Institute of Education sponsored survey of 3,500 American academics—reported here and earlier in the Chronicle of Higher Education series—we have viewed the profession from two contrasting perspectives. And two rather different sets of conclusions have emerged.

In some instances, we have looked at the professoriate "from a distance," and thus have tried to locate it as a distinctive occupational cohort in the context of American society. On other occasions, we have viewed the profession from within, and have been more sensitive to what differentiates or divides its many component parts than to what distinguishes it as a whole.

Politics

The varying implications of the two perspectives become evident as one assesses the political orientations of faculty. Compared to other groups in the U.S., the disproportionate liberalism of academics

stands out. No other large occupational cohort is as supportive of liberal and equalitarian values.

Professors have delivered majorities to Democratic nominees in every presidential election since the Great Depression. Fifty-seven percent of them voted for George McGovern in 1972, for example, when only 32 percent of all professional men and women, and just 38 percent of the entire electorate, were so recorded. Within Democratic ranks, moreover, the faculty preference is for the more equalitarian and "New Liberal" candidacies. While we have not collected any survey data subsequent to the 1976 presidential campaign, we found it entirely in keeping with established professorial commitments that the college town of Mansfield, Connecticut--whose electorate is heavily composed of University of Connecticut faculty--gave Morris Udall a higher share of the vote against Jimmy Carter and Henry Jackson than any of the other 168 communities in the state in the May 11 Democratic primary. (The vote in Mansfield was 67 percent for Udall, 22 percent for Carter, 6 percent for Jackson, and 6 percent for an uncommitted slate, compared to percentages of 31, 33, 18, and 13 respectively among all Connecticut Democratic primary voters). This pattern has been evident in college towns across the country in 1976.

The relative liberalism of professors can be seen not only in voting, of course, but in their positions on the entire range of social and economic issues. Faculty more heavily support increasing social welfare spending, advancing the claims of minorities to equal treatment, imposing

more sharply graduated income taxes, bringing private business under more stringent public control, and the like, than do any of the other major occupational cohorts in the country. The view from without, then, is clear.

But those inside the academy have a different perspective. "Things are just not that way," faculty often tell us. "Professors are not that liberal. They are a very heterogeneous group, reflective of almost the entire range of political viewpoints."

Of course they—~~we~~—are. From within we see the diversity, the extraordinary variation in social and political commitments—between faculty in sociology and those in civil engineering; from professors in major research universities to their counterparts in community colleges; between young and old. And within a single discipline, within one university, the variety in viewpoints is often immense. Having themselves so frequently been presented with tangible evidence of the extent and the range of differences within their profession, faculty understandably draw back from any assertion that the professoriate is a liberal club.

In fact, academe is at once distinctively liberal and much divided. The products of both an "outside" and an "inside" perspective are essential in locating the sociopolitical position of the profession.

Ascendant and influential, or troubled and declining?

There seems to be a large measure of disagreement as to the place of higher education in the contemporary U.S. Once again, the matter at stake point is critical in accounting for the divergent perspectives. From without, academe appears to be a formidable stratum. Its

numbers have increased tremendously in the years since World War II. There are now 2,800 institutions of higher education, a half million full-time professors, nine and a half million students. Some 40 billion dollars were expended by U.S. colleges and universities in 1975. The research and development enterprise is critical in advanced industrial society, and universities play a decisive role within it. Universities also play a strategic "gate keeping" role, serving as the primary credentialing institution for virtually the entire array of professional and managerial occupations—surely the most influential occupational cohorts and those most rapidly expanding in terms of their proportion of the total labor force.

While declining birth rates means that the pool from which college students are drawn will shrink somewhat—and hence that the frenetic growth of the recent past is over, there is no indication that the desire of Americans to see their offspring college educated is diminishing. There is no indication that the dependency of postindustrial society on universities—for technical expertise and for the extending of culture generally—will be anything other than extended.

National opinion surveys show that the public rather highly regards the professoriate and has considerable confidence in it, in terms of how well it is seen performing its role. The research of Allen Barton, Carol Weiss and their colleagues at Columbia University's Bureau of Applied Social Research indicates that other elites consider intellectuals to be a stratum influential in the broad arena of public policy. The capacity of academics and other members of the intellectual community to influence

thinking about the society and its problems and to help shape the political agenda has been widely noted by social theorists.

We have called attention to such observations in earlier writing--and in so doing have often evoked a quizzical, if not an actively dissenting response from some of our faculty readers. One recent reviewer, for example, wondered whether Ladd and Lipset "are living in the same real world as the rest of us."

The view from within is simply very different from that without. Decline, or stagnation, is very much on the minds of professors these days, as they see their salaries struggling to keep pace with inflation, as they see many of their better graduate students placed in jobs below their expectations or not placed at all, as they perceive the consequences of an end to an era of unprecedented growth.

Like seemingly every other elite occupational cohort, faculty consider themselves more lowly valued by the society than others consider them, and believe they are less influential than other groups deem them to be. Perhaps this is because the faculty, like other strata--businessmen, labor leaders, governmental officials, etc.--has a biased "agenda" of what it considers the "important" issues, and finds itself frustrated in achieving its goals. Objectives attained are quickly forgotten, while areas in which expectations are blunted and goals denied remain highly salient.

The problems of the academic profession and its inadequacies very much occupy faculty thinking. The profession is dissatisfied with many of the old institutional arrangements, and is inclined to experiment with new forms. The professed willingness of 72 percent of all academics,

including a clear majority of those at major research universities, to vote for a collective bargaining agent seems indicative less of the actual behavior likely if and when an election is held than of a general malaise and a groping for new forms.

The academic profession is extraordinarily self-critical. Many of its members doubt they are doing an adequate job for their student constituents. They see higher education as overspecialized and compartmentalized. Too much energy is going into research, not enough into teaching. Higher education "turns off" many of the better students. It rewards conformity and blunts creativity. It is, a majority of faculty believe, insufficiently responsive to the needs of minorities who have been deprived historically.

Our survey reveals general configurations in faculty thinking much like one would expect from Clark Kerr's apt description of the "multiversity" a decade and a half ago. Academe has grown so much, assumed so many divergent--even contradictory--roles and responsibilities, absorbed so many new people at both the faculty and the student levels, that it no longer has a "soul"--in the sense of widely shared norms, expectations, sense of purpose. It is bureaucratized and intellectually fragmented. It has become a central social institution, but this has hardly been a painless process. And its members have not escaped the general tendency of this postindustrial era--of expectations expanding faster than any other facet of existence.

So the academic profession feels undervalued and undersupported, wonders what its mission is, doubts the adequacy of its performance. And when it is told it is a big, central, vital, influential, important

stratum in the contemporary society, it blinks and asks, "who, me?"

But again, it is all a matter of vantage point. The secular growth in importance of the intellectual stratum, of which faculty are a major part, is a central fact of the contemporary U.S. social experience. The view from within emphasizes much more, though, the many problems which have followed in the wake of the new status higher education has attained.

Consensus

For all differences in interpretation which result from differences in vantage point, the characteristics of the faculty emerge from our inquiry in a fashion admitting little variety of interpretation. Let us note just three of these as examples.

▶ The professoriate is highly stratified vertically. The variations by type of school in role, educational orientations, and sociopolitical views are very substantial.

▶ The professoriate is highly stratified horizontally. Academic disciplines, so important to the work life and organizational structure of universities, contribute more than any other variable to the internal professorial differences in sociopolitical ideology, and contribute importantly to differences in academic ideology.

▶ The professoriate is, predominantly, a teaching profession, with a relatively small research layer. A majority of academics are primarily interested in teaching, not research, have contributed little if at all to scholarship, think of themselves teachers or professionals—not as scientists, scholars, or intellectuals—are prepared to cut funds for

research before those connected with the teaching program are touched.

Conclusions

In 1969, a large survey of American academics was conducted under the sponsorship of the Carnegie Commission. Six years later, we again surveyed a national sample of faculty. What sorts of shifts^{have} occurred?

Overall, these data seem to conform to the familiar French aphorism concerning change and continuity. On or near the surface, things have changed greatly. Academe^{has} moved from an era of campus protests and activism, to an era of retrenchment and quiescence. Faculty concerns are obviously very different now than in the Vietnam years. The substance of professors' opinions on a few issues, most notably unionism, has shifted extensively.

But the underlying structure of professorial opinion has been little affected. The nature and configuration of divisions among academics is unchanged. The relationship of faculty views to those of other strata in the society has held constant. The most striking elements of the opinions of the American academic community remain these: a strong commitment to equalitarian goals within the university and beyond it in the larger society; a deeply-etched pattern of divisions, most notably organized by type of school and discipline; and an intense professional self-criticism.

APPENDIX

TECHNICAL REPORT

1975 SURVEY OF THE AMERICAN PROFESSORIATE

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SAMPLING PROCEDURE

As a starting point in our sampling procedure, we employed as a basis for selection a list of 2,827 institutions found in A Classification of Institutions of Higher Education (Berkeley, Calif.: Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, 1973). The classification scheme therein, based on stratification by institutional type, was adapted to meet the specific needs of the 1975 survey. Five groups of eligible institutions were defined from which 111 schools were randomly chosen: Doctoral-Granting Institutions, which comprises two levels each of Research Universities and Doctoral-Granting Universities; all Comprehensive Universities and Colleges; Category I Liberal Arts Colleges; Category II Liberal Arts Colleges; and all Two-year Colleges and Institutes. A total number of 2,406 colleges and universities within these five groups were eligible for sampling.

Measures were taken to ensure that all schools had an equal opportunity for inclusion in our survey, and to eliminate the bias presented by varying institutional size. In each of the five classification groups the colleges and universities were assigned a consecutive number, or range of consecutive numbers, based upon their size. After all institutions had been assigned numbers, 111 schools were chosen through random number generation (See Appendix A).

When the initial task had been accomplished, we began contacting the 111 schools selected, requesting current (1974-1975) lists, with rank and department designations, of all full-time faculty in actual teaching situations. All ranks below instructor, visiting faculty, those known

to be on leave, and any nonteaching professionals were eliminated from the rosters before the sample was drawn.

Once the rosters were obtained and inappropriate members excluded, the drawing of names was initiated. A ratio for drawing faculty was set for each classification category so that the final distributions of faculty would be proportional to the ratio set for the various types of institutions. From each list every Nth name was randomly selected, with the N varying for the five classifications: Class I, every ninth name; Class II, every sixth; Class III, every second, Class IV, every third; Class V, every third. The sampling design provided an adequate representation of faculty in all sizes of institutions, as well as in most classifications.

As the names and addresses were selected and recorded for the total of 7,798 potential respondents, the University of Connecticut Computer Center supplied a complete printed-label mailing list. Each faculty member on the list was then sent a questionnaire (see Appendix B) and asked to participate. The mailing procedure and time schedule are described below where administration of the survey is reviewed.

QUESTIONNAIRE ADMINISTRATION

Once the mailing lists were in hand for the entire sample, the administration phase was initiated. The extensive mailing operation was handled through the Social Science Data Center of the University of

Connecticut. An eighteen-page questionnaire, with return envelope, was mailed to each of the 7,798 faculty included in the sample. The first mailing began on March 13, 1975 and continued to April 16, 1975.

Approximately three weeks after the initial mailing, beginning on April 7 follow-up reminder postcards were sent out over a one-month period to those faculty not responding. Aiming for the highest possible response rate, the first week in May was directed toward sending a second questionnaire, with cover letter requesting support, to all remaining nonrespondents.

Four thousand and eighty-one questionnaires were returned, a rate of 52.3 percent. Of these, 279 were subsequently excluded because they had been only partially completed. Another 265 of the returned questionnaires arrived after the July cut-off date--more than three months after the original mailing. Our final working sample, then, comprises 3,536 respondents who fully completed the questionnaire and returned it within a 100-day period following the mid-March 1975 preliminary mailing.

A codebook was constructed to meet the basic needs of both the investigators and of future outside users, following the format employed by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan. Once completion of the codebook was achieved, a meeting of the coding staff was convened. Each staff member was given a coder's manual, developed by Peter Hooper and Diane Reed, which not only served the purpose of clarifying basic coding instructions, but also anticipated various coding dilemmas.

The actual coding of questions began at the end of May 1975, with a tentative completion date set for August 15. By August 19, the coding had

been completed. Throughout the coding phase, continuous efforts were made to check the accuracy of the data. Error rates for coders were established at the outset and were rechecked weekly to insure quality performance and the best possible product.

All coded materials were sent in batches to a campus facility for keypunching and verification. The data were placed on tapes and returned to the project staff. From that point, project programmers began cleaning the dataset, creating new variables, collapsing existing ones into more manageable forms, constructing scales, and beginning comparative analysis. Additional facets of this phase of the project, the weighting and data validation procedures, will be discussed at length elsewhere in this report. By September 1, 1975 the dataset was operational.

WEIGHTING PROCEDURES AND NONRESPONDENT BIAS

The purpose of these procedures was the standard one--to so adjust the weight given each individual response that one could reasonably generalize from the sample to the entire body of full-time faculty within colleges and universities in the United States.

Several sources of information on the "universe"--the professoriate at large--were tapped as the weights were developed. The most useful was the 1973 American Council on Education's (ACE) Institutional Characteristics File.

Weighting was by type of school (employing the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education structure as presented in a Classification of Institutions of Higher Education), academic rank, and discipline. The weights listed below were derived and employed.

Table 1. Assigned Weight Values, 36 Faculty Groups Defined by Rank, Discipline, and School Type

Class I: Doctoral-Granting Institutions

<u>Field</u>	<u>Professors</u>	<u>Associate Professors</u>	<u>Assistant Professors and Instructors</u>
Social Sciences	.7639	.7544	.8216
Natural Sciences	.5708	.5558	.7712
Business Applied	.5209	.7796	1.1068

Class II: Comprehensive Colleges and Universities

<u>Field</u>	<u>Professors</u>	<u>Associate Professors</u>	<u>Assistant Professors and Instructors</u>
Social Sciences	1.0119	1.2303	1.2534
Natural Sciences	.7273	1.2918	1.4414
Business Applied	3.6757	1.2391	1.5354

Class III: Liberal Arts and Colleges

<u>Field</u>	<u>Professors</u>	<u>Associate Professors</u>	<u>Assistant Professors and Instructors</u>
Social Sciences	.7864	1.0578	1.0516
Natural Sciences	.7895	1.2065	1.4539
Business Applied	1.1111	1.1666	1.3600

Class IV: Two-year Institutions

<u>Field</u>	<u>Professors</u>	<u>Associate Professors</u>	<u>Assistant Professors and Instructors</u>
Social Sciences	3.4839	2.2439	2.1787
Natural Sciences	5.6667	2.1219	1.9037
Business Applied	4.9167	3.7600	3.5102

These items, type of institution, discipline, and rank (the latter largely as a function of age), had been found in previous analysis to differentiate powerfully faculty social, political and educational attitudes. The weighting formula thus adjusted respondents to the universe on variables known to be critical to the areas of research emphasis.

The principal impact of the weighting scheme was to adjust for our intentional oversampling of major universities and undersampling of junior colleges. Even at that, a perusal of the actual weights demonstrates that no one cell was drastically reduced or exaggerated. The additional weights for rank and teaching field had a smaller impact.

Table 2 shows the unweighted distributions for the 1975 survey, and for the entire faculty population by rank and field. The data do indicate that professors and associate professors were originally overrepresented, notably the former. Assistant professors were underrepresented. Social scientists and natural scientists were both slightly overrepresented among unweighted respondents, and applied professional faculty slightly underrepresented.

Table 2. Proportions of Faculty by Rank and Discipline; Survey Respondents and Total Population

1975 Faculty Survey Respondents				
<u>Field</u>	<u>Professors</u>	<u>Associate Professors</u>	<u>Assistant Professors and Instructors</u>	(Row Totals)
Social Sciences	.1427	.1107	.1936	.4470
Natural Sciences	.1418	.1120	.1367	.3905
Business Applied	.0729	.0424	.0456	.1609
(Column Totals)	.3574	.2651	.3759	

Table 2 (continued)

Population Statistics

<u>Field</u>	<u>Professors</u>	<u>Associate Professors</u>	<u>Assistant Professors and Instructors</u>	<u>(Row Totals)</u>
Social Sciences	.1093	.0961	.2365	.4419
Natural Sciences	.0870	.0939	.1910	.3719
Business Applied	.0476	.0408	.0956	.1840
(Column Totals)	.2439	.2310	.5231	

Earlier we noted that 52 percent of the 7,798 faculty members invited to participate in our survey returned completed questionnaires. Forty-eight percent of the selected sample, for one reason or another, declined to participate. Our intention was to identify characteristics of this nonrespondent group, so that a comparison might be made to the group who did respond. Our goal was to determine whether or not a nonrespondent bias existed.

To conduct this follow-up investigation, it was necessary to return to the faculty lists of the respective institutions participating in the survey (from which the original sample was drawn), to learn as much about the nonrespondents as possible. Information was obtained on six variables: Carnegie Institution Classification, school type, school size, rank, teaching field and sex.

The investigation began with an examination of the variables upon which the weighting scheme was based, namely, Carnegie Institution Classification, rank, and teaching field.

Comparing and contrasting the three categories of Table 3 (weighted respondents, unweighted respondents, and nonrespondents) reveals the effect that the weighting scheme had on the distribution of this data. In order to obtain a large enough N that would enable us to make comparisons of faculty members within the Doctoral-Granting institutions, as well as between various other classifications, that group was initially oversampled. This is reflected in the fact that among respondents (unweighted), 53 percent were from the Doctoral-Granting institutions, and also, that the largest percentage of the nonrespondent category (46 percent) was from this same school classification.

Table 3. Distributions of Respondents and Nonrespondents by Type of Institution, Carnegie Classification (column percentages)

<u>Classification</u>	<u>Respondents (Weighted)</u>	<u>Respondents (Unweighted)</u>	<u>Nonrespondents</u>
Doctoral-Granting Institutions	33	53	46
Comprehensive Universities and Colleges	29	26	25
Liberal Arts Colleges I	8	9	8
Liberal Arts Colleges II	2	2	3
Two-year Institutions	28	11	19

When the percentages of the respondents (unweighted) and the nonrespondents were compared, the Doctoral-Granting institutions were found to be more likely among the ranks of the respondents than nonrespondents (53 percent-46 percent). Moving to the other end of the table the data for the Two-year institutions show this category was less represented among the respondents than the nonrespondents (11 percent-19 percent). A possible explanation for this may be that the more research-oriented faculty (i.e., those at the Doctoral-Granting institutions) were more inclined to participate in a research project of the sort we were conducting.

The effects of the weighting scheme are manifested in the distributions observed in the weighted respondent category. As was mentioned above, the Doctoral-Granting institutions were intentionally oversampled. Consequently to bring our sample more in line with the universe, we had to adjust for this bias. Thus, the percentage of institutions of this classification among the respondent category drops from 53 percent to 33 percent, while the percentage of Two-year institutions falling within the response category increases by 17 percent, (11 percent to 28 percent). Similar trends are seen in Table 4.

Table 4. Distributions of Respondents and Nonrespondents by School Type (column percentages)

<u>School Type</u>	<u>Respondents (Weighted)</u>	<u>Respondents (Unweighted)</u>	<u>Nonrespondents</u>
University	33	53	46
4-Year Institution	39	36	35
2-Year Institution	28	11	19

Table 5 suggests that faculty members with the rank of assistant professor were less likely to be respondents than nonrespondents, while professors were more likely to be registered among the respondent category. Assistant professors comprised 37 percent of the respondents (unweighted), while contributing 46 percent to the nonrespondent group. The professors, on the other hand, placed 36 percent of their rank among the respondents, while only 29 percent fell among the nonrespondents. The weighted data show, as had been expected, a close similarity between respondents and nonrespondents.

Table 5. Distributions of Respondents and Nonrespondents by Rank, (column percentages)

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Respondents (Weighted)</u>	<u>Respondents (Unweighted)</u>	<u>Nonrespondents</u>
Assistant Professor	43	37	46
Associate Professor	25	27	25
Professor	32	36	29

The third variable upon which the weighting scheme was based was teaching field. The assumption was made that of all the teaching disciplines, the social scientists would probably be more likely to respond. Our survey was primarily a social science activity, and it was expected that social scientists would relate most favorably to it.

An examination of the data in Table 6 indicates that the distributions between respondents (unweighted) and nonrespondents are in fact quite similar. There was minimal overrepresentation or underrepresentation of

faculty by field in the original sample, and there was a minimal variation in the rate of response, by discipline.

Table 6. Distributions of Respondents and Nonrespondents by Teaching Field, (column percentages)

<u>Teaching Field</u>	<u>Respondents (Weighted)</u>	<u>Respondents (Unweighted)</u>	<u>Nonrespondents</u>
Social Sciences	45	45	42
Natural Sciences	27	31	30
Business-Applied	28	24	27

Finally, Table 7 indicates that women were slightly underrepresented among survey respondents. They comprised 18 percent of the respondents (unweighted) and 22 percent of the nonrespondents. When the weights are applied, the contribution of women to the respondent category is increased from 18 to 21 percent, which brings the proportion into correspondence with the distributions among nonrespondents, and with what we know the distribution within the entire professoriate to be.

Table 7. Distributions of Respondents and Nonrespondents by Sex, (column percentages)

<u>Sex</u>	<u>Respondents (Weighted)</u>	<u>Respondents (Unweighted)</u>	<u>Nonrespondents</u>
Male	79	82	78
Female	21	18	22

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS :

Once we began analysis of our data, it was our interest to determine how closely our results reflected other distributions known to exist within the American professoriate at large. Drawing a composite of the total faculty population is not an easy task, since few faculty census studies tap a broad range of variables. We were very fortunate, however, to have access to two extensive surveys of the American professoriate: The first is the 1969 Carnegie Commission on Higher Education Faculty Study. The second is the 1972-73 Faculty Study of the American Council on Education. Both studies have N's in excess of 50,000. The Carnegie Study comprises 60,028 respondents, while the 1972-73 ACE Survey has 53,029 faculty participants. These studies, then, are of unprecedented size. They more nearly resemble censuses than conventional studies.

One might argue that even if we find similarities between the three studies, this doesn't necessarily suggest we have discovered reality; that in fact, all three surveys may be committing similar sampling errors. This is certainly not beyond the realm of possibility. But it is highly unlikely when we keep in mind that these three studies were conducted by three different institutions, employing three different sampling procedures, at three different points in time. The credibility of the Carnegie and ACE studies is further enhanced by their size. So, while we can not be positive that the results reported in these surveys are a microcosm of the entire population of the professoriate, we can be reasonably confident that we have obtained an accurate portrait.

With this background, how closely do the results of our survey reflect those of the Carnegie and ACE studies--for variables on which no census data exist and surrounding which continuity from 1969 to 1975 would be expected?

In the past six years, since 1969, there has been some shift in the composition of the professoriate, but actually a shift of a very modest nature. Hiring, firing, deaths and moving have all prompted expected changes in staffing, but not altered the makeup of the profession significantly. Probably the largest change, though by no means dramatic, has occurred in the age strata which comprise the membership. With the advent of recent economic conditions there has been a substantial cut-back in hiring. As a consequence, fewer young faculty have entered the profession and the under-30 age group has decreased in size, naturally increasing the older cohorts. Beyond the age element, only modest alterations in the composition of the faculty population would be expected.

In our comparison of the results of the 1975 survey with those of the Carnegie Commission and ACE, the data fully supported these notions. The fact that the data did indeed show similarities and differences just where they were expected to appear is striking. An unusually abundant variety of background, professional and political variables were in fact compared in this analysis; and those that follow are only a small representation of what was evidenced throughout the investigation.

Background. A comparison of the three above-mentioned surveys revealed that an alteration in the age distributions of faculty had occurred over the six-year period. A clear pattern emerged, as witnessed in Table 8,

reflecting the recent decrease in young faculty due to hiring practices. The 1975 results support this expectation.

Table 8. Distributions of Faculty by Age
(column percentages)

<u>Age</u>	<u>1969 Carnegie Survey</u>	<u>1973 ACE Survey</u>	<u>1975 Ladd-Lipset Survey</u>
Under 30	15	10	6
30-39	34	33	35
40-49	28	30	30
50-59	16	18	21
60 and older	7	9	8

Unlike the age factor, which has been influenced by social conditions there are other background characteristics which logically should not change. There is no reason to believe that as a whole the religious or family background of faculty would shift in any significant manner. For instance, no evidence exists which would lead one to suspect an increase in the proportion of Catholic academics. Table 9 supports this notion of continuity. The 1975 survey shows background distributions very close to those of the Carnegie survey.

Table 9. Distributions of Faculty by Religious Background (column percentages)

<u>Religion Raised</u>	<u>1969 Carnegie Survey</u>	<u>1975 Lipset-Ladd Survey</u>
Protestant	66	60
Catholic	18	19
Jewish	9	10
Other	4	7
None	3	5

Looking at father's principal occupation the results are strikingly similar. Both the Carnegie and 1975 surveys show virtually identical distributions. As one would expect, this factor remains stable; (Table 10) the continuity is there.

Table 10. Principal Occupation of Father
(column percentages)

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>1969 Carnegie Survey</u>	<u>1975 Ladd-Lipset Survey</u>
College/University Teaching, Research, Administration	4	4
Elementary or Secondary Teaching or Administration	3	3
Other Professional	14	16
Managerial, Administrative, Semi-professional	16	17
Owner, Large Business	2	1
Owner, Small Business	18	18
Other White Collar: Clerical, Retail Sales	8	7
Skilled Wage Worker	16	17
Semi- and Un-skilled Wage Worker, or Farm Laborer	8	9
Armed Services	1	1
Farm Owner or Manager	10	8

Another background variable of interest is mother's education. One could say that over recent years more women have been furthering their education, and an increase in the percentage of more highly-educated mothers would exist. Minimal variations are found across the three studies, as

noted in Table 11, but they do, interestingly, show a modest shift in the expected direction.

Table 11. Educational Background of Mother
(column percentages)

<u>Education</u>	<u>1969 Carnegie Survey</u>	<u>1973 ACE Survey</u>	<u>1975 Ladd-Lipset Survey</u>
Less than high school	38	35	33
High school graduate	28	31	30
College	34	34	37

Professional life. When various aspects of the professional life of faculty were reviewed, no significant differences were found between the surveys. One would not expect any major changes in cultural orientations over a six-year period, and indeed very little was found (Tables 12-13).

Table 12. Frequency of Attending a Concert
(column percentages)

	<u>1969 Carnegie Survey</u>	<u>1975 Ladd-Lipset Survey</u>
Once a week or more	3	3
2-3 times a month	9	8
Once a month	21	16
Few times a year	46	51
Once a year or less	22	22

Table 13. Frequency of Attending a Play
(column percentages)

	<u>1969 Carnegie Survey</u>	<u>1975 Ladd-Lipset Survey</u>
Once a week or more	1	1
2-3 times a month	4	4
Once a month	19	16
Few times a year	55	56
Once a year or less	22	23

As a small matter, it is interesting to note that even the proportions of faculty with nine- or eleven-month contracts were consistent throughout the three surveys. The nine-month contract applied to 66-69 percent of faculty in each survey, and the eleven-month contract to 31-34 percent.

When these types of variables were encountered, the absence of variation across the timespan was generally the conclusion. The wide range of analysis consistently revealed only minor, if any, changes in the professional life of faculty.

Political stance. It is difficult to find variables to compare in terms of continuity when political issues are involved. Opinions and agendas change and that is, of course, to be expected. One place where a meaningful comparison could be drawn is in voting behavior. Though the question of vote recall is dubious in some cases, an examination of the 1964 and 1968 presidential vote showed almost perfect agreement in recall from the 1969 Carnegie survey and recall from the 1975 Ladd-Lipset survey (Tables 14-15).

Table 14. 1964 Presidential Vote Distributions
of Faculty (column percentages)

	<u>1969 Carnegie Survey</u>	<u>1975 Ladd-Lipset Survey</u>
Johnson	78	77
Goldwater	21	22
Other	1	1

Table 15. 1968 Presidential Vote Distributions
of Faculty (column percentages)

	<u>1969 Carnegie Survey</u>	<u>1975 Ladd-Lipset Survey</u>
Humphrey	59	58
Nixon	37	36
Wallace	1	3
Other	3	3

From these representative examples of an impressive number of background, professional, and political variables, the striking similarities found between the 1975 survey and the two landmark surveys of the Carnegie Commission and the American Council on Education, are clearly seen. This comparative analysis has strengthened our confidence in the 1975 survey as an accurate portrait of the American professoriate.

SCALE CONSTRUCTION

Following an intuitive analysis of those variables that might constitute a logical group of attitudinal scales, a factor analysis of these variables was utilized to identify the underlying dimensions that would statistically warrant the inclusion of such variables to create a group of attitudinal scales. For each set of variables, unidimensionality was established by coding responses in such a manner as to reflect one direction. Secondly, utilizing the OSIRIS III G-Score program, the variables were arranged as cumulative scales. Operationally, a cumulative scale implies that variables are ordered by degree of difficulty such that a respondent who answers in the affirmative to the most difficult item will consistently answer affirmative to less difficult items. The criteria of acceptance for the variables to be incorporated for scales was a coefficient of reproducibility equal to or above .90.

Finally, to assign scale scores to individuals, the coded responses were given values in accordance with the dimension to be expressed by each scale. For example, ordinal response codes were often given values ranging from -2 to +2 indicating intensity as well as directionality. In cases where the range of the scale values was too large, (1) the scales were collapsed into quintiles retaining the distribution of the responses; and (2) the scales were collapsed so as to represent a 10, 20, 40, 20 and 10 percent distribution of responses.

INSTITUTIONS INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE

1975 SURVEY OF THE AMERICAN PROFESSORIATE

CATEGORY I

Research and Doctoral-granting Universities

Wayne State University, Detroit
Pennsylvania State University, University Park
University of California, Davis
Kansas State University of Agriculture and Applied Sciences, Manhattan
University of Arizona, Tucson
University of California, Berkeley
State University of New York, Buffalo
Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh
University of Portland, Oregon
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Michigan State University, East Lansing
University of Missouri, Columbia
Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago
University of Kansas, Lawrence
University of Vermont and State Agricultural College, Burlington
Miami University, Oxford, Ohio
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore
Tulane University of Louisiana, New Orleans
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Northwestern University, Evanston
Iowa State University of Science and Technology, Ames
University of Virginia, Charlottesville
University of North Dakota, Grand Forks
University of Iowa, Iowa City
Brandeis University, Waltham, Massachusetts
University of California, Los Angeles
Utah State University, Logan
Stanford University
Southern Illinois University, Carbondale
University of Kentucky, Lexington

Colorado State University, Fort Collins
Purdue University, Lafayette, Indiana
University of Northern Colorado, Greeley
Arizona State University, Tempe
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis-St. Paul
Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts
University of South Carolina, Columbia

CATEGORY II

Comprehensive Universities and Colleges

Angelo State University, San Angelo, Texas
Eastern Washington State College, Cheney
Chadron State College, Nebraska
California State University, Los Angeles
Albany State College, Georgia
University of Central Arkansas, Conway
Hofstra University, Hempstead, New York
East Carolina University, Greenville, North Carolina
Central Washington State College, Ellensburg
University of Texas, El Paso
Southwest Missouri State College, Springfield
City University of New York, Brooklyn College
Elmira College, New York
Northeastern Illinois University, Chicago
California State University, Fullerton
City College of New York
Chico State College, California
Florida Technological University
Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton
Lewis-Clark State College, Lewiston, Idaho
Salem State College, Massachusetts
Baldwin-Wallace College, Berea, Ohio
University of North Carolina, Greensboro
Ferris State College, Big Rapids, Michigan
Fairfield University, Connecticut
University of New Orleans, Louisiana
Humboldt State University, California
Augusta College, Georgia

Fayetteville State University, North Carolina
Southern Oregon College, Ashland
Quinnipiac College, Hamden, Connecticut
San Diego State University, California

CATEGORY III

Liberal Arts Colleges I

Lebanon Valley College, Annville, Pennsylvania
Claremont Men's College, California
Colorado College, Colorado Springs
Centre College of Kentucky, Danville
Bates College, Lewiston, Maine
Carleton College, Northfield, Minnesota
Columbia University, Barnard College, New York
Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, Massachusetts
Furman University, Greenville, South Carolina
University of California, Santa Cruz
Ursinus College, Collegeville, Pennsylvania

CATEGORY IV

Liberal Arts Colleges II

Lincoln University, Pennsylvania
Wilmington College, Ohio
Greenville College, Illinois
Averett College, Danville, Virginia
Anna Maria College, Paxton, Massachusetts
Notre Dame College, Cleveland, Ohio
Kansas Newman College, Wichita, Kansas
John Brown University, Siloam Springs, Arkansas
Upsala College, East Orange, New Jersey
Wofford College, Spartanburg, South Carolina
School of the Ozarks, Point Lookout, Missouri

CATEGORY V

Two-year Institutions

Cabrillo College, Aptos, California
American River College, Sacramento, California

City College of San Francisco, California
Palomar College, San Marcos, California
Rhode Island Junior College, Providence
County College of Morris, Dover, New Jersey
Kirtland Community College, Roscommon, Michigan
Oakland Community College, Orchard Ridge, Farmington, Michigan
Erie Community College, Buffalo, New York
Thornton Community College, Harvey, Illinois
San Diego Evening College, California
Riverside City College, California
Flathead Valley Community College, Kalispell, Montana
Merritt College, Oakland, California
Moorpark Junior College, California
Northampton County Area Community College, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania
Florida Junior College, Jacksonville
Behrend College, Erie, Pennsylvania
West Valley College, Campbell, California

THE 1975 SURVEY OF THE AMERICAN PROFESSORIATE

Dear Colleague:

Every year, pollsters conduct literally hundreds of surveys of the opinions of the American general public. On only a few instances, however, have the views of college and university faculty throughout the country been systematically assessed. The present survey, in which we are asking you to participate, is actually the first to cover the entire professoriate, and to deal with a broad range of critical national and international issues as well as major internal problems confronting universities.

We mention this because it seems relevant to the help we are asking of you. It is important that the opinions of faculty be known. It is important to those of us who are academics, so that when we participate in decisions affecting universities we are apprised of the judgments of the entire community to which we belong. And it is important that policy makers in the United States know the views of the more than a half million women and men who by their training, their place in the enterprise of scholarship and research, and their position of responsibility in educating over eight million college students, play a significant role in American life.

We are aware that this survey, like any other, has its limitations, and that there are many other ways in which the positions of faculty members are made known. But we believe that the responses to a questionnaire which is carefully designed, which is sent to a representative sample of all academics, and which includes the widest spectrum of salient national and academic issues, can make a real contribution.

For the last six years, both of us have had the privilege of being associated with the 1969 Carnegie Commission surveys of faculty and students. We have reported on the survey findings in a number of articles and monographs, and now in an "overview" volume (*The Divided Academy: Professors and Politics*, McGraw-Hill, 1975). We have undertaken this new inquiry both to update the earlier work and to extend it more directly to national and international affairs.

This questionnaire is a long one. Our pretesting shows that faculty require, on average, about one hour to complete it. But the questionnaire could have been shortened only by excluding important substantive areas, thereby making the ultimate results less valuable.

Your help is obviously critical. We want to secure the views of a fully representative sample of *all faculty*, not just a portion of the professoriate. The accuracy of the survey is entirely dependent upon your willingness to answer the questions. We believe the importance of the study will justify the time you give to it.

The general results of this survey will be made available promptly to the academic community. If you would like to receive, with our compliments, a preliminary report on the findings, please check the circle at the bottom of this letter. Within two years after the questionnaires have been returned, the entire data set and supporting materials—*coded so as to preclude identification of any individual or institution*—will go into the public domain and will be available to all researchers.


One other matter. It is impossible to frame questions all of which are equally relevant to faculty members in many different disciplines and kinds of institutions. You may find some that seem inappropriate to your situation. We urge you to answer all the questions as well as you can; in our analyses we will be able to take into account special circumstances that affect replies to some of the questions.

Most importantly, we assure you that your answers will be held in the strictest confidence. This commitment is absolute. We are interested only in the total distribution of responses and in statistical relationships, and will under no circumstances report responses on an individual or departmental basis. The identifying number which appears on the questionnaire is solely for internal administrative purposes—for example, so that we can send copies of the findings to those who want them.


We hope you will find the questionnaire interesting to answer, and that you will complete and return it to us while you have it at hand. We will welcome any comments you might make, and will endeavor to answer any questions you might choose to raise.

Thank you for your help.

Sincerely,



Everett C. Ladd, Jr.
Mathematical Sciences Building, U-164
University of Connecticut
Storrs, Connecticut 06268



Seymour Martin Lipset
William James Hall 580
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Check here if you wish us to send you a preliminary report on the survey findings.

RESPONSE INSTRUCTIONS

Most of the questions below can be answered by simply putting a check mark in the numbered circle or circles which identify what you consider the most appropriate response. It does not matter what type of pen or pencil you use.

I. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The first set of items comprise matters of public policy and your judgments as to what are the appropriate governmental responses.

1. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements on economic policy.

- 1. Strongly agree
 - 2. Agree with reservations
 - 3. Disagree with reservations
 - 4. Strongly disagree
- ① ② ③ ④

- a. Rigorous application of wage and price controls is necessary to combat current inflation in the U.S. ① ② ③ ④
- b. In times of recession, government spending should be held down to avoid a deficit ① ② ③ ④
- c. Differences in income between people in the United States should be reduced . ① ② ③ ④
- d. Special tax exemptions like the oil depletion allowance should be eliminated ① ② ③ ④
- e. Poverty could be eliminated within ten years if it were given a high national priority ① ② ③ ④
- f. Americans are insufficiently appreciative of the extent to which social problems can submit to governmental solutions. We remain excessively suspicious about the use of positive government ① ② ③ ④
- g. Big corporations should be taken out of private ownership and run in the public interest ① ② ③ ④
- h. The Federal Government should support the creation of jobs in the public sector for those to whom the private sector does not provide employment ① ② ③ ④
- i. There should be a top limit on incomes so that no one can earn too much more than others ① ② ③ ④
- j. Much higher inheritance taxes should be imposed to minimize the passing on of large family fortunes ① ② ③ ④
- k. A higher degree of governmental control or regulation of the American economy is essential ① ② ③ ④

- l. Poverty in the U.S. is now due mainly to cultural and psychological problems of the poor ① ② ③ ④
- m. The political power of the poor should be increased by encouraging community organization and participation in control of government programs ① ② ③ ④
- n. Workers should have a larger role in management of the plant in which they work ① ② ③ ④

2. The causes and implications of the events known as "Watergate" continue to command attention. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements on Watergate.

- 1. Strongly agree
 - 2. Agree with reservations
 - 3. Disagree with reservations
 - 4. Strongly disagree
- ① ② ③ ④

- a. Watergate testifies to the dangers inherent in the steady growth of Presidential power over the last several decades . . ① ② ③ ④
- b. Watergate occurred primarily because of Richard Nixon; nothing comparable would have taken place under another president ① ② ③ ④
- c. Watergate reveals a variety of basic weaknesses in American political and economic institutions ① ② ③ ④
- d. Serious though the scandal was, Watergate received excessive, exaggerated treatment by newspapers and television ① ② ③ ④
- e. A mentality of suspicion, nurtured by the events of the late 1960s, especially the Vietnam war, was a primary cause of Watergate ① ② ③ ④
- f. Judge John Sirica's handling of the Watergate trials represents the best in the U.S. judicial system ① ② ③ ④
- g. Considering all of the circumstances, Gerald Ford's pardoning of Richard Nixon now appears justified ① ② ③ ④

3. Please answer the following questions, to provide a profile of your electoral preferences over the past decade and a half.

- a. For whom did you vote in the Presidential Election of 1960?

Kennedy ①	Other candidate . . . ④
Nixon ②	Not eligible to vote ⑤
"Left" third party candidate . ③	Did not vote ⑥

Continued

b. For whom did you vote in the Presidential Election of 1964?

- Johnson ①
- Goldwater ②
- "Left" third party candidate . . . ③
- Other candidate . . . ④
- Not eligible to vote . . . ⑤
- Did not vote ⑥

c. For whom did you vote in the Presidential Election of 1968?

- Humphrey ①
- Nixon ②
- Wallace ③
- "Left" third party candidate . . . ④
- Other candidate . . . ⑤
- Not eligible to vote . . . ⑥
- Did not vote ⑦

d. For whom did you vote in the Presidential Election of 1972?

- McGovern ①
- Nixon ②
- "Left" third party candidate . . . ③
- Other candidate . . . ④
- Not eligible to vote . . . ⑤
- Did not vote ⑥

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what?


- Strong Democrat ①
- Not very strong Democrat ②
- Independent, closer to Democrat ③
- Independent ④
- Independent, closer to Republican ⑤
- Not very strong Republican ⑥
- Strong Republican ⑦
- Other party ⑧

Do you typically find yourself voting for all or most of the candidates of one party, or do you typically split your ticket, voting for candidates of one party or another depending upon the specific contest?

- Always vote straight Democratic ticket ①

- Always vote straight Republican ticket ②
- Usually vote for Democratic candidates, but occasionally vote for a candidate from another party . . . ③
- Usually vote for Republican candidates, but occasionally vote for a candidate from another party . . . ④
- Vote most often for Democratic candidates, but frequently support candidates of other parties . . . ⑤
- Vote most often for Republican candidates, but frequently support candidates of other parties . . . ⑥
- Regularly split ballot among candidates of the contending parties ⑦
- Regularly favor the candidates of some party other than the Republican or Democratic ⑧

6. The following describe different types of involvement in public affairs in the various levels of government—municipal, state, and national. Please indicate all of the forms of involvement which apply to your experience.



- a. Have stood as a candidate for elective office ① ② ③ ④
- b. Have been actively involved in the affairs of a political party ① ② ③ ④
- c. Have assisted candidates in their campaigns for office ① ② ③ ④
- d. Have served as a consultant to political leaders or government agencies ① ② ③ ④
- e. Have served as an appointed member of government boards, commissions, or task forces ① ② ③ ④
- f. Have contributed money to political campaigns ① ② ③ ④
- g. Have worked for nonparty groups which attempt to influence public policy . . . ① ② ③ ④

The political leaders listed below have been prominently involved in American political life, either holding or being considered for the Presidency. Would you indicate the strength of your approval or disapproval of the policy orientations and general political position of each of them.

	+5								-5	
									Strongly disapprove	
a. George McGovern	+5	+4	+3	+2	+1	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
b. Richard Nixon	+5	+4	+3	+2	+1	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
c. Henry Jackson	+5	+4	+3	+2	+1	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
d. Eugene McCarthy	+5	+4	+3	+2	+1	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5

7. Continued

e. Gerald Ford	+5	+4	+3	+2	+1	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
f. Barry Goldwater	+5	+4	+3	+2	+1	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
g. Walter Mondale	+5	+4	+3	+2	+1	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
h. Hubert Humphrey	+5	+4	+3	+2	+1	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
i. Charles Percy	+5	+4	+3	+2	+1	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
j. Edward Kennedy	+5	+4	+3	+2	+1	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
k. George Wallace	+5	+4	+3	+2	+1	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
l. Nelson Rockefeller	+5	+4	+3	+2	+1	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5

8. In view of the extensive debate on the subject, we are interested in your opinions concerning the proper role of the national communications media in our society today. For each of the following statements, would you agree or disagree?

- 1. Strongly agree
- 2. Agree with reservations
- 3. Disagree with reservations
- 4. Strongly disagree

- a. Publication by the press of "secret" government documents (e.g., the Pentagon Papers) serves the public interest ① ② ③ ④
- b. Newsmen should strive to avoid any ideological point of view in their writings ① ② ③ ④
- c. The government and news media should pursue a policy of mutuality and cooperation ① ② ③ ④
- d. The major role of the media should be to convey information ① ② ③ ④
- e. The media should be a "watchdog" on government ① ② ③ ④
- f. An adversary relationship between the media and the government is in the best interest of the country ① ② ③ ④
- g. Newsmen should not be granted immunity from subpoena and trial testimony ① ② ③ ④
- h. The media should play a major role in reform ① ② ③ ④

9. How closely do the viewpoints generally expressed by each of the following publications correspond to your own point of view?

- 1. There is a very high degree of correspondence.
- 2. There is considerable correspondence, but some important divergence.
- 3. There is considerable divergence, but some areas of correspondence.
- 4. There is a very high degree of divergence.
- 7. I am not sufficiently familiar with the viewpoint to express a judgment.

- a. *New Republic* ① ② ③ ④ ⑦
- b. *Commentary* ① ② ③ ④ ⑦
- c. *Dissent* ① ② ③ ④ ⑦
- d. *New York Review of Books* ① ② ③ ④ ⑦
- e. *Nation* ① ② ③ ④ ⑦
- f. *National Review* ① ② ③ ④ ⑦
- g. *Progressive* ① ② ③ ④ ⑦
- h. *Public Interest* ① ② ③ ④ ⑦
- i. *Human Events* ① ② ③ ④ ⑦
- j. *The New York Times* Editorial Page ① ② ③ ④ ⑦
- k. *New Left Review* ① ② ③ ④ ⑦

Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements about American society.

- 1. Strongly agree
 - 2. Agree with reservations
 - 3. Disagree with reservations
 - 4. Strongly disagree
- ① ② ③ ④

- a. American society will advance most if each individual is competitively motivated ① ② ③ ④
- b. Leaders of the major institutions have lost confidence in their ability to control the direction in which America is moving ① ② ③ ④
- c. In the U.S. today there can be no justification for using violence to achieve political goals ① ② ③ ④
- d. Most youth who currently reject society's economic and political values will outgrow their period of rebellion ① ② ③ ④
- e. Meaningful social change cannot be achieved through traditional American politics ① ② ③ ④
- f. The belief that where social problems exist, governmental solutions should be sought, has attained too high a measure of casual acceptance ① ② ③ ④
- g. The environmental problem is not as serious as people have been led to think ① ② ③ ④
- h. Generally speaking, our political system is working well in handling America's problems ① ② ③ ④

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements on civil rights and race relations?

- 1. Strongly agree
 - 2. Agree with reservations
 - 3. Disagree with reservations
 - 4. Strongly disagree
- ① ② ③ ④

- a. Racial integration of the public elementary schools should be achieved, even if it requires busing ① ② ③ ④
- b. Where *de facto* segregation exists, black people should be assured control over their own schools ① ② ③ ④
- c. While major problems remain, the United States has made continuing, meaningful progress over the past twenty years toward achieving equality of opportunity for black Americans ① ② ③ ④

12. Here is a set of statements concerning various forms of regulation. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each.

- 1. Strongly agree
 - 2. Agree with reservations
 - 3. Disagree with reservations
 - 4. Strongly disagree
- ① ② ③ ④

- a. Capital punishment should be retained for crimes such as kidnapping and premeditated murder ① ② ③ ④
- b. Sportsmen should not be required to register their firearms ① ② ③ ④
- c. Lesbians and homosexuals should not be permitted to teach in the schools . . . ① ② ③ ④
- d. Everything possible should be done to protect the rights of those accused of crime ① ② ③ ④
- e. Avowed Communists should not be permitted to hold public office ① ② ③ ④
- f. There should be no laws forbidding the distribution of pornography ① ② ③ ④
- g. The use of marijuana should be legalized ① ② ③ ④
- h. Competition is an essential ingredient of a healthy business system in the U.S., and governmental policy should encourage more of the competition associated with a traditional free market system ① ② ③ ④

13. Here is a list of some groups and institutions in our society. How would you rate the influence of each of these groups in the setting of public policy in the United States?

- 1. Very high
 - 2. High
 - 3. Moderate
 - 4. Low
 - 5. Very Low
- ① ② ③ ④ ⑤

- a. Cabinet members, assistant secretaries ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- b. Executives of large corporations . . . ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- c. High federal civil servants ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- d. Intellectuals (university professors, social scientists, leading writers) . ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- e. Labor union leaders ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- f. The major newspapers ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- g. Members of Congress ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- h. Military leaders, the Pentagon ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- i. News magazines ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- j. Opinion of mass publics ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- k. Political party leaders ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- l. The President and White House staff ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- m. Television news departments ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- n. Very wealthy individuals and families ① ② ③ ④ ⑤

14. A variety of areas in which public funds are expended are listed below. For each one please indicate whether, given available resources, you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount.

- 1. Too much
 - 2. About right
 - 3. Too little
- ① ② ③

- a. Space exploration program ① ② ③
- b. Improving and protecting the environment ① ② ③
- c. Improving and protecting the nation's health ① ② ③
- d. Solving the problems of the big cities . . . ① ② ③
- e. Halting the rising crime rate ① ② ③
- f. The military, armaments and defense . . . ① ② ③
- g. Foreign aid ① ② ③
- h. Welfare ① ② ③

15. The following is a list of areas in which the U.S. is involved with other countries. For each item, please indicate whether you think the U.S. should increase its commitment, keep its commitment at roughly the current level, or reduce its commitment.

- 1. Increase the commitment
 - 2. Keep at current level
 - 3. Reduce the commitment
- ① ② ③

- a. Giving economic aid to poorer countries to help their standards of living ① ② ③
- b. Keeping American troops in Europe as part of the NATO commitment ① ② ③
- c. Selling arms and giving military aid to countries which are against Communism ① ② ③
- d. Negotiating with the Soviet Union to obtain arms control ① ② ③
- e. Applying economic sanctions against countries whose policies we disapprove of . . ① ② ③
- f. Trying to settle disputes between other countries, such as Turkey and Greece . . ① ② ③
- g. Applying pressure against the Soviet Union so that they will allow more Jews to emigrate to Israel ① ② ③
- h. Preventing other countries from getting nuclear weapons ① ② ③

16. During the Vietnam war, some academics (along with others in the population) thought that we should have done everything to win a complete military victory. Other people thought we should have withdrawn as soon as possible. Still others, of course, had opinions somewhere in between. We would like to know where you stood—both when the war first became an issue and later toward the end of direct U.S. involvement. Where would you place yourself on the following scale?

a. When the war first became an issue:

Complete Withdrawal	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Military Victory	I Had No Po- sition
									9

b. Toward the end of U.S. involvement:

Complete Withdrawal	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Military Victory	I Had No Po- sition
									9

17. During the course of the Vietnam war, academics together with other Americans variously expressed their support for or opposition to U.S. policies. Some common forms of involvement are listed below. For each, please indicate if you were active in that way, and if you were, the frequency of your involvement.

- 1. Often
 - 2. From time to time
 - 3. Rarely
 - 4. Never
- ① ② ③ ④


- a. Tried to convince people individually to change their position on the war . . . ① ② ③ ④
- b. Wrote to my Congressman or the President or some other governmental official about the war ① ② ③ ④
- c. Signed a published petition expressing an opinion on the war ① ② ③ ④
- d. Wrote to a newspaper or other publication about the war ① ② ③ ④
- e. Took part in meetings of groups or organizations concerned with the war ① ② ③ ④
- f. Took part in demonstrations concerned with the war ① ② ③ ④

18. What do you think are the main "lessons" that those who make American foreign policy should have learned from our involvement in Vietnam?

9. Do you think that current policy makers have in fact learned these lessons?


Yes ① No ②

10. Many people are reconsidering the nature of the "Cold War" between the United States and the Communist powers. Here are some statements about the Cold War. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each.



- a. The Cold War was entirely the result of Soviet hostility to the West ① ② ③ ④
- b. The United States exaggerated the Communist threat in order to justify the Cold War ① ② ③ ④
- c. Since our relations with the Soviet Union are so much better now, we can say that the Cold War is over ① ② ③ ④

11. How do you feel about each of the following measures for improving relations with Communist regimes? Some of these have already been implemented, while others have been proposed. In each case, indicate whether you approve or disapprove of the measure.




- a. Granting diplomatic recognition to Communist China ① ② ③ ④
- b. Ending our economic embargo against Cuba ① ② ③ ④
- c. Allowing the Soviet Union to buy wheat and other commodities from the U.S. at favorable prices ① ② ③ ④
- d. Allowing the Soviet Union to reach roughly equal military strength with the U.S. ① ② ③ ④
- e. Supporting the membership of Communist China in the United Nations . . . ① ② ③ ④
- f. Encouraging American business firms to invest in Communist countries ① ② ③ ④
- g. Giving technological aid to Communist countries in order to help them in their industrial development ① ② ③ ④
- h. Ending any underground efforts toward military and political subversion of Communist governments ① ② ③ ④

22. Thinking about all the different types of social systems in the world today, which of these statements comes closest to how you feel about Communism as a social system?


- It's the worst kind of all ①
- It's bad, but no worse than some others ②
- It's all right for some countries ③
- It's a good type of social system ④

23. Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements.




- a. The President should be required in all cases to get the approval of Congress before sending U.S. armed forces into action outside the U.S. ① ② ③ ④
- b. The United States should maintain its dominant position as the world's most powerful nation at all costs, even going to the very brink of war if necessary . ① ② ③ ④
- c. The United States is spending too much money for national defense and military purposes ① ② ③ ④
- d. There is nothing wrong with using the CIA to help support governments friendly to the U.S. and to try to undermine autocratic governments . . ① ② ③ ④

24. For each of the following situations, what do you think the U.S. should do?




- a. If the Soviet Union invaded West Germany or West Berlin ① ② ③ ④
- b. If North Vietnam launched a massive invasion of South Vietnam ① ② ③ ④
- c. If China invaded India ① ② ③ ④
- d. If Israel were attacked by Arab countries and threatened with defeat ① ② ③ ④

25. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements concerning the Middle East conflict and U.S. policy in the Middle East:



- a. Israel's security requires that it keep most of the territory it gained from the Arabs in the 1967 "Six Day War." . . . ① ② ③ ④
- b. It is wrong for Israel to retaliate against the Arabs whenever Arab guerrillas commit an act of terrorism ① ② ③ ④
- c. The Arabs should be allowed to set up a separate nation of Palestine on the West Bank of the Jordan River ① ② ③ ④
- d. Israel is basically a racist and imperialist country ① ② ③ ④
- e. Israel has a right to keep the city of Jerusalem as its capital, so long as the Israelis respect the religious rights of Christians and Moslems ① ② ③ ④
- f. Guerrilla activities on the part of the Palestinian Arabs are justified because there is no other way for them to bring their grievances to the attention of the world ① ② ③ ④
- g. The U.S. has an unquestioned moral obligation to prevent the destruction of the state of Israel ① ② ③ ④
- h. If the United Nations were to vote to expel Israel, the U.S. should withdraw from the U.N. in protest ① ② ③ ④
- i. The U.S. should continue to supply Israel with weapons and military equipment ① ② ③ ④
- j. In order to maintain good relations and promote its interests, the U.S. should be willing to sell arms and military equipment to Saudi Arabia ① ② ③ ④
- k. The U.S. should apply pressure on Israel to give in more to Arab demands . . . ① ② ③ ④
- l. The U.S. should pursue a more neutral and even-handed policy in the Middle East ① ② ③ ④
- m. If Israel were threatened with defeat and destruction, the U.S. should send troops to help protect Israel ① ② ③ ④


26. On the whole, in the Middle East situation, do your sympathies lie predominantly with Israel or predominantly with the Arabs? Please indicate your position on the scale below.



II. UNIVERSITY AFFAIRS

The next set of items comprise matters of university policy, and your assessments of educational standards and practice.

27. Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements, all bearing upon your work and role, and those of scholars generally.



- a. It is more important for a scholar to be precise and rigorous in his thought than speculative and intuitive ① ② ③ ④
- b. The most important work of scholarship involves probing of new, unsettled problems ① ② ③ ④
- c. Careful scholarship is that which provides us with hard data, independent of our subjective desires, wishes, and biases . ① ② ③ ④
- d. The larger system of American scholarship is overly conservative ① ② ③ ④
- e. Scholars must be emotionally neutral and impartial toward their ideas if these ideas are to stand a fair chance of ultimately being proved valid ① ② ③ ④
- f. The more competitive a scholarly community becomes, the more likely it is to discover new knowledge and otherwise to progress ① ② ③ ④
- g. I like new and wild ideas ① ② ③ ④
- h. I don't believe in rigorously formulating hypotheses and experiments before carrying out my research ① ② ③ ④
- i. I do not like fancy, speculative theories that are not firmly grounded in hard data ① ② ③ ④

3. Faculty are very much at odds over questions of response and responsibilities in the face of discriminatory practices and underrepresentation affecting women and various minorities such as blacks. Proponents of one general position maintain that the university should strive to behave as a meritocracy, rewarding only quality of academic performance, regardless of the impact of this policy upon the representation of women and minorities. Others maintain that the university has a strong obligation to implement programs to increase representation of women and minorities, and to create an academic climate more attractive for these groups, even if this means modifying otherwise valued emphasis upon rewarding only academic merit. In this general context, how would you respond to the following?

- 1. Strongly agree
 - 2. Agree with reservations
 - 3. Disagree with reservations
 - 4. Strongly disagree
- ① ② ③ ④
- a. The above distinction is essentially false. College and universities for the most part have not applied meritocratic standards in the past ① ② ③ ④
 - b. There is no way to determine what is "the best" academically. "Meritocracy" is a smoke screen behind which faculty have hidden in promoting discriminatory practices ① ② ③ ④
 - c. Before awarding tenure, faculty of a department or college should satisfy themselves that the candidate for tenure is the most deserving by the most demanding national standards which can be applied ① ② ③ ④
 - d. In a time of scarce resources, salary increases should be awarded on the basis of academic merit, even though this means denying increases to many faculty of lower scholarly attainment ① ② ③ ④
 - e. The need to increase the representation of blacks, women, and various other minorities on the faculty is such as to justify use of "benign" quotas ① ② ③ ④
 - f. It may be necessary, in order to increase opportunities for minority students, to admit some whose prior academic records fall below those of competing white students, by conventional academic criteria ① ② ③ ④
 - g. If there are two students in a class, one from a privileged background and the other who has had few educational opportunities, it may be both necessary and appropriate for the faculty member to apply differing standards in grading them ① ② ③ ④

29. In your opinion, has the status of the academic profession increased, declined, or stayed roughly the same over the past decade?

- Increased significantly ①
- Increased moderately ②
- Stayed the same . . . ③
- Declined moderately ④
- Declined significantly ⑤

30. Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements about contemporary scholarship and university life.

- 1. Strongly agree
 - 2. Agree with reservations
 - 3. Disagree with reservations
 - 4. Strongly disagree
- ① ② ③ ④
- a. Many of the best students can no longer find meaning in science and scholarship ① ② ③ ④
 - b. The typical undergraduate curriculum has suffered from the specialization of faculty members ① ② ③ ④
 - c. Scholarly competition has generally been an element destructive of an appropriate intellectual environment ① ② ③ ④
 - d. Most American colleges reward conformity and crush student creativity ① ② ③ ④
 - e. Faculty promotions should be based in part on formal student evaluations of their teachers ① ② ③ ④
 - f. Teaching effectiveness, not publications, should be the primary criterion for promotion of faculty ① ② ③ ④
 - g. The concentration of federal and foundation research grants in the big institutions contributes substantially to the advancement of knowledge ① ② ③ ④
 - h. Many of the highest-paid university professors get where they are by being "operators," rather than by their scholarly or scientific contributions . ① ② ③ ④
 - i. No one can be a good teacher unless he or she is actively involved in research . ① ② ③ ④
 - j. Excessive commitment to research has so drawn energy and attention from teaching that the quality of undergraduate education has suffered significantly ① ② ③ ④
 - k. The recent revival of competition for grades among students is beneficial, because this competition spurs students to work harder ① ② ③ ④
 - l. Faculty with proved research records should be given lighter teaching loads than other faculty ① ② ③ ④

31. The statements which follow relate to a series of internal political arguments which have divided faculty. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each.

- 1. Strongly agree
 - 2. Agree with reservations
 - 3. Disagree with reservations
 - 4. Strongly disagree
- ① ② ③ ④

- a. Academic research on the genetic bases of differences in intelligence *should not be permitted*, because it serves to sustain a fundamentally racist perspective ① ② ③ ④
- b. Academic research on the genetic bases of differences in intelligence *should be discouraged* because it can easily serve to reinforce racial prejudices ① ② ③ ④
- c. Academic research on the genetic bases of differences in intelligence *should encounter no limitations* at all ① ② ③ ④
- d. Student demonstrations have no place on a college campus ① ② ③ ④
- e. Students who disrupt the functioning of a college should be expelled or suspended ① ② ③ ④
- f. Classified weapons research is a legitimate activity on college and university campuses ① ② ③ ④
- g. Most American colleges and universities are racist whether they mean to be or not ① ② ③ ④

2. Various critics have asserted that some groups—blacks, women, political radicals, and political conservatives—are seriously underrepresented today among the faculties of American colleges and universities. Please indicate which of the following positions best approximates your own response in each instance.

- 1. There simply is not significant underrepresentation.
 - 2. There is significant underrepresentation, but no remedial action is called for.
 - 3. There is serious underrepresentation, but strict adherence to the merit standard, not preferential treatment, is the appropriate remedy.
 - 4. There is serious underrepresentation, and preferential treatment in the recruitment process is needed to correct this problem.
- ① ② ③ ④

- a. Women ① ② ③ ④
- b. Blacks ① ② ③ ④
- c. Radicals ① ② ③ ④
- d. Conservatives ① ② ③ ④

33. What role do you believe undergraduate students should play in decisions on the following?

- 1. Control
 - 2. Voting power on committees
 - 3. Formal consultation
 - 4. Informal consultation
 - 5. Little or no role
- ① ② ③ ④ ⑤

- a. Faculty appointment and promotion ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- b. Undergraduate admissions policy ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- c. Provision and content of courses ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- d. Student discipline ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- e. Bachelor's degree requirements ① ② ③ ④ ⑤

34. It is evident that university resources in the ensuing decade will be insufficient to all claims made upon them. Please indicate where among the following areas of university expenditure you believe cutbacks must be most vigorously resisted, and where cutbacks can most readily be accommodated, as an era of relative austerity requires that such choices be made.

- 1. Should be among the last to be cut
 - 2. Occupies an intermediate position, if cuts become necessary
 - 3. Should be among the first to be cut
- ① ② ③

- a. Funds for libraries and laboratories ① ② ③
- b. Faculty salaries ① ② ③
- c. Number of senior faculty ① ② ③
- d. Number of junior faculty ① ② ③
- e. Number of support staff (secretaries, laboratory assistants, etc.) ① ② ③
- f. Funds for athletics and related student activities ① ② ③
- g. Financial assistance to students ① ② ③
- h. Funds directed primarily to the teaching program ① ② ③
- i. Funds directed primarily to research support ① ② ③

III. FACULTY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

The unionization of college and university professors, scarcely discussed as recently as a decade ago, has become a major development and source of contention. The following items involve your experience with and assessments of collective bargaining in higher education.

35. Are you a formally enrolled member of any of the following organizations? Do you regularly attend meetings of the organization? Have you served as an officer or committee member in the organization? (Mark all that apply.)

- 1. Member
 - 2. Regularly attend meetings
 - 3. Served as officer or committee member
 - 5. Not associated with the organization
- ① ② ③ ⑤

- a. American Association of University Professors (AAUP) ① ② ③ ⑤
- b. American Federation of Teachers (AFT) ① ② ③ ⑤
- c. A National Education Association (NEA) affiliate ① ② ③ ⑤
- d. A state, county or city employees' association not confined to college teachers ① ② ③ ⑤
- e. An association formed for collective bargaining purposes, limited to the faculty of your institution ① ② ③ ⑤

36. Has an election for a collective bargaining agent been held at your institution?

- Yes ①
- No ②

37. (IF YES) How did you vote?

- For the AAUP as the bargaining agent ①
- For the NEA or an NEA affiliate as the bargaining agent ②
- For the AFT or an AFT affiliate as the bargaining agent ③
- For an alliance of two of the above ④
(Please specify which: _____)
- For some other bargaining agent ⑤
(Please specify which: _____)
- Voted for no agent ⑥

38. If an election for a collective bargaining agent were to be held now at your institution, how would you vote?

- For the AAUP as the bargaining agent ①
- For the NEA or an NEA affiliate as the bargaining agent ②
- For the AFT or an AFT affiliate as the bargaining agent ③
- For some other bargaining agent ④
- For no agent ⑤

39. Which of the following terms characterize the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), the National Education Association (NEA), and the American Association of University Professors (AAUP)?

	AFT		NEA		AAUP	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
a. School teachers organization	①	②	①	②	①	②
b. Militant group	①	②	①	②	①	②
c. Professional society	①	②	①	②	①	②
d. An organization too heavily politicized	①	②	①	②	①	②
e. Elitist	①	②	①	②	①	②
f. Unprofessional	①	②	①	②	①	②
g. Radical	①	②	①	②	①	②
h. Conservative	①	②	①	②	①	②
i. Undemocratic	①	②	①	②	①	②

40. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

- 1. Strongly agree
 - 2. Agree with reservations
 - 3. Disagree with reservations
 - 4. Strongly disagree
- ① ② ③ ④

- a. Collective bargaining by faculty members has no place in a college or university ① ② ③ ④
- b. Faculty unionization benefits persons in the junior ranks more than the senior staff ① ② ③ ④
- c. Representation by a union increases the amount of dissent within the faculty . ① ② ③ ④
- d. Faculty unionization improves academic opportunities for women ① ② ③ ④
- e. Student representatives should be allowed to take part in collective bargaining negotiations ① ② ③ ④
- f. Collective bargaining forces student groups to cooperate with university administrations against faculty demands and interests ① ② ③ ④
- g. Collective bargaining results in over-emphasis on rules and regulations . . ① ② ③ ④
- h. Collective bargaining reduces collegiality between administrators and faculty . ① ② ③ ④
- i. Faculties have little real power to influence university policies, since the traditional "self-government" institutions such as faculty senates or councils are typically ineffective ① ② ③ ④
- j. Faculty unions have made it more difficult for schools to deny tenure . . . ① ② ③ ④
- k. Collective bargaining is likely to bring higher salaries and improved benefits . ① ② ③ ④
- l. Individual salary bargaining for merit increases is bad for college faculty as a group ① ② ③ ④

40. Continued

- m. The only basis for salary differentiation among faculty in the same rank at a given institution should be age or seniority ① ② ③ ④
- n. Collective bargaining for faculty is meaningless without a willingness on the part of faculty to strike, should negotiations reach an impasse ① ② ③ ④
- o. Collective bargaining tends to substitute seniority for merit and lower the standards for tenure appointments ① ② ③ ④
- p. Union grievance procedures serve to protect the faculty against arbitrary action by administrative officials ① ② ③ ④
- q. Non-tenured faculty need the assurance of fair treatment at the point where the tenure decision is made, and only an employee organization can provide this ① ② ③ ④
- r. Because it is *non-professional conduct*, faculty should not engage in militant actions such as strikes or picketing ① ② ③ ④
- s. Because it is *not apt to produce results*, faculty should not engage in militant actions such as strikes or picketing ① ② ③ ④

IV. BIOGRAPHICAL AND CAREER DATA

41. Where were you born?

_____ (city and state)
 _____ (country)

(If other than U.S. citizen at birth)


(a) How old were you when you moved to the U.S. to live?
 _____ years.

42. Your sex:

Female ① Male ②

43. How old are you?

44. In what religion were you raised? What is your present religious preference?




- Baptist ① ②
- Baptist (Southern) ① ②
- Congregational (United Church of Christ) ① ②
- Episcopal ① ②
- Jewish ① ②
- Latter Day Saints (Mormon) ① ②
- Lutheran ① ②
- Lutheran (Missouri Synod) ① ②

- Methodist ① ②
- Presbyterian ① ②
- Quaker (Society of Friends) ① ②
- Roman Catholic ① ②
- Unitarian Universalist ① ②
- Other Protestant ① ②
- Judeo-Christian — no specific denomination ① ②
- Other religions ① ②
- None ① ②

45. From the standpoint of personal belief, do you consider yourself:

- Deeply religious ①
- Moderately religious ②
- Largely indifferent to religion ③
- Basically opposed to religion ④

46. Which of the following ethnic or national backgrounds best describes that of your father? Your mother?



- German ① ②
- Italian ① ②
- Irish ① ②
- French ① ②
- Polish ① ②
- Russian ① ②
- English, Scot, Welsh ① ②
- Jewish, Eastern Europe ① ②
- Jewish, German or Austrian ① ②
- Jewish (other) ① ②
- Chicano/Mexican-American ① ②
- Puerto Rican ① ②
- Latin American (other) ① ②
- Black/Negro/Afro-American ① ②
- Chinese ① ②
- Korean ① ②
- Japanese ① ②
- Other (Specify, _____) ① ②

47. What was (is) your father's principal occupation?

- College or university teaching, research or administration ①
- Elementary or secondary school teaching or administration ②
- Other professional ③
- Managerial, administrative, semiprofessional ④
- Owner, large business ⑤
- Owner, small business ⑥
- Other white collar: clerical, retail sales ⑦
- Skilled wage worker ⑧
- Semi and unskilled wage worker, or farm laborer ⑨
- Armed services ⑩
- Farm owner or manager ⑪

48. What is the highest level of formal education reached by your spouse? Your father? Your mother? (Mark one in each column)

	a. Spouse	b. Father	c. Mother
No spouse	1		
8th grade or less	2	2	2
Some high school	3	3	3
Completed high school	4	4	4
Some college	5	5	5
Graduated from college	6	6	6
Attended graduate or professional school	7	7	7
Attained advanced degree	8	8	8

49. How would you characterize the economic status of your family when you were in high school?

Wealthy	1	Somewhat below average	4
Above average	2	Poor	5
Average	3		

50. In what year did you obtain your highest degree?

1928 or before	1	1954-1958	7
1929-1933	2	1959-1963	8
1934-1938	3	1964-1966	9
1939-1943	4	1967-1971	10
1944-1948	5	1972 or later	11
1949-1953	6		

51. Please list the academic degrees which you have been awarded, the institution granting each, and the year in which each was obtained.

Degree	Institution	Year
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

52. At what colleges or universities have you subsequently held regular, full time academic positions; (if more than three, list the first and the two most recent.)

Institution	Years
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

53. What is your present rank?

Instructor	1	Lecturer	6
Assistant Professor	2	No ranks designated	7
Associate Professor	3	Other	8
Professor	4		
Distinguished or "Named" Professorship	5		

54. What kind of appointment do you now hold?

Regular with tenure	1	Visiting	4
Regular without tenure	2	Other	5
Acting	3		

55. What is the principal activity of your current position at your institution?

Administration	1	Other	4
Teaching	2	(Please specify)	
Research	3		

56. During the past five years, have you served in any of the following university administrative or faculty governance positions? (Mark all that apply.)

	Yes	No
a. Chairman or head of department	1	2
b. Head of a research institute	1	2
c. Full-time college- or university-wide administrative position	1	2
d. Member of an elected faculty governance body	1	2
e. Member of a college- or university-wide committee	1	2


57. How involved have you been in departmental and university affairs in recent years?

	a. Department	b. University
Heavily involved	1	1
Moderately involved	2	2
Slightly involved	3	3
Not involved at all	4	4

58. During the spring term, how many hours per week are you spending in formal instruction in class? (If on leave, indicate what your normal teaching load would be.)

None	1	11-12	6
1-4	2	13-16	7
5-6	3	17-20	8
7-8	4	21 or more	9
9-10	5		

59. From the following list, mark one subject in each column; mark the most appropriate fine categories, if applicable; where your precise field does not appear, mark the most similar category.



NONE	1	2	3	4
Agriculture and/or Forestry	1	2	3	4
Architecture and/or Design	1	2	3	4

59. Continued

Biological Sciences (General Biology)	①	②	③	④
Bacteriology, Molecular biology, Virology, Microbiology	①	②	③	④
Biochemistry	①	②	③	④
General Botany	①	②	③	④
Physiology, Anatomy	①	②	③	④
General Zoology	①	②	③	④
Other Biological Sciences	①	②	③	④
Business, Commerce and Management	①	②	③	④
Computer Science	①	②	③	④
Education	①	②	③	④
Elementary and/or Secondary	①	②	③	④
Foundations	①	②	③	④
Educational Psychology and Counseling	①	②	③	④
Educational Administration	①	②	③	④
Other Educational fields	①	②	③	④
Engineering	①	②	③	④
Chemical	①	②	③	④
Civil	①	②	③	④
Electrical	①	②	③	④
Mechanical	①	②	③	④
Other Engineering fields	①	②	③	④
Fine Arts	①	②	③	④
Art	①	②	③	④
Dramatics and Speech	①	②	③	④
Music	①	②	③	④
Other Fine Arts	①	②	③	④
Geography	①	②	③	④
Health Fields	①	②	③	④
Medicine	①	②	③	④
Nursing	①	②	③	④
Other Health fields	①	②	③	④
Home Economics	①	②	③	④
Humanities	①	②	③	④
English language & literature	①	②	③	④
Foreign languages & literature	①	②	③	④
French	①	②	③	④
German	①	②	③	④
Spanish	①	②	③	④
Other foreign languages (including linguistics)	①	②	③	④
History	①	②	③	④
Philosophy	①	②	③	④
Religion & Theology	①	②	③	④
Other Humanities fields	①	②	③	④
Industrial Arts	①	②	③	④
Journalism	①	②	③	④
Law	①	②	③	④
Library Science	①	②	③	④
Mathematics and Statistics	①	②	③	④
Physical & Health Education	①	②	③	④
Physical Sciences	①	②	③	④
Chemistry	①	②	③	④
Earth Sciences (incl. Geology)	①	②	③	④
Physics	①	②	③	④
Other Physical Sciences	①	②	③	④

Psychology	①	②	③	④
Clinical	①	②	③	④
Experimental	①	②	③	④
Social	①	②	③	④
Counseling and Guidance	①	②	③	④
Other Psychology fields	①	②	③	④
Social Sciences	①	②	③	④
Anthropology & Archaeology	①	②	③	④
Economics	①	②	③	④
Political Science, Government	①	②	③	④
Sociology	①	②	③	④
Other Social Sciences	①	②	③	④
Social Work, Social Welfare	①	②	③	④
SOME OTHER FIELD	①	②	③	④

60. Would you characterize your recent scholarship, research or creative writing as:

	Yes	No
a. Pure or basic	①	②
b. Applied	①	②
c. Policy oriented	①	②
d. Literary or expressive	①	②

61. In many disciplines, faculty differ as to whether their work is primarily in the area of theory, or involves a largely substantive or experimental approach. Is your work:

Largely theoretical	①
Largely substantive or experimental	②
The distinction is not applicable to my discipline	③

62. In most academic fields, scholars vary between a more "rigorous," "hard," or scientific approach on the one hand, and a more "qualitative," "soft," or humanistic approach on the other. How would you locate your approach on the "hard-soft" continuum within your discipline?

"hard" "rigorous" or scientific											"soft" "qualitative" or humanistic
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7				

63. Do your interests lie primarily in research or in teaching?

Very heavily in research	①
In both, but leaning toward research	②
In both, but leaning toward teaching	③
Very heavily in teaching	④

64. How many books or monographs have you published or edited, alone or in collaboration?

None	①	3-4	③
1-2	②	5 or more	④

65. How many articles have you published in academic or professional journals?

- | | | | |
|----------------|---|------------------------|---|
| None | ① | 5-10 | ④ |
| 1-2 | ② | 11-20 | ⑤ |
| 3-4 | ③ | More than 20 | ⑥ |

66. How many of your professional writings have been published or accepted for publication in the last two years?

- | | | | |
|----------------|---|------------------------|---|
| None | ① | 5-10 | ④ |
| 1-2 | ② | More than 10 | ⑤ |
| 3-4 | ③ | | |

67. To how many academic or professional journals do you subscribe?

- | | | | |
|----------------|---|------------------------|---|
| None | ① | 5-10 | ④ |
| 1-2 | ② | 11-20 | ⑤ |
| 3-4 | ③ | More than 20 | ⑥ |

68. In the past 12 months, did you receive research support from: (Mark all sources that apply)

- | | Yes | No |
|--|-----|----|
| a. Institutional or departmental funds | ① | ② |
| b. Federal agencies | ① | ② |
| c. State or local government agencies | ① | ② |
| d. Private foundations | ① | ② |
| e. Private industry | ① | ② |
| f. Other | ① | ② |
| g. No research support | ① | ② |

69. During the past two years, have you served as a paid consultant to: (Mark all that apply)

- | | Yes | No |
|---|-----|----|
| a. Local business, governments or schools | ① | ② |
| b. A national corporation | ① | ② |
| c. A non-profit foundation | ① | ② |
| d. Federal or foreign government | ① | ② |
| e. A research project | ① | ② |
| f. Other | ① | ② |
| g. No paid consulting | ① | ② |

70. Within the past two years, have you received an offer of another job or a serious inquiry about your availability for another position?

- | | |
|---|---|
| An offer | ① |
| Not an offer, but a serious inquiry | ② |
| Neither | ③ |

71. Have you received any scholarly honors or prizes, or have you been elected as an officer of a major scholarly association?

- | | | | |
|---------------|---|--------------|---|
| Yes | ① | No | ② |
|---------------|---|--------------|---|

IF YES, please list/describe the honor[s] or office[s].

72. What is your basic institutional salary, before taxes and deductions, for the current academic year?

- | | | | |
|-----------------------------|---|-----------------------------|---|
| Below \$7,000 | ① | \$17,000-\$19,999 | ⑥ |
| \$7,000-\$9,999 | ② | \$20,000-\$24,999 | ⑦ |
| \$10,000-\$11,999 | ③ | \$25,000-\$29,999 | ⑧ |
| \$12,000-\$13,999 | ④ | \$30,000-\$34,999 | ⑨ |
| \$14,000-\$16,999 | ⑤ | \$35,000 and over | ⑩ |

73. Is this based on

- | | | | |
|-----------------------|---|------------------------|---|
| 9/10 months | ① | 11/12 months | ② |
|-----------------------|---|------------------------|---|

74. In recent years, roughly how much have you earned over and above your basic salary? (Please estimate as a percentage of your basic salary.)

- | | | | |
|---------------------|---|------------------------|---|
| 0% | ① | 30%-39% | ⑤ |
| Under 10% | ② | 40%-49% | ⑥ |
| 10%-19% | ③ | 50% and over | ⑦ |
| 20%-29% | ④ | | |

75. What are the two largest sources of your supplementary earnings? (Mark one in each column)

- | | a. Largest | b. Second Largest |
|---|------------|-------------------|
| Summer Teaching | ① | ① |
| Teaching elsewhere (extension, etc.) other than summer teaching | ② | ② |
| Consulting | ③ | ③ |
| Private practice | ④ | ④ |
| Royalties (from publications, patents) | ⑤ | ⑤ |
| Fees for speeches and lectures | ⑥ | ⑥ |
| Research salaries and payments | ⑦ | ⑦ |
| Other | ⑧ | ⑧ |
| None | ⑨ | ⑨ |

76. What was your total family income, before taxes in calendar year 1974?

- | | |
|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| Below \$10,000 . . . ① | \$25,000-\$29,999 . . . ⑤ |
| \$10,000-\$14,999 . . . ② | \$30,000-\$39,999 . . . ⑥ |
| \$15,000-\$19,999 . . . ③ | \$40,000-\$49,999 . . . ⑦ |
| \$20,000-\$24,999 . . . ④ | Over \$50,000 . . . ⑧ |

77. Has your own economic position as a member of the academic profession improved, worsened, or stayed roughly the same over the past five years?

- | | |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| Improved markedly ① | Worsened somewhat ④ |
| Improved moderately ② | Worsened significantly ⑤ |
| Stayed the same . . . ③ | |

78. If you were to begin your career again, would you still want to be a college professor?

- | | |
|------------------------|-----------------------|
| Definitely yes . . . ① | Probably no . . . ③ |
| Probably yes . . . ② | Definitely no . . . ④ |

79. Some faculty are inclined to think of themselves as "intellectuals." Others find "scholar," "scientist," "teacher," or "professional" more satisfactory descriptors. Which of these terms describes you best? Which is the poorest descriptor?

- | | | |
|------------------------|---------|------------|
| | a. Best | b. Poorest |
| Intellectual | ① | ② |
| Professional | ① | ② |
| Scholar | ① | ② |
| Scientist | ① | ② |
| Teacher | ① | ② |

80. The term "intellectual" has been defined in a variety of ways. Would you please tell us how you interpret the term?

81. Some observers have noted a different pattern of automobile purchases among academics than among other groups of professional men and women in the United States, and have seen this related to broader aspects of the university culture. To permit us to check on the validity of these observations, please indicate what car(s) you presently own.

Make	Year
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

82. How often, on average, do you attend:

1. Once a week or more
2. Two or three times a month
3. About once a month
4. A few times a year
5. Once a year or less

- | | |
|----------------------------------|-----------|
| a. A religious service | ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ |
| b. A concert | ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ |
| c. A play | ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ |
| d. An athletic event | ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ |

83. Here is a list of newspapers and magazines. For each, please indicate whether you read it regularly, occasionally, or rarely.

1. Read regularly
2. Read occasionally
3. Rarely or never read

- | | |
|--|-------|
| a. <i>American Scholar</i> | ① ② ③ |
| b. <i>Atlantic</i> | ① ② ③ |
| c. <i>Business Week</i> | ① ② ③ |
| d. <i>Commentary</i> | ① ② ③ |
| e. <i>Daedalus</i> | ① ② ③ |
| f. <i>Encounter</i> | ① ② ③ |
| g. <i>Foreign Affairs</i> | ① ② ③ |
| h. <i>Foreign Policy</i> | ① ② ③ |
| i. <i>Fortune</i> | ① ② ③ |
| j. <i>Harper's</i> | ① ② ③ |
| k. <i>Nation</i> | ① ② ③ |
| l. <i>National Review</i> | ① ② ③ |
| m. <i>New Republic</i> | ① ② ③ |
| n. <i>New York Review of Books</i> | ① ② ③ |
| o. <i>New York Times</i> | ① ② ③ |
| p. <i>New Yorker</i> | ① ② ③ |
| q. <i>Newsweek</i> | ① ② ③ |
| r. <i>Playboy</i> | ① ② ③ |
| s. <i>Public Interest</i> | ① ② ③ |

83. Continued

- t. *Saturday Review* ① ② ③
- u. *Science* ① ② ③
- v. *Time* ① ② ③
- w. *U.S. News* ① ② ③
- x. *Wall Street Journal* ① ② ③
- y. *Washington Post* ① ② ③


84. In general, how do you feel about the institution at which you are now a faculty member?

- It is a very good place for me ①
- It is fairly good for me ②
- It is not the place for me ③

85. Do you think you could be equally or more satisfied with life in any other college or university?

- Definitely more satisfied ①
- Probably more satisfied ②
- Equally satisfied ③
- Probably less satisfied ④
- Definitely less satisfied ⑤

86. If you were to seek another position elsewhere, what importance would you attach to the following:



- a. Higher salary ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- b. Higher rank ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- c. Tenure ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- d. Less pressure to publish ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- e. More time for research ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- f. Small teaching load ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- g. More opportunities to teach ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- h. Opportunity to teach graduate students ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- i. Less administrative responsibility ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- j. More administrative responsibility ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- k. Better students ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- l. Better colleagues ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- m. Good job for spouse ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- n. Better community ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- o. Better schools for my children ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- p. Better research facilities ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- q. Better chance for advancement ① ② ③ ④ ⑤
- r. Better housing ① ② ③ ④ ⑤

87. Comparing yourself with other academic persons of your age and qualifications, how successful do you consider yourself in your career?

- Very successful . . . ①
- Fairly unsuccessful . . ③
- Fairly successful . . . ②
- Very unsuccessful . . ④

Thank you very much for taking the time to complete this questionnaire.