DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 126 799 HE 008 049

TITLE	Overviews of Issues in Higher Education: Declining Test Scores, Collective Bargaining, and State Planning.
INSTITUTION	Educational Policy Research Center for Higher Education and Society, Washington, D.C.
SPONS AGENCY	Office of the Assistant Secretary for Education (DHEW), Washington, D.C.
PUB DATE	May 76
CONTRACT	EPRC-300760026
NOTE	86p.
AVAILABLE FROM	Joseph Froomkin Inc., 1015 Eighteenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036
EDRS PRICE	MF-$0.83 HC-$4.67 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS	*Achievement Tests; *Collective Bargaining; Collective Negotiation; *Educational Planning; *Higher Education; Planning Commissions; *Private Colleges; *Public Schools; Research; *Students; Teacher Militancy; Unions

ABSTRACT

Three current concerns of planners of postsecondary education are reviewed. Declining test scores are attributed to an effort of high schools to "cool off" prospective enrollees from enrolling in college by discouraging them from taking academically demanding programs, and impacts, especially on prestige schools, which will tend to attract an increasingly socially homogeneous and intellectually heterogeneous group of students. A status report on collective bargaining indicates that collective bargaining will be more common in the public than the private sector; will affect the ability of public institutions to recruit and promote research; and will ultimately make it more difficult for state legislatures to divert aid to private schools. The organization of state higher education planning commissions is analyzed in terms of the effect of the structure on developments in postsecondary education. (JMF)

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OVERVIEWS OF ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUCATION: DECLINING TEST SCORES, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, AND STATE PLANNING

EPRC for Higher Education and Society

Contract No. 300760026

May 1976

INTRODUCTION

The following three studies deal with current concerns of planners of postsecondary education. These short overviews were prepared by the center as a contribution to the debate on these subjects.

1. Declining Test Scores: Reasons and Impacts. Achievement test scores of college-bound students are continuing to decline. It is suggested that an important contributing factor to this decline is the effort of high schools to "cool off" prospective enrollees from enrolling in college by discouraging them from taking academically demanding programs. Nevertheless, despite less rigorous preparation, a high proportion of youths decide to attend college.

The most serious impact of test score declines, we believe, will be on the self-concept of prestige schools. Unless they offer increasing financial inducements to attract high ability students, these institutions will become increasingly socially homogeneous and intellectually heterogeneous.

2. A status report on collective-bargaining in the postsecondart sector. This study concluded that although the unionization trend among faculties slowed down recently, it is likely to regain its lost momentum soon. The faculties' lack of sympathy for the financial pressures exerted upon administrations, the trend to impose centralized control on public institutions in a period of slow growth, and the deteriorating economic and job prospects for faculty will encourage professors to join unions. In all probability, collective bargaining will be more common in the public than in the private sector. In the long run, unions will (1) affect the ability of public institutions to recruit staff to pursue promising research leads, forcing the public sector to be increasingly oriented to teaching, and (2) create powerful coalitions between elementary, secondary and college teachers which will make it more difficult for state legislatures to divert aid to private schools.

3. The organization of state higher education planning commissions. An analysis of state planning/coordination structures was undertaken to understand the effect of different types of commissions on developments in the postsecondary sector. The study came to the conclusion that the structure of state commissions did not significantly affect state policy, especially as it related to the private sector. States with strong and weak planning/coordinating organizations did not differ significantly in their propensity to offer scholarships to students in the private

sector, or in the level of their awards. The decisions to finance public and aid private higher education are essentially political decisions. If one wishes to focus increasing attention on the interaction between public and private systems within a state, and the impact of one state's public system on that of neighboring states, inter-state cooperation must be encouraged between governors, their key staffs, and interested state legislators.

Joseph Froomkin

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DECLINING TEST SCORES: REASONS AND IMPACTS

By

Joseph Froomkin

DECLINING TEST SCORES: REASONS AND IMPACTS

Few recent developments have received as much attention in academic circles and among test-oriented psychologists as the continuing decline in the test scores of potential college applicants. After reaching a peak in 1963, these test scores have declined continuously, and there is little evidence that the slide has ended.

Statisticians have concluded that the current wave of test-takers is scoring genuinely lower than those who took the tests some years ago, and that the difference in mean scores is not a statistical artifact. However, the reasons for this decline have not been rigorously identified, and various hypotheses, none airtight, have been proposed to explain the decline.

The present paper will briefly summarize the evidence of the decline in test scores, review some of the hypotheses for the decline, and comment on institutional adjustments to the declining test scores.

HOW MUCH DID THE TEST SCORES DECLINE?

Both major testing organizations, the College Entrance Examination Board and the American College Testing Program, have recorded significant declines in the test scores of potential college applicants. The scores have dropped even more on the verbal portion of the test than on the mathematical portion. The American College Testing Service, which tests achievement in social studies and physical science, as well,

has observed significant declines in social studies, but not in science. (See Table 1.)

During the time period for which information is available for both testing services, 1964/65 to 1974/75, verbal scores on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), administered by the College Entrance Examination Board, declined by 39 points, or 0.4 of a standard deviation, while mathematical scores declined 24 points, or roughly a quarter of a standard deviation. For the same ten years, the English scores recorded by ACT declined by 1.1 points on their scale, or roughly one-fifth of a standard deviation, and those for mathematics by 1.5 points, again roughly one-fifth of a standard deviation. Combined SAT scores declined by one-third of a standard deviation, and those of the ACT by one-fifth.[1]

No one can state with certainty the extent to which the scores of all college-bound students declined. In the first place, it is quite possible that the same test-takers are clients of both organizations. The CEEB test-takers numbered some 70 per cent of all high school graduates who enter college in the fall following graduation, and the ACT administers tests to a number equal to 60 per cent. There is undoubtably some overlap between the two organizations.

The attainment of students deciding to take tests of both organizations may be affected by the admission policies of colleges and universities, or the changing preferences of students for different types of schools. Also, rumors that test-scores are given less weight in admission, or that

TABLE 1

DECLINES IN TEST SCORES OF PROSPECTIVE COLLEGE STUDENTS

	SATS		ACT		
	Verbal	Mathematics	English	Mathematics	Composite
1964-65	473	496	18.7	19.6	19.9
1965-66	471	496	19.1	19.5	20.0
1966-67	467	495	18.5	18.7	19.4
1967-68	466	494	18.1	18.3	19.0
1968-69	462	491	18.4	19.2	19.4
1969-70	460	488	18.1	19.5	19.5
1970-71	454	487	17.7	18.7	18.9
1971-72	450	482	17.6	18.6	18.8
1972-73	443	481	17.8	18.8	18.9
1973-74	440	478	17.6	18.1	18.7
1974-75	434	472	17.3	17.4	19.1

Source: L. A. Munday, Declining Admissions Test Scores, Research and Development Division, The American College Testing Program, Iowa City, Iowa: 1976, pp. 3,5.

institutions have lowered standards, may discourage some students from repeating the tests in the hope of scoring better the second time. It has been estimated that perhaps as much as four points of the decline in the SAT may be ascribed to the smaller proportion of students taking the CEEB test a second time. Also, the decision of the University of California to drop the requirement for entering in-state freshmen to submit SAT scores could have reduced the number of high scoring test-takers in the sample.[2]

Since the CEEB clients are mostly private schools, with a smattering of public schools on both coasts, and the ACT penetration is highest among mid-western and public schools, changes in college-attendance patterns for gifted students may also affect the scores recorded by each of the testing services. The tendency of gifted students to attend in greater numbers public institutions could have very well reduced the number of high-scorers for the SAT.[3] Our estimates indicate that the proportion of students who earned scores exceeding 600 on the verbal part of the SAT test declined much more dramatically than those earning the equivalent score of 26 points on the ACT test. The number of test-takers with these scores dropped by roughly a third for the SAT's and only 15 per cent for the ACT population. (See Table 2.)

The real decline in scores is probably even more serious than that represented by published figures. Unadjusted SAT scores probably understate the decline by one-third. Studies undertaken by the CEEB

TABLE 2

NUMBER OF STUDENTS WITH TEST SCORES OVER 600 VERBAL, OR 600 MATHEMATICS ON SAT TESTS, AND 26 ACT ON ENGLISH, MATHEMATICS AND TOTAL SCORES, 1971-72, 1974-75

(thousands)

	SAT		ACT		
	Verbal	Mathematics	English	Mathematics	Total
1971-72	116	183	49	205	130
1974-75	79	157	42	175	113
Per Cent Decline	-32	-14	-15	-15	-13

Source: Unpublished data, Educational Testing Service, cited in Annegret Harnischfeger and David E. Wiley, Achievement Scores Decline; Do We Need to Worry, Chicago, December 1975 (CEMREL, Inc.).

indicate that the forms of the tests administered in more recent years have been easier than those used in earlier time periods. The actual decline in verbal test scores, when adjusted for the difficulty of the test form, was 48 and not 33 points. On the mathematical part, the corrected decline is 40 points, instead of 29. The adjusted declines are roughly 10 per cent of the verbal and eight per cent of the math scores in 1963.[4]

Researchers who have tried to find evidence for a decline in the achievement of high-school students to buttress their arguments that the CEEB and ACT samples are representative have pointed out that:

(1) the test scores of Iowa seniors on an independent test have declined in the recent past,[5]

(2) state-wide tests in Minnesota have also shown declines in the achievement of high school students,[6]

(3) scores on a widely-used commercial test of achievement have also recorded declines for high school students.[7]

There is considerable unanimity that the performance of high school students is declining. The development is especially disturbing since it cannot be explained by changes in the proportion of the age-eligible population that continues to high school graduation. The proportion of age-eligibles graduating from high school has stabilized in the course of the past five years, a period when tests declines were exceptionally pronounced.

WOMEN ARE NOT THE CAUSE OF LOWER SCORES

Less than one-eighth of the decline in verbal scores, and only one-tenth in the decline in mathematical scores on the SAT test can be accounted by the increasing number of women taking the test. Between 1966/67 and 1974/75 the decline in female achievement in vocabulary was greater than that of males. It can be rationalized by assuming that a higher proportion of females with potentially low test scores now take the test. In mathematics, women always scored lower than men.

A new adjusted composite score which is derived by (1) decrementing female verbal scores by no more than the decline of male scores, and (2) weighting the new composite score by the sex-weights in the earlier time period fails to explain the lion's share in the decline in scores. (See Table 3.).

IS THE FAMILY THE CAUSE OF LOWER TEST SCORES?

Among the most speculative and tentative explanations for the decline in test-scores is the influence of the family. Most psychometricians would agree that verbal ability is determined early in a child's life and influenced by family environment.

It is often mentioned that the students with declining test-scores belong to the demographic wave called the "baby-boom." There is considerable evidence that children in large families are less verbal than children in small families. An imaginative psychologist has recently suggested that part of the decline in test-scores is due to the increasing

TABLE 3

MEAN SAT TEST SCORES OF MEN AND WOMEN, AND FOR BOTH SEXES, 1966-67 AND 1974-75 ON SAT TESTS, ACTUAL AND ADJUSTED.

	Verbal				Mathematics			
	Male	Female	Total	Adjusted	Male	Female	Total	Adjusted
1966-67	463	468	466	-	514	467	492	-
1974-75	437	431	434	438	495	449	472	474

Source: Adapted from Sam McCandless, Program Service Officer CEEB, "The Decline in Achievement" (processed), 1975.

Adjusted Test Scores: Female Test Scores Estimated 440 Verbal, 449 Mathematics, Proportions Male .543, Female .457.

proportion of second and third children enrolling in college. It is generally accepted that the verbal ability of subsequent children is lower than that of the first-born.[8] Other observers have opined that children raised by divorced parents could have lower scores. Finally, the change in child-rearing styles resulting from the ubiquitous television set has been mentioned as a possible cause of the decline in test scores.[9]

All these arguments are plausible, but they are not convincing. None explains the increase in the achievement of children in the earlier grades compared to the test scores ten or twenty years ago, and their subsequent decline in later grades. If the potential for verbal achievement is formed in the early years, the family has to be exonerated.

Another attempt to explain the lower achievement in the higher grades involves working mothers. Their inability to supervise homework, etc., has been mentioned as a possible cause of the declining test scores. Unfortunately, no study has proved that the achievement of children of working mothers is lower than mothers who stay at home, once socio-economic status and education of parents is controlled. This hypothesis, then, is tantalizing, but unproved.

ARE LESS AFFLUENT TEST-TAKERS THE CAUSE?

The democratization of the postsecondary sector, which has made it possible for students from families with modest means to enroll in colleges and universities, has also been mentioned as a possible cause for the decline in test scores. In another study, we have mentioned that

the propensity of children from the lower income families to enroll in college has increased somewhat in the course of the past five years, going against national trends.[10] If the mean attainment of these students was somewhat lower than that of test-takers in previous years, a hypothesis consistent with what we know about the attainment of children raised in poor families, we would expect test-scores to decline, reflecting this change in self-selection.

Our information about the incomes of families of test-takers is based on a slender reed, the potential college entrants' own estimates of their families' incomes. There is considerable evidence that such data are inaccurate, but no better statistic is available from any other source. Whatever published data do exist indicated that (1) the mean incomes of families of ACT test-takers remained constant during the period 1970/71 to 1974/75, and (2) during that period average family income increased 20 per cent in current dollars. The average test-taker came from a family with 1.4 times the median income in the earlier time period, while four years later the family income of the average test-taker was barely 1.2 times the national median.

Until recently, the income distribution of clients of the CEEB was not tabulated in a way to make it possible to judge the test-takers' mean incomes. For the past three years, however, a more detailed tabulation of test-takers by income and earned scores has become available. (See Table 4.)

TABLE 4

ANNUAL PARENTAL INCOME AND MEAN SAT SCORE, BOTH TESTS COMBINED

	Per Cent	Score
1972-73		
$18,000 and over	27	503
$15,000 - $17,999	12	486
$13,500 - $14,999	8	479
$12,000 - $13,499	9	471
$9,000 - $11,999	20	464
$6,000 - $8,999	14	445
Under $6,000	10	411
1973-74		
$18,000 and over	34	485
$15,000 - $17,999	12	473
$13,500 - $14,999	7	469
$12,000 - $13,499	9	464
$9,000 - $11,999	17	455
$6,000 - $8,999	12	435
Under $6,000	8	403
1974-75		
$30,000 and over	12	494
$20,000 - $29,999	21	479
$15,000 - $19,999	20	464
$12,000 - $14,999	16	454
$9,000 - $11,999	15	442
$6,000 - $8,999	10	422
Under $6,000	7	393

Source: College Entrance Examination Board, cited in The Chronicle of Higher Education, March 8, 1976.

A re-analysis of these test score statistics in terms of the mean incomes of families in the appropriate years does not explain the decline in test scores. The test scores are plotted in relation to the mean incomes in each year in Chart 1. The decline in the test scores of a test-taker from a family with the mean income is nine points, roughly the same as the published decline in test scores for all CEEB clients.

Chart 1 highlights the more drastic decline in the test scores of children of affluent parents, and the more modest decline in the test scores of children with poorer parents. The hypothesis that children of more affluent parents are increasingly applying to private or Eastern schools, schools which require SAT tests, is not borne out by an analysis of the distribution of test-takers by income. Roughly the same proportion of test-takers in both 1971/72 and 1973/74 originated from families with incomes 1.5 times the national median. It would appear that the decline in the test scores of the children of the affluent is real.

The different slopes of the curves in each year preclude any firm judgment about the effect of incomes on test scores, and make it risky to generalize from the SAT experience to the ACT. If the decline in scores by income group was similar for the two testing organizations, perhaps as much as one-quarter to one-half of the declining test scores of the ACT sample could be accounted by the decreasing affluence of test-takers. However, since the declines, as measured in terms of standard deviation are different for the two testing organizations, such comparisons

CHART 1


1972/73
1973/74
1974/75
500
480
460
440
420
400
MEAN SAT SCORE
.25
.50
.75
1.0
1.25
1.50
1.75
(MEDIAN INCOME = 1.0)

have no scientific basis. Even the most reckless comparisons fail to explain the decline in test scores by the declining affluence of those in the sample.

IS THE SCHOOL AT FAULT?

As neither family influences nor changes in the income distribution can explain the declining test scores, it is reasonable to look at the possible role of school influences. A variety of hypotheses has been advanced in this connection.

One of the most attractive was stated by Rouse,[11] who hypothesized that rapidly rising enrollment after 1952 could have affected the quality of teaching, and caused declining test scores. If schools were forced to hire less experienced, less well-educated, or less verbal teachers to fill rapidly increasing vacancies, the quality of instruction, and hence attainment, could have declined as a result. National statistics indicate that the experience of teachers did not change much from 1965 to 1975, after declining somewhat between 1960 and 1965. The educational attainment of teachers as measured by the percentage of teachers with at least an undergraduate degree, or by the percentage of teachers with graduate degrees, actually increased from 1960 on. Since 1970, both the mean experience and education of teachers have increased, and test scores have declined.[12] We have no time series measuring the ability of teachers, but some recent studies have indicated that, even in a period of surplus of applicants over jobs, the recruitment of teachers

seems to favor the graduates of less selective institutions with below average grades.[13] Perhaps Rouse is right in tactfully suggesting the timeliness of an investigation of the effects of a decline in the caliber of teachers on student test scores.

Test scores may also have been affected by the changing programs of junior high and high schools in recent years. These changes have been documented by Harnischfeger and Wiley.[14] Based on detailed, and unpublished, surveys of the National Center for Educational Statistics, these two researchers have noted (1) a decline in the proportion of pupils taking English courses in grades 7 through 12 in the period 1970/71 and 1972/73, (2) a drop of enrollments in mathematics of some seven per cent, and (3) rapid growth, 1.4 to 2.6 per cent, of enrollment in remedial mathematics. The same survey also indicates that (1) seven per cent fewer students took physical science in any given year, and (2) a decline in students' propensity to enroll in foreign language courses, and (3) virtual stability of enrollment in history.

The two authors make the startling point that concurrently with the decline in the number of courses taken in academic subjects, there has been an even steeper decline in enrollments in the more vocational courses. These enrollments, they estimate, have declined by some 30 per cent. These developments can be explained by either one of the following two developments: (1) the average student is taking fewer courses in 1972/73 than in the earlier time period, and (2) the lighter

work load of students is due to the increasing popularity of work-study or other "reality oriented" programs.

These developments do not come as a surprise to anyone who has followed the current educational rhetoric. Affective, as contrasted to cognitive, development has been increasingly emphasized at the high school level. High school teachers and administrators try to shelter their students from the bitter taste of failure in their formative years, and are less concerned about achievement. By contrast, the personnel in the postsecondary sector would like to attract an increasing number of students with high scores. There is less rapport between these two sectors than ever before.

There is increasing evidence that the gap between what the high schools believe to be satisfactory attainment and what the test-giving community, which reflects the values of the postsecondary establishment, believes are acceptable levels of knowledge is widening. For instance, both the CEEB and the ACT report that the later waves of test-takers, who scored low on the tests, had consistently higher high school grades than did the earlier waves, who scored higher on the tests.[15]

The widening gap between these two sets of values can be considered either trivial or serious depending upon one's point of view. Statistical analysis has indicated that test scores alone do not explain more than one-third of the variance of grades earned by students in college. When high school grades are taken into account, the contribution

of scores to predicting grades does not amount to more than 10 per cent of the variance.[16]

On the other hand, if one is interested in high school standards and the intellectual challenge which is offered to teen-agers, the test-score decline is worth pondering. It would appear that we are "cooling-off" some proportion of the more gifted students by encouraging them to pay more attention to non-academic activities, while at the same time having little success in raising the achievement of students from poor families. Despite the inadequate preparation, they continue to enroll in college, because they believe that a postsecondary education is required to succeed in later life.

To what extent is the federal government responsible for this decline in scores? The federally-sponsored drive for innovation in curriculum at all levels of the school, under Title III ESEA, may well have contributed to the decline in test scores. Some years ago when the International Education Association published the results of its international assessment of mathematical achievement, it warned educators that autonomously administered changes in curriculum were likely to result in lower scores.[17] These warnings were never heeded by federal policy-makers, who firmly believed that other, possibly non-measurable, gains would materialize from a drive to sponsor change.

THE IMPACT OF DECLINING SCORES ON SCHOOLS

The postsecondary sector appears to have taken the declining test scores in stride. Institutions catering to freshmen with lower test scores have grown more rapidly than those which were more selective. In most cases, the selective institutions swallowed their pride and accepted a sufficient number of students with lower test scores to fill their freshman classes.

The American College Testing Service compared the mean scores of entrants in a number of client institutions in 1969/70 and 1974/75. It noted that mean scores declined least in junior colleges, and most in doctoral-granting institutions. Colleges that conferred only bachelor's degrees saw their score decline somewhat less than those which awarded graduate degrees below the doctorate. Despite the lower initial scores of enrolled freshmen, ACT concluded that the retention rate through the first term did not differ significantly from one period to the other.[18]

It is fairly obvious that colleges and universities are neither denying admission to low-scoring applicants, nor encouraging those with the least academic promise (as measured by test scores) to drop out. There is, on the contrary, some evidence that the grades earned by college students are higher than ever. It has been hypothesized that the grade inflation in colleges is due to the decline in expected standards in performance. The mood of the high school, it has been argued, has been taking over the colleges. This decline in standards may have also been

triggered by the desire to accommodate the less gifted students, and those, in turn, make the entrants look good by comparison.

Two years ago a self-study group of nine selective New England and Middle-Atlantic colleges had already expressed some alarm about the decline in test scores. Between 1968 and 1972, the proportion of freshmen with verbal test scores over 700 declined by one-third, and those with mathematical scores over 700 dropped by 17.1 per cent. In 1968, 84 per cent of the freshmen had verbal scores over 600; by 1972, this proportion had declined to 72 per cent. The proportion of freshmen with SAT scores over 600 in mathematics declined less steeply, but significantly, from 84 per cent in 1968 to 79 per cent of the 1972 freshman class.[19]

These declines have continued. For 32 highly selective colleges, which reported the test scores of the middle 50 per cent of the freshman class for both 1971 and 1974, further declines were observed. The lower range of freshman scores declined by 15 points, and the upper range by 28 points. Our impression is that these declines are understated because a number of institutions reported the same statistics for both years. Information from the grapevine of admission officials places mean score declines for most of the selective institutions at 50 points for five years, or three times the rate of the average decline in scores. Being mostly private and expensive, these institutions, where the mean freshman score still remains over SAT 600, are returning to their former

tradition of catering to a clientele which is more heterogeneous intellectually and more homogenous socially.[20]

This fact has not escaped prospective college applicants. While the number of test-takers who scored over 600 on the SAT verbal portion of the test declined by 32 per cent, in the past 10 years, the number of applicants to highly selective institutions declined by only 6 per cent. Despite the less attractive pool of applicants, the institutions did not reduce the number of acceptances. The total number of students accepted remained constant throughout the time period. As in the past, 50 per cent of those accepted turned up, and the size of the freshman class in selective schools remained stable in both time periods.

The decline in SAT scores, which has affected students from rich families, as well as students from more modest backgrounds, is changing the character of elite colleges. In another study, we estimated that roughly half of the students with scores over 600 were in elite schools. If the study could be repeated today, we would not be surprised if the proportion of gifted freshmen in elite institutions were even lower. These schools are increasingly pricing themselves out of the market for some proportion of gifted students. Our guess is that these students currently do not take the CEEB test at all.

A TIME FOR THE RECONSIDERATION OF MISSIONS

The tentative nature of our findings rules out set conclusions about the decline in test scores. Others have called for more studies

to understand the influences and the causes of the decline. We shall limit ourselves to setting down our impressions about what might have happened.

Most likely, the clientele of both test services has changed. Probably fewer high-scoring students take both tests. Some less affluent gifted students are no longer applying to selective private institutions.

What is the policy issue? Should we be concerned that the elite institutions are losing their intellectual cachet? Or should we be concerned more about the type of education which the poorer gifted students are getting? We prefer to worry about the second question, and bemoan the fact that there is no information on this subject. We do know that an increasing number of public institutions have introduced honors programs for gifted students, but we know of no survey of their content, nor of the impact of the programs on the students themselves. With high scoring students increasingly choosing to attend public schools, it would behoove federal policy-makers to investigate what arrangements have been made in the public sector on behalf of the increasingly rare gifted students.

Another issue worth investigating further is the reason for the decline of academic course offering in high schools. To what extent is this a function of anti-intellectualism of the counselling profession? To what extent is it due to the low caliber of teachers who were hired during the recent expansion of enrollments? Why is the high school

increasingly polarized, with the majority of students taking fewer academic courses, and a miniscule, but growing, minority taking advanced courses?

It may be appropriate to conclude with a controversial proposition. Perhaps the high school is anticipating the developments in our society, and is doing its best to discourage students from indulging in higher education which they will not be able to use in their work. If high school administrators are right, however; the same message must also reach the postsecondary sector, which is still trying to keep enrollments from declining, and in the process, may be sacrificing standards which were probably none-too-high in the past.

FOOTNOTES

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[20]Susan F. Watts, ed., The College Handbook (New York: CEEB, 1975). Douglas Dillenbeck and Sue Wetzel, The College Handbook (New York: CEEB, 1975).

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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN HIGHER EDUCATION

A LOOK AT THE FUTURE OF A SOCIAL MOVEMENT

By

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INTRODUCTION

Between 1966 and 1975 faculty unions became increasingly important in the bargaining over faculty salaries and working conditions. By late 1974 the faculties of 443 campuses of 277 institutions had chosen union bargaining agents and 211 contracts had been signed.[1] By late 1974, one of every four two-year colleges, and one of every sixteen four-year and graduate institutions had collective bargaining in place. About 21 per cent of all academic faculty members in the United States were organized in that year.

At present, collective bargaining is not the prevalent form of relationship between faculty and administration in institutions of higher learning as a whole, nor in any subgroup defined by such characteristics as: geography, salary levels, academic standing, size, degree-granting range (i.e., full-scale graduate institutions, institutions granting only a few doctorates, four-year institutions, two-year institutions), and control (public, private nondenominational, denominational). Thus far, collective bargaining has made almost no inroads at all into the top-ranking universities, public or private, nor the top-ranking four-year colleges (which are all private institutions). Not one of the great public or private universities or colleges is to be found among the ranks of institutions with certified collective bargaining agents for their faculties. (See Appendix.) With the exception of Boston University[2] no private, large, doctoral

granting universities with lesser research commitment have attempted faculty collective bargaining. Only public campuses or systems (SUNY, Rutgers, Wayne State, The University of Cincinnati, The University of Hawaii and The University of Washington[3]) or publicly supported in a very substantial way (Temple) have elected bargaining agents.

The process of certification of higher education faculties for collective bargaining has been going on fairly steadily since 1966 (cf. Table I and Appendix). By late 1974 the broad aspects of the situation were fairly clear. As Garbarino points out:

1. Collective bargaining is primarily a feature of public higher education. Although only two-thirds of all full time higher education faculty are in public institutions, 90% of all those who are organized are in public institutions. Only 2% of all private institutions are organized as contrasted with 20% of public institutions.[4]

2. Since more than five-sixths (in 1969) of all faculty were in four-year and graduate institutions, it is in that sector that the future of faculty bargaining lies.[5]

3. Organized faculty are concentrated in a few states: New York, Pennsylvania, Michigan and New Jersey. One-third of all organized institutions and one-half of all organized faculty members are in New York.[6]

Between 1972 and 1974 both the number of institutions organized and the numbers of faculties covered by agreements appears to have slowed down. In the course of the current year, a number of agreements, notably the union gains at the University of Georgia and the University of Florida, have given the impression that the unionization movement was picking up again.

TABLE I

ANNUAL INCREASE (ABSOLUTE AND PERCENTAGE) IN VARIOUS MEASURES OF COVERAGE BY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Years	Total Institutions		Faculty		Four-Year Institutions		Four-Year Faculty	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
1966-1967	14	61	1,800	35	1	100	100	50
1967-1968	33	89	7,300	104	8	400	3,000	1,000
1968-1969	68	97	21,800	152	16	160	12,800	437
1969-1970	39	28	11,200	31	14	54	7,300	45
1970-1971	68	38	25,100	53	44	110	22,000	94
1971-1972	40	16	11,900	160	18	21	9,200	70
1972-1973	25	9	3,400	4	19	19	2,800	5
1973-1974	21	7	4,600	5	9	9	3,200	6

Source: Computed from Garbarino, op. cit., Table 6, pp. 58-9.

The extent to which unionization will spread or slow down in the next few years depends to a large extent on the action taken by state legislatures. Currently, eleven state legislatures are considering the exemption of university teachers from provisions of public employment bills which outlaw unions. A recent survey of the status of these bills indicated that little movement in legislative process was anticipated during this pre-election year, but that the likelihood of the passage of these bills was not foreclosed in the future.[7]

We believe that these bills are not likely to have smooth sailing in those states where a "flagship" institution has special affection of the legislature. The pressure for homogenous treatment of all institutions covered by a contract does not escape the understanding of most state legislators. In states like Alabama, Nebraska or Ohio, the danger of weakening the support and the special relationship of the State University to the legislature may effectively block the passage of such measures.

Some Reasons for the Increase of Collective Bargaining

Why, after decades of disdain for the notion of collective bargaining, have college and university faculties tended to favor this new mode of dealing with administrations? Ladd and Lipset[8] offer four reasons for this change.

1. The economic reason. With slower growth in enrollments and reduction in resources going to institutions, with rising output of PhDs, probably due in significant degree to a tendency on the part of young people to try to avoid the problems of the "real" world, there is

increasing competition for a shrinking number of faculty positions. These threats to the faculty are not always understood by them.

2. The structural reason. The development, in the public sector, of statewide systems administered from the center, has been a phenomenon of the 60s and 70s. This has led to the increasing bureaucratization of the institutions within these systems, and the removal of the decision-making locus from the individual campus, to a considerable degree. Thus, there has been a significant reduction in faculty prerogatives in governance.

3. The legal reason. Beginning in the early 60s there has been a proliferation of state laws enabling public employees to engage in collective bargaining.

4. The ideological reason. Events of the 60s (the anti-war movement and the student movement generally) led to an increased involvement of students in governance of institutions. Unionism is seen as a response, essentially conservative, of self-protection by faculty members.

These pressures, in both public and private sectors, impel faculty members in many institutions to seek relief, illusory or not, in collective bargaining: the collectivization of public institutions into systems, with the consequent removal of control over many budgetary functions to central offices;[9] the perceived need to protect faculty interests in the budget against the inroads of well-organized groups of support and maintenance workers, and against the resistance of organized student groups to increases in tuition levels (particularly at private institutions). Finally, especially in private institutions, there is the belief that collective bargaining offers the best basis for establishing legal standing for the faculty at institutions which treat its faculty as employees rather

than as "the university."

Collective bargaining has gained the most acceptance in the public sector for the structural and legal reasons given above. It gained popularity first in the two-year and lesser four-year colleges for the economic reasons. Moreover, the "collegiality" between the faculty and administration there was much more illusory.

Where the Changes Have Taken Place

In recent years moves toward collective bargaining have been made at second-rank universities, where more of the perquisites of the classic scholarly life (moderate teaching loads, some degree of faculty involvement in governance, commitment to research, some degree of collegiality between faculty and administration) are to be found than in the public four-year and two-year colleges, in the most recently emerging universities or in the smallest and least selective private four-year colleges. Thus, election campaigns have been mounted by advocates of collective bargaining at Fordham, Syracuse, Boston University, New York University, Temple, Rutgers, Wayne State and Pittsburgh. Of these elections, collective bargaining lost at Fordham, Syracuse and New York University, while the issue remains in doubt at Pittsburgh. But the matter has not come up seriously at institutions which are separable from large systems, which are financially in fairly good condition, where faculty feel that their role in institutional governance is not seriously in jeopardy, where faculty feel some significant sense of collegiality with

administration. One anomalous case, anomalous not because it is not consistent with this discussion of reasons, but because an election was held at all, is that of Michigan State. By the logic of the foregoing discussion, there should have been insufficient pressure to warrant the holding of an election. However, one was held. And collective bargaining was roundly defeated.

Tight budgets tend to downgrade the perceived quality of institutions, at least in the eyes of the faculty. Since there is little prospect for a rapid growth in funds allocated to higher education, the atmosphere which contributes to the growth of unionism is likely to be reinforced on a number of campuses. Experienced observers of collective bargaining, such as Garbarino, Ladd and Lipset, and Crossland,[10] are agreed that collective bargaining will, in all likelihood, continue to spread in higher education institutions.

The Bargaining Agents

Most of the collective bargaining agents in higher education institutions are affiliates of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) or the National Education Association (NEA). Generally the three organizations have divided their successes along type-of-institution lines (cf. Table II). With some exceptions 1) AAUP has done best with four-year and graduate institutions which have a tradition of broad offerings or liberal arts orientation going back more than ten or fifteen years; 2) AFT has done

TABLE II

NUMBER OF CAMPUSES BY AAUP CATEGORIES* AND MAJOR BARGAINING AGENT, 1974

	I		II		IIA		IIB		Total	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
AAUP	13	65	19	17	11	12	8	31	32	24
AFT			22	19	17	19	5	19	22	16
NEA			44	39	36	41	8	31	44	33
AAUP-AFT			1	1	1	1			1	1
AAUP-NEA	2	10							2	1
AFT-NEA	5	25	27	24	24	27	5	19	34	25
	20		115		89		26		135	

*AAUP Categories: I--includes institutions which offer the doctorate degree and which conferred in the most recent three years an annual average of fifteen or more earned doctorates covering a minimum of three nonrelated disciplines.
II--is a total of categories IIA and IIB.
IIA--includes institutions awarding degrees above the baccalaureate but not included in category I.
IIB--includes institutions awarding only the baccalaureate or equivalent degree.

Source: AAUP

best with two-year colleges; 3) NEA has signed up teacher-training institutions which have traditionally been a part of the education establishment. In other words, AAUP has been most successful in institutions at which traditionally it had a membership base;[11] AFT has generally organized institutions which are governed locally, and NEA institutions traditionally training teachers.

Immediate Effects of Unionization

Is there any basis for concluding that collective bargaining has materially affected working conditions? At present there is little evidence to support firm conclusions; one study[12] which examined salary and promotions demonstrates the difficulty of pinpointing clearcut results. This is a statistical analysis of two groups of institutions with collective bargaining contracts. The first group consists of forty-three institutions with collective bargaining contracts effective during the academic years 1970-71 to 1974-75 inclusive. The second subset is eight schools with initial contracts prior to 1970-71. On the basis of this analysis the authors come to a number of tentative conclusions. First of all, they suggest

> The analysis would appear to indicate that initiation of collective bargaining has brought gains to upper level faculty via more rapid growth in compensation and salaries, but not to lower rank faculty in terms of either more rapid salary increases or increased promotions. However, this apparent greater increase in compensation and salary for full and associate professors requires further analysis because the data indicate that a set of seven Pennsylvania schools account for much of these gains.

> There is little evidence of any general gains in faculty compensation, salary, or promotions attributable to collective bargaining contracts.[13]

With respect to the impact of particular organizations engaged in collective bargaining, the authors say:

> It would appear that AAUP has been successful in increasing, for at least some faculty ranks, the compensation and salary levels above national trends /including schools which do not have collective bargaining/. There is no evidence that AAUP has increased promotion into upper ranks at a rate different from the national average... Faculty compensation, salary and promotion gains at AFT-represented schools have not differed significantly from the national 'average'...../the nine institutions in the sample represented by NEA/ made sizable, and statistically significant, average gains relative to the national trends in faculty compensation and salary for the assistant professor through full professor categories. They did not, however, show differential promotion growth from the nationwide movement...These results for NEA are primarily attributable to a single contract which covers seven of the nine institutions in this category..../Of the fifteen institutions which are represented by a combined NEA-AFT unit/it appears that such combined.../institutions/ show primarily negative mean growth rates and definite relative decreases in salary and compensation since collective bargaining was initiated.[14]

With respect to the Pennsylvania contract referred to above, the authors point out that prior to the initiation of collective bargaining the faculty at the institutions were "paid considerably less than either the regional or national average salary and compensation in each rank."[15] They continue, though, that "these salary gains were accompanied by apparently slower than normal promotions at these schools."[16]

The authors then analyze two instances of institutions covered

by collective bargaining which pay substantially higher than average salaries, the U. S. Merchant Marine Academy and the City University of New York. These were among the very first colleges to elect bargaining agents and to begin the collective bargaining process. The bargaining agent for these campuses is NEA and AFT jointly and the result of collective bargaining, according to the authors, is

> Compensation and salary at the CUNY campuses and at the Merchant Marine Academy were considerably and significantly higher than both the national and regional average salaries for all ranks in the academic year 1970-71... However,....during the past four years, CUNY-MMA have shown a negative mean net growth rate in faculty compensation and salary. That is, faculty compensation, on a national average, has grown from 1% to 2% per year faster than the compensation at CUNY-MMA. Similarly, on a national comparison, the faculty salaries have averaged from 1% to 1.6% higher rates of growth per year than those at these schools... We can conclude that, at least over the period for which our data holds, CUNY-MMA campuses do not show any positive gains associated with collective bargaining; in fact, we note exactly the opposite result... In no sense...do the data indicate that these institutions have gained from collective bargaining during the period 1970-71 to 1974-75.[17]

And finally,

> The major findings of this study can be succinctly stated as follows: we can find no evidence of any general gains in salary, compensation, or promotions attributable to the adoption of collective bargaining by college and university faculty. If anything, the evidence suggests that those campuses adopting collective bargaining have not done as well as the non-collective bargaining schools. Positive collective-bargaining gains were observed primarily for those campuses represented by AAUP and for the single group of Pennsylvania colleges represented by NEA. These gains were more than offset by the generally negative impact on campuses represented by either AFT or combined AFT-NEA bargaining agents.[18]

The authors are at pains to point out that these results can only be treated as tentative due to the small sample with which they have been forced to operate. Moreover, the only considerations with which the authors have been able to deal have been faculty salary, compensation and promotion rates. They quite clearly point out that they have been unable to specify, precisely enough for purposes of statistical analysis, such matters as faculty power, collegiality, morale, or involvement in governance of the institution. It seems quite clear that for many faculty bodies at many institutions these considerations are of almost as much importance as salary and rate of promotion.

Recent developments in Pennsylvania and New Jersey illustrate that unionized faculties are willing to give up, on occasion, compensation increments in order to assure job security. In mid-1976, union representatives representing the higher education sector scaled down their monetary demands in order to save 280 faculty positions, which otherwise would have been eliminated the following year.[19]

Long Range Implications of Unionism

Assuming that faculty unionization continues to spread, what sorts of consequences can be expected? We have already seen indications that the effect on salaries, compensation and promotion is difficult to evaluate. And it will be even more so as the numbers of institutions covered by collective bargaining increases and it becomes more and more difficult to establish a "clean" norm of change unaffected directly

by collective bargaining for comparison purposes.

But what of other aspects of the working situation of academic faculty? And what is the likely effect on the role of administrators, both local and systemwide? How are these events likely to affect the character of institutions? Are there likely to be differential effects depending on which organizations are selected as bargaining agent? And finally, how differently will the public and private sectors be affected?

1. Where will collective bargaining be accepted?

If past trends are portents of the future, unionization will take place much more in the public sector than in the private. There will probably be few, if any, faculty unions at the very best of the private universities.[20] Indeed, faculties at some of the elite four-year private colleges, as well,[21] will probably not choose to be represented by bargaining agents.

2. Tendencies toward centralization in the public sector.

In the public sector unionization is likely to spread, in line with past trends. And as the process moves forward there will be a general tendency on the part of state governments to try to simplify the task of bargaining by minimizing the number of contracts negotiated. The pattern followed in New York and Hawaii is likely to be replicated in many other places.

In New York this pattern has resulted in the inclusion of all SUNY units, four-year colleges, University Centers, Medical Schools

and special colleges, being covered by one agent, and by one contract. Moreover, all professional personnel, faculty and others, in the system, have been covered by the same contract. The result has been that while the state's negotiations have been simplified, the contract has been far less satisfactory to the faculty than might otherwise have been the case.

In these instances, the price of simplifying administration is to place significant policy decisions regarding salary levels, tenure, the location of programs, libraries and such facilities as computers and laboratories, at a center where budgetary powers are concentrated. Such centralization is often forced by state legislatures in their attempt to control costs through prescribing hours, class size, and content.

3. Restricted role for public sector campus administrators.

Should this trend gather steam, the greatest losers are likely to be the local (i.e., individual campus) administrators. They will lose their authority to originate policy. Their major task will consist of implementing policies worked out at the center between the bargaining and grievance committees, on the one hand, and the central administration's negotiators on the other.

4. Effects on Governance Arrangements.

What will happen to the faculty's role in institutional governance? Faculty unionization will, in general, not result in a reduction of that role although its form may change slightly. Those private institutions which are organized will have been the ones at which faculty's

role in governance was in jeopardy anyway.[22] In the public sector there will be some removal of governance activities to central points but it is not unlikely that those central points will be close physically and functionally to the flagship campuses of the public systems. And it is precisely here that faculty's role in governance was strong before. There may have to be more doffing of the hat to faculty from lesser campuses by those of the flagship campuses, but governance will still be a strong faculty prerogative there.

Faculty senates (those comprised of faculty members only) will find the scope of their concerns narrowed. One study[23] suggests that the union will come more and more to be the primary arena in which the faculty deal with economic issues while the Senate will be concerned with academic affairs.

Senates which represent broader constituencies (faculty, administration, students, staff, etc.) could find their powers less diluted than the faculty senates will. They may continue, to roughly the extent they were before, to be involved in economic issues. Faculty would be having to deal with these matters in a tricky way, since in the Senate they will have to be careful not to get their more complex governance roles tangled up. They will have to engage in a bit more orchestration than in the case where either there is a faculty senate, or where there is no union.

On balance, the organization of the faculty by a union will

not reduce faculty's roles in governance which it wishes to keep. It will probably make it more difficult for an individual unit in a system of campuses to mold its programs and work load. Moreover, it will surely tend to reduce the extent to which collegiality can develop or flourish (if it has been flourishing) between faculty and administration. And the resulting greater bureaucratization will tend to give rise to new power groups whose primary function will be the conduct of union business.

5. Tenure.

Traditionally, academic tenure in American colleges and universities has been associated with a series of statements drafted by AAUP and ACE and endorsed by a number of professional and academic organizations.[24] In this tradition academic tenure is viewed as a means of protecting the freedom of expression of the academic faculty. Proponents of this view have never justified tenure as a means of maintaining claims on jobs, but rather as a way of ensuring that unpopular intellectual positions could honestly be taken and defended without fear of retaliation by dismissal. In this conception of tenure, it has been held from early on that tenure should not be easily conferred. The usual position has been that tenure should be conferred only in exceptional cases much before completion of seven years of full-time teaching but that it should be granted in most cases upon completion of seven years. The only exceptions to the seven-year maximum rule countenanced by these statements of policy would occur if a new appointment at a new institution were to begin

within such a short time of completion of seven years of full time teaching as to allow nearly no time for a probationary period to pass. In such a case there is provision for limited fractional counting of the prior experience.

It is clear that this policy was formulated with as much concern for the maintenance of academic quality as it was for the protection of faculty members. This approach to the tenure of teachers in their positions is to be distinguished from that which characterizes civil servants, especially teachers in the public elementary and high schools. It has been common for many years for tenure in such institutions to be gained after three years or fewer as a regular full-time teacher. And consistent with their experience in these pre-college institutions, NEA and AFT were heard, in recent years just before the financial difficulties made themselves felt, to urge that tenure in colleges also come after completion of the third year. This could come only at the cost of a chance really to establish the potential scholarly quality of the candidate, in the overwhelming proportion of cases.

It is worth noting in passing that in the British higher education system tenure comes with the first reappointment, that is, after one year. And the cost of this practice (which has led to a situation in which about 94 per cent of all academic faculty in Great Britain have tenure) has caused some strain as enrollments turned down.

The tenure system, as it has been for decades, is under

attack from three other quarters. Younger, untenured faculty see tenure as a barrier which not all of them can cross. They are vociferous in their attacks on the tenure system, and on AAUP, which many see as devoted to the maintenance of tenure and little else. Administrators with tight budgets have been discussing the establishment of tenure quotas (which AAUP strongly resists) or the outright abolition of the system. There have been proposals[25] by administrators that tenure be replaced by a system of renewable-term contracts. Thus far, this sort of proposal has not caught on.

Thus, the tenure issue turns out to be a source of friction between untenured and tenured faculty and administrators, and between tenured faculty and students as well as between AAUP and NEA-AFT. A union contract, in many instances, can be perceived by the existing faculty as a way to increase job security in these uncertain times.

6. Special Issues in the Private Sector.

In the private sector the situation is different. Two of the major pressures for unionism are there absent. There is no aggregation process at work in the private sector. Consequently, the faculty is less likely to feel its channels to administrators blocked, and feel increasingly powerless. Nor is private faculty pressure likely to cause state resources to be channeled to these institutions. To the contrary, there is a constant awareness of institutional poverty which is frequently driven home by appeals to faculty, who may well be underpaid relative to their

publicly employed brethren, to contribute to the institutional fund drive. The private institutions are, for the most part, bloodless stones.

Faculty unions at private institutions are a response to two kinds of pressures. First, they are seen by faculty members as a counterweight to the well-organized budgetary claims of unionized support and maintenance staff. Second, they are a desperate defense against perceived authoritarianism of administrators. As a few cases of the Bloomfield College or Boston University variety develop and tie the institutions up in conflict and lawsuit, administrations of private institutions may find it advisable to improve their linkages to the faculty.

An interesting occurrence in the private sector has been the attempt, successful in some instances,[26] of professional schools whose faculty command significantly higher salaries than do most faculty members, to separate themselves in the bargaining process from their colleagues in the rest of the university. The usual pattern is for these units to petition the NLRB for the chance to claim separate bargaining unit status. Frequently, once this is achieved they do not go into collective bargaining. Rather, they continue in their individualistic mode. But what they have achieved is to avoid being forced to bargain in the same unit as their less favored colleagues.

7. Two Scenarios.

Suppose for the moment that the scenario develops along these lines, then: a large number of public and relatively few private

institutions are unionized. In the unionized sector decision-making regarding budgets, work load, appointment, promotion, tenure, salaries, etc., are controlled by negotiation between unions and central negotiating authorities. What is likely to happen to the quality of public institutions? The answer to this question depends heavily on the ability of unions to negotiate successfully for wages, job tenure and seniority and not neglect traditional academic conceptions. At present, all the indications are that faculties perceive significant differences among the three major faculty organizations with respect to these matters, and that their success to balance these considerations simultaneously is limited.[27]

The convenience of dealing with a single bargaining agent may place research institutions in the same bargaining unit with lesser institutions, as happened in Hawaii. The faculty of research campuses are then outnumbered by those of lesser institutions. Trade union conceptions of tenure, seniority and bargaining procedures may come to dominate. This did happen at Hawaii when, in the first election, AFT became the bargaining agent. But the membership there became so disenchanted with AFT's performance that it was turned out and replaced by a local coalition of AAUP and NEA. No such overturn occurred in SUNY and CUNY; there has been a watering-down of procedures there due to the merging of each of the entire systems into one bargaining unit. If this were to happen in a significant number of cases, the private sector might become the repository of research capability. One might then find two

different classes of university faculty developing: those with institutional commitment and those with discipline commitment. In such a case, we might expect a drift of the second sort of faculty toward private institutions, and a consequent drfit of the better graduate students toward those institutions as well. Thus, the public sector faculty would become bureaucratized while the private university sector faculty would tend to remain essentially individualized.

An alternative scenario would envision the private sector becoming substantially unionized (a less likely outcome, in my view). In this case the distinction between the two sectors would be less clear. If the private sector is organized by an organization like AAUP, which has a greater commitment to traditional academic values than do AFT or NEA, the private sector would be in general more supportive of traditional notions of tenure, promotion, salary determination and collegial determination of academic issues.

Administrators in private institutions which have been organized can expect to find themselves in a different position than their counterparts on unorganized private campuses or than those in the public sector. They should retain much of the authority of the administrators of unorganized campuses. Indeed, in some ways their jobs should be much more enjoyable. They ought to be much more able to deal with pressures from conservative boards of trustees pressing them to be tough, by pointing out the extent to which the bargaining situation limits this.

And they might be able to devote themselves much more to a new form of collegialism, that which could develop over the bargaining table when both parties to the bargain are concerned to preserve as much of traditional academic attitudes and procedures as possible.

Finally, if enrollments do turn down, the concerns of unionized faculties to protect jobs of their members are likely to strengthen their coalition with members of the same or similar unions representing teachers at the elementary and secondary school level. Given the preponderance of public sector faculty among the organized, it is quite possible that a strong and politically powerful coalition will develop with unintended consequences. The pressure of unionized public sector teachers to protect their interest could very easily block legislation to aid the private sector in a given state. If the size of the pie for higher education is fixed, the likelihood that more of it is to go to the public sector is increased when strong pressure groups, represented by unions, put collective pressure on the legislature.

8. The Future of the Three Organizations.

What of the future of the three major unionizing organizations active in the higher education sector? Crossland[28] speculates that the three will, within a decade or two, merge into one giant hyphenated organization. In order for this fusion to occur, the significant difference between their missions, and in their commitments, would have to be worked out. There have been gestures, largely on the part of NEA,

toward each of the other two organizations.

AAUP has consistently rebuffed NEA and the AFT-NEA merger in New York has just broken up. AAUP is very strongly committed to the continuation of its role as conscience of the academic world through its development and promulgation of policies dealing with tenure, appointment, promotion, academic freedom, maintenance of salary standards. AAUP has, and will continue to have, an important portion of its membership among the unorganized in the elite private university and college sector for whom the maintenance of its traditional role is important. Therefore, it is unlikely, except in particular circumstances where local temporary alliances make sense (such as the NEA-AAUP hookup in Hawaii), that AAUP will merge.

Merger between AFT and NEA may perhaps occur. But the recent history in New York suggests that such a merger is unlikely to take place soon. There are widely perceived fundamental ideological differences between the two[29] in which AFT is seen as liberal to radical and as a militant labor organization. NEA, on the other hand, is ideologically much more conservative, has ties to the educationist establishment and is less militant. The two organizations serve different publics with different needs just as AAUP serves a still different public with yet different needs. The advantages of merger are getting fewer and fewer as the organization process spreads.

In those states where there exists either a series of disparate

agglomerations of public educational institutions (e.g., California with a university, a state college system and a system of community colleges) or in those states where a flagship institution (e.g., Alabama, Nebraska or Ohio) holds the particular affections of the state legislature, the consequences of unionism are likely to be looked with disfavor by legislatures. It is precisely in those states that reluctance about authorizing public employee bargaining will be felt most.

Conclusions

Summing up, then: collective bargaining is in higher education to stay. It is very likely to cover much of public higher education, much less likely to succeed in covering the private sector. It will result in significant bureaucratization of those institutions where it succeeds. There will result, especially on public campuses, significant reduction in the prerogatives of local campus administrators. It may simplify and enrich the roles of administrators on private campuses. It may lead to a two-level higher education world. On one level (the private sector) there would be much more adherence to traditional individualistic academic values and ways of doing business. On the other level (the public sector) there would be more reliance on collective techniques and probably a loss for faculty interested in research. This split-level structure would probably result in a reduction of the traffic of faculty members between the two sectors and in some degree contribute to the intellectual stultification especially of the public sector.

If the prognosis of this review are accepted, the trends to collective bargaining will just reinforce existing trends: (1) faculties will get older, and (2) there will be less emphasis on research. As enrollments stabilize or decline, these trends were likely to manifest themselves under any circumstances.

Collective bargaining agreements may either improve the caliber of teaching or cause it to worsen. If a union contract makes faculty more secure, they may pay more attention to teaching; if increased security decreases incentives for outstanding performance, course content and presentation will deteriorate. There is no evidence to bolster either hypothesis. Hence, federal action on collective bargaining, difficult to envisage under existing labor relations legislation and states' rights to regulate bargaining with public employees, is not a matter of urgency.

A more immediate concern is the targeting of research to maintain the quality of faculties. Recent trends to de-emphasize fundamental research may have to be reconsidered. With turnover of faculty declining, federal investment in scholarly research is likely to have long-lasting effects and pay off in better postsecondary programs. This is the issue which needs immediate attention.

FOOTNOTES

[1]National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education, Schedule of Institutions with Bargaining Agents and Contracts, September 1, 1975, p. 1.

[2]AAUP has been certified by the NLRB as collective bargaining agent for the Boston University faculty, but the Boston University administration is contesting this certification in the courts so no bargaining has yet taken place.

[3]Although AAUP has been designated its collective bargaining agent by the faculty at this institution in an election held there, the State of Washington has not yet recognized the designation.

[4]Cf. J. W. Garbarino (with the association of B. Aussieker), Faculty Bargaining, Carnegie Commission on Higher Education and The Ford Foundation, McGraw-Hill, 1975, pp. 57-59.

[5]Ibid., p. 60.

[6]Ibid., pp. 60-61.

[7]"Election-Year Politics Hits Public-College Bargaining," Chronicle of Higher Education, March 22, 1976, p. 1.

[8]E. C. Ladd, Jr., and S. M. Lipset, Professors, Unions and American Higher Education, Carnegie Commission on Higher Education and The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D. C., 1973, p. 4.

[9]See the third paper in this collection.

[10]Fred E. Crossland, "Will the Academy Survive Unionization?" Change, February 1976, pp. 38-42.

[11]Cf. Table II.

[12]William W. Brown and Courtenay C. Stone, "An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Collective Bargaining on Faculty Salary, Compensation, and Promotions in Higher Education," Department of Economics, California State University, Northridge, California, February 1976.

[13]Ibid., pp. 16-17.

[14]Ibid., pp. 19-20.

[15]Ibid., p. 20.

[16]Ibid., p. 21.

[17]Ibid., pp. 22-23.

[18]Ibid., p. 25.

[19]"2 States' Layoffs Averted," Chronicle of Higher Education, March 29, 1976, p. 11.

[20]Including, almost certainly, the Universities of Chicago, Pennsylvania, and Rochester; Yale, Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, Columbia, Carnegie-Mellon, Cornell, Brown, Johns Hopkins, Northwestern, Washington, Duke, Rice, Vanderbilt and Dartmouth Universities; and MIT and Cal Tech.

[21]Such as Amherst, Williams, Oberlin, etc.

[22]Cf. "Collegiality by Contract," Chronicle of Higher Education, March 10, 1976, p. 5.

[23]Stanford Project on Academic Governance, reported in Faculty Collective Bargaining, A Chronicle of Higher Education Handbook, Editorial Projects for Education, Washington, D. C., 1976, pp. 68-70.

[24]Especially the statements of 1915, 1925 and 1940. For details of these statements and the history, see Louis Joughin, Academic Freedom and Tenure, A Handbook of the American Association of University Professors, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, Wisconsin, 1969, Chaps. III and IV.

[25]For example, by the presidents of Bloomfield, Bennington and Union Colleges.

[26]For example, the Law Schools at Syracuse and Fordham and the Medical School at Pittsburgh.

[27]Cf. "The Ladd-Lipset Survey," Chronicle of Higher Education, February 9, 17, 23, 1976.

[28]Fred E. Crossland, op. cit.

[29]Ladd and Lipset, Chronicles, loc. cit.

APPENDIX TABLE 1

AAUP CATEGORY I* SCHOOLS WITH COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, BY YEAR OF CERTIFICATION, AGENT AND CONTROL

Certification Year	Agent	School	Control of School
1968	AFT-NEA	CUNY System	Public
1970	AAUP	New York Polytech	Private
1970	AAUP	Rutgers University	Public
1970	AAUP	St. Johns University	Denominational
1970	AFT-NEA	SUNY System	Public
1971	AAUP	University of Rhode Island	Public
1972	AAUP	Adelphi University	Private
1972	AAUP	University of Delaware	Public
1972	AAUP	Wayne State University	Public
1973	AAUP	Temple University	Public
1974	AAUP	University of Cincinnati	Public
1974	AAUP-NEA	University of Hawaii System	Public
1975	AAUP	Boston University	Private
1975	AAUP-NEA	Kent State University	Public
1975	AAUP	Western Michigan University	Public
1975	AAUP	University of Washington	Public
1976	AAUP	Stevens Institute of Technology	Private

*Institutions conferring, in the most recent three years, an annual average of at least fifteen earned doctorates in at least three nonrelated disciplines.

Source: AAUP

APPENDIX TABLE 2

AAUP CATEGORY II-A* SCHOOLS, WITH COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, BY YEAR OF CERTIFICATION, AGENT AND CONTROL

Certification Year	Agent	School	Control
1967	AFT	S.E. Massachusetts University	Private
1969	AFT	Boston State College	Public
1969	NEA	Monmouth College	Denominational
1969	NEA	Central Michigan University	Public
1970	AAUP	New York Institute of Technology	Private
1970	AAUP	Oakland University	Public
1970	NEA	Salem State College (Mass.)	Public
1970	AFT	Bryant College (R.I.)	Private
1970	AFT	Massachusetts College of Art	Private
1970	AFT	Worcester State College (Mass.)	Public
1971	NEA	Fitchburg State College (Mass.)	Public
1971	NEA	Pennsylvania State Colleges (system)	Public
1971	AFT	Lowell State College (Mass.)	Public
1971	AFT-NEA	Long Island University	Private
1971	AFT-NEA	Pratt Institute	Private
1972	AAUP	Hofstra University	Private
1972	NEA	Lowell Technological Institute (Mass.)	Public
1972	NEA	North Adams State College (Mass.)	Public
1972	NEA	Youngstown State University (Ohio)	Public
1972	NEA	Rhode Island College	Public
1973	AAUP	University of Bridgeport (Conn.)	Private
1973	AAUP	Rider College (N. J.)	Private
1973	AAUP	Towson State College (Maryland)	Public
1973	AAUP	Wagner College (N. Y.)	Private

APPENDIX TABLE 2 (Cont'd)

AAUP CATEGORY II-A* SCHOOLS, WITH COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, BY YEAR OF CERTIFICATION, AGENT AND CONTROL

Certification Year	Agent	School	Control
1973	NEA	Westfield State College (Mass.)	Public
1974	AAUP	Eastern Michigan University	Public
1974	AAUP	Fairleigh Dickinson University	Private
1974	NEA	Kansas State College at Pittsburgh	Public
1974	AFT-NEA	Cooper Union	Private
1975	AAUP-AFT	Eastern Montana College	Public
1975	AAUP	Emerson College (Mass.)	Private
1975	AAUP	Northern Michigan University	Public
1975	NEA	Framingham State College (Mass.)	Public
1975	NEA	Minnesota State College System	Public
1975	NEA	St. Francis College (Pa.)	Denominational
1975	NEA	Western Montana College	Public
1975	AFT	New Jersey State College System	Public

*Institutions awarding degrees above the baccalaureate, but not in category I.

Source: AAUP

APPENDIX TABLE 3.

AAUP CATEGORY II-B* SCHOOLS WITH COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, BY YEAR OF CERTIFICATION, AGENT AND CONTROL

Certification Year	Agent	School	Control
1970	AFT-NEA	U. S. Merchant Marine Academy	Public
1971	AAUP	Dowling College	Private
1971	NEA	Nebraska State College System	Public
1971	NEA	Saginaw Valley State College (Mich.)	Public
1972	AAUP	Ashland College (Ohio)	Denominational
1972	AAUP	Bard College	Private
1972	AAUP	Lincoln University (Pa.)	Private
1973	AAUP	Bloomfield College	Private
1973	AAUP	Regis College (Colo.)	Denominational
1973	NEA	University of Dubuque	Private
1973	NEA	Ferris State College (Mich.)	Public
1973	NEA	Southern Oregon College	Public
1973	AFT	Vermont State College System	Public
1974	NEA	Jamestown College (N.D.)	Denominational
1974	AFT	New England College (Maine)	Private
1975	NEA	Adrian College (Mich.)	Denominational
1975	NEA	Northern Montana College	Public
1975	AFT	Quinnipiac College (Conn.)	Private
1976	AAUP	D'Youville College (N. Y.)	Private
1976	AAUP	Utica College	Private

*Four-year colleges awarding the baccalaureate or equivalent.

Source: AAUP

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THE ORGANIZATION OF STATE HIGHER EDUCATION PLANNING AND COORDINATING COMMISSIONS

By

George Basich

THE ORGANIZATION OF STATE HIGHER EDUCATION PLANNING AND COORDINATING COMMISSIONS

In the course of the past few years, after a period of rapid growth, the American postsecondary sector has experienced a slow-down in the rate of increase of enrollments. The more widely disseminated projections of enrollment for the remainder of the 1970's and the early 1980's predict even slower growth or no growth at all in the work loads of postsecondary education institutions.

This break with past trends will place additional strain on state planning/coordinating bodies, as some public sector campuses remain stable and others lose enrollments. An even more politically painful development will be the need, in the long run, to examine the role of the public sector vis-a-vis the private sector. Some states may also have to evaluate the impact of their policies for public institutions on the public sector of neighboring states.

Keeping these new issues in mind, we decided to review the organization of the state commissions that are charged with the planning and coordination of higher education systems, hoping to throw some light upon their ability to deal with these problems. We have reviewed recent trends in the organization of state planning agencies, summarized some evaluations of their scope and effectiveness, performed some statistical analyses to highlight the possible effect of organization upon the

propensity of states to support the private sector (this support consists mostly of scholarships for students who attend private schools), and summarized the views of knowledgeable observers about the policy-making process at the state level. We have tried to answer the following question: Should the federal government encourage the strengthening of organizations at the state level, or should it rely on other arrangements to build a desirable consensus during a period of stability?

SOME HISTORY

Until late in the 19th Century, state postsecondary institutions were governed by separate boards of trustees, just as were their private counterparts. Legislatures authorized new institutions on an ad hoc basis, often in response to pressures of different religious or booster groups.

In the last two decades of the 19th Century, the rapid expansion of normal teacher training schools and of agricultural and mechanical colleges sparked a movement for more integrated control of the public sector of higher education. State governing boards for higher education were established, particularly in less affluent states, to coordinate the administration of the several campuses and to put some order in institutional relations to the state government. There were about a dozen such statewide governing boards at the end of World War I, 16 by 1949, and today, after a net gain of three adherents since the mid-60's, 20 states have single or consolidated statewide governing boards, sometimes only

for four-year colleges and universities, and less often for all public institutions.

Other states retained separate boards for their principal universities which co-existed with statewide boards for other systems, e.g., the teacher's colleges, which eventually were upgraded to four-year institutions. Separate boards were established for vocational technical schools and for junior colleges. Especially following the post-World War II expansion in enrollments, these same states began to adopt some form of statewide planning and coordinating organization, for the most part advisory in character, which often did not include all the public institutions in the state.

Today, with the exception of two small states which have no coordinating agencies and rely on individual board arrangements, 28 states without statewide governing boards have opted for a variety of higher education planning and coordinating organizations with varying jurisdiction and authority. As a general rule, over the last decade, these coordinating organizations have tended to expand their coverage of the postsecondary sector, and to assume increasing authority to bolster their original purely advisory roles.

A TYPOLOGY OF AGENCIES

The increasing complexity and variety of state higher education planning arrangements did not escape the attention of policy scientists. Thus, Berdahl tried to describe developments in this field and evaluate

the performance of these boards.[1] In order to simplify the discussion, we have adopted his classification of state higher education planning/coordinating arrangements. These may be summarized as follows:

(1) No structure. Individual institutions have their own governing boards; no formal organization exists to coordinate their activities. There were 28 such states in 1949, 11 as late as 1964, and two in 1975.

(2) Voluntary. A consortium of institutions, generally in the public sector, is established without any statutory authority. Seven states had such arrangements in 1959, and only one in 1974.

(3) Institutional membership, advisory. Boards with representatives of either a majority of public institutions or of all public institutions, but only advisory powers, are of purely historical interest. There were three such boards in 1964, one in 1973, none in 1974.

(4) Broad membership, advisory. Boards that also have only advisory powers, but presumably more influence, since the majority of members were appointed to represent the public interest, gained acceptance in the 1960's. The number of such boards peaked at 12 in 1973. Subsequently, three of the 12 became quasi regulatory (see below), and one state adopted the broad membership, advisory structure.

(5) Broad membership, quasi regulatory. Boards with a majority of members representing the public, and with some regulatory authority, are becoming increasingly popular. These boards do not replace

the individual institution's governing boards, but have broader authority than advisory boards. They recommend, and are sometimes capable of imposing, growth targets, program scope, and resource allocation ceilings, at least for the public sector.

(6) Statewide governing boards. These boards have substantial direct power to administer, plan and allocate resources among campuses in the public sector only. There are twenty states with such boards today.

The state organizations by type appear in Table 1.

After Berdahl published his survey, Congress enacted the Higher Education Act of 1972, which, in part, authorized states to establish or designate existing agencies as so-called 1202 commissions for statewide planning of all postsecondary education resources. These commissions were supposed to fill gaps in existing higher education planning and to integrate into the planning process increasingly important occupationally oriented training programs. The new organizations, it was hoped, would force states to rethink their policy for all education beyond the high school.

By March of 1975, 46 states had established 1202 commissions. Thirty of these commissions were attached to existing state higher education planning/coordinating agencies. Nine new commissions were established outside of statewide governing boards; two in the states with no structure; and another in the state with the voluntary agency. Current

TABLE 1

CLASSIFICATIONS OF STATEWIDE PLANNING/COORDINATING STRUCTURES, 1964 AND 1973

State	Classifications 1964	1973
Alabama	1	4
Alaska	6	6
Arizona	6	6
Arkansas	4	4
California	3	3
Colorado	2	5
Connecticut	1	5
Delaware	1	1
Florida	6	6
Georgia	6	6
Hawaii	6	6
Idaho	6	6
Illinois	5	5
Indiana	2	4
Iowa	6	6
Kansas	6	6
Kentucky	3	4
Louisiana	1	5
Maine	1	6
Maryland	4	4
Massachusetts	1	5
Michigan	4	4
Minnesota	2	4
Mississippi	6	6
Missouri	4	4
Montana	6	6
Nebraska	1	2
Nevada	6	6
New Hampshire	6	6
New Jersey	1	5
New Mexico	5	5
New York	5	5
North Carolina	5	5
North Dakota	6	6
Ohio	5	5

TABLE 1 (Cont'd)

CLASSIFICATIONS OF STATEWIDE PLANNING/COORDINATING STRUCTURES, 1964 AND 1973

State	Classifications 1964	1973
Oklahoma	5	5
Oregon	6	6
Pennsylvania	4	5
Rhode Island	6	6
South Carolina	4	4
South Dakota	6	6
Tennessee	1	5
Texas	5	5
Utah	4	6
Vermont	1	1
Virginia	4	4
Washington	2	4
West Virginia	1	6
Wisconsin	3	6
Wyoming	6	4

Legend: 1 - No structure
2 - Voluntary agency
3 - Advisory board with a majority of members representing institutions
4 - Advisory boards with a majority of members representing the public interest
5 - Quasi-regulatory boards with a majority of members representing the public interest
6 - Single or consolidated governing boards without local or subsidiary system governing bodies.

Source: 1964: Robert O. Berdahl, Statewide Coordination of Higher Education (Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1971), pp. 34-35.
1973: Nancy M. Berve, "Survey of the Structure of State Coordinating or Governing Boards and Public Institutional and Multicampus Governing Boards of Postsecondary Education--as of January 1, 1975," Higher Education in the States (Denver: Education Commission of the States, Vol. 4, No. 10, 1975), pp. 297-352.

opposition, centered in vocational education circles--but not shared by their occupationally-oriented-program brethren at the community and four-year college levels--reflects a strong preference for tying the statewide planning process to existing vocational education program administrators and agencies.[2]

It would be difficult for most states to implement the recommendations for cut-backs of programs or facilities, if these were advanced by 1202 commissions. The power of the planning/advisory bodies in many states is limited to the public sector, and in 1969 only three states exercised the power to charter institutions to grant licenses or degrees, and two more had authority to approve program changes and degrees after the charter had been granted. It is unlikely that even these states could curb "surplus" institutions, as long as they were providing an acceptable service. In other states, the planning/coordinating agency has little authority to regulate existing programs of public institutions, and can, at best, administer mild wrist-slaps to colleges and universities which are expanding unnecessary, or undesirable, programs.

AGENCIES: PREFERRED FORMS AND OPERATIONAL STYLES

The Berdahl study purposely eschewed any effort to measure outcomes of the different types of agencies. According to Berdahl, more important than form is the agency's reputation for "fairness" in the exercise of its assigned functions, and especially its ability to mediate between the state and the institutions.

Of the many functions performed by a state coordinating agency, e.g., planning, budget review, program approval, capital outlay review, or federal aid administration, Berdahl's study focused on the first three. He believes the agency needs strong planning and program approval powers and capability, to control not only the size, but also the character of institutions. While he counsels strong agency budget review and recommending authority, however, he is not sure that the agency should displace, still less duplicate, the executive budget process for higher education. His preference, sometimes hedged by reference to local circumstances, is for the quasi-regulatory form. He feels that governing boards are often mired in administrative concerns and have not focused enough on long-range planning, or dealt with the overall problems of schools that are not part of the board. He also believes that institutional autonomy in administrative matters is very important, and this remains essentially intact even under quasi-regulatory agencies.

The quasi-regulatory agency is probably better suited to an expanding postsecondary sector than to one which is stable or declining. In the steady-state environment, institutions are likely to break ranks and expand, violating the recommendations of the board. This has already happened in Alabama, where two units of the state system carried out expansion plans in contravention to the agency's recommendations.

Unanimity is lacking about the ideal form of a state higher education agency. The Carnegie Commission for Higher Education,

which was headed by the ex-chancellor of a major state university, recommended agencies with advisory powers only.[3] However, most knowledgeable observers, including Folger and Godwin, clearly prefer the stronger quasi-regulatory form. These two authors stress the need to improve both the technology of planning and its exercise.[4]

Our literature review impressed us with the narrowness of the concerns of most state agencies, regardless of form. While one finds evidence of an occasional serious study of the role of the private sector, the literature is devoid of a detailed, orderly analysis of the impact of the public sector's plans and policies on private institutions. An even more glaring omission is the lack of studies of the increasing propensity of students to opt for occupational training and the effect of this new trend on the role of conventional postsecondary institutions.[5]

Berdahl, in his study, notes that planning/coordinating bodies gave lip service but little serious consideration to private higher education. The proprietary vocational sector is not mentioned at all by Berdahl, Folger, or other writers on postsecondary planning. It does not appear, from our survey, that most agencies coordinated their plans with those of private institutions, except in the case of the facilities construction programs, which were financed mostly by the federal government, and perhaps the design of scholarship programs. If the planning bodies made long-range evaluations of the roles of both sectors, this fact has not been featured in recent literature.

STATE PLANNING/COORDINATION AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR

The dearth of factual information about the way state planning/coordinating agencies deal with the problems of the private sector motivated us to attempt to measure the relationship between different types of organization and certain developments of the past 10 years. We decided to ask the following questions: (1) Did the form of the organization of the planning/coordinating process in the past, say in 1964, affect the growth of the public and private sectors? (2) Was the relative growth of these two sectors influential in determining the organization of the agencies today? (3) To what extent does the organization of the planning/coordination process affect the state's ability to introduce scholarship programs? (4) Are state scholarship programs which favor the private sector more likely to be introduced where one type of agency, rather than another, prevails?

Organization in 1964 and the role of the private sector.

In 1964, the states that had no planning structure, and those with either citizen-dominated advisory or quasi-regulatory boards, had the highest proportions of private enrollment. (See Table 2.) In the following decade, it was precisely these states which most expanded their public sectors. Despite high public enrollment growth rates, the share of the private sector in these states did not decrease more than in states with other coordinating structures. It would appear that it was not the

TABLE 2

1964 DISTRIBUTION OF STATE PLANNING/COORDINATING STRUCTURES, BY CLASS; 1965-74 PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR GROWTH, CHANGES IN PRIVATE SECTOR SHARES; 1974 STATE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM DATA

Distribution of State Structures, By Class, in 1964	Per Cent Enrollment Increased from 1965 to 1974		Private Share of Total Enrollment		State Scholarships		
	Public Sector	Private Sector	1965 (%)	1974 (%)	Per Student Enrolled (dollars)	Private School Recipient (dollars)	Per Cent of 1974 Private Enrollment with Awards
"1" (11 states)	122.7	19.8	45.2	30.1	37.79	691.85	8.6
"2" (4 states)	78.7	13.4	24.7	17.3	43.80	1,102.45	8.4
"3" (3 states)	88.6	10.5	14.4	10.6	28.46	1,450.37	12.2
"4" (8 states)	123.3	-00.003	38.5	23.4	60.66	913.56	15.9
"5" (7 states)	102.3	14.1	39.1	26.6	71.16	820.45	18.8
"6" (17 states)	94.6	24.6	23.0	16.0	17.28	668.99	11.9
					(50 State Totals:	872.74	13.8)

Enrollment Data Source: NCES - 1965: Opening Enrollment 1965.
1974: Fall Enrollment in Higher Education, 1974 (Washington, D. C.: National Center for Education Statistics, U. S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare) Table 81.

TABLE 2 (Cont'd)

1964 DISTRIBUTION OF STATE PLANNING/COORDINATING STRUCTURES, BY CLASS; 1965-74 PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR GROWTH, CHANGES IN PRIVATE SECTOR SHARES; 1974 STATE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM DATA

Scholarship Data Source: Toward a More Effective Federal/State Partnership Related to Private Higher Education (Prepared for the U. S. Office of Education, U. S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare by the Staff of the Education Commission of the States, October 31, 1975), pp. 33-35.

Joseph D. Boyd, 1974-75 Undergraduate State Scholarship/Grant Programs (Deerfield, Ill.: Illinois State Scholarship Commission, October 1974).

structure of the planning/coordinating organizations, but the states' internal politics and the financial capacity of the private sector to expand which affected the growth and distribution of enrollment.

Organization in 1973 and the role of the private sector.

The distribution of state planning/coordinating organizations in 1973 tells a somewhat different story about trends in both public and private sector enrollments. (See Table 3.) In general, states with rapid growth in public enrollments moved to organizations with more authority. The effect of rapid public-sector growth on private-sector growth is still unclear; the proportionate declines of the private share of total enrollment were very similar in states with high and low growth. Strangely enough, the largest proportional losses in the private share occurred in states with the broader advisory group.

Some general comments on structure.

A total of 37 states currently have either quasi-regulatory boards or state governing boards. Another ten have advisory boards dominated by citizen members. The following pattern seems to have been established: (1) States in which private enrollments are proportionately higher are more likely to have quasi-regulatory boards. (2) States in which the private sector plays a smaller role have either advisory boards or statewide governing boards.

Scholarship aid and the private sector.

State scholarship programs, which can be taken as a measure

TABLE 3

1973 DISTRIBUTION OF STATE PLANNING/COORDINATING STRUCTURES, BY CLASS; 1965-74 PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR GROWTH, CHANGES IN PRIVATE SECTOR SHARES; 1974 STATE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM DATA

Distribution of State Structures, By Class, in 1973	Per Cent Enrollment Increased from 1965 to 1974		Private Share of Total Enrollment		State Scholarships		
	Public Sector	Private Sector	1965 (%)	1974 (%)	Per Student Enrolled (dollars)	Private School Recipient (dollars)	Per Cent of 1974 Private Enrollment with Awards
"1" (2 states)	148.5	58.4	36.7	27.0	49.24	682.64	8.7
"2" (1 state)	45.5	4.7	25.5	19.7	4.26	-	-
"3" (1 state)	88.2	54.8	11.8	9.9	25.70	1,773.18	10.6
"4" (12 states)	96.0	9.2	26.6	16.8	28.04	1,055.12	9.4
"5" (14 states)	116.1	11.7	44.6	30.0	73.69	804.80	16.7
"6" (20 states)	91.7	20.0	24.5	16.9	22.21	708.02	11.8

Source: See Table 2.

of the state's concern with opening up opportunities to participate in higher education for children whose families are somewhat better off than those eligible for federal aid, distributed some $475 million in scholarship aid for the year 1974-75. Probably two-fifths of that aid was restricted to graduate students and special programs, and three-fifths was channeled to undergraduate students. Nearly 60 per cent of the total scholarship funds were distributed to students attending schools in the private sector.[6]

It is remarkable that the incidence of state scholarship programs is lowest in states with state-wide governing boards. Only 13 out of 20 states with governing boards had such programs in operation by 1974-75, as contrasted to 25 of the remaining 30 states. All seven of the holdouts in the group have had statewide governing boards for at least 10 years.

The percentage of the scholarship funds going to students attending private institutions did not differ significantly in states with either of the three most popular forms of organization of planning/coordinating bodies. What did differ was the dollar amount allocated per enrollee in the state, and the amount of dollars available per student enrolled in private education. Compared to states with other types of organization, states with quasi-regulatory boards, the very states with the highest proportion of students in private institutions, allocated more money both per private school enrollee and per private student recipient.

The states with more money per private enrollee also disbursed

scholarships to a higher proportion of students enrolled in the private sector. As can be seen from Table 3, these programs spread the money more widely by keeping the average award at no higher, and sometimes at a lower amount per recipient, than in states with smaller and more restrictive programs.

FORM, SUBSTANCE AND POLITICS

When states are classified into groups with similar organizations for the planning/coordination of higher education, the lack of difference in outcomes, either with respect to enrollment trends, or shares of the private sector, or scholarship policy, raises the interesting question of whether these organizations play an important role in determining policy at the state level.

One of the more successful directors of a state system, John D. Millet, who headed the Ohio Board of Regents, would certainly answer this question in the negative. In his valedictory lectures, he stated:[7]

> There was never any doubt in my mind...that the really important decisions affecting higher education in Ohio were made by the Governor and the General Assembly. The Board of Regents had final authority to decide only certain particular questions...
>
> The really important planning decisions were not made by the Board of Regents; they were made by the chief executive and the legislature, with the further participation of the judiciary on two occasions. And I want to add that this process is the way by which I think planning decisions must be made in our kind of society and in our kind of government.

Millet further defines policy planning, which is usually

performed by the legislature, executive and judicial branches, as[8]

> the resolution of major issues entailing value judgements, major issues of social goals...Policy planning is also concerned with how to obtain the economic resources with which to pursue the desired goals...

In his experience, program planning, the job left to the Board of Regents, "is more concerned with the details of action, once policy decisions have been made."

The limited role which planning/coordinating agencies can play under these ground rules has been widely recognized. For instance, Warren G. Hill saw their problem as follows:[9]

> Central agencies and their staffs have found themselves torn between the conviction that they should be institutional proponents and the realization that their statutory obligations require objectivity and a close relationship to governors and the legislative bodies. In how many instances do states have plans to adjust to stabilized or declining enrollment that minimize disruption and unreasonable "straight line" cuts in support? How many of states have established priorities that cut across constituent unit lines, that is, whereby the needs of all the facilities in a state system are placed in rank order rather than on a campus or single-system basis?

Despite their limited influence, the state planning/coordinating councils have had some positive effect upon procedural matters. It cannot be denied that they have, on occasion, rationalized the distribution of resources throughout the state system and promoted more efficient pooling arrangements between the private and public sectors. Whenever they have had impressive statistical programs, the way they presented information to the executive branch and the legislature undoubtedly affected

the substance of policy decisions.

Nevertheless, as John Folger has pointed out, the technology of planning leaves much to be desired. Enrollment projections change from year to year. There is no clear understanding of the role of higher education in meeting the demands of the labor market. Folger doubts that the planning/coordinating agencies, or for that matter anyone else, can do a definitive job of anticipating the optimum size and composition of the postsecondary system in a given state. The more sophisticated presentations, which take multiple alternatives into account, are not readily accepted by action-oriented groups such as governors and the state legislatures.

The federal policy-planner must face the danger that there is a seductive ease in communicating with organizations which are in place, organizations which, in a non-political world, could do the job. There is a temptation to make these essentially undemocratic organizations more representative and encourage them to include or consult more of the providers of postsecondary education (the 1202 strategy). While it is possible that the claimants of resources for higher education can be gathered in a council, however, it is less likely that they will reach a consensus, and the policy makers who hold the purse strings are likely to make their decision in an ad hoc manner.

A Carnegie Commission on Higher Education survey of legislators concluded:[10]

> The impression conveyed by legislators and state executive officials as they anticipated the future was one of men beleaguered by the pressures of office. Few of them seemed able to take a long view that was wholeheartedly optimistic. Most of them were more aware of possible difficulties in meeting the challenges to higher education than of alternatives in coping with the expected needs. Most of them seemed cognizant of the fact that the future depends on the present. For all of them, higher education was of necessity only one item on the agenda of public policy making. And because it was only one item competing with many others, few of these state officials were willing to be programmatic.

SOME CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

The apparent consensus that the allocation of resources to the postsecondary sector is predominantly a political process, and the much more tentative conclusion that its allocation within the public system can, perhaps, be affected by state planning/coordinating bodies, still leaves two questions unanswered: (1) Which activities may need to be encouraged to allocate resources in a period of declining enrollments, and (2) how to protect the private sector in a period of rapidly rising prices?

We do not believe that the state planning/coordinating bodies are likely to be strong enough in most states to champion programs that would solve these problems. It would be unfair to castigate an organization for not looking around the corner, or for not addressing questions which may not be politically meaningful in the context in which it operates. This was not our purpose. On the contrary, we attempted to evaluate the potential role of these organizations in innovating or providing

initiatives in a moment of crisis.

The planning and the implementation of the spectacular growth of the public sector took place in a political context which was shaped largely by governors. Governors and their staffs were the mainspring of successful expansion programs in higher education. The names of Sanford in North Carolina, Rhodes in Ohio, Kerner in Illinois, Brown in California, and Rockefeller in New York are closely associated with the establishment of master plans for the expansion of postsecondary education.

We would like to suggest that the time is ripe to interest governors, and possibly legislative leaders, in alternate policies which would be suitable to a no-growth environment. High on this new agenda is the need to refocus state higher education master plans to deal more effectively with the private sector, and to initiate coordination among states in pricing college services and in pooling resources.

State planning/coordinating commissions would not be excluded from this process. On the contrary, their roles would probably be strengthened. No political figure likes to make difficult and unpopular decisions. The options will have to be worked up by members of state commissions in order to reduce the onus of the hard choices.

With busy governors and legislators increasingly harried by money problems, information and expert advice from state agencies will be in greater demand. Whether it will be available will depend on the

initiative of the governors in demanding, or allowing their state agency staffs to examine, ways of shrinking the public sector.

As an immediate initiative, we would propose a series of regional conferences for governors or key aides, where some of the issues raised in this paper would be discussed. This activity is well in the tradition of the Office of Education, which has been sponsoring an information program for Congressional staffs, and ought to allocate some money to broadening the outlook of key personnel in areas where the most important decisions in postsecondary education are being made.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Robert O. Berdahl, Statewide Coordination of Higher Education (Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1971).

[2]T. Harry McKinney, "Administration of the Section 1203 Comprehensive Statewide Planning Grants Program" (Report for the Office of Planning, Budgeting, and Evaluation in the Office of Education, U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare) November, 1975, pp. 20, 30-63 passim.

[3]Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, The Capitol and the Campus: State Responsibility for Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill, April 1971).

[4]John K. Folger, "Three Questions about Statewide Planning," and Winfred L. Godwin, "Regional Dimensions of Planning and Coordination," in Formulating Policy in Postsecondary Education, ed. by John F. Hughes and Olive Mills (Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1975), pp. 230-246.

[5]Our view is conveniently demonstrated by omissions in the volume, Formulating Policy in Postsecondary Education, cited in the previous paragraph.

[6]Toward a More Effective Federal/State Partnership Related to Private Higher Education (prepared for the U. S. Office of Education, U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare by the staff of the Education Commission of the States) October 31, 1975. Figures derived from data on pp. 33-35.

[7]John D. Millett, Politics and Higher Education, 1974 (University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1974), pp. 61-62. (Note the parts of this quote are now in reverse order of appearance.)

[8]Ibid., p. 57.

[9]Warren G. Hill, "To Keep from Being King," in Formulating Policy in Postsecondary Education (Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1975), pp. 247-248.

[10]Heinz Eulau and Harold Quinley, State Officials and Higher Education (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), p. 185.