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ABSTRACT

A conversation about cultural anthropology between a college anthropology professor and an English and humanities high school teacher is related. As part of the National Humanities Faculty Why Series, the book is intended to help students, teachers, and citizens maintain and improve their intellectual vigor and human awareness and to help them reflect on the purpose, methods, and usefulness of a wide range of human endeavors. A major area of concern is why, in our contemporary world, young people are so narrowly and strongly identified with small groups on territory (street gangs for example), social and economic class, and ethnic or racial origin. How these groups can be induced to extend their horizons of identification to the larger power systems of nation-states is discussed. To help social groups accept each other's differences without hostility, educators must teach tolerance without destroying self-justifying group identifications. What is involved in achieving such goals is discussed. Also included is a bibliographical note that cites anthropology resource materials of interest to teachers and students. (Author/RM)

WHY BELONG?

A CONVERSATION ABOUT CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY WITH JAMES PEACOCK CONDUCTED BY CAROL BALL RYAN

The National Humanities Faculty Why Series

2

TITLES IN THIS SERIES

Why Talk?	Walter J. Ong and Wayne Altree
Why Read & Write?	Harry Berger, Jr., and Louis E. Haga
Why Re-Create?	Burton Raffel and Vincent J. Cleary
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Why Remember?	Erich Gruen and Roger O'Connor
Why Belong?	James Peacock and Carol Ball Ryan
Why Judge?	William J. Bennett and William L. Bennett
Why Pretend?	Errol Hill and Peter Greer
Why Draw?	Donald L. Weismann and Joseph F. Wheeler

Foreword to the Series

This conversation bears a simple title. *Why Belong?* Yet taken together, this and the other conversations in this series illuminate one overriding question. What does it mean to be human?

Of course there are no final answers to that question, yet there are hard-won understandings and insights available to us from many sources, past and present. We all too often fail even to ask the question. Thus we ignore the help available and fail to become more human, more compassionate, more decent than we are.

At a time when our problems are so many—racism, poverty, pollution, crime, overpopulation, to name a few—we hold that all who care about education are compelled to re-examine what is taught and why. We believe that the problems will not be solved without getting at the larger question underneath them: What does it mean to be human?

The NHF WHY SERIES, then, reflects the concern of the National Humanities Faculty for the full range of humanistic questions. These questions involve but are not limited to the subjects in the curriculum that traditionally comprise the humanities. English, social studies, music, art, and the like. Indeed, they embrace the purpose of education itself.

In this series, the titles range from *Why Belong?* (human culture) and *Why Remember?* (history) to *Why Pretend?* (drama) and *Why Dream?* (myth). Each presents a transcribed conversation between two people—one an authority in the study or practice of a particular branch of the humanities, the other a person experienced in the hard realities of today's schools. In these informal yet searching dialogues, the conversationalists are rooting out fundamental questions and equally fundamental answers not often shared with students of any age. They are the vital but often unspoken assumptions of the delicate tapestry we call civilization.

These conversations are designed for the learner who inhabits us all—not only the student but the teacher, administrator, parent, and concerned layman. We hope they will offer new insights into our inescapable humanity.

A.D. Richardson, III
Director
National Humanities Faculty

THE NATIONAL HUMANITIES FACULTY WHY SERIES

WHY BELONG?

a conversation about cultural anthropology with

James Peacock

conducted by

Carol Ball Ryan

Chandler & Sharp Publishers, Inc.
San Francisco

About The National Humanities Faculty

The NHF provides outstanding humanists from the world of the humanities, arts, and sciences as consultants to schools. The program was founded by Phi Beta Kappa, the American Council on Education, and the American Council of Learned Societies under grants from the National Endowment for the Humanities (although the findings, conclusions, etc., do not necessarily represent the view of the Endowment) and various independent foundations. Inquiries are invited: The National Humanities Faculty, 1266 Main Street, Concord, Massachusetts 01742.

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Introduction to the Conversation

A. D. Richardson III, in his foreword to this series of conversations between high school teachers in the humanities and relevant scholars, poses as the fundamental question "What does it mean to be human?" We all know that fundamental questions are the most difficult to answer directly and simply What constitutes an explanation has long troubled philosophers. So also has human nature.

When we come to the question that confronts Professor Peacock and Mrs. Ryan—"Why Belong?"—additional intricacies are introduced. Of course one could answer that to be human means one must belong because human beings are one of the gregarious species of primates. However true, this is a gross tautology that would neither enlighten Mrs. Ryan nor satisfy Professor Peacock's sensitive and learned insights into the thousands of experiments man has made in gregarious living. Even if anthropologists were able to agree on how such groups should be classified and characterized, there would still remain another pressing consideration that people ask themselves. Why is my group better than others? In other words *Why Belong?* contains two major subsidiary questions: the *what* of social groups and the *why* of the meaning and value people assign to their own life ways. In the shorthand of contemporary anthropology these two questions are usually referred to as society and culture.

For the last fifty thousand years at the very least we have some archaeological evidence that human groups have encountered each other. We have some speculations about such encounters. Not until written records became available and systematic ethnographic research was undertaken do the details of such encounters begin to emerge. The records, on the whole, have not been reassuring about at least one aspect of what it means to belong to a human group Extermination, flight, and enslavement have in the past been dominant

responses to intergroup encounters. Human groups have fought for wealth, however defined, for slave labor, and for natural resources. Conquests or extermination of alien groups have often been rationalized in terms of the superior culture of the aggressors. Here a caveat must be entered to what can only seem a lugubrious view of mankind. Any thoughtful contemporary knows there is no one-to-one correlation between the behavior of individuals and the actions undertaken by social aggregates.

In the early part of this conversation on Why Belong, Mrs. Ryan asks Professor Peacock some immediate and practical questions that she faces as a teacher of English and humanities in the Scituate (Massachusetts) High School. She asks essentially why in our contemporary world are young people so narrowly and strongly identified with small groups based on territory (street gangs, for example), social and economic class, and ethnic or racial origins. She asks how such groups can be induced to extend their horizons of identification to the larger power systems of nation states. She wonders whether one day we may hope that human beings and social groups will accept each other's differences without hostility. The path to such indubitably desirable ends Mrs. Ryan suggests is the teaching of tolerance without destroying self-justifying group identifications. This is saying complexly what Mrs. Ryan asks forthrightly. That such questions can be asked by Mrs. Ryan is a measure of how far aspirations for mankind have both persisted and expanded over four thousand years. It is the recurrent dream of the peaceable kingdom.

Professor Peacock wisely responds to such hopes with cautious digressions. He provides us with an excellent mentalistic (as opposed to a materialistic) analysis of what is involved in achieving such goals. He points out that man as a social animal and man as a cultural animal are intimately interrelated. To this conversation he brings his experience as a professor of anthropology, formerly at Princeton, now at the University of North Carolina, and as a specialist in Indonesian culture.

It is not appropriate for the writer of an introduction to suggest different frames of reference. I have already erred in this respect by suggesting some historical perspectives. I shall err again by suggesting some contemporary matters not directly considered but certainly implicit in Mrs. Ryan and Professor Peacock's conversation.

I refer to what is sometimes labeled the crisis of the modern world. The sense of crisis is certainly present in the contemporary scene. It is not the first time that wide sections of a population have been oppressed by feelings of

disorientation and depression during periods of rapid sociocultural changes. Our present sense of crisis has produced a large and growing literature that is both descriptive and prescriptive. Too often its prescriptive aspects are culture-bound. In periods of stress, groups often persevere in, or revert to, patterns of the past even when these patterns may have precipitated the crisis, or at least are no longer appropriate to new situations. This has been called cultural involution.

Today there is general agreement that we are experiencing what is considered an unprecedented rate of change. Established institutions are crumbling; old moralities are being brought into question; our planet which was assumed to be an inexhaustible open system is now seen as a closed and fragile one. Some see such changes as progress, others as disaster.

The proximate causes suggested for these changes range as widely as the changes themselves: the exponential rise in population, the emphasis on technology with its potentials for both human and environmental destruction; the growth of bureaucracies and service occupations at the expense of productivity; and national power systems and economies. The list can be extended at will.

The basic humanistic concern is with the individuals who are experiencing such changes, whatever their cultural backgrounds or their social status. If they survive at all, they live on longer to face the growing irrelevance of much of that preadolescent learning, both cognitive and valuational, that is essential to the formation of stability in human groups. In all of this, as in all human history, it is the poor, the weak, and the unskilled who suffer most drastically in such periods of change, both physically and psychologically.

The ghetto child may be learning the advantages of escape into drugs, crime, gang warfare, and trashing. He may end his life in a prison riot. The child from an upper-class environment maybe learns that the values of legal justice, egalitarianism, and the rewards of conformity are open to question. In such periods the number of individuals who are passively anomic or aggressively alienated increases. Formerly cohesive groups fracture along a whole series of fault lines both social and cultural.

The practical question is what can teachers, particularly of adolescents, realistically expect of themselves. Possibly the first answer is not to expect too much of schooling. Most of their pupils have already internalized basic approaches to life derived from families, peer groups, and the media. Our schools are institutions of limited effectiveness in coping with the crises of our times. For parents, educators, and politicians to burden schools and teachers

with broad sociocultural responsibilities, with which they themselves cannot cope, is to do education a disservice.

However, if emphasis is on the development of an individual rather than on the solution of social problems, most teachers will encounter a few students who are curious, eager, and still capable of learning well beyond formal curricula. Helping them to discover what are ethnocentrically called "exotic cultures" should in itself be a training in tolerance and at the same time a lesson in man's basic need to belong to his own group without hostility toward others. In other words, tolerance may be better communicated indirectly by objective and sympathetic exposure to other times and places than by direct insistence on this indubitably necessary virtue in our disturbed and claustrophobic world.

Cora DuBois

Harvard University

WHY BELONG?

RYAN One of the goals that educators like to set is to increase their students' tolerance of different peoples and customs, perhaps even to move beyond mere tolerance toward respect. Do you think we have the right to try to form values like this?

PEACOCK Well, instead of giving a yes or no answer, maybe I can start with an analogy: Think about the thermostat and the furnace, as a model of looking at society. If you think of what the thermostat does, it in effect defines values for the furnace. If it's set at sixty-five degrees, it tells the furnace that's how hot it should get and how cold it should remain—not above sixty-five, not below. And what the furnace does is provide the resources, the heat.

In a very simple way, you can think of society as working in the same way. We have all these resources—human, technological, and so forth—and we have values that have to guide these resources, the way they're used, the way they're mobilized. Otherwise, the resources simply run away with themselves. (To some degree that's probably what's happened in the ecological crisis, too much power given to the technology and too little to the values.) So, thinking of that analogy, I would say it's extremely important to formulate values which do have some control over the way resources are used.

Then comes the question. How do you form these values? Anthropologists work from one of two basic positions, I suppose. One is the materialist position, which holds that values are simply a result of technological development. So, in terms of our analogy, the furnace in a sense creates the thermostat. If you have enough furnaces, eventually someone has to invent the thermostat in order to control them, to keep the heat from getting out of hand. By this token, if you create an industrial society, eventually you'll automatically get ecological values, say, because otherwise the society won't survive, the technology will get out of hand. Or back in history three or four

thousand years, when food production came to be the way of life, automatically and necessarily there came to be values of a hierarchical type, as a result of the increased surplus which agriculture permits as compared to hunting and gathering. some people are thought of as being higher than others The increased surplus permits a leisure class, distinguished from the working class, and so you get high and low, and you get values which say that the high is better than the low. These are just two examples of how, according to this school of thought, you really don't have to worry about forming values. You simply start trying to survive, and then, just automatically, your values will form themselves. So from this point of view, the question "Do we have a right to form values?" is a nonquestion.

Now, what does this imply for the other anthropologists (let's call them "mentalists") and for people like educators or religionists, who try to form values in a more direct way? People who, instead of working from the technological, work from the mental? Well, first of all, I think the materialist position contradicts itself, because after all the materialists are writing books to espouse the idea that books don't have any influence. If that's true, why bother to write books? Why aren't they out building machines or roads? And, without going into the evidence, I belong to this second group of anthropologists and assert that direct modes of forming values—sermons, courses in schools, rituals in primitive society, brainwashing, psychoanalysis, and so forth—can directly affect values independent of technology.

All that as a prelude to trying to answer your question, because first of all one has to believe that we can form values before it makes any sense to ask if we have a right to do so.

Then the question. Do we have a right to do so? There, I suppose, we have to make what we might call a humanistic assumption. that there are aims and fulfillments for men which go beyond mere physical survival – appreciation for beauty, social harmony—and that one can define certain significant values that make life more meaningful or beautiful or, as some would put it, moral. And then one would have to assume that men have as much ability to decide what these significant, meaningful values are as the environment does

Now, if we took the materialist position, we'd say it's not really up to us to decide what values we would hold because the environment is going to decide for us. But I'm taking the humanist position and saying that first, we can determine our values, independent of the environment, and, second, we can arrive at some notion of what are good values and what are bad values —maybe something very general like beauty is better than ugliness, or har-

mony is better than strife, or productivity is better than passivity. I'm assuming both, and therefore I say yes, we do have the right to try to form these kinds of values.

RYAN But haven't you really distinguished two sets of values, values that industrial society—the environment of technology—seems to be creating and the values that humanists would like to try to teach? Don't these conflict? And if so which takes precedence?

PEACOCK Well, conflicts obviously do arise. For example, it seems pretty clear that the so-called counterculture disillusionment with American society can be blamed in part on the humanists. If you think about it, what have the humanists been teaching? For so long they've been teaching very much the counterculture types of values—that self is important, maybe even more important than the system, that self-fulfillment is an ultimate goal, that beauty is important, that experience means something, perhaps even more than productivity. And then think of the kinds of things that the counterculture sees America as standing for, particularly in the government, the so-called military-industrial complex. It stands for essentially technological values —more and more machinery, more and more industrial control, what Reich in *The Greening of America* calls the corporate state, which violates the self and then turns the self into a cog in a bureaucracy—you know that whole image. And in a way we humanists in our own method follow the technological pattern while we espouse humanist values.

I have a class with over two hundred students, who just yesterday took the final exam. I graded the exam by computer because we had only forty-eight hours to get the grades in. The system, the corporate state under which I work, the bureaucracy virtually forced this method. Here I'd been standing up for a whole semester teaching or preaching humanistic values, appreciation of the self, experience, and that sort of thing, and yet the method I was using to award a grade (which theoretically though I think not in fact reflected how well the students learned the lesson) contradicted the lesson that I was trying to teach. I think that kind of problem faces most of us who are working in schools. In too many ways our method and our message are contradictory, in the way that the counterculture has learned to emphasize as contradictory Perhaps when the students go off and try drugs or what I think are more enduring things, like meditation, when they try to discover themselves, living in communes where they try to get away from the bureaucratic loneliness and impersonality of the larger society, we are partly responsible. They see themselves as doing what we have always told them to do as humanists. And their

attempt is in opposition to the main society.

RYAN Is it possible then that one of the things that needs to be done as we work to increase students' tolerance for different peoples and customs is to increase their tolerance, perhaps even respect, for us, because we manage to operate at all when we're caught in this bind? In other words, admit this conflict frankly to the students and say we're up against it.

The humanities course by its very nature seems to be running counter to society, and yet this has to be a resolvable difference. I can't believe that it can't be resolved somehow.

PEACOCK I tend to think that it may not ever be resolvable. Society, I think, has essentially four problems to solve. The first is the kind that we're talking about with respect to the furnace; society has to generate sufficient resources to adapt to the physical environment. And then there's the second problem, which is to mobilize these resources sufficiently to achieve any collective goals that society may have, for example, winning a war. The third problem it has to solve is to integrate these two processes and also integrate all the people who are trying to carry out these processes. And then the fourth problem is to define some kind of meaningful framework so that all these attempts at solving such problems seem significant enough to people so that they keep on solving them. For example, if digging a hole is necessary for survival, but the diggers don't see anything more meaningful about digging than the simple fact that they're digging a hole, after a while they'll stop digging; they have to have some framework of meaning, like digging a foxhole to keep from getting hit by a shell. But, of course, it's rare that we have such direct affirmation or justification. Usually we have to have a more abstract one, so we have to have something like the Protestant Ethic that tells people that it's good to work because otherwise you're evil.

Now, let me take the fourth and the first problems. The way these are organized is discrepant. The function of trying to adapt to the environment is organized technologically; one is always trying to take certain means and organize them more efficiently to achieve certain ends—what we call the practical thing And, there, any questions of beauty, logical elegance, meaning, and so forth tend to be, if you push practicality far enough, dropped. You know the hard-headed businessman who if told, "Well, that factory you threw up really isn't very pretty," will say, "So what, I just wanted to turn out more shoes."

On the other hand, ultimately, the people who work in the factory have got to see making those shoes as meaningful. Otherwise, ultimately, they're not

going to make any more shoes. They'll cop out, which a lot of today's people are doing. There has to be some sort of mechanism that defines the meaning of what people are doing, and usually there we get into questions of what the religion does, what the people's philosophy of life is, what art has to say, and all that. There it seems that the endeavor is organized differently, because when you start trying to show how something is meaningful, you start paying less attention to efficiency and you start paying more attention to such things as moral cohesiveness (that one ethic doesn't contradict another) or beauty (that one form fits with another).

It looks to me as though when people start trying to construct a philosophy of life, a religion, an ideology, a culture, that is meaningful, they work on the basis of a pattern that assumes values like beauty and elegance, and these values necessarily and inevitably contradict the values like efficiency and practicality that people are forced to affirm when they are trying to solve the first problem of adaptation. So I think the contradiction is inherent, and yet it seems clear to me that to survive, the human race has to wrestle with it.

RYAN Does the fact that the problems of survival are more interconnected than they've ever been before and more global than they've ever been before link the humanistic value of mutual respect with survival—maybe even, at long last, bring respect and survival to agreement?

PEACOCK Without abandoning the position that ultimately even in this situation there's a contradiction between the two values of survival and sol idarity, I do agree with the idea that here in this new and growing internationalism lies an opportunity for anthropology, which is not to just increase tolerance but, as you say, to develop respect and empathy for varied cultures or societies and in that way to increase world unity or world solidarity.

But let me also return to our four problems, survival, mobilization, integration, and meaning, and the idea that solving the one gets in the way of solving the others. So long as the nations are at peace, solidarity among them is seen as necessary for the survival of all. But when they go to war, and one country is up against the wall, it will see such values as humanity and international solidarity as just getting in the way. To have a soldier who is maximally efficient in killing the enemy, it probably helps to have him not respect and tolerate the enemy, perhaps even to get that sort of value out of his mind. So solidarity facilitates survival only at a certain phase—and let's hope we stay at that phase.

RYAN It seems to me an even more subtle attack on this business of values comes from humanists themselves, those who claim that there is no such thing

as a value which can be generally accepted. Even such a thing as beauty, which you mentioned, they would not be willing to impose as a value on other people. They insist that values come from the clarification of the individual.

PEACOCK Yes, but I think the most powerful source of that point of view or perhaps the broadest elaboration of it has been in anthropology, the notion of cultural relativism, which was coined, I think, by Melville Herskovits some forty years ago.

Let me give you an example of how I, and I think many anthropologists, go about trying to get at this question of cultural relativism, which is related to the question of tolerance and respect and whether or not we can do anything to increase them. In my introductory course I usually start off with a couple of analogies. One is the story of the wheelbarrow and the Russian worker. Once there was a worker in a Russian factory, and every day at quitting time he pushed a wheelbarrow through the gate. The guards would always inspect the wheelbarrow and then let him go on through. Finally, after many months, it was discovered that he was stealing wheelbarrows. Now, the lesson in this little story, I say to my students, is that the guards had too narrow a point of view. They looked at the part, not the whole, they were looking for contents instead of the container. The one thing that anthropology tries to teach is to look at the totality, at the whole, of any culture, and ultimately at the whole gamut of human existence. Now this breadth, we assume, produces a certain attitude which is something like objectivity.

Next, I give them the analogy of the psychoanalyst and the patient—the idea of undergoing psychoanalysis, where ultimately the aim is to make the patient conscious of what's unconscious within him, to make the neurotic become completely aware of his neurosis and what it means. Now, anthropology tries to do the same thing by this broadening viewpoint with respect to the student and his society, by trying to survey the total gamut of cultures and society. It hopes to bring the student to see his own society as simply a case within this spectrum so that it's more of a specimen to him than something in which he is involved. We don't want him to do this all the time, we don't want him to drop out of society, but to learn to take this attitude when it's helpful to do so, to see his society more or less as a specimen on a laboratory bench and achieve the same sort of objectivity toward his society's values and hangups that the patient achieves through psychoanalysis concerning *his* values and hangups.

And if the weapon of psychiatry is depth, getting this one patient to probe deeper and deeper within himself, I'd say the weapon of anthropology is

breadth, to survey in a wider and wider compass the possible values and experiences and world views that humans can have, and in this way to bring the student to assume what we call cultural relativism. That is to say, the student is able to realize that his own society's values are relative to the peculiar conditions that exist there and that any society's values exist relative to the peculiar conditions that exist there, and therefore he's able to get into, to empathize with, to sympathize with, the unique values of any society by understanding the conditions that have brought them about.

Let me just add one qualification, though, before dropping cultural relativism. I must distinguish here between cultural relativism as a method of understanding and cultural relativism as an ethical position. Let me give an example. The Dani of New Guinea cut off fingers in order to pass from one status to another. If a girl becomes a woman, she cuts off a finger to symbolize this passage. Now, the doctrine of cultural relativism would say if you want to understand what seems at first sight to be a bizarre act or savage behavior, you've got to understand what cutting off the finger means to the Dani, and therefore to understand what it means to pass from being a girl to a woman in Dani society. On the other hand, this does not imply that ethically we would espouse that women everywhere ought to cut off fingers when they stop being girls. Cultural relativism therefore is not necessarily an ethical position. We can try to understand Nazism without condoning it. But there's often a misunderstanding that anthropology, in teaching a method of tolerance, necessarily implies ethical relativism as well as methodological relativism. That just isn't so.

RYAN The one thing that seems to be emerging from the method of tolerance, though, is this matter of, to use your word, empathy.

PEACOCK I hope so.

RYAN But realistically, does it ever have the reverse effect?

PEACOCK Probably, but effects either way are hard to measure. If only we could take all the students who've taken introductory anthropology and test their tolerance four years after they achieve their B.A. and then test the tolerance of all those who have not—you know, this is the sort of thing that's implied when anthropologists say things like every president of the United States should have been trained in anthropology, which may be a ridiculous kind of thing to say. Without tests, we don't know whether anthropology induces tolerance or the reverse.

RYAN We're trying that kind of testing, by the way.

PEACOCK I'd like to hear about it.

RYAN Well, we're trying to evaluate exactly this kind of thing. Is there any difference in our students after they've had a course which allegedly teaches tolerance, and how long will the effect last if it does last? We've evolved a pretest, posttest situation with questions, fairly specific questions, designed to show any increase or decrease in tolerance. It was given at the beginning of the year to our class of juniors and to a control class, which will not have anything like our course. We'll give it again at the end of the year. And then we'll get the class back after a year of not having them in the course, that is, just before they graduate, and give it again, and see how much loss there's been. There's a theory, being worked on at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, that all tolerance will be lost. Depressing, isn't it?

PEACOCK There's an opposing theory, though, which may be merely optimistic rather than accurate, and that's the idea of the sleeper effect. Have you run across that?

RYAN No, but I think I understand it.

PEACOCK Two groups were examined, given some sort of questionnaire to test their racial tolerance, their attitude toward different races. (For the moment, I'm not worrying about that term "race," which anthropologists don't like.) Then one group was given some sort of tolerance course and the other was not. The next test showed no difference, but after a year or two years, the group that had taken the course showed more tolerance than the other group.

Now, there are various ways of explaining the results. You might say something intervened, something significant happened that had nothing to do with the course. But the other interpretation is the sleeper effect, unlike direct stimulus response learning, say, of the multiplication tables, learning of values occurs in part in the unconscious. William James used to say that you learn how to swim in the winter and how to skate in the summer, referring to this unconscious type of learning. It takes a while for these things to seep into the neurons (if I may use a sloppy analogy). This complex learning of values takes a long time, there has to be some kind of unconscious sifting of sand, and therefore you won't see the effects until a year or two later.

RYAN Well, that is optimistic. I'd love to have it work that way.

PEACOCK Of course, if we push the sleeper effect far enough, then we really can't ever test it. Some even argue that the effects won't show up in this generation, but will show up in the next. Their argument would be something like this. Values probably don't have as direct an effect on the way people behave if these values are taught to adults as they do when they are taught to

children. Your students and mine are, after all, sixteen, eighteen, nineteen years old, and our teaching of values may just slightly affect them, not enough so that we see much difference in their lives, but maybe there will be a difference in the way they raise their children. And then these children will change a little bit because of that way of rearing, and maybe then we'll see a little bit more change when they raise their children. Then in many generations we'll see—somebody will see—the fruits of our labors.

RYAN You never could test that, but still it's nice, and it keeps educators going, I'm sure.

PEACOCK I wanted to get back to your original question of how or whether anthropology does affect values. There's another aspect that may be pertinent to the answer, and that's the effect of anthropology on anthropologists. The one thing that seems to be at the core of the anthropologist's thought about himself is identity. Here I'm talking only about a cultural anthropologist, as opposed to a physical anthropologist, who studies about human evolution, or the archaeologist, who studies artifacts. I'm talking about the anthropologist who studies living people. The core of his identity is field work in some exotic society. In fact, in most graduate schools it's a requirement that the student have at least a year of this exotic immersion. Afterward, interestingly, when you run into an anthropologist this is the point he almost always turns to in trying to establish a relationship with you.

For example, last night I'd got in about 11 o'clock, checked into my hotel, and stepped out to get something to eat. When I'd taken about three steps, who should I run into but an old anthropologist friend. So I went home with him, and we talked for a couple of hours. It only took about ten minutes before we were talking about some people who were doing field work in the same place he and I had, in Indonesia. One of them is his student and is in Indonesia right now, and another is someone we both know who has just come back from Indonesia.

And what should he begin talking about? Not about the theories that they were developing or anything like that, but about the experience they were having in field work. What aspect of that experience did he single out? Well, he said the student didn't really get into it (those were the words he used). His wife didn't like to live in a village, so he had to live in a town, and as a result he never really got into the village life on this little island. And then he said the second person always remained an outsider. My friend wasn't sure why, but he'd been on this same island and had talked to people there and knew that, strangely enough, this person had never been accepted into a particular

clan that he was trying to learn about and on which he eventually wrote.

It's interesting that that question of acceptance, nonacceptance, involvement, nominvolvement, inevitably comes up when anthropologists talk about anthropology, and acceptance or nonacceptance within some really different group. This experience is often described as being very much like psychoanalysis in the sense that you remake yourself. You go in as a sort of child who doesn't know the language and the customs and the values, and you're forced to some degree to remake yourself in order to participate at all. Of course, you never participate very fully. There have been a few anthropologists who have gone all the way and never came home. But most of us are too rigid, or Western, or whatever to ever do that. But we have to participate to some extent even just to stay for a year.

At that very gut level, field work in anthropology and its notion of appreciation of other people's values has had a profound influence on anthropologists. And if one's experiences somehow come through to one's students, some of this feeling must seep through. Though there are problems. For example, I myself find it very hard to talk about my field work—the trauma of existing in Indonesia—to over two hundred students and through the bullhorn provided by my department to improve teacher-student rapport. Still, I'm convinced that the most profound experience any anthropologist has had does come through to the outside and have an influence.

RYAN Do you think, then, that for younger students an experience in culture shock is valuable along those lines?

PEACOCK Yes, I do. It's a delicate thing, but even getting them into doing a little bit of field work in a ghetto or in a slightly different class community from their own can be a mild version of culture shock. We try to do a little bit of that with our students. We have field projects here and there, one in Mexico, one in the Caribbean. But they're so few, it requires so much effort to organize a lot of people in these kinds of experiences, and also it can inconvenience the community they're studying. You know, it's really hard for a community to take on a student as a guest. And so we run into administrative questions. Just how far can we go in getting a student into one of these experiences? Morally, to what extent is it fair to expect every community to have its own anthropologist sort of sitting around looking at it? You know, it's not great fun to have some guy just sitting around looking.

RYAN The aborigines have said something like that, haven't they? That everybody studies them, and nobody helps them?

PEACOCK Yes, and of course this is one of the reasons that many of the

American Indian groups have rejected anthropology. Last summer I happened to ride past a Hopi reservation and see a big sign. It didn't say "Anthropologists Keep Out," but it said "No White Men Allowed. They Have Violated the Rules of Our Society as Well as Their Own." This represents the attitude of many Indian groups toward anthropologists, that they have taken but not returned. Fair enough. That attitude is certainly reasonable. But from an educational point of view, this kind of exposure would seem necessary in order to bring about a profound sort of sympathy and cultural relativism, and yet from a moral point of view, respect for others' rights and values might decree that we don't permit students to have this sort of experience. It looks as though we're again running into a contradiction. Have any of your high school students gone outside the classroom?

RYAN The way we've handled it is through volunteer work in the community. This brings students into contact with different cultural scenes, not really different cultures but simply minute scenes—an old age home or a home for exceptional children or a special education class within the school system. And the students, from what we've heard from them in conferences that we've taped, are profoundly moved.

And yet we've also come up against the idea that maybe their sympathy with the people is going to be very hard on those people when the students withdraw. For instance, we have a boy, a football player—you'd never suspect he had such depths of sensitivity. He's been going once a week to St. Coletta's School, and you should hear him talk about his experience with an exceptional child who cannot speak, never can communicate to anyone, but somehow now can communicate in some way, some nonverbal way to this boy, and runs to meet him when he comes, goes leaping across the field and hugs him. They understand each other. You wonder what's going to happen when the class project ends.

PEACOCK And whether it would be better that this relationship never had started because of the trauma of its stopping.

RYAN Yes, because helping our students to become sensitive to people may not be helping that little boy beyond a certain point. We don't know whether this is good or not. The only justification I can find for it is that if you sensitize enough students toward the need to give like this, maybe some of them will continue to give.

PEACOCK Of course, at least for the time being, you've solved one of the contradictions. Since what this football player is doing is helping rather than simply observing, he is giving something in return for what he's getting. It's

hard to total up whether he's giving as much as he's getting, but at least it's better than his simply sitting there behind a one-way mirror and in a sort of fish-eyed way coldly observing these specimens running around.

On the other hand, it's amazing, though, how much objectivity can become involvement. For example, I suppose the most distant way of studying living creatures is the method used by anthropologists who study primates, not men but other primates—chimpanzees, macaques, gorillas, and so forth—and their method is simply to sit there and look, sometimes even sit way off and look with binoculars. But in one case, one of the most moving accounts I've ever read, there is a chimp named Washoe, and the experimenter has taught her to speak with sign language. One of the problems with the primates other than man is that for various reasons, such as too little separation between the glottis and the velum, they can't produce a sufficient variety of sounds to make human speech. But the idea is that maybe the mental equipment is there to a greater extent than we expected, so the experimenter taught Washoe to speak with sign language like the one deaf mutes use. Washoe has learned something like three hundred words and can speak sentences. An experimenter, whose name is Susan, told of one incident when she stepped on a baby doll that Washoe had and Washoe signaled with her hands something like "Up, Susan, off the doll. Foot up. Up, Susan. Give baby. Washoe want baby."

RYAN Sounds like Dick and Jane.

PEACOCK Yes. I have a three-year-old child, and it's so much like the way she talks. And then another time Washoe looked in a mirror and caught a glimpse of her image and said, "Me, Washoe," even sensing that she was a self. So here, where you would have expected to find the greatest distance between the observed and the observer, pure objectivity is breaking down.

And one might even ask about this the question that you've asked about your football player and the child. What's going to happen to Washoe when the experiment is over?

RYAN To shift the approach to the problems involved in the study of anthropology, do you think it has negative effects on this matter of values, on the building of respect? I'm thinking, for example, of studies which seem to link low intelligence with various ethnic groups.

PEACOCK Well, let me cite a couple of studies. You may be thinking of the Jensen studies that were first published in the *Harvard Educational Review* and tried to argue that the intelligence test scores of whites were higher than those of blacks to an extent that environment could not explain.

There is also a theory put forth by an anthropologist, Carlton Coon, which tries to trace different racial groups back to different fossil men, so that, for example, the African Negro came from zinjanthropus, or the Indonesian came from pithecanthropus—that sort of thing.

Well, most anthropologists reject both these theories, which would differentiate among the ethnic or racial groups in terms of intelligence and cultural capacity. There's a collection of articles edited by Loren Brace, Terry Bond, and George Gamble and published by the American Anthropological Association which attempts to refute the Jensen argument. There is very good reason to believe that environment, not heredity, is still the major factor in intelligence. Anyway, intelligence test scores, most of us would argue, don't really test intelligence unless one follows Thorndike's definition of intelligence as what intelligence test scores measure.

Most of us do not agree with any of the attempts, so far, to show that ethnic or racial groups differ in fundamental capacity for intelligence. After all, for 500,000 years, at least, the human species (and it is one species, a race is not a species) has been intermarrying at various points. The racial divisions that exist now are certainly not those that existed in Paleolithic times, the time of Neanderthal man. And the entire species has been working on the same environmental problem—survival. The tool man's had has been a flexible mental capacity that permits the use of language and that sort of thing —culture, in short—instead of some strictly biological means of adaptation, like the birds' wings or the sabertooth tigers' tusks. And so for that very general reason, which can be made more specific, most of us feel that over this 500,000 years all human races have thrust toward developing a rather high capacity for intelligence, probably with no significant difference among them. There may be other ways in which anthropology has negative effects on tolerance and respect, but I think in this question of interpreting ethnic or racial differences it would tend to have a positive effect.

RYAN Then, on balance and, in a way, to sum up this matter of the search for values, what do you think of anthropology as a tool along these lines?

PEACOCK I think the overall thrust of anthropology, insofar as it has had any effect, has been toward increased tolerance. This may be arrogant, but I think that the amazingly greater tolerance and appreciation of human diversity that you find now compared to what you found in the colonial period, say, up to the Second World War is in part due to anthropology and to the insights that to some extent revolve around it. So much of what anthropology has to say about cultural relativism seems trite to today's students, but thirty-five years

ago when colonialism was rife it wasn't. So I think the overall effect has been toward increase in tolerance and empathy.

RYAN Do you think that there is an age when this kind of study is most effective? I'm thinking of the contrast between the university and the high school student.

PEACOCK I think it may be more effectively taught at the high school level. It's not something I've worked out in detail, but let me give my reason for saying that.

It seems to me that the high school is the last significant community for most people. If you think about it, in a high school just about all the functions of life are satisfied for a student. In the high school he finds clubs, friends, dating, mating, as well as work, academic work. Once he goes to the university, he tends to find that the classroom is a place for study, but dating, mating, friends, clubs, and that sort of thing don't have much if any connection with classrooms. Contrast the high school to the big state university. And then to society later on, where work is so separate from family life, friendship, and all the rest. If you accept this analysis, then you might say that in high school any influence the classroom has will more easily ramify into other spheres of the student's life than in the university. So for that reason, I'd say that if a value change can be brought about in high school classrooms, the implications will be greater.

RYAN How about elementary school?

PEACOCK There's a move in that direction, certainly. Thinking of my own children, I'm impressed by how much they are getting. For example, my three-year-old in nursery school brought home a drawing she had done of a Jewish top and stuck it on the refrigerator, and I don't think that would have happened in a small-town Christian-oriented school a few years ago.

There are studies that show that racial prejudice is usually developed at the preschool age, if I'm not mistaken. So you might think that the preschool level would be a crucial time at which to introduce racial tolerance—books that have, instead of Dick and Jane, black or oriental children. And, I suppose, anthropology can widen it even further and provide, for example, Eskimo Dicks and Janes. Those early years could be a very crucial time.

RYAN We do assume, though, that one of the pressing concerns of the high school student is this matter of finding identity, trying to identify himself. And part of that, of course, involves career choice and part of it is personal, but part of it is membership in some sort of human community.

PEACOCK Right. Ethnic, or national, or what in your school you call the

family-of-man identification.

RYAN Do you think there's an important timing involved? Is this the place to tap in?

PEACOCK Let's think of what this search for identity means. At least a very important part of what it means is passing from membership in your family to membership in the larger society. I think most people, at least in the United States, think of this as the passage from high school to college, or to the job world. In high school, most people are living at home and are therefore part of the family, but in college or once they go to work and get married they're living away and therefore they're removed from it.

Now, what does family membership imply? Well, one thing that it involves is particularism. Particularism means what's implied by the phrase "a face only a mother can love." By universal standards, Johnny may be ugly as sin, but to his mother he's beautiful. Well, this is particularism, where you relate to a particular person because of your particular relation to that person, instead of seeing that person in terms of some universal standard. Now, let's take the opposite. If universalism is taken to the extreme, penetrates the family, then there would be mothers who, if Johnny's ugly enough, reject him and toss him out, ship him off somewhere. To some degree this seems to be happening in middle-class families, where studies have shown that many mothers reward their children when they achieve by hugging and kissing and so forth, but don't when they don't achieve. So there are these two values.

Now, particularism in the family is paralleled by ethnic identity, or racial identity, in one very important way, and that is that neither of these identities is voluntary. The reason your mother feels bound to you is because she's your mother, and there's nothing she can do about it; there's nothing voluntary about that. You're stuck with your family membership; it's particularistic. The same is true of ethnic membership. You're stuck with it. You're born into the black race, the white race, the yellow race, or the Italian ethnicity, the Anglo-Saxon ethnicity. To a great degree, most people are born into their religious group, too. They're born Protestant and remain so, or they're born Catholic.

To carry this reasoning further, if ethnicity is so much like the family in that it's particularistic, then it seems very natural that at the point when you're passing from family membership to the outside world and seeking a substitute for the family—you want the same particularism that you're losing by moving out of the family—that at that point ethnicity would seem to be a very good substitute. And if this is true, I suppose maybe the high school and early

college years would be a very logical time for students to suddenly become aware of, begin to emphasize, their ethnic identity, as a substitute for losing the family. And if this is true, then it would seem to be a very crucial time to teach some tolerance so that the need for particularistic identity doesn't result in an overly narrow identity, which is to say prejudice and that sort of thing. Maybe this is a roundabout way of reasoning, but it does seem to link up these two, high school and a tremendous need for identity, an important part of which would seem to be ethnic or something else that's particularistic.

RYAN Do you think that you can extend what you just said to include simply being human, as well as being ethnic? After all, one is born with that, too.

PEACOCK Well, I have a cynical view of that. If I can put it succinctly, I don't think people can identify with one group unless they oppose it to some other group. There can be no "us" unless there is a "them." So the problem with the human group is who's the "them." Who's the nonhuman? It might be the animal world. This would perhaps help explain why in Christianity, where there's some notion of the possibility of a total world of Christians, a Christian world brotherhood, so much emphasis was placed in many sects on distinguishing us from other animals. Man has a spark of divinity whereas animals don't. It might be that with interplanetary travel, as we begin to think more and more of the possibility of nonhuman creatures, we can identify more and more with the human group because we say it's "us" against "them." As I said, this is a rather cynical notion, but it looks as though the historical evidence says that identity only occurs with opposition.

RYAN Then what do you think is going to happen if young people go on establishing ethnic identity or even national identity and not human identity?

PEACOCK Well, it looks as though what would happen is a dangerous seedbed for prejudice, war, and so forth, which is derived from this essential need for a particularistic identity.

But both of us are trying to see how something like humanities, anthropology in humanities, could tear this down. I suppose anthropology does try very hard to point out how the family of man is one big family, but for a long time it has emphasized the distinction between the human and the nonhuman. Maybe that's part of the us/them dichotomy. Humans have language. Humans have symbols. Humans have religion. Humans can have funerals whereas animals cannot. That sort of thing. Maybe we'll get an anthropology which is, instead of worldwide, interplanetary, and then we can emphasize other comparisons.

RYAN Somehow I can't see that as a solution. I see it as a mammoth extension of the problem.

PEACOCK I agree. Ultimately, it just extends the war to the galaxy.

RYAN If this kind of identification is going on, with or without our help, simply going on anyway—the ethnic identification or the national identification to replace the nuclear family—if this is going on anyway, what intervention ought we make at this point before it gets out of hand? Back to values again.

PEACOCK Each time we come up with this word "ought," I feel paralyzed because, speaking off the cuff, I have this great fear that I might say something that somebody might actually do. There's nothing more frightening to an intellectual than to make a recommendation and have it accepted.

But actually one can see dangers in breaking down ethnic identities, breaking down national identities. Let me just give an example, a study of two groups done in Nova Scotia. One is an Anglo-Saxon group, the other an Arcadian group (French-speaking Catholics). The study showed that mental illness occurred oftener among the Anglo-Saxon group than among the Arcadians. What were some of the reasons? Partly because of the notion at that time of a French solidarity in Canada, the Arcadian group felt this ethnic in-group identity, and this particularistic security seemed to cut down on mental illness, whereas the Anglo-Saxon group, with a more universalist approach, had more mental illness. People have noticed that among Jews there is usually a lower rate of alcoholism than among certain other groups. Part of the reason for that may be the tight in-group ethnic identity. There are some good things about ethnic identity. Belonging can have good effects.

So, on balance, one would hate, in the name of humanity and tolerance, to dislocate people from any group concrete enough to give them identity and so force them to identify with a group so abstract that it cannot give them identity, such as the family of man. I think instead of saying "What ought we to do?" we should try to point out some of the pros and cons each way but say that we should probably very carefully consider to what extent a group so abstract as the family of man can provide this type of belonging. I think we have to admit that historically the family of man hasn't yet managed to give this kind of powerful identity. But look at the ethnic enclaves we know about. Nationalism is obviously a powerful force. Much of the florescence of literature in Indonesia, for example, was during the nationalist period when spirits were high. Certain international religions have produced this kind of excitement, security, sense of belonging—Buddhism, Islam. But every one of these

has been an "us" against some "them," not nation against nation, but us Muslims against the Infidels, us Communists against the Capitalists.

RYAN You're looking at it from the point of view that one would exclude the other. I was hoping to add the third concept.

PEACOCK Okay. I don't see them excluding each other, obviously, any more than belonging to a family precludes being a member of a nation.

RYAN I mean, as long as ethnic identification is going to take place, perhaps it should be fostered and the best of it encouraged, and even taught. The same with national identification, if it's going to take place, and I'm sure it is—obviously it has its role to play, though I question it simply because it has historically caused more conflict. What about adding to them the concept of human identification?

PEACOCK Well, there's one thing we can certainly say, and that is that it looks as if the ethnic and the national identification are going to come about with no great difficulty. They have already come about so often. So, if we are to have any effect at all, then it would seem that we should add something that is not coming about naturally. Certainly we can say that identification with the total human family does seem more difficult. If we can bring that about, we've really accomplished something. There are, of course, universalizing trends Again, I would point to the counterculture as a very positive catalyst or solvent.

RYAN The counterculturalists have found a new way to do the "us against them."

PEACOCK Yes, they have, and yet it has mixed a lot of "us's" that formerly weren't mixed. Take rock music. I'm very struck by the analysis of 40,000 songs done by Alan Lomax based on computer study. He discovered that rock music encompassed more different song types than any other form of music in human history. That's really an amazing sort of conglomeration. And it goes along with the counterculture. It combines a lot of different things that haven't been combined. Maybe it's a part of the identification. Could we try to nail this down more specifically by thinking about your course, which is entitled "The Family of Man," I think?

RYAN Yes, it is. But since the anthropological element comes from your book *The Human Direction*, could I ask you first for a brief summary of the evolutionary scheme?

PEACOCK Let me say first that our scheme is just one of many put forward by anthropologists, and all of them have their virtues and vices. Our scheme is both a typology and a history, it can be used to classify societies

existing today as well as to delineate phases in world history. We distinguish five types or phases: primitive, archaic, historic, early modern, and modern.

The primitive type of society was dominant in the world before there were kingships and cities based on large-scale agriculture, beginning around 6000 B.C. Primitive societies are based on a simple ecology, such as hunting, gathering, and fishing, and are primarily organized around bonds and divisions of "blood," of kinship. We emphasize, too, that primitive societies tend to unify the social and the sacred. For example, sacred plants and animals known as "totems" are allied with particular social groups, such as clans. And mythology may merge sacred and secular time, as in the Australian aborigine concept of "the dreaming," where spiritual ancestors exist not in the past but in "everywhen" and can, during rituals in which the aborigines actually dream, possess the personalities of living men. In primitive society, then, sacred creatures are very intimately bound to living men, and the sacred and social are often perceived as identical.

If primitive society is based on kinship, archaic society is based on kingship. Examples are the kingdoms of ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia, medieval Southeast Asia, and contemporary Swaziland of Africa. The economic base of such kingdoms is more complex than that of primitive society, normally based on food production rather than food gathering. The sacred is more clearly differentiated from the secular; gods emerge who do not identify with ordinary men. Just as society has become differentiated into ruler and ruled, so has the universe become differentiated into gods and men. However, the gods still inhabit the world, living in mountains and oceans, and they may be incarnate in extraordinary men such as the god-kings of Egypt and Southeast Asia.

Historic society emerged with the historical religions, notably Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity, all created during the first millennium A.D. In these religions, sacred and social are differentiated to the point that the ultimate powers inhabit another world rather than residing in this one. This other world, be it a heaven or Nirvana, is imagined to be radically better than this world and this life, so that people struggle mightily to gain salvation and live in that other world forever. Owing to the intense concern with salvation, there flourish specialists in that endeavor, such as monks in Christianity and the Sangha or Sufists in Buddhism and Islam. With historic society, we start to see the decline of particularism and the rise of universalism. That is to say, people are judged less and less according to who they are, in terms of membership by birth in families, castes, and classes, and more and more according

to what they do. At first this "what they do" is defined religiously—what they do by good works to attain salvation - but as time goes on it's defined secularly, too—what they do by good *work*, by performance, to achieve "success." But this development comes most clearly in the next phase, the early modern.

Early modern society emerged only some four hundred years ago with the Protestant Reformation. Ever since, variations on the pattern have been erupting, such as the communist and nationalist revolutions of Russia, China, and the so-called New Nations that have occurred in this century. Protestantism, especially in its most radical forms such as Calvinism, amplified the historic vision of a great distance between the Kingdom of God and the Kingdom of Man. Tormented by the sense of distance and discrepancy between the two worlds or kingdoms, Protestants struggled to reform the world of men to match the world of God. A parallel is seen in the revolutionary struggle of the twentieth-century communists and others to remake the world radically to match some transcendent and utopian vision. Of all the types of society, the early modern is the one most driven toward reform and change.

Modern society is just now emerging, and its contours are still vague. It seems to be organized much like early modern society but is more collectivist, with the bureaucratization of everything, modern man is an organization man. The most salient feature of modern religion is the Death of God. People cease to believe in objective gods and heavens. They take a subjective position that such entities are merely symbols, created by the thoughts of individuals. If the source of religion is believed to be the individual self, then the search for religious meaning turns inward. Through meditation, mysticism, and drugs, we explore the self, looking for truth. But this "self" is vague and murky, and it seems to embrace an infinite variety of values. What is good and what is bad seems to depend on which self is talking. Instead of worshipping one God we now go to many selves. Not surprisingly, modern man is confused.

How have you been presenting this framework to your students? I mean, how do you dramatize the scheme once students have some grasp of the basic concepts, such as culture and evolution?

RYAN After we've introduced technique and terms and the idea of interdisciplinary faculty and group work, we plunge right into a really detailed examination of what you have called the human direction, trying to dramatize it and enliven it for this particular age group, to make it live by performing rituals and plays and seeing films to illustrate the different periods.

The first one we did, to illustrate the primitive period, was the ritual of the

Ndembu cure. We brought in the drama coach and the music teacher and two arts teachers; and the class more or less decided for themselves which role each one would have. About six people decided to be musicians, and fifteen or twenty decided to be villagers. Two or three others made the mask of the witch doctor and the costumes, which they researched in Victor Turner's *The Forest of Symbols*. After about three days of this workshop preparation, they performed the ritual. It was quite effective, and I think they loved doing it.

We pushed back all the desks in the classroom to give us a wide floor space, and then certain of them were brought forward to represent huts of villagers, placed according to the diagram in the book. Then the students enacted, improvising the dialogue, the difficulties of the patient in his relationships with the tribe. The musicians improvised calls to meetings with tom-toms, and they accompanied, with a sort of throbbing chant, the actual working of the medicine man. The medicine man came in, first only to interview the various members of the village to find out what the sources of the trouble were. Then he came in in full regalia, mask and all, to perform the cure, which began with the patient lying on the floor, being sprinkled with sand.

The groaning of the patient was heart-rending. And the medicine man had a remarkable dignity about him. And the people of the tribe stood around watching while he extracted the disease, in the form of a tooth, from a blood-letting, an opening in the patient. When he did the whole tribe felt purged. All of them as one felt purged of the illness.

PEACOCK And how did the students feel?

RYAN They felt rather exhilarated. They really did. It was fun for them and they loved it.

PEACOCK In the book Turner said the girls trilled. Did they trill?

RYAN Yes, they did. The chorus sitting on the window sill trilled, especially the leader of the music department. It was very nice.

I think everyone understood the qualities of the primitive community, the feeling that they had and why it worked. That's the kind of thing that makes it real for high school students. One interesting thing, by the way, that came out of their study of the primitive culture was that they found it very appealing. I think they felt in their own culture a loss of wholeness, a loss of being complete and at home in the world. They regret this. So they must have been touched.

In the archaic period we did a shadow play after the students had read a chapter from the *Bhagavad-Gita*, chapter two, which seems to say it all.

PEACOCK Did you use a *wajang* play from James Brandon's *Thrones of Gold*? This shadow play is Indonesian, Javanese, but Hindu-ized. It's a Hindu story from the *Bhagavad-Gita*.

RYAN Yes. It has the same characters as the *Bhagavad-Gita*, and they're doing the same things that the *Bhagavad-Gita* has them doing. Only it is more on the level, I suppose, of popular culture than really deep spirituality. It's the same thing but appealing more widely to people who would be watching a shadow play, standing and watching one in the street. We included the comic relief scenes and ogres and all the rest. We also had a marvelous tape of Gamelan music and we have a very musical girl who can improvise. Of course, she doesn't really know how those songs should sound, but she was able to improvise in a very credible way, having listened to the tapes enough. So we had chanting going on from the narrators and the girl improvising this lovely song effect and serious scenes where the gods appeared and came into the bodies of the kings and the comic relief scenes with all their slapstick and farce. The youngsters really threw themselves into this.

PEACOCK So they played the parts instead of puppets? I think that's probably much more powerful.

RYAN We didn't have time enough to make puppets.

PEACOCK Also, unless one has studied for years, one really doesn't know the techniques to do the puppets. And anyway in Indonesia they've adapted the puppet play to human plays, so really you're right in keeping with the shadow play.

RYAN Of course, we don't limit ourselves to plays. When we were doing the archaic period of Greece and Rome, for example, the students read excerpts from the sixth book of Vergil's *Aeneid*, which is so perfectly archaic. It was absolutely marvelous, where Aeneas goes to the sybils' cave and the god speaks through the hundred openings in the cave and gives him instructions about descending to the underworld. And his father gives him the mission of being the founder of Rome, ancestor of Augustus, and all that.

PEACOCK One of the distinguishing features of the archaic is that the gods live on the earth instead of in a heaven, so that would be necessary.

RYAN One of the nicest things happened when we had the chapter summaries from *The Human Direction* reduced to chart form—the primitive and the archaic—on the board, and we had just started talking about the third, the historic A student came back to talk with us about some notes he felt he had missed and looked at the chart, just looked at it, and started tracing it across horizontally Then he said, "It looks to me as if the concept of god is going to

get more and more abstract as we become more sophisticated."

PEACOCK So the students had really caught on to the principle. It culminates, as we see it, in the Death of God, where the image of god is too concrete and the push is to some more abstract feature.

RYAN So he asked, "Is this going to happen?" He anticipated that. And we said, "What do you think as you look around?" And he answered, "Yes, I guess it is, but can't something be done about it?"

I think this shows that the evolutionary approach is enormously provocative. The students are finding it, as you hoped it would be, a scheme, a framework, some way of feeling a little more comfortable with human history and direction. That brings us back to this matter of identity. Don't you think that it makes a person more comfortable if he knows where he is in the panorama?

PEACOCK Yes, I suppose so. Direction is part of identity.

RYAN And heritage, too.

PEACOCK Yes, that's right.

RYAN So we hope, anyway, that it's going to provide one way for a youngster to relate himself to a human community.

PEACOCK Although, I suppose from the point of view of identity, it's rather a shame that the scheme stops without saying where he'll be next. It tries to say, but it leaves an open question, and in that sense he knows where he's been but not where he's going.

RYAN One can always extend the line.

PEACOCK Yes, if you get the principle, you can extrapolate. But imagine a Martian coming down to earth and sitting in an automobile. Someone tells him how to shift gears, and so he shifts into first, second, third, fourth, and then he tries to shift into fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, on the assumption that the principle will apply infinitely. And our idea of evolution is that one of the problems with making predictions is just like the Martian's problem in trying to extrapolate from the principle of shifting into first, second, third, and fourth on into fifth, sixth, and so forth. He's assuming that shifting gears is simply an infinite process and you move from one to the other; it's just more of the same, you simply increase the number. Many views of evolution hold that the way to predict is simply to extrapolate from the present, that the trend that has been noticed so far will be continued indefinitely into the future. It's simply that there will be more of the same, more people, more pollution, more destruction. I disagree. I think there are reasons why we cannot make that assumption.

RYAN Then, if you see the direction in which things will go unless some intervention occurs, you can see your role perhaps a little more clearly.

PEACOCK Yes.

RYAN If this is the direction we're headed in, and you don't want it to go on . . . How inexorable do you think it is?

PEACOCK With the Death of God, when people don't feel any longer that it's possible to impute to the ultimate forces of the universe the kind of concreteness they accepted in the past, many will start seeking that ultimate force within themselves. But the self is a vague and murky entity. When you start looking into yourself instead of looking up to some objective, clear-cut deity, the direction becomes unclear.

This is when the personality becomes what the psychiatrist Robert Lifton termed "protean." One of Lifton's patients complained of feeling that he wore many masks, that he had no true self underneath. The patient also said he had no clear idea of right and wrong, that there wasn't a crime he couldn't imagine himself committing. Lifton says this type of personality is the "Protean Man," and we might see him as a result of our "Modern Religion." With modernity we've lost or are losing our belief in objective dualisms, such as God and Devil, Heaven and Hell, Good and Evil. Losing these objective guides to action, we look inward, seeking fulfillment of the self rather than obedience to the external. But what is it that "fulfills" the self? We don't know because, with the break-down of external standards, our definition of self becomes so vague. Trying to fulfill itself, the self becomes ever more protean, more many-sided, amoral, flexible, and confused.

But getting back to the question: is this direction in the development religion and the self inexorable? I wouldn't say so, but the trend does seem to follow from steady trends in society and technology. The world's population has steadily and relentlessly increased, and society and technology has become more complex. Take, for example, the increase in job specialities —some twenty thousand are listed by one bureau in Washington. As complexity of the technical and social systems has increased, people have required an increasingly abstract framework to render this complexity meaningful. So unless the processes of specialization, bureaucratization, and technological advance are reversed, I would predict that our way of defining meaning will become more and more abstract. We'll reject concrete, objective, external symbols such as God and we'll seek ever more abstract, subjective sources of meaning such as "self." And because of the vagueness of definition of the modern self, our personalities will become ever more flexible, slippery, and

bewildered, which is to say, more protean.

RYAN This is more of an argument against a humanities course than for one.

PEACOCK No, not necessarily. I think probably in one way it's an argument for. If the attempt to define a frame of meaning becomes more and more abstract, then the group in which you locate that meaning would also have to become broader, and in that sense, logically, protean man would more easily root his identity in the human group than root it in some particular ethnic or national group.

RYAN He would be trying to define or to know what it is to be human.

PEACOCK Exactly. And I think probably there you hit it: he does find some sort of ethical boundary, he's not an infinite relativist. He may not have found an ethic he can unambiguously affirm. And so he may be kind of cut loose. But if we can see him as looking for what is totally human, what is universally human, he could find something that he could say is right, an ethic that he could affirm.

RYAN Okay. It seems to me that all the elements that the course has been dealing with in its phases of evolution are there because they were needed and still are needed in any new phase of evolution. In other words, what it is to be human has always been something aesthetic, something spiritual, something useful, something social, and still is. So protean or not, man would define himself in a new way but in those terms.

PEACOCK So there is some substance then to protean man. I think really you've added something new to Lifton's picture of protean man. He simply emphasizes the things that he is *not*; he is not all of these things that we have traditionally sought as a source of identity. But I think the things you pointed to he *is*, or he can affirm. Maybe your course is helping to meet needs of people who are willy-nilly becoming protean men and women.

RYAN Well, if exposing our students to a great variety of man's activities through the ages will help, maybe we are doing something. Certainly your anthropological framework gives them a look at the major belief systems —Buddhism, Judaism, Confucianism, medieval Christianity, New England Protestantism, and communism. And inside this framework we can fit poetry and other literature and music and art along with the ritual and drama I mentioned earlier. Besides Vergil they read parts of Dante's *Divine Comedy*, and poems by Tu Fu and Li Po and Walt Whitman. Some of the music comes along with ritual and drama, and some, like the Taoist meditation music, we use as background. Instead of lecturing at our students, we try to get them

doing as much as we can.

Of course films and slides are great for sections that can't be so active. They need to look at slides of Chinese landscape painting, for example, or the film *The Red Detachment of Women* for dance. But we try to involve them as directly as possible. It seems very important to read some things like the *Analects* of Confucius even in part, or *The Sayings of Chairman Mao* or Jonathan Edwards' "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God," not just be told about them.

PEACOCK Hasn't your description of your course answered your question about teaching values? This kind of active creating by students of rituals, drama, dance, active exploration, looking at texts, seeing films, strikes me as really the most humane way to deal with values. I think I probably was—I don't want to say tricked—but I ended up taking a more authoritarian point of view than I would have liked in saying that we do have the right to form values, that we should teach values of tolerance and respect.

Probably a better approach is the way your course is doing it, by encouraging people to try various kinds of experiences, such as trying to produce a ritual in a primitive society, trying to produce an archaic shadow play, and through this exploration testing out or investigating what it feels like to adopt different values. If you go through a primitive ritual you get some feel for what it is like to be a primitive, and the same with the archaic and the historic. There certainly is a nice correlation between a humanistic nondirective approach permitting individual freedom, exploration, and so forth, and the dramatic participation that you're having in your course.

Of course, the same holds, even more strongly, for field work. That's why anthropology and other disciplines emphasize field work so much. it permits people to form their own values instead of simply being told about them. Now admittedly, there is a structure behind our supply of these kinds of experiences. If we deliberately send people off to an exotic place to do field work, or deliberately encourage them to do work with old people or deaf children, or deliberately encourage them to put on an alien or exotic play or ritual, we're not being completely unbiased, but still we're not saying that they have to adopt the values that the experience implies. We're just saying try it on for size.

So I really like the philosophy that your course implies, as well as the practical, I'm sure vivid, quality of having so much of it self-done. By having students play an active part in this learning process rather than having the learning process imposed on them, aren't they, just by virtue of doing, learn-

ing something about playing an active part in modern society? The fact that they've seen that it's possible to go out and try new things should make the future a little less frightening.

RYAN Do you think, then, that anthropology can have implications for young people finding an active part to play in society and that at the same time it is consciously keeping some of the richness and beauty of diversity alive?

PEACOCK Yes. What you're doing is providing them with a richness of experience actively perceived, and so you're providing a sort of model for how they in their lives might try to deliberately keep alive some sort of richness of participation. You know, of course, that's part of the counterculture, one of the promising and good parts, this deliberate attempt to seek a diversity of experiences, to hitchhike around the world, to smoke pot in Afghanistan as well as in Los Angeles or New York, to sample with some degree of sincerity—the degree of profundity of understanding is sometimes questionable—a variety of religions, all the way from Zen Buddhism to transcendental meditation.

The very way that you have modeled your course is, in a sense, protean or modern. You've provided a richness, a diversity of participation, and people can come away not simply with the concepts of the course in mind but with a memory of the experience, a feeling for a great diversity of participational experiences.

Maybe in the future the protean personality will be able to partition itself sufficiently to be a spontaneous participant part of the day and the specialist bureaucrat the society seems to demand the other part. We may have overlooked some of the flexibility that human organisms are capable of.

There is one other thing, though, and it relates to a point connected to your course and to our discussion of the type of value that anthropology can offer. We've been talking here about anthropology mainly as a part of the humanities conceived as teaching appreciation of something, appreciation of man's diversity, richness, and in this sense teaching tolerance and respect. But there's the other half of anthropology. It's a science in the sense that it endeavors to bring order out of chaos by classifying, by analyzing. So another thing that it can offer in this more scientific aspect is a sense of pattern.

The big thing that I try to teach, in addition to the appreciation, is that all this diversity resolves into certain rather clear-cut patterns. The attitude that I would like the student to leave the course with, in addition to his appreciative, receptive attitude, is an analytical one, so that when he sees a lot of apparently diverse, confused, or insignificant phenomena he will look for some pattern

there. And, of course, if you push it far enough, this resolves into certain methods for analyzing pattern, statistical methods or comparisons of various kinds. But at the first level it's simply a disposition to look for pattern.

Now, I don't think there's any real discrepancy here between this scientific side of anthropology and the humanistic because obviously in learning the value of a piece of literature you look for a pattern in it. You don't simply enjoy it, you begin analyzing the themes, the way one character opposes another. In art, you begin breaking the drawing down into certain lines and forms. And music, of course, can be so highly theoretical in its analysis as to easily rival the physical sciences. So there's no discrepancy here either. But since humanities are often thought of as soft, emotional, and appreciation-oriented, I think we have to balance that picture by emphasizing the scientific or analytical aspect of both the humanities and the sciences.

In a way, discovering the pattern may help some of the other things we've been talking about, such as the search for identity. There's a recent book by Rodney Needham, *Belief, Language, and Experience*, that ends with the following approximate quote. "Einstein said that the most incomprehensible quality of the universe is that it is comprehensible. For the study of human life, the solitary comprehensible quality is its incomprehensibility." I strongly disagree with this position. I think that one item of faith that a perceptive study of anthropology can evoke is a conviction that life and its movement, its history or evolution, does have a pattern and perhaps a direction. And, therefore, if one is sufficiently keen and vigorous in his pursuit, he will discover something of that pattern. After all, you can't really identify with anything until you uncover its contours and structure. So I think discovering the pattern is part of finding your place and identity in the total scheme.

RYAN Can you tie what you've just been saying into the concept of "the family of man"?

PEACOCK Well, if all the world comes to consist of protean people, they would be playing fruit basket turnover all the time, right? They would be dropping in and out of each other's lives so that each would encompass within himself or herself a diversity of experience. I must say it's rather confusing to conceive of this. But I presume that's where the human family would come in. If there were enough movement in and out of everybody's life, then surely people would develop more feeling for what it is that holds them all in common, and so then they would plant their feet firmly in this one unifying thing, humanity.

I don't see humanity as something entirely chaotic. One of the keys that

anthropology tries to insert or turn is pattern, and there are certain things which do seem to have been, for as long as there have been human beings, universal. For instance, no society, as far as I know and as far as any anthropologist has shown, permits murder except under circumstances of military defense. No society permits stealing as a common occurrence except when directed against an out-group. No society permits incest except for certain very, very specialized figures, such as the divine kings of ancient Egypt, Inca, Aztec, Hawaii. There are apparently these very solidly grounded universals which we could plant our common faith in.

RYAN How about universal needs to create, universal needs for things like beauty, universal needs for things like social harmony?

PEACOCK It does seem to be true—I believe this is correct—that there is no society that does not have art. There is no society that does not have religion in some form, and by that I mean not simply belief in a supernatural but some overriding scheme that gives a sense of meaning. There is no society that does not have a mechanism for preserving social harmony, avoiding war. That almost follows by definition: it wouldn't be a society for long without that. To date, there is no society which does not have some form of family system, a system of social relations based on biological kinship.

But the other parts, the art, the religion, many practical people kind of shut off and say, "What's the use of them?" It's difficult to argue sometimes how they are useful, but it does make one pause when you realize they're always there. You know, when you realize these things are always there, you begin to feel that there's a common base for humanity and you can't just blithely and irresponsibly diverge from that pattern without tremendous consequences.

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No single text provides a satisfactory survey of anthropology, but a useful starting point is *Anthropology Today* (Del Mar, Calif.: CRM Books, 1971). This work is based on pieces written by anthropologists, then synthesized into a kaleidoscopic overview by the CRM editorial staff. The result is a rather disorganized and occasionally erroneous but nevertheless absorbing and vividly illustrated account of the field. Alan Dundes, *Every Man His Way: Readings in Cultural Anthropology* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), skillfully anthologizes representative essays and articles by anthropologists. A particular slant on sociocultural anthropology (discussed in *Why Belong?*) is James L. Peacock and A. Thomas Kirsch, *The Human Direction. An Evolutionary Approach to Social and Cultural Anthropology* (2d ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973).

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Somewhat outside the conventional boundaries of anthropology are the speculations about the future that emerge in this conversation. The notion of "Protean Man" is taken from Robert Jay Lifton's *Boundaries. Psychological*

Man in Revolution (New York. Random House, 1970). Incisive and provocative speculations about trends of today and tomorrow, of particular interest because they focus on England rather than America, are to be found in anthropologist Edmund Leach's *A Runaway World* (New York. Oxford University Press, 1968).

J.P.

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