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ABSTRACT

The control orientation of educators may predispose them to resist compromising in conflict for fear of appearing ineffective to their colleagues. Students' and community groups' nonnegotiable demands may also induce this fear and resistance to compromising. Subjects who believed their group member evaluated them on resisting intimidation, compared to gaining tangible outcomes, did resist agreements with the low-power person and developed competitive attitudes toward him. Subjects confronted with a nonnegotiable demand, compared to a negotiable demand, tended to resist reaching an agreement and did develop competitive attitudes. The race of the other bargainer did not appear to affect significantly subjects' reactions. Results imply that reducing the pressures on educators to be in control can help them manage their conflicts constructively. (Author)

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Control Orientation, Nonnegotiable Demands, and Race in  
Conflict Between Unequal Power Persons

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Abstract

The control orientation of educators may predispose them to resist compromising in conflict for fear of appearing ineffective to their colleagues. Students' and community groups' nonnegotiable demands may also induce this fear and resistance to compromising. Subjects who believed their group member evaluated them on resisting intimidation, compared to gaining tangible outcomes, did resist agreements with the low-power person and developed competitive attitudes toward him. Subjects confronted with a nonnegotiable demand, compared to a negotiable demand, tended to resist reaching an agreement and did develop competitive attitudes. The race of the other bargainer did not appear to affect significantly subjects' reactions. Results imply that reducing the pressures on educators to be in control can help them manage their conflicts constructively.

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To many observers of schools, educators have seemed preoccupied, even obsessed, with the control of students (e.g., Waller, 1932; Willower & Jones, 1967). Indeed, many teachers believe that control over students is equated with teaching competence (Gordon, 1957). The adoption of a control orientation may often be a prerequisite for acceptance by other educators (Hoy, 1968, 1969). Although the control orientation of educators has been documented, how this orientation affects school life has not been clarified (Willower, in press).

This control orientation is likely to affect how educators manage and resolve the conflicts they face. Students often object that their assignments are irrelevant and that their treatment is unfair; recently students have sought by a variety of methods to increase their power over their school lives (Chesler & Lohman, 1971). Community groups have demanded that educators prohibit certain books, provide bilingual education, and in other ways be more responsive to their needs. Previous research suggests that educators' control orientation may adversely affect how they argue and resolve their differences with students, community groups, and each other.

The control orientation of a person's colleagues may predispose him to be wary of appearing intimidated and ineffective in conflict situations. Coffman (1955; 1959) and others have argued that, especially in aggressive interactions, persons attempt to appear strong and capable, that is, they seek to maintain social face. Several studies have found that persons in conflict who believe they have, or fear they will, appear ineffective are likely to resist compromising and reaching an agreement. These results have been interpreted as suggesting that resistance to compromising is the

culturally defined way of asserting that one is a competent person and effective negotiator (Deutsch & Krauss, 1960; Brown, 1968; Tjosvold, 1974).

The pressures that educators place on each other to resist intimidation and to control students (Hoy, 1968; 1969) may then reinforce this culturally defined way of appearing effective in conflict. Persons who believe their colleagues' definition of an effective conflict participant is one who resists intimidation and attempts to be in control may consider their compromising and acceptance of the other negotiator's request as implying that they are weak and ineffective. On the other hand, persons who believe their colleagues consider an effective negotiator as one who gains tangible outcomes are likely to agree with the other negotiator's request, provided that request is also useful to them; they believe they can appear effective by reaching an advantageous agreement.

Individuals' understanding of how they are to appear effective to their colleagues may affect their attitudes as well as their behavior toward the other negotiator. Persons who believe they must resist intimidation in order to appear competent may attempt to resist any firm influence attempt; the other negotiator, however, is apt to attempt to influence them strongly in order to reach an agreement favorable to himself. Persons who seek to be in control are likely to perceive that their goal of avoiding being unduly influenced is mutually exclusive with the other negotiator's goal of strongly influencing them. This perceived competitive goal arrangement can then greatly undermine their relationship (Johnson & Johnson, 1974).

Persons who attempt to appear effective by gaining tangible outcomes have more cooperatively linked goals with the other negotiator. Many conflict situations are bargaining ones because the participants have competitive interests in that the agreement one most prefers, the other bargainer least prefers, but they have cooperative interests in that they can reach an

agreement in which both persons can gain more tangible outcomes than if they fail to reach an agreement (Deutsch & Krauss, 1960). Since the conflict situation in this study is a bargaining one, the bargainers who believed they can appear effective by gaining tangible outcomes, compared to appearing effective by being in control and resisting intimidation, were expected to develop more cooperative attitudes toward the other bargainer.

Recently, students and community groups have used nonnegotiable demands in their conflicts with educators. This strategy clearly conveys what is desired from the target and that the demander is unwilling to compromise from his opening position. Previous studies in conflict resolution have tended to find that a nonnegotiable strategy is relatively ineffective for gaining agreements (Komorita & Benner, 1968; Benton, Kelley, & Liebling, 1972). These studies have not, however, explored the variables that mediate between a nonnegotiable demand and resistance to agreement. Thus, the conditions under which this relationship is strongest are unclarified.

Like a threat, a nonnegotiable demand may imply intimidation and thereby provoke resistance to compromising: The target may fear that he has appeared ineffective or that he will appear so if he complies with this demand (Deutsch & Krauss, 1960; Tjosvold, 1974). Since the affront to social face is also experienced as a frustration, the nonnegotiable demand is expected to induce the target to develop competitive attitudes toward the person making the demand. A strategy that includes concessions may convey that the target does appear strong and effective and that he need not resist compromising in order to reassert that he is a strong and capable person.

Students and community groups may be racially different from educators. Although many studies have investigated attitudes toward black persons, few studies, if any, have examined experimentally white responses to black persons in face-to-face conflict situations. Because of varying degrees of prejudice

against black persons in our culture, it was expected that black bargainers would obtain fewer agreements and establish less cooperative relationships than white bargainers. Finally, students and others who may conflict with educators often have less power. Since unequal power has been considered an important variable in conflict resolution (Apfelbaum, 1974), this study investigates control orientation, nonnegotiable demand, and race in bargaining between persons who have unequal power.

Based on the above rationale, the following hypotheses are proposed:

1. A low-power person's nonnegotiable demand, compared to a negotiable demand, induces the high-power bargainer to resist reaching an agreement and to develop competitive attitudes toward the low-power person.
2. A high-power bargainer who believes his group member is evaluating his effectiveness on resisting intimidation, compared to gaining tangible outcomes, resists reaching an agreement and develops competitive attitudes toward the low-power person.
3. A high-power bargainer resists reaching an agreement and develops competitive attitudes toward a black low-power bargainer, compared to a white low-power bargainer.

## Method

### Subjects and Design

Male and female white volunteer subjects were recruited from an undergraduate education course at The Pennsylvania State University. Eighty subjects were randomly assigned to eight conditions. They were told that they could earn course credit and chances to win \$20 for their participation.

The three independent variables of the study were negotiability of demand (negotiable or nonnegotiable), the situationally-defined way of appearing strong (resisting intimidation or gaining outcomes), and the race of the

low-power bargainer (black or white). A factorial design was used which implied a 2 x 2 x 2 between-subjects analysis of variance.

### Overview

The experimental session had two phases. In phase 1, the subject was induced to become committed to his group's position, to be willing to defend that position in the negotiations, and to believe that he had more power than the person with whom he would negotiate. All subjects defended the same negotiation position. Results from a prenegotiation questionnaire indicate that these inductions were successful. In phase 2, each subject negotiated with a confederate. Each subject believed his negotiation performance was being evaluated by his fellow group member. Half the subjects believed they were being evaluated on resisting intimidation; the other subjects, on gaining outcomes. The confederate was either a black or a white person and either compromised or presented a nonnegotiable demand. After 20 minutes of negotiation, the subject reported whether he had reached an agreement and then completed a questionnaire that included measures of the inductions and the dependent variables of cooperativeness of relationship, willingness to compromise, attitude change, attraction, and the perceived characteristics of the low-power person.

### Procedure

The purposes of phase 1 were (a) to inform the subject of the procedures and situation, (b) to gain his commitment to his group's position, (c) to give the subject an individualistic orientation to the negotiations, and (d) to induce the subject to believe that he had more power than the person with whom he would negotiate. In order to accomplish these purposes, two groups, each consisting of a subject and a confederate (posing as a subject), were placed in separate rooms. Each two-person group was told that it represented a country named Fenwick and that the other group represented a country named



Rodane. Each group was then given the same instructions. The instructions informed the subjects that Rodane, the only producer of an ore, and Fenwick, the only nation that could manufacture the ore into a marketable metal, had agreed to new capital outlays to increase the overall efficiency of the mining and manufacturing enterprise. The financing of these outlays had already been agreed upon and were considered when estimating the expected annual profits. The remaining issue, which would be negotiated in the next phase of the experiment, was the price Fenwick should pay Rodane for the ore. This price, in turn, would determine how the total profits would be divided between the two countries.

Each group received a list of profits that indicated the present agreement and six possible new agreements, along with the expected profits for their country associated with each of these agreements. So that the subjects would have personal, tangible incentives corresponding to their country's outcomes, they were told that they could earn chances to win \$20 and that the number of chances depended upon what agreement they reached with the other negotiator. For the subjects' country of Fenwick, the higher the price paid Rodane for the ore, the lower would be its profits and the fewer the number of chances to win \$20 the subjects would earn for themselves. With five of the possible new agreements, Fenwick would receive more profits and its representatives more chances than if no new agreement was reached. If the new agreement least advantageous to Fenwick' (\$95 per ton of ore) was reached, Fenwick's profits and chances would be equal to its outcomes if no new agreement was made.

Power is defined in this study as the control over valued resources. An unequal power relationship exists when one person or group controls more valued resources than the other person or group. Fenwick is considered to have high-power because it controlled more of the resource of money valued



by both Fenwick and Rodane. In addition, Fenwick would continue to receive a larger share of the profits and Fenwick's representatives would have more chances to win \$20 than Rodane's representatives if no new agreement was reached. Subjects were, therefore, expected to believe that their group had more power than the other group.

Briefing sheets outlining five arguments supporting Fenwick's position were given to each group to help prepare them to defend Fenwick's position in the negotiations.

The instructions also informed the subject that one of them would negotiate with the other group's representative and that the other person would observe and evaluate the negotiator's performance. The subject also believed that the observer would share his evaluation with the negotiator after the negotiation phase of the experiment. After the subject and confederate had discussed the instructions, the experimenter asked them to draw slips from a box to decide who would negotiate and who would observe. The drawing was arranged so that all subjects were chosen to be the negotiator.

The experimenter then had the confederate write his idea of a strong and capable negotiator. The experimenter then asked the subject to read the confederate's response and said, "It is important for you to understand what the observer had written for he will be asked to base his evaluation of your negotiating on it."

What the observer had written depended on the condition of the subject. For a subject in the resist intimidation condition, he wrote, "I think a strong and capable negotiator is one who doesn't let himself be intimidated by the other negotiator. If you are a strong negotiator, you don't let the other side force you into accepting their demands." To clarify what he meant, the confederate paraphrased this statement and said, "My idea of a strong negotiator is one who doesn't let himself be forced or pushed around by the

other side." For a subject in the evaluated on obtaining outcomes condition, the confederate wrote, "I think a strong and capable negotiator is one who obtains real and tangible advantages for his group and himself. If you are a strong negotiator, you get what money or other real results you can." To clarify, the confederate paraphrased this statement and said, "My idea of a strong negotiator is one who gets what money and results he can for his group." After the subject understood what the observer had written, the subject and confederate completed a prenegotiation questionnaire.

The work of Blake and Mouton (1962) and Ferguson and Kelley (1964) indicate that the intergroup procedure used in the study would accomplish the purposes of phase 1. The results from the prenegotiation questionnaire indicate that the subjects felt that the issue was personally important to them, that they were satisfied with their group and its position, and that their position was both dissimilar and superior to the other group's position. Data also indicate that the subjects were motivated to make as much money for their country as they could rather than to make more money than the other group. No significant differences in the effectiveness of the inductions were found among the conditions.

To begin the negotiation portion of the experiment (phase 2), the confederates exchanged rooms with one another; each of them was introduced as the representative from Rodane. (Contrary to the subject's belief, his group member did not observe and evaluate his negotiation performance.) The experimenter told the subject and the confederate to present their opening positions in about three minutes, that they then should negotiate freely, and that they had 20 minutes for the negotiations. The subject was directed to present his opening position first.

At the end of his opening arguments, the confederate made either a non-negotiable or a negotiable demand. The nonnegotiable demand was, "I'll agree

to a price of \$85 for the ore. That's my first, only, and final offer. I will not compromise." To implement the negotiable demand, the confederate said, "I think the price of ore should be \$95. Right now, I'll accept \$95 as the price of ore." Four minutes later, he said, "I'll compromise from my original offer of \$95; I'll agree to a price of \$90." In another four minutes he offered, "I'll compromise again . . . I'll come down from my offer of \$90 to \$85. But I am not going to compromise again or agree to a price below \$85." For both conditions, the confederate agreed only to a price of \$85 or higher. No subject offered a price higher than \$85.<sup>1</sup>

The third independent variable was the race of the low-power bargainer. Subjects were randomly assigned to negotiate with a black or a white confederate. Because of the procedures used, half the subjects had a black person and half the subjects had a white person in their phase 1 group; the design was balanced in that in each of the eight conditions half the subjects believed a black person was evaluating them and half the subjects believed a white person was evaluating them.

After 20 minutes, the experimenter told the subject and the confederate to report any agreement they had reached and to complete a questionnaire that included measures of the inductions and dependent variables. Upon completion of the questionnaire, subjects were fully debriefed. Subjects readily promised not to discuss the procedures and hypotheses.

## Results

### Measures of Inductions and Affront to Face

Before the negotiations, the subjects indicated on what basis their group member would evaluate their strength and capability as a negotiator. Results indicate that 85% of the subjects in the obtaining outcomes condition and 80% of the subjects in the resist intimidation condition accurately indicated on what basis they would be evaluated. In the post-negotiation

questionnaire, subjects rated the extent to which the other bargainer compromised and the extent to which they were insulted by him on 7-point scales. As expected, subjects ( $\bar{X} = 6.68$ ) in the nonnegotiable condition perceived the other bargainer as less willing to compromise than did subjects ( $\bar{X} = 3.83$ ) in the negotiable condition ( $F = 130.25$ ,  $df = 1/72$ ,  $p < .01$ ). The nonnegotiable demand appeared to affront social face; subjects ( $\bar{X} = 3.68$ ) in the nonnegotiable condition rated themselves as more insulted by the other negotiator than did subjects ( $\bar{X} = 5.13$ ) in the negotiable condition ( $F = 12.20$ ,  $df = 1/72$ ,  $p < .01$ ). It was not thought necessary, even desirable, to check on the other bargainer's race. The results then indicate that the inductions necessary to test the hypotheses were successfully implemented.

#### Negotiability of Demand

As summarized in Table 1, the results generally support the hypothesis that a nonnegotiable demand, by disrupting the high-power person's attempt to appear strong and capable, increases resistance to accepting that demand and induces competitive attitudes towards the low-power person. The nonnegotiable demand may have increased resistance to agreement; subjects who

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 Insert Table 1 about here.  
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confronted a negotiable demand reached more agreements than did those subjects who confronted a nonnegotiable demand, although this difference did not reach significance ( $F = 2.78$ ,  $df = 1/72$ ,  $p < .10$ ).

Results indicate that the nonnegotiable demand did disrupt the building of a cooperative relationship. Subjects who negotiated with a compromising, in contrast to a noncompromising, bargainer perceived their relationship with him to be more cooperative ( $F = 15.05$ ,  $df = 1/72$ ,  $p < .01$ ) and were more attracted to him ( $F = 4.82$ ,  $df = 1/72$ ,  $p < .05$ ). The nonnegotiable demand,

compared to the negotiable demand, appeared then to intensify the competition between the bargainers.

#### Resist Intimidation Orientation

The data, summarized in Table 1, generally support the hypothesis that a high-power person evaluated on obtaining tangible results for his group, compared to a high-power person evaluated on resisting intimidation, accepts the low-power person's demands and develops a cooperative relationship with him. The result that clearly supports this hypothesis is that subjects evaluated on obtaining tangible outcomes, compared with those subjects evaluated on resisting intimidation, more frequently accepted the other bargainer's demands ( $F = 6.85$ ,  $df = 1/72$ ,  $p < .05$ ). Evaluated on resisting intimidation subjects refused to accept the offer of the other bargainer, although such nonacceptance cost them tangible outcomes.

Results suggest that subjects evaluated on obtaining outcomes had more cooperative attitudes toward the other bargainer. In contrast with subjects evaluated on resisting intimidation, subjects evaluated on obtaining outcomes felt they had changed their attitude about the central issue of the negotiations ( $F = 5.17$ ,  $df = 1/72$ ,  $p < .05$ ) and thought that they were willing to compromise ( $F = 14.94$ ,  $df = 1/72$ ,  $p < .01$ ). In addition, these subjects evaluated on obtaining outcomes tended to trust the other bargainer more ( $F = 3.64$ ,  $df = 1/72$ ,  $p < .06$ ).

#### Race of the Low-Power Person

The study also investigated the impact of the low-power person's race on the high-power person's responses. The analysis of the data found no significant or nearly significant differences on willingness to reach

agreement or cooperative relationship. Consequently, the cell means for race are not presented separately in Table 1.

#### Discussion

Results from this study imply that a high-power person's response to the low-power person's demands for change depends on the criterion she believes is being used to evaluate her strength and capability as a negotiator. Subjects who believed they were being evaluated on obtaining tangible outcomes, compared to subjects evaluated on resisting intimidation, changed their attitude toward the other person's position and were more willing to compromise and to reach an agreement with the other bargainer.

Social face concerns have generally been thought to have a destructive impact on conflict resolution. Once bargainers have become very concerned about appearing strong, they may act to reduce the tangible outcomes of the other bargainer, although these actions may be quite costly to themselves. Both implicitly and explicitly, researchers have advocated that social face concerns ought to be minimized so that bargainers may act rationally--that is, maximize their tangible outcomes (Deutsch & Krauss, 1960; Brown, 1971). Results from this study suggest that social face concerns need not always induce destructive, irrational behavior; they may induce bargainers to increase their tangible outcomes by reaching a mutually advantageous agreement. Reaching this kind of agreement is likely to occur when bargainers believe their group values obtaining tangible outcomes above resisting intimidation and being in control and when they believe that their capability as negotiators is being evaluated accordingly.

#### Nonnegotiable Demand

Results from this study also suggest that a low-power person's non-negotiable demand affronts the high-power person's social face and thus increases his competitive attitudes toward the low-power person. Compared to

subjects who faced a compromising strategy, subjects who confronted a non-negotiable strategy perceived a competitive relationship and disliked the other person. While a nonnegotiable demand, compared to a negotiable one, increased resistance to acceptance of the other person's demand, this difference reached only the .10 level. This study does not then provide strong support for Komorita and Benner's (1968) and Benton, Kelley, and Liebling's (1972) conclusions that a nonnegotiable demand is ineffective for reaching a fair agreement. However, the competitive attitudes found in this study to be induced by the nonnegotiable demand can be expected to reduce the target's susceptibility to being influenced by the other bargainer (Deutsch, 1973).

A bargainer may reasonably expect concessions from the other bargainer. Expecting concessions, though confronting someone who refuses to make concessions, bargainers may believe that they have been uninfluential in the negotiations. One possible strategy for them is to deny responsibility for the outcomes of the negotiations (Benton, Kelley, & Liebling, 1972). Or they may attribute their lack of influence to their own weakness and incapability as a negotiator and fear that observers will also. They may then feel affronted and attempt to reassert their effectiveness by refusing to make concessions and by resisting the other bargainer's influence attempts.

#### The Low-Power Person's Race

Unexpectedly, no significant or nearly significant differences are attributable to the race of the low-power person. Perhaps the population from which the sample of subjects were drawn (college students) is relatively racially unbiased. A problem with this explanation is that studies drawing from the same population have found predicted biases against black persons (e.g., Goldstein & Davis, 1972). In contrast to most studies on attitudes toward black persons, subjects in this experiment actually interacted with the other person, and rather intensely so. In this interaction, the black and



white low-power bargainers' willingness to goal facilitate were controlled. The failure to find any differences in responses to black and white bargainers is consistent with the proposition that when a black and a white person interact in a goal interdependent situation, the black person's actual goal facilitation or frustration of the white person determines the white person's responses to him, rather than his race or his beliefs (Johnson & Johnson, 1972).

#### Implications for Education

Considerable educational research suggests that the control orientation of educators can undermine student outcomes and the classroom social climate (Withall & Lewis, 1963). However, the dynamics of how this control orientation affects classroom life are relatively unexplored. Results from this study indicate that this control orientation may reduce the chances of educators and students resolving their conflicts so that both groups benefit. Since educators appear to believe that other school persons expect them to be in control and to resist intimidation (Willower, in press; Hoy, 1968; 1969), this finding on control orientation suggests that educators frequently fail to reach a mutually beneficial agreement with students for fear of appearing ineffective to their colleagues. Perhaps organizational programs aimed at changing the definition of a competent educator away from the control of students and otherwise reducing the pressures on educators to control students may help them respond more effectively to student requests for change (Miles & Schmuck, 1971).

Students (and others) who use a nonnegotiable demand strategy may be unnecessarily creating resistance to agreement with their demands. This strategy appears to alienate the targets and induce them to believe that they must reassert their strength by refusing the demand. A nonnegotiable demand may help the demander look strong and confident, provide other

psychological rewards, and serve to unite the group. These benefits are apt to be short-lived, however, if the strategy does not also gain tangible results for the group. Since educators who are confronted by nonnegotiable demands, and strategies like threat (Tjosvold, 1974), may feel they have lost social face, they should recognize that they may become so intransigent that they fail to agree with the other conflict participant although this stance is costly to them as well as to the other person. More generally, educators should recognize that conflicts are nearly inevitable aspect of their mutual dependence and interaction with others (Deutsch, 1973). Their effectiveness then depends, in part, on how they manage and resolve their conflicts with each other, students, and community persons.

Two related limitations should be noted on the generalization of the results of this study to educational settings. This negotiation session lasted approximately one hour and the conflict participants were selected so they did not previously know each other. Many conflicts in schools are between persons who have already developed relationships. Educators and students, for example, who have developed cooperative relationships may be able to resolve their conflicts constructively (Deutsch, 1973), despite nonnegotiable demands or pressures on educators to resist intimidation and to be in control.

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## Footnote

<sup>1</sup>The confederates were trained in an extensive pilot study (a) to induce commitment on the part of the subjects to their position and (b) to bargain in a standard manner in the negotiation period. The confederates were unaware of the hypotheses.

Table 1

## Comparison Among Conditions on Dependent Variables

| Dependent Variables          | Obtain Outcomes |                    | Resist Intimidation |                    | Significant Comparisons             |
|------------------------------|-----------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------------|
|                              | Nego-<br>tiable | Nonnego-<br>tiable | Nego-<br>tiable     | Nonnego-<br>tiable |                                     |
| Agreements                   | .65             | .35                | .25                 | .20                | Outcomes<br>vs<br>Intimidation*     |
| Cooperative<br>Relationship  | 3.50            | 4.90               | 4.10                | 5.55               | Negotiable<br>vs<br>Nonnegotiable** |
| Willingness to<br>Compromise | 2.95            | 3.45               | 4.75                | 4.05               | Outcomes<br>vs<br>Intimidation**    |
| Attitude Change              | 4.40            | 4.90               | 5.85                | 5.15               | Outcomes<br>vs<br>Intimidation*     |
| Attraction                   | 1.90            | 2.65               | 2.75                | 3.35               | Negotiable<br>vs<br>Nonnegotiable*  |
| Trust                        | 2.85            | 3.35               | 3.50                | 3.15               |                                     |

Note.--Only significant ( $p < .05$ ) F results are presented. Agreement was scored as 1; nonagreement as 0. The lower the mean, the more favorable the response. Means are collapsed over race. Seven-point scales were used to measure the dependent variables. Analysis of variance was used to compare conditions.  $N = 80$ , 20 in each cell.

\*  $p < .05$

\*\*  $p < .01$