ABSTRACT
              In this paper, the author examines the confusion that
currently exists concerning the term "physical education." In
particular, he analyzes the claim that "physical education" is a
"family resemblance" term--a word or phrase which may be used to
denote fundamentally different concepts, but concepts in which there
is some overlapping of characteristics. The author first discusses
three developments in philosophy which have dealt with the function
and purpose of philosophy: logical atomism, logical positivism, and
ordinary language philosophy. The author then looks at four studies
concerned with the meaning of some aspect of the term "physical
education." Next, William Frankena's explanation of the various
meaning of the term "education" are presented, and the author
explains how he came to apply these and two additional meanings to
the term "physical education." These meanings include (1) the subject
matter, (2) the activity of education, (3) the process of being
physically educated, (4) the actual or intended result of 2 or 3, (5)
the discipline, and (6) the profession. The author continues his
analysis of the term "physical education" with a diagram which
includes its various meanings. He concludes that "physical education"
has characteristics of both being a "family resemblance: term and of
not being one (i.e., it cannot be definitely stated that "physical
education" either is or is not a "family resemblance" term). (PCB)

AN ANALYSIS OF THE CLAIM THAT "PHYSICAL EDUCATION" HAS BECOME A "FAMILY RESEMBLANCE" TERM

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Introduction*

This investigation was designed to discover the different meanings - not objectives or aims - that are currently being applied to the term "physical education" in the English language. It was based generally on Wittgenstein's idea that a "family resemblance" term is radically different than a word or term which may be said to have an essential definition. The traditional way of analyzing a term has been to attempt to find those conditions or character- istics which apply to any given term in all cases. This new idea is based on the assumption that there are some words or terms for which there are not definite lists or sets of characteristics, even though the term may be relatively correctly employed in a number of different circumstances. In other words, two persons using this term - "physical education" - may have similar but fundamentally different concepts in mind, but both uses do have a "family resem- blance" inasmuch as there is some overlapping of characteristics. And thereby hangs the tale of this presentation . . .

Such an approach to doing philosophy is part of a twentieth century development that has become known as "philosophical analy- sis." In fact, White has said that this is the "Age of Analysis" for philosophy (1955), and Weitz has written about "the analytic tradition" in twentieth century philosophy (1966). This is not meant to imply that there is no longer debate about the exact

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nature of philosophy - far from it. Many seem to worry about the
justification for philosophy since scientific method has been used
to demonstrate that true knowledge can only come through controlled
experimentation. If science is becoming the "be all and end all"
of scholarly endeavor, one might well ask what is the justification
for an area of study treating such matters as values, truth, ethics,
and related matters?

In a brief effort to place this present study in perspective,
it should be recalled that there have been three developments in
this century that have sought to provide answers to this quite
crucial question: (1) logical atomism; (2) logical positivism;
and (3) ordinary language philosophy. The underlying tenet behind
these approaches was that philosophy's function is analysis, but
each one tended to view analysis somewhat differently. There was
general agreement, however, that philosophy was to be approached
through the medium of so-called language analysis to a greater or
lesser extent (Zeigler, 1968, pp. 39-41).

Logical atomism involved a new approach to logic as devised by
Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) and Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947)
called mathematical logic. It had been thought that Aristotle had
said the last word on this subject, but these two great philosophers
developed a logic that was much broader in scope because of its
inclusion of propositions rather than with classes only. This more
inclusive logical system involved the recommended greater relation-
ship of mathematics to logic -- ideas which were to a considerable
degree brought to Russell's attention by the work of Peano whom he

met at the International Congress of Philosophy in Paris in July of 1900 (Russell, 1968, p. 191).

Russell's next step was to show that a language like English has essentially the same structure as mathematics. Because the language was not exact enough, however, it was thought that mathematical logic would help man explain the components of language through sentences designed to offer "world facts." Carried through to its presumably logical conclusion, the philosopher would then be in a position to find out everything about the structure of the world by using this type of philosophical analysis to rearrange an ambiguous language so that the newly arranged, logical sentences would become crystal clear. This approach, which flourished for twenty years or more in some quarters, was thought to offer a new metaphysical system, but it was eventually superseded by logical positivism which carried mathematical logic a step further.

In the 1920's a group subsequently known as the Vienna Circle came to believe that it was not possible for logical atomism to provide the world with a system of metaphysics. Their answer was logical positivism which presented philosophy as an activity -- not as theories about the universe. They felt that philosophy's task was to analyze and explain what statements meant. Some statements would be able to "withstand being subjected" to the verifiability principle. This means that a sentence might be factually significant to a given person, if he understands those observations which would enable him to accept or reject the proposition therein contained. However, a logically valid, factual sentence must be "confirmable" or "disconfirmable" if one really wishes to say that

"he knows what he is talking about." A statement's meaning is inextricably involved with the verification method (Feigl, 1949, p. 9 et ff.).

Thus, some sentences may be significant factually; others are not directly applicable to this world, although they appear to be analytically true; and a third group are nonsensical or non-significant. It can readily be seen how devastating such an approach to philosophical activity would be to traditional philosophical approaches. The usual philosophical statement of the past was definitely not empirically verifiable, which means -- at least in the eyes of those employing this new approach -- that the older efforts were typically mere conjecture and not really important to man! Philosophy was thereby awarded a new role -- analysis of ordinary language statements into logical consistent form. As a result it could be told quite quickly whether a problematical question could be answered either through mathematical reasoning or scientific investigation. The philosopher does not therefore provide the answers; he analyzes the questions to see what they mean.

Ordinary language philosophy is the third approach to philosophy which involves a type of language analysis - but in a slightly different way. It was started in the 1930's by Ludwig Wittgenstein (? -1952) who has earlier been one of the originators and developers of logical atomism. In the period between the 1930's and 1952 (when Wittgenstein died), he decided that it would not be possible to devise a language so perfect that the world would be reflected accurately. Accordingly, he came to believe that much of the confusion and disagreement over philosophy emanated from misuse of

language in various ways. With this approach the task of the
philosopher was not to transpose the problems of philosophy into
certain language terms; rather, it was to decide what the basic
words and terms were and then to use them correctly and clearly
so that all might understand. This is, of course, closer to
semantics, the science of meanings. Wittgenstein was more
anxious to learn how the term was used than he was to discover
how people defined it. With such an approach it may be possible
for philosophy to solve some problems through clarification of the
meaning of certain terms which have been used synonymously (albeit
often incorrectly). In this way man might gradually achieve
certain knowledge, at least about man's reaction to the world
and how he describes it, through the medium of ordinary language
philosophy -- the newest of the three types of philosophical
analysis (sometimes called "philosophy of language").

In concluding this introductory section, it must be granted
that analytic philosophy has become most influential in the
English-speaking world. Where these many achievements will lead
philosophy - and man! - remains open to question. Obviously, it
is now clear that the philosopher can use any language that he
wishes, but he is obligated to make very clear the language rules
that he is employing (Carnap's "principle of tolerance"). Further,
the newer mathematical logic with its scientific inference offers
infinitely greater possibility of relating logic more completely
to the technology of the computer, not to mention the development
of an ideal language for philosophical endeavor based on synthetic

statements (symbolic or mathematical logic). As Kaplan indicates, this may provide man with a "rational reconstruction of the language of science," but where will he then find a philosophy to _live_ by (1961, p. 83)?

Related Literature and Background

To return directly to the topic at hand -- whether "physical education" has become a "family resemblance" term -- the writer is quick to admit that this problem had never occurred to him in exactly this way until relatively recently. For some thirty years the field of physical education has been stumbling along in what might be called, not too gently, "philosophical confusion." This investigator, in the 1940's and early 1950's, was as fully imbued and confused by the so-called "objectives of physical education" propounded through the normative philosophizing of so many of the strong, dedicated leaders of the field between the years from 1920 to 1950.

Because of a highly important experience in a doctoral program at Yale with the eminent historian and philosopher of education, John S. Brubacher, the writer began to understand in the mid-1950's the implications for physical education that the various "schools" of educational philosophy seemed to possess. At this point he and a few others began the slow and tedious "conversion" of this type of philosophizing to physical education -- a move which this writer does not regret even though at that very time many within the field of educational philosophy began to feel the influence of the movement toward analytic philosophy that was developing so strongly on this continent. In addition, existential philosophy of varying

types -- atheistic, agnostic, Christian -- had been "transported"
in various ways from the European continent, and it too was having
a considerable influence (in quite sharp contrast to philosophical
analysis).

It was roughly in the mid-1960's that existential philosophy
was called to the attention of the field of physical education,
and this emphasis is certainly still evident today. (It should
be pointed out in passing that some of Metheny's "theory of
physical education approach" and the "movement" emphasis must have
undoubtedly reflected the emphases toward philosophical analysis
that had taken place in philosophy and which was changing the
educational philosophy "scene" as well).

In the late 1960's and early 1970's, this writer was privi-
leged to serve as thesis committee chairmen for four men and
women specializing in the philosophy of sport and physical educa-
tion, all of whom used a different variation of "philosophical
analysis" in an attempt to answer the requirements of their main
problems and sub-problems. Each of these investigations - in one
way or another - was concerned with the meaning of some aspect of
the term "physical education." The first was an attempt by the
late Peter Spencer-Kraus to consider the possibility of the applica-
tion of Austin's "linguistic phenomenology" to sport and physical
education (1970). Spencer-Kraus found "that many of the problems
recurring in that area [the philosophy of physical education and
sport literature] were steeped in a confusion resulting directly
from the equivocal use of the terms and idioms employed." He
concluded that there was "a great need for consensus" in the matter

of precise definitions of terms employed in sport and physical education, and he believed strongly that "the application of the Austinian technique might great improve the chances of arriving at that consensus" (pp. 56-57).

George Patrick's study was the second of the four projects, and it was entitled "Verifiability (Meaningfulness) of Selected Physical Education Objectives." An _analytic_ description in terms of form and function of the stated objectives was made, and the _normative_ part of the study was based on the descriptive analysis of the objectives and the kind of knowledge provided by logic, ethics, philosophy, and philosophy of education. Positivism's "principle of verifiability" was subdivided into two forms: _weak_ or logical possibility of confirmation, and _strong_ or operationally testable. Objective statements were viewed as informative, expressive, directive, and performative. Three functions of objectives were stated (1) as a slogan, (2) as a guide to the educative process, and (3) as a test. It was found that objectives functioning as slogans were likely to be meaningless or verifiable in the second degree (weak); that objectives functioning as guides using informative-directive language were verifiable in the first or second degree; and that objectives functioning as a test must use the informative-directive mode of language before they could be considered verifiable in the first degree. Thus, "if physical educators wish to act responsibly, they should be able to state that for which they are accountable" (Patrick, 1971, p. 94).

The third investigation that was analytic in nature was

carried out by Kathleen Pearson. It related to so-called conceptual analysis within what has more recently been called "philosophy of language" by many. She examined (1) the structure of the multi-concept "integration-segregation" as it pertained to male and female participants in physical education classes, and (2) the functional aspects of this multi-concept in the intentional, purposive, and responsible actions of persons engaged in the professional endeavor called physical education (Pearson, 1971, p. 2). After extracting the various meanings attached to the concept and describing their extensional features in the "structural analysis" phase, Pearson proceeded to a "functional analysis" stage in which she delineated the reasons set forth for advocating the various "structures" or positions relative to the usage of the concept by writers in the available literature. She considered the assumptions implicit within each of the reasons and the empirical evidence available to support or cast doubt on the validity of the hypotheses underlying these reasons. Lastly, the question was asked, "How might one be guided in making responsible decisions concerning the multi-concept in question?"

Pearson concluded specifically that physical educators attach many and varied meanings to the word "coeducation"; that the reasons set forth for this practice indicate a wide variety of objectives; that these claims or objectives have not been subjected to empirical research techniques; and that many contemporary physical educators still hold the dubious belief that jumping activities for girls and women cause injury to the pelvic organs. Generally speaking, she

concluded that "the field is almost barren of empirical research to support or cast doubt on the advisability of integration-segregation of male and female participants in physical education classes" (pp. 213-214).

The final of the four thesis investigations was Robert Oster-houdt's encyclopedic study entitled "A Descriptive Analysis of Research Concerning the Philosophy of Physical Education and Sport" (1971). Building upon - and, in certain instances, sub-tracting from - a selected bibliography on sport and physical edu-cation developed by this writer, Osterhoudt's efforts resulted in an organization of the body of knowledge in this area, and it also offered "a reference for the classification and treatment of future works" (p. 227). He analyzed descriptively the selected literature of the twentieth century and, very importantly, reviewed major taxonomies for research prior to the development of a specific one for this particular investigation. The broad outline of this taxonomy had been suggested earlier in a paper by Pearson entitled "Inquiry Into Inquiry" (Unpublished) that had been investigated as a special project while studying with the writer at Illinois (Urbana). Once again, Osterhoudt built most effectively on this taxonomy when his detailed study of the literature warranted the institution of certain modifications. Basically, the literature was divided into three categories as follows: (1) construct analy-sis, (2) system analysis, and (3) concept analysis. Interestingly enough - and this finding of Osterhoudt points up the significance of this present paper inquiring into "family resemblance" status

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for the term "physical education," he found one hundred and thirty-eight (138) studies which he was able to classify as "the analysis of concept construction!" In his "Discussion" section Osterhoudt pointed out gently that "a more abiding consultation with the mother discipline, with philosophy proper, is required, so as to avoid the dogmatic espousals, with which the philosophy of physical education and sport has all too long been preoccupied" (p. 235).

Methodology and Findings

The various aspects of the "Age of Analysis" are undoubtedly leaving their marks on all of us to a greater or lesser extent. (The reader is referred to the excellent publications embodying a type of conceptual analysis which were authored by Harold Vander-Zwaag and Daryl Siedentop in 1972.) This writer had long been concerned with the multitude of objectives propounded by the normative physical education philosophers of yesteryear, but it was only in the late 1960's that he became truly familiar with the efforts of William K. Frankena in the area of educational philosophy. In this Michigan philosopher's work entitled Three Historical Philosophies of Education (1965, p. 6), he explained that the term "education" was indeed ambiguous inasmuch as it could mean "any one of four thing" as follows:

(1) the activity of educating carried on by teachers, schools, and parents (or by oneself),
(2) the process of being educated (or learning) which goes on in the pupil or child,
(3) the result, actual or intended, of (1) and (2),
(4) the discipline or field of enquiry that studies on or reflects on (1), (2), and (3) and is taught in schools of education.

Somehow this type of analysis of the term "education" had simply never occurred to the writer before and it didn't seem very

important at the time. After giving the matter some thought, however, the matter became more intriguing especially when it became apparent that there might indeed be a _fifth_ meaning that had been somehow overlooked. This was envisioned as the _profession_ of education. Still further, it soon became evident further that a similar approach could be employed with the term "physical education," no matter whether the term was still considered acceptable by the intelligentsia of the field.

Correspondence was initiated with Professor Frankena and, on May 21, 1968, he stated in a letter that:

> . . . you suggest that there is a fifth sense of 'education' in which it refers to a 'profession.' This did not occur to me. I guess I don't much use 'education' that way. But I suppose it does get used in that way, and that one can add this fifth definition, as you do.

Well, the reader can appreciate that at this point the writer was at least "partially hooked" by virtue of his great discovery that had been conceded by the Chairman of the Department of Philosophy at The University of Michigan!

The next step, of course, was to adapt this approach to the definition of the term "physical education," and in the process - Eureka - somehow a _sixth_ meaning of the term "physical education" emerged. In addition to the basic four meanings outlined by Frankena, the fifth one "discovered" by Zeigler, it became quite obvious that "physical education" also meant the _subject-matter_ (e.g., tennis, or some other physical involvement that was considered to be part of the physical education program). Now what to do - write Professor Frankena again? The decision - absolutely not!

The next problem faced by the writer was how to announce this

great discovery to the unsuspecting world of physical education.
One could just feel the thrill that would run through the audience
when these six distinctions or definitions were offered to the
assembled multitude.

Such an occasion presented itself quite soon in a formal paper
prepared for presentation at the First Canadian Symposium on the
History of Sport and Physical Education held at the University of
Alberta in Edmonton on May 13, 1970 (where this investigator was
given the opportunity to make the opening presentation). At the
beginning of the paper it was stated, "As might be expected, there
is great ambiguity to the term "physical education." To the present
it has been possible to identify some six different meanings as
follows:

1. The subject-matter, or a part of it (e.g., tennis, or some
   other sport or active game; some type of physical activ-
   ity involving exercise such as jogging or push-ups; a
   type of dance movement or activity; movement with purpose
   relating to these three types of activities),
2. The activity of physical education carried on by teachers,
   schools, parents, or even by oneself,
3. The process of being physical educated (or learning) which
   goes on in the pupil or child (or person of any age),
4. The result, actual or intended, or (2) and (3) taking
   place through the employment of that which comprises (1),
5. The discipline, or field of enquiry, in which people study
   and reflect on all aspects of (1), (2), (3), and (4) above;
   that which is taught (the "body of knowledge") in depart-
   ments, schools, and colleges of physical education, and
6. The profession whose members employ (1) above; practice
   it (2); try to observe (3) taking place; attempt to measure
   or evaluate whether (4) has taken place; and base their
   professional practice on the body of knowledge developed by
   those undertaking scholarly and research effort in the
   discipline (5).

   (Adapted from W. K. Frankena, 1965, p. 6, and the reader
    should see also Zeigler and VanderZwaag, 1968, p. 8.)

The writer can still hear that   hall echoing with thunderous applause

on that important morning. Seriously, and to be quite truthful, no
one has ever mentioned that bit of language analysis to its "per-
petrator since that fateful day!" This very fact would seem to be
reasonable evidence that this type of philosophical analysis has in
no sense yet "arrived" in the field of physical education despite
the relative importance which the present investigator feels should
be accorded to such inquiry now and in the future.

One further development must be reported at this time, and it
revolves around the writer's subsequent realization that "physical
education" might indeed be a "family resemblance" term à la Wittgen-
stein. This was an idea propounded as a theory of meaning for certain
general terms such as "see," "know," "reason," and "free." Such
general terms have been used in many seemingly different ways - that
is, the conditions for the accurate use of the word vary in different
circumstances. (This was, of course, basically at variance with
the traditional method of analyzing a term in which it was necessary
to discover the specific conditions or characteristics which appeared
in all cases in which the term was employed. It was thus possible
to determine what might be considered to be the "essential definition"
of that term under discussion.)

With the "family resemblance approach" the idea of determining
requisite properties for employment in the definition of a specific
term is discarded. This is done because it has been shown that the
term may be employed correctly in different situations even though
no one essential property (or set of properties) appears each and
every time that the term is used. But all of the uses do indeed
bear a "family resemblance" to each other (i.e., to a certain extent

elements of characteristics overlap so that every use has <u>something</u> "in common with every other use," even though "there is no property which it holds in common with all of these other uses" (Gochnauer, 1973, p. 216).

The question then is, "Can this "family resemblance approach" be applied to the term "physical education?" Fortunately (or unfortunately) the answer at present appears to be a resounding "yes" and "no." Generally speaking, the answer must be in the negative, but for many individual groups within the profession an affirmative might be possible because they individually see "physical education" as <u>either</u> sport <u>or</u> play, <u>or</u> exercise, <u>or</u> dance. If there were agreement almost unanimously that "human movement" or "human motor performance" in these areas is the <u>essential</u> definition, then it would be possible to dispense with the "family resemblance term" idea, but quite obviously those in the field are far from consensus on this important point. Thus, the answer to this question must be "yes" and "no," or at the very best it can possibly be shown that the term "physical education" is a family resemblance term partially <u>or</u> it is such a term to a greater or lesser extent.

Would that it were possible to leave you with such clarity and precision! However, the analysis must in all fairness to the reader be pursued further. As the presentation of a diagram is considered, keep in mind the following definitions of the uses or meanings of the term "physical education" as postulated on page 13 above:

A = <u>S</u>ubject-<u>M</u>atter (<u>T</u>heory and <u>P</u>ractice) of Field <u>X</u> (what is presently called <u>P</u>hysical <u>E</u>ducation by many)

Thus, $A = SM(T+P)$ of $X(PE)$
$A_1 = SM(T)$
$A_2^1 = SM(P)$ 16

B = Teaching of Subject-Matter (Theory and Practice) of Field X (Physical Education) by Instructor

Thus, $B = T$ of SMX(T+P) by I
$B_1 = T$ of SMX(T) by I
$B_2 = T$ of SMX(P) by I

C = Process of Learning of Subject-Matter (Theory and Practice of Field X (Physical Education)

Thus, $C = P$ of L of SMX(T+P)
$C_1 = P$ of L of SMX(T)
$C_2 = P$ of L of SMX(P)

D = Result of Teaching of Subject-Matter (Theory and Practice) of Field X (Physical Education) by Instructor so that the Process of Learning (Knowledge, Skill, and Competency) occurs in Student

Thus, $D = R$ of T of SMX(T+P) by I so that P of L (K, S, and Co) occurs in S
$D_1 = R$ of T of SMX(T), etc.
$D_2 = R$ of T of SMX(P), etc.

E = The Discipline of Subject-Matter (Theory and Practice) of Field X in which Scholars and Researchers investigate all Aspects of the Subject-Matter (Theory and Practice) of Field X; its Teaching by Instructor; the Process of Learning by Student; and the Result of its Teaching by Instructor which results in a Body of Knowledge and Theory of the Subject-Matter

Thus, $E = $ The Di of SMX(T+P) in which Scholars and Researchers investigate all Aspects of the SMX(T+P); its T by I; the P of L by S; and the R of its T by I which results in a B of K and Th of the SM
$E_1 = $ The Di of SMX(T), etc.
$E_2 = $ The Di of SMX(P), etc.

Note: Subject-Matter of the Discipline of "X" (Physical Education) includes currently (1) the History, Philosophy, and International Aspects; (2) the Sociological and Social Psychological Aspects; (3) the Motor Learning and Performance Aspects; (4) the Physiological Aspects; (5) the Biomechanical Aspects; and others (such as Anthropometrical, Cultural Anthropological, and Growth Aspects, etc.)

F = The Profession of "X" (Physical Education) whose Members employ Subject-Matter (Theory and Practice); practice its Teaching; try to observe the Process of Learning take

place; attempt to measure or evaluate whether the <u>R</u>esult
has occurred; and base their professional practice on the
<u>B</u>ody of <u>K</u>nowledge developed by Scholars and Researchers
in the <u>D</u>iscipline and Related Fields

Thus, F = The Profession of X(PE) whose Members employ
  SM(T+P); practice its Teaching(T+P); try to
  observe the P of L take place; attempt to measure
  whether R has occurred; and base their profes-
  sional practice on the B of K developed by
  Scholars and Researchers in the D and Related
  Fields
  F_1= The Teachers and Coaches of the Profession of
  X(PE), etc.
  F_2= The Performers, etc.
  F_3= The Teachers of Teachers, etc.
  F_4= The Scholars and Researchers

Now that definitions have been offered, and an attempt made to

establish certain formulas describing the six different meanings or

uses of the term "physical education" (and its several variations),

the reader is asked to recall that a family resemblance term is one

in which the term may be employed correctly in different situations

even though no one essential property (or set of properties) appears

each and every time that the term is used. All of the uses do have

at least elements of characteristics that overlap. (An <u>example</u> of

this might be as follows:

    Q: F,H
    R: F,G
    S: G,H
    T: G,F

In this example Q has F in common with R and T, and H in common with

S; R has F in common with Q and T, and G in common with S and T, etc.

Note that there is no one characteristic (or set of characteristics)

which can be found in all of the cases (Q, R, S, and T).)

The analysis has progressed to the point where a similar analysis

can be made of the claim that "physical education" is a family resem-

blance term based on the above example and on the definitions and the

formulas prior to that which explain that the term is currently being allotted six meanings or uses -- and also keeping in mind that the term physical education is being employed to cover such "sub-meanings" as sport, play, exercise, and dance. Consider therefore uses U, V, W, X, Y, and Z which do have a distribution of overlapping characteristics - but which also have an "essential definition" _if_ a person, or group of people, within the profession is willing to allot the field of "X" such an essential definition (e.g., sport, play, dance, _or_ exercise):

<u>The Field of "X" (Physical Education)
Analyzed as a Possible Family Resemblance
Term</u>

U: A   Subject Matter (Theory and Practice)

V: B (A)   The Teaching of the Subject-Matter

W: C (A via   The Process of Learning the Subject-Matter
          B)   through the Efforts of the Teacher

X: D (A via   The Result of the Subject-Matter Being
         B in C)   Taught by the Teacher so that the
                  Process of Learning Takes Place in the
                  Student

Y: E (A, B   The Discipline Includes Knowledge of the
         C, D)   Subject-Matter, its Teaching, the Process
                  of Learning, and the Result

Z: F (A, B,   The Profession Includes Teachers & Coaches,
         C, D   Performers, Teachers of Teachers, and
       used by   Scholars & Researchers who Employ the
        F_{1-4})   Subject-Matter; may Practice its Teaching;
                  Observe whether the Process of Learning Takes
                  Place; and Evaluate whether the proper Result
                  Occurs.

<u>Specific Findings</u>. As a result of this preliminary analysis, the following specific findings may be stated:

1.   Each use has <u>something</u> in common with the other five uses.

2.   This <u>something</u> can and does vary greatly, however, depending upon whether theory or practice is being considered, and also upon whether the term "physical education" is

viewed and/or defined as sport, play, exercise, or
dance, etc.

3. Each use has a distinct characteristic separate from each
of the other five uses even though there is general
agreement that the term is being used correctly in each
of the six instances described. A particular use usually
includes a combination of one or more of the meanings and/
or characteristics of a different use.

Conclusions

As a result of this investigation or analysis of the claim

that "physical education" has become a family resemblance term,"

it is not possible to state definitively and in a clear-cut fashion

that physical education is such a type of term or it isn't! The

following conclusions appear to be possible:

1. "Physical education" is a family resemblance term
by virtue of the fact (1) that the term is relatively
correctly employed in connection with each of the uses
and/or meanings enumerated; (2) that two persons using
this term at present may have similar but fundamentally
different concepts in mind; and (3) that there is some
overlapping of characteristics from meaning to meaning.
(See Specific Finding # 3 above.)

2. "Physical education" could be a family resemblance term
if there is variance in the meaning from use to use as
explained in Conclusion #1 above, but it might not be
if there was complete agreement by those concerned about
the meaning A (A$_1$, A$_2$) or SMX. (Specific Finding # 2 above)

3. "Physical education" is not a family resemblance term
if (1) the literal meaning of the words "physical" and
"education" is accepted as the "essential definition"
which applies to all cases in which the term is employed;
or (2) if there is general consensus that "human movement"
is at the core of the definition of the term whenever it
is used, no matter whether human movement is viewed in a
narrow sense (as related only to sport, play, exercise,
and/or dance), or in a broad sense (as related to man's
movement under all conditions). (Specific Finding # 1 above)

Recommendations

The investigator believes that he has demonstrated quite con-

clusively that there is great confusion in connection with the use

of the term "physical education," so much in fact that it seems to test sorely a "philosophy of language" approach of philosophical analysis. Further study is needed of each of the three conclusions offered above in the hope that further light may be shed on what has been a vexing problem to so many people in the field of physical education and sport. In the meantime, if the term "physical education" is still employed by those whose philosophical persuasion is not offended by such usage, its use should be sharply delimited and care should be taken to employ qualifying and descriptive terms precisely in this connection.

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