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ABSTRACT

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INTERVENING: MANAGERIAL ISSUES AND CHALLENGES

IN AN EDUCATIONAL MANAGEMENT

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

bу

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INTERVENING: MANAGERIAL ISSUES AND
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MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

(Abstract)

The literature on intervention theory tends to overlook the pragmatic managerial issues and challenges of intervening. This paper analyzes the formative period of a school management development program to establish crucial differences between the program director's espoused theory and the actual experience of the intervention. These differences are generalized as summary observations which represent researchable questions on social intervention. Specific managerial guidelines are also developed for the change practitioner. The paper is of importance, therefore, to the researcher of intervention processes as well as to the practitioner.

INTERVENING: MANAGERIAL ISSUES AND CHALLENGES IN AN EDUCATIONAL MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

Among the principles guiding the application of behavioral science knowledge to social intervention is that the change agent and client be mutually involved in the change process (Argyris, 1970; French & Bell, 1973). Increasingly social scientists raise ethical points on the intervention issue and the tendency is to look askance at cases in which the change target is not a "client" in the sense of having control over what happens to her, him or it (Walton & Warwick, 1973). This concern parallels earlier developments in the general field of management where the growth in behavioral science knowledge was accompanied by the promotion of participatory managerial values (Likert, 1967; McGregor, 1960). Although the current change literature is replete with discussions of alternative intervention technologies (Hornstein, Bunker, Burke, Gindes & Lewicki, 1971), it tends to neglect the operational dynamics of this value orientation. Practically speaking though, it is one thing to discuss the merits of a theory, but quite another to effectively implement it (Argyris & Schon, 1974). Indeed, the interventionist has recourse to few, if any, guidelines for managing programs with the dual goals of achieving constructive change and achieving such change through participative means. To focus further attention on this important intervention issue, this paper critically examines the experience of one educational management development program in which a decision was made to implement an organic model. This model was to affect both the organization of an intervention team and the application of an intervention strategy by the team.

The case to be examined here relates to the activities of the Education Middle-Management Center (M-MC). Its purpose is to improve schooling by engaging principalships from the New Orleans Area public schools in activities designed to increase their managerial effectiviess. M-MC consists of an intervention team, a client system of participating principals and school staffs, and a program director. The intervention strategy linking purpose with resources is simultaneous research and action (Brown, 1972) supported by continuing education. Financial support and legitimation is provided by The Kettering and Rockefeller Foundations and the New Orleans Public School System.

In effect, M-MC is a "resource mobilizing" capability, a device through which resources from university, school, and general community sources are interfaced to bring about constructive change in school management practices. As key inputs to this process, the members of the intervention team, the participating school principals, the director of M-MC and the intervention strategy all deserve a brief introduction.

Inputs

<u>Intervention Strategy.</u> Through simultaneous <u>research</u> (to increase understanding) and <u>action</u> (to facilitate constructive change), M-MC seeks to develop the problem-solving capabilities and proactivities in



¹⁰nly information necessary to the analysis is presented here, for further details see Parrilleaux, Schermerhorn and Welsh (1975) or various program documents available directly from Middle-Management Center, Center for Education, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana, 70118.

participating principalships. Specifically, the strategy involves interventionists and principals collecting data pertinent to school management and using these data for purposes of intervention and change. Such a strategy has been described by Clark as:

...A change oriented, knowledge gathering technique which is aimed at practical concerns of people in an immediate problematic situation and one in which the intention of all involved is to gather data about and to make changes in the properties of the system itself(1972).

Research-action in the M-MC context is unique in that this strategy is applied at two levels of action -- the individual school and school cluster levels. At the school level, a principal and a member of the intervention team relate dyadically in research-action; at the school cluster level, groups of principals and the intervention team engage in similar experiences.

As a complement to research-action, M-MC mobilizes educational experiences (lectures, seminars, exercises, library resources, etc.) as responses to learning needs discovered by principals and interventionists in their M-MC activities.

Intervention Team. The interventionist in the M-MC model is an interdisciplinary team. Members (ITMs for intervention team members) are all volunteers and participate on a marginal and part-time basis. In M-MC's first operational year the distribution of ITMs included 12 academicians, three management partitioners on released time, and three management consultants.

Client System. In the high school feeder system (composed of a high school and its two middle and nine feeder elementary schools)



with which linkages were established, principals participated on a marginal time basis. In all cases this involved the expenditure of both personal and normal working time.

The Director. As a role, the director is accountable for M-MC as an organization. This includes "managing" the intervention team, maintaining linkages between ITMs and the principals, and implementing the intervention strategy. The directorship is funded and staffed on a one-half time basis. The person in the role originated the M-MC idea and coordinated its movement from idea to reality.

Goals

During its first year, M-MC's operational goals were:

- 1. To develop the intervention team,
- 2. To establish linkages with principalships in one high school feeder system, and
- 3. To facilitate research-action experiences in this feeder system linkage.

The first two goals are formative, i.e. they deal with the creation of the intervention team and its linkage with the client system. The third goal is summative and deals directly with implementing the intervention strategy to achieve constructive change in the client system.



A key feature of the M-MC intervention program is the management style of the director. His approach is best described as an attempt to operationalize the prescriptions of Argyris (1970) for "organistically-oriented" intervention. In the M-MC context the director's adoption of this organic value orientation gained formal status as this written operating assumption of the intervention program: "The effectiveness of a Middle-Management Center and its intervention team is a function of the 'organic' orientation."

The director's intentions were "to maximize psychological ownership among all participants in all aspects of the intervention program," and to create an environment in which M-MC participants could achieve results through self-direction and self-control. For example:

- 1. In respect to forming the intervention team the director considered M-MC to involve a "smorgasboard of possible tasks" and that potential members were their own best authorities on defining personal roles.
- 2. In respect to linking with the client system the director expected intervention team members to "create relationships in which the principals exercise influence and autonomy over the quality of their own professional lives."

Thus, influenced by this organic value, the director's adopted management style was expected to result in a situation of participation, influence and ownership among organizational participants.

It is important to note, however, that the organic model was not just considered something "good", but it was thought to be a basic prerequisite to the success of the M-MC intervention. This latter program logic had the following rationale. Early concerns of M-MC were of the "Who are we?", "What should we do?" and "How should we



do it?" types. In such a setting where the program was in a process of invention, the director expected his personal allegiance to an organic value to "facilitate the pooling of interdisciplinary information for model building." Further, M-MC was created on the basis of voluntary and marginal time commitments. To attract and maintain participants under these conditions, the director thought that:

...any contribution would be initiated and maintained as a result of satisfaction and psychological success individuals would experience. The project had to provide something potential team members did not already possess. The organic posture was presumed to represent an opportunity...


Thus, from the perspective of the director, the organic model was both an "end," in the sense of representing a valued state of behavior, and a "means," in the sense of being a presumed facilitator of the organization's goals. The theory underlying this expected role of the organic value in M-MC is schematically represented in Figure 1.

In essence, Figure 1 details the contribution of the director's allegience of the organic value to M-MC operations in theory.

Through its influence on his adopted management style, the organic value was expected to create an operating mode of participation, influence and ownership. This mode was expected to facilitate the achievement of intervention team development, client system linkage and research-action as M-MC operational goals.

FIGURE 1

The Espoused Theory



represent lines of theoretical influence

PURPOSE -8-

The experience of the authors in M-MC suggests that M-MC faced unique challenges in meeting its initial operating goals -- challenges traceable in part to the difficulty of implementing espoused theory. Through an eclectic analysis of M-MC's first year of operations, this paper (1) documents inconsistences between the director's intentions and actual M-MC outcomes, and (2) establishes guidelines for others seeking to implement organic intervention models.

THE EXPERIENCE

The foci of our investigation are the behaviors of the members of the intervention team, client principals and the director. Data for the examination include the director's response to a series of structured interview questions, a case analysis of M-MC's first operational year (Middle-Management Center, 1974), and the personal experiences of the authors.

Intervention Team

The director's management style appears to have resulted in an organic M-MC operating mode for ITMs. It was his policy to let new members serve as their own best judge of the role they should play in M-MC. For example:

A prospective team member was introduced by another to the director. The two subsequently met over lunch, and the potential member accepted an invitation to attend M-MC activities for an observational period. Within one month he had operationally joined as a result of the director's



²Co-author Barrilleaux is the director of M-MC.

acceptance of his offer to assume responsibility for facilitating the planning of meetings with a cluster of school principals.

In effect, a reciprocal information gathering process preceded decisions to join and participate. Members were not forced into pre-cast molds and, in fact, eventual self-descriptions by ITMs of their individual roles defied cross correlation. On this one dimension of M-MC membership, ITMs had considerable participation and influence in decisions allocating themselves as resources.

Case researchers note further that some ITMs <u>initiated</u> written agreements with the director to outline individual contributions and activities. Other data indicate ITMs experienced frequent feelings of impact on M-MC goals, action strategies, structure and policies, as well as conflicts with one another in debates and decision-making on these same issues.

Thus, an organic operating mode was established to a considerable degree between the director and ITMs. This operating mode, although allowing for conflicts, appears to have been a positive influence bringing potential members to the intervention team and inducing them to stay. Any turnover in the membership was primarily due to job transfers and/or changes in primary role demands which prohibited expenditures of marginal time with M-MC. ITMs developed senses of psychological ownership while tending to remain as members.

A further consideration with respect to the intervention team, however, is its basic purpose -- to apply the intervention strategy. Here, the facts are less supportive of the positive impact of the organic operating mode. Implementation of the intervention strategy was a subject of controversy and limited results during the initial M-MC



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expressed by some university-based ITMs in a team meeting that they possibly suffered decreasing interest as the organization gained sophistication. For this group, it seems the "kick" may well have been in building the model rather than in implementing it. Any sense of ownership accruing to the model-building stage apparently had difficulty carrying through to the action implementation stage. This lack of action follow-through is evident more generally in the behavior of ITMs. Case researchers commented, "There is an inconsistency in the ITMs' verbalization of a desire for action and the amount of time committed or proactivity demonstrated." Records show also that ITMs were diligent in attending scheduled meetings, but little else appeared to happen through their efforts.

The central issue concerns doing research-action. Although 15 ITMs told case researchers they considered research-action important as an M-MC goal, only six indicated it was a dominant theme in their interactions with principals. On a more general question regarding the application of the strategy to help principals conceptualize management problems, ITMs responded with the following perceptions of success: 0=extremely successful, 3=successful, 10=partially successful, and 2=largely unsuccessful. Thus, while most ITMs agreed that they were supposed to be doing research-action, they admited that they actually were not. In an atmosphere of self-motivation and control, action committments to the intervention strategy suffered. The question is "Why?"

One major issue in this regard relates to the role perceptions of the ITMs. Seven ITMs specifically reported feeling underutilized, and ten felt M-MC did not meet their training



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needs. These data indicate a degree of uncertainty existed among ITMs over the requisite skills and expected behaviors associated with their M-MC roles. For example, consider the following comments to the director by ITMs:

"I don't know what I'm to really do at cluster meetings."

"Just tell me what you want me to do."

"Let me know how I can help."

In effect, we are observing a classical case of role ambiguity. The ITMs were not acting because they were unsure of how they should act. In the organic setting of M-MC, uniquely defined personal roles and the director's approach to daily management, self-described as "no wrist slapping or punishment...dependent upon commitment and a sense of ownership," emerge somewhat dysfunctional from an action perspective. Although a sense of psychological ownership, participation and influence existed among ITMs and contributed to their willingness to join and remain on the intervention team, these same ITMs experienced role ambiguity. The result was relative inaction during this formative period.

Intervention Team - Client System Interface

A generally similar result may be observed in the intervention team-client system interface. Here, the director held the following expectations:

...principal as client is "in charge" of own as well as organization's self renewal... team members are to create relationships in which principals exercise influence and autonomy over the quality of their own professional lives...

That such expectations resulted in an organic operating mode is



best exemplified by the case of a survey taken to provide the

by ITMs and principals for application to the school situations of the latter. The participative process resulted in a high degree of ownership for principals in both the survey and resulting data. In fact, when revisions to the survey were suggested by certain ITMs for a follow-up application, the changes were

This operating mode appears to have constituted a positive appeal to principals to join with ITMs as M-MC participants. Of the twelve feeder system principals, only one eventually failed to affiliate with M-MC and this was a rather unique case:

resisted by other ITMs and principals until they were included in

the revision process.

This principal was committed to a stance of "back-to-basics" while seeking direct resources for his elementary school children. He stated, "I don't have time for the M-MC if it won't give materials or teacher help for my classes."

The reasons for M-MCs high linking percentage must be inferred with caution, however, since M-MC is legitimated through the top management of the school system. Yet, principals' reports that the "non-directive" character and "flexibility" of M-MC were its best attributes indicate that the organic operating mode was a significant inducement to their participation.

For example, one principal commented to the director:

"...its good to be able to meet with ITMs who don't come with a loaded agenda but are ready to respond to the things that are stresses for me."

These types of relationships between ITMs and principals served to facilitate the formation of the intervention team -

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client system linkage. There is additional evidence, however, that indicates this organic mode adversely impacted the involvement of principals in activities essential to the basic intervention strategy. We have already noted where research-action was a problem for ITMs; this applies to principals as well. Most principals associated the "research" aspect of the strategy with the survey described above. They assumed that the responsibility for this research rested with ITMs, and even complained that the data they had supplied had not been prepared for action.

Originally, action under the intervention strategy was expected to be based on the proactivities of principals.

Examples of proactivities include principals:

Requesting the M-MC to assist in collecting demographic data to support a proposed school redistricting plan.

Organizing a seminar through M-MC to provide information on collective bargaining for teachers.

Actually, these types of requests were few. The reason for this relative inaction might be inferred from principals' reactions to their dyad relationships. They reported these relationships to be highly valued activities. Only five of 11, told case researchers they understood the expectations associated with these relations. As importantly, only seven felt that their individual ITM partner did. This, again, is evidence of role ambiguity.

Thus, while an organic operating mode seems to have supported the initial willingness of principals to affiliate with M-MC, its role in facilitating action outcomes is less clearly positive. A significant factor in regards to the inter-



vention team - client system interface relates to feelings of role ambiguity. Principals did not seem to know what to do and did not understand research-action in general. They had joined an organization, but weren't sure how to participate.

The Director

The director served as the information and administrative hub of the organization. He chaired M-MC meetings and through his adopted management style expected to facilitate intervention activities. In practice this facilitator role proved "difficult to maintain."

In many ways the director became a primary "doer" as well as facilitator of M-MC intervention activities. It was largely on his sponsorship that learning activities were made available to principals. It was primarily he who in cluster meetings operationalized research-action as part of the meeting agenda -over and over it was his voice that would attempt to turn principals' comments into researchable issues through such statements as, 'What I really hear you saying is..." or "It sounds as if you're talking about 'such and such' a problem." To a considerable extent these initiating behaviors contradicted the director's intentions and the organic M-MC operating mode. These contradictions did not pass without notice. Some ITMs complained to case researchers that M-MC's services were incongruent with the needs of principals, and that many appeared opportunistic. Two others reflected as follows on M-MC's organic operating assumption:

"...really have not operated that way, manipulative at times."



"...we have been very directive and structured."

These comments show that some ITMs considered the director's initiating behaviors as contradictions of an espoused theory of action. Perhaps the full significance of these behaviors is found in one member's frequent referral in team meetings to M-MC as "Lou's (the director's) thing."

Two cases exemplify a possible basis for an attitude such as the latter:

Case 1. The director recognized with certain ITMs
that M-MC needed a formal research-action task group.
He offered the task to selected individuals and
proceeded to convene them.

Case 2. The director recognized the need for M-MC to prepare to link with a second cluster of principal-ships. After broaching the issue in an ITM meeting and encountering questions on the wisdom of such a move, he essentially stated the move would be made in the succeeding operational year.

Each case involves the director operating somewhat unilaterally to establish action directions for M-MC. Whether or not such actions were legitimate in terms of an organizational rationale, they encountered resistance and were considered by some as "directive." In fact, the research-evaluation task group was slow to become operational because two members present at the initial meeting told the director and others that this was something that could not be done without the total approval of M-MC membership. These individuals had developed senses of ownership to the point of being able to tell the director that his behavior violated the organic assumption of the organization.



While representing transgression from the organic operating mode, each of the above attempts by the director eventually succeeded, notwithstanding resistance. Furthermore, each, in its own way, accounted for a substantial portion of M-MC's action accomplishments during the initial operating period.

It is interesting to consider in this same frame of reference the director's personal feelings during this operational period. When queried on the personal costs encountered as director of M-MC, he responded extensively as follows:

...the major <u>personal</u> costs centered about the time and psychological energy required to reduce the disparity between what I said and what I practiced, and the feeling that as director I seemed to loose my right to express frustration, anger and aggression.

By his own words, the director recognized that he was inconsistent in behaving in accord with an organic value. He also expressed concern that such inconsistencies were illegitimate to his managerial role, and noted that they cost him psychologically. As a person in the role, or as the person with the adopted management style, the director viewed his situation as:

...a battle of forces between personally internalizing an organic value and situational realities
including:

- marginal time commitments of participants,
- learning needs of a growing team membership,
- expressions of guilt by ITMs perceiving they



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have failed to do something of note or contribution,

- continuous requirements for program nodification and renewal, and
- continuous pressures of short range program
 evaluations by clients, team members, funding
 sources and significant others.

These thoughts of the director offer us important insights into his experience in attempting to implement the espoused theory as presented in Figure 1. First, the organically-determined management style was truly "adopted;" it was something he consciously tried to do and had to work at.

Second, situational dynamics caused his behavior to contradict at times the intended organic operating mode. Third, the director was frustrated by these contradictions. Finally, ITMs recognized these cntradictions and met them with some resistance and alarm.

In previous discussion we have noted that the director was able to implement an organic operating mode for M-MC.

This mode was apparently violated at times, however, and its impact on M-MC's goals is also apparently mixed. To put the insights of this analysis in summary perspective, we offer the following observations on the expected impact of an organic model on the management and operations of intervention programs. These observations are presented in general form to stimulate further reflection and dialogue on the issues as they apply to various organizational and intervention contexts. Their validity, of course, extends only to our interpretation of the M-MC experience.

Observation #1

Operating under an organic model will contribute to
a program director's ability to 1) attract members of
diverse educational and occupational backgrounds to an
intervention team, 2) attract individuals from a client
system to interface with members of the intervention team,
and 3) develop among members of the intervention team and
client system senses of psychological ownership in the
intervention program.

M-MC data also suggest that the impact of an organic model on action follow-throughs by organization members is less clearly positive. The second observation summarizes this logic.



Observation #2

Operating under an organic model will contribute to perceived role ambiguities for members of an intervention team and its client system; these role ambiguities will, in turn, contribute to a lack of action follow-through.

The organic operating mode of M-MC led to a situation in which a substantial number of ITMs and principals were unsure about what action expectations were held of them. These uncertainties led to discrepancies between their verbal commitments and action follow throughs. The cumulative result was an inability of the director to fully effect the implementation of the intervention strategy during this operational period.

Observation #3

Adopting an organic value will contribute to personal frustrations for the director of an intervention program; these frustrations will, in turn, cause behavioral contradictions and personal feelings of paying a high "price" for operating under these guidelines.

In the task-oriented settings of intervention programs, it is not easy for a director to maintain allegiance to an organically-determined management style. At times, in fact, it may not be possible and contradictory behaviors are likely to occur. Although filling an action void, such behaviors may be dysfunctional. In particular, contradictions will pose personal ramifications for the director who verbalizes one line of reasoning and then acts out quite another.

These summary observations are schematically presented in Figure 2. This figure is an empirically-determined version of M-MC's experience with the espoused theory of Figure 1. In



FIGURE 2

The Practice






Figure 2, an organic value influences the adopted management style of the director. This management style influences the formation of an organic organizational operating mode which in turn, facilitates intervention team building and client system linkage. The organic operating mode, however, also creates role ambiguities for participants which, in turn, are dysfunctional for the application of the intervention strategy. The resulting inaction is frustrating for the director and leads to contradictory and directive behaviors. While these behaviors offset somewhat the inaction of the general membership, they also conflict with the organic operating mode and thus contribute further to role ambiguities. This sequence of relationships is based on our interpretations of the M-MC initial operating experience. It thus represents practice as opposed to espoused theory.

Additional Considerations

Three variables in addition to those already discussed are included in Figure 2. First, is the prior organizational experiences of participants. In the case of M-MC, the director explicitly presumed that the organic mode would be an attraction. Consider his statement:

...the project had to provide something potential
team members did not already possess. The organic
posture was presumed to represent an opportunity...

If—an organic organizational experience is truly novel it
could constitute an additional source of role ambiguity for
participants. Movement from one organizational experience to
a radically different one is liable to be associated with



hesitation and uncertainty in taking a new role. One may, in

fact, need to <u>learn</u> new behavior patterns, and be assisted in this learning. During the learning period, reticence to overstep comfortable behavioral boundaries would also be expected. Thus, for M-MC, the organic mode may have, indeed, been different. This difference, however, may have contributed to member role ambiguities.

Second, is the pressure of sponsors and funding sources for action results. These expectations, when premature, may interact with an absence of explicit accomplishments and contribute to a director's frustration. In the M-MC case, the organization was subject to annual renewal of funding.

Furthermore, M-MC was ligitimated by the New Orleans Public School System. The action orientations of these resource suppliers constituted obvious pressures on the director in his role as the primary interface. Ultimately, the pressures manifested themselves in his contradictory behaviors.

Third, the director as a person is an imporant input.

We have already noted where an organic value was a primary influence on the adopted management style of the M-MC director. This style was not adopted by a non-entity, it was adopted by a person and this person became an important dynamic in the practice of the theory. In this case specifically, the director is highly task orientated and admittedly of directive tendencies. He had to discipline himself in the adopted management style.

To a certain extent it is reasonable to assume his person also required time to learn and adjust to the new style. It is also reasonable to equate some of his reported frustration with a conflict between his person and the adopted management style. It is likely that many individuals interested in



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assuming the responsibilities for intervention programs would be susceptible to similar conflict.

IMPLICATIONS

The organic model as applied in the M-MC context appears to have resulted in certain benefits and costs for the intervention program. In terms of benefits, an organic value contributed to the director's abilities to facilitate the formative M-MC goals of team-building and client system linkage. Being associated with ultimate participant role ambiguities, however, the organic mode cost the organization in terms of summative accomplishments. To this point our purpose has been to offer a thought-provoking view of something that has been neglected in research and conceptualization on social intervention -- a specific confrontation of the managerial issues and challenges established when one attempts to achieve planned change under an intervention program whose norms and operating guidelines are governed by an organic model. Our analysis of the M-MC experience suggests, at the very least, that such an intervention should be approached with certain behavioral guidelines in mind. We therefore conclude with an elucidation of these guidelines.

- 1. Recognize that an organic model will affect all participants in an intervention program and may be a source of uncertainty for many. Therefore:
 - operate under the model only as an early and conscious choice of participants,
 - assume a proactive stance in reflecting with participants on the model's underlying values, and
 - encourage every participant to personally interpret



these values in the specific context of the intervention program.

- 2. Recognize that an organic operating mode will result in most participants frequently wanting to discuss and/or modify the procedures and goals of the intervention program. Therefore:
 - give early attention to establishing means for high quantities and quality of information sharing, and
 - develop with participants early and clear statements of
 program purposes, goals and objectives, and then
 "revisit" them frequently to challenge their operational
 validities and desirabilities.
- 3. Recognize that an organic operating mode may be a new experience for many participants. Therefore:
 - require prospective participants to invest a period of observation and interaction with the program before making any commitments to join, and
 - expect that time will be required for new participants

 to <u>learn</u> to behave within this organic operating

 mode and that some participants will learn faster than

 others.
- 4. Recognize that participants will experience role ambiguity as they <u>learn</u> to behave in an organic operating mode. Therefore:
 - expect that verbal commitments may tend to exceed action follow-throughs,
 - expect that participants will sometimes act "inorganically,"
 - establish processes to facilitate the taking of action roles, and



- enable participants to continually renegotiate action roles over time.
- 5. Recognize that the early experience of an intervention program operating in an organic mode will be associated more with formative than summative accomplishments. Therefore:
 - be prepared for the customarily high "start-up"

 costs of a new program to be continuous in an experience where the program is continually renewing

 itself, and
 - expect premature demands for results from resource suppliers and task-oriented participants.
- 6. Recognize that operating under an organic value may conflict with your own tendencies for self-initiated action and desire for results. Therefore:
 - learn to wait dynamically -- create and facilitate in anticipation of ultimate summative effects.

This paper raises questions we think are of importance to the researcher of intervention processes as well as to the practitioner. Whether or not the director's adoption of an organic value as a guide to his management of the M-MC intervention program is alone responsible for the experience reported above, this analysis demonstrates that there is a considerable gap between intervention theory and the practice of social intervention. Particularly relevant in this respect is the potential trade-off between timeliness of action, which appears to be a liability of an organic intervention model, and ultimate validity of action, which is one of the supposed benefits. Certainly, the dynamics of doing social intervention under organic criteria are important empirical issues. The



fact that we have been able to crystallize certain of these issues in the experiences of the M-MC challenges all of us to be more prudent in researching as we are intervening.

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