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ABSTRACT

The report discusses the need to vary the training of Reserve and Guard units by skill and readiness requirements and to make more efficient use of training time. It contains recommendations to the Secretaries of Defense, Transportation, Army, Navy, and Air Force. The review was based on questionnaires mailed to 2,209 randomly selected reservists (1,707 were returned) and 1,438 unit commanders (1,241 were returned). The reliability and validity of responses were validated by on-site visits of 99 sample units. The General Accounting Office (GAO) estimated that in fiscal year 1974 reservists' time devoted to other than official jobs or spent idle totaled 15 million man-days and cost about \$1.2 billion (about 43% of the \$2.7 billion authorized by Congress for drills and active duty training during that period). The report alerts the Congress that some members in all Reserve components and Reserve units can maintain proficiency under a reduced training schedule. GAO recommends that the Congress amend the existing laws to permit varying the training of the Army and Air National Guard by categories according to kinds and degrees of training. Materials related to the conduction of the review are appended. (Author/EC)

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REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

Need To Improve Efficiency Of Reserve Training

Department of Defense
Department of Transportation

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION & WELFARE
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FPCD-75-134

JUNE 26, 1975

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COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

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To the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives

This report on Reserve training discusses the need to vary the training of Reserve and Guard units and members by skill and readiness requirements and to make more efficient use of training time. It contains recommendations to the Secretaries of Transportation, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force and matters for consideration by the Congress.

We made our review pursuant to the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67).

We are sending copies of this report to the Director, Office of Management and Budget, and the Secretaries of Transportation, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "James B. Stead".

Comptroller General
of the United States

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ABBREVIATIONS

DOD	Department of Defense
GAO	General Accounting Office
MAC	Military Airlift Command

COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

NEED TO IMPROVE EFFICIENCY
OF RESERVE TRAINING
Department of Defense
Department of Transportation

D I G E S T

The military services require 99 percent of their reservists to attend forty-eight 4-hour drill sessions and to spend 2 weeks on active duty each year, although needed readiness and skill difficulty vary widely among units and members. (See p. 9.) The average number of reservists in paid training status was about 894,000 in fiscal year 1974. (See pp. 1 and 2.)

On the average, reservists spend about 50 percent of their drill time and 61 percent of their active duty time training in their official military job. Remaining time is devoted to other jobs or general military activities or spent idle. (See p. 5.) Idleness is a major cause of dissatisfaction among reservists. (See ch. 5.)

GAO estimated that in fiscal year 1974 reservists' time devoted to other than official jobs or spent idle totaled 15 million man-days and cost about \$1.2 billion (43 percent of the \$2.7 billion authorized by the Congress for drills and active duty training during that period).

This report alerts the Congress that some members in all Reserve components and Reserve units can maintain proficiency under a reduced training schedule. (See p. 41.)

The Congress may have to consider new compensation measures, such as enlistment and reenlistment bonuses and a redefinition of a creditable year of Reserve service for retirement. GAO recommends that the Congress amend the existing laws to permit varying the training of the Army and Air National Guard by categories according to kinds and degrees of training. GAO suggests that the Congress consider these

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matters within the context of a tailored Reserve forces training program. (See p. 41.)

GAO recommends that, to improve training, the Secretaries of Transportation, Defense, and the services:

--Identify early deployment units and provide them with sufficient training to achieve required proficiency.

--Reduce training schedules for units which have sufficient postmobilization time to upgrade proficiency.

--Reduce training schedules for reservists whose military jobs are not difficult or are similar to their civilian jobs, or who have otherwise achieved required skill levels.

--Ease the administrative workload of unit commanders.

--Reevaluate the general military activities required and identify those that can be eliminated or deferred until after mobilization.

--Implement more mutual support and active service affiliation agreements.

--Situate high-priority units where they can train with essential equipment. (See p. 40.)

The Departments of Defense and Transportation generally agreed with GAO's recommendations and said several actions had been or would be taken to implement them. (See pp. 41 to 45.)

GAO's estimate of the allocation of time and costs of reservist training follows:

	<u>Costs</u>	<u>Man-days</u>
	(millions)	
Waiting, filling in time, doing nothing	\$ 474.9	6.5
Jobs others than of- ficial military jobs	351.0	4.5
General military activities (physi- cal fitness, drug abuse, equal oppor- tunity, code of conduct, inspections, formations, etc.)	<u>328.2</u>	<u>4.2</u>
Total	\$1,154.1	15.2
Official military jobs	<u>1,548.2</u>	<u>17.9</u>
Total	<u>\$2,702.3</u>	<u>33.1</u>

(See p. 6.)

The review was based on questionnaires mailed to 2,209 randomly selected reservists and 1,438 unit commanders. The reliability and validity of responses were validated by on-site visits. (See pp. 3 and 4.)

GAO's comprehensive, multiservice study disclosed many units with no deployment requirements and others with requirements that allow sufficient postmobilization time for training. These units attend 48 drill sessions and 2 weeks of active duty training a year. (See pp. 10 and 11.) The Department of Defense said GAO was technically correct but many of the units were needed within the United States after mobilization to meet immediate needs of combat units. (See p. 65.)

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Government has assigned to the Reserve forces, including the National Guard, a prominent role in the Nation's defense. Since the end of the draft in 1973, reservists ^{1/} have become the primary source of manpower that the President can quickly mobilize to augment active duty forces in a national emergency.

To enter the paid Reserve training program, each reservist must have served a period of active duty during which he received basic and advanced individual training. In the Reserve training program, he receives annual active and inactive duty training with his unit. The unit training includes academic and on-the-job training in each reservist's officially assigned military job and training regarding how the unit should function as a team. A portion of the training is also devoted to such general military activities as inspections, formations, and attending lectures on a variety of subjects.

Some units organize, equip, and train to be mobilized and deployed intact. Others train reservists to augment active duty units.

Annual active duty, except for initial basic and advanced individual training, usually consists of an annual 2-week ^{2/} training session at an active or Reserve military installation. Inactive duty training is usually received monthly during four consecutive 4-hour drills on a selected weekend at National Guard armories and Reserve centers.

Each unit has a commander who is responsible for planning and overseeing the training. Although the services have prepared general guidance for mission-related training, the unit commanders are largely on their own in determining the best use of the available training time.

The average number of reservists in paid drill status is shown below for the seven components which compose the Ready Reserves.

^{1/}The term "reservist" as used in this report refers to members of the Selected Ready Reserve, which includes the National Guard.

^{2/}Fifteen days for National Guard units.

<u>Component</u>	<u>Average paid drill strength</u>		
	<u>Fiscal</u> <u>year</u> <u>1973</u>	<u>Fiscal</u> <u>year</u> <u>1974</u>	<u>Fiscal</u> <u>year</u> <u>1975</u>
		(estimated)	(estimated)
Army National Guard	373,564	369,535	366,429
Army Reserve	230,705	227,609	209,570
Navy Reserve	120,684	115,563	105,788
Air National Guard	88,318	90,427	86,514
Air Force Reserve	46,079	46,402	49,821
Marine Corps Reserve	34,755	32,683	33,747
Coast Guard Reserve	11,255	11,300	11,500
Total	<u>905,360</u>	<u>893,519</u>	<u>863,369</u>

The fiscal year 1974 budget included \$4.1 billion for the Reserve training program. About \$2.7 billion was for the drills and active duty training of Reserve forces covered by our review.

ACTIONS UNDERWAY TO IMPROVE TRAINING

In August 1973 the Secretary of Defense initiated a comprehensive study of factors which limit or enhance use of the Reserves for national defense. The group conducting this study is examining organization, equipment, readiness, deployment objectives, management, and possible trade-offs between active and Reserve component forces. The study had not been completed when we concluded our review in October 1974.

The Naval Reserve is in the process of an extensive restructuring resulting from an effort by the Reserve Analytical Study Project which has been active for over 2 years. The restructuring is not expected to be fully implemented with equipment in place until fiscal year 1979.

An Army reorganization of its supervisory and advisory structure began in 1973. Specific objectives of this program are to:

- Increase the Continental Armies' ability to supervise Reserve component activities.
- Provide hands-on type of training and assistance to Reserve component units.
- Improve installation capability to support the Reserve components.

- Provide within the advisor system technical expertise in more functional fields.
- Help units write and conduct tests and exercises.
- Increase association of active Army units with Reserve component units.

APPROACH TO THE REVIEW

The objective of our review was to determine whether the unit training of each reservist is relevant to his assigned job and designed to achieve and maintain the needed degree of proficiency, or whether problems and constraints were hindering the training. The review did not cover basic and advanced individual training during initial active duty.

Because of the size of the program and the many variables (identified in a preliminary survey) which could contribute to or detract from the value of the training, we elected to use survey questionnaires to obtain broadly based information, instead of relying entirely on visits to training sites. Department of Defense (DOD) officials concurred in this approach and helped us design the questionnaires.

We mailed questionnaires to 2,209 reservists selected at random from the approximately 903,000 reservists in the Selected Ready Reserve in October 1973. We received 1,707 responses, although some respondents did not answer all applicable questions. Response rates by component are shown in appendix I. The following table shows the number of responses by pay grade.

<u>Pay grade</u>	<u>Responses</u>
E1 to E4	726
E5 to E7	670
E8 to E9	49
W1 to W4	27
O1 to O3	140
O4 to O6	90
Not shown	5
	<u>1,707</u>

After we received responses from members of 1,438 units, we mailed another questionnaire to the commanders of these units. We received 1,241 responses from the unit commanders, although some did not respond to every question. Response rates by component are shown in appendix II, and the number of responses from each component are shown in the following table.

<u>Component</u>	<u>Responses</u>
Army National Guard	434
Army Reserve	262
Navy Reserve	150
Air National Guard	118
Air Force Reserve	102
Marine Reserve	75
Coast Guard Reserve	<u>100</u>

1,241

To determine whether the questionnaire results were consistent and stable and the data valid, we visited 99 of the sample units during normal drill periods. We compared the responses with

- the same respondents' estimates obtained during the visit about 3 months later,
- responses obtained from other unit members, and
- our observations of conditions.

On the basis of these comparisons, we concluded that the survey responses were reliable and the member responses reasonably valid and free of biases. The unit commanders, on the other hand, demonstrated a significant and consistent tendency to make their unit conditions look more favorable and their training needs more pronounced. (See app. III, pp. 51 to 54.)

In the above comparisons and in our analyses, we used generally accepted statistical techniques to determine significance at the 95-percent-confidence level. The techniques are described briefly in appendix III, pp. 48 to 50.

We also reviewed DOD and service directives, regulations, and policies related to Reserve training; interviewed responsible officials at DOD, service headquarters, and intermediate service commands; examined and evaluated studies and reports of Reserve training performed by DOD, the services, and independent agencies; selectively examined Army contingency plans; and reviewed Reserve training legislation.


CHAPTER 2

HOW RESERVISTS SPEND TRAINING TIME

The average reservist spends about 50 percent of his drill time and 61 percent of his active duty time training in his official job. The remaining time is devoted to other jobs or general military activities or is spent idle. We estimate that in fiscal year 1974 the time (1) devoted to activities other than training in official jobs and (2) spent idle totaled 15 million man-days and cost about \$1.2 billion (about 43 percent of the \$2.7 billion authorized by the Congress for drills and active duty training). Figure 1 depicts, on the average, how reservists spend their training time.

FIGURE 1

AVERAGE USE OF TRAINING TIME



The percentages shown in figure 1 are averages of responses from the 1,686 reservists who responded to the questions on drill time and the 1,587 reservists who responded to the questions on active duty time. Distributing the time of nonrespondents in the same proportion as the respondents, we estimated the following allocation of the fiscal year 1974 training costs of \$2.7 billion.

	<u>Costs</u>	<u>Man-days</u>
	(millions)	
Waiting, filling in time, doing nothing	\$ 474.9	6.5
Jobs other than official military jobs	351.0	4.5
General military activities (physical fitness, drug abuse, equal opportunity, code of conduct, inspections, formations, etc.)	<u>328.2</u>	<u>4.2</u>
Total	\$1,154.1	15.2
Official military jobs	<u>\$1,548.2</u>	<u>17.9</u>
Total	<u>\$2,702.3</u>	<u>33.1</u>

The following table shows the average time spent in officially assigned military jobs by component.

<u>Component</u>	<u>Percent of training time in official jobs</u>	
	<u>Drills</u>	<u>Active duty</u>
Army National Guard	49	62
Army Reserve	48	59
Navy Reserve	45	63
Air National Guard	62	68
Air Force Reserve	56	66
Marine Corps Reserve	46	53
Coast Guard Reserve	56	58

Many reservists spend far less than the average time in their official jobs. About 27 percent of the respondents on drills and 15 percent of the respondents on active duty said they were spending less than 21 percent of their training time in their official jobs. The following table stratifies the sample results.

<u>Percent of time in official jobs</u>	<u>Number of responses</u>	
	<u>Drills</u>	<u>Active duty</u>
0 to 20	448	239
21 to 40	235	189
41 to 60	330	283
61 to 80	349	443
81 to 100	<u>324</u>	<u>433</u>
	<u>1,686</u>	<u>1,587</u>

Members in low pay grades spend less time in their official jobs than members in higher pay grades. The 683 who said they spend less than 41 percent of drill time in their official jobs include

--52 percent of the 710 respondents in grades E-1 to E-4,

--38 percent of the 666 respondents in grades E-5 to E-7, and

--19 percent of the 305 respondents in grades E-8 and above.

The 428 who said they spend less than 41 percent of active duty time in their official jobs include

--38 percent of the 661 respondents in grades E-1 to E-4,

--22 percent of the 627 respondents in grades E-5 to E-7, and

--13 percent of the 295 respondents in grades E-8 and above.

We believe the amount of training time spent in non-mission activities could be reduced if the military services scheduled training sessions according to kinds and degrees of training (ch. 3) and corrected inefficiencies in the management of available training time (ch. 4).

CHAPTER 3

NEED TO VARY AMOUNTS OF TRAINING

BY SKILL AND READINESS REQUIREMENTS

The military services schedule the same amount of training for nearly all of their reservists, although 10 U.S.C. 2001 and DOD Directive 1215.6 require that schedules, except those for National Guard members, be varied according to kinds and degrees of training. A number of military study groups have reported that some units need more training than others, but the services have generally not acted on their recommendations.

We believe the amount of training should be varied to provide full schedules for high-priority units with difficult skills and less for others. Many units would have considerable postmobilization time for training in an emergency, while others must be ready on short notice. Questionnaire responses showed that many reservists believe the amount of training they receive is excessive and others believe it is insufficient. This was substantiated by our visits to unit training sites, which showed that many members had military jobs that were easy to learn or similar to their civilian occupations while others had more difficult jobs.

LEGAL REQUIREMENTS

Section 270, title 10, U.S. Code, provides that, except as specifically provided in regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, or by the Secretary of the Treasury [Transportation] with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service in the Navy, each ready reservist, except for members of the Army and Air National Guard, shall be required to

- participate in at least 48 scheduled drills or training periods during each year and serve on active duty for training of not less than 14 days (exclusive of travel time) during each year
- serve on active duty for training not more than 30 days during each year.

Section 2001, title 10, U.S. Code, provides that each Reserve component except the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard shall be divided into training categories according to the kinds and degrees of training.

The Secretary of Defense through DOD Directive 1215.6 has established training categories of 48, 36, 24, and 12 drills and 12 to 15 days of active duty a year for the Reserves. He directed the service Secretaries to develop criteria for including Reserve members in the above training categories. The Secretaries were to

- consider the individual's civilian employment, the specialized nature of the training required, the availability to the unit of proper training aids, and the equipment necessary to perform the assigned training mission and
- provide for the minimum number of inactive duty training periods and annual active duty training days required to attain and maintain proficiency.

Under 32 U.S.C. 502(a) the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force are empowered to regulate the training of the Army and Air National Guards. However, there is no authority for varying the training schedules into categories according to kinds and degrees of training. This provision prescribes for members of the Army and Air National Guards at least 48 drills and 15 days of active duty, except as excused by the responsible Secretaries. Thus, the statute apparently prohibits the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force from regulating the training.

Under 14 U.S.C. 751a the Coast Guard Reserve is to be organized, administered, trained, and supplied under the direction of the Commandant of the Coast Guard. The Commandant has agreed to adopt for the Coast Guard Reserve the training categories established by the Secretary of Defense.

IMPLEMENTATION BY THE MILITARY SERVICES

The services require about 99 percent of their reservists to attend 48 drills and a 2-week active duty session each year, although needed readiness and skill difficulty vary widely among units and members. Service officials cite the following reasons for not varying scheduled training.

- Provisions of Federal law do not specifically authorize less scheduled training for the National Guard.
- Units authorized less training might have lowered morale because (1) pay and opportunities for early retirement credit would be reduced and (2) such units might feel less important than higher priority units.

--Unit identity and continuity might be impaired if units meet less than once a month.

MILITARY STUDIES SUPPORT VARYING TRAINING

A July 1971 DOD study concluded that some reservists need as little as six drills a year; however, it also concluded that reducing the number of drills would require legislation to provide affected members full retirement credit. The study proposed using savings from reduced training to provide more training for early deployment units.

A May 1972 Army study identified low-priority Reserve units and concluded that reducing their training time could annually release about 5 million man-days and about \$98 million in personnel costs for use elsewhere in the Reserve component program.

Although some Army officials have supported the proposal that training schedules be tailored to meet mission requirements, others have opposed it. For example, in a June 15, 1972, memorandum for the Office of Reserve Components, the Chief, National Guard Bureau, said:

--Although it may be desirable in theory to tailor training assemblies to mission requirements of each unit, the Congress in section 2001 of title 10 has intended to insure that all units of the Guard have an equal number and duration of drills.

--Members of units with lesser training needs might feel less important and Members of Congress might adopt a similar view.

--The need for varying training of units with different missions has not been sufficiently shown.

According to a March 1974 report on another Army-sponsored study, (1) many units need more training to improve proficiency because of high personnel turnover, inadequate training sites, and equipment shortages but (2) other units could receive less training because ample time is available for postmobilization training.

UNIT READINESS REQUIREMENTS

Many units have no deployment requirements and others have requirements that allow sufficient postmobilization time for training. Of 934 Army units included in our review of requirements as of January 1, 1974, we identified

291 with no deployment requirements and 280 with requirements which were not effective until from 120 to 240 days after mobilization. For example, the Army had 18 civil affairs units with no deployment requirements and 25 such units with requirements that follow mobilization by 120 days or more. Although many skills of these units are civilian related and most members are highly qualified, the unit members attend 48 drills and about 2 weeks of active duty training a year. Other examples include 8 finance units, 15 quartermaster units, and 41 judge advocate units, which all follow the same training schedule although they have no deployment requirements.

RESERVISTS' VIEWS ON TRAINING SUFFICIENCY

The member questionnaire requested the 2,209 reservists to estimate time spent in official jobs and to characterize training time spent in official jobs as about right or less or more than what is needed. Only 24 percent of the respondents on drills and 14 percent of those on active duty considered the amount of training time in their official jobs insufficient. These respondents spent an average of about 40 percent of drill time and 49 percent of active duty time in their official jobs. Estimates for the overall Reserve population, based on the sample results, are shown at the 95-percent-confidence level in the following table. Estimates for each service component are shown in appendix IV.

	<u>Drills</u>			<u>Active duty</u>		
	<u>Number of reservists</u>	<u>± Range</u>	<u>Percent of time in official jobs</u>	<u>Number of reservists</u>	<u>± Range</u>	<u>Percent of time in official jobs</u>
Time spent in official job is:						
About right	394,000	20,000	59	441,000	20,000	68
Less than needed	155,000	15,000	40	84,000	12,000	49
More than needed	123,000	14,000	39	123,000	14,000	49
No response	<u>231,000</u>			<u>255,000</u>		
Total	<u>903,000</u>			<u>903,000</u>		

Those who considered official job training to be excessive selected the following reasons for these beliefs from questionnaire choices. Many selected two or more reasons.

	<u>Percent responding</u>	
	<u>Drills</u>	<u>Active duty</u>
Military job skills do not require continuous repetitive training	65	59
Required job skills have been achieved	39	42
Military job is similar to civilian job	12	11
Unit has achieved the necessary proficiency/skill level	17	22
Other	21	22

Respondents to the unit commander questionnaire included 1,016 who said 30,661 (or about 20 percent) of their unit members were not qualified in their jobs. Unit commanders' responses on sufficiency of training included

- 580 who said some of their members need more training,
- 184 who said some of their members need less training, and
- 537 who said the amount of training provided their members was about right.

For difficult skills, it is important that full use be made of the available training time. The forty-eight 4-hour drills and 2 weeks of annual active duty provide only a limited number of hours of intermittent training. A recent Army study has shown that any substantial increase in total training time is counterproductive and destructive of morale.

Commanders selected the following as the principal causes of skill shortages from questionnaire choices.

	<u>Number of responses</u>
Personnel turnover	438
Unit was reorganized or newly formed	139
Reluctance or inability of reservists to attend active duty schools	464

Several unit commanders commented that retraining needed as a result of reorganizations would require members to attend military schools. However, reservists are unwilling or unable to do so because of their civilian commitments. The extent of retraining needed in 167 units because of reorganization was stated by the commanders as follows:

<u>Number of units</u>	<u>Percent of members needing retraining</u>
51	75 or more
15	50 to 74
32	25 to 49
69	Less than 25

VISITS TO DRILL SITES

Visits to drill sites also showed that some reservists do not need as much training time as has been scheduled, as illustrated by the following examples.

Army National Guard Artillery Unit

The unit had 119 members assigned. Although it reported that 90 percent of its members were fully qualified in their official jobs, the unit was still required to attend 48 drills and spend 2 weeks on active duty a year.

The commander said:

- The unit could maintain proficiency and accomplish its mission with fewer than 48 drills a year, perhaps with as few as 24.
- All members could definitely attend fewer drills.
- Repetitious training during drill time was causing a morale problem.
- Training efficiency would increase if time were scheduled according to individual members' skills.

We interviewed several reservists during a weekend drill. An artilleryman estimated that he spends about 98 percent of his time in his official job and said the training time was excessive. A fire direction control specialist said he spends about 55 percent of his time in his official job

and that this was excessive because he had achieved the necessary skill level. According to a medical section chief, he spends about 20 percent of his drill time and about 30 percent of his annual active duty in his official job. He classified this time as excessive because he does not require continuous repetitive training, has achieved the necessary skill level, and has little to do.

Air National Guard Combat Support Unit

This unit had 250 members assigned, including 225 who were fully qualified. Unit members were required to attend 48 drills and spend 15 days on active duty annually.

The commander said:

- Some members receive more training than they need in both drills and active duty.
- Not all members have to be present at each training session.
- Some jobs, such as food service and transportation, do not require frequent repetitive training.
- Judge advocate and chaplain specialties were not needed in the unit.
- The best way to reduce excessive training was to reduce the number of drills.

A cook assigned to the unit said that (1) he spends about 10 percent of his drill time and 80 percent of his annual active duty in his official job and (2) because he has achieved the necessary skill level, he does not need continuous repetitive training.

Marine Reserve Maintenance Unit

The mission of this unit was to provide motor transport maintenance for other Marine Reserve units. The unit, which was required to attend 48 drills and spend 2 weeks on active duty a year, had 67 members assigned, including 45 who were fully qualified for their assigned jobs.

The unit commander estimated that:

- The required number of drills and amount of annual active duty was sufficient for what the unit needed.

--Most members in his unit were being provided the appropriate amount of training.

Unit members contacted stated that on the average they spent 51 percent of their drill time and 61 percent of annual training time in officially assigned jobs. Several indicated that they sometimes did not have enough work to keep them busy during training. A training officer, an administration section chief, and a welder/mechanic said they were being sufficiently trained although they reported spending 50, 80, and 50 percent, respectively, of their drill time in official job activities.

Army Reserve Quartermaster Unit

This unit had 234 members, including 192 who were fully qualified for their military jobs. The unit was required to attend 48 drills and 2 weeks of annual training. The unit commander believed that:

--Most members were provided the appropriate amount of training.

--The unit as a whole was spending about 55 percent of drill time and about 80 percent of annual active duty training in wartime mission activities.

--Men assigned to administration and the motor pool were generally busy, but those assigned to the petroleum supply platoons were idle much of the time because of the lack of adequate training equipment and facilities.

--Many people in his unit could maintain proficiency with less than 48 drills a year.

A petroleum pump operator and a petroleum specialist said they spend about 60 percent and 10 percent, respectively, of their training time in official job activities; they felt this was sufficient.

Air Force Reserve Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron

The mission of this unit is to provide inflight nursing care to patients moved by C-141 aircraft. The unit had 121 members, including 107 who were fully qualified for their assigned jobs. Unit members are required to attend 48 drills and spend about 2 weeks on active duty annually. The unit

also uses additional flying training periods to prepare for flying live missions with an active force unit. Annual active duty training is performed in 3-day increments during the training year.

Unit members contacted estimated that 51 percent of drill time and 65 percent of annual training time was spent working in official military jobs. A medical technician and a medical service specialist, who reported spending 50 percent of drill time in their official jobs, said their training was sufficient. Two flight nurses reported drill time spent in their official military jobs at 15 to 55 percent, which they also believed was sufficient.

CHAPTER 4

NEED FOR MORE EFFICIENT USE OF TRAINING TIME

Service officials could better use available training time if they

- placed less emphasis on administrative paperwork and general military activities and more emphasis on supervision over members and instructors,
- increased affiliation with the active services, and
- arranged for the units to have access to adequate facilities and equipment.

PREOCCUPATION WITH ADMINISTRATIVE AND GENERAL MILITARY MATTERS

Many unit commanders spend much of their time on paperwork and various administrative functions rather than on mission training. Their responsibilities in some administrative areas are greater than those of active duty commanders of similar units. In the active services, recruiting, determining training requirements, and assigning personnel are centralized, whereas in Reserve units, commanders and their assistants generally perform these extra duties, often at the expense of effective training and supervision.

Command emphasis on administrative and general military requirements

Reserve component administrative and general military requirements are an extension of the active service systems and include priorities imposed by the active service. Twelve hundred and thirty-one unit commander respondents estimated that on the average about 25 percent of drill time and about 15 percent of active duty time is used by unit members not officially assigned administrative duties to satisfy these requirements. The following table shows the average percentage of training time spent on administrative and general military requirements by each component.

Average percentage of
reported training time used for
administrative and general military
requirements

<u>Component</u>	<u>Drills</u>	<u>Active duty</u>
Army, National Guard	22	13
Army Reserve	32	17
Navy Reserve	31	17
Air National Guard	21	16
Air Force Reserve	25	18
Marine Corps Reserve	27	16
Coast Guard Reserve	15	8

Visits to drill sites showed that some units devote much more time to these requirements than indicated by the overall averages reported by the commanders. Examples of annual drill time scheduled for administrative and general military activities and the time available for mission training are shown below.

<u>Component</u>	<u>Administrative and general military</u>		<u>Mission training</u>	
	<u>Hours</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Hours</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Army National Guard unit	113	59	79	41
Army Reserve unit	140	73	52	27
Navy Reserve unit	102	53	90	47
Air National Guard unit	123	64	69	36
Air Force Reserve unit	95	49	97	51
Marine Corps Reserve unit	83	43	109	57
Coast Guard Reserve unit	38	20	154	80

General military activities, such as lectures on drug abuse, equal opportunity classes, formations, inspections, and ceremonies, on the average consume about 14 percent of available drill time and 10 percent of annual active duty for training. Nearly one of every three individual respondents reported spending at least 20 percent of his drill time on general military activities, and one of five reported spending at least 20 percent of his annual active duty on such activities.

Army and Air Force studies have also shown that reservists are using too much of their training time to satisfy non-mission-essential requirements imposed by higher commands.

According to a May 1972 Army study, the peacetime administrative workload in many units cannot be handled by the administrative personnel within limited drill time; thus many training hours are lost when other unit members are used to do the additional work during training periods. The weight of administrative requirements and the priority emphasis in this area are illustrated by comments contained in this Army study.

"* * * The character of AGIs [Annual General Inspections] and other inspections has been directed toward an infinite amount of administrative detail. Adviser personnel in many units, particularly at lower levels, have been specialists in personnel and logistics rather than training. Few unit commanders have been relieved for failure to pass ATTs [Army Training Tests] or progress through a training sequence, but individuals have been relieved for failures on AGIs and CMMIs [Command Maintenance Management Inspections]. Therefore, there has been a tendency to concentrate on administration rather than training."

A May 1973 study of Air Force nonflying Reserve units stated that between one-fourth and one-half of the reservists' drill time is spent on administrative and general military functions required by headquarters directives and that these requirements distract from specialized skill training.

Management inspections

Higher command emphasis on administrative and general military requirements contributes to unit commanders' emphasis on these factors in preparing for inspections. Inspections are primarily directed at administrative paperwork, records, and documentation rather than training effectiveness. During our site visits, six units were preparing for adjutant general and other inspections rather than training.

We inquired about management inspections at 88 of the units visited. Of these, 75 had been inspected within the prior 2 years. Only 10 of the 68 available reports on these inspections contained substantive comments on training effectiveness. Seven reports commented on mission training practices and three mentioned shortages of supplies, equipment, and personnel. Other sundry comments included:

- Outdated training documentation.
- Lack of general military training.
- Substandard lighting at the unit home station.

--Missing or inadequate forms, lesson plans, training program documentation, and recordkeeping.

--Failure to comply with administrative regulations.

Supervision and control

We requested the sampled Reserve members to rate control over attendance and supervision during training as very close, moderate, or very lax. About 54 percent of the respondents rated the controls over attendance as moderate or very lax, and about 63 percent rated supervision as moderate or very lax. The following table shows by component the percentage of respondents who considered the controls very close.

<u>Component</u>	<u>Monitoring to assure attendance</u>	<u>Supervision during training</u>
	(percent)	
Army National Guard	45	36
Army Reserve	41	34
Navy Reserve	47	37
Air National Guard	53	40
Air Force Reserve	53	46
Marine Corps Reserve	50	40
Coast Guard Reserve	44	36

The degree to which reservists are supervised and controlled during training has considerable impact on the amount of time they spend in official military jobs and in idleness. Those reservists who reported that control and supervision in their units was lax spend less training time in official military jobs and more training time waiting, filling in time, or doing nothing than those who felt they were very closely or moderately controlled and supervised.

The following table shows how adequacy of supervision affects use of reservists' time.

	Percent of drill training time spent		Percent of active duty training time spent	
	In		In	
	<u>official job</u>	<u>Idle</u>	<u>official job</u>	<u>Idle</u>
Supervision during classroom instruction is:				
Very close	60.5	12.4	68.4	9.7
Moderate	47.4	22.9	59.0	16.8
Very lax	30.7	43.2	48.2	29.7
Supervision during field exercises is:				
Very close	59.9	12.5	68.5	9.8
Moderate	46.5	23.7	58.5	17.0
Very lax	27.4	48.6	42.9	36.1
Supervision during on-the-job training is:				
Very close	62.4	11.2	69.3	9.0
Moderate	47.0	22.7	58.6	16.8
Very lax	27.4	51.0	43.7	35.9

Visits to drill sites also showed that supervision and control over training was lax. In 66 units the commanders were devoting less than half their time to supervising unit training and in 26 of these units supervision and control over training was lax. The heavy administrative workload was the main reason given by unit commanders for spending so little time supervising unit training.

Twenty-seven of the 99 unit commanders had little direct control over the training. We observed some reservists sleeping in classes and others standing around idle. Some were involved in make-work projects, such as chipping paint, demolishing an old building, cleaning vehicles and equipment, cutting grass, and painting buildings. Many occupied themselves by playing cards, reading magazines, listening to radios, playing volleyball, playing records, and conversing. Some supervisors showed little concern for the idleness; others said their members' time could not be fully occupied because there was not enough work or training to keep them busy.

We also observed reservists who arrived late for classes, left early, or were absent.

Training instruction

We asked the sampled reservists to rate their training instruction as good, fair, or poor. We received 1,641 ratings for drills and 1,559 for active duty. Fair or poor ratings averaged 60 percent for drills and 46 percent for active duty. The percentages of members who rated instructions as good are shown by component in the following table.

<u>Component</u>	<u>Drills</u>	<u>Active duty</u>
	(percent)	
Army National Guard	37	52
Army Reserve	38	49
Navy Reserve	39	62
Air National Guard	54	58
Air Force Reserve	49	56
Marine Corps Reserve	29	45
Coast Guard Reserve	48	60

The quality of training instruction greatly affected the amount of training time individual soldier respondents reported spending in officially assigned jobs and in idleness. Reservists who felt instruction was poor reported spending more training time in idleness and less training time in official military jobs than those who reported that their training instruction was either good or fair.

<u>Training instruction rated as usually</u>	<u>Percent of drill training time spent</u>		<u>Percent of active duty training time spent</u>	
	<u>In</u>	<u>Idle</u>	<u>In</u>	<u>Idle</u>
	<u>official job</u>	<u>Idle</u>	<u>official job</u>	<u>Idle</u>
Good	67.6	6.4	72.9	7.0
Fair	49.1	18.5	54.5	19.3
Poor	22.0	54.2	33.6	40.1

Visits to drill sites disclosed:

- Instructors reading to the class from manuals.
- Reservists required to read manuals during scheduled classes.
- Material being repeated several times.
- Instructors not familiar with scheduled class subjects.

NEED FOR BETTER COORDINATION BETWEEN
RESERVE UNITS AND THE ACTIVE SERVICES

Of the sampled unit commanders, 580 (or 49 percent) felt that some of their unit members needed more job training than they were currently receiving. Of the 580, 339 felt that this needed training could be best provided through mutual support or affiliation with active service units. The following shows by Reserve component the number of unit commanders who felt they had unit members who needed more training and those who felt that the needed training could be best provided by better mutual support and increased active service affiliation.

<u>Component</u>	<u>Number who felt that they had unit members who needed more training</u>	<u>Number who believe they need better mutual support and increased active service affiliation</u>
Army National Guard	197	118
Army Reserve	117	73
Navy Reserve	92	60
Air National Guard	46	16
Air Force Re- serve	45	26
Marine Corps Reserve	39	22
Coast Guard Reserve	<u>44</u>	<u>24</u>
Total	<u>580</u>	<u>339</u>

Advantages to the Reserve components from close active-Reserve ties include:

- Joint use of equipment and facilities.
- Full-time administrative, logistical, and maintenance support.
- A greater opportunity to train with modern weapons.
- Participation in command and control exercises under the direction of full-time military commanders.
- Opportunity to train on the job in active duty positions under the observation of specialized supervisors.

The following are two examples of units we visited which need increased active service affiliation.

--Army Reserve General Supply Company: The mission of this unit was to establish and operate a general supply facility for the receipt, storage, and issue of general military supplies. The unit had 168 personnel assigned, of which 109 were fully qualified for the positions they were manning. The unit commander said some members in his unit required more training because some required skills were difficult to achieve and maintain. The best way of providing this training, according to him, was by increasing affiliation with active service units. The unit commander reported that during monthly drills the unit spent about 30 percent of the available drill time training and working in wartime mission assignments.

The unit needs access to refrigeration equipment, warehouse facilities, and cargo to provide adequate training to supply and refrigeration personnel. The unit commander said the required facilities and equipment were available at an active Army installation about 50 miles from the unit. Necessary arrangements to use those facilities had not been made.

--Naval Reserve Surface Division: The mission of this unit was to provide trained officer and enlisted personnel available for immediate active duty; to increase the manning level of afloat units of the active fleet to full complement; and to provide for the specific mobilization needs of other programs for personnel not trained therein. During drills unit members spent about 60 percent of their time in wartime mission assignments.

According to the unit commander, over 75 percent of the skills in his unit required more training than was being provided. This additional training was required because job tasks required frequent repetitive training, required skills were difficult to achieve and maintain, and required skills were not similar to civilian jobs. One of the methods he suggested for providing the needed training was by increasing affiliation with active service units.

He also said that drills consisted mainly of text-book training and war-game exercises. He believed that the unit was not sufficiently trained to effectively support the active fleet if mobilized.

He commented that, although the unit was doing a good job with training at their center, " * * * nothing actually replaces ship board training or on the job practical experience. We need more of this!" The unit has had only one weekend training exercise aboard ship in the last 3 years.

The Air Force Reserve and Guard and the Coast Guard Reserve components appeared to have the most extensive mutual support and active service affiliation programs involving monthly drill training. The respondents from these components reported spending considerably more drill time in official military jobs than those from the other components, as shown in the following table.

<u>Component</u>	<u>Percent of monthly drill time in assigned job</u>
Air National Guard	62.3
Air Force Reserve	56.1
Coast Guard Reserve	56.1
Other components	47.7

Training Air Force reservists is the responsibility of major active Air Force commands which would gain the Reserve units upon activation. Most Air Force Reserve units are located at active Air Force bases, and most Air National Guard units are located at municipal airports and Air Force bases. Thus, these units are provided ready access to support facilities.

The "gaining command concept" of the Air Force provides that the active command gaining the unit upon activation will inspect and insure that the Reserve unit is trained in accordance with the gaining command's standards.

The other services have established a Reserve chain-of-command to oversee Reserve training. For example, the Chief, Army Reserve, has management responsibility but does not have command authority over Army Reserve training. The Army Reserve command system has an active Army Headquarters (Forces Command) which commands the Army Reserve units through a subordinate chain of active Army and Reserve commands. The several command levels fragment, rather than centralize, the management responsibilities.

Two programs which provide for close association between the active and Reserve forces during monthly drills are the Air Force Military Airlift Command (MAC) Reserve Associate program and the Coast Guard augmentation program.

The MAC Reserve Associate program is to provide trained Reserve personnel to merge with MAC units to achieve full use of MAC aircraft in direct support of the active force mission. The Reserve Associate concept establishes Reserve airlift units, without unit equipment, located with, and using the equipment and facilities of, an active MAC airlift unit. In addition to flying local training missions, these Reserve units fly regular MAC missions. Although both the Reserve Associate unit and its active unit counterpart report their readiness separately, they also have a combined rating and the periodic readiness inspections are based on the combined capability of both units. Thus, the active wing commander shares the responsibility for operational readiness with the Reserve group commander.

We visited an Air Force Reserve unit which was part of the MAC Reserve Associate program. It was located at an Air Force base and used the equipment of the active force at the base. The unit had 152 assigned personnel, 93 of whom were fully qualified for the positions they were manning. The unit commander reported spending about 70 percent of monthly drill time and about 90 percent of annual active duty in wartime mission assignments.

Unit members contacted reported spending only 10 percent of monthly drill time and about 7 percent of annual active duty training time idle. Reservists in the unit expressed a high degree of satisfaction with both the monthly drill and annual active duty training programs basically because their training and work were relevant to their officially assigned jobs. Other reasons cited for satisfaction were that the work and training were interesting, meaningful, necessary, and well organized. During our visit, we found the unit to be well trained--training was being accomplished substantially in accordance with the published schedule and classes were apparently productive and in accordance with lesson plans.

The Coast Guard's augmentation program involves the detailing of reservists to operating units of the active service to perform productive and meaningful work. Reservists report to the same station for each drill subject to the needs of the active unit. The program was started in mid-fiscal year 1972, and in fiscal year 1973 about 64 percent of total Reserve training was in the program.

This approach provides a wide variety of practical training situations to the reservist while contributing directly to active Coast Guard operating missions,

such as port security, search and rescue, aids to navigation, and vessel support. Augmentation forces provide large numbers of personnel to the regular forces for peak seasonal operations.

During our validation work we visited several Coast Guard Reserve units which were part of the augmentation program. A typical unit we visited assumed responsibility for operating an active Coast Guard base during drills. The unit had 41 assigned personnel, 40 of whom were fully qualified for the positions they were manning. The unit had no equipment of its own, instead it used the equipment of the active service unit it was replacing for the weekend.

Unit members contacted reported spending more than 70 percent of their monthly drill time in wartime mission assignments and about 11 percent idle. They exhibited a high degree of satisfaction with their training program because they felt their training and work were necessary, meaningful, and relevant to the unit's assigned mission. Very little idleness was observed.

ADEQUACY OF FACILITIES AND TRAINING EQUIPMENT

Of the 1,241 unit commanders responding, 318 (26 percent) said it was impractical to provide meaningful unit mission training at their home stations. The unit commander responses by service component are summarized in the following table.

<u>Component</u>	<u>Number of commanders reporting that meaningful unit training was not practical at home station</u>
Army National Guard	119
Army Reserve	82
Navy Reserve	55
Air National Guard	17
Air Force Reserve	17
Marine Corps Reserve	18
Coast Guard Reserve	<u>10</u>
	<u>318</u>

The table on the following page shows the portion of their training that 295 unit commanders said could not be practiced at or near their home station.

<u>Respondents</u>	<u>Percent</u>
35	Less than 25
85	From 25 to 49
102	From 50 to 74
73	75 percent and over

The majority of the respondents to this question were commanders of Army National Guard, Army Reserves, and Navy Reserve units. Additional voluntary comments include the following.

- Unit mission training has to be limited to classroom academics.
- Unit size and restrictive ordinances precluded field exercises and on-the-job training.
- Range facilities were not available for weapons firing.
- Home station environments were not compatible with the unit mission.

Typical examples of functions affected by these conditions are postal services, basic combat training, aerial port operations, communications, public information, veterinary services, naval surface operations, naval submarine support, military intelligence, supply operations, security functions, and smoke and gas generator operations.

The member questionnaire requested reservists to indicate whether available facilities were suitable for training. The responses are summarized in the following table.

	<u>Drills</u>	<u>Active duty</u>
	(percent)	
Facilities are:		
Usually suitable	65	61
About suitable	22	23
Not suitable	13	16

The adequacy of training facilities greatly affected the amounts of training time individual soldier respondents reported spending in officially assigned jobs and in idleness. Reservists who did not have suitable training facilities were spending less time in official military jobs and more time doing nothing than those who reported that their training facilities were suitable.

<u>Training facilities</u>	<u>Percent of drill training time spent</u>		<u>Percent of active duty training time spent</u>	
	<u>In official job</u>	<u>Idle</u>	<u>In official job</u>	<u>Idle</u>
Usually suitable	52.8	19.4	65.3	12.5
Not suitable	44.0	29.7	50.1	26.5
<u>Distant training sites</u>				

Excessive training time may be lost traveling to suitable training sites. Of the unit commander respondents, 231 (19 percent) said their members had to travel 60 miles or more to adequate sites.

Visits to unit drill sites substantiated that many units did not have adequate training facilities close to their home stations. Units that were affected by this problem included Army National Guard infantry, mechanized infantry, armor, field artillery, engineering, and special forces; Army Reserve supply, medical, quartermaster, and transportation units; Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard fighter units; Marine Corps Reserve artillery and infantry units; and Navy surface and subsurface units. For example:

- The nearest field training sites for a mechanized infantry unit visited were 210 and 450 miles away.
- A ship repair company commander said many of his unit members need more training but the unit must travel over 100 miles to the nearest ship repair facilities.
- 226 members of a personnel records management unit could get very little on-the-job training at their home station because the unit has only its own records to manage. The unit commander said he would like to support other units to afford his members an opportunity for work experience.

Availability of suitable training equipment

Reservists often must train without equipment or with inoperable or obsolete equipment. Responses from 1,119 unit commanders showed that for drills an average of 24 percent of required training equipment was not available, 20 percent was obsolete, and 22 percent was not operational. For annual active duty training, they said 12 percent of

the equipment was not available, 15 percent was nonoperational, and 15 percent was obsolete. Navy unit commanders reported the least opportunity for practical training with their equipment. The following table shows, by component, the percentages of equipment needed for training that were not available, inoperable, and obsolete.

Component	Percent of equipment needed for training					
	Not available		Inoperable		Obsolete	
	Drills	Active duty	Drills	Active duty	Drills	Active duty
Army National Guard	21	13	17	13	21	20
Army Reserve	22	15	24	20	14	10
Navy Reserve	54	12	48	18	44	15
Air National Guard	10	10	14	13	8	8
Air Force Reserve	11	8	12	10	11	8
Marine Corps Reserve	13	6	17	14	11	9
Coast Guard Reserve	28	15	26	15	15	13

Forty-two of the 99 units we visited were limited in the amount of mission-related training because of equipment shortages. Equipment shortages limit training in the following ways.

- Training is limited to classroom academics.
- Members are not able to improve their job skills to the level required upon mobilization.
- Obsolete equipment requires excessive maintenance at the expense of training.
- Limited quantities complicate training schedules and limit tactical training.
- Personnel question the need for their services when this need is not supported by suitable equipment.

The member questionnaire requested reservists to indicate whether required training equipment was available, operational, and adequate. The responses are summarized in the following table.

	<u>Drills</u>	<u>Active duty</u>
	(percent)	
Training equipment is:		
Available and operational	72	80
Not available, not operational, or obsolete	28	20

The adequacy of training equipment greatly affected the amount of training time individual soldier respondents reported they spent in official military job activities and in idleness. The respondents who reported on how they spent drill and active duty training time included 457 and 292, respectively, who reported that their training equipment was not available, not operational, or obsolete. Those who reported that their training equipment was available and operational said they spent much more time in official military jobs and much less idle, as shown below:

	<u>Percent of drill time spent</u>		<u>Percent of active duty time spent</u>	
	<u>In official job</u>	<u>Idle</u>	<u>In official job</u>	<u>Idle</u>
Training equipment is:				
Available and operational	54.2	18.7	64.2	13.5
Not available, not operational, or obsolete	41.5	28.9	49.5	24.6

CHAPTER 5
USE OF TRAINING TIME
AND RESERVIST SATISFACTION

About 55 percent of the respondents expressed satisfaction with drills and 62 percent with active duty. Analysis of data on satisfaction and data on use of training time showed that satisfaction correlated closely with the portions of training devoted to the reservists' official military jobs. Idleness appears to be a primary cause for reservists' dissatisfaction.

Respondents to the questions on satisfaction included 1,663 who answered for monthly drills and 1,637 who answered for annual active duty. Sample results, including nonrespondents, are shown in the following table.

	<u>Drills</u>		<u>Active duty</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Satisfied	919	41.6	1,012	45.8
Not satisfied	587	26.5	464	21.0
Undecided	157	7.1	161	7.3
No response	546	24.7	572	25.9
	<u>2,209</u>		<u>2,209</u>	

At the 95-percent-confidence level, the above rates are applicable to all reservists with an accuracy of + about 1 to 2 percent. The sample results show that in October 1973 the 903,000 active reservists included about

- 240,000 who were dissatisfied with monthly drills and
- 190,000 who were dissatisfied with annual active duty.

Distributing the nonresponses in the same ratios as the responses would increase the dissatisfied rates to 35.3 percent for monthly drills and 28.3 percent for annual active duty. The dissatisfied percentages of the respondents by component are shown on the following page.

<u>Component</u>	<u>Percent dissatisfied</u>	
	<u>Drills</u>	<u>Active duty</u>
Army National Guard	34	29
Army Reserve	44	35
Navy Reserve	28	17
Air National Guard	28	26
Air Force Reserve	29	27
Marine Corps Reserve	53	42
Coast Guard Reserve	29	19

The dissatisfied respondents selected the following reasons for dissatisfaction from questionnaire choices; many selected more than one reason.

	<u>Drills</u>	<u>Active duty</u>
Training and work is not:		
Meaningful	58.6	54.1
Interesting	53.7	48.9
Necessary	39.4	33.6
Relevant to officially assigned military job	31.5	22.6
Training is disorganized	57.4	46.8
Other	25.9	27.2

Some of the respondents' further comments on their reasons for dissatisfaction follow.

--An Army National Guardsman: Too much time is being spent on disciplinary functions at the expense of relevant training. Enforcing hair regulations takes priority over everything else. The people that make up the training schedules are not responsive to the individual needs of the vast majority of guardsmen. Many of the skills that have been mastered in college or civilian occupations are not being taken advantage of.

--Another Army National Guardsman: A great deal of time is spent on frivolous nitpicking details that waste time. For instance, half a morning may be spent lecturing on haircuts and uniforms.

--An Army Reservist: At drills, we usually do everything several times to fill time, and our work, if organized, could easily be done in one-fourth the time. The training schedules submitted are for formality only and are not followed. The only time that

the correct information is available is when inspecting officers visit. The entire job is a ridiculous waste of time.

--Another Army Reservist: Not much emphasis is placed on training of assigned skills. Lower echelon enlisted men must be kept busy at seemingly unimportant tasks. Very little time is spent training for military job.

--A Navy Reservist: Any training was held to a minimum because the regulars used the Reserves to ease their own workload. Reservists in the higher pay grades spend most of their Reserve weekend sleeping, playing, or just wasting time, while those in the lower pay grades spend time chipping paint, which has no training value.

--An Air National Guardsman: The jobs we are given are designed only to keep us working and are not based on real need. It seems they have nothing better to do with our energy than make up things to do.

A substantially higher percentage of Army and Marine Corps Reserve respondents were dissatisfied with each program than were those of the other five components, as shown in the following table.

	<u>Percent not satisfied</u>	
	<u>Drills</u>	<u>Active duty</u>
Army Reserve	44.3	35.2
Marine Corps Reserve	52.5	41.7
Other five components	28.1 to 34.4	16.6 to 28.9

Although a variety of reasons could account for the differences, the most important reason appears to be idle time. Army and Marine reservists said they spent substantially more time waiting, filling in time, or doing nothing than the other components.

	<u>Percent of time idle</u>	
	<u>Drills</u>	<u>Active duty</u>
Army Reserve	26	19
Marine Corps Reserve	25	22
Other components	20	14

IDLENESS APPEARS TO BE A MAJOR
CAUSE OF DISSATISFACTION

The responses showed that reservists tended to be satisfied if they spent most of their time training for their officially assigned military jobs and dissatisfied if they spent much of their time waiting, filling in time, or doing nothing. (See figs. 2 and 3 on the following page.)

FIGURE 2 SATISFACTION AND TIME SPENT IN ASSIGNED JOB





FIGURE 3 SATISFACTION AND TIME SPENT IN IDLENESS



Members who joined the Reserves for patriotic, monetary, or career reasons were better satisfied as a group than those who joined because of the draft. Although draft-motivated members tend to be dissatisfied, they as well as more highly motivated members are more apt to be satisfied if their time is used effectively. As shown in the following comparison, satisfied members spend substantially more time in their officially assigned jobs and substantially less time idle than dissatisfied members, regardless of their motive for joining the Reserves.

<u>Reason for joining</u>	<u>Opinion of program</u>	<u>Number of respondents</u>	<u>Percent of time</u>	
			<u>In official job</u>	<u>Waiting, filling in time, doing nothing</u>
Drills:				
Draft	Satisfied	196	54	14
	Not satisfied	388	27	49
Other	Satisfied	705	67	6
	Not satisfied	181	37	34
Active duty:				
Draft	Satisfied	247	63	14
	Not satisfied	319	40	37
Other	Satisfied	714	75	5
	Not satisfied	118	47	21

The way reservists' time is used greatly affects their satisfaction regardless of pay grade. Although members in upper pay grades were better used as a group than those in lower grades, the time of satisfied members was consistently used more effectively than that of dissatisfied members. The sample results by low, medium, and upper pay grades are compared on the following page.

<u>Pay grade</u>	<u>Opinion of program</u>	<u>Number of respondents</u>	<u>Percent of time</u>	
			<u>In official job</u>	<u>Waiting, filling in time, doing nothing</u>
Drills:				
E1 to E4	Satisfied	269	56	12
	Not satisfied	341	26	48
E5 to E7	Satisfied	405	65	8
	Not satisfied	193	32	42
E8 and above	Satisfied	236	73	2
	Not satisfied	49	52	21
Active duty:				
E1 to E4	Satisfied	297	63	12
	Not satisfied	265	37	37
E5 to E7	Satisfied	416	74	7
	Not satisfied	157	48	26
E8 and above	Satisfied	257	78	3
	Not satisfied	24	49	25

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE CONGRESS, AND AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION

We believe that requiring nearly all reservists to receive the same amount of training is inefficient and unnecessary. Skill difficulty of Reserve units varies from easy-to-learn skills, such as operating a light truck, to skills, such as field artillery fire control, that are more difficult to acquire. Many of the more difficult skills, such as those needed by lawyers and medical doctors, have been largely developed in civilian practice. The units' priorities also vary widely: some are required to be ready for active service on short notice, while others have several months to prepare for active service in a national emergency.

Further inefficiencies resulted from ineffective use of available time. We believe command emphasis on administrative matters has caused many unit commanders to devote an inordinate amount of their time to paperwork at the expense of supervision. Lack of attention to control of reservists and the quality of training has contributed greatly to the inefficient use of training time.

Many units cannot give their members meaningful hands-on mission training because they are not situated near facilities where such training could be performed or because they do not otherwise have access to adequate facilities and equipment.

We believe that more affiliation with active service units would help relieve many of these problems, particularly if the commanders of the active service units shared the responsibility for Reserve training. The active service units could relieve the Reserve unit commanders of some of the administrative paperwork, reduce the need to issue a full complement of equipment to the Reserves, make their facilities available for reservists' use, and participate in the training.

Reducing the amount of idleness and time devoted to activities other than official job training could increase satisfaction among Reserve members and the effectiveness of the training. We believe such an increase in satisfaction would help in recruiting and retaining Reserve forces.

Reduced training schedules will require an evaluation of Reserve training requirements. This evaluation should determine for each Reserve unit an annual training program

designed to meet readiness requirements realistically achievable considering the availability of personnel, equipment, facilities, and other support. The evaluation should result in a defined number of active duty training days and inactive drill periods required for each unit.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense require each of the services to place each unit in a training category based on an evaluation of training needed and realistically achievable to meet skill requirements and mission assignment priorities. For Reserve units with reduced training schedules, the Secretary should consider what other measures, such as unit relocation and compensation, may be needed to satisfy manning objectives.

We recommend that the Secretaries of Transportation and the services:

- Identify units with early deployment commitments and provide them with sufficient scheduled training to achieve required unit proficiency.
- Reduce training schedules for units which have sufficient postmobilization time to upgrade unit proficiency.
- Reduce training schedules for reservists whose military jobs are easy to learn or similar to their peacetime jobs, or who have otherwise achieved required skill levels.

In addition, we recommend that the Secretaries of Transportation, Defense, and the services:

- Ease the administrative workload of unit commanders and emphasize attention to supervision and the quality of instruction.
- Reevaluate the general military activities required of Reserve units and identify those activities that can be eliminated or deferred until after mobilization.
- Situate high-priority units where they can train with essential training equipment.
- Arrange more mutual support and active service affiliation agreements, including arrangements to use the facilities and equipment of the active forces for Reserve weekend training.

MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE CONGRESS

Some units and members in all Reserve components can maintain proficiency under a reduced training schedule.

Section 2001, title 10, U.S. Code, provides for training categories according to kinds and degrees of training, but specifically exempts the National Guard.

Under 32 U.S.C. 502(a) the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force are empowered to regulate the training of the Army and Air National Guards. However, no authority exists for varying the training schedules into categories according to kinds and degrees of training. This provision prescribes for members of the Army and Air National Guards at least 48 drills and 15 days of active duty, except as excused by the responsible Secretaries. Thus, the statute prohibits the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force from regulating the training.

Under 14 U.S.C. 751a the Coast Guard Reserve is organized, administered, trained, and supplied under the direction of the Commandant of the Coast Guard. The Commandant has adopted the training categories established by the Secretary of Defense.

We recommend that the Congress amend the existing laws to permit varying the training of the Army and Air National Guard by categories according to kinds and degrees of training.

Tailoring unit or individual training schedules to mission assignments may require new compensation measures, such as enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, and a redefinition of a creditable year of Reserve service for retirement. The Congress should consider measures of this type only if proposed by DOD within the context of a tailored Reserve forces training program.

Proposed statutory amendments

Section 502 of title 32, U.S. Code, to be amended by adding the underscored words to read as follows:

"§ 502. Required drills and field exercises.

(a) Under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Army or the Secretary of the Air Force, as the case may be, each company, battery, squadron, and detachment of the National Guard, unless excused by the Secretary concerned, shall--

(1) assemble for drill and instruction, including indoor target practice, at least 48 times each year, except as specifically provided in regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary concerned; and"

Section 2001 of title 10, U.S. Code, to be amended by deleting the words in brackets to read as follows:

"§ 2001. Reserve components.

As prescribed by the Secretary concerned, each reserve component [except the Army National Guard of the United States and the Air National Guard of the United States] shall be divided into training categories according to the kinds and degrees of training, including the number and duration of drills or equivalent duties to be completed in stated periods. The designation of training categories shall be the same for all armed forces and the same within the Ready Reserve and the Standby Reserve."

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION

On February 5, 1975, we discussed the contents of this report with DOD officials, who generally agreed with our findings and recommendations. They concurred in the sampling techniques and methodology used and stated that the report discussed problems for which DOD was seeking solutions.

On March 4, 1975, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that he believed our report to be one of the best analyses concerning Reserve training and that it will assist the services' and DOD's efforts to upgrade training.

The Department of Transportation, in an April 8, 1975, letter, said that the Coast Guard fully supports the intent of our recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, including the placing of units in structured drill categories, and that the Coast Guard Reserve will implement all the recommendations as applicable. (See app. V.)

DOD, by letter dated May 29, 1975, agreed with our conclusions and recommendations. (See app. VI.) In its letter DOD:

--Agreed that Reserve component units required within the first 30 days after mobilization should be identified and provided with adequate training and equip-

ment to meet required readiness levels. This policy has become part of the Secretary of Defense's guidance to the services.

--Agreed that units without early mobilization requirements should be identified and either removed from 48-drill status or converted to meet early combat needs.

--Agreed that some individuals possessing so-called "soft skills" should have lesser training requirements than other individuals in the same units.

--Said that the report confirms several recognized problem areas with Reserve training and program management.

However, DOD added that several of our findings and recommendations needed clarification and perhaps reconsideration before publication.

Although DOD agreed that some units and individuals can receive lesser training, it said that reducing training periods would, because of reduced pay, hinder recruiting. We recognized that reduced pay for some individuals could affect recruiting in an all-volunteer environment and revised our recommendations accordingly. However, we believe reducing the amount of idleness and time devoted to activities other than official job training will increase the effectiveness of training and satisfaction among reserve members and thereby increase retention. If DOD finds that tailoring unit and individual training schedules negatively affects recruiting, it should determine what other measures are needed and request the Congress to enact appropriate legislation. We believe the Congress should, however, consider DOD's proposed measures only within the context of a tailored Reserve forces training program.

DOD stated that Reserve component units have been collocated with the active forces whenever possible. However, active installations are not always located in or near areas with populations sufficient to support a Guard or Reserve unit; it is often necessary to transport personnel considerable distances to provide appropriate training; and it is not easy or practical to relocate a Reserve unit with members tied to local community job markets.

We agree that some Reserve units may not be collocatable with active units. However, these units should at least be located where they can receive adequate training. If units cannot be located near adequate training sites or be effectively affiliated with their active counterparts, we doubt

whether such units are serving a useful purpose. Because our review identified units scheduled for 48 drills and located great distances from adequate training sites, we do not believe the services are insuring that "each member receives the very important hands-on training" or is using "available equipment whenever possible."

DOD stated that it is difficult to assess the complete problem of how reservists spend their training time without differentiating between the terms "official jobs," "general military," and "other jobs." This becomes important when conclusions hinge on the respondents' interpretation of these terms. Before distributing our questionnaires, we made extensive field tests of reservists' understanding of the terminology used in our questionnaires and obtained agreement on terminology from DOD Reserve officials. As discussed in appendix III, pages 51 to 54, we also validated the reliability and validity of responses by onsite visits.

DOD also said that many of the specific problems mentioned in the report have been reduced by ongoing efforts to make more efficient use of training time. According to DOD, these efforts include

- a program to reduce the administrative requirements for units;
- better training coordination between the active and Reserve forces, resulting in improved unit readiness;
- insuring that each member receives the very important hands-on training using available equipment whenever possible; and
- efforts by all components to upgrade the quality and quantity of training equipment to reach authorized levels.

After receiving DOD's comments, we met with DOD and Reserve component officials and discussed the steps the services have taken. As a result of these discussions and our analysis of the data provided us, we believe more needs to be accomplished before maximum use will be made of available training time.

DOD said that, to improve Reserve training, the services have taken steps to ease the administrative workloads of unit commanders. Army officials said they eliminated 49 reporting requirements during fiscal year 1975. According to Marine Corps officials, they have stopped requiring unit commanders to maintain individual troop information and training records.

The Navy and Air Force components, however, have not reduced their administrative requirements.

In fiscal year 1974 the Army initiated an affiliation program which designated certain Reserve component units to fill understructured active Army divisions upon mobilization. These units are receiving training assistance from, and are being prepared to deploy with, their affiliated active Army divisions. According to Army officials, the readiness of the Reserve units in the affiliation program has improved. Initially, 25 battalion-size Reserve units were included in the program, and by 1977 the Army plans to expand the program to include 96 such units.

Although the Army has acted to improve the training being provided their reservists, we believe further actions are warranted. For example, the affiliation program has potential for wider application. Although not discussed in the text of our report, Army officials said during our review that the following major Army commands could be involved in training responsibility and would be the gaining command on mobilization: Military Transportation Management Command, Army Security Agency, Army Material Command, Health Services Command, Training and Doctrine Command, and Forces Command. According to Army officials, further expanding the affiliation program would require increased funding.

According to Navy officials, the Navy Reserve program is being restructured to be more responsive to the mobilization requirements of the active fleet. Included in the restructuring are plans for weekend training with the active force. Navy officials believe that the restructuring will result in improved Reserve training. The remaining Reserve components have not substantially changed their training programs.

DOD also mentioned that all components are striving to upgrade the quality and quantity of training equipment to reach authorized levels. Equipment shortages are being covered in detail in another GAO report to be issued in the near future.

MEMBER QUESTIONNAIRE SAMPLE SIZE
AND RESPONSE RATE BY COMPONENT

<u>Component</u>	<u>Members</u>	<u>Sample</u>	<u>Responses</u>	<u>Response rate</u> (percent)
Army National Guard	368,024	736	576	78
Army Reserve	226,275	452	331	73
Navy Reserve	128,691	257	200	78
Air National Guard	91,305	176	147	84
Air Force Reserve	42,795	194	154	79
Marine Corps Reserve	34,963	195	127	65
Coast Guard Reserve	<u>11,390</u>	<u>199</u>	<u>172</u>	86
Total	<u>903,443</u>	<u>2,209</u>	<u>1,707</u>	77

UNIT COMMANDER QUESTIONNAIRE SAMPLE SIZE
AND RESPONSE RATE BY COMPONENT

<u>Component</u>	<u>Sample</u>	<u>Responses</u>	<u>Response rate</u> (percent)
Army National Guard	515	434	84
Army Reserve	296	262	89
Navy Reserve	182	150	82
Air National Guard	123	118	96
Air Force Reserve	120	102	85
Marine Corps Reserve	80	75	94
Coast Guard Reserve	<u>122</u>	<u>100</u>	82
Total	<u>1,438</u>	<u>1,241</u>	86

METHODS USED TO ANALYZERESPONSES TO QUESTIONNAIRES

In analyzing the responses to the member questionnaire, we used accepted statistical methods to establish the precision of estimates at the 95-percent-confidence level. The significance of differences in sample averages was also tested at that level. That is, the differences were considered significant only if there were less than 1 chance in 20 that the differences resulted because we used responses from a sample rather than the entire universe of reservists. The techniques used to establish significance included:

- Chi-square test.
- Stepwise multiple regression.
- Analysis of variance.
- Comparison of means test (*t* test).

CHI-SQUARE TEST

The results of this test provided early indications of significant relationships between the responses. For example, the following cross tabulation shows that members with higher pay grades were significantly more satisfied with drills than those with lower pay grades.

<u>Pay grade</u>	<u>Satisfied</u>		<u>Not satisfied</u>		<u>Undecided</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
E8 and above	236	77.6	49	16.1	19	6.3
E5 to E7	406	61.8	193	29.4	58	8.8
E1 to E4	<u>274</u>	39.3	<u>344</u>	49.4	<u>79</u>	11.3
	<u>916</u>		<u>586</u>		<u>156</u>	
Chi-square total				148.038		
Degrees of freedom				4		
Probability that differences are due to chance--less than .001						

STEPWISE MULTIPLE REGRESSION

Although the chi-square tests identified significant relationships between the various responses, they did not show how the relationships rank in importance. The stepwise multiple regression determines the correlation between a dependent variable and any number of independent variables and ranks the independent variables according to the degree of correlation. This helped us to establish the most important cause and effect relationships. For example, the following results show the most important correlations between dissatisfaction with drills and other responses.

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Responses</u>
1	Time waiting, filling in time, doing nothing
2	Training instruction during 1973 was usually poor
3	Motivated by draft to join Time training or working in officially as- signed job is:
4	--More than what is needed
5	--Less than what is needed

Thus, although the chi-square test showed that satisfaction varied significantly by grade, this analysis indicated the above reasons to be more important causes for dissatisfaction. Other tests showed that idleness adversely affects satisfaction regardless of pay grade.

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE

This technique was useful for assessing the significance of differences between averages of several groups. Significance of differences is measured by the relationship of the variance within groups to the variance between groups, as shown below for averages of time waiting, filling in time, doing nothing, etc., by Reserve component.

<u>Component</u>	<u>Sum of responses</u>	<u>Average percent of time spent in idleness</u>	<u>Sum of squared deviations from average</u>	<u>Number of responses</u>
Army National Guard	11,665	20.537	387,155.230	568
Army Reserve	8,481	26.015	291,002.930	326
Navy Reserve	3,999	20.095	147,925.190	199
Air National Guard	3,018	20.814	112,039.973	145
Air Force Reserve	2,686	17.556	105,253.779	153
Marine Reserve	3,146	25.168	98,007.473	125
Coast Guard Reserve	<u>3,668</u>	21.576	<u>148,387.510</u>	<u>170</u>
Total	<u>36,663</u>	21.746	<u>1,289,772.085</u>	<u>1,686</u>

	Sums of squared deviations from average	Degrees of freedom	Mean square
Between components	11,595.797	6	1,932.6328
Within components	1,289,772.085	1,679	768.1787

Value of $F = 1,932.6328/768.1787 = 2.5159$
 Probability that difference in averages is
 attributable to sampling--less than 5 percent

Although the above test does not pinpoint reasons for the differences between the averages, inspection of the data indicates that members of the Army and Marine Reserves are idle significantly more than members of the other five Reserve component services. Comparison of means tests showed this to be true.

COMPARISON OF MEANS TEST (t test)

This test measures the probability that differences in the averages of two sample groups can be attributable to sampling. It was helpful in more detailed analysis of the data to pinpoint cause and effect relationships. For example, although cross tabulations showed that members motivated by the draft were more apt than others to be dissatisfied with drills, the following comparison of means test shows that many are satisfied if their time is used efficiently.

<u>Draft-motivated members'</u> <u>satisfaction with drills</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Average</u> <u>time in</u> <u>official job</u>	<u>Standard</u> <u>error</u>
		(percent)	
Satisfied	196	54.066	1.958
Not satisfied	388	<u>27.392</u>	1.367
Difference		26.674	2.388

Z value = $26.674/2.388 = 11.17$
 Probability that difference is due to
 sampling--less than .000003

The t tests were also used extensively to assess the reliability, validity, and biases of the responses to the questionnaires, as described below.

RELIABILITY, VALIDATION, AND BIAS TESTS

The confidence limits and assurance levels used to qualify the statistical estimates are in themselves measures of reliability in that they specify the chances that an estimate is likely to fall within a specified range of values. But since sampling error estimates for various reasons can sometimes provide misleading assumptions of reliability, we considered it important to assess the degree to which the questionnaire data may be considered consistent and stable and to provide additional evidence that the data measures the variables it was designed to measure.

We used three independent methods to assess reliability. We resampled the population, analyzed a sample of comparisons which tested for differences between the original individual and other members in his group, and later retested a sample of individuals and analyzed their test and retest scores for differences.

To appraise the construct validity of the report statistics, we asked two different and more credible populations of people to make the same observations independently. Then we compared their observations with those made by the people in the population survey under similar conditions.

We made observations by visiting 99 unit sites chosen at random from a judgment-sampling universe. This sampling domain, which contained about 54 percent of the units in the original sample, was established without regard to information in the responses. In each case we compared the questionnaire findings provided by the original respondents with the similar estimates of others in their units. Observations were developed by surveying other members in the unit.

Since these validity assessments helped establish a more credible measure of the true value, they were also used as bases for an evaluation of biases. The GAO observations, the average of the observations made by the members of each group tested, and, after a statistical evaluation, the individuals' responses on certain items were considered approximate benchmarks for the true value. Overall, these comparisons seemed to support the following three conclusions.

- The respondents' statistics were reliable.
- The member responses were reasonably valid and relatively free from biases.
- The validity of the unit commander responses was suspect.

On most items, where the opportunity existed, the unit commanders demonstrated a significant, consistent, and substantial tendency to bias their responses to make their unit conditions look more favorable and their training needs more pronounced.

All of the above comparisons were made by testing several hypotheses about the population of unit members and about the population of unit commanders. Each hypothesis was designed to offer specific evidence as to the certainty to which a particular population statistic could be considered a reliable, valid, or unbiased estimate. Either matched-pair t or t test statistical analyses techniques were used to make all difference comparisons. The assurances of similarity or differences were provided at the 95-percent-level of confidence with confidence limits of no wider than ± 10 percent. That is to say the chances are 19 out of 20 that we have noted all measured differences between the comparison groups that are greater than 10 percent. Since these hypotheses were tested on a small sample of 99 units selected from the much larger sample used to derive the report statistics, test comparison differences of 10 percent or less are either not likely to prove significant or are considered relatively trivial.

We used several data collection procedures to gather the information necessary to test the various hypotheses. Both the original unit member respondents and the original unit commanders were retested at the 99 unit sites after they had submitted their original mail questionnaires. Several members from various pay grades were selected from each unit and tested and an average unit score computed. We conducted personal interviews, made observations, and reviewed the records in each unit to generate specific measures of relevant items.

However, since the units were selected from a judgment sampling universe, we did not assume randomness even though the units visited were selected at random. For further support, we compared the small sample population with the original large sample populations for significant differences on all measures used in this study. With few exceptions, there were no significant differences greater than 10 percent. The responses for both the large and small sample were compared on 225 different items. The two populations responded differently on only two items of the individual questionnaire and two items of the unit commander questionnaire. In three of the four exceptions the differences were only 11 percent and in the fourth item the difference was 13 percent. On these bases, we considered the test sample to be reasonably representative of the large population sample.

This conclusion also supports the assumption of reliability in that a second independent sampling procedure produced approximately the same statistical results as those derived from the initial large population survey sample. However, we conducted three other tests for reliability. We compared each member's and each commander's initial test results with his retest results. Finally, we compared the responses on each of the individual questionnaires with the set of average responses generated by the other members of his unit on the same questionnaire.

In all 425 tests, only one item showed a significant difference greater than 10 percent. When retested, the number of individuals stating that the annual active duty training was well organized was 15 percent greater than on the original test. Since the reliability estimates derived from the confidence limits of the large sample statistics and the four separate experimental designs involving over 650 statistical comparisons uncovered only five instances of significant differences (none greater than 15 percent) and given the criteria established by the test for the conditions under which the assumption is based, that deviation in the consistency and stability of the statistics is unlikely, we felt it reasonable to assume that the results established by the large sample statistics were reliable.

It is, of course, much more difficult and expensive to establish a case for validity. However, if we assume that, in cases where individuals have the ability to make a knowledgeable estimate, a survey of unit members can produce a reasonably valid estimate of the degree to which a unit does or does not have a specified attribute, then we have at least one bench mark that better approximates the true value of unit attribute than the individual response. Then, if we compare, in each of the 99 cases selected at random, the estimates derived by averaging responses from the other members of the unit with the responses of the individual coming from that unit who participated in the large population survey, we have at least one measure of construct validity.

We made the above comparisons and, since there were no significant differences between the individual respondent and the measure of several other observers in his group, we found no evidence that the individual responses were lacking in validity. However, such was not the case for the unit commander responses.

Whenever feasible (that is, in cases where both the unit commander and the individual were able to make the same observations), we compared the unit commanders' responses to the members' tested and validated responses. When this

comparison was not feasible, GAO auditors provided the comparative validation observation in accordance with a procedure established by the site audit plan. In all, the unit commanders' responses were compared with the individuals' responses on 50 items and with the GAO observation responses on 60 items.

Twenty-eight, or nearly one-fourth, of the 110 comparison items showed significant and substantial differences. In nearly all comparisons that afforded the unit commander the opportunity to provide a more favorable estimate of his unit's status or to emphasize the need for more training, the unit commanders showed a significant, consistent, and substantially greater tendency to do so than did the validation populations of individual unit members and GAO auditors.

The unit commanders differed from individuals on 11 out of 50 measures of the unit commander questionnaire, indicating a substantially greater need for more time, training and drills, and active duty than the individual members of the unit. Similarly, the commanders claimed that substantially more of their time was spent on mission-related military duties than did the individual unit members.

The trend was even more pronounced when compared with the GAO observations. On 17 out of 60 variables of the unit commanders' questionnaire, a substantially greater portion of commanders than GAO observers chose responses stressing the requirement for more training. These major differences between the commanders and the two validity populations indicate the existence of substantial population biases in many of the unit commander sample estimates and lead us to doubt the validity of many of the unit commanders' measures.

In summary, our analysis of the data collected during unit field test audits and during the tests and retests of the unit member and unit commander populations supports the contention that nearly all of the statistics derived from the large population survey of individual unit members and unit commanders are reliable. The analysis failed to uncover any evidence that would lead us to doubt the validity of the individual unit members' responses or the assumptions that such statistics derived from individual unit member population samples are unbiased estimates. However, the analysis clearly indicated that the converse might be true of the unit commander populations.

SUFFICIENCY OF TRAINING IN OFFICIAL MILITARY JOBS
AS INDICATED BY SAMPLE RESULTS

Component	Drills			Active duty		
	About right	Less than needed	More than needed	About right	Less than needed	More than needed
Army National Guard	171,000	53,000	54,500	187,000	26,500	55,500
Army Reserve	86,100	32,000	40,500	103,600	18,000	34,500
Navy Reserve	51,100	39,100	5,500	61,600	20,500	10,000
Air National Guard	50,300	11,900	12,500	49,800	7,800	12,500
Air Force Reserve	13,100	9,300	5,100	19,900	5,500	5,500
Marine Corps Reserve	11,700	6,800	3,800	13,400	3,600	3,900
Coast Guard Reserve	6,000	2,500	1,100	5,300	1,800	900
Total	<u>394,300</u>	<u>154,600</u>	<u>123,000</u>	<u>440,600</u>	<u>83,700</u>	<u>122,800</u>
Range at 95-percent-confidence level:						
From	374,400	139,700	109,200	420,400	72,200	108,900
To	414,200	169,500	136,800	460,800	95,200	136,700



ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR ADMINISTRATION

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590

April 8, 1975

Mr. Henry Eschwege
Director
Resources and Economic Development
Division
U. S. General Accounting Office
Washington, D. C. 20548

Dear Mr. Eschwege:

This is in response to your letter dated February 11, 1975, requesting the Department's comments on the General Accounting Office (GAO) report on need to improve efficiency of reserve training. GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense require that each of the services establish more definitive criteria to implement policy guidance for placing units in training categories based on skill requirement and mission assignment priorities. The U. S. Coast Guard fully supports the intent of the recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, and they will be implemented in the Coast Guard as applicable.

I have enclosed two copies of the Department's reply.

Sincerely,

Handwritten signature of William S. Heffelfinger in cursive script.
William S. Heffelfinger

Enclosure
(two copies)

I. TITLE: THE NEED TO IMPROVE EFFICIENCY OF RESERVING TRAINING - 11 FEBRUARY 1975II. GAO FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

The findings and recommendations deal in general terms with the Reserve components of all the Armed Forces and do not specifically refer to the Coast Guard Reserve, or any particular component for that matter, although the full report does provide greater detail regarding the individual services performance in the areas measured. The findings were divided into three general categories.

A. There is a need to vary amount of training by skill and readiness requirements.

(1) All components schedule the full 48 drills and two weeks annual training for nearly all paid drilling reservists even though there are service provisions for scheduling less frequent drills.

(2) Many units scheduling full training programs have no deployment requirements and others have requirements which are not effective for up to 340 days after mobilization, thus providing sufficient post-mobilization time for training.

(3) Some reservists consider themselves, or are considered by their unit commanders, to be adequately trained even though official job training constitutes only 50-60 percent of total time. Reservists who consider training inadequate were spending only 40-50 percent of their time training in official jobs.

B. There is a need for more efficient use of training time.

(1) Many unit commanders spend much time on paperwork and other administrative functions in lieu of mission training.

(2) Management inspections concentrate on administrative paperwork and record documentation rather than training effectiveness.

(3) Monitoring of attendance and supervision of training is generally moderate or lax.

(4) Approximately one-fourth of the units have difficulty providing meaningful mission training at their home stations and about one-fourth of required training equipment is reportedly unavailable. Of that available, about 42 percent is inoperable or obsolete.

(5) Unit commanders generally considered that increased training effectiveness could be achieved through increased mutual support and affiliation with active service units.

C. Use of training time and satisfaction. 55 to 62 percent of reservists surveyed expressed satisfaction with training and a close correlation was shown between satisfaction and the amount of time devoted to official military jobs. by inference from other comparisons this satisfaction also correlates to amount of mutual support and affiliation with active service units.

The recommendations were for the Secretary of Defense to require each of the services to:

- Identify early deployment units and provide them with sufficient training to achieve required proficiency.
- Reduce training schedules for units which have sufficient post-mobilization time to upgrade proficiency.
- Reduce training schedules for reservists whose military jobs are not difficult, similar to their civilian jobs, or who have otherwise achieved required skill levels.
- Ease the administrative workload on unit commanders.
- Reevaluate the general military activities required of reserve units to identify those activities which can be eliminated or deferred until after mobilization.
- Situate high priority units where they can train with essential equipment.
- Implement more mutual support and active service affiliation agreements.

The report also indicates several matters for consideration by the Congress:

- There are reserve units and members in all reserve components which can maintain proficiency under a reduced training schedule.
- Since tailoring training schedules to mission assignments would diminish the opportunity for earning retirement points for some reservists, the Congress may want to consider the feasibility of changing the retirement program to ensure that Reserve personnel on reduced training schedules can continue to accumulate retirement points and be retained in the reserve program.

III. DOT Comments on Findings and Recommendations:

1. Findings:

- a. The need to vary amount of training by skill and readiness requirements:
Insofar as the Coast Guard's Selected Reserve (drill-pay) units are concerned the

full 48 drills and two weeks annual training are scheduled and necessary to meet the degree of responsiveness required by mobilization planning documents. There are no Coast Guard Selected Reserve units training for delayed deployment. All Selected Reservists are required to report within three days of mobilization and all units are to be fully operational within less than fifteen days. Although most reservists are qualified for the military jobs they presently perform, almost all are training to fill either existing, or prospective vacancies at a higher grade level. This requires additional knowledge and practical experience. In order to meet mobilization planning requirements and to obtain the proper balance between practical training achieved through the augmentation training program with active service units and the necessary formal instruction, the full 48 drills and two weeks annual active duty for training are required.

b. The need for more efficient use of training time. It is recognized that excessive paperwork and other administrative functions are a continuing problem, and that many management inspections direct themselves primarily to administrative paperwork and record documentation. However, there are ongoing programs to correct these problems in the Coast Guard Reserve. Improved methods of reporting drill attendance have been on trial for several months as have improved methods of monitoring and verifying data in Headquarters files. However, the ever-increasing requirements for additional information for management, budgetary, and reporting purposes must be recognized as factors which contribute to this problem. An on-going program to conduct readiness evaluations of reserve units that emphasizes the units' readiness and levels of training rather than paperwork and administration has been in existence since 1972 (Commandant Instruction 3500.9 of 17 October 1972).

Although some members may perceive monitoring of attendance as being lax, records of attendance reveal that only a very small number of Coast Guard Reservists are not meeting the attendance standards that have been established. Relative to supervisory control, Coast Guard petty officers are expected to perform effectively without close supervision -- the relatively small size of the Coast Guard requires this. Further, the augmentation training program, which places detachments of reservists in an on-the-job environment at regular units at various times throughout the month, for periods often in excess of the normal 4 hour drill period, does not lend itself to close command supervision by reserve unit commanding officers.

As opposed to the average of 26 percent occurrence among all services, only 10 percent of the Coast Guard Reserve unit commanders reported that meaningful training could not be obtained at the unit's home site. Where this occurs it results from the fact that some reserve units are in locations remote from regular Coast Guard activities where meaningful augmentation training can be conducted. Personnel assigned to these units must be, and in most instances are, transported to locations where they can participate in augmentation training. In those locations where this is not practical, effective formalized training programs and training equipment must be provided.

The table on p. 46 in the report indicates that a total of about 69% of required Coast Guard Reserve training equipment is either not available, inoperable, or obsolete. Further research appears to be indicated to clarify with unit commanders what is authorized as opposed to what is desired. This need for clarification results from the fact that the only major items of training equipment required for reserve use are boats and related equipment. Currently the reserve boat inventory consists of 150 small boats in the 16' to 40' range. These boats, which are generally the same boats used by the Coast Guard, are used for augmentation training under operational conditions and would also be used operationally under conditions of mobilization. A few boats are obsolete and will be replaced as funding permits. All of the others are operable except for short periods when routine repairs and maintenance are required. Other than boats and related equipment, only vehicles, classroom training aids and publications are normally authorized for reserve unit use. A substantial part of all reserve training is accomplished at regular Coast Guard stations under operational conditions using regular Coast Guard equipment--boats, vessels, vehicles, communications equipment, tools, etc. This is not only cost-effective, but ensures training with the same equipment that would be used for mobilization.

It is agreed that close mutual support and cooperation between active duty commands and Coast Guard Reserve units, coupled with interesting and relevant formalized instruction are necessary to provide a balanced and effective training program.

c. Use of training time and satisfaction. It is agreed that satisfaction of the individual reservist is increased when he or she is productively employed in meaningful training activity. As indicated in the body of the report, Coast Guard Reservists are among those most satisfied with their training. This is considered to reflect the meaningful and productive activity they engage in during augmentation training.

2. Recommendations:

The intent of all the recommendations for the Secretary of Defense is fully supported and will be implemented for the Coast Guard Reserve as applicable.

a. It is agreed that early deployment units should be identified and provided sufficient training to achieve required proficiency. All Coast Guard Selected-Reserve units are early deployment units, are identified as such, and are required to be operational within 15 days after mobilization. Maximum efforts will continue to improve their training as may be needed for mobilization.

b. In view of the fact that no Coast Guard Selected Reserve units are scheduled for delayed deployment, the present schedule of 48 drills and two weeks annual training cannot be reduced without a derogation in mobilization readiness.

c. It is not desirable to reduce the number of scheduled drills since (1) Coast Guard Reservists are training for assignments in higher grades requiring more experience and knowledge, and (2) the mix of practical on-the-job operational training and formalized instruction necessary to achieve and maintain mobilization skills requires the full 48 drill and two week annual training schedule. Any reduction in scheduled training would have a detrimental impact on the overall readiness of the Coast Guard Reserve.

d. It is agreed that maximum possible efforts should be made to reduce the administrative workload imposed on unit commanders and appropriate action is being taken -- see Section IV.d.

e. It is agreed that non-essential general military activities required of reserve units should be reduced or eliminated and appropriate action is being taken -- see Section IV.e.

f. It is agreed that, where it can be accomplished without undue reductions in strength, Reserve units should be relocated to sites where they can train with operational equipment. Many relocations of this type have been accomplished within the Coast Guard Reserve during the past two years. Additional units are currently being evaluated for possible relocation.

g. It is agreed that more effective mutual support and joint training activity with regular service units should be sought. The Coast Guard Reserve's program of augmentation training at regular units has achieved an extensive increase in the level of mutual support and joint activity. This program has been effective in realizing the current high level of training and readiness in the Selected Reserve.

With respect to the matters for consideration by the Congress:

- The Coast Guard Reserve does not have units and members who can be placed in a reduced training schedule--less than 48 drills and 2 weeks annual training--without a derogation in mobilization readiness.
- In the event that consideration is given to a reduced drill schedule for some personnel there are a number of disadvantages to this type of action. A change in the retirement program to permit reservists to qualify for retired pay with fewer points may be a partial solution; however, it is doubtful if this would compensate for reduced immediate earnings. Some losses and possibly significant ones in Selected Reserve strength levels may result from the reduced opportunity to earn drill pay. This could also affect the recruiting of veterans and particularly non-prior-service personnel. Differences in drill participation levels among the various reserve components could create undesirable competition by enlisted personnel seeking maximum opportunities for paid participation. Also, dissatisfaction within a reserve component could result due to different participation levels.

IV. Status of Corrective Action.Recommendations a, b and c.

Since all Coast Guard Selected Reserve units are early deployment, high priority units, no action on recommendations to reduce scheduled drills is considered necessary.

Recommendation d.

Methods of reducing the administrative paperwork of the unit commander that are being introduced are:

1. Simplification of attendance reporting through adoption of a new automated attendance and payroll data input system is expected to be completed by the end of the current calendar year.
2. An improved automated Personnel Accounting System for reservists is in the initial stages of development. Its completion within the next two years will provide improved capability to retrieve necessary management information and to verify data maintained in Headquarters records. This should greatly reduce administrative requirements at the reserve unit.

Recommendation e.

With the emphasis on practical on-the-job training at active duty units, the requirements for general military formations and other similar activities have been significantly reduced in the past two years. All such remaining activities will be reviewed to determine whether or not further reductions may be effected.

Recommendation f.

Essential training aids are being provided to units as funding permits, for example, a system of self-contained, audio-visual training aids suitable for individual or group use was introduced in 1974. Additional training materials for this system are being continually added to the inventory.

Recommendation g.

Continuing efforts to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the augmentation training program at regular units are a continuing goal of the Coast Guard Reserve program.

SUMMARY

The overall results of the study appear to support the effectiveness of augmentation training as the primary method of training Coast Guard Reservists. The findings and recommendations regarding this type of training indicate that it is accomplishing its purpose in terms of maximizing meaningful training and in increasing individual satisfaction. At the same

time it is benefiting the Regular Coast Guard through expanded mission capability under routine, peakload and emergency conditions. The report reveals that there are some areas such as unit administration and the utilization of reserve time where increased management emphasis may be required in order to effect further improvements. This report is expected to be helpful in assisting the Coast Guard to identify and correct these program areas. It would be of additional assistance if the statistical data collected on the Coast Guard Reserve could be provided in its entirety, and this data is hereby requested. This would permit a more detailed analysis of the study findings and would be of value in developing more specific solutions to program areas in need of further improvements.



O. W. SILER
Admiral, U. S. Coast Guard
Commandant

GAO note: Page references in this letter may not correspond to those of the final report.



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

MANPOWER AND
RESERVE AFFAIRS

Mr. Forrest R. Browne
Director, Federal Personnel and
Compensation Division
United States General Accounting Office
Washington, D. C. 20548

20 MAY 1975

Dear Mr. Browne:

The Secretary of Defense has asked me to respond to your request for DoD comments on the GAO draft report entitled, "Need to Improve Efficiency of Reserve Training." (OSD Case #4026)

The report confirms several recognized problem areas associated with Reserve training and program management. Since the survey was taken, many of the specific problems mentioned in the report have been reduced by on-going efforts to make more efficient use of training time. These efforts include: an active program to reduce the administrative requirements for any unit; better training coordination between the Active and Reserve forces which has resulted in improved unit readiness; ensuring that each member receives the very important "hands-on" training utilizing available equipment whenever possible; and all components are striving to upgrade the quality and quantity of training equipment so authorized levels can be reached.

We do feel that several of your findings and recommendations need clarification and, perhaps, reconsideration prior to publication.

The Services uniformly believe Selected Reserve units needed for mobilization during the first 30 days require a minimum of 48 drills and two weeks of active duty training to achieve and maintain their mobilization readiness. Granted, some individuals can maintain certain skill levels with fewer training periods, i.e., truck drivers, cooks, etc., however, there are other military training requirements for many of the same individuals which involve teamwork, i.e., perimeter defense, damage control, fire fighting, flight operations, combat patrol - and these involve closely coordinated team performance.



It should be kept in mind that a reduction in training periods (and consequent reduction in take home pay) creates a negative impact on recruiting in an all-volunteer environment.

We agree that units without early mobilization requirements should be identified and either removed from 18 drill status or converted to meet early combat needs. This is reviewed annually during each budget cycle and DoD recommendations are presented to Congress as part of the President's Budget. The report makes the point that many Reserve Component units have no deployment requirements and others have sufficient post-mobilization time for training. While technically correct, the inference can be misleading. It is true that some units have no deployment requirements, however, many of them are needed within CONUS during the first 30 to 60 days after mobilization to meet the immediate needs of combat units. Such units are Training Divisions, Judge Advocate, Personnel, Supply, Finance, Transportation, and Medical Units. A need for training as part of a unit exists but the Services could consider a reduced schedule if such a reduction can be made without a loss of unit readiness.

Reserve Component units have been collocated with the Active forces wherever possible. Unfortunately, Active installations are not always in or near population densities sufficient to support a Guard or Reserve unit. It is often necessary, therefore, to transport personnel for considerable distances in order to provide appropriate training. It is not easy or practical to relocate a Reserve unit whose members are tied to local community job markets. Hence, a great deal of care must be taken when making such considerations. In the Active force the people can be moved to where the equipment is located while in the Reserve, we must go where the people are.

The report refers to Reservists' opinions concerning the sufficiency of training and the relationship between job skill requirements, civilian related skills and achievement of skill levels; and then, attempts to relate these opinions to the number of drills required. Chapter 2 gives a breakdown of how Reservists spend training time. While the amount of idle time is alarming and merits close attention by OSD and the Services, it is difficult to assess the complete problem without differentiating between the terms "official jobs," "general military" and "other jobs." This becomes all the more important when conclusions hinge on the respondees' interpretation of these terms. All personnel

must be able to perform certain functions of a general military nature, as well as individual skills, to accomplish the unit's mission. Repetition in much of the training is necessary and productive although, if not meaningful, it is a waste of time. It is true that the necessity for repetition in skill training is sometimes not appreciated by the trainee. There is room for improvement in this area, and it will be followed up by the Services and OSD. A related problem is that Reservists may be required to devote a small portion of training time to some "house-keeping" chores but this is a necessary part of maintaining any area used by a group. These chores, nevertheless, can become an abrasive issue of disproportionate magnitude easily stressed by questionnaire respondents. Certainly there is no justification for idleness during training time and the entire problem is receiving a great deal of attention at all levels of command.

In summary, we agree that Reserve Component units required within the first 30 days after M-Day (actually those scheduled thru D+90) should be identified and provided with adequate training and equipment to meet required readiness levels. This has become part of the Secretary of Defense's guidance to the Services. We also agree that some later, follow-on type, support units might be candidates for reduced training schedules. This has been a consideration during budget hearings and will continue to be addressed.


We agree that, in some cases, individuals possessing so-called "soft skills" should have lesser training requirements than other individuals in the same units. In other cases, however, soft-skilled personnel would be used in required and productive unit support roles. Without their efforts, the units would not be able to train as efficient entities, which is the overriding consideration.

In our opinion, great caution should be exercised in presenting to Congress the costing data relating to training time derived by the study. The definition of the groupings on page 2 requires clarification to permit analysis and to relate these terms precisely to the amounts displayed.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on your draft report. You have confirmed many recognized problems for which we are still seeking viable solution. The report reveals that there are areas where increased management emphasis and improved leadership are required to effect further

improvements. In order to accomplish this, we would appreciate your providing OSD with a copy of the entire statistical data collected on the DoD Components. The Services then will be able to better sort out their problem areas and correct command management deficiencies.

Sincerely,



John F. Abner
Principal Deputy

GAO note: Page references in this letter may not correspond to those of the final report.

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE
FOR ADMINISTERING ACTIVITIES DISCUSSED
IN THIS REPORT

	<u>Tenure of office</u>	
	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>
<u>DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE</u>		
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:		
James R. Schlosinger	July 1973	Present
William P. Clements (acting)	May 1973	July 1973
Elliot L. Richardson	Jan. 1973	May 1973
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:		
William P. Clements	Jan. 1973	Present
Kenneth Rush	Feb. 1972	Jan. 1973
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS):		
William K. Brehm	Sept. 1973	Present
Carl W. Clewlow (acting)	June 1973	Sept. 1973
<u>DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY</u>		
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:		
Howard H. Callaway	June 1973	Present
Robert F. Froehlke	July 1971	June 1973
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS):		
Donald G. Brotzman	Mar. 1975	Present
M. Donald Lowe	Mar. 1974	Jan. 1975
Paul D. Phillips (acting)	Jan. 1974	Mar. 1974
Carl S. Wallace	Mar. 1973	Jan. 1974
CHIEF OF STAFF:		
Gen. Frederick C. Weyand	Oct. 1974	Present
Gen. Creighton W. Abrams	Oct. 1972	Oct. 1974
<u>DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY</u>		
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:		
J. William Middendorf II	June 1974	Present
J. William Middendorf II (acting)	Apr. 1974	June 1974
John W. Warner	May 1972	Apr. 1974

	<u>Tenure of office</u>	
	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS):		
Joseph T. McCullen, Jr.	Sept. 1973	Present
James E. Johnson	June 1971	Sept. 1973
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS:		
Adm. James L. Holloway III	June 1974	Present
Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.	July 1967	June 1974
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS:		
Gen. Robert E. Cushman, Jr.	Jan. 1972	Present
<u>DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE</u>		
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE:		
John L. McLucas	July 1973	Present
John L. McLucas (acting)	May 1973	July 1973
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS):		
David P. Taylor	June 1974	Present
James P. Goode (acting)	June 1973	June 1974
CHIEF OF STAFF:		
Gen. David C. Jones	July 1974	Present
Gen. George S. Brown	Aug. 1973	June 1974
Gen. John D. Ryan	Aug. 1969	July 1973
<u>DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION</u>		
SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION:		
William T. Coleman, Jr.	Mar. 1975	Present
Claude S. Brinegar	Feb. 1973	Mar. 1975
COMMANDANT OF THE COAST GUARD:		
Adm. Owen W. Siler	May 1974	Present
Adm. Chester R. Bender	June 1970	May 1974
CHIEF, OFFICE OF RESERVES		
Rear Adm. Julian E. Johansen	July 1973	Present
Rear Adm. James W. Moreau	Aug. 1971	July 1973