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A'BSTRACT

The method of campaigning politically on television has changed markedly between 1952, when speeches by candidates were the prevalent mode of television campaigning, and 1972, when 60-second and 30-second spot announcements had almost replaced broadcast addresses. However, studies show that spots do not constitute an important source of political information for any significant number of eligible voters, nor do spots affect voter turnout. A variety of factors suggest the desirability of prohibiting political advertising on television and radio (as in Britain) and of requiring publicly licensed broadcasters to make free time available for all major candidates to appear in an uncontrolled format. (Graphs illustrating various points are interspersed throughout the paper.)

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Broadcast Political Advertisements and the Public Political Debate Howard H. Martin The University of Michigan

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It is no secret that, since 1952 when television first played part in political campaigning, candidates use of broadcast media has turned increasingly toward the 60-second and 30-second 'spot' announcement and the 5-minute 'trailer' during prime time and away from the broadcasting of candidates! speeches. In 1952, there were almost no other broadcasts than those of the candidates' speeches. By 1960, exclusive of the four televised debates, of 48 Nixon speeches 4 were nationally televised, and of 78 Kennedy speeches, only one-the election eve speech--was nationally televised. In 1964, both Toldwater and Johnson televised only one speech a piece. by 1972, 'spot' announcements had nearly driven out broadcast addresses: Nixon broadcast only one speech on prime time television nationally, Nixon did give 13, radio and McGovern broadcast no 'live' addresses. addresses on a range of issues, under the auspices of CREP, usually scheduled just after noon, chiefly to get his views on record and have the speeches reported in the press. McGovern purchased time for a small number of half-hour discussions of issues.

A quantitative measure has been provided by Stanley Kelley of this remarkable shift."

Mean length of party telecasts:

Modal length of televised broadcasts:

1952 30 minutes
 1956 5 minutes
 1960 5 minutes

Decline in the use of the 5-minute 'trailer' probably had reduced the modal length to less than 60 seconds by 1972.

A corollary measure of the increasing use of 'spots' is provided by the increased expenditures for television (and radio) time which, as broadcast speeches have declined and 'spots' increased, display ever heavier use of advertising 'spots' heavily concentrated in prime time.?

Comparison of TV/Radio Network and Local Charges, General Election

					•		
	·	1956	1960	1964	1968		
GOP.		\$ 5.38 м	\$ 7.56 м	\$13.03 M	\$22.51 M	-	
DEMO	, .	4.12	6.21	11.01	15.45		
OTHER:	•	•32	.43	•56	2.45		•
TOTAL	بديم د ي 	9.80	14.20	- 24.60.	110.110		,

By 1968, total broadcasting expenses by parties had reached \$ 55.73 million, with \$ 27.86 million spent by Republicans and \$ 27.73 million spent by Democrats, an overall increase from 1964 of 70%.3

Although the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 limited spending for media advertising, outlays were still substantial; 1972 time-charges for network and local broadcasts were ahead of 1956

totals. The Republicans spent for all media advertising their legal limit of \$ 14.3 million, of which \$ 4.3 million was spent for broadcast ads in the general election. Democrats spent \$ 6.2 million of their \$ 14.3 million limit on broadcast ads during the same period.

Potentially, 'spots' reach a substantial majority of the voting-age population. A.C. Nielsen has reported in 1972 publications that 96% of United States households have television receivers, and that nearly 70% of these households watch television between 7:30 p.m. and 9:30 p.m. on an average day. When 'spots' are used in saturation during the last two weeks of a campaign, nearly maximum exposure is possible. Moreover, 'spots' reach a cross-section of the voting-age population; selective exposure is apparently overcome. A study of exposure to television ads during gubernatorial campaigns in Wisconsin and Colorado in 1972 displayed nearly equal exposure of partisans to ads of major party candidates.

÷ -			n		
*	Favor GOP	Undecided/DST	Favor DEMO		
Seen more GOP ads	31 %	27 %	32 %		
Seen equal number	48	-53			
Seen more DEMO ads	21	20	31		

Finally, 'spots' reach people who expect to be entertained. It was discovered as early as 1952 that audiences for political telecasts shrank when entertainment programs were also available. That is hardly surprising; prime time television is a vehicle for entertainment. Moreover, judgments of the quality of political 'spots' have employed entertainment standards; viewers were asked to rate ads as "generally

entertaining," "generally boring," or in between." The expectation of being entertained obviously qualifies the impact of political information upon an audience otherwise very large and containing opposite partisans and the uncommitted.

Although the potential audience for 'spots' is immense, for whom do they constitute an important source of political information? The question is simpler to answer in the negative. 'Spots' are not an important source of information for people of strong partisan affiliations; such people make up their minds about their vote before the campaign begins.

W.	1952	1956	÷
Knew their vote all along	30 %	44 8	
Decided when candidates chosen	35 %	32 %	
TOTAL	65.%	76 %	, 

Nor are 'spots' an important source of information for people who are strongly interested in the campaign; they, too, make up their minds early. Moreover, the highly interested depend upon a mix of many information media--newspapers, magazines, television and radio; in such a mix, television ads appear insignificant. The following table indicates also that people who care little about the campaign also are much less exposed to media sources of political information of any kind.

Involvement		<u> </u>		Media	Exposure	
	Low	1	.2 ·	3 .	High 4	, .
High 4	5 %	10 %	23 %	41 %	46 %	
. 3	. 13	2li	32	30	31 .	
2	33 *	35	27 <sup>.</sup> .	21 .	17	• • •
· 1	149	31	· 18	8	6,	* **

Nor are 'spots' important for those who split their votes. The ticket-splitter is a highly motivated voter, not similar to the self-styled "independent' voter who is really a disinterested voter. The ticket-splitter rates televised add very low on an Il-point scale, as the following table shows. For him, important sources are those over which candidates exert the least control. 10


Rating of Sources of Campaign Information


· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Undecideds	} 	Ticket-split	ters
Interpersonal	_	·	. · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
Talk with family	5.5	• .	5.6	
Contact with candidate	5.0		5.2	
Talk with friends	4.8		5.0	
Audio-Visual	•		,	<i>u</i> .
TV news	6.7	, <b>, ,</b>	6.8	
TV documentaries/specials /	6.5		6.6	
TV editorials	5.7	. •	5.6	
TV talk shows	5.6	•	5.6	
TV educational programs	5.6		5.9	
Ty ads	3:6		. 3.6	-

•		Undecideds	Ticket-splitte	
Frin	t	-		
•	News stories and editorials	5.8	5.9+	
	Newspaper ads,	3.8	3.7	
	Fillboards	2.4	2.1	

If not political partisans or those highly interested in politics or ticket-splitters, then who are those for whom 'spots' are an important source of political information? Apparently, the answer is: those who do not care much about the campaign, those who do not care much about the campaign, those who do not care much about the issues and inaccurately perceive candidates' stands, those who are vote "changers" (switch parties from one election to the next) or "floaters" (those who change their minds at least once during the campaign. Although potentially this group could be as large as 25% tof eligible voters who express an intention to vote, their numbers are always seriously eroded by non-voting. Foreover, because of their fundamental disinterest, few pay close attention to the ads. The study in sisconsin and Colorado found that only 28% of those exposed to 'spots' paid close attention to them; 12% paid "some" attention; 29% paid no attention.

Although television political 'spots' do not constitute an important source of political information for any significant number of eligible voters, what direct evidence have we of the effect of 'spots'? First, the increase in 'spot' announcements—and of television generally—has not affected voter turnout as television ownership has become almost universal, as the following graph illustrates. 12





In fact, there is a higher correlation between newspaper reading and turnout than between television use and turnout: 13

· • ·	3 Th * m	
TV .	Newspapér	% Voted II
own	read	83 % 1,073
don't own	read	73.%
own	don't read	61 % 167
don't own	don't read	<sup>1</sup> 1 % . 103

whom they may, presumably, provide an important source of political information? we may reason that 'spots' may provide such voters with information that would tend to influence a preference only if the information were uniformly favorable to a single party candidate. Fut, as has already been shown, exposure to 'spots' is not uni-partisan. Moreover, attention paid to 'spots' is not seriously skewed by partisan preference: 1

Attention Paid to Televised Political Ads.

<u> </u>				-	Favor GOP	UnD/DST	Favor Demo
Closer	attention	to	302 a	ġs	22 % .	1:- 1/2	2 %
Equal	•	-		٠,	711	<u>s</u> 91	81
Closer	attention	tò	DELIC :	ads	<u>'</u> 4	5.	17 6

And, in all the studies I have seen, it has proved impossible to separate the effect of television ads from the effect of television exposure generally, therefore it is impossible to know whether candidate-controlled exposure ('spots') or uncontrolled exposure (news affects low-interest voters. For example, a study of the effects of the "democrats for Nixon" 'spots' in 1972, which ridiculed "covern's positions on defense spending, welfare and his alleged inconsistency, showed that over the last six weeks of the campaign voters became more aware of Nixon's and "covern's beliefs on spending and consistency, but could not directly attribute that change to 'spots'

Tercent Improvement in Understanding

Mc3 on De	efense	Nixo	n on ae	fense	MoG. C	onși	stency
High Interest (high exposure)	+23·×		+19		•	, <del>-</del> 3,	
Low Interest (high exposure)	+33		+12	•	, .	+ģ	: · .
Loderate Interest (high exposure)	+30.	•	+26	s. 3		+1	and the
Low Interest (low exposure)	+12	* 4.	+8		•	_l;	
High Interest (low exposure)	+6 .	<u> </u>	+27	•		8	

Moreover, when we subtract the change that occurred without exposure, the difference between high interest and low interest voters is small indeed, probably within the error margin for a sample of this size (±5%) and therefore insimificant. 15 It does not follow, then, from what empirical evidence there is, that low interest voters are more likely to be influenced by spots than other segments of the voting public.

Although there is no evidence that 'spots' have so far exerted important effect upon the political decision process, there are still reasons for concern about their continued use. First, persistent employment of 'spots' reinforces the notion that an electoral decision is no more important than selection of an antacid. Such a lon. - : rance cultural impact is predictable and undesirable. memorable 'spots' have employed fear-appeals and/or over-simplification of an opponent's position in order to arouse doubts that cannot easily, be allayed in the short term of a campaign. For example, the Democratic party ad in 1961 picturing a jirl licking an ice-cream cone while a voice explained that strontium 90 was building up in milk supplies due to nuclear testing, and that Darry Goldwater opposed the test ban treaty. Fr, Mixon supporters' law and order 'spots' in 1968, of the Connally group's add in 1972 for Nixon that showed a hand sweeping toy ships and planes off a table-top while a voice explained that McJovern planned to emasculate American defenses., Such ads seem to fall into the category of things euphemistically labelled "dirty tricks." Finally, continued use of "spots" may render the electoral decision more irrational if false or misleading information is given to people who do not care enough to check its accuracy.

Therefore, although my worries about the effects of political adebate and decision-making of the decline and near-disappearance of broadcast discourse appear to be unfounded in terms of measurable consequences to date, there do seem to be some reasons for taking action. That action? the prohibition of all political advertising on television and radio, which has been repeatedly proposed and is the status quo in Britain, is still desirable. Such a prohibition ought

make available free time for all major candidates to appear in an uncontrolled format preempting all other television programming simultaneously. 16 Such arrangements would substantially remove the apprehensions many have had that televised political 'spots' may subvert the full discussion of issues and the full disclosure of candidate consetence.

Endnotes:

" l"Campain Delates: Some Facts and Issues," <u>lublic Coinion</u>
<u>suarterly</u>, 26 (Fall, 1962), 35.

2Figures have been rounded to proportion of millions of dollars from FCC data reported in <u>Congressional quarterly Heekly Report</u>, 27 (September 12, 1969), 1702.

· 3<u>Ibid</u>., p. 1701.

Congressional quarterly Leekly Report, 31 (May 12, 1973), 113%.

5Charles A. Atkin et al, "Quality versus quantity in Televised olitical Ads," <u>Jublic Opinion Quarterly</u>, 37 (Summer, 1973), 216.

Exelley, "Campai m Debates: Some Facts and Issues," p. 356.

7Atkin, "Quality yersus Quantity," p. 216.

Angus Campbell; hillip E. Converse, Marren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, <u>The American Votor</u>, <u>An Abrid ment</u> (New York: John Miley and Sons, Inc., 1961), pp. /1-2.

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10 alter LeVries and LaRce Tarrance, Jr., The Ticket-Splitter
(Frand Rapids, Michigan: In. Erdmanns Jublishing Co., 1972), pp. 75-6.

11 Atkin, "Juality versus quantity," p. 216.

12 The data on turnout rate is adapted from a chart in Angus Campbell, "Fac Television Reshaped .olltics?" Columbia Journalism Review, I. (1963), up-dated with figures from Congressional quarterly Almanacs for 1970 and 1972.

1° milliam A. Glasser, "Television and Voting Turnout," <u>rublic</u> <u>Coimion quarterly</u>, 29 (Spring, 1965), 78.

<sup>1</sup> Atkin, "Quality versus quantity," p. 21%.

15 Thomas E. Fatterson and Robert D. McClure, <u>I olitical Advertising</u>:

<u>Voter Reaction to Televised olitical Commercials</u>. Citizen's Research

Foundation Study, No. 23 (1971).

16 Twentieth Century Fund, Voter's Time: Report . . . on Campaign Costs in the Electronic Tra (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1969), developed these proposals.

