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ABSTRACT

One of the most hazardous assignments police officers face is dealing with family quarrels and disturbances. In 1972, 13 percent of all policemen killed in the line of duty died while responding to disturbance complaints. Despite these dangers, techniques for dealing with such crises are rarely included in police recruit and inservice training programs. The feasibility of training police as specialists in family crisis intervention was first tested by the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance in 1967. The National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice believes that crisis intervention training can enhance police safety and make police service more responsive to community needs. The institute has prepared this monograph to explain the concept underlying the training and to discuss some guidelines and problems in organizing a training program. (Author/HMV)

FAMILY CRISIS INTERVENTION:

FROM CONCEPT TO IMPLEMENTATION

By

MORTON BARD

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FOREWORD

One of the most hazardous assignments police officers face is dealing with family quarrels and disturbances. In 1972, 13 percent of all policemen killed in the line of duty died while responding to disturbance complaints. Twenty-seven percent of the assaults on police officers occurred in the same setting.

The risk is even greater for the participants in these quarrels. Of all murders reported in 1972, 24.3 percent occurred between family members, 7.1 percent during a "lover's quarrel," and 41.2 percent as the result of other arguments. The vast majority of all aggravated assaults involve relatives, neighbors or acquaintances.

Despite these dangers, techniques for dealing with such crises are rarely included in police recruit and inservice training programs. Research, however, indicates that police trained in crisis intervention are less likely to be injured or assaulted when handling fights and disturbances. Some researchers believe well-trained officers also serve to reduce homicide and assault rates.

The feasibility of training police as specialists in family crisis intervention was first tested by the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance in 1967. The National Institute has continued to support this work, expanding the training focus from a small group of selected volunteers to a broad range of officers and refining the experience of earlier projects.

The Institute believes that crisis intervention training can enhance police safety and make police service more responsive to community needs.

From a broader perspective, this sophisticated training technique changes the police function in concrete and positive ways. Success is measured in terms of police ability to solve disputes rather than piling up felony arrests. As the police begin to view themselves as skilled conflict managers capable of defusing potentially explosive situations, beneficial effects are felt throughout the department.

Successful intervention in family disputes also can result in many economies, eliminating the time and expense involved in bringing a case to court.

This monograph explains the concept underlying the training and discusses some guidelines and problems in organizing such a program.

We hope it will be useful both as an introduction to crisis intervention techniques and as an aid to those agencies interested in adopting this training method.

Gerald M. Caplan
Director
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INTRODUCTION

Police administrators today are constantly seeking to improve the quality and delivery of police services. However, because these services have become so diversified and complex, their improvement must involve certain new organizational strategies.

An important idea to consider in determining these organizational strategies is the concept of policing as a "person profession," that is, one which requires a facility in interpersonal relations. If one accepts this assumption, it follows that the training of police officers in the acquisition of interpersonal skills should occupy a high priority in the police system.

One area of police work that requires a skill in interpersonal relations is that of family crisis management. Although processing family disturbances constitutes an important aspect of police work, and although a significant proportion of injuries and fatalities suffered by police occurs in this area, police administrators have generally not addressed themselves to the realities of this problem.

Some years ago, however, a study indicated that the training of police officers in specific interpersonal skills could improve and facilitate the management of domestic disturbances (1). Utilizing resources from both the behavioral and social sciences, this project in crisis intervention training demonstrated that there were more effective, safer, and more satisfying ways for police officers to handle family crises than the traditional means. What is more, there were some indications that skillful performance of family crisis intervention was viewed as a valuable service by the community. Given the frequency with which police departments are confronted by family disturbances, and given the limited competence of and unclear mandate for police officers in such situations, it was natural to find police administrators responding quickly to the implications of that initial study.

Unfortunately, however, enthusiastic implementation of family crisis programs often went forward with too little understanding of the underlying concept and with even less appreciation of the organizational pitfalls which can result from adopting these programs.

It is the intent of this monograph to help correct that situation by briefly explaining the concepts undergirding police family crisis intervention and by exploring some of the organizational implications inherent in a "go" decision by a police department. It is not expected that this discussion will be an exhaustive one; it is only intended to alert the interested police administrator to some of the important issues involved.

THE CONCEPT

The use of the term "family crisis" in our original demonstration study was intended to broaden the view of what was involved in the usual family fight. Typically, police officers have regarded the event as an alcohol-inspired "nothing" about which little could be done. The term crisis was intended to communicate a sense that a dispute is usually a tip-of-the-iceberg phenomenon, that is, a spontaneous and obvious expression of some deeper difficulty in the family. It was assumed that broadening an officer's perception of a family disturbance was a necessary first step to acquiring the skills for dealing more effectively with these events.

While the original study's results supported that assumption, in most police departments the term "family crisis" merely became a new and perhaps more professional way of saying "family fight." A namechange alone, therefore, is insufficient. The new name should reflect new knowledge and new understanding. If it does not, implementation of both training programs and organizational changes may be compromised.

In order to explain the importance of the term "family crisis intervention" as originally defined, two areas of human behavior which relate to this police function will be discussed. They are interpersonal conflict management and crisis intervention theory and practice.

CRISIS INTERVENTION

During the past three decades crisis intervention has occupied an increasingly important place in mental health applications. Lindemann (11), an early contribution to crisis theory, posited that early skillful and authoritative intervention in critical personal events could forestall the possibly more serious, long-term consequence of such events. The logic of this formulation was subsequently supported by others (1, 2, 4, 5, 7) mostly in settings that lent themselves to his approach, that is, in hospitals and in clinics.

But intervention approaches based upon this theory posed an enormous challenge to mental health institutional practices. Long accustomed to operating by requiring people to "come in" for help, professionals were, and continue to be, hard put to develop methods of intervening at times of crisis when people are more susceptible to being influenced by others (3, p. 13). A variety of efforts have been made by institutions to achieve some outreach capability, including twenty-four hour walk-in clinics, telephone hot lines, mobile crisis units and local storefront clinics. These methods, intended to reduce the time interval between the crisis event and "laying on the hands," have brought to light some inherent flaws. For one thing, crisis services were usually secondary to the more central concerns of the mental health enterprise, namely diagnosis, treatment and training. Crisis intervention as a preventive strategy received little more than peripheral attention. (This phenomenon is no different essentially than the feat of preventive medicine in the priority system of the medical profession). Indeed, a crisis became virtually indistinguishable from an acute psychiatric emergency. And so, just as ideas tend to conform to institutional constraints and practices, crisis intervention became only a new term and was tantamount to putting old wine into new bottles.

Early efforts to deliver crisis services surfaced other difficulties as well. Often, the use of the service was determined by the prior knowledge

or experience of the person in crisis, that is, by his recognition of need for the service or even by his knowledge of the service's existence. More important, perhaps, the methods employed rarely reached those who, by virtue of lack of education or impoverished circumstances, were unlikely to recognize their need and to reach out for help at the time of crisis. Further, since crisis services usually are a part of mental health facilities, they may not be positioned close enough to the site of a critical event to be of use to the victims. Finally, even when in crisis, many people are apprehensive about the implications of any psychiatric contact.

Those who have worked with the crisis concept have emphasized the importance of the *earliness* of the intervention in taking advantage of the openness of the person in crisis. However, the speed with which intervention can be accomplished is strongly influenced by how predictable the crisis was. As McGee (12) has suggested, crises fall on a continuum of predictability. There are those that can be seen coming, so to speak. They range from the normal developmental crisis to such events as a new job, a school examination or elective surgery. And then there are those crises precipitated by wholly unforeseen events such as natural disasters, serious accidents, or crimes. It would seem logical that crises that can be anticipated lend themselves to planning and that therefore earliness of intervention can be assured. But the unanticipated or sudden crisis event presents an extraordinary challenge. Since it cannot be predicted, how is it possible to plan for immediacy of intervention?

Leaving aside the answer to that question for the moment, let us consider the importance of authority. The perceived power of the care-giver has always been a secret weapon of the helping system. This phenomenon of power is even more important in the management of people in crisis—particularly those under the impact of a sudden, arbitrary and unanticipated crisis. The crisis has a chaotic effect; coping mechanisms are severely taxed and a sense of helplessness ensues. In a sense, the individual is, to a lesser or greater extent, so reduced in his ability to cope that his behavior may be regarded as regressed. Either actively or passively, he seeks help or direction. And, those in the environment who are perceived as powerful are apt to be seen as the source of order and stability in an otherwise suddenly choatic world.

For the surgical patient undergoing the crisis of a sudden change in body form or function, only the surgeon is seen as having almost magical powers to order, to restore, to facilitate adaptation. What he says, what he does, how he says it and how he does it may be endowed with significance far beyond the real. Similarly, seeking the helpful power of authority is extremely important for a person in a crisis-induced emotional state.

Recognizing the significance of authority provides a context for answering the question about how it is possible to plan for prompt intervention in all crises. Clearly it is not possible to plan for the sudden, unpredictable and arbitrary stressful event. But it is possible to enlist the participation of an existing service delivery system whose domain is crisis, whose mode is immediacy and whose very essence is authority. These three attributes are all essential for effective crisis intervention. The irony is that they should be absolutely unique to an agency not usually identified as part of the helping system... the police (10). Police officers usually are the first summoned when a sudden crisis occurs (appeal for help), they have a highly organized mobile response capability (immediacy), and they have the legal and symbolic power to "do something" (authority). The crises with which they commonly deal are natural disaster, crime and serious accident... events that can have shattering impact. These factors, when taken together, attest to the unique potentials of the police as a primary crisis intervention resource.

In effect then, the half-million police officers in this country constitute an untapped natural resource for the management of the unpredictable crisis event that so defies the mental health institional capability. Indeed, it can be argued that this group is already delivering crisis services, however

grudgingly and ineptly at the present time. This grossly inadequate service delivery is only the natural consequence of the dual role the police occupy in society. As the instruments of power, the police are encouraged to view themselves simplistically as "dirty workers" whose essential mission is to clean up or control the human flotsam and jetsam of society. At the same time, they have increasingly fallen heir to a vast array of helping functions, estimated to be between 80% and 90% of manhours.

The range of unpredictable crisis events that come within the purview of the police is almost infinite. Members of that service delivery system are positioned in time and place for an array of crisis intervention roles. The following typify the kinds of events that lend themselves to skillful crisis intervention as a preventive strategy by police officers:

1. *Crime victimization.* The victims of crimes, particularly those against the person, experience extraordinary stress reactions. A policeman trained in crisis intervention techniques can have the dual effect of helping the victim in stress while at the same time eliciting information necessary for the successful investigation of the crime.

2. *Natural disaster.* In this category are included such events as fire, flood, explosion, earthquake, tornado, etc. The suddenness and impact of the event leads to a "disaster syndrome." The dimensions of this syndrome and specific techniques for combatting it are essential knowledge for the police who must restore order after such an event.

3. *Notification.* A frequent police activity with little recognition by laymen, this involves informing the family or next of kin of the death or injury of a family member. In this circumstance the police officer himself both causes the crisis and can act as an agent in its resolution.

4. *Accident.* Ranging from vehicular homicides to falling objects, these events differ somewhat from the "disaster syndrome" in that the chaos is personal and exists in an otherwise ordered and intact environment.

5. *Psychotic reactions.* These reactions have profound effects upon others, particularly family members.

6. *Suicides and attempted suicides.* As with psychotic reactions, these occurrences profoundly affect others. Skillful intervention by police may offer significant preventive opportunities.

Even a cursory examination of these crises communicates the unique potentials for crisis intervention in the police service delivery system. Further, it is suggested that the kind of immediacy in time and place that can be achieved by the police cannot be achieved by any other element in the helping system. In fact, given institutional constraints, the preventive mental health objectives of crisis intervention theory are unlikely to be realized by existing mental health operations. Ultimately it may be more rational, and indeed more economic to utilize the police system for the achievement of the objectives of crisis intervention. It really remains for the mental health professions to acknowledge that fact and to develop means by which the police may be used in an outreach capacity. It will require that mental health professionals conceive of new ways of "giving knowledge away" to those who are not trained in mental health theory but who are in a position to be more effective than theorists. If there is a commitment to prevention in mental health, then there must be a challenge to develop means for utilizing the immediacy and authority of the police system.

INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

The management of interpersonal conflict is probably the most time-consuming aspect of the police function. Cumming (8) monitored 82 consecutive hours of telephone calls to the Syracuse (N.Y.) Police Department and found that almost twenty percent of them were for disputes and fights in public and private places and among family members, neighbors, and total strangers. The police departments of Dallas (Texas), Kansas City (Mo.), New York (N.Y.), and Cambridge (Mass.) report similarly high percentage of time

allocated to interpersonal conflict. Cumming concluded that although the "apprehension of law breakers may stand in the public mind as the crux of police work, most of a policeman's day is spent in more mundane matters such as . . . acting as an outside mediator in situations of conflict" (p. 170).

The word *mundane*, in this connection, has interesting implications. For one thing it is a reflection of the policeman's denigration of a dangerous and disagreeable function. For another, it reflects the television and detective-novel inspired public fantasy of what it is that occupies dramatic primacy in police work. However, the incredibly complex role of mediation is anything but mundane and the consequences of incompetent third party intervention are very serious; it can and often does contribute to violence rather than to pacification. A significant percentage of those police officers killed and injured in the line of duty were involved at the time in efforts to manage a human conflict. Both the dire effects on officers and the high homicide and assault rate among citizens may be traceable to the persistent neglect of the significance of the third party intervention role of the police.

The reluctance of both the public and the police to acknowledge the role of the police in conflict management is a costly misrepresentation of an important reality. More and more, the police, who are our most immediate representatives of a remote governmental authority, find it difficult to separate their duties in social regulation and public security from the day-to-day management of complex human problems. Conceptions of the police role which emphasize remoteness of authority by downgrading human services contribute to public disorder and insecurity, alienate the police from those they are charged with protecting, and, in a circular sense, negatively affect their crime control objectives. It can be reasoned that the goal of delivering human services can be regarded as an objective that, because of its profound effect upon public trust and cooperation, is equal with the objective of crime control.

The usual role of a policeman is one which leads naturally to his becoming involved as a third party in interpersonal conflicts. This function is one which can neither be readily delegated nor ignored. Both the urgency and destructive potential of interpersonal conflict requires the kind of timely and authoritatively lawful third party response capability that is absolutely unique to the police function.

Certainly it is no secret that when push comes to shove, the police enforce the political, economic and social views of the establishment. If the delivery of human services was acknowledged as being consistent with those views, policemen would be given the training and the encouragement necessary to deliver those services competently. Such training would serve not only to change potentially dangerous ways of reacting to a conflict, but also would result in a more satisfying job performance. Indeed, a recent study demonstrated that the performance of policemen trained in conflict management improved significantly as measured by traditional police criteria (14).

Furthermore, a general sense of security in a community is not only the product of a lower crime rate. There is mounting evidence that citizens feel secure when they are convinced that government is responsive to their needs. The policeman is both the most visible and the most immediately available extension of governmental authority. As a crucial service which communicates responsiveness, conflict management goes far toward generating a sense of security.

Many of these observations result from a number of years spent directing action research programs that have sought, among other things, to test the feasibility of training police for third party intervention in interpersonal conflict (3, 5). During the course of these studies in New York City, it was possible to collect data on more than 1,500 cases of police management of conflicts among people. However, it should be noted that because of the nature of the original study involving family conflicts and the nature of the subsequent study's setting, (low income housing projects) most of the data relate to family disputes. Nevertheless it

may be useful to touch briefly upon some of the findings.

Since training was a critical variable in these studies, a number of methods were used to assess training effects. Most striking was the finding that policemen, even when randomly selected, can learn and practice relevant interpersonal skills to affect their performance as conflict managers. What is more, the evaluation suggested that the changes in police behavior which are necessary for effective third party performance do not require a corresponding change in the attitudes and beliefs of the policeman. That is, despite changes in behavior our measures suggested that the changes occurred while attitudes remained constant.

It was our impression that the behavioral changes observed were related to the nature of the training. We call the training methods which we used "affective" and "experiential" methods. The methodology of such training differs considerably from the more traditional methods of the military-vocational training and from the academic model as well. In the military-vocational, instruction is along "how-to" lines and encourages the application of formulae to ensure job performance. In the academic, learning is highly abstract, verbal and passive; it rarely requires translation of knowledge into operational application. While the military-vocational admirably serves the purposes of mass troop movement or of assembly-line production, and while the academic model is ideally suited to contemplative and precise scholarship, neither can possibly serve the needs of a policeman who must make very rapid decisions in highly variable situations involving complex human interactions.

What then, given these needs, did our "affective" and "experiential' training program consist of? Most of the course content focused upon behavior within an actual social situation. The methods employed ranged from specifically prepared police social science information (communicated in a context which encouraged discussion) to real life simulations and video-taped role plays. A short period of intensive classroom training was followed by a period of field training over time. And the major thrust of the training was to encourage the kind of self-criticism which permits the practitioner to learn from his mistakes. Regularly scheduled case conferences were used which permitted the officers to continue the process of learning as they practiced in the field.

Perhaps it would be useful to take a closer look at the kinds of changes experiential training methods brought about in the officers in our studies. The following were among the training effects noted: 1) the officers were better able to regard both parties in conflict as contributing to the situation rather than to see the dispute as the responsibility of one "crazy person"; 2) the officers were able to maintain objectivity in the way they behaved as well as in the way they perceived the conflict; 3) the response toward the police of those in conflict was positive; 4) there was little evidence of the need to employ force; 5) there was absence of injuries to officers; 6) the officers more frequently employed techniques other than arrest and or court referral.

In one of our studies we attempted to determine whether conflict management training produced any measurable effects on the residents of a community (5). An independently conducted community attitude survey revealed that the residents of the housing projects in which officers had been trained in interpersonal conflict management evidenced a greater sense of security after one year than residents in two control projects. It should be emphasized that the sense of security did not appear related to reported crime. It was our impression that the improved quality of police services (i.e. more sensitive interpersonal behavior by the police) communicated to the residents a greater sense of responsiveness by the authorities upon whom they were dependent for their security and welfare.

Our studies to date have confirmed the President's Commission (6) finding that in most disputes "often the parties really want (the officers) only to 'do something' that will settle things" rather than make an arrest (p. 291). It appears to us

that people in conflict want an objective, skillful and benign authority who can successfully negotiate, mediate or arbitrate a constructive outcome. The passions of the moment require a "here and now" legally sanctioned intervention which no other agency of the helping system is capable of delivering. Indeed, it can be shown that the police are even summoned to offices of psychiatrists, to social and welfare agencies and to hospital clinics for the purpose of managing disputes in those settings.

Also, our experiences to date have convinced us that we have only just skimmed the surface phenomena in third party intervention. We are aware that much of a policeman's behavior results from a mix of understanding, insight, knowledge and intuition. But exactly what is the full range of approaches used by officers in dealing with disputes? In order to learn the answer to that question and others, we must build bridges between the practitioner in the field and the researcher in the laboratory. A recently designed approach which we plan to put into effect soon is an elaboration of a strategy suggested by R. E. Walton (13). The model proposed an active and intimate collaboration between police practitioners in the field and university based social scientists. The suggested collaboration would result in an instrument for knowledge-building for the police system and for social science as well. The opportunities for studying aspects of human aggression in an actual social situation are limitless.

Finally, society's capacity for coping with the kind of violence that originates in interpersonal conflict can be enhanced by the use of a previously unacknowledged human resource. In a departure from the traditional view of their function, it is suggested that the police have a unique potential for delivering a service which can alleviate or prevent violence. Indeed, it is suggested that given their symbolic and lawfully authoritative role, the police, if provided with skill, competence and institutional support, can better serve the need for third party intervention in human conflict ("here and now") than any other agency of the helping system. Important functions related to training, to research, and to knowledge-building have been defined for social science in the achievement of these kinds of service roles by the police.

For society to encourage excellence of police performance in conflict management is one way of removing the stigma which we place on conflict in human relations. As Deutsch (9) recently said, "... the issue is *not* how to eliminate or prevent conflict but rather how to make it productive or at least, how to prevent it from being destructive." In providing a clear sanction for the police to deliver this much needed third party intervention service, we are acknowledging that conflict is not only a realistic and inevitable part of relationships among people, but can also present us with inherently constructive opportunities. In addition, by legitimating a human need whose traditional closet status has been so costly in terms of human life and social disorder, we are expressing our concern for and respect of the individuals in need.

ORGANIZATIONAL & OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

AMBIVALENCE AND AMBIGUITY

An organization can undertake changes in its operations for any number of reasons. Often the implicit and explicit reasons underlying the effort to change are closely related to the success or failure of the operation. Indeed, perhaps even more than the "nuts and bolts" of implementation, it is the underlying commitment that determines the outcome of organizational change. It is useless if not self-defeating, to pretend that ambivalence is not a factor inherent in change efforts. But failure to recognize and confront this ambivalence results in policies that are ultimately destructive to the success of an effort to change. It may be useful, therefore, to identify some of the sources of policy-making ambivalence that have subtle and corrosive effects upon the implementation of the family crisis concept by police organizations.

The social work myth. Even the most well-intentioned and best informed police executive may have difficulty in including helping services as an important function for a policeman. There somehow remains a residue of conviction that helping people is essentially a social work function that is discrete from the "real" work of the police. This attitude, while historically understandable, is associated with the belief that any helping function requiring the use of interpersonal skills diminishes the masculine authority image of the police. If this feeling of ambivalence exists in a police executive, it can wreak havoc with policy decisions and with administrative arrangements. It can result in him giving double messages and otherwise conveying his uncertainty to his subordinates, which can effectively subvert the most efficiently designed plan.

Before instituting a family crisis component, the police executive would be well-advised to expect this subtle form of unintentional subversion on the part of other policemen and deal with it openly. There is sufficient evidence by now that family crisis intervention *is* police work and not social work. Police have been doing the job grudgingly (and in most cases ineptly) to their own disadvantage, as police homicides and assaults will attest. Acknowledgement of the function does not make it social work; training for the function does not make it social work; and, organizational restructuring does not make it social work.

It must be understood that the family crisis approach to police training does not in any way alter the basic identity of the police. Instead, its major objective, as established by research, is for family crisis intervention to enable the policeman to do his job with greater effectiveness, with greater personal safety and with greater personal satisfaction. Unless that issue is clearly understood, successful implementation is endangered.

The community relations myth. In most cases the term community relations is a euphemism for public relations. Quite commonly, police officials regard a concept like family crisis primarily in terms of its value in changing the public's perceptions of the police in a positive direction. That is, it is seen as a concept which would appeal to the community in general and to "do-gooders-who-do-not-understand-real-police work anyway" in particular. If this motivation is the primary one for instituting a family crisis program, then the pro-

gram can be expected to flounder. What is more, a program which is merely a short-term commitment to achieve a questionable public relations payoff contributes not only to cynicism within the police, but also to cynicism of the general public.

Community sophistication about public relations gimickry is now at a point where even subtle expressions of it are quickly detected. More than that, the ambivalent policy-maker whose primary concern is to sell the public fails to grasp a vital reality—to mount a program essentially to improve image is to condemn it to failure. The image of any organization, and particularly that of a helping agency, is defined by the quality of functions performed; it is measured by the day-to-day activities of each of its practitioners. No amount of verbal game playing can convince a person that the actions he perceives are other than they appear. As with the "social work myth," any vestige of the "community-relations myth" as a source of ambivalent feelings about family crisis intervention, dooms it to failure.

The funding game. Society has recently begun to appreciate more fully the importance of law enforcement, and has become increasingly generous in supporting its efforts to upgrade itself. When increased public support first materialized, almost any reasonably designed "experiment" or "demonstration" program was looked upon favorably. Programs were usually undertaken on a trial basis using funds that were "added on" to existing budgets. This "soft-money" approach was particularly well-suited to organizational ambivalence in program policy-making. Often, without awareness, the decision to implement a new approach was taken without reallocating any existing budget dollars, thus denying any commitment or permanence to a new program.

Given experience and research to date, the work "experiment" is no longer justified with respect to the significance of family crisis as a viable policing strategy. Organizational policy makers may still require add-on funds to launch such a program but any planning should acknowledge the need for reallocation of existing funds to ensure the long-term continuation of the change. Failure to do this is yet another expression of the subtle feelings of ambivalence which communicate themselves throughout the organization and are certain to be a factor leading to failure of the change.

Recommendations. The foregoing discussion was not intended to be comprehensive . . . only illustrative. It has only attempted to touch upon some of the subtle and hidden factors that may be at work when a decision is made to implement a new approach in a time-honored traditional system. Yet, unless these factors are understood, articulated and confronted, their influence in determining outcome is quite predictable. To undertake to implement family crisis as a police function requires, as a first step, recognition that ambivalence is a natural consequence of change in any organization. Inevitably, ambivalence leads to ambiguity which ultimately defeats the change effort.

The following recommendations may be helpful in countering the destructive potential of ambivalence:

1) The executive decision to "go" with family crisis, whether derived unilaterally by the Chief or by him in concert with his executive staff, must be reinforced by direct efforts to surface the sources of ambivalence. This means that a chief cannot just assign responsibility for this new program to a subordinate staff member and then treat the strategy as if it was the sole responsibility of that individual. Instead, we suggest that the Chief hold executive group meetings with responsible staff on a regularly scheduled basis in order to tease out and confront those ambivalences that figure prominently in the organization. This paradoxically simple yet difficult exercise has a multiple payoff. It reinforces executive commitment and communicates readiness and willingness to confront any organizational ambivalence. Further it serves to reduce the isolation of responsible staff and reassures such staff that the commitment to this program is deep and not merely the product of executive whim.

2) Whatever the ultimate operational design might entail, it must have clearly defined incentives and rewards. Traditional rewards in police organizations are geared almost entirely to functions that constitute the smallest proportion of man-hours. For example, promotion to detective (as a reward) may be based on a particularly dramatic holdup arrest. This serves to reinforce the policeman's conviction that rewards are most likely to be related to crime-control functions. Means must be found to reward those myriad functions which require as high a degree of competence as do family crisis intervention techniques. One of the most telling statements of unequivocal commitment to an organizational change is through a reordering of reward priorities. Incentives and rewards can serve most effectively to reduce organizational ambivalence and its resultant ambiguity.

MODELS OF IMPLEMENTATION

The execution of any idea requires a model which contains all of the important elements of the concept and which can serve as the means for achieving the desired goal. Given the general structure of police organizations, three models will be discussed; the choice of a specific model, however, will depend upon the nature of each situation.

Generalist-Specialist Model. This was the model used in the original family crisis demonstration project. In essence, a selected group of general patrol officers processed all family disturbance calls in a specified area. These officers operated in uniform and on all tours of duty; when not engaged in the management of a family disturbance, they provided general patrol services in an assigned sector. This model has the following advantages:

1) Professional identity of the officer is preserved. In the eyes of his colleagues and of the public the officer charged with family crisis responsibilities is still a "real cop."

2) In a large organization, it appears to be an efficient way of delivering a needed service without sacrificing general uniformed patrol coverage.

3) It has implications for other generalist-specialist roles (e.g., youth, rescue, etc.) in which each officer has a specialized area of expertise. It avoids the need for each patrolman to be all things to all people.

4) It enhances the morale of patrolmen in that their area of special expertise is respected by both their colleagues and the public. Further, it defines a specific function for the exercise of professional discretion while maintaining general patrol capability.

5) It can take advantage of natural or latent talents of patrolmen.

Generalist Model. An alternate model, more suitable to small organizations is for all patrol personnel to be given training in family crisis theory and practice. This was the model employed in the housing study; as the research findings indicate, it can be useful as a strategy. The advantages of this model are:

1) It is suitable for small organizations that turn out too few men to have the luxury of a generalist-specialist on each tour.

2) It ensures involvement of all personnel in acquiring special knowledge.

3) While the quality of service delivered will show greater variance than it would with selected generalist-specialists, it will tend to maximize the impact on the department itself and on the public.

4) It minimizes the tendency to delegate all family intervention functions to a small unit; it reinforces family crisis as the ongoing responsibility of all patrol personnel.

Specialist Model. In contrast to the preceding models, we have not had any experience with the specialist model. However, our impressions gained in studying police operations and theory suggest that this may be the least desirable model. Indeed, assigning exclusive specialization for family intervention to selected officers who have no general patrol responsibilities appears to have few, if any, redeeming virtues. Therefore, the following disadvantages should be weighed before proceeding with this model:

1) This is the model through which organiza-

tional ambivalence is most likely to be expressed. The delivery of the service becomes the exclusive responsibility of the specialist and satisfies only the policy decision with no reference to the broader operating responsibilities of the organization.

2) It tends to create two classes of citizenship within the organization; those who do "real" police work and those who do social work. This encourages the public to think of the police as being either "bad guys" or as being "good guys;" that is, those who are aggressive enforcers and those who are benevolent authorities.

3) It is ultimately destructive to morale and hence destructive to the function of the specialist. The specialist feels alienated from his colleagues and confused in his identity as a policeman if his functions are restricted to a single dimension of service. Consider, for example, the derisive designation of "kiddie cop" for juvenile specialists in many departments.

TRAINING

It must be clear by now that preparing policemen to deliver a highly complex human service requires unusual training for specific skills. Indeed, it requires a kind of training that is a synthesis of that which is traditional in police work and that which is found in fields which concentrate exclusively on human services. Once again, there are different training models that must be considered.

Intensive Training. In police organizations, the characteristic way of preparing personnel with specific skills is to run them through a brief and intensive training program. The methods of instruction are usually of a "how-to" nature, largely by lecture augmented by audio-visual aids. At the conclusion of the training experience, the patrolman returns to the field. There is usually little if any follow-up evaluation and even less likelihood of ongoing training in the field.

Field Training. Usually unsystematic, fragmented and methodologically questionable, field training can be found to range from the roll call exercise to informal "rap" sessions. It is this form of training that breeds the greatest cynicism since it comes across as "lip service" or "going-through-the-motions." This approach is most likely to communicate organizational ambivalence about the training itself, not to speak of the lack of commitment to the content of the training.

Combined Intensive and Field Training. This model, if properly conceived and employed, holds the greatest promise for human service functions. The brief and intensive training must be carefully designed to be consistent in content with the ultimate objectives of the program. But even more important, the intensive training should be regarded as *orientative* rather than conclusive. It should be the foundation upon which training in the field will build. Naturally, the methods employed in that training should also set the tone and prepare the officer for the kind of methods to be used in the field. It is unlikely, for example, that the exclusively lecture audio-visual format will be feasible in the field.

At the conclusion of the brief intensive and orientative training, it is essential that there be follow-up in the field. It is here that the bulk of training occurs, in the human service professions ... that is, in "learning-by-doing." In medicine the basic orientation afforded by the medical school is followed by years of continuous training in the clinic and hospital geared to practice. The methods used are essentially those of case study and self-critical analysis of practical applications of theory. If field training is possible in the kind of life and death emergency-oriented field that medicine represents, it is equally possible and necessary as an adjunct to the basic training of policemen.

A final word on training. Given the present transitional state of police training, and given its movement to a broader model than the traditional military-vocational one, few police organizations have the in-house capability to conceptualize or implement the kind of training that successful family crisis intervention entails. Hence, as much assistance as possible must be obtained from outside resources, that is, from the academic and professional communities. While it is true that

most previous efforts at collaboration have been found wanting, it is also clear from recent developments that committed police leadership can inspire successful input from such outside resources.

RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER AGENCIES

A critical variable in making family crisis intervention a successful strategy is the establishment of working relationships between the police and other agencies of the helping system. However, given the fact that many of these agencies are already overburdened, it would be foolhardy to have unreasonable expectations of their ability to be of service. In order to ensure maximum participation though, agency representatives should be included as part of planning very early.

It should be noted that because a policeman is involved in a crisis when emotions are at their height, and is perceived as someone with authority, he may be in the best possible position to effect a constructive outcome. Because of this, a skilled policeman may be preferable to a community agency. But there will be cases which require services beyond the ability of the officer. In those instances, resources should be available and responsive. With proper training and judicious referring, these agencies can be effective backups. It is vital that the police executive ensure interagency liaison from the outset so that the necessary resources will be available.

Some final words are in order with respect to police family crisis intervention. This document has only touched upon some of the issues relevant to the implementation of such a program by police organizations. Acknowledgement of the highly complex functions performed by the police is inherent in the decision to develop such a program. It has been the position of this monograph that the questions of social regulation and public security are inseparable from the day-to-day management of complex human problems. The police are our most immediate representatives of a remote governmental authority. Conceptions of their role that reinforce remoteness contribute to public insecurity, alienate the police from those they are supposed to protect and, in a circular sense, negatively affect the objective of crime control. If citizens are to cooperate in the process of crime control they must trust the police. Such trust is engendered by the competent delivery of those human services that occupy so much of a policeman's time. It can be said, therefore, that the delivery of services like family crisis has parity with crime control as an objective of police organizations.

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