

## DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 111 733

SO 008 579

AUTHOR O'Neil, Daniel J.; Wagner, J. Richard  
TITLE Teaching Canadian Politics at American Universities:  
Some Recommendations.  
PUB DATE May 75  
NOTE 36p.; Paper presented at the Western Social Science  
Association meeting (Denver, Colorado, May 1975).  
EDRS PRICE MF-\$0.76 HC-\$1.95 Plus Postage  
DESCRIPTORS College Instruction; \*Comparative Analysis; Foreign  
Relations; Higher Education; Policy Formation;  
\*Political Science; \*Politics; Relevance (Education);  
\*Social Sciences; \*Teaching Techniques  
IDENTIFIERS \*Canada; Comparative Political Systems

## ABSTRACT

The introduction and study of Canadian political systems are recommended as a model for use in political science courses at American universities. In the past, recognition of the worth of Canadian studies has been minimal. New and interesting topical areas such as Canadian nationalism, missionary activities, energy resource problems, and pollution have redirected the emphasis on Canadian studies. Four major areas of Canadian studies are examined which bear directly on important topics of interest to American political scientists: nation building, policies, institutions, and international relations. A brief historical narrative of each area is included, along with techniques for incorporating Canadian studies. (Author/JR)

\*\*\*\*\*  
\* Documents acquired by ERIC include many informal unpublished \*  
\* materials not available from other sources. ERIC makes every effort \*  
\* to obtain the best copy available. nevertheless, items of marginal \*  
\* reproducibility are often encountered and this affects the quality \*  
\* of the microfiche and hardcopy reproductions ERIC makes available \*  
\* via the ERIC Document Reproduction Service (EDRS). EDRS is not \*  
\* responsible for the quality of the original document. Reproductions \*  
\* supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made from the original. \*  
\*\*\*\*\*

ED1111733

TEACHING CANADIAN POLITICS AT AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES:  
SOME RECOMMENDATIONS

by

Daniel J. O'Neil and J. Richard Wagner  
University of Arizona

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,  
EDUCATION & WELFARE  
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF  
EDUCATION

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY.

SP008579

Interesting, challenging, intellectually exciting and professionally rewarding are words normally not associated with the study of Canada. Exempting the border states and study centers at Duke and Johns Hopkins, most American academicians have ignored Canada. A "vast, almost empty space where life is quieter"<sup>1</sup> than in the United States may appear unglamorous, dull, almost backward to Americans enamored of Zaire, Bangladesh and Cuba. Recognition of the worth of Canadian studies has, in the past, been minimal and the conventional lament of "missionaries" in the United States has been heard often. Canadian studies advocates almost openly wish for a revolution, major confrontation or nationalization of American property as a device to accord their specialty the prestige that Vietnam, the Congo and Cuba have afforded Asian, African and Latin American scholars.

Canadian nationalism, "missionary" activities, energy resource problems and pollution have made Canadian studies as fresh as today's New York Times. The classroom instructor, at the college and university level, can capitalize on that interest to utilize Canada in his examples. Yesterday's self-pity has no more vitality than the stodgy pages of an old Saturday Evening Post. Today's

Canadian studies scholar needs to furnish his disciplinary colleagues - whether in sociology, literature or political science - with ideas and approaches that mesh the rising interest in Canada with traditional approaches and concerns in a field. Using Canada as a model or case study affords understanding and a base for potential growth.

Political Scientists, teaching American government, comparative politics, institutional processes and policies, or international relations, can use Canada as a testing laboratory for hypotheses. No matter how the field is divided, Canadian experiences can be instructive and relevant. While suggestions may not always be fresh and untried, they should offer insights and interpretations which can make Canada meaningful for most courses in political science.

Our principle purpose is to raise questions, offer suggestions and to specify areas of inquiry where the study of Canada bears directly on important topics of interest to political scientists. Our listings are not exhaustive, but illustrative. Political science, of course, is not the study of current events. History, the discipline from which political science evolved, must not be ignored. We believe the surest way to understand the future and make empirically valid generalizations is to have knowledge about similar phenomena in the past. We also subscribe to the comparative approach. Societies and institutions are best understood in relation to one another. Nation-building, policies, institutions and international relations are areas we have selected for attention.

A. Nation-building

A major problem confronting many political systems, especially those of the Third World- is nation-building.<sup>2</sup> What can a political system do to inculcate a sense of shared nationality in people who often lack a common history, religion, and language? How is a nation to be constructed out of an artificially created geographic entity? Systems as different as Nigeria, Israel, and India have addressed this question. While most of the nation-building systems examined in comparative politics courses focus on the Third World, Canada offers an example of a 20th century, affluent, developed, Western nation that has grappled with this problem and has demonstrated some degree of success in nation-building despite the existence of cultural cleavage not unlike that of many developing nations. Canada's achievement, with minimal coercion and violence, has afforded considerable respect for sub-cultures. The French fact remains. Thus the Canadian success story as well as its pattern of operation might serve as a model for others.

Canada has attempted the Herculean feat of reconciling nation-building with tolerance for diversity. Thus Laurier, the first French Prime Minister of Canada, offered a famous analogy:

Below the island of Montreal the water that comes from the north, from the Ottawa, unites with the waters that come from the western lakes, but united they do not mix. There they run, parallel, separate, and distinguishable and yet are one stream, flowing within the same banks; the mighty St. Lawrence rolling on toward the sea ... as perfect image of our nation.<sup>3</sup>

The Canadian appeal to a mosaic, a salad bowl pattern, perhaps best understood as the co-existence of the mosaic and melting-pot, allows comparisons with the more monolithic American approach. Does the mosaic really operate or is it a symbolic gesture to appease the thirty percent of the population which is French? Is the mosaic an ideal or just a rationalization of the unavoidable? Has Canada been forced to accommodate unassimilated Quebec thereby providing a precedent for other non-English immigrants? Can the mosaic pattern be reconciled with a common nationality or does it place too great a strain on the political system? Do defenders of the mosaic arrangement deduce too much from the Swiss model?

Nation-building also involves a search for symbols of nationality.<sup>4</sup> Every society attempts to create symbols of affection and unity but the process is especially crucial for the so-called new nations. Yet, history often deters unity. Different segments of the population entertain different and often conflicting interpretations of the past. German Catholics and Protestants view the exploits of Luther differently. French leftists and rightists react dissimilarly to the Paris Commune. The Battle of the Boyne possesses a different meaning for Ulster Orangemen than Greenmen. Marriott examines this problem in India where Moslems and Hindus have conflicting interpretations of the past. Each community cites its victories at the expense of the other.<sup>5</sup> Consequently the Indian government attempted to create a secular state and utilized ritual and paraphernalia associated with the non-controversial Buddhist realm.

Canada has searched for symbols that aid in addressing the

identity problem and that encourage a sense of national unity.<sup>6</sup>

There is, however, a potential for explosion. Quebec's memory of the Conquest, Riel, the Manitoba school question, wartime conscription, etc., are different than English Canada's recollection.<sup>7</sup>

The 1960's controversies over the two nations concept, the new flag, and the national anthem attest to the survival of the differences. On the other hand, Canada seems to have found viable unifying symbols. Some institutions transcend cultural division and enjoy high levels of legitimacy - the parliament, the maple leaf, and some historical occurrences as the War of 1812. All Canadians share a pride in contrasting their society with the United States. George Woodcock writes:

The Canadian is concerned about his identity. As the lucky citizen of a middle power which has never started a war of its own accord, has never oppressed another people, and has won its independence at the cost of three tiny rebellions, he has few glorious events around which to build his sense of nationhood. What he does have is precisely his collective sense of difference from the Americans. Canada came into existence because a group of British colonies did not wish to be subjected to the "Caesarism" that is endemic in the American political system. The people of these colonies were not impressed by the megalomania of the United States, they contrived - though hopelessly outnumbered - to avoid being swallowed up by the American colossus, and their attitude had the curious effect of converting the Yankees who settled among them into loyal if not enthusiastic British subjects.

As a political being, the Canadian has remained markedly different from the American, experimenting with socialism and social credit, favouring a parliamentary style of government which avoids the dangers of disguised dictatorship implicit in the American institution of the presidency, and developing an individual form of confederation which is even now in the process of evolution. Canadians are less inclined to the emotional and cruel extremes of politics than Americans; on the other hand, they sustain more consistent trends of radicalism. Such comparisons between Canada and the United States are inevitable, and Canadians spend much of their time making them, for they are daily conscious of living between a powerful and politically dangerous neighbor to the south and a bleak wilderness to the north. They draw a satisfaction which sometimes verges on smugness from being somewhat more tolerant and more independent than Americans.<sup>8</sup>

Fear of absorption by the United States has not been the sole factor in uniting the two cultures.

Canada appears to have utilized what Nordlinger calls concessionalism.<sup>9</sup> This involves generous symbolic and financial concessions by the dominant culture to the minority. This policy, successfully utilized, has minimized cultural conflict in such countries as Switzerland and Norway.<sup>10</sup> Concessional implementation raises some interesting questions for those who take this approach. What prerequisites are necessary to achieve majority acquiescence in concessionalism? What limitations are imposed on the ruling elite before reaction and nativism are encouraged



in the dominant group? Does concessionism satisfy the minority or simply whet its appetite for more? Is concessionism an approach that only the more affluent society can afford? These questions are especially relevant to the American since his government seems increasingly committed to cultural concessionism.

Canada has pioneered in concessionism. With the Quebec Act of 1774, the British made religious, cultural, and legal concessions to the conquered French. Edmund Burke condemned the government for the discrepancy between its Canadian and Irish policies. British Catholics had to wait over 50 years for the same religious freedom enjoyed by the defeated French. The act of 1841, unifying Upper and Lower Canada with government functioning on the principle of concurrent majorities in the French and English sections, was a great concession by the majority to the minority. Since Confederation the French have reaped numerous concessional advantages. Quebec has often been treated as a "province unlike the others." With Laurier's election there was clear acceptance of a French-Canadian as Prime Minister. Virtually every Prime Minister has depended upon a lieutenant of the opposite culture. Macdonald had Cartier, Laurier had Fielding, King had LaPoint, St. Laurent had Howe, etc. Diefenbaker was severely criticized for this omission as well as his basic insensitivity to French culture. The Liberal Party, either by design or accident, has rotated the party leadership between the cultures. Both the Liberals and the Progressive Conservatives, when in power, have attempted to balance the cabinet ethnically. Both the speakership of the House and the office of the Governor-General now rotate between



the cultures. The economic concessions demanded and gotten by Jean Lesage, Prime Minister of Quebec, probably best illustrate the economic workings of concessionism.<sup>11</sup> Important concessions followed the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism's report, forcing the federal government, as through the Official Languages Act, to recognize more adequately French Canada as a cultural instead of a geographic concept.<sup>12</sup> Thereafter, new attempts were made to safeguard the French, through media, education and government. Imbalance in the civil service was a prime area for reform.

A fruitful comparison might contrast the techniques employed to pacify Quebec with those used to reconcile the defeated American South. The responses of both vanquished groups to these techniques might be studied. Both Southern and French sub-cultures perceived themselves as different from the rest of the country. Both were conquered, both were conservative, traditional, deeply religious, and less developed. The British and later the Canadian government used concessionism, deferring to the traditional French leadership and the Catholic Church. Quebec enjoyed considerable autonomy. As a consequence, the French created a unified, cultural entity and romanticized their North American deviation. They glorified their way of life, its Catholicism, soil bound agriculture, and classical education. A similar story unfolds with the defeated American South. With the Compromise of 1877, the South secured national acquiescence for its sphere of autonomy.<sup>13</sup> The traditional leaders acquired control of government with the freedom to address the race problem

in a Southern manner. Both generous economic concessions and cabinet representation were accorded the South. Politically the region solidified within the Democratic Party and utilized its Congressional influence to preserve its sphere of autonomy well into the second half of the 20th century. Culturally, utilizing the "Gone With the Wind" myth, the past was romanticized.<sup>14</sup> A South of refinement, agriculture, and classical education was superior to the materialism, industry and grossness of the North. The two defeated regions thus appear to have reaped similar concessions and to have created similar defensive mythologies.

Curiously, nation-building often involves the search for a foreign model of emulation. Usually this represents an elitist exercise having but nominal impact on the masses. Also different models are often projected by different elites. But why one model rather than another? Why the shifting popularity of respective models? When is there a rejection of foreign models and recognition of national accomplishments? Is there a pattern? Mexican elites, for example, at different times experimented with Spanish, American, and French models. Only after the 1910 Revolution did the Mexican model emerge.<sup>15</sup> A period of cultural regeneration followed which encouraged a new interest in Mexico and her Indian heritage. First the artists, later the politicians, realized that Mexico need not follow others but itself had something unique to contribute to the world. Mexicans later contended that Mexico possessed an indigenous revolution, a rich culture, a viable political system, and an impressive economic growth rate. The lesson was clear, let others look to Mexico for a model!

Canada also provides an elite's search for a model of emulation. Initially, the model seemed to be the United Kingdom. United Empire Loyalists were especially deferential to the British Constitution, the Monarchy, and the other symbols of Empire.<sup>16</sup> Later the model for many Canadians became the expanding, developing, affluent United States. Some, like Goldwin Smith, even advocated annexation. Recently some intellectuals have suggested the Scandinavian model, emphasizing its cold war neutrality and expanded commitment to the welfare state. Now, however, foreign models seem less attractive and the existing Canadian system appears more attractive. A new pride, a turning inward, a self-reliance and a realization that Canada has much to offer to the world has evolved.

Finally, Canada offers interesting opportunities for examining the relationship of religion to nation-building. Political scientists have only reluctantly studied religion and have produced nothing comparable to the monumental works of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim in sociology or R.H. Tawney and Ernst Troeltsch in history.<sup>17</sup> Yet religion is a better indicator of voting behavior than class in many societies of Western Europe.<sup>18</sup> Additionally, numerous international conflicts (Northern Ireland, Nigeria-Biafra, Ethiopia-Eritrea, India-Pakistan) are interpreted, at least by the participants, as essentially religious. Sociologists have addressed the question of religion and development, political scientists cannot lag long behind.

There are vital questions relating religion to nation-building, given the Marxist rejection of religiosity, which

especially interest pluralistic Third World countries. Is secularism necessary for successful nation-building in a pluralistic society? That is, can transcending nationalism develop only after religion ceases to be vital to the individual? Or can religion collaborate in the work of nation-building?<sup>19</sup> Or is the nature of the religion the critical variable? To what degree can the political scientist with his secular commitment and belief in the legitimacy of class politics really penetrate this question?

Canada is important in examining the role of religion in nation-building because of the religious diversity and the importance assigned to it by Canadians.<sup>20</sup> Some countries in Christendom are religiously pluralistic, but more frequently one sees religious homogeneity - Spain, France, Scandinavia, Italy, Columbia, etc. Here the nominal believer is pitted against the believer rather than sect against sect. Canada, however, presents a religious mosaic with all currents of Christianity present. Protestant, French Catholic, English Catholic, Uniate, and Orthodox communities co-exist. These communities survive within the same political system and with similar financial resources available. The possibility of a fairer comparative analysis than that involving religious communities in different political systems exists. These religious divisions have been important in the voting behavior as well as the party identification of Canadians. Historically, both English and French have used religion to define their cultural identity. After the conquest the Church became particularly important to the French. Catholicism was intertwined with nationalism. A pattern similar to that in

Ireland, Poland, Greece, and perhaps Scotland emerged. Conquered peoples intensified their religiosity in the face of the heretical conqueror. For the Church, in these cultures, a myth of resistance and persecution combined with a policy of moderation and collaboration developed. Rejection of the Church implied secularization and a loss of nationality.

#### B. Policies

Canada is a rich laboratory for persons interested in a policy approach to the study of political science. Without exhausting the field, three areas of policy will be examined which offer numerous comparative opportunities -- immigration, corruption, and small nation survival.

The topical immigration question has explosive potential for domestic American politics. American immigration authorities estimate that four to twelve million illegal immigrants are in the United States. Over 800,000 new illegal entrants were apprehended last year and it is estimated that one to four times that number went unapprehended. The experience of the American past seems irrelevant to the present large Spanish-American migration.<sup>21</sup> The late 19th, early 20th century European immigrants, coming individually, were motivated to assimilate. They were separated by an ocean from the mother country. White, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant cultural self-confidence and massive economic expansion were at their zenith. Although some nativism certainly existed, most Americans viewed the newcomers as assets. The present immigrants, in contrast, arrive at a time of WASP

identity crisis, a commitment to zero population growth, fiscal austerity, and increasing unemployment. Most come from Mexico and move into areas having large Spanish speaking ghettos. Government deference to ethnicity and many rewards based on ethnic credentials diminish past pressures toward assimilation. A continuation of this Spanish-American migration, combined with WASP zero population growth, could present the United States with an unprecedented and far different cultural mix. Canada, with its mosaic ideal, and its experience with an unassimilated linguistic and cultural group might serve as a more adequate model for American future action than the American past. Additionally, the experience of such European nations as Britain, France, and Switzerland might be relevant. The politics of immigration might be increasingly important to both domestic and international affairs.

A second topical policy question involves the politics of corruption.<sup>22</sup> Corruption seems an unusually acute problem in the Third World with their limited resources and concern for economic and political development. Perhaps there has been a tendency to apply an alien norm to Third World performance. Some contend that "corruption" often performs an important function in contributing to legitimization and systemic stability.<sup>23</sup>

Now, for example, big city machine politics, considered corrupt by progressives, are seen as acculturating the immigrants to American life. The political scientist is therefore confronted with some distinctive questions. What exactly is corruption? What role does it perform in the life of the polity? Is it inevitable? What is the relationship of corruption to political culture, institutionalization, and developmental levels?

Canada is a democratic, parliamentary system with a culturally mixed citizenry, a frontier tradition, and high levels of affluence. Canada has also had to address the question of corruption. Numerous Quebec scandals, especially under Maurice Duplessis; the 1873 Canadian Pacific Railway morass; the 1915-16 War Profiteering scandals; the Customs Department affair of 1926; The Beauharnois Power Company "contributions"; and the indiscretions of the Pearson period - including the Munsinger affair - are but a few of the cases available for study.<sup>24</sup> Canada provides the possibility of examining the opportunities for and the deterrents to corruption in a parliamentary-federal system. These may then be placed in a comparative perspective.

A third policy area involves small nation cultural survival in the face of super-power pressure for standardization. Are the small nations destined to cultural extinction? Is "development" just another name for conformity? What tools of resistance are available to small nations? The Canadian experience is valuable given Canada's position as a predominantly English speaking nation of 22 million people located next to the United States. Thus Canadians have been concerned with defining Canadian culture in contrast to the American variety.<sup>25</sup> They have attempted to demonstrate that Canadian artists, novelists, and poets are different from their American counterparts, interested in the cultural mosaic, existing frontiers and the solitude of the Arctic. There has been concern with the impact of American media and government support accorded Canadian competitors, as the



Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. Critics have bemoaned the disproportionate numbers of American academicians in Canadian Universities as well as the flood of American textbooks.

Herbert Spiro has introduced the concept of "style" to the study of comparative politics.<sup>26</sup> Different types of political systems have different political cultures with characteristically different orientations in policy-making. Such social scientists as Gad Horowitz, Seymour M. Lipset and Kenneth McRae have attempted to account for the differences in Canadian and American styles.<sup>27</sup> Horowitz notes a greater tolerance for diversity and a higher level of moderation in Canadian than in American policy-making. Canada never experienced a McCarthy reaction to the cold war nor a hysterical crusade against governmental intervention in the economy. Building on Louis Hartz, Horowitz attributes this tolerance in Canada to the existence of the full European ideological spectrum. This contrasts with American dogmatization of the single Lockean liberal tradition. Empire Loyalists provided Canada with a Tory tradition that would rival the later liberal tradition. The Tories would stress the importance of the organic community in contrast to the liberal stress on atomized competition. Given the early ideological diversity, the failure to "establish" liberalism, and the Tory emphasis on organic community, it was quite possible for an indigenous socialist tradition to develop. Canada would not become a one myth nation, hence the higher level of moderation and tolerance.

Both Lipset and McRae are concerned with the contrast between Canada and the United States. Both emphasize the political

origin of each state. Each observes that Canada, unlike the United States, has a counter-revolutionary tradition. The Loyalists, defeated in the southern colonies, re-established themselves in Canada. They had tremendous respect for constitutionalism, law and compromise. They rejected appeals to force as American. There was no revolutionary legitimization of a resort to force. Consequently, the Canadian and American approaches to the frontier and to the Indian were quite different. Lipset especially stresses the importance of Canadian reaction to the United States in the development of a Canadian style.

Canada had to be constantly on its guard against the expansionist tendencies of the United States. It could not leave its frontier communities unprotected, or autonomous. Law and order in the form of the centrally controlled North West Mounted Police moved into frontier settlements along with the settlers. This contributed to the establishment of a great tradition of respect for the institutions of law and order on the Canadian as compared to the American frontier. At the same time, frontier egalitarianism and individualism were played down in Canada because they were linked to American values and might conceivably undermine national integrity ...<sup>28</sup>

The Horowitz, Lipset, and McRae hypothesis suggests that the political science instructor might comparatively explore political development in terms of the nature of national political origin. The key to the style of national politics might relate

to the origin of the nation-building process. History might be far more important than political scientists have been willing to concede. Canada's origin might be profitably contrasted with that of such systems as the American, Spanish, German and Mexican. Subsequent political development in systems having a revolutionary origin might be contrasted with the development of such counter-revolutionary states as Canada, Britain, and Sweden. Deference to a myth of revolutionary origin may demand a costly, violent, price.

### C. Institutions

Numerous social scientists have addressed the question of democratic institutionalization.<sup>29</sup> Why the dearth of viable democratic systems when democracy seems the ideal of so many? What are the economic, cultural, historical prerequisites for democratic success? How important is cultural, historical and social congruency in supporting democratic political structures? How vital is the load factor? Is democracy conducive to divisiveness and hence a luxury for new nations concerned with nation-building and development? The Canadian case is especially appropriate to this study. Canada is one of the few viable, enduring, democratic systems. Considered relatively, it has provided maximal individual freedom, minority protection, and institutions allowing genuine participation.<sup>30</sup> Numerous immigrants from non-democratic cultures have been successfully absorbed. Hence Canada offers the opportunity for testing some of the hypotheses that were deduced largely from the Anglo-American, Northern European experience.

Canadian federalism should also prove of interest to the political scientist.<sup>31</sup> While numerous political systems are theoretically federal, few operate in a federal manner. Discrepancy abounds between constitutional theory and actual practice. Both Mexico and the U.S.S.R., for example, are constitutionally federal, but actually unitary. Why the popularity of federalism in theory but the failure in practice? Why have some succeeded and others failed? Is there a historical, cultural, social pattern of success? Is it perhaps offered at the constitution building stage to appease fearful minorities, but subverted later out of political or economic necessity? Can federalism be reconciled to massive central planning to meet emergency needs in the areas of population, ecology and limited resources? The Canadian system again is relevant as a rare, viable, federal system over one hundred years old. The Canadian federal arrangement represented an attempt to unite two peoples who thought of themselves as different. There was little initial enthusiasm for the scheme and many predicted a short life. The British North American Act of 1867 offered a division of provincial and federal power with the central government preponderant. This model was influenced by the American civil war and states rights squabbling. British judicial decisions later transformed the initial understanding. Despite this change, the federal system has worked. Why?

Although Third World, new nation, federalism has declined, a number of traditionally unitary European states seem to be

evolving in a federal direction. Recently, Britain, France, and Italy have proposed forms of regional devolution that resemble federalism. These efforts are made to appease newly-awakened ethnic or regional interests. These changes arouse little enthusiasm on the part of the central government. Canada, however, has a legacy of success with constitutional forms that failed throughout much of the Third World but are perhaps destined for a new life in older European nations.

Canada has a written constitution, the B.N.A. Act, which seems modest when compared to the comprehensive post-war ventures in complex constitution-making.<sup>32</sup> Enacted by the British Parliament with an amending process dependent upon that body, Canada's constitution is deceptively simple. Party government is not made explicit, but British conventions are implicit. Although the Act never acquired the mystique of the American constitution, it has served its purpose and has demanded a certain veneration. It offers an interesting comparative case to place along side such different exercises as the American, the British, and the Third French Republic. Perhaps attempts at creating comprehensive, all embracing constitutions that raise the popular level of expectation are doomed to failure. There may be much to be said for constitutional modesty in the Canadian vogue.<sup>33</sup>

Canadian political parties and voting behavior offer a fertile field to political scientists. The two dominant non-ideological, all embracing, political parties are easily recognizable. The Liberals and Progressive Conservatives are not unlike the American parties or the Social Democratic and Christian

Democratic parties of Western Europe. Their structure and behavior are quite consistent with Daniel Bell's "end of ideology." Yet Canada also has vital and successful third parties. Why? Léon Epstein explains this phenomena in terms of the conflict between cabinet-parliamentary government and the social structure of a federal system.<sup>34</sup> How applicable to Canada are the third party hypotheses developed in the American framework? Do major non-ideological, umbrella parties tend to coopt the successful issues of the third parties? Are third parties doomed to long-term impotence? Does the decline in American party identification, on the other hand, and the youthful fascination with ideology, mean the U.S. might move in the Canadian direction - two dominant, traditional parties plus a number of regional and/or ideological parties?

Finally, Canadian politics can serve as an important balancer to the normative obsession with class politics. Political scientists often seem to view non-class politics as somehow illegitimate (e.g., the view that the white southerners and ethnic groups voting for Nixon in 1972 were voting against their own interest.) This implies that people ought to vote in terms of class politics defined as both developed and inevitable. Mass decisions to vote in regional, religious, linguistic, or cultural terms are viewed as obstructionist, primitive, and aberrational. Yet Canada, with a quality of life attractive to many American academicians, is a developed, affluent democratic system in which class politics is only minimally important. J. Murray Beck concluded his study of Canadian federal elections by noting:

Yet the elections demonstrate no less clearly that support for the major political parties has not diverged sharply along class lines. Much as V.O. Key wrote about politics in the U.S.; so Underhill, Dawson, and Corry have written about politics in Canada - that it can most suitably be viewed as a process of sectional reconciliation and that Canadian political leaders have acted as brokerage politicians to that end more than their counterparts in the U.S.<sup>35</sup>

#### D. International Relations

Students of international relations, concerned with the causes of war and the conditions of peace, have a significant research field in Canada and Canada's relations with the world. The world, from Canadian eyes, is dominated by the United States. In a system where a small state exists on the border of a large sovereignty, 10 times more populace and powerful, the animosities and amity of states take on a new character. Equilibrium of power between the two is not possible, war seems folly as a tool of statecraft, and peace permits penetration of the smaller by the greater. Under such conditions, the scholar may gain fresh insight into the traditional questions of the field. What role does nationalism play for a small power? Are small states inevitably subject to imperialism, economic and cultural, if not political and military? Is there a viable role for a small power as a "broker" between large states to utilize diplomacy and international organizations to influence great states? Does the term sovereignty have



any relevance in an era of military and economic interdependence, especially for small, essentially defenseless, nations?

Canadians, until recently, have lacked a strong sense of nationalism and national identity.<sup>36</sup> French Canadians, however, would find that statement less true. Lacking a keen sense of nationalism, of mission, Canada's international relations have been remarkably pacific. Perhaps this only reflects a lack of power. But it may be a positive result of an unclear identity. No wars have been begun by Canadians, not even a civil conflict or substantial revolution. Canadian military activities since the defeat of the French have been to defend against American attack - effectively terminated about 1871, despite the continued existence of Defense Scheme #1;<sup>37</sup> to assist Britain with the burdens of two world wars; and to aid in United Nations peace-keeping operations. A remarkable record of non-aggression for a power which, as recently as 1945 (and perhaps only 1945), was the 4th most powerful state in the world.

The recent assertion of Canadian nationalism, with its strongly anti-American tone, offers an excellent laboratory to examine subsequent international behavior of a small state.<sup>38</sup> Logically, an increase in tension with other powers and a reduction of cooperative activity would accompany this nationalism. Canada has reduced her commitment to NATO and appears increasingly reluctant to undertake international peacekeeping roles. Relations with the United States seem more tense and more formal than was the case in the St. Laurent-Eisenhower, Merchant-Heeney, era.<sup>39</sup> That this will lead to war is unlikely; increased Canadian self-

sufficiency and less internationalism in foreign policy (smaller percentage contributions of the G.N.P. to foreign aid programs, etc.) seem more probable. But the student of nationalism as a cause of war cannot rule out the possibility that Canada's international behavior will dramatically change.

If Canadian nationalism flourishes, substantial portions of "irredenta" can be found. Although Jay's 1796 Treaty provided the framework for arbitration and diplomatic negotiation which resolved the boundary problems of Maine-New Brunswick (1842), Oregon (1846), and the Alaskan border (1903), these were completed when Canada was weak. If Canadian nationalists accept the historic thesis that the "British placed good Anglo-American relations above Canadian interests,"<sup>40</sup> territorial claims going all the way back to 1783 would be revived. As long as Canada remains weak militarily, a Chinese-Soviet style clash is unlikely. Yet, the student who finds geographical factors, especially boundary disputes, a major cause of war could do well to watch Canada's changing relations with the United States. Point Roberts, that geographic anomaly, may be a useful indicator of future attitudes.<sup>41</sup>

Commercial interests between Canada and her giant neighbor seem so tightly bound that rivalry leading to conflict is beyond the imagination. General Motors of Canada is wedded to General Motors of the United States. But such economic marriages, though they may preclude certain forms of conflict, raise the flag of economic imperialism. Numerous writers see Canada "silently surrendering"<sup>42</sup> her economic independence to United States corporate interests. This kow-tow for capital inflow, managerial

expertise and technological advancement seriously compromises the political, as well as the economic, survival of that unique entity known as Canada. For economic nationalists, the 70% of Canadian trade tied to the United States is appalling, the well known litany of American dominance of the rubber, petroleum, mining and automobile industries, as well as significant segments of other manufacturing in Canada, is a national scandal.<sup>43</sup>

This must change, they argue. Walter Gordon's 1962 budget was symptomatic of this concern as are more recent actions vis-a-vis Merchantile Bank, and the restrictions on alien property purchases in some provinces, as Nova Scotia. The student of international relations can compare Canada's economic situation with other small states on the borders of great powers, Ireland and the United Kingdom, Finland and the Soviet Union, for example, to determine whether this economic penetration is common. Comparison may determine if there are effective small power techniques to prevent economic penetration while longitudinal studies may suggest whether such economic intimacy contributes to war or peace.<sup>44</sup>

Equally pervasive is cultural penetration. Time, Reader's Digest, Playboy and other products of the American magazine industry compete with Canadian publications like Maclean's for readers, advertising dollars, and newsstand space. But the printed work is not alone. Through the easy access of a common language, the audio and visual presence of the United States in Canada is overwhelming. Popular songs on the juke box and radio are from the United States. "All in the Family," "Rhoda,"

"Gunsmoke," and "Lucy" reruns are on the T.V. Hollywood films show at the cinema. The list seems endless. The United States government, however, is not imposing these elements of popular culture on Canada. The Canadian consumer demands and purchases these products. But cultural nationalists want the vast influx slowed, if not stopped. Canadian content in records and Canadian television programming has given some advantage to domestic production. Government actions, from the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation to the National Film Board, have been an encouragement. And, potentially, the imposition of economic penalties on Time's "Canadian" edition and Reader's Digest may provide further relief.<sup>45</sup> Still the student of international relations must ask, is cultural imperialism inevitable when a great country borders a small and no linguistic barriers exist? Germany's relation to Austria could offer interesting contrasts and similarities. If not inevitable, the effectiveness of small power restrictions and buffers need to be assessed and judged on a cost effectiveness basis. The Belgian relation to France and the Irish connection with Britain might offer insights.

Canada's international role, much discussed and never settled,<sup>46</sup> demands attention. Barbara Ward suggests that Canada's domestic development, bilingual and compromising, might make her an international "model builder." Canadians might be "the creative institution makers; the citizens who help recreate the world's image of itself."<sup>47</sup> This vision of Canada as the first "international nation" recalls Canada's steadfast work to make the United Nations a successful force in world affairs, to open the Commonwealth

to all nations and, on occasion, to debate joining the O.A.S., for the contribution Canada could make to Latin America. This enlarged Canadian role in the world, during the Suez crisis, forging NATO, and announcing a pace setting foreign aid goal of 1% of the G.N.P., now appear the result of a unique post-war period when Canada's status and strength had few peers, plus the unusually skillful diplomatic capability of the late Lester Pearson. But this may be an ethnocentric perspective. The student of international relations must assess the contribution of Canada as an effective "middle power" to international peace and security. Canada's policies and actions may yet prove Barbara Ward correct, though Thompson and Swanson's recent overview does not support that optimism.<sup>48</sup> Certainly the student of international relations interested in the conditions of peace cannot ignore the range of states below the great power level if he hopes to explain total system behavior.

Canada, on occasions such as the Suez crisis and the entrance into World War II, has served a broker role between the United States and Britain. Occasionally, under inept leadership - as Diefenbaker's infamous Caribbean flight to join Kennedy and Macmillan - she has been more of a burden than benefit. More often, however, Canada has seemed interested in one or the other of her great power acquaintances merely as a make weight against the other. Canadian foreign policy today, increasing its attention to Germany, Japan and France, is designed to lessen the impact of the United States on Canada. Greater trade and increased communication with other

states may lessen the place of the United States in Canadian life.<sup>49</sup> Trudeau's visit to Moscow may be viewed in this light. These attempts by a small power to find an international role compatible with sovereignty and a sense of national dignity are undoubtedly matched and comparable to similar efforts of Yugoslavia, Egypt, and Belgium.

Perhaps the deepest affront to Canadian sovereignty is the helplessness, militarily, in the face of superior American power. Canada is virtually defenseless against her neighbor. Instead of a strong national force, Canada's military strength, like her foreign policy, has been depoliticized by regular reference to a number of joint, U.S.-Canadian boards, agencies and committees. Defense of Canada is parcelled out to NORAD and NATO, each effectively under United States control. The Arrow cancellation and Bomarc missile fiasco are eloquent testimony to Canada's inability to support a sophisticated defense establishment. The Permanent Joint Board of Defense, since 1940, along with regular meetings at all levels of Canadian and American defense officials, have made it clear that Canada is subordinate to the United States in defense, radar warning systems and air operations. Small wonder that the topics of neutrality, or withdrawal from NORAD and NATO, occasionally surface.<sup>50</sup> Canadians confronted with this defense reality, which confirms the economic, cultural and political realities of the United States presence, cannot but be overwhelmed with the magnitude of their effort to be not only separate, but different, from the United States.

Canada as a model in teaching politics at American Universities

is challenging, interesting and rewarding. The comparative approach, a sense of history as well as contemporary affairs, and cultural sensitivity can combine in many areas of political interest - nation-building, policies, institutions or international relations, for example - to enrich the study of political science. The classroom instructor, as well as the student, will find Canada a provocative, varied and useful model.



# FOOTNOTES

1. Dale C. Thomson and Roger F. Swanson, "Scholars, Missionaries or Counter-Imperialists?," ACSUS Newsletter, vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1971), p. 8.
2. There is now a vast scholarly literature on nation-building. See, for example, Seymour Martin Lipset, The First Nation; Clifford Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States; S.N. Eisenstadt and Stein Rokkan, eds., Building States and Nations; Karl Deutsch and William Foltz, eds., Nation-Building; Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation-Building; Reinhard Bendix, ed., State and Society; Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation; W. Bell and E. Freeman, eds., Ethnicity and Nation-Building.
3. See Joseph Schull, Laurier (New York: St. Martin Press, 1965), p. 187.
4. For a perceptive examination of this problem see McKim Marriott, "Cultural Policy in the New States" in Clifford Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States (New York: The Free Press, 1963).
5. Ibid., p. 35.
6. On the Canadian identity problem and the reaction to various symbols, see Mildred Schwartz, Public Opinion and Canadian Identity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).
7. Of the significance of the conquest for French Canadians, Kenneth McRae writes: "The fact of conquest was for French Canada a searing and scarring psychological experience that manifests itself even today in a hundred different ways. It is a treacherous, hidden rock that constantly troubles the smooth flow of French-

English relations, no matter how carefully it is camouflaged."

Kenneth A. McRae, "The Structure of Canadian History" in Louis Hartz, ed., The Founding of New Societies (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1964), p. 230-231.

8. George Woodcock, Canada and the Canadians (London: Faber and Faber, 1970), p. 95.

9. Eric A. Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs Harvard University, 1972), pp. 29-30.

10. A fascinating study of Norway which notes the symbolic, political, and financial concessions made to the traditional sub-culture is Harry Eckstein, Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968).

11. For an interesting examination of Lesage and the system's reaction to his demands, see Peter C. Newman, A Nation Divided (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), chs. 21-23.

12. Ibid., p. 324.

13. The definitive study of the Compromise of 1877 and its ramifications is C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1951).

14. Probably the best presentation of the Southern superiority myth is 12 Southerners, I'll Take My Stand (New York: Harper and Row, 1930).

15. Probably the best development of the Mexican search for a model is Frederick C. Turner, The Dynamic of Mexican Nationalism (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1968).

16. For somewhat different views of the Empire Loyalists see McRae, op. cit. and Gad Horowitz, "Conservatism, Liberalism and Socialism in Canada: An Interpretation", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, vol. XXXII, no. 2 (May 1966), pp. 143-171.

17. For two recent attempts to remedy this deficiency, see Donald Eugene Smith, Religion and Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970) and Guenter Lewy, Religion and Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974).

18. Such social scientists as Robert Alford, Seymour Lipset, Stein Rokkan, and Mildred Schwartz have been concerned with the relationship between religion and voting behavior. For the importance of religion to voting behavior in Western Europe, see Richard Rose, ed., Electoral Behavior: A Comparative Handbook (New York: The Free Press, 1974). The political scientists' interest in religion, however, seldom extends beyond concern with its impact on voting.

19. Edward Williams considers this problem in Latin America. Edward J. Williams, "The Emergence of the Secular Nation-State and Latin American Catholicism," Comparative Politics, vol. 5, no. 2 (January 1974), pp. 261-277.

20. Mildred Schwartz, Robert Alford, John Meisel, and John Porter have all noted the important impact of religion in affecting Canadian electoral behavior. See Mildred A. Schwartz, "Canadian Voting Behavior" in Richard Rose, ed., op. cit.; Robert R. Alford, Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1963), ch. 9; John Meisel, "Some Bases of Party Support in the 1968 Election" in Hugh G. Thorburn, ed.,

Party Politics in Canada (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1972). John Porter wrote: "Religion, interwoven with ethnicity and social class, has been and continues to be the most significant divisive element in Canadian society." John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), p. 511.

21. Probably the leading contemporary scholars involved in the study of the American immigrants are Nathan Glazer, Daniel P. Moynihan, Michael Novak, and Andrew Greeley.

22. See the comprehensive anthology edited by Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Political Corruption (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1970), and Pierre-Elliott Trudeau, "Some Obstacles to Democracy in Quebec," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, vol. XXIV, no. 3 (August 1958) pp. 297-311.

23. See Joseph S. Nye "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis," American Political Science Review, vol. LXI no. 2 (June 1967), pp. 417-427.

24. On the more recent Pearson scandals see Richard J. Gwyn, The Shape of Scandal (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1965); Peter C. Newman; A Nation Divided: Canada and the Coming of Pierre Trudeau (New York: Knopf, 1969), pp. 264-87; and Blair Fraser, The Search for Identity, Canada 1945-1967 (Garden City: Doubleday and Co.; 1967) ch. XXV.

25. On the Canadian identity problem as related to American influence, see Woodcock, op. cit., ch. XI.

26. Herbert J. Spiro, Government By Constitution (New York: Random House, 1959), pp. 163-297.

27. See Gad Horowitz, loc. cit.; Seymour M. Lipset, The First Nation (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1967), pp. 284-312; and McRae, op. cit.

28. Lipset, op. cit., p. 287.

29. Such contemporary social scientists as Seymour Lipset, Dankwart Rustow, Barrington Moore, William Kornhauser, Robert Dahl, Edward Shils, Daniel Lerner, Lucien Pye, Harry Eckstein, Gabriel Almond, and Sydney Verba have addressed this question.

30. On the nature of the Canadian political culture, see Robert Presthus, Elite Accomodation in Canadian Politics (London: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 20-23. Employing a variety of the Almond-Verba Civic Culture terminology, Presthus describes Canadian politics as "quasi-participative."

31. There is now a vast literature on federalism. See, for example, Ivo Duchacek, Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimension of Politics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, inc., 1970); Thomas Franck, ed., Why Federations Fail: An Inquiry into the Requisites for Successful Federation (New York: New York University Press, 1968); Carl J. Friedrich, Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1968); William S. Livingston, Federalism and Constitutional Change (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956).

32. Robert M. Dawson, Democratic Government in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), ch. 2; J.R. Mallory, The Structure of Canadian Government (New York: St. Martins Press, 1971), ch. 1.

33. See guidelines for constitution-makers based upon comparative study in Spiro, op. cit., p. 427
34. Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies (New York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 62-64; Mildred Schwartz and Robert Alford have also addressed the third party question. Schwartz in Rose, ed., op. cit., pp. 552-553; Alford, op. cit., pp. 259-260.
35. J. Murray Beck, Pendulum of Power: Canada's Federal Elections (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1968), p. 420. Mildred Schwartz, Robert Alford and John Porter have also examined the minimal importance of class in Canadian politics.
36. See, for example, W.L. Morton, The Canadian Identity (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1965).
37. James Eayrs, The Art of the Possible (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), p. 74.
38. See Ian Lumsden, ed., Close the 49th Parallel, etc. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970); and Abraham Rotstein and Gary Lax, eds., Getting It Back (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1974).
39. Contrast the Merchant Heeney report, Livingston Merchant and A.D. P. Heeney, "Canada and the United States: Principles for Partnership" U.S. Department of State Bulletin (August 2, 1965), pp. 193-202 with U.S. Ambassador William Porter's recent public criticism of Canada's trade practices in The New York Times, September 28, 1974.
40. G.M. Craig, The United States and Canada (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 170.
41. See Manfred C. Vernon's "The Point Roberts Report and U.S.-Canadian Waters" in Gerard F. Rutan, ed., Canadian-American Relations in the West (n.p.: Northwest Scientific Association, 1974), pp. 48-59.

42. Kari Levitt, Silent Surrender: The American Multinational Corporation in Canada (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1970); and Robert L. Perry, Galt, U.S.A.: The "American Presence" in a Canadian City. (Toronto: MacLean-Hunter, 1971).
43. A recent recitation of these facts appeared in Walter Stewart's Trudeau in Power (New York: Outerbridge and Dienstfrey, 1971), pp. 126-127.
44. Annette Baker Fox, The Power of the Small States: Diplomacy in World War II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959); and Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968).
45. See The New York Times, January 11, 1975 and January 24, 1975.
46. Peyton Lyon, The Policy Question: A Critical Appraisal of Canada's Role in World Affairs (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963); James M. Minifie, Peacemaker or Powdermonkey: Canada's Role in a Revolutionary World (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1960); and John W. Holmes, The Better Part of Valour: Essays on Canadian Diplomacy (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970).
47. George Woodcock, op. cit., p. 292.
48. D.C. Thompson and R.F. Swanson, Canadian Foreign Policy: Options and Perspectives (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1971).
49. Ibid., chs. 4 and 7.
50. Andrew Berwin, Stand on Guard: The Search for a Canadian Defence Policy (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965).