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ABSTRACT

In order to identify appropriate behaviors of company commanders for behavioral change training, an extensive questionhaire was administered to company commanders and recruits. A profile of the average company commander resulted, giving demographic, attitudinal and behavior characteristics. An analysis was made of the relationship of attitudes and normative beliefs to the prediction of behavioral intentions. Company commander characteristics were linked to behavior factors; based on these factors a PLATO computer-assisted instruction program was designed to help all company commanders to reach the behavioral standards of effective commanders. (UY)



DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH UTILIZING THE PLATO IV SYSTEM FOR COMPANY COMMANDER BEHAVIORAL CHANGE TRAINING

Department of Psychology' University of Illinois Champaign, Illinois 61820

August 1975

US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH.
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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverce elds if necessary and identity by block number) An investigation of the possible utilization of the PLATO IV System as a behavioral change training device for use with company commanders at Recruit Training Commander, San Diego, was undertaken. Working within the theoretical framework developed by Fishbein, questionnaire data was collected to assess the possible relationships among attitudes and specific task-oriented behaviors. On the basis of the results from these measures, computer-assisted instructional materials were initially developed for use on the PLATO IV System. This report presents summaries of the data analyses and the framework of the developed computer programs.

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SUMMARY

The use of computers and computer-aided technology is advancing in many diverse fields today. This report is concerned with the possible utilization of the University of Illinois' PLATO IV System, for behavioral change training, PLATO is an acronym for programmed logic for automatic teaching operations, a computer-based teaching system. PLATO has been shown to be a versatile computer-based system which has been used in public schools, community colleges, and university (both graduate and undergraduate) courses. The work reported here is the initial work undertaken for the development of PLATO materials to be used with company commanders at Recruit Training Command (RTC), San Diego, California.

The investigators, working within the theoretical model proposed by Fishbein for the attitude-behavior relationship, first identified a relevant set of specific behaviors and then constructed a questionnaire to assess the components of the theoretical model. On the basis of the results of the questionnaire measures, computer-assisted instructional materials were developed. The initial construction and development of these materials are discussed.

The results of the data analyses support the theoretical model of the attitude-behavior relationship and lend support to the approach undertaken. If one is interested in assessing the determinants of the attitude-behavior relationship, explicit measures of specific relevant behaviors are necessary. Knowledge of general measures of attitudes have been shown to have very little predictability for the intended performance or nonperformance of specific behaviors.

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SECTION.I

INTRODUCTION

This report will review the progress made during the recently completed contract year from July 16, 1973 to August 20, 1974. The basic purpose of this work was to investigate the possible utilization of the PLATO IV System as a training device for military personnel. It was decided to work with company commanders stationed at Recruit Training Command (RTC), San Diego, California.

Briefly, in order to pursue the use of the PLATO IV System for behavioral change training, one must identify the particular kinds of behaviors to be changed and the type of variable which may control that specified behavior. The work undertaken in this project was guided by Fishbein's (1973) theoretical views on the attitude-behavior relationship. According to the theory, an individual's intention to perform any given behavior a function of two factors: (1) the attitude toward performing that behavior and (2) the normative beliefs about what others" think of performing the behavior. Algebraically, this can be expressed as:

$$B \sim BI = [A_{act}] w_o + [\Sigma NB(MC)] w_1$$

where

B = overt behavior

BI = the behavioral intention to perform that behavior-

A act = attitude toward performing the behavior

NB = the normative liefs of others

MC = the motivation to comply with the expectations of others

wo and w = regression weights empirically derived

Recent research on the attitude-behavior relationship², ³ has indicated that although general attitudes, e.g., toward being a company commander,

Fishbein, M. The prediction of behaviors from attitudinal variables. In K. K. Sereno and C. D. Mortensen (Eds.), Advances in Communication Research, New York: Harper and Row, 1973.

Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. Attitudes and normative beliefs as factors influencing behavioral intentions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1972, 21, 1-9.

Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. Attitudes and opinions. In P. Mussen and M. Rosenzweigh (Eds.), Annual Review of Psychology, 1972, Palo Alto: Reviews, Inc., 1972, 23, 287-544.

toward the Navy, or new recruits, are related to patterns of behavior that , are performed with respect to these objects, these general attitudes may or may not be related to specific behaviors. Further, there is other evidence that the performance of any specific behavior is primarily determined by a person's intention to perform that behavior. These intentions the fiselves are determined by specific attitudes, i.e., toward the behavior in question; and by normative considerations, i.e., the subject's beliefs that relevant others think he should or should not perform the behavior in question. Finally, attitudes, either toward objects or toward specific. . behaviors, are themselves a function of beliefs and their evaluative aspects. Thus, the basic elements underlying a person's attitudes, intentions, and behavior are the relevant beliefs that the person holds. The immediate implication of this perspective is that, if one wishes to change attitudes, intentions, or behavior, one must ultimately change those beliefs that serve as the primary determinants of those attitudes, intentions; or behaviors.,

SECTION II

METHOD

In order to identify appropriate behaviors of company commanders for the behavioral change training, the investigators visited RTC, San Diego, from September 19 to September 24, 1973. During this trip we met with the RTC staff to discuss the project and to elicit any suggestions that would facilitate dur observations. We also met with and interviewed 14 company commanders and 13 recruits. In these interviews and discussions we sought to identify very specific behaviors that company commanders performed in their everyday routine. While on the Base we also "shadowed" company commanders during the day and observed various training and classroom situations. On Friday, we attended the graduation exercise and the evening.smoker. During the weekend, we attended some of the athletic competitions and continued our observations of the company commanders. This trip was extremely useful in building rapport with the RTC staff and a number of company commanders, as well as for compiling a list of specific behaviors that could be adopted within the framework of the project.

In order to arrive at a manageable set of behaviors that appeared most relevant to the project, we asked the RTC command staff to identify from our list of 65 specific behaviors those behaviors which they considered to be important and which should be performed by a "good" company commander. On the basis of the responses of the RTC staff, we selected a subset of 35 behaviors for further use. All of these 35 behaviors were deemed important and the performance or nonperformance was indicated.

A questionnaire with fixed alternatives was developed in reference to the set of 35 behaviors. This questionnaire was constructed in order to assess the theoretical components required by Fishbein's theory.

Specifically, for each behavior six questions were asked, each requiring self reports of the individual of:

- a: prior performance of the behavior,
- b. intention to perform the behavior in the future,
- c. attitude toward performing the behavior,
- d. normative belief about the commanding officer (CO) of recruit, training expectations concerning performance of the behavior,
- e. normative belief about the Military Training Officer's (MTO) expectations concerning performance of the behavior,
- and f. normative belief about most other respected company commanders' expectations concerning performance of the behavior.

In addition, questions utilizing the Semantic Differential technique were included to assess more general attitudes toward (1) today's Navy, (2) new recruits, (3) being a company commander, (4) trying to brigade, and (5) pushing a company.

Twenty questions from the Ford-Borgatta Job Satisfaction Measure were modified for use with company commanders. This measure was included to assess the company commanders' satisfaction with various aspects of their job. Thirty questions were also constructed (based largely on information obtained from our visit to RTC, San Diego) directed at assessing the company commanders' recruit training philosophies.

To complete the questionnaire, various demographic and sociological questions were asked. Many of the items were taken from Braunstein's (1972) survey questionnaire. A copy of our completed questionnaire is included in Appendix A. Oral instructions of a general nature were given at the beginning of the administration of the questionnaire and written instructions concerning each section were included within the questionnaire booklet.

company commanders. These company commanders were assigned to one of three groups by the RTC staff on the basis of subjective ratings of the company commanders past effectiveness in the ffeld: (1) above average (AA), N=22; (2) average (A), N=38; and (3) below average (BA), N=22. For administration purposes, the company commanders were unaware of the groupings made by the RTC staff and completed the questionnaire in groups of approximately 20 each. It took on the average 60 minutes to complete the questionnaire. After completion of the questionnaire, we discussed the purpose and content with the respondents who indicated that they found the experience very interesting. In fact, some company commanders stayed for nearly an hour after completion of the questionnaire to discuss their views and experiences.

Osgood, C. E., Suci, G.: J., & Tannenbaum, P. H. The measurement of meaning. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1957.

Finch, C. W., & Gibson, J. N: Development of a questionnaire to measure Air Force junior officer attitudes toward intrinsic aspects of the work itself. Air Force Institute of Technology, January, 1972, (AD 743405).

Braunstein, C. Report of enlisted findings, Navy personnel survey. Naval Personnel Research and Development Laboratory, July, 1972 (AD 746477).

SECTION III

RESULTS

DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES. The profile of the average company commander at San Diego was as follows:

He was a mean age of 35.6 years, had been in the Navy for a mean of 16,4 years, was presently an E-7 (38%) or E-6 (38%), and was in a third or later enlistment (87%). He had pushed three or four companies, and probably had not led a brigade company (only about 22% of company commanders have brigaded, and less than 10% have led more than one brigade company). He was most likely to come from the South (32%) or the Midwest (23%), and to have had a high-school diploma (58% had graduated from high school and an additional 12% had had some college). He was married (91% were currently married, only 4% had never been married), and for the most part (61%) his wife was happy he was in the Navy (only 5% felt their wives were unhappy they joined the Navy). He probably joined the Navy "for a secure position with promotions and favorable retirement benefits" (23%), because it provided an "opportunity for advanced education, professional, or technical skills" (20%), or "for travel; adventure; and new experience" (18%). He was most likely to have become a career petty officer because of "rétirement benefits and the opportunity to retire after 20 years of service" (50%). He felt (63%) that career opportunities in the Navy were better than in civilian life (only 1% felt the opposite was true), and preferred living in the civilian community (49%) or among military people off base (21%). Only 2% would like to live among military people on base. He probably does not have a full or part-time civilian job (28% did have civilian jobs), and was most likely ordered to his present assignment (56%). Only 21% had volunteered for their duty as a company commander.

While the above profile holds pretty well for all company commanders, there were some important differences between those company commanders who were judged above average (AA) and those judged below average (BA). The above average company commanders have spent less time in the Navy (AA=14.8 mean years, A=16.4 mean years, BA=18.0 mean years), but have pushed more companies (mean number of companies pushed was AA=4.4, A=3.8, BA=2.8), and not unexpectedly, they were more likely to have had led a brigade company (AA=59%, A=13%, BA=0%). They were more likely to believe their wives were happy with their careers (AA=73%, A=58%, BA=55%), they were less likely to have become career petty officers because of retirement benefits and retirement opportunities (AA=27%, A=68%, BA=41%), and they were more likely to believe that career opportunities in the Navy were better than in civilian life (AA=82%, A=61%, BA=50%).

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GENERAL ATTITUDES. These measures were the traditional type of attatude toward a general concept as measured by the Semantic Differential tech-inique.

Generally speaking, most company commanders positively evaluated "Today's Navy" (79% favorable, 6% neutral, and 13% unfavorable), and the majority (60%) liked "Being a company commander" and felt that "Pushing a company" was a good thing (59%). In contrast, only 46% positively evaluated "Trying to brigade" (21% negatively evaluated this behavior), and only 37% had favorable attitudes toward "New recruits" (29% had unfavorable attitudes). Not surprisingly, significant differences in attitude between the three groups of company commanders (i.e., AA, A, and BA) were obtained with respect to some of the concepts. While all company commanders were similar, with respect to their attitude toward "Today's Navy" and "New the company commanders considered to be above average had significantly (χ^2 , df=4, p <.05) more favorable attitudes toward "Being a company commander," "Trying to brigade," and "Pushing a company" than did those company commanders who were considered below average. Table 1 shows the percent of company commanders in each group with favorable (+), unfavorable (-), and neutral (0) attitudes toward each concept.

TABLE 1. PERCENTAGE OF COMPANY COMMANDERS, BY GROUPS, WITH FAVORABLE (+), NEUTRAL (0), AND UNFAVORABLE (-) ATTITUDES

	Being Compar	a ny Comm	ander	Attitud Trying			Pushin	g a Co	mpany	
Group -	+	, 0		<u></u> + .	0		. +	<u>.</u>	<u>.</u>	
AA	77	14	9	77	18	5, *	77	14	, 9	
Α .	66	10	24	42	21 ,	· 37 _.	, 60	8	32	
BA	32	32	36	23	59	18	36	32	32	
Total	60	17	23	46	30	21	. 59	16	26	x

In interpreting these data, it is necessary to remember that no inferences about causality can be shown. That, is, it's just as reasonable to assume that above-average company commanders have more favorable attitudes because they have been successful, as to assume that they have been successful because they have more favorable attitudes.

PAST BEHAVIOR. It should be noted that an attempt was made to select behaviors on which company commanders performance or nonperformance would differ.

Table 2, which shows the percent of company commanders who reported that they performed each of the 35 behaviors, suggests that we were successful in identifying a set of behaviors that were differentially performed. Only one behavior (#34) was performed by over 90% of the company commanders (92% had disciplined recruits in front of the whole company) and only two behaviors (#8, #15) had been performed by less than 10% of the company commanders (3% had allowed recruits to finish fights they start among themselves and 9% had told their company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline). Twenty-four of the behaviors were performed by between 25% and 75% of the company commanders.

Despite this wide variation in performance, very few of these behaviors were differentially associated with the three company commander groups (AA, A, and BA). In other words, most behaviors were equally likely to be performed by company commanders who were judged to be below average as those judged to be above average. In fact, only 8 behaviors seem 10 provide some insight into the differences between above- and below average company commanders. As can be seen in table 3, above-average company. commanders were more likely than the below-average group to have told their companies they expected them to brigade, (2) attended smokers where one of their recruits was fighting, and (3) told their recruits they don't believe in setting back. Similarly, above-average company commanders wefe less likely than below-average company commanders to (1) ask other company commanders for help with disciplinary problems or (2) ask other company commanders for help in teaching infantry." to have (3) immediately fired a recruit P.O. who exceeded his authority, to have (4) selected a setback as his RCPO, or to have (5) told his company that brigading was not, important. As can be seen in table 3, however, only 2 of these differences (those concerning telling recruits about brigading) were significant (χ^2 , df=4, p < .05).

TABLE 2. PERCENTAGE OF COMPANY COMMANDERS' SELF-REPORT OF PERFORMING EACH BEHAVIOR,
INTENDING TO PERFORM EACH BEHAVIOR, AND EVALUATING EACH BEHAVIOR AS GOOD OR BAD

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behavior	, bad	Ì	45 '	48	48	• 39	. 55	. 78	. 6	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	,	88	• 4	; , 36
	as neutral		£.	, 10	40	24	, 10	ب س	, E.	ဖ	, 10	, 46	21.	,15
% evaluating	good	<u> </u>	48	42	. 21	, . 40	. 89	A 22	. 48	• 4	81 ,	, . 16	.75	46
do not	intend		38	34.	. 53	. 68	, 52	16	17,	s. , 26	20,	. 6 6	° .	46
% ° don't		1	16	. 22	30	20,	. 13		18	41	4	. 23	17	20
	intend	*	46.	4. 4.	" 17	. 41	. 62	,62	, 65	4.	76	, 18	48	34
% parforming	behavior		55	46	34	35	78	, 88,	69 .	. ຕ <i>ູ</i>	83		`	47
•			problems.	Immediately fired recruit PO who '' 'exceeded authority	Selected "setback" as ACPO	Told company I expect them to brigade	Taken phone privileges as form of discipline	Pre-checked dockers prior to inspection	Been ahead schedule in teaching IG lessons	Allowed recruits to finish fights among, themselves	Asked other CC to inspect company during primary training	Selected toughest recruit for master- at-arms	Attended all smokers where my recruits fight	Used "Marching thru Ga." as discipline
		, rri) 	8	ຕ່ໍ	4		ه. د.	7.	&	6	10,	11.	12.

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TABLE 2. PERCENTAGE OF COMPANY COMMANDERS' SELF-REPORT OF PERFORMING EACH BEHAVIOR, INTENDING TO PERFORM EACH BEHAVIOR, AND EVALUATING EACH BEHAVIOR AS GOOD OR BAD (cont.)

				NAVTKA	rguIPC	EN 73-	C-0129	- 1					ç
navior	bad	75	76	. 484	89,	99 •	44	41	8 61	2	29	. 62	,
evaluating behavior	as neutral	6	9	, 9	. 01	, 11	ဖ	, 02	6	26	18	18	29
% evalua	good	16.5	18.		22	23	, ,	39	63	29	. g	20	59
6					.** *			•		•			•
. ·	do not intend	62	62	. 88	. 09	,19	4.8	43.	27	11	24	51	35
%	don't know	. L	'	11	12	,	, cc	, 17	14	* 58 8	, 50 %	, 88	- 20
	intend	, 1 4	.15	-	. 8	22	44	40	69	. 61	56	. 21	. 9
			. '		•			•	-			•	
, %	performing behavior	5 .	. 38	- ර ග	~ %	23	5 8	, 51	61	83	65	69	. 22
r	a ^a [.	,	ر. معالم	5			٨	1	· .	0 3		ະ	lasses
<i>.</i>	•	ompany if 3 recruits	Punishéd whole cômpany if 3 recruits lost points in personal inspection	ignore recruit as ne	don't believe in `	th recruit to 😘	ive PT as form of	t Po when exceeded	o help teach infantry	at R	for infantry drill the bridge"	to use "cheating gear"	Attended most instructor-conducted classes
•	,	Punished whole company if 3 reclost points in locker inspection		Told company to ignore recruit form of discipline	Told recruits I don't believe "setting back"	Faked beating with recruit to scare company	Allowed POs to give PT as discipline	19. Backed up recruit PO when exc.	Asked other CC to help teach	Selected-some recruit officers	Used Sunday p.m' for infantry after "crossing the bridge"	Allowed company to use "cheating	Attended most ins
		13.	14.,	15.	16.	17.	18.	19.	20.	21.	22.	23	24.
			• '								"V		

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TABLE 2. PERCENTAGE OF COMPANY COMMANDERS' SELF-REPORT OF-PERFORMING EACH BEHAVIOR, INTENDING TO PERFORM EACH BEHAVIOR, AND EVALUATING EACH BEHAVIOR AS GOOD OR BAD (cont.)

		% performing	bu		; ¢	\$ \$. % evalı	lating]	evaluating behavior	
		behavior		intend	know	intend	good	as neutral	al "bad	
25.	Allowed EPO to handle most questions after TV classes	. 62	•	.56	13	, 31	49	7.47	34	
26.	Set aside time each week for recruits' problems	35	,	39	13	4.8	48		, 78	• •
27.	Been out of barracks by 1800 after "crossing the bridge"	70	,	99	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	. 18	22	20	က	NAVT
28.	Required company to study for tests 45 minutes each might	68 .		91	/ 4 '	, w	26	N	ੇ , ਜਾਂ •	AEQUIP
29.	Been in barracks at feveille after "crossing the bridge"	51	*		13.	, 37	35,	. 02	, 45	CEN 73
30.	Had more than 2 EPOs in company	74		64	20	16	75.		س	-C-01
31.	Pre-inspected company on evaluation day		\$	· 08	6 ,	11,	81,	7.	, ,	129-1
32.	Told company brigading not important	66-		30	20	20	21	28	, £	۱.
33.	Tried to "hide" recruit who'd cost company points	34 L		, 9 H	13	7.1	. 10	÷ά	84	
34.	Disciplined recruit in front of company	. 92	•	73	10		69	თ	22	·
35.	Learned names of every member of company	38	- ∰	, 53	12	32	59	21	. 20	2

TABLE 3. PERCENTAGE BY GROUP OF COMPANY COMMANDERS' SELF-REPORT
OF REFORMING EACH BEHAVIOR

Item Number	Behavior	, · · ·	<u>АА</u>	, <u>A</u> ,	BA
1.	Asked other company commander for help with discipline problems		36	58	68
2	Immediately fired recruit petty officers who exceeded their authority	e .	36	45	59
3	Selected "setback" as RCPO		18	29	55
4.	Told company I expect them to brigade		63	26	14 *
11.	Attended all smokers where my recruits fight	•	68,	39	41.
16.	Told recruits I don't believe in "setting back".	•	27 .	· 21	9
20.	Asked other company commanders to help teach infantry	•	36	71	68
32.	Told company-brigading is not important		. € 5 .	5 0	50 *

* Differences between groups is significant at .05 level; x2, df=4.

BEHAVIORAL INTENTIONS. Perhaps more important than what they have done in the past are the company commanders' intentions to perform each of these behaviors in the future.

Table 2 also indicates that we were successful in selecting behaviors which company commanders differentially intended to perform. Once again, however, we found relatively few intentions which clearly discriminated between company commanders judged to be above average and those judged to be below average. Although only 2 intentions reached acceptable levels of significance, table shows the 10 intentions which tended to discriminate among the three groups of company commanders.

In table 4 it can be seen that in contrast to below-average company commanders, above-average co pany commanders intended to (1) tell their companies they expected them to brigade, and (2) to attend smokers. Further, they did not intend to (1) tell their companies that brigading

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was not important, (2) to ask other company commanders for help with disciplinary problems or in teaching infantry, (3) to immediately fire recruit petty officers who exceeded their authority, (4) to select a setback as their RCPO, or (5) to select the toughest-looking recruit as their masterat-arms. Finally, they were more likely to intend not to take away phone privileges or use Sunday afternoons for infantry drills than were the below-average company commanders.

TABLE 4. PERCENTAGE BY GROUP OF COMPANY COMMANDERS' SELF-REPORT OF INTENTIONS TO PERFORM AND NOT PERFORM EACH BEHAVIOR

\	•			$\mathbf{G} \mathbf{r} \mathbf{o}$	ű p s	*	
. \	•	A	4 .~~		A	B/	1
Item Numbér	Behavior	Intend	Not Intend	Intend	Not Intend.	Intend	Not Intend
1.	Asked other CC for help w/discipline problems	41	50	45	. 37	55	27
2.	Immediately fired recruit PO who exceeded authority	27	50	47	32	54	. 23
3.	Selected "setback" as RCPO	14	68	. 16	32	23	36
4. *	Told company I expect them to brigade	, 64	18	37	50	~27	41
5.	Taken phone privileges as form of discipline	55	36	63	21	√. 68	18
10.	Selected toughest recruit for master-at-arms	. 14	72	18	58	- 23	45
刻.	Attended all smokers where my recruits fight	68	23	42	37	36	46
20.	Asked other CC to help teach infantry	46	, 45	61	26	68	. 9
22.*	Used Sun. p.m. for infantry drill after "crossing bridge"	55	. 27	53	, 37	64 ,	0 ,
	Told company brigading not important	23	63	32	, 50	36	37

^{*} Difference significant at less than .05 level, χ^2 , df = 4.

It's worth noting that these differences in intentions between the three groups closely parallel the differences found with reject to past behaviors (see table 3). This finding was not surprising since it has long been recognized that one of the best predictors of future performance is past behavior. Consistent with this, the mean correlation (using Fisher's r to Z transformation) between past behavior and intentions was .587. While this indicated that company commanders did largely intend to perform behaviors in the future which they had performed in the past, the relationship was by no means perfect. For example, although 69% of the company commanders had allowed their companies to use "cheating gear" in the past, only 21% intended to do so in the future. Similarly, while only 38% of the company commanders had learned the names or nicknames of every member of their past companies, 53% intended to do so with future companies. Other differences can be seen in table 2.

ATTITUDE TOWARD PERFORMING THE BEHAVIORS.

The evaluation of the behaviors are also presented in table 2. Once again it can be seen that the company commanders differed greatly in their evaluations of each of the behaviors. For example, while 42% of the company commanders thought that "immediately firing a recruit PO who exceeds his authority" was a good thing, 48% thought it was a bad thing to do. It's important to note that company commanders' attitudes toward performing these behaviors were strongly related to their intentions to perform these behaviors (the average correlation for this relationship was .620); that is, in general, company commanders intended to perform behaviors they evaluated positively, and they did not intend to perform those behaviors which they evaluated negatively. Here too, however, the relationship was by no means perfect. For example, although 75% of the company commanders thought that "attending all smokers where one of my recruits was fighting" was a good thing, only 48% intended to perform this behavior in the future.

While there were some differences in the attitudes of the three groups of company commanders, very few were significant, and they largely paralleled the differences previously reported with respect to behaviors and intentions. For example, above-average company commanders, were more likely to think that "telling my company I expect them to brigade" was a good thing (59%) than the average (37%) or below-average (27%) company commanders.

The mean responses for observed behaviors (OB), behavioral intentions (BI), and attitudes toward the behavior (A) is presented in Appendix B by groups for each of the 35 behaviors. The mean results showed the same patterns as the percentage results discussed above.



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NORMATIVE BELIEFS.

In addition to an individual's attitude toward a behavior, his normative beliefs (i.e., his beliefs about the expectations of relevant others) are also expected to influence his intentions. Table 5 presents the percentages of the company commanders' normative beliefs about the expectations of three relevant others: (1) other company commanders they respect, (2) the Military Training Officer (MTO), and (3) the commanding officer (CO) for recruit training. (Appendix C presents the mean values for the same sets of normative beliefs.)

Three major problems were identified in table 5. First, with respect to many behaviors, a large proportion of company commanders did not know what a given referent expected of them. Second, in many cases there was considerable disagreement among the company commanders with respect to a given referent. For example, 35% of the company commanders believed the CO thought they should "be ahead of schedule in teaching IG lessons," while 40% believed the CO thought they should not. Third, and perhaps most important, many company commanders believed they were under conflicting pressures. For example, 69% believed that other company commanders they respected thought they should "use Sunday afternoons for infantry drill after crossing the bridge," and at the same time 66% believed that the CO thought they should not.

These differences in perceptions of the expectations of the three referents can be seen most clearly when one looks at the relationships among the beliefs about the referents' expectations. While there was a moderate relationship between the perceived expectations of "other company commanders" and the MTO (mean correlation = .470), and a moderate to strong relationship between the perceived expectations of the MTO and the CO (mean correlation = .571), there was a low relationship between the perceived expectations of "other company commanders" and the CO (mean correlation = .292). That is, other company commanders were viewed as holding expectations that were somewhat related to those of the MTO, the MTO was seen as holding expectations which were somewhat related to those of the CO, but the company commanders saw relatively little similarity in the expectations of other company commanders and the CO. To put this somewhat differently, the more discrepant the referents were in terms of their location in the chain of command, the less similar they were seen to be in terms of their expectations about how a company commander should behave.

Not too surprisingly, the company commanders tended to resolve this conflict by placing more weight on the expectations of those referents that were closest to them in the chain of command. That is, the company commanders intentions were closely related to the expectations of other company commanders (mean correlation = .446) than they were to the expectations of the MTO (mean correlation = .303) or the CO (mean correlation = .201).

TABLE 5. PERCENTAGE OF COMPANY COMMANDERS PERCEIVING THAT OTHER COMPANY COMMANDERS (CC), THE MILITARY TRAINING OFFICER (MTO), AND THE COMMANDING OFFICER (CO) OF RECRUIT TRAINING THE MILITARY THEY SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT PERFORM EACH OF THE BEHAVIORS

	t should	26	88	. 91	33	. 56	37	40	68	13,	51,*	ω.	74
႘	don't know	: 21	23	69	29	16	, 18	42°	10	23	. 42	21	. 17
	should	54	49	15	39	28	45	ဒိုင	H	62	7	73	ზ
	should not	7	. 27	21	74	, 28	22	24	.∕ 8	∞	42	ָׁנו	57
MTO	don't know	13	22.	59	24	20	18	26	13	20	. 45	29	,8 3
	should	61	51	20	. 22	52	. 09	50	4	. 72	, 13	. 09	20
	should	. 34	34	39	. 24	11	10		74	′ ဖွ	, S	ດ	22
Other CCs	don't know	18	. 81	44	. 18	13	· α	21	16,	6	59	30	17
Oth	should	48	, 49	17	. 58 	. 92	88	20	, 10		42	. 65	61
į	• 4	Asked other CC for help with discipline problems	Immediately fired recruit PO who exceeded authority	·Selected "setback" as RCPO	Told company I expect them to brigade	Taken phone privileges as form of discipline	Pre-checked lockers prior to inspection	Been ahead schedule in teaching IG lessons \wedge	Allowed recruits finish fights among themselves	Asked other CC inspect company during primary training	Selected toughest recruit for master-at-arms	Attended all smokers where my recruits fight	Used "Marching thru Georgia" as discipline
•		٦,	2	ຕໍ	4.	5.		. 7:	ω	• ်	10.	, 11,	12.

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TABLE 5. PERCENTAGE OF COMPANY COMMANDERS PERCEIVING THAT OTHER COMPANY COMMANDERS (CC), THE MILITARY TRAINING OFFICER (MTQ), AND THE COMMANDING OFFICER (CO) OF RECRUIT TRAINING THE MILITARY THEY SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT PERFORM EACH OF THE BEHAVIORS (cont.)

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				NAVTR	AEQUI	PCEN	73-C-	0129-	Ŧ	_				
,	`	should	84	88	. 83	09 .	68	79	09	18	page	99	89	
	00	don't know	9	9	12	. 23	o	14	25	,	54	21	9	•
	•	should.		ω.	വ	11	8	L .	15	64.	87	13	, G	,
•	,	should . not	74	75	92	. 63	70	. 76	. 57	. 23	12	. 55	. 82	
	MTO	don't know	15	1:5	137	- 20	18	Ţ	23	9	43	20	7	
,		should.	11	10	<i>L</i> .	11	7, 21,	Ŕ	20	72	45	25	11	
		۱	٠,	*			*		,				٠.	
4	1	should not	. 59	. 61	90	. 54-	51,	. . .36	37	23	, 10	, 16	30	
,»	Other CCs	don't know	13	13	23	13	, 16	, 16	. 22	6	27.	15,	22	
•	Ot.	should	28		17	34	33	48.	441	89	, 63,	69	. 48	•
•	•		Punished whole company if 3 recruits lost points in locker inspection	1. Punished whole company if 3 recruits lost points in personal inspection	5. Told company to ignore recruits as form of discipline	<pre>16. Told recruits I don't believe in "setting back"</pre>	7. Faked beating with recruit to scare company	18. Allowed POs to give physical training as form of discipline	 Backed up recruit PO when he exceeded authority 	20. Asked other CC to help teach infantry	21. * Selected some recruit officers at R&O	22, Used Sunday p.m. for infantry drill after "crossing the bridge"	3. Allowed company to use "cheating gear"	•
		7	新	14.	15.	16	17.	18	19	. 20	21	22	23.	

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TABLE 5. PERCENTAGE OF COMPANY COMMANDERS PERCEIVING THAT OTHER COMPANY COMMANDERS (CC), THE MILITARY TRAINING OFFICER (MTO), AND THE COMMANDING OFFICER (CO) OF RECRUIT TRAINING THE MILITARY THEY SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT PERFORM EACH OF THE BEHAVIORS (Cont.)

		ö	S	- -		MTO			00	. ,
,		should	know	should	should	don't' know	don't'should know not	should	don't know	should
Aftended most instructor-	instructor- ses	30	1 1	35,	69		. 20	77	13	, 10
Allowed EPO to handle most tions after TV classes	handle most gues-	22	20	. 53	. 42	18,	56.	. 08	, 21	59
Set aside time qach week forecruits' problems	qach week for	43	, 88	. 53	48	• ģ	. 23	. 61	, 88 [,]	, 21
Out of barracks by 1800 aft. "crossing the bridge"	s by 1800 after bridge"	, 64	15	21	0 6		9	. 87	6.	41
Required competests 45 minut	Required company to study for tests 45 minutes each night	93	ß	N	96	4,	, 0	∲ 26.	, ro	, 0
29. Been in barracks at reveille	ks at reveille	43	21	36	. 27	. 21	. 61	21	16.	. 63
Had more than 2 EPOs in com	2 EPOs in company	.`	21	זו	49.	28	23	43	40.	17
Pre-inspected company on evaluation day	company on	06	• 41	9 ,	69	10	, 21	JE,	. 20	29
Told company brigading not	rigading not important	27	14	59	59	23	48	. 23	.34	,43
33. 'Tried tg "hide" recruit who cost company points	"recruit who'd oints	33	16	51	• თ	, 01	. 81	9	, ò	88
Disciplined re of companyq	Disciplined recruits in front of companyq	20	, 15	15	68	28	33	. 21	56	53
Learned names of company	Learned names of every member of company	45	26	29	50	12	. , ⁵	59	19	22.

Although there were, again, a few differences between the three groups of company commanders (AA, A, BA) with respect to their perceptions of what particular referents thought they should or should not do, these differences were similar to those found with respect to behaviors, intentions and attitudes, and were relatively minor in contrast to the differences outlined above.

OPINION QUESTIONS.

The final part of the questionnaire attempted to assess the company commanders' beliefs or opinions about various aspects of recruit training (Questions 1-30) and their jobs as company commanders (Questions 31-50). Table 6 shows the percentage of company commanders agreeing or disagreeing with each statement. (Appendix D presents the mean values and F ratios for these questions by groups.)

In table 6 it can be seen that company commanders differed widely in their recruit training philosophies and in their satisfaction with their jobs. For example, while 51% believed that "the tougher I act the better my company does," 33% believed that this was not true. Similarly, while 41% were "satisfied with the way I get feedback about my work as a company commander," 38% were not satisfied.

In contrast to most of our previous findings, large and significant, differences between the three groups of company commanders were found with respect to many of these opinion items. These differences can be summarized as follows:

- a. The above-average company commanders were less likely to believe that politics were involved in selecting the brigade company (Q 31), or that the best company didn't brigade (Q 14 and Q 11) than did average or below-average company commanders. At the same time the AA group was more likely to believe that it was important to brigade (Q 29) and that men in a brigade company did better in the fleet (Q 17).
- b. Above-average company commanders believed they had to be "tougher" with recruits than did the A or BA company commanders (Q 6, 12, 16).
- c. Above-average company commanders were more satisfied with their jobs (e.g., Q 32, 35, 36, 38) and felt less need to reorganize the work involved (e.g., Q 41, 42, 43, 45, 48) than the average or below-average company commander.

Once again, however, a cautionary hote must be added. Just as was the case in discussing general attitudes, it is not clear whether these opinions are a <u>result</u> of being successful in the past, or if they are factors that have contributed to the success of the above-average group.



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TABLE 6. PERCENTAGE OF COMPANY COMMANDER RESPONSES FOR OPINION QUESTIONS

•	15		, » ~	NAV	TRAEQ	JIPCEN 7	,3-C-0	129-1		,		
e e	Total	42	27	4.	. 88	36	33	. *	26	4	ນ	ω
Disagree	BA	59	32	36	32	,	23	.6	13	4	S	2
ä	Ą	37	26	8,r	29	40	37	رچ <i>ې</i>	35	0	Ŋ	0
†	AA	36	22	£ 59		14	36	໌	32	6	4,	14
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Ī		•	•	-					•	
ar.	Total	10	., 27	46	.	13	17	ø	15	7	16	9
Ne'i ther	BA	14	83	14,	4.	~, 6	.41	ດນຳ	23	ß	27	6
Ž	. 4	'n	, 3.6	58	, œ	្នំ ្	œ	Ν.	10	დ,	נו	က
	AA	18	14.	32	Ω	18	ຸດ •	, ¹ 4.	14	14	, 14	တ
. 1	~1	•	٠	, ,	., •		*	•	\			
	Total	• • 48	56	. 12		51	ار کن		. 59	. 88	19	89
Agree	BA	27	45	23		, 1 4	38	98.	64	91	89	86
Y	.♥		2, ,	œ	793	, 44	55.	92	58	95,	2	26
	AA	46,	, 2 , .	ດ ໍ	89	. 68	55	£.	54	77	82	LL.
• `				v	4	•	•	Proposition of the second				
Recruit Training Questions		. M.E.D. inspectors fair and impartial in evaluations	I feel whole company (co) would benefit if I could take a wiseguy out bahind barracks	. If I only win one flag, I'd want, athletic flag	. Way things are run now, recruit training a summer camp for kids	i don't mind bending rufes. a little when I think it will help my company in competition	. Tougher I act, better my company does	Instructors of group dynamics should alert CCs to problems observed in class <	When RCPO fired, should be trans- ferred to another company	. I feel my training affects a man all his life, not just during Navy career	. Generally I want to do what MTO	. Best company doesn't always brigade
Α.	1	ਜਂ ,	^ه ر	ლ	4.		0 1	7.	α´ ·	9	.v. 10.	11.
	,											•

PERCENTAGE OF COMPANY COMMANDER RESPONSES FOR OPINION QUESTIONS (cont.)

,		¥ .		37 4 7 777 17 4	POUTD/	CEN 73-C-	7o∙2a_1	\			. •	,
	 1	. 1							0	10		
. 6	Total	13	23	8	43	. 44	70	11	09	€	15	
Disagree	BA	0	27	6	. 36	27	83	6.	20	8	4.	٠,
Dis	A	18	24	37	42	. 47	49	11	99•	79	11	
,	AA	18	18	,	50	5 ,	41	14	59	37	32	,
		. •			ů	: `	4.					,
	Total	7 8	43	34	. E	37	; 18	18	23	13	.41	,
Neither	BA	32	20	41	,46	53	8 . /	27.	36	18	41	•
Nei	¥	34	45	31	32	29,	က	13	13	۰ ∞	39	ı • •
	, AA	32,	8 8.	32.	, 27	32	45	18.	27	18	, 45 \	, . '
است	, H1					_			,			,
	Total	59	34	33	23	7 6	, 12	7.1	17	, 22 ,	`≈ 44	
9	BA	899	23	√ 20	18	.8 T	0	64	14	14	22	,
Agree	₩	38	31	32	26,	24	18	92	žı	13	20	73°4,
	AA 	20	20	1. 84	23	44	14	, 89	14	4 5	• ¤.	
ŕ		•	×		•	•						;
,		. If I were able to discipline recruits same as own children, I'd turn out better companies	. If only win one flag I'd want military.	Even if my company was best, I wouldn't win the competition	. Must be tougher with setbacks than with other recruits	Werse if man loses the co points in personal inspection than bag or locker inspection	. Men in co that brigades are better in fleet than men in co that doesn't brigade	. Generally I want to do what CO for recruit training thinks I should	. If 60 men'in company, every minute with one man is wasted 59 minutes	. The more flags I win, the better job I'm doing '	If I only win one flag, I'd want to win the academic flag	
*	:	, S	13.	14.	15.	16.	77	18.	19.	20.	21.	

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TABLE 6.

TABLE 6. PERCENTAGE OF COMPANY COMMANDER RESPONSES FOR OPINION QUESTIONS (cont.)

	,				NAVTR	AEQUIPCE	EN 73-C	-0129-	1		•		E'
	Total	44	ຸ ຕໍ	10	31	∞	32	₃ 1	53	25.	,	32	25
Disagree	BA	50	o .	ເນ	37	ທ	46	37	73	G	-	, G	.27
Dis	¥	47	0	ທ	34.	<i>ا</i> س	. 62	31	,	21.		. 39	29
	AA	32	6	23	18	× 	, 83	23	18	46	, `	41	18,
Neither	AA A BA Total	18 8 14 12°	5 0 0 1	4 3 9 5	5, 8 27, 12	5 3 4 4	9 24 36 23	18 8 18 13	14 - 16 23 17	18 11 9 12		27 29 3200 29	9 5 18 10
	Total	44	96	85,	22	• • 88	45	. 26	2 08	63		68	65).
Agree	BA	36	100	86	36	,	, 18	45	 4	88	•	59	55
Å	<u>*</u>	45	100	92	58	92	. 47	. 61	. 24	89		32	99
ł	AA 	, 50	86	.73	$\dot{77}$	* 77	68	59	. 89	36		32	73
•		22. First comes fear, then respect	23. All I want a recruit to do is try his best ,	24. What my company does reflects on me	25. If company loses lot of points it means I've done a lousy job	26. I feel w/some recruits a kick in butt more effective than marching party	27. A good CC feels he can brigade every time he pushes a company	28. During first days of training, best way to motivate co is thru fear	29. Important to me to brigade my co	30. Too many politics involved in selecting co that brigades	Job Satisfaction	31. Many things I do as CC checked unnecessarily by supervisors	32. I like actual work in being CC
		03	0	Ø	ΝΙ .	Ø	16	α,	ल।	ल ∤,	B.	iα.	й

TABLE 6. PERCENTAGE OF COMPANY COMMANDER RESPONSES FOR OPINION QUESTIONS (cont.

		}						•	•			L	*	
•			Agı	Agree	-		Ne	Nei ther	ا	,	ä	Disagree	ee	
		AA .	Ψ	BA	Total	AA	∀ .	BA	Total	AA	A	BA	Total	
33	One good thing being CC is deciding how to do own work	22	63	32	59	. 14	Ω,	27	. 13	• 6	32	41	8 8 7 8	
34.	I get enough info about how I'm doing in work as CC to allow me to correct errors and improve performance	٥; ن		20	95	22	. ∞ ,	14	15	71	21	36	23	24.4
35.	My work as CC interesting enough to talk about it w/people not involved.	83	, 44 ,	. 4. 	92	. 44	. 10	ົ	e;	Ar.	דו		; gr	,
36.	Being CC is job that allows mê continually learn something worthwhile	89	63	52	. 62	6	18	23	17	23	19	22	21	
37.	More companies I push, 'the more boring CC becomes	14	13	23	, 16	18	13	27	, 18	89	74	50	99,	
38.	I feel satisfied about way I get feedback about CC work	41	45.	98,	41	23	, 21	18	21	36	34	46	38	2 •
39.	Effort to do job\as CQ not worth it	23	13、	27	20	6	16	ß	11		, 11	68	69	
40.	Being CC won't affect anything in the long run	ດົ	ω ;	6	ග	14	, «	18	12	. 77	. 84	73	. 79	-
, 41.	Could accomplish more as CC if more freedom to determine how accomplish objectives	ວ	28	89	, 09 ₁	23	29	23	. 56	. 23	13	ຸ້ດ	41	•
42.	Parts of CC's job really don't make sense	55	89	68	, 65	14	21	, 83	20	33	11	ი	15	

ė

PERCENTAGE OF COMPANY COMMANDER RESPONSES FOR OPINION QUESTIONS (cont,) TABLE 6.

	-	İ	Ag	Agree		1	Nes	Nei ther			겁	Disagree	0	
	•	AA	V	BA	Total	AA	A	BA	Total	AA	∀	BĀ	Total	
	If I could reorganize work as CC, I could do job more effectively	32	, 34	36	. 34	45	37	. 59	45,	23	29	ស	21,	
44.	I often feel a cog in machinery and what I do doesn't matter much	£25.	26	41	32,	6	18	ָּדְר ,	15	. 59	56	45	53	
,	When pushing Co I often feel I waste my time because work is badly organized	8 F	. 21	55	5,0	14	26	18	. 23	, 89 •	ھ 53	27,	20°	•
,	46. When pushing Co I'm usually able to arrange own schedule w'regard to when things are done	89	, * (50 mg/s	35 /	54 ·	• 6	∞.	18	· 14	- 53 - 53	34	20	35	`
	Often feel trying to do my job as CC better gets me nowhere	23	34	36	350	41	16.	,32	. 71	. 73	50	32	51	
	When pushing a Co I often wish more freedom in work	73,	99	77	7.1	, 23	11	1.8	16	4.	23	ຸ່ ທີ່	13	•
	Actual work in being CC often distasteful to me	` ດ	42	45	. 34	ιo	18	18	15	86	, 40	37	. 51	
.05	Being CC is marking timetime on a temporary job	14	Î	23	.15	б •	œ	41		77	81	73	78	
	, Y				•	1		Ĺ						

Those questions in which the statement number is underlined (e.g., 6.) show a significant degree of association (χ^2 , df = 4, p<.05) between group classification and response category. Note:

To summarize briefly, the data discussed in this section indicated that, consistent with expectations, there were enormous variations in the ways that different company commanders have performed their jobs in the past and the way they intend to perform them in the future. The company commanders also differed greatly in their evaluations of specific behaviors and in their perceptions about the way relevant referents think they should perform. Although significant differences between company commanders judged to be above and below average did exist, these differences tended to be mainly in their general attitudes and opinions. There were, however, a few behaviors that tended to discriminate between the above-and below-average company commanders.



SECTION IV

ANALYSIS OF THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS

In addition to the summary analyses described above, several other analyses were conducted to test the theoretical assumptions concerning the relationships of attitudes and normative beliefs to the prediction of behavioral intentions. A principal components analysis with a varimax rotation was performed on the 35 behavioral intentions and on the 50 opinion items to determine the underlying dimensions of these measures.

As can be seen in table 7, seven factors for the behavioral intentions were specified which accounted for 51% of the total variance. factor loadings associated with each statement indicate the correlation between the statement and the specified factor. These values can range between -1.00 and +1.00 and can be interpreted in a similar fashion as the correlation coefficient. 'A negative value indicates that the statement is negatively related to the factor specified. For instance, looking at Factor'V in table 7, one can see that the intentions of "attending most instructor-conducted classes" and "setting aside time each week for recruit problems" are positively related to the factor specified. The intention of "taking away phone privileges as a form of discipline" is also related to the factor but in an inverse relationship, i.e., respondents indicated that they would not take away phone privileges and that they would attend most instructor-conducted classes and set aside time for recruit problems. The grouping of these three statements into one factor indicates an underlying dimension of concern for recruits.

Table 8 presents the eight factors (which accounted for 54% of the total variance) for the set of 50 opinion items. In dealing with these measures (behavioral intentions and opinions) the factors can now be utilized in lieu of the entire set of separate questions.

Consistent with our expectations, we found that company commanders' attitudes toward "Today's Navy," "New Recruits," "Being a Company Commander," "Pushing a Company," and "Trying to Brigade" were generally unrelated to their past behavior (see table 9) or their intentions of future behavior (see table 10). Thus, for example, knowledge of a company commander's attitude toward "Today's Navy" does not permit accurate prediction of whether he has or has not performed any of the 35 behaviors (e.g., the mean correlation of the absolute values of the coefficients between attitude toward "Today's Navy" and self-reported past behavior was .128) or whether he does or does not intend to perform any of these behaviors in the future (for example, the mean correlation of the absolute values of the coefficients between attitude toward "Today's Navy" and "future intentions" was .130).

TABLE 7. BEHAVIORAL INTENTIONS PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS (ROTATED) ANALYSIS

, · · · · ·	•
Factor	,
Loading .	
}	Factor I - Company Punishment and Beating the System
.81	Punish whole company if 3 recruits lost points in locker inspection
. 80	Punish whole company if 3 recruits lost points in personal inspection
.54	Allow recruits to finish fights among themselves
.54	Fake a beating with a recruit to scare company
.44 🕯	Try to "hide" recruit who would cost company points
.42	Allow company to use "cheating gear"
l	Factor II Dependence on Other's
*	
.79	Ask other company commanders to help teach infantry
* .77	Ask other company commanders for help with disciplinary problems.
.60	Select "setback" as RCPO
.59	Ask other CC to inspect company during primary training
.44	Immediately fire recruit PO who exceeds authority
.42	Requires company to study for tests 45 minutes each night
	×
	Factor III - Benevolent Supervision
.69	Be out of barracks by 1800 after "crossing bridge"
.67	Pre-inspect company on evaluation day
.60	Pre-check lockers prior to inspection
.55	Attend all smokers where my recruits are fighting
.41	Require company to study for tests 45 minutes each night



TABLE 7. BEHAVIORAL INTENTIONS PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS (ROTATED) ANALYSIS (cont.)

Factor Loading	
	Factor IV - Use of Recruit Petty Officers
.78	Back up recruit petty officer (PO) when he exceeds authority
.63	Allow petty officers to give PT as form of discipline
.52	Have more than 2 educational petty officers (EPO) in company
.51	Discipline recruits in front of company
.45	Tell recruits I don't believe in "setting back"
	Factor V - Concern for Recruits
.66	Attend most instructor-conducted classes
57	Take away phone privileges as a form of discipline
.55	Set aside time each week for recruit problems
	•
•	Factor VI - Academic Procedures
70	Allow EPO to handle most questions after TV class
.60	Learn names of every member of company
.53	Be ahead of schedule in teaching IG lessons
	Factor VII - Competition and Company Organization
63	Tell company I expect them to brigade
.51	Tell company brigading is not important
.50	Select some recruit officers at R & O
44	Be in barracks at reveille after "crossing bridge"
.41	Select toughest recruit for master-at-arms
~.4ì	Fake beating with recruit to scare company

£ \$

TABLE 8. OPINION ITEMS PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS (ROTATED) ANALYSIS

Factor	·
Loading	n
	Factor I - Personal Dissatisfaction with Job
87	Being company commander is job that allows me to continually learn something worthwhile
81	My work as a company commander is interesting enough to talk about it with people not involved in recruit training
71	I like actual work in being a company commander
.71	The more companies I push, the more boring being a company commander becomes
.68	Being a company commander won't affect anything in the long run.
58	I feel satisfied about the way I get feedback about my work
58	Being a company commander is marking timetime on temporary job
.58	I often féel trying to do my job as a company commander . better gets me nowhere
.55	Effort to do my job as company commander is not worth it
.50	I often feel like a cog in machinery and what I do doesn't matter much
.48	Actual work in being a company commander is often distasteful to me

TABLE 8. OPINION ITEMS PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS (ROTATED) ANALYSIS (cont.)

Factor Loading	Factor II - Politics
.69	Even if my company were the best, I wouldn't win the competition
. 65	Too many politics involved in selecting company that brigades ,
.56	Many things I do as company commander are checked unnecessarily by supervisors
52	Best company doesn't always brigade
.:48	If I were able to discipline recruits the same way as my own children, I'd turn out better companies
.48	If I can only win one flag I'd want it to be the academic flag
.41	If I can only win one flag I'd want it to be the athletic flag
.41	I feel my training affects a man all his life, not just during his Navy career
	Factor III - Toughness and Competition
.68	Tougher I act, better my company does
.66	It's important to me to brigade my company
.64	If I can only win one flag I'd want it to be the military flag
:62	Must be tougher with setbacks than with other recruits
.58	Men in company that brigades do better in the fleet than men, in company, that doesn't brigade
.50	The more flags I win, the better job I'm doing
.42	I don't mind beinding rules a little when I think it will help my company in the competition

TABLE 8. ÓPINION ITEMS PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS (ROTATED) ANALYSIS (cont.)

•	
actor	
Loading	Factor IV - Dissatisfaction with Organization of Job
.79	If I could reorganize the work as a company commander I could do the job more effectively.
.71	I could accomplish more as a company commander if I had more freedom to determine how to accomplish my objectives
.57	Some parts of a company commander's job really do not make sense
.54	When pushing a company I often wish I had more freedom in my work
. •49	Instructors of group dynamics should alert company commanders to problems observed in class
.47	When pushing a company I often feel I waste my time because work is hadly organized
.46	I often feel like a cog in machine and what I do doesn't matter much
.46	I often feel trying to do my job as a company commander better gets me nowhere
42	Military Evaluation Department inspectors are fair and impartial in evaluations
	Factor V - Fear
.63	During first few days of training the best way to motivate a company is through fear
.5 4	First comes fear, then respect
.54	If there are 60 men in my company, every minute with one man is a wasted 59 minutes
.47	Putting in effort to do job well as a company commander is not worth it
/ ·	

TABLE 8. OPINION ITEMS PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS (ROTATED) ANALYSIS (cont.)

actor	
oading ~	
	Factor VI - Personal Fraedom
= 10°4A	
.67	When pushing a company I'm usually able to arrange much of my own schedule with regard to when things are done
.62	I feel with some recruits a kick in the butt is more effective than a marching party
.58	· Way things are run nows recruit training is like a summer camp for kids
.52	All I want is for a recruit to do is to try his best
.45	One good thing about being a company commander is that I decide how to do my own work
69 ,	
	Factor VII - Performance Reflection on Company Commander
۰	ractor vii - Periormance neitection on Company Commander
.69	If company loses a lot of points it means I've done a lousy job
`. 65	What my company does reflects on me
-,58 ح	I feel whole company would benefit if I could take wiseguy out behind barracks every now and then
51	When RCPO is fired he should be transferred to another company
46	I don't mind beinding the rules a little when I think it will help my company in the competition
-	Factor VIII - Compliance
. 83	Generally I want to do what Military Training Officer thinks I should do
.62	Generally I want to do what commanding officer for recruit training thinks I should do
.48	I feel my training affects a man all of his life, not just during Navy career

TABLE 9. PEARSON-PRODUCT MOMENT CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR SELF-REPORT OF PAST BEHAVIORS AND GENERAL ATTITUDES

Pac	t Behaviors	Today's Navy	New Recruits	Being a CC	Trying to Brigade	Pushing a Company
1.	Asked other CC for help with disciplinary problems	067	.072	068	235	-,146
2.	Immediately fired recruit PO who exceeded authority	.065	042	014	'.001	.099
3.	Selected "setback" as RCPO	016	075	.084	.087	011
_4.	Told company I expect them to brigade	, 014 %	087	.209	.206	.044
5. ,	Taken phone privileges as form of discipline	075	145	251	207	252°
6.	Pre-checked lockers prior to inspection	150	.024	010	.031	027
7.	Been ahead schedule in teaching IG lessons	072	.012	.003	.023	Q39
8.	Allowed recruits to finish fights among themselves	121	037	237	017	170 %
· 9.	Asked other CC to inspect company during primary training	006	.122.	038	000	070
10.	Selected toughest recruit for master-at-arms,	.088	1,86	064	111	149
11.,	Attended all smokers where my recruits were fighting	.185	.276	.391	. 279	.428
12.	Used "Marching thru Georgia" as discipline	182	119	162	095	182
13.	Punished whole company if 3 recruits lost points in locker inspection	224	257	128	105	 190
14.	Punished whole company if 3 recruits lost points in personal inspection	219	269	131	079	199
•	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		•			

TABLE .9. PEARSON-PRODUCT MOMENT CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR SELF-REPORT OF PAST BEHAVIORS AND GENERAL ATTITUDES (cont.)

١	51)	Today's Navy	New Recruits	Being: a CC	Trying to Brigade	Pushing a Company
Past	Behaviors					
15.	Told company to ignore recruit as form of discipline	,097	.089	032	.078	.024
16.	Told recruits I'don't believe in "setting back"	.069	.206	.222	.115	.255
17.	Faked beating with recruit to scare company	296	068	028	.053	064
18.	Allowed POs to give physical training as form of discipline	- 124	.043	146	051	143
19.	Backed up recruit PO when exceeded authority	170	.047	058	064	062
20.	Asked other CC to help teach infantry	.098	;123	108	212	115
21.	Selected some recruit officers at R & O	289	<u>√256</u>	229	253	194
22.,	Used Sun. p.m. for infantry drill after "crossing bridge"	141	₹.050	071	÷.014	024
23.	Allowed company to use "cheating gear"	·211	124	.037	.098	007
24.	Attended most instructor conducted classes	.175	`.086	.095	.082	.132
25.	Allowed EPO to handle most questions after TV classes	123	065	075	141	006
26.	Set aside time each week for recruit problems	016	.127	.091	.036	.029
27.	Been out of barracks by 1800 after "crossing the bridge"	.171	.204	.192	.092	.233
28.	Required company to study for tests at least 45 minutes each night	.040	.089	086	.09.6	030



TABLE 9. PEARSON-PRODUCT MOMENT CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR SELF-REPORT OF PAST BEHAVIORS AND GENERAL ATTITUDES (cont.)

	Past	Behaviors	· Today's Navy	New Recruits	Being a CC	Trying to Brigade	Pushing a Company	* 5
\ }	29.	Been in barracks at reveille after "crossing, the bridge"	174	045	089	040	070	
	30.	Had more than 2 EPOs in company	.012	.174	.049	.091	.029	
٥.	.31.	Pre-inspected company on evaluation day	004	.312	.192	.224	.208	
	32.	Told company brigading is not important	044	084	160	·225	-\085	
	33.	Tried to-"hide" recruit who'd cost company points	<u>358</u>	<u>-°.247</u>	340	<u>-: 299</u>	342	
,	34.	Disciplined recruit in front of company	159	179,	211	114	229	
	35.	Learned names of every member of my company	188	.122	008 ⁻	043	105	
		Average Correlation	.128	. 129 -	.125	.112	127*	*

Note: N = 74, the correlation values underlined indicate $\rho \neq 0$, p <.05.

^{*} Average of absolute value of coefficient transformed by Fisher's r to Z.

NORMATIVE BELIEFS (ZNB(MC)), AND TRADITIONAL ATTITUDES AND EMPIRICAL REGRESSION WEIGHTS (Wo & W1) FOR THEORETICAL MODEL AND MULTIPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT (R) PREDICTIONS OF INFENTIONS FROM ATTITUDES TOWARDS BEHAVIORS (Aact) TABLE 10.

				,					_				
îp ! Eput	85"1	Push GmoD	228	600.	092	.083	-,136	044	-,161	.043	980*-	166	
with BI		Tryi Brig	-, 329	06é	, 1.098	.181	-,108	.039	094	.116	049	072	,
	18. 81	Bein	136	057	.019	91.	176	.023	.083	.043		049	•
Correlation	stiu	ием Ием	.058	:013	051	.060	022	.051	174	107	.151	- 286	
		sboT gvsM	043	.082	.205	304	111.	093	256	101	.017	014	
		-œ	.738	099	.626	.738	.641	.664	.592	.463	.750	.551	
		wı	.272	.052	.247	.034	., 179	920	.278	.140	2882	.121	
•		0	.559	.640	.482	.718	.511	. 689	380	.397	.592	488	
	Correlation with BI	NB (MC)	. 562	.268	.448	.437	.506	.184	.510	.274	.517	. 333	
	Correl with	Aact	.709	.657	584	.737	.626	099*	.550	• 444	.704	.540	•
	k	•	Asked other CC for help w/discipline problems	Immediately fired recruit PO who exceeded authority	Selected "se back" as RCPO	Told company I expect them to brigade	Taken phone privileges as form of discipline	Pre-checked lockers prior to inspection	Been ahead schedule in teaching IG lessons	Allowed recruits to finish fights among themselves	Asked other CC to inspect Co during primary training	Selected toughest recruit for master-at-arms	
			-1	8	က်	4.	ນ.	9	7.	&	.6	10.	

N=74, underlined correlation values indicate that $p\neq 0$, p<.05. For R values that are underlined, p<.05, df = 2/71. Note:

TABLE 10. PREDICTIONS OF INTENTIONS FROM ATTITUDES TOWARDS BEHAVIORS (A_{act}), NORMATIVE BELIEFS (ENB(MC)), AND TRADITIONAL ATTITUDES AND EMPIRICAL REGRESSION WEIGHTS (WO & W₁) FOR THEORETICAL MODEL AND MULTIPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT(R) (cont.)

	•	٠.									
-		Ризћа Сопрв	.157	070	058	` •000 • –	.038	.056	123	057	106
with BI		Trytı	.171	0002	037	.030	.068	.058	.092	055	-,039
	8 8	Being	.170	.022	,090	001	, 800°	.083	120	112	104
Correlation	sţţı	мем изея	.427	118	325	325	033	920.	234	.407	,109
	s,A	Toda	.100	123	272	263	146	162	-,409	169	240
		æ	. 565	.613	. 709	. 695	. 666	. 619	.671	. 824	.969
		, Ly	.384	.207	.181	.173	.236	.421	.020	.301	.240
		_≽ o	. 228	.502	.583	. 590	.521	301	. 662	.625	315
	Correlation with BI	· 2 NB (MC)	.540	.400	. 537	.479	. 482	. 558	.301	.630	.576
	Correls with	Aact	.491	. 582	.694	629	.632	.493	.671	.784	.672
•			Attended all smokers where my recruits fight	Used "Marching thru Ga." as discipline	Punish whole company if 3 recruits lost points in locker inspection	Punish whole company if 3 recruits lost points in personal inspection	Told company to ignore recruit as form of discip.	Told recruits I don't. believe in "setting back"	Faked beating with recruit to scare company	Allowed FOs to give physical training as form of discappline	Backed up recruit PO when he exceeded authority
			11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	18.	19.

TABLE 10. PREDICTIONS OF INTENTIONS FROM ATTITUDES TOWARDS BEHAVIORS (Aget), NORMATIVE BELIEFS (ENB(MC)), AND TRADITIONAL ATTITUDES AND EMPIRICAL REGRESSION WEIGHTS (wo & wl) FOR THEORETICAL MODEL AND MULTIPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT (R) (cont.)

					•						4	
	hing a		240	232	157	.038	.361	.044	.024	011.	.036	.245
with BI	ing to		312	7,184	148	.144	.326	.040	.048	.131	038	.152
Correlation v	ng a	Bei	202	188	218	.124.	.390	.012	.102	. 290	020	.217
.Corre	stļua	ием Вес	020.	064	048	.051	. 230	040	.088	.212	.105	.248
	2 t kg	boT vsM	.024	065	224	219	,164	038	. 090	015	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	.501
		ద	.634	.638	.720	.556	.603	.764	302.	.146	. 522	.517
.?	•	w ₁	,055	.108	.257	048	.218	.108	.189	980.	.117	-p85
	ı	∌ ^O	. 594	. 558	. 582	.573	.438	.704	. 560	660.	.481	.470
	Correlation with BI	ENB (MC)	.468	499	.477	.165	.501	460	.581	011.	.231	.31.8
	Corr	Aact	.632	. 633	629	. 555	.579	.758	.892	.120	.509	.512
			Asked other CC to help teach infantry	Selected some recruit officers at R & O	Used Sun. p.m. for infantry drill after "crossing bridge"	Allowed company to use "cheating gear"	Attended most instructor- conducted classes	Allowed BPO to handle most questions after TV classes	Set aside time each week for recruits problems	Been out of barracks by 1800 after "crossing bridge"	Required company to study for tests at least 45 min. each night	29. Been in barracks at reveille after "crossing bridge"
			20.	21.	22.	23.	24.	25.	26.	27.	28.	29.

TABLE 10. PREDICTIONS OF INTENTIONS FROM ATTITUDES TOWARDS BEHAVIORS (A_{BCt}), NORMATIVE BELIEFS (INB(MC)), AND TRADITIONAL ATTITUDES AND EMPIRICAL REGRESSION WEIGHTS (world) FOR THEORETICAL MODEL AND MULTIPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT (R) (cont.)

	,		NAV'I	raequ.	ipcen :	· 3~C~01	.29~1		٠. ,
	s Aring , Ynaqu		,092	.073	.108	072	190	010	* 80/
with BI	fgade Ving to		.169	.134	041	-:017	06 <u>4</u>	051	,10 7
	ម និបា	PGC BG	.044	.080	.114	088	115	.078	.103
Correlation	oruits.	Иел Вес	.185	192	.005	338	060.5	.071	.126
	ន ំបូនឯ បុរ	olt.	142	136	.079	-,232	176	° .031	.130
,		æ	.670	.720	.589	. 685	.741	.752	.641
	ųį	* *	.192	160*	.084		.155	.133	
,	*	»°	.567	699	.550	.689	.653	643	
}	ation	ENB(MC)	. 534	.434	.307	.170	.472	.638	.426
~	Correlation with BI	Aact	.683	.716	.584	.685	.729	.747	.620
2	<i>1</i>		Had more than 2 EPOs in company	Pre-inspected company on evaluation day	32. Told company brigading is not important	Tried to "hide" recruit who'd cost company points	Disciplined recruit in front of company	Learned names of every member of company	Average Correlation
	1.		, ,	. 31 .	32.	33.	34.	35.	

^{*} Average of absolute value of coefficient transformed by Fisher's r to Z.

Prediction of behavioral intentions was no better when attitude and job satisfaction scores (based on responses to the last 50 items of the questionnaire) were considered (see table 11). That is, company commanders who were satisfied with their jobs did not intend to behave very differently from company commanders who were not satisfied (the mean correlation between satisfaction and intention was .15). While there were relatively few differences in the behaviors and intentions of the most effective and least effective company commanders (as categorized by the RTC staff), these two groups differed greatly in some of their general attitudes, recruit training philosophies, and feelings of job satisfaction (see table 12).

In contrast to the above results, and also consistent with our theoretical expectations, prior performance was significantly related to future intentions (mean correlation = .59). Even more importantly, a company commanders' intention to perform (or not perform) any given behavior was highly predictable from (1) his attitude (Aact) toward performing the behavior (mean correlation = .62) and (2) his beliefs that relvant others (ΣNB(MC)) think he should or should not perform the behavior (mean correlation = .43). The mean multiple correlation between these two predictors and intentions was .64 (see table 10 for individual multiple correlation coefficient for each behavior). Although company commanders' intentions to perform a given behavior were more closely related to the expectations of others close to them in the chain of command (i.e., other company commanders) than to referents that are higher up in the chain (i.e., the MTO or the Commanding Officer), this does vary somewhat across different behaviors and thus the best predictor is a composite score based on the perceived expectations of all three referents.

In line with the theoretical predictions of this approach, the relationship between general attitudes and behavioral intentions can be increased by adopting a multiple-act measure of the behavioral intentions. A multiple-act measure of the behavioral intentions is provided by the principal components analysis in which the individual 35 behavioral intentions are grouped into seven factors. One can now look at the relationship between measures of attitude and these multiple-act measures (i.e., the seven factors) rather than each separate behavioral intention (a single act measure). The correlations between the attitudes (i.e., general measures and the factors of the opinion items) and the factors of the behavioral intentions are presented in table 11. As one can see, there is a stronger relationship among these multiple-act measures than among the single-act measures presented in table 10. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974.



Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. Attitudes towards objects as predictors of single and multiple behavioral criteria. <u>Psychological Review</u>, 1974, 81, 59-74.

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORAL INTENTIONAL FACTOR SCORES TABLE 11.

			Behavioral		Intentions Factors	8	-
,	·	II	III	IV	· »	VI	. VII
Attitudes	•			,		*	
Today's Navy	390	.126	015	312	018	056	.135
New Recruits	359	.043	.207	.116	.211	035	-,129
Being a Company Commander	. 020	114	.143	088	.294	· . 002	-,119
Trying to Brigade	.037	238	.176	900	.254	065	761
Pushing a Company	101	168	.116	-,085	.254	-,109	128
				***			•
Opinion Item Factors	•			,		1	
H	045	.211	081	085	429	•050	. 228
II	990	.210	047	080	- 039	.036	.356
· · · III	.314	111	.244	τοί·	.018	-,125	388
· AI	125	.148	.087	-,113	240	.111	179
Α	.351	.078	.183	013	222	.052	184
VI	306	302	*088	080*	090*-	081	.001
VII	.166	049	.276	109	047	.059	164
VIII	061.	018	.251	083	:173	-,068	.013

Note: Underlined correlation values indicate that p#o, p < .05.

TABLE 12. MEANS AND OVERALL GROUP DIFFERENCES, BY GROUPS, ON TRADITIONAL ATTITUDE MEASURES, BEHAVIORAL INTENTION FACTORS, AND OPINION QUESTIONS FACTORS

,	•	×	Ş .		
		Me	eans for Gr	oup	· <u>F</u>
		AA	A	BA ' '	
A. <u>A</u>	ttitude Measures	1	•	•	
Ţ	oday's Navy .	37.33	37.50	37.27*	1
N	ew Recruits	33.33	30.26	31.33	1
, B	eing a Company Commander	41.05	34.58	30.61	5,258**
T	rying to Brigade	40.50	32,44	29.27	5.883**
P	ushing a Company	40.50	34.42`	31,72	3,954*
, <u>B</u>	ehavioral Intentions		•		,
F	actor I	15.66	13.97	14.61	1
•	II	17.28	21.57	25.05	6.175**
	III	23.33	21.39	19.22	2.732
	IV	22,22	20.15	22.83	1.216
	v	11.50	10.89	10.83	1
	IУ	12.50	13.18	13.33	1
	vii	20.66	26.02	26.66	5.624**
	£		١.		
OI	pinion Items Factors		•		
Fε	actor I	9.72	15.10	17.05	6.926**
	II	26.27	32.78	36.72	11.810**
	III	22.05	15.63	13.83	9.525**
	IV .	21.50	22.26	26,00	4.152*
	v	14.94	13.82	12.88	. 1
	VI	28.44	27.18	23,55	4.222*
	VII	15.11	14.05	11.83	2.823
	VIII	11.33	11.37	11.05.	1

p < .05, df = 2/81p < .01, df = 2/81

These findings indicate that, consistent with our initial expectations, changes in specific behaviors are not likely to result from even a successful change in company commanders general attitudes, feelings of satisfaction, or overall (i.e., general) recruit training philosophies. Support for this position is indicated by the results reported in table 10. Thus, we know we don't want to develop programs directed at producing such changes (i.e., general attitudes or satisfaction) if our goal is to produce change in certain previously specified behaviors. However, we should be able to produce changes in specific behaviors by changing company commanders' attitudes toward the behavior in question and/or the perceptions of relevant others.

SECTION V

COMPANY COMMANDER EVALUATIONS

In seeking specific behaviors, and from our discussions with the staff at RTC, San Diego, the question of company commander evaluations was raised. The question of evaluations is directly linked to the concept of company commander effectiveness; in order to write a program of behavioral change training, the direction of the behavior change must be specified if one is to increase the effectiveness of the program user. This question of evaluation was also of concern to the company commanders themselves, as can be seen in their responses to the 50 opinion items (see table 6).

In order to obtain some idea of how these 82 company commanders were classified into the three groups of effectiveness, we performed a discriminant analysis on the factor scores of the seven factors of behavioral intentions and on the eight factors of the opinion items.

For the classification based on the behavioral intentions, two discriminant functions were specified. The first accounted for 80.5% of the variance and was found to be significant ($\chi^2 = 25.766$, df = 8, p<.01). The second function accounted for 19.5% of the variance and was not significant ($\chi^2 = 7.142$, df = 6, p>.05). The standardized discriminant weights for the first discriminant function were:

Factor	Weights
ı	1.326
II	-4.695
III	2.674
IV	0.468
v	Ò.701
VI	-1.788
ΔĬΙ,	-5.654

The group means on the first discriminant function were:

Group	Mean
,AA	0.896
Α -	-0.170
BA	-0.586

Statistical classification based on discriminant analysis:

	• •	Statistical	Classification	into Groups
	A-si med Crouns	AA	A	BA.
•	Assigned Groups	•	<u> </u>	
	Group AA (N=19)	. 10	\ 9	0
	Group A (N=38)	, 5	29	4
	Group BA (N=18)	1	11	6 ·
	,	(N=16)	(N=49)\	(N=10)

This procedure was used to designate the weights for each of the seven behavioral intentions factors which would maximally discriminate among the three previously formed groups (AA, A, BA). By using the obtained discriminant function, one can then, on the basis of statistical criterion, classify each individual into one of the three groups. As can be seen in the classification table above, the company commanders classified on the basis of the seven behavioral intentions factors fit fairly well into the groups which were specified by the RTC staff.

The classification based on the opinion items also specified two discriminant functions. The first function accounted for 92% of the variance and was significant ($\chi^2=46.705$, df = 9, p<.01). The second η function accounted for 8% of the variance and was not significant ($\chi^2=5.435$, df = 7, p>.05). The standardized discriminant weights for the first discriminant function were:

Factor	Weights
	2.638
ıı ·	5.279
ııı ·	-3.182
ıv	0.945
v	-2.988
vı	-2.658
· IIV	-1.705
VIII	-0.711

. The group means in the first discriminant function were:

	Group		Mean
	^AA		-1.074
	A	-	0.128
€,	BA		0.864



Statistical classification based on discriminant analysis:

Statistical Classification into Groups

Assigned Groups	AA	A	_BA_
Group AA (N=19)	9	10	0
Group A (N=38)	3	28	. 7
Group BA (N=18)	0	8	10
	(N=12)	(N=46)	(N=17)

The classification of company commanders on the basis of the opinion items factors showed high agreement with the subjective classification done by the RTC staff. The above-average group members were, by our procedure, classified into the AA and A groups only. The average group, which was composed of company commanders of a wider range of effectiveness (some above average and some below average), was classified primarily into the A group, with a few individuals being classified into both the AA and BA groups. No member of the below-average group was classified into the AA group. Thus, while one may expect some members to be reclassified by this procedure from their previously designated groups, no company commander was reclassified from the AA group to the BA group or from the BA group to the AA group on the basis of the opinion items factors.

As can be seen from these analyses, the classification into the effectiveness groups based on our data corresponded fairly well with the assignment of the RTC staff. In pursuing this aspect, we requested and were sent the feeder evaluations of company commanders' performance used at San Diego for the company commanders who responded to our questionnaire. A copy of this evaluation form can be found in Appendix E. Using the data on the evaluation forms, we performed a multiple regression analysis with the last item (item T) of overall evaluation as the criterion measure. Table 13 shows the standardized regression weights for each predictor variable. A step-wise multiple regression analysis was also performed which specified three predictors (company organization, company discipline, and administrative) and produced a multiple correlation of .941. As can be seen from the results of this analysis, using only the three predictors specified by the step-wise procedure resulted in an almost equivalent degree of prediction as compared to the use of all 19 predictors (R = 1954).

To better understand the underlying dimensions of this evaluation form a principle axis analysis was undertaken. Table 14 presents the three factors which emerged and the factor loadings; these factors account for 81% of the total variance. Looking at table 14 one can see that these separate judgments were highly related and loaded heavily on the first factor which may be labeled "general evaluation." The second factor was composed of "cooperativeness" (#4) and "reliability" (#5). The third



TABLE 13. MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS: PREDICTION OF OVERALL EVALUATION

	•	Standardized Weights
1.	Performance of Duty	.148
2.	Endurance	.100
3.	Personal Appearance	058
4.	Cooperativeness	014
5.	Reliability	.082
.6.	Initiative	265
· 7 .	Conduct .	105
8.	Potential *	, 221 *
9.	Resourcefulness	.071
10.	Leadership: Directing	.013
11.	Leadership: Counseling	185 ·
12.	Writing	012
13.	Speaking	064
14.	Company Organization	.160 ^a
15.	Company Discipline	.312 ^a **
16.	Infantry Evaluation	- 108
17.	Bag Evaluation °	.301
18.	Academic Evaluation	, .026
19.	Administrative	.335 ^a **
-		

Multiple Correlation = .954

Step-wise Multiple Correlation = .941

^{*} p < .05

^{**} p < .01

a variables entering into step-wise correlation

TABLE 14. PRINCIPAL AXIS ANALYSIS OF EVALUATION RATINGS (ROTATED)

3	1	/	ı .,	ú	ııı
1:	Performance of Duty	•	0.87860	0.28160	0.16801
2.	Endurance		0.84899	0.32433	-0.10265·
3.	· Personal Appearance		0.65543	0.44358	-0.11888
4.	Cooperativeness		.0.16796	, 0.93955	0.08596
5.	Reliability	•	0.29399	0.88478	-0.01037
6.	Initiative	,	0.88419	0.36444	0.05546
7.	Conduct		0.72098	0.40308	0.05289
8. '	Potential		0.84670	0.36894	0.02643
9.	Resourcefulness		0.89643	0.29047	0.06487
10.	Leadership: Directing	•	0.91891 •	0.25319	0.09182
11.	Leadership: Counseling		0.89325	0.30509	0,12825
12.	Writing		0,47404	0.37924	0.23402
13.	Speaking		0.72548	0,47338	-0.05543
14.	Company Organization	-	0.85786	0.28878	0.22407
15.	Company Discipline		0.88531	$0.\overset{'}{1}8329$	0.16667
16.	♥Infantry Evaluation		0.76896	0.03395	0.15767
17.	.Bag Evaluation		0.82552	0.14411	-0°.01991
18.	Academic Evaluation		0.12575	0.03171	0.95947
19.	Administrative	• *	0.88892	0.20080	0.11428
20.	Overall Evaluation	•	0.87351	0.25443	0.17182

factor found was the "academic" evaluation (#18) rating. Thus it appears that for these 20 judgments of performance there was quite a bit of interrelatedness among the separate judgments specified.

Using the responses from the evaluation form and the subjective ratings of the company commanders' effectiveness provided by the RTC staff, we next attempted to assess the relationship between the evaluation ratings and the initial classification into effectiveness groups. The results from these multiple regression analyses are presented in table 15.

These findings concerning the evaluations of company commanders are interesting and will be pursued in the future in conjunction with the staff at RTC, San Diego. By making these evaluations more objective and understandable to the company commanders, the distrust and dissatisfaction with the evaluation procedure may be reduced. Thus, by providing information concerning the evaluation process, the morale of the company commanders may be increased and facilitate behavioral changes for greater effectiveness.

TABLE 15. MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS: PREDICTION OF CLASSIFICATION OF COMPANY COMMANDERS BY EVALUATION RESPONSES

•			Standardized	Weights	
		2	·		
1.	Performance of Duty	•	042	.004	
2.	Endurance		+.219	.256	
3.	Personal Appearance		¬.020	034	
4.	Cooperativeness		+,010	.019	
5.	Reliability	*	+.149	.173	
″ 6 .	Iņitiatīve		910*	996	*
7.	Conduct		+.009	.039	
8.	Potential		116	058	
9.	Resourcefulness		+.426	.421	
10.	Leadership: Directing		+.610 ^a .	.627	
11.	Leadership: Counseling		+.126	.066	
12.	, Writing		004	009	
13.	Speaking	×	100	118	
14.	Company 'Organization		+.107	.165	
15.	Company Discipline	ı	+.054	.149	
16.	Infantry Evaluation		+.277	.306	
17.	Bag Evaluation		+.102	.112	
18.	Academic Evaluation		094	088	
19.	Administrative		574 *	450	
20.	Overall Evaluation		+.303		

^{*} p < .05

Multiple Correlation (20 variables) = 1.630

Multiple Correlation (19 variables) \neq .623

Stepwise Multiple Correlation (20 variables) = .494

Correlation between overall evaluation (item #20) and classification = .471



a variable entering into stepwise correlation

SECTION VI

PLATO MATERIALS

The purpose of these sets of analyses was to guide the direction of the PLATO programs to be written. The data discussed in the preceding pages supported the theoretical approach undertaken to investigate the attitude-behavior relationship. Thus, the attitude toward the behavior and the normative beliefs of relevant others were shown to be the most reliable factors to be dealt with in order to change specific behavioral intentions.

This emphasis was incorporated into the "behavioral intention" program. The structure of the program is schematically presented in figure 1. After a brief introduction to the function of the PLATO keyboard and to the program content in general, the user is asked to select from a specified list of 10 goals, 5 goals of which he considers to be important as a company commander. If the company commander does not feel that his most important goal is included in the list of 10 goals, he has the option of adding his most important goal to the list.

The next phase of the program assesses the user's behavioral intentions of 32 behaviors chosen from the list of 35 previously used in the questionnaire. It should be mentioned at this point that any number of behaviors could be substituted into this program without any difficulty. The program was written in a general fashion and a few minor changes are all that is required to change the content of or the number of the behaviors. Each intention is judged in relation to the expectation of (for the present) the MTO and internally labeled within the computer as a positive or negative instance. Again, it should be pointed out that the judgement of the intention could be in relation to the expectation of any member of. the RTC staff, or any combination of members. Since the Captain and the MTO did not disagree on the performance or nonperformance of any of these 32 behaviors as assessed by a questionnaire given to the RTC staff, all feedback is worded in regard to the MTO. Those behaviors in which the intention positively matches the MTO's expectation are eliminated from the pool of behaviors for future use. Those intentions which negatively matches the MTO's expectations are coded for future use within the program.

Each behavior which was coded as a negative instance (i.e., the intention did not match the MTO's expectation) is then presented individually and the company commander is asked to relate the attainment of his goals to the performance or nonperformance of the specified behavior. The number of goals specified to be enhanced by the performance of the behavior is then compared to the number of goals inhibited by the performance of the behavior and, on the basis of this comparison, the behavior is coded for further feedback. The company commander is then asked to give his judgment of the MTO's expectation of the behavior and then, on the basis of this expectation and of the goal comparison, one of three forms of feedback is then given. The feedback is in the form of a motivating response




Figure 1. FLOW CHART OF BEHAVIORAL INTENTION PROGRAM

in which the company commander is asked to consider his intention in light of his goals and also the MTO's expectation. By making the company commander aware of the consequences of his intention and of the MTO's expectation, a change in his behavioral intention should occur in the direction as specified by the RTC staff.

At the completion of these negative instances, the company commander is asked about his perception of the agreement between the MTO and the CO concerning the set of behavioral expectations. Feedback is then presented indicating the perfect agreement between the MTO and the CO. At this point in the program the mission of RTC is presented on the screen and the company commander is instructed to consider his intentions in conjunction with the mission. The set of 32 behaviors are then presented again for a reassessment of the behavioral intention to perform or not perform the behavior. All responses made by the company commander are stored in computer variables so that subsequent analyses can be performed. This program will be revised to some degree during the next year and field tested for effectiveness.

A second program was also developed which grew out of the evaluation work. In discussing how evaluations were performed, one individual of the RTC staff mentioned a set of 12 criteria that he personally used in evaluating company commander performance. In looking at this list, it appeared that some overlap may have existed among the criteria and that the evaluation judgment could be made using some subset of these 12 criteria. A program was written in which profiles of company commanders were generated by the computer using each of the 12 criteria. For each profile a single judgment of overall evaluation was requested and subsequently stored. Of the 40 such profiles presented, the first 10 profiles and the last 10 profiles are exactly the same in order to assess the reliability of the user's judgments. After the 40 profiles are judged, feedback in the form of correlation coefficients are presented indicating the reliability of the judgments and the relationship between each of the 12 criteria individually and the overall evaluation judgment. The feedback is explained and then 20 additional profiles are presented, after which additional feedback on the second set of profiles is given. This program was written to test whether the 12 criteria were independently used in making evaluation ratings of company commanders. The same individual of the RTC staff who provided the list of criteria went through the program in order to provide us with information about how these 12 criteria were related to his overall judgment of company commander performance. Using this information as a basis, we then revised the program to present profiles with only 6 of the original 12 criteria.

At this point in time, the program is designed for a company commander to make his own judgments of the profiles and then to compare his feedback with that of the MTO and CO'in order to see how and where his use of the criteria differs from those who actually evaluate him. The intent of this program is to provide the company commander with relevant



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information on how he is evaluated and to point out, through the feedback, misperceptions in the evaluation process. This program is also very flexible in that the number and/or the criteria can easly be changed, as well as the relevant others who are used for feedback purposes. A computer like the PLATO System is very necessary for this type of program in that the computer stores and manipulates a great deal of data in order to produce immediate feedback to the program user. Major revisions are planned in the next year to improve the usefulness of this program.

These two PLATO programs utilize the unique capabilities of a computer system in that complex branching and data manipulation is performed on-line in an interactive manner with the user. Both programs also have the capability of being easily revised to change the behaviors or criteria if so desired. The effectiveness of these programs for behavioral change training will be evaluated in the next year.





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Appendix A

QUESTIONNAIRE ADMINISTERED TO COMPANY COMMANDERS

San Diego, California - January, 1974.



Company Commander Questionnaire

Form i

1974



ir	Please answer the following questions by filling in the appropriate aformation.
1.	Age
2.	Rate Rating
3.	Number of years in the Nevy
4.	How many companies have you pushed?
5.	Have any of your companies brigaded? Yes No II yes, how many?
° 6.	Which state did you grow up in?
	' For the following questions, answer by checking the appropriate letter.
7.	What is the population of your hometown?
	A. Less than 1,000
	B. 1,000 to 5,000
	C. 5,001 to 20,000
	D. 20,001 to 50,000
	E. 50,001 to 100,000
	F. 100,001 to 500,000
	G. More than 500,000
١	as more than 500,000
8.	What is your educational level?
••	
•	A. Grammar school only
	B. Some high school
	C. High school graduate
	D. Junior college graduate
	E. Some college
	F. College graduate
_	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
9.	What is your marital status?
	A. I have never been married
	B. I am married
	C. I am divorced and not remarried
	D. I am legally separated
	E. I am a widower
	•
10.	If you are married answer this question, otherwise skip it
	How does your wife feel about your being in the Navy?
	A. She is happy that I am in the Navy and proud that I have chosen
	it as a career
	B. She is happy I am in the Navy and would be proud if I did choose
,	it as a career
	C. She has no strong feelings about my being in the Navy
	D. She is satisfied that I am in the Navy now but would not want me
	to make it a career
٠	
•	E. She is unhappy that I ever joined the Navy

ERIC

11.		the single most important reason why you initially joined the Navy?
	A.	Career opportunities looked better than in civilian life
	В.	For travel, adventure, new experience
	c.	Opportunity for advanced education, professional, or technical skills
	D.	Wanted to fulfill my military obligation at a time and in the
		service of my choice rather than be drafted
	T	Wanted to serve my country
	F	Interest in the sea, and/or shipboard life Interest in flying or astronautics For a position with responsibility and dignity
	ر ي جست	Interest in flying or astronautics
. •	U.	For a nocition with responsibility and dignity
		For a secure position with promotions and favorable retirement
•	I.	For a secure position with promotions and involuble retilement
	<i>_</i>	benefits
	J.	Some other reason: State your reason here
	,	
	•	r s
12.	•	our current service plans?
,		eligible for retirement now and:
•		Plan to leave active duty as soon as possible .
•		Undecided about reenlisting in the Navy
	c.	Plan to reenlist but not sure about staying until retirement
•	p.	Plan to stay until retirement
	Lam elie	ible for retirement now and:
	E.	Plan to retire with 20 years or less of active service (counting
	******	constructive time)
	73	Plan to retire with more than 20 years but less than 30 years of
	F.	
	_	active service
	G.	Plan to retire with 30 or more years of active service (if
		authorized)
	н.	Undecided as to when I will retire
13.	If you are	a career Petty Officer, or plan to be, what were the reasons for
	your decis	ion?. State the one most important reason for your decision.
	A.	Limited opportunity to use my skills and abilities in a vocation
		of my choice in the civilian community
	B.	Job security
	c.	Promotion opportunity
		Retirement benefits and the opportunity to retire after 20 years
		of service
	E.	Pay, allowances and fringe benefits (medical, commissaries and
•		exchanges, etc.)
	F.	Opportunity to travel, including PCS (accompanied tour) in various
		national and international locations
	G.	Opportunity for interesting and challenging assignments
		Belonging to an organization I can be proud of
	н.	Opportunity for additional technical training
	I.	
,	J.	Other reason: State your reason here
14.	How do car	eer opportunities in the Navy compare with those in civilian life,
	considerin	g all factors which are important to you in choosing a career?
•	. А.	Career opportunities in the Navy are better than in civilian life
	В.	Career opportunities in the Navy are the same as in civilian life
•	c.	Career opportunities in the Navy are worse than in civilian life
0	D.	No opinion
D I	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	no openion

ERIC

/			
15.	b. Where would you prefer to live?		•
	A. Among military people on-hase		
	R Among military people off-base		
	B. Among military people off-base C. In the civilian community		
	t. In the civilian community	*	•
	D. Makes no difference where I live	' .	*
16.		d active duty in	the Navy?
	A. Intended to make the Navy my career	-	
	B. Was undecided and was waiting to see how. C. Hadn't thought about it	w well I would 1:	ike the Navy
	C Hadn't thought phout it		•
	D. Intended to fulfill my military obligat:	ion(s) only	•
	D. Intended to Idillia my million, obligation	ronto, ourl	
17.	would do the most to make Naval service more attract A. Expand opportunity to use off-duty education pace, USAFI, In-Service-GI Bill, etc.) B. Improve living conditions aboard ship C. Less frequent permanent change of station and the condition packed of the condition	on (PCS) moves ors, both ashore	a carcer? Fuition Aid, and at sea
•	cannot be provided G. Make pay, allowances, and retirement equal or industry H. Improve leadership and supervision I. Give enlisted men more influence on choice of the control of the	ice of geographic	cal location
•	G. Make pay, allowances, and retirement equor industry H. Improve leadership and supervision I. Give enlisted men more influence on choice.	ice of geographic	cal location
•	G. Make pay, allowances, and retirement equal or industry H. Improve leadership and supervision I. Give enlisted men more influence on choice. J. Provide sea pay (\$15 to \$115) based on converse of sea duty	ice of geographic	cal location
•	G. Make pay, allowances, and retirement equal or industry H. Improve leadership and supervision I. Give enlisted men more influence on choice. J. Provide sea pay (\$15 to \$115) based on control of the control of th	ice of geographic	cal location
•	G. Make pay, allowances, and retirement equal or industry H. Improve leadership and supervision I. Give enlisted men more influence on choice. J. Provide sea pay (\$15 to \$115) based on converse of sea duty	ice of geographic	cal location
,	G. Make pay, allowances, and retirement equal or industry H. Improve leadership and supervision I. Give enlisted men more influence on choice. J. Provide sea pay (\$15 to \$115) based on converse of sea duty K. Other change: State the change here	ice of geographic	cal location
18.	G. Make pay, allowances, and retirement equal or industry H. Improve leadership and supervision I. Give enlisted men more influence on choice. J. Provide sea pay (\$15 to \$115) based on converse of sea duty K. Other change: State the change here. B. What is your present pay grade?	ice of geographic	cal location
18.	G. Make pay, allowances, and retirement equal or industry H. Improve leadership and supervision I. Give enlisted men more influence on choice. J. Provide sea pay (\$15 to \$115) based on converse of sea duty K. Other change: State the change here. B. What is your present pay grade?	ice of geographic	cal location
18.	G. Make pay, allowances, and retirement equal or industry H. Improve leadership and supervision I. Give enlisted men more influence on choice. J. Provide sea pay (\$15 to \$115) based on converse of sea duty K. Other change: State the change here	ice of geographic	cal location
18.	G. Make pay, allowances, and retirement equal or industry H. Improve leadership and supervision I. Give enlisted men more influence on choice. J. Provide sea pay (\$15 to \$115) based on converse of sea duty K. Other change: State the change here. B. What is your present pay grade?	ice of geographic	cal location
18.	G. Make pay, allowances, and retirement equal or industry H. Improve leadership and supervision I. Give enlisted men more influence on choice. J. Provide sea pay (\$15 to \$115) based on converse of sea duty K. Other change: State the change here. A. E-1 B. E-2 C. E-3	ice of geographic	cal location
18.	G. Make pay, allowances, and retirement equal or industry H. Improve leadership and supervision I. Give enlisted men more influence on choice. J. Provide sea pay (\$15 to \$115) based on or yrs) of sea duty K. Other change: State the change here. A. E-1 B. E-2 C. E-3 D. E-4	ice of geographic	cal location
18.	G. Make pay, allowances, and retirement equal or industry H. Improve leadership and supervision I. Give enlisted men more influence on choice. J. Provide sea pay (\$15 to \$115) based on converse of sea duty. K. Other change: State the change here. A. E-1 B. E-2 C. E-3 D. E-4 E. E-5	ice of geographic	cal location
18.	G. Make pay, allowances, and retirement equal or industry H. Improve leadership and supervision I. Give enlisted men more influence on choice. J. Provide sea pay (\$15 to \$115) based on converse of the sea duty K. Other change: State the change here. B. E-1 B. E-2 C. E-3 D. E-4 E. E-5 F. E-6	ice of geographic	cal location
18.	G. Make pay, allowances, and retirement equal or industry H. Improve leadership and supervision I. Give enlisted men more influence on choice. J. Provide sea pay (\$15 to \$115) based on or yrs) of sea duty K. Other change: State the change here. B. E-1 B. E-2 C. E-3 D. E-4 E. E-5 F. E-6 G. E-7	ice of geographic	cal location
18.	G. Make pay, allowances, and retirement equal or industry H. Improve leadership and supervision I. Give enlisted men more influence on choice. J. Provide sea pay (\$15 to \$115) based on converse of the sea duty K. Other change: State the change here. B. E-1 B. E-2 C. E-3 D. E-4 E. E-5 F. E-6	ice of geographic	cal location
18.	G. Make pay, allowances, and retirement equal or industry H. Improve leadership and supervision I. Give enlisted men more influence on choice. J. Provide sea pay (\$15 to \$115) based on or yrs) of sea duty K. Other change: State the change here. B. E-1 B. E-2 C. E-3 D. E-4 E. E-5 F. E-6 G. E-7	ice of geographic	cal location
18.	G. Make pay, allowances, and retirement equal or industry H. Improve leadership and supervision I. Give enlisted men more influence on choice. J. Provide sea pay (\$15 to \$115) based on or yrs) of sea duty K. Other change: State the change here. B. E-1 B. E-2 C. E-3 D. E-4 E. E-5 F. E-6 G. E-7 H. E-8	ice of geographic	cal location
18.	G. Make pay, allowances, and retirement equor industry H. Improve leadership and supervision I. Give enlisted men more influence on choice. J. Provide sea pay (\$15 to \$115) based on converse years) of sea duty K. Other change: State the change here. B. E-1 B. E-2 C. E-3 D. E-4 E. E-5 F. E-6 G. E-7 H. E-8 I. E-9	ice of geographic	cal location
-	G. Make pay, allowances, and retirement equor industry H. Improve leadership and supervision I. Give enlisted men more influence on choice. J. Provide sea pay (\$15 to \$115) based on or yrs) of sea duty K. Other change: State the change here. B. E-1 B. E-2 C. E-3 D. E-4 E. E-5 F. E-6 G. E-7 H. E-8 I. E-9 What is your present enlistment and/or extension st	ice of geographic	cal location
-	G. Make pay, allowances, and retirement equor industry H. Improve leadership and supervision I. Give enlisted men more influence on choically. Provide sea pay (\$15 to \$115) based on converse of sea duty K. Other change: State the change here K. Other change: State the change here A. E-1 B. E-2 C. E-3 D. E-4 E. E-5 F. E-6 G. E-7 H. E-8 I. E-9 What is your present enlistment and/or extension st A. First enlistment	ice of geographic	cal location
-	G. Make pay, allowances, and retirement equor industry H. Improve leadership and supervision I. Give enlisted men more influence on choice. J. Provide sea pay (\$15 to \$115) based on order yrs) of sea duty K. Other change: State the change here. K. Other change: State the change here. A. E-1 B. E-2 C. E-3 D. E-4 E. E-5 F. E-6 G. E-7 H. E-8 I. E-9 What is your present enlistment and/or extension st A. First enlistment B. Extension of first enlistment	ice of geographic	cal location
-	G. Make pay, allowances, and retirement equor industry H. Improve leadership and supervision I. Give enlisted men more influence on choich of the control	ice of geographic	cal location
-	G. Make pay, allowances, and retirement equor industry H. Improve leadership and supervision I. Give enlisted men more influence on choice. J. Provide sea pay (\$15 to \$115) based on order yrs) of sea duty K. Other change: State the change here. B. E-1 B. E-2 C. E-3 D. E-4 E. E-5 F. E-6 G. E-7 H. E-8 I. E-9 What is your present enlistment and/or extension st A. First enlistment B. Extension of first enlistment C. Second enlistment D. Extension of second enlistment	ice of geographic	cal location
-	G. Make pay, allowances, and retirement equor industry H. Improve leadership and supervision I. Give enlisted men more influence on choich of the control	ice of geographic	cal location



20.	Do you have a full or part-time	civilian job after duty h	ours?	?
	A. No, have no desire to	•		•
	B. No, but would like to			
	C. Yes, primarily in order	er to make ends moet		
	D. Yes, for various other	reesons		
		• '	,	
21.	My shore duty assignment as a con	npany commander was:		
٠.	A. A voluntary request	,		
	B. The better alternative	from the choices offered	l to	me
	C. The only reasonable as	signment offered		
	D. I was ordered to this	assignment.	1	1
				٠,



**	On th	e next	two p	ages v	e are	going	to as	k you t	o rate ce	rtain	•
asp	ects of	your	job or	scale	s wit	h sever	inte	rvals s	uch as:		
7	· go	od	_:		_:_	:	<u> </u>	::	bad	•	,
	, ea	sy	_:			:_	` :		diffic	ul§,	
The								follows		•	
EAS'		mely qu	ilte s	lightl	y nei	ther sl	ightl	quite	extremel	DIFFIC y	CULT
									t best de		
									ing stati		
	Diego,			marks	as fo	llows:			ightly di	fficul	then
						IONED I			4	. /	
	go	od	: X	_:	_:	_:		_:	_ bad .		
	· ea	sy	.:	_:	_:	: <u>x</u>	_:	_:	_ difficu	1 t	
1)									owing poi		ries.
•		this					not this	*			
٠		<u> </u>		_:	:_	:	x		,		7
2)	Be sur	e you d	ill c	ut eve	ry qu	estion	on the	page •	do not	omit any	<u>7</u> •
3)	Never-			-							

TODAY'S NAVY

Ğood	: <u>-</u>	:	:_		:_		Bad
Wise,	:		·:	:_	<u> </u>	:	Foolish '
Beneficial	:	:	:	:		:_	Harmful
Rewarding			:	. :	:	:	Punishing
Pleasant	•			:	:	•	Unpleasant
					. :		Vnintelligent
Intelligent		*	·~	,·			Not Satisfying
Satisfying		*	·			`	Difficult
Easy	:_	:_	:_	:		<u> </u>	

NEW RECRUITS

					_		•
Good		:_	· ·	:_		:	Bad
Wise	:	:	:	·:	:		Foolish
Beneficial	-	:	:		:	:	Harmful
					:	:	Punishing
Rewarding					,		Unpleasant
Pleasant		:			*		Unintelligent
Intelligent		:					ű
Satisfying	:_	:_	∴:		:	;	Not Satisfying
Easy		:_	:_	:_	:_		Difficult

BEING A COMPANY COMMANDER

Good	:_	:_				:	, Bad
. Wise		<i>o</i> .	:	:		<u> </u>	.Foolish
Beneficial			· .		;	:	Harmful
Rewarding			:	:_		:	Punishing
Pleasant	•	<u>.</u>		:	:	:	Unpleasant
Intelligent			:_		. ?	:	Unintelligent
Satisfying		E; \	<u>.</u> :	:		:	Not Satisfying
Easy	·		· •	:		:	Difficult
		Tryi	NG TO	BRIGAD	E	-	- -
Good _		:		:	:_	-	Bad
Wise		:_	<u></u> :	:		:	Foolish
Beneficial			:_	:			
Rewarding		<u> </u>	<u></u> ;				Punishing
Pleasant	•	:	<u>.</u> :		:		Unpleasant
ntelligent	<u> </u>	:	;	·:	·:	:	Unintelligent
Satisfying		<u>:</u>	:	_:	·	·	Not Satisfying
Easy	:	:	:		•		Difficult
•	P	usėing	A COM	ipany			
Good	:	_:	:		:		Bad
Wise	:	:	:	_:		:	Foolish
Beneficial	· • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	_:	:		:		Harmful
Rewarding	:	_:	_:	:	:		Punishing
Pleasant	<u>.</u>	_:	_:		_:	_:	Unpleasant
ntelligent	:	_:	_:	_:		_:	Unintelligent
Satisfying	·:	_:	_:				Not Satisfying
Easy	:	_:	_:	<u> </u>	_:		_ Difficult
		` ~,	65	69			_

On the next four pages we're going to ask you about your past
performance of, and future intentions concerning, a set of behaviors
that Company Commanders may or may not engage in. That is, first we will
ask you whether you ${\text{have}}$ or ${\text{have not}}$ performed each behavior (in the past)
and then we will ask you if you intend to perform the behavior with your
next company. For these latter judgments you will use the following seven
place scale.
I intend to:_:_:_:_ I do not intend to perform
behavior X
The seven intervals should be interpreted as follows:
I intend to : : : : : I do not in- extremely quite slightly don't slightly quite extremely tend to certain certain know, certain certain For example, if you are quite certain that you do not intend to perform
behavior X with your next company, you should place your mark as follows:
I intend to : : : : X : I do not intend to perform
behávior X
Again, please remember to
1) Place your checkmarks in the middle of spaces, not on the boundaries.
not /
this this
. X : X
2) Be sure you fill out every question on the page - do not omit any.

3) Never put more than one checkmark on a single scale.



	• •	have	have r	io t
ia.	1	distributions	***************************************	asked other Company Commanders for help with disciplinary problems
2.	I	•	**************************************	immediately fired a recruit petty officer who exceeded his authority
3.	I			selected a "setback" as my R.C.P.O.
4.	I	***************************************		told my company that I expect them to brigade
5.	I	· .		taken away phone privileges as a form of discipline
6.	I		-	pre-checked all lockers prior to inspection
7.	,I'		-	been ahead of schedule in teaching the I.G. lessons
	I		-	allowed recruits to finish fights that they start among themselves
9. :	I.		, 	asked other Company Commanders to inspect my company during primary training
10.	I.		***********	selected the toughest looking recruit for my master-at-arms
3 1.	1.			attended all smokers where one of my recruits was fighting
12.	I.			used "Marching to Georgia" as a form of discipling
13.	I.		emeritarinistansis	punished the whole company when 3 recruits have lost points in locker inspection
14.	Ι.	4	-	punished the whole company when 3 recruits have lost points in personal inspection
15.	ı.			told the company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline
16.	I.	`	***************************************	told my recruits that I don't believe in "setting back"
17.	I .		-	faked a beating with a recruit in order to scare the company
18.	I .	· ·		allowed my recruit petty officers to give physical training (such as push-ups and jumping janks) as a form of discipline
19.	I -	villaineman,	Quarteris tan	backed up a recruit petty officer when he exceeded his authority
20.	ı	<u>.</u> ,		asked other Company Commanders to help me teach infantry
D 1.	I _		سينسه	selected some recruit officers at R and O
22.	I	•	årdstylen.vis.a	used Sunday afternoons for infantry drill after "crossing the bridge"

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		have 2	have	not
23.	I	***************************************		allowed my company to use "cheating gear"
24.	I	-	***********	attended most instructor conducted classes
25.	I	******	*********	allowed my E.P.O. to handle most questions after T.V. classes
26.	I	 ,	**	set aside a specific time period each week to handle recruit problems
27.	I	***************************************		been out of the barracks by 1800 hours after "crossing the bridge"
28.	I		********	required my company to study for their academic tests for at least 45 minutes a night
29.	Ţ	•	*********	been in the barracks at or before reveille after "crossing the bridge"
30.	I		Minor all agreements	had more than 2 E.P.O.'s in one company
31.	I		******	pre-inspected my company on evaluation days
32.	I	-	•	told my company that brigading is not important
33.	I	· ·		tried to "hide" a recruit who might cost the company points
34.	I,		*********	disciplined recruits in front of the whole company
5.	I.	·	-	learned the names or nicknames of every member of my company

.1	. I intend to : : : : : I do not intend to ask other Company Commanders for help with disciplinary problems
2,	I intend to : : : : : I do not intend to immediately fire a recruit petty officer who exceeds his authority
. 3.	I intend to : : : : : I do not intend to select a "setback" as my R.C.P.O.
4.	I intend to : : : : : I do not intend to tell my company that I expect them to brigade
5.	I intend to : : : : : I do not intend to take away phone privileges as a form of discipline
6.	I intend to : : : : : I do not intend to pre-check all lockers prior to inspection
7.	I intend to : : : : I do not intend to be ahead of schedule in teaching the I.G. lessons
8.	I intend to : : : : : : I do not intend to allow recruits to finish fights that they start among themselves
9.	I intend to : : : : I do not intend to ask other Company Commanders to inspect my company during primary training
10.	I intend to : : : : I do not intend to select the toughest looking recruit for my master-at-arms
11.	I intend to : : : : : I do not intend to attend all smokers where one of my recruits is fighting
12.	I intend to : : : : : I do not intend to use "Marching to Georgia" as a form of discipline
13.	I intend to : : : : I do not intend to punish the whole company when 3 recruits have lost points in locker inspection
14.	I intend to : : : : I do not intend to punish the whole company when 3 recruits have lost points in personal inspection
15.	I intend to : : : : : I do not intend to tell the company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline
16.	I intend to : : : : : I do not intend to tell my recruits that I don't believe in "setting back"
17.	I intend to : : : : : I do not intend to fake a beating with a recruit in order to scare the company
18.	I intend to : : : : : I do not intend to allow my recruit petty officers to give physical training (such as push-ups and jumping jacks) as a form of discipline

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19.	I intend to : : : : : I intend not to back up a recrust petty officer when he exceeds his authority
20.	I intend to : : : : : I intend not to ask other Company Commanders to help me teach infantry
21.	I intend to : : : : : I intend not to select some recruit officers at R and O
22.	I intend to : : : : : I intend not to use Sunday afternoons for infantry drill after "crossing the bridge"
23.	I intend to : : : : : I intend not to allow my company to use "cheating gear"
24.	I intend to : : : : : : : I intend not to attend most instructor conducted classes
25.	I intend to : : : : : : I intend not to allow my E.P.O. to handle most questions after T.V. classes
26.	I intend to : : : : : I intend not to set aside a specific time period each week to handle recruit problems
27.	I intend to : : : : ! ! I intend not to be out of the barracks by 1800 hours after "crossing the bridge"
28.	I intend to : : : : : : I intend not to require my company to study for their academic tests for at least 45 minutes a night
29.	I intend to : : : : : I intend not to be in the barracks at or before reveille after "crossing the bridge"
30.	I intend to : : : : : : I intend not to have more than 2 E.P.O.'s in one company
31.	I intend to : : : : : : I intend not to pre-inspect my company on evaluation days
32.	I intend to : : : : : I intend not to tell my company that brigading is not important
33.	I intend to : : : : : I intend not to try to "hide" a recruit who might cost the company points
34.	I intend to : : : : : : I intend not to discipline recruits in front of the whole company
35.	I intend to : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :



and make thing we want to know is whether you personally reer that
performing each of these behaviors is good or bad. Once again, we will
use a seven interval scale where the intervals should be interpreted as
follows:
Good : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
Thus, for example, if you personally feel that performing behavior X
is extremely good, you should place your checkmark as follows:
Performing behavior X is Good X: : : : : : Bad

1.	Asking other Company Commanders for help with disciplinary problems is
,	good:_:_:_bad
2.	Immediately firing a recruit petty officer who exceeded his authority is good:: bad
' 3.	Selecting a "setback" as my R.C.P.O. is
	good bad
4.	Telling my company that I expect them to brigade is good : : : : : bad
5.	Taking away phone privileges as a form of discipline is good : : : : bad
6.	Pre-checking all lockers prior to inspection is good : : : : bad
7.	Being shead of schedule in teaching the I.G. lessons is good : : : : bad
8.	Allowing recruits to finish fights that they start among themselves is good : : : : : bad
9.	Asking other Company Commanders to inspect my company during primary training is
•	good : : : : bad
10.	Selecting the toughest looking recruit for my master-at-arms is good : : : : bad
11.	Attending all smokers where one of my recruits is fighting is good : : : : : bad
12.	Using "Marching to Georgia" as a form of discipline is good : : : : bad
ì3.	Punishing the whole company when 3 recruits have lost points in locker inspection is good : : : : : bad
14.	Punishing the whole company when 3 recruits have lost points in personal inspection is good : : : : bad
15.	Telling the company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline is good : : : : bad
16.	Telling my recruits that I don't believe in "setting back" is good : : : : bad
17.	Faking a beating with a recruit in order to scare the company is good bad
18.	Allowing my recruit petty officers to give physical training (such as push-ups and jumping jacks) as a form of discipline is
a	good : : : : bad
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19.	Backing up a recruit petty officer when he exceeds his authority is good
20.	Asking other Company Commanders to help me teach infantry is good bad
21.	Selecting some recruit officers at R and O is good bad
22.	Using Sunday afternoons for infantry drill after "crossing the bridge" is good : : : : : bad
23.	Allowing my company to use "cheating gear" is good : : : : bad
24.	Attending most instructor conducted classes is good:: bad
25.	Allowing my E.P.O. to handle most questions after T.V. classes is good;
26.	Setting aside a specific time period each week to handle recruit problems is good:: bad
27.	Being out of the barracks by 1800 hours after "crossing the bridge" is good:_:_:_bad
28.	Requiring my company to study for their academic tests for at least 45 minutes a night is good : : : : : bad
29.	Being in the barracks at or before reveille after "crossing the bridge" is good:: bad
30.	Having more than 2 E.P.O.'s in one company is good bad
31.	Pre-inspecting my company on evaluation days is good:::bad
32.	Telling my company that brigading is not important is good::bad
33.	Trying to "hide" a recruit who might cost the company points is good : : : : bad
34.	Disciplining recruits in front of the whole company is good:::bad
35.	Learning the names or nicknames of every member of my company is good:: bad

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Thus far you have been asked whether you have performed each behavior in the past, whether you intend to perform these behaviors in the future, and whether you personally feel that performing each behavior is good or bad. We would now like to know whether you believe that certain other people think you should or should not perform each behavior. Once, again, seven place scales will be used, and the intervals should be interpreted as follows:

I	should		:	:	:		:	`	should	noț
_		extremely	quite	slightly	don't	slightly	quite	extremely		
		certain	certain	certain	know	certain .	certain	certain		

For example, you might be asked if "Most Battalion Commanders" think you should perform behavior X. If you are extremely certain that "most battalion commanders" think you should not perform behavior X, then you would place your checkmark as follows:

	•		Most	Batt	:al:lon	Comm	an	der	s ?	Think			,	
I	should	 	:	:	.•	:	. :_	X	Ì	should	not	perform	behavior	x.
		 '				•			1			iofa aba	nı+ 2	

On the following 6 pages, you will be asked your beliefs about 3 specific others (two pages for each person).

Most other Company Commanders I respect think

1.	I should : : : : : : I should not ask other Company Commanders for help with disciplinary problems
2.	I should : : : : : : : : I should not immediately fire a recruit petty officer who exceeds his authority
3.	I should ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
4.	I should : : : : : I should not tell my company that I expect them to brigade
5.	I should : : : : : : I should not take away phone privileges as a form of discipline
6.	I should : : : : : I should not pre-check all lockers prior to inspection
7.	I should : : : : : : : : : : : : I should not be ahead of schedule in teaching the I.G. lessons
8.	I should : : : : : : I should not allow recruits to finish fights that they start among themselves
9.	I should : : : : : I should not ask other Company Commanders to inspect my company during primary training
	I should : : : : : : : : : : : : I should not select the toughest looking recruit for my master-at-arms
1.	I should : : : : : : I should not attend all smokers where one of my recruits is fighting
12.	I should : : : : : I should not use "Marching to Georgia" as a form of discipline
13.	I should : : : : I should not punish the whole company when 3 recruits have lost points in locker inspection
14.	I should : : : : : : : : : : : : I should not punish the whole company when 3 recruits have lost points in personal inspection
15.	I should : : : : : : : : : : : : I should not tell the company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline
16.	I should : : : : : : : I should not tell my recruits that I don't believe in "setting back"
17.	I should : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
.8.	I should : : : : : I should not allow my recruit petty officers to give physical training (such as push-ups and jumping jacks) as a form of discipline



19.	I should : : : : I should not back up a recruit petty officer when he exceeds his authority
20.	I should : : : : : I should not ask other Company Commanders to help me teach infantry
21.	I should : : : : : I should not select some recruit officers at R and O
22.	I should : : : : : I should not use Sunday afternoons for infantry drill after "crossing the bridge"
23.	I should : : : : : I should not allow my company to use "cheating gear"
24,	I should : : : : : I should not attend most instructor conducted classes
25.	I should : : : : : I should not allow my E.P.O. to handle most questions after T.V. classes
26.	I should : : : : I should not set aside a specific time period each week to handle recruit problems
27.	I should : : : : : I should not be out of the barracks by 1800 hours after "crossing the bridge"
28.	I should : : : : I should not require my company to study for their academic tests for at least 45 minutes a night
29.	I should .: : : : I should not be in the barracks at or before reveille after "crossing the bridge"
30.	I should : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
31.	I should : : : : : I should not pre-inspect my company on evaluation days .
32.	I should : : : : : I should not tell my company that brigading is not important.
33.	I should : : : : I should not try to "hide" a recruit who might cost the company points
34.	I should : /: : : : I should not discipline recruits in front of the whole company
15.	I should : : : : : I should not learn the names or nicknames of every member of my company

ERIC Full Text Provided By ERIC

The military training officer thinks

1.	I should : : : : : : I should not ask other Company Commanders for help with disciplinary problems
2.	I should : : : : : I should not immediately fire a recruit petty officer who exceeds his authority
3.	I should ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
4.	I should : : : : I should not tell my company that I expect them to brigade
5.	I should : : : : : : : I should not take away phone privileges as a form of discipline
6.	I should : : : : : : I should not pre-check all lockers prior to inspection
7.	I should : : : : : I should not be shead of schedule in teaching the I.G. lessons
8.	I should : : : : : I should not allow recruits to finish fights that they start among themselves
9.	I should : :: :: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
10.	I should : : : : : : : : I should not select the toughest looking recruit for my master-at-arms
11.	I should : : : : I should not attend all smokers where one of my recruits is fighting
12.	I should : : : : : I should not use "Marching to Georgia" as a form of discipline
13.	I should : : : : : I should not punish the whole company when 3 recruits have lost points in locker inspection
14.	I should : : : : : I should not punish the whole company when 3 recruits have lost points in personal inspection
15.	I should : : : : : I should not tell the company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline
16.	I should : : : : : I should not tell my recruits that I don't believe in "setting back"
17.	I should : : : : : : I should not fake a beating with a recruit in order to scare the company
18.	I should : : : : : I should not allow my recruit petty officers to give physical training (such as push-ups and jumping jacks) as a form of discipline
	ma · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

	I should : : : : : : : : I should not back up a recruit petty officer when he exceeds his authority
20.	I should : : : : : : I should not ask other company Commanders to help me teach infantry
21.	I should I should not select some recruit officers at R and O
-	I should I should not use Sunday afternoons for infantry dril3 after "crossing the bridge"
23.	I should : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
·, 24.	I should :: : : : I should not attend most instructor conducted classes
25.	I should : : : I should not allow my E.P.O. to handle most questions after T.V. classes
26.	I should : : : : : I should not set aside a specific time period each week to handle recruit problems
27.	I should : : : : : I should not be out of the barracks by 1800 hours after "crossing the bridge"
- 28.	I should : : : : : I should not require my company to study for their academic tests for at least 45 minutes a night
29.	I should : : : : : I should not be in the barracks at or before reveille after "crossing the bridge"
30,	I should : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
31.	I should :::: I should not pre-inspect my company on evaluation days
32.	brigading is, not important
́. зз.	I should : : : : : : I should not try to "hide" a recruit who might cost the company points
34.	* T should not discipline recruits in
35.	I should : : : : : : : : I should not learn the names or nicknames of every member of my company

The commanding officer for recruit training thinks

1	. I should : : : : : I should not ask other Company Commanders for help with disciplinary problems
2	. I should : : : : : : : I should not immediately fire a recruit petty officer who exceeds his authority
3,	R.C.P.O : : : I should not select a "setback" as my
4.	I should : : : : : I should not tell my company that I expect them to brigade
5,	I should : : : : : I should not take away phone privileges as a form of discipline
6.	I should : : : : : : I should not pre-check all lockers prior to inspection
, 7.	I should : : : : I should not be shead of schedule in teaching the I.G. lessons
8.	I should : : : : : I should not allow recruits to finish fights that they start among themselves
9.	I should : : : : : I should not ask other Company Commanders to inspect my company during primary training
10.	I should : : : : : I should not select the toughest looking recruit for my master-at-arms
11.	I should : : : : : I should not attend all smokers where one of my recruits is fighting
12.	I should : : : : : I should not use "Marching to Georgia" as a form of discipline
13,	I should : : : : : I should not punish the whole company when 3 recruits have lost points in locker inspection
14.	I should : : : : I should not punish the whole company when 3 recruits have lost points in personal inspection
15.	I should : : : : : I should not tell the company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline'
16.	I should : : : : : I should not tell my recruits that I don't believe in "setting back"
17.	I should : : : : : I should not fake a beating with a recruit in order to scare the company
18,	I should : : : : : I should not allow my recruit petty officers to give physical training (such as push-ups and jumping jacks) as a form of discipline



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	I should : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
20.	I should : : : : : : : : I should not ask other Company Commanders to help me teach infantry
	I should : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
22.	I should : : : : : : : : I should not use Sunday afternoons for infantry drill after "crossing the bridge"
23.	I should : : : : : I should not allow my company to use "cheating gear"
24.	I should : : : : : : : I should not attend most instructor conducted classes
25.	I should : : : : : : : : I should not allow my E.P.O. to handle most questions after T.V. classes
26.	I should : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
27.	I should : : : : I should not be out of the barracks by 1800 hours after "crossing the bridge"
28.	I should : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
29.	I should : : : : : : : I should not be in the barracks at or before reveille after "crossing the bridge"
30.	I should _: : : : I should not have more than 2 E.P.O.'s
31.	In one company I should not pre-inspect my company on evaluation days
32.	I should : : : : : : : : I should not tell my company that brigading is not important
33.	I should : : : : : : I should not try to "hide" a recruit who might cost the company points
34,	I should ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
35.	I should ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::



In this final part of the questionnaire we are going to ask you for your opinions about various aspects of your job and recruit training in general. Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each of the following questions by checking the appropriate asswer.



• •			1	ĬĂVTRAEQU	IPCEN 73	-C-012	9-1			
Strongly Disagree		,					.			delication in particular
Moderately Disagree	,				•	90 - 10				
Slightly Disagree	_	•		a	,		Perminent		.	
Keither Agree nor Disagree		, A		`				,		
Slightly					The state of the s		disequing-analysis			
Moderately Agree						well-by-youth-documents	***			
Strongly					. Say	sindensens tames				
	, M.E.D. inspectors are fair and impartial in their evaluation	would benefit if I could take a wiseguy out behind the barracks every now and then	If I could only win one flag, I'd want it to be the athletic flag	The way things are run now, recruit training is just like a summer camp for kids	I don't mind bending the rules a little when I think it will help my company in the competition	The tougher I act, the better my company does	Instructors of group dynamics courses should alert company commanders to problems observed in class	When an RCPO is fired he should be transferred to another company	I feel that my training affects a man will his life and not just during his Navy career	Generally speaking, I want to do / what the Military Training Officor thinks I should do



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				•	Neither		~	•	
		Strongly Agree	Moderately Agree	Slightly Agree	Agree nor Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Moderately Disagree	Strongly Disagree	
.11.	The best company doesn't always brigade				-		and the same of th		
12.	If I were able to discipline recruits the same way I would (or do) discipline my own children, I'd turn out better companies	ts.	• :1		- Parker Stranger				
13.	If I could only win one flag, I'd want it to be the military flag	***************************************							
14.	Sven if my company were the best, I wouldn't win the competition	`	*	Ì		3	,	terrifikasinsvertik	NAVT
15.	You have to be tougher with set- backs than with other recruits		d demonstrated						RAEQUI:
16.	It's worse if a man loses the company points in personal inspection than if he loses points in bag or locker inspection				water particular and the second			***	PCEN 73-C-
17.	Men in a company that brigades will do better in the fleet than men in a company that doesn't brigade	,							0129-1
18.	Generally speaking, I want to do what the commanding officer for recruit training thinks I should do			Value	***************************************				
19.	If I have 60 men in the company, every minute I have to spend with one man is wasting 59 minutes			-		,			
20.	The more flags I win, the better job I'm doing		•	•	an.				Ŀ

			*	1	NAVTRAEQ	UIPCEN 73-	C-0129)~1	1.	
Strongly Disagree	and delivery to a				ļ		*			
Moderately Disagree								·.		
Slightly			провожната							
Reither Agree nor Disagree			*	•	• ,	.	-			•
Slightly				•			/			,
Moderately Agree							destination			
/			•	· 				١ , ١	.	pa
	If I could only win one flag, I'd want it to be the academic flag	First comes fear, then respect	All I want a recruit to do is try his best	What my company does reflects on me	If the company loses a lot of points it means I've done a lousy job with them	26 I personally feel that with some recruits a good swift kick in the butt would be a lot more effective than a marching party	A good CC feels like he can brigade every time he pushes a company	During the first few days of training, the best way to motivate a company is through fear	It is important to me to brigade my company	There are too many politics involved in selecting the company that bri- gades
ERIC.	21.	22.	, 83°	24.	25.	98 88 84	27.	28.	. 53	°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°

Many of the things I do as a CC are checked unnecessarily by supervisors

31.

				NAVTRAEQUI	IPCEN 73-	·C-0129	-1	•		
Strongly Disagree								es III des in contractores		,
Moderately Disagree					}				-	1.
Slightly					-		Anna Angelogia			
Neither Agree nor Disagree		•				-			_	
Slightly		a ^t							:	ę na sa
Moderately Agree									1.	
Strongly Agree		ere never manive			* .				, Î	
	I like the actual work involved in being a Company Commander	One good thing about being a CC is that I decide how to do my own work	I get enough information about how I'm doing in my work as a Company Commander to allow me to correct errors and improve my performance	I find my work as a CC interesting enough to talk about it with people who are not involved in recruit training	Being a Company Commander is a job that allows me to continually learn something worthwhile	The more companies I push, the more boring being a CC becomes	I feel satisfied about the way in which I get feedback about my work as a Company Commander	Putting in effort to do my job as a CC well really isn't worth it	My being a CC really won't affect anything in the long run	I could accomplian more as a CC if I had more freedom in determining how I should accomplish my objectives
	32.	33.	34.	35.	36.	34.	38.	39.	40.	41.

.			3	NAVTRAEQU	IPCEN 73-	C-0129-	1 ,			`
Strongly Disegree					,	Antique de la constante de la				
Moderately Disagree			-		·	·			,	*
Slightly			` ` `						,	
Meither Agree nor Disagree	it is unit produced to the second				-				-	
Slightly		1.			,		en e	1		
Moderately Agree			`						•	
Strongly			.	.]					•	
	Some parts of a Company Commander's job really do not make sense	If I could reorganize the work involved in being a CC, I could do the job more effectively	I often feel like a cog in the machinery and that what I do doesn't matter much	When I'm pushing a company I often feel that I waste my time because the work involved is organized badly	When I'm pushing a company I'm usually able to arrange much of my own schedule with regard to when things are done.		When I;m pushing a company I often wish I had more freedom in planning or doing my work,	The actual work involved in being a CC is often distasteful to me	Being a Company Commander is marking timejust putting in	time on a temporary job
	42.	4	4 4.	45.	46.	90	48.	49.	50.	

Appendix B

MEAN RESPONSES OF COMPANY COMMANDERS' SELF-REPORTS OF , PERFORMING EACH BEHAVIOR (OB), INTENDING TO PERFORM EACH BEHAVIOR (BI), AND EVALUATING EACH BEHAVIOR (Aget), BY GROUPS



TABLE B-1. MEAN RESPONSES OF COMPANY COMMANDERS' SELF-REPORTS OF PERFORMING EACH BEHAV IOR (OB), INTENDING TO PERFORM, EACH BEHAVIOR (A act), BY GROUP

ð			GB	•		' BI		,	Aact	•
. 1	,)	AA	A	BA	AA	A	BA	, AA	A	BA
	Asked other CC for help with discipline problems	1.36	1.36 (1.58	1.68	3.43	3.89	4.55	3.14	3.76	4.32
2	Immediately fired recruit PO who exceeded authority	7,41	1.45	1.58	3.33	4.37	4.95*	3.55	4.03	4.27
ຕໍ່	Selected "setback" as RCPO	1.23	1.29	1.55	2.43	3.21	3.86*	2.73	3.34	3,50
4,	Told company I expect them to brigade	j.59	1,26	1.14*	5,29	3.50	3.55*	4.95	3,79	3.73
ŭ,	Taken phone privileges as form of discipline	1.82	1.79	1.77	4.38	4.95	5.00	5.05	5.00	4.59
9	Pre-checked lockers prior to inspection	1.91	ند. ه	1,82	5.95	5.61	5.45	5.55	5.82	5618
7.	Been, ahead of schedule teaching IG lessons	1.73	1.06	15.73*	5.24	4.89	5.50	6.05	5.42	5.32
φ `	Allowed recruits to finish fights among themselves	1.00	1.03	1.05	1.38	1.53	1.59	ì.45	1.55	1.45
6	1	1.86	1.79	1.82	5.05	5.32	00.9	5.55	6.29	5.86
10.	Selected toughest recruit for master-at-arms	1.18	1,26	1.27	2.43	2.87	3.18	3.05	3.43	3.73
11.	Attended all smokers where my recruits fight	1.68	1.39	1.41	5.13	4.16	3.77	5.45	6.03	5.59
12.	Used "Marching thru Georgia" as discipline	1.50	1:37	1.55	.3.57	3.58	3,50	4.09	3.71	4.45
13.	Punished whole company if 3 re- cruits lost points in locker insp.	1.27	1.32	1,09	2.48	2.50	2.09	2.50	2.66	1.86
TSE.	Se notes at end of this table, on page	91)	Ú.	•	•					

TABLE B-1. MEAN RESPÔNSES OF COMPANY COMMANDERS' SELF-REPORTS OF PERFORMING EACH BEHAVIOR (OB), INTENDING TO PERFORM EACH BEHAVIOR (BI), AND EVALUATING EACH BEHAVIOR (A BCt), BY GROUP (cont.)

		• *										1		
	BA	1,77	1.45	2:77	Z.55	4.05	4.32*	5.00	. 2.00*	4.82	3, 2, 3, 3,	4.73	4.09	
Aact	A	2.50	7.95	2.32	2.66	3.55	3.21	4,97	5.53	4.11	2.71	5.03	4.13	
	AA	.2.82	1.91	3.32	3.00	4.18	4.18	3.82	4.55	4,64	3.23	4.91	4.86	,-
	•	*		•		*		*		,	" *	1		
	BA	2.05	1.73	3.05	, ' 2.41	4.27	4.55	5.36*	4.82	5.50	3,91*	4.14	4.64	.` `
BI	A	2.45	2.24	3,05	, 8 , 39	3.34	3.45	4.79	5.53	4.26	2,58	3.84	4.11	. *
	AA	2,67	1.71	3.05	3.33	4.05	3.95	3,71	4.90	4.76	3.38	4.33	5.24	• .
		* *				ē				•	·			
	BA	1.05*	1.05	1.09	1.23	1.73	1.68	1.68	1.86	1.64	1.86	1.64	1.59	
OB	A	1,34	, 1,13	1.21	1.18	1.50	1,45	1.71	1.84	1.63	1.58	1.50	·i.61	
	AA	1.27	1.09	1.32	1.36	1.68	1.45	1.41	1.73	1.68	1.73	1.55	1.77	
	•	Punished whole company if 3 recruits lost points in personal inspection .	Told company to ignore recruit as form of discipline	eve in	Faked beating with recruit to ' scare company	Allowed POs to give physical train- ing as form of discipline	Baked up recruit PO when exceed authority	Asked other CC to help teach infantry	Sefected some recruit officers at R & 0	Used Sun. p.m. for infantry drill after "crossing the bridge"	ating	•. pe	to handle most gues-	(See Notes at end of this table, on page 91)
¢	.	14.	15.	16.	17.	18.	19.	20.	\.	22.	23.	24.	25.	(See

TABLE B-1. MEAN RESPONSES OF COMPANY COMMANDERS' SELF-REPORTS OF PERFORMING EACH BEHAVIOR (OB), INTENDING TO PERFORM EACH BEHAVIOR (BI), AND EVALUATING EACH BEHAVIOR (A act), BY GROUP (cont.)

1.	0/.			. 8		**	ř Bř			Aact		
· ·	**	·	AA	∀	BA	AA	Ą	BA	AA	A	BA	
,	26.	Set aside time each week for recruits problems	1.36	.32	1,27	~ 3.57	4.00	3.77	4.41	4.84	4.05	
,	27.1	Been out of barracks by 1800 after "erossing bridge"	1,64	. 8	1.55*	5.19	5.47	4.45	5.64	6.13	5.50	
•	28,	Required company to study for tests 45, mins. ea, night	16.1	1.89	1.86	6.57	6.24	6,64	6.68	89.9	6,59	
	29.	Been in barracks at reveille after crossing the bridge	1,59	7 1.42	1.55	4.67	3.87	4.09	4.23	3.16	3.73	
1	30.	Had more than 2 EPOs in company	1.82	1.66	1.82	5,71	5.00	60°2')	6.32	5.71	5.73	
94	ة (Pre-inspected company on evaluation day	1.91.		16*1	5.76	6.16	5.77	5.95	6.13	5.41	*
• ′	32	Told company, brigading not important	1.09	1.50	1.50*	2.71	3,39	3.76	2.45	3.34	3,59	
,	33.	Tried to "hide" recruit who'd cost company points	1,18	1.42	. 1.36	2.43	2.53	2.64	1.68	2.08	2.09	
	• 34.	Disciplined recruit in front of company	1.86	1.95,	1.86	5,29	5.32	5.18	4.55	5.37	4.45	
	35.	Learned names of every member of company	1.36	1.45	1.32	4.19	4.39	4.27	, 5.00	4.84	4.50	
	,	1		-		,						

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* p < .05, F test, df = 2.81

(Sec Notes at end of this table, on page 91).

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MEAN RESPONSES OF COMPANY COMMANDERS' SELF-REPORTS OF PERFORMING EACH BEHAVIOR (OB), INTENDING TO PERFORM EACH BEHAVIOR (BI), AND EVALUATING EACH BEHAVIOR (A ct), BY GRUP (Cont.) TABLE B-1.

Notes:

For

For the BI scores

- If the behavior had been performed in the past it was coded 2, and if the behavior had not been performed in the past it was coded 1. the OB scores

to perform the behavior, 4 indicating a neutral point, and 1 indicating extreme - A seven-point scale was used with 7 indicating extreme certainty of intending certainty in not intending to perform the behavior.

- A seven-point scale was used, with 7 indicating extremely good, 4 indicating neither good nor bad, and 1 indicating extremely bad. For the A scores

Appendix C

MEAN RESPONSES, BY GROUPS, OF COMPANY COMMANDERS, FOR NORMATIVE BELIEFS OF OTHER COMPANY COMMANDERS (NBCC), THE MILITARY TRAINING OFFICER (NBMTO), AND THE COMMANDING OFFICER (CO) OF RECRUIT TRAINING COMPANY

C-1. MEÁN RESPONSES, BY GROUPS, OF COMPANY COMMANDERS FOR NORMATIVE BELIEFS OF OTHER COMPANY COMMANDERS (NBCC); THE MILITARY TRAINING OFFICER (NBMTO), AND THE COMMANDING OFFICER (CO) OF RECRUIT TRAINING COMPANY TABLE .C-1.

~			•	14111	1625607	.1 ()1)	10-9	-0123	-1					
	BA.	4.36	4.38	. 3.81	5.29*	2.62	4.43	3.14	1.38	5,00	3,24	5.82	1:67	•
NB CO	A	4.86	4.63	4.00	3.82	3.66	4.37	لم الم	1.30	5,47	2,71	5.66	2.18	
	, AA	4.19	4.29	3.70	3.43	3.10	3.29	3.76	1.67	4.76	2.43	5.57	2.05	
	h .,					,	• •		,					
	BA	4.67.	5.05*	4.10	5.19	4.48	5.14	4,10	1.76	5,33	3.67	5.48	2, 29	
NBMTO	A	4.92	4.95	3.89	4.58	4.82	5.05	4.26	1.68	5.39	3.11	5.03	2.89	
	AA	4.00 ~	3.67	3.31	4,14	3,95	4:48	4.81	.1.90°	5.90	2.86	5.48	3.05	`
			,	• ,	•	* * .	•	•	١.		. ′			Ł
].	BA	4.71	4,76	.4.10	4,38	5.67	8°.38	5,33	2.43	6.38	4.14	5,10	4.71	` .'
MBCC	Å,	4.21	4.24	3,45	4.87	5,47.	6.34	5.42	2.50	8.0.9	4.42	5.32	5.21	(96
	AA	3.81	4.00	2.86	4,81	5,29	5.90	5.90	1.71	5.52	3.24	5,57	4.29	page 9
•					_ / <u>*</u>						,		•	g
		• Asked other CC for help with discipline problems	Immediately fired recruit PO who exceeded authority	3. Selected "setback" as RCPO	4. Told company I expect them to brigade	. Taken phone privileges as form of discipline ,	6. Pre-checked lockers prior . to inspection.	Been ahead sche IG lessons	8. Allowed recruits to finish fights among themselves	9. Asked other CC to inspect company during primary trng.		Attended all smokers where my recruits were fighting	. Used "Marching thru Georgia" as discipline	(See notes at the end of this table,
-			0	ω	₹ .	, ເບ	9	7	∞	o ∙	1Ò.	11	12.	S

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5-1. MEAN RESPONSES, BY GROUPS, OF COMPANY COMMANDERS FOR NORMATIVE BELIEFS OF OTHER COMPANY COMMANDERS (NB_{CC}), THE MILITARY FRAINING OFFICER (NB_{MTQ}),
AND THE COMMANDING OFFICER (CO) OF RECRUIT TRAINING COMPANY (cont.) TABLE C-1.

			MBCC	, .	, -	NB MTO			NB _{CO}	-	
		AA	4	BA	AA	A .	BA	AA	· W	BA	9
13.	Punished whole Company if 3 recruits lost points in locker inspection	2.90	3,34	3.12	38	2.45	2.24	2.29	1.71	1.43	, .
14.	Punished whole Co if 3 recruits lost points in personal inspec.	2.95	3,29	3,05	2.29	2.45	2,24	2.19	17:1	1.43	
151	Told company to ignore recruit as form of discipline.	2.29	3.24	2,62	2,00	, 3 4, 34	1.95	2.10	1.84	1.38	
16.	Told recruits I don't believe in "setting back"	3.14	3,13	3,86	3.10	2.47	, 2, 33	3,19	2.58	2.48	1
17.	Faked beating with recruit to scare company	3,86	3,39	3.14	2.57	2.05	2, 33	1.48	1.58	1.33	
18.	Allowed POs to give physical training as form of discipline	4.19	4.08	4,29	. 33 . 33	2.34	1.86	2.14	2.13	1.48	
19.	Baked up recruit PO when exceeded authority	3.81	3.50	4.71	3.10	2.58	3,86*	2.83	2,45	. 3.52	•
20.	Asked other CC to help teach ; infantry	4.00	4.87	* 1935	4.62	5.26	4.90	4.43	5,18	4.95	,
21.	Selected some recruit offi- cers at R & O	° 4.57	5.58	5.05	4.10	5.18	4.57	4.00.	5.16	4.71*	
22.	Used Sunday p.m. for infantry drill after "crossing bridge"	. 4.90	5.11	5.81	3.14	3.21	3.05	2.24	2.71	2.33	.5
23.	-Allowed company to use "cheating, gear"	3.95	3,95	4.81	1.90	1.82	1.81	1.48	1.55	1.35	
(See	(See notes at the end of this table, o	on page 9	و) 96)				,	,	* # "	•	

O-1. MEAN RESPONSES, BY GROUPS, OF COMPANY COMMANDERS, FOR NORMATIVE BELIEFS OF OTHER COMPANY COMMANDERS (NB_{CC}), THE MILITARY TRAINING OFFICER (NB_{MTQ}), AND THE COMMANDING OFFICER (CO) OF RECRUIT TRAINING COMPANY (cont.) TABLE C-1.

	•	•	, NB _{CC}	.		NBMTO			· NB _{CO}	. `
,		AA	A	BA	CAA	A	BA	AA	A	BA
24.	Attended most instructor-conducted classes	4.10	3.58	4.81	5.14	5,18	5.48	. 00.9	5.65	5.7.1
25.	Allowed EPO to handle most questions after TV classes	4.24	5.00	4.48	3.24	3.29	. 2.&1	2.62	3.18	2.71
26.		4.14	4.55	4.14	4.52	4.79	4.57	5.14	4.92	5.00*
27.	Been out of barracks by 1800 after "crossing the bridge"	5.19	5.00	.5.14	6,05	6.16	6.62	6.38	6.37	6.48 ⁷
28.	Required company to study for tests 45 minutes each, night	6.52	6.37	6.48	6.76	6.61	. 86	6,71	° 6,74	6.71
. 29	Been in barracks at reveille after "crossing the bridge"	4.29	9 4.18	3.48,	3.76	2,79	2.24	3.57	2.34	2.33
30.	Had more than 2 EPOs ir company	5.81	1 5,50	5.00	5. 38	4.45	4.10	4.57	4.66	4.19
31.	Pre-inspected company on evaluation day ()	6.24	6.42	6.29	. 2.00	5.39	, 5.38	3.90	4.53.	4.81
, 33°,	Told company brigading not	2,62	3,29	3.52	3.67	3.63	2.71	3.62	3.34	3.29
33.	Tried to "hide" recruit who'd cost company points	2.67	, 3.95	3.38	1.95	1.89	j.62	2.10	1.,55	1.10
34.	Disciplined recruit in front of company	4.95	5 5.45	5,29	3.76	4.1.1	3.90	2.90	3.45	2,76
35.	Le	4.71	4.21	3,81,	4.90	4.29	.4.19	. 5.71	4.29	4.62,
0		7 .6	, 96		•,	•	•	•		f

(See notes at the end of this table, on page 96)

MEAN RESPONSES, BY GROUPS, OF COMPANY COMMANDERS FOR NORMATIVE BELIEFS OF OTHER COMPANY COMMANDERS (NBCC), THE MILITARY TRAINING OFFICER (NBMTO),.
AND THE COMMANDING OFFICER (CO) OF RECRUIT TRAINING COMPANY (cont.) TABLE C-1.

Notes:

* p < .05, F test, df = 2/81

respondent was extremely certain that the referent felt he should perform the behavior, 4 indicating a neutral point, and I indicating that the respondent was extremely certain that the feferent felt For all of the normative beliefs measures a 7-point scale was used, with 7 indicating that the he sh ould not perform the behavior.

·Appendix D

. MEAN SCORES FOR OPINION QUESTIONS, BY GROUP

TABLE D-1. MEAN SCORES FOR OPINION QUESTIONS, BY GROUP

^		_	-	. •	, P
<u>A.</u>	Recruit Training Questions	<u>• AA</u>	<u>A</u>	BA -	<u>F</u> .,
1.	MED inspectors fair and impartial in evaluation	4.62	4.26	3.32	2.36
2.	I feel whole compand would benefit if I could take wiseguy out behind barracks	² 4. 76	4.82	ار 4.32	0.40
.3.	If only win one flag, I'd want it to be athletic flag		ત્રે .;3.37	3.54	3.18*
4.	Way things are run now, recruit training is like a summer camp for kids	4.86	4.76	4.77	0.01
·5.	Don't mind bending rules a little when I think it will help my company in competition	4.81	3.95	3.86	1:59.
6. 🗻	Tougher I act, better my company does	4.19	4.26	4.18	0.01
7.	Instructors of group dynamics should alert CCs to problems observed in class	15.90	6.32 ,	6.00	0.54
8.	When RCPO fired, he should be trans- ferred to another company	4.52	4.74	5.27	0.73
20 .	I feel my training affects a man all his life, not just during Navy career	6.05	6.45	6.23	0,83
`10.	Generally I want to do what MTO thinks I should do	· 5.90	5.84	5.41	1.00
.11.	Best company doesn't always brigade	5.62	6.71	6.48	4.23
12.	If I were able to discipline recruit same way as my own children, I'd turn out better companies.	4.67	5.00	5.81 3	2.06
13.	If only win one flag I'd want military,	4,76	4.24	3.86	1.35
14.	Even if my company were the best, I wouldn't win the competation	3.05	3.89	4.95	5.35*



TABLE D-1. MEAN SCORES FOR OPINION QUESTIONS, BY GROUP (cont.) .

•				•	
Α.	Recruit Training Questions (cont.)	AA	<u>A</u>	BA	<u>F</u> · .
			٠,		
15.	Must be tougher with setbacks than with other recruits	4 3.38	3.53	3.38	0.08
16. ·	Worse if man loses the company points in personal inspection than bag or locker inspection	·3. 1 05	3.55	3.76	0.84
,	Tocker inspection		•	. ·*	
17.	Men in company that brigades better in Fleet than men in company that does not brigade	3.10	2.21	1.76	3,23*
1	hoop not arrange		•		• "
18.	Generally I want to do what CO for recruit training thinks I should	45.00	5.53	5.29	0.77
19.	If 60 men in company, every minute with one man is wasted 59 minutes .	2,81	2.92	2.95	0.03
20.	More flags I win the better job	4.10	. 2.32	2.24	7.12*
21.	If only win one flag I'd want academic	3.62	5.00	5.14 .	6.75*
22.	First comes fear, then respect	4.14.	3.87	3.41	0.67
23.	All I want recruit to do is to try his best	6.29	6.61	6.77	1.27
24.	What my company does reflects on me	5.33 •	6.21	5.68	2.09
25.	If company loses lot of points it means I've done a lousy job	5.43	4.58	3.95	2.57
26.	I feel with some recruits a kick in butt is more effective than marching party	5.62	6.45	6.09	1.77
27 .	A good CC feels he can brigade every time he pushes a company	4.90	4.42	3.50	3.12*
28.	During first days of training, best way to motivate a company is through fear	4.81	4.58	4.00	0.86



TABLE D-1. MEAN SCORES FOR OPINION QUESTIONS, BY GROUP (cont.)

		, '	•		*
Α.	Recruit Training Questions (cont.)	, AA	<u>A</u> <u>A</u>	BA	<u>F</u>
				• •	
29.	Important to me to brigade my company	4.9	95 2.89	2.18	12.56*
30.	Too many politics involved in select- ing company that brigades	3.9	90 5.00	5,68	4.37
•	• 1, •	٠,			
В.	Job Satisfaction Questions	,	* +		
			`	~	•
31.	Many things I do as CC checked unnecessarily by supervisors	3.5	57 3.82	(4.91∕r	4.32*
•,'		.	40' - 4-70	4 50	1.08
32.	I like actual work in being CC	5,4	48 4.79	4,09	1,00
33.	One good thing about being CC is deciding how to do own work	5.5	52 _4.87	3.68	4,73*
34.	I get enough info about how I'm		•	*	
24.	doing as CC to allow me to correct	5.0	00 5.16	4.23	1.94
	errors and improve			x .	(*
35.	My work as CC interesting enough to talk about with people not involved	5.	95 5.61	4.73	2.38
36.	Being CC is job that allows me continually to learn something worthwhile	5.3	19 4.97	4.68	0.33
,37.	More companies I push, the more boring being CC becomes	2.	62 .2.61	3.41	1.40
38.	I feel sati sfied about way I get feedback about CC work	4.	43 4.11	3,82	0.48
39.	Effort to do job as CC not worth it	2.	81 2.45	2.86	0.38
40,.	Being CC won't affect anything in the long run	2.	14 1.97	2.59	1.16
.41.	Could accomplish more as CC if more freedom to determine how to accomplish objectives	4.	29 5.06	5.18	2,25
42.	Parts of CC's job really don't make sense	4.	33 5.25	5.50	2.74

TABLE D-1. MEAN SCORES FOR OPINION QUESTIONS, BY GROUP (cont.)

В	Job Satisfaction Questions (cont.)	· AA J · A	BA.	F_
• .				
43.	If I could reorganize work as CC. could do job more effectively	4.14 4.03	4.55	0.77
			~	_
44.	I often feel a cog in machinery and what I do doesn't matter much	3.10 3.31	3.82	0.85
45′.	When pushing company I often feel I	0.05 0.05	, 4.64	4.16*
	waste my time because work is badly	3.05 3.25	4.64	4.10*
	organized	,	·	<
	*** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** ****	,	•.	
46.	When pushing company I'm usually able	5.00 4.53	13.33	4.30*
	to arrange my own schedule with regard \tag{`\tag{'}} to when things are done	J.00 \$ 4.00	0,20	4.50
٠.	to when things are done	•	•	. 7
47.	Offen feel trying to do my job as CC	*	,	
41,	better gets me nowhere	3.10 . 3.56	4.41	2.43
ě	3. S			روب
48.	When pushing a company I often wish		54 64	1.58
	more freedom in work	5.33 4,80	5.04	1.55
		•	•	
49.	Actual work in being CC often dis-	2.10 4.08	4.14	7. 19*.
`	tasteful to me		4 444.7	
•			• ,	
50.	Being CC is marking timetime on	1.85 2.16	2,73	1.36
•	temporary job			
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	•		. ` ,
•		· •	· · · · ·	

* p < .05, df = 2/81

Note: These items were scored on a 7-point scale, with 7 indicating strong agreement with the statement, 4 indicating neither agreement nor disagreement, and 1 indicating strong disagreement with the statement.

Appendix E

EVALUATION FORM USED AT RTC, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

FOR COMPANY COMMANDER PERFORMANCE

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· Figure E-1. Evaluation Form Used at RTC, San Diego California for Company Commander Performance.

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