DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 110 349 95 SO 008 203

AUTHOR Cummings, William K.
TITLE Homogeneity of Individual Value Orientations: A Macro-Social Investigation.
INSTITUTION Chicago Univ., Ill. Dept. of Sociology.
SPONS AGENCY National Inst. of Education (DHEW), Washington, D.C.
PUB DATE [74]
NOTE 41p.

EDRS PRICE MF-$0.76 HC-$1.95 PLUS POSTAGE
DESCRIPTORS *Affective Tests; Attitude Tests; Comparative Analysis; *Cross Cultural Studies; *Cultural Differences; Cultural Interrelationships; National Norms; Norm Referenced Tests; Political Attitudes; *Social Attitudes; Social Differences; Social Science Research; Social Values; Sociocultural Patterns; Sociology; Surveys; *Values; Youth

ABSTRACT

The relative homogeneity of individual value orientations in 11 contemporary nations is the subject of this paper. In macro-sociological discussions, particularly of the polity, there are frequent assertions about the relative homogeneity of a people and of their culture, but these assertions are rarely specified or derived from quantitative empirical investigations. A review of the literature on cultural homogeneity and individual value orientations indicates that there have been major obstacles to computing societal scores of the relative degree of homogeneity in individual value orientations. A new approach is proposed which avoids the obstacles encountered in previous efforts by assuming that attitudes are a reflection of values and, thus, inferring the heterogeneity of value orientations through a study of diversity in attitudes. Scores are computed for 11 nations and several propositions are considered in an effort to account for these national scores. In addition, suggestions are made for the application of this new approach to other levels of analysis. (Author/ND)

# Homogeneity of Individual Value Orientations: A Macro-Social Investigation*

by

William K. Cummings

University of Chicago



*The project reported herein was performed pursuant to a grant from the National Institute of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. However, the opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the National Institute of Education, and no official endorsement by the National Institute of Education should be inferred. I would like to express my personal appreciation to Fred Strodtbeck and William J. Wilson of the University of Chicago for their helpful comments and to Miranda Ferrell for her skillful assistance.

# Homogeneity of Individual Value Orientations:

## A Macro-Social Investigation

abstract

In macro-sociological discussions, particularly of the polity, there are frequent assertions about the relative homogeneity of a people and of their culture, but these assertions are rarely specified or derived from quantitative empirical investigations. A review of the literature on cultural homogeneity and individual value orientations indicates that there have been major obstacles to computing societal scores of the relative degree of homogeneity in individual value orientations. This paper proposes a new approach which avoids the obstacles encountered in previous efforts; scores are computed for eleven nations, and several propositions are considered in an effort to account for these national scores. In addition, suggestions are made for the application of this new approach to other levels of analysis.

# Homogeneity of Individual Value Orientations: A Macro-Social Investigation

William K. Cummings

The subject of this paper is the relative homogeneity of individual value orientations in eleven contemporary nations. The concept of value orientations has been variously defined (Adler, 1956: 395), but our approach follows in the tradition of Kluckhohn (1951: 395), where values are defined as "conceptions of the desirable." Values are institutionalized at various levels in a social system. The value orientations of individuals include not only their conceptions of the desirable society but also their conceptions of ideal work, community, and personal organization among other objects. Thus it is erroneous to equate the sum of individual value orientations with societal values[1]; moreover, especially in complex societies, it is to be expected that many individuals will have conceptions of the desirable society that stand in substantial contrast with the dominant values of the society (Williams, 1970: 438ff.; Hollander, 1973: 119). These individuals may also vary in their conceptions of the ideal family, community, school, and other social objects. Our concern in this paper is with the extent to which individuals of different societies actually vary in these conceptions on a range from relative unanimity (homogeneous value orientations) to great diversity (heterogeneous value orientations). In addition, we will review several hypotheses which may account for this

variation and the consequences different levels have for the functioning of these societies.

Macro-sociological treatments of individual societies often refer to the relative homogeneity of their members. For Redfield, "in the ideal folk society, what one man knows and believes is the same as what all men know and believe (Redfield, 1959: 316)." The peoples of certain modern societies have also been characterized as relatively homogeneous in their values: Sweden is frequently singled out as an example (Childs, 1947). And according to Reischauer, "some observers feel that the Japanese have achieved greater cultural uniformity throughout the length and the breadth of the land and throughout the vertical stratification of their society than has ever been achieved in a country of Japan's size, and they compare Japanese cultural uniformity to that of a primitive tribe (Reischauer, 1962: 103)."

While such descriptive statements are prevalent, no one to date has completed a satisfactory comparative study of the relative homogeneity of value orientations. Thus far, all comparative attempts at measuring homogeneity have first attempted to identify the content of value systems. However, for various reasons which we now turn to consider, these empirical efforts at measuring the content of societal value systems have floundered. After considering these previous efforts, we will present an approach which avoids their shortcomings.

The Measurement of Individual Value Orientations

Two research traditions have attempted with only qualified success to devise instruments for comparing the content of individual value orientations in different societies. On the one side is a universalistic

tradition initiated by Spranger which postulates that men, regardless of their heritage, are oriented to a common set of universal values; societal differences occur only in the relative emphasis that members place on the respective values. Spranger's theory was the basis for the development of the Allport-Vernon value instrument during the thirties (1931), and this instrument has been used in several multi-nation studies by directly translating it into the language of the participating nations. Morris (1956), Rodd (1959), and others have developed similar instruments and these have also been used in comparative studies--primarily on student populations. If this universalistic tradition had developed greater momentum, we would by now have results from several studies administered to representative samples of national populations. Measures of dispersion in responses such as standard deviations and ranges could be used to determine the degree of cultural homogeneity of different national groups.

However, the validity of the universalists' value instruments has been challenged by cultural relativists who assert that the nuances of the value systems of most societies are so unique that devising a single value instrument for use in different cultural settings is an impossibility. Some moderate cultural relativists have suggested the utility of retaining the assumption of universal value dimensions, but they stress the importance of devising "equivalent" questions to tap where individuals in different settings stand in terms of these dimensions (Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, 1961); despite the merits of the proposal it has faltered due to the difficulty in devising equivalent questions for multi-nation studies. An alternate approach is to use sentence completion stimuli and allow respondents to freely emit their values; but in this case the problem of developing a reliable coding procedure is substantial.

Due to the debate between the universalists and relativists, researchers do not have at hand a widely approved instrument for the study of values across nations. Hence there has not been even a single major cross-national study of value orientations.

A somewhat middle-of-the-road approach, though drawing more closely on the first tradition, is Rokeach's new value instrument (1973) which consists of 18 words or phrases respondents are asked to rank. The advantage of the Rokeach test over earlier instruments is that the 18 words present a much simpler and hence potentially less culture-bound stimulus. On the other hand, the instrument presents problems of translation. Moreover, because most individuals do not have clear conceptions of their systems of value orientations but rather mentally code these associations with idiosyncratic life experiences, it can be doubted whether the Rokeach instrument provides a sufficient stimulus to elicit valid orderings. Rokeach dismisses these problems. However, most tests of this instrument have been conducted in the U.S., and primarily by Rokeach or his associates. Thus we have little evidence on the cross-cultural validity of the instrument for identifying the content of value systems. Finally, Rokeach does not indicate how his instrument might be used to measure differences in degree of the homogeneity of individual value orientations across societies.

These problems in value research have led us to consider the works of other fields bearing on homogeneity. Our concern with the relative homogeneity of individual value orientations is relevant to the concept of cultural pluralism, which Furnival (1948) used to characterize societies composed of groups with distinct cultures but linked through common economic

and political institutions. Anthropologists have compared several African societies in terms of the differences in the cultures of their constituent groups (Berghe, 1965) and one recent study has even quantified and analyzed the causes and consequences of the relative degree of cultural pluralism of 114 contemporary societies. This latter study concluded that "plural societies are typically young nations, covering large, sparsely populated areas, engaged chiefly in agriculture, and poor; their governmental functions are still shaky and unstable, as literacy rates are low, and various interest groups struggle confusedly for dominance." (Haug, 1967: 304). If inter-group and inter-individual homogeneity were closely correlated, we could use the measures developed by Haug for our purposes. But we have no definitive studies on this correlation. And there are theoretical reasons for doubting its strength. For example, we know that individuals are imperfectly socialized to group cultures. And according to Durkheim (1964: 136-7):

> far from the two varying with each other, we shall see that the effacement of one is the necessary condition for the appearance of the other. .... There is now less distance than heretofore between the Frenchman and the Englishman, generally speaking, but that does not stop the contemporary Frenchmen from differing among themselves more than the Frenchmen of yesteryear.

An Alternate Approach to Measuring Homogeneity

Since neither the research traditions concerning values or cultural pluralism have developed acceptable approaches for measuring the homogeneity of individual value orientations, we have found it necessary to develop a new approach building on attitude research. The concept of attitude has a somewhat ambiguous status in social science. Attitudes are commonly defined as the evaluations that individuals make vis-a-vis

specific social states; while there is agreement on this general definition, scholars differ concerning the relation of attitudes to the deeper levels of human personality. Raw empiricists are content to define attitudes simply as the answers that individuals give to evaluative questions; the implication of this definition is that people do not have attitudes until interviewers evoke them. In other words, attitudes are regarded as ephemeral utterances with an uncertain origin in the minds of respondents.

However, those more firmly rooted in the social psychology tradition believe attitudes have a relatively stable basis in individual personality. In this view, attitudes are mutually determined by several factors and among these is an individual's value system, that sector of his personality most directly concerned with evaluation. For example, Allport (1961: 802-3) asserts that "attitudes themselves depend on pre-existing values" and Watson (1966: 615) claims that "attitudes express values."

Our approach to measuring homogeneity rests on this assumption that attitudes are in some degree a reflection of individual values. It is possible to measure the relative likelihood that individuals randomly chosen within different sub-groups will choose answers on attitude questions identical to those selected by others in their sub-group. This measure is constructed by summing the frequency with which members of a sub-group choose the most commonly chosen answer for a large number of questions, and then repeating the procedure for other sub-groups. The rank-order for the sums reflects the relative likelihood that members in the respective groups will give similar answers. A single attitude question presumably evokes evaluations from a sub-sector of an individual's value system. A large number of questions should stimulate evaluations based

on a substantial proportion of the values held by an individual. As attitudes are a reflection of values, we feel our procedure is a plausible, though indirect, way to measure the homogeneity of individual value orientations.

Several aspects of this approach deserve comment:

(1) It does not reveal anything about the content of value systems. It assumes that the members of different societies have different values, and this will be expressed by differences in the answers that are most commonly chosen in the different societies. The approach attempts to determine the relative extent to which individuals in different societies concur with the majority opinions of their particular society--whatever these may be.

(2) Our approach recognizes that the link between values and attitudes is imperfect, and that the role of values in determining answers to particular attitude questions will vary between individuals and societies. One respect in which attitude questions vary is in their degree of abstractness: in selecting attitude questions, we have observed the rule that all questions included in the computation of homogeneity scores should deal with general issues or situations rather than with issues or situations particular to individuals, sub-groups, or societies. A second difference in attitude questions is the social sphere they bear on; assuming that questions focused on only one social sphere will evoke only a segment of an individual's value system, we recommend the use of questions bearing on as wide an array of social spheres as possible. Finally, regardless of these precautions, specific questions will vary in their salience to individuals and societal groups. To the extent a

particular question varies in salience, its tendency to evoke unanimity will also vary by societal group. One means of adjusting for this problem is to include as large a number of questions as possible when constructing an index of homogeneity--we recommend a minimum of ten questions.

(3) Our approach assumes that attitudes are equally a reflection of values in all societies. But some social philosophers (Nakamura, 1964; Hsu, 1953) suggest that feelings and action in certain societies are relatively more situation bound than in others. The implication is that situations, including the interview situation, will provide a stronger stimulus for attitudes in these societies than will values. On the other hand, in other societies, individual values might have a stronger relation to values. While we acknowledge this proposition, it should be pointed out that it thus far has no empirical support. To the extent this proposition is correct, our effort to measure relative value homogeneity is confounded, and our approach reduces to a mere measurement of relative attitude homogeneity.

Application of the Eleven-Nation Youth Survey

While there are few cross-national surveys of the content of values (and not even one based on representative national samples) in recent years there have been several cross-national surveys of other aspects of belief systems--fertility attitudes and behavior, political culture, political behavior, youth attitudes--to note a few examples. Many of these studies have administered lengthy questionnaires to national samples and provide suitable data for the computation of homogeneity scores.

A survey of particular interest to us was conducted in 1973 by Gallup International at the request of the Prime Minister's Office in Japan.[2] National samples of youth 18-23 were selected in 8 advanced societies; in addition, youth samples of reasonably high quality were selected from 3 developing societies.

Most of the questions (see Appendix) were designed to determine the attitudes of youth to their social institutions or to comprehend youth's philosophy of life. The responses indicated large differences between nations. For example, one question asked "What do you think is the most important thing for our country to do now?" followed by a list of six alternatives. Over one-third of the selected youth in seven of the societies felt the most important thing was for their country "to place extra emphasis on social security and provide a secure way of life for the people." On the other hand, American youth emphasized the need "to build a peaceful society," and youth in England, India, and the Philippines stressed the need for their country "to promote industry and enrich the nation's life." On other questions, the response category was restricted to an agree-disagree format: for example, "Is 'human nature' fundamentally bad?" Here again there were substantial national differences with one-third of Japanese youth agreeing whereas less than one-sixth of the youth in the U.S., England, West Germany, and Switzerland agreed. Comparing question by question indicates that the youth of these 11 nations do differ substantially in their social attitudes, and presumably in their value orientations which underlie these attitudes.

We would like to propose that this questionnaire might also be used as a means of measuring the relative extent of homogeneity in the

attitudes (and hence the value orientations) of the youth of the respective samples. For example, concerning the first question cited above (What do you think is the most important thing for our country to do now?) among Japanese youth, 56.7% agreed that their country's most important problem is to emphasize social security. In France, more youth chose "emphasizing social security" than any of the other alternates, but still the proportion who chose this alternative was only 34.4%. For American youth, social security was less important than "building a peaceful society," and 54.6% felt that the latter was most important.

It would not be proper on the basis of one question to say that the attitudes of Japanese youth are more uniform than French youth. However, through adding up for each country the per cent who chose the majority response for a large number of questions, we believe it is possible to develop an indicator of the relative degree of homogeneity of the attitudes of youth in these countries.

For the 1973 survey, we have chosen 34 questions from a total of 60 attitude questions according to the criteria mentioned above. Those questions in the survey dealing with very personal situations or problems peculiar to Japanese society--Japan sponsored the survey and developed the questionnaire--were eliminated. At the same time, questions were retained which probed attitudes to the social spheres of family, education, work, society, and politics. Of the 34 questions, one has 9 alternatives, one has 8, one has 7, seven have 5 alternatives, three have four alternatives, one has 3, and twenty have only 2 alternatives. Thus, the smallest sum a nation could have would be 289.6% and the largest sum

would be 3400%. In the Appendix we list the sums for each of the 11 nations in the 1973 survey as well as detailed information on the computations.

When the scores for the 11 countries are compared (Table 1) perhaps the most interesting result is the relatively small range between the country scoring lowest on the index of heterogeneity (West Germany with 1952.4) and the country scoring highest (Yugoslavia with 2243.6). Some might infer from this bunching of scores that our strategy is not a very sensitive or reliable discriminator of degree of homogeneity. However, we have used several tests to evaluate the reliability of our measure, and all are reassuring.

One was to compute rank-order correlations of the overall scale with several sub-scales to determine whether one of these attitudes was the major component. To the contrary, the rank-order for countries in the education, politics, and social attitudes areas where numerous questions were available all were significantly correlated with the rank-order of countries for the total index. The rank-order coefficient for education was .71; it was .41 for political; and .85 for social. Only the work scale had a negligible relation to the overall scale.

In a second test, we dropped all questions with only two responses (e.g., agree, disagree) on the assumption that a few deviant answers on these could lead to wild fluctuations, and computed a new index. The Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient of this sub-index with the original index was .74.

Next we randomly selected ten questions from the original 34 and computed a sub-index in the same manner. The Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient of the reduced with the original index was .84.

would be 3400%. In the Appendix we list the sums for each of the 11 nations in the 1973 survey as well as detailed information on the computations.

Perhaps the most interesting result is the relatively small range between the country scoring lowest on the index of heterogeneity (West Germany with 1952.4) and the country scoring highest (Yugoslavia with 2243.6). Some might infer from this bunching of scores that our strategy is not a very sensitive or reliable discriminator of degree of homogeneity. However, we have used several tests to evaluate the reliability of our measure, and all are reassuring.

One was to compute rank-order correlations of the overall scale with several sub-scales to determine whether one attitude was the major component. To the contrary, the rank-order for countries in the education, politics, and social attitudes areas where numerous questions were available all were significantly correlated with the rank-order of countries for the total index. The rank-order coefficient for education was .71; it was .41 for political; and .85 for social. Only the work scale had a negligible relation to the overall scale.

In a second test, we dropped all questions with only two responses (e.g., agree, disagree) on the assumption that a few deviant answers on these could lead to wild fluctuations, and computed a new index. The Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient of this sub-index with the original index was .74.

Next we randomly selected ten questions from the original 34 and computed a sub-index in the same manner. The Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient of the reduced with the original index was .84.

TABLE 1

RANKINGS OF ELEVEN YOUTH SAMPLES ON OVERALL HOMOGENEITY OF VALUE ORIENTATIONS AND ON HOMOGENEITY FOR SPECIFIC AREAS

| Low Homogeneity | Total Index (34 questions) | Education Index (10 questions) | Occupation Index (2 questions) | Political Index (7 questions) | Social Index (15 questions) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | West Germany (1952.4) | France | Japan | Brazil | West Germany |
| 2 | France (1959.4) | Japan | Brazil | Philippines | Japan |
| 3 | Philippines (1976.1) | Brazil | India | France | France |
| 4 | Brazil (1976.9) | West Germany | Philippines | India | England |
| 5 | Japan (2006.1) | Philippines | United States | West Germany | United States |
| 6 | England (2050.0) | England | Switzerland | Switzerland | Philippines |
| 7 | United States (2052.6) | Yugoslavia | Yugoslavia | Yugoslavia | Brazil |
| 8 | Switzerland (2094.4) | Sweden | France | England | Switzerland |
| 9 | India (2108.1) | Switzerland | West Germany | United States | India |
| 10 | Sweden (2176.0) | United States | England | Sweden | Sweden |
| 11 | Yugoslavia (2243.6) | India | Sweden | Japan | Yugoslavia |

TABLE 2

HOMOGENEITY STUDIES COMPUTED FOR THREE

ADDITIONAL CROSS-NATIONAL STUDIES

| Almond-Verba (16 questions) Low Homogeneity | | Verba-Nye (21 questions) Low Homogeneity | | Buchanan-Cantril (7 questions) Low Homogeneity | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Italy | 1 | Japan | 1 | Netherlands |
| 2 | Germany | 2 | United States | 2 | France |
| 3 | United Kingdom | 3 | India | 3 | Italy |
| 4 | United States | | | 4 | Britain |
| 5 | Mexico | | | 5 | Germany |
| | | | | 6 | Norway |
| | | | | 7 | Mexico |
| | | | | 8 | United States |
| | | | | 9 | Australia |

Finally we turned to three other comparative studies --the Almond-Verba study of Political Culture, the Verba-Nye study of Political Behavior, and the Buchanan-Cantril study of International Perceptions.[3] The first two of these studies used questionnaires which were somewhat narrow in scope for our purposes and covered a smaller number of countries -- the Verba-Nye study used an identical questionnaire for only three countries and the Almond-Verba an identical questionnaire for five. We selected 16 questions from the Almond-Verba study and 21 from the Verba-Nye study and used the same procedure as above to compute three new sets of scores as presented in Table 2. In our view, these indexes were less satisfactory in that they had few questions on attitudes outside the political area. Nevertheless, it is interesting that, in both cases, wherever there is overlap, the rank-order for degree of heterogeneity of countries is identical with that for the 1973 youth survey.

The Buchanan-Cantril study, conducted in 1948-1949, included a larger number of countries than either Almond-Verba or Verba-Nye, but the respondents of each nation were asked fewer attitude questions. Only seven questions were minimally appropriate for the computation of the homogeneity scores summarized in Table 2, whereas we believe at least ten should be used. Nevertheless, the rank-order of the countries in terms of degree of homogeneity is similar to that for the youth study (only Germany is ranked substantially out of order and possibly contributing to this difference was Buchanan-Cantril's restricting their survey to British-occupied Germany) and the Almond-Verba study. Mexico scores slightly higher in cultural heterogeneity than the U.S. in the Buchanan-Cantril study, whereas in the Almond-Verba study she ranks

slightly lower. These parallel results from three reputable surveys based on national samples increased our confidence in the proposed procedure.

Determinants of the Relative Degree of Homogeneity

The resultant ordering of societies in terms of their relative degree of homogeneity in individual value orientations may surprise some readers. For example, in recent years Americans have become increasingly conscious of the heterogeneity of this nation, thanks to the forceful reminders of social protest movements. Ethnically, America is a diverse society and, moreover, its occupational and political systems are among the most complex in the world. Presumably, social and cultural differentiation are interrelated.[4] Nevertheless, according to our index, the U.S. is more homogeneous in value orientations than two developing societies and even Japan -- a nation which has supposedly achieved an unusual degree of cultural uniformity.

Clearly many factors have independent roles in determining the nations' relative homogeneity in value orientations. Though the small number of countries for which we could construct a homogeneity index does not allow a serious evaluation of these factors, it is worthwhile to review them as we search for an understanding of the relative ranking of the 11 cases.

The Division of Labor. Possibly the most widely accepted explanation for heterogeneity in value orientation is that it is brought about through the increasing division of labor. Durkheim (1964: 170, 172) submits that with the division of labor "there is a decreasing number of collective beliefs and sentiments." While the common conscience

does not disappear completely, "it more and more comes to consist of very general and very indeterminant ways of thinking and feeling, which leave an open place for a growing multitude of individual differences." This general perspective is consistent with the evolutionary formulations of a large number of anthropologists from Morgan to Redfield. Lenski (1970: 100) agrees with the division of labor generalization, but doubts that it will continue to be valid: "the effects of technological advance in the years ahead are likely to prove very different from its effects in the past, at least insofar as social and cultural diversification is concerned. Instead of increasing diversification, technological advance is likely to reduce it." We used two familiar indexes of economic development -- GNP per capita and the proportion of the labor force in agriculture -- to determine whether the more developed countries of our sample were also more heterogeneous in value orientations.[5] For both indexes, there was no significant relationship.

Educational Revolution. One reason for the low relation of development and heterogeneity in values is that the theories are primarily concerned with major thresholds in social type, as between agrarian and industrial society, rather than with differences within these types. Also, the theories assume that the division of labor allows for greater heterogeneity but does not guarantee it. Parsons and Platt's (1973: 267-303) recent work on the "educational revolution" has underlined the important role of the educational system and especially the university in promoting cultural heterogeneity. One feature of the educational revolution is the large number of people permitted to work at the university developing new "definitions of the societal situation." In addition, growing proportions of the population attend higher educational

institutions and learn these new advanced definitions. The educational revolution normally follows the industrial and democratic revolutions, but there is no determinate sequence. Thus in our sample, the Philippines is a country that has gone further in developing educational institutions than factories and it scores high on the heterogeneity index. Generally, educational development (indexed by the adjusted school enrollment ratio) is a weak predictor of heterogeneity in value orientations; the rank order correlation is .26.[6]

Information System. While the educational revolution may serve to promote diversity, other of the new institutional complexes such as the information system composed of the mass media and advertising are potential promoters of homogeneity. This complex is most likely to affect the quality of culture if it operates from a single center and develops messages that become widely diffused. On the other hand, to the extent that the complex is decentralized and several centers compete for public attention, we might expect the information system to have little effect on culture, or even to promote some diversity. Unfortunately, there are no ready comparative indexes of the degree of decentralization-competitiveness of this complex. While it is easy to obtain data on the per capita distribution of newspapers, TVs, radios and telephones, these measures are peripheral to the decentralization-competitiveness hypothesis. Thus it is not surprising that the correlates of those indexes with heterogeneity are uniformly low. Turning to particular societies, one discovers that some have relatively centralized institutions for one information sphere and decentralized ones for another. For example, television is relatively centralized in the U.S., with only three major

networks all working out of New York and offering similar formats; the only significant source of diversity is the struggling public broadcasting system. On the other hand, most newspapers, though they depend on the major wire services, have a local base and are filled predominantly with local news. In contrast in Japan, the newspaper industry is highly centralized. While there are local papers, most families depend on one of the three major national daily newspapers published from Tokyo. Japanese TV is also relatively centralized, but at least there are five major networks and among these is a government subsidized National Broadcasting Company (NHK) which has both full-time general interest and educational channels. The several continental European countries are not especially distinguished for the decentralization of their media, but competition is often evident. Moreover, the members of each society make considerable use of media developed by their neighboring societies, thus generating an indirect mode of competitiveness. While this complexity in the information systems of advanced societies makes comparisons between them difficult, we should not ignore the obvious contrast with societies that have not yet developed complex information systems. In our sample, India, the Philippines, and Brazil are examples, and it is of interest that two of these societies score exceptionally low on our index of cultural homogeneity.[7]

Political Centralization. Political centralization is another institutional variable often cited in discussions of cultural homogeneity. More centralized polities have the capacity to exert greater control over the culturally oriented institutions such as the schools, the media, and the church. Whether a central government uses this capacity or not will

depend on the circumstances of each case. However, there are doubtless some regularities underlying government policy shifts towards the promotion of homogeneity: for example, when nations are newly founded and seeking their identity, during periods of martial law and in periods of violent political competition, and when nations are at war or enduring a potentially disintegrative national crisis such as a depression. Again, we are unable to systematically evaluate any of these hypotheses, as available measures of government centralization are too crude for our purposes. Nevertheless, we feel that the relative degree of value homogeneity in Yugoslavia and especially Sweden might, in part, be accounted for by the cultural activities of these two nations' governments. In the Swedish case, the government has developed an ideologically oriented curriculum which is administered uniformly throughout the nation. This is also the ideal in Yugoslavia, though practical conditions inhibit full realization.

Ethnic Diversity. Apart from the institutional variables, ethnic diversity is also often pointed to as a determinant of cultural heterogeneity. Seemingly in favor of this hypothesis is the finding of several recent studies on American ethnicity that distinctive sub-cultures have continued to resist the temptations of the melting pot. (Glazer and Moynihan, 1963; Gordon, 1964). However, a careful reading of these studies suggests that the distinctiveness of America's ethnic sub-cultures lies more in their styles of dress, diet, and language than in their basic value commitments. Indeed, it appears that the recognition of separateness has induced many ethnic leaders to try to bring the central commitments of their people as closely in line with the central American values as possible. Thus it is not surprising that the U.S., which scores moderately high on several indexes of ethnic diversity, nevertheless ranks high on homogeneity. Moreover, the data from our 11 countries suggest the American experience

may be typical. Indeed, of all the determinants we have reviewed, the strongest correlate we can report is between ethnic diversity and cultural homogeneity; the Spearman rank-order correlation is .55. The only ethnically homogeneous country which also scores high on cultural homogeneity is Sweden.

The institutionalization of class stratification including barriers to intergenerational mobility would be another plausible determinant of value heterogeneity. Qualitative accounts lead us to conclude that the older industrial societies such as Germany, France and Great Britain as well as agrarian societies, have more rigid class boundaries, and indeed, several of the societies classified in this manner are more heterogeneous. However, it is difficult to find consistent support for this classification in the confused stratification and mobility literature. Moreover, though we have a few studies detailing distinctive occupational sub-cultures, the empirical evidence on class-based sub-cultures is weak. Thus, we are not prepared, at this stage, to advance class as an important determinant of cultural heterogeneity.

The Consequences of Homogeneity

Homogeneity of individual value orientations in combination with other variables has frequently been viewed as an important factor in social processes, especially of the polity. Kornhauser (1961) distinguishes pluralistic modern societies from mass societies by the extent to which the members of the latter adhere to "mass standards" of evaluation. Observing that "mass standards are readily used by mass-oriented elites as bases for manipulating and mobilizing large numbers of people," he concludes that "a society characterized by mass standards lacks strong cultural support for the defense of basic institutions, especially liberal democracy."

(Kornhauser, 1961: 103). Turning the argument around, Robin Williams (1970: 302) suggests that a democratic system is the only political mechanism able to resolve the inevitable conflicts that emerge in a pluralistic system. In sum, theorists argue that a certain degree of heterogeneity is vitally related to the functioning of democratic institutions.

On the other hand, excessive heterogeneity threatens effective government. Thus, the first task of new governments is to gain broad acceptance for common national symbols and political norms. To the extent that the national composition is heterogeneous and especially if the heterogeneity is grounded in ethnic or racial diversity, the task of national mobilization is difficult. Separatist movements may emerge and undermine the strength of the national polity as has been the case in India throughout the post-revolutionary period. (Harrison, 1960).

The degree of homogeneity of a people has equally important consequences for other institutional areas. Insofar as a labor force is homogeneous, employers find it easier to select and train employees, thus resulting in considerable savings to their organizations. Moreover, work teams are not troubled by the strains that sub-culture differences might generate. On the other hand, a homogeneous labor force may not be able to develop as many new ideas for improving the work process. Also the lack of heterogeneity makes it easier for a group of employees to agree on "restriction of output" norms (Collins, Dalton, and Ray, 1946) and to form unions (Pelling, 1960) -- both potentially counter to the interests of management. Presumably, the control of the labor force would vary between management and labor leaders depending on whether the labor force was heterogeneous in its value orientations or homogeneous.

Needless to say, the propositions we have mentioned here are exceedingly difficult to test at the societal level, due to the influence of other factors. Certainly, given the small number of countries for which we have computed homogeneity measures, serious examination of these propositions is out of the question. However, the centrality of many of these propositions in sociological theories underlines the need for more extensive attempts to measure and examine cultural heterogeneity.

Other Applications of the Homogeneity Measure

Our previous discussion has concentrated on cross-national comparisons of homogeneity; however, our approach can be applied to other problems--for example, to variations over time in the homogeneity of a given society or to differences in the relative homogeneity of societal sub-groups. Many of the hypotheses elaborated above can be reformulated to consider these differences. In Japan an excellent nationwide survey of national character has been conducted every five years since 1953 (Tokei Suri Kenkyusho, 1974). Preliminary analyses of the changing content of Japanese national character have been reported elsewhere--these suggest on the one hand impressive stability in value orientations concerning basic human relations in the family, at the workplace, and between friends; yet there are major changes in individual goals and attitudes towards government, society and the environment (Nishihira, 1974). Concerning homogeneity, the educational level of the Japanese population--especially women--has been substantially upgraded during the postwar period, but possibly counter-acting education's diversifying effect have been the centralizing trends in the mass media. To examine homogeneity, we selected 18 questions from this survey which were repeated in 1953, 1963, and 1973 and which conformed with the criteria noted earlier for our approach. The scores on homogeneity were 838 in

1953, 822 in 1963, and 834 in 1973, suggesting little change in the degree of homogeneity over this twenty year period.

The Japanese survey is a somewhat unusual source in that national opinion surveys with questions ranging over a variety of issues are rarely repeated in any nation including the U.S. However, if a large number of similar questions were asked at one point in time but on different surveys and then these questions were repeated several years later, it would be possible to pool the answers to surveys of the earlier period, compute a measure of homogeneity, and compare it with a measure for the same questions in the later survey. The General Social Survey of the National Opinion Research Center affords such an opportunity.

Also our approach can be used to examine differences between sub-groups. As one example, we have reviewed all the tables in Gerhard Lenski's The Religious Factor (1963) which provided marginals on attitudes by socio-religious groups (only 8) and computed value homogeneity scores: middle-class Protestants scored high on homogeneity; working-class white Protestants and middle-class white Catholics bunched in the middle; and black Protestants scored much lower.[8]

In terms of our earlier propositions, we might argue that the higher degree of homogeneity of middle-class Protestants is due to their greater exposure to the national mass media and possibly to their relatively well-integrated community life. On the other hand, the other groups and especially the lower-class blacks are possibly less affected by these homogenizing experiences. Additional explanations might be presented, but without replications of this computation for other samples extended discussion is not justified. Our purpose is merely to illustrate the possibility for such an application.

Similarly, our computational technique can be applied to compute differences in degree of homogeneity between occupations or people of different educational and income levels. Also, it could be used in small group research as a baseline measure for group homogeneity prior to conformity experiments or the coding of interaction processes: presumably groups that scored higher on heterogeneity would manifest a lower incidence of conformity or of positive interactions.

## Conclusion

Our primary objective has been to identify the obstacles that have prevented earlier researchers from computing cross-national indexes of the homogeneity of individual value orientations and to suggest a new approach that avoids these obstacles. The main obstacle has been the inability to develop an instrument for measuring values that has cross-cultural validity. However, if we can agree that attitudes are a reflection of values, we propose a method for inferring the heterogeneity of value orientations through a study of diversity in attitudes. Of course attitudes are also influenced by other features of a situation, and to the extent that these other features prevail our approach is rendered meaningless. For particular situations, due to some strong stimulus such as the influence of a significant other we know that individuals develop attitudes that are contrary to their values. However, over a large number of situations we assume that an individual's value orientations are the most consistent influence on his attitudes.

An alternate approach might be to compute indexes of behavior on the assumption that behavior is also a reflection of values. The advantage is that behavioral measures are more readily available (e.g. from censuses

and official surveys) and can be more easily validated; however, we suspect that behavior is far more influenced by aspects of social situations than are attitudes and hence that a behaviorally based approach would be even less sensitive to true variation in the homogeneity of value orientations.

The reliability of our homogeneity index has been confirmed by each of several different measuring techniques. Given the present status of cross-cultural research, it is difficult to conceive of a simpler and more effective procedure for measuring cultural homogeneity. Insofar as researchers believe the concept of cultural heterogeneity is important, they might seriously consider some alterations of future research designs to include questions that would best index the extent of diversity in the attitudes of different populations. One principle in such a strategy would be to include questions which range over a sufficiently broad range of areas--e.g., surveys that focus on political behavior might find it worthwhile to include attitude questions on issues such as the importance of education, respect for parents, fertility ideals, attitudes to sex, views on the importance of life and work, respect for law, views on the ideal agenda for the national government, and evaluations of the performance of government. Secondly, researchers could survey previous research studies to identify questions that produce an exceptional degree of diversity.

## Footnotes

1. This mistake of summing or averaging individual variables to operationalize a system level variable is characteristic of studies based on survey analysis. A familiar example is the landmark study of Almond and Verba (1963: 14-15) where they defined "the political culture of a nation as the particular pattern of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation."

2. The Prime Minister's Office contracted with Gallup International to conduct comparable surveys in the eleven countries of youth 18-24. In most countries, a stratified random sampling was used to select about 2500 subjects; at least 1990 respondents completed the interviews in all of the eleven countries and in the instances where a random sample had been selected they constituted from 74 to 91 per cent of the intended subjects. In France, Brazil, and the Philippines rural youth were significantly undersampled; in the latter instance, weights were used to adjust the distribution of responses prior to calculating the distributions analyzed in the text. Full details are reported in the Prime Minister's Office report (1973: 38-51). An English translation of the survey is scheduled for publication in the near future through the Japanese Government Printing Office.

3. Each study used a uniform sampling design and identical questionnaires administered by qualified research centers for all of the countries covered. The Buchanan-Cantril Study (1964) was a pioneer in this type of research as it was conducted immediately following World War II. The Almond-Verba study was the first cross-national study of the sixties designed to evaluate an articulated theory of social process. And the Verba-Nye study which still remains to be published was designed to pursue several issues in political behavior raised by the Almond-Verba study. Our indexes are calculated from data presented in the published reports of the first two surveys and from marginals graciously supplied by the country teams of the Verba-Nye project.

4. However, as Kornhauser observes (1964: 105)

> "There is no one-to-one relation between social and cultural differentiation or stability. In the United States, for example, there appears to be greater social differentiation than cultural differentiation, perhaps in part because of the system of popular education that prevails in this country. In France, on the other hand, the reverse situation seems to obtain, in part due to the elitist character of educational institutions in that country."

5. Full details on the measures we employ for these correlates are reported in Taylor and Hudson (1972) on the following pages: The division of labor is operationalized as GNP/capita and Percent in Non-Agricultural Industries as explained on page 314; educational development is operationalized by the school enrollment ratio as explained on page 225; to evaluate the information system hypothesis, we considered the relation to homogeneity of newspapers/1000 and telephones/1000 as explained on page 239; ethnic diversity is operationalized by a modification of the index of linguistic and ethnic fractionalization originally developed in the Soviet Union Atlas Narodov Mira as explained on page 271.

7. At the same time, it is necessary to recall the sampling bias in the Brazilian and Philippine samples towards urban educated youth as noted in footnote 2. While the respondents were weighted to compensate for the bias towards the more modern sector of the population, these adjustments may have been insufficient and hence may be partially responsible for the low scores.

8. Suitable marginals for eight attitude questions were reported in tables 10, 12, 15, 18 (two questions), 19, 22, and 23. The score for middle-class white Protestants was 573, 514 for middle-class white Catholics, 519 for working-class white Protestants, 526 for working-class white Catholics, and 491 for working-class blacks.



## REFERENCES


Adler, F.
1956 "The value concept in sociology." American Journal of Sociology 62: 272-279.

Allport, G. W.
1961 Pattern and Growth in Personality. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.

Allport, G. W. and P. E. Vernon
1931 A Study of Values. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. (revised 1951 in collaboration with G. Lindzey).

Almond, G. A. and Sidney Verba
1963 The Civic Culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Buchanan, William and Hadley Cantril
1953 How Nations See Each Other. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Childs, Marquis W.
1936 Sweden: The Middle Way. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Collins, Orvis, Melville Dalton and Donald Roy
1946 "Restriction of output and social cleavage in industry." Applied Anthropology 5 (Summer): 1-14.

Durkheim, Emile
1933 The Division of Labor in Society. New York: Free Press.

Furnival, J. S.
1948 Colonial Policy and Practice. London: Cambridge University Press.

Glazer, Nathan and Daniel P. Moynihan
1963 Beyond the Melting Pot. Cambridge: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.

Gordon, Milton M.
1964 Assimilation in American Life. New York: Oxford University Press.

Harrison, Selig
1960 India: The Most Dangerous Decades. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Haug, Marie R.
1967 "Social and cultural pluralism as a concept in social systems analysis." American Journal of Sociology 73 (November): 294-304.

Hollander, Paul
1973 Soviet and American Society. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hsu, Francis L. K.
1953 Americans and Chinese: Two Ways of Life. New York: Abelard-Schuman.

Kerr, Clark, John T. Dunlop, Frederick Harbison, Charles A. Myers
1960 Industrialism and Industrial Man. New York: Oxford University Press.

Kluckhohn, Clyde
1951 "Orientations in the theory of action: an exploration in definition and classification." Pp. 388-434 in Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils (ed.), Toward a General Theory of Action. New York: Harper and Row Publishers.

Kluckhohn, Florence R. and Fred L. Strodtbeck
1961 Variations in Value Orientations. Evanston: Row, Peterson and Company

Kornhauser, William
1959 The Politics of Mass Society. Glencoe: Free Press.

Lenski, Gerhard
1961 The Religious Factor. Garden City: Doubleday and Co., Inc.

1970 Human Societies. New York: McGraw-Hill.

McNichols, Charles L. and Clayton D. Carus
1944 Japan: Its Resources and Industries. New York: Harper and Bros., Publishers.

Morris, C.
1956 Varieties of Human Value. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Nakamura, Hajime
1964 Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples: India, China, Tibet, Japan. Honolulu: East-West Center Press.

Nishihira, Shigeki
1974 "Kawatta Kokuminsei; Kawaranai Kokuminsei," (The Stable and Changing Aspects of Japanese National Character) Jiyu 16, 8 (August): 174-182.

Parsons, Talcott and Gerald M. Platt
1973 The American University. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Pelling, Henry
1960 American Labor. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Prime Minister's Office
1973 Sekai Seinen Ishiki Chosa Hokokusho. Tokyo: Sorifu Seishonen Taisaku Honbu.

Redfield, Robert
1959 "The folk society." Pp. 311-332 in Morton H. Fried (ed.), Readings in Anthropology, Volume II. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company.

Rodd, W.
1959 "Cross-cultural use of 'The Study of Values." Psychologia 2: 157-164.

Rokeach, Milton
1973 The Nature of Human Values. New York: The Free Press.

Shils, Edward
1970 Selected Essays. Chicago: Center for Social Organization Studies.

Taylor, Charles L. and Michael C. Hudson
1972 World Handbook of Politics and Social Indicators. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Tokei Suri Kenkyusho
1974 Kokuminsei no Kenkyu Dai Gokai Zenkoku Chosa (The Fifth Nationwide Study of National Character), Suken Kenkyu Ripota 38.

van den Berghe, Pierre L.
1965 Africa: Social Problems of Change and Conflict. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company.

Watson, G.
1966 Social Psychology: Issues and Insights. Philadelphia: Lippincott.

Williams, Jr., Robin M.
1970 American Society. 3rd ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

## APPENDIX. COMPUTATION OF THE HOMOGENEITY INDEX AND THE SUB-SCALES

| Questions and Most Chosen Answers | | Percent in Each Country Who Chose the Most Chosen Answers | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Education Sub-scale | | Japan | U.S.A. | England | West Germany | France | Switzer-land | Sweden | Yugo-slavia | India | Philip-pines | Brazil |
| 8.0 Please state whether or not these statements about school life apply to your experience. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 8.1 Teachers communicate knowledge mechanically. | True | 61.8 | 70.9 | 64.4 | 58.0 | 51.6 | 69.4 | 65.5 | 67.8 | 63.1 | 58.1 | 72.1 |
| | False | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 8.2 Schools simply means of obtaining good job and marriage. | True | 51.4 | | | | | | | 52.5 | 64.0 | 63.3 | 54.0 |
| | False | | 62.9 | 58.2 | 65.0 | 53.2 | 57.1 | 61.9 | | | | |
| 8.3 Schools give little attention to human qualities of students. | True | 71.4 | 67.9 | 72.0 | 70.1 | 74.2 | 78.2 | 74.5 | 74.0 | 78.2 | 62.4 | 59.4 |
| | False | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 8.4 Schools do not teach skills and knowledge truly helpful in society. | True | | | 49.7 | | 54.7 | | | 60.3 | 63.2 | | |
| | False | 50.7 | 62.4 | | 58.7 | | 54.6 | 72.4 | | | 61.5 | 55.6 |
| 8.5 Schools produce stereotyped men. | True | | | | -- | | | | | 56.7 | | 49.0 |
| | False | 51.4 | 76.8 | 74.1 | -- | 48.2 | 60.2 | 73.7 | 62.9 | | 58.5 | |
| 8.6 Schools emphasize memorization at cost of creativity. | True | 63.0 | 64.8 | 72.3 | 62.1 | 59.5 | 61.1 | 58.9 | 60.1 | 72.6 | 52.3 | |
| | False | | | | | | | | | | | 56.4 |
| 8.7 Schools do not reflect the opinions of students. | True | 60.7 | | 63.7 | 57.0 | 60.1 | 70.5 | 46.8 | 66.5 | 64.3 | | |
| | False | | 49.9 | | | | | | | | 55.9 | 54.4 |

| Questions and Most Chosen Answers | | Percent in Each Country Who Chose the Most Chosen Answers | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Education Sub-scale (continued) | | Japan | U.S.A. | England | West Germany | France | Switzer-land | Sweden | Yugo-slavia | India | Philip-pines | Brazil |
| 8.8 Most people accept that social prestige of your school will influence your job opportunities and future, regardless of your qualifications. | True | 63.2 | 69.6 | 58.6 | | 70.2 | 74.2 | | 67.1 | 62.9 | 76.5 | 56.4 |
| | False | | | | 47.1 | | | 65.5 | | | | |
| 9.0 Which of these comes closest to your own view of higher education? | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Attend higher school to improve chances of obtaining good job and marriage. | | | | 31.8 | | | 44.6 | 27.7 | | 36.5 | 27.4 | |
| Attend higher school to get a good education. | | 39.4 | 43.2 | | 25.3 | | | | 48.9 | | | 38.0 |
| I would have liked to stay on, but have to earn a living. | | | | | | 24.2 | | | | | | |
| 30.2 To what extent are you satisfied with school life? | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Satisfied | | | 42.7 | 46.5 | | 38.0 | | 59.4 | 43.5 | 75.1 | 52.9 | 55.4 |
| More or less satisfied | | 37.5 | | | 64.7 | | 46.1 | | | | | |
| Education Sub-total | | 550.5 | 613.2 | 591.4 | 553.2 | 533.9 | 612.0 | 606.3 | 603.6 | 636.6 | 568.8 | 550.7 |

| Questions and Most Chosen Answers | | Percent in Each Country Who Chose the Most Chosen Answers | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Japan | U.S.A. | England | West Germany | France | Switzer-land | Sweden | Yugo-slavia | India | Philip-pines | Brazil |
| **Occupation Sub-scale** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 13.0 Why do you think man works? | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | To earn money | 54.5 | 59.4 | 80.3 | 70.1 | 79.8 | 62.8 | 75.2 | 66.7 | 55.9 | 54.3 | |
| | To find self fulfillment | | | | | | | | | | | 42.4 |
| 30.3 To what extent are you satisfied with your job and working conditions? | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Satisfied | | 47.8 | 53.8 | | 45.2 | 49.8 | 62.9 | 47.9 | 41.8 | 46.0 | 52.6 |
| | More or less satisfied | 39.6 | | | 57.7 | | | | | | | |
| | Occupation Sub-total | 94.1 | 107.2 | 134.1 | 127.8 | 125.0 | 112.6 | 138.1 | 116.6 | 97.7 | 100.3 | 95.0 |
| **Political Sub-scale** | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 27.1 Government emphasizes too much benefits of the nation at the cost of individuals. | True | 87.9 | 73.8 | 68.3 | | 68.3 | 62.9 | 67.5 | -- | 71.1 | 54.7 | 54.8 |
| | False | | | | 49.3 | | | | -- | | | |
| 27.3 Government sometimes goes in the opposite directions from those in which the people really want it to go. | True | 85.3 | 86.9 | 90.1 | 55.6 | 75.9 | 66.1 | 86.0 | -- | 74.7 | 62.4 | 71.2 |
| | False | | | | | | | | -- | | | |
| 27.5 In the present grossly materialistic society, money reigns supreme. | True | 83.7 | 87.9 | 86.0 | 78.3 | 90.1 | 89.5 | 81.8 | -- | 85.9 | 74.5 | 76.9 |
| | False | | | | | | | | -- | | | |
| 27.7 Man's future is often virtually predetermined by his father's (mother's) profession as well as his family background | True | | | | 72.1 | | 57.4 | | -- | 51.7 | 69.0 | 61.4 |
| | False | 50.8 | 51.0 | 56.9 | | 53.3 | | 63.3 | -- | | | |

| Questions and Most Chosen Answers | Percent in Each Country Who Chose the Most Chosen Answers | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Political Sub-scale (continued) | Japan | U.S.A. | England | West Germany | France | Switzer-land | Sweden | Yugo-slavia | India | Philip-pines | Brazil |
| 28.0 To what extent do you think that the Government is protecting the rights and welfare of the people? | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Yes, fully. | | | | | | | | -- | | 39.2 | |
| Yes, more or less fully. | | 44.0 | | 61.5 | | 57.4 | 53.5 | -- | 40.5 | | 40.9 |
| No, not fully. | 66.9 | | 40.5 | | 27.8 | | | -- | | | |
| 29.0 Suppose you are dissatisfied with society, what attitude would you take? | | | | | | | | | | | |
| I will use my voting right but nothing more. | 54.5 | | 53.6 | 49.4 | | | 55.1 | -- | 43.9 | 57.3 | 40.6 |
| I will actively resort to a variety of measures such as petitions, letters, demonstrations, strikes, etc., as long as the means are permitted by law. | | 53.6 | | | 38.7 | 46.2 | | -- | | | |
| 30.5 To what extent are you satisfied with your society? | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Satisfied. | | | | | 63.1 | | | 52.9 | 51.7 | 40.6 | 46.8 |
| More or less satisfied. | | 39.0 | 40.6 | 55.1 | | 43.6 | 48.8 | | | | |
| More or less dissatisfied. | 46.5 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Political Sub-total | 475.6 | 436.2 | 436.0 | 421.3 | 413.4 | 423.1 | 456.0 | 427.1 (Average) | 419.2 | 397.7 | 392.6 |

| Questions and Most Chosen Answers | Percent in Each Country Who Chose the Most Chosen Answers | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Social Sub-scale | Japan | U.S.A. | England | West Germany | France | Switzer-land | Sweden | Yugo-slavia | India | Philip-pines | Brazil |
| 17.0 Suppose you meet a man lost and trying to find his way. What would you do? | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Ask him if he needs help. | | 50.9 | | | | 53.5 | | | | | |
| Tell him the way if he asks me. | 64.9 | | 64.1 | 59.0 | 59.4 | | 63.1 | 62.7 | 59.3 | 58.0 | 52.5 |
| 18.0 What do you think is the most important thing for our country to do now? | | | | | | | | | | | |
| To promote industry and enrich the nation's economic life. | | | 34.7 | | | | | | 53.6 | 40.2 | |
| To place extra emphasis on social security and provide a secure way of life for the people. | 56.7 | | | 49.4 | 34.4 | 44.1 | 35.5 | 50.0 | | | 44.3 |
| To build a peaceful society. | | 54.6 | | | | | | | | | |
| 20.0 Which statement best describes your feelings about premarital sexual relations? | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Such relations should be avoided under any circum-stances. | | | | | | | | | 72.6 | | |
| Such relations are all right if the parties concerned are in love. | 68.3 | 57.0 | 67.5 | 64.8 | 65.4 | 68.3 | 56.5 | 74.6 | | 55.3 | 48.3 |

| Questions and Most Chosen Answers | | Percent in Each Country Who Chose the Most Chosen Answers | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Social Sub-scale (continued) | | Japan | U.S.A. | England | West Germany | France | Switzer-land | Sweden | Yugo-slavia | India | Philip-pines | Brazil |
| 21.0 What do you want most in your life? | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ? Sincerity and love between myself and others. | | 35.8 | 63.5 | 48.3 | 42.2 | 56.4 | 52.9 | 59.8 | 58.4 | 34.9 | 35.1 | 44.2 |
| 22.0 "Human nature" is fundamentally bad. | Agree | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Disagree | 64.6 | 80.1 | 79.5 | 75.8 | 69.9 | 83.7 | 73.3 | 80.5 | 73.3 | 72.7 | 78.8 |
| 23.1 Money is for spending and not for saving. | Agree | | | | 51.4 | 70.6 | 65.8 | 79.0 | 89.9 | 57.9 | 73.1 | 75.2 |
| | Disagree | 57.3 | 63.1 | 50.6 | | | | | | | | |
| 23.4 One should not get deeply involved in the affairs of friends. | Agree | | 54.5 | 63.0 | 66.7 | 82.1 | 73.5 | 73.1 | 72.9 | 65.1 | 66.7 | 70.3 |
| | Disagree | 68.8 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 23.5 It is important in this world to take it easy and not work too hard. | Agree | 72.1 | | | 60.0 | 72.1 | 63.6 | 79.8 | 58.0 | | | 66.1 |
| | Disagree | | 58.1 | 59.1 | | | | | | 64.0 | 51.3 | |
| 23.7 Human wisdom will avoid another world war. | Agree | 63.6 | 53.0 | | 52.5 | 51.7 | | 56.1 | 79.9 | 73.5 | 57.9 | 78.9 |
| | Disagree | | | 48.8 | | | 62.0 | | | | | |
| 23.8 Human wisdom will prevent pollution and complete depletion of natural resources. | Agree | 50.4 | 58.0 | 50.6 | ~~58.0~~ | 45.9 | | 54.8 | 71.3 | 70.0 | 62.0 | 74.4 |
| | Disagree | | | | | | 55.6 | | | | | |

| Questions and Most Chosen Answers | | Percent in Each Country Who Chose the Most Chosen Answers | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Japan | U.S.A. | England | West Germany | France | Switzer-land | Sweden | Yugo-slavia | India | Philip-pines | Brazil |
| Social Sub-scale (cont.) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 23.9 We will have a better society to live in 30 years from now. | Agree | | | | | | | | 82.7 | 62.5 | 62.5 | 50.0 |
| | Disagree | 68.1 | 55.7 | 60.2 | 58.7 | 48.4 | 79.1 | 71.6 | | | | |
| 26.3 I want my mother to be more economically independent. | Yes | 59.2 | | | | 52.3 | 50.4 | | 75.2 | 71.2 | 80.5 | 68.2 |
| | No | | 46.9 | 49.2 | 53.1 | | | 57.5 | | | | |
| 26.4 I want my mother to have her own aims for living without depending upon her husband and/or child(ren) | Yes | 73.9 | 60.4 | 59.6 | | 45.6 | 58.0 | | 51.5 | | 55.1 | 51.7 |
| | No | | | | 62.6 | | | 53.3 | | 50.2 | | |
| 30.1 To what extent are you satisfied with life at home? | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Satisfied. | | 64.1 | 73.1 | | 64.0 | 58.8 | 76.4 | 64.9 | 71.3 | 68.3 | 67.6 |
| | More or less satisfied | 39.9 | | | 47.5 | | | | | | | |
| 30.4 To what extent are you satisfied with relations with friends? | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Satisfied | | 76.1 | 80.2 | | 67.9 | 77.4 | 86.4 | 70.9 | 76.2 | 70.6 | 68.1 |
| | More or less satisfied | 42.3 | | | 48.4 | | | | | | | |
| Social Sub-total | | 885.9 | 896.0 | 888.5 | 850.1 | 886.1 | 946.7 | 975.6 | 1043.4 | 955.6 | 909.3 | 938.6 |
| GRAND TOTAL | | 2006.1 | 2052.6 | 2050.0 | 1952.4 | 1958.4 | 2094.4 | 2176.0 | 2243.6 | 2108.1 | 1976.1 | 1976.9 |