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**ABSTRACT**

The North Carolina Mobility Project was an experimental program designed to determine if unemployed people in economically depressed areas of North Carolina could be relocated to and satisfactorily employed in the State's more highly industrialized Piedmont. The aim of the mobility project was to intervene in the migration patterns of the State so that the routes led west to North Carolina's own urban centers rather than out of the State. The document discusses: (1) the target and supply areas, (2) the effects of the Department of Labor's guidelines for large population recruitment and selection, and (3) the program's administration and operation in relation to staff functions, the mobility recruiting process, job development for relocated workers, financial assistance, and housing (temporary and permanent). Briefly summarized are two studies--Workers Eligible But Not Interested in Relocation, and Linkages with Training Programs--and two reports--An Evaluation of the Mobility Project by Paul Johnson, and The Consultants Report to North Carolina Mobility Project by Priscilla TenPas. Findings indicate that most relocated workers were pleased with the results of their move, employers reacted positively to the program, and subsidized relocation is an important method of matching available workers with available jobs. The full texts of the studies and reports are appended. (BP)

**APPROACHES TO RELOCATION**

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**SUMMARY OF PROJECT EXPERIENCES  
1965 - 1973**

CE 003 170

**North Carolina Manpower Development Corporation  
Chapel Hill, North Carolina**

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## INTRODUCTION

The North Carolina Mobility Project was an experimental program designed to determine if, using appropriate supports, unemployed people in economically depressed areas of North Carolina could be relocated to and satisfactorily employed in the State's more highly industrialized Piedmont. The aim was first to determine if a subsidized relocation effort would alter the migration patterns of rural North Carolinians away from the traditional route north--to the Baltimore, Washington and New York ghettos--toward the State's own cities which had been experiencing a shortage of workers during this period. The underlying assumption was that the problems which had compounded themselves in the northern slums -- poor jobs, poor pay, poor housing, and poor health -- would be eliminated or at least moderated through intrastate subsidized relocations.

From its inception in 1965 until operations ceased in 1973 the North Carolina Mobility Project relocated 2,000 workers. Two-thirds of them remained in their new location, making more money and holding better jobs than before. The process through which they were relocated involved three basic steps: recruitment of workers in rural North Carolina, financial assistance for the move, and job development in the Piedmont. In addition, the project offered extensive counseling to relocated workers, located housing for them, and provided other services to help in their adjustment to their new surroundings. Project activity provided new insights into all of these areas, including:

- the most effective recruiting techniques. The staff learned not only which methods of recruiting produced the largest number of relocations, but also the method which produced workers who were more likely to stay in the cities.

- job development practices which would insure a proper match of employers and mobility recruits, and enable the staff to choose job sites selectively.

- the steps necessary to maintain successful linkages with other manpower programs and an assessment of the role of a mobility capacity within such programs.

Consultants for the project state that mobility did substantially affect the direction of migration patterns toward intrastate away from interstate migration for rural North Carolinians. Furthermore, relocated workers made significant economic gains from relocation, gains which were retained by those who eventually returned to their home counties as well as those who stayed in the receiving area. And equally important, studies show these gains were made without displacing workers already in the receiving area.

Project personnel believe that the value of a mobility capacity within a comprehensive manpower system has been demonstrated and that it is an effective job placement tool, either as an adjunct to training or as a means for direct placement.

## THE TARGET AREA

The aim of the mobility project was to intervene in the migration patterns of the state's poor so that the routes led west to North Carolina's own urban centers rather than north and out of state. The staff was divided into two operating units. One was located in the rural areas of the state where the migration process originated (the supply area). The second was located in the state's urban centers (the demand area) where, it was hoped, some of the rural poor could find jobs without the relocation trauma experienced in Baltimore or New York. Although the location of the demand and supply areas remained the same throughout the project, within these areas work sites varied as special target groups or locations were emphasized.

## THE SUPPLY AREA

During the eight years the mobility project operated, individuals from 32 of the state's 100 counties were relocated. In the early years of the project, recruiting was done in the mountain areas of the state. This experiment was generally unsuccessful (discussed in Part III) and after 1969 mobility staff concentrated its efforts elsewhere. Similarly, until 1970 intensive recruiting was carried out in the southeastern counties of the state where a unique tri-racial situation existed involving whites, blacks, and Indians. The advent of a nine county Concentrated Employment Program, however, brought a variety of new manpower services to that area and the project concentrated its recruiters in the state's coastal plain.


After 1970 most of the recruiting was carried out in the twelve coastal plain counties displayed on the map on page 5. The chart below compares family income, percent of rural farm families, and percent of families living below the poverty level in these counties with the figures for the state.

### INCOME AND FARM STATISTICS\*

County	% Living on Rural Farms	Median Family Income	Income Less Than Poverty Level
Lenoir	11.0	\$ 7,002	23.7
Edgecombe	16.6	6,359	26.4
Nash	20.2	6,668	23.6
Bladen	24.4	5,547	30.5
Duplin	24.2	5,710	28.9
Harnett	18.5	6,348	20.5
Johnston	23.3	6,023	24.8
Halifax	15.9	5,799	29.9
Franklin	33.3	5,837	27.9
Granville	23.1	6,360	24.1
Warren	36.5	4,997	34.3
Martin	22.0	5,711	29.0
The State	10.4	7,774	16.3

\*All figures from the 1970 Census

SUPPLY AND DEMAND AREAS





The median family incomes in these counties, with the exception of Lenoir, were at least \$1000 lower than the state average and they had a higher percentage of families living below the poverty level. In addition there were more families living on farms in these counties than anywhere else in the state.

The chart below displays unemployment and labor force participation for the supply area counties.

#### UNEMPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYMENT\*

Counties	Unemployment* All Males	Unemployment Black Males	Labor Force Participation All Males	Labor Force Participation Black Males
Lenoir	2.6	5.0	74.5	66.3
Edgecombe	3.6	5.7	76.3	69.7
Nash	2.4	5.3	75.2	67.6
Bladen	2.4	4.6	69.6	63.7
Duplin	2.7	5.8	74.9	69.4
Harnett	4.4	5.7	75.2	64.1
Johnston	2.2	6.2	75.9	72.8
Halifax	4.0	7.4	67.7	61.4
Franklin	1.9	3.8	68.2	65.1
Granville	1.6	3.1	64.3	65.2
Warren	3.6	5.1	61.7	57.5
Martin	3.7	5.4	70.7	64.8

\*All figures from the 1970 Census

Although unemployment rates were low, the equally low labor force participation indicated widespread hidden unemployment.

Most jobs available to the target population have been either in farming or in farm related occupations. However, increasing mechanization and consolidation of individual small farming units have steadily displaced these workers. Although there has been noticeable industrialization in the supply area over the life of the project, much of it was peripheral to the major cities in the area, while the smaller county seats and crossroad communities showed little or no growth. Many of these new plants were traditional employers of women and consequently did not expand the opportunities for male wage earners. Thus, even though new industry has increased in the supply area, the area continued to offer limited employment opportunities to the target population.

## THE DEMAND AREA

There was also considerable industrial growth in the state's urban centers but there a better balance was reached between high and low paying jobs.

The demand area, located in North Carolina's Piedmont, included three cities: Charlotte, Greensboro, and High Point. Workers were also moved to Raleigh, Statesville, Lexington, and Gastonia, but no major job development efforts were undertaken in these cities. Charlotte, the largest city in the state, is a major center for trucking firms, supply depots, and construction firms. Greensboro is a textile, steel and tobacco manufacturing center. High Point's major industry is textiles though there are sizable furniture and hosiery manufacturing plants located there. Greensboro and High Point are both located in Guilford County and are in the same Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area.

During the life of the Mobility Program median family income was considerably higher in the demand area than in the state as a whole while the percent of families living below the poverty level was significantly lower.

The following table displays employment and unemployment rates for the demand area in 1970.

### UNEMPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYMENT DEMAND AREA

Cities	% Unemployed All Males	% Unemployed Black Males	Labor Force Participation Rate, All Males	Labor Force Participation Rate, Black Males
Charlotte	1.9	3.0	83.6	76.0
Greensboro- High Point	1.7	2.6	81.2	72.5

Unemployment rates were low and labor force participation was high, indicating a tight labor market. This demonstrated not only a need for additional labor but insured against displacement of workers already in the area by mobility relocated workers.

### III. THE TARGET POPULATION

Department of Labor guidelines and those added through the years by the Mobility Project have narrowed the target population considerably. DOL guidelines for mobility projects relocating from rural areas limit recruitment and selection to:

1. farm families with less than \$1,200 yearly income, or
2. workers unemployed for six weeks or more regardless of cause, or
3. workers discharged from work for cause other than misconduct.

The target population was further limited by restrictions imposed by the Mobility Program itself. These restrictions were designed to deal with special problems which the project was not equipped to handle:

1. An individual with a family larger than six persons was excluded because it was found that the new wages would still not be enough to support a large family in an urban setting.
2. Workers under 18 and over 45 years of age were excluded because there were too few jobs for those age groups.
3. Female heads of households with minor children were not accepted for several seasons. The limited availability of day care, too few realtors willing to accept such a family as tenants, and limited job opportunities and low wages for women in general made this group extremely difficult to work with.
4. The physically or mentally handicapped were excluded because of the lack of job opportunities.
5. Chronic alcoholics were not accepted because of their inability to hold down a steady job.

In addition to the formal restrictions, the target population was further limited as the Mobility Program discovered its lack of effectiveness with Indians and whites.

Mobility attempts to recruit and relocate Indians were much less successful than its attempts to recruit blacks. Staff members theorize that the intensified search during the past few years of the North Carolina Indians for a collective identity has resulted in a special need for community support. Indians want to remain in their own communities or to only migrate to cities where an Indian community already exists. This attitude toward relocation has severely limited the number of Indians moved under the program.

Whites have proven to be even more difficult to relocate. The staff felt there were three reasons for their failure with this group. First, because whites seem to feel they belong in the community and political institutions of the counties in which they live as opposed to blacks who feel they are prevented from belonging, whites are more reluctant to move. Second, low income whites have more job opportunities in their home counties. Third, prejudice against a project in which staff, clientele, and especially boarding houses are totally integrated strongly influenced whites against the program. Whatever the reasons, few were ever moved and of those who were, most returned home.

A profile of a typical mobility recruit would show him to be black, male, married, and unemployed. He would be 24 years old and a high school drop out. His last job would have been seasonal, paying \$1.62 per hour. For this particular group, the mobility program proved to be a highly successful manpower tool.

## IV. ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATIONS

### STAFFING

The mobility staff was divided according to function. Central administration coordinated relocations and was responsible for planning and overall direction. The supply area staff recruited workers for the program and provided initial counseling. Demand area staff found jobs and housing for the relocated worker and his family. Since the nature of the project called for extensive field work, close supervision was minimal and staff members were required to be relatively self-sufficient.

Administration of the project was handled at a central office located in Durham. The director of the project was housed there along with an assistant director, who was responsible for day-to-day operations, and an accountant. Bookkeeping was supervised by the North Carolina Manpower Development Corporation. For a time, the State Employment Service administered relocation allowances for workers, and housing and car loans, but in 1970 this function was also assumed by the Manpower Development Corporation.

The main task in the supply areas was recruiting. Since some counseling services were also needed, the project decided to use two people as a counselor-recruiter team. However, when budget constraints required a return to using one individual in both roles it was found that one person could effectively serve both functions and that the number and the success rate of relocation did not decrease with less staff.

The makeup of the demand area staff varied. Personnel to perform job development and counseling tasks were permanent. In addition, during the time the project operated dormitories for new workers, a sizeable nonprofessional staff was required.

The size of the staff changed during the life of the project from a high of 62 in 1968 to approximately 15 at the time the program began to phase out in 1973. When money was available for additional staff, from time to time, housing specialists, supervisors, and additional job developers, and recruiters were added. The project preferred, however, a small cohesive staff whose members were able to perform several functions effectively.

The relocation process was handled through the central office. A recruiter initiated the move by submitting a profile of the perspective relocatee to the central office. The central staff, after reviewing the case, would give clearance for the move and specify the date. The central staff would then alert the receiving center and forward all information on the new worker. Although there was no prohibition against direct communication between receiving and recruiting staffs, formal communication channels went through the central office.

### RECRUITING

The mobility recruiting process involved not only finding individuals who would relocate but also determining and eliminating those who could not relocate successfully and giving needed preparation to those who did move. This function was performed by either a recruiter-counselor team or by one staff member who served both roles. New recruits came from a variety of sources. They included walk-ins, agency and client referrals, and products of door-to-door canvassing.

The primary and most dependable source of recruits eligible and willing to relocate was the house-to-house canvass. Contacting clients at home or in another stable setting -- as opposed to a poolroom or bar where eligible people would also likely be floaters or hustlers -- increased the chances of successful relocation. Using this approach a recruiter was able to gain helpful insights into the entire family's prospects for making a successful move.

A second successful source of recruits was the relocated workers themselves. As time passed, workers relocated in previous years asked the project staff to contact relatives and friends who were interested in relocation, making project continuity between the demand area and the supply area productive. In some cases friends or relatives were simply urged to move by relocated workers without going through the staff.

A third source of mobility recruits was referrals from community agencies, community leaders, and job training programs. The staff agreed this was one of the least productive recruiting methods because agencies were frequently misinformed both about what the mobility program itself could or would do for a relocatee and what to expect from relocation in the demand area. One recruiter summed up his experience with referrals by noting that "they tended to relocate faster and return home faster" than those he recruited himself.

Walk-ins were the least successful recruits. The staff felt that depending on walk-in prospects to any great extent tended to load up the program with "runaways." Their retention rate in the demand area was very low.

Timing was as important to recruiting as method. The project found that a severe drop of people eligible and willing to relocate occurred after the beginning of the growing season. In addition, the lessening of the pressures of the long hard winter months made a decision on moving seem less immediate. As a result, there were predictable periods when intense recruiting activity was fruitful, and other times when such activity simply didn't pay off.

Finally, recruiters pointed out that the quality of their contacts with potential recruits ultimately determined the success of the recruiting process. Straight, honest explanations about the program and prospects for relocations were essential. Staff members maintained that even if a relocatee and his family could not adjust to the demand area and returned home, neither they nor the program suffered so long as they had not made the move on the basis of misleading information. The basis for sound recruiting, they emphasized, was to inform people of the opportunity offered by mobility, not to sell them on making a move.

#### JOB DEVELOPMENT

Generally, labor shortages in the Piedmont allowed a relocated worker to be placed on a job within a week of his arrival in the demand area. Since the majority of mobility's recruits had little training or acceptable experience, unskilled, entry-level positions were the norm. Job sites included textile plants, furniture plants, hosiery mills, bakeries, and vending machine operations.

The mobility staff made a point of offering the relocated worker a job choice. Information on wages, pay increments, job descriptions, shifts, and overtime potential were obtained for each position and given to the worker. In addition to these factors, a worker's choice might be influenced by the fact that persons from his home area were already employed at a particular plant. This made it difficult to prevent a concentration of workers at certain job sites.

The mobility project tried to avoid such concentrations because of the potential problems. Unexpected or seasonal layoffs or wholesale quitting following the lead of one disaffected worker would affect too large a proportion of relocated workers. In addition staff members felt that such concentration tended to dilute some of the beneficial effects of moving.

To match employers with employees, the staff assessed both recruits and employers. The new recruit was coached on how to present himself to an employer. If he was to be given a manual dexterity test, he was encouraged to practice beforehand. In assessing the employers the staff tried to find and avoid job sites with high turnover rates, poor working conditions, and inconvenient locations. Job developers also tried to learn each business's hiring patterns and its employee preferences.

The staff felt it was important for the employer to know a mobility worker's background so that he could judge if his firm was ready and able to deal with personnel who might be distinctly different from the urban area employees he was used to. Once the decision was made, the staff frequently performed as a middleman between the new employee and his employer. However, due to an increasing concern with retention rates, some plants took steps within their corporate structure to establish rapport with their workers, primarily through in-plant counseling services.

The availability of employment for women was important to job development for two reasons. It not only influenced the project's capacity to relocate eligible women but determined the potential for two wage earners in the family. Mobility offered two services to spouses who were interested in working: assistance in job hunting and assistance in finding child care. Occasionally the wife of one mobility worker would provide child care for the wife of another and thereby bring additional income to two relocated families. According to consultant reports, employers felt mobility recruits were at least as good as their other new employees. Where recruits had received skill training before being placed, employers stated that the program saved them recruiting and training money as well as furnished them with good workers.



## FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Mobility workers received both cash and non-cash assistance when they relocated. Non-cash assistance was used while the relocatee looked for work and to cover moving costs for his family. This assistance, carried in the project's administrative budget, included:

1. transportation between the supply and demand area.
2. transportation for job interviews.
3. room and board in a boarding house or at the receiving center prior to job placement.
4. transportation for the family from the demand area
5. moving of household furnishings and personal belongings.

Cash assistance in the form of a relocation allowance covered expenses after the relocatee found employment and his family moved to the demand area. A single worker received a lump sum of \$75.00\* while married workers' allowances were adjusted for family size. The average payment for a married worker with two children was \$402.00. The amount of the relocation allowance was based on the national average weekly manufacturing wage which steadily increased each year. Consequently the average payment to married workers increased from \$306.00 to \$506.00 during the life of the project.

During the first year of the program's operation cash assistance was in the form of loans. After 1966 all such aid was administered as grants. In addition to the relocation allowance, from 1966 to 1969 workers were eligible for a loan of up to \$1,500 for a down payment on a home and up to \$200 for an automobile.

The staff stresses that the timeliness of financial assistance was as important as the amount. Once an individual has made the decision to move, relocation should take place as soon as possible. When financial assistance was held up because of project funding delays and relocation had to be postponed, recruits were inevitably lost.

## HOUSING

The shortage of adequate, safe, lower priced housing throughout the demand area made the search for housing a special problem for the mobility staff. Of necessity, members became as skilled at finding houses as they were in finding jobs. The staff found the most successful method of locating suitable housing was through contacts within the low income community since low cost housing was rarely advertised publicly.

Relocation requires two kinds of housing in the demand area: temporary housing for the new recruit while he looks for a job and permanent housing for the worker and his family once a job has been found.

## TEMPORARY HOUSING

The project tried two approaches to providing temporary housing for new recruits. For a time the project operated dormitories in connection with its receiving centers. This system created a strong support system for the new relocatee through the increased availability of staff and the reinforcement of other recruits. In addition, staff was able to watch the progress of the new recruits much more closely and intervene before problems became too difficult. After using this arrangement for some time, the staff decided the system made new workers too dependent on staff support and decreased the worker's confidence in his ability to handle his own problems. Also, the costs of dormitory living were higher than living arrangements made outside the project. Eventually the dormitories were closed and new recruits were placed in boarding houses upon arrival.

*\*During the first three years of the project's operation the figure was slightly higher. It was reduced in 1970 because of budget limitations.*

## PERMANENT HOUSING

The most common living arrangements were apartments (29.5%)\*, rooms (26.8%), and rented houses (21.3%). Since it was extremely difficult for newcomers to get on public housing priority lists, more workers purchased houses or trailers than moved into public housing. As we have already noted, the project for several years made loans to relocatees to aid them in making down payments on houses. However, this was discontinued in 1970, and the advent of turnkey housing and federally subsidized "purchase" units made home ownership possible without a down payment.

## DEMAND AREA HOUSING AND THE WORKER

A study done on workers' satisfaction with demand area housing shows that relocated families were generally pleased with their new homes. Sixty-five percent of the sample studied said their new housing was better than their supply area homes. Only 6.6% felt their new homes were not as good.

*\*Percentages are taken from the TenPas study of 306 relocatees.*

## V. RESEARCH: JANUARY, 1972 – AUGUST, 1973

At the direction of the Department of Labor, project activity during 1972 and 1973 focused on research. This included two studies done by project consultants as well as projects designed and carried out by staff.

The two studies carried out by the project staff were to provide information on the target population and to evaluate the project's experiences with other manpower programs. The first study (Appendix A) examined the differences between workers who relocated and those who were eligible to do so but chose not to. The second study (Appendix B) assessed the project's experiences with providing relocation services to job training programs.

### WORKERS ELIGIBLE BUT NOT INTERESTED IN RELOCATION

During 1972 mobility recruiters completed a brief information sheet on workers who were eligible for relocating but indicated they were not interested in moving. Similar to those who did relocate, these individuals were primarily male, and were high school dropouts.

The two groups differed in several respects. Fifty-one percent of those who had relocated had lived in a city at one time, a factor which the staff feels is a good indicator of relocation success. Only 21 percent of those not interested in relocation had lived in a city. Almost 30 percent of the persons eligible but not interested in relocating were receiving public assistance, usually food stamps, while only 14 percent of the relocating workers received public assistance.

The study indicates that pecuniary factors are not always the most important in determining successful relocations. Project experience with whites and Indians indicates that an individual's perception of his place within his community may overshadow all other factors. Individuals who live below a certain income may be less able to cope with a move, regardless of the financial advantages attached to it.

When asked why they did not want to relocate, these individuals gave personal reasons: attachment to family, friends, and the community, attachment to farming, and dislike for the city. Since those who did move succeeded in overcoming these attachments, we must assume that the significant reasons for not moving were not articulated.

### LINKAGES WITH TRAINING PROGRAMS

The mobility project developed linkages with a variety of manpower programs over the years on the assumption that mobility offered a viable alternative in those areas where the demand for certain skills was not equal to the supply. In addition, a mobility capacity enabled trainees to have more choice in the kind of skills they learned since they were not dependent on the demand in their immediate area.

Cooperative projects ranged from offering mobility as one alternative for job placement at the Lenoir Community College Manpower Center to using relocation as the placement goal at the North Carolina Rural Concentrated Employment Program. Other projects were undertaken with Jobs '70, Job Corps, and RCA residential training center in northeastern North Carolina. In reviewing the project's experience in arranging relocations for these programs, the following observations can be made about factors important to a successful linkage:

1. Both the training staff and the mobility staff must understand the other's role. The responsibilities of each must be clearly delineated.
2. The training staff must see relocation as a desirable training adjunct. Retaining workers in the local area is generally top priority but since this is not always possible trainers should be able to help the trainees examine relocation as a realistic alternative.
3. In a training program where all job placements include relocating as in the CEP-Mobility experiment, recruiting and selection procedures must satisfy relocation criteria first.

\*Percentages are taken from the TenPas study of 306 relocatees.



4. Some agencies are extremely reluctant to refer their clients to another agency feeling that such a referral reflects a weakness in their own program. Emphasis on training to the exclusion of job placement is frequently a problem. When staff views the end goal of training as finding suitable employment for the trainee, these problems are minimized.

## CONSULTANTS' REPORTS

The mobility project undertook two major pieces of research during 1972-73. The objectives of the two projects were to measure the success of the mobility concept as a manpower tool and to provide information on various parts of the mobility process to enhance its effectiveness. Although consultants designed and carried out the research, mobility staff members provided the data in one case and did the actual field interviews in the other.

The first study, by Dr. Paul Johnson of North Carolina State University, (Appendix C) reviewed available data and project experience to date to try to isolate the indicators of probable success or failure of workers eligible for relocation, and to determine the benefits ascribed to the program by both employers and employees. The second study, by Priscilla TenPas of the University of Wisconsin, used an interview questionnaire to look at earnings and employment gains among mobility workers and to explore emotional costs of benefits.

The following summaries of these two studies discuss the major findings of each. A third section describes the information collected through the TenPas study on the six outcome categories.

### AN EVALUATION OF THE MOBILITY PROJECT

By Paul Johnson

The evaluation of the mobility project was divided into three major areas. First, cost benefits were studied and a payback formula developed. Second, variables which might affect the worker's decision to remain in the demand area were examined. Differences in current average hourly wage were studied to determine why variances occurred. Finally, the consultant conducted a survey of employers to determine their attitude toward the program.

With the exception of the employer survey all data for this study were taken from records for a five-year period already on file. Data included information taken just before moving, immediately after moving, and at the end of a two-month followup.

The Johnson study indicated that a mobility program can be cost effective in a relatively short length of time. Since the cost effectiveness depends on the worker remaining in the demand area a specific time period, the decision to stay becomes a crucial factor. The study identified several factors which influence the worker's decision to stay in the demand area, most of which can be directly or indirectly affected by the mobility staff. In regard to employer attitudes toward the mobility program, the report concluded that employer satisfaction was directly related to whether or not the program could save the employer recruiting and training costs. However, no employer voiced a negative opinion of mobility indicating that employers generally were satisfied with the program and in some cases would actively support it.

The major points covered in the study are discussed below.

### COST BENEFITS

The study defined a successful relocatee as one who was employed in his new occupation long enough to recoup his private expenses and in addition recoup the program costs invested in him. To determine the time period required to recoup these costs, a formula was devised which took the difference between the supply area wage and the demand area wage, and adjusted it for the length of time the worker was unemployed before and after the move. Using this formula the study found it will take between twelve and fifteen work weeks for the relocatee to earn enough to recoup personal and program costs.

The study did not include cost benefit ratios because the lack of a control group made it impossible to determine how many moves would have been made without the program or what the mover's experience would have been. In addition program staffing and budget changes over the life of the project made relevant costs difficult to pin down.

In summary, if the relocatee remained in the demand area even a relatively short length of time, program costs were repaid since there was a significant wage gain when relocation occurred. However, the study warned against using the formula to compare the North Carolina mobility project to other manpower programs. The experimental nature of the North Carolina project and the resulting high costs would skew a comparison. Also not accounted for in the formula was the presence of unemployed people already in the demand area at the same level of job readiness as the mobility worker.

### THE DECISION TO STAY

The short payback period made the decision to stay crucial. The study examined the following thirteen variables to determine their effect on a relocatee's decision to remain in the demand area.

1. Sex
2. Age
3. Educational level
4. Employment status in the supply area
5. Whether the person has lived in a city
6. Amount of debt
7. Whether or not he had friends in the area
8. Number of jobs held in the demand area
9. Initial demand area wage
10. Current wage
11. Marital status
12. Demand Area
13. Whether the person had training

The only monetary factor which proved statistically significant was the current wage of the relocatee at the time of the survey. First wage in the demand area, wage in the supply area, amount of debt, and training were not significant. Other important variables were length of stay in the demand area, friends in the demand area, and number of jobs in the demand area.

The study concluded that the four significant variables were really measures of personal adjustment and the ability to respond to wage differences. The length of time variable was especially important since there seemed to be some minimum time period a relocatee must stay in the demand area before he began to respond to other variables.

### WAGE DIFFERENCES AMONG MOVERS

The study found considerable variation of current wages among those who moved. This variation was notable since mobility relocatees were a rather homogeneous group, whose race, education, area of origin, and even skill levels did not vary significantly.

The number of jobs held in the demand area proved significant. The data showed that persons who changed jobs averaged an 11 cents per hour gain per job change.

The study concluded that rather than indicating instability, job change generally indicated a search for high wages in this group. Consequently, mobility staff, rather than emphasizing remaining in the first job, should encourage the job search.

### RETURNS TO EMPLOYERS

The survey of employers was undertaken to determine if employers felt the mobility project was of benefit to them. Two groups of employers were interviewed.

The first was a group located in the Piedmont. Job openings offered by this group were generally low-skill, entry-level

positions which were normally filled by walk-in applicants and employee referrals. Fewer than half of these employers felt mobility had saved them money on recruiting, and even fewer felt the project had saved them money on training.

A second group of employers was interviewed on Eastern North Carolina. These employers had used mobility recruits for skilled jobs which had significant training and recruiting costs. The mobility recruits had been given special training before referral. Consequently these employers were enthusiastic about mobility, stating it had saved them money in both recruiting and training.

Both groups of employers were asked how they rate mobility recruits compared to other employees. Piedmont employers felt mobility recruits were as good as other recruits but no better. Eastern North Carolina employers felt mobility recruits were much better than others.

In summary not a single employer had a negative view of mobility and the program was enthusiastically endorsed by some. Since the positiveness of the employer's attitude was directly related to workers skills, the study suggested that mobility programs and manpower training programs have an added incentive for maintaining linkages with training programs.

## THE CONSULTANT'S REPORT TO THE NORTH CAROLINA MOBILITY PROJECT

By Priscilla TenPas

The TenPas study had two objectives: First, to discover if mobility workers made employment and earnings gains because of their move, and second, to explore emotional costs of benefits to the worker. The consultant designed a survey which measured occupations and earnings as well as adjustment and satisfaction of those who moved. The survey was to be administered to all mobility workers moved during one contract year. One hundred and eighty-three out of 306 who actually moved were located for purposes of the survey.

In addition to the survey the consultant also examined the effects of mobility on the employment situation and the migration patterns of the demand area. Finally, she attempted to design a formula to predict success for potential mobility clients.

The study concluded that there were significant earning gains for mobility relocatees. In addition it pointed out that these gains were not made at the expense of unemployed workers already in the demand area.

Data from the questions on personal satisfaction and adjustment were inconclusive for the most part and indicated a need for further refinement of the research instrument and the target group. A summary of the major points follows.

### RESPONDENTS VS. NON-RESPONDENTS

A large portion of the project sample was not located for the questionnaire and the study admitted the possibility of a bias.

However, information available on non-respondents including project records on age and education level, and interviews with friends and relatives in the supply area, indicated that the fact that non-respondents could not be located did not imply that they all returned to the supply area. In fact, the information suggested that there was no extreme distribution of the present location of non-respondents which would create a bias for over- or under estimating the benefits or costs of mobility.

### OCCUPATIONS AND EARNINGS OF RESPONDENTS

The study examined occupations and earnings for three periods: Before the move, after the move, and at the time of the interview. Before the move, occupations were heavily weighted toward nonfarm laborers. However, since 62 percent of the respondents described these jobs as seasonal, the study assumed that most of these positions were farm-related. Before the move, 15 percent of the respondents made below \$1.51 per hour. A full one-third made between \$1.51 and \$1.75 and 93 percent less than \$2.50.

Immediately following the move, earnings and employment status took a definite upward turn. While nonfarm labor remained the most common occupation, 95 percent of the respondents stated their jobs were nonseasonal, full time. Only 5.5 percent reported earnings below \$1.75 per hour and 45 percent were making between \$1.76 and \$2.00.

At the time of the interview, the percent of respondents who held full time nonseasonal jobs had decreased to 84 percent. This reflected, of course, the employment status of those who had returned to the supply area. Even though the employment rate had decreased, earnings had gone up. Nearly 40 percent reported earning over \$2.25 per hour on their first job indicating regular salary raises during the period from immediately after the move until the time of the interview.

In summary, the study showed that there were significant wage gains for those who moved, and the gains seemed to increase over time. In addition, though occupation did not change there was a very large increase in full time nonseasonal employment. The data also indicated that wage and employment gains held true even for those who returned to the supply area although these gains were less significant.

### MOBILITY, ADJUSTMENT, AND SATISFACTION

The study attempted to determine the psychological costs and benefits of the mobility program to the worker. Three sets of questions were asked relating to the move and the worker's attitudes.

The first asked the worker to describe his feelings about the move. The data showed that most relocatees thought of the experience positively, regardless of whether they remained in the demand area. Not a single respondent felt the whole thing had been a mistake. Only 14 percent said they preferred to live and work back home, although 35 percent actually returned to the supply area. Furthermore, when asked would he prefer to live in the demand area or "at home" if he could retain his present job (or his last job in the demand area) the answer was more strongly in favor of the demand area than had been anticipated.

From a series of questions designed to determine adjustment to surroundings, the study observed that very few problems were specified by the respondents. These responses could stem from a weakness in the questionnaire, but the study raised the possibility that the services provided by mobility staff eliminated many problems before they became serious.

Because housing was such a crucial factor to a family's sense of well being, and because mobility staff had made strong efforts to aid in the housing search, a series of questions was asked to determine attitudes about housing in the demand area. The study showed 30 percent of the relocatees lived in apartments, 21 percent in rented houses, and 27 percent in rooms. A large majority (65 percent) felt the demand area housing was better than housing in the supply area even though rent increased radically in the demand area. Only 7 percent felt demand area housing was worse than in the supply area.

The third series of questions concerning life situation, outlook, and personal relationships revealed very little. Although those who remained in the demand area tended to respond somewhat negatively to specific questions about their life and work situations, all responded they would make the move over again if given the choice.

This research indicated that mobility recruits generally preferred the urban area over the farm, if all other factors were held constant. This was true even for those who returned to the supply area. The study advances the theory that services offered by mobility staff ameliorated some of the problems workers would ordinarily have faced in an unfamiliar environment. However, it should be understood that adjustment from a rural area to a North Carolina city is quite different from adjustment from a rural area to a large urban area like Baltimore or Washington.

### SUBSIDIZED MOBILITY: WHAT ABOUT THE PIEDMONT?

The study attempted to determine what effect, if any, the mobility project had on the employment picture in the demand area. It described this area as having had unemployment rates low enough that it could be categorized as having a tight labor market. On the other hand, while unemployment rates in the supply area were also low, so was the labor force participation rate--indicating considerable hidden unemployment.

By comparing subsidized migration patterns and unassisted relocation into urban demand areas, the study concluded that

the greatest impact of subsidized mobility was felt in those areas with low unemployment rates and high labor force participation rates. The result was that additional labor was added to those areas that most needed it. It also indicated that mobility relocations were placed in areas which minimized the possibility they were simply displacing other workers.

In addition the study stated that the mobility project substantially affected the direction of migration patterns toward intrastate and away from interstate migration for black North Carolinians.

The study pointed out that the effect of movers encouraging family and friends to move was not measured but may well have had a significant impact.

#### MULTIVARIATE MODELS FOR ANALYSIS AND PREDICTION OF MOBILITY BEHAVIOR

The study stated that in order for mobility to be cost effective,

1. the wage and employment changes must be positive; and
2. workers must receive these benefits for a period of time sufficient for individuals or society to recoup the investment.

Reduction of payback cost so that the project could meet these goals required stronger retention rates, higher wage differences, or both (two researchers for the mobility project have differed drastically in their estimates of payback periods). To accomplish this, the researcher attempted to design a formula that would enable the staff to predict success or failure among potential recruits so that they might intervene to effect a more successful outcome. This attempt was not successful and the study concluded that the project would have to look further for the predictors for successful relocation.

#### ANALYSIS OF OUTCOME CATEGORIES

For this purpose of analysis, mobility clients were divided into the following categories:

	Number of cases studied
Category 1 - Those still in the demand area	119
Category 2 - Those who left the demand area after at least 12 months	4
Category 3 - Those who left the demand area between 6 and 12 months	14
Category 4 - Those who left the demand area between 2 and 6 months	21
Category 5 - Those who left the demand area between 1 and 2 months	10
Category 6 - Those who left the demand area in less than 1 month	<u>15</u>
	<b>TOTAL 183</b>

Information was collected through the TenPas survey and consisted of statistics on employment status in the demand and supply area, and data on satisfaction and adjustment for individuals in each category.

The two charts included in this section were taken from the TenPas study.

#### LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION

Chart 2 (columns 1 and 2) indicates that all six income categories showed an increase in the length of time employed after the move to the demand area. As expected, the gains were positively related to the amount of time spent in the demand area.



**LABOR FORCE STATUS: YEAR PRIOR TO MOVE VS. ALL TIME SINCE MOVE**  
**ALL FIGURES ARE MEAN % BY GROUP**  
**N=183**

	(1) % time working in year prior to move	(2) % time working since move	(3) Col. 2 -Col. 1 change	(4) % time unemployed since move	(5) % time Not in labor force since move	(6) Col. 3 divided by Col. 1. rela- tive change in working time
<b>BY OUTCOME CATEGORY</b>						
1. Still in D.A. N = 119	63.0	95.2	+32.1	.9	1.5	.509
2. Left after 12 months N = 14	54.2	90.7	+36.5	1.5	6.7	.673
3. Left between 6 & 12 months N = 14	61.3	86.5	+25.2	7.7	.1	.411
4. Left between 2 & 6 months N = 21	63.9	74.1	+10.2	7.3	15.6	.159
5. Left between 1 & 2 months N = 10	69.2	85.3	+16.2	12.5	1.7	.234
6. Left in less than 1 month N = 15	65.0	66.7	+1.7	19.0	7.3	.026

A pattern emerged from the employment figures for categories 2 through 5. These four categories showed an inverse relationship between the worker's success in finding work in the supply area and his decision to stick it out in the demand area.

This pattern did not hold for categories 1 and 6. However the difference between categories 5 and 6 was quite small and a larger sample might have provided results which would conform to the pattern. Another explanation may be that those who remained less than one month do not stay in the demand area long enough for the employment-before-the-move variable to become significant. This possibility was supported by Dr. Johnson's observation in regard to adjustment variables:

"There are some adjustment problems unexplained by the other variables that depend on staying in the new environment. Once some critical length of time is passed, then the person will respond to other variables."

Category 1, those still in the demand area, was also an exception to the pattern. Possibly other, more immediate concerns entered into the "permanent" decision to stay.

Columns 2 and 3 in Chart 2 show that those who remained in the demand area had a higher labor force participation

rate than any other outcome category. However those who left the demand area after 12 months or more ( category 2 ) had a greater increase in their employment rate. A possible explanation is that any mobility recruit who lasted a year or more in the demand area would not return to the supply area unless he knew he could equal his demand area salary or increase it. In any event, such an individual would tend to be more employable than when he left home since he would have at least a year of industrial work behind him.

We can assume that the individuals in category 6 -- those people who returned to the supply area in less than a month -- simply returned to the same work situation they had left with no increase in their employability. Consequently, although they may have been better off than before they left, the gains were rather small.

### UNEMPLOYMENT

The length of time unemployed for mobility recruits was inversely related to length of time in the demand area (Chart 2, column 5). The figures fall into three groups. They indicate that in regard to length of time unemployed it did not make much difference whether one left the demand area between two and six months or between six and 12 months, since employment rates for both are nearly the same. However if one remained in the demand area less than two months, the unemployment figure was much higher (12.5 percent) and increased even more with a stay of less than a month (19 percent).

Unemployment figures were quite low for categories 1 and 2. Evidently the one year mark was very significant. A 1.5 percent individual unemployment rate for category 2 tended to support the observation that a year's experience in the demand area are significantly increased the employability of the mobility client over those who have stayed a shorter length of time.

### RESPONSE TO SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL INDICATORS

The TenPas questionnaire included 30 questions on current life situation, outlook, and personal relationships. Since the questionnaire was administered by the same staff who had originally worked with the mobility client during his move, there may have been a tendency among those who left the demand area to justify the decision by over-stating their satisfaction with present circumstances.

Consequently, it was difficult to interpret the finding that those who remained in the demand area responded more negatively than did those who decided to return to the supply area. Furthermore, no discernible pattern appeared in the responses of categories 2 through 6.

The TenPas study observed that even though those still in the demand area responded somewhat negatively to questions about their life and work situation, they were overwhelmingly positive about the move itself. If they had the choice, they said, they would make the move all over again, or would move again to a better job. The majority also chose the demand area over the supply area as a favored location for their current job.

### NUMBER OF PROBLEMS REPORTED BY OUTCOME CATEGORIES

The TenPas questionnaire also included ten questions concerning adjustment in the demand area. Each negative response received one point. Cell size was so small the outcome categories were regrouped as displayed in Chart 3.

There were few negative responses by any category. No one had more than four negative responses and only three respondents had more than two. A larger proportion of those who left in the first months reported problems than those who remained for longer periods and those still in the demand area. Those still in the demand area reported slightly more problems than the long term "leavers."

The report cautioned that the results were indecisive and simply may not have been representative of the kinds of problems faced by a mobility worker.

**CHART 3**  
**NUMBER OF PROBLEMS REPORTED BY OUTCOME CATEGORIES**

Outcome Category Number of negative Answers	Still in Demand Area	Left after 2 months or more categories 2, 3 & 4 (long term leavers)	Left before 2 months categories 5 & 6 (short term leavers)	TOTAL
0	70 58.8	25 64.1	9 36.0	104 56.8
1	36 30.3	11 28.2	10 40.0	57 31.2
2	11 9.2	3 7.7	9 36.0	19 10.4
3	1 .8	0 0	1 4.0	2 1.1
4	1 .8	0 0	0 0	1 .5
<b>TOTAL</b>	119 100.0	39 100.0	25 100.0	183 100.0



## VI. FINDINGS

### ABOUT RELOCATEES

Mobility recruits were generally young, black, and male. They were high school dropouts with no job training and little work experience. Though the majority are unemployed at the time they were recruited, most had worked before in seasonal, farm-related jobs.

While there were no sure predictors for successful relocation, the staff found that there are some factors which improved the chances of a worker making a satisfactory adjustment:

1. The presence of a family. This provides a stabilizing force for the worker and seems to make him more determined to succeed in the demand area.
2. The attitude of the wife. The staff found that the wife must not only agree to the move, she must be actively for it.
3. Employment history. Previous jobs should indicate whether the worker is really interested in steady employment.
4. The young worker. Special care should be given in working with young people to insure that jobs goals are clearly identified and the relocation is geared to fulfilling some goal rather than transferring young people from aimlessness in one area to aimlessness in another.

Project research indicated that most relocatees were pleased with the results of their move. Even those who eventually returned to the supply area felt that the move was beneficial to them. While those who stayed in the demand area indicated more uncertainty about their lives than those who returned home, they obviously felt benefits in the demand area outweighed the problems.

### ABOUT JOBS AND EMPLOYERS

Mobility workers were employed in a variety of industries including textile plants, hosiery mills, furniture plants, bakeries, and vending machine operations. Regardless of the kind of job, relocation meant economic gains for the worker both in his average hourly wage and in the length of time he can work. And it meant economic gains without displacing workers already living in the demand area.

Mobility staff frequently served as middlemen between employer and employee. However, as employers became increasingly concerned with retention rates and labor shortages, there was a growth of in-plant programs to establish and maintain rapport with their workers.

Employers reacted positively to the mobility program because they were satisfied with the workers the program recruited. In cases where training enabled mobility recruits to qualify for skill jobs, employers found the program saved them training and recruiting costs.

### ABOUT MOBILITY AS A MANPOWER TOOL

The mobility project demonstrated that subsidized relocation is an important and, in some instances, the only viable method of matching available workers with available jobs. The state employment service's goal of becoming a comprehensive manpower service agency makes it the logical agency to maintain a relocation capacity. It has the resources to assess labor supply and demand both locally and on the state level. Its potential access to workers in the state is far greater than any other manpower agency.

Subsidized relocation can have a variety of uses in a comprehensive manpower system, particularly for a state such as North Carolina in which general skill levels are extremely low among large segments of the work force. A mobility capacity means a worker has more freedom in his choice of work. It offers a way to alleviate a labor shortage in one area by alleviating a labor surplus in another. In a state where the economic livelihood of many communities depends on one industry the closing of that industry can mean economic disaster. Mobility can be used as an emergency measure in such a situation. It can be used as a job placement tool for the skilled and professional workers as well as for the unskilled and the disadvantaged. Most important, it can insure workers an opportunity to make a decent living in their own state at the same time it supplies the state's industries with the workers they need.

## WORKERS WHO CHOSE NOT TO RELOCATE

During 1973 the North Carolina Mobility Project conducted a study of individuals who were eligible for mobility services but who chose not to relocate. The purpose was to determine the differences between people who relocated and those who chose not to and to determine if any programmatic implications could be drawn.

The study was carried out through a questionnaire administered by the project's field staff between March, 1972, and January, 1973. In order to insure accuracy the questionnaire was administered twice to each individual, the second time after a five-month interval.

The interviews were conducted in Mobility's supply area, those counties where project field staff recruited workers for relocation. They were located in eastern North Carolina and included Edgecombe, Franklin, Johnston, Halifax, Harnett, Nash, Pitt, Warren, and Wilson counties. The staff administered the questionnaire while making regular recruiting calls, collecting data on all individuals who met the Department of Labor's and Mobility's eligibility criteria but were not interested in relocating. (The Department of Labor's eligibility criteria specified individuals who (1) were unemployed for six weeks or more regardless of cause, or (2) were discharged from work for cause other than misconduct, or (3) lived on a farm and had a yearly income under \$1,200. The Mobility Program's criteria eliminated (1) individuals with a family larger than six persons, (2) worker under 18 and over 45 years of age, (3) female heads of households with minor children, (4) the physically or mentally handicapped, and (5) chronic alcoholics.)

Sixty-seven questionnaires were completed. The information was then compared to data collected on the seventy-two workers who were actually relocated by Mobility during the same period.

### MOVERS VS. NON-MOVERS

Statistics on sex, race, marital status, age, number of dependents, education, housing arrangements, income, transportation, public assistance, and previous exposure to the city were collected on both groups. They were found to have similar sex, marital status, and income statistics, but differed significantly in age, housing arrangements, and exposure to the city.

Both the movers, those whom Mobility relocated, and the non-movers, those who were eligible but chose not to relocate, were primarily male. Of the movers, 80.6% were male compared to 83.3% of the non-movers, no doubt reflecting the exclusion of female heads of households from both groups.

Marital status statistics were reversed for the two groups.

#### MARITAL STATUS OF MOVERS AND NON-MOVERS

	MOVERS	NON-MOVERS
Married	52.8%	47.8%
Single	47.2%	52.2%

However, the difference did not appear large enough to be significant. Both groups had a similar average number of dependents: 1.9 dependents for non-movers and 1.8 dependents for movers. The average yearly income for movers (\$1,578) was only slightly higher than that of non-movers (\$1,472). Twenty-seven percent of the non-movers owned their own cars compared to 25% of the movers. From these figures it appeared that neither marital status, sex, annual yearly income, nor car ownership had a significant influence on the decision to relocate.

Among the factors influencing the decision, differences in the proportion of Indians between the two groups was perhaps the most dramatic.

**RACE: MOVERS AND NON-MOVERS**

	BLACK	INDIANS	WHITE*
Movers	95.8%	4.2%	0%
Non-Movers	59.7%	40.3%	0%

Mobility staff found Indians much more difficult to recruit than blacks. Indians tended to want to remain in their own communities or to migrate only to cities where an Indian community already existed. This attitude severely limited the number of Indians relocated by Mobility in recent years.

A second significant difference between movers and non-movers was age. Although the average age of both groups was under 30, movers tended to be under 25 (average age 23.5 years) while non-movers tended to be over 25 (average age: 28.2 years). Though both groups tended to be high school dropouts, movers were slightly better educated. Movers attended an average of 9.5 years of school before dropping out compared to 8.2 years for the non-movers. Since in North Carolina, younger people generally have a higher educational level than older ones, age and education level were probably directly related in this sample.

Housing arrangements showed some interesting differences.

**HOUSING ARRANGEMENTS  
MOVERS AND NON-MOVERS**

	LIVING WITH RELATIVES**	RENT-FREE	RENTING
Movers	58.3%	27.8%	13.9%
Non-Movers	43.3%	17.9%	38.8%

In both groups, more people were living with relatives than in any other living arrangement. A larger proportion of movers were living in rent free situations than non-movers. Over twice the proportion of non-movers were renting a house or apartment as movers. Though one might assume that individuals living without rent obligations would tend to want to remain in such a favorable financial position, this did not appear to be the case with the sample. It may be that living with relatives or in a rent-free situation represented a less stable and consequently less desirable living arrangement. On the other hand, those who were paying rent presumably had a sufficiently steady working situation to enable them to meet this obligation. If this was the case, it would be reasonable to assume that individuals in the less stable, less desirable housing arrangement would be more likely to choose to relocate.

More than twice the percentage of movers (51.3%) had previously lived in a city as non-movers (20.9%). Mobility staff had observed previously that those relocatees who lived in a city before relocation generally made a more successful adjustment to urban life. The data on movers and non-movers indicated that experience in city living positively affected the original decision to relocate.

Many more non-movers received some kind of public assistance than movers (29.9% compared to 13.8%). Since assistance represented a relatively secure source of income, people may have been reluctant to risk it for the chance of more money in the city. There was no evidence that people moved in order to obtain public assistance or to increase the level of their aid.

\*No eligible whites were contacted by Mobility recruiters during this study.

\*\*Heads-of-households were excluded from this category.

## NON-MOVERS: REASONS FOR NOT RELOCATING

Each individual who refused relocation was asked why he did not want to move. All the reasons were exclusively personal: they did not want to leave friends and relatives, they liked their community and farming and they disliked the idea of living in the city. Since it was assumed that those who did move succeeded in overcoming these attachments, other factors would appear to have had more significance in the decision.

### Conclusions:

Individuals who decided to relocate were younger, therefore probably less settled; they did not have their own housing arrangements; and they had no sure income, either from salaries or from public assistance. They appeared to have a more positive inclination to travel outside their community as indicated by the number who had previously lived in the city.

Although none of this analysis answers the question of how other groups can be helped or persuaded to move, it does suggest that it should be possible for a recruiter to add up those factors which indicate whether a particular candidate is or is not likely to relocate. Indeed, it appears that the growth of Mobility's relocation rate over the years was in part due to the gradually increasing sensitivity of recruiters to these factors which determine whether a candidate is likely to relocate.

## LINKAGES WITH TRAINING PROGRAMS

The North Carolina Mobility Project developed linkages with a variety of manpower programs over the years. Cooperative efforts with training programs took place both in the recruiting and the receiving areas. They involved various kinds of prevocational and skills training.

Mobility's participation with these projects ranged from providing relocation services to participating in the training itself. Over 100 training program graduates were relocated. In addition to carrying out a number of successful relocations, the Mobility staff learned a good deal about administering such efforts.

### RCA-CADA

The Choanoke Area Development Association's Family Training Project (RCA-CADA) was an OEO project, located in northeastern North Carolina and administered by the Radio Corporation of America. Families entered an intensive training course, often for six months or more. They learned skills and home economics while living in a Family Development Center designed to reorient their way of life.

Since RCA-CADA was a residential training program, all families had to be relocated at the time they completed training. The Mobility project agreed to assist both families who moved within the recruiting area and those who moved elsewhere in the state. Mobility placed 80% of all RCA-CADA graduates and 100% of those graduated between February, 1970 and August, 1973.

### SEACAP/CEP

The Southeastern Community Action Program (SEACAP) was a Concentrated Employment Program which operated in a rural ten-county area offering prevocational orientation and assessment to be followed by MDTA skill training or job placement.

In 1968, Mobility agreed to provide relocation assistance to any SEACAP trainee who could not be placed locally. This included helping the SEACAP training staff prepare the worker and his family for relocation, arranging transportation for the family and its possessions, and administering a relocation allowance. In cities where Mobility had a receiving center and staff, workers were assisted in finding jobs, obtaining housing, and in adjusting to urban work and living conditions.

### JOB CORPS

During 1969 a cooperative arrangement was worked out with the North Carolina Job Corps Field Program Specialist to obtain resumes on Job Corpsmen who were eligible for Mobility's services: those over 18 years of age and returning to homes in Mobility's recruiting area.

Mobility agreed to assist eligible Corpsmen and their families in relocating, to arrange transportation for their families and possessions, and to pay a relocation allowance. In one recruiting area the local Job Corps counselor arranged group sessions between Corpsmen returning to the area and the Mobility recruiter so an explanation of Mobility and its services could be provided. Seven Job Corps men and women were relocated by Mobility.

### CRAVEN CENTER AND LENOIR COMMUNITY COLLEGE

In 1969 the North Carolina Manpower Development Corporation opened a prevocational training center in Craven County in the eastern part of the state. One year later Lenoir Community College, located in an adjoining county, organized a second prevocational training program as a pilot project to serve the disadvantaged in its area. Both Lenoir and Craven Center offered adult basic education and human resource development.



At Lenoir Community College Mobility recruiters assisted in staff training for the program as well as assisting in initial recruitment of trainees. The program's job developer used relocation in placing eight of Lenoir's graduates. At Craven Center Mobility workers participated in the training program, explaining Mobility and offering its services to the trainees, and in the recruitment of trainees. Five Craven Center graduates were relocated through Mobility.

### JOBS-70

From 1970 until 1972, Mobility worked with the JOBS-70 training program in High Point and Greensboro. JOBS-70 is a nationwide program aimed at training disadvantaged workers for jobs in industry. The High Point - Greensboro program consisted of an eight-week training course that included adult basic education, job readiness, and on-the-job training for specific job openings. A new class, consisting of 20 trainees, began every four to six weeks.

The managers of the JOBS-70 program welcomed the opportunity to use Mobility relocatees. In the first two training cycles nine Mobility referrals were accepted. When Cone Mills received a large number of JOBS-70 slots, Mobility made a number of successful referrals. In fact, during the first training course, all but one of the Mobility recruits were rated either excellent or above average in their progress during the training period.

### THE RURAL CEP/MOBILITY PROJECT

The Rural Concentrated Employment Program (CEP), sponsored by the North Carolina Manpower Development Corporation, operated in a six county area as a successor to SEACAP. CEP participants were provided orientation and counseling, basic and remedial education, skills training, on-the-job training, public service employment, supportive services, and training stipends. During the spring of 1972 the CEP and the Mobility project jointly carried out a project to determine whether a CEP orientation would result in a higher success rate for Mobility relocatees.

The basic curriculum for the training was essentially a three-week abridgement of the standard eight-week CEP curriculum. Problems arose from the beginning. Ideally the training group should have been as nearly as possible representative of typical Mobility relocatees: Some ten out of twelve should have been male, and ten out of twelve should have been heads of household; average age should have been about 28. Instead only five were male, only two were heads of household, and the oldest trainee was only 22. Though all trainees should have been interested in relocation as a prerequisite for selection for training, five claimed during the course of the program that they had not been told that the program involved relocation, and said that they had no intention of relocating. At the conclusion of the training seven trainees were placed; five others declined relocation.

### CONCLUSIONS

#### Administration:

- Both field staff and administrators should take part in the initial planning of cooperative projects. Even though administrators may not participate actively in later stages, their initial involvement will insure lower echelon staff commitment.
- To avoid duplication of supportive services, Mobility and the training project should agree on what services each will provide.
- In a cooperative effort such as the Mobility/CEP demonstration, where both programs were involved throughout recruitment, training and placement, one individual should be appointed to coordinate effort and provide direction for both staffs.
- Field workers and administrators of both Mobility and the training program must clearly understand the services and financial support offered by each program. Agreement should be reached on which activities each agency will be responsible for and when those activities will be performed.
- Close rapport between trainers and the Mobility recruiter in each training locality must be developed.

## Referrals:

- It is crucial that recruiters be allowed enough time to verify information obtained on people to be relocated and to contact local references.
- Relocation allowances are so fundamental to successful relocations that referrals should not be accepted unless money is available to pay this allowance.
- Group sessions with individuals eligible for Mobility services are an efficient and effective way of imparting information on relocation.
- Some trainees are not acceptable under Mobility criteria for relocation. These include female heads-of-household with minor children or with families larger than six people. To avoid misunderstandings with trainers, it is important to spell out Mobility criteria for relocation in the early stages of planning.
- In a cooperative effort in which all trainees are expected to relocate, Mobility criteria should receive first priority during recruitment. Potential trainees should agree to relocation as a prerequisite for being selected for the program.
- When research is the main purpose of a joint program, minimum research requirements should be met before the project is started.
- Often the workers who cannot find employment locally at the conclusion of training are those who, for various reasons, are least stable or least easily placed. Therefore Mobility needs time for relocation orientation which will not be required for trainees who do not move.
- For stable relocation and effective placement, Mobility staff need the kinds of personal information -- employment experience; family responsibilities; draft, debt and police records; health and disability records -- which are collected on other people whom Mobility assists. This information can either be collected and passed on by the training program or it can be collected by the Mobility staff before relocation.

**AN EVALUATION OF THE MOBILITY PROJECT  
OF THE NORTH CAROLINA  
MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION**

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Raleigh  
1973**



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## I. INTRODUCTION

The Mobility Project of the North Carolina Manpower Development Corporation is one of the longest lived and, in a sense, one of the most successful pilot mobility programs undertaken since these programs were first tried in the mid-1960's. The current report represents the findings of an evaluation of the program under a contract between the NCMDC and N.C. State University. The main findings reported here concern the benefits that can be ascribed to the program, the decision to stay in the demand area, an analysis of wage differences among movers, and a brief analysis of returns to employers.

No real attempt to describe the workings of the program will be made here. Details of the program are available in the various reports of mobility. These include summary reports at the end of each contract, and monthly reports submitted to the U.S. Department of Labor. In addition there have been earlier evaluations that went into some detail on the program. Fairchild [1] and Robbins [2] both evaluated earlier phases of mobility.<sup>1</sup> A concurrent analysis by researchers from the University of Wisconsin is under way as this is written.

Basically the program has functioned as follows. The target group for relocation assistance is low income rural persons. The essential criteria are that a person be unemployed without prospects of employment or that a person have earnings under \$1,200 per year. Over the course of the program the dollar value for the poverty line has shifted upward. The unemployment criterion has, of course, remained the same, and it is really prospects of employment that matter.

Once eligibility has been established, an offer can be made to assist a move, with the promise of a job, to Piedmont North Carolina. This area has the bulk of the state's urban population and for much of the history of the program jobs were plentiful. Even in cyclical downswings North Carolina has had unemployment rates much below the U.S. average. In any event the program has been small enough not to affect total employment in any of the demand areas.

The services provided by Mobility have included allowances for travel of individuals and families, for movement of household goods, and a lump sum grant.

In the analyses that follow two samples of persons moved by Mobility are used. The total number of persons moved on which any information was secured between 1968 and 1972 was 567. Of this group 303 were moved 1968-70, and 264, 1970-72. Not all of the information was usable. The net number of schedules was 521, and this number was eventually reduced to 495. For the summary tables in this introduction that are designed to give a profile of the persons moved, different sample sizes will be used depending on the availability of information for various attributes.

The information used from these schedules included information before moving, immediately after moving and at the end of a two month follow up. Some attempt was made to get one year follow up information. As might be expected, it was easier to get information from relocatees who had stayed in the demand area than from those who had returned or moved on. Consequently, the information was highly selective and not very useful for analytical purposes. No attempt is made in the rest of the report to use this information.

Tables 1 through 8 give some profile information on the persons moved. Most of the information is self explanatory. The main thing to notice from this summary information that is important for some of the analysis is the homogeneity of the population. It is mostly black, mostly young, mostly unemployed. The educational distribution is skewed towards at least a tenth grade education.

<sup>1</sup>Numbers in brackets refer to literature cited at the end of the report.

**Table 1. SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF PERSONS MOVED BY MOBILITY, 1968-72**

<b>Sex:</b>	<b>Male 514; Female 50</b>
<b>Race:</b>	<b>Negro 535; Indian 9; White 23</b>
<b>Marital Status</b>	<b>Married 274; Never married 255; Separated or divorced 35</b>
<b>Whereabouts after 2 months:</b>	<b>In demand 403; In supply 92; Other 26</b>

**Table 2. CERTAIN DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLES FOR MOVERS**

	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>
<b>Ever been arrested</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>425</b>
<b>Raise own food (in supply)</b>	<b>123</b>	<b>423</b>
<b>Ever live in city</b>	<b>296</b>	<b>271</b>
<b>Own an automobile</b>	<b>133</b>	<b>428</b>

**Table 3. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF TRAINING**

<b>Kind</b>	<b>Number Trained</b>
<b>None</b>	<b>400</b>
<b>RCA-CADA (Low Income Technical Training)</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Lenoir Community College</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Concentrated Employment Program</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>MDTA</b>	<b>40</b>
<b>Job Corps</b>	<b>45</b>
<b>Business School</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Vocational Rehabilitation</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Armed Services</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Other</b>	<b>51</b>

Table 4. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYMENT STATUS

Status	Number
Full time	12
Part Time	26
Unemployed	423
Farm labor	68
Farm tenant	9
Not in labor force	26
Other	3

Table 5. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF NUMBER OF JOBS HELD IN DEMAND

Number of Jobs	Number
0	31
1	365
2	100
3	19
4	5

**Table 6. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF AGE**

<b>Age Group</b>	<b>Number</b>
18-21	252
22-25	156
26-29	62
30-34	36
35-40	31
41-50	28
51+	2
<b>Mean age</b>	<b>24.4 Years</b>

**Table 7. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF EDUCATION**

<b>Years School Completed</b>	<b>Number</b>
0-6	52
7-9	168
10-12	340
12+	7
<b>Average years school completed</b>	<b>9.6</b>

**Table 8. AVERAGE VALUES FOR CERTAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF MOVERS**

<b>Average wage in supply</b>	<b>1.62 dollars/hr.</b>
<b>Average number of weeks employed--supply</b>	<b>31.6 weeks</b>
<b>Average family income--supply</b>	<b>1,444 dollars/yr.</b>
<b>Average size of debt</b>	<b>177 dollars</b>
<b>Average wage, first job in demand</b>	<b>1.94 dollars/hr.</b>
<b>Average days training--demand</b>	<b>5.7 days</b>
<b>Average wage in supply for returnees</b>	<b>1.87 dollars/hr.</b>

## II. COSTS AND RETURNS TO MOVING

The basic idea of investing in a move is quite simple. People equate the marginal cost of moving with the marginal return from the move. In principle, then, the discounted present value of future returns should exceed or be equal to the cost of the move.

When private moves are being analyzed, this view of mobility presents no problems. Individuals can be assumed to make relevant calculations based on their current information, or make a joint decision to invest in search for new opportunities. Actually measuring these costs and returns may prove difficult. There are externalities, market imperfections, and non-pecuniary considerations that may be exceedingly complicated, but the basic idea is simple.

When we discuss a publicly supported mobility program we encounter direct divergence between private and social returns. Now the returns to mobility not only must compensate the costs to the participant, but must allow society to recoup the expenses of the program. There is a large literature available for evaluating public programs of the manpower variety. There is no real need to repeat the details of that literature. The differences between a manpower training program and a mobility program will make the elements of the accounting system different so a brief review of how one should cost out the program is in order.

The basic framework for analysis of these programs is the benefit cost ratio. Conceptually, this ratio is fairly simple and its interpretation easy. One simply calculates the stream of benefits and discounts them to the present. One then does the same thing for costs. If the ratio is greater than one then there is a sense in which the program can be said to pay.

In practice, a whole host of problems abound with this framework. Some of them are general, e.g., what if there are competing programs, and what discount rate to use? Some of them are more specific to particular problems, e.g., are the measurements of costs and benefits accurate, have externalities been taken into account, etc.

No actual cost benefit ratios are included in this report for several reasons. First, there are no real control group data. The lack of control group data means that the measure of benefits may be flawed. That is, we can compare before and after positions of individuals, but we do not know the net benefit position because we do not know what percentage of the moves would have taken place without the program. Also, we do not know what the experience of movers would have been without the program. This latter problem involves such things as cyclical swings in unemployment, and structural changes in the labor market. This latter problem is not too serious in the current analysis, since the analysis extends over enough time to work out cyclical unemployment effects or they can be controlled. It also may average out structural changes encompassing a broad enough geographical space.

The lack of a control group is not entirely the fault of the project. One could have worked out an experimental design for a mobility project, but that was not done. Since the persons enrolled were not chosen from a particular population as random choices, then the control group, ideally, should be chosen by the same mechanism as the enrollees. Given the nature of the program, and its duration this mechanism cannot be easily specified. An attempt was made by Fairchild [1] to set up a control group for his earlier study. Also, efforts have been made internally by Mobility to get information on control groups. Neither of these has been particularly successful.

As noted above, for this particular mobility program, the lack of a control group may not be as serious as in some other manpower areas. The target group is not one where persons might be unemployed because of a downturn in general economic activity. Rather, it is a group of rural low income persons. These people lack job information, training and other attributes on a permanent basis. Looking solely at the enrollees may provide more insight than in some other programs. Their past income and employment records may be as valid for control purposes as concurrent data from a sample of people not enrolled.

A second reason for not carrying out the benefit-cost calculations is the experimental nature of the program. The experiment consisted in part in varying the nature of the services, the earliest years of the program varied considerably in scope and nature from the later years. Secondly, as budget allocations changed the program costs per recipient changed. Direct costs would vary by size of staff and clientele, but some personnel as well as other costs would be overhead costs that would be spread over varying numbers of participants. In this situation the relevant cost is difficult to pin down.

The preceding is not meant to be an argument against cost-benefit analysis. In fact, planning for a permanent program would require that such calculation be made. Only if the program would "pay off" in the sense of benefits exceeding costs could any argument be put forward for a program. The problem is that calculating a return to program expenditures of an experiment may be misleading. In what follows, then, the emphasis is on benefits, it is assumed that appropriate adjustments to experimental costs can be made elsewhere.

### THE ACCOUNTS

The benefits and costs for private account can best be analyzed by separating the recipients of mobility assistance into two groups—stayers and returnees. The last group may be somewhat inaccurately described. What we want to do is separate out people with different benefit ratios. Three groups can be identified: (1) those who stay in the demand area of the Piedmont, (2) those who return to the home community, and (3) those who move and then move on with their own resources. As a practical matter only the first two are available for interview and attention will be concentrated on those two groups. Later, a sample of 521 observations is used. Of these, 405 stayed, or 78 percent, 92 or 18 percent returned, and 24 or 4 percent were in the third category of "other."<sup>2</sup> Only groups 1 and 2 will be discussed. For the stayers the benefits are simply the increased income taken into the future, and discounted back to the present. The costs on private account are the costs to the individual of making the move and foregone income from making the move. These costs are relatively small and occur within a short time span and need not be discounted. For present purposes the net benefit is taken as an increase in income adjusted for expected unemployment in the previous site. That is, the control variable is each individual's past work history. The problem of what length of time to assign the gain remains. The difficult question is over how long a time period to ascribe the benefits. This problem is especially acute in calculating the social benefits. In order to make this calculation it will be helpful to invert the problem and ask what is a success or failure.

Most investments in human capital can be viewed as shifting up an earnings function. That is education, training, etc., make a lifetime income stream greater by the reward to the new skill. The case of investment in migration is not so clear. If no occupational change accompanies the move, then a permanently higher wage can only be rationalized by a persistent disequilibrium (or rather a long run disequilibrium) between areas, or by a zero wage or something approaching it, or opportunities within that occupation are assumed to decline in the home area.

In the case of a move from a low income rural area almost all moves involve an occupational change. In most cases there is some modicum of training for an urban type job. The average number of days training in the current sample is 5.7 per relocatee. The costs of training, no matter who bears them, cannot be much greater on the average than \$100, then. Apparently, however, this minimal training is sufficient to give the necessary exposure to urban work. The main point is that the work experience of returnees if they go back home is more nearly like their demand area experience than it is their previous supply area experience. The indication is that at low levels of skills, it is not so much specific job experience as such things as punctuality, lack of absenteeism, etc., that determine suitability for future employment. Consequently, nothing for this group is subtracted for occupational change or associated training. The move to urban life, then, receives all of the benefits. Under these circumstances what constitutes a success?

On private account a failure is the easiest to describe. A failure would occur if a person were moved and returned home and resumed his unemployment status, or resumed his old occupation that carried a less than fully employed or less than minimum wage status before he had recouped his private expenses. Everyone else by definition would have achieved a successful move. That is, all those who stayed in the demand area long enough to more than compensate his private costs is clearly a success. Successes are also represented by persons who stay and move on to other urban jobs as they clearly receive an increase in income greater than their cost of moving. Also, quite clearly, persons who return home but retain their urban type jobs are also successes if they recover both costs of moving, i.e., the move to the urban area and the move back.

Since the private opportunity costs of the group under consideration here are quite small the proportion of successes on private account is quite high. This fact is significant for two reasons. Any such moves that would have been undertaken without assistance would pay off easily by the usual accounting system.<sup>3</sup> Secondly, a benefit to the program that has not

<sup>2</sup>It should be noted here that a permanent program might have a higher percentage in this category than an experimental program. Also, such a category may have information on an aspect not well captured here, how many persons might have moved on their own?

<sup>3</sup>Nonpecuniary costs are ignored at this point.



been measured, the demonstration effect that begets moves by friends and relatives also probably has a high pay-off. This observation also leads to a quandary, whose discussion is postponed, as to why persons do not on private accounts undertake something that would appear to have a high pay-off.

One complication that is slighted in this overview is that of changes in the cost of living. This change can be important in rural to urban moves. Typically, three items that bulk large in low income budgets will probably be more expensive in urban areas. These are food, housing and transportation to and from work. Some attention has been given to this problem in an earlier piece of work [Robbins (3)]. Conditions have not changed that much since then, so some monetary returns to moving should be lowered for a real comparison. The exact amount is uncertain, and it should also be pointed out that cheaper food and housing, especially the latter, will become less important in the aggregate with the passage of time.

Successes and failures on public account present almost as straightforward a contrast. Now the concept of a success means that the person has to be employed in his new location or his new occupation long enough to recoup his private expenses, and, in addition, recoup the program costs invested in him. As long as we are discussing relatively small programs with a small number of moves, this addition does not involve any real changes. The changes in real wages can be taken to represent changes in real output for the economy. If there are unemployed resources in the demand area as well as the supply area the issue may not be as clear cut. In that case moving rural unemployed to new areas to compete with urban unemployed may not represent a real gain to the full extent of the average wage change. This problem does not affect the evaluation of the current small scale experimental program, but it clearly would affect the evaluation of a more extensive program of a larger scope.

With this framework one could evaluate a program in terms of some desirable proportion of successes or some other desideratum. The problem that would remain would be that it would be impossible to compare this program with alternative manpower programs. The important point to be made in framing the question this way is that in terms of any one individual move, or in terms of an average wage move, one does not have to have an arbitrary length of stay to be counted a success.

The evidence from Mobility records is simply not sufficient to draw inferences about long run returns. Information is adequate on stayers but not on returnees or those who move on. Therefore, to make good estimates of benefit-cost ratios to compare with other programs some more arbitrary allocations would have to be made. The jump in income clearly should be allocated to something other than the rest of the working lifetime. Even with very high discount rates the lifetime income allocation would probably be a distortion. Even low income rural persons cannot be assumed to choose a permanent employment status of less than two-thirds employment. Therefore, for a benefit cost analysis an allocation for somewhere between two months and three years would probably be the choice. These bounds are set by the use of internal evidence from Mobility and a long standing rule of thumb for length of job tenure.

Unfortunately, then, for good analysis, the numerator of the benefit-cost ratio may be as elusive as the denominator. However, as the examples that follow indicate, the success ratio of Mobility has been good, the benefit-cost ratio is greater than one, and the thorny problems are those of predicting from the pilot program to a permanent program.

#### EXAMPLES OF BENEFITS

One set of numbers used to calculate benefits was presented in the preliminary report and is worth repeating here. The group under consideration was that of 264 relocatees moved in the most recent period of mobility activity.

On the average these persons were employed about 60 percent of the preceding year. A reasonable pre-move wage would thus seem to be 60 percent of the last reported wage. To be eligible one had to be unemployed at the move. An alternative wage is not zero, however, on the average. The expected income per year is the frequency of employment times the average wage during the year.

The average wage in the supply area is thus approximately \$1.08 an hour. The average wage in the demand area was \$2.02, and the average wage for returnees was \$2.03. The average length of unemployment for returnees was 5.8 weeks, some income for this must be subtracted off on both private and social account.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup>Actually, this adjustment should probably be in the denominator as an increase in cost. Since the denominator is being ignored for the most part the adjustment here is made in the numerator.



The percentage of returnees in this group was 13. Therefore the adjustment should be .13 times an adjustment to the wage. Since we took the most recent experience in the supply area as the proper adjustment for employment experience, let us take the earliest experience of returnees as the proper adjustment and assume 10 percent as the average length of unemployment upon return home. Applying these adjustments, the accounts look as follows:

Average wage in supply	1.80
Fraction of time employed .6	
Average wage in supply adjusted for employment	1.08
Average wage in demand	2.02
Difference due to move	.94
Fraction of workers returnees .13	
Fraction of time unemployed if return .10	
Adjustment to wage of return	.013
Hourly return to move	.928

The return to the move of \$.93 per hour includes a return to the urban training or experience of the returnees. If the benefit is restricted to the pure return to the initial move, one could subtract another \$.12 (.13 x .94) to get a net benefit of \$.82 per hour. Both of these may overstate the return as the cost of living differences might be substantial. However, it is very clear that on private account one would only have to work about 14 eight hour days at the .93 wage differential to recoup \$100 in moving expenses. This expensive a move is probably high for the kinds of move discussed here. Even at the .82 per hour benefit, one would only have to work between 15 and 16 days to recoup the private costs of \$100.

As pointed out earlier, the use of current Mobility costs as a guide to the future might be misleading. For illustrative purposes, however, we can adopt the program cost for the current framework. The cost used by Mobility at present is \$423 per move. At the \$.93 per hour benefit rate one would have to work 57 days to pay the program costs. Private costs are expected to be minimal for these moves so this program cost approaches the total social cost of the move. If the .82 per hour benefit is used the days necessary to recoup program costs is 74. Therefore, something between 12 and 15 weeks would constitute a successful move based on the sample information here.

If the total sample of 521 is used the result is not much different. Out of 521 only 495 persons can be separated into stayers and returnees. The accounts for these 495 look as follows:

Average wage in supply	1.62
Average wage adjusted for unemployment	.97
Fraction of time employed .6	
Average wage in demand	1.94
Difference	.97
Fraction returned .19	
Fraction unemployed .06	
Average wage in supply	1.87
Adj.	.01
Adj difference	.96

The main differences between the samples are that the average wage is less and the fraction of returnees is slightly larger. The average wage level reflects the lower general price level in the earlier part of the period. The absolute magnitude of the wage gain is slightly larger for the sample taken as a whole, \$.97 to \$.94. The fraction of time employed in the supply area, interestingly, did not change over the whole period, being roughly 60 percent in both periods.

In summary, then, for the benefits of mobility, it is clear that the pay back period for rural to urban moves of low income persons is quite short. The sample used may be flawed by lack of control group data, and generalizations to future programs should be made with caution.

### III. THE DECISION TO STAY

The fact that the period one has to stay to recoup the costs of moving is not very long makes the question of the determination of the decision to stay a crucial one. Consequently, an analysis of the decision to stay was made:

Clearly, the motives for staying are of the same order as the motives for moving or not moving in the first place. The underlying economic theory of moving is predicated on persons attempting to maximize their utility. What we observe is income and not utility. Thus we usually assume that people are attempting to maximize their income. The observed pay-off to subsidized mobility can involve a lot of elements that have kept individual responses from finding the equilibrating spatial distribution of workers and wages. Such things as information, and capital constraints would come into play here. In addition, individuals place values on place of residence and job that are not reflected in the market prices of labor services. When one wants to explain differences between individuals and not aggregate behavior at the margin, these nonpecuniaries should be taken into account.

Thus, a regression analysis of the decision to stay in the demand area was made. This analysis included both pecuniary and nonpecuniary variables. The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable that takes on the value one if the person stayed and zero otherwise<sup>5</sup>. The independent variables are sex, age, educational level, employment status in supply area, whether or not a person had lived in a city, amount of debt, whether one had friends in the area, number of jobs in demand area, kind of job held, time in the demand area, initial demand area wage, current wage, marital status, demand area, and whether or not one had had training.

The results of this regression are shown in Table 9. Roughly, the variables can be separated into pecuniary and nonpecuniary. The initial wage received in the demand area, the amount of debt in supply, the supply wage, the amount of training on the job can be taken as pecuniary variables, i.e., price and income variables. The other variables are largely nonpecuniary. Some of the latter really are variables that standardize for certain categories such as age and education.

The interesting finding is that few of the pecuniary variables are significant. The two wage variables are interesting. The first wage in demand variable is not significant, but the current wage is. The two variables are only correlated with an  $r$  of .04. The inference is that starting wage, which had a mean of 1.63 and a standard error of .68, had no net influence on the decision to stay. The significant coefficient on the current wage largely reflects the difference in wages of stayers and returnees. We have already seen that the average wage in demand on follow-up was 1.94 and 1.87 in supply. This latter coefficient essentially confirms that this difference is significant net of other effects.

Supply wage, supply debt and training are all not significant. Inspection of the correlations among the independent variables would indicate that these variables are not intercorrelated to a degree that separate effects cannot be determined. They do not explain much of the decision in either a gross or net fashion.

There are two large blocks of dummy variables. One for job classification in the demand area and one for employment status in the supply area. The former category explains a significant amount of the variation in the decision ( $F$  is significant at 1 percent level), while the latter does not. Most of the significance in type of job comes from two categories, benchwork, and a catch-all category that includes one professional and some non-responses. The coefficients themselves represent differences from a group labeled miscellaneous.

The rest of the significant variables are whether or not the mover had friends in the area, the number of jobs held in the demand area, and the length of time spent in demand. As might be expected, the number of jobs held is negatively correlated with initial wages and positively correlated with current wages. The inference (which should not be pushed too far) is that persons adept at finding a new and higher paying job are more apt to stay. A potential alternative that persons who change jobs are less stable is clearly rejected in this case. (See Part IV for more evidence on this point.)

The length of time spent in the demand area is a less than perfectly specified variable. The time span of the observation for each individual is quite short—approximately 8 weeks. The reasoning underlying the time variable is that there is some

<sup>5</sup>There are several technical statistical problems with this formulation. This study is considered exploratory. The results are subject to reservations that are probably not serious in this context.

adjustment problem, unexplained by the other variables that depends on staying in the new environment. Once some critical length of time has passed then the person will respond to other variables. The interpretation within this short time span, then, is that the longer one stays the more likely he is to remain, other things being held constant.

These results compare favorably with those of Johnson and Robbins in the 1967 study. Here as in that work there is not enough variation in wages to explain the decision. This larger sample also does not have enough variation in sex and race to make those variables important. The major effects on differences among individuals as to staying would seem to be:

- (1) Personal adjustment as measured by the "length of stay" variable.
- (2) Personal adjustment as measured by the "friends" variable.
- (3) Ability to respond to wage differences as measured by "number of jobs" variable.

Table 9. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF DECISION TO STAY IN DEMAND AREA--  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS WHETHER OR NOT A PERSON STAYED

VARIABLE	COEFFICIENT	"t"
Intercept	.459	1.88
Marital status	-.023	-.61
Age	.001	.43
Sex (female = 1)	.004	.11
Education	.002	.41
First demand wage	-.000	-.88
Current wage	.001	5.23
Ever lived in city (no = 1)	-.021	-1.19
Have friends in demand (no = 1)	-.096	-5.48
Kind of Job		
Other	-.265	-2.69
Managerial	.131	.41
Clerical	.057	.80
Service	-.007	-.12
Farm related	-.291	-1.26
Processing	.035	.55
Machine Trades	.053	.92
Benchwork	.168	2.78
Structural work	.021	.32
Miscellaneous	0	0
Receive training	.027	.72
Employment in Supply		
Full time	.033	.36
Part time	.048	.67
Unemployed	.008	.17
Farm laborer	-.099	1.75
Farm tenant	.059	.50
Not in labor force	0	0
Debt in supply area	-.000	.69
Number of jobs	.100	3.61
Time in demand	.008	3.71

#### IV. WAGE DIFFERENCES AMONG MOVERS

In the last section it was noted that there was a substantial variation in current wages, i.e., as of the follow-up report. In many regards the persons moved were a homogeneous group. Race, education and area of origin all show much less variation for instance, than do wages. Some attempt to explain this variation was deemed necessary.

Table 10 sets out the results of a regression of wages on certain individual characteristics of the movers. One has to conclude that despite a highly significant F statistic for the regression as a whole, not much useful analytically comes out of the results.

The number of jobs held in the demand area is significant. The finding in Part III about the decision to stay is thus confirmed for wages. Persons who change jobs on the average gain 11 cents per hour per job change. Rather than indicating instability, job changes probably represent search for higher wages. Based on this principle, it would ill behoove a mobility program to inhibit job search after the move.

The sign on the training variable is not as unexpected as it might seem. The coefficient is significant at the 11 percent level due to the large number of degrees of freedom. The economics of on-the-job training indicate that for certain kinds of train-

Table 10. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF CURRENT WAGES ON INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS

VARIABLE	COEFFICIENT	"t"
Intercept	110.885	2.73
Training	-1.604	-1.55
No. of jobs	11.574	2.38
Supply Area Job		
Other	7.894	.27
Managerial	10.704	.27
Clerical	12.060	.91
Service	-9.530	-1.04
Farm and related	1.359	.16
Processing	6.040	.46
Machine Trade	1.845	-.17
Benchwork	-29.413	-1.96
Structural work	-4.890	-.58
Miscellaneous	0	0
Demand Area Jobs		
Other	-118.967	-7.33
Managerial	128.606	2.25
Clerical	6.011	-.47
Service	-7.938	-.76
Farm and related	-1.794	-.04
Processing	7.033	.62
Machine tools	1.890	-.18
Benchwork	3.420	.32
Structural	5.222	.45
Miscellaneous	0	0

ing the employee will bear part of the cost. Where an employer is not providing specific training for which he can capture some gain, he will pass on to the employee as much of the cost of training as he can. It is entirely likely that the negative sign here reflects that phenomenon.

The two blocks of dummy variables are for occupational classification, both before and after moving. The before move occupations taken as a whole do not explain a significant fraction of the variation in wages ( $F = .927$ ). The demand area job classification as a whole does explain a large fraction of the variation ( $F = 6.93$ ), but this is partly illusory. One occupation is significant in the managerial group where there are only a few observations and these have clear cut wage differentials. Also significant is a category labeled other. This category includes persons not currently employed. The large significant negative effect is thus obvious.

The main inference is that despite the appearance of large variability in wages relatively little can be explained by the variables included. Some of it is due to not employed. Some is explained by training and job changes. The rest is apparently due to individual differences not included in the variables. This finding is not surprising given the low level of skills of the target population.

## V. SURVEY OF EMPLOYERS

One potential benefit from a mobility program appears on the ledger of the employers rather than the employees. There are costs of search on both sides of the market, of course, and a program that brings jobs and workers together clearly has the potential of reducing costs of search for employers as well as employees. The interesting finding, then, is that cost saving to employers is little if anything to the major employers in Piedmont North Carolina.

The reason for the small savings is illustrated in Table 11. The market for the types of jobs mobility recruits find is quite informal. If little expense is incurred in market search by employers, then little will be saved by the formal program. Thirty-five employers of mobility workers were asked (among other things) to list in order their most im-

Table 11. SOURCE OF RECRUITS BY ORDER OF METHOD

METHOD OF RECRUITMENT	FIRST CHOICE	SECOND CHOICE	THIRD CHOICE
<b>PIEDMONT</b>			
Walk-in	13	6	8
Employee referral	13	13	6
Employment Security	2	3	7
Advertisement (newspaper or radio)	7	3	1
Training agencies	0	1	3
Employment agencies	0	4	4
Other	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>
	35	33	29
<b>EASTERN NORTH CAROLINA</b>			
Walk-in	2		
Employee referral	-		
Employment Security	6	1	
Advertising	2	1	
Training agencies	2	1	
Employment agencies	-		
Other	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	
	12	3	



portant source of recruits. Twenty-six of the 35 listed either walk-in's or employee referrals as their first place recruitment method. Neither of these involves any expense outside the plant.

The other nine employers list a formal market information system as their primary recruitment device, seven use advertising (newspaper or radio), and two the Federal State Employment Security Commission. The pattern of informality carries over into the second most important method. Of 33 responses (two companies only gave one method) 19 used informal methods of recruitment as second device.

This informality is not surprising. The jobs that are being filled are, at the most, semi-skilled. Recall from the section on returns to relocatees that the average number of days training was 5.7. No matter who bears the cost the investment is under \$100. Such an investment does not require extensive screening costs. Initial recruits can be totally unskilled and with a minimum of on-the-job training they can take up their required skills. There is very little payoff to extensive screening for these kinds of jobs. Even if the ESC offices kept good files of the unskilled, employers might not want to bear the extra costs in paper work, visits, etc., to search for the same kind of person they can find with no out of plant costs.<sup>6</sup>

Fewer than half, 16 out of 35, employers said that the mobility program saved them any recruiting costs. An even smaller fraction, 7 out of 35, said that the mobility program saved them any training costs. On the other hand, 33 out of 35 employers said they were at least as satisfied with mobility recruits as with other recruits.

The main inference, then, would be that on the employer side, mobility reduces costs by very little. Employers certainly would not be averse to a continuation of such a program as they are satisfied with the workers. They simply cannot quantify any benefits accruing to them in their current market surroundings.

A smaller sample of employers in Eastern North Carolina presents a sharp contrast to the Piedmont employers. One group of workers relocated by mobility has been composed of graduates of a technical training program operated by RCA Corporation for the Choanoke Area Development Association. Some of these relocated workers have been moved (and employed) within Eastern North Carolina. This area is also part of the supply area for normal mobility relocations. The main difference between normal mobility recruits and employers and this special group is that these relocatees have received specific technical training.

RCA-CADA trainees receive technical training in electronics, auto repair, welding and building crafts. Their placement, in the main, then, is with employers interested in those skills. The jobs are not the typical low skilled jobs of the Piedmont nor of most of those plants that have come into the supply area. It is not surprising, therefore, that of 14 employers surveyed, all 14 said that mobility saved them recruiting costs, and likewise, all 14 said that they saved training costs, although the nature of the program should guarantee that result. Of 11 who responded to the question, six employers ranked mobility recruits as much better than normal recruits, while in the Piedmont only one of 35 employers made that judgment. Another interesting finding was that 10 of 12 employers used formal recruiting devices as first choice, with ESC being the first choice of six. All of these findings are consistent with the recent literature on employee and employer search in the labor market. Large firms with relatively low skilled jobs will not invest a great deal in formal information services. Small firms, especially with relatively more skill requirements will invest more in formal search.

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<sup>6</sup>An interesting observation is that of the 7 employers who used formal advertising as a primary recruitment device, none listed ESC as second choice. The small number of observations prohibits any inference.

**CONSULTANT'S REPORT TO THE MOBILITY PROJECT  
OF THE NORTH CAROLINA MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION**

**Cilla Reesman TenPas  
Madison, Wisconsin  
1973**

## I. PREFACE

The subsidization of labor mobility in the United States has been carried out largely in the form of demonstration projects, but not, in the strict sense of the word, as an experiment. On the other hand, laments over the lack of controlled experimentation in this field tend to gloss over the fact that current theories of mobility are either so general or so ill-defined as to require exploratory studies simply as a means of shedding some light on a complex phenomenon.

When the three remaining "experimental and demonstration" mobility projects were required, in 1972, to shift their emphasis from mobility as a process to be expedited to mobility as a subject of research, the guidelines were loosely defined. However, years of pragmatic field operations at each site had resulted in distinctive sets of limitations on the scope of post hoc research, simply by virtue of the fact that diverse adjustments in client selection, operating procedures and service delivery had been made in response to the lessons of experience and the changing economy. In addition, limited resources demanded that the research focus on a narrow spectrum of practical, rather than theoretical concerns. There is no control group, in the technical sense, in this research, although reference will be made to previous research in which such a group was studied. The basic question asked was whether or not the mobile workers made employment and earnings gains as compared with their own pre-move status. Secondly, although longitudinal data on attitudes is largely unavailable, it was felt that some attempt must be made to explore potential sources of the often-postulated psychic costs (less often, benefits) of geographic mobility, especially rural to urban mobility.

The report which follows is written for use by the staff of the North Carolina Mobility Project. It does not contain any lengthy descriptions of the project itself, nor does it discuss or analyze the basic demographic characteristics of the movers or the regions involved. Although the consultant familiarized herself with this material in preparing this report, the explanation and interpretation of project style, selection procedures, service delivery modes, as well as the intricate history of the fruits of seven years of trial and error, are ultimately the province of the local experts. The consultant, in such a case, is in the position of pointing to more questions than answers in the data. For every calculation of how much change occurred or how much difference we find between groups, there arise questions of why and how these were produced. When statistical methodology has been exhausted, we are left, both literally and figuratively, with large unexplained variances. The challenge to the program administrators is then to dredge experience, records, anecdotes, local custom, and even some finely educated hunches, to shed light on possible answers.

Finally, the NCMP is not, as it undertakes this report, in the position of defending or rationalizing a poor report card, by any means. On the contrary, it is in a position to share with policymakers and project personnel both general information on the process of mobility subsidization and the problems involved in adapting and implementing such policies to the local and regional scene.

Cilla Reesman TenPas  
Madison, Wisconsin  
June, 1973

## II. INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSULTANT'S REPORT

Several criteria of "success" have been proposed for judging the individual and social yields of programs for subsidized geographic mobility. That most commonly referred to is the retention rate of participants in the selected relocation sites (referred to as demand areas). A related measure is the flow-back rate of relocatees returning to the original supply or home area (supply area). Each of these rates may be measured over arbitrary time periods. The research reported here was conducted on the basis of the NCMP project "year" October 1, 1970 - January 31, 1972. Hence, the longest term relocation under study occurred about two years prior to the interview, with a smaller time lapse for late movers. Attempts were made to personally interview all 306 relocatees from the contract period. For the 183 respondents it was discovered that the flow-back rate plus the demand area retention rate accounted for 100 percent of the group. This is partially an artifact of the timing and funding of the study, which did not allow for extensive travel to locate and interview relocatees who had left the original demand area but not returned to the supply area. For these non-respondents, reliance on the retention or flow-back rates does not tell the full tale of "success" of the move. Since interviewers were able to contact friends or relatives of the non-respondent group in many cases, the information concerning their present location has been combined with project intake and processing records to yield a profile of this group. This, and some speculation on the possible non-response bias involved, is presented in a special section, Respondents and Non-respondents.

A second set of criteria concerns individual economic outcomes for program participants. The use of annual income change for this purpose is always problematic, but becomes almost prohibitive in dealing with the sharp transition from rural to urban settings for households where cash income often was a minor factor in the context of store credit and promise-to-work systems (described in earlier reports of NCMP). Instead, we choose to deal exclusively with wages and the opportunity to work among relocatees. In numerous instances, the tables presented represent a variation in standard labor force reporting procedures. It should be noted that where percent time working is referred to, this is not equal to 100 percent of time as a labor force participant minus percent time unemployed. Instead, time unemployed and time out of the labor force have been combined to represent total non-working time. This method was used in order to reveal any implied underemployment. Readers wishing to calculate unemployment rates, based on standard procedures, will find sufficient information in the tables to do so.

A third dimension of individual outcomes of relocatees is the concept of psychic costs or benefits confronting the worker and his family. In this area we must regard our research efforts as exploratory. Rather than selecting a well defined index of a particular type of satisfaction, questions were chosen to reflect the most prominent areas of concern suggested by program staff and by the speculations of previous researchers. More often than not, the use of straight economic cost-benefit analysis has been accompanied by assumptions concerning the direction and magnitude of net psychic cost. (cf. C.K. Fairchild, *Subsidized Worker Relocation in the United States*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1971, pp 139-140.) Inevitably, and this report is probably no exception, the reporter's biases, as well as lack of first hand information, intrude upon the analysis in the form of unstated premises about what "should" please, frighten or motivate the persons studied. Data on attitudinal indicators in this study are strictly cross-sectional, and no longitudinal inferences should be drawn. However, it is also post-program data, and on the whole describes absolute numbers of negative responses which seem to us to be lower than our prior (subjective) estimates. We recommend, therefore, that any further research on subsidized mobility be designed to gather longitudinal data concerning areas of potential psychic costs which may be ameliorated by appropriate counseling or services. (Similar cross-sectional data are being sought in a study of the Northern Michigan Mobility Program.)

The fourth level of analysis addressed in this report is the impact of subsidized mobility within the state of North Carolina, as compared with natural (that is, unsubsidized) migration. Although an in-depth analysis was beyond the scope of our resources, use of 1970 Census data provided indications that the effect of subsidized mobility upon the growing economy and high demand labor markets of the Piedmont was substantial and positive.

### III. RESPONDENTS vs NON-RESPONDENTS

All relocatees studied had extensive pre-program personal data on file, as well as a record of program services and some initial follow-up. Thus, although completed and useable follow-up interviews were obtained for 183 persons (respondents), we have some basis for comparisons with 123 persons who could not be located for this purpose. The response rate of 60 percent obtained in this follow-up is clearly below the standard acceptable response rate of 70 percent for studies of the disadvantaged, as set forth by OPER.<sup>7</sup> In total, these represented the 306 persons moved during the contract under study.

Several conflicting hypotheses have been advanced concerning the manner in which respondents and non-respondents in a mobility study are likely to differ. On the basis of studies indicating that youthful workers are more geographically mobile than older workers, we would expect that they would be more prone to secondary moves, rendering them difficult to find and interview. We would also speculate that those with more education would be more mobile, and hence more difficult to locate. Family size on the other hand is expected to have a negative affect on mobility.

Comparing mean age and education for respondents and non-respondents (R and NR), these patterns are not as marked as expected. While the NR group was younger (24.2 years vs 25.7 years), the difference in means proves significant only at the .10 level when a 2-tailed test is invoked. Similarly, last grade attended differs in the expected direction (10.0 for NR and 9.5 for R), and at the same level of significance. Numbers of dependents at time of initial move, however, differ markedly and in the expected direction, with NR have a mean of 1.36 and R 2.20, significantly different at the .05 level. Since numbers of dependents directly affect moving subsidies, the NR's show a mean total subsidy of over \$100. less than the R group (\$265.54 vs \$367.28).

The real question which we must address using these comparisons is the direction and dimensions of any non-response bias introduced by failure to find 123 NR's. Does this bias cause over- or under-estimation of the benefits or costs of mobility? Have we lost track of those likely to be the most "successful" or the least "successful" movers? If we invoke the crudest criterion, return to the supply area, as indicative of failure to adjust to the new circumstances of industrial work and urban life, we find a highly varied pattern of last known residence for the NR group (note, this being part of the reason for failure to locate these persons. This is often current information supplied by relatives found in the supply or demand areas.) Table 1 displays the last known residence of non-respondents and respondents' residence at interview. It is possible that NRs of unknown residence may be distributed in any fashion among alternative outcomes. However, let us consider three extreme possibilities and their implications. If the 49 NRs of unknown location were combined with the 7 known to be in the supply area, 56 or 45.4 percent of the total NR's would be considered direct flowback, as compared with 35 percent of the respondents.

The fact that less than 30 percent of the NR group were "short term leavers," combined with the youthfulness and relatively small family sizes in this group, would tend to lend support to the hypothesis that secondary moves were likely to be made to places other than the supply area.

While it is doubtful that the distribution of movers into respondent and non-respondent categories was random, there is also little evidence to support a hypothesis that by not interviewing the NR group we have missed "the failures." Forty percent are known to have made secondary moves outside of the state. The maximum possible flowback rate is 45.5 percent (those known to be in the supply area plus the unknown group). However, since some of these persons appear in the unknown group as a result of interviewer contacts with persons in the supply area who would be expected to know if the NR had returned there, we are inclined to believe that most of them are not in the supply area. The interviewers' success in finding and counseling persons in the supply areas being a matter of past record, we are also disinclined to consider the loss of 49 persons from the sample to be the result of willful misinformation from the informants. There are no reported cases in which interviewers found a mover to be in the supply area, having once been informed that he was not there. Second, the unknown group may have become secondary movers within North Carolina.

In the first instance, we would be postulating a higher flowback rate for a group somewhat younger and more educated than the respondents. This would frankly defy the expected effects of age/education correlates of mobility. The second possibility is that underenumeration problems common to urban census data have emerged in this follow-up.

<sup>7</sup>The reporter is indebted to an anonymous reviewer of a previous draft of this report for pointing out this problem.



Finally, the possibility arises of secondary mobility beyond North Carolina. As lately as 1965, research indicated that black North Carolinians, when they moved between counties, tended to leave North Carolina altogether, while whites tended to move within the state. We have seen that at least 39 percent of the NR group followed this pattern subsequent to relocation within North Carolina.

In all likelihood, no extreme distribution of locations of unknown NRs occurred. For some of these persons, the subsidized move may simply have changed the timing and routing of participation in a natural migration pattern, with the added twist of an interruption (for good or ill) at the demand area. For others, this "interruption" may have been permanent.

Program files, supplemented by the reports of friends, relatives and former employers helped to fix the time at which non-respondents were last known to be in the demand area. Interestingly, numerous NRs stayed several months in the demand area. Table 2 compares outcome categories by months spent in the demand area by respondents and non-respondents.

Table 1. RESIDENCE NON-RESPONDENTS: LAST KNOWN (N=123)

PLACE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (%)
Demand Area	1	0.8
Supply Area	7	5.7
Military	7	5.7
Institutionalized	5	4.1
Student outside N.C.	1	.8
Deceased	2	1.6
N.C. City other than demand area	2	1.6
N.C. Rural area other than supply area	1	0.8
Outside N.C.	48	39.0
Not Known	49	39.8

RESIDENCE RESPONDENTS AT TIME OF INTERVIEW (N=183)

Demand Area	119	65.0
Supply Area	64	35.0

[ 49 ]



Table 2.

## OUTCOME CATEGORIES -- RESPONDENTS AND NON-RESPONDENTS

OUTCOME	RESPONDENTS		NON-RESPONDENTS	
	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (%)	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY
Still in D.A.	119	65.0	1	.8
Left D.A. after at least 12 months	4	2.2	12	9.8
Left D.A. between 6 and 12 months	14	7.7	27	22.0
Left D.A. between 2 and 6 months	21	11.5	45	36.6
Left D.A. between 1 and 2 months	10	5.5	15	12.2
Left D.A. in less than 1 month	15	8.2	21	17.1
Missing data	0	0	2 (deceased)	0
Total	<hr/> 183		<hr/> 123	

#### IV. OCCUPATIONS AND EARNINGS OF RESPONDENTS

The project population for NCMP during the period studied consisted largely of black families living in the eastern, heavily agricultural, third of North Carolina. Tobacco and trees are both grown as cash crops, increasingly on a large scale as opposed to small operations or tenant farming. With the changing season, numerous day laborers shift from field operations to tobacco warehousing or wood cutting and processing. The season in tobacco culture is such that a worker may well be reluctant to move until he has completed the final seasonal stage in the warehousing operations. Hence, we find that immediate pre-move occupations are weighted heavily toward non-farm laborers with farm laborers second in importance. This should not obscure the fact that considerable "floating" between these categories is an annual pattern in the supply area. 62.3 percent of respondents described their last job prior to move as seasonal.

Table 3 displays occupations for the last job prior to moving, the first job following the move, and the last reported job at the time of interview, regardless of location. While laborer (non-farm) retains its position as the modal occupation immediately after the move, 94.5 percent of the workers reported their new jobs as non-seasonal full-time, with 3.8 percent reporting seasonal full-time work (1.6 percent not reporting).

Table 3.

OCCUPATIONAL DISPERSION  
LAST JOB IN S.A. AND FIRST AND LAST JOBS SINCE MOVE

	LAST JOB IN S.A. (before move)		FIRST JOB IN D.A.		LAST JOB SINCE MOVE	
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
Mgr. official or proprietor	--	--	1	0.5	1	0.5
Clerical	4	2.2	6	3.3	4	2.2
Sales	--	--	1	0.5	4	2.2
Craftsman/ foreman	15	8.2	24	13.1	35	19.1
Operatives	19	10.4	56	30.6	48	26.2
Laborer (except farm and mine)	73	39.9	64	35.0	62	33.9
Service	15	8.2	26	14.2	28	15.4
Farm laborer/ farmer	48	26.2	--	--	--	--
Student/trainee	5	2.7	1	0.5	--	--
Military	1	0.5	--	--	--	--
Missing Data	3	1.6	1	0.5	1	0.5
No. D.A. Job	--	--	3	1.6	--	--
Total	183	99.9	183	99.8	183	100

NOTE: percentages do not total to 100.0 due to rounding

In the year prior to the move about 48 percent of the respondents reported working in eight or fewer months. Only 14.2 percent had quit their last job (other than for military or educational reasons), while 18.0 percent reported permanent lay-off and 35.0 percent seasonality of occupation as reasons for termination of last job prior to the move.

Methods of determining wage scales for agricultural day labor leave much to be desired. Pay may be in dollars per day (number of hours unspecified), by piecework, or may involve a promise to work a given number of days to settle a debt. Income in kind, such as a house, may be included. While reporting error may play some part in the wage distribution, anecdotal information lends credibility to some of the extremely low average hourly wages indicated. Twenty-eight (14.8 percent) of movers reported wages averaging below \$1.51 per hour, with 17 reporting no job prior to the move. Sixty-one (one third) fell into the category \$1.51 - \$1.75 which brackets the minimum wage (see Table 4) 74.3 percent earned less than \$2.00 per hour, and fully 91.8 percent less than \$2.50. (And these at generally seasonal employment, as indicated on page 59.) After the move, only 10 persons (5.5 percent) reported wages at or below \$1.75, while those in the \$1.76 - \$2.00 group went to 45.4 percent of the total. An explanation is close at hand. The entry level jobs in textiles and furniture in the Piedmont region tend to display very narrow wage ranges. In addition, the number of portals of entry into each industry tend to be limited as a matter of policy.

Table 4. AVERAGE WAGES (HOURLY) ON LAST REPORTED JOB BEFORE MOVE

WAGE RANGE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (%)
No wages	17	9.3
\$.76-1.00	5	2.2
1.01-1.25	17	9.3
1.26-1.50	6	3.3
1.51-1.75	61	33.3
1.76-2.00	33	18.0
2.01-2.25	20	10.9
2.26-2.50	12	6.6
2.51-2.75	8	4.4
2.76-3.00	1	0.5
3.01-3.50	3	1.6
3.51-4.00	1	0.5
Not reported	...	...
	183	100.

62.3% of the jobs reported in this table were seasonal

Table 5.

FIRST AND LAST WAGES ON FIRST JOB AFTER MOVE\*

WAGE RANGE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (%)	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (%)
No Information	3	1.6	3	1.6
\$ .76-1.00*	2	1.1	1	0.5
1.51-1.75	10	5.5	9	4.9
1.76-2.00	83	45.4	39	21.3
2.01-2.25	49	8	60	32.8
2.26-2.50	20	.9	34	18.6
2.51-2.75	10	5.5	19	10.4
2.76-3.00	2	1.1	6	3.3
3.01-3.50	3	1.6	5	2.7
3.51-4.00	1	0.5	5	2.7
4.01-4.50			1	0.5
5.51-5.00			1	0.5

Mean number of weeks first job was held = 32.3

Number of persons still holding first job 52 (29.2%)

94.5% of these jobs were non-seasonal full-time

*NOTE: \*A few of these jobs were held back in the S.A. by early leavers, accounting for some of the low wage rates.*

In addition to straight hourly earnings, most respondents reported some overtime work each week. These hours and mode of compensation (for last job since move) are displayed in Table 6 below.

Table 6. HOW MANY HOURS PER WEEK OF OVERTIME DO YOU AVERAGE ON THIS JOB (BEYOND 40 HOURS)?

HOURS	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE
None	56	30.6
1 - 4	46	25.1
5 - 10	44	24.0
Over 10	31	16.9
Not Known	6	3.2

HOW ARE YOU PAID FOR OVERTIME?

TYPE	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE
On salary	4	2.2
Straight time	11	6.0
Time and one-half	104	56.8
Double-time		0.5
Other		1.6
Not Applicable or not reported	60	32.8

Table 7.

**LAST OR CURRENT WAGE ON LAST JOB REPORTED  
REGARDLESS OF LOCATION**

WAGE RANGE	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (%)
\$ .76-1.00	1	0.5
1.01-1.25	1	0.5
1.26-1.50	2	1.1
1.51-1.75	12	6.6
1.76-2.00	19	10.4
2.01-2.25	39	21.3
2.26-2.50	40	21.9
2.51-2.75	28	15.3
2.76-3.00	13	7.1
3.01-3.50	13	7.1
3.51-4.00	9	4.9
4.01-4.50	2	1.1
5.01-5.50	2	1.1
5.51-6.00	1	0.5
6.01-6.50	1	0.6
<b>TOTAL</b>	<u>183</u>	<u>100.0</u>

**CURRENT LABOR FORCE STATUS**

Ninety-four per cent, or 172 persons, are still holding the job reported in Table 7. Five persons are unemployed, six reported themselves not in the labor force. This job was full-time non-seasonal for 83.6 percent of the cases, full-time seasonal for 14.8 percent (27 persons) and part-time seasonal in 3 cases (1.6 percent). Hence, very little wage dispersion appears until workers have been employed for some time, with 60 or 90-day wage reviews being the general rule.

A maximum of two years passed between first job in Demand Area and interview. Wage dispersion in that period was marked. Nearly 40 percent of the total were earning over \$2.25 per hour on their first reported job.



Table 8 compares labor force experience of all 183 respondents for the year prior to the move, with that for all time since the move with a breakdown by outcome category. (Note that in this table, time working, plus time unemployed, plus time not in the labor force accounts for 100 percent of the time involved. The method used to produce mean per cent by group actually yields an accounting of somewhat less than 100 percent of the time.)

We note that substantial improvement in the proportion of time working after the move is evidenced for all except the very short-term returnees (category 6). The two categories with very small cell sizes (Category 2 and Category 5) have yielded some discontinuities in the general trend of greater change being associated with longer tenure in the demand areas.

Table 8. LABOR FORCE STATUS: YEAR PRIOR TO MOVE VS ALL TIME SINCE MOVE  
ALL FIGURES ARE MEAN % BY GROUP  
N=183\*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	% Time working in year prior to move	% Time working since move	Col. 2 - Col. 1 change	% Time unemployed since move	% Time not in labor force since move	Col. 3 divided by Col. 1 relative change in working time
<b>BY OUTCOME CATEGORY</b>						
1. Still in D.A. N=119	63.0	95.2	+32.1	.9	1.5	.509
2. Left after 12 months N=14	54.2	90.7	+36.5	1.5	6.7	.673
3. Left between 6 and 12 months N=14	61.3	86.5	+25.2	7.7	.1	.411
4. Left between 2 and 6 months N=21	63.9	74.1	+10.2	7.3	15.6	.159
5. Left between 1 and 2 months N=10	69.2	85.3	+16.2	12.5	1.7	.234
6. Left in less than 1 month N=15	65.0	66.7	+1.7	19.0	7.3	.026
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>63.3</b>	<b>89.1</b>	<b>+25.8</b>	<b>4.3</b>	<b>3.6</b>	<b>.405</b>

\*A maximum of two years is involved in post move follow-up.

## V. MOBILITY, ADJUSTMENT, AND SATISFACTION: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

A major question which has plagued Mobility Projects, as well as theoreticians, is the non-economic welfare of movers. To the theorist this may take the form of debates over the question of interpersonal utility comparisons. On the scene of subsidized mobility there is the haunting question: are we really doing anyone a favor, by encouraging this move? What costs are there for a family, used to a rural agricultural society, in moving into an urban setting? "Costing out" of social and psychological impacts is a hazardous undertaking, but at the very least it behooves us to inquire of the movers what problems or satisfactions they perceive in the process of mobility and the transition to a new, often radically different life style.

Previous reports filed by NCMP have described in some detail the economic and social fabric of depressed areas of eastern North Carolina. One of the strongest impressions which these descriptions leave is that the society of origin, whatever its economic liabilities, absolved many participants of decision-making in numerous realms by its reliance upon tradition. This is not to portray this as a stress-free society; on the contrary, the lack of social, economic and educational options defined for the poor in such a society, exists in parallel with increasing communication from the outside world of non-traditional options. But the fact remains that the industrial world of the Piedmont cities contains challenges, stresses, and demands for self-confidence in decision-making of a sort which is largely foreign to a non-industrial setting.

To an outsider, many of the long-term depressed areas of the U.S. hold great charm. A city dweller on vacation may look at Northern Michigan, the hills of West Virginia or the piney woods of eastern North Carolina, and think: "I'll bet these people would think I'm crazy to punch a time clock, worry over commuting time, hustle for a promotion, and spend my week-ends trying to find an appliance repairman." In fact, it is almost an article of faith among mobility researchers that, given a choice, rural migrants to the cities would return home. What is the choice? Obviously, the economic conditions, which are anything but equal, would have "to be held equal" to make any sense out of offering a choice. In the absence of a capacity to perform such a feat, statistically or otherwise, research on mobile workers tends to focus on flow-back rates as evidence of the perceived benefits of home vs. the costs of urban life. An alternative method is to assume that a substantial portion of flow-back results from inadequate access to (investment in) the information necessary to "successful adjustment to a new environment".

In the course of interviewing in North Carolina we sought to obtain direct and indirect reactions of the movers to the decision to move and their views of the demand areas as places to live and work. Their answers suggest a very different view than was anticipated. For instance, toward the end of the interview all respondents were asked: Which of the following most closely expresses your current attitude about the move:

	N=183 RELATIVE FREQUENCY (%)
1. I would do it all over again if I had the choice	51.4
2. The whole thing was a mistake	0
3. I'd move again for a better job	18.0
4. I prefer to live and work back home	14.2
5. Not sure	5.5
Missing values	3.2

The most provocative result was that none of the 183 respondents said that the whole thing was a mistake. Nowhere near the 35 percent figure of those who returned to the supply area ("home") felt called upon to invoke a "taste" for the home area, or conversely, to chalk the move up as a simple mistake. Granted, the choices offered do not define all possibilities, but they provoked us to look more closely at other indicators.

In a rather simplistic attempt to hold employment conditions constant, a question was asked concerning area preference if respondent could have his current job (or last demand area job) either in the supply area or the demand area. Again, the answer was more strongly in favor of the demand area than had been anticipated. (See Table 9). In spite of the fact that the supply area was referred to as "back home" and the possibility that the returnees had returned home because of shortcomings of the job in question, we fail to see the expected overwhelming preference for the area of origin.

Without following these movers step-by-step and probing their Psyches at each step to produce comparisons of their reactions to the demand areas as compared with home, what can we say about these rather unexpected summary reactions? Firstly, because these results are so unexpected, we must admit that we did not design the questionnaire to probe deeply into comparisons of supply and demand areas. We did, however, include numerous items which were designed to tap perceived difficulties of adjustment to the urban setting as well as subjective responses to the demand area.

A group of ten questions concerning adjustments such as trouble finding one's way about in the new city, visits to other parts of the city, feelings of being unsafe at home or work, success in finding a church (for those who looked), etc. were analyzed. In each case a respondent scored one point for each negative indication. What was sought was some crude indicator of the absolute number of such problems perceived by stayers vs returnees. The first surprise came when no respondent accumulated more than four negative responses and only 3 had over 2. Although small cell sizes make fine distinctions between stayers and each other outcome category impossible, by grouping categories we obtain the distribution displayed in Table 10.

Interpretation of this table is a speculative venture at best. One possible view is that the items chosen are not in fact indicative of adjustment problems, hence few were chosen by respondents.

Table 9. PREFERRED AREA

1. Those in D.A. and currently employed:

"If you could have the same job you now have, but could choose between having it here in \_\_\_\_\_, and back home in \_\_\_\_\_, which would you prefer?"

	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (%)
1. demand area	92	78
2. supply area	25	21.2
3. neither	1	.8
4. not applicable (either not in D.A. or not working)	65	
5. don't know	0	

2. For those in D.A. but not working, and those who are back in supply area:

"if you could have the last job you had in \_\_\_\_\_, but could choose, etc."

	ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY	RELATIVE FREQUENCY (%)
1. demand area	16	24.6
2. supply area	47	72.3
3. neither	2	3.1
4. not applicable	118	

However, the variation in responses among groups as well as the small absolute number of negative responses suggest another possibility which cannot be formally tested in the absence of a control group of unassisted movers. That is, that the assistance and counseling provided by NCMP staff has resulted in a smaller number of these adjustments be-

coming problematical, even among early leavers. In addition, even early leavers may report few problems simply because they did not stay long enough to be confronted with many of the situations envisioned in the questions. Lacking an item analysis of problems encountered by stayers vs. long-term returnees, little may be said concerning the more common reports of problem stayers.

In another attempt to see the demand areas through the eyes of the movers, each respondent was read a list of descriptive terms and asked to tell the interviewer whether or not each fit his idea of the new area. The following list indicates percent of respondents indicating each answer:

Crowded	30.1%
Exciting	43.7
Frightening	6.6
Strange, uncomfortable	12.6
Fun	51.4
Interesting	57.9
Unfriendly	11.5
Noisy	26.8
Too much dirt	7.1
Provides advantages not found at home	61.7
About the same as home in most ways	49.2

In these characterizations, we may see some of the reasons for few reported problems of adjustment. Most of the terms which could be construed as positive characterizations were chosen at least twice as frequently as the negative terms (except for "crowded" which is probably the most neutral of the terms).

One of the problems which mobility staff sought to ease was that of housing. Urbanized areas of North Carolina have had severe housing shortages for several years, particularly adequate low-income housing. As migrants from other counties, Mobility clients seldom qualified for public housing priority lists. When asked about the houses which were found for them in the Demand Areas, 64.5 percent said they were better than their supply area homes, 28.4 percent thought they were about the same and 6.6 percent felt they were worse. All respondents were asked about moves between houses in demand area. Reasons given were:

Did not move while in D.A.	66.1%
Cost too high	4.9
Needed more room	6.6
Bad neighborhood	1.1
Bad house	6.0
Not close to job	2.7
Not convenient to shopping, school etc.	2.7
Purchased home	1.1
Other	9.3

Table 10.

## NUMBER OF PROBLEMS REPORTED BY OUTCOME CATEGORIES\*

Outcome Category No. of negative answers	Still in D.A.	Left after 2 months or more 2,3, & 4 long term leavers	Left before 2 months 5 & 6 short term leavers	TOTAL
0	70 58.8	25 64.1	9 39.0	104 56.8
1	36 30.3	11 28.2	10 40.0	57 31.2
2	11 9.2	3 7.7	9 20.0	19 10.4
3	1 .8	0 0	1 4.0	2 1.1
4	1 .8	0 0	0	1 .5
TOTAL	119 100.0	39 100.0	25 100.0	183 100.0

*\*Summary List of Questions used and negative responses*

- Var 47 Able to find way around D.A. with little trouble - no
- " 48 Other family members found way in D.A. with little trouble - no
- " 50 Visited other parts of D.A., away from home and work - not at all
- " 51 Able to find church in D.A. to your liking (if looked) - no
- " 52 Did you and family feel safe in neighborhood, at work - no
- " 55 Characterization of D.A. as "confusing"
- " 56 Characterization of D.A. as "frightening"
- " 60 Characterization of D.A. as "unfriendly"
- " 65 Spouse favored move? - no
- " 73 Compare D.A. housing with S.A. housing - D.A. housing worse

The scarcity of public housing is such that more families (11) have been able to buy a house or trailer since the move than have gotten into public housing (3). The most common living arrangements were apartments (29.5 percent), rooms (26.8 percent) and rented houses (21.3 percent).

Prior to moving, about 81 percent paid rent and utilities of less than \$20 per month. In the demand areas, housing began to take a substantial portion of respondents' incomes. Although 65 percent reported rent payments of less than \$80 per month, the distribution was bi-modal, with about 32 percent at \$40-59.00 and 27 percent at \$80-99.00, possibly reflecting a standard difference in marital status and family size and hence amount of type of housing demanded.

Before permanent housing was located, the worker generally stayed in a boarding house while he was helped to find work. Originally, Mobility Projects were to move only persons who had acquired a job in the new area. This mode of operation was wholly unrealistic in North Carolina, given the peculiarities of the search and hiring process. Entry level workers in textiles, furniture and commercial baking are generally expected to begin work the morning following hire, and are, without exception, hired only through first hand contact. Hence, workers were moved to a boarding house and then helped to search for jobs. Only three of the respondents held no reported job in the new area. Over 84 percent began work within seven days of their arrival, over 95 percent in under fourteen days.

Given the severe housing shortages and the fact that dependents were not moved until a job had been started and housing secured, early reunion of families was also considered essential to retention of workers in the demand area. Of the 108 workers with dependents who moved, 19 (17 percent) were united with their families within 2 weeks and 70 (65 percent) within a month of the primary worker's relocation. The twelve families where reunion was postponed for over 6 weeks generally encountered problems associated with illness, advanced pregnancy or difficulty finding housing for large families. (7 of these families had 6 or more dependents moved.)

Finally, a group of thirty questions concerning the current life situation, outlook, and personal relationships were asked. This group of questions was originally devised for use in the research on movers in the Mississippi Labor Mobility Project and is being used for both movers and non-movers in the Northern Michigan Labor Mobility study. Its use in North Carolina was an exploratory venture, and as will be seen, the results are difficult to interpret. First, since we must assume some differences in personality factors between stayers and returnees, difference in responses cannot simply be turned into useful predictors of likelihood of "successful" mobility. Since cell sizes for various groups of returnees are small, tests for significance of different rates of response have not been performed. Although there are few, if any, areas of strong dissatisfaction with life in the area (as expressed by stayers), we are unable, with this data, to address the critical question: Compared to what?

Appendix A displays the original questions and responses by outcome category. The most striking single aspect of the tendency of those still in the demand area to respond somewhat negatively to specific questions about their life and work situations is this: The question concerning present attitude toward the move, which was reported earlier, directly followed these questions. Yet those in the demand area overwhelmingly responded that they would do it all over again or would move again to a better job if given a chance. They also choose the demand area over the home area as a favored location for their current job. Hence, although the absolute number of negative responses to individual questions in this group may be indicative of strains or concern which may be associated with adjustment problems or fulfillment of need for safety, self-esteem or "community," it would seem that economic options available in the demand area are not the only source of benefits seen by the stayers.

When results of similar interviews in Michigan are available, we may have a basis for more meaningful comparisons of this group with movers and a group of non-movers.

## VI. SUBSIDIZED MOBILITY: WHAT EFFECT ON THE PIEDMONT?

Table 11 and 12 display selected unemployment and labor force participation rates (1970) for counties comprising the supply and relocation areas (SA and DA) used by NCMP during the contract reported. With few exceptions, the unemploy-

Table 11.

### LABOR FORCE INDICATORS BY SUPPLY AREA

COUNTIES BY SA GROUP	Unemploy- ment: all males %	Unemploy- ment: Negro males %	Labor force participation rate: all males %	Labor force participation rate: Negro males %	No. Moved during contract	
					R	NR
1. Lenoir	2.6	5.0	74.5	66.3	6	8
2. Edgecombe	3.6	5.7	76.3	69.7	38	29
Greene	2.2	4.0	76.9	71.5		
Nash	2.4	5.3	75.2	67.6		
Pitt	3.6	7.0	68.8	68.0		
Wilson	4.3	10.2	74.9	68.1		
3. Bladen	2.4	4.6	69.6	63.7	13	10
Columbus	2.8	5.4	69.3	63.2		
Duplin	2.7	5.8	74.9	69.4		
New Hanover	1.8	3.5	78.5	67.1		
Pender	4.0	7.1	68.4	66.8		
Sampson	2.1	4.0	73.1	67.1		
4. Harnett	4.4	5.7	75.2	64.1	30	9
Johnston	2.2	6.2	75.9	72.8		
Wake	1.8	3.5	74.0	63.5		
5. Bertie	4.4	7.9	64.9	54.5	8	12
Gates	1.2	2.0	71.4	67.9		
Halifax	4.0	7.4	67.7	61.4		
Hertford	3.1	5.7	72.7	67.5		
6. Durham	2.6	3.8	71.1	64.7	26	8
Franklin	1.9	3.8	68.2	65.1		
G anville	1.6	3.1	64.3	65.2		
Vance	2.4	3.9	75.2	69.7		
Warren	3.6	5.1	61.7	57.5		
7. Richmond	3.2	6.8	72.6	62.2	14	9
Robeson	2.8	4.6	71.3	64.2		
Scotland	4.1	4.1	75.1	67.3		
Moore	2.6	7.3	72.6	65.5		
8. Anson	2.3	3.2	68.3	61.9	2	1
9. Martin	3.7	5.4	70.7	64.8	46	36
Northampton	3.3	3.1	61.8	51.8		
TOTAL					183	122

Source, 1970 Census of Population

General Economic and Social Characteristics, North Carolina



ment rates in supply area counties, in themselves, would not be sufficient to describe a depressed area. However, these rates in combination with the low labor force participation rates indicate widespread hidden unemployment. It should be recalled that respondents had reported over 60 percent of their jobs prior to moving as seasonal and nearly half (48 percent) had been able to work eight or fewer months in the year preceding the move. Although we might suspect the age profiles in depressed areas to be weighted toward the over-60 group, and hence to depress overall participation rates, if this factor is at work it is hardly comforting. The tenant farming, widely used in eastern North Carolina until the last decade, and agricultural day labor systems now in use, account for large proportions of black employment in the past and present in these counties. Thus, older workers' disappearance from labor force participation rates are hardly comparable to "retirement" from industrial work, especially as regards the probability of receipt of pensions or social security.

Table 12. LABOR FORCE INDICATORS BY DEMAND AREA

	Unemploy- ment: all males %	Unemploy- ment. Negro males %	Labor force participation rate: all males %	Labor force participation rate: Negro males %	No. moved to this Demand Area	
					R	NR
1. Mecklenburg (Charlotte)	1.9	3.0	83.6	76.0	48	37
2. Gaston (Gastonia)	2.0	2.2	82.6	76.6	4	3
3. Greensboro (Guilford)	1.7	2.6	81.2	72.5	49	33
4. High Point (Guilford)	1.7	2.6	81.2	72.5	53	27
5. Rocky Mount (Nash)	2.4	5.3	75.2	67.6	0	4
6. Raleigh (Wake)	1.8	3.5	74.0	63.5	0	3
7. Other*						
Bertie	4.4	7.9	64.9	54.5	29	15
Halifax	4.0	7.4	67.7	61.4		
Hertford	3.1	5.7	72.7	67.5		
Northampton	3.3	3.1	61.8	51.8		

Source, 1970 Census of Population

General Economic and Social Characteristics, North Carolina

\*This area was a joint supply and demand area in which the RCA-CADA Family Development Project recruited men and their families for residential skill training and subsequently relocated graduates of this program within the same area.

Except for Demand Area 7, the relocation sites exhibit unemployment rates low enough to justify designation as tight labor markets. As seen in Table 13 sizeable black in-migration has taken place since 1965 in several of these counties. This represents a new trend in patterns of mobility for black North Carolinians. According to North Carolina Mobility Project 1965-1968 (Vol. 1, Chapter 3, p. 101), the pattern of black inter-county migration originating in North Carolina in the 1950's and early sixties was heavily interstate as well, while whites tended to migrate intrastate. Although some changes have occurred, the demand for workers is still apparently strong in the Piedmont region, as evidenced in low unemployment rates.

Table 13 shows the five year net in-migration of blacks to demand area counties. In parentheses is the average annual net in-migration. Although the two sets of figures are not strictly comparable, estimates of the total numbers of subsidized movers (and dependents) have been calculated by demand area (using mean number of dependents to derive estimates). Most of the mobility reported in this contract period took place in the year following the census. Thus, if we project aver-

Table 13. TOTAL CHANGE IN NEGRO POPULATION 1965-1969 FOR DEMAND AREA COUNTIES (NO. OF NEGROES GREATER THAN 5 YEARS OLD WHO LIVED IN DIFFERENT COUNTY 5 YEARS AGO)

	Total (yearly average)	No. Respondents moved in during contract	No. Non-Respondents Moved in
D.A. 1			
Mecklenburg County (Charlotte)	7159 (1432)	48	37
D.A. 2			
Gaston County (Gastonia)	723 (145)	4	3
D.A. 3 & 4			
Guilford County (Greensboro and High Point)	6154 (1231)	102	60
D.A. 5			
Nash County (Rocky Mount)	1640 (328)	0	4
D.A. 9			
Wake County (Raleigh)	5136 (1027)	0	3

\*Source: U.S. Census of Population 1970  
General Population Characteristics, North Carolina

Table 14.

**ESTIMATES OF TOTAL SUBSIDIZED MOVERS AND INDEX  
OF POTENTIAL IMPACT ON RELOCATION SITES**

	Respondents plus dependents: (average dependents = 2.20)	Non-Respondents plus dependents (average depend- ents = 1.36)	TOTAL	Index of Potential Impact
D.A.				
1. Mecklenburg County	154	87	241	16.8
2. Gaston County	9	7	16	11.0
3. & 4. Guilford County	326	142	468	38.0
5. Nash County	0	9	9	2.7
9. Wake County	0	7	7	Less Than 1.0

*\*Index of impact = total subsidized in-migrants per county, divided by mean annual black in-migration to county 1965-1969. Hence, an index number of 100.0 would indicate that the number of subsidized movers is equal to the annual average in-migration estimate.*

age in-migration into that year, we can arrive at a crude index of the potential impact of subsidized in-migration on total black in-migration by county. Using the available statistical information derived from United States Census Data and the relocation records of the North Carolina Mobility Project, the comparison of subsidized Negro migration patterns and unassisted relocation into urban demand areas does suggest that the North Carolina Mobility Project did substantially affect the direction of migration patterns, as was originally intended, toward intrastate and away from interstate migration for Negro residents of North Carolina.

Looking back to the table of labor force indicators for demand areas, we find that the greatest impact of subsidized mobility was felt in the areas which show combinations of very low unemployment rates and relatively high labor force participation rates. Hence, those areas most in need of additions to the labor force received the largest number of subsidized in-migrants as well as the largest relative impact.

Although we lack sufficient means to formally test any hypotheses about the distributions of unemployment in demand area counties it seems that a strong case is evident in these data to support the contention that subsidized movers were distributed in a manner which minimized the probability that they were simply displacing other workers in the relocation areas. In fact, this is an understatement, since labor shortages have been indicated in several relocation sites.

While NCMP is a small project, it appears that the potential impact of subsidized mobility on natural mobility patterns in North Carolina is large. The secondary effect of subsidized movers encouraging friends and relatives to move to demand areas is not captured in any of these data, but may well be significant, according to mobility staff (In fact, many of the black in-migrants to the relocation sites, shown in Table 13, were themselves subsidized movers.)

In turn, a pattern of migration which brings workers to jobs within the state preserves the state's human capital investments in education, etc. and strengthens the tax base, while contributing to an easing of tight labor markets and the economic pressures which accompany them in the fast growing Piedmont.

The extent to which the state of North Carolina, the workers and their families, and the economy as a whole may derive net benefits from this process is heavily dependent upon flow-back rates and their causes.

## VII. MULTIVARIATE MODELS FOR ANALYSIS AND PREDICTION OF MOBILITY BEHAVIOR

Although no attempt will be made in this report to construct a formal cost-benefit model for subsidized relocation in North Carolina, we are concerned with two determining components of such models. In order for mobility to be cost effective, either individually or socially, two basic conditions are required:

1. That the wage and employment changes be positive and
2. That workers receive these benefits for a period of time sufficient for individual or society, to recoup the investment (at any given interest rate.)

Two previous studies have looked at costs and benefits in the North Carolina Mobility Project (see C.K. Fairchild, Subsidized Worker Relocation In the U.S., unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1971; and Paul R. Johnson "An Evaluation of the Mobility Project of the North Carolina Manpower Development Corporation" preliminary report, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, North Carolina, February 1973, xerox.)

Johnson, in a series of regressions, attempts to predict decisions to stay in or to leave the demand area, by a sample of relocatees. It is of some interest that initial demand area wages fall out of the equations as not significant, as do supply area wage, pre-move debt and training. However, variables reflecting the existence of friends or relatives in the demand area, length of time spent in demand area, and number of jobs held in demand area are significant.

One interpretation, not put forth by Johnson, would be that each of these variables represents sources of information or breadth of search activity in the demand area. That is to say, we might draw from Johnson's findings a secondary hypothesis: that post-relocation mobility decisions are a function of the availability, cost, and willingness to invest in (to take risks based on) information about the demand area as a labor market and as a consumer market.

In a separate regression analysis of post-move wage differences, Johnson comes up with the not unsurprising result of being able to explain very little variation on the basis of training, number of jobs, and pre- and post-move occupations, for a group of relatively homogenous relocatees over a short time period.

However, a modified pay-back period analysis, based on average direct costs of relocations, produces interesting results. Adjusting average wage differences of movers in supply and demand areas for unemployment rates and flow-back rates, Johnson estimates that a minimum of 12 and maximum of 25 weeks of work in the demand areas would be sufficient to recoup gross relocation costs for the average mover, given the flow-back and unemployment rates of sampled relocatees.

This is in direct conflict with the findings of Fairchild, which were based on a sample of relocatees in North Carolina for 1966-1967, and which included a "control group." Based on an extrapolation of flow-back rates Fairchild predicts that about six years will be required to pay-back the social costs of these relocations. (Fairchild, p. . .) The result of his estimates is a 33.6 percent gross retention rate at the end of one year, and a net migration rate of 17.2 percent (when migration of control group is accounted for).

Reduction of the pay-back period and improvement of the cost effectiveness of mobility programs obviously requires stronger retention rates, higher wage differences, or both. To the extent that we might predict, prior to selection for relocation, the outcomes for a given mover, both goals might be met by directing relocation investments towards altering the predicted outcomes for those who are predicted to be returnees. Alternatively, we could engage in "creaming," rendering assistance only to those predicted to be stayers. Under these conditions (i.e., retention rates approaching 100 percent) the gross rate of return on the investment in relocation, even at modest wage differences, becomes mathematically explosive.

Most relocation projects selected a middle ground in terms of screening and service provision for potential relocatees. As problems of adjustment to life and work in relocation areas were identified, steps were initiated to mitigate hardship and psychic costs through family counseling, housing referrals, orientations to urban transport, work customs, and financial/consumer counseling both before and after the move. By concentrating assistance among coastal blacks, the project was, in effect (assuming their analysis to be correct), focusing its efforts on altering the "success" prospects of a relatively disadvantaged population.

In addition, given the historic migration patterns of black and white North Carolinians, this was a decision to intervene in the process which had previously resulted in white intra-state and black inter-state migration, even in times of near shortage labor conditions in the Piedmont.

As reflected in the increased retention rates (65 percent) evidenced in this search, all of these adjustments have probably had a positive impact on rates of return on investment. In an attempt to discern potential areas for further improvement, multivariate analyses of wage changes and time spent in the demand area, were performed, using the data at hand for male relocatees. Initial multiple regression estimates for proportion of time spent by relocatees in the demand area and of current wages produced indications that age and/or marital status, depending on which other predictors were used, tended to swamp most other predictors and produce wild variations in regression coefficients between these two variables and among virtually all of the others.

In an attempt to control the supposed interaction effects of various "maturity" variables (age, marital status, education), separate regressions were run arbitrarily splitting the sample by age at twenty-five (c.f. Lansing and Mueller's comments on declining mobility of all types after age 24.) The results in equations to predict time spent in demand area, were dismal, to say the least. Marital status, number of dependents moved, education, first demand area wage, occupation, and an index of relative supply and demand area unemployment rates were entered as predictors. For older workers, the only significant coefficient (at .05) was number of dependents moved (indicating a 2.2 % increase in time spent in D.A. for each additional dependent moved) and the proportion of total variance explained fell far short of significance at any acceptable level. The equation for younger workers produced not one significant coefficient at the .10 level, much less a significant F for the total equation. In both instances  $R^2$  hovered at .10\*

Attempts to predict absolute differences in wages between supply and demand area employment for male relocatees in two age groups produced quite different but also disappointing results. Predictors entered were number of demand area jobs held, education, last known occupation, and mobility status (stayer, long-term leaver, short-term leaver), and weeks between relocation and interview.

The equation for older relocatees produced no significant coefficients, as well as a non-significant overall F (N=80).

Predicted influences on expected absolute wage change for black male relocatees (last job in supply area to last job reported) are reported in the regression summary on the next page.

These statistics tap the estimated effects of variables which depend heavily on post-move behavior and differential availability of relatively high paying sales, operative and craft jobs as between the supply and demand area. Obviously, however, we have failed to account for most of the variance in wage changes in this manner ( $R^2=.32$ ). The indicators used as independent variables have, as predictors of wage outcomes, the disadvantage of being poor proxies for "real" influences in that they are, to put it crudely, at least "twice removed" relatives of premove status and personal characteristics. If we are to seriously consider "policy implication" from such estimates, we are left with no alternative but to search further for predictors of occupational and locational (mobility) variables. We note from the table that the strongest "influences" are associated with occupational interest which movers were more likely to have formed in the demand area than the supply area. (See: "Employment and Earnings").

\*The  $R^2$  term refers to a ratio of variance in the dependent variable which was explained, to variance remaining unexplained, after the regression equation has been estimated.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE = ABSOLUTE WAGE CHANGE FROM  
PREMOVE TO POSTMOVE. N=91 (MALES UNDER 25)

	RGR Coefficient (St. error of B)	F
No. of jobs held	-0.06 (1062)	0.959
Education	-0.007 (.039)	3.890
Current Occupation		
managers	.746 (.690)	1.167
clerical	.974 (.709)	1.891
sales	1.468 (.368)	15.785*
craftsmen	.476 (.206)	5.355*
operatives	.399 (.192)	4.349*
farmer and farm labor	-.472 (.322)	2.144
long-term leaver (left between 2 and 6 months)	-.264 (.239)	1.214
weeks since relocation	.005 (.004)	1.299
currently in demand area	-.001 (.205)	0.000
Constant = 1.0269		

\*F (1.89) at .05 critical value 3.96

$R^2 = .324$  F = 3.48 Significant at .01 for ( F<sub>11, 80</sub> )

## APPENDIX

N = 183

### Responses to Social-Psychological Indicators by Outcome Category

Outcome Category Definitions (applicable to every question or statement, 1-30)

1 = still in Demand Area

2 = stayed in D.A. at least 12 months

3 = stayed 6 - 12 months in D.A.

4 = stayed 2 - 6 months in D.A.

5 = stayed 1 - 2 months in D.A.

6 = left D.A. in less than one month

1. Do you feel that you have as many friends as you would like to have?

(Missing data for any row is in parentheses.)

Outcome/Answer (% of row)	Yes	Uncertain	No	Number in category
1 (1.7%)	80.7	.8	16.8	119
2	100.0	0	0	4
3	92.9	0	7.1	14
4	85.7	0	14.3	21
5	100.0	0	0	10
6	66.7	0	33.3	15



2. Are your neighbors the kind of people you want for friends?

Outcome/Answer (% of row)	Yes	Uncertain	No	Number in category
1 (1.7%)	71.4	6.7	20.2	119
2	100.0	0	0	4
3	85.7	14.3	0	14
4	85.7	0	14.3	21
5	90.0	10.0	0	10
6	80.0	6.7	13.3	15

3. Is there a church, club, or other social organization in your neighborhood that you belong to?

Outcome/Answer (% of row)	Yes	Uncertain	No	Number in category
1	36.1	.8	63.0	119
2	50.0	0	50.0	4
3	50.3	0	50.0	14
4	52.4	0	47.6	21
5	70.0	0	30.0	10
6	66.7	0	33.3	15

4. Do (did) you like most of the people that you work with?

Outcome/Answer (% of row)	Yes	Uncertain	No	Number in category
1	92.4	2.5	5.0	119
2	100.0	0	0	4
3	100.0	0	0	14
4	100.0	0	0	21
5	100.0	0	0	10
6	93.3	0	6.7	15

5. Do your children like the school here?

Outcome/Answer (% of row)	Yes	Uncertain	No	Number in category
1 (56.3%)	37.0	1.7	5.0	119
2 (75.0%)	25.0	0	0	4
3 (78.6%)	21.4	0	0	14
4 (85.7%)	14.3	0	0	21
5 (100.0%)	0	0	0	10
6 (80.0%)	20.0	0	0	15

6. Do you get satisfactory care for your children when it is needed?

Outcome/Answer (% of row)	Yes	Uncertain	No	Number in category
1 (33.6%)	64.7	0	1.7	119
2 (25.0%)	50.0	25.0	0	4
3 (42.9%)	57.1	0	0	14
4 (66.7%)	28.6	4.8	0	21
5 (60.0%)	40.0	0	0	10
6 (66.7%)	20.0	6.7	6.7	15

7. Do you feel that you could turn to the people you know here if you were in trouble?

Outcome/Answer (% of row)	Yes	Un rtain	No	Number in category
1	77.3	10.1	11.8	119
2	75.0	25.0	0	4
3	78.6	7.1	14.3	14
4	90.5	4.8	4.8	21
5	90.0	10.0	0	10
6	100.0	0	0	15

8. Do you have the opportunity to make decisions on your present job?

Outcome/Answer (% of row)	Yes	Uncertain	No	Number in category
1	68.9	3.4	27.7	119
2	75.0	25.0	0	4
3	71.4	7.1	21.4	14
4	81.0	0	19.0	21
5 (10.0%)	60.0	0	30.0	10
6 (6.7%)	80.0	6.7	6.7	15

9. Is there opportunity for promotion on your present job?

Outcome/Answer (% of row)	Yes	Uncertain	No	Number in category
1	74.8	0.8	24.4	119
2	50.0	0	50.0	4
3	64.3	7.1	28.6	14
4	71.4	0	28.6	21
5 (10.0%)	50.0	10.0	30.0	10
6 (6.7%)	60.0	0	33.3	15

10. Does your present employer keep you informed of your rights and available opportunities for promotion?

Outcome/Answer (% of row)	Yes	Uncertain	No	Number in category
1	82.4	3.4	14.3	119
2	75.0	0	25.0	4
3	85.7	0	14.3	14
4	57.1	4.8	38.1	21
5 (10.0%)	40.0	0	50.0	10
6 (6.7%)	60.0	0	33.3	15

11. Do your fellow employees feel your employer is fair?

Outcome/Answer (% of row)	Yes	Uncertain	No	Number in category
1 (.8%)	79.0	5.9	14.3	119
2	75.0	25.0	0	4
3	92.9	0	7.1	14
4	90.5	0	9.5	21
5 (10.0%)	90.0	0	0	10
6 (6.7%)	86.7	0	6.7	15

12. Does your employer discriminate against employees because of age, sex, or race?

Outcome/Answer (% of row)	Yes	Uncertain	No	Number in category
1	10.9	5.0	84.0	119
2	0	0	100.0	4
3	14.3	7.1	78.6	14
4	14.3	4.8	81.0	21
5 (10.0%)	0	0	90.0	10
6 (6.7%)	20.0	0	73.3	15

13. In your present situation, can you live the way you want to?

Outcome/Answer (% of row)	Yes	Uncertain	No	Number in category
1	52.9	0.8	45.4	119
2	50.0	0	50.0	4
3	42.9	0	50.0	14
4	66.7	4.8	28.6	21
5	70.0	0	30.0	10
6	53.3	0	46.7	15

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14. Even though you have confidence in yourself, do you feel that you have a lot of limitations?

Outcome/Answer (% of row)	Yes	Uncertain	No	Number in category
1	49.6	3.3	47.1	119
2	50.0	25.0	25.0	4
3	28.6	14.3	57.1	14
4	47.6	0	52.4	21
5	70.0	0	30.0	10
6	53.0	0	46.7	15

15. Do you generally limit your social life to members of your own family ?

Outcome/Answer (% of row)	Yes	Uncertain	No	Number in category
1	48.7	0.8	50.4	119
2	50.0	0	50.0	4
3	28.6	7.1	64.3	14
4	38.1	0	61.9	21
5	20.0	0	80.0	10
6	53.3	6.7	40.0	15

16. Do you worry a great deal about the future?

Outcome/Answer (% of row)	Yes	Uncertain	No	Number in category
1	37.8	4.2	57.1	119
2	25.0	0	75.0	4
3	35.7	0	64.3	14
4	33.3	9.5	57.1	21
5	30.0	0	70.0	10
6	46.7	0	53.3	15

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17 Do you often wish you were "better off" than you are?

Outcome/Answer (% of row)	Yes	Uncertain	No	Number in category
1	70.6	1.7	27.7	119
2	75.0	0	25.0	4
3	78.6	0	21.4	14
4	85.7	0	14.3	21
5	80.0	0	20.0	10
6	73.3	0	26.7	15

18. Do you make friends easily and enjoy meeting new people?

Outcome/Answer (% of row)	Yes	Uncertain	No	Number in category
1	92.4	1.7	5.9	119
2	100.0	0	0	4
3	100.0	0	0	14
4	100.0	0	0	21
5	90.0	0	10.0	10
6	93.3	0	6.7	15

19. Does your boss usually seem to understand you?

Outcome/Answer (% of row)	Yes	Uncertain	No	Number in category
1	79.8	6.7	13.4	119
2	75.0	0	25.0	4
3	92.9	0	7.1	14
4	100.0	0	0	21
5 (10.0%)	80.0	10.0	0	10
6 (6.7%)	86.7	6.7	0	15

20. Is the work you are doing well suited to your abilities and interests?

Outcome/Answer (% of row)	Yes	Uncertain	No	Number in category
1	79.0	2.5	18.5	119
2	75.0	0	25.0	4
3	85.7	0	14.3	14
4	76.2	0	23.8	21
5 (10.0%)	60.0	10.0	20.0	10
6 (6.7%)	73.3	6.7	13.3	15

21. Does your job provide for a secure future?

Outcome/Answer (% of row)	Yes	Uncertain	No	Number in category
1	70.6	10.9	18.5	119
2	50.0	0	50.0	4
3	50.0	7.1	42.9	14
4	57.1	0	42.9	21
5 (10.0%)	80.0	0	10.0	10
6 (6.7%)	60.0	0	33.3	15

22. Do you take pride in your work?

Outcome/Answer (% of row)	Yes	Uncertain	No	Number in category
1	92.4	3.4	4.2	119
2	100.0	0	0	4
3	100.0	0	0	14
4	95.2	4.8	0	21
5 (10.0%)	80.0	10.0	0	10
6 (6.7%)	86.7	0	6.7	15



23. Do you make enough money to take care of the needs of your family?

Outcome/Answer (% of row)	Yes	Uncertain	No	Number in category
1 (.8%)	64.7	5.9	28.6	119
2	75.0	0	25.0	4
3	57.1	14.3	28.6	14
4	61.9	9.5	28.6	21
5 (10.0%)	90.0	0	0	10
6 (6.7%)	73.3	0	20.0	15

24. Do you generally enjoy being with your co-workers?

Outcome/Answer (% of row)	Yes	Uncertain	No	Number in category
1	95.0	0.8	4.2	119
2	100.0	0	0	4
3	100.0	0	0	14
4	95.2	0	4.8	21
5 (10.0%)	80.0	0	10.8	10
6 (6.7%)	86.7	6.7	0	15

25. Do you feel that in these days a person doesn't really know who he can count on?

Outcome/Answer (% of row)	Yes	Uncertain	No	Number in category
1	61.3	6.7	31.9	119
2	100.0	0	0	4
3	50.0	7.1	42.9	14
4	61.9	9.5	28.6	21
5	80.0	0	20.0	10
6	40.0	13.3	46.7	16

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26. Would you agree that it's hardly fair to bring children into the world the way things look for the future?

Outcome/Answer (% of row)	Yes	Uncertain	No	Number in category
1	21.0	9.2	69.7	119
2	25.0	25.0	50.0	4
3	28.6	7.1	64.3	14
4	23.8	14.3	61.9	21
5	30.0	0	70.0	10
6	26.7	0	73.3	15

27. Do you feel that things are getting worse for the average man?

Outcome/Answer (% of row)	Yes	Uncertain	No	Number in category
1	44.5	7.6	47.9	119
2	50.0	25.0	25.0	4
3	42.9	14.3	42.9	14
4	57.1	0	42.9	21
5	20.0	20.0	60.0	10

28. Nowadays a person has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself.

Outcome/Answer (% of row)	Yes	Uncertain	No	Number in category
1	63.0	3.4	33.6	119
2	75.0	0	25.0	4
3	57.1	0	42.9	14
4	66.7	0	33.3	21
5	0	0	50.0	10
6	46.7	0	53.3	15

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29. There's little use writing to government officials because often they aren't really interested in the problems of the average man.

Outcome/Answer (% of row)	Yes	Uncertain	No	Number in category
1	55.5	16.8	27.2	119
2	50.0	50.0	0	4
3	57.1	7.1	35.7	14
4	52.4	4.8	42.9	21
5	60.0	10.0	30.0	10
6	40.0	6.7	53.3	15

30. I believe my children will have a real chance to get ahead.

Outcome/Answer (% of row)	Yes	Uncertain	No	Number in category
1	84.9	12.6	1.7	119
2	75.0	25.0	0	4
3	100.0	0	0	14
4 (4.8%)	81.0	9.5	4.8	21
5 (10.0%)	80.0	10.0	0	10
6	86.7	13.3	0	15