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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the freedom of government officials to critically evaluate public policies and programs during the Nixon Administration, and surveys the role of free speech in effective intragovernmental decision making and in President Nixon's style of leadership. It argues that freedom of expression was significantly restricted within the Nixon Administration during the formulation of both domestic and foreign policy. (Author)

FREE SPEECH WITHIN THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines freedom of government officials to critically evaluate public policies and programs during the Nixon Administration, and surveys the role of free speech in effective intragovernmental decision-making and President Nixon's style of leadership. It argues that freedom of expression was significantly restricted within the Nixon Administration during the formulation of both domestic and foreign policy.

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In his first Inaugural Address Richard Nixon asked Americans to "lower their voices" and aid his effort to "bring us together." During the next few years the Nixon Administration enlarged its popular support by polarizing the "silent majority" from dissenters who were labelled an "effete corps of impudent snobs," or "garbage" or "rotten apples," or "a cancer."[1] Leading government officials launched rhetorical attacks on "radical-liberals" who were in turn admonished to "stop shouting."

When Washington, D. C., police arrested some 12,000 persons during the May Day (1971) demonstrations against the Vietnam war, Attorney General John Mitchell and other administration officials endorsed th tactics as a good example for the rest of the nation to follow.[2] However, it did seem strange to some observers that the chief law enforcement officer of our country was praising massive illegal arrests, and that an administration which had pledged to "bring us together" was advocating repression of dissent by denying the right of free expression to thousands of peaceful protesters.

These are only two isolated instances which are frequently cited by those who feel that freedom of speech was restricted by the policies and practices of the Nixon Administration. The purpose of this paper is not to re-open that question but rather to address an issue which has been largely ignored: the extent to which freedom of speech was restricted <u>within</u> the Nixon Administration.[3] This paper argues that domestic and foreign policy decision-making were impaired because dissent <u>within</u> the governmental bureaucracy was suppressed.[4]

FREEDOM OF SPEECH

Freedom of speech, including the right to criticize the opinions, proposals, and policies of those in power, is a fundamental principle of our governmental system. Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, Robert M. O'Neil observes that "at one time men assumed that the state had power either to prevent or to punish all speech--oral or written--that was critical of the established order, or dangerous or offensive or for some other reason not to the liking of the ruling powers. . . . But in the United States, the First Amendment stands as a theoretical bulwark against such encroachments upon the liberty of expression."[5]

Freedom of speech is a shared value in our society. We generally believe that restrictions on free expression deny basic inalienable rights and are philosophically objectionable. Although typically justified on the basis of such abstract principles, freedom of expression has significant instrumental or practical value as well. The democratic ideal assumes that wisdom is discovered in the marketplace of ideas through popular consensus. Every individual's opinion is equally needed; thus, the right of free and full expression must be assured to insure optimally effective policy making. Professor of Speech at the University of Wisconsin, R. R. Allen concludes that the democratic method of decision-making results in the "best" judgments.

> The democratic dream envisions a nation in which public decisions occur only after all alternatives have been presented, understood, and evaluated. It involves a

> commitment to popular debate as a means of reaching decisions. It affirms that every opinion may contribute to the public search for truth. It is an idea that when ideas "knock heads" the best idea will win popular support. . . . If such a clash of opinions is to occur, citizens must feel free to speak. The first amendment to the Constitution of the United States guarantees such freedom.[6]

These same principles of democratic decision-making and freedom of speech are essential for effective intragovernmental deliberations. The communication of ideas, information, and opinions during the formulation of policy is an important factor influencing the quality of decisions. Policy and program discussion depend on an atmosphere and structure which guarantees and encourages debate, critical analysis, and free expression of opinion. If group decision-making is to be effective, "all members should be allowed the right of self-expression without hidden threats."[7] "In a successful group no member withholds information because he is frightened, anxious, or disgusted."[8] Groups, such as government bureaucracies or policy planning councils, tend to reach better judgments if free expression is protected. "Groups in which free communication is maximized are generally more accurate in their judgments."[9]

While free and open expression may be recognized as an important ingredient in effective decision-making, in practice it is difficult to establish a governmental structure and atmosphere which encourages criticism and dissent. In his recent book, Victims of Groupthink,[10] Irving L. Janis suggests that several foreign policy fiascoes (such as the Bay of Pigs during Kennedy's administration, and Vietnam escalation during the Johnson administration) were due to factors which restricted the give-and-take of argument and free expression of critical judgments.

Restricted free speech during policy making discussions is not unique to the Nixon administration, but has handicapped previous administrations as well. It is clear that if the wisest decisions are to be made government officials must feel free to disagree with existing policies as well as those being considered as alternatives. Moreover, policy makers should be encouraged to express their criticism during policy deliberations. Unless these conditions of free speech are guaranteed within the governmental bureaucracy, the likelihood of wise decision-making is significantly attenuated.

RICHARD NIXON'S STYLE OF LEADERSHIP

A President's personality and style of leadership influence the patterns of communication which develop in the governmental machinery. In September, 1968, Richard Nixon told the nation that he did not want a government of "yes-men."

> It's time once again we had an open administration--open to ideas from the people, and open in its communication with the people--an administration of open doors, open eyes and open minds. . . . Only if we have an administration broadly enough based philosophically to insure a true ferment of ideas, and to invite an interplay of the best minds in America, can we be sure of getting the best and most penetrating ideas.[11]

Unfortunately, freedom of expression within the Nixon Administration did not materialize. Political analysts suggest that President Nixon's personality forced the appointment of advisors and governmental officials who were intensely committed to the President and his policies.

> Long before the Watergate case broke, Richard J. Whalen, a conservative intellectual who had worked for Nixon in the preconvention stage of the 1968 campaign, was putting

> up alarm signals about the White House. . . . They [Presidential advisors] were sober, industrious, efficient and almost completely unaware of a wider world and a larger politics than they had known. . . . Nixon's own insecurity caused him to need the protection of men willing to do whatever he wished.[12]

Many of the Watergate revelations indicate the degree to which White House advisors were committed to Richard Nixon. [illegible]er, for example, John Dean's description of Bob Haldeman's chief assistant Gordon Strachan. "Strachan is as tough as nails. He can go in and stonewall, and say, 'I don't know anything about what you are talking about.' He has already done it twice you know, in interviews. . . . It is a personal loyalty to him. He doesn't want it any other way. He didn't have to be told. He didn't have to be asked."[13]

The Nixon Administration gradually developed a "secretive" style of governing which was characterized by closed channels of communication rather than by free expression of opinion. Decisions were made by a handful of key advisors without Congressional consultation or consideration of alternative points of view. Time magazine wrote that the Nixon Administration showed a great capacity for self-deception, and a strange isolation from reality. White House advisors were arrogant for years with the Congress, the bureaucracy, and the press.[14] "The President's closest advisors were revealed [after Watergate] as amoral men who considered themselves above the law in what they conceived to be their service to Richard Nixon."[15]

David Broder of the Washington Post described Nixon's style of leadership as a "private presidency." Decision-making power was taken from Congress, the Cabinet, and the governmental bureaucracy, and was centralized at the White House.

> Nixon chose to conduct his government, his politics and all his public responsibilities in an essentially private, covert fashion. The key members of the staff he entrusted with his work were those men whose sole commitment and sole experience in public life was the advancement of Richard Nixon. . . .[16]

Nixon surrounded himself with advisors who shared his political philosophy; he centrali decision-making at the White House. This process effectively destroyed free debate and discussion within the administration. White House officials saw the Congress, governmental agencies, the Cabinet, and anyone who disagreed with their "game plan" as an enemy.

> Mr. Donald K. Freeman, chief of the psychiatry department at the University of Chicago, compared the Nixon team to a professional football team--an apt analogy in light of President Nixon's fascination with the sport. . . . "It becomes impossible to lose; there can be no dignity in losing." . . . Many Presidential aids distrusted the political processes--Congress, the courts and the federal bureaucracy--because they thought a conservative, Republican program would be found unacceptable to those groups.[17]

The full extent of Nixon's paranoia regarding political opponents became apparent during the recent impeachment hearings which documented White House plans to use the Internal Revenue Service and other governmental agencies against political "enemies."[18]

The Senate Watergate hearings provided unique insight into the administration's style of governing. Particularly revealing was the language employed by Nixon advisors. Government was portrayed as a giant machine with "inputs" of information, liason men as "conduits," and Haldeman's description of the goal of policy formulation processes as a "zero defect system." Viewing government as a machine rather than as a

collection of people seemed to remove personal responsibility. Euphemisms such as "surreptitious entry" for burglary, "increments in the form of currency" rather than payoffs, and "my statement is inoperative" or "I mis-spoke myself" instead of saying I was lying, diminished the sense of moral responsibility. Constant references to "team players," "ball games," "coming aboard," and "not fouling up the gameplan" suggest the importance attached to loyalty and teamwork.[19]

Richard Nixon's style of leadership placed a premium on telling the President exactly what he wanted to hear. Decision-making authority was concentrated in a few White House advisors who were committed to Nixon and his policies. Outside criticism and alternative points of view were shut off and free speech within the administration was virtually pre-empted. The detrimental impact of Nixon's style of leadership on domestic and foreign policy decision-making is analyzed in the following section.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND DOMESTIC POLICY FORMULATION

Presidential Advisors

President Nixon's style of governing discouraged and often pre-empted free expression of alternative points of view from major components of policy formation, such as government agencies, the Cabinet, and Congress. The only remaining opportunity for free expression in the Nixon Administration existed among the small group of White House advisors. However, the selection of Presidential advisors who were in almost complete agreement with the Nixon political ideology limited the range of views that would be considered. More importantly, advisors who demonstrated indepen-

dence of thought and sought to express their views were terminated or became so frustrated that they resigned.

The experience of Harvard Professor Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who was Nixon's principal domestic affairs advisor, illustrates the restraints imposed on free speech within the administration.

> I'd always thought of Dick as two people--the good and the bad Nixon--the one I liked was the one who was open to ideas and persuasion. The one that made me nervous was the one who isolated himself and retreated into formulas. As it happened the White House that evolved brought out the bad Nixon.[20]

Moynihan left the White House in 1970, just a few months before another domestic affairs advisor, Steve Hess, also gave up. Hess had written Nixon's campaign biography in 1968 and had been a close student of Nixon for many years. He explained his voluntary departure this way: "As a Republican liberal, I naturally work on the proposition that you win some and you lose some. I found I was losing them all."[21]

When Secretary of Interior Walter Hickel openly expressed criticism of Nixon's policies, he and several Interior Department officials were abruptly dismissed.

> He [Hickel] was fired on November 25, 1970. Within hours one of Haldeman's aides had descended on Hickel's department with a purge list. He summoned six of the department's highest officials and addressed each of them as follows: "We want your resignation, and we want you out of the building by five o'clock."[22]

Walter Hickel and Daniel P. Moynihan left or were fired primarily because they spoke out against the team line.[23] Perhaps the most obvious example of inhibited free speech within the Nixon Administration was the firing of Special Watergate Prosecutor Archibald Cox. The administration

then moved to appoint a new prosecutor who "would not be quite so independent."

Moynihan, Hess, Hickel, and Cox are not typical White House advisors. The vast majority of Presidential advisors tailored their views to conform with administration policy and President Nixon's ideology. Freedom of speech within the administration was effectively limited to a discussion of views consistent with the President's existing beliefs, opinions, and policies. H. R. Haldeman described the process and atmosphere of policy discussion in the White House as follows:

> We started out trying to keep political coloration as much as possible out of policy and hiring matters. However, we realize that these things make for variety in decision-making, and so within reasonable limits we have tried to keep a spread of opinion on the staff, so that no one is to the left of the President at his most liberal or to the right of the President at his most conservative. . . . Ehrlichman, Kissinger and I do our best to make sure all points of view are placed before the President. We do . . . act as a screen, because there is a real danger of some advocate of an idea rushing in to the President . . . if that person is allowed to do so, and actually manages to convince [him] in a burst of emotion or argument . . . [24]

Presidential Commissions

The National Advisory Commission has recently become an important element in the formulation of national policy. President Johnson appointed a National Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, as well as one on Marijuana and Drug Abuse. The objective deliberation and freedom of expression allowed these national fact-finding teams was subsequently restricted by the Nixon administration. When it was rumored that the Obscenity Commission would recommend liberalized censorship laws, "Vice President Agnew spoke for the Administration. 'As long as Richard Nixon

is President, Main Street is not going to turn into Smut Alley.'"[25]

Similarly, while the Shafer Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse was deliberating, President Nixon publicly stated that a recommendation of reduced penalties for possession of marijuana would be unacceptable. Thus, the administration would listen only to proposals consistent with their pre-existing beliefs. Once again free speech within the Nixon Administration was inhibited.

Administration Relations with Congress

The Nixon Administration was isolated from expressions of Congressional opinion, with the exception of occasional consultation with conservative Republican Congressmen who were staunch Nixon supporters. White House hostility toward Congress was particularly evident regarding the impoundment of appropriated funds and the frequent invocation of Executive privilege during Congressional investigations.

> Nixon has threatened to carry Executive impoundment of funds voted by Congress to further lengths than any previous President. And until he had to reverse himself a few weeks ago, he was asserting fantastic claims of "Executive privilege" to give his men immunity from testifying before Congress about anything he chose to have them silent about.[26]

The Nixon Administration initially frustrated Congressional expression of opinion by hoarding decision-making authority and consulting with only a few friendly Congressmen. When Congress attempted to speak by establishing priorities with appropriation and spending levels, the President impounded the funds. Congressional investigations were also handicapped by widespread use of Executive privilege. Senator Sam Ervin, Chairman of the Watergate Committee, expressed the feelings of many

Congressmen concerning relations with the Nixon Administration and Executive privilege.

> Divine right went out with the American Revolution and doesn't belong to White House aides. "What meat do they eat that makes them grow so great?" I am not willing to elevate them to a position above the great mass of the American people. I don't think we have any such thing as royalty or nobility that exempts them. I'm not going to let anybody come down at night like Nicodemus and whisper something in my ear that no one else can hear. That is not executive privilege. It is executive poppycock.[27]

The President attempted to improve relations with Congress, not by seeking out Congressional viewpoints, but rather by public relations tactics. "At one point they [the President's congressional liaison staff] were issued buttons reading 'I Care About Congress.'"[28]

Watergate

"As long ago as the sixteenth century, Niccolò Machiavelli observed, 'The first impression that one gets of a ruler and his brains is from seeing the men about him.' By this yardstick, Richard Nixon . . . was not a very brainy President."[29] The underlying cause of Watergate may well be the personal characteristics of the White House advisors and the style of government that evolved. The isolated atmosphere of secret and closed decision-making was fostered by the selection of advisors deeply committed to Richard Nixon and his philosophy of government. A prime example is Charles "Chuck" Colson, whose White House title was Special Counsel to the President. "Colson, a very rugged character indeed, was once quoted as saying: 'I would walk over my grandmother if necessary [for Richard Nixon].'"[30] During informal conversation with John Dean,

President Nixon commented on the loyalty of Chuck Colson. "They [our Democratic friends] think I have people capable of it [the Watergate break-in]. And they are correct, in that Colson would do anything."[31]

This feeling of loyalty and "team spirit" pervaded the administration. Those who opposed the Nixon "game plan" were seen as enemies, and the White House became isolated from other points of view and immune to criticism.

> Haldeman and Ehrlichman were openly described by pressmen and politicians of both parties alike, as "the two Germans." The isolation of the President himself was attributed to the construction of a "Berlin Wall" round him by his two closest aides.[32]

The Nixon Administration was also characterized by written communication and complex bureaucratic reporting arrangements. The business of government was conducted by memorandum and an absence of face-to-face contact.

The personal characteristics of Presidential advisors, isolation from alternative points of view, intense commitment to the Nixon ideology, the importance attached to team loyalty, contempt for potential enemies, and restricted channels of communications within the White House, are all factors contributing to the planning, execution and subsequent cover-up of Watergate and related incidents. Perhaps more importantly, these same factors caused a repression of free expression of opinion within the Nixon Administration. These restraints on freedom of speech exerted untold influence on all domestic policy deliberations conducted during the Nixon Administration.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION

The Nixon Administration, the press, and the American people have all agreed that Richard Nixon's major triumphs were in the area of foreign policy. However, freedom of speech was restricted within the administration during the formulation of foreign policy, and both within and outside the administration once a policy was established.

Early in Mr. Nixon's first term, the President's foreign affairs advisor Henry Kissinger had virtually taken personal charge of American foreign policy. Decisions were made by Kissinger and a few White House advisors with little or no consultation with established organs of foreign policy formulation. Secretary of State William Rogers and the experienced career men in the State Department bureaucracy were effectively bypassed.

Nixon's first foreign affairs crisis was student reaction to the invasion of Cambodia in May, 1970. Over 100 colleges participated in a nationwide student strike. The presidents of thirty-seven colleges and universities urgently requested a meeting with President Nixon.

> Dr. Allen [U. S. Commissioner of Education] went to the White House to urge Moynihan and Ehrlichman to recommend such a meeting. They disagreed, arguing that the university administrators had been presumptuous and arrogant in their demands. "This is not the way you treat a President," said Moynihan. . . . Nixon turned down the request.[33]

Throughout Nixon's first term, administration spokesmen discouraged free speech concerning the Vietnam war by suggesting that dissent was unpatriotic.

> In a Today show interview, Presidential Aide H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman charged that Nixon's Democratic opponents favored installing a Communist regime in Saigon; critics of the President's Vietnam proposals, said Haldeman, were "consciously aiding and abetting the enemy of the United States."[34]

The most obvious example of restricted freedom of speech is the failure to consider alternative positions during foreign policy decision-making conferences. When President-elect Nixon was organizing his governmental machinery in late 1968, he recognized the importance of free expression during policy formulation.

> I am one who likes to get a broad range of viewpoints expressed and Dr. Kissinger is setting up at the present time a very exciting procedure for seeing to it that the President of the U. S. does not just hear what he wants to hear, which is always a temptation for White House staffers.[35]

Unfortunately, the wide range of critical opinion which Nixon initially sought never materialized. In fact, as the administration became committed to specific policy options, overt attempts were made to suppress alternative points of view. A prime example is the administration's reaction to reports of the Intelligence branch of the CIA which criticized Nixon's Viewnam policy.

> The branch of the CIA that irritated Kissinger and finally the President was the Directorate of Intelligence. Staffed by highly educated analysts, the Directorate of Intelligence was charged with the task of sifting intelligence, from both open and covert sources, and providing objective estimates of developments in other countries. In outlook they were perhaps closer to the academic community than they were to their cloak-and-dagger brethren in Plans. . . . On Vietnam, the CIA's analyst-evaluators had for many years provided the Government's most pessimistic stream of advice. . . .
>
> When Nixon came to power, the CIA's analyst-evaluators were still mired in a gloomy complexity about Vietnam. In the service of a White House that

> prized the value of positive thinking, this was not an attitude calculated to win friends or even influence official policy which, under pressure of the Nixon-Kissinger grand design, began seeking ways of making the war "winnable." . . .
>
> Nixon wanted his analysis uncluttered by "irrelevant" detail. As time went by, this need was met by researchers on Kissinger's rapidly expanding NSC staff in the form of "National Security Study Memoranda." Over a hundred of these papers were produced during Nixon's first term and they came to supplant the CIA's estimates as the analytical basis for presidential decision-making.[36]

In December 1971, during the India-Pakistan crisis, Kissinger and Nixon formulated a pro-Pakistan foreign policy while publicly maintaining a stance of neutrality. The pro-Pakistan tilt ordered by Nixon and Kissinger in secret meetings was opposed by U. S. Ambassador to India Kenneth Keating,[37] State Department officials,[38] and was contradicted by CIA intelligence.[39] Again in this instance, freedom of expression was restricted. During policy planning discussions Kissinger was harsh with those who thought the U. S. should maintain diplomatic equilibrium, and he intimidated potential dissenters by invoking the President's name. "Kissinger bristled with impatience at the men who tried to be fair. . . . 'The President says either the bureaucracy should put out the right statements on this, or the White House will do it.'"[40] During the India-Pakistan crisis, Kissinger and Nixon forced policy decisions on unwilling officials without fully considering alternative policy options.

Thus, even in the area of foreign policy, the Nixon Administration inhibited free speech. Kissinger and Nixon often made decisions without consulting or fully considering the opinions of other foreign policy experts within the government. Intelligence estimates which contradicted

established policy were ignored. On one occasion Kissinger "went so far as to scrawl 'piece of crap' on a CIA Vietnam report."[41] Nixon and Kissinger established their own intelligence system in order to avoid information or opinions inconsistent with established policies. Expression of alternative points of view both inside the government, and in the country as a whole, was restricted by the Nixon Administration.

CONCLUSION

An American citizen's fundamental right of free speech--to intellectually disagree with the policies of those in power and to verbally express that criticism--is as important to those who are directly involved in governmental policy as it is to citizens who influence national policy less directly. Government service should not necessitate the voluntary surrender of First Amendment rights. Perhaps equally important, freedom of expression is instrumental to achieving optimally effective decision-making. Thus, institutional arrangements which restrict the right of free and open expression of all points of view during policy deliberations must be avoided.

Freedom of expression was significantly restricted within the Nixon Administration. Some of the factors which resulted in the suppression of alternative policy options were the President's style of leadership, the selection of advisors who shared his political ideology and were committed to him personally, the centralization of decision-making authority at the White House, and the isolation of policy makers from Congress, the press, the governmental bureaucracy, and public opinion.

Freedom of speech within the administration was restricted during discussions concerning both domestic and foreign policies.

Freedom of speech within governmental policy deliberations is philosophically essential to guarantee an individual's right of free expression. Equally important, freedom of speech within decision-making organizations is essential to stimulate a wide range of program options and help insure the best possible policy.

Notes

1. For an analysis of the Nixon-Agnew rhetoric of polarization, see Andrew A. King and Floyd Douglas Anderson, "Nixon, Agnew, and the 'Silent Majority': A Case Study in the Rhetoric of Polarization," Western Speech, 25 (Fall, 1971), 243-55; and Frank Trippett, "Spiro," Look, 35 (Sept. 7, 1971), 29.

2. Fred P. Graham, "Mitchell Praises Capital's Tactics," The New York Times, May 11, 1971, sec. 1, pp. 1, 20.

3. A major problem in analyzing restrictions of free speech within the Nixon Administration is the absence of objective, first-hand resources. The researcher investigating recent policy making discussions must rely on second-hand reports of journalists (such as David Broder, John Maclean, Rowland Evans, Robert Novak, Jack Anderson and Lewis Chester) and news reports (such as Time, and The New York Times). Later revisions of this paper have been supplemented with references from published transcripts of White House conversations.

4. The suppression of dissent surveyed in this paper occurs on two levels: 1) the governmental level broadly conceived, including relations between the President and Congressional leaders, and communications between Congress, national fact finding commissions, the press, and the Executive branch; and 2) the intragovernmental level, including communication between the President, White House advisors governmental agencies and bureaus, and the Cabinet.

5. Robert M. O'Neil, Free Speech: Responsible Communication Under Law (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), pp. 28-9.

6. R. R. Allen, et al., Speech in American Society (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1968), pp. 4-5.

7. Gerald M. Phillips, Communication and the Small Group (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), p. 67.

8. Clovis R. Shepherd, Small Groups: Some Sociological Perspectives (San Francisco: Chandler, 1964), p. 124.

9. Paul A. Hare, Handbook of Small Group Research (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 389.

10. Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972).

11. Richard M. Nixon, quoted in David S. Broder, "Nixon Concept of Presidency Led to Scandal," Tulsa Daily World, May 6, 1973, sec. A, p. 7.

12. Lewis Chester, et al., Watergate: The Full Inside Story (New York: Ballantine Books, 1973), p. 7.

13. The White House Transcripts: Submission of Recorded Presidential Conversations to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives by President Richard Nixon, ed. Gerald Gold (New York: Bantam Books, 1974), pp. 116-17.

14. "Nixon's Nightmare: Fighting to Be Believed," Time, May 14, 1973, p. 17.

15. Ibid.

16. David S. Broder, "Nixon Concept of Presidency Led to Scandal," Tulsa Daily World, May 6, 1973, sec. A, p. 7.

17. John Maclean, "Watergate Tied to Nixon Team's Huge Desire to Win," Chicago Tribune, July 1, 1973, sec. 1, p. 4.

18. White House Transcripts, p. 63.

19. Anthony Sampson, "Washington 'Waterspeak' Fouling Up Game Plan," The News-Gazette (Champaign, Ill.), Oct. 28, 1973, sec. 6, p. 53. See also, Stefan Kanfer, "Words from Watergate," Time, Aug. 13, 1973, p. 20.

20. Chester, Watergate, p. 12.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Maclean, "Nixon Team's Desire to Win," p. 4.

24. H. R. Haldeman in Chester, Watergate, p. 4.

25. Gerald Astor, "No Recession in the Skin Trade," Look, June 29, 1971, p. 33.

26. Hedley Donovan, "Time Essay: The Good Uses of the Watergate Affair," Time, May 14, 1973, p. 24.

27. Sam Ervin in Chester, Watergate, p. 255.

28. Chester, Watergate, p. 13.

29. Ibid., p. 17.

30. Ibid., p. 16.

31. White House Transcripts, p. 91.

32. Chester, Watergate, p. 13.

33. Rowland Evans, Jr. and Robert D. Novak, Nixon in the White House: The Frustration of Power (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 276.

34. "Preparing a Political Fallback Position," Time, Feb. 21, 1972, p. 9.

35. The New York Times, Dec. 3, 1968, sec. 1, p. 1.

36. Chester, Watergate, pp. 47-48.

37. Jack Anderson and George Clifford, The Anderson Papers (New York: Ballantine Books, 1974), pp. 292-94.

38. Ibid., pp. 308-314.

39. Ibid., p. 287.

40. Ibid., p. 312.

41. Chester, Watergate, p. 45.