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ABSTRACT

This paper presents a new measure of school desegregation policy output and explores various socioeconomic conditions and political processes associated with the degree of school desegregation in 69 northern cities. Data was collected by a mail questionnaire. The measures of school desegregation policy were computed as follows: The number of black and white students in each school in the year after a claimed action was subtracted from the number of black and white students in the same school in the preceding year. The difference was attributed to administrative action if it increased racial integration in the receiving school. The number of black and white students so reassigned was totaled for the school district and then standardized by dividing by the school population of each race to obtain the percentage of black students reassigned and the percentage of white students sent to predominantly black or formerly black schools. Cross sectional, multiple regression analysis indicates that school desegregation policy is limited by several socioeconomic constraints. However, in contrast to many other school desegregation policy studies, political variables such as the ideology and behavior of the school board, civil rights activity, and controversy explain a substantial amount of variance in school desegregation policy. (Author/JM)

THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION POLICY

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Abstract

This paper presents a new measure of school desegregation policy output and explores various socioeconomic conditions and political processes associated with the degree of school desegregation in 69 northern cities. Cross sectional, multiple regression analysis indicates that this policy is limited by such socioeconomic constraints as the percentage Black in a school district, community social status, and Black social status. However, in contrast to many other school desegregation policy studies, political variables such as the ideology and behavior of the school board, civil rights activity, and controversy, explain a substantial amount of variance in school desegregation policy.

THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION POLICY

For over a decade, comparative policy analysts have been debating and attempting to resolve such persistent problems as that of adequate variable measurement, and of causal linkages between different levels of analysis and types of variables. We have contributed to this debate by focusing on a single urban policy -- school desegregation.

This paper explains the development of a measure of school desegregation policy, and the analysis of it. This analysis will include discussing four issues of continuing concern to urban analysts who attempt to explain varying levels of policy output: (1) the relative power of socioeconomic variables versus political variables; (2) the linkages between aggregate socioeconomic variables and local policymakers' attitudes and behavior; (3) the influence of community power structure; and (4) the influence of civil rights protest activity.

The unit of analysis used here is the school district. This is a "macro" or aggregate analysis which depends on community characteristics for its independent variables, political process data as its intervening variables, and school desegregation policy as its dependent variable. As Eisenger points out, the linkages between community characteristics and patterns of political behavior have seldom been made explicit theoretically. Yet, environmental factors are important determinants of

the structure of opportunities in a community, and the context within which politics takes place.[1] Social environmental characteristics such as the percentage Black, the median income level, the median educational level, and the dominant type of employment structure can be crucial in determining the policy agenda of a community, the attitudes and behavior of policymakers, and thus, ultimately the policy output.

Because of the enormous time and money limitations of comparative urban research, most studies have relied solely on environmental factors to explain policy output. The few studies that have included political process variables such as decisionmakers' attitudes and behavior, campaign activity, controversy, and elite power structures, have found them to be important in determining policy.[2] This study benefits from the use of political process data from a NORC survey conducted in 1968-69, headed by Robert Crain, on the politics of school desegregation in 91 northern cities. The research was designed to investigate the ways local school systems in the North dealt with the problem of de facto school segregation, to identify the important characteristics of actors, cities and political structures, and to relate these characteristics to the school desegregation actions taken by cities and their school systems.[3]

The sample used in this study was obtained in two stages. Ninety-one cities were chosen by Robert Crain and others from the National Opinion Research Center's Permanent Community Sample of 200 cities.[4] The Permanent Community Sample is a national sample of all cities over 150,000 in population with cities below that threshold sampled proportionally

to size. The 91 cities were selected from those cities which had 3,000 Blacks (insuring issue salience) and were outside of the South or eliminated de jure segregation immediately after the 1954 Supreme Court decision, Brown v. Board of Education, thus entering the northern situation of de facto segregation.

Because the research reported here was originally part of a study of community conflict as it is reflected in school board elections and school financial referenda, 22 cities which had neither elected school boards nor financial referenda, or in which there were data collection problems, were eliminated from the study.[5] The resulting sample of 69 cities contains 82 percent of all "northern" cities over 500,000; 41 percent of all "northern" cities over 100,000; and 11 percent of all "northern" cities over 50,000. Within each of these city/school districts,[6] NORC trained interviewers administered a series of 18 interviews in 1967 and 1968 with selected school system personnel, politicians, civil rights leaders, civic leaders, and city officials who served as expert informants on the politics of their city and their school district. 1970 Census data, and school desegregation and civil rights activity data collected in 1973, were added to this.

Measuring School Desegregation Policy

As Cook and Scioli have noted, the measurement of policy output in most research studies has tended to be inappropriate or limited (e.g. the measurement of social service delivery by dollar expenditures).[7] The

reason for this is primarily practical--dollar expenditures or some other simple measure of policy are much cheaper to obtain than more complex measures. In the case of school desegregation, limitations of the measures used in previous research have been due to both practical considerations and research design shortcomings.

School desegregation policy has usually been measured as either a dichotomous variable: desegregation or no desegregation, or a measure of the level of segregation. With a dichotomous variable such as that used by Matthews and Prothro, and by Crain in his early work,[8] a school system that reassigns one percent of its Black students for the purposes of integration is put in the same category as one that reassigns fifty percent. Yet, the determinants of a "cultural exchange" program should be different from that of a massive busing program.

With a measure of segregation such as that used by Dye and the U.S. Civil Rights Commission,[9] and by Farley and Taeuber,[10] the effect of residential integration is confused with that of school desegregation initiated by school authorities. A measure of segregation can yield information on an existing situation--e.g., how many Black children are in predominantly white schools, or how many Black children would have to be moved from their schools to have a perfectly integrated situation. Such a measure, however, cannot tell you how much of the observed school integration is a result of school action, and how much the result of neighborhood integration over which school authorities have no control. Any comparative, quantitative

study of city-school politics and public policy should be able to distinguish between the two; first, in order to determine who and what influenced the policy decision, and secondly, to analyze the impact on the community. School integration resulting from neighborhood integration may have a different impact on such phenomena as white flight or electoral backlash than integration resulting from administrative action.

One of the few research studies to attempt to measure school desegregation as a policy continuum is the Kirby, Harris, and Crain analysis.[11] They attempted to systematically categorize and rank different kinds of school desegregation policy and then compare communities on the basis of their ranking. However, their measure has some of the same problems as a dichotomous measure. The fact that it does not take into account the degree to which each of these actions is implemented means there are some errors in the rankings. For example, according to their scheme, both Los Angeles and Pasadena would be rated as "busing" cities yet Pasadena has reassigned more than 80 percent of its Black student population, while Los Angeles has reassigned less than 2 percent.

We attempted to overcome these problems by using a quantitative measure of the proportion of Black and white students reassigned for the purposes of school integration. The data for the measure was collected by means of a mail questionnaire which listed the bi-racial schools (defined as a minimum of 10 percent Black and 10 percent white) in a district and asked administrators to indicate the reason for their bi-racialness and the

approximate date of any claimed action.[12] The measures of school desegregation policy were computed as follows: the number of Black and white students in each school in the year after a claimed action was subtracted from the number of Black and white students in the same school in the preceding year. The difference was attributed to administrative action if it increased racial integration in the receiving school. The number of Black and white students so reassigned was totaled for the school district and then standardized by dividing by the school population of each race to obtain the percentage of Black students reassigned and the percentage of white students "reverse integrated" (sent to predominantly Black or formerly Black schools).

Further policy classification was unnecessary because the percentage of Black and white students reassigned proved to be highly related to the type of action taken. Mandatory busing results in the highest percentage of students reassigned, while voluntary busing never amounts to more than a few percentage of students reassigned.[13] Furthermore, a straightforward quantitative measure avoids the problems of semantics encountered with inflammatory policy issues.

In Table 1, 69 northern school districts are listed with two school desegregation measures and a measure of segregation. The first two columns represent policy measures: the percentage of Black students reassigned, and the percentage of white students "reverse integrated." The next

column indicates whether the school desegregation was court ordered. The scores in the far right column measure the level of segregation in a school district. The segregation measure is the index of dissimilarity used by Farley and Taeuber computed from Fall 1971 HEW racial composition data. Therefore, the lower the score, the less segregated a school district is.[14]

[Table 1 about here]

As the table indicates, school districts that reassigned a large percentage of Black and white students are much less segregated as a result of it than those that initiated no desegregation. Pasadena, California; Pontiac, Michigan; Berkeley, California; Wichita, Kansas; and San Francisco, California are the least segregated because they have reassigned the most students--in most cases under court order.

A score of zero on a policy variable does not necessarily mean a school district has done nothing. In fact, most school systems with scores of zero have at least a voluntary minority busing program but it simply has not made the affected schools bi-racial by our standards. The table also shows that most desegregating cities avoid sending white students to Black schools. Cities, such as Pasadena, Pontiac, and Berkeley, that have "reverse integrated" a large proportion of white students have done

so primarily by changing a school from predominantly Black to predominantly white in one large reassignment. This is less difficult than sending whites to a school that will remain predominantly Black. Cities like Las Vegas, Nevada and Tacoma, Washington have managed to send whites to Black schools by establishing "magnet" schools--predominantly Black schools scholastically and culturally enriched to attract whites who voluntarily choose to attend. However, no school district has had the energy or money to create and maintain more than two magnet schools. (It may also be argued that there are not enough whites interested in an enriched integrated program to voluntarily fill more than two schools.)

In Table 2, a correlation matrix is presented for the two school desegregation policy variables, desegregation under court order, and the level of segregation in a school district. The high interrelationship between these variable appears to indicate some degree of measurement validity. On the other hand, because the relationship between the policy variables and the level of segregation is not perfect, it is apparent that the latter (computed solely from "hard" data) cannot substitute for the former (computed from "soft" and "hard" data, with hard data also used for verification). A correlation of -.72 and -.53 means there will be differences in determinants when one measure of output is used rather than the other. We believe the superior measure is the real policy measure--percentage of Black and white students reassigned--[15] rather than the measure of an environmental condition--level of segregation.

[Table 2 about here]

Socioeconomic Environmental Characteristics of School Desegregation Policy

There has been a continuing debate in public policy studies as to whether socioeconomic or political variables are more important in explaining variations in policy output. Beginning in 1963, with the publication of a study by Dawson and Robinson[16] examining welfare policy, many political scientists have questioned the importance of political variables. Various state policy and urban policy studies have suggested that the relationship between political variables and policy outputs may, in large part, be a function of the socioeconomic characteristics of an area.[17] Moreover, much of this research has argued that socioeconomic variables may influence public policy independent of political characteristics.

School desegregation, like many controversial urban policies and unlike most state policies, is characterized by a good deal of citizen opinion and debate on its feasibility and desirability. Thus socioeconomic characteristics are important in influencing school desegregation, not only because they determine need or limit spending capacity, but because they are hotly debated considerations both prior to and after the policy decision. Moreover, socioeconomic characteristics are also important in determining political styles and policy agendas, and thus ultimately what policy decisions are made. Matthews and Prothro's 1964 study ("Stateways Versus Folkways..") found that socioeconomic environmental

factors were overwhelmingly more important than political factors in predicting southern school desegregation (measured dichotomously as the presence or absence of Black students in white schools). Although political factors became more important in the latter study as the amount of integration increased, demographic factors still explained most of the variance in integration. Dye's 1968 study of 55 northern and southern school districts ("Urban School Segregation") also found demographic variables to be more important in shaping northern school segregation (measured as the percentage of Negro elementary pupils in schools which are 90-100 percent Negro). Those relationships between political system variables and school segregation which did occur among northern cities were either very weak or "washed out" when the effects of demographic variables were controlled.

Perhaps the most salient socioeconomic characteristic and one which is crucial in determining both the policy agenda and policy output, is the Black percentage of students in the school district. Dye's 1968 analysis, using his measure of segregation, found a strong relationship between the Black percentage of students and the degree of segregation (.76). The higher the percentage Black, the more segregated the school district. Matthews and Prothro in 1968 and Prothro in 1972 using their dichotomous variable in 997 southern counties, also found the percentage Black in a county school district to be negatively related to the presence of Black students in white schools. On the other hand, Crain et al. (The

Politics of School Desegregation) and Kirby, et al. (Political Strategies in Northern School Desegregation) found only a slightly positive, insignificant relationship, while the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights in their 1967 study, Racial Isolation in the Public Schools, found none at all.

In this study, using a more appropriate measure of policy output, percentage Black has a curvilinear relationship with school desegregation. This relationship is graphically represented in the scatterplot in Fig. 1 using the log of school desegregation.[18] The school districts designated by an asterick have desegregated under court order. The scatterplot shows an ascending slope up to the 45th percentile and a descending slope after that point. Thus, percentage Black is positively related to desegregation only as long as Black students are in a minority. (The zero order correlation is only - .05.) This is as true for court ordered school desegregation as it is for "voluntary" or non court ordered school desegregation.[19]

[Figure 1 about here]

The failure to search for a curvilinear relation explains to a large extent the Civil Rights Commission error and the weak relationship in Kirby, et al. Crain, et al. studying eight cities did acknowledge the possibility of a curvilinear relation and their scatterplot shows roughly the same curve as in Fig. 1 (with one deviant case).[20]

Other research studies have also found the percentage Black to have a curvilinear relation to policy output. Pettigrew found that border

state school districts with intermediate Black percentages were the first to desegregate their schools.[21] Blalock argues that the case of the Negro in the United States suggests that minority mobilization may be expected to be highest when the minority percentage is intermediate in value.[22] Thus, an intermediate Black population is more successful in demanding school desegregation than a small or large Black population because there are sufficient numbers to give them political clout, but not so many as to make school desegregation demographically unrealistic.[23]

Other socioeconomic background factors related to the amount of school desegregation are listed in Table 3. School district percentage Black was recoded into three dummy variables: 0 to 13.0 percent, 13.1 to 44.5 percent, and above 44.5 percent in order to measure its curvilinear relation to school desegregation with a Pearson's r. As one might expect from Fig. 1, the relationship between school desegregation and an intermediate percentage of Blacks is 0.31. Moreover, school desegregation is negatively related to a small percentage of Blacks (-.18) and a large percentage of Blacks (-.22).

[Table 3 about here]

There are other interesting relationships. The school district size has a negative relation of -.16 with school desegregation. This is not surprising since population size has always been an important influence on city policies. Size commonly correlates with city expenditures, reflecting increased needs and demands for services generated by population

growth. However, there is an increasing tendency for the tax base of most large cities to decline as their expenditures increase. Thus, school boards in large cities tend to be unwilling to take on another expensive social program that might accelerate the general trend of white migration to the suburbs. (School district size correlates .24 with percentage Black.)

Dye's study also found a negative relation between size and school integration. The larger the city, the more segregated the school system (.49). However, Prothro's 1968 study found almost no relationship at all between Southern SMSAs (Southern school districts are usually county-wide) and school integration. On the other hand, Kirby, et al. found a positive relation between size and school desegregation.[24] Much of these differences in findings may be attributable to differences in measurement of their policy output variable.

The general picture obtained from Table 3 is that higher social status communities initiate more school desegregation. This is substantiated by positive correlations with such high status indicators as the percentage college graduates; the percentage employed or living in universities; the educational level of the Black population; the percentage high school graduates; the median educational level; the percentage employed in white collar occupations; and the median income level. It is further substantiated by negative correlations with two low status indicators, the percentage of Blacks earning less than $3,000, and the percentage of

individuals employed in wholesale/retail.

Generally this conforms to the findings of Matthews and Prothro's 1968 analysis, Prothro's 1972 replication, and Dye'sschool segregation study.[25] All of these studies, despite the fact that they use different measures and include southern school districts, found indicators of high social status to be positively related to school integration.

The only studies using northern school districts and a policy action variable found the opposite relationship. We think Crain, et al. and Kirby, et al. are in error. Crain, et al. probably suffers from a small sample size (eight) and the fact that the study was based on policy actions taken before 1965. Little desegregation occurred that early and they appear to have mistaken active negotiations and friendly relations for real school desegregation. Although Kirby, et al. have an adequate sample size (91), they also have some error in their dependent variable, as we mentioned earlier, because their rankings failed to take into account levels of policy output.[26]

However, Table 3 shows a confounding factor in the relationship of the percentage foreign stock (first or second generation Americans) to school desegregation policy. Percentage foreign stock is typically an indicator of low social status since it presumably measures the percentage of blue collar ethnics (including Spanish surname, Africans, and Asians) in a community. White, blue collar ethnics are generally conservative on the issue of racial integration.[27]

Dye also found such a relationship (although his variable only measured white ethnics), but could only say it was unexpected since blue collar ethnics have been assumed to be "private regarding" and therefore less concerned with the plight of the Negro.[28] Kirby, et. al. also found a similar positive relationship between school desegregation policy and the percentage foreign stock. They argued that although blue collar ethnics are conservative, they select leaders who opt for concessions to Black demands.[29] Although we are unable to explain why, our data supports this argument, since percentage foreign stock is correlated .27 with school board racial liberalism.

Another demographic correlate of school desegregation action, the percentage of individuals employed in wholesale/retail is negatively related to school desegregation at -.29. Communities with a large percentage employed in wholesale/retail tend to be of lower status (-.21 with percentage college graduates) with a conservative leadership. Most wholesale/retail firms depend on local consumption. Downtown merchants typically are in favor of whatever increases the volume of trade coming into the central business district. They are anxious to attract good customers and to discourage people with little money to spend whose presence in the downtown area might make shopping there less attractive to potential customers. Thus they are rather disapproving of any social program, such as school desegregation, which might cause white out-migration.[30] University towns, on the other hand, are more likely to

implement more school desegregation because this kind of economic structure is less financially dependent on social stability and thus more conducive to social innovation. Moreover, university towns tend to have a large percentage of college graduates and a high median educational level--social resources positively related to school desegregation.

The Relationship of Social Status to Community Politics

Opinion surveys generally show that higher status individuals are more liberal on matters of race than lower status individuals. Greeley and Sheatsley's 1971 survey shows that whites who have been to graduate school have pro-integration attitudes on almost twice as many activity areas as those with only an elementary education. The same positive relationship was found between income and pro-integration attitudes, and occupation and pro-integration attitudes.[31] Eitzen found that the most important variables in explaining attitudes were social status variables--education, occupational prestige, and income. The higher the social status of the individual, the more liberal he or she was on civil rights issues.[32]

Most scholars have been careful to point out that there need be no relationship between individual level patterns and aggregate level patterns. Blalock, however, notes that philosophically and theoretically it would be very upsetting if we were to assume that the fundamental nature of the relationship between two variables changes with every change in units.[33] If one could control the way in which outside influences operate on the

variables in question, there is no reason why individual level relationships should not hold up at the aggregate level. In this case, it does not seem illogical to assume that there is a similar explanation for the two findings that higher status individuals have more pro-integration attitudes and higher status school systems initiate more school desegregation.

The explanation may lie in what Lineberry calls "linkage variables."[34] The attitudes and behavior of political decisionmakers serve as a linkage between individual level relationships and aggregate level relationships. One important finding of this study is that districts with racially liberal school boards[35] initiate more school desegregation ($r = .30$). Table 4 shows that school districts with a higher income level and a higher social status Black population have more racially liberal school board members.[36] The most plausible explanation for this is that higher status communities, because they are composed of higher status individuals, elect school board members who are liberal. Presuming a relationship between attitudes and behavior, the liberalism of the board results in acquiescence to the demand for school desegregation made by Black civil rights groups.

[Table 4 about here]

One of the more interesting findings displayed in Table 4 is that the proportion Black has the same curvilinear relation to school board racial liberalism as it does to school desegregation policy. School boards are more likely to be racially liberal when the Black proportion is intermediate. This can be explained quite simply in political terms: as Black

voting power increases, more liberal candidates win election. However, there is a ceiling on this effect because cities with large Black populations are also poor, central cities whose social status is too low to produce or elect liberal white candidates.[37]

Political agendas are also different in higher status communities. When the Black community is less than a majority and more educated, the issue of school desegregation is more salient to them than demands for jobs, housing, or political power that preoccupy lower social status, majority Black communities. Thus a school desegregation demand stands the best chance of being pushed in higher status communities where the percentage Black is large enough to make school desegregation a need, but small enough to make it more salient than bread and butter issues. Furthermore, the school desegregation demand is more likely to become part of the formal agenda in these communities because it falls on fertile ground--a liberal school board, a community that is more receptive to change than other types of communities, where school desegregation is demographically feasible. Figure 2 illustrates these relationships. (The small arrows off to one side mean other factors are also affecting the phenomena.)

[Figure 2 about here]

Regression Analysis of Types of School Desegregation

The results of various stepwise multiple regression programs and one series of zero order correlations are presented in Table 5. For the

sake of comparability, the same variables were entered into equations involving different dependent variables. The first dependent variable is the log of the degree of school desegregation policy in columns 1, 2, and 3. The second dependent variable is a dummy variable, desegregation under court order, in columns 4, 5, and 6. The third dependent variable in column 7 is the log of the degree of court ordered school desegregation with only zero order correlation coefficients because of the small N(9). The fourth dependent variable in columns 8, 9, and 10 is the log of the degree of voluntary (non-court ordered) school desegregation.

[Table 5 about here]

Each of the three pairs of multiple regression equations, degree of school desegregation, desegregation under court order, and degree of voluntary school desegregation, were run in the same way. Equation 1 for each dependent variable includes only political variables. This was done, first, in order to maximize their importance vis-a-vis socioeconomic variables, and secondly, to see which political variables are strongest in relation to other political variables in explaining variations in school desegregation policy output. These political variables are entered into the equation in a stepwise fashion.

Equation 2 for each dependent variable includes both socioeconomic variables and those political variables strong enough to stay in the equation. Socioeconomic variables were entered first because they are viewed as background variables -- the first variables (or independent variables) in

a causal sequence in which social factors determine political styles that in turn determine policy outputs. However, each was selected in a stepwise fashion according to its ability to predict. Subsequently, the political variables (or intervening variables) were entered into Equation 2 in a stepwise fashion.

Figure 3 illustrates the underlying model on which the first pair of equations for degree of school desegregation are based, and summarizes the subsequent findings. The equation indicates that intervening political variables can explain as much as 39 percent of the variance in school desegregation when they do not have to compete with socioeconomic variables.[38] Only two of these variables, however, are strong enough to remain in equation 2 when socioeconomic variables are controlled for. The elite power structure centralization (to be discussed in more detail later), and the average level of general civil rights activity[39] did not even stay in the first equation; while the controversy variables, level of trust between the school board and the civil rights movement,[40] and school board political activity[41] washed out in the second equation containing socioeconomic variables. Only desegregation under court order[42] and the racial liberalism of the school board were strong enough to withstand socioeconomic controls.[43]

[Figure 3 about here]

While socioeconomic variables explained 30 percent of the variance in school desegregation, political variables explained an additional

17 percent. This is still three times more explained variance than Matthews and Prothro and Prothro found. Dye found that political variables tended to wash out altogether when the effects of socioeconomic variables were controlled for in partial correlations. Only Kirby, et al. found political variables to explain as much as they do in this equation.[44]

Because desegregation under court order was the single most important variable in explaining the degree of school desegregation, another pair of equations, based on Figure 4, were run to predict the likelihood of court ordered school desegregation (1=court ordered desegregation, 0 = all other cases). Essentially, we are isolating that portion of Figure 3 prior to the last box (degree of voluntary and court ordered school desegregation), and converting "the presence of court ordered desegregation" into the dependent variable. Because of the importance of the presence of a court order, we want to know what makes court ordered school districts different from non-court ordered school districts. Put another way, what kinds of school districts desegregate under court order?

[Figure 4 about here]

Court ordered desegregation is limited by the same social and demographic constraints found in predicting the degree of school desegregation. Courts rarely order lower social status, majority Black school districts to desegregate. However, if they are so ordered, they will almost always

appeal and win. These SES attributes explain 22 percent of the variance. Moreover, much the same political factors operate in determining if a school district will desegregate under court order as operate in determining the degree of school desegregation. While the racial liberalism of the school board becomes unimportant, other measures of the board's attitudes and behavior gain in importance. Politically inactive school boards with a high level of trust between themselves and the civil rights movement are more likely to desegregate under court order than other types of districts. This is because they are more likely to be ordered to desegregate, and are more likely to obey rather than pursue endless political maneuvering and court appeals. Political variables explain 18 percent of the variance uniquely (Equation 1) and in combination with SES variables (Equation 2).

If these factors operate in determining the likelihood of desegregation under court order, what explains the degree of school desegregation under court order? Part b of Figure 5 illustrates the underlying model of the next set of equations in columns 8, 9, and 10 of Table 5, and summarizes the findings. The racial liberalism of the school board is the most important variable related to the degree of court ordered school desegregation which varies from 2.58 percent to 98.48 percent Black and white students reassigned. This is also true for voluntary school desegregation (a) although the variable is less strongly related and washes out when socioeconomic variables are controlled for. Thus we can say that the relationship between

the degree of voluntary school desegregation and the board's racial liberalism is a result of the effect that community SES has on the racial liberalism of decisionmakers. It is an intervening variable. In the case of court ordered school desegregation, we simply do no know to what degree racial liberalism can be explained by community characteristics because the small N does not allow us to control for other variables.[45]

[Figure 5 about here]

These findings regarding the general importance of the school board's liberalism are in agreement with Crain, et al. and in disagreement with Kirby, et al., Crain, et al. found that the most important predictor of school desegregation in their eight cities was the racial liberalism of the school board. On the other hand, Kirby, et al. argued that the racial liberalism of the school board seemed to have no effect on school desegregation. Whatever their attitudes regarding race might have been, school board members were enmeshed in a system which they could only partly control. Thus each of the board members responded to a situation which was heavily colored by the behavior of other political actors in the system.[46]

The findings of this study suggest that the stronger relationship of board liberalism to the degree of court ordered desegregation than to the degree of voluntary desegregation may be due to the fact that the former is less heavily colored by the behavior of other political actors in the system. After a court suit has been handed down, the ideology of the school decision-makers has a chance to assert itself because there are less political actors attempting to dominate the policy. The system tends to become more

dyadic: the board versus the court. In the case of voluntary school desegregation, there is no "deus ex machina" resolving some of the local political competition for control, thus the board's ideology has less effect.

There is a somewhat puzzling relationship found in Table 5 -- the negative relationship between the "level of trust between the School Board and the Civil Rights Movement" and the "Degree of Voluntary School Desegregation." This variable is positively related to every other type of school desegregation (except this one) but the relationship is not very strong. When the influence of court ordered school desegregation is taken out, the fact that the level of trust is negatively related to most indicators of social status, causes it to be negatively related to the degree of school desegregation. However, it is not strong enough to remain in an equation with socioeconomic variables.

The relationships found in Table 5 (and part a of Figure 5) for voluntary school desegregation suggest that it is unique in having political intervening variables such as controversy, civil rights activity, and school board racial liberalism totally explained by the

socioeconomic factors hypothesized as their background "causes." Political variables uniquely explain 22 percent of the variance in voluntary school desegregation in Equation 1 and nothing in combination with socioeconomic variables in Equation 2.

Community Power Structure and Policy Output

The variable measuring the degree of centralization of the elite power structure was created from interviews with the city editor, a 1955 school board member, mayor, political leader, and major civic leader in each city using a reputational technique. Each was asked to name , if they could, approximately 20 individuals other than local government officials, who were active in opposing or trying to significantly alter such programs. The variable ranges from a low level of agreement on a list of individuals important in civic affairs (pluralistic) to a high level of agreement on individuals important in civic affairs (centralized).[47]

Crain, Morlock, and Vanecko analyzed the structural characteristics of communities with varying degrees of agreement on elites. Their

findings indicate that a high level of agreement is indeed evidence of a centralized power structure.[48] When we compare cities with low and high levels of elite centralization, we are comparing those in which the government works alone in trying to generate support for city projects because there is no single sector of the populace that is influential, and those in which it has the aid and support of an organized private sector: the civic elite. Communities with a centralized elite power structure tend to be of a low social status (-. 13 with median Black educational level and -. 20 with median income). These characteristics are conducive to a highly centralized private sector because low status communities typically have less people who want to actively participate. Where there are less actors who want to (or are able to) exert influence, there is more agreement on who they are. Thus, the measure of agreement on elites is indeed a measure of the degree of centralization of the community power structure.

Numerous research studies in the past decade have suggested that widespread political participation (a pluralistic power structure) is dysfunctional for policymaking.[49] The general theory asserts that the greater the number of decisionmakers who participate in decisions, the less likely it is that the program being considered will be adopted. In such a situation, opposition by one official can often prevent adoption.

Clark's study of budget expenditures and urban renewal in 51 American cities is one of the few to find decentralization of decisionmaking (community power) positively associated with both budget expenditures and urban renewal.[50] He suggested that the basis for his finding, as opposed to the opposite conclusions of earlier research studies, might be the nature of the issue. Issues such as fluoridation, school desegregation, and urban renewal are fragile issues--they are new, only tentatively supported, and have extremely vocal, sometimes hysterical, opposition. Clark hypothesized that for fragile decisions, the more centralized the decisionmaking structure, the lower the level of outputs. He further argued that the reason why urban renewal adoption was found in his research to be more likely in a decentralized system was because issues such as school desegregation and urban renewal are becoming less fragile with time.

The findings of this study suggest that the centralization of the decisionmaking structure has no relationship to the level of school desegregation policy output, except where it is court ordered. Clark is wrong in believing that school desegregation is becoming more fragile with time to the extent that a decentralized power structure will lead to higher policy output.

Social resources such as the median Black educational level, the percentage Black, school district size, etc. and political factors such as the liberalism of the school board become much more important in explaining the level of output than the degree of centralization of the decisionmaking structure. Part of the reason for this may be that school desegregation is a volatile policy which the civic elite tends to avoid involvement in.[51] However, when the issue is "resolved" as in the case of court ordered school desegregation, the centralization of the civic elite becomes an important factor influencing the level of policy output. A centralized civic elite appears to be more willing to intervene in the case of a court order, and this intervention, as we would expect, is on the side of "law and order" (e.g. obeying the intent of the court decision).

The Effect of Civil Rights Protest Activity and Controversy on School Desegregation Policy Output

Lipsky argued in "Protest as a Political Resource" that protest activity, although essential in raising an issue as a public concern, was ineffective in causing the system to act. Crain, et al. found the acquiescence of the school board to civil rights demands for desegregation to be determined almost from the beginning of the decision process. They thus concluded that the extent of civil rights activity has relatively little influence on the degree to which the school system meets the demands made. Rather the extent of acquiescence determines the level of activity. Kirby, et al. felt that not only was civil rights activity ineffectual in causing the school

board to desegregate, but in fact was dysfunctional in that it caused the civic elite to withdraw from the controversy. The result of elite withdrawal was to withhold legitimacy from civil rights demands for desegregation.[52]

We found no relationship between civil rights activity on behalf of school desegregation[53] and the degree of school desegregation. One reason for this may be that school systems with the demographic and political characteristics that encourage school desegregation, also have the social resources that tend to make civil rights demonstrations unnecessary. Conversely, school systems that have a high level of civil rights activity on behalf of school desegregation tend to have low social status, (r=-.17), a centralized power structure (r =.30), and politically active school administrators (r = .27).[54] These characteristics are not those of school systems that implement a high degree of school desegregation.

Thus it would appear that Crain et al. are correct--the extent of acquiescence determines the level of civil rights activity rather than the other way around.[55] Civil rights demonstrations are most frequent and prolonged in communities where they are least likely to have an effect and where the decisionmakers are least likely to desegregate because of a lack of social and financial community resources.

In addition, Table 5 shows a definite negative relationship between the average level of general civil rights activity (including protest activity not specifically directed at the schools) and school desegregation. This

variable tends to substantiate Kirby, et al.'s thesis that civil rights activity was in fact dysfunctional in its effect on school desegregation.[56] Even though not directed at the schools, it may have alienated decision-makers and various civic groups creating a backlash against civil rights demands, of which one of the more important was the demand for school desegregation.

Although civil rights activity may have no effect or a negative effect on school desegregation, it is apparent that most school desegregation is the result of conflict. As Table 5 also shows, controvery over race relations and education are positvely related to the degree of school desegregation. Gamson points out in Power and Discontent that one can approach studies of decisionmaking from a viewpoint that implicitly values community control of conflict, or from one that assumes conflict can be useful.[57] Both viewpoints have some validity with regard to school desegregation policy. On the one hand, it is important that the civil rights movement be able to control conflict to some extent in cooperation with a well organized, high social status Black population. This tends to inhibit opposition to school desegregation.

However, it is also clear that school desegregation benefits from controversy. School boards and white elites do not bring up the school desegregation issue, nor are they willing to initiate it without prodding. Controversy generated by the civil rights movement is necessary to raise the issue as a public concern and to place it on the formal agenda of a

community. Continual pressure is needed to force the school board and superintendent to change their views and/or their policy. Thus conflict performs a necessary function of disturbing status quo power arrangements, coalitions, and traditions. The conflict has to be structured, however, in order for it to produce a desegregation decision, and a strong, prestigious civil rights movement backed by a high social status Black population can accomplish this.

Summary

School desegregation policy is a policy greatly limited by socioeconomic constraints. Yet more than in most comparative, quantitative policy studies, political factors are highly influential. In the three different multiple regression analyses (all school desegregation, voluntary school desegregation, and desegregation under court order) political factors explained a good deal more variance than they have in most other studies of school desegregation. Although in examining each variable and its relation to school desegregation, the differences between this study and earlier studies may not have seemed large, taken collectively they add up to numerous contradictions that need to be resolved. Refining the policy output variable so it really measures policy output, is a step in the direction of resolving some of these contradictions.

In general, the degree of school desegregation tends to be positively related to indicators of social status. High social status, medium percentage Black school districts have the social resources that make school

desegregation a concern for Blacks, as well as endow it with legitimacy in the eyes of white decisionmakers.

One of the reasons why these indicators of social status are important is because high social status has typically been related to racial liberalism in individuals. This relationship has an effect at the aggregate level. High social status communities have school board members who are more racially liberal and school board racial liberalism is positively related to the extent of school desegregation. This relationship is strongest for the degree of court-ordered school desegregation. In this type of school desegregation, the court tends to preempt other political actors, and thus the attitudes of the school board members become more important.

Despite the fact that school desegregation is a controversial "fragile" policy issue, it seems to have no relationship to community power structure. Nor does the level of civil rights activity on behalf of school desegregation have much effect. Civil rights activity often appears to be the result of a lack of acquiescence on the part of decisionmakers, rather than a causal force in influencing a decision. On the other hand, conflict can serve the purpose of disturbing status quo power arrangements and forcing a decision, just as it can reflect the fact that change is occurring in a community.

TABLE 1

69 SCHOOL DISTRICTS RANKED BY PERCENT BLACKS REASSIGNED WITH PERCENT WHITES "REVERSE INTEGRATED," PRESENCE OF COURT ORDER, AND LEVEL OF SEGREGATION IN THE SCHOOL DISTRICT (AS OF FALL 1971)

School Districts	Percent Blacks Reassigned	Percent Whites "Reverse Integrated"	Court Order	Index of Dissimilarity (Level of Segregation)
Pasadena, Calif.	82.50	15.98	yes	12.1
Pontiac, Mich.	67.02	20.07	yes	12.5
Wichita, Kansas	54.10	2.53		18.6
Berkeley, Calif.	50.40	15.92		6.1
San Francisco, Calif.	40.40	6.18	yes	24.7
Riverside, Calif.	38.20	0		23.7
Providence, R. I.	36.00	0		29.4
Niagara Falls, N. Y.	28.80	1.46		24.7
Waukegan, Ill.	28.00	3.72	yes	49.2
Denver, Colo.	23.66	1.64	yes	53.9
Springfield, Mass.	21.90	0		39.6
Stamford, Conn.	20.00	1.42		35.2
Sacramento, Calif.	19.98	0	yes	36.9
Lansing, Mich.	17.00	0.08		32.3
Bridgeport, Conn.	14.90	0		45.6
Peoria, Ill.	14.30	0.33		44.1
Racine, Wisc.	12.30	0		49.2
Oklahoma City, Okl.	10.98	0.52	yes	77.9
Las Vegas, Nev.	10.10	0.71	yes	35.5
Seattle, Wash.	9.90	0.35		59.3
Minneapolis, Minn.	9.70	0		66.6
Grand Rapids, Mich.	9.40	0		33.6
Tacoma, Wash.	9.20	0.24		30.9
Ann Arbor, Mich.	9.00	0		31.0
Lexington, Ky.	8.81	0.84		58.5
San Bernardino, Calif	7.10	0		44.8
St. Paul, Minn.	6.77	0		50.9
Baltimore, Md.	6.60	1.32		82.3
Waterbury, Conn.	4.80	0		42.3
Dayton, Ohio	3.96	0		80.8
Rochester, N. Y.	3.28	1.88		42.4
Syracuse, N. Y.	3.24	0		47.5
Warren, Ohio	2.80	0		43.4
Rockford, Ill.	2.40	0		64.4
Indianapolis, Ind.	2.36	0.22	yes	67.6

TABLE 1 - CONTINUED

School Districts	Percent Blacks Reassigned	Percent Whites "Reverse Integrated"	Court Order	Index of Dissimilarity (Level of Segregation)
Colorado Springs,Co.	2.30	0		50.0
Pittsburgh, Pa.	2.30	.04		68.4
Waterloo, Iowa	2.16	.09		64.2
Flint, Mich.	2.06	1.63		62.4
Toledo, Ohio	1.37	0		68.3
Los Angeles, Calif.	1.36	0		87.1
Milwaukee, Wisc.	.92	0		83.3
Des Moines, Iowa	.90	.20		56.2
E. St. Louis, Ill.	.73	0		71.4
Kansas City, Mo.	.31	0		86.3
Detroit, Mich.	.26	0		75.2
San Diego, Calif.	.19	0		70.5
Hartford, Conn.	.01	0		70.3
Erie, Pa.	0	0		33.7
Utica, N. Y.	0	0		40.6
Santa Monica, Calif.	0	0		43.2
Lima, Ohio	0	0		45.4
Portland, Ore.	0	0		51.2
Muncie, Ind.	0	0		55.1
Charleston, N. J.	0	0		56.4
Camden, N. J.	0	0		60.7
Kansas City, Kansas	0	0		63.4
Hamilton, Ohio	0	0		67.2
Youngstown, Ohio	0	0		67.7
Springfield, Ill.	0	0		68.1
Omaha, Nebraska	0	0		68.7
Cincinatti, Ohio	0	0		68.8
Akron, Ohio	0	0		69.3
Columbus, Ohio	0	0		73.3
Albuquerque, N. M.	0	0		73.4
Philadelphia, Pa.	0	0		78.8
Louisville, Ky.	0	0		80.7
Saginaw, Mich.	0	0		83.4
Cleveland, Ohio	0	0		88.1
Mean	10.21	1.12		54.2
Median	2.36	0.0		56.2

TABLE 2

CORRELATIONS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION POLICY MEASURES, COURT ORDERED, AND LEVEL OF SEGREGATION

	Percent Blacks Reassigned	Percent Whites Reverse Integrated	Court Ordered[a]	School District Segregation
Percent Blacks reassigned		.80	.52	- .72
Percent Whites reverse integrated			.49	- .53
Court Ordered			.47	- .72
School district segration (Taeuber)				- .23

[a]Desegregation under court order is a dummy variable: 0=did not desegregate under court order, 1=did desegregate under court order.

Figure 1

The Relationship Between School Desegregation and the School District Percentage Black



TABLE 3

THE RELATIONSHIP OF SCHOOL SYSTEM SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS TO SCHOOL DESEGREGATION POLICY

	Zero Order Correlation with School Desegregation
Racial and Ethnic Composition	
Black percentage of the student population between 13.1 percent and 44.5 percent[a]	.40
Black percentage of the student population above 44.5 percent[a]	-.35
Black percentage of the student population below 13.1 percent	-.17
Percentage foreign stock	.31
SES	
Percentage college graduates	.30
Percentage high school graduates	.27
Percentage employed or living in universities	.31
Median educational level of the black population	.32
Percentage employed in white collar occupations	.22
Other Factors	
School District student population size	-.18
Percentage employed in wholesale/retail	-.12

[a]These are dummy variables

TABLE 4

THE RELATIONSHIP OF SCHOOL SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS TO THE RACIAL LIBERALISM OF THE SCHOOL BOARD

	Zero Order Correlation with School Board Racial Liberalism
Median Income	.27
Black educational level	.23
Black proportion between 13 and 44.5 percent	.23
Black proportion less than 13 percent	-.15
Black proportion over 44.5 percent	-.13

Fig. 2 — The effect of percent black on intervening political and social variables and school desegregation policy



TABLE 5

THE RELATIONSHIP OF SCHOOL DISTRICT CHARACTERISTICS TO TYPES OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION POLICY

Community Characteristics	Degree of school desegregation			Desegregation under court order (dummy variable)			Degree of court ordered school desegregation	Degree of voluntary school desegregation		
		Eq. 1	Eq. 2		Eq. 1	Eq. 2			Eq. 1	Eq. 2
	Zero Order (r)	Stand. Coef. (Beta)	Stand. Coef. (Beta)	Zero Order (r)	Stand. Coef. Beta	Stand. Coef. (Beta)	Zero Order (r)	Zero Order (r)	Stand. Coef. (Beta)	Stand. Coef. (Beta)
Socioeconomic:										
Intermediate Percentage Black (13.1 - 44.5)	.40		. 28	.22		.33	.27	.35		.46
High Percentage Black(>44.5)	-.35		a	-.16		.12	e	-.33		a
Percentage College Graduates	.30		.27	.08		a	.21	.31		b
Percentage Employed in Wholesale/ Retail	-.12		-.08	-.01		a	-.63	-.08		-.20
School District Population Size	-.18		-.15	-.01		a	-.68	-.18		-.23
Black Educational Level	.32		b	.19		a	.21	.27		.46
Percentage Employed in Manufacturing	-.11		a	-.25		-.46	.25	-.01		a
Percentage of Blacks Earning Over $10,000	.21		a	.15		.31	.25	.15		a
Cumulative explained variance for SES:			(.30)			(.22)				(.34)
Political:										
Court Ordered	.47	.48	.38	b	b	b	b	c	c	a
Elite Power Structure Centralization	.02	a	a	.02	-.11	a	.40	.07	a	a
Controversy Over Race Relations	.27	.15	a	-.01	a	a	.43	.29	.23	a
Average Level of General Civil Rights Activity	-.17	a	a	-.24	-.26	-.23	-.66	-.18	a	a
Controversy Over Education	.25	.12	a	.01	a	a	.35	.27	a	a
Level of Trust Between Board and Civil Rights Movement	.03	.18	a	.28	.30	.32	.51	-.21	-.23	a
School Board Political Activity	-.23	-.17	a	-.24	-.16	-.13	-.02	-.15	-.25	a
School Board Racial Liberalism	.26	.24	.21	-.05	a	a	.77	.23	.26	a
Cumulative explained variance for equation:		(.39)	(.47)		(.18)	(.40)			(.22)	(.34)
	N=69			N=69			N=9	N=60		

[a]Dropped out of equation

[b]Not run in equation due to multicollinearity problems

[c]No cases

Figure 3

A Model of Factors Determining the Degree of School Desegregation



Figure 4

A Model of Factors Determining the Likelihood of Court Ordered School Desegregation



Figure 5

A Model of Factors Determining (a) the Degree of Voluntary School Desegregation and (b) the Degree of Court Ordered School Desegregation



FOOTNOTES

[1]Peter K. Eisinger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities," American Political Science Review, 68 (March 1973), 11-12.

[2]Some of these studies are: Heinz Eulau and Robert Eyestone, "Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy Outcomes: A Developmental Approach," American Political Science Review, 60 (September 1966), 640-654; James Clarke, "Environment, Process, and Policy: A Reconsideration," American Political Science Review, 63 (December 1969), 1172-1182; Robert Crain, Elihu Katz, and Donald B. Rosenthal, The Politics of Community Conflict (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, Inc., 1969); Robert L. Crain, Morton Inger, Gerald McWorter, and James J. Vanecko, The Politics of School Desegregation, (New York: Anchor Books, 1969); and David J. Kirby, Robert T. Harris, and Robert L. Crain, Political Strategies in Northern School Desegregation, (New York: D.C. Heath and Co., 1973).

[3]The results of the study are analyzed in Kirby, et al., Political Strategies in Northern School Desegregation.

[4]See Peter H. Rossi and Robert L. Crain, "The NORC Permanent Community Sample," The Public Opinion Quarterly, 32 (Summer 1968), 261-272 for a description of the Permanent Community Sample. A tape containing the most important variables from four PCS studies can be obtained from the University of Michigan's ICPR archive.

[5]Identifying Footnote.

[6]All but two of the 69 school districts in this study have the same name and virtually the same boundaries as the city. The decision to desegregate is in every case the result of interaction between city and school officials and citizens of both legal entities. The result is that for all practical purposes the distinction between city and school district is almost nonexistent.

[7]Thomas Cook and Frank Scioli, "Policy Analysis in Political Science: Trends and Issues in Empirical Research," Policy Studies Journal, 1 (Autumn 1972), 6-11.

[8]Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, "Stateways Versus Folkways: Critical Factors in Southern Reactions to Brown v. Board of Education," in Essays on the American Constitution, ed Gottfried Dietze (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964); James W. Prothro, "Stateways Versus Folkways Revisited: An Error in Prediction," Journal of Politics, 34 (May 1972) 352-364; Crain, et al., The Politics of School Desegregation.

[9]The measure used by Dye, and also by the U.S. Civil Rights Commission Report is the percentage of Black students in schools that are 90 - 100 percent Black. Thomas Dye, "Urban School Segregation, A Comparative Analysis," Urban Affairs Quarterly, 4 (December 1968), 141-165; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Racial Isolation in the Public Schools, 2 vols. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967).

[10]The measure used by Farley and Taeuber is the index of dissimilarity developed by Karl and Alma Taeuber, a measure of the percentage of minority students who would have to be reassigned to white schools in order for each school in a school district to have the same percentage of minority students as in the whole district. Reynolds Farley and Alma F. Taeuber, "Racial Segregation in the Public Schools," American Journal of Sociology, 79 (January 1974), 888-905.

[11]Kirby, et al.

[12]Identifying Footnote.

[13]The relationship between the percentage of a plan which is mandatory and the percentage of students reassigned is .94 for white students and .77 for Black students using Gamma.

[14]The formula for the index is $T = 1/2$ (sum of absolute values of $N_i/N - W_i/W$). Karl E. Taeuber and Alma F. Taeuber, Negroes in Cities (Chicago: Aldine, 1965) p. 236.

[15]Because of the high correlation between percent Blacks reassigned and percent whites "reverse integrated," an index of the two was created to avoid problems of multicollinearity in the multiple regression analysis. The index is simply percent Blacks reassigned added to percent whites "reverse integrated."

[16]Richard Dawson and James Robinson, "Interparty Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Politics in the American States," Journal of Politics, 25 (May 1963), 265-289.

[17]Herbert Jacob, "The Consequences of Malapportionment: A Note of Caution," Social Forces, 43 (December 1964), 256-261; Richard I. Hofferbert "The Relationship between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States," American Political Science Review, 60 (March 1966), 73-82; Thomas Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public: Public Policy Outcomes in the American States (Chicago: Rand McNally); Dye, "Urban School Segregation"; Thomas Dye, "Governmental Structure, Urban Environment, and Educational Policy," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 11 (August 1967), 353-380; Terry N. Clark, "Community Structure, Decision-Making, Budget Expenditures, and Urban Renewal in 51 American Communities," American Sociological Review, 33 (August 1968), 585-587; Louis A. Froman, "An Analysis of Public Policies in Cities," Journal of Politics, 29 (February 1967), 94-108; Heinz Eulau and Robert Eyestone, "Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy Outcomes: A Developmental Approach," American Political Science Review, 62 (March 1968), 124-143; Brett W. Hawkins and Thomas R. Dye, "Metropolitan Fragmentation: A Reasearch Note," Midwest Review of Public Administration, (February 1970), 17-24; Raymond E. Wolfinger and John Osgood Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," American Political Science Review, 60 (June 1966), 306-326.

[18]Because the distribution of school desegregation is rather skewed by such extreme cases as Pasadena, Pontiac, Berkeley, and Wichita, a logarithmic transformation to the base 10 (adding 1 to all cases to eliminate zeros) was performed. All further analysis of the degree of school desegregation, whether court ordered or non court ordered, will be based on the log of the variable. A logarithmic transformation preserves the rank ordering of the cases but pulls the extremely large values in toward the middle of the scale and spreads the smaller values out in comparison to the original, unlogged values of the variable. This shift toward a symmetrical distribution better fulfills assumptions that form the basis of statistical significance testing in a regression model. For an extremely clear discussion of logarithmic transformations see Edward Tufte, Data Analysis for Politics and Policy (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1974), 108-131.

[19]Although several school districts, with a majority Black student population, such as Detroit and Richmond, have been ordered by a court at one time or another to desegregate, all have won on appeal.

[20]U. S. Civil Rights Commission, vol. 1; Kirby, et al., p. 59, Crain, et al., The Politics of School Desegregation, p. 164.

[21]Thomas F. Pettigrew, "Demographic Correlates of Border-State Desegregation," American Sociological Review, 22 (December 1957), 683-689.

[22]Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations (New York: Capricorn Books, 1967), p. 177.

[23]There has been some discussion over what ratio of Blacks to whites can be considered stable, and not likely to result in white flight and eventual resegregation. Rossell and Crain estimate the "tipping point" to be around 30 percent, although this appears to be a conservative estimate for most districts. Rossell and Crain, Evaluating School Desegregation Plans Statistically, pp. 17-29.

[24]Dye, "Urban School Segregation," p. 157; Prothro, p. 359; Kirby, Harris and Crain, p. 59.

[25]Matthews and Prothro, p. 148; Prothro, p. 359; Dye, p. 155. (One exception to this general picture is that Dye found no relationship between the status level of the Black population and school integration.)

[26]Crain, et al., The Politics of School Desegragation, p. 230; Kirby, et al., p. 59.

[27]Andrew M. Greeley and Paul B. Sheatsley, "Attitudes Toward Racial Integration," Scientific American, 225 (December 1971), 17-18.

[28]Dye, p. 156; A recent analysis by James J. Vanecko and Jennie Kronenfeld, "Preferences for Public Expenditures and Ethno-Racial Group Membership: A Test of the Theory of Political Ethos," (unpublished paper, Brown University, 1974), shows that blue collar ethnics are not necessarily "private regarding," at least as far as public expenditures are concerned. (The original thesis that they are private regarding comes from Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (New York: Vintage Books, 1963) and is refined in later articles.

[29]Kirby, et al., pp. 58-59.

[30]Banfield and Wilson, City Politics, pp. 261-262.

[31]Greeley and Sheatsley, p. 16.

[32]D. Stanley Eitzen, "Social Class, Status Inconsistency and Political Attitudes," in Political Attitudes and Public Opinion, eds. Dan D. Nimmo and Charles M. Bonjean (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1972), pp. 339-346.

[33]Hubert M. Blalock, Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1961), pp. 98-99.

[34]Robert L. Lineberry, "Approaches to the Study of Politics," in Community Politics, eds., Charles M. Bonjean, Terry N. Clark, and Robert L. Lineberry (New York: The Free Press, 1971), pp. 16-25.

[35]The construction of this attitude scale is described in detail in Kirby, et al., p. 222, under the heading School Board Liberalism--Conservatism Scale. The scale is computed from an attitudinal questionnaire administered to four members of the 1968 school board in each city. The data is still useful for this study because the 1968 school board members were on the board for most of that period 1968-71. Very few school districts desegregated before 1968.

[36]Although community income level and Black educational level were related to the board's racial liberalism, none of the various measures of community educational level were. It is not uncommon to find income and education relating to variables in different ways. See Howard Hamilton, "Voting Behavior in Open Housing Referendum," in Political Attitudes and Public Opinion, eds. Dan D. Nimmo and Charles M. Bonjean (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1972), pp. 515-529.

[37]School boards are generally predominantly white, even in predominantly Black school districts. This has usually been attributed to the fact that most school boards are elected at-large, and at-large elections tend to favor white, middle class candidates. However, the 1971 New York City and 1970 Detroit school board elections produced white dominated school boards even in districts with overwhelmingly minority group student populations. George R. LaNoue and Bruce L. R. Smith, The Politics of School Decentralization (Lexington, Mass: D. C. Heath, 1973) p. 188. Appointed school boards also tend to be predominantly white, although they have a higher minority group representation than elected boards.

[38]Political environmental variables -- the nature of elections, the size of electoral units, the characteristics of the selection of the chief executive and similar factors -- are only very weakly related to school desegregation policy and drop out of any equation with political process variables in it.

[39]The average level of general civil rights activity was obtained from interviews with two civil rights leaders in each city. It is an average of all types of protests, demonstrations, and sit-ins conducted by the civil rights movement during the period 1961-1966.

[40]The data for the "level of trust" was obtained from six informants in each city and includes subjective evaluations of relationships, school board reactions, civil rights movement reactions to school board response, and evaluations of the seriousness of negotiations. A detailed explanation of its construction can be found in Kirby, et al., p. 220.

[41]The variable includes school board public support for referenda, informal consultations with state legislators, formal presentations to state legislators, and consultations with the mayor.

[42]The variable "court ordered" is a measure of the presence of desegregation under court order with 1 = court ordered desegregation and 0 = all other cases. Thus the variable is a measure of both the likelihood of a court order and the likelihood that it will be obeyed.

[43]The fact that the other political variables were reduced to zero does not, however, mean that they necessarily have no effect. They may be simply intervening variables which are totally explained by the socioeconomic variables entered into the equations. Multiple regression equations of this type tend to be conservative since they underestimate effects. This is why two equations were run for each dependent variable.

[44]Matthews and Prothro, p. 152: Prothro, p. 362; Dye, "Urban School Segregation," p. 160; Kirby, et al., pp. 237-239.

[45]By sampling standards and criteria for degrees of freedom needed to use multiple regression analysis, nine is a small N. It represents, nevertheless, almost the universe of court ordered school desegregation in the North. Therefore, the zero order correlations can be considered reliable indicators of relationships found in the North up through the 1971-72 school year.

[46]Crain, et al., The Politics of School Desegregation, p. 171; Kirby, et al., pp. 90-91.

[47]It is not within the scope of this paper to continue the extensive debate over the pros and cons of techniques used to uncover community power structure. Wolfinger has criticized the reputational technique on the grounds that it assumes that appearance and reality are equivalent. He argues that there is no way to validate the respondents' opinions of who has influence. Raymond Wolfinger, "Reputation and Reality in the Study of Community Power," American Sociological Review, 25 (October, 1960), 636-644. In response to these criticisms D'Antonio and Erickson found the reputational technique to be valid over time, and to be related to the actual influence of power. William V. D'Antonio and Eugene C. Erickson, "The Reputational Technique as a Measure of Community Power: An Evaluation Based on Comparative and Longitudinal Studies," American Sociological Review, 27 (June 1962) 362-76. In comparing different techniques of determining community power structure, French found that using the reputational method alone located the key participants in every issue. He thus concluded that the reputational technique did not distort reality. Robert M. French, "Effectiveness of the Various Techniques Employed in the Study of Community Power," The Journal of Politics, 31 (August 1969), 818-820.

[48]Robert L. Crain, Laura L. Morlock, and James J. Vanecko, "The Influence of Reputational, Positional, and Decisional Elites in Northern

Cities," (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, September 1969).

[49]Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); Crain, Morlock, and Vanecko, "The Influence of Reputational, Positional, and Decisional Elites in Northern Cities"; Amos Hawley, "Community Power and Urban Renewal Success," American Journal of Sociology, 68 (January 1968), 422-431; Crain, Katz, and Rosenthal, The Politics of Community Conflict, p. 215; Crain, et al., The Politics of School Desegregation, p. 230; Kirby, et al., p. 121.

[50]Terry N. Clark, "Community Structure, Decision-Making, Budget Expenditures, and Urban Renewal in 41 American Communities," American Sociological Review, 33 (August 1968), 587-591.

[51]Edna Bonacich and Robert Goodman, Deadlock in School Desegregation (New York: Praeger, 1972); Crain, et al., The Politics of School Desegregation.

[52]Michael Lipsky, "Protest as a Political Resource," The American Political Science Review, 62(December 1968), 1146; Crain, et al., The Politics of School Desegregation, pp. 153-159; Kirby, et al., pp. 74-77.

[53]The variable used in this study, updated from that used by Kirby, et al., consists of the number and duration of sitins, demonstrations, and boycotts that occurred during and after major demands for school desegregation and the intensity of public support for the action which attracted the largest number of people.

[54]Eisenger's findings generally agree with ours. He found that black protest (of which the largest component was school directed) occurred more frequently in cities with a small white collar work force (a low ratio of managers, proprietors, and officials in the civilian labor force). Eisenger, p. 19.

[55]Crain, et al., The Politics of School Desegregation.

[56]Kirby, et al., p.87.

[57]William Gamson, Power and Discontent, (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1968).

[5]The study is Christine H. Rossell, "The Electoral Impact of School Desegregation in 67 Northern School Districts", (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern California, 1974). (Two cities were later added to the analysis.) School desegregation data for 90 cities can be found in Chapter 12, by Rossell, in Kirby, Harris, and Crain, (1973).

[12]Racial composition data was obtained from the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Directory of Public Elementary and Secondary Schools in Selected Districts, Fall 1970, Enrollment and Staff by Racial/Ethnic Group, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971). There are also volumes for Fall 1967, Fall 1968, and Fall 1972. Data for desegregation claimed in earlier years was obtained from published records of the school districts themselves. A more detailed explanation of the computation of this measure can be found in Christine H. Rossell and Robert L. Crain, Evaluating School Desegregation Plans Statistically (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Center for Metropolitan Planning & Research, 1973), pp. 4-11.