DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 099 935 CS 500 930

AUTHOR	Barrett, Harold, Ed.; Loebs, Bruce D., Ed.
TITLE	Conference in Rhetorical Criticism: Address of the Conference and Outstanding Papers; Annual Conference (1st, Hayward, Calif., May 1966).
INSTITUTION	California State Coll., Hayward. Dept. of Speech and Drama.
PUB DATE	66
NOTE	31p.
EDRS PRICE	MF-$0.75 HC-$1.85 PLUS POSTAGE
DESCRIPTORS	*Communication (Thought Transfer); Debate; *Persuasive Discourse; Rhetoric; *Rhetorical Criticism; Speech Education; Speeches
IDENTIFIERS	Black (Edwin); Gladstone (William); Roosevelt (Theodore); Sutro (Adolph); Webster (Daniel)

ABSTRACT

At the first annual Cal-State Hayward Conference in Rhetorical Criticism, upper division and graduate students from 12 colleges and universities presented papers on the theory, history, and criticism of rhetoric. A panel of faculty members, serving as editor-critics, judged the five papers in this volume as outstanding. The titles and authors of these papers are "Black = Without Light?" by Ronald Douglas Gordon, "An Analysis of the Archetypal-Thematic Metaphor in Webster's 'Seventh of March Address'" by Roger W. Hite, "Adolph Sutro and the Comstock Tunnel" by Dorothy M. Mansfield, "The Rake and the Crown" by Stephen L. Mock, and "Gladstone's 'Address at Edinburgh'" by V. Jackson Smith. The conference address by Dr. Kenneth G. Hance, "What is a Rhetorical Critic?" is also included in the volume. (TO)

CONFERENCE IN RHETORICAL CRITICISM

Address of the Conference and Outstanding Papers

Harold Barrett, Editor

Bruce D. Loebs, Assistant Editor

California State College at Hayward, 1966

Cover Design

by

Ivan Hess

—Foreword—

Recognizing the usefulness of scholarly exchange to those professors of rhetoric and public address who participate in regional and national meetings, and sensing the value of extending this kind of experience to selected advanced students through association with established scholars, California State College at Hayward held the first annual Conference in Rhetorical Criticism on May 14, 1966.

The Speech-Drama Department, in cooperation with the Creative Arts Division Council, invited colleges and universities to send one or two students of upper-division or first-year graduate standing to read an original paper on any topic in the history, theory, or criticism of public address. The Department received final entries from seventeen students, representing twelve institutions.

Students read their papers in four sections to a panel of three editor-critics and a chairman--the participating professors of rhetoric and public address. The editor-critics criticized the work and deliberated to select papers deserving commendation. The five student papers in this volume are those judged outstanding by the editor-critics.

The Conference was privileged to have Professor Kenneth G. Hance of Michigan State University, then visiting professor at California State College at Los Angeles, as main speaker at the evening banquet, climaxing the day's events. His speech, "What is a Rhetorical Critic?", is reproduced in this journal, altered slightly to conform to requirements of the written mode. The only substantive change in the text is the deletion of a large portion of the introductory remarks.

The Conference is deeply indebted to Professor Hance for this major contribution to the success of the event.

To Professor Karl F. Robinson the Conference extends appreciation for his advice in numerous important areas.

Finally, the Conference wishes to recognize Professor Robert O. Hall, Head, Division of Learning Resources, California State College at Hayward, for his stimulating ideas and personal resolve--both of which were essential to the publication of this journal.

Harold Barrett, Editor

Bruce D. Loebs, Assistant Editor

Student Participants

Patricia Bilbrey, University of the Pacific, "A Modern Forum for Deliberative Oratory"

Evan Blythin, San Diego State College, "An Investigation of Sources Relating to Catiline's Speech to His Soldiers"

Minnette Gersh, San Fernando Valley State College, "Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Party--1912"

Ronald Douglas Gordon, San Jose State College, "Black - Without Light?"

Will Hawes, Pepperdine College, "An Ethico-Imperative Analysis of the Seventh of March Speech (1850) of Daniel Webster"

Roger Hite, California State College at Hayward, "An Analysis of the Archetypal-Thematic Metaphor in Webster's Seventh of March Address"

Robert Ivie, California State College at Hayward, "Judge /Jeremiah S./ Black's Powers of Persuasion"

Gayle R. Lain, University of Wyoming, "An Analysis of Ethos in the Public Speaking of Sitting Bull"

Irma L. Letson, California State College at Los Angeles, "Textual Problems and the 'Sermon on the Mount' "

Dorothy M. Mansfield, San Fernando Valley State College, "Adolph Sutro and the Comstock Tunnel"

James L. Marchello, San Jose State College, "JFK Speaks Out in Crisis: A Rhetorical Analysis"

Steve Mock, University of California at Davis, "The Rake and the Crown"

Elizabeth Silliman, Sacramento State College, "An Examination of the Logical Proof in a Speech Delivered by Millicent Garrett Fawcett in Bristol, England, 1871, Entitled, 'Why Women Require the Franchise' "

V. Jackson Smith, Sacramento State College, "Gladstone's 'Address at Edinburgh' "

Lorin H. Soderwall, California State College at Los Angeles, "Invention and Disposition in Harry Emerson Fosdick's 'Shall the Fundamentalists Win?' "

Student Participants (continued)

Larry Wachter, Washington State University, "Henry, Lord Brougham as a Speaker"

Carroll Wood, Chico State College, "David Lloyd George: 'A Scrap of Paper' "

Faculty Participants

Editor-Critics

Milton Dobkin, Humboldt State College
Phil Dolph, San Jose State College
Donald Duns, University of the Pacific
Robert N. Hall, University of Wyoming
Kenneth G. Hance, California State College at Los Angeles
Paul Huber, Sacramento State College
Warren S. Jones, Pepperdine College
Mary McEdwards, San Fernando Valley State College
Robert C. Martin, California State College at Hayward
Jack Mills, San Diego State College
G. P. Mohrmann, University of California, Davis
Richard W. Platt, Chico State College
Karl F. Robinson, California State College at Hayward

Section Chairmen

George Dell, San Francisco State College
Ernest E. Ettlich, Washington State University
Bruce Loebs, California State College at Hayward
Brenda Robinson, California State College at Hayward

Director of the Conference

Harold Barrett, California State College at Hayward

Schedule of Events

1:00 Briefing

1:30 Presentation of Papers in Sections

Presentation -- approximately one hour

Criticism -- approximately one hour

Decision for Publication

4:00 Presentation to the Conference of Papers Selected for Publication

7:30 Dinner -- College Dining Room

Remarks: Dr. Karl F. Robinson, California State College at Hayward

Introducing the Speaker: Dr. Robert C. Martin, Chairman, Department of Speech and Drama, California State College at Hayward

Speaker: Dr. Kenneth G. Hance, Michigan State University and California State College at Los Angeles

"What is a Rhetorical Critic?"

—CONTENTS—

ADDRESS OF THE CONFERENCE

WHAT IS A RHETORICAL CRITIC?

by

Kenneth G. Hance, Michigan State University

The former Dean of our College of Communication Arts is a man who has a Ph.D. in the behavioral sciences and a master's degree in journalism--granted, not a speech man--but a man who is deeply involved in communication and is a brilliant man. At a meeting of our college faculty four or five years ago, he had made a plea for a favorable vote upon a proposal. He lost by two votes; yet, believing in the democratic process, he accepted this completely. But as he and I walked out of that room together, he said--not facetiously at all--"I believe that I should have done a bit more homework. I should have prepared a better speech on behalf of my proposal, because perhaps if I had done so (had given a better speech), my proposal might have won."

While we could stack that up on the shelf without making any comment, let me just ask you this question: Was this man correct in assessing the goodness or inadequacy of his speech in terms of outcome? If he had prepared "a better speech"--whatever it might have been--would he have received the majority of the votes? Or conversely, did he fail to get the majority of the votes because of inadequacies in that speech? Now there is a basic question for us in rhetorical criticism.

One or two of you have heard me speak of this next anecdote, and I'll make it very brief. Last fall I walked into a meeting of the Michigan Association of Teachers of Speech--a section devoted to rhetorical criticism. What I heard was a man "debating against Governor Wallace." Governor Wallace was not there, of course. The subject was a rhetorical critique of Governor Wallace's speech on a certain occasion; yet this man sounded to me as though he were debating against Governor Wallace. He said, in effect, "Governor Wallace's assumption here is invalid. His reasoning from that was incorrect. Governor Wallace was wrong." This man was a rhetorical critic, in his mind, and according to the program. Was he actually a rhetorical critic? Ask yourselves, fellow teachers, whether your role, when a student has finished a speech, is to make judgments from your point of view concerning the correctness or the incorrectness of that student's thesis? All of this leads to twelve quick questions, and I'm not going to use these as a basis or framework of these remarks.

First, does the rhetorical critic judge in terms of results or outcome? And if so, to what extent, and in what context?

Question two: Does he judge in terms of what he regards as the truth of the thesis and supporting materials of the speech which he is evaluating, if it is a particular speech or a speaker? If he does, then, to what extent?

Number three: Does he judge solely in terms of his evaluation of the speaker as a human being--what McBurney and Wrage in The Art of Good Speech and Guide to Good Speech refer to as the "ethical approach?" If so, why and to what extent?

Number four: Is the rhetorical critic concerned with what we would call the goodness, in contrast to the inadequacy or the badness, of a "rhetorical effort"?

Is he concerned with effectiveness--that's number five--with results, with outcome?

If so--number six--how does, or can, he distinguish between goodness and effectiveness? Are they the same? Are they completely different? Are they interrelated? Is a "good speech" necessarily an effective speech? Is an effective speech necessarily a good speech? Let's "try those questions on for size" for a moment. How would you answer them? A rhetorical critic must do so.

Number seven: Does the rhetorical critic describe what happened, what went on? Does he tell you, in other words, what the speaker said, what his supporting material was, and so on? Perhaps you say "of course." All right, there's a question. If so, (number eight) is that all that he does? In other words, is rhetorical criticism merely a description of the work of a speaker? Some of you may say, "Of course not." Some may say, "Yes, it may be."

I'll follow with this. Number nine: Does he evaluate--criticize, we might say? If so, and this is very important, (number ten) on what basis? What are the norms or criteria of assessing goodness? If so, (number eleven) is this all that he does?

And, number twelve: How much does he think needs to be done in connection with a given project in rhetorical criticism?

I could add to the twelfth, a thirteenth question: If he, at a given time, decides to do less than a complete study (that is a descriptive and not an evaluative word), what does he say or do to let the listener or the reader know that he knows what a complete study is, and by the same token, knows what he's doing?

I imagine if I were to stop here now and we were to engage in a discussion of these questions, we probably would not have unanimity. I would be very much surprised if we did. In fact, it might be tragic if we were to have unanimity of response.

In view of that, perhaps I shouldn't attempt to answer the questions at all, because while I do have an answer that is personally satisfying, it might be but one answer from one person. And there might be two or three or four other answers that might be better. In any event, in attempting to discharge my responsibility here, I'd like very briefly to try to do three things: (1) To set forth in general terms what I consider to be the role of the rhetorical critic--his functions, some principles, and methods. You say, "How can you be brief at that?" But I said first, "in general terms." You'd be amazed at the next in view of "briefly": (2) To set forth more specifically at least the more important principles and methods, as I see them, related to "complete criticism," and this necessarily will be very sketchy, schematic, and largely assertive. And finally, (3) very briefly, to set forth at least the more important criteria by which we can measure the competence of a rhetorical critic.

I'm sure some of you are saying, "You are attempting to do not only all that Thonssen and Baird try to do in four hundred and fifty pages," and that's ridiculous at this time of night--it would be any time, perhaps. But I assure you folks I can see the clock there; and I'll make this brief, even though it will necessarily be assertive; and that is perhaps unfortunate in view of the controversial nature of perhaps every one of these questions. In any event, "Here is where I stand," not defiantly, but in terms of my present knowledge.

In very general terms, what is the role of the rhetorical critic? Well, that raises the question, what do we mean by "rhetorical criticism"? I shall be so bold as to put it in this sentence: Rhetorical criticism may be defined, in my judgment, as the application of principles of rhetoric to speaking for purposes of description, analysis, interpretation, and evaluation. "Description" means an attempt to get at this kind of question: what happened, what was said, what went on? "Analysis": why did this happen--trying to find reasons. "Interpretation": what is the meaning of what happened--what trends, tendencies, categories, and so forth, do we find there? Someone says, for example, "He spoke impromptu." That is not a descriptive statement; it is an interpretative statement. A descriptive statement might suggest something that anyone could, as it were, photograph, hear, and see. When we align that with what we think of, we know of, as the impromptu method, then we're making an interpretative statement. When we say that this man used inductive reasoning, that is an interpretative statement. We can say he presented this instance; and from those two he made a statement which he called a generalization. We, then, as interpreters, would say, "He used the inductive method." The fourth process is that of "evaluation": how good is that which happened?

Secondly, under the general heading of the role of the critic, I would ask: what about his basic philosophy and approach? Assertively, and I realize it is that, I would make the following four statements. In my judgment, the proper approach is not the "results approach," not the measurement of goodness especially on the basis of outcome. I might say, furthermore, that if you back up to interpretation, evaluation, and description, you're not going to say very much if you stick by the "results approach," as the word suggests, or even as we might define it: that approach which describes, analyzes, interprets, and evaluates in terms of outcome. Because, if all you're interested in is outcome, you're not interested in what we commonly refer to as--and I'll use labels--inventional, arrangement, stylistic, and delivery matters. You're concerned only with what happened. Some of you say, "Well, that's ridiculous." Yes, it may be ridiculous; but if you think of the "results approach"--that was a good speech because he got what he asked for--then all you're interested in is what he asked for and what the results were.

Second, I do not agree with what I call the "truth approach." To assess a speech in terms of my concept of what is the right phrasing of the theme, the correct point of view, is ridiculous. But, some of our friends--some persons--make that judgment. "That speech wasn't any good."

"Why? Why?"

"Well, he 'barked up the wrong tree.' He didn't say the right things. His thesis was wrong."

"That speech of Johnson's wasn't any good."

"Why not?"

"Why?! The policy in Vietnam can't be defended, a and he was trying to defend it. Of course no speech that would do that would be any good."

"Ridiculous," you might say; but it might be interesting to ask yourselves whether or not you haven't done it. You've heard people do it. Footnote: One of the finest articles I know of in the Quarterly Journal is entitled "On the MacArthur Speech"--that famous "old soldiers never die" speech. The person who wrote the article, Dr. Karl Wallace of Illinois, reports response from a variety of sources in the halls of Congress very shortly after that speech was delivered. In response to the question: "What did you think of the speech?" persons said the following:

"Terrible."

"Why?"

"I think Truman's right; MacArthur's wrong."

"What did you think of the speech?"

"Wonderful! There wasn't a dry eye in the house--what an emotional appeal!"

"Why?"

"The people just responded tremendously." And so, on and so on.

Incidentally, what do those responses indicate? That some judged on the basis of truth. Some judged on the basis of results. Wallace points out that now and then a person said it was a good speech--or a bad one, as the case may be--because MacArthur did or didn't do certain things. Here we're approaching what I think of as rhetorical criticism.

I disagree, also, with the so-cal'ed "ethos approach." I think, personally, to judge the quality, the caliber, of a speech in terms of purely the ethos of the speaker, or conversely, to assume that a person whom you regard highly as a person will automatically prepare and present a good speech is an erroneous point of view.

What then, number four, is the proper philosophy and approach? From my point of view it is what we may call the methods, the artistic, the procedural.

What about scope in general methodology? Because speaking cannot well be studied apart from the circumstances of the event, rhetorical criticism, I believe, should be concerned with more than the verbal message, or the composition, or with delivery. Rather--and this sounds like coals to Newcastel, I know--rather, it should be concerned with all of the factors which impinge: speaker, general background, specific background or setting, preparation--all elements of the composition, delivery, and interaction or response. And may I underscore the "and." If I may say so, I think one of the errors or fallacies in the thinking of a number of persons in our field is the fact that what some call the "traditional approach"--some call it the "Aristotelian approach"--ignores this last point. It is message-centered, some say, and not either audience-centered or audience-related. I cannot see that. I cannot read that into Aristotle's Rhetoric or into Cicero or Quintilian or Saint Augustine. I don't see it there.

What was Aristotle doing in those many, many pages when he was talking about the kinds of government: oligarchy, democracy, autocracy? He wasn't giving us a lecture in political science, per se; he was telling us what people who live under those conditions are likely to be like so that we would have some understanding of what the people on the "receiving end" would be. Why would he talk about the characteristics of the young, the middle-aged, and the old? Not to give us a lecture, correct or incorrect, in child rearing and old-age psychology, but so that we would know the better what kinds of people are likely to be on the "receiving end." It's our task to get some answers to the question: who are these people likely to be? I wondered if old Aristotle wasn't as much audience-oriented as anybody in 1966 in the behavioral sciences. And I have no particular brief for Aristotle. But, frankly, the thought that "traditional rhetorical criticism"--whatever it is--that traditional rhetoric focuses solely upon the message--maybe upon the speaker--is a point of view that I just cannot understand. It's a point of view I hear expressed a number of times, even on our campus--not by my colleagues, I might say, in the department of speech. Perhaps they're in error, maybe I am--but at least interaction or response is, and should be, included. Complete rhetorical criticism, therefore, involves description, analysis, interpretation, and evaluation; uses the method approach; and is concerned with all elements in the situation.

What some of you are going to say is, "You mean to say, then, that this afternoon in twenty-two hundred words every person had to do that?" No, that was my reason for question number thirteen, which I might as well answer right here now. I had it a little further along the line in my outline, but I'll say it here. Any segment of rhetorical criticism, in judgment, should indicate or acknowledge the total scope; and it should be related, at least by title, to the total or whole. I know that some of my colleagues this afternoon called that to the attention, as I did, of some of you people. I'm talking here specifically about completeness. If we wish to do everything that needs to be done in rhetorical criticism, I believe these are the topics.

Very briefly--in connection with my second question--what are the necessary topics, the necessary elements or methods? Partly because of time and also manageability, I thought it might be well to focus upon just one kind of rhetorical criticism, namely that of a single speaker. You can make application and extensions, as did Dr. Robert Martin, for example, who made a study of the Lyceum in America over a period of time. He was dealing with more than one speaker, but I think that the same basic question or consideration could come in. Well, very briefly, and you say, 'Here goes the table of contents of Thonssen and Baird." Essentially so, yes.

The speaker: biographical matters, relevant details--and I say relevant. We are writing a rhetorical biography, a rhetorical sketch, and not a so-called definitive biography. We shall be concerned with the interests, the values, the basic assumptions, the way of looking at life from the point of view of this individual, as a speaker.

Number two, historical background: Again, relevant details, factors of influence upon the speaker; factors related to his themes; factors that, perhaps, were influenced by him. In other words, we put him into this time and place situation or setting, and we ask what kind of interaction went on. He was caused by

something, and he may have caused something.

Number three: the occasion and the audience - features of the occasion, features of the audience, You will recall Wichelns' essay entitled "The Literary Criticism of Oratory," a masterpiece. You may recall that Wichelns deplored the tendency of persons who regarded themselves as speech or rhetorical critics to think of the speech as the verbal message, exclusively, who while perhaps gettting a bit of the speaker "into the picture" largely studied the speech, as it were, in isolation, with little or no reference to occasion and/or audience.

"Ridicuious," you say, Well, Wichelns documents the studies. The Cambridge History of American Literature is replete with such studies that people regard as definitive and authoritative. The message is studied in isolation without reference to the occasion and the audience. Even though the papers in this conference were generally excellent, I would urge some of you to ask yourselves this question (even though you were taking a segment of rhetorical criticism, even though some of these elements we are speaking about did not necessarily have to be there, and you did not intend that they should be there): Did you have in your mind--in your mind's eye--a picture, and adequate picture, of the people who were listening to the speaker whom you were studying? When one of you said, for example, "This, and then this, and then this reinforced the speaker's argument concerning this moral view," how do you know? While it did so for me, I ask you: "How do you know? Suppose the listener were an agnostic; suppose he were an atheist, would it have done so?" It might have done just the reverse. The very fact that a person is a clergyman might mean, in the vernacular, that while for one audience he has everything "going for him"; for another audience everything might be "going against him." I think frankly, folks, that is not a strained point of view at all. Whately, you may recall, in the 1855 edition of his Elements of Rhetoric added an essay which was not in the 1828 edition. The title of that essay, which can be found at the place where he is talking about ethos, is "Some Influences of the Professions"; and Whately, there, takes the clergyman and the lawyer and the statesman and the physician, and asks such questions as these: When a person is announced as a clergyman, what are the reactions, the responses that may possibly be uttered or thought of with respect to him? When a man is announced as a lawyer, in the vernacular today, "what's going for him?" "What's going against him?" I think it is extremely important that this matter of occasion and audience be included in what we would refer to as a complete body of rhetorical criticism, or even in a more limited body if we are asking what, perhaps, happened as a result of or in relationship to, this message.

The speaker's preparation, general and specific textual problems, textual authenticity, the status of texts, are problems related to these and similar judgements. Again I ask you this question: "How sure are you concerning the authenticity of some of the texts which you used as the bases of your studies which you reported this afternoon?" And when you say that a speaker said this, and especially when you are referring to stylistic matters, and say he said it "this way and this way," I'd like to ask you the question: "How sure are you that he said it that way?" Lest you think that you are "licked before you start," I would say that it is imperative that the critic recognize what he is working with--the possibility of textual non-authenticity--and the necessity of such a phrase as this: "'The Seventh of March Speech' as we know it," "'The Seventh of March Speech' as we have it in this edition," "'The Muckrake' speech as we have it here."

If I seem to be harping on that subject, I would say that it is important and frequently overlooked. Because one of you made a study of Webster, let me illustrate from him. Dr. Glen Mills, who wrote his doctoral dissertation on Daniel Webster, has, I suppose, done more than anybody else that I know of in really ferreting out things such as what did Webster say; he investigated up in New Hampshire, at the Athenaeum, in Worcester, and elsewhere. The truth is that we do not know one single word that Daniel Webster actually said in any speech, because, as Dr. Mills reports, Daniel Webster said that if anybody caused to have a speech of his printed without his having first edited it, he was going against Webster's will. And the National Edition of Daniel Webster is what Webster said it should be--a heavily edited collection. Dr. Mills discovered a presumed text in Webster's handwriting, which he compared with the National Edition. Perhaps the best analogy I can give you is this: You're holding the book in the wings in a play, and the book is Act One, Scene Two, but out there on the stage there are lines from Act One, Scene Three, or vice versa. Some of those pages just do not collate at all. Now, I'm not saying, friends, that when one of you spoke this afternoon on some aspects of "The Seventh of March Speech" or the "Muckrake" speech of Roosevelt, you were dealing with completely untrue materials--not at all-- but let's be sure that we at least know what we're dealing with.

Quickly now, to matters of invention: lines of thought and supporting materials; matters of arrangement: organization in general and the parts of the message; matters of style: word choice and word composition; matters of delivery; and interaction or response: response during the speech, short-range after, and long-range after. And may I say that almost every single item of evidence that is related to this matter of interaction or response is different from the evidence that you will uncover and report in connection with the assessment of the goodness or the badness of the speech in terms of rhetorical principles. You'll simply go to other

material. One man, whose study and abstract I have right here is making a dual study of a speaker. He's trying to find out "how good a speaker" he was, and "how effective a speaker" he was. And for "effective," as represented by response and relationship to the man's intended purpose, Mr. Kurtz is going to bodies of material that are not in the rhetorical literature, He is going to indices of response as represented by a number of things that have to do with the responses of the audience, noting what transpired.

What are the more important criteria by which we can or should evaluate a critic?--my third point. First, criteria of scholarship--five which I shall merely state: The adequacy of his basic philosophy, approach, scope, and general method; the objectivity of reporting or describing; the adequacy of the supporting material or evidence, in other words, his research; what I call the logicality of his reasoning in analyzing and interpreting; and the adequacy of his evaluating in two senses--the criteria and also the relating of the phenomena to the criteria; second, the criteria of composition, the adequacy of the organization (because after all, we are preparing a message), the adequacy of the process of development, and the adequacy of style.

If this is too large an order, and frankly I think it is not, then perhaps we shall have to make the best of it. But, no, it isn't negative like that at all. If this is too large an order, or seems to be, then it may be that in a given instance, as in the papers in this conference, we shall, of course take a segment of the totality of rhetorical criticsm. But I would urge that in taking a segment, in doing one particular task, we let our reader know what the boundaries of "complete rhetorical criticism" are. The following paragraph demonstrates but one way of doing it:

> Thonssen and Baird approach speech criticism in terms of seven basic factors: the integrity of ideas, emotions in speech /I won't read all seven/. In addition, an adequate critique should involve a biographical study of the speaker, analysis of the times in which the speech was given, and of the particular circumstances of which the speech was a product. However, in this brief paper it is not possible to deal adequately with each of these important aspects. Therefore, this paper will treat only invention and disposition, relying upon Thonssen and Baird's standards of judgment.

Now, I think this paragraph tells us that the person who wrote this knows what complete rhetorical criticism should and might include. "I'm choosing not to do all of those things"--a sentence or two--and then the focus. Other illustrations, of course, would come to mind.

What I'm trying to suggest, in conclusion, is this--it is incumbent upon each of us who would be a rhetorical critic--would be, if you will, sophisticated in this field--to ask and answer such questions as those twelve or even the thirteenth (the matter of limitations), and at least set up for himself a satisfying and internally consistent set of answers. I think that's not too much. I think that's what, from Wichelns through Brigance through Thonssen and Baird, and others, our friends, our mentors, our leaders are trying to tell us. It's a challenging task, but a wonderful task. And I hope that everyone of you, and I'm referring to those who are my professional colleagues as well, will continue to see in the process of what we call rhetorical criticism one of the most satisfying and important areas of scholarship before us. To do any less, I think, is to sell our profession short. Also, it is to do an injustice to ourselves, as well as to the person whom we are studying.

A wonderful conference, Harold, which you and your colleagues have had. Excellent studies in rhetorical criticism that you folks have presented to us. I appreciate this opportunity of being with you.

COMMENDED PAPERS
OF THE CONFERENCE

10/7/8

BLACK = WITHOUT LIGHT ?

by

Ronald Douglas Gordon, Senior in Speech, San Jose State College

Provoked by the inadequacies of current critical procedures, Edwin Black, in Rhetorical Criticism,[1] set out not only to examine the limitations of these methods of criticism, but also to provide what he expected would be new insights, new hopes for those who are in any way involved with, or exposed to, the field of rhetoric.

The prevailing mode of criticism, according to Black, is neo-Aristotelianism.[2] Its identifying characteristics are a division of proofs into the logical, pathetic, and ethical; a use of the categories of invention, arrangement, delivery, and style; and a concern with effect.

Black perceives two types of neo-Aristotelian criticism: the pragmatic, as defined by Wichelns,[3] and the formalistic, as displayed by Parrish.[4] The latter view of criticism purports to be concerned with "quality" rather than effect. In actuality, however, both of these neo-Aristotelian procedures are essentially concerned with effect, since the formalist regards "quality" as meaning the adherence of a discourse to the rhetorical categories, categories (or canons), illustrates Black, that were established as being important by ancient rhetorical theorists because of the ability of men to verbally move or bend other men (i.e., to secure effects) by means of discourses that were later reducible to such canons.[5]

Black says that the only way the formalist can meaningfully justify a judgment of what is "rhetorically good" is by using the touchstone method, which involves defining by example the term "rhetorically good", and comparing the discourse under consideration to such touchstones. If this is done, we are told that it is then possible for the formalist to produce some valuable criticism.

But Professor Black goes on to argue that neo-Aristotelian methodology, as it is most frequently practiced, is not without shortcomings. As a matter of fact, according to Black, Aristotle did not necessarily intend the Rhetoric to be a guide for criticism.[6]

One of Black's primary contentions is that the neo-Aristotelian critic does not appraise the rhetor's objectives, he merely attempts to determine whether the rhetor achieved them or not. Black then presents John Jay Chapman's "Coatesville Address" (1912), and asserts that the neo-Aristotelian method could not deal with the speech properly.[7]

First of all, Black declares that the speech did not achieve results and, therefore, it would, according to neo-Aristotelianism, be regarded as a failure. Then, Black says, adherence to the canons would also result in a negative judgment because of the lack of structural unfoldment of the speech, the vagueness of the emotional appeals, the proof that deliverance from Evil can only come from God, the weak ethos of the speaker, and the style that was vivid, but no more so than the newspaper accounts of the event.[8]

Black apparently feels that he further solidifies his case when he declares:

> One could extend indefinitely the list of formal defects; the introduction that does not placate; the presentation of ideas embarrassing to the audience on a ceremonial occasion; the absence of a specific program or policy; the contravention of patriotic sentiments in discussing America and her people. But why go on? The speech had no immediate audience anyhow, and why bother with a soliliquy that was overheard by three people? And yet, as Edmond Wilson has commented, the speech is "strange and moving."[9]

Black proceeds to criticize the speech in his own style, in an attempt to show the true merits of the speech.

---

[1] Edwin Black, Rhetorical Criticism -- A Study in Method, (New York, 1965).

[2] See chapters II and III for Black's treatment of the subject.

[3] Herbert A. Wichelns, "The Literary Criticism of Oratory" in The Rhetorical Idiom, Essays in Rhetoric, Oratory, Language, and Drama, ed. Donald C. Bryant (Ithaca N.Y., 1958), pp. 38-39.

[4] Wayland Maxfield Parrish, "The Study of Speeches," in Parrish and Marie Hochmuth, American Speeches (New York, 1954), p. 7.

[5] Black, pp. 60-75.

[6] Although Thonssen and Baird maintain that "the theory and criticism of public address are inseparable;" Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, Speech Criticism: The Development of Standards for Rhetorical Appraisal, (New York, 1948), p. 332.

[7] Black, pp. 78-90.

[8] Ibid., pp. 82-83.

[9] Black, loc. cit.

The rather humorous element in Black's attack on neo-Aristotelianism is that he succeeds so well in illustrating the negative factors of the speech (from the frame of reference of the canons) that he never quite succeeds in establishing the speech's greatness through his own critique. For example, he writes:

> One who, having read his speech, would remain detached from the event would have to deny his responsibility for the killing, and by the very act of denial he would enter into a relationship with the event...Chapman's speech forces the auditor to percieve the event and to examine his own relationship to it; hence, the speech undermines the possibility of passive indifference.[10]

We must congratulate Black in that his prose is almost as poetic as Chapman's, but Black's comments definitely seem strained. To say that when one repels a message he is nevertheless in a relationship with it is to say very little. If we expose ourselves to the Fuller Brush Man's salestalk then we have been in a rhetorical transaction, but so what? The salesman, by knocking on the door and causing us to open it "undermined" our passive indifference, but that does not restrict the ways in which we may respond to his discourse. It is the response that is ultimately important.

Black then piles Ossa upon Pelion by describing Chapman's rhetorical skill:

> Chapman thus shapes a perception of the lynching that moderates outrage with detachment, moderates it in fact, so extensively that it is substantially transformed and becomes a reaction for which we have no precise word in English. We do not need a word so long as we have Chapman's speech, for it enables us to experience the reaction. We are his audience.[11]

We may not be able to find a word in English to describe the perception which is shaped by Chapman's speech, but there is definitely a word to apply to Black's analysis: "syrupy."

> The passage of time, therefore, can only enable the audiences to this speech to apprehend its ramifications, to explicate its complexities and absorb its overtones.[12]

Most any religious speech or value speech can be exalted in the same manner that Black has exalted Chapman's address. The critic ceases to be a critic in this type of analysis, and becomes only a speech popularizer, or a creative writer.

Black's examination of Chapman's mode of appeal appears to be a Burkeian search for the master strategy and the lesser syllistic strategies. Chapman identified with the lynchers, the bystanders, his forefathers, and all men who were not even present at the lynching. Chapman attempted to emphasize the consubstantiality of all Americans under God, so that all would ask for mercy. The speech's last sentences are an example of Chapman's emphasis on the transcendence of truth:

> 'The occasion is not small; the occasion looks back on three centuries and embraces a hemisphere. Yet the occasion is small compared to the truth it leads us to. For' this truth touches all ages and affects every soul in the world.'[13]

It is the speech's transcendant appeal through identification (although Black avoids using the term identification) that prompts Black to rate the speech highly:

> Finally, there is the strongest confirmation of all: the vision of the fullest rhetorical potentialities of the speech. Insofar as we can imagine an auditor who yields himself completely to its influence, we can see one who would be delivered from the conflict of niggling ideologies. He would be moral without being righteous, passionate without being violent. He would be a reformer of the spirit, whose domain of responsibility would extend to all men everywhere.[14]

However, might not Black's criticism come within the purview of a neo-Aristotelian criticism of the speech? It is not unthinkable that a neo-Aristotelian critic might do everything that Black has done in criticizing the speech, plus more. Such a critic would not only consider the means of persuasion available to Chapman, as has Black (referring here to Black's conclusion that the Coatesville event would elicit one of four conspicuous responses, with Chapman choosing two of these responses and amending them so that he could shape the most appropriate reaction amongst his auditors),[15] but such a critic would also consider the negative elements of the speech (its loose structure, for example) which detract from the

---

10 Black, p. 86.
11 Ibid., p. 87.
12 Black, p. 88.
13 Black, p. 82.
14 Black, p. 90.
15 Ibid., p. 85.

speech's "strange and moving" aspects. In short, whereas Black comes across as trying to "sell" the speech on the basis of its good points (its potentialities, its scope, its morality),[16] a neo-Aristotelian critic would be more attentive to all of the elements which stand out in the speech or surround the speech situation (organization, logos, ethos, style, etc.). Black, in the last paragraphs of his criticism, says:

> It is a tragic irony that the life of John Jay Chapman illustrated the very harmatia that he saw most clearly at Coatesville...It is Chapman at Coatesville who gives us the measure of his own tragedy, a tragedy wherein the anti-ideologue falls victim to ideology; the man who would transcend hate dies a hater.
>
> We can see in Chapman's later surrender to vindictiveness how triumphant was his sublimation of it at Coatesville. The tendency toward it was already a strong force in him - other aspects of his life bear this out - /underlines added/ and it held for him a terrible attraction, so that the seed of his insight and the seed of his destruction were the same seed.[17]

The neo-Aristotelian critic would give more attention to Chapman's ethos than Black has, and would not so easily separate the discourse from its rhetor, since Chapman's life indicated that he himself was not, in practice, delivered from the conflict of niggling ideologies; since his life proved that he was not, in practice, moral; since his spirit was not, in reality, reformed; and since his domain of responsibility did not, in practice, extend to all men everywhere.

If a formalistic neo-Aristotelian critic were to react negatively to Chapman's speech, it would not primarily be due to critical myopia, nor to the reasons Black has provided, but, more likely, to the inadequacies of the speech itself. A neo-Aristotelian critic would not require that the introduction of the speech placate the audience since it was a ceremonial speech intended to blame, not to praise; nor would a neo-Aristotelian critic regard the speech as being inadequate due to its lack of plan or policy, since it is a value speech, not a policy speech; nor would a formalistic neo-Aristotelian critic require that the speech receive a favorable response from its immediate auditors; nor would the critic demand more proof than Chapman gave in support of the statement that deliverance can only come from God, since Chapman's speech was a sermon, and his implicit authority was the Holy Bible, not himself. Black's attack on the neo-Aristotelian is largely an attack on a straw man.

[16] Ibid., pp. 89-90.
[17] Black, loc. cit.

While reading the early chapters of Rhetorical Criticism the reader has the impression that Black is leading up to a critical methodology that the critic might use in accomplishing his critical task, however, Black's book is without such resolution. Perhaps Black fulfills his main intention through his critique of neo-Aristotelianism, but he does not satisfy the expectant reader's anticipation. His criticism is followed by neither a clear nor an adequate alternative.

Indeed, the study of Black's speech criticism and the reading of his book lead to disappointment. The book goes not far enough; the speech criticism, too far.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE ARCHETYPAL-THEMATIC METAPHOR IN DANIEL WEBSTER'S "SEVENTH OF MARCH ADDRESS"

by

Roger W Hite, Senior in Speech, California State College at Hayward

Daniel Webster's "Seventh of March Address, 1850," regardless of its ruinous political consequences, remains today as a model to be admired and studied by students of rhetoric and public address for its use of the archetypal-thematic metaphor. Prior to examining this stylistic element, let us turn for a moment and view the speech in historical perspective.

It is doubtful that the speech could have contained any stylistic or rhetorical elements forceful enough to win from Webster's constituents approval of his endorsement of the Fugitive Slave Law. Here, rhetorical style was dwarfed by political philosophies and historical facts. Neither Webster's awesome ethical appeal nor his seemingly flawless logical reasoning could cauterize the cancerous growth in the union. The occasion, in view of the abolition movement in the North and clamorings in the South for secession, demanded compromise. Indeed, the success of Webster's dream--"Liberty and union"--depended on compromise. Yet, compromise, particularly Clay's proposal regarding the slavery issue, spelled ruin for Webster's greatest personal aspiration--the Presidency. His choice was commensurate with his legend of greatness.

For a more general discussion of the metaphor in public address it is suggested that an essay by Osburn and Ehninger appearing in Speech Monographs be consulted.[1] Their concern with the metaphor is three-fold: firstly, with defining metaphor as it pertains to rhetoric; secondly, with how an audience responds to metaphor, i.e., the psychological process of metaphorical identification and understanding; and, thirdly, the most successful types of metaphors for public address. The article also categorizes metaphor qualifiers--forces which formulate lines of association and direct how the metaphor will be understood. Although used here in a modified sense, this paper utilizes two of these qualifiers: archetypal and thematic.

Before discussing Webster's use of metaphor, we should acquaint ourselves with the meaning of the word "metaphor." "Metaphor" itself is a metaphor, meaning the "carrying across" of a term or expression from its normal usage to another.[2]

The archetypal metaphor, as suggested by Osborn and Ehninger, is the word symbol that transcends cultural meaning; it is a symbol that has attained, at least in our western culture, a traditional meaning. It is a universal symbol, a commonground figure of speech, to which all men respond similarly. Osborn and Ehninger recognize the value of adapting the archetypal metaphor to rhetoric. They state:

> The metaphorical stimuli characteristic of rhetoric frequently calls into play qualifiers of the archetypal class. Such stimuli are among the most powerful the speaker can summon, since they not only enhance the emotional impact of a speech, but identify the audience strongly with the speaker's purpose and align them against what he opposes.[3]

In discussing the text of Webster's address (undoubtedly edited by Webster prior to publication) our interest is with his usage of one of the most basic, perhaps the most "pure," archetypal metaphor--light.

To suggest how this metaphor gained its value is only conjecture. We find evidence of its development in the writings of Plato. He states: "What is the good in the realm of the intelligible is the sun in the realm of the visible..."[4] To Plato, then, light was the symbol, the metaphor, of goodness. Augustine (354-430 A.D.) followed this same line of thought. He simply took St. John's version of the gospel--"God is light and in him is no darkness at all"--and associated it with the idea of truth: "God is truth, for it is written: God is light."[5]

In a very crude manner, producers of the "Western" type movies utilize the archetypal "white" when they symbolize the virtue of a character by the color of his hat, shirt, or horse. For a humorous rendering of this idea see the essay by John Steinbeck, "How To Tell The Good Guys From Bad Guys."[6]

---

1 Michael Osborn and Douglas Ehninger, "The Metaphor In Public Address," Speech Monographs, XXIV (August, 1962), 224-234.

2 F. L. Lucas, Style (London, 1955), p. 195.

3 Osborn and Ehninger, p. 226.

4 Wylie Sypler, Art History, An Anthology of Modern Criticism (New York, 1963), p. 135.

5 Ibid., p. 136.

6 John Steinbeck, "How To Tell The Good Guys From Bad Guys," in Essays Today, (New York, 1956), pp. 52-56.

In his "Seventh of March Address" Webster selects this most archetypal of all metaphors, light, figuratively to represent his cause. Light is the brightness, the goodness, of the union. Around this basic metaphor of light Webster arranges several other symbols which associate the cause of union with goodness, heaven, and cosmos in the universe. In antithetical position to these metaphors suggesting secession--darkness, hell, and chaos. Antithetical, as used here, describes the placing of two archetypal metaphors in opposition. As we find in Webster's speech in rhetoric it is highly desirable to use the archetypal symbols in an antithetical relationship to provide an important link between logical argument and style. This structure causes the audience to gear their minds to a two-value system. If, for example, a speaker associates union with the archetypal qualifier light, an audience is conditioned to respond by interpreting those things opposed to union, secession in this case, as dark and evil.

Another important factor to consider when discussing the archetypal-thematic metaphor is the "thematic" element. When a metaphor stands alone in discourse, that is, when it is not linked to other figures of speech, it must rely on the freshness of its own image. We find an example of an isolated metaphor in Webster's appeal to his audience to make its accomplishments a "bright link" in the chain of American generations. This metaphor, it seems, fails to rise to any high level. In fact, the idea of bright links, strong links, weak links, or any kind of links in a chain is, and was, rather commonplace. Contrast this limited metaphor to the type that is extended throughout the speech in various phrases. Here, each new symbol regenerates the virtue of the speaker's case and re-establishes his metaphorical intent. Thus, as a speech continues, it is possible to strengthen an earlier "weak" metaphor through thematic extension. We will find an example of this in Webster's speech.

Osborn and Ehninger touch on the concept of the "dead" metaphor. A dead metaphor is a word symbol, a cliche, in which no gap exists between the audience's identification of the metaphor and their solution of its implications. They state that it is desirable to use a metaphor requiring an amount of conscious effort to solve. They suggest that the process of metaphor solving can actually strengthen audience identification with the speaker's cause: it "serves as a sort of internal alchemy to make of the metaphor itself an argument in its own behalf."[7] They also note, however, that the process of identification must not be too esoteric.

[7] Osborn and Ehninger, p. 231.

The successful metaphor, then, totters on a thin line between life and death. The thematic extension of the archetypal metaphor provides a way of overcoming this dilemma. As we shall see in Webster's speech, the beginning metaphor--the storm--is cliched. But what Webster does with this metaphor, the manner in which he appeals first to the archetypal, secondly to the antithetical relationship, and thirdly to the thematic extension device, demonstrates how life is breathed into a metaphor and how it becomes more vital as it is extended thematically. Consider now the metaphorical elements in Webster's "Seventh of March Address."

Webster begins by establishing the storm metaphor:

> The imprisoned winds are let loose. The East, the North, and the stormy South combine to throw the whole sea into commotion, to toss its billows to the skies, and disclose its profoundest depths.

From this base Webster proceeds by building the antithetical relationship of light and darkness, of cosmos and chaos, into his figure. He says:

> I am looking for no fragment upon which to float away from the wreck, if wreck there must be, but for the good and the preservation of all; and there is that which will keep me to my duty during this struggle, whether the sun and the stars shall appear for many days.

The metaphorical implication is one of contrast--darkness and stormy weather as opposed to calm and sunny or starry weather. Here, then, is the first evidence of the archetypal-thematic metaphor.

Intermingled with the metaphor of the storm, Webster places what we would now consider a hackeneyed figure: he equates the political world to the ocean, the country to a ship upon the ocean, the risk of shipwreck to secession, and his role in speaking for the cause of union to the helmsman. The fact that Webster implies this entire analogy through the use of synecdoche--"helm" and "wreck"--illustrates his confidence in the archetypal scheme.

Later, Webster expands and fashions his earlier metaphor. He states:

> They are apt, too, to think that nothing is good but what is perfect, and that there are no compromises or modifications to be made in considerations of differences of opinion or in deferences to other men's judgment. If their perspicacious vision enables them to

> detect a spot on the face of the sun, they think that a good reason why the sun should be struck down from heaven. They prefer the chance of running into utter darkness to living in heavenly light, if that heavenly light be not absolutely without any imperfection...

In this case we find that the sun is the metaphorical symbol for the Constitution. Notice, too, the contrast between heavenly light and utter darkness. Webster relates, as mentioned earlier, unionism to light, cosmos, and heaven. Darkness, "utter darkness," is the antithesis of light--it represents the cause of secession.

During the body of Webster's speech little metaphorical language is used. It contains primarily a logical approach to dealing with the country's sectional differences. Oliver suggests that "the basic persuasive technique Webster used was a type often highly praised; that of giving the language to one side (the South) while attempting to give the substance to the other side (the North)."[8] Underlying this method, however, flows a constant stream of disjunctive argument: either we have union or we have chaos. In the peroration, however, we once again find Webster tying into the metaphorical theme established earlier:

> Sir, he who sees these states, now revolving around a common center, and expect to see them quit their places and fly off without convulsion, may look the next hour to see the heavenly bodies run from their spheres, and jostle against each other in the realms of space, without causing the wreck of the universe.

Here, Webster scoffs at the possibility of "peaceable secession," placing it on a plane equivalent to destruction of the universe. Webster extends his basic storm metaphor and expands it thematically to include on one level the destruction of the ship of state, on another level to the loss of the sun and heavenly light, and on still a higher level, to the chaotic wrecking of an entire universe. The thematic extension of archetypal symbols elevates, considerably, Webster's cause of union.

At this point it might be justifiable to ask "Why this great concern with the archetypal-thematic metaphor?" If the end purpose of all rhetoric is, as Aristotle suggests, to persuade, how does the stylistic embellishment of the metaphor contribute to this cause? One rhetorician, upon examining the text of Webster's address, would conclude that Webster is constructing a disjunctive line of reasoning, i.e., either we have union or we have chaos. Another rhetorician, however, concentrating on the cooperation of style and reasoning, would note that Webster makes use of a particular kind of metaphor relation that actually enhances and supports this disjunctive line of reasoning. We find, then, that the antithetical relationship of the archetypal metaphors serves as the stylistic counterpart to the logical disjunctive structure. In this case, style is quite useful in supporting a logical line of reasoning.

Webster concludes on the same archetypal-thematic level:

> And now, Mr. President, instead of dwelling in those caverns of darkness, instead of groping with these ideas so full of all that is horrid and horrible, let us come out into the light of day--let us enjoy the fresh air of liberty and union.

Once again, Webster uses cavern, darkness, horrid and horrible, as the antithesis of his cause. Unionism, in keeping with the theme, allows one to be in the light of day, the fresh air of liberty.

The "Seventh of March Address" is not an isolated example of Webster's reliance on the archetypal-thematic metaphor. Earlier in his career we find evidence of this same stylistic virtue. Consider, for example, his "1820 Plymouth Address":

> I hear the sound of the hammer, I see the smoke of the furnace where the manacles and fetters are still forged for human limbs. I see the visages of those who, by stealth and at midnight, labor in this work of hell--foul and dark as may become of such instruments...

Here, Webster uses the archetypal metaphor of darkness and thematically extends it by references to smoke, midnight, foul and dark, and hell, to describe the evil of slavery.

Webster's reply to Hayne also demonstrates the use of the archetypal-thematic metaphor:

> I have not accustomed myself to hang over the precipice of disunion, to see whether, with my short sight, I can fathom the depth of the abyss below... when my eyes shall be turned to behold, for the last time, the sun in heaven, may I not see him shining on the broken and dishonored fragments

[8] Robert Oliver, History Of Public Speaking In America (Boston, 1965), p. 154.

of a once glorious union...

Webster uses the archetypal metaphor of light and thematically extends it by associating it with sun, heaven, and universal cosmos. In antithetical relation to this metaphorical theme we find the idea of darkness, hell, and chaos. Here, as in the "Seventh of March Address," style is used to support the disjunctive line of reasoning.

Three conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of Webster's address. First, the archetypal metaphor is a successful type of metaphor to use in public address as it is the most universally understood; secondly, it is possible to add new life to a dead or weak metaphor through thematic extension; and, thirdly, the antithetical relationship of archetypal metaphors enables the style of a speech to enhance and strengthen a disjunctive line of reasoning.

ADOLPH SUTRO AND THE COMSTOCK TUNNEL

by

Dorothy M. Mansfield. Graduate in Speech. San Fernando Valley State College

In 1859, California's Forty-Niners turned East, toward the silver mines of Nevada's fabulous Comstock Lode on Sun Mountain. California money, invested by men like William Ralston and his Bank of California, followed the miners. Ralston expected the tremendous returns from the Nevada silver to make San Francisco the most important city on the Pacific Coast.

When Prussian immigrant Adolph Sutro came to the Comstock, his trained engineer's mind saw immediately the waste of resources, effort, and money caused by hasty surface mining. In 1860, he proposed a tunnel, an astounding four miles long, through the mountain, to allow deeper mining and economical removal of ore. He was laughed at and called an audacious dreamer.

By 1864, William Ralston had stopped laughing at the ridiculous, unfeasible plan Sutro was still advocating, for Ralston's investments were in danger. The Comstock's largest mines had penetrated deeper into the Lode where progress was hazardous and slow in hot, gaseous air. One after another, the mines were turned into subterranean lakes by steaming floods of water.

Ralston and most of the mine operators enthusiastically endorsed the tunnel project. But when it became apparent that Sutro would profit greatly from the tunnel, thus jeopardizing the supremacy of the San Francisco investors, financial backing was suddenly withdrawn.[1]

Adolph Sutro retaliated by waging a war of words--the only fight a lone man can make against such large interests. Rhetoric was his ammunition. His concern had been for the completion of his daring engineering feat, but now Sutro's struggle expanded against those expedient interests of Raiston's group that permitted dangerous as well as wasteful mining methods on the Comstock.

Ralston's powerful influences blocked American financing for the tunnel; Sutro went to Europe, where, although unsuccessful in seeking funds, he was able to study the latest mining techniques with European experts who gave his plan unanimous endorsement.[2]

Meanwhile, Ralston fought a Congressional loan to the engineer, arguing that the tunnel was unnecessary, even if feasible. In answer, using written rhetoric, Sutro published the letters of recommendation from the European engineers and added his own statements. He distributed these to members of Congress. But this Congress, and two short sessions which followed, failed to bring the consideration to a vote.

Late in the summer of 1869, a fire in the Yellow Jacket Mine left over forty miners dead. Clearly, the disaster could have been prevented by proper ventilation and accessible escape exits--advantages offered by the Sutro Tunnel.[3] The miners were bitter toward the Ralston group; they were ready to listen when Adolph Sutro made a rousing appeal for financial and physical help directly to the men involved.

With the miners' unofficial support, the tunnel was begun, but Ralston continued to oppose the project. He managed to influence a Presidential commission against it. Sutro was sure the commission had been fooled, since it was comprised mainly of old Army engineers unfamiliar with modern techniques. In April, 1872, he demanded a Congressional hearing.

Before the Mining Committee, Sutro used his rhetorical talents in a last big effort for the tunnel. The hearings lasted for twenty-five sessions and concluded in favor of a construction loan; the Sutro Tunnel finally became a physical reality July 8, 1878.

How had Sutro accomplished the feat: What rhetorical menas had he used to persuade the miners, the Congress, the experts? At first, his objective had been to convince prospective investors that the tunnel was practicable. The emphasis in Sutro's arguments shifted when his opponent's strategy shifted. No longer were indifference and derision opposing him; he now faced open inmity as Ralston's financial ring betrayed the engineer and set out to stop him.

Sutro was forced to channel his persuasion toward the need for a tunnel. In so doing, he aligned himself with the group whose need was most immediate--no longer the investors whose concern was only for profit, but the miners who suffered from the lack of ventilation, who died from consumption brought on by the steam-ridden gases they constantly breathed, who daily faced the horror of unexpected flooding. Sutro's rhetorical versatility is evident in the three particular instances already referred to--the written appeal to Congress, the speech to the miners, and the final Congressional hearing.

---

[1] George D. Lyman, Ralston's Ring (New York, 1937), p. 71.

[2] Lyman, p. 93.

[3] Lucius Beebe and Charles Clegg, Legends of the Comstock Lode (Stanford, 1956) p. [illegible]

When he returned from Europe, Sutro had found the Ralston lobbyists arguing that the Comstock's remaining water problem could be handled satisfactorily by huge, powerful pumps and that a tunnel was unnecessary. Whenever possible, Sutro's credibility as a mining engineer was attacked.

In the publication of European recommendations, to which Sutro had added his own written appeal, he refuted Ralston's evidence with facts demonstrating the colossal cost of maintaining separate pumps, steam engines, and air compressors for each mining operation. With telling logic and analogy, Sutro paralleled the Lode situation with a busy city street. "Does each householder of the city provide his own drainage?" he asked. "Does not every street have the benefits of a common sewer? So would it be with the Sutro Tunnel."[4]

His support exemplified the advantages of the tunnel: a common outlet for water run-off; elimination of pumping costs; one common railway to transport ore to the mills; low-grade ore extraction made possible; healthy ventilation supplied to the mines.[5] And remembering that he was addressing Congressmen, Sutro added economic advantages for the larger society: stimulation of commerce; increased population; new industry; increased property values; and that greatest of all legislative appeals--lower taxes![6]

Although the proposed loan for Sutro had daily become more popular--partly due to the reverse effects of Ralston's persecution--other problems in Washington prevented a vote, and it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of Sutro's written appeal.

The most memorable rhetoric of Adolph Sutro came as he faced the embittered miners following that fiery disaster of August, 1869. Certainly his audience knew that Sutro intended to capitalize on the highly charged situation; they were ready to listen.[7] Sutro had to find some way to build upon and maintain the miners' attitudes, to direct them toward the ultimate goal of constructing the tunnel. The facts he exposed about the disreputable tactics of the Ralston machine were not new to the miners. But this was the first time those facts had been mentioned above a whisper, especially by a principal in the struggle who aligned himself with them. Sutro began: "I have come out here among you, my fellow citizens, in order to explain to you all about this tunnel business..."[8]

Almost immediately he made a startling proposal, that the miners build the tunnel themselves!

> I have come among you to propose to the working people of Nevada to join in together in order to start work on the tunnel itself, and thereby give me that solid indorsement at home, from those who live on the very spot, from the men who work in these very mines, and who are supposed to know most about it...Your solid endorsement will be valued highly at Washington! It will annihilate the efforts of that scheming combination: the California Bank.[9]

The full effect of Sutro's appeal was in the language he used. He referred to the miners as "the working people of Nevada," establishing them as an admirable class and implying that because they "live on the very spot" and "work in the very mines" they are the real experts "who are supposed to know most about it..." Sutro thus associated them positively with the tunnel construction and led them to dissociate from the desk-men of "that scheming combination" who would block the tunnel. He gave further prestige to the miners' endorsement as "solid" and "valued," stressing their power to "annihilate," to wipe out the undesirable, "scheming" efforts of the Bank.

Sutro's acknowledgement of the miners' potential might is followed by a blatant attack against "the arch-enemy," "that hydra-headed monster you have reared in your midst," "that enemy of the welfare of the whole Pacific Coast," "that crafty concern which resorts to every means to carry out its ends."[10] Almost every other word carries some derogatory value associated with his--and the miners'--opponent.

"And why," Sutro asked, "are they compelled to do all this in darkness of night? Why is it they dare not make their motives known?" And he answered: "Allow me to pierce that darkness and let in a ray of daylight...let me explain to you why they make you work in foul atmosphere

> which sends half of you to your graves in the prime of manhood...why they have allowed forty-five of your miners to be foully murdered...for the want of an exit through the tunnel...[11]

Again, there is the divorce of miners' and investors' interests in the metaphorical terms,

---

4 Lyman, p. 335.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Lyman, p. 140.
8 Ibid.
9 Lyman, p. 140.
10 Ibid., p. 141.
11 Lyman, p. 141.

"darkness" and "daylight," a distance emphasized by Sutro's blunt charge that the recent tragedy was no accident. The miners were sent to their graves, "foully murdered." Here was the kind of vivid language, the concrete, familiar details, the indignant courage appreciated by men who worked with fear. Adolph Sutro spoke not to these men, but with them, as one of them.

He then described specific intrigues on the part of the Bank and the Mill Company it controlled and the advantage taken of miners on stocks and loans. What more could the men expect? Sutro warned them:

> Have you ever seen a cat play with a mouse? It lets it run a little piece and then catches it again and repeats the experiment a number of times, to its great delight and amusement. But did you ever know it to fail that the cat ate up the mouse in the long run?[12]

Sutro's combination of specific facts, trenchant illustrations, and figurative analogies brought his audience to recognition of their position. Did they now understand why the Ralston ring had blocked the tunnel? "The tunnel," Sutro accused, "they know full well, is the key to this mountain..."[13]

He returned to his first appeal, suggesting their means for destroying the Bank was in building the tunnel, for, Sutro said, "if that tunnel is constructed by third parties [the Bank's] monopoly will be utterly broken..."[14]

Sutro built upon the miners' already tense emotions before he made his most audacious proposal--that the miners not only build the tunnel, but that they also help finance it! "Laboring men of Nevada, shake off the yoke of slavery and assert your manhood...subscribe to the tunnel stock...there lies your power."[15] Again there is the relation of positive terms with the miners--"laboring men," "manhood," "tunnel," "power;" while the "yoke of slavery" unmistakably meant Ralston's yoke.

With clever insight Sutro translated the tremendous amount needed in financial pledges from "$360,000 per annum" into "thirty-three cents a day," a more tangible sum for his audience of miners.[16]

[12] Ibid., p. 144.
[13] Lyman, p. 145.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.

Sutro's intentions were not to incite this audience to violence. He wanted the miners roused but with their action directed into the tunnel. "Rouse up...," he told them. "You have no Andrew Jackson among you to crush out the bank which has taken your liberties, but you have the power within yourselves."[17]

Over and over, Sutro had stressed that the action must come from the miners. In words similar to those used by today's Civil Rights leaders, he advised: "You can destroy your enemy by simple concert of action."[18] Sutro won the miners' financial pledge of $50,000 and their physical pledge in that "concert of action." The tunnel was begun.

Construction went on even as the Congressional hearings of 1872 were held to determine definitively the necessity of the tunnel. Acting as his own attorney, Sutro solidly established his credibility in a powerful display of his special knowledge. In the 810 pages of transcript, he achieved by questioning of commission experts a complete confirmation of all he had said and written about the tunnel in the preceding years.

Early in the closing argument, Sutro discredited Ralston by using the banker's own words against him. Reading from one of Ralston's glowing letters endorsing the tunnel, Sutro contrasted it with the banker's sudden mercenary reversal, stating:

> The Bank of California now came to the conclusion that it was a great enterprise, and, thinking we were about to get a subsidy from the United States, they set out to break it up.[19]

Sutro brought out the historical fact that there is always opposition to any kind of improvement. He used Galileo as an example when he said:

> They preached against him from the pulpit everywhere, and the argument used against his discovery was that it was impossible that there should be more than seven planets because there were no more than seven days in a week, and no more than seven openings in a man's skull. That is the kind of argument they used, and some as unreasonable have been used against many new ideas.[20]

[17] Ibid.
[18] Lyman, p. 145.
[19] Closing Argument of Adolph Sutro (Committee of Mines and Mining of the House of Representatives), (Washington, D. C., 1872), p. 8.
[20] Closing Argument, p. 77.

By implication, Sutro made the opposition to his tunnel also look unreasonable and resistant to progress. He further made Ralston's arguments appear a wasteful, time-consuming obstruction by analogizing the long, drawn-out tunnel fight with the unsuccessful opposition of the Duke of Bridgwater to England's first railroad.[21] The Congressional Committee closed the arguments with the recommendation for a $2,000,000 loan, and British banks followed with the necessary additional amounts.

Ironically, when the Sutro Tunnel was finally completed, the Comstock had passed its crest. This fact cannot detract from the evidence that Adolph Sutro, untrained in oratory, made rhetoric as indispensable a tool to his fight as picks were to the miners he helped. His struggle against the Bank of California was one of the first great fights by an individual against corporate greed and corruption.[22]

In his victory, Sutro the man, the engineer, the humanitarian, demonstrated the value of rhetoric as an instrument of responsibility.

---

[21] Ibid.

[22] George W. James, Heroes of California (Boston, 1910), p. 285.

THE RAKE AND THE CROWN

by

Stephen L. Mock, Junior in Political Science, University of California at Davis

Rhetorical critics have long accepted and utilized e three part analysis suggested by Aristotle. In is system, logical, emotional, and ethical appeal come the touchstones of evaluation; it is assumed at good speeches have these appeals and that a ader will recognize the meaning assigned by the itic. Recently, Edwin Black has called this system to question with his attack upon what he calls "neo-istotelian criticism."[1] Of course, any critical stem is only as good as the critic applying it, and is traditional system has provided many valuable alyses, so it is not the purpose here simply to ex-nd Black's argument. Yet the three part approach y be too easy to apply, because some critics thinkingly use the most superficial characteristics the basis for evaluation in finding the evidence the three categories. These same categories handi-p other critics by placing limitations on the analy-s that results in examinations that seemed cramped. erefore, the purpose in this discussion will be to nsider a slightly different approach to rhetorical iticism, using Theodore Roosevelt's "The Man with e Muck-Rake" as the subject of study.

This speech was chosen because it has given itics trouble, and the traditional approach leaves me loose ends. For example, Glenn Capp has real oblems with the speech.[2] Although he indicates at the speech ranked high in a poll of speech achers,[3] Capp has difficulty in justifying this ting with the standard method of criticism. He ates: "It is difficult to outline his speech in e-two-three order," but he then goes on to register e observation that "the speech bulks large in gical appeal."[4] This logic is not specified, and e absence of a coherent structure in Capp's analy-s at least implies the absence of a tight, logical gument in Roosevelt's speech. It appears, then, t Professor Capp is explicating the speech as he nks it should have been written.

Another critic, Richard Murphy, rejects the traditional system in his analysis of the speech, and his conclusions do not agree with Capp's.[5] Murphy finds no tight logic, claiming instead, "Roosevelt's style was one of didactic assertion, with little induction" and that his "arrangement is episodic."[6] In a general conclusion, he remarks: "Roosevelt's arrangement and style. . . are expressions of a unique personality. His composition had the episodic nature of a well-experienced, restless man, a balance of treatment characteristic of a thoughtful man."[7] But this evaluation stems from a consideration of many speeches, and although it is a very illuminating tack, it cannot be applied to a single speech act in isolation.

Additional problems can be found in almost every anthology that carries this speech text. The questions for study and varied comments suggest that there is something here that the traditional scheme does not fathom. Consequently, I want to look at the speech from a slightly different view, as I mentioned earlier, and I am going to use the method proposed by Staub and Mohrmann.[8]

If you are familiar with their approach, you know they have attempted to utilize the traditional nomenclature, but, at the same time, to avoid the compartmentalization that seems to be inherent. They base their critique on the premise that rhetoric cannot be separated from poetry and philosophy, and they claim that most critical systems, literary or rhetorical, encourage arbitrary separation. All three areas, they insist, must be considered as sisters of linguistic discourse, and distinctions between them can only be made on the appeals of ethos, pathos, and logos. Here are the traditional terms, but their application is changed. An ethos-centered communication places most emphasis upon the author--speaker or writer; the pathos-oriented work subverts the creative personality in order to concentrate upon the product; and, finally, the logos stress will appear when focus is upon the audience.

---

dwin Black, Rhetorical Criticism (New York, 1965), 36-90.

lenn R. Capp, Famous Speeches in American History, w York, 1963) pp. 134-146.

bid., p. 3.

bid., p. 137

5 Richard Murphy, "Theodore Roosevelt", History and Criticism of American Public Address, III, ed. Marie Kathryn Hochmuth (New York, 1955), pp. 313-364.

6 Ibid., p. 348.

7 Ibid., p. 355.

8 A. W. Staub and G. P. Mohrmann, "Rhetoric and Poetic: A New Critique," Southern Speech Journal, XXVIII (Winter, 1962), 131-141.

In most instances, this method yields an analysis of linguistic discourse that is not far different from accepted notions. The system is built upon the relationship between author, materials, and audience, and when applied, the stress of ethos is strongest in rhetoric, that of pathos in poetic, and that of logos in philosophy. Of course, most linguistic acts fit neatly into these compartments, but that is the advantage of the system. It recognizes stress or emphasis rather than differences that are essential, and this makes for a system of fluid analytical devices. As part of their discussion, Staub and Mohrmann consider Lincoln's "Gettysburg Address," Kilmer's "Trees," and some nineteenth century poetry.[9] The results suggest that the approach has some validity, and I think that it can shed light upon "The Man with the Muck-Rake."

The method reveals, as could be expected, that there is ethical stress in the speech, but this appeal is not dominant. Roosevelt relies upon little direct personal appeal. Nothing in the speech would compare, for example, with President Johnson's personal lessons learned down on the Pedernales. The personal "I" and "we" are present, but these usages are limited, and Roosevelt does not try to make a strong impression as a personality. Certainly, at the time of the speech, the fact that he was President was important, and he does give a rough outline for proposed legislation dealing with a progressive income tax, federal regulation of interstate corporations, and railway rate scales. And as Murphy points out, a comparison with other speeches can give information about the creative personality, but there is little in this speech itself or in the style that presses hard on ethos. Rather, the oration seems predominantly pathos-stressed; that is, Roosevelt's main concern is with an emphasis upon the subject matter.

The speech can be divided into two sections: the first eleven paragraphs chastise the "muck-rakers" for producing sensationalism while ignoring "the forces of truth and love and courage and honesty and generosity and sympathy;" the second movement is made up of the last eleven paragraphs and deals with good and evil in a more generalized fashion. Two central images govern the entire structure: on the one hand, the muck-rake, symbolizing evil and corruption; on the other, the "Celestial Crown," representing all that is good. These symbols dominate, and although a discussion of good and evil builds some ethical stress, the general treatment pushes toward the product.

Roosevelt focuses more and more on the crown as the speech develops. Each time he mentions or even alludes to it, it grows more attractive and more important, gradually supplanting the muck-rake as the central theme. This parallels, and is a part of, the increasing emphasis in the speech on the positive good that should be sought in life. The crown is clearly present early in the speech, and after a reference to the muck-rake, Roosevelt immediately counters by describing "the celestial crown. . . the crown of worthy endeavor." In the second movement, the more generalized attack on good and evil, the image and symbolism of the crown is there when Roosevelt asserts:

> More important than aught else is the development of the broadest sympathy of man for man. The welfare of the wage-worker, the welfare of the tiller of the soil--upon this depends the welfare of the entire country; their good is not to be sought in pulling down others [one might parenthetically add 'into the muck']; but their good must be the prime object of all our statesmanship.

The presence of the crown is important in creating a religious mood that binds the speech together, and this mood is re-enforced in several ways. Roosevelt repeatedly asserts sweeping moral judgments, and many of the phrases sound as if they had been copied verbatim from a handbook of commonplaces. He lectures: "It is vital not to permit this spirit of sanity and self-command to degenerate into mere mental stagnation," and remarks later: "Violent emotionalism leads to exhaustion." And he concludes his speech on this moral note; "Spiritually and ethically we must strive to bring about clean living and right thinking."

Intensifying the religious mood are the very quotations that Roosevelt cites, all of which have Christian origins. Of course, the symbol of the muck-rake is taken from Bunyan's Puritan epic, Pilgrim's Progress, and there is a quotation from Ecclesiastical Polity by Bishop Hooker. Yet the clearest reference is made when Roosevelt recites the eighth Commandment. These three quotations establish the moral didacticism of the address beyond a doubt.

For the immediate audience, the moral emphasis may well have reflected upon the President's character and contributed to ethical stress. But even then, and certainly today, the primary stress is the struggle between good and evil; the pressure falls upon the product and a pathetic emphasis. Logos is also present in the appeal that Roosevelt's commonplaces have as accepted truisms, but the focus still centers on the moral struggle.

The lines of investigation I have employed could be extended, and the discussion could be extended, but even this brief examination suggests that the method helps us to understand "The Man with the Muck

---

[9] Ibid., pp. 136-138; and G. P. Mohrmann and A. W. Staub, "Rhetoric and Poetic: A New Critique Applied--I," Southern Speech Journal, XXX (Fall, 1964), pp. 36-45.

Rake." The speech is unusual, because the speaker structures it around an appeal of pathos, with only a secondary appeal to the ethos of rhetoric. This stress on pathos is the very characteristic that gives the speech a timeless and immediate quality even today. The income tax, railway rates, and the muck-rakers have lost the impact of controversial topics; nevertheless, the plea for appreciation of the good in life is as meaningful in 1966 as it ever was. We will continue to study "The Man with the Muck-Rake," and we should, but we will find few of the traditional rhetorical values present. Instead, we will find an effective speech, effective because Roosevelt stressed the subject matter rather than himself, effective because he presented a lasting pathetic appeal rather than a purely personal statement.

AN EXAMINATION OF WILLIAM EWART GLADSTONE'S "ADDRESS AT EDINBURGH"

by

V. Jackson Smith, Graduate in Speech, Sacramento State College

In November of 1879, William Ewart Gladstone, "ignoring the offer of a safe seat in Leeds," chose, instead, to campaign in Midlothian against the administration of Lord Beaconsfield.[1] By taking the issues directly to the people, Gladstone revolutionized political campaigning in Britain. Hammond and Foot record that, "up to this time speeches in the country had only been made, as a rule, by sitting members during Parliament's recesses and were little regarded by public opinion or the press." In two weeks, they add, "Gladstone ended this system for good by his series of addresses to the Scottish electors."[2] Every word that he spoke was reported, and the effect outside Midlothian was tremendous. The effect inside Midlothian was "electrical,"[3] in that it sparked a spirited interest in the election issues among the residents.

One of Gladstone's appearances, during this campaign, was at the Music Hall in Edinburgh, on November 25, 1879. It is the purpose of this paper to examine Gladstone's address to the Scottish electors at Edinburgh, and to briefly note its purpose, arrangement, types of ethical, emotional, and logical proof, style, and the effect of the speech.

The purpose of this address, and the whole Midlothian campaign, was to attack the administration and to displace Disraeli as Prime Minister. Gladstone was particularly displeased with the direction that British foreign policy was taking in 1879. He was "a great lover of peace and he disliked attempts to extend the empire because this often led to war."[4] He was convinced that Disraeli's continuing extension of the British Empire and Britain's involvement in the Eastern Question--Russia's persistent threat to Turkey--would lead to disaster. His fears prompted this "grassroots" campaign in Midlothian.

The structure of Gladstone's address in Edinburgh is generally based on an effect-cause relationship, but these relationships are encased in an over-all problem-solution format. To paraphrase succinctly, Gladstone said "We have bad government, these are the effects, let's trace them back to the cause--now here's what can be done about it!" The internal arrangement of the speech is topical. Gladstone discussed the budget, the failure of the administration to call an election, the Eastern Question, Afghanistan, and other issues, one at a time. He also traced the chronology of certain events within a subject area; particularly during the discussion of the Eastern Question:

> In the spring of 1876. . . .[5]
> On the 31st of July 1876. . . .

Occasionally, Gladstone digressed, briefly, but his transitions were unmistakable:

> And now I hope I have spoken intelligibly upon that subject, and I will pass on to another which is far less agreeable.
>
> I have now got as far as the Anglo-Turkish Convention. What is next? The next is Afghanistan.

Gladstone utilized ethical proof early in this address. He implied gratitude and appreciation in the second sentence of the speech by referring to the audience as "the spontaneous and gracious offeres to me of a trust which I deem it a high duty under these circumstances to seek, and which I shall deem it the highest honour to receive." He displayed courtesy and good manners in the statement, "I will begin this campaign, if so it is to be called. . by avowing my personal respect for my noble opponent and for the distinguished family to which he belongs." He dispensed with his qualifications in one sentence: ". . . I speak after the experience of a lifetime, of which a fair portion has been spent in office. . ." He had, in fact, already served as Prime Minister for a six-year period, and had been in Parliament for forty-six years.

But perhaps the most obvious example of ethical proof in this address is in the following:

> What we are disputing about is a whole system of Government, and to make good that proposition that it is a whole system of Government will be my great object in any addresses that I may deliver in this country. If it is acceptable, if it is liked by the people--they are the masters--it is for them to have it. It is not particularly pleasant for any

---

[1] John Lawrence Hammond and M. R. D. Foot, Gladstone and Liberalism, 1953, p. 131.
[2] Ibid
[3] Ibid
[4] C. E. Carrington and J. Hampden Jackson, A History of England, Cambridge, 1954, p. 676.
[5] British Orations from Ethelbert to Churchill (London, 1960), pp. 298-324.

> man, I suppose, to spend the closing years of his life in vain and unavailing protest; but as long as he thinks his protest may avail, as long as he feels that the people have not had their fair chance and opportunity, it is duty to protest, and it is to perform that duty, gentlemen, that I am come here.

The speaker displayed determination, humility, conviction, and a sense of responsibility in these lines. Many other examples of ethical proof are evident in the text of this address.

There are also numerous examples of the use of emotional proof in this address. Gladstone appealed to the national pride of his listeners and apparently hoped to arouse indignation, suspicion, and apprehension within them. He frequently used emotionally charged words and phrases, imagery, the "bandwagon technique," satire, and challenge, to produce the desired emotional effect. Such statements as the following must have been calculated to arouse indignation in the Midlothians:

> I am grieved to find that...mistrusting the body to whom the constitution and the law had given the power of choice between candidates for Midlothian, an attempt has been made to import into the country a body of strangers, having no natural interest in the country,...to realise some faint hope of overbearing the true majority of the constituency.
>
> .....
>
> If faith has been broken, if blood has been needlessly shed, if the name of England has been discredited and lowered from that lofty standard which it ought to exhibit to the whole world...all these things are the work of an Administration and a Parliament.

Suspicion and distrust of the party in power must have been further aroused by these remarks:

> ...they would not break away without some reason--an illegitimate reason...one connected with their interests...
>
> .....
>
> And why, gentlemen, are they not anxious to obtain the judgement of the country? It is surely plain that they are not anxious. If they were anxious, they would follow the rule and dissolve the Parliament.

Repetition is also utilized in the example above. Then, apprehension must have been aroused by the following:

> There would be the chance...of taking some measure which again could carry misgiving and dismay to the hearts of the sober-minded portion of the nation..to disturb the world, to destroy confidence, to unsettle business and the employments of life....

Appeal to the national pride is evident in the next example:

> There is no precedent in human history for a formation like the British Empire. A small island at one extremity of the globe peoples the whole world with its colonies....it goes among the ancient races of Asia and subjects two hundred and forty millions of men to its rule...it disseminates over the world a commerce such as no imagination ever conceived in former times....

The challenge came, as would be expected, near the end of the address:

> It is no longer the Government with which you have to deal. You have to deal with the majority of the House of Commons....They must be dealt with individually.

As has been noted, Gladstone also used emotionally charged words, imagery, and, occasionally, satire. His "loaded" words and phrases were often modifiers, such as "loud-voiced minority," "ill-omened sounds," and "sober-minded," all of which appear in one paragraph. "...embraces in its scope the whole country, and descends to the very roots of our institutions," and "there was not a cloud upon the horizon" are brief uses of imagery. Gladstone also referred to the prevailing thought to employ the bandwagon effect:

> I have not been surprised to be assured by those among you...that we stand quite as well as we did, or better than we did, before the introduction of these faggot votes.
>
> .....
>
> And it is because they know that the country is against them that they are unwilling to appeal to th· country.
>
> .....
>
> Now, gentlemen, I am not saying that which is peculiar to persons of my political creed.

There are two examples of satire in the Edinburgh address. Gladstone used the first to cast doubt on the word of Lord Beaconsfield and the second to discredit the Government in general:

> It was only upon the 10th of November that the Prime Minister gave to the world the assurance that he thought peace might be maintained. I thought that matter had been

settled eighteen months ago when he came back from Berlin and said he had got 'peace with honour.' Now he says, 'I think peace may be maintained, and I think it more likely now than it was five months or four months ago.' --more likely than it was five months or four months after he had come back from Berlin and announced 'peace with honour.' That is what he says--he thinks it may be maintained.

....

The maxim of a Government ought, gentlemen, to be that which was known in ancient history as the appeal from Philip drunk to Philip sober. But the conduct of the present Government.... has been...the appeal from Philip sober to Philip drunk.

[illegible] logical proof consisted largely of references to history, analogy, expert testimony, figures, comparison, and narration of events. Historical precedent is specifically referred to in one example and alluded to in another:

...[illegible] has arrived at a time wherein, according to the fixed and invariable practice... [illegible] to a dissolution.

....

...This Government has and [illegible], created a greater number of innovations, broken away from a greater number of precedents, [illegible] greater number of [illegible] [illegible] than any Government which has existed [illegible].

In [illegible] instance, Gladstone found an analogy useful in making a point:

When the catalogue of expedients is exhausted, it is just like a manager with his stock of theatrical pieces--after he has presented them all he must begin again...

The use of testimony was all the more effective since it was usually testimony of the opposition: "I am now going to show you the evidence upon which I speak--Lord Beaconsfield, in reply to me on the debate, said that..."is one such example. Another is "I have got the witness of Lord Beaconsfield's Foreign Secretary..." Then "Here is what Lord Cranbrook, who stated the case of the Government in the House of Commons said..." is the final example of the use of testimony to be considered.

Gladstone used specific figures and a comparison to clarify the dispute between the two political parties over whether the surplus, left by the Gladstone administration, was a "realised surplus":

But what we left was the prospect of the incoming revenue for the following year... which distinctly showed that there would be a surplus of £5,000,000 to £6,000,000... and if they choose to say it was not a realised surplus--undoubtedly it was no more realised than the Duke of Buccleuth's rents for next year are realised; but, if, as is not likely, the Duke of Buccleuth has occasion to borrow on the security of his rents for next year, I suspect he will find many people quite ready to lend to him. Well, gentlemen, that is the only explanation I need give you.

The speaker employed the narration of events to illustrate how the current Government had taken on many new responsibilities which he felt were too great:

But what has been the course of things for the last three years?...An annexation of territory in the Fiji Islands....They have annexed in Africa the Transvaal territory... We have made war upon the Zulus....We have annexed the Island of Cyprus....We then, gentlemen, have undertaken to make ourselves responsible for the good government of Turkey in Asia....We have undertaken to defend the Armenian frontier of Turkey against Russia... and...We have, by the most wanton invasion of Afghanistan, broken that country into pieces.

As to the style of the speech, reference has already been made to imagery, analogies, loaded words, and repetition. Long sentences are also characteristic of Gladstone's style. Examples will not be cited, in the interest of space, but one sentence in this address contained 180 words, as it was punctuated in this collection. It is, of course, possible for a speaker with Gladstone's experience and capability to deliver a series of subordinate thoughts, within the main thought pattern of a sentence, in such a way that the audience is still able to follow his train of thought.

It is evident throughout this address that Gladstone was keenly aware of the need to adapt any speech to the audience, as John Morley noted.[6] He made frequent reference to his audience, by means of personal pronouns, and by speaking to their interests. Further, he did not talk down to his audience, but addressed them as equals. At one point he paid tribute to their heritage: "With the traditions of

[6] Dwain Earl Moore, "John Morley as Critic of Public Address" (unpublished dissertation, Dept. of Speech, University of Illinois, 1954), pp. 43-44.

liberty which we think we cherish, with the recollec- that you Scotchmen entertain of the struggles in which you have engaged to establish your own liberties here...." Earlier, he acknowledged the cross-section represented in his audience: "I appeal to you as practical men, I appeal to you as agriculturists, I appeal to you as tradesmen--I appeal to you in whatever class or profession you may be...." This technique of recognizing members of his audience as individuals was frequently reinforced by the use of "you" and "we." He also made his audience feel important, as can be seen in this final example:

> Whatever is to be done in defending and governing these vast colonies with their teeming millions; in protecting that unmeasured commerce...whatever is to be done, must be done by the force derived from you and your children, derived from you and your fellow-electors, throughout the land....

All of these techniques, just enumerated, could ordinarily be expected to create rapport between speaker and audience. Such rapport could, therefore, contribute greatly to the favorable response that Gladstone is said to have received from his audience. The immediate effect of the speech at Edinburgh was, according to The Times, demonstrated by "loud and prolonged cheering and applause."[7] Another report testifies to his effectiveness in the following:

> He was able to strike home to his listeners, through his famous eye, the controlled gestures, and the urgent tones of his deep voice, the idea that each was personally answerable for the wrongs done to the Balkan Christians, and that each was personally able, by casting his vote aright, to make amends.[8]

The more permanent effect of Gladstone's Midlothian campaign might be concluded from the fact that the electors voted the Liberals back into power in 1880, and Gladstone was again Prime Minister. Trevelyan wrote that, "It is probable that Gladstone's views on Turkey had made a more lasting impression in the provinces than many politicians knew."[9] In any event, political campaigning in Britain was drastically and permanently altered by Gladstone's having taken the issues to the people in the provinces. Perhaps this, as Trevelyan implies, is the real significance of Gladstone's Midlothian campaign.

---

[7] The Times (London), November 26, 1879, p. 10.

[8] Hammond and Foot, Gladstone, p. 132.

[9] George Macauley Trevelyan, British History in the Nineteenth Century (London, 1948), p. 297.