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ABSTRACT
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functions for the child and in what sequence these functions develop.
The notion of communicative intention is contrasted with grammatical
categories and with the goal of an utterance. Finally, communicative
intentions and goals of utterances are contrasted with the
innumerable pragmatic purposes which accompany speech. Together these
functions, along with the grammatical components of the sentence,
constitute the total speech act which is taken to be the fundamental
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**BEST COPY AVAILABLE**

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COMMUNICATIVE INTENTIONS AND SPEECH ACTS IN LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT

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COMMUNICATIVE INTENTIONS AND SPEECH ACTS IN LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT

ABSTRACT

Although recent research in children's acquisition of language has resulted in enormous amounts of important information about the acquisition of grammar, little progress has been made in determining how the child uses his knowledge of grammar in actual communicative situations. A complete theory of the child as language user requires not only a model of grammar but also a model of the language user. Recent attempts to explicate a theory of linguistic functions have failed to provide a basis for the investigation of how, when, where, why, etc. the child uses the grammatical structures at his disposal.

The present paper proposes a theory of how language functions for the child and in what sequence these functions develop. It characterizes the notion of "communicative intention" as the child's intention to induce in a listener the recognition of how the child wants his utterance to be taken. It contrasts this notion with grammatical categories and with a second theoretical construct, the "goal of an utterance" which is taken to be the listener's response that the speaker expects. Finally, communicative intentions and goals of utterances are contrasted with the innumerable "pragmatic purposes" which accompany speech. Together these functions, along with the grammatical components of the sentence, constitute the total "speech act" which is taken to be the fundamental unit of linguistic communication. The data reported suggest that various intentions gradually become "grammaticalized" or "lexicalized" in the course of language development. We conclude that communicative intentions and other functional aspects of language play a greater role in the organization and choice of utterances than has been supposed by grammatical theories of language development.

"Grammar does not tell us how language must be constructed
in order to fulfill its purpose, in order to have such-and-
such an effect on human beings. It only describes and in no
way explains the use of signs."

Wittgenstein (1953, p. 138)

For the past decade and a half an enormous amount of information
and numerous important insights about children's acquisition of gram-
mar have been a :umulated. During the early 1960s the transformational-
generative theory of language provided a rich theoretical framework
for investigating the child's acquisition of syntax (see Brown, 1973
for thorough review of early work). More recently revised versions of
transformational grammar have been applied to child language, with the
result of yielding important information about the semantic aspects of
acquisition: Bloom (1970) emphasized the semantic structures underlying
early syntactic productions; Ingram (1971) described children's earli-
est utterances in terms of case grammar categories; Antinucci and
Parisi (1973) proposed a generative semantics model of child language.
The most recent research (Bloom, 1973; Nelson, 1974) suggests that the
non-linguistic conceptual inputs to the acquisition process are far
greater than were supposed in the initial applications of the trans-
formational approach to child speech.

What has been overlooked almost completely in recent approaches
is the "pragmatics" of child language as opposed to the grammar(that
is, the syntax, semantics and phonology). In particular, the problem
of the child's "intentions" in using the grammar for communicative
purposes has been neglected. This issue of communicative intent, when
it is de: with at all, is typically subsumed under the investigation
of language functions, with most investigators paying lip service to

fact that language somehow functions to express the child's intentions. One long-standing tradition has been to divide the child's early one-word utterances into the "referential, expressive and conative functions" (McNeill, 1970). Concerning patterned speech, recent research has typically explicated the structures of child speech and then offered ad hoc lists of "functions" to describe how the child uses such structures. Bloom (1970), for example, after providing an account of the development of transformations in three children, offers an ad hoc list of functions -- "comments, reports, directions and questions" -- which, like the traditional categories, are too general to be of use to an interesting pragmatic theory. One outstanding exception to this trend has been the work of Halliday (1973). However, he too proposes a theoretical dichotomy, which is equally artificial and extreme, in that he claims that the functions of language determine its structure; and his list of six linguistic functions is also too general to provide the basis for subtle distinctions in the way children use utterances to communicate intentions.

The present paper proposes a more integrated view of the relations between the structure and function of language in development than has previously been provided. It characterizes the notion of "communicative intention" as distinct from traditional grammatical categories on the one hand and from the innumerable pragmatic purposes that accompany speech on the other hand. A theoretical framework is proposed for describing the child's developing repertoire of communicative intentions and for explaining the relations between these intentions and the acquisition of grammatical structures. Some data are reported from three separate research projects, each of which involves the notion of communicative intention to some degree. It is suggested that communicative

intentions and grammatical structures constitute partly independent subsystems of language development which mutually influence each other; that these intentions gradually become "grammaticalized" or "lexicalized"; and that some apparently intractable problems of language development become amenable to analysis in light of the framework proposed here.

The Problem of Intentionality

The problem of intentionality in general has been defined differently by different philosophers and cognitive psychologists. William James (1892, p. 164) long ago noted the phenomenon of intending to communicate: "the intention of saying a thing...is an entirely definite intention,distinct from all other intentions...and yet how much of it consists of definite sensorial images, either of words, or of things? Hardly anything!" James' notion of intention, which is so radically different from the cognitive structures that constitute linguistic competence, has not been elaborated upon by others. However, some related notions of intention have been discussed. Lewin (1951), for example, in criticizing association theories, argued that these theories fail to account for intentions which Lewin characterized as "quasi-needs" that help reduce tension. Miller, Galanter and Pribram (1960), on the other hand, emphasized the organizing power of intentions in terms of the cognitive plans that underlie behavior. They claim that"a crucial difference between a chain of actions and a Plan of action" is intention: "When a chain is initiated with no internal representation of the complete course of action, the latter parts are not intended. When a Plan is initiated, the intent to execute the later parts of it is clear" (p. 62).

James' sense of "the intention of saying a thing" seems to be more closely related to certain philosophical issues than to the treatment of intentionality by cognitive psychologists. A primary issue in the philosophy of ordinary language, for example, has been the problem of meaning; and at least one group of philosophers have held that meaning is essentially a matter of the speaker's intentions. This line of thought began perhaps with Wittengenstein's cryptic aphorism "the meaning of a term is its use" (1953, p.   ). Austin (1962) has explicated this notion in one way, in terms of an hypothesis of "illocutionary acts." According to Austin, apart from statements like "It is red" which take truth values, there is a large class of utterances like "I promise to give you the book" which take "felicity conditions." That is, utterances of the "promise" type are not necessarily true or false, but are subject to such conditions as whether the speaker is sincere, whether the listener already expects to receive the book in question, and so on. Searle (1969) has developed Austin's original hypothesis into an extensive   theory of "speech acts". The speech act, which Searle takes to be the " basic unit of linguistic communication" (p. 16), is comprised of two components - the proposition and the illocutionary force. In the utterance "Is John eating an apple?", for example, the proposition is roughly "John eat apple" while the illocutionary force is a question. The important aspect of Searle's theory for present purposes is that the illocutionary force of an utterance conveys how the speaker intends his utterance to be taken. The final notion of relevance here comes from Grice (1957) who defines meaning this way: the speaker means something if he "intended the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention" (p. 385). With this sketch of background information in mind, we can proceed to the central task of this paper which is to characterize the notion of "communicative intention" and its status

in the child's acquisition of language.

Communicative Intentions and Language Development

A "communicative intention" will be defined as an intention to induce in a listener the recognition of how the speaker wants his utterance to be taken. In order to explicate the notion of communicative intention (abbreviated CI) with respect to language development, I will distinguish between the CI and (a) the non-communicative intentions characterisitc of infants before they acquire language; (b) syntactic and semantic categories of grammar; (c) the goals of utterances; and (d) the non-linguistic pragmatic purposes that accompany speech.

Piaget (1952), who has provided an account of cognitive development during infancy, accords intentionality a central status in his theory:... "...it is precisely intention that separates...habit and intelligent adaptation" (p. 149). He describes the fourth stage of the sensorimotor period of intelligence as "the intercoordination of secondary schemata... the child must aim to attain an end...there exists simultaneously the distinction between the end and the means, and the intentional coordination of the schemata" (p. 211). Thus, for example, if the child wants to build a tower of blocks, he must (among other things) locate the blocks, grasp them, place one on top of the other, and so on. The important point is that the child's intention is directly linked to the practical consequence of his act -- in one sense his intention and his goal are identical -- and the child must accomplish the goal himself.

A CI, as distinct from Piaget's "sensorimotor intention", involves of course another person. In addition to accomplishing goals himself, the child learns that with language He can get others to accomplish things for him; but for this he must learn how to induce in other people the recognition of what he wants them to do. With the block example, if

the child wants someone else to build the tower for him, he must produce an utterance, say "build tower", which will induce in the person the recognition that the child wants his utterance to be taken as a solicitation to perform the act of building the tower. Two differences between the CI and the sensorimotor intention are then: (1) the intention of the former is to induce a recognition in the listener as opposed to the child doing the act himself; (2) the goal of the child's utterance is the expected effect that this recognition will produce in the listener, the building of the tower in our example. Thus, the CI and the goal of the utterance are distinct. Furthermore, the CI of the utterance is under the control of the speaker, while the goal of the utterance is under the control of the listener. The listener may or may not do what (he knows) the child wants.

The relation between the CI and the beginning of language development can be characterized with reference to the child's one-word speech. When the child begins to speak (usually at about the age of one year), he has a limited vocabulary (typically less than 100 words during the first few months) and for a /certain period (normally anywhere from three months to a year) he utters only one word at a time. However, he uses these single words in different contexts, with different gestures and with different intonation patterns. A child can utter "ball", for example, intending to induce in a listener the recognition that he wants the utterance to be taken as (a) a question (typically with a rising terminal intonation contour and with a possible candidate for the class 'ball' being focused on) OR as (b) an answer to the adult's examination question "What's this?". He can intend the utterance of the word "mommy" to be taken as (a) a label (where he's pointing to a picture of a person he thinks is a "mommy" OR as (b) a call

(typically in an abrupt rising-falling intonation contour and in a context where his mother is some distance away but within earshot). He can utter "no" as (a) the negative <u>answer</u> to the yes-no question "Do you want to go?" <u>OR</u> as (b) a <u>protest</u> (typically with a loud, abrupt intonation pattern and accompanied by gestures of resistence). In short, questions, answers, labels, calls and protests are the names of CIs which are manifested by intonation, gesture or position in context and which attempt to induce in listeners <u>that</u> the child wants his utterances taken in specific ways. The single word itself in such utterances refers to <u>what</u> the child is talking about, the "content" or reference of the utterance being an aspect of what will become part of his linguistic competence. (A study of one-word speech using this paradigm can be found in Dore, 1974.)

A long-standing controversy in the literature concerns the status of these one-word utterances with respect to the grammar, and the notion of CI proposed above offers a solution to this issue. On the one hand, "holophrase" theorists argue that the child has knowledge of grammatical structure during this period, but that he is physiologically too immature (in terms of memory, vocal apparatus and perhaps lexicon) to produce more than a word at a time. They cite as evidence of "underlying structure" the kind of non-linguistic behavior described above as accompaniments of words. McNeill (1970), for example, claims that "while children are limited to uttering single words at the beginning of language acquisition, they are capable of conceiving of something like full sentences" (p. 20). Similarly, Ingram (1971) considers "crying, gesture and intonation pattern as formal features in the child's syntax" (p. 889). On the other hand, some investigators have argued that one-word utterances are not sentential in nature. Piaget (1952) has maintained that these words are not "true language" insofar as they are more

like personal symbols than like the socially shared, arbitrary units in a linguistic system. Bloom (1973) has offered evidence that suggests that children are not physiologically limited to producing only one word, that they produce successions of single words at this time which are not syntactic and that varying intonation contours do not indicate underlying structure because these contours are not fully contrastive phonologically (that is, particular intonations do not uniquely signal particular intnétions and vice-versa). Bloom concludes that "children learn to use prosody patterns in their speech _after_ they learn that basic grammatical distinctions are signalled by word order in English, that is after they learn syntax" (p. 57).

The evidence for holophrase theory is too weak to the support the claim that children"know" about sentences; the evidence against the holophrase position fails to appreciate the fact that children "know" more about language than mere lists of words. If the child's language behavior during this period is viewed in light of the notion of CI proposed above, the following theoretical position emerges: his knowledge of words indicates that he has acquired one of the fundamental components of linguistic competence, namely reference; his uses of words indicates that he has acquired the linguistic, but non-grammatical (or "pragmatic" if you will) component of the CI. (Dore, to appear, provides further arguments in favor of this view and discusses the entire holophrase issue in greater detail.) This position is consonant with the data thus far collected on the one-word stage and it avoids making assumptions about the child's linguistic knowledge that are not warranted by his behavior. Perhaps more importantly, this position preserves the account of linguistic competence proposed for adults by standard transformational theorists, while it attempts to investigate how the child acquires and uses this competence.

Regarding the acquisition of patterned speech, there have been a
few studies that attempt to deal with the problem of intentionality,
but these have defined "intention" differently from the notion of CI.
Schlesinger (1971) has emphasized the importance of intentionality in
language development: "There is no place for intentions in a grammar,
but any theory of performance which fails to take intentions into account
must be considered inadequate...If it were to contain only a mechanism
operating along the lines of a grammar, the performance model would produce
utterances of grammatical strings. Yet these utterances would bear no
systematic relationship to the environment. To function properly, the
model must specify how this relationship is established" (p.64). Un-
fortunately, despite Schlesinger's quite clear distinction between
intention and grammar, when he describes the kind of intentions he has
in mind it turns out that these are identical to semantic categories
proposed by grammatical theories. For example, he claims that in the
utterance "John catches a red ball", the speaker's intentions "must be
assumed to contain the information that 'John' is the agent of 'catch',
that 'ball' is the direct object of 'catch', that 'red' modifies 'ball'"
(p. 66) and so on (emphasis mine). It is not possible to distinguish
between Schlesinger's categories and the categories proposed by case
grammar and transformational grammar theories of language development.
Similarly, Slobin uses the term "semantic intention" to indicate the
child's "meaning" before he acquires the conventional syntax to convey
that meaning. This sense of "intention", too, is synonomous with sem-
antic relations; and in general, the "intention models" so far proposed
are variations of semantic models, and thus are grammatical in nature.

Slobin, however, has distinguished "semantic intentions' from "communicative functions": About the latter he points out that "children everywhere have the same general definition of the form and function of language. Everywhere language consists of utterances performing a universal set of communicative functions (such as asserting, denying, requesting, ordering, and so forth...(p. 302). These functions are of course related to CIs and CIs in turn are quite distinct from grammatical categories.

In order to investigate the relation between our notion of CI and the acquisition of grammar, a pilot study of one child's earliest patterned speech is now being conducted. The child has been audio-taped for two hours a week (in a variety of situations at home) since the first week she began to consistently produce utterances of more than one morpheme. The data for Phase I of the study have been collected (the protocols include the mother's utterances and descriptions of the context and of the child's non-linguistic behavior). The end of Phase I was defined as the point at which at least 25% of the child's taped utterances contained two or more morphemes for a period of four consecutive weeks. The corpus for this four-week period contains a total of 308 multiple-morphemic utterances. Of this total there are only 73 different utterances, with frequencies for each utterance ranging from 2 to 26 occurrences. The data were analyzed for morphemic length according to the guidelines provided in Brown (1973), (Incidently, the difference between morpheme-counts and word-counts at this stage is negligible.) The utterances were also coded by CI (complete definitions for each type of CI are given below).

One preliminary finding of the study that bears on the issue of the acquisition of grammar and CIs concerns word order. Of the 73 different utterances in the corpus, 33 (or about 46%) had variable word order.

Table I lists the utterances that occured with variable word order.
It is important to point out that one major methodological difference
between this study and similar studies of language acquisition is that
an utterance was counted as the same type as another utterance if they
both (a) contained the same words and (b) conveyed the same CI, despite
the fact that the word order of the two utterances was different. Assuming this methodology is sound, since word order (especially early on in
development) is the primary signal of syntactic organization, the variability of word order in 46% of the utterances raises a crucial issue.
The fact that the CI remained constant while word order varied so often
allows for the interpretation that children at the onset of patterned
speech may not be acquiring syntactic categories directly, but that CIs
play a greater role in the cognitive organization of utterances than
has been supposed by recent grammatical approaches to language development. In short, grammar may not explain as much as we thought about the child's
knowledge of language, and intentionality may affect development in ways
as yet undiscovered.

Two minor points about this pilot study may mitigate the interpretation just offered. First, the child did produce other kinds of utterances,
such as greetings, protests and exclamations, which did not vary in word
order. But, as is reported in most studies, these utterance types tend
to be expressed in rigid formulas -- greetings in "Hi" plus person's name,
protests in "No" plus verb, etc. -- while the CIs in Table I contain
underlying propositions that allow for different syntactic expressions.
Yet the child did not select from alternate syntactic forms in the adult
language, since the majority of her Reversed Word Orders have no equivalent in adult speech. Moreover, if the child were learning surface
syntactic categories directly, it would certainly be easier to learn
one syntactic form instead of two for the same proposition.

11A

Table I. The multiple-morphemic utterances with variable word order produced by one child during her twenty-first month.

COMMUNICATIVE INTENTION	MOST FREQUENT WORD ORDER	REVERSED WORD ORDER
Descriptions	baba("bottle") fall	fall baba
	Raggy no fall	no fall Raggy
	Kiki sleep	sleep Kiki
	baby sit	sit baby
	doggie duddy	duddy doggie
	baby no cry	no cry baby
	dog eat bone	dog bone eat
	Kiki eat apple	Kiki apple eat
	Kiki dirty	dirty Kiki
Questions	*see Mom	Mom see
	*more Dad	Dad more
	out Kiki	Kiki out
	dog bad	bad dog
	Mommy sleep	sleep Mommy
	/as æ/("What's that?")Dad	Dad /as æ/
	more apple	apple more
	dirty dog	dog dirty
	where go ball	where ball go
	where go Dad	where Dad go
	where go dog	where dog go
Requests	*no go Nanny	Nanny no go
	/mɔgɛn/("more-again")cookie	cookie /mɔgɛn/
	*kiss /bʊbʊ/ Mommy	Mommy /bʊbʊ/kiss
	baby no sleep	no sleep baby
	*get Dad	Dad get
	put Raggy	Raggy put
	*sit Mom	Mom sit
	*here dog cookie	here cookie dog
	*here book Mom	Mom here book
	more baba	baba more
	more down	down more
	/gɛn/("again") up	up /gɛn/
	*dog sit down	sit down dog

The second point that mitigates the interpretation in favor of the importance of CIs is that 9 of the 33 utterances in Table I involve a conventional change in word order. That is, when addressing a listener in English it is permissable to put his name at the beginning or the end of the utterance (see utterances with asterisks in Table I). However, in the adult model of English the name part of such utterances are marked prosodically (one prosodic feature, for example, is a pause between the listener's name and the rest of the utterance). The child in this study did not use pause consistently, or any other prosodic device, to signal the special status of the name. This indicates that her word order variations were not conventionally governed and thus that she 'created' these word orders for some reason beyond the grammar. Older children of course follow the adult conventions in such cases and, in fact, the name part of such utterances is analyzed as a separate CI, namely a Request for Attention, in our three-year old speech presented below.

Goals of Utterances and "Pragmatic Purposes"

In a third research project the utterances of six three-year old children were classified in terms of a set of CIs they expressed. Table II lists the definitions of the CIs that were identified in four one-hour samples taken from the first four months of videotaping the children in a nursery setting with which they were familiar.

The table defines four basic, or "core", CIs, each of which has several subtypes. These four categories -- Requests, Responses, Descriptions and Statements -- are not likely to expand extensively in number throughout the child's subsequent development. But a second, "open" set of CIs continually expand; each month we identify more of this type. Most utterances of this second type appear to be primitive versions of the "performatives" described by Austin and Searle. That is, these

CIs seem to take felicity conditions instead of truth values as the principal measurement of their effectiveness. These CIs accomplish acts in being said and they typically exploit the propositional content of the utterances to communicate messages beyond the literal import of the utterances. However, this generality of their performative-like characteristic requires further analysis, especially since it involves a substantial revision of the philosopher's version of performatives for adults. One example should make the significance of this caution clear. Searle explains that the successful performance of the speech act of "promising" for adults is subject to a set of rigorous conditions, two of which are the Sincerity and the Obviousness Conditions. The speaker must be sincere about performing the future act for the listener and the speaker must not make this promise if it is obvious to the listener that the speaker will perform the promised act anyway. We have found two occurrences of the word "promise" (in conventional linguistic contexts) by a three-year old child. But both occurrences violated one of the necessary conditions for a successful (or "happy") performance: in the first case she failed to perform the act which she promised to do immediately; in the second case she promised to do something that it was perfectly obvious she would do anyway. Thus, it is not at all clear how children cognitively represent these kinds of intentions as opposed to the more straightforward "core" types.

At any rate, the primary value of isolating the CI of an utterance is that it makes possible the distinction between the intention and the goal of an utterance. Consider the most frequent CI, the Action Request which solicits a listener to do something. The CI is to induce some recognition in the listener -- the goal of an Action Request is <u>the act which the listener is expected to perform</u>. Thus, the intention is a

Table II. Defintiions of the types of communicative intentions identified in samples of three-year old speech.

CODE DEFINITION OF COMMUNICATIVE INTENTIONS

REQUESTS are intentions to induce in a listener the recognition that the speaker intends his utterance to be taken as a solicitation.

RQYN Yes-No Question...solicits affirmation or negation of the propositional content of the speaker's utterance.

RQWH Wh-Question...solicits information about the identity, location, time, reason or manner of an object, event or situation.

RQAC Action Request...solicits a listener to perform, not to perform or cease to perform an action (act, process, activity, etc.).

RQAT Attention Request...solicits a listener's attention.

RQPM Permission Request...solicits a listener to grant permission for the speaker to perform a future act.

RQRQ Rhetorical Question...solicits a listener's acknowledgement to allow the speaker to continue speaking.

RESPONSES are intentions to induce in a listener the recognition that (a) the responder recognizes the intention of the listener's previous utterance and that (b) the responder intends his utterance to be taken as a complement to the listener's previous utterance.

RSYN Yes-No Answer...complements a preceding Yes-No Request by affirming or negating its content (and possibly by providing further information).

RSID Identity Response...complements a preceding Wh-Question by supplying the identity of an object, person or situation.

RSEV Event Response...complements a preceding Wh-Question by supplying a description of an event.(action, process, activity, etc.).

RSPR Property Response...complements a preceding Wh-Question by supplying a description of a property.(characteristic, quality, etc.).

RSLO Location Response...complements a preceding Wh-Question by supplying a description of the location or direction of an object or event.

RSAG Agreement...complements a preceding utterance by agreeing with, denying, complying with or not complying with the content of that utterance.

RSQL Qualification...complements a preceding utterance by qualifying, clarifying, adding to or otherwise changing the content of that utterance.

RSPM Politeness Marker...complements a preceding utterance (or action) by uttering a conventional expression of politeness.

(Table II continued)

DESCRIPTIONS are intentions to induce in a listener the recognition that the speaker intends his utterance to be taken as an accurate representation of an observable (or verifiable) aspect of the environment

DSID Identification...labels or otherwise identifies the existence (occurrence, etc.) of an object, person, event or situation.

DSEV Event...represents the occurrence of an event (action, process, etc.).

DSPR Property...represents an observable characteristic of an object, person, event or situation.

DSLO Location...represents the location or direction of an object, person or event.

DSOP Other Person...represents the internal state (emotion, attitude, capacity, etc.) of another person based on observation or knowledge of the other person.

STATEMENTS are intentions to induce in a listener the recognition that the speaker intends his utterance to be taken as the expression of the speaker's belief (attitude, opinion, etc.) that some unobservable "fact" is true.

STFA "Fact"...expresses analytic facts, classifications, definitions, rules or procedures.

STIN Intent...expresses the speaker's intent to perform a future act.

STEV Evaluation...expresses the speaker's personal impression, attitude or judgment about a person, object, event or situation.

STPO Possession...expresses the speaker's belief that an object belongs to someone.

STIR Internal Report...expresses the speaker's internal state (emotion, attitude, etc.).

STEX Explanation...expresses the speaker's belief about the reason (cause, motive, etc.) for a given state of affairs.

STPR Prediction...expresses the speaker's belief that a certain event will or will not take place.

(Table II continued)   **BEST COPY AVAILABLE**   13c

The following intentions which have been identified in our speech samples are not organized into general categories as the above intentions are. The definition for each of the following intentions begins with the formula "... is an intention to induce in a listener the recognition that the speaker intends his utterance to be taken as..."

ROLE Role-play...the establishment or maintenance of a fantasy.

PROT Protest...an objection (complaint) to the listener's previous behavior.

GREE Greeting...acknowledgement of the listener's presence (and possibly as the initiation of a conversation).

LEAV Leave-taking...as a farewell and an end to the conversation.

JOKE Joke...a non-literal, humorous remark.

WARN Warning...a notification of an impending event harmful to the listener.

THRE Threat...a notification that the speaker may do harm to the listener.

VOLU Volunteer...a commitment to perform a future act, or establishment of the speaker's position in a game.

GAME Game-marker...the initiation or end of a game.

TEAS Tease...a playful, but mildly agressive and annoying remark about the listener.

psychological state which induces another psychological state (a recognition) while the goal is an act in this case. Similarly with requests for information -- the intention is, again, to induce the recognition that the speaker is soliciting information, the goal is the the listener's act of _supplying_ information. With Responses the goal is the listener's acceptance of the content of the response as an appropriate complement to the listener's previous utterance. With Descriptions the goal is the listener's belief that the speaker's proposition is an accurate description. With Statements the goal is the listener's belief that the speaker's proposition is true. The goal of an utterance is, therefore, at the same time the speaker's _expectation_ of the listener's response and the listener's act, acceptance or belief.

Assuming that our distinction between CI and the goal of utterances holds up, there is one final distinction about utterances that contributes to a theory of language functions. This third notion will be called a "pragmatic purpose". An example from adult speech should make this notion clear. Suppose a teacher and Student A are sitting in a classroom before class begins and Student A says "It's drafty in here." The teacher then turns to Student B, who is at the doorway, and says "Close the door, please." The CI of the teacher's utterance is to induce in Student B the recognition that he wants the door closed, the goal is the closing of the door. One of the _purposes_ of the teacher's utterances may be to please Student B. In fact, there may be many "pragmatic purposes" behind the teacher's utterance. He may want to express his respect (affection, annoyance, etc.) for Student B, or his hope that the student will like him, or he may even want to impress upon those who overheard him the idea that he is considerate (nice, gallant, sensitive, etc. ad infinitum). Pragmatic purposes, or 'ulterior motives' if you will, may never be known

by the listeners, and they are certainly well beyond the bounds of the theory of CIs proposed here.

Two examples from our three-year old speech corpus make it clear that children have at least a fundamental grasp of pragmatic purposes, apart from their knowledge of CIs and goals of utterances. One girl said to the nursery school teacher "Give me juice!" and on another occassion "Can I have some juice, please?". (In terms of syntax of course the former is an imperative and the latter an interrogative.) The CI of both utterances is the same -- to induce in the teacher the recognition that the girl wanted her utterance to be taken as a solicitation for the teacher to give the child juice. The goal of the utterances was also the same, the expected effect of receiving juice. The purposes, however, were different. In the latter case the choice of a more polite form communicated not only a greater degree of politeness, but may also have included a desire to be friendly, to express affection, respect, etc. Pushing this point a bit, it is even possible that the child was <u>not</u> thirsty and that therefore quenching her thirst was <u>not</u> a purpose of the utterance. In short, the pragmatic purpose of an utterance can be the opposite of what is inferred by the listener.

Another child was building a tower of blocks throughout most of the hour he was videotaped. At different times in the session he said (1) "You're standing on my blocks,"; (2) "No, don't touch my blocks!"; and (3) "You better not knock my blocks over." A purpose common to all these utterances could be simply that he wanted to finish building the tower. The interesting fact is that each utterance conveys a different CI. The CI of (1) is a Description of Event, but it is clear to the listener that the goal of the description <u>in this context</u> is that the listener

get off the blocks. The purpose of the speaker's choice of that part-
icular utterance in that particular context may have been to maintain
his (already close) friendship with the other boy. The CI of (2) is a
Protest; the goal of (2) is the same as (1.); but the purpose of (2)
is clearly not meant to be friendly, polite, etc., and may even have
been antagonistic (since it was addressed to a girl with whom the speak-
er was not especially friendly). Finally, the CI of (3) is a Threat;
the goal is to prevent the listener from touching the blocks before-
hand; and the purpose of (3) is to communicate hostility (it was
addressed to another boy with whom the speaker was not especially friend-
ly).

From the point of view of the investigator, if he assumes the role
of listener it is possible to infer the child's intention without much
difficulty and it is likely that he can readily identify the goal of
the child's utterances in most cases. But it is quite unlikely that we will
be able to determine the purposes behind utterances.

It should not be surprising that children, even very young children,
have a repertoire of forms to communicate the same intention and to
accomplish the same goal (and vice-versa in both cases). After all, there
is no isomorphic relation between semantic meanings and surface syntactic
forms, and there is no reason to assume a one-to-one relation between
CIs and syntactic forms. An analysis of the functions of language along
the lines proposed here would contribute to a model of the child as
language user, as opposed to a model of language for the child which has
been the focus of research in developmental psycholinguistics for so
long.

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