DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 099 906 CS 500 897

AUTHOR Barrett, Harold, Ed.; And Others
TITLE Conference in Rhetorical Criticism: Commended Papers (3rd, Hayward, California, May 11, 1968).
INSTITUTION California State Coll., Hayward. Dept. of Speech and Drama.
PUB DATE 68
NOTE 20p.; Marginal reproducibility

EDRS PRICE MF-$0.75 HC Not Available from EDRS. PLUS POSTAGE
DESCRIPTORS American Indians; *Communication (Thought Transfer); Debate; Deductive Methods; Drama; Higher Education; Logic; *Persuasive Discourse; Rhetoric; *Rhetorical Criticism; Speech Education
IDENTIFIERS Logan (Chief Tahgahjute); Richards (I A); Whately (Richard)

ABSTRACT

At the third annual Cal-State Hayward Conference in Rhetorical Criticism, 22 upper division and graduate students from 16 colleges and universities of the western states presented papers on rhetorical theory, history, and criticism. Panels of faculty members from the same colleges and universities, acting as editor-critics, rated four of these papers as superior and they are included in this volume. The titles and authors are: "Some Questions Regarding the Facts and Circumstances of Logan's Speech" by James Johnson, "I. A. Richards; Rhetorical Prospector: The Miner, His Mines, and His Metaphor" by Richard S. Lucas, "Rhetorical Analysis of Drama: A Critical and Creative Process" by Louis B. Queary, and "The Relationship of Substance and Form in Richard Whately's Logical Proofs" by Charlene G. Wasserman. (TO)

CONFERENCE IN RHETORICAL CRITICISM

Commended Papers

Harold Barrett, James Johnson, Bruce Loebs, — Editors

California State College, Hayward — 1968

—Foreword—

On May 11, 1968, the Speech and Drama Department and Creative Arts Division Council of California State College at Hayward held the Third Annual Conference in Rhetorical Criticism. In attendance were professors and twenty-two upper-division and graduate students from sixteen colleges and universities of the western states. The students read papers on rhetorical theory, history, and criticism, in six sections to panels of professors--the editor-critics.

Departing from our usual plan of ranking to select papers for commendation, we used a rating system: good, excellent, or superior. The four papers in this volume are those rated superior by the editor-critics.

This year's Conference was favored by the participation of Harry Caplan, Goldwin Smith Professor of the Classical Languages and Literature at Cornell University from 1941-1967. His banquet address, "The Classical Tradition: Rhetoric and Oratory," was followed by a standing ovation. Professor Caplan is unable to release his address for printed distribution at this time, believing it not ready for such publication. We respect his wishes--and at the same time look forward to his one day finding means of making his rich and illuminating survey of classical theory and practice available to all students of rhetoric and the classics.

Standing in his immense shadow we would presume to dedicate this volume to Professor Caplan, interpreter of the classical tradition to generations of students--to the scholar who, in the words of Everett Lee Hunt, found his "academic niche in the study and the teaching of Greek and Latin, but instead if deserting rhetoric...continued to make notable contributions in that field, and to enlist the interest of classical scholars who might otherwise never have concerned themselves with the implications of Greek and Roman rhetoric for modern life."

The Editors

Student Participants and Faculty Participants

Dorothy M. Bennett, University of Oregon, "Rhetoric Today."

Steve Chambers, University of California at Davis, "The Rhetorical Tradition and American Periodicals, 1800-1850."

Ron Claussen, University of California at Davis, "War and Peace: Crisis in Western Rhetoric."

Jerry L. Daniel, University Wyoming, "Rhetoric in C.S. Lewis' Modern Theolog nd Biblical Criticism'."

Dan Freedland, San Jose State College, "The Success of the Isocratean Method of Rhetorical Instruction."

Teruo Fujii, University of Utah, "A Study in Message Modification: Rhetorical Influence by Restrictions."

Nancy Headding, Central Washington State College, "The Nichomachean Ethics: Its Relation to the theory and Criticism of Ethos."

Robert Ivie, Washington State University, "William McKinley on the Philippines."

James Johnson, Cal State, Hayward, "Some Questions Regarding the Facts and Circumstances of Logan's Speech."

Robert Johnson, Sacramento State College, "A Rhetorical Criticism of 'The Russians are Coming'."

Shirley G. Jones, University of Utah, "Success Despite Defeat: Edmund Burke's Character."

Barbara Keener, University of Wyoming, "Adam Smith's Rhetorical Theory in Wealth of Nations."

Rachel L. Leeds, San Fernando Valley State College, "Black Power: Vintage 1900."

Richard Lucas, Sacramento State College, "I.A. Richards; Rhetorical Prospector: The Miner, His Mines and His Metaphor."

Margaret Morrisson, Cal State, Hayward, "William Jennings Bryan and the 'Naturally Good' Man."

Rebecca Nobles, University of Oregon, "Wendell Phillips and Martin Luther King: The Rhetoric of Agitation."

Judy Ovadenko, U.C.L.A., "The Rhetorical Philosophy of the Fuehrer."

Lynn Padilla, Cal State, Los Angeles, "Woodrow Wilson's Use of Light-Dark Metaphor."

Joan Quall, Whitworth College, "Audience Analysis as a Basic for Argumentation."

Louis B. Queary, University of California at Berkeley, "Rhetoric Analysis of Drama: A Critical and Creative Process."

Perry L. Walker, Humboldt State College, "Charles Sumner's 'The Crime Against Kansas'."

Charlene Wasserman, Cal State at Los Angeles, "The Relationships of Substance and Form in Richard Whately's Logical Proofs."

Editor-Critics

John Baird, California State College, Hayward
John Cambus, California State College, Hayward
Harry Caplan, University of Washington
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Mary G. McEdwards, San Fernando Valley State College
G.P. Mohrmann, University of California, Davis
D.C. Moore, Sacramento State College

Director of the Conference

Harold Barrett, California State College, Hayward

Schedule of Events

9:30	Briefing
10:00	Critics' Silent Review of Papers in Sections
	Coffee Time for Student Participants
LUNCH	
1:00	Section Meetings
	Presentation of Papers
	Comments of Editor-Critics
	Decision for Commendation and Publication
4:00	Reading to Entire Conference of Commended Papers
7:30	Dinner: Dining Room, Cal State Cafeteria

Master of Ceremonies: Dr. John Cambus, Acting Chairman, Department of Speech and Drama, California State College, Hayward.

Introducing the Speaker: Dr. Harold Barrett, Associate Professor, Department of Speech and Drama, California State College, Hayward

Speaker: Dr. Harry Caplan, Goldwin Smith Professor of the Classical Languages and Literature, Cornell University, 1941-1967

"The Classical Tradition: Rhetoric and Oratory"

Papers of the Conference

--Contents--

Commended Papers of the Conference

SOME QUESTIONS REGARDING THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOGAN'S SPEECH

by

James Johnson, Senior in Speech, California State College, Hayward

In October of 1774, near the banks of the Scioto River in Ohio, the Mingo Indian Chief Tahgahjute, whom the whites called Logan, walked with General John Gibson. Gibson had been sent by Lord Dunmore to arrange a peace conference following the unsuccessful Indian attempt to resist white settlement in the Ohio Valley. The two approached a wooded spot close by the Indian camp, where Logan spoke words in his own language that were to project far beyond that place and time.

Tahgahjute early in life began to be called Logan, probably in honor of the Secretary of Pennsylvania, James Logan.[1] Though his father was also a Mingo chief, he was believed to be of full French ancestry and was said to have been captured as a child and brought up as an Indian. This would have made Logan a half breed, but he was thoroughly nurtured as an Indian.[2] The life of Logan was no different from others of his time and race--until 1774, when a mob of white men murdered a group of Mingo, including members of Logan's family. The massacre of his wife and children turned Logan's friendship for the colonists to hatred, and he set upon a path of vengeance, allying himself with the British to whom he turned over more than 30 scalps.[3] In order to put down the Indian uprising, the Department of the Interior sent a formal military force under Colonel Cresap which led to a struggle often referred to as "Cresap's War." The war ended in 1774 with the final defeat of the Indians at Point Pleasant.

Interestingly, the words which Logan spoke in reply to Lord Dunmore's request to attend the peace conference have been compared to the world's greatest orations. Ten years after the speech, Thomas Jefferson stated, "I may challenge the whole orations of Demosthenes and Cicero to pronounce a single passage superior to the speech of Logan, a Mingo Chief, to Lord Dunmore."[4]

The purpose of this study is to raise questions regarding the facts and circumstances of Logan's speech to Lord Dunmore. My investigation is not designed to answer all relevant questions, but rather, to study and present their historical significance to the field of rhetoric. This investigation must be termed a preliminary study, for it will require further, extensive research to solve the many mysteries that surround this speech.

Following General Gibson's attempt to persuade the Mingo leader to attend the peace conference, Logan, according to historian Wilcomb E. Washburn, shed "an abundance of tears" and spoke the following words:

> I appeal to any white man to say, if he ever entered Logan's cabin hungry, and gave him not meat: if ever he came naked and cold, and not clothed him. During the course of the last long and bloody war Logan remained idle in his cabin, an advocate of peace. Such was my love for the whites, that my countrymen pointed as they passed, and said, 'Logan is the friend of the white man.' I had even thought to live with you, but for the injuries of one man. Colonel Cresap, the last spring, in cold blood, and unprovoked, murdered all the relations of Logan, not even sparing my women and children. There runs not a drop of my blood in the veins of any living creature. This called on me for revenge: I have sought it; I have killed many: I have fully glutted my vengeance: for my country I rejoice at the beams of peace. But do not harbor a thought that mine is the joy of fear. Logan never felt fear. He will not turn on his heel to save his life. Who is there to mourn for Logan?--Not one.[6]

Washburn, in his study of Logan, has stated, "Logan's history is, in microcosm, the history of the Indian-white relationship."[7] The outline of the speech recapitulates a conventional pattern:

1. Initial befriending of the whites by Indians----
"Such was my love for the whites, that my countrymen pointed as they passed, and said, 'Logan is the friend of the white man.'"

2. Personal outrage against the Indians by frontier outlaws---
"Colonel Cresap, the last spring, in cold blood, and unprovoked, murdered all the relations of Logan, not even sparing my women and children."

3. Seeking of violent revenge by the Indians---
"This called on me for revenge; I have sought it: I have killed many: I have fully glutted my vengeance."

4. Formal retaliatory military expedition to "put down" the "Indian uprising" ---
"For my country I rejoice at the beams of peace. But do not harbor a thought that mine is the joy of fear. Logan never felt fear."

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[1] Lawrence Wroth, Dictionary of American Biography (New York, 1933). p. 392.

[2] Clark Wissler, Indians of the United States (New York, 1940). p. 119.

[3] Webster's Biographical Dictionary (Springfield, Massachusetts, 1943). p. 913.

[4] Wissler, p. 120.

[5] "Logan's Speech," in An American Primer, ed. Daniel Boorstin (Chicago, 1966). p. 60.

[6] Ibid., p. 62.

[7] Ibid., p. 63.

5. The defeat of the Indians, followed by their loss of land and spirit---
"Who is there to mourn for Logan?---Not one.

The earliest known copy of Logan's speech--first in manuscript and first published--was that of James Madison. On January 20, 1775, Madison wrote to William Bradford, his most intimate friend, the following letter. "I have not seen the following in print and it seems to be a just a specimen of Indian eloquence and mistaken valor, that I think you will be pleased with it." [8] Acknowledging the copy of Madison, Bradford wrote in reply:

> I thought it a pity that so fine a specimen of Indian eloquence and mistaken valor (which to use your justly call it) should languish in obscurity and therefore gave a copy of it to my brother who inserted it in his paper; from which it has been transcribed into the others and has given the highest satisfaction to all that can admire and relish the noble beauties of nature. I need make no apology for publishing what I suppose was not to made public. [9]

Madison's version of Logan's speech was published in the Pennsylvania Journal, the Bradford family newspaper, on February 1, 1774, under the heading "Extract of a letter from Virginia." It was republished in the New York Gazette on February 13, 1774. Meanwhile, on February 4, 1774, the Virginia Gazette published an altered and perhaps inferior version which has been called the first in print. In 1857, with the publishing of historical material in the American Archives, Logan's speech was included as it appeared in the Virginia Gazette of February 4. [10]

Thomas Jefferson recorded Logan's speech in his pocket account book from a copy given him by Lord Dunmore and translated by General Gibson. So striking and provocative was the speech that, according to Jefferson, "It became the theme of every conversation in Williamsburg." [11]

Jefferson published the speech in his Notes on Virginia to refute the assertions of the French philosopher Buffon, who argued, "There is something in the soil, climate and other circumstances of America, which occasion animal nature to degenerate, not excepting even the man, native or adoptive, physical or moral." [12] In rejecting this theory, Jefferson used Lonan's speech as evidence of the high talents of the aboriginies of the country.

The language of Logan's translated speech, with its overtones of biblical power and directness, made a strong impression on the people whose principal literary inheritance was the Bible. The impact of the speech was immediate. Jefferson's retelling of the story gave it further impetus. His account was widely reprinted in school readers throughout the last half of the 18th century and the first half of the 19th century. [13] When Logan's speech appeared in the early editions of Dr. William H. [illegible] McGuffey's Eclectic Fourth Reader, it was [illegible] millions of American school children. The incredible sales of the McGuffey Readers was estimated at more than 122,000,000 between 1836 and 1920. For years the speech was a required recitation piece for all children. [14]

The wide acceptance of Logan's speech by the white populace was doubtless due, in part, to the guilt felt by many people for the wrongs and injustices imposed upon this "noble savage." But with this acceptance came a controversy which was to remain strong fifty years after the death of Thomas Jefferson.

[illegible] arose from the allegation that Colonel Cresap killed Logan's family. In his Notes on Virginia, Jefferson referred to Cresap as "a man infamous for the murders he had committed on those much injured people." In 1797, when Jefferson was advancing toward the presidency, Cresap's son-in-law, Luther Martin, one-time radical who had become a Federalist leader, launched an assault on Jefferson for slandering "so brave defender of the country." [16] Martin offered evidence that a man named Captain Greathouse had lead the Yellow Creek massacre and that Cresap was not present. Martin's attack on Jefferson was presented via letters to newspapers. Jefferson held that the offensive tone and partisan purpose of Martin's letters to the press "forbade the respect of an answer," [17] and he refused to be drawn into a public controversy on the subject. But at the same time he set himself upon a two-year inquiry to search for first-hand evidence of the incidents of 1774. His findings confirmed that Martin's accusations were essentially correct. He found that there had been three sets of murders of Indians on the Ohio River near Wheeling. Cresap perpetrated the first two attacks, in one of which some of Logan's relatives were among the slain. Following the lead of Cresap, Daniel Greathouse lead a party of thirty-two which massacred Logan's family at Yellow Creek. Jefferson's refusal to exonerate Cresap on all counts kept the controversy alive as long as he remained in politics.

After Jefferson's death the controversy erupted every ten or twelve years, until 1867 when historian and critic of Jefferson, Brantz Mayer, disclosed that Jefferson had deliberately suppressed a letter given him in 1798, which not only denied Cresap's guilt in the Yellow Creek massacre, but held him blameless in the earlier killings. It has been suggested by author Irving Brant that Jefferson's ego was too large to admit his serious mistake. But, as Brant observes, "It is utterly immaterial whether Cresap or Greathouse led the party which slaughtered Logan's family; the fundamental guilt was where Jefferson placed it and was deeper than he claimed." [18]

The campaign to clear Cresap included a strong effort to discredit Logan. In 1867, Brantz Mayer wrote a book, titled, Tah-jah-jute, or Logan and Cresap, stating that Logan's speech was delivered to Dunmore's emissary, and not in council, Mayer found that:

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8 Irving Brant, James Madison--The Virginia Revolutionist, (New York, 1941), p. 282.

9 Ibid., p. 284.

10 Ibid., p. 284.

11 Boorstin, p. 60.

12 Ibid., p. 60.

13 Ibid., p. 62.

14 Ibid., p. 63.

15 Notes on the State of Virginia, (Chapel Hill, 1955), p.63.

16 Brant, p. [illegible].

17 Jefferson, p. [illegible].

18 Boorstin, p. 290.

I knew General [illegible], a brave, [illegible] child[illegible], he was one of the most artless and [illegible] the world and the last man on earth that would [illegible] a false statement of [illegible] events. He was a [illegible] good English scholar, with a remarkable memory, yet without any fancy or [illegible], [illegible] and observant [illegible] was [illegible].

But still the attack continued. John J. Jacob, in his book, A Biographical Sketch of the Life of the Late Captain Cresap, states, "Your Logan speech, your fine specimen of Indian oratory, is a lie, a counterfeit, and never in fact had any existence as a real Indian speech."[21] In 1903, M. Louise Stevenson, in a defense of Cresap, concluded that "It is high time that this 'conversation' should be eliminated from the school books..."[22] And in fact, it is rare to find the speech of Logan in the school books of the 20th century. Commenting on this, Washburn has stated:

> It is only in the present age, in which biblical rhetoric is lost amidst the blaring of 'commercials,' the elephantine obscurity of 'governmentese,' and the saccharine hypocrisy of social chit-chat, that Logan's prose is beginning to seem archaic, if it is remembered at all.[23]

On July 28, 1841, a group of pioneers and citizens of the Scioto Valley, meeting at Westfall, in Pickaway County, formed the Logan Historical Society. The purpose of the society was to:

> Perpetuate those principles of which Logan suffered the sneers of his red brethren, by the erection of a monument to his memory and by the careful collection, safe keeping, and lasting preservation, for the use of posterity, the many scattered but interesting fragments of the history of the early settlements of the Western country...[24]

Logan's speech was to be "fully engraved in quilt letters on said monument."[25] Other monuments were erected at Logan's presumed birthplace in Auburn, New York, and under the elm near Circleville, Ohio, where local tradition assumed his speech to have been made.

The character of Logan and his people is romantically described by Washington Irving in his Sketch Book. Irving, like Jefferson, rejected the theory of the Indian as being an inferior human and wrote:

> There is something in the character and habits of the North American savage, taken in connection with the scenery over which he is accustomed to range, its vast lakes, boundless forests, majestic rivers, its trackless plains, that is, to my mind wonderfully striking and sublime.
>
> This much can be said with certainty, authentic or

counterfeit," the remarks attributed to Logan have played a significant part in the drama of the Indian-white relationship in America. The final history bearing on Logan's address has not been written. My investigation, a preliminary study, hopefully sets the groundwork for further research.

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[21] Ibid., p. 63.

[22] Brant, p. 438.

[23] Ibid., p. 63.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

I.A. RICHARDS: RHETORICAL PROSPECTOR: THE MINER, HIS MINES, AND HIS METAPHOR

by

Richard S. Lucas, Graduate in Speech, Sacramento State College

A lifetime [illegible] with the [illegible] of human communication [illegible] Ivor Armstrong Richards to be both criticized and [illegible] with [illegible] feeling by a multitude of commentators.[1] In a recent book, W. H. N. Hotopf expresses the [illegible] that much of the criticism directed at Richards [illegible] understanding.[2] This failure of the critics [illegible] adequately Richards' work [illegible] the general [illegible] language [illegible] as [illegible] in the world [illegible]. The elusive [illegible] failure [illegible] scholar, [illegible] more lifetimes [illegible] Richards [illegible] required before this [illegible].

Any attempt [illegible] in Richards' [illegible] how to examine [illegible] attributable to him. Richards' [illegible] areas of knowledge [illegible].[3] I shall attempt a partial [illegible], examining his accomplishments as writer and teacher, probing those portions of his theory which bear directly on metaphor, and finally by closely scrutinizing his use of metaphor in one of his [illegible] talks.

Richards' sprawling body of writing includes numerous influential works as well as many articles in periodicals, both scholarly and popular.[4] The nucleus of this complex 'wordy' [illegible]anism, this written work of Richards, is, and has always been, his interest in poetry. It is not unusual for a poet to metamorphose into a critic, but Richards has reversed this and published his first book of poetry in 1958, at age [illegible].[5]

The impressive body of writing produced by Richards does not wholly account for the impact his life has had. His teaching activities and continual concern for education have also left their mark.

Writer and teacher - but more specifically critic, philosopher, psychologist, lecturer, professor, poet, playwright - all of these terms, and more, are needed to describe the career of I. A. Richards; and his influence in the fields of criticism and communication has been so widespread (and in some instances so subtle) that it will be impossible to map fully the effects for many years.

Our brief, exploratory probe of Richards' theory of metaphor should prove exciting, for Hotopf, who has spent "many years . . . in reading and critically appraising" his writings, finds them "thick with ideas."[6] For Richards, metaphor is a constitutive part of language and his view of metaphor is widely inclusive, the only prerequisite being the conjunction of two ideas, for:

> In the simplest formulation, when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word, or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their interaction.[7]

A rule for detecting metaphor introduces two of Richards' own terms used in his exposition:

> whether . . . a word is being used literally or metaphorically is not . . . an easy matter to settle. We may provisionally settle it by deciding whether . . . the word gives us two ideas or one . . . whether it presents both a *tenor* and a *vehicle* which cooperate in an inclusive meaning.[8]

The *tenor* is the underlying idea to which the *vehicle* lends some further characteristics. For example, in the statement, "*He was a lion in battle*,"[9] the tenor, the

---

[1] For example: C. I. G[illegible] recognizes Richards' keen [illegible] mind, his critical [illegible] that can [illegible] distinctions of meaning easily, and calls him a pioneer in new fields . . . unafraid to follow any trail of thought, however faint, no matter where it will lead," "I. A. Richards and the Science of Criticism," *Sewanee Review*, XLVI (Oct., 1938), 526-5[illegible]; while Eliseo Vivas views the other side of the coin when he accuses Richards of "dismissing as mere verbiage theories with which he disagrees and of bravely hacking at very difficult intellectual knots rather then patiently unravelling them," "Four Notes on I. A. Richards' Esthetic Theory," *Philosophical Review*, XLIV (July, 1935), 354-367.

[2] W. H. N. Hotopf, *Language, Thought and Comprehension*, Bloomington, Indiana 1965, p. 5.

[3] Stanley E. Hyman, *The Armed Vision*, (New York, 1947), p. [illegible].

[4] Some of the most well known are: with C. K. Ogden, *The Meaning of Meaning*, (1948); *Principles of Literary Criticism* (1929); *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, (1936); and *Interpretation in Teaching*, (1938).

[5] Richards' first book of poetry was *Goodby Earth and Other Poems*, (1958). He also has published *The Screens and Other Poems*, (1960) as well as two plays, *Tomorrow Morning, Faustus*, (1962), and *A Leak in the Universe*, ([illegible]).

[6] Hotopf, *Language*, p. [illegible].

[7] Richards, *Philosophy*, p. [illegible].

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 119 (italics mine).

[9] Daniel Fogarty, *Roots for a New Rhetoric*, (New York, 1959), p. 37.

underlying idea, is "man in battle," while the vehicle, "lion," lends certain lion-like characteristics to the idea of man in battle and the inclusive meaning is the result of the interaction between the two ideas.[10]

Metaphor is so vital because of what the mind does when confronted with ideas which belong to different "orders of experience" since:

> The mind is a connecting organ, it works only by connecting, and it can connect any two things in an indefinitely large number of different ways. Which of these it chooses is settled by reference to some larger whole or aim . . . In all interpretation we are filling in connections.[11]

The importance of metaphor, then, is due, in part, to the fact that its presence does not disrupt the usual mode of thought.

Richards holds that the "problem of communication" is one of obtaining "clear transmission" through a complex vehicle:

> How to obtain clear transmission is precisely the problem of communication. We have seen that it is a matter of availability of common experiences, the elicitation of these by a suitable vehicle, and the control and extrusion of irrelevant elements . . . through the complexity of the vehicle.[12]

Metaphor contributes to this complexity by the multiplication of contexts relevant to the underlying ideas. Richards points out that:

> In difficult cases the vehicle of communication must inevitably be complex. The effect of a word varies with the other words among which it is placed. What would be highly ambiguous by itself becomes definite in a suitable context . . . To this is due the superiority of verse to prose, . . . poetry being by far the more complex vehicle.[13]

Any attempt to examine Richards' practice in the light of his theory should start with his view of communication in which "a language transaction . . . may be defined as a use of symbols in such a way that acts of reference occur in a hearer which are similar in all relevant respects to those which are symbolized by them in the speaker."[14] Because no speaker and hearer can ever have identical "contexts," the symbolization must be complex enough to facilitate the desired interpretation by "making available common experiences," by the "extrusion of irrelevancies," and by the introduction of varied elements.[15] It is in these capacities that metaphor is expected to serve.

> Metaphor is a semi-surreptitious method by which a greater variety of elements can be wrought into the fabric of the experience. . . . What is needed for the wholeness of an experience is not always naturally present, and metaphor supplies an excuse by which what is needed may be smuggled in.[16]

The yeoman service which Richards exacts from metaphor piques the curiosity about what use the theorist might himself make of metaphor in communication.

In an attempt to satisfy this curiosity, a brief, exploratory analysis of the metaphor in Richards' communication was undertaken. The sample is a short talk "given in connection with the Harvard General Education programme," in February, 1947, entitled, "General Education in the Humanities" and was an explanation of a course on "Sources of our Common Thought."[17] We do not have information on the audience, except Richards' statement that the talk was addressed to an audience with a "special interest."[18]

The speaker's main, unexpanded thesis was that a general education should consist of the continual asking of the question, "What is a general education?." The use of metaphor in the talk expanded this thesis in several ways.

The first was through the introduction of common experiences. Moral obligation was linked to the quest for a general education; the individual was made an "eddy" in the water-shed of tradition, and the student was identified as a "make-the-grade examinee." The bringing in of reference to common experience was continued through the "Old Testament," "perfect spring weather," and the widespread American ideal of the "pursuit" of a goal. A concluding metaphor opened up many "contexts" by linking the "questioning" to the materialistic business world:

> But we cannot ask such a question in the void. It does no good to interrogate merely the words General Education. We must have materials - samples to examine - while remembering that it is our business to be examiners, not examinees. We must not let the routines and mechanics of the learning-teaching trade get in the way.[19]

All of these metaphors made available to the hearer many "contexts" with which almost any American audience would have had much experience. Of course, without some limiting of the "contexts" to those which are compatible with the speaker's purpose, this function of metaphor might be self-defeating.

This points to the importance of another function which metaphor performed in this talk, the "extrusion of irrelevancies." The possibility that the bearers might have resisted the thesis as individuals was lessened by three separate metaphors which tended to involve the individual hearer to a greater degree:

> Any man today has to fight for his moral life to get a good general education.
>
> . . . They are the chief tributaries of the river in which we, as individuals, are little whirls and eddies.
>
> . . . with planet-dweller's indifference.

---

10 Richards, Philosophy, p. 96.

11 Ibid., p. 124-5.

12 Richards, Principles of Literary Criticism, p. 188.

13 Ibid., p. 178-9.

14 Ogden and Richards, Meaning of Meaning, p. 205-6.

15 Richards, Principles of Literary Criticism, p. 180.

16 Ibid., p. 180.

17 Richards, Speculative Instruments, pp. 129-132.

18 Ibid., p. xii.

19 Ibid., p. 132.

Here the questioning (or quest) was made a moral issue in which the individual is submerged. Also, his bringing modern man's reputation for sophisticated indifference out in plain view made it a less desirable refuge.

Another metaphor added urgency to the thesis by linking the message of the Old Testament to the contemporary hearer as a player in the "perpetual human tragedy":

> The Old Testament . . . is an unparalleled exhibition of titanic questionings followed by wooden-minded formalism and miscomprehension. It enacts before us, on the grandest scale, the perpetual human tragedy - the transformation of originative inspiration into the neat note and devout observance of the make-the-grade examinee.[20]

Thus metaphor served to define the idealistic aspects of the thesis and then turned to the practical. The "business world" metaphor quoted previously was well suited to this purpose. The "vehicle" consisted of the practical, workaday, competitive values of economic enterprise and interacted with the underlying idealistic "quest" for a general education. The result was a limiting of the proper interpretation to the idea that if the quest were to be productive one would have to ask meaningful questions about valid samples.

Another facet of the use of metaphor which may be profitably examined concerns the "dependence of the effects upon one another."[21] One thread of interdependence was in Richards' use of the Old Testament. It was one source of Western Man's tradition in the "watershed" metaphor, an exhibition of "perpetual human tragedy" in the next, and an example of what general education is and is <u>not</u> in a third metaphor. Because the Old Testament holds a place of general esteem, the several uses of it were probably effective in controlling references about traditional, humanistic, and practical individual involvement.

In another sense, all of the metaphor used pointed toward the need for personal involvement in this questioning about general education. The issue of morality, the importance of tradition, the compromise of the "make-the-grade" student, the "pursuit" of the goal, the necessity of the "business" approach - the resultants of all these tenor-vehicle interactions emphasized the need for individual involvement.

It seems, then, that Richards' use of metaphor in this short talk made more complex, i.e., expanded, the thesis, by the introduction of common experiences, by the extrusion of irrelevancies, and by the control of interdependencies. The simple "questioning" became the complex message which made relevant "references" about moral obligations, tradition flowing from the ancients, the indifference of moderns, "the perpetual human tragedy," the "pursuit" of a goal, and pragmatic procedures subordinate to desirable ends."

I have not intended to convey the idea that Richards' practical use of metaphor was a conscious effort to fulfill the tenets of his theory. The myriad factors which impinge on the communication process legislate against the successful combination of theory and practice in any narrow, mechanistic manner.[22] What I have tried to convey in my brief examination of a talk by Richards is the idea that his use of metaphor does support his theory. If his view of language and thought as being essentially metaphoric is valid, it follows that the use of metaphor would tend to support his theory even when the speaker has never been exposed to that theory. If effective use of metaphor can result without knowledge of theory, where, then, is the value of detailed study of metaphor? Perhaps one basic value would be the awareness that metaphor plays a vital role in rhetoric, and is not simply "a sort of happy extra trick with words."[23] But Richards has staked out a larger claim:

> We must translate more of our skill in discussable science. Reflect be[illegible] what we do already so cleverly. Raise our implicit recogni[illegible] into explicit distinctions. As we do we find that all the questions that matter in literary history and criticism take on a new interest and wider relevance to human needs.[24]

Richards' full and productive life leaves exposed a rich out-cropping waiting to be worked. For the rhetorical prospector the exploratory assays are promising and exciting. The heaviest nuggets, however, (and the poke full of dust as well) are carried by calloused hands. Perhaps the prospectors outnumber the miners.

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[20] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 132.

[21] Richards, <u>Principles of Literary Criticism</u>, p. 180.

[22] Richards points this out in regard to the writing of poetry, and I believe it holds true (perhaps to a lesser degree) in persuasive prose. In his preface to <u>The Screens</u>, he writes: "What connections, if any, hold between a critic's theories about poetry and his practice when he professes as a poet? My own view has been that no such connections should be discernable. The duties of good critical theory . . . are analogous to those of a good police in a society as nearly anarchic as possible. Good theory is not there to tell the poet what he shall do, but to protect him from gangster-theories. . . . Critical theory does this best by observing the actualities of inspiration and composition. These I suggest, are complex enough to make inferences as to how a poet <u>should</u> write ridiculous." p. 7.

[23] Richards, <u>Philosophy</u>, p. 90.

[24] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 94-5.

RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF DRAMA: A CRITICAL AND CREATIVE PROCESS

by

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Most of the public and a great part of the literary world think of rhetoric pejoratively. A passage in a text is dismissed as "just rhetoric," or a poet's work is downgraded as "basically rhetorical." Rhetoric in literature is thought of as a collection of devices which are incidental to, and probably detract from, the work. In fact, rhetoric is a systematic tool which can be universally applied to both creation and criticism.

Rhetorical theory, assumes that creator both understands where his work is going and is in control of the process. From this assumption, it must be granted that interpretation lies within the text itself. Once this is established, it is obvious that it is unfair to look at the work with a preconceived idea of its meaning. That is the prerogative of the creator: the critic's responsibility is to discern the author's intention from the work as it develops, or,conversely, to be the ideal audience. The ideal audience brings to the text only the tools of reading. That is, he accepts the work as an entity and looks for the author's intention as the author develops it in time, not with the aid of hindsight or already established viewpoint.

One kind of literary criticism starts with a view of the overall work and works down to the level of the individual words only after the interpretation has been set. Where this approach leads is best evidenced by the continued misreadings, not of obscure works, but of King Lear, As You Like It and Coriolanus, of Keats, Wordsworth, and Coleridge, and Melville, Conrad, and Hawthorne. Obviously, it would be foolish to say that ten generations of literary critics are wrong about the most studied literature in the world. That is patently untrue, but what is true is that their interpretations are based on a methodology so individual and devious as to amount to little more than informed opinion. While the method becomes unnecessarily complex, the conventional approach is simple. The work (for the purposes of this paper I propose to treat only with drama) is read and considered as an entity. Some hypothesis is formed about it: its intent, its characters and their purpose, the reasons for the apparent structure, the overall "theme," and any other generalizations which seem workable. The hypothesis is then tested by looking for supporting and contradictory evidence within the text. The results vary. Sometimes the method works perfectly, and a comprehensive understanding of the text is reached by the critic--the play is nailed down without serious problems. However, sometimes the critic finds himself in the position of the early geographer who thought that the earth was flat; his hypothesis is wrong, but his intellectual ability is so great that he is able to construe the textual evidence so as to support his theory, and his incorrect interpretation becomes accepted.

An approach based on textual rhetoric, using both figures and structure, avoids the trap of starting with an hypothesis about the work. Instead it applies a methodology which is based on the nature of the genre and which can be applied universally. The only assumption necessary is that language in context is indicative of the author's intention. Or, conversely, that language in context is what affects the audience. Language, from the overview, can be misconstrued, but the assumption is that if the creator has control of the creation, the language says what he wants it to say from start to finish.

Rhetorical analysis of drama has two broad bases: character and structure. Unlike in conventional analysis, character comes first. Rhetorical analysis mirrors the creative process. From language, character is built; from the interaction of character comes structure; the structure contains the art. Implied in the language of a character in context is how he will act in a given situation. If the artist is to control the work, he must be sure that his characters are their language, that they do not contradict it.

When a character speaks in a certain way, whether in real life or on the stage, we make certain assumptions about him and about his relationship to other people. Thus, from her characteristic rhetoric, we can identify a character as the "Jewish Mother" because it has become a pure form, a convention. Similarly, there are many other conventional stances which we recognize immediately; the bully, the braggart, the simpering virgin, for example, have all become burlesque. Such textual analysis is based on the assumption that the rhetoric of complex, three-dimensional, "real" characters such as Edmund and Lear, Rosalind, or Coriolanus determines their character. In other words, the character of Edmund can be established immediately, not only by what he says or does; but by how he says what he says, in the first scenes in which he appears. Context is meaningful; hyperbole, per se, does not fix a character in a stance role, but the sum of characteristic figures does. Just as the rhetorical question can call forth the Jewish mother, and heroic litotes the bully, each figure implies both by its presence and by its absence, something about the character who uses it.

Rhetorical analysis is basically simple. A text is read closely for rhetorical figures, without direction or bias based on any concept of the work, but simply for identification and notation. There is no way to learn to discriminate the figures except by practice; theoretical definition and knowledge of the figures is useful only when solidified by practical application, since figures are not significant out of context. Once noted, figures fall into categories; some will recur continually. In every speech, both soliloquoy and dialogue, some will exist in dialogue consistently, some in soliloquoy only. Many figures will occur occasionally, but not in a pattern. Obviously the figures which are ubiquitous are basic to the character; they tell us something specific about him. So do figures which are absent. And if a character speaks one way in dialogue and another in soliloquoy, do we not suspect him of duplicity? In a glossary of rhetorical terms compiled and edited by Professors William J. Brandt and Leonard E. Nathan of the University of California at Berkeley, the

figures are divided into three broad categories: argumentative figures, tropes, stance figures. This glossary's emphasis is considerably different from that of classical rhetoric, but the terms are essentially the same. The method is primarily definition by operative function. Argumentative figures are self explanatory; they are primarily structural figures, and their function is to persuade; enthymeme, distributio, ratiocinatio, sententia, exemplum, analogy, and antithesis are familiar figures in the argumentative group. Tropes consist of terms which vivify language by exploiting some semantic discontinuity; for example, the familiar synecdoche, metonomy, simile, metaphor, and the less familiar abusio and translatio. The stance figures, last of all, are made up of those figures which determine the role of the character and lead the audience to a particular response. Typical stance figures are apostrophe, correctio, exclamatio, hyperbole, irony, litotes, paralipsis and others. In short, any figure which determines or clarifies the audience-speaker-play relationship is a stance figure. There are a great many other figures which cannot be placed anywhere because their effect varies too much with context. In fact, any figure, argumentative or trope can be a stance figure in context.

At this point in analysis, the figures have been identified and any apparent patterns noted. The next problem is to determine the implications of the figures and the patterns. When Jacques first enters in As You Like It and piles hyperbole on top of conventional hyperbole, isn't it possible to predict that he will eventually get inside a metaphorical barrel and listen to the reverberations of his "All the World's a Stage" speech? He fixes his character the moment that he opens his mouth, if we take the trouble to examine his rhetoric in relation to the other characters. Yet for years, Shakespearean actors have cleared their throats, stepped forward, and declaimed "All the World's a Stage" exactly as if it were the philosophical statement of the play, when in fact it is the ultimate in parody. Similar errors can occur whenever the literal meaning gives possible interpretive clues contrary to context.

Coriolanus was seen by the plebians in his play as a man of immense and all-consuming pride, a monument to insolent aristocracy. The plebians are clearly identified in the play as worse than cretins and completely without judgment or discretion; they equate the price of grain with civic virtue; they distribute all conduct into "for us or against us"; in short their rhetoric demonstrates the stance of militant self-gratification. Critics and performers persist in believing that the plebians are correct in their estimation of Coriolanus, the man. Examination of his rhetoric shows two characteristic figures. The first is abusio, the unmediated trope, which is vivifing language of the strongest type. The second is asyndeton, the simplest form of catalogue, a list. When he is in battle, Coriolanus' language has the ring of swords on shields; he is commanding and inspirational. When he is in a political situation, he is blunt, inarticulate, and conventional. Is this the language of a proud man, pride in the sense of the seven deadly sins? Or is it rather the language of a man who is lost when he is away from the arena which is his life, the language of a man conscious of his worth and his place, and painfully shy when he is away from his area? The tragedy is implicit in the character of Coriolanus as shown by his rhetoric, as in Shakespeare's immense statement about vox populi. But, if we see Coriolanus as proud only, the tragedy and the statement disappear and nothing is left but the narrative. The two brief examples hint at what can be done with rhetorical figures for the purpose of character determination. They are deliberately obvious, but it can be imagined what can be done with the truly complex characters such as Lear. The important point is that it can be done before the fact; before the plebians have had a chance to tell us that Coriolanus is overweeningly proud, we have determined that he is not simply that. There is no need to fit the evidence into a gestalt hypothesis, because we find Shakespeare's intention in the language.

The second half of the analytic process is rhetorical structure, which can be said to be an extension of the dictum that a banana peel which appears in the first act should be stepped on in the third. Two elements work together in structure; static elements such as Jacques in As You Like It, Glouchester in King Lear, and the plebians in Coriolanus are constants, not so much characters, as blocs of stance. Kinesthetic elements, Lear, Edmund, Rosalind, and Coriolanus undergo a change. Rhetorical structure is than, the reaction of the kinesthetic elements against each other and against the static, stance blocs. All of the larger figures are evident in structure. Antithesis is common; structural distributio is often used to establish hierarchy; structural enthymeme can be used to make the audience see a logical progression, and other figures can be used in similar ways. The kinesthetic relationship of Rosalind and Orlando reacts against the stance of Jacques; perception, stylized, is played off against the static stance of the court. In King Lear, Glouchester and Cordelia polarize the stance bloc, the stable axis of the play, around which the interaction of Lear, himself, and Edmund takes place. The point is that once character is established, once we know which characters are stance and can place them through the fundamental tool of the figurative analysis, we can form expectations and look for relationships implicit in the characters.

In Coriolanus, we find two fundamental stance blocs. Menenius has a triple role: he is the interlocuter between Coriolanus, the Tribunes, and the plebians; he is the stater of problems delivering the three knocks that traditionally herald the tragedy; and he is the suave foil to the painfully shy Coriolanus. The second stance bloc is the plebians, collectively. They can be characterized, "panem et circensem." Throughout the play, they demand pacification in the form of reassurance from the power structure that they are important. Their stance is established in the opening speech by one commoner when he states that Coriolanus is the chief enemy of the people because he thinks he is better than they are. The commoner's proof of this is his statement that Coriolanus is against the dole.

The fundamental question of the play is posed solely through the interaction of the two stances with the changing character of Coriolanus which is further played off against the stance of his mother. The play calls into question the validity of vox populi and at the same time the insanity of the equation: military success equals political competence. Without the knowledge of the stance and the character, the question cannot be posed; without the character analysis it is difficult to identify the stance. Looking at the play as a whole and working backwards to character, it is easy to go wrong about both the characters and the play. But, starting with the rhetoric of the individual, proceeding to the structural interaction, and ending with the play as a gestalt, it is hard to go wrong.

Briefly stated, that is the case for rhetoric as the tool for literary criticism, particularly drama. It is not necessary to point out the small adaptation necessary to make the two apply to the novel, the short story, and to poetry. In every genre there are at least two voices, the author and the speaker; no matter what the convention, they can never be one. All literature contains interaction conveyed by rhetoric and directed to an audience. The tool can be applied anywhere, and works anywhere, because it follows the development of the statement rather than moving backwards from the end product to the parts.

The final criterion for discarding conventional literary criticism is that it leads nowhere. The best of literary criticism makes only a statement about the work in question, and it is seldom an open-ended statement. That is, it may explicate beautifully, it may deal

definitively with the "what" of something, it may even answer the "why" and the "how", but it is not capable of translation into the creative process. All of the methods of critical study--examination of vocabulary, verb form studies, image cluster counting--are self limiting; they occur after the fact, in the same sense that political pundits can always tell us why X won the election after he has won it.

Rhetorical analysis is not subject to that limitation. It is as useful to the creator as it is to the critic. The author starts with intention, and using rhetoric, he has the means to implement it. The tools in terms of the figures are universal. The author is still free to invent. The critic has access to the same process, where the author began with his intention and used rhetoric to implement it the critic is able to begin with the rhetoric and follow the whole process of implementation to the author's intention. Aside from the obvious gains in simplification of methodology, this analysis forces an absolute integrity to the text on the part of the reader. It is an open-ended system: it works <u>from</u> intention for the author, giving him a method to control the creative process; it works <u>to</u> intention for the critic, enabling him to follow the creative process to intention.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF SUBSTANCE AND FORM IN RICHARD WHATELY'S LOGICAL PROOFS

by

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As numerous writers in the speech field testify, we are well aware that many of the ideas and beliefs adhered to in rhetoric today are directly traceable to the rhetorical theory of Richard Whately. Douglas Ehninger states that although Whately is "not the only force influential in shaping the theory found in most of our textbooks and courses" in argumentation today, "Whately's influence is certainly a major one--major enough to persist and to set the dominant pattern for nearly two centuries."[1]

Many of these writers also remark about the religious ends for which Archbishop Whately intends his Elements of Rhetoric. Wayland Parrish describes the book as an "ecclesiastical rhetoric"--"one which divides its attention almost equally between arming the pulpit orator for his task of demonstrating the revealed truths of religion to an unlettered congregation and equipping the Christian apologist who is called upon to defend his faith against the attacks of nonbelievers."[2] The implication of such statements is that there is a connection in some way between Whately's interest in religion, the subject matter with which he is dealing, and the rhetorical aids or forms he develops as a consequence of this interest. However, these statements for the most part stand relatively unsupported and neither the implied relationship of substance and form in Whately, nor the importance of this relationship is developed.

It is therefore the purpose of this paper to examine specific instances of the relationship between the substance[3] with which Whately is dealing, that is truth, and his proposed form[4] for dealing with the substance, that is elements of logic and rhetoric. Following this examination, the extension of this relationship to his concept of rhetoric as a whole and its modern implications will be explored.

I

First it is necessary to examine more closely the implications of Whately's interest in religion, before enumerating examples of the relationship between substance and form.

The basic assumption underlying statements which refer to the influence upon Whately's rhetoric of his interest in defending religion is touched on by the phrase "the revealed truths of religion." The truths of religion are revealed through nature as witnessed by the Scriptures. Intuitive truth exists in the nature of things and is immediately perceived through some inherent, and therefore God-given, faculty of the mind when one is confronted through direct experience, the memory, or the imagination with the evidence of such truths.[5] The resulting truths are absolute in the Platonic sense of that term. The truths of Christian religion as revealed through nature are thus perceived by the intuition. Consequently, the belief that truth for Whately is derived intuitively is the basic assumption underlying the statements by theorists attempting to evaluate Whately's rhetorical theory.

Although Whately does not state this assumption in the Elements of Rhetoric, that he does indeed believe that truth is derived intuitively is apparent in his discussion of the primacy of deduction over induction of his Elements of Logic.[6] Whately contends that the process of induction is made possible only by a previous deduction. The conclusion of this deduction he terms the "principal of adequacy" which in turn becomes the "Great Major Premise" or assumption behind all induction. This premise states that the instances taken as a sample are adequate to warrant an inference to the whole class. Thus, Whately's chain of reasoning is from intuitive evidence based on sensation, to intuitive truths formulated by innate or God-given and self-evident laws of reason, to the premises of a deduction which results in a conclusion that in turn justifies induction.

One of the most fundamental intuitive truths pertains to the constancy in nature. Whately states that it matters little whether this truth is learned or intuitive. However, if belief in the operation of a universal is learned, then it is the result of a series of experiences which when

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[1] "Campbell, Blair, and Whately Revisited," Readings in Rhetoric, ed. Lionel Crocker, et al. (Springfield, Ill., 1965), p. 373. See also Wayland M. Parrish, "Whately and His Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XV (February 1929), 58-79; James A. Winans, "Whately on Elocution," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXI (February 1945), 1-8; Oroville L. Pence, "The concept and Function of Logical Proof in the Rhetorical System of Richard Whately," Speech Monographs, XX (March 1953), 23-88; and Clarence W. Edney, "Richard Whately on Dispositio," Speech Monographs, XXI (August 1954), 227-234.

[2] Ibid., p. 366.

[3] By substance I am referring to a concept that is more basic or fundamental than specific subject matter or content. This concept underlies content. Substance as I shall use it refers to epistemological concerns--to the sources of knowledge and truth. The basic or underlying subject matter with which any rhetorical theory must deal is a definite belief as to how we can or perhaps cannot know that a statement is true or certain.

[4] By form I am referring to what might be termed method, technique or structure.

[5] C. W. Edney, "George Campbell's Theory of Logical Truth," Speech Monographs, XV (1948), 20-24.

[6] Richard Whately, Elements of Logic (Boston, 1856), pp. 257-258.

used as a basis for reasoning result in a conclusion by induction. Whately could not then make his statement that deduction is primary to induction. If, on the other hand, the operation of a universal is a truth arrived at intuitively, then it is the result of immediate perception by the mind of that truth. Because intuitive truths compose the original premises from which all others are inferred, the existence of a constancy in nature is the basis of the premise of a deduction. Deduction is then primary to induction. Therefore, in order to argue the primacy of deduction, Whately must believe that knowledge of the constancy of nature is an intuitively derived truth. Substance for Whately is, then, intuitive truth.

II

The problem remains of illustrating the relationship of substance, which I have established as intuitive truth, and form or the method of proving these truths. Because of a limitation on time and space, the illustrations are chosen only from among Whately's logical proofs. The proofs to be discussed include: (1) His classification of arguments in general, (2) the subdivisions of induction, argument from example and arguments from analogy; and (3) testimonial evidence.

Whately divides arguments into two classes: arguments a priori and "other." In an a priori argument the premises account for the conclusion of that instance or if granted. Within the "other" class fall arguments in which the premises, even if granted, do not account for the conclusion. For example Whately uses in the Elements of Rhetoric to explain the distinction between the two classes of proof: "A murder is ordered imputed to anyone on the grounds of a hatred for the deceased or an interest in the death of the deceased. In such a case the argument belongs to the former or a priori class. The person's guilt or the conclusion is admitted and the grounds serve to account for that conclusion or, in other words, explain how he could commit the murder. Therefore, the argument is from cause to effect. If however, the grounds are that he has blood on his clothes, then the conclusion is not accounted for, and the argument belongs to the "other" class.[1]

The second class of arguments he divides into argument from sign and argument from example. Arguments from sign combine both cause to effect and effect to cause. His illustration is that "A fever is considered at its first introduction, as adverse to religion. Godliness is likely to be decried at its first introduction as adverse to religion. Therefore, every one that is likely to be decried at its first introduction as adverse to religion" (pages 86-87). Argument from sign he explains as being "from effect to condition. In the example cited for argument from cause to effect, the spot of blood on the clothes of the accused is arguing from sign (page 53).

To be noted first of all, Whately quite obviously substitutes the term "Other" for the term a posteriori, which is used by Aristotle for this second class of arguments. The classification a posteriori concerns matters after the fact. Such arguments state that a cause operates because of an observed effect. Rather than establishing the reason for the being of the fact, they establish the reason for acknowledging the belief of the fact. Whately, however, is not primarily interested in establishing that a thing is true. A belief in intuitive truth precludes philosophy's ever being able to prove true. The term a posteriori implies a basis in experience. Whately's use of the term would have implied that perhaps there is truth that is learned and is therefore the result of experience, rather than a priori truth that is intuitively derived. Thus there is a direct relationship between substance or his belief in intuitive truth and form or his classification of the second kind of argument as "other." The form used is chosen in light of the substance for which it is intended.

The second area of general consideration, argument from induction, Whately further subdivides into argument from example and argument from analogy. Within his classification of argument from induction, the relationship of substance and form is seen in his omission of a discussion of causation and his criteria for judging the effectiveness of such an argument. Although Whately deals extensively with causation in his discussion of a priori argument and argument from sign, he does not relate causation to induction. To do so would be to view the conclusions of induction as predictions. However, Whately's truths, having been established prior to the inductive process, do not allow for prediction. He is only interested in proving or establishing these intuitive truths. He looks back almost exclusively to the moment of revelation, rather than to the future. Again the substance influences the form, resulting in the omission of a discussion of causation within induction.

Whately's criteria for testing induction or argument from example include sufficiency (pages 88-90). Sufficiency means that the number of objects or instances taken as a sample is adequate as evidence to warrant the conclusion. Outside of Whately's system, sufficiency has no boundaries. No definite number is too many and no definite number is too few. Being so ambiguous, sufficiency can function only to grant that one generalization is weaker or stronger than another, depending upon the number of examples in the sample. Therefore, determining a sufficient sample is essentially a matter of judgment based on common sense--something within man that tells him the sample is sufficient. This notion of a basis in common sense comes close to Whately's notion of a basis in intuitive truth. The number of examples used in an induction is sufficient for Whately because the induction is preceded by a deduction, based on the intuitively derived truth that there is a constancy in nature and stating in its conclusion that the number of examples in the induction is sufficient to warrant the conclusion. Thus, sufficiency for Whately is no longer ambiguous but is instead definite. Whately is saying in essence that a sufficient number of examples is the number of examples that is sufficient, intuitively. One's God-given faculty of mind tells him what number is sufficient. Therefore, Whately's choice of sufficiency as a criterion for induction again illustrates the influence of substance on form.

The second subdivision of argument from induction is argument from analogy. In argument from analogy, the analogue is more remote from the case in point than in the former. Whately distinguishes further between these two classes by pointing out that resemblances in example are direct and concrete, while in analogy they are more abstract--the analogue and case in point only standing in similar relations to other things. He contends that the further removed the analogue from the case, the more effective is the analogy (pages 90-92).

An examination of his definition reveals that Whately's argument from analogy is similiar to what is now referred to as figurative analogy in which things of different classes are compared. He does not, however, distinguish between figurative analogy and literal analogy in which things of the same class are compared. It would even be possible, according to Whately's definition, to place literal analogy within argument from example. In addition to this omission, Whately takes an opposing stand to the conventional belief that the closer the analogue to the case the more

[1] Richard Whately, Elements of Rhetoric, (Louisville, Gretter, 1846), pp. 46-47. Subsequent page references will appear in the text.

effective the analogy.[8]

Whately bases both his definition of analogy and his criterion for the effectiveness of an analogy on an intuitive truth--the constancy of nature. This intuitive truth is demonstrated more forcefully by a comparison between different classes than by a comparison within the same class. In like manner, the more remote the analogue to the case, the more forceful the argument because the basic intuitive truth is more clearly demonstrated. Thus, an egg and a seed bear a like relation to the future nestling of a bird and a young plant, but also and more effectively to the parent bird and the old plant (pages 90-91).

Conventionally, analogy, and especially figurative analogy, is considered to be less rigorous than other forms of reasoning. However, Whately places analogy as a separate form of argument and gives great weight to its value. Again, these principles are the result of Whately's belief that analogy is a clear demonstration of an intuitive truth. Again, the form of the proof, this time of analogy in its definition, its criterion, its emphasis and its worth, is directly influenced by substance or intuitive truth.

The last area to be considered is that of testimonial evidence. Whately removes testimony from inartistic proofs, where it is placed by Aristotle, and gives it new status by making it a species of sign. He contends that the existence of testimony can be taken as a mark or indication of the event referred to, since testimony is a direct consequence of the event attested to.

A matter of fact is something which might conceivably be submitted to the senses, and about which there can be no disagreement among persons present. Thus, if the witnesses are confronted with the same facts they cannot by definition disagree. Therefore, testimony is a sign that an event occurred (pages 58-59).

In his work Historic Doubts Whately attempts to show in what way the Scriptures as testimony may be regarded as providing valid historical evidence for Christian beliefs or intuitive truth.[9] This he does by interpreting testimony in light of his purpose.

III

Thus, Whately's conclusions concerning his general classification of arguments, argument from example and argument from analogy, and testimonial evidence are the result of the relationship of substance or intuitive truth and the form taken by his logical proofs. The extension to Whately's entire concept of rhetoric of this relationship results in what has been termed a managerial rhetoric. Rhetoric for Whately is "the finding of suitable arguments" and their "skillful arrangement" in order to prove for someone else a truth arrived at through the intuition and before the process of rhetoric begins (page 40). Thus, rhetoric manages the materials used in support of a previously derived truth. Invention in Aristotle's rhetoric entails the discovery of matter, or what is to be said, and is distinct from disposition, which entails deciding how best it can be said. Within Whately's system, however, invention is reduced to the finding of forms, or the means by which truth may be established, and becomes fused with disposition or the arrangement of these forms. Douglas Ehninger states that Whately brings "together invention and disposition and welds them into one general body of doctrine directed toward teaching how the a priori conclusions of the Christian orator or disputant may be impressed upon others."[10]

In light of the relationship of substance and form in Whately's theory and the major influence of his theory on today's rhetoric, what is needed is a re-examination of the direct applicability of his concepts today. Much of Whately's theory may still be of use. However, the conclusions of many of today's epistemological concerns, or the search for the sources of truth, differ radically from Whately's epistemological conclusions, and if any of the forms proposed by Whately in use today include forms affected by his belief in intuitive truth, then they may no longer be applicable.

At a more general level, the evidence of a relationship between substance and form in Whately substantiates the absolute necessity for the consideration of a rhetorician's epistemological concerns in conjunction with a consideration of his rhetorical theory. These concerns involve discovering a rhetorician's definition of such concepts as knowledge and truth, determining his sources for the criteria by which to judge evidence, and establishing the relative probability of the conclusions reached from these ultimate premises. A rhetorical theorist's concept of the origin of truth is at the most fundamental level the substance with which he is dealing, and it influences to a great extent the form his theory takes. In addition, it is only through a consideration of epistemology that we arrive at the relationship between a specific rhetorical theory and truth. If rhetoric is not involved with the discovery of truth, but is solely the form for transmitting, proving, or clarifying the truth, then we have the problem of justifying and defending an art that is simply instrumental in nature and which is of use only in addressing those who do not have cognitive ability adequate to grasp the truth.[11]

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8 Jack Ray and Harry Zavos, "Reasoning and Argument: Some Special Problems and Types," Perspectives on Argumentation, ed. Gerald R. Miller et al. (Chicago, 1966), p. 97.

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10 In Crocker; et. al., pp. 360-361.

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