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ABSTRACT

The Chicago Youth Development Project was an action-research program jointly undertaken by the Chicago Boys Club and the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research to test whether a program of aggressive street work and community organization in the core of a city could reduce delinquency among youth living there. The report presents a comprehensive account of what was actually done and with what effect, providing the most complete and objective information obtainable, demonstrating to what degree this kind of program can achieve its goals and suggesting what improvements are needed for an even greater impact. The study compares the effects, over five years, of the program in two inner city areas with comparable control areas nearby on such variables as delinquency rates, youth employment rates, school attendance, and adults' satisfaction with their community. The researchers conclude that the project made negligible impact on these respects, but that when boys' expectations of their eventual educational attainment were raised, their delinquency declined. Based on this finding, the researchers suggest that effective future programs will concurrently open educational and vocational opportunities and prepare youngsters to grasp them, fashioning new ways for some adolescents to be students. (Author/AJ)

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EXPERIMENT IN THE STREETS: The Chicago Youth Development Project

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by
Martin Gold
Hans W. Mattick
and the
Staff of the Project


a Report to
The Ford Foundation
The W. Clement and Jessie
V. Stone Foundation
United States Department
of Labor

INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH
Research Center for
Group Dynamics
Program on Children,
Youth and Family Life

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the number who got jobs (but not the number who kept jobs). Project was not successful in diverting apprehended offenders in the experimental areas from the juvenile justice system.

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Preface

I

The Chicago Youth Development Project was an action-research program jointly undertaken by the Chicago Boys Club and The University of Michigan Institute for Social Research. It was intended to test whether a program of aggressive street work and community organization in the core of one of America's great cities could reduce delinquency among youth living there.

During the six years of its activity, literally thousands of boys, hundreds of girls and thousands of adults came into direct contact with the Project. Hundreds of boys and their parents were interviewed, as well as scores of community leaders; thousands of records were collected from police and court files. The action-research design addressed such questions as: Was there any detectable effect on the environment in which the Project worked? Did delinquency and its attendant problems abate? What change can be attributed to all the effort? Or did the social process grind on unperturbed?

But this is no soap opera or pulp mystery. We want to tell our readers at once what to expect. Ours is no stunning success story. It has no heroic ending and is not likely to inspire any but the dauntless and the dogged and the stubborn. Briefly, juvenile delinquency did not plummet down; it hardly dwindled at all. The data indicate the CYDP had some limited but tangible success in reducing delinquency. Further, the data suggest why the Project had this effect and among which boys, and thereby they provide some specific guidelines for further effort.

This report on the work of a juvenile delinquency prevention project is almost unique in that it presents a comprehensive account of what was actually done and with what effect. Its nearest counterpart in that respect is the celebrated Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study (Powers and Witmer, 1951). Too often, a great deal of time, money and energy is invested in a delinquency prevention or community action program and at most only an impressionistic rendering of incomplete and inadequate testimony survives as some description of what happened. This report provides the most complete and objective information obtainable

on a street work and community organization project designed to prevent juvenile delinquency. It demonstrates to what degree this kind of program can achieve its goals and suggests what improvements are needed for an even greater impact.

II

A decent regard for our fellow-man and history requires the more general acknowledgment of the contributions of our main collaborators and colleagues, for without them the Chicago Youth Development Project would have been just another delinquency project of the kind whose number were legion in the 1960's and which, for the most part, are buried like unknown soldiers in unmarked graves.

To begin with essentials, Mr. David R. Hunter, Mr. Dyke Brown, and Mr. Paul Ylvisaker of the Ford Foundation are to be thanked for the initial vote of confidence they extended to the idea that an action-research enterprise like the CYDP was feasible--a judgment that led to a grant of \$1,225,000 to the Chicago Boys Clubs and the Institute for Social Research at The University of Michigan. Similarly, Mr. W. Clement Stone of the W. Clement and Jessie V. Stone Foundation, is to be thanked for adding \$174,000 to the initial grant and coming to the rescue of a faltering research effort. Still later, the U.S. Department of Labor Manpower Administration contributed \$10,500 toward partial support of the reporting phase. Without the provision of this material base, and the moral support it represents, there would have been no project and no report.

In the role of "Elder Statesmen" and wise counselors, Ronald Lippitt and Joseph N. Clemens were pre-eminent. Lippitt was the Program Director at the Institute under whose general supervision the research effort went forward. His advice was invariably valuable and generously offered; moreover, it was delivered with such consummate social skill that differences of intellectual orientation resulted in far more light than heat. Clemens was the Executive Director of the Chicago Boys Clubs for the greater part of the period during which the CYDP was active. He was a man who knew and understood the forces at play in Chicago during the 1960's, and had more than a premonition that a project like the CYDP could be disturbing to the relatively peaceful accommodation worked out

among and between the social agencies and the political establishment of the city. Yet, when "times of trouble" came--and they did come--he stood fast, defending his agency and the delinquency project that those who were disturbed by it did their best to define as delinquent. In Chicago parlance, "he was a stand-up guy when the chips were down," and without him the CYDP would have been "torpedoed" as a "militant trouble-maker." This characterization of the CYDP was ludicrous, on the face of it, to anyone who had the slightest inkling of what radicalism means, but it is the style of in-fighting that takes place between an entrenched complacency with the status quo and an attempt at innovation that threatens to make some inroads: as the late, and honored, Joseph D. Lohman used to admonish would-be reformers in Chicago, "If you fight the Beast, you should not be surprised if the Beast fights back."

The "flywheels" of the day-to-day operations of the CYDP, on both the action and research sides of the project, were: Hans W. Mattick, Frank J. Carney, Earl F. Doty, John L. Ray and Nathan S. Caplan in Chicago, and Martin Gold at the Institute in Michigan.

Carney's formal title was "Associate Director of Extension Work," but he was known throughout the CYDP areas, and beyond, as "the street-work supervisor." He had previously done streetwork for the Hyde Park Neighborhood Youth Club in Chicago and was very wise in the ways of the street. Both the streetworkers that he supervised and the "kids" in the area constantly tested his knowledge and insight, and usually they lost. He could "outplay" them all, but won with grace, and seldom lost a friend in the process. He presented a rather roughhewn exterior and spoke with a marked Chicago "accent," but he had an intellectual bent of the most wide ranging and disparate interests. On a typical supervision trip through the CYDP areas at night, he and Mattick would stop and talk to various groups of youngsters in order to track down the workers and exchange information. Interspersed between the discussions of the project business were expositions on the theories of Kenneth Burke, criticisms of National Training Laboratory methods, and a reasoned argument on the relationship between female circumcision customs and the rise of the Mau-Mau movement in Africa. He is an incredible phenomenon and a fine human being.

Doty bore the title of "Associate Director of Community Organization," and a first-class community organizer is what he was. He had

been a high school teacher in an inner-city school and, later, a vocational and rehabilitative counselor. He had the social skills to communicate effectively across the entire social structure, from welfare mother to corporation president, with the youthful and adult of both sexes, and persons of all ethnic origins. He struck a neat and diplomatic balance between helping people to help themselves and guiding their efforts along the most productive channels. He was a "man on the go," for long hours at a time, for not only did he have business with the 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. world of the agencies and bureaucracies, but also with the 6:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. world of community residents. He developed a keen perception of those agencies and individuals whose relationship to the local community was essentially parasitic, i.e., those who wanted to live off the fact that people have problems and who work to maintain, rather than solve, those problems. Nevertheless, he muted his criticisms in the interest of trying to bring them into a more productive relation with the community and its problems. He had the capacity to work selflessly in the interest of others, and most of those with whom he came into contact during those years were the better for it--sometimes despite themselves.

John Ray was the "Outpost Supervisor." (The Outpost was a building that formerly served as a fire station, with a large space on the ground floor where the fire engine formerly sat and a series of sleeping rooms and a lounge on its upper floor; that is, it was wonderfully flexible and suitable as an informal facility in which a variety of youth activities could go on simultaneously.) Ray had been a streetworker for several years, before CYDP was organized, in what came to be called the "Horner Pilot Project." He was an unassuming but prepossessing man who exuded a quiet charisma. With the passage of time he came to know, and in turn was known by, literally thousands of young people in and around the CYDP areas. He was like a man born to the vocation: a streetworker par excellence. He was extremely sensitive and perceptive in complex human situations, dealing with problems large and small, chronic and acute, in a physical environment that fairly hummed with activity. While a small dance (40 people) was in progress on the ground floor, he would have two or three separate "social clubs" holding meetings in rooms on the upper floor, while he conducted a floating bull session in the lounge; and all the while (with the help of another streetworker and four or five

informal "assistants") everything was under reasonable control. Over the years a wide variety of interested people came to observe the Outpost and Ray in action, but whether the visitors were Nelson Algren or Senator Percy, Studs Terkel or W. Clement Stone, a group of Soviet functionaries from the Moscow Ministry of Justice or a television team from a national network, Ray was unflappable. He handled them as if they were simply another of his "boys" or "social clubs," and with consummate skill. He was a "natural" and a father-brother-best friend figure to hundreds of boys.

Nathan S. Caplan was the "Associate Director of Research," the psychologist in charge of the research team in Chicago. He had formerly been the Chief Psychologist at the Cuyahoga (Cleveland) County Juvenile Court in a clinical capacity and welcomed the opportunity to participate in a hard-nosed, "hard data," empirical research project. He was intelligent, creative and hard-working. He found himself "surrounded" by sociologists and anthropologists, to say nothing of the social and political processes of the city that complicated the life of the researcher. While he held his own in the interminable methodological discussions that accompanied the research task, his psychological orientation was partially transmuted. On the side, as a form of recreation and catharsis, he was a competent artist, and this too was fed into the research effort in the form of using artistic media to influence the behavior and attitudes of inner-city boys. Caplan's parents doted on his young family and frequently came to Chicago to visit him. Almost invariably, just before or during their visit, a spectacular street crime would take place--a dead gangster would be found in the trunk of an auto, or some section of the city would explode into a riot. Baffled and concerned, his parents would ask, "Nathan, why is being a psychologist so hard? Why didn't you study for an easy job--like a lawyer?" No doubt, Caplan often asked himself the same question during the years of the CYDP; but he stuck to his last, making major contributions to the research design, and supervising the research assistants and field teams in a complex task under difficult conditions.

Matlick is now the Director of the Center for Research in Criminal Justice and a Professor at the University of Illinois Chicago Circle Campus. He began his relationship to the CYDP in the position of "Field

Director of Research." As such, he freely advised the first "Action Director," Donald E. Hamilton, during the year that Hamilton held that position; but such advice was always tendered as a suggestion, on a "take it or leave it" basis, for as Field Director of Research he had no "real responsibility" for the action program: whatever the Action Director decided to do, that would be grist for the evaluative research mill. As fortune would have it, however, Hamilton resigned after a year, and Mattick, who was made Director of the entire project, was suddenly placed into the ambivalent situation of having his future efforts "evaluated" by a research design he had helped formulate. There was now some reason to regret having been so free with advice in the past and having to live with the consequences of having had much of it adopted. But there was no help for it; while, as Director of the CYDP, there was an opportunity to reorganize some aspects of the action program, the research design was already in the process of implementation and would have to be endured. Under his leadership the action side of CYDP, like the research side, became predominantly social-psychological in character, with some ancillary roots in pragmatic philosophy and city politics. Its intellectual ancestors were Charles S. Pierce, John Dewey, George H. Mead, and Frank Tannenbaum.

Martin Gold, now a Program Director at the Institute for Social Research, was the Research Coordinator from beginning to end of the CYDP. He maintained the momentum that finally brought this report to completion. Over the years Gold produced a series of penultimate drafts and sent them to Mattick, who offered more or less extensive commentaries, suggestions for additional materials, and some substantive and ideological criticisms. Gold was, however, the final arbiter of materials to be included and excluded in the text, since he had been far more insulated from the action programs of the CYDP. This is not to say that some of the others were not helpful in the period after the phase-out of the action programs, late in 1966; it is to point out who carried the main burdens and who bear the responsibility of authorship.

III

It remains to say something, both more general and more specific, about the Chicago Youth Development Project as a syncretic enterprise

that was a complex unity. All together about eighty persons played important roles in the day-to-day affairs of the CYDP, for greater or lesser periods of time during the life of the project. Of these, about twenty had a predominant allegiance to the Chicago Boys Clubs and about ten had a predominant allegiance to the Institute for Social Research, although all thirty devoted a part of their time to the CYDP. The remaining fifty persons could be conceived of as the "core staff" of the CYDP, for whom the project was the primary reference group. The core staff consisted of the streetworkers (20), the community organizers (9), the research assistants (10), the directorate (7), and a supporting secretarial and clerical staff (13). The discrepancy is accounted for by "transfer" between categories and promotions. Not all of these can be named here, although all were essential to the project during their tenure. Those who played the more important roles (the twenty-five with the longest tenure and best performance) have been named, and their work has been described in some detail, elsewhere (Carney, Mattick, and Callaway, 1969; Mattick and Caplan, 1964).¹ The entire "gang," whether "core" or "fringe," judged as a whole, were a remarkable and dedicated group.

In the final analysis, however, it was the streetworkers and community organizers who were the proletarian infrastructure on which the entire CYDP superstructure was based. What can be said, on their behalf, to explain their lives in a parting gesture? Their lives were, literally, not their own. Charisma, empathy, improvisation and reciprocity were the tools of their trade. Long hours, interrupted schedules, impossible demands and serious dilemmas were their lot. Despite their training, supervision and support, each experienced times of triumph or despair for which no one could have prepared them. Veterans of a thousand rendezvous with destiny--"hanging on the corner"--involving an infinity of human encounters and interactions--"out-playing the players"--how can one communicate that style of life to the cloistered classes who read books? Would it be sacrilegious of us, in either a secular or sacred sense, to describe them as remote descendants of Socrates or

¹A collection of Daily Activity Reports and other CYDP papers are on deposit in the Archives of the Manuscript Division, Chicago Historical Society.

Christ, engaged in a dialectics of the streets with the young men in a modern Agora, or preaching a different doctrine to their disciples and the multitudes? But Socrates and Christ were killed by an apprehensive status quo. Too often, those who merely want to help--or, at least, to minimize harm--are misperceived as Blanqui planning a street insurrection, or Che Guevera leading the peasants in revolt. But considering the magnitude of the problems that they faced, they were really more like the protagonist of Death of a Saleman, "out there on the horizon with a shoe shine and a smile," trying their best to deal with the tasks "that come along with the territory." In twentieth century, inner-city, urban Chicago, it was no longer necessary for an apprehensive status quo to resort to drastic measures: left to their own devices, the CYDP streetworkers and community organizers would have worked themselves to death. Driven by a mad Till Eulenspiegel disguised as an even madder Captain Ahab, they drove the Beast before them, across uncharted urban seas, and like Moby Dick, it turned on them; but they survived like Ishmael.

March 20, 1974 (Vernal Equinox)

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CHAPTER 1

History and Prospectus

There are those who believe that men are the victims rather than the masters of history; for massive social forces have their own inner logic, beyond our individual ken or collective control. The glacier of history, they say, moves inexorably, forcing changes, posing problems and rendering the world essentially ungovernable by what a vain humanity calls rationality. Are the efforts we make to give direction, not merely to our own lives, but to our communities, our nations, our civilizations, in vain? Shall we finally come around to Voltaire's Panglossian philosophy that this world, such as it is, is the best of all possible worlds--meaning the only possible state of affairs; that what we must do--because it is all we can do--is each to occupy his own small space and there make his garden grow?

There are others who conceive of life as a struggle, who will not settle for a narrow complacency, nor will they acquiesce in their own victimization or that of others. Those who undertook the project we report on here found it hard to be complacent in the midst of cruel conditions. They plunged into a whirlpool of economic poverty, political powerlessness and social deprivation. All the flotsam and jetsam of human victimization were present: unemployment, racial conflict, crime, and exploitation; inadequate schools, housing, health, legal and other social services; and all these conditions pressed their imprint especially on the young people. Those who chose to intervene could have extricated themselves had they wished to do so; the problems were directly theirs only because they chose to make them theirs. But to turn away would have been to let fall a commitment they had taken up to address some of these problems and to try to wrestle them down.

They were in the beginning the small staff of the new Henry Horner Chicago Boys Club and the executives in the central office to whom they were

responsible. Their work began in spring of 1956, when they first occupied a basement office in the newly opened, not yet completed Henry Horner public housing project on the near west side of Chicago. Construction on their Boys Club building, to be located at one edge of the high rise housing development, had hardly begun. But introduction of the program could not wait for the building to open. Conditions were miserable in the housing project and the surrounding neighborhood; indeed, they were becoming dangerous.

About 3500 people had already moved into apartments in the project, all of them quite poor, most of them black, few of them from the neighborhood. About 2000 children were among them, few of them knowing each other or their neighborhood. Construction was continuing on 750 more apartments which were in the period of six years to bring in 3800 more people.

And already the near west side was one of Chicago's worst areas. Demographic data generated the usual indices of social disorganization: a high proportion of broken families; a high proportion of families on public assistance; dilapidated and crowded housing; extremely low incomes; mixed residential and industrial land use; and among the highest adult and juvenile arrest rates in the city. A cursory look around confirmed the cold data: dingy streets, sagging porches, broken windows, littered lots, kids and adults gathered on the sidewalks at all hours of the day and night.

The "project people" were viewed by their neighbors as aliens, thrust upon them by City Hall, and they and their massive new buildings were considered fair prey. One project mother told a Boys Clubs worker that she could not send her 10-year old daughter to the store for bread because the child would have the small change taken from her by roaming gangs of boys before she got there. The Chicago Housing Authority was facing a serious problem of vandalism to its buildings.

The advice spread in Chicago that it would be wise to keep one's car doors locked and windows closed when driving through the streets near the Henry Horner project to prevent being pirated, and to observe special cautions when stopping for traffic lights.

The situation was such that the Welfare Council of Metropolitan Chicago urged the Boys Clubs to begin working in the area before the Henry Horner Boys Club building was completed. The Chicago Housing Authority made storage rooms available as club rooms in the basements of several occupied high rise apartment buildings. For the agency's part, working without a building, while not the usual Boys Club style, had precedents in Chicago. Indeed, the Chicago Boys Clubs had had

some experience with workers operating on the streets of the south side of the city, in its Woodlawn Club area, trying to do something there about the troublesome behavior of boys who would not come into the Woodlawn Club building program.

The experience with street work in the Woodlawn Club area set a pattern for Chicago Boys Club operations which had implications for program development in the Henry Horner area, so it is well to describe that pattern here. The Boys Clubs of America typically operates a building-based program. Participants are granted access to buildings and programs by the payment of modest annual membership dues. Inside, they find facilities for sports and hobbies, and adult leadership. Youngsters (mostly but not exclusively boys) participate as individuals or in club groups. There are also programs which extend beyond the building, the most extensive of which is summer camping opportunities. But the Boys Clubs also provides vocational training in cooperation with local industries and businesses, grants scholarships for higher education, and meets youths' needs in many important ways.

The characteristics of the traditional Boys Clubs program that should be stressed here is its open but relatively passive receptivity. Recruitment of members is ordinarily limited to advertisements in the mass media. Boys come to the Boys Clubs; the agency does not reach out aggressively after them. But this mode of operation does not seem adequate when the youngsters believed to need the program, for their sake and for the sake of their communities, are disinclined to present themselves at the Boys Clubs' open door. In the area of the Woodlawn Club, it appeared that this condition prevailed. The most troublesome boys did not join the Boys Clubs. It was the same situation that Shanahan and Dunning (1942) had described for Chicago in the '30's: delinquent boys avoided traditional recreational agencies. So the Woodlawn Club staff had determined to reach out beyond their club building and had established the role of extension worker for that purpose. This was the pattern adopted in the Henry Horner area.

Responding to the urging of the Welfare Council, a small Boys Club staff began programming in basement rooms, outdoor playspace, and on the streets surrounding the Henry Horner development. Cressy Larson, the director of the fledgling club, recognized that the situation called

for more than a recreation program; that for the sake of the children and the neighborhood generally, the problems of conflict and danger needed to be dealt with. So he proceeded on two fronts, both of which eventually became institutionalized in the organization of CYDP. On the one hand, street work with gangs of boys was undertaken by Jay LaFoe. On the other, Larson himself began to organize the parents and other adults into floor, building, project and block clubs for the purposes of self-help and neighborhood integration. (Later assuming LaFoe's role as extension worker was John Ray, who carried the effort into CYDP. Lincoln Blakeney took up Larson's task of community organization when Larson had to assume the administration of a Club building; Blakeney later succeeded to Larson's directorship of the Henry Horner Boys Club and provided continuity into CYDP from that position.) Larson found that a major concern of the adults was the safety of their children and themselves, especially in the early evening hours. So he organized the male adults, of whom there were relatively few in the Project, into Project patrols. He and LaFoe further realized that these patrols would more successfully control boys' behaviors if boys themselves could be recruited to assist in them. LaFoe had managed to contact some of the gangs with the toughest "reps" in the area, the Tomahawks, the Clovers, and others; he recruited the more peripheral and socially constructive members into the Henry Horner Honor Guards to patrol the Project and neighborhood in squads under the direction of the young adult males. This program unexpectedly took dramatic shape.

Many of the young adults had recently been mustered out of the U.S. Army at the end of the Korean Action. Some of them had participated in military drill teams whose marches they had enlivened with dance patterns of black origin. These men encouraged the boys in their squads to learn and to elaborate upon the drills. The Boys Club staff encouraged this development by providing not only organizational leadership but also by acquiring surplus army uniforms and helmets. The men and boys decorated their field jackets with unit patches appropriate to their squads' names --e.g., the Flames, Silver Anchors, Diamond Drill--and painted their helmets in distinctive colors.

The drill team program mushroomed to fantastic proportions. At its height, 250 boys aged 14 to 20 were participating in some 15 teams. They received city-wide recognition for their performances in Chicago's

Veterans Day parades in the years 1956-1958. Indeed, the size of the Henry Horner Honor Guard, in combination with some aggressive community organization activities on Larson's part, gave rise to some apprehension on the part of the local police and others. Some were referring to the Honor Guard as "Cressy's Army." But their fears proved groundless. From its inception through its gradual demise, the Henry Horner Honor Guard was never held responsible for anything but positive recreational values.

As the boys in the drill teams grew older, the activity lost its appeal. While younger boys continued to drill for some years after, the Honor Guard was substantially disbanded by 1959. John Ray, who succeeded LaFoe, had by 1959 already begun to transform some of the gangs in the area into social clubs. The Monarchs and the Elegant Gents, boys' social clubs that Ray had put together from gang elements, were setting the pattern for local teenagers. So the older boys' drill teams changed their image, the Diamond Drill becoming the Ideal Gents, the Silver Anchors, the Los Gatos Social and Civic Club, and so on.

Community organization was developing simultaneously with changes in the behavioral patterns of the teenage boys. In 1956, Cressy Larson called the Henry Horner Neighborhood Council into being for two main reasons: first, he believed that the project's Tenant Council, operating under the leadership of the Housing Authority, was not advocating vigorously enough for its members; and second, Larson hoped that a neighborhood group would help to integrate project with area dwellers in a way that a tenants' group could not. Larson turned over his responsibility for the neighborhood council to Lincoln Blakeney in the Spring of 1957. It had already begun to grow, with a "Chief Prompter" and "Assistant Prompter" in many of the completed project buildings, and "Floor Prompters" representing most floors; there was only sparse participation in block clubs in the area outside of the housing project. By late 1957, the council claimed about 450 members, was holding regular monthly meetings, and had had some success with maintaining tenants' parking privileges and with patrolling the project during evening hours. The council was pursuing tenants' interests with sufficient energy to create some hostility toward it by the Housing Authority's project manager, hostility which generalized to the director of the Henry Horner Boys Club as well.

The Henry Horner Neighborhood Council decided in 1958 to affiliate with the Midwest Community Council. This larger organization soon after established a youth section, the Midwest Youth Council, and Blakeney's assignment was shifted to that unit. The Henry Horner Boys Club, now occupying its partially completed building in the housing project, had already organized an interclub youth council, and it affiliated with the Midwest Youth Council. Its activities included sponsoring a neighborhood wide Graduation Ball and participating in several charitable drives for canned goods and money.

The Henry Horner experience was eminently satisfying and encouraging to the Chicago Boys Clubs. Extension worker John Ray had made positive contact with the gangs that had the meanest reputations in the area; he knew hundreds of boys in the area by sight, many of them by name, and they knew him; his working hours, extending from noon often to past midnight, were overfull with service to individual boys, to informal groups, to gangs, and to organized teenage social clubs; he had established good rapport with the police in the area and was regarded by the juvenile officers as a valuable colleague. Community organization work and the fabulous drill team program had made the Henry Horner Boys Club well-known to adults who lived and worked in the area; involvement of adults in the local governing board of the club was growing; the Henry Horner Youth Council was the centerpiece of the Midwest Youth Council. The new building buzzed with activity from the moment it opened its doors in the afternoon 'til it shut in late evening. The Henry Horner staff and the directors in the central office downtown felt that they had acquired the experience and the base necessary to expand the program, so they determined to seek a major grant to augment the extension work and community organization.

Nineteen-fifty-nine was a propitious year for such expansion. Juvenile delinquency prevention projects were very popular at that time, for the children born during the post-World War II "baby boom" were beginning to knock on the door of history, and a disproportionate number of them were in the "crime vulnerable" age range of 14 to 24. Between 1955 and 1965 many observers commented on the implications of this burgeoning youth population. In 1963 Professor Saul Bernstein, Head of the Group Work Department at Boston University School of Social Work, made a circuit through the United States visiting nine cities and 29 "Street-

work Agencies." What he saw seemed to frighten him: "The confluence of the population explosion, minority tensions, increased unemployment of the unskilled and uneducated, concentration of deprived and frustrated people in limited areas of our large cities, and the feeling of hopelessness about the future, brooks no delay in the marshalling of far greater resources. Each day that goes by sees some youngster being drawn more deeply into the delinquency mold. . . . Some are moving into the stage where no known method may be able to reach them." In passing, and consonant with the sentimental ideology of traditional social work, he resolved the "Arrowsmith dilemma" of the tension between the need for knowledge and the need for action by putting down research: ". . .there needs to be a balance between research and service. When funds are inadequate and many groups are neglected . . . it is a serious step to devote large amounts of money to research. . . . Research can contribute much, but it is not and cannot be a substitute for increased services" (Bernstein, 1964). That kind of "a balance between research and service" seemed to ignore Goethe's famous warning: "There is nothing so frightful as ignorance in action," and seemed to insure that "no known method" would ever be developed "to reach them." The CYDP was not sympathetic to that view. For good or ill, they preferred the role of Prometheus to that of a blinded Cyclops, but instead, wound up playing the role of Sisyphus.

A more constructive response, to the same set of disturbing events, was that taken by Irving Spergel, himself a former street worker and supervisor. Drawing on some of the same sources of information and experience, Professor Spergel of the School of Social Service Administration at the University of Chicago wrote, "My basic assumption is that the gang worker, if he is to do a good job, must aim for a systematic development of his understanding and skill. . . . Although practice, like good research, must be built on a scientific base, at the present time there is not sufficient theory, research, and experience to create a scientific base. Consequently, there are theory and research which have no application to practice, and important methods of practice without adequate rationale. . . . My purpose is to present principles and delineate guidelines for acceptable performance," but, "A monograph such as this one must remain an impressionistic account until more research on gangs and street work practice is available" (Spergel, 1966). Such "a

balance" between research and practice was, not only consonant with Goethe's dying words: ". . . more light," but, essentially, the view taken by the CYDP as an "action-research" project.

The public image of delinquency in the late 1950's was that of the so-called "fighting gang." This was largely the creation of the New York City media, sent out to the nation on the wire services, based on a real and tragic incident: the killing of a young boy named Michael Farmer by a gang called the Egyptian Pharoahs. When, as background material to this killing, the white, middle-class and literate New York media sent out its investigative reporters to "discover" the nature of gangs and the gang problem, they "found" something that seems to have eluded less time-driven and less news-oriented observers. The "found" large gangs with clearly defined geographical "turfs" that had a complex internal division of labor giving rise to publicly acknowledged functional titles, e.g., President, Vice-President, War Counselor, Armorer, Scout, Spy, etc., and all of them ready to fight at the slightest provocation. It was not the first time that the media, with the active cooperation of public bureaucracies and social agencies, had played the role of Dr. Frankenstein and helped "create a monster" that then began to take shape because it was actively being called into organizational existence; nor would it be the last. At that time it also served to call into existence the New York City Youth Board who promptly published a tract entitled Reaching the Fighting Gang (New York City Youth Board, 1960). And street work was the promising cure. Other, more comprehensive and more sophisticated programs, were then launched--the Roxbury Special Youth Program in Boston (Miller, 1962), Mobilization for Youth in New York City (Bibb, 1963), and the Group Guidance Program in Los Angeles (Klein, 1969). All the early reports of these programs were tinged with the optimism of dedicated workers doing their best. Their initial experiences seemed encouraging: it appeared that the tough gangs could be "reached" and brought under some control.

The Ford Foundation was interested in the problem of delinquency and was helping to fund some of these efforts, so in June 1959, the late Irving Rudolph, then Executive Director of the Chicago Boys Clubs, contacted the Foundation's officers responsible for such programs and told them of the history of the Henry Horner program and of the Boys Clubs'

aspirations for its future.

Paul Ylvisaker, Dyke Brown, and David Hunter of the Ford Foundation considered the Chicago Boys Clubs proposal promising. Particularly appealing was the idea that a long-established nation-wide youth agency was engaging in what, for it, was a major innovation. For two aspects of the Henry Horner Boys Club program were atypical for the Boys Club. One was its effort to reach out beyond the youthful clientele which usually participated in its building-centered program to serve a population which had not come eagerly to its doors. Participants in a recreational, building-centered agency are highly self-selected. Boys who willingly submit themselves to fairly close adult supervision, to the rules of an agency and of the games and activities available therein, and to the activities considered wholesome by the wider society are not likely to include many serious troublemakers. And while it had long been the public commitment of the Boys Clubs of America to "prevent juvenile delinquency, to promote juvenile decency," students of delinquency seriously doubted whether this agency--or the Boy Scouts or the YMCA, etc.--had ever really involved but a few hard-core delinquents in their programs. Yet, the Chicago Boys Clubs, after several years of such an effort on a relatively small scale, was proposing to expand it several-fold. Furthermore, the agency aimed ultimately to draw even the most heavily delinquent into its on-going program. The Ford Foundation saw in this proposal an opportunity to enlist an important agency in the effort to ameliorate a major social problem.

The second innovation in the Horner history was the attempt at community organization. Characteristically, the involvement of adults in Boys Clubs programs is focussed specifically on youth--serving on boards and committees whose functions are primarily to raise funds for scholarships, equipment, buildings, operating costs, and so on; and serving as volunteer recreational leaders, skills teachers, and, more rarely, vocational and psychological counselors. The Henry Horner program on the other hand also enlisted adults in order to attack the problem of delinquency at its roots in the community, to organize the disorganized. Adult groups were mobilized to deal with adult problems, even when this led to challenging social institutions. The Ford Foundation recognized the path-breaking significance of this kind of program for a privately supported agency, and also the potential dangers inherent

in it. For the Boys Clubs of America depends heavily on its relationships with leaders of social institutions to maintain its support in the community, and community organization might well threaten those relationships. The Foundation believed that the roots of delinquency indeed lay deep in the structure and processes of the community, and that social institutions would have to change if the problem were to be ameliorated. Ylvisaker, head of the Ford Foundation's Public Affairs Program in 1965, enunciated the Foundation's position with regard to community action:

We are dealing with forces and problems of such magnitude-- migration, automation, racial tensions, relaxing moral standards, exploding populations, accelerating technological progress and obsolescence--that it will take every ounce of energy and imagination we can muster, from both public and private sources, to make even small dents, changes and improvements.

For these reasons, the Ford Foundation was favorably disposed to granting the Chicago Boys Clubs funds to support an expanded extension work and community organization program. Still, one question remained-- would an expanded program really reduce delinquency? There were of course sincere testimonials to the effectiveness of the Horner program from other public and private youth-serving agencies in Chicago, from the police department, from residents, and from friends of the Chicago Boys Clubs; there were anecdotes aplenty from the Boys Clubs staff and their obvious enthusiasm for what they were doing. But these do not add up to firm evidence of an effective program. They suggested that the program was promising but not that it was necessarily delivering.

Firm evidence of effectiveness is rare in this field. One of us has written elsewhere, "The practice of delinquency prevention and treatment is at this time in its pre-science phase. That is, it is guided by beliefs which are more nearly articles of faith than cogent theories; and observations on its effects are more influenced by wish than by fact" (Gold, 1971). Seldom have action programs been accompanied by systematic research. This has been a serious lack. It has prevented action people from learning just what is worth doing; it has hindered increasing our understanding of delinquency.

The Ford Foundation recognized in the Henry Horner program an opportunity to obtain instructive data on delinquency prevention and sounded out The University of Michigan Institute for Social Research (ISR) for its interest in conducting the research. Ronald Lippitt, Program Director

at ISR, and some of his colleagues had been engaged for several years in research on delinquency and welcomed this chance to observe what would be, from a researcher's point of view, a field experiment. The Chicago Boys Clubs, for their part, were eager to demonstrate that the agency was in fact doing what it said it could do. Joseph N. Clemens, the Associate Director and soon after, Executive Director of the Chicago Boys Clubs, became an active member of the group that formulated the initial plans for the Project.

The Boys Clubs staff appreciated the risks involved in the research component. What if the findings were negative? Suppose delinquency were not reduced? Such an outcome might be interpreted by the public as reflecting the ineptitude of the Boys Clubs and erode the base of its community support. For, after all, in the public view, other agencies were effective in battling delinquency--didn't they say so? It was not likely that any but the most sophisticated members of the public would be aware of the groundlessness of the other agencies' claims and appreciate the toughmindedness of the Boys Clubs in submitting their efforts to objective scrutiny.

Negative findings would also seriously affect the morale of the Boys Club workers. If it were shown that what they were doing was making no tangible progress against delinquency, they could not be expected to go on with the job with the vigor and commitment that it required.

These risks the directorate of the Chicago Boys Clubs faced realistically. They figured that either it would be demonstrated that their efforts were effective or they ought indeed to be doing something else. They were explicit from the start and throughout the course of the Chicago Youth Development Project that they wanted to know what they were doing right and what they were doing wrong, so as to do more of the former and less of the latter. And if there was little of the former, then in that case they needed even more to know about it. They did not intend, under any circumstances, to give up the effort to reduce delinquency. They would determine on the basis of the research findings either to do more of what they were doing or to redirect their efforts.

This was obviously no Pangloss-ian view of the world. Underlying this kind of effort is the conviction that people can do something to improve the quality of their lives, an assertion that high levels of

delinquency and other social problems are not inherent in the social fabric of the hearts of great cities. And if a respected and experienced social agency, backed by the resources of an immense foundation, could not make the problem move, then what could?

The action program expanded in two ways. First, more personnel were added to the staff of the Henry Horner Boys Club to step up both the work with boys on the streets and with adults in the neighborhood. Second, two more clubs in the inner city were added to the program. Adding two more clubs was meant to serve several purposes. One was to test whether what seemed to be successful in a predominantly black neighborhood including a massive public housing project could also be effective in a predominantly white neighborhood of diverse ethnic groups and with no large housing development as a focal point, and in a neighborhood in racial transition. A second was to provide the research opportunity to observe the action program from its very inception, which of course was no longer historically possible in the Horner area.

After almost a year of CYDP experience, it was reluctantly decided to reduce the target areas to two, around the Henry Horner Boys Club and around the transitional area of the Oldtown Boys Club, and abandon the effort in the Lincoln Boys Club, in the predominantly white area. The action staff felt that their resources were spread too thin over three areas to make a significant impact.

A CYDP directorate was set up in the Chicago Boys Clubs central office, consisting of an overall director and two associate directors responsible for extension work and community organization respectively.

The Institute for Social Research established a research staff in the Chicago Boys Clubs office along with the action staff directorate. It consisted of a research project director, an associate director, and several research assistants.

After almost a year, CYDP was reorganized with a new Director of Action and Research, Hans W. Mattick, and a new division of labor among three Associate Directors, Frank J. Carney for Extension Work, Earl F. Doty for Community Organization, and Nathan S. Caplan for Field Research in Chicago. This was the supervisory team that conducted the CYDP in Chicago until its completion. Mattick supervised the entire operation in Chicago. Carney was in charge of seven Extension Workers assigned to

two Boys Clubs and an Outpost; Doty supervised four Community Organizers in two Boys Clubs' areas and worked closely with the two Club Directors and their staffs in those areas; and Caplan directed the efforts of three full-time research assistants whose work was supplemented from time to time by other researchers as data gathering operations expanded and contracted. This research effort in Chicago was, in turn, linked to ISR headquarters at the University of Michigan campus where a research coordinator, Martin Gold, and research assistants, J. Alan Winter and Lois Felson Mock related the work of the Chicago field staff to ISR resources.

The Chicago Youth Development Project was designed and implemented as a six-year effort, from 1961 through 1966. The first year was spent largely in recruiting, organizing, and training the action and research staffs, acquiring equipment and work space, constructing and trying out research instruments, and familiarizing relevant others both in the Chicago Boys Clubs and in the city at large with the plans. The final year of CYDP was devoted largely to winding down the program--organizing reports for the Boys Clubs of America, disbanding the staff, preparing the next action programs based on CYDP experience, and so on. So the major effort of CYDP took place in the four years 1962-1965. The total cost of the enterprise eventually came to \$1,410,000.

Historical Context

"May you live in interesting times," is said to be an ancient Chinese proverb that serves as both a blessing and a curse. The Chicago Youth Development Project was conducted in interesting times. In spirit and in microcosm the CYDP was influenced by the Zeitgeist incarnate in the events of the early 1960's. It will contribute to our understanding if we place the CYDP into its historical context. Such a historical sketch must, necessarily, be highly selective and, in the nature of the case, will not construct an image of the nation, Chicago, or the local neighborhood that will satisfy the demands of Chamber of Commerce boosterism. For, while both the positive and the negative currents in the larger society have their impacts on the local area, when one is attempting to deal with the multiplicity of social factors related to juvenile delinquency, the negative influences always seem to make a bad situation worse, but the positive influences are often diluted in their impact. Accordingly, as we sketch the historical context of the CYDP, we will select those events, national and local, that seemed most relevant to the people with

whom the project was concerned, once the necessities of daily survival and routines had been met.

The dawning of the sixties seemed to promise an era of optimism with only a few flashes of heat-lightning on the horizon that seemed to be left over from a darker age. We did not think they portended a coming storm. John F. Kennedy had been elected to the Presidency in 1960, and there were fewer than 1,000 U.S. "military advisers" in Vietnam. It was also the year of the first civil rights "sit-in," and soon the new program of manned space flights would be matched by "freedom rides" on earth. The fierce pride of "The International" seemed to have been exchanged for the confidence of "We Shall Overcome" as submerged segments of the people found new hope.

In Chicago, the Democratic Party regime of Mayor Richard J. Daley had grown too complacent in power, too early. Having successfully weathered a series of exposures of "moderate" corruptions, they were severely chastened by the infamous "burglars in blue" police scandal. Reform came in the guise of a newly imported scholar-police Superintendent, Orlando W. Wilson, who was installed in office early in 1961. The police scandal had been exposed late in 1958 and plans for reform dominated the local elections of 1960. The two years of grace between exposure and election enabled the Daley regime to co-opt and control the reform process. By making appropriate promises and embracing the new Superintendent, the Democrats minimized their losses in the 1960 elections and proceeded to reconsolidate their power. Both the Establishment and the Outsiders in Chicago seemed to share the sentiments of "We Shall Overcome" in 1960, but for somewhat different reasons. It was, in short, a time of great optimism: if there were problems, there were also solutions. They were, however, not necessarily the right solutions.

While the national treasure and manpower were disproportionately poured into Vietnam and the space program over the ensuing years, Chicago invested in office buildings, lake-front luxury apartments and high-rise public housing complexes. There was an interesting parallelism between these national and local activities during the early sixties. They reflected an attitude by those with the power of decision toward the rich and the poor, the black and the white, and the insiders and the outsiders. Those who lived in the luxury apartments were under-represented in Vietnam but worked in the new office buildings; those who lived in high-rise public housing did not work in the space program but often lived

on welfare. Clearly, the New Frontier of the Kennedy administration had opened selectively, but race relations in Chicago grew increasingly worse.

In 1961 a Negro tenement in Chicago was destroyed by fire. By happenstance the burned out families were evacuated to a church in the Bridgeport area--an area of symbolic significance because it is where the Mayor grew up and still maintains his home and family. It was the only area in Chicago that decreased its Negro population between the 1950 and 1960 census. The local white residents, lower middle class for the most part, gathered around the church and began to feed on rumors. Soon the crowd became ugly and threatening. In a few hours the police and the church authorities felt obliged to remove the burned-out blacks in the interest of public safety and civil order. It was a minor incident as such incidents go in Chicago, but it was a portent for the coming years in which the CYDP would concentrate on juvenile delinquency. In fact, 1962 was the only year of grace, between 1961 and 1966, in which Chicago did not have either a serious racial incident or a full-scale riot, including one in the Puerto Rican community.

While Marshall McLuhan was diverting the intellectuals of the nation with his novel theories of communication, the Beatles were rock-and-rolling the youth and lending substance to "the medium is the message." But others were protest-marching in Birmingham or gathering 200,000 strong in Washington, D.C., to hear Martin Luther King proclaim, "I have a dream." And the war in Vietnam continued to deepen. In Chicago the Black Muslims "suddenly" came to prominence and were promptly misperceived for that which they were not. Despite the obvious talents and fiery oratory of Malcolm X, the organization was basically conservative and under the firm control of the mystical Honorable Elijah Muhammad. The Black Panther Party would not be organized for another five years, and then from entirely different roots. Nevertheless, the political establishment of Chicago, and some of the white neighborhoods, were made exceedingly nervous by all the talk about "white devils." The well-known Chicago Police's "red squad," the undercover and subversives unit, kept a wary eye on the new militants.

In November of 1963 Chicago and the nation were shocked by the assassination of President Kennedy. It was not, however, responded to by the local authorities as if this traumatic event could be the motive force toward civil disorder. The accession of President Johnson was followed by a major attempt to keep the momentum of the New Frontier moving by substituting

the concept of the Great Society and formulating the War on Poverty. Yet, despite a good record of domestic achievements, including the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the real war in Vietnam continued to tarnish the Johnson administration, and no number of Mercury, Gemini, or Apollo flights into space could refurbish it.

In Chicago, the budget of the police department nearly doubled between 1960 and 1964. The same could not be said for the budget of the Board of Education. Instead, during these years the schools of Chicago, and particularly the public schools in the ghetto areas, deteriorated rapidly. In 1963 the picketing of the poorer schools began and these led to large scale school boycotts. A series of protest marches through white neighborhoods of Chicago were conducted, led by Dick Gregory through Bridgeport and by Martin Luther King through Gage Park. One objective of the protesters was to get rid of the General Superintendent of the Board of Education, Benjamin Willis, but he remained in office throughout the years of the CYDP. He finally resigned in December of 1966, at a time of his own choosing. The new police Superintendent, on the other hand, accomplished much that was long overdue. He increased the manpower of the department and even promoted a black officer to the rank of Deputy Commissioner and put him in charge of the Human Relations Unit. Most of the new police money in these early years of Superintendent Wilson went to new communications, computers and other technical equipment. On the streets of Chicago, what could be seen is that the police squad cars had changed color to blue and white, but what was done under color of law lagged behind the technical changes. It was the National Conference of Christians and Jews who organized the first "Police and Community Workshops" in a few of the worst police districts in Chicago; and it was the Citizens Information Service of the League of Women Voters, rather than the Board of Education or the Central Committees of the local political parties, who organized a series of "Leadership Training Classes" in some of the more depressed areas of the city. The resources of both private groups were inadequate, but they had, at least, perceived the need and attempted a relevant response.

In 1964, a close-in suburb of Chicago (Dixmoor) had a serious racial outbreak and the Sheriff of Cook County called on the Chicago police, as well as many nearby suburban police departments, for support. The Chicago police were clearly ambivalent about devoting manpower outside the city.

For the past two years, what with all the protests, boycotts and marches, they had put in many extra duty hours under the constant threat of violence. While no single, large-scale riot had erupted, there had been many skirmishes; it had been like two years of brush-fire duty in the Windy City. The city authorities, the police, and the neighborhoods and schools that had been the targets of repeated protests were haunted by the fear that the Dixmoor riot would spill over. Chicago teetered on the precipice for a week, and experienced another month of deep anxiety, but managed to keep its balance.

The assassination of Malcolm X in New York in February 1965 and the Watts riot in Los Angeles in August of 1965 were strongly felt in the volatile climate of Chicago. A minor strand in the web of racial discord that enveloped the city had been a protest about the white staffing of fire stations in black areas and the general failure of the Fire Department to employ blacks. When, then, a hook-and-ladder truck, without a steersman at the ladder's tiller, ran wild and killed a black woman, a major riot erupted. For four days a large area of the west side was under siege and hundreds were arrested. The National Guard was alerted, but the Chicago police contained the riot without outside help. The riot area was just west of one of the CYDP areas and the staff worked long hours to keep "their kids," and some of the adults, under control. The nerves of the city crackled and popped through August and September before its citizens felt "safe" again. It was an illusion.

Hardly had the summer of 1966 begun when a routine police incident in the Puerto Rican community was escalated into an on-again, off-again riot that lasted ten days. Again there were numerous arrests and injuries, but also one death "under ambiguous circumstances." One would have thought that the tragedy was a sobering experience, for citizens and police alike, but instead it was only a curtain-raiser. A month later, an incident involving the closing of a fire hydrant in the midst of the huge ABLA public housing complex, brought the city its worst riot since 1919.

The ABLA complex consisted of four public housing projects: Addams, Brooks, Loomis Courts and Abbot, including some fifty separate buildings covering a square mile. It was nearly solid black, but surrounded by deteriorated Italian, Puerto Rican, black and mixed industrial-commercial neighborhoods. The opening of fire hydrants to cool off on hot summer days

has been a long-standing tradition in nearly all ethnic slum communities of the city--an ersatz form of "going swimming" for youngsters living some distance from Lake Michigan. It is an endless task for the police to shut them off, and they do it with a sense of reluctance and futility. This trivial incident set off a riot that flared for the better part of ten days and required 4,200 National Guardsmen to bring it under control. Again hundreds were arrested and many were injured, but this time the riot was more lethal. Three black people, including a 13 year old boy and a 14 year old, pregnant, girl, were "killed by stray bullets."

The Addams housing project was within one of the CYDP areas, and the rest of the ABLA complex lay just to the south and the west. The impact of the riot on the CYDP and its staff was intense and personal. The black members of the staff were worked nearly to death during the two weeks that the riot sputtered; while the white members of the staff were under the strictest orders to stay out of the area for it was not a time when either rioters or police made fine distinctions between friends and foes. A rough division of labor was worked out: the black staff members, for the most part, worked in the streets, while the white staff members went to the police stations and detention places to identify and vouch for juveniles and adults they knew. The CYDP was "disorganized" for about a month, but the city remained jittery well into the fall of 1966.

It was not yet, really, the end, but after that the CYDP was, for the most part, out of it. The Kerner Commission was to record four separate racial incidents for 1967, and then came "the big one." In April 1968 the assassination of Martin Luther King set off a conflagration and convulsion such as the city had not experienced in forty-nine years. But, before that time, the Chicago Youth Development Project, as an entity with its own identity, had run its course.¹ Shortly after the Puerto Rican and black riots of 1966 the CYDP began a process of phase-out. Concurrently, a somewhat similar project bearing the acronym: S.T.R.E.E.T.S., (fondly referred to as "Son-of-CYDP") was phased-in. It

¹There are as yet no scholarly histories of Chicago in the early '60's. Some of the better journalistic accounts are Gleason, 1970; Royko, 1971; and Terkel, 1967.

was to be a larger effort, conducted jointly by a group of youth serving agencies, and some of the CYDP staff transferred into the new project. During the phase-out-phase-in stage the staff-in-transition felt ambivalent about both their past and their future, "Don't worry," they said, "STREETS will take care of the business as well as the CYDP did." They were not wrong.

The Chicago Youth Development Project was, by no means, the only juvenile delinquency prevention and control effort going forward in the city during the early 1960's. Beside the private agencies, to which we will return, there were a whole range of "official," public "youth-serving" agencies at the state, county and city levels, the most prominent of which, in their relationship to the CYDP, were Mayor Daley's Commission on Youth Welfare and the Youth Division of the Chicago Police Department. The latter, under the excellent leadership of Captain "Mike" Delaney was, unfortunately, supplanted by the so-called "Gang Intelligence Unit" in 1963. After that, and increasingly with time, not only were these "official agencies" the most prominent, they also tended to become interchangeable. What purported to be a commission interested in youth welfare was partially, and covertly, converted into an arm of the Gang Intelligence Unit, and shot through with police spies and informers. The result was an increasing alienation between the youth of the city and the official agencies designated to deal with youth problems. The alienation was especially severe in the inner city, including the CYDP areas, and eventually led to extreme polarization and some open confrontations. The Gang Intelligence Unit dealt with what they defined as "gangs" through two major tactics: subversive undercover methods that had little regard for civil rights or due process--the kind of tactics that were later described as "dirty tricks" in the political arena; and when those did not work, resort to "raids," group arrests and open repression.

The CYDP, unfortunately, experienced the GIU during its period of ascendancy, in all its rampant glory. But by 1970, relations between the police and the community in the depressed areas of the city had deteriorated to its lowest ebb, and the Gang Intelligence Unit was in the vanguard of this process. In a comprehensive survey of the Chicago Police Department conducted by a team of investigators from the International Association of Chiefs of Police in 1969, the problems created by the Gang Intelligence

Unit were not openly acknowledged, but it was clear that they had been perceived and evaluated. In the wise way in which problems of crisis proportions can sometimes be revealed through the use of bland language, the survey team remarked that since the Gang Intelligence Unit was really performing patrol functions, "We recommend that the overt (control and enforcement) function of the Gang Intelligence Section be reassigned to the patrol districts. This will fix the responsibility for control at the primary field unit and eliminate duplicative efforts" (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1970). After some delay this recommendation was quietly implemented not by abolishing the unit but by sharply reducing its manpower and transferring its flamboyant commander.

In addition to the Chicago Boys Clubs, which was the sponsor of the Chicago Youth Development Project, the main private agencies that were engaged in juvenile delinquency prevention work, in Chicago in the early 1960's, through methods somewhat similar to those used by the CYDP, were: the Chicago Youth Centers, the Chicago Commons Association, and the Chicago Metropolitan YMCA, with their "Detached Worker Program." No doubt, there were others, but they were much less prominent. Whatever their differences may have been in the 1960's, all of them shared a common heritage, intellectual and practical, that survived in their work and served to influence it. Indeed, anyone seeking to come to grips with the problematic aspects of youth in Chicago, who was not bent on re-inventing the wheel, could not escape the influence of that heritage. The first department of sociology in an American university had been established at the University of Chicago in 1892, giving rise to the "Chicago School" of sociologists, with their strong concern with urban problems, whose influence continues to be pervasive. Jane Addams established Hull House in Chicago in 1889, one of the earliest social settlements in the United States, giving rise to the settlement movement, with its strong concern for human problems in the city, an influence that is still pervasive. Finally, the founding of the Chicago Area Project in 1931, by Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay, influenced all subsequent attempts to deal with youth problems by drawing on the indigenous sources of strength in Chicago communities. This is not the place to recount either the history or the

lessons² of this common heritage, but it is well to indicate that the juvenile delinquency prevention efforts of the Chicago Youth Centers and the Chicago Commons stayed well within these traditions and did not transcend them. The Detached Worker Program (DWP) and the Chicago Youth Development Project, by way of contrast, had somewhat larger pretensions. While these two latter did not differ all that much on their "action sides" from the two former, the fact that the DWP and CYDP had a self-conscious "research side" to them set them apart, and gave them a visibility that their more "deprived" cohorts may have been fortunate enough to tolerate with equanimity.

Both the Detached Worker Program of the YMCA and the Chicago Youth Development Project of the Chicago Boys Clubs were by far the largest delinquency prevention projects in Chicago during the early sixties; indeed, the CYDP was the largest such privately financed project that had ever been staged in the city. Both projects attempted to deal with youth problems through the use of "streetworkers;" that is what those who did the work called themselves, although their respective agencies insisted on the terms "Detached Workers" for the YMCA and "Extension Workers" for the CBC. While this terminological difference reflected some difference in the degree of relationship between the streetworker and the facilities of their sponsoring agencies, as set forth at some length in the text of this report, it was a distinction without much practical difference. A more fundamental difference was the fact that the CYDP included a community organization staff which attempted to deal with local adults and the full range of public and private institutions that had an important impact on the lives of the young people the streetworkers were trying to help. Again, the sponsoring agency preferred to call them "Community Resources Coordinators," rather than community organizers, because both the civil rights movement and the ornate methods of Saul Alinsky (whose work in Chicago was aptly described as "all rhythm and no music" by a perceptive

²See for example Addams, 1910; Faris, 1970; Kobrin, 1959; and Sorrentino, 1959. Equally important is a less attractive "heritage"; see for example Demaris, 1969; Landesco, 1968, and Longstreet, 1973.

critic) had made community organization work "suspect" in the eyes of the city administration. It was, again, a distinction without much difference, for streetworkers cannot do serious work on behalf of vulnerable youngsters without establishing some species of relationship to local adults and institutions significant to the life careers of the young people to be helped. The main difference between the DWP and CYDP, in this respect, was that the latter anticipated the need, and attempted to meet it, by providing a division of labor in its staffing organization. In practice, however, even the anticipated division of labor broke down: streetworkers focussed on young people but sometimes found themselves doing community organization work; and community organizers often found themselves working directly with young people. Moreover, the streetworkers that the YMCA called "Detached Workers," also found themselves doing some community work for, whatever else may be said about the DWP and the CYDP, both were serious in their intentions and day-to-day work.

A more explicit difference between the DWP and the CYDP was the relationship that the "research sides" of these projects had to their "action sides," and this difference had a considerable, if subtle, impact on the "action sides" of these two juvenile delinquency prevention projects. In both cases, the research efforts that went forward in conjunction with the action projects was conducted by researchers who were independent of the agency sponsoring the action program. In the case of the DWP, the action side of the project had already been organized and fielded when, at a relatively early stage, a research team was organized to study it. The leaders of the research team described their task in prospect as, "We were to open a window on the gangs being worked with by the detached workers, and, among other things, collect observations in Chicago to test propositions of the type we had reviewed at the two day meeting." In retrospect they said, "... this book brings together previously published work in a form which reveals the interplay between our method and theory. It is a 'natural history' of the way in which the research findings opened new theoretical perspectives to us" (Short and Strodbeck, 1965:vii). Thus, the detached workers, their gang-clients, and the larger context in which they played out their roles, was seen as an opportunity for learning, testing hypothesis and developing theory. If, in the process, something

useful was discovered, the researchers would provide "feedback" to the action team, but that purpose was incidental to the main thrust of the research effort. It may be added, for the sake of later comparison with the CYDP, and for the sake of those readers whose interest extends to such things, that the DWP research, while predominantly sociological in character, had some ancillary roots in psychology and anthropology. The intellectual ancestors of that research were Durkheim, Freud, Merton and Sutherland; and the hypotheses they sought to test were those of Richard A. Cloward and Lloyd E. Ohlin and, to a lesser degree, those of Walter B. Miller and Albert K. Cohen.

The highly selective syndrome of events sketched above is no more than the salient mise en scene, the social-psychological environment in which the Chicago Youth Development Project went forward in space and time. A six-year action-research project that spent nearly one and one-half million dollars and employed sixty-some persons during its existence, does not go forward in a vacuum, but is complexly related to its total environment and history. Some elements of that environment and history have here been abstracted from the expanse of space and the stream of time because they seemed disproportionate in their impact on that project. It is as important, in its way, to understand some of the events and currents that had an impact on the Chicago Youth Development Project as it is to reveal what impact that project had on the goals it set for itself, for in their mutuality lay their destiny.

Overview of this Report

The next chapter describes in some detail the assumptions upon which the Chicago Youth Development Project was based--assumptions about the psychology and sociology of delinquency, about adolescence, about social life in the inner city, and about the function of a youth serving agency in the lives of its clients and in the social organization of its community. That is, Chapter 2 presents the reasons for the Project doing what it did and for the research component to choose to observe what it observed.

Chapter 3 lays out the action program and its related research design and methods.

Chapters 4 and 5 describe and assess the Project's program with regard to the adult community and boys respectively. Chapter 5 concludes with the

presentation and interpretation of data on the reduction of juvenile delinquency in the Project's target areas.

Chapter 6 reports the effect of the Chicago Youth Development Project on the Chicago Boys Clubs. That discussion illuminates some of the material in earlier chapters on how the action program went about its work, and it sets forth some important considerations for agencies to take into account when planning programs such as this one.

Finally, Chapter 7 draws implications from what has gone before. It addresses the question of what might be done differently to achieve more substantial results, how research might be better conducted on such programs; and what has been learned of a general nature about, among other things, adolescence, the inner city, social work with adults and boys, and the possibility that a small band of humans can make a real difference.

CHAPTER 2

Goals and Images

Soon after the Chicago Youth Development Project was launched, the action and research staffs began a series of conferences on the goals and the theory-of-practice of the action program. The researchers played the role of interrogators, urging the practitioners to be as explicit and specific as possible. They asked essentially four questions: (1) What are the goals of this program, what accomplishment would amount to "success?" (2) How would you know whether you had achieved that goal, what evidence would indicate that? (3) Why have you chosen this kind of program to reach these goals, what makes you think this is the best way for you to go about it? (4) And how would you be able to tell whether the program was a reality, that you were taking those steps you intended to take? The researchers were trying to find out what, from the action staff's point of view, ought to be measured and what action people would consider valid measures of those. They were also trying to get some understanding of the beliefs which underlay the development of the proposed program.

The fresh, warm enthusiasm for six years of working together on a significant social problem cooled and hardened considerably in this encounter of action and research. What was anticipated to be a few weeks of intense and lively discussion continued on for months. And indeed, these questions were continually discussed and debated throughout the course of CYDP. The reasons for the difficulty at arriving at conclusions were many. The action staff had not been pressed before to articulate the ultimate goals of their efforts. Implicitly, the goals had something to do with reducing juvenile delinquency, but that vague consensus itself covered over a host of unsettled questions: was the reduction of delinquency an end in itself for CYDP or was delinquency just one symptom

of a broad range of social problems which CYDP should come to grips with? whose definition of "delinquency" was going to be used, the police's-- who might not like kids pitching pennies in an alley or clogging a sidewalk in protest against their high school's administration? or the extension workers'--who might ignore, even encourage such behavior? were we talking about reducing the boys' delinquent behavior, reducing the number of boys who were caught, or the number who were officially labelled "delinquent" by the courts? As for the program itself, those involved had different reasons for being involved and for doing what they did, and they discovered in the course of discussion that they were not planning actually to do the same things or agreed that what the other fellow intended to do was right. Nevertheless, as frequent and frustrating as these sessions were, they were worthwhile. Not only did the research staff get clearer directions for the job they were supposed to do, but also many misunderstandings and contradictions surfaced so that the action staff could begin to deal with them constructively.

(Controversy among CYDP staff was certainly not limited to the action staff. The researchers had their disagreements too--over whether measures should be more clinical and holistic or more objective and specific, about the definition of "juvenile delinquency" and how to measure it, about appropriate control groups, and so on. How these issues were eventually settled is reported in the next chapter, as though the decisions were reached all in the light and with no heat.)

Finally, informed by these discussions and assessing the potential of the Project, the CYDP directorate formulated these eight Project goals:

1. To reduce the absolute amount of illegal and antisocial behavior attributable to the target population in the experimental areas.
2. To change the behavior of individuals and groups in the contacted part of the target population, where necessary, from the more seriously antisocial to the less seriously, and from the less seriously antisocial to the conventional, within the class and cultural norms of the local population.
3. To help individuals and groups in the contacted part of the target population meet their emotional needs for association, friendship, and status by providing conventional, organized, and supervised activities for them, with a view to increasing their capacity for participation and autonomy.

4. To increase the objective opportunities for youth in the external environment, in the fields of education, employment, and cultural experiences.
5. To help youth prepare themselves for conventional adult roles by providing guidance in the fields of education, work, family life, and citizenship through direct intervention in their life processes, especially at times of crisis.
6. To relate the target population to local adults and institutions in positive ways so that communication channels between youth and adults may be developed through which a shared, conventional system of values may be transmitted.
7. To develop in parents and local adults a concern for local problems affecting youth welfare, and to organize them with a view to having them assume responsibility for the solution of local problems.
8. To create a positive change in attitude, in both young and adults, about the possibility of local self-help efforts to improve the local community, through active and cooperative intervention in community processes, and thus to create a more positive attitude toward the local community itself.

It was agreed that action goals (1) and (2) were qualitatively different from the others. The first two action goals were ultimate, that is, ends in themselves, and the other six were considered instrumental, necessary to achieve the Project's aims. The Chicago Youth Development Project was primarily to reduce delinquent behavior both among the youngsters with whom it made direct contact and, by that means, among all the youth in the target neighborhoods. In place of delinquency, the boys were to be encouraged to engage in behavior acceptable to their neighbors. However, the Project's ultimate concern with delinquent behavior was not singleminded; the action staff was willing to grant the goal primacy, but not exclusiveness. So the CYDP prospectus (Mattick and Caplan, 1964) noted that ". . . in a means-end scheme such as this, the six instrumental goals are means from one point of view and also ends worth achieving in their own right. Moreover, although the first two goals tend to place a stress on the negative behavior of young people, the six instrumental goals indicate a concern for fostering positive behavior in accordance with the developmental aspect of the project title . . ." (pp. 6-7).

The theory-of-practice implied in four of the six instrumental goals have to do with adolescents' needs--needs for friends of their own age, for things to do which are under their own control, and for opportunities to learn the attitudes, skills, and motives that would enable them to take

legitimate and respectable places in their society, as adolescents and later as adults. The last two instrumental goals concern the adult community and theory about how it must change in order for delinquency to subside. The relationship between instrumental goals and the end goals, and between the instrumental goals and the program which was to realize them rested on certain beliefs, certain images, about the nature of the inner city, of adolescence, of delinquency, and of the agency. In order to understand why the agency chose a program of extension work and community organization to reduce delinquency rather than some other means, it is necessary to understand these images. It is to these that we now turn.

The Givens: I. The Inner City

The City occupies a dark place in American cultural thought. Those who were associated with the Chicago Youth Development Project could not help but share in this cultural outlook, and it provides a basis from which to understand the Project's approach to the environment in which it worked. Essentially, the City was an antagonist, a condition of which youth were considered victim and a breeding place for delinquency. The Project did battle with the City.

The evil image of the City which prevails in American culture appears clearly in contrast with its European counterpart. For in European culture, the City is the crown of its civilization, showplace of its highest cultural achievements. With its origins around royal courts, the European City has characteristically been the seat of government and home of the arts and sciences. Paris, London, Rome, Copenhagen, Vienna, St. Petersburg--these are the places the fortunate ones came from or went to. Nor was a more positive view of the City entirely absent from the culture of CYDP. The staff also regarded Chicago as a place of opportunity, creativity, and anonymity for those who deserved it.

But in many ways, the City is alien to American culture shaped by its frontier and sustained for so long in its rural experience. The American imagination peoples its cities with aliens and believes that the values and opportunities prevalent there are alien to the American way of life. For Americans, the City is where the immigrants got off the boat and where those remained who had not the drive and wherewithal to get far from

the docks. Worse, the City is the last resort for the failed farmer, forced off his land--if he ever had his own--and having to work for someone else. In the American City are huddled together the miserable poor and the crooked rich, the culturally barren and the culturally suspect.

Never mind that European cities are not now so different from American cities, that the forces which have shaped their recent development and which sustain them are largely common to both. Slums and poverty can be found in European as well as in American cities; new immigrants are now to be found in similar proportions; factories besmirch both; in neither Europe nor America are cities really communities. And on the other side, both European and American cities are the homes of Culture--theaters, concert halls, and art galleries. But the images embedded in a culture are slow to change and the disparity in images of the City between American and European culture survives still.

Chicago has its own distinctive image, one that partakes of the general American image of evil but which also bears a patina of its own. Carl Sandburg is remembered for having described Chicago as "Hog Butcher for the World," but he had other things to say about that city as well:

They tell me you are wicked, and I believe them; for I have
seen your painted women under the gas lamps luring the
farm boys.
And they tell me you are crooked, and I answer, "Yes, it is
true I have seen the gunman kill and go free to kill again.
And they tell me you are brutal, and my reply is: On the
faces of women and children I have seen the marks of
wanton hunger.

(1926, "Chicago")

It seems to us that Chicago's image of itself is of a tough town of gangsters and brawlers and corrupt politicians. It makes no pretensions of cosmopolitan sophistication like New York, or of aristocratic refinement like Boston. It is known now as the last stronghold of the political Boss and is believed to be dominated by racketeers. And it is satisfied with itself that way: Alderman Mathias "Paddy" Bauler once spoke the city's mind when he said, "Chicago ain't ready for reform."

If the City has an evil image in American culture, and if Chicago has an especially evil reputation, then Chicago's Inner City is evil nonpareil. As the Inner Court of Solomon's Temple harbored the Holiest of Holies, so the inner core of America's City is its darkest heart. Again, the contrast

with Europe is instructive: Europe's cities have their slums, but they have developed in "quarters," in "districts" or on the expanding peripheries; American cities rot at their cores. American cities are relatively new as history is reckoned, so most of them have no cherished antiques. Only a few of America's old cities--Philadelphia, Boston, New Orleans, Sante Fe, and San Antonio belong on the list--have made efforts to preserve--in Philadelphia's case, to reclaim--their historical centers. The rest have grown away from, even fled their cores, leaving them to age ingloriously. They become the sinks into which the weak and aimless fall, prey to the greatest dangers of the dangerous City.

Given these images of the City, of Chicago, and of its dark interior, then it is easy to understand the sympathy with which the Project set out to work with the children and adults who lived there. It was no wonder, these images implied, that the adolescents were heavily delinquent; it would have been a miracle were they not. The Project's mission was, in one sense, to overcome the forces inherent in the inner city, to turn these aside so that their victims would not be driven to desperate acts, or hopelessness, or both.

From this standpoint, the figures which locate high rates of crime and delinquency in the inner city are altogether plausible, confirming what one intuitively believes. Indeed, Chicago itself was the prototypic city for the landmark research on delinquency areas by Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay (1942) and on delinquent gangs by Thrasher (1936). Shaw and McKay's figures demonstrate that juvenile delinquency is most prevalent in the core of the city and declines as one moves toward the periphery; and that this relationship holds decade after decade, regardless of the specific people who live in the various areas, their ethnic or racial backgrounds, or their particular cultural history. That is, delinquency is a product of the conditions of inner city life, not of the particular people who live it.

While there was broad consensus among the CYDP staff about the crimogenic character of the inner city, there were at least three alternative models of why that should be so. One posited a state of disorganization and of normlessness; a second, of homegrown deviant organization and norms; and a third, of deviancy organized and directed from a distance.

The view of the inner city as social chaos takes as its starting

points the poverty of the population and the primacy of the economic state of affairs in social life. In this view, poverty means powerlessness. The population cannot resist exploitation and the encroachment of unwanted elements from outside. The future, not being under the residents' control, is also not predictable by them. Consequently, the driving motive which relates the residents to the area is to get out. And so while they live there, they withhold themselves from the area and don't get involved.

Those that can get out, do, and those that cannot, remain but also remain uninvolved. As time goes on, the population of failures, drifters, and disadvantaged becomes more dense. Others' perception of them and their images of themselves grow more negative. A culture of poverty develops whose basic guides to social behavior are distrust and rejection. This blight falls not only on relationships among neighbors but on family relationships as well, so that, under the stress of other related life conditions, families become unstable and fall apart.

One cannot raise children as good citizens in such an environment, nor can one be a good citizen. The youth of the inner city, growing up in broken or unstable families, lacking potent, respectable and self-respecting adult models, lacking consistent norms developed in the family and sustained by the community, naturally turn to delinquency. They may feel delinquent behavior is risky, but they do not know it is wrong. Or if they do, it is not as wrong as the conditions which give rise to it and which its tangible and intangible rewards make more tolerable.

As the first model of the inner city focusses on poverty as its essential characteristic, so the second focusses on its special isolation. It is in this framework that the word "ghetto" is more apt than "inner city." The core of the city is imagined to contain an organized social system and a distinctive sub-culture cut off from the world around it by reciprocal inner and outer forces. The social system and culture are partly imported and partly homegrown. That is, some of it comes from abroad and attracts labels like Little Italy and Greektown, or from other parts of the U.S., usually the South, and is borne by blacks; and some of it is generated out of the inner urban condition and is comprised of accommodations to being uprooted, to living in close proximity to different but equally uprooted people, to outsiders' attempts at exploitation, and to the centrifugal forces catching up and separating out the best of the

younger generation. In any case, social life is not chaotic, but as tightly regulated or more so as the suburbs. But it is deviant. Children are taught to behave in ways that the dominant culture labels delinquent because it is different from its own prescribed ways, while this same behavior may be permitted or even encouraged by the children's parents and neighbors. For example, one accommodation to the Others--"Niggers," "Wops," "Polacks"--a few blocks away is to let the adolescent boys patrol the neighborhood and keep the Others out; but outsiders call this strategy "gang warfare," and boys are punished for it by the courts.

In the third view, the essential feature of the inner city is that it is organized as a hopeless victim. According to this model, the inner city is assigned to harbor vice for the larger metropolitan centers. It supplies the demand for prostitution, gambling, illicit drugs, shady entertainment, fences, and the rest. In addition, by distributing an adequate number of low-level patronage jobs throughout the area, the political machine creates a stable supply of votes which it is able to turn out for elections which are largely ignored in most parts of the city but which are crucial for the maintenance of the machine. In this sense, the inner city is organized, but by outsiders and for their own uses.

Programs of reform approach the inner city differently depending on which model they adopt, and CYDP subscribed to all three. Views of the inner city as social chaos or victim prompt a sympathetic but vigorous attempt at total reclamation and reform. Urban renewal, insofar as it has a social philosophy, rests on such models and so tears down in order to build anew. The approach to the deviant but internally organized sub-culture is more respectful. It is chastened by American values of ethnic tolerance and pluralism. Indigenous leadership is recognized and co-opted; the social network is regarded as useful and is infiltrated at its nodes of clubs, churches, political organizations and such; the culture is deemed quaintly attractive, and it is patronized. But the people must behave within the proper limits. As Frank Tannenbaum has pointed out, "The strife natural to a community that grew rapidly and by the continued addition of new and varying cultural groups was not an easy background for the enforcement of puritanic virtues and ideals written into law. The ruling and law-making prerogatives remained for a long time, and still largely remain, in the hands of the earlier immigrants

and settlers and their children" (Tannenbaum, 1938:45).

In sum the Chicago Youth Development Project took as given the fecundity of the inner city for juvenile delinquency. The Project accepted social chaos, exploitation, and sub-cultural divergence as plausible reasons for finding delinquency so rampant there. Its relationships to adults and adolescents, to their groups and organizations, and to area institutions were conditioned in part by its images of the inner city. These three images seemed to carry different weight at least at first in the two different target areas: the first two, more in the black area around the Henry Horner public housing project; and the third, more in the traditionally Italian neighborhood around the Oldtown Boys Club. But this distinction began later to break down as the civil rights movement gave rise to recognition of a black culture, and the spread of blacks and of the University of Illinois into the Italian area shook up its social organization.

The Givens: II. Parents and Citizens

Much of what has already been written about CYDP's images of the Inner City implies the Project's views of the adults who live there. It is necessary here only to translate those images into terms specific to adults as parents and as citizens, the roles in which the Project usually met them.

The Project proceeded on the unarguable assumption that the primary carriers to children of the wider culture are their parents. If for some reason parents do not discharge this function, this duty, then one expects to find their children unsocialized and unacculturated. But it should be noted that these two terms carry somewhat different connotations. To be "unsocialized" suggests a wild, unregulated, uninhibited, even savage state; or worse, it suggests an unrealized humanity. On the other hand, "unacculturated" has not so harsh a sound; it suggests rather an altogether human development, but one which is inappropriate for its time or place.

Grinding poverty and chaotic social relationships associated with our images of the inner city slum incapacitate parents as socializers. To begin with, their general competency is called into question by their very residence in the inner city, on the assumption that no one would live there

if he could escape. Genetic endowment, life experiences, and their place in the social structure conspire in various degrees to keep them there. But the consensus is that the slum harbors the weak, the unskilled, the physically and mentally sick, and that, as parents, they are at best minimal receivers of the culture, not to speak of incapable transmitters. Insofar as parents socialize their children by being models for them, slum parents cannot be expected, according to one image of the slum, to be good parents.

But the recruitment of weak types into the inner city is only part of the explanation for their poor parenting; slum conditions also have their effects. If one must work hard and long at legitimate and illegitimate pursuits in order merely to scrape by, few physical and emotional reserves are left for the demanding task of parenting. Patience and tolerance wear thin and children tend to receive short shrift from infancy on. Especially when children lose both the cuteness and manageability of babyhood, the pressures toward parental rigidity and the provocation to anger under trying circumstances become powerful. And when, to add to the onus, many parents, almost always mothers, have to manage without the help of a partner, the situation is overwhelming.

Furthermore, slum parents have to overcome the neighborhood. Whether they themselves are competent or not, or whether or not they are able to maintain an adequately organized family life, their children must venture beyond their own doors. There they encounter the offspring of the neighbors, and chances are that a substantial proportion of them are poorly socialized. The older their children get, the more parents lose their grip to the influences of the street, and, as we have suggested, one view of the inner city street emphasizes its hostility to socialization.

Adults as citizens fare no better, in this view of slum dwellers, than they do as parents. Again, assumptions of their incompetency include their lack of knowledge about and inability to understand the political processes which affect them. They do not read the newspapers or pay much attention to any but the most dramatic reporting on television. They are not aware of their rights or even that they have any. If they identify a neighborhood or personal problem as essentially political, they do not know where or how to complain. Nor would they expect much to come of their complaints; for the conditions of their lives have made fatalists of them. What happens to them is not under their control, and they believe

that that is not likely to change.

Organization to create political change does not come spontaneously to slum dwellers. In addition to their disbelief in their own efficacy, they do not trust one another. So convinced are they of the stigma of slum residence that, even if they exempt themselves and their nearest kin, they apply the stereotypes to their neighbors. They imagine them to be unreliable, incompetent, and desperately selfish. And since few if any norms have developed to facilitate social relationships, they avoid dealing with one another. Under such conditions, coming together for political action is almost inconceivable.

The set of assumptions about slum people and slum conditions which generate the foregoing image of adults as parents and citizens is quite different in its implications from the assumptions of a sub-cultural image. While the latter, as the former, lead to parental incapacity and political impotency, the process is imagined to be dissimilar.

Parents, according to this view, are not poor transmitters of culture per se, but poor transmitters of the dominant culture, simply because it is not their own. It is in this sense that their children are deemed unacculturated. Early on in their lives, one supposes, the children's deviancy is not so marked. They may have some difficulty in school, especially with reading and language skills, but they are not wild and uncontrollable. Later on, however, most notably as they enter adolescence, they demonstrate the disadvantages of their divergent backgrounds. They are not appropriately skilled or motivated for adult life outside of their immediate neighborhoods. The typical consequence is one or another form of cultural rejection. On the one hand, youngsters may reject the wider culture in favor of their parents'; but, unlike their parents, they tend to make opposition out of their difference, that is, to adopt a counter-culture. They become fierce partisans of their way of life and resent the imposition of an alien culture upon them. On the other hand, they may reject their parents' sub-culture as old-fashioned, provincial, or demeaning; they sense that binding themselves to it will prevent them from making their way successfully in the common culture. At the same time, they reject their parents' influence generally and, thus alienated from any social constraints, freely test the limits of tolerable behavior and beyond.

In the face of either kind of cultural rejection, the parents of these youngsters become distraught. They had never expected their children to

get into trouble. They regard themselves and their neighbors as law-abiding citizens and cannot understand how their children went wrong. They blame bad influences, the City, or modern life and recall that it was not thus back in the Old Country or Down South or wherever they remember with nostalgia.

They also resent the interference of dominating outsiders in their lives. When their children get into difficulty at school or with the police, they feel sure that they as parents can contain the problem in the context of their neighborhood and cultural mores. They maintain an elaborate social organization designed in part to do just this. The men in the family or the church or some ethnic social agency can provide the punishment or the services needed to correct the situation--if they were left alone.

This brings us to the kind of citizens these adults are imagined to be. They are members of ethnic interest groups. They have to be more or less taken into account depending on their numbers, the degree of their concentration in parts of the city, and their contacts with the political power structure. Their political concern is primarily with partisan advantage. Feeling chronically threatened in their minority status, they cannot as a group afford the nobility of statesmanship. They need such protection as police and zoning boards can give them, and patronage. They suppose that every other ethnic group takes the same political stance and that that is altogether proper and fair.

Consequently, their political structures are closed, closed to outsiders of other ethnic origins and closed to issues which are not ethnically relevant. It is difficult for a social agency like the Boys Clubs to persuade them to elevate the welfare of youth in their list of priorities; because they have settled on their priorities among themselves, and the agency is not part of their ethnic sub-culture besides.

We realize that we have sketched these images of inner city adults with broad strokes and in over-simple outline. This is not the place for full-scale portraits in all their complexity. It has been intended to share with the reader something of the Project's view of the world with which it meant to deal. For this purpose a sketch must not only suffice, it is also most appropriate; for the staff did not self-consciously develop these images in any detail. They were taken for granted as bases on which to work. It remained for one of the CYDP research staff, Gerald D. Suttles,

sometime later, to paint a more complete portrait of just one of the target areas in his book, The Social Order of the Slum (1968).

The Givens: III. Delinquent Boys

Of all the images of the Delinquent abroad in the literature and in the culture at large one at least was foreign to CYDP: the image of the disturbed individual. Both action and research people could agree with Tannenbaum's assessment that "If individual shortcomings are to be made the basis of a theory in criminology that will explain criminal conduct and establish a causal relationship between them, then the work is yet to be done" (Tannenbaum, 1938:216). Previous experience of the action staff indeed included instances of boys whose tangles with the authorities were due in part to neurosis, psychosis, or incredibly low intelligence. But the social problem of delinquency in the target areas was not assumed to be comprised of individual cases of sick and defective children. High delinquency rates reflected social conditions, were assumed to be a response to these conditions.

One of those conditions was the condition of slum family life on which we have already dwelled. Project staff expected to find many boys out of the control of their parents for all sorts of reasons. It was known that a large proportion of the families in the Henry Horner housing project were fatherless, that whole floors of apartments housed not a single adult male. It was believed that many intact families had such difficulty surviving the urban environment that even some of the basic activities of parenting were neglected. It was anticipated that many boys, finding little stability or satisfaction in family life, would give their primary allegiance to their peers in the streets so that the gang rather than the family became the chief source of social control.

The action staff, having had already some years of experience with street work, did not assume the journalist's image of the delinquent gang. That is, they were under no illusions about the degree of organization or about the size of identifiable groups of boys. They had learned that the boys in the inner city were no more capable, and perhaps less, of stable, elaborate, and tight organization than other groups of adolescents. Boys roamed rather in small groups of three or four, maybe six to eight; memberships shifted from time to time; leadership and other group roles were

informal; groups were not dedicated exclusively or even mainly to fighting or other delinquent behavior, and there was likely to be a wide range of delinquent activity among the membership of any one group. Gang names and associated legends abounded in the communities but really belonged to no one; they were put on and off like team jackets as the occasion warranted.

Nevertheless, the society of peers was a major element in the lives of the target population. The bulk of their delinquent behavior was perpetrated in groups and, it was supposed, for the groups; that is, their delinquent behavior was believed to be both functional for their group life and for individuals in relation to their groups. Extension work proceeded on the assumption therefore that work with individual boys had much less prospect for success than work with groups of boys.

Another condition of social life in the inner city believed important for delinquency is the malintegration of youth with major institutions in their lives. In the first chapter, we noted that, for one reason or another, heavily delinquent youngsters do not readily join organizations like the Boys Clubs or the YMCA. So they miss out, not only on the recreational opportunities which are the main substance of such programs, but also on other services which these agencies provide. They are not exposed to easy opportunities for incidental learning of social roles and they cannot take advantage of informal counseling at critical moments. They do not have available to them the character references which sometimes make the difference between getting a job and not. They do not hear about jobs or scholarships and training funds that might be important to them. No one with status in the community knows them at a time when some intercession with the school or the police can be crucial in their lives.

The school itself is alien ground. Heavily delinquent adolescents typically perform badly in school. Their behavior is often troublesome. They are prone to drop out at the earliest opportunity, and even before actually separating themselves formally, they become psychological dropouts --they withdraw any commitment to the student role, they cease trying, they attend irregularly, they pay little attention when present. Many teachers lack the time and the skills to manage these boys, so the boys simply drift away. The teachers are often relieved to be rid of them. But, of course, not making it in the schools means getting off the most direct escalator to a reasonably successful and conventional adult life. Dropping out before high school graduation means leaving the American mainstream.

Even if he manages to get all the way through high school, there is some question about whether a young man from the inner city has much opportunity to get ahead, American-style. He is handicapped in his pursuit of employment by the stigmas of race and poverty, by not knowing anyone in control of jobs, and by inadequate preparation at home and in school. Cloward and Ohlin have argued in Delinquency and Opportunity (1961) that the dominant forms of delinquency in a neighborhood are shaped by the economic opportunities available to the older adolescents and young adults there. If sufficient legitimate opportunities are available, then they theorize that it is unlikely that delinquency will thrive to any unusual degree. If there is a stable organization of illegitimate opportunities--i.e., organized crime--then one would expect to find the younger generation apprenticed to and integrated into that structure. Delinquent gangs form, according to this theory, when there are neither legitimate nor illegitimate economic opportunities, and they express their members' frustrations in fighting, drug-taking and other forms of delinquent behavior. The action staff had had enough experience with boys looking for jobs to feel that there was some validity to this theory.

The assumptions of the Boys Clubs agency contributed still another theme to the relationship between inner city life and juvenile delinquency. Youth typically occupies two places in the common picture of the slum street: they are either squeezing some kind of game in between the traffic or hanging around on a streetcorner or front stoop. There is no real place to play. Nor is there anyone to provide them with leisuretime programs. So they have lots of idle time when "the Devil finds things to do." The principal theory underlying recreation as a treatment for delinquency is simply to occupy the time which otherwise would be spent misbehaving. We suspect that this theory was at least in part responsible for calling in the Chicago Boys Clubs to remedy the youth problems in the Henry Horner area.

Finally, to understand CYDP's programmatic approach to delinquency treatment, we need to take into account the belief that the Delinquent is an invention of the police and the courts. Several assumptions are involved here. First is that almost every adolescent at some time commits some offense serious enough to provide a basis for legal sanctions if the offense were detected. Therefore, the real difference between a "delinquent" and a "nondelinquent" is that the latter is in the condition of being caught,

or more precisely, of being subjected to some official labelling upon being caught. This assumption does not rule out the fact that youngsters differ in the degree and seriousness of their delinquent behavior; it does however imply that these differences among them have little or nothing to do with whether they are labelled "delinquent." It is in this sense that the Delinquent is as much a creation of the police and courts, in their reaction to the behavior of a juvenile, as it is the behavior of the juvenile himself.

A second assumption links delinquency, viewed in this way, with the inner city. It holds that the identification of high delinquency rates with the inner city is substantially the consequence of the reaction of the police and courts, and less a reflection of the behavior of the young residents. That is, the stigma of the inner city is bound in a self-fulfilling prophecy; for, if it is to be expected that that environment would produce delinquency, then that misbehavior of its youth which is discovered had better be treated firmly (officially) so that it will not get further out of hand. Furthermore, such neighborhoods had better be patrolled more heavily to hold down its huge potential for crime, and so more crime is discovered. Thus are the inner city's high delinquency rates created and perpetuated. And they serve also to convince inner city adolescents that this is the way kids like them are and to act accordingly.

So one of the problems of delinquency in the inner city, according to these assumptions, is the differential application of law enforcement. If the police and the courts could be persuaded to treat delinquency in the inner city as they do in the suburbs, the delinquency rates would immediately go down and the inner city would lose some of its negative image. And youngsters in turn might behave better.

The Givens: IV. The Agency

The last guiding image to consider is the image the agency had of itself. We will discuss this here in terms of the capacities the Chicago Boys Clubs believed it had to deal with delinquency as the agency saw the problem.

The agency regarded itself as one of the established institutions in Chicago. Beginning in 1901 with a single club in two lofts on South State Street, the organization had grown steadily through the years. By 1960 it occupied 16 club buildings, three camps, and a four-story office building in the Loop. One hundred fifty full-time and 100 part-time staff members administered a program which served 18,000 member-youngsters.

The succession of a new lay President of the agency as CYDP was being organized in 1960 helps to bring one facet of the agency's reflection into focus. Col. William M. Spencer's greeting in the Chicago Boys Club Quarterly Review read:

As the new president of the Chicago Boys Clubs, I look upon the task ahead not only as a challenge, but as a sacred cause which we must support with zeal and enthusiasm. The welfare of our boys is paramount in any plans we have for Chicago's future and I sincerely hope and trust that you will join me wholeheartedly in our crusade for better tomorrows for all of our city's youngsters.

As one of my first official acts as head of this great Boys Clubs organization, I was privileged to meet the staff leaders of our 16 clubs together with the administrative heads of the headquarters departments.

I want to tell you that I have never met a more dedicated group of men and I knew after my talks with them that the Boys Clubs are filling a real need in Chicago's communities--and that this need is being met by men of high principles--men imbued with deep devotion and loyalty to their jobs.

Later I toured the various clubs of the Chicago Boys Clubs organization. We have 16 such clubs ranging in size from a few rooms in the basement of a housing project to a four-story, architecturally-designed boys club complete with swimming pool, gymnasium, auditorium and club rooms. It was a real thrill to tour these clubs--from the lowliest to the most modern.

I saw the staff members in each club going about their work with professional capability and efficiency. I was particularly impressed, however, by the attitude of the boy members of the club toward these men who are second fathers to hundreds of youngsters desperately in need of guidance.

Most important of all was the inspiration that the visitor received from association with staff leaders. Their good cheer was contagious; the way they made every boy feel his own importance, is something I will not forget.

This work deserves our best efforts. These Boys Club leaders need our spirited backing. The boys need our best help.

Let us not fail them. (p. 2)

The new President's emphasis was on the adult leadership, its skill and its dedication, which evoked positive responses from boys. While

he expressed pride in the physical facilities, Col. Spencer particularly deprecated the differences among them. They were meeting places for wholesome adults and boys who needed them, that was the important thing. During the ceremony of passing the President's gavel, Col. Spencer was asked specifically about the Boys Clubs role in combatting juvenile delinquency, and he dwelt again on adult leadership. "I dislike that phrase [juvenile delinquency] intensely," he said. "The troubles of our children can be attributed to the older generations who have failed to provide leadership. And that word--leadership--is a key to the success of the Chicago Boys Clubs in dealing with youth. When we can arouse all Chicago to the merits of the Boys Clubs work, the phrase 'juvenile delinquency' will disappear from the language simply for lack of use."

The new President was faithfully reflecting here the agency's commitment to reducing juvenile delinquency and its own assessment of the primary tool at its disposal--its line staff's capacity to relate to all kinds of children.

An external--and sometimes cynical--view of the Boys Clubs is that it runs a "bats and balls" program; that is, that it depends heavily on a recreational program to accomplish its goals for children. That was not the image the Boys Club staff had of itself, especially at its higher levels. The activities program was a come-on, a way of attracting youngsters into the orbit of the agency. And while wholesome recreation was regarded as intrinsically good for boys, it was not charged with the central task of character building or with the reduction of delinquency. For achieving those ends, the agency counted on its capacity to recruit and train a good staff.

Second only to its staff, the agency depended on its access to community resources that were valuable for boys. We have already mentioned that the Chicago Boys Clubs provided educational scholarships and helped boys to find jobs. Both of these resources were obtained largely through contact with wealthy and influential people. Typical of such agencies, the Boys Clubs manned its boards of directors, its advisory committees, and its task forces with key citizens. These were the kinds of people that people in the Henry Horner and Oldtown target areas would not likely ever meet or even know about. But if a boy needed a job or a group needed

free tickets to an event or if a boy's family asked for help in getting through the maze of a welfare bureaucracy, the agency could provide important contacts.

Its contacts in the city's Establishment also had political implications for the Chicago Boys Clubs. The top staff was aware that CYDP's intention to organize the target communities might arouse resistance in public and private institutions. The agency believed that its own position in the community--for example, its Executive Director traditionally served on the Mayor's Youth Commission--and its relationships with citizens who were influential in civic and economic circles would afford the agency what in Chicago--and later elsewhere--was known as "clout," that is, political power to overcome opposition.

This image of itself then as an agency with staff expertise, material resources, important contacts, and political influence infused the Chicago Boys Clubs with a sense of confidence at the launching of the Chicago Youth Development Project. The image helped to shape the program insofar as it defined what the agency felt it could do. Other facets of the image further defined what the agency felt it should do.

The Boys Clubs is not thought of by the public or by itself as an auxiliary of the country club set. And even while it maintains club buildings and has a large membership in comfortable neighborhoods, it is not identified as an agency for middle class children either. The Boys Clubs, more than its best-known brother agencies, the Boy Scouts and the YMCA, is regarded as serving the working class and the poor. Its early membership in Chicago fits this image. As an old alumnus described himself and his friends, "Inasmuch as all of us were from the old Jones School area, we were considered pretty tough kids, living in basements or the back room of our father's clothing store or shoe store or whatever." It is apparent that the agency's identification with poor kids implies its commitment to serve "tough kids," that is, to combat juvenile delinquency. Clearly the development of CYDP was consistent with the traditional image of the agency.

Corollary to its emphasis on serving the working class poor was its image as a nondiscriminatory agency. It projected this image consistently in all of its public relations materials: letterheads depicted an inter-

racial membership; photographs from the gymnasiums, crafts rooms and camps almost invariably included at least both black and white boys. This commitment to serve boys of any ethnic origin amounted to a moral imperative. Insofar as delinquency was imagined to be a problem of the inner city which was disproportionately black, then CYDP represented further testimony to the Chicago Boys Clubs' resolve. It was not anticipated in the beginning that this resolve and CYDP's firm attachment to it would prove to be a significant limitation on the effectiveness of the program.

CHAPTER 3

Design for Action and Research

If someone should discover that his physician had prescribed an expensive medicine for him in the complete absence of any certainty that that medicine would cure what ailed him, he would be appropriately indignant. We have such qualms about personal and physical illness. But we do not seem to care that way about reputed cures for social pathologies. The fact is that we know almost nothing about what measures will effectively prevent juvenile delinquency, and yet we spend large sums of public and private money on programs without much question. The irrationality of this is not that large sums are spent but rather that no effort is made to determine if they are being wisely spent. The rational approach would be to implement programs with sufficient support to do them well, and also to study their effectiveness.

When this is pointed out so baldly, it seems so obvious that the puzzling question arises--why isn't it done? Why are there so many programs launched--to prevent delinquency and to ameliorate many other social problems--with no attempt to evaluate them?

Prof. Donald T. Campbell of Northwestern University has suggested one reason:

It is one of the most characteristic aspects of the present situation that specific reforms are advocated as though they were certain to be successful. For this reason, knowing outcomes has immediate political implications. Given the inherent difficulty of making significant improvements by the means usually provided and given the discrepancy between promise and possibility, most administrators wisely prefer to limit the evaluations to those outcomes of which they can control, particularly insofar as published outcomes or press releases are concerned. Ambiguity, lack of truly comparable comparison bases, and lack of concrete evidence all

work to increase the administrator's control over what gets said, or at least to reduce the bite of criticism in the case of actual failure. There is safety under the cloak of ignorance. Over and above this tie-in of advocacy and administration, there is another source of vulnerability in that the facts relevant to experimental program evaluation are also available to argue the general efficiency and honesty of administrators. The public availability of such facts reduces the privacy and security of at least some administrators.

Even where there are ideological commitments to a hard-headed evaluation of organizational efficiency, or to a scientific organization of society, these two jeopardies lead to the failure to evaluate organizational experiments realistically. If the political and administrative system has committed itself in advance to the correctness and efficacy of its reforms, it cannot tolerate learning of failure. To be truly scientific we must be able to experiment. We must be able to advocate without that excess of commitment that blinds us to reality testing. [1969, pp. 409-410]

The politics of reform and evaluation are a consideration for private as well as public agencies. The Chicago Boys Clubs depends on private contributions for its survival, and its image as an effective agency for youth is important to its public appeal. Should it be determined that one of its programs was systematically and objectively tried and proved ineffective, that information might wash back over the agency's entire public reputation to the agency's detriment.

Nevertheless, the Chicago Boys Club staff committed itself and remained committed throughout the six years of CYDP to hard-headed research on this program. The cooperation of the action staff and of the directorates of the local clubs and the downtown office was wholehearted. The Chicago Youth Development Project was conducted with researchers constantly looking over its shoulder and with all the restriction of free movement that that figure implies.

In a real sense, CYDP was a collaborative venture of action and research. Plans, ideas, and information flowed between the two staffs regularly. Especially in the initial planning stages, when every effort was made to build the research design into the action plan, the action and research staffs worked closely together. This chapter describes the integration of the designs for action and research. It outlines the relationships among the action goals and the construction of the program to reach those goals; and the relationships among the goals, the program, and the research procedures

which aimed to determine whether and in what ways the program accomplished its goals.

Choosing the Target Neighborhoods

Where in the inner city should CYDP be established? The main criterion for the selection of the two experimental areas was that they had some need for and could benefit from a delinquency prevention program, a need no other agency was addressing at that time. This need was identified largely by the delinquency rates of the areas, insofar as they could be determined on the basis of reliable data and without resort to an extended empirical investigation. Fortunately the State of Illinois Institute for Juvenile Research and the Youth Division of the Chicago Police Department had been compiling such data in the city for several years and made them available to us. Several areas of Chicago qualified on this basis.

A second criterion from the action staff's point of view was the location of a Boys Club in the areas to serve as a base of operations for the CYDP staff.

A third criterion was the desirability of continuing and expanding the program already in progress at the Henry Horner Boys Club.

A fourth criterion was that an area selected have strong tangible boundaries such as expressways, railroad tracks, and rivers, so that one could assume that the greatest portion of boys' social interaction was within the area rather than outside it.

From the research point of view, the main criterion for selection of experimental--target--areas was the possibility of identifying matching control areas, areas comparable to the experimental areas but in which CYDP would not operate. The importance of control areas cannot be overestimated. If carefully chosen and observed with the same care given to the experimental areas, control areas offered the best assurance that certain detectable effects would not falsely be attributed to the experimental program and that other effects, rightly attributed to the experimental program, would not be overlooked. Some illustrations will underscore the value of matched controls.

One might suppose that many conditions unrelated to a program like CYDP affect the delinquency rate of a neighborhood. Among them are such

factors as changes in the practices of the responsible juvenile bureau of the police or of the juvenile court, or general economic conditions in the wider community. If any of these change in such a way as to alter the delinquency rate downward, a study solely of the experimental area might mislead one to attribute that decline to the experimental program. Certainly the rates there will be lower at the program's end than they were at its beginning. However, the rates in the matching control areas, if the areas were chosen properly and their rates measured as carefully, would also drop in response to the same extra-program factors. Witnessing a similar decline in areas where the experimental program was not operating would make one cautious about attributing the decline in the experimental area to the program.

The advantage of including control areas also works to detect those positive effects of a program which might otherwise pass unnoticed. Suppose that conditions external to a field experiment on delinquency generate a general rise in delinquency rates throughout the city while the experiment is running. Actually, the effectiveness of the program counteracts those forces so that the rates in the experimental areas hold steady from the beginning to the end of the program. But without comparable control area rates, it would seem from the steady rates that the program had been ineffective. Only in comparison with rising rates in the control areas do the rates in the experimental areas demonstrate the worth of the program.

For CYDP research purposes, the possibility of identifying matching control areas depended on having available certain demographic and statistical data. So, insofar as it was possible, both experimental and control areas were chosen to be coterminous with statistical reporting units whose data archives and published reports both before and during the project's tenure would be useful for research purposes. It was largely on the basis of such demographic and statistical information collected for such geographical units as census tracts, police districts and Chicago community areas that the matching of control areas to experimental areas was done. The major statistical reporting units whose data proved useful included the U.S. Bureau of the Census, the Chicago Community Inventory, the Chicago Police Department, the Chicago Public School System, the Institute for Juvenile Research, and the Welfare Council of Metropolitan Chicago.

Another important criterion for area selection was that the areas be manageable for both the action program and the research evaluation. The areas had to be small enough to be covered by the action program within the limits of its treatment resources and yet large enough to yield significant quantitative data for evaluation. It had to be large enough to include the operating milieu of a population of adolescent boys, yet small enough so that it could be covered by the resources of the research staff.

The choice of experimental and control areas went through several phases marked by trials and errors. Selection of the Henry Horner area as a target area was straightforward; the desirability of continuing what had been begun there and the area's continuing need dictated its choice. Two additional target areas were initially planned and a round of discussions and negotiations was begun to settle upon them. Having identified potential target areas on the basis of the criteria outlined above, the directors and staffs of the local clubs were consulted about their receptivity to the Project.

The CYDP idea was initially attractive to all the local staffs who were approached. After all, participation means an input of personnel and other resources which would add substantially to the capacity of the clubs involved for at least five years and probably more. Participation also meant being part of a large, exciting project which would have the close attention, not only of the downtown office but also of the national office of the Boys Clubs of America. Still, further discussions made some club directors hesitant when the burdens of the project became more clear, when their proportions began to loom as large or perhaps even larger than the advantages. Eventually, self selection narrowed the field of choice.

The Project actually was launched in three areas: Henry Horner, Oldtown, and one other. They each fitted the major criteria fairly well and, taken together, they represented a variety of ethnic groups, neighborhood subcultures, and types of housing (i.e., public and private, apartment buildings, and single-family dwellings). But after several months of orientation, training, and setting up of research procedures, the third area was reluctantly dropped. A major reason was that the resources for both action and research staffs were drawn thin over three areas; it would

be more realistic to cover two target areas and their matched controls. Another reason for the reduction, particularly relevant for selecting the area to be dropped, was the growing feeling on the part of the central CYDP directorate that the directors of that local club were having great difficulty in incorporating CYDP into its program. That neighborhood had been chosen in part because it was in the process of ethnic succession, blacks displacing whites along some of the main transportation and shopping corridors. The change in population and the consequent ferment were generating problems enough for the club's administration and CYDP served only to exacerbate them. The Project staff regretted foregoing the opportunity to work under those conditions, to see how a program like CYDP could manage in such a situation, indeed to demonstrate how such a program might ameliorate the peculiar tensions. However, as we point out later, that opportunity came rather unexpectedly in the Oldtown area in any case, and it did yield special insights.

Descriptions of the Target Areas

The Henry Horner area is about two miles due west of Chicago's central Loop district in an area known by native Chicagoans as the "Near West Side." The target neighborhood was defined as an area about one mile square and included a population of 30,270, of which about 2,180 were 10- to 19-year-old boys according to the U.S. Census for 1960. Eighty-three percent of the residents were black, the rest Caucasian, Puerto Rican, Mexican, and others. The area had been recognized for its high delinquency rates for as long as such data had been published. In the early 1950's, a decade before CYDP, this area was in the highest quartile of juvenile arrests in the city, according to the Institute for Juvenile Research compilation of police statistics. It remained among the most delinquent fourth of community areas through the 50's, approximately one out of every ten boys in the neighborhood acquiring a court record in those years. And up to the launching of the Project, the area registered among the largest increases in the number of juvenile complaints in the city.

Median annual income in the area was \$3,223, well below the average for the city and about 35% of the families had been supported by welfare funds

sometime in recent years. Most adult residents had not completed junior high school.

The dominant geographical feature in the area was the Henry Horner Housing Project, which we have already described. Outside of the housing project, about one in four of the dwellings were either without a private bath or considered dilapidated. Less than 20% of homes were owned by their residents. Half the area was given over to industrial and commercial use. Over 70% of the structures had been built before 1895. Chicago's Skid Row cut through the area from east to west.

The Oldtown area was better off than the Henry Horner area according to the usual indices. Median income was closer to the city-wide average, at \$5,058, and the adults were on the average about one school grade more educated. The defined experimental area was about three-fourths the size of the Horner area but, because the Horner area included more commercial space, had two-thirds of the Horner population. The population included about 1,760 10- to 19-year-old boys, that segment of the total with which CYDP was directly concerned.

The Oldtown area had a more dramatic image than the Horner area.¹ "Oldtown" is CYDP's name for the neighborhood, after the Boys Club there; Chicagoans know it as "Taylor Street" after a main thoroughfare, or as part of the "Near West Side." In the years of Prohibition and for a while after, the area was a stronghold of gangsters including "Scarface" Al Capone and Frank "The Enforcer" Nitti. Near its center stands Hull House, the famous settlement house established by Nobel Laureate Jane Addams. Just to the south of the target area's boundary but still within the area as defined by Chicagoans is Maxwell Street, where pushcarts once assembled daily to create a colorful open-air market of retail merchandise of all sorts.

A succession of ethnic groups flowed through the Oldtown area beginning with the wealthy Chicagoans who lived within carriage-drive of their downtown office in the 1800's, then each group--Scotch-Irish, Germans, Greeks, Jews, Italians, Mexicans--surrendering the neighborhood to the next. So far only the Italians have left their cultural mark on the area which they still dominate.

¹This material on the Oldtown area has been largely taken from Suttles, 1968, pp. 13-18.

The Italians in 1960 accounted for about a third of the Oldtown area's population; Mexicans, about a fourth; blacks, about 17%; and Puerto Ricans, under 10%. The blacks were, at the beginning of CYDP, almost completely confined to the Jane Addams public housing project where they made up over 90% of the residents, the rest being mainly elderly Jews who had lived there for decades, since the time the area was a Jewish neighborhood.

While the area was somewhat better off economically than the Horner area and evidenced a greater degree of social organization and stability, it was nevertheless even more characterized than Horner by high delinquency rates. There too high rates had been a fact for many years. During the 1950's, 14 to 15 boys in every 100 in the area had acquired juvenile court records, placing the neighborhood ninth in delinquency among Chicago's 75 community areas.

Control Areas²

When the purpose of a study is to measure, evaluate and describe the effectiveness of a juvenile prevention program, a major question raised is "Effectiveness compared to what?" That question can be answered in terms of temporal and spatial comparisons. The temporal comparison is arrived at by specifying what the juvenile delinquency situation was before the prevention program was introduced and then specifying what the juvenile delinquency situation is at a given interval of time after the prevention program can be assumed to have had some effects. This is the familiar before and after design to evaluate the effectiveness of a program. The spatial comparison is arrived at by selecting certain nonprogram areas as control areas and specifying what the juvenile delinquency situation was, in both the program and nonprogram areas, at the beginning of the prevention effort, and then specifying what the juvenile delinquency situation is, in both areas, at a given interval of time after the prevention program can be assumed to have had some effects in the program area. This is the familiar before and

²This material is adapted from Mattick and Caplan, 1964, pp. 54-60.

after method, as qualified by the addition of a here and there comparison. This combination of controls enables one to take account of events and processes that would effect changes in both experimental and control areas independently of the program being evaluated.

Since the action program had been launched in two experimental areas, the research program necessarily concerned itself with making a temporal comparison of a variety of factors present in those areas before the action program was launched and after some cut-off date. However, as we have pointed out, if the research program confined itself to such before and after measures of change, the problem would have remained of relating what changes had taken place because of the action program. The experimental areas were dynamic entities undergoing changes which were due to factors quite apart from those attributable to CYDP. A simple temporal comparison could describe the changes that had taken place over time, but would have left the attribution of those changes to inferential speculation. Accordingly, some method had to be adopted to try to control for the changes that would take place in the experimental areas in any case.

Natural-Unified Control Areas

The method first adopted to gain a measure of control was to select two areas of the city similar to the experimental areas. These control areas were selected at the same time as the experimental areas were chosen and by the same criteria as these which determined the selection of the experimental areas. These areas, one for each experimental area, were called "natural-unified" control areas. They were "natural" in the sense that their boundaries were determined by the congruence of census tract borders and strong natural barriers, e.g., above street level railroads or main traffic arteries like expressways. They were "unified" in the same sense as the experimental areas in that all their census tracts were contiguous. Like the experimental areas, the natural-unified control areas were inner-city areas with a heterogeneous population and high indices of social disorganization. Figure 3:1 locates the experimental and natural-unified control areas, and the constructed-dispersed areas (to be described next).


Constructed-Dispersed Control Areas

A comparison of the experimental areas and the natural-unified control areas, based on the 1960 census and on the basis of the block survey undertaken by the Project, made it apparent that the natural-unified control areas, while useful for some purposes, were of limited value for making some important kinds of comparisons. It was found that, although the experimental and natural-unified control areas were comparable in many respects, certain experimental area characteristics were not represented in their respective natural-unified control areas. Large urban renewal and housing projects, for example, were present or soon to be undertaken in each of the experimental areas, but equivalent developments were present in only one of the two natural-unified control areas. Similarly, empirical investigation indicated that certain experimental area characteristics were rare in Chicago, e.g., the Social Athletic Clubs and street markets in the Oldtown area, and the Madison Street skidrow in the Horner area. Thus, from the standpoint of gaining adequate control and making spatial comparisons, the natural-unified control areas left something to be desired. Therefore, in order to make more precise comparisons, a different concept of control areas was devised.


In general, the question we faced was how to arrive at a control area for highly variegated and complex experimental areas that were undergoing rapid and extensive change and that contained some rare features? The equivalents of the majority of the important characteristics of the experimental areas, not represented in the natural-unified control areas, could be found in other scattered areas of the city. Accordingly, a different concept of control areas was formulated consisting of a number of spatially dispersed census tracts, each tract being selected on the basis of a high degree of equivalence to the various individual census tracts that constituted the experimental areas. This "constructed-dispersed" control area concept assumed that it was not essential that the census tracts which formed it also form a single geographic entity, as did the experimental and natural-unified areas. Thus spatial and cultural unity was an essential part of the experimental areas and the natural-unified control areas, but the constructed-dispersed control areas were composed of elements drawn from several matched parts of the city.

Figure 3:1

BEST COPY AVAILABLE



Experimental Area



NUC Area



CDC Area

CITY OF CHICAGO



RICHARD J. DALEY
MAYOR



RESEARCH DIVISION

COMMUNITY AREA BASE BY
CHICAGO COMMUNITY INVENTORY 1960

PREPARED BY
DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING
GRAPHIC SECTION
1960

The nature of the constructed-dispersed control areas was, of course, dictated by the characteristics of the experimental areas and of the separate census tracts which made up the experimental areas. Therefore, the first step in determining the nature of the constructed-dispersed control areas was to clearly define the nature of the experimental areas, and their census tract subdivisions, in the form of a statistical profile of demographic characteristics. On the basis of population and housing data given in the Advance Table of the 1960 census, supplemented by empirical investigation, demographic profiles of census tracts in the experimental areas were computed on the basis of 22 census and noncensus items reduced to statistical indices. The kinds of factors entering into such statistical profiles included gross land space available and net residential land space, total population, population density, racial and ethnic proportions of the population, proportion of renter occupied and nonsound housing, population per household, presence or absence of public housing in the tract, and some empirical investigation for changes that had taken place since the 1960 census. Once the experimental tracts were so defined, census tract investigations were undertaken outside of the experimental areas in order to find at least two matching census tracts for every census tract in the experimental areas. Altogether, demographic profiles were computed for nearly 300 separate census tracts and their profiles compared with similar profiles of the experimental area census tracts.

Candidate tracts were then surveyed further in order to gather additional data not available in the published 1960 census material. The more complete profile comparison sheets were then examined and those candidate tracts showing the greatest resemblance to the experimental tracts were finally selected to comprise the matching constructed-dispersed control areas. Such matching was, of course, not uniformly close in every case, but it was close within specifiable limits of tolerance (see Table 3:1 for a comparison of the demographic characteristics of the experimental and constructed-dispersed control areas).

The major advantage in using constructed-dispersed control areas was the greater degree of initial comparability with all, or sections, of the experimental areas, which made possible the isolation and study of specific variables that may be significant in evaluating the effectiveness of the CYDP

TABLE 3:1

Comparison of Experimental and Constructed-Dispersed Control Areas on Selected Demographic Characteristics

Areas	Total Population	% Males 10-19	% Nonwhite	% Negro of Nonwhite	Average Size of Household	Median Family Income in Dollars	Median School Years Completed	Unemployment
Horner								
Experimental	30,269	7.2	85	99	3.4	3,223	7.9	14.5
Control	35,018	7.2	91	100	3.5	3,734	8.4	12.4
Oldtown								
Experimental	20,524	8.6	16	93	3.7	5,058	8.4	6.3
Control	18,309	9.2	4	56	3.4	5,382	8.2	6.3

*Source: U.S. Department of Labor. Income, Employment, and Labor, Chicago, 1960.

action program. The problem of interpreting the complex and dynamic interaction of variables also proved to be more manageable with the constructed-dispersed control areas. There are also some secondary advantages to their use. A spatially dispersed control area was less likely to have all of its separate components affected simultaneously by such mass phenomena as population shifts, slum clearance, expressway construction or natural disasters, which in the course of the program might severely affect the degree of comparability between the experimental areas and the natural-unified control areas. Had such a mass phenomenon become an important feature of an experimental area, a similar phenomenon could be found also in one of the constructed-dispersed control areas, or, if not, one more addition to the constructed-dispersed control areas could have been made in order to take account of the significant variables that enter into that mass phenomenon.

It should be pointed out that the CDC concept did not replace, but only supplemented the natural-unified control areas. Because they constituted a geographical entity, certain kinds of analysis involving community-related factors could only be carried out in the natural-unified areas. These areas had the virtue that they might exhibit important milieu-characteristics that were also present in the experimental areas, for example, domination by machine politics, or race conflict. They could also reflect the effects of institutional policies at police, school, and other subdivisions organized on an area-wide basis. Therefore, in order to account for the milieu-characteristics of experimental areas, an entity like the natural-unified areas was necessary. However, for more precise comparisons of individual or race characteristics, or for the purpose of making comparisons that try to take account of dynamic changes in the experimental areas, the CDC system was more appropriate. In such instances, figures for the dispersed tracts were combined as if they were contiguous.

Organization of CYDP

Figure 3:2 lays out how personnel were organized to conduct the action and research phases of CYDP. An Executive Committee was ultimately responsible for the conduct of the program, and it was composed of the Executive Director

and Assistant Director of the Chicago Boys Clubs, the Director and Assistant Director of the Program on Children, Youth, and Family Life at the Institute for Social Research, the Director of CYDP, and the Project's three Associate Directors. The Associate Directors supervised the action and research workers in the field.

The Extension Workers (EWs) and Community Resource Coordinators (CRCs) were in one sense considered part of the staffs of the local clubs and in another sense, were part of the special CYDP, which was administered by its directors downtown. For local supervisory purposes, on a geographical basis the EWs and CRCs were supervised by the local Club Director as to policy matters, and by the local Program Director for purposes of coordinating the use of club facilities by CYDP youth groups with the necessities of regular club programming. For functional purposes, as specialized workers in extension work and community organization, the EWs and CRCs were supervised by the Associate Directors of these functional subdivisions inside the action program. After completion of the CYDP, consideration was to be given to lodge all supervision at the local clubs.

There was a rationale for this dual supervisory relationship over the field staff at the earlier stages of CYDP. The Project, as a special six-year enterprise, could be operated and supervised in the experimental areas from some central office, quite apart from existing Boys Club facilities and staffs, and thus avoid the indirection and potential conflict that arose from dual supervision. (See Chapter 6.) However, such a direct organizational structure for the CYDP staff would have set it apart from the club facilities in the experimental areas and, upon the expiration of Ford Foundation support for such a special project for a six-year period, there would remain no organic relationship between the CYDP and future Chicago Boys Club operations. By integrating the CYDP field staff with the traditional in-building staff structure of the participating clubs, CYDP functions and operations would, if it were deemed desirable after the Project ended, more easily become a part of Chicago Boys Clubs operations. Thus, during the period of Ford Foundation support, and during the earlier stages of the project, the CYDP and the Chicago Boys Clubs agreed to abide with an awkward supervisory arrangement for the sake of the future integration of the best features of the CYDP, as empirically evaluated by the research program, into the standard operating methods of Chicago Boys Clubs programs. In this manner, CYDP




Figure 3:2. Organization of the Chicago Youth Development Project.

sought to avoid what seemed to be pitfalls or weaknesses in otherwise comparable juvenile delinquency prevention and control programs, i.e., the danger of isolating the special or experimental program from the traditional, ongoing, processes of the sponsoring agency.

The style of the CYDP program fits the general description of aggressive social work. It was necessary for the EWs and the CRCs to reach out for their youthful and adult clients, to develop their clientele. The reader will remember that the Project assumed that the appropriate targets for intervention were not likely to come to the agency and were not the kinds of people which the agency ordinarily served.³

So EWs were first obliged to search out the heavily delinquent boys in their areas, make contact with them, and draw them into the orbit of their influence. The search itself could be a long and frustrating process, for the most delinquent boys were not so easily identified. EWs were helped by other youth workers, the local police, school personnel and others. Probably the richest source of information about neighborhood youth were young people themselves who could be contacted through the Boys Clubs. The search phase proceeded much more quickly and easily in the Horner area where there were EWs already on the ground with numerous entries to the adolescent population; this early phase went more slowly in the Oldtown area despite the help of the Boys Club staff there.

EWs were expected ultimately to contact groups of boys rather than individuals where possible. Besides the efficiency of working with groups, the Project assumed that the social forces of an individual's peer group would need to be harnessed to the worker's efforts if they were to prove effective. Often this meant that EWs had actually to organize into more stable groups what were initially encountered as shifting congeries of friends. Making initial contact with groups or the process of organizing groups was facilitated by the EWs affiliation with the Boys Clubs because offering the use of the clubs' facilities could provide the substance of the EWs' early approaches to the boys.

The program resources at the EW's command was the first major basis of the EWs' influence, influence in the early stages limited to maintenance

³For a description of specific strategies of extension work developed in CYDP, see Carney, Mattick, and Callaway (1969).

of some relationship. Certain of these resources were from the beginning part of the EWs' stock in trade--a boys club gymnasium or workshop, money for occasional refreshments, and, most important, wheels. The Project's stationwagons appealed immensely to potential clients, sometimes because they wanted to go somewhere but more often because they enjoyed just riding around the city. Often, especially in the early stages of contact, EWs would drive boys into sections of Chicago not really far from their own neighborhood but where they had never ventured before.

Another resource built into the Project for the EWs (but only in the Horner area, for reasons given in Chapter 6), was a place to go, just to hang around. This was the Outpost, a former firestation a few blocks from the Henry Horner Boys Club. The boys club building itself is not an appropriate place in which adolescents can just hang. The program schedule there is tight; there is no lounging space for teenagers protected from the littler boys who are constantly going in and out; smoking, swearing, and sleeping off a drunk are not easily tolerated; and it is not a setting conducive to conversation about an adolescent's personal problems. The Outpost, on the other hand, was a place with which boys off the street could identify: they could meet their friend there, hold parties there, decorate it as they wished, and make it their own. And it not only permitted an EW to offer boys this special place, it also protected the agency's ongoing program; for EWs were supposed to recruit the toughest kids in the neighborhood for CYDP and there was great concern about what would happen to the boys club building and ongoing program if such boys were injected into it. Ideally EWs would after a time so socialize them that these boys could and would participate constructively in the building-centered program, but it was assumed that that process of socialization would take some time.

It was anticipated that boys would have needs to which extension workers ought to respond but which would not be satisfied by resources at the EWs' immediate command. Getting back into school might be one; a job might be another. This is partly where the Community Resource Coordinators came in. Their role required them to make contact with the major institutions relevant to the youth in the target areas so that, when a client of an EW had such a need, the CRC could facilitate its satisfaction. It might have been simpler to refer a boy or a group of boys to a CRC on those occasions,

but the Project chose not to work that way. For some important functions which provision of resources was supposed to serve in the action design could only be served if the EWs provided them. So the CRCs hustled resources for the EWs and the EWs passed them on to the kids.

The Project cast each EW into the role of giver. We have already mentioned that his command of resources in the early stages of contact with boys was intended to cement relationships. Furthermore, as relationships endured, it was anticipated that the EW's giving would shape boys' perceptions of the kind of person their EW was and that it would structure the relationship in useful ways. On the one hand, his giving would define him as a "good guy." But on the other hand, care had to be exercised that the EW did not begin to seem a "patsy." That is, he was supposed to be giving--within reasonable limits and for reasonably good causes--and he had also the right to make requests.

Such a definition of an EW's role, it was hoped, would accomplish several aims. It would make of him a friend and an object of identification for his youthful clients; that is, his generous behavior would hopefully encourage his boys to like him enough to do things for him--to be good for him--perhaps even to that degree that he would not even have to be around or to ask in order for them to act as they knew he wanted them to. It would also establish a bond of trust such that boys would open up to their EW about the things that were bothering them so that the problems which were provocative of misbehavior could be dealt with. It would furthermore appeal to such norms of reciprocity the boys had incorporated so that they would feel obligated to honor the requests of their EW--for better behavior--as he had honored their requests. (Reciprocal relationships like this were recognizable by some boys who witnessed their parents and other adults relate to politicians in their wards.) In short, the EW's magnanimous provision of valued resources was intended to enhance his influence with his clients.

The EW was of course a major program resource himself. He was selected to be an appropriate object of emulation and hopefully of identification for inner city boys. That is, the men recruited for these positions were chosen for their warmth and presence, for the feeling of confidence they projected, and for their own positive citizenship. They

also had to know the score; it would not do for them to be naive or utopian about the inner city, adolescents, or delinquency. Both their personal experience and professional training were considered relevant indicators of their sophistication.

The agency contributed to the positive image of the EWs by adding the appurtenances of the occupational role. Theirs was after all a white collar job requiring no manual labor and the target population of boys knew few men personally in positions of such status. Although the EWs seldom actually sat behind desks wearing jackets and ties, boys came to realize that the EWs had offices and did dress that way when they attended conferences downtown or even in another city. It was also clear that their employer entrusted the EWs with a good deal of expensive equipment, including large, late model stationwagons.

In many ways, then, the role and persons of the EWs were designed to enable them to fill the deficits believed to permit or encourage delinquency among inner city boys. The EWs had the motivation, time, and character to become surrogate parents who might exert some beneficent social control. They possessed the personal and material resources to meet some heretofore unmet needs of their young clients. They had contacts in the wider community which bridged the gaps between the inner city boys and the institutions which affected their lives.

Research Interlude: Records and the Boys' Interviews

Before we go on to describe other aspects of the action program, it would do well to demonstrate how the research design was built in. In the previous section we provided an overview of extension work as it was intended to be practiced with CYDP. In this section we describe how the research was designed to determine (1) whether the EWs did those things the program expected them to; and (2) if extension work invoked the social and psychological processes in boys and their groups which were theoretically supposed to reduce delinquency. The data of this study were sorted into three categories of a generalized model of action programs, categories of inputs, processes, and outcomes. These will be illustrated in what follows here.

Every member of the action and research field staff, supervisory staff and auxiliary staff were obliged to maintain written records about their work. The EWs, CRCs and Research Assistants wrote daily activity reports. The Program Directors of the clubs in the two experimental areas, who had supervisory relations with the field staff, submitted reports twice monthly concerning their CYDP activities and the relationship of the CYDP Program to the normal club program. The Club Directors of these clubs, and the Associate Directors of Extension Work, Community Organization and Research, submitted monthly reports. The Club Directors' reports related to CYDP activities and relations in their own club areas, while the reports of the Associate Directors were functionally oriented to their supervisory relations with the field staff. The major function of the reports made by CYDP staff members was to communicate information for administrative, supervisory, historical and research purposes.

Each of the field staff set aside some time at the beginning of the work day, usually the early afternoon, in order to record the events of the previous day. The CYDP memorandum on reporting procedures for the field staff stated, "The writer of a report always knows more about events than he can set down and so he must strike a balance between saying everything he knows and saying so little in general terms that his report says nothing. This means that he has to summarize and select the most significant events of his experience in such a way as to make it clear to a reader what happened. The writer of the report should put himself in the place of the reader and ask himself: is this report clear, simple and direct, and does it say what I mean to say? The way to achieve clear communication in reports is to observe the standard rule of the 5-W's: who, what, when, where and why. If reports tell who did what, and where and when it was done, and, insofar as possible, why it was done, the report will serve most purposes." Supervisors placed a great deal of stress on prompt, regular, and complete records.

A coding system was developed to abstract the information reported in the daily activity reports of the action staff. The primary activity categories provided for in the code were: School, Career, Aid, Police, Delinquency, Socialization, Community, and Private Consultation. These activity categories were empirically derived to capture the bulk of the

episodes reported and could be broken down into subcategories which more precisely defined the nature of most activities engaged in by the workers. Also coded was the amount of time spent on each activity and the various patterns with which one activity followed another. Members of the research staff met weekly with the action workers in order to go over the week's reports with a view to gaining more comprehensive and accurate understanding of the written reports before coding was actually carried out.

In addition to his daily activity reports and special reports that were written from time to time, each EW and CRC maintained a file of Contact Cards on every youngster with whom he had established a relationship. These cards provided entries for 15 items of information, largely of an identifying and associational character, e.g., name, address, group affiliation, hangout, school, employment, and the like. A contact was operationally defined as being any young person about whom the worker had enough knowledge to enable him to make an exact or approximate entry for every item on the Contact Card. The worker could make subsequent corrections of entries as accuracy of knowledge about the contact increased or as the facts changed, e.g., change of address or group affiliation. (A similar card for contact with adults was also maintained.)

The relationships between staff members and youngsters were classified into recognition, contact association, and influence. The EWs recognized a good many members of the target population by sight, but their relationships with some were not, however, of such a nature that the worker could systematically supply the 15 items of information called for by the Contact Card. Workers were under no obligation to produce Contact Cards in quantity for the sake of sheer numbers, but they were required to report every contact, as operationally defined, and to keep their contact files current. The daily activity reports and the Contact Cards were one of the areas in which there was constant feedback between the action and research programs. (See Chapters 4 and 5 for verbatim examples of daily activity reports.)

The daily activity reports and the Contact Cards yielded data on the nature of the services given to boys, identified the boy to whom it was given, and enabled the researchers to characterize both workers and boys in terms of the amount and type of service given or received. So, for example, it was possible to determine from these records whether EWs were trying to get boys back into school and keep them there or how much personal counseling

any boy received. These records were the main sources of data on CYDP's inputs into the target areas.

The question of whether these inputs were setting the intended processes in motion had to be answered with other data. Workers' reports could not be depended upon as the sole sources of information for such matters as the strength of identification of boys with workers, boys' attitudes toward school, and boys' aspirations for the future. The researchers found it necessary to talk with the boys themselves. So interviews were conducted with two independent samples of contact boys, one at the beginning of the Project and one at the end.

The research staff judged that it was neither necessary nor desirable to interview every contact boy. Field work of such scope would be altogether too consuming of time and resources. Instead, a representative sample of about 20 percent of the contact boys was interviewed (186 boys in 1963, 228 in 1965). This sample was chosen by systematic random procedures from the Contact Card files of the EWs. Once a boy was chosen, every effort was made to interview him: a letter was sent to him and his parents at home announcing his selection for a study of youth by The University of Michigan; a personal visit was made by a trained male interviewer to obtain the boy's and his parents' consent to participate in the study and to make an appointment for the interview; and an interview was taken shortly thereafter. Of the boys chosen for the sample, 69 percent were eventually interviewed in the early wave.⁴

The study was presented to respondents as under the auspices of the Institute for Social Research of The University of Michigan and no mention

⁴This response rate may seem quite low by the standards of survey research, but the figure is somewhat misleading. Actually, only a few contact boys selected to be interviewed refused to participate; the rest of the incomplete interviews were due to inability to locate the respondent who was not living at the address listed on the Contact Card. Some undetermined number of these were not strictly speaking contact boys; for the EW was not able accurately to complete the Contact Cards on them, which was the operational definition for contact boy. It is our belief that a more valid estimate of the response rate for boys actually in meaningful contact with CYDP approaches the high level achieved for the other samples of boys described below.

was made of the Chicago Boys Clubs until late in the second wave interview. As we explain in more detail in Chapter 7, several aims of the interview made it desirable not to associate the interview with CYDP. For example, we were interested in whether EWs or any Boys Club staff members had become influences in the lives of contact boys, so we gave respondents several opportunities to mention such people in response to questions about adults they might know and respect and from whom they might have sought help in the recent past. It would obviously have biased the boys' responses to have sensitized them to the Boys Clubs or CYDP before or during the interview.

It would not have been sufficient to interview the contact boys only. The goals of CYDP encompassed all the boys in the experimental areas. Work with the most delinquent boys who could be reached was the means toward improving the situation throughout the target neighborhoods. So the research design had to include the total population of boys.

Obviously it would have been near impossible to observe all of the boys in the target areas, so careful random samples of that population were drawn in the target areas and in the constructed-dispersed control areas, both early and late in the Project's tenure. Again, every effort was made to interview all the boys chosen, with great success: 91 percent (229 boys) were interviewed in 1963. The questions asked of them were almost identical to the ones asked of the contact boys with some differences in the amount of probing done for mention of Boys Club staff members.

The boys' interviews were the major source of data on many important input and process variables in the study. For example: they provided information on whether the boys contacted directly by CYDP really represented the input of a different clientele for the Boys Clubs; for the characteristics of the contact sample could be compared to those of the Boys Clubs members who fell into the random samples of all the neighborhood boys. Similarly, the contact boys could be compared to all the boys in their neighborhoods in terms of changes in their attitudes, their own reports of their behavior, the influential people in their lives, and so on; this comparison helped to reveal what processes were introduced into boys' lives and with what effect that could be attributed directly to the program. Comparisons of the representative samples of experimental with control area boys demonstrated what differences could be attributed to CYDP operating in the experimental neighborhoods. Most important, having interviews with comparable samples early

and late in the Project enabled us to watch for changes over time.

It is worth noting that a great deal of the boys' interviews inquired about boys' concrete behaviors in the recent past rather than, for example, asking them what they wanted to do, expected to do, or would do. Our intent here was to get a boys' effective attitudes and other personal characteristics by observing their behavior, albeit through their reports of their behavior. We hoped in this way to avoid measuring merely the language habits boys may have acquired through contact with the program, or their ability to give the socially desirable and conventional responses.

Design for Action: Community Organization

The role of the CYDP Community Resources Coordinators actually combined two somewhat different kinds of tasks, these two not completely compatible with one another. We have already alluded to one general function of the CRCs, to help the EWs bridge the gap between inner city boys and the institutions of their neighborhoods in order, through the EWs, to provide the boys with needed goods and services. The other general function was to organize the adults in the community into an effective force in the service of neighborhood youth. How these two functions sometimes conflicted with one another is explained in Chapter 6. In this section, we wish only to link the design for community organizational activity with the goals and assumptions of the program.

There is a sense in which the CRCs were intended to share a portion of the parental function given largely to the EWs. On the assumption that inner city parents were unable to intercede for their children with police, schools, and other community agencies, CYDP provided personnel to do that, and the CRCs performed part of that role. They were selected to be the kinds of people who could relate to the administrators of such agencies, who could present an image which it was believed most inner city parents could not: articulate, knowledgeable, and willing to assert the cause of a child in the face of opposition.

CRCs were expected early in their employment to contact relevant agencies, get to know the people there, and give the agency people an opportunity to get to know them. When situations called for it, CRCs were instructed to perform services for other agencies in order to cultivate relationships which might eventually accrue to the benefit of CYDP's clients. Sometimes a CRC

would find that his network of contacts provided the first opportunity for communication between agencies which had functioned side-by-side in the area for years. As a result, the Project's CRCs frequently found themselves staffing new interagency coordinating committees, a function which they were willing to take on, not only for the general welfare of the community, but also on account of the influence of such positions over allocations of community resources. Obviously, a professional CRC could be even more helpful to a boy than most parents could be if he developed his position in the community properly.

The second major function of a CRC was to organize the community's adults. Here the relevant assumptions were that the social conditions of the area were the source of delinquency and that these conditions had developed because resident adults lacked the political power to prevent it. CRCs were to provide the expertise, time, and energy the lack of which, it was assumed, prevented inner city adults from organizing into an effective force. It was anticipated that this would be a difficult job and would take some time. CRCs would have to overcome their own strangeness to the target neighborhoods to the point where they knew them as well as they knew their own and were known in them. Further, they would need to break down the barriers of mistrust and stereotyping which were assumed to exist among inner city people so that neighbors could begin to work together on common problems.

CRCs were not required to limit the scope of their activities to concerns immediately relevant to youth, especially not at first. Their job was to discover what the residents perceived their common problems to be and to bring residents together to try to solve them. It was hoped that some successful experiences of working together toward whatever reasonable goal would create a sense of identification with the neighborhood, cooperativeness with neighbors, and personal efficacy which could be harnessed for youth-related concerns at a later date. Besides, if delinquency were a product of general social conditions, any kind of improvement was potentially relevant. Furthermore, if CRCs could help specifically boys' parents to make things--anything--happen in their neighborhoods, it might earn the parents some respect and influence over their sons.

Research Interlude: Interviews with Adult Women and Agency Executives

In order to describe and assess the Project's efforts at community

organization, the research staff undertook to gather information from the people most directly involved, adult citizens and agency executives in the areas. Of course, the CRCs' activity records were also useful to this end.

Representative samples of mothers of boys 10- to 19-years-old were drawn from the two experimental and the two constructed-dispersed control areas. We decided to select only women for several reasons. First, the pilot experience in the Horner area indicated that women were more frequently drawn into community programs than men, probably because they spent more of their time at or around home. Being there more may have created for them a keener concern for community problems and also made it easier for them to participate in community activities. We were also aware that a large proportion of families in the areas under study included no adult male. Furthermore, there is a certain amount of efficiency gained from an adult female sample: they are more apt to be found at home by survey interviewers, especially during the working day; and data analysis need not concern itself with sex differences among respondents. However, since we also wanted to learn something about adult male involvement in the community, we included questions about husbands' activities in the women's interview. While of course there were single men in the neighborhood as well, about whom we would get no information in this way, we did not believe that many such men would become involved in community organization.

We chose to interview mothers of boys 10 to 19 particularly because we assumed that their impressions would be most direct and their motivation to participate highest. If CYDP had no discernible effect on these women, we reasoned, it probably had no effect on adult residents generally.

The representative samples of mothers were selected, as were the samples of boys, by careful random selections of households in the neighborhood. Interviews were conducted in the homes and lasted about an hour and a half each. As was the case for the boys, the study was not associated with the Chicago Boys Club.

We did not select a sample of mothers of contacted boys to parallel the sample of the boys themselves. We recognized the advantages of getting information from this group, but we had to make some hard choices about how we would spend research funds. This sample had to be omitted. Our reasoning here was that the interviews with adult women were designed particularly to focus on the problem of community organization; and that aspect of the action

program was not aimed especially at the mothers of boys served directly by the program. What we gave up in omitting this sample was mothers' impressions of what was happening to their sons in the program. We probably did not learn less about community organization: the mothers of contacted boys who fell into the general sample did not seem to become disproportionately involved in that part of CYDP; and indeed later analyses indicated that the participation and views of mothers of boys 10- to 19-years-old did not differ from those of another test sample of adult women in general.

One aim of the interviews with mothers was to gauge changes over the course of the Project in residents' involvement in community organizing activities. So we asked them about relevant behavior of their own and of their husbands: were they more aware of or concerned about community problems? had they taken any steps to try to solve them? did they belong to any groups which were working on such problems? had their participation in these groups changed in recent months? and so on.

Another aim was to determine if the Chicago Boys Clubs was becoming recognized as a community resource for adults. So we probed in several ways, without mentioning the agency specifically, for respondents' associations to it: who or what agency provided help with community problems? what agency would a woman go to if she were prompted to do something? which were the effective agencies?

The immediate goals of work with adults were two-fold:

To develop in parents and local adults a concern for local problems affecting youth welfare, and to organize them with a view to having them assume responsibility for the solution of local problems;

and

To create a positive change in attitude, in both youth and adults, about the possibility of local self-help efforts to improve the local community, through active and cooperative intervention in community processes, and thus to create a more positive attitude toward the local community itself.

With these goals in mind, the researchers constructed the mothers' interview not only to measure degrees of involvement but also the possible effects of that involvement on their attitudes. Efforts were made to determine respondents' sense of political efficacy, that is, the degree to which the mothers believed that residents could gain some control over their environment and could effectively deal with the private and public institutions which affected

their lives. We also asked them questions about their satisfaction with their neighborhood and their eagerness to stay or to move in order to discover whether their commitment to their neighborhoods changed over the CYDP years.

Finally, an attempt was made during the course of the interview to learn whether CYDP could be regarded as successful at reducing delinquency in the judgment of the mothers residing in the neighborhoods. They were asked to assess the seriousness of the juvenile problems in their areas and to note any changes which had taken place recently. We never intended to rely on such judgments as a prime measure of the Project's outcomes. But there is a sense in which this inquiry among resident respondents does get at the heart of a delinquency problem. For if one assumes that actual delinquent behavior differs little from the inner to other parts of the city, but that the delinquent image and reputation of the inner city is the essential difference and the critical problem, then the line of questioning we have been outlining here did elicit that image from the people most affected by it. It helped us to determine to what degree CYDP did ameliorate this important aspect of the delinquency problem.

We also approached an entirely different set of respondents in an effort to get a reputational assessment of delinquency in the experimental and control areas and of CYDP's performance in relation to it. These respondents were a select list of heads of agencies located in the target areas or their natural-unified controls. They included such people as pastors, school principals, police supervisors and welfare agency directors. They too were asked to estimate the delinquency problem in their own areas and any recent changes in the size or nature of the problem that they may have observed. And, again without identifying the relationship between the Chicago Boys Clubs and the study, they were asked to identify those agencies which were effectively coping with the problems of neighborhood youth.

Assessing CYDP's Outcomes

So far we have described how the Project integrated into a program the inputs with which and on which it intended to operate in the context of some working assumptions about delinquency and its etiology. We have also laid out the research strategies for measuring whether the Project actually employed the means called for in its program design and for determining to

what extent this program set what were assumed to be delinquency reducing and youth enhancing processes in motion. In this final section of the chapter, we describe the research design for measuring the intended outcomes.

The reader will remember that the Project aspired ultimately to two types of results. It was hoped not only that delinquency would decline in the target areas, but also that boys would engage more in constructive activities.

Interviews with boys in the representative contact, experimental area, and control area samples provided the data on their constructive activities. We simply asked them about how they had spent their time recently; at one point in the interview we actually collected from each boy a detailed accounting of his time on the day previous. We also asked them about the formal and informal groups to which they belonged, noting especially membership in agencies like the Boys Clubs and the YMCA. We inquired if they were currently employed at all, in what job and for how long. We asked about their recent attendance at school. In several ways then we tried to assess our respondents' constructive use of their time. By comparing changes in the behavior of the different samples over time, we were able to arrive at some determination of the apparent success of CYDP in reaching one of its major goals.

Measures of the degree to which delinquent behavior declined came from several sources. Two have already been mentioned: interviews with adult residents and with agency executives in the experimental and control areas. But these sources were considered secondary, however important the impressions of these people were to the welfare of neighborhood youth. The primary source of delinquency data were the records of the police and of the courts.

The researchers were aware of the shortcomings of official delinquency data for gauging the incidence of delinquent behavior in a population of youngsters: so few offenses are actually detected; so few even of the most delinquent youth are known to the police; and which offenses are entered in the official records depend so heavily on characteristics of the officials rather than characteristics of offenders or their offenses. Nevertheless, it is possible, with appropriate care, to approximate the incidence of delinquent behavior, especially if one wishes to make comparative rather than absolute statements.

The details of the measures are given in Chapter 5. Here we will describe only some critical relationships between the research design and the goals of the program. Since the program aimed at reducing delinquent behavior itself rather than merely records of such behavior, it was necessary to employ

those records least affected by the dispositional behavior of the police or courts; so records of police arrests of juveniles resident in the research areas were compiled regardless of their dispositions. The Project also aimed at reducing official delinquency, as an end in itself but primarily as a means to reducing delinquent behavior; so we compiled records of the dispositions of juvenile cases in the areas. Records of both arrests and dispositions were collected at several points before, during, and after CYDP's tenure, and were aggregated for contact, experimental and control boys aged 10-19, and changes in rates among these groups were compared.

Making comparisons of delinquency data from one jurisdiction to another is a risky research procedure. Not only are the populations often different, but the procedures of the agencies differ in ways which affect their records aside from the behavior of the population under their jurisdiction. Our research was designed to minimize the risks here by the selection of experimental and control areas. Not only were they selected so that their populations would be similar in certain demographic characteristics, but also so that they were under the jurisdiction of the same police department and court. In this way, the agents who created the records upon which we depended for delinquency data approximated constants in the research design.

However, there is a sense in which, even under these conditions, the police and courts might not be constants. It is possible that the various personnel involved in creating delinquency records--policemen, juvenile officers, court workers, judges, and others--behaved differently toward boys in the experimental areas, particularly those who were served directly by CYDP, the contact boys. If it were the case they handled these boys more leniently, for example, then the Project would, according to the records, have reduced delinquency; but the effect would have been only on the records --on official delinquency--and not on delinquent behavior. If CYDP effected a change only in law enforcement practices, this would be revealed by a comparison between data on police arrests, prior to judgments about dispositions, and records which document dispositions. For we assumed that the police on the street who created the arrest records would not behave differently toward contact, experimental or control boys since they could not know which were which at the point of arrest. As a matter of fact, such a comparison revealed that CYDP did affect the dispositions of juvenile cases handled by local police,

and in a way quite different from that intended by the Project; these data are presented and discussed near the end of Chapter 5.

The main purposes of this chapter were to show how the general design of the treatment program was derived from its goals and its assumptions; and how the research design was shaped to monitor input, process, and outcome variables of the program. Specifics of both action techniques and research measures are described in the next three chapters where what was tried and how well it succeeded are presented in close juxtaposition. These materials should provide an objective basis on which to decide whether and in what way this kind of effort to reduce delinquency justifies the investment of resources necessary to mount it. They should also contribute to our understanding of youth development and hopefully point the way to its enhancement.

Working in the Community

The Chicago Youth Development Project orientation to its target communities was that adults, their agencies, and their institutions were both sources of the problems which generated juvenile delinquency and resources for its control.

On the one hand, agencies and institutions were not addressing themselves adequately to many of the special difficulties which provoked some teenagers to chronic delinquent behavior. The school system and the recreational agencies were not adapting their programs to meet the needs of the youngsters most vulnerable to delinquency; the Project itself was just an early experimental step in the adaptation of one of the foremost agencies serving boys. Furthermore, the economic system was not functioning adequately to recruit young workers from the inner city and start them on their way to productive lives, with the result that their unemployment rate was the highest of any able-bodied group in the country. The schools, the youth-serving agencies, businesses, shops, and factories had to learn to include boys like the Project's clients, and the boys had to be helped to take advantage of whatever opportunities were afforded them.

At the same time, many inner city parents and their neighbors were unable, having problems of their own, to help boys in ways which more affluent grownups take for granted; for these adults had little influence on those forces which affect theirs and their children's lives. Their own youthful experiences with the school system had often been no happier than their children's, and they now had little or no resources to mediate with the school system. Nor did many participate in the governance of local agencies or know anyone who did. They also had their own difficulties

keeping regular decent employment, not to mention finding jobs for youngsters.

They hardly felt that their neighborhoods were theirs. As we pointed out at the beginning of this report, most wanted to escape from the inner city if they got the chance. They were discouraged by the delapidated state of the buildings, the poor quality of the services, the noise and the crowdedness. They could not trust some of their desperate neighbors, nor did they feel adequately protected from them by the police. And during the term of the Project, the whites were feeling pressed and put upon by the coloreds--the blacks, Mexicans, and Puerto Ricans who were invading their neighborhoods.

Most of all, they blamed the kids. Of all the bad things about their neighborhoods, the badness of the teenagers stood out most. Many adults felt that the adolescent boys around them were uncontrolled and dangerous, bad influences on younger children and a menace to everyone.

The Target Areas as Communities

We have already described the target areas in terms of their population and physical character. Here we need to focus briefly on the potentialities and problems they presented for community action.

The two areas, one around the Henry Horner Chicago Boys Club and the other around the Oldtown Chicago Boys Club, were in some significant ways quite different, despite the fact that both were located in the inner city near Chicago's loop, both contained relatively poor populations, and both had for many years evidenced high rates of juvenile delinquency.

Their ethnic composition was a basic difference. The Oldtown area was populated mostly by Italians, and most of the others there were Mexican. According to the 1960 Census, 16 percent of the residents of Oldtown were black, and almost all of these lived in the Jane Addams public housing project. The Horner area was over 90% black. The historical and social contrasts between blacks and Italians in America in turn gave rise to differences which CYDP had to take into account.

The Italians and Mexicans in the Oldtown area were a more closely knit community with more of their own binding institutions and therefore capable of more immediate and concerted action on community problems.

Almost everyone belonged to the Roman Catholic Church, and even if they were not all regular church-goers, which most were, or active members, which some were, the Church served as a hub in community social relations. Indeed, one church, Our Lady of Pompeii, was regarded as the Italians' community church, even though many Italians attended the Church of the Holy Guardian Angels instead. The Catholic church linked the Mexican community to the Italian community, even though most Mexicans belonged to St. Francis or Holy Family and few ever saw the insides of Our Lady of Pompeii or Holy Guardian Angels.

The major religious denomination among the few blacks in the Old-town area and the many in the Horner area was Baptist. But church organization among the blacks was markedly more proliferated than among the Italians and Mexicans. None of the five Baptist churches in the Horner area was recognized as dominant, and none of the eleven denominational churches in the area occupied a leadership role. Storefront churches were common throughout the Horner area and served independent sect congregations. Each commanded the loyalty of a small group of blacks, often no more than a few dozen and these almost all older women. The sects did not bind the community together but rather tended to isolate clusters of residents from one another.

It is important to note the impact of the different forms of religious institutions on the young people in the two target areas, for the Catholic church also educated most of the Italian elementary school pupils and many of the high school youth as well. Many of the Mexican school children also attended parochial schools. Most Italian and Mexican children attended school with their own kind, however. Holy Guardian Angels and Our Lady of Pompeii schools enrolled Italian children almost exclusively, while St. Francis School was almost exclusively Mexican. Only Notre Dame School, affiliated with a national order, taught an even mix of Italian and Mexican pupils in addition to children of other ethnic backgrounds from outside the community. So the parochial school system followed the pattern of the churches, bringing youngsters of the same ethnic background together in an important aspect of their lives, linking diverse ethnic groups in only a small way physically; but it provided children from varied backgrounds with a common experience and potential channels for communication through the system if it were needed.

Of course, almost all of the black children attended public schools. These schools did not claim the loyalty of or arouse school spirit among their pupils as the smaller parochial schools did. Nor did the black parents feel involved in the institution the way Italian and Mexican parents were involved in their children's schools through their churches. The faculties and administrations of the public schools were regarded as outsiders in a sense that the religious operating the parochial schools were not.

The relationship of the citizens to city government was also quite different in the two target areas. The Oldtown area was part of Chicago's First Ward and was traditionally represented by Italian aldermen. The Horner area was split between Chicago's Twenty-sixth and Twenty-seventh Wards and had been represented by whites for years. So the Italians in the Oldtown area had more reason to feel that they had advocates in City Hall than did the Horner people. This difference was bolstered by the fact that public jobs were more commonly held by Oldtown area residents than by residents of Horner; indeed, the modal employment of the Italians in the First Ward was in public agencies of some sort.

It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the residents of Oldtown were in control of political decisions affecting their area. Neither they nor the citizens in the Horner area were politically powerful, as events before and during the Project's tenure made obvious. For example, when the Jane Addams Housing Project opened in 1937, its 933 apartments were occupied almost exclusively by Italians. The Italians in the area always hoped it would remain that way or at least would remain all white. But despite efforts to persuade the city government to bar blacks, by 1961 Jane Addams was almost completely black. Nor were the white residents of the area resigned to this fact; racial tension in the neighborhood of the housing project remained high. White citizens characteristically did their shopping around Taylor Street to the north and black citizens around Roosevelt Road to the south. And public recreational facilities were tacitly but rigidly segregated.

As CYDP began in 1961, another development was being imposed on the Oldtown area despite the objections of the residents, especially the Italian community. One third of the area was selected as the site for the

Chicago Circle Campus of the University of Illinois. A small part of this had already been cleared in an urban renewal project. The homes of about eight thousand people, Italians and Mexicans in about equal numbers, were eventually destroyed, and their residents forced to move outside the area. Furthermore, it was obvious from the first that locating the University in the area would have an impact on the area beyond the campus itself. The University people--faculty, students, and others--would be looking for homes nearby; and the natives, who owned less than 20 percent of the land, could not successfully resist their encroachment. The pattern of commercial services also would change, so that, for example, the many small Italian groceries would give way before chainstore supermarkets and workingmen's bars would become coffeehouses. Some of the residents had heard of recent experiences of south side residents with the University of Chicago and knew from that what to expect. They also had witnessed the destruction of homes just to the west of Oldtown by the development of the West Side Medical Center.

Political action to stop the University development organized around a local Italian resident, Mrs. Florence Scala, and was vigorously pursued. Launched into politics on the University site issue, Mrs. Scala actually entered the race for alderman. But political and ethnic lines became confused when Mrs. Scala also came out for civil rights legislation, fair employment, and other interests of the black residents in the Jane Addams Housing Project. Hers became an independents' crusade against The Machine. The situation became literally explosive: a bomb blew off Mrs. Scala's front porch in the midst of her aldermanic campaign.

The Oldtown Boys Club could not stay aloof from the currents of community conflict. Of prime importance in this regard was the color blind policy of the Boys Clubs of America. When the Chicago Boys Club determined to erect a new building to replace the obsolete facility in the area, it was located in the neighborhood of greatest need, that is, nearer to the Jane Addams Housing Project than the original building had been. And when the doors opened in 1963, all boys were welcome. The Club, which had even in its old quarters served a large proportion of black children, soon became known as a black recreational facility by area residents, and the Italians ceased to support it as they had. This matter will be

discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. It is necessary to make note of it at this point because of its implication for a CYDP community action program among the white residents of the Old Town area.

Many residents of the Horner area had a special relationship to local government as its tenants and its dependents. One of every five of them lived in public housing, administered by the Chicago Housing Authority. One of every three residents was supported in part or whole by the Cook County Department of Welfare, and this one-third of the population was not by any means always the same third but rather was comprised of people going on welfare while others went off. So many Horner people had frequent and intimate contact with the political system which had immediate impact on their daily lives. The residents, however, felt themselves powerless to affect it.

At the same time, when the Project began, the national civil rights movement had reached a crest of activity and importance. But it seemed hardly to have touched the Horner area. Few residents were involved in civil rights activities, nor had civil rights organizations become moving forces in the neighborhood. There was no outstanding leader or issue around which the people rallied.

On the other hand, social work professionals recognized that the Horner area was in need of services, and several agencies were located in the area. An office of the Mayor's Committee on Human Relations offered help especially to new residents and had acquired a clientele largely of Puerto Rican immigrants. The West Side Community Service offered counselling, educational, and recreational activities for youth. St. Leonard's House provided shelter and rehabilitative assistance to released convicts. The Commission on Youth Welfare established a field office on the western edge of the target area, from which workers tried to organize neighborhood councils and block clubs and to sponsor recreational activities for youth. The Illinois State Employment Service had an office in the area, as did the Cook County Department of Welfare and the Unemployment Compensation Department. The Midwest Community Council had as its main function the stimulation and coordination of activity among the other agencies.

The Purposes of Community Activity

If the effect to control delinquency was to be anything but a never-abating series of skirmishes fought by a small band of professionals, then the adult population of the area and the agencies and institutions which served it had to be mobilized. Structural change was deemed essential to the Project's enduring effects. So efforts were made to create enduring organizations of neighborhood adults that would be educated about the problems which give rise to delinquency, which would become committed to helping youth, and which might, united, exert effective political pressure on agencies and institutions on behalf of youth.

We need to be clear about the organizational aspirations of CYDP. Realistically, even the most organized of middle class neighborhoods is only loosely organized: not everyone belongs to a formal local organization, and the formal organizations are seldom formally related to one another. But enough neighbors belong to something so that informal networks of friends and acquaintances put most adults in touch with an effective organizational structure which can contact City Hall or deal with an emergency, or enlist some needed resource. Similarly, even the most "disorganized" neighborhood harbors some organization: people do have friends, relatives, and acquaintances next door and down the block; a few local people know someone with some influence Downtown. The aim of the Project was to build on the modicum of organization in the target areas, elaborating and extending it as a viable, broader, and more effective instrument for community welfare, especially the welfare of the area's young people. The Project's aspiration was not for a tight, inclusive membership structure covering the entire area but rather a community more nearly resembling the better organized middle class neighborhoods.

Meanwhile, Project workers, particularly the Community Resource Coordinators, also tried to fill the gap between the Project's clients and social institutions. In addition to nurturing and developing community organizations, the CRCs related themselves to school principals, district superintendents, and guidance counselors; to employment agencies and employees; to youth workers from other agencies; to the managers of public housing units; to philanthropists; to the ticket offices of sports arenas; and so on. From all of these they gathered good will and resources which

the boys the Project served otherwise would not have got. What the Community Resource Coordinators could garner was usually funneled to the boys through the Extension Workers, with whom the CRCs worked closely. While it was the prime responsibility of the Extension Workers to work directly with the boys, the CRCs worked primarily with the surrounding environment, smoothing the way the Extension Workers were helping boys to take and enhancing EW-boy relationships by providing EWs with valued resources.

The two global activities of Community Resource Coordinators--community organization and marshalling community resources--were not altogether compatible. Resources were largely controlled, of course, by established individuals, agencies, and institutions, and getting resources depended on maintaining good relationships with these. At the same time, one aim of community organization was to challenge the Establishment, and that threatened to destroy whatever positive relations that were developed. No solution was found for this dilemma. It remained a point of tension throughout the course of the Project, both in the Project's relationships with its environment and within the Project staff. Nor was the problem confined to the Project; it also had significant effects on the Chicago Boys Clubs generally. We discuss this more fully in Chapter 6, among other effects of CYDP on the agency.

The Processes of Community Action

Hans W. Mattick, Director of CYDP, described the work of the Community Resources Coordinator and the overall processes of Project community action in an account of the Project while it was going on (Mattick & Caplan, 1964). We quote extensively from it here to present the means by which the community action goals of the program were carried forward.

Many people have a stereotyped notion about the nature of community organization, which they envision as a group of people brought together in a place of assembly who elect a chairman, select committees to effect a division of labor, and discuss problems with a view to formulating plans of action. There is no doubt that this stereotype reflects a common form of community organization, and one that a Community Resources Coordinator will strive to bring about, but it is not the starting point in community organization work. It is a result. A CRC begins with the building of the less visible form of community organization, his personal network of contacts.

As he comes to deal with various kinds of individual or group problems, a CRC will bring together, for example, a parent, a policeman and a school teacher who have a significant relationship to a particular boy; or a group of PTA members, a school principal and a district school superintendent who may be concerned about the relationship between in-school students and a group of school drop-outs who are having an adverse effect in the school area. Later such key persons in a CRC's personal network of invisible community organization will serve as bridging elements to convene larger and visible forms of community organization.

An enterprising CRC, upon being assigned to an experimental area, is obliged to contact and develop a series of relations with significant institutions, agencies and local leaders, such as local schools, the police, local businessmen, potential employers, agency heads, local politicians and members of the Board of Managers of the Boys Club that serves as his base. In a relatively short time such local institutions and leaders are entered in his address book, phone book or file system, and he begins to call upon them for help with this or that case. In so doing, he comes to obligate himself as well as to receive help, and so he must reciprocate help and favors or the relationships he has established will wither away. A CRC views these various people who may be useful to him as both an invisible form of community organization (his personal network) and as potential cadre members for the more visible form of community organization that he will strive to bring into being as local necessities may demand.

[This first stage of his work] may be described as "Free Enterprising," that is, a CRC develops as many useful contacts as he can to help him in his work and exploits them in whatever fashion they may lend themselves to his momentary and long-run purposes. The development of such personal networks of influence relationships is not particularly difficult, particularly if a CRC has something to offer in return by way of reciprocity, but their usefulness can be self-limiting in that they may reduce him to a kind of "case-worker," looking for favors on a case-by-case basis. A relationship between a CRC and an enabler that can be helpful with this or that case is not to be discounted, but each such case tends to be viewed as an "exceptional case" by the enabler. The prevention of juvenile delinquency cannot be addressed on a case-by-base basis when every case is handled as an exception. In this regard, at least one of the objectives of a CRC is to convert "exceptions" into routinely accepted cases by the enabler in order to maximize the constructive potential of that enabler.

The second [stage of] relationship that can be established by a CRC may be called "Ad Hoc Organization." In the nature of the case, this is a special purpose, short-run, kind of a relationship that comes into, and passes out of, existence with the purpose it hopes to achieve. A CRC develops an organization out of local community adults or enablers, or out of some combination of both, in order to effect some purpose that wholly or partially coincides with

CYDP objectives. Having organized such small-scale groups a number of times in different problem areas, a CRC comes to be related to the hierarchies of which such problem-oriented groups are members. In addition to dealing with the immediate problem at hand, a CRC uses these occasions for a variety of other purposes designed to increase and widen the scope of his own effectiveness. He forms an estimate of the fields of competence and usefulness of others for his purposes as, for example, in addressing a group of parents at a meeting about youth problems in the area, and how to deal with them. Simultaneously, others will have formed a similar estimate of the CRC's capacities and, in the system of obligations he has organized, he must be ready to perform similar functions for the persons he has called upon for help. As a CRC performs these reciprocal functions for others, he interprets to them the dimensions and purposes of the CYDP so that it becomes a force to be reckoned with in the local area. Even the local politicians soon come to form a realistic estimate of whether local community organization efforts have to be taken seriously. If a CRC has developed enough local contacts, and has a parents-tenants or local leaders organization coming together to deal with local problems, such community organization efforts tend to develop political overtones and some relationship to the local political structure comes to be established. This is not an unmixed blessing and requires circumspection, but it is the way to develop a local relationship to the system of goods and services that the city provides for its citizens. Such goods and services would be distributed through the city administration in any case, so the community organization efforts of the CYDP can serve to communicate the needs of the local area to the proper city departments for whatever goods and services may be required. There is nothing incompatible between CYDP objectives and good political administration or the rational distribution of city goods and services according to need.

When a CRC begins to develop a local community organization, he has to have the resources to deal with its potentialities. He may be able to organize the first few meetings without a great deal of help, but as the organization begins to develop momentum, he can exercise his legitimate claim on some of the time and energy of the local Program Director and Club Director. Similarly, a CRC has a claim on the time and talent of the CYDP Associate Director of Community Organization. A nascent community organization is a delicate organism that requires constant attention, encouragement and direction. Program Directors, Club Directors and the Associate Director can help to supply these until the organization is developed enough to work out its own division of labor and objectives. In its early stages however the main merit of a community organization may be that just as an Extension Worker has a youth group under his supervision, so now a CRC has an adult group under his supervision. A CRC has to use this group, while it is trying to find its identity, for whatever purposes he can and, at first, he will use it as an educational device. In effect he now has a wider audience to whom he can communicate his views of the local situation and, in some degree, he transforms that audience into his own agents and emissaries so that they become preoccupied with that view and pass it on to others informally.

Although the motives and talents of such local adult groups are mixed and varied, through processes of interaction they soon come to develop concerns and procedures of their own. In that process a CRC, although supplying knowledge and guidance, avoids authoritarian methods and invites the sharing of leadership functions. An early task of a CRC is to keep the organization grounded in the realities of the possible so that they may have an early experience of success to help insure their own survival. Experience with community organizations has indicated that it is always better to start with limited objectives that can be attained than to formulate grandiose plans that verbalize the problems but have no relationship to what the group is able to do. One way for a CRC to avoid such futility is for him to include members of his invisible community organization in such publicly functioning groups. Local agency heads, teachers, policemen and local businessmen act as a leaven to help in keeping a group of parents, tenants and interested adults within the bounds of the pertinent and the possible, for purposes of local community action.

Such a local community organization, once organized and functioning, can serve a variety of purposes but community organization is not an end in itself in the CYDP action program. Community organization work is undertaken for the sake of coming to grips more effectively with the problems of the youthful population in the area. The constant focus and emphasis of a CRC and the auxiliary Boys Club staff is to relate the adult organizations of the community, whether organized de novo and ad hoc, or previously existing organizations with whom the CYDP staff cooperates, to the youth of the area. The members of such community organizations become, in effect, a group of volunteer laymen and professionals whose interests coincide, for the most part, with the achievement of CYDP goals.

Both CYDP experimental areas contain public housing projects. From the standpoint of community organization, a CRC views the physical layout and structures that comprise these housing projects as ready-made, empty, organizational forms. The floors of high-rise buildings, the buildings as units and the clusters of buildings that may comprise a public housing complex constitute a natural hierarchy of organizational bases for the tenants that share a floor or a building or a cluster of buildings. The tenants on a floor can designate a floor-counselor, a series of floor-counselors can elect a building-captain and a group of building-captains can elect a chairman for the entire public housing complex. The Chicago Housing Authority has attempted this kind of community organization with variable degrees of completeness and success. Whatever the state of organization among public housing tenants may be, a CRC will either help with such organizational work de novo or relate himself to the tenant organizations that are already functioning in some capacity. There is enough concern, on the part of the public housing authorities and many of the tenants, with the undesirable consequences of unsupervised youthful behavior, that a CRC should have little difficulty in focusing the time and energy of such community organizations on the problems of youth welfare.

The adult population living outside the public housing projects constitute a different and somewhat more difficult problem in community organization. Ordinarily "the block" is conceived of as the "natural" unit for organizing local adults. In practice however a CRC usually starts the organization process of a potential block club around a group of neighbors who already know each other. Further exploration by a CRC will usually lead to the discovery of several such groups of neighbors within a single block. Such groups, although they know their own members, are isolated from each other by the impersonal style of urban living. It is the task of a CRC to serve as liaison man between such groups until he can bring them together as the organizational core of a true block club. A complication in this process is that it is deceptively easy at first, while the formal status positions of the potential organization (President, Secretary, Treasurer, etc.) are still open, or filled by interim appointments. Once these positions are formalized by the holding of an election, there is a realignment of the organization and a period of confusion during which dissident and disappointed members drop out. What remains, however, despite all limitations, is a more rationally organized and potentially more purposive block club. The task of a CRC is not only to keep the interests of these block clubs focused on youth-related community problems but also to begin the process of "bridging" a relationship between several such block clubs . . .

The importance of forming such over-arching community organizations, despite their tenuous viability in such areas as the CYDP experimental areas, lies in the communication processes that they engender and the possibility of working out a division of labor among the tasks and resources of the areas . . . Nevertheless, from the standpoint of achieving CYDP goals with the target population, it is the subgroups that make up these larger community organizations who do the important day-to-day work in the field of youth welfare and local improvement. Some typical areas in which organized adults have been related to individuals and group members of the target population are in job finding, school reinstatement, chaperonage of social affairs, court appearances, supervision after release from a correctional agency, organized sports, reconciling family quarrels, tutoring, and a variety of sponsorships and counseling in more specialized activities. Similarly, on a group basis, such local community organizations have made representations to a school principal about undesirable school conditions, welcomed new tenants to housing projects, organized local "clean up" campaigns, participated in community leaders training workshops, organized a three-day Mile Square Health Fair, developed and administered special curriculum materials for selected street gangs, made follow-up home-visits on juvenile "station-adjustment" cases, participated in human relations and police conferences, held a seminar on credit buying dangers, published a community guide to local agencies and services and engaged in the publication of a small community newspaper.

[The third stage] may be designated as [the stage of] "Structure Formation." Beginning with either a series of contacts gained by

Free Enterprising, or building upon an earlier Ad Hoc Organization, a CRC combines local community adults and enablers with local and city-wide agency people, with a view to dealing with a whole series of continuing or recurring problems. Structure Formations are Ad Hoc Organizations with continuity and with their purposes generalized to deal with a set of related problems in the area of youth welfare and local civic improvement. Such Structure Formations can develop a degree of autonomy that frees the time of a CRC for further organizational work and, in proportion to the degree to which they become relatively autonomous, they tend to "multiply" his effectiveness by achieving the objectives he seeks to achieve far beyond his own capacity as a Free Enterprising or Ad Hoc Organization community organizer.

The fourth, and perhaps ultimate, [stage] can be described as the achievement of Institutional Change. That is, a CRC . . . effects a change in policy on the part of some institutional complex, which change coincides with the objectives of the CYDP that are not adequately being met under present institutional arrangements. The major institutions under consideration here are the schools, the police, public and private employment channels, public and private social agencies and, ultimately, local political and economic arrangements. The object of attempting to achieve such Institutional Change is, again, the desire to maximize and routinize the processing and effects on members of the target population of such institutional complexes in a variety of constructive and long-run ways; for delinquency is not defined in terms of the acts of individuals alone, but also in terms of how the community, in its corporate capacity, reacts and what its institutional complexes do about young people.

A CRC can also enter into "cooperative relations" in an active or symbiotic fashion with other pre-existing or independently organized community organizations in an effort to establish another form of relationship. When he does this, insofar as that organization's purposes and his own objectives are congruent, he can serve to contribute some staff time to strengthen that organization. Insofar as the purposes of that organization are irrelevant, tangential or divergent from CYDP goals, however, he either becomes an influencer from within in order to justify and maximize the effects of his participation, or he abandons fruitless relations. It has been relatively easy for the CYDP CRCs to enter into cooperative relations with existing agencies in the experimental areas for they are always hungry for what they view as additional staff-time. Such cooperative relations with pre-existing or independently organized community organizations have resulted in only modest returns for CYDP, although there have been a few outstandingly fruitful results. This should not be surprising in view of the fact that such organizations are a response to weakened community conditions . . .

The organization of successful Ad Hoc Organizations and viable Structure Formations grows out of intelligent Free Enterprising, but it also depends upon the motivation, energy and time allocation of other persons beside a CRC. The local adult populations in the inner-

city areas from which the CYDP experimental areas have been selected are notoriously poorly motivated and are not in the habit of applying such energies as they may have to the organized improvement of their own social conditions. Further, the local enablers tend to be over-burdened for they represent, or function in, weakened or ill-adapted institutions located in problem-ridden areas. In such a situation, a CRC working at the local level experiences a series of difficulties. To begin with, it is difficult to get anything organized at all and, having done so on a modest scale, merely to maintain the viability of a nascent community organization can tax the morale of even a good CRC. Once the community organization is in some stage of viability, there comes the task of developing and maintaining a realistic purpose congruent with a CRC's objectives. If the community organization he has brought into being, or is cooperating with, is merely social, or comes to exploit a CRC without effecting any of his purposes, then he, rather than they, has been "organized." Finally, assuming he has a viable and congruently purposeful community organization under some degree of influence, there comes the task of instilling quasi-autonomy so that a CRC does not have to baby-sit the organization full time.

Experience has demonstrated that the CRCs of the CYDP, and to some extent the Extension Workers as well, are able to form Ad Hoc Organizations and Structure Formations of variable size, quality and potential. In the nature of the case, it is impossible to set forth requirements or units of expectation for community organization workers; all they can do is their best. The three CRCs of the CYDP, together with the Club Directors and Program Directors of the Chicago Boys Clubs units participating in the project, and the supervisory staff, all enter into the community organization efforts of the CYDP, as do the Extension Workers to a more limited extent. Any one, or combination, of these action staff members may "strike it rich" and develop a community organization that becomes a self-enabler and a multiplier that has far reaching consequences for the achievement of CYDP goals. There is a large element of what the sociologists call "serendipity" or "the aleatory factor" in community organization. A community organization that is presently weak, dormant, or even non-existent might turn into a powerful instrument for the achievement of CYDP goals in the future. There are other community organizations that come in with a bang and go out without a whimper. At least, and at best, it may be said that community organization efforts in the CYDP [are carried on] with a view to exploiting to the maximum whatever potential can be developed.

The foregoing description of the community action aspect of the Project stresses community organization efforts. We have pointed out that Community Resource Coordinators also tried to make resources immediately available to the boys being served through their Extension Workers. And it should also be pointed out that sometimes the activities of the CRCs were indistinguishable from those of the Extension Workers, just as the latter sometimes performed

some of the functions of CRCs. How these various functions were actually performed and what kind of job they made of the CRCs is best demonstrated by presenting the log of one Community Resource Coordinator as he recorded a week of his activities.

A Week in the Life of a CRC

At the time these reports were written, this CRC had been employed for twenty-seven months. He was 30 years old, black, married with three children. He had a M.A. in education from a large midwestern, state university. He was working in the area of the Henry Horner Chicago Boys Club (near Washington and Wood Streets). The population in that area is predominantly black, with a few scattered Spanish-speaking sections. Most of the CRC's clients were blacks, but his local and city-wide agency contacts were as ethnically representative as agency people tend to be. He was considered an imaginative and competent community organizer and this week of work is fairly representative of his round of activities.

MONDAY, January 21, 1963

9:00 a.m. Arrived at Horner Boys Club (HBC) and worked on my daily activity logs. I had fallen behind on them last week due to actualizing plans for the Men's Improvement Council (MIC's) "Smoker," the Voluntary Teachers' Association (VTA) meeting, and Community Service Committee (CSC) meeting--all held last week. [The MIC's are a housing project-based, male, adult, black, social and civic improvement organization with a Women's Auxiliary; the VTA is a teachers' and parents' association of Horner area adults and grammar and high school teachers from the local schools; the CSC is a predominantly female, adult, black, social and civic organization.] Although the first two were relatively successful, I have learned (the hard way) that three such events in any one week, and especially with two major ones (Smoker and VTA), are too much to pull off.

11:00 a.m. Conference with Gene Tyler [Community and Tenants Relations Aide for Henry Horner Homes--a public housing project]. Tyler and I discussed the Women's Auxiliary (WA) and the MIC's at length. If you will recall the WA (of the MIC's) had planned a dance for 1/18/63 which was to feature prizes, drinks, and games, as a means of raising funds. They had had tickets printed up to sell for 25c and after this was done it first came to the attention of the MIC's. Due to the fact that alcoholic beverages were to be sold, that poker was the "game" referred to on the tickets and that the affair was scheduled to be held in an apartment in Horner Homes (against Chicago Housing Authority rules), the MIC's interceded and the affair was called off. In a previous conversation with Mrs. Ehnis (President, WA) she had indicated that she was strongly against giving the affair but had been voted down. In addition to this, I have discovered that most of the women who are active in the WA feel

that Mrs. Ehnis is too dominating a leader and thus there is some friction. Tyler and I discussed all of these matters at length and definitely feel that henceforth one of us, or a representative of the MIC's, should attend the meetings of the WA as sort of a resource person. In addition we plan to hold a special meeting with Mrs. Ehnis and the other officers of the WA in order to iron out some of the difficulties as diplomatically as possible.

12:00 n. Parted from Tyler and returned to HBC where Sam Reece [the other CYDP community organizer in the HBC area] and I were to get together and go over some things that he wanted to review. He did not show up and consequently the meeting was cancelled.

1:15 p.m. Parted from HBC for the Grand Blvd. unit of the Chicago Commission on Youth Welfare (CYW), 591 E. 37th St. There I rendezvoused with Ray Harry (Outpost Supervisor-OPS) and Sheldon Gans (17), "Los Lobos." The meeting had been arranged previously and the purpose was to try and get Gans enrolled in Dunbar Vocational High School through and with the cooperation of the CYW. Ward Pfister, the Neighborhood Worker at this unit of CYW and formerly at the Midwest Unit (in Horner area) was our contact man. After talking with Pfister about the situation, he suggested that we go over to the Dunbar School and talk with a Mr. Leonard as he felt that we had a pretty good chance of getting Gans enrolled. Subsequently the four of us journeyed to Dunbar where we soon discovered that Mr. Townsend was in charge of admitting youth who had not completed one year of high school. Both Harry and I presented the case to Townsend but the results were not what we had expected. Townsend indicated that he could not accept Gans as they are overcrowded and Gans, who would be 18 years of age next March would find himself in class with kids 13 and 14 years old, and this would not be healthy. I didn't think that Mr. Townsend was intentionally rude or rough but possibly due to his elderly status in life his speech and mannerisms conveyed that impression. It also appears he knew very little about the military service as he suggested that one alternative would be for Gans to join the service and they would teach him a trade. However, Townsend did suggest that Gans think in terms of evening school where he could get the same courses but be with kids his own age. Shortly thereafter we drew the conversation to a close, secured literature pertaining to night school from Townsend, thanked him and then parted. Outside we thanked Pfister who told us that since Gans resided in their area he would try to see if he could come up with a part-time job for him.

2:30 p.m. Returned to HBC for a while and then parted for the Outpost (OP).

2:45 p.m. At OP where Harry and I rehashed what had gone on at Dunbar. We were both in agreement that something positive did come out of the situation and Gans had already told Harry that he would go to night school.

5:00 p.m. HBC staff meeting.

6:30 p.m. Attended the MIC's Financial Committee meeting.

7:45 p.m. Parted the area.

TUESDAY, January 22, 1963

9:00 a.m. Arrived at HBC and shortly thereafter went into a conference with Jefferson Broadstreet [Club Director of HBC] regarding the forthcoming (1/24/63) meeting at the club concerning the Shinner Fund [scholarship loan fund administered through the Chicago Boys Clubs], with representatives of the Youth Opportunities Committee (a subcommittee of the Midwest Community Council) and other interested agency personnel on hand. We discussed the agenda, follow-up contacts to get an estimate of the number of people to expect, the need of a fact sheet and many other points.

11:00 a.m. Worked on editing articles which had been submitted for publication in "Action" (a local newsletter containing news and announcements for Horner area adult organizations) and tied all the loose ends together. Afterwards I took the material to the printers. The paper should be ready 1/25/63.

2:00 p.m. At this time I locked myself in one of the rooms at the club and worked on a Shinner Fund fact sheet for the meeting on 1/24/63. Essentially, what I did was to extract certain major items from the Shinner Fund brochure so that it would make for rapid reading but still give one a general knowledge of the workings of the Fund. Afterwards I worked very closely with Ethel Sorbet, CYDP secretary, in regard to making follow-up telephone calls to insure attendance at the meeting.

4:00 p.m. Talked at length with Miss Risa White whom Hans Mattick, Director-CYDP, had suggested talk with me. She is presently a teacher in Chicago but is working on her Master's thesis which is to concern itself with on-going programs in Chicago for school dropouts. Essentially she was interested in two points, i.e., (1) what do we do with dropouts, and (2) youth employment. Nothing other than this was covered.

5:30 p.m. Arrived at the OP and shortly afterward Ray Harry (OPS), Lionel Dukes [a CYDP street club worker in the Horner area] and I parted for dinner.

7:00 p.m. Returned to the OP from where I again tried to contact Mrs. Privitt, President, Jackson-Van Buren Block Club, but again I was unsuccessful. However, I still will try to reach her as I do want to pull her group in with the Victor Herbert-Chicago Park District group (a group of parents associated with the youngsters who play at the Victor Herbert School playground, administered by the Chicago Park District after regular school hours).

7:45 p.m. Parted the area.

WEDNESDAY, January 23, 1963

12:00 n. Arrived at HBC and shortly afterwards Mrs. Keen (relatively active with the CSC) telephoned. I knew what she wanted before talking with her. Sgt. Gamson of the Area 4 Youth Division (Chicago Police Department) had called for Ray Harry (OPS) or I last Saturday about her son Timothy Keen (14) and former member of the now defunct "Gentlemen" (13-16) (previously sponsored by Warren Sattler, a former CYDP street club worker). It seems that Keen and another youth were involved in some type of "strong-arming." In talking with Mrs. Keen she revealed the following story: Last Saturday morning Keen asked to go to the Boys' Club and she gave him permission to do so. Instead Keen and another boy (no name) went over to the Duncan YMCA where they stood around outside and talked. A couple of other youths approached and Keen and his friend, at the friend's suggestion, asked them for some money. The other boys indicated that they didn't have any and with that Keen's friend retorted, "All I find." It was at this point, while Keen and his friend were searching the two youths, that a squad car cruising in the area spotted the dealings, picked them up and took them to Monroe Street Police Station. Mrs. Keen had to go over to get Keen out. Young Keen gives the impression of being mentally limited and he is also quite suggestible. Mrs. Keen was disappointed and somewhat surprised at her son as he had not been involved in any difficulty for quite a while. The purpose of her call was to see if we had some social club that he could join. I explained to her as best I could about the nature of group clubs and their operation and that we could not just put a boy into a group. However, I did suggest that she talk with Roger Ashley (part-time HBC staff member) who was running a teen canteen in the social room at the 18XX W. Lake Street building of the Horner Housing Project, and was going to pull a group together to help him. Considering this and the structure of such a group it may be possible for Keen to become involved in it.

12:45 p.m. Received a telephone call from Mrs. Brown, wife of Willie Brown (President of the MIC's). Mrs. Brown was calling in behalf of her newly formed social club, the Hi-Ho Matrons Club. From her conversation it was my impression that all of the members reside in Horner Homes. The essence of the conversation was that Mrs. Brown wanted to know if it would be possible for her club to hold a fashion show which they planned for some time in April at the OP. The show would be pulled together by her group and all segments of the populace --adults, teens, pre-teens--would participate. It was obvious that Mrs. Brown had heard about the OP from her husband and others, and in their enthusiasm they may have exaggerated the condition and facilities at the OP. [The OP, an old fire station house appropriate for servicing boys' street clubs, leaves something to be desired as the setting for a fashion show.] I informed Mrs. Brown that her proposal was a good one but suggested that at some time in the near future she should visit and view the OP to decide whether it would meet her needs. Consequently we agreed to get together on 2/2/63 at 1:00 p.m. to follow through on this.

2:00 p.m. Mrs. Ehnis (President, WA, and sponsor of the EM-Cees, a girls' group aged 14-15) came over to the club to pick up the invitations (which I had promised to duplicate) for the M.C.'s affair on 1/25/63 at the Pioneer Room [of the Horner Housing Project]. This will be the group's first money-making venture. Unfortunately, I had completely forgotten about the invitations but it proved a worthwhile experience as I took the opportunity to get Mrs. Ehnis more involved by showing her how to perform this duplicating operation.

3:00 p.m. Parted for the OP. Only three of the guys came around and this was possibly due to the bitter cold weather. It was also quite cold in the OP. The oil-heater had broken down again. The three guys who braved the weather were Sanford "Mush" Atkins (16) and Richard Gould (17) of the "Kool Kats" and Wally Walters (16) of the "Los Lobos." During this period of time I tried to write up my CYDP daily activity reports on several occasions but it was so cold in the OP that I couldn't get started.

6:00 p.m. Dinner.

7:00 p.m. Journeyed to the Boys' Club where I pulled together some material in preparation for tomorrow's meeting regarding the Shinner Fund.

8:00 p.m. Parted the area.

THURSDAY, January 24, 1963

9:00 a.m. Arrived at HBC and shortly thereafter sat down and completed work on yesterday's CYDP daily activity log.

10:00 a.m. Involved in preparation, shopping, etc., for noon meeting regarding use of the Shinner Fund by the Youth Opportunities Committee (YOC) as well as other interested agencies and/or individuals.

12:00 n. The above meeting was held at the HBC. Present from the HBC or CYDP staff were Jefferson Broadstreet (Club Director), Don Schaff (Program Director), Ray Harry (OPS), Lionel Dukes (FW), Sam Reece (RC), and myself. The purpose of the meeting was to hammer out a "process" for use of the Shinner Fund by YOC and other interested agencies. There were approximately 40-45 people in attendance representing such agencies as the Chicago Housing Authority (Horner and Rockwell Homes), the Chicago Commission on Youth Welfare (Midwest Unit), Lincoln Chicago Boys Club, Oldtown Chicago Boys Club, Cook County Department of Public Aid (Horner and Rockwell units), four public grammar schools, Crane High School, the Chicago Commission on Human Relations (local branch), the Midwest Community Council and others. It is my impression that the meeting came off quite well and a good deal of enthusiasm was generated. Mr. Nelson Coch (Educational Director for the Chicago Boys Clubs and Liaison man between Shinner Foundation and CBC) was on hand as a keynote speaker and resource

person. Albert Robison (Executive Director, MCC) pledged the MCC's support to actively push and publicize the Fund and I take him at his word. He apparently envisions the Shinner Foundation as possibly setting up a local office (if the number of applicants is great) in the MCC area, and he even anticipates the possibility of the MCC getting administrative funds to operate such a local office from the Foundation. Robison is always an enthusiastic speculator about the financial possibilities in any situation at the MCC's fortunes have been declining recently. I did not feel it was my business to dampen his ardor as long as it might make a positive contribution. Although I hope, and it is my impression, that members of the YOC and other agencies will begin actively pushing use of the Fund, the real test of "success" of the meeting remains to be seen.

2:45 p.m. With Ray Harry (OPS) I interviewed Sheldon Gans, "Los Lobos," for the Shinner Fund. Gans' plans are to enroll at Dunbar evening school early next week and pursue a course as an electronic technician. I have no doubt that he can be successful in this pursuit. Ray Harry is to discuss Gans' plans with his parents.

4:30 p.m. Arrived at the OP hwhere I worked on my CYDP daily activity logs for a while. Then I went to supper.

7:00 p.m. Parted for a special meeting of the Men's Improvement Council. Only the officers attended this meeting which focused on the need to engender more enthusiasm in the MIC's and to see that those new members recruited during the "Smoker" got off to a right start. It was decided at the last meeting of the MIC's that during the winter months meetings would be held twice a month.

FRIDAY, January 25, 1963

9:00 a.m. Arrived at HBC and briefly worked on CYDP daily activity logs. By 9:45 a.m. I had decided that it would be wise for me to go over to Wally Walters' (16), of the "Los Lobos," house if we were to get him registered at Gregier Vocational High School today, as previously arranged. I had no question as to his sincerity in wanting to return to school but I also knew that the "Los Lobos" party last night had probably "exhausted" him. Walters lives in the Horner Housing Project and it was obvious as he appeared at the door that I had gotten him up. He apologized for not being at the boys club as previously arranged and then went on to get dressed as I sat down. While waiting for him I noticed a sign on the wall which he had made while at St. Charles Reformatory. It was titled "Rules of the House" and stated: (1) Do not lie at any time, (2) Keep the house clean, (3) Go to school on school days, (4) Go to church on Sundays, (5) Obey mother. While I was scanning this the front door opened and Mrs. Halsey Walters, grandmother, with whom he lives, walked in. I had met her on previous occasions. While Walters washed we made idle chatter and she went about cooking his breakfast, consisting of eggs, toast, grits, bacon, and orange juice. I was pleased to see that as the checks from the Department of Public Welfare had started coming

again (during a recent six week period the family had not received a relief check due to some DPW mixup that Ray Harry and I worked to straighten out) and breakfast was indeed a reality. While Walters ate, I had coffee. As we were about to leave there came a knock on the door. I opened the door with Walters immediately behind me and was greeted by an elderly man in his sixties whose face was red and there was saliva oozing from the corners of his mouth. He looked past Walters and me and asked the grandmother, "Is the boy home?" Obviously, I thought, he doesn't know Walters on sight. However, I soon discovered that it was Mr. Downey, Walters' parole officer from the Illinois Youth Commission. It was the same Mr. Downey who Ray Harry (OPS) and I had never met but with whom we had had some rather negative dealings over the telephone. I introduced myself and reminded him that I had talked with him previously on the telephone. Walters later told me that he had not seen him for six months. He asked Walters how he was doing and if he was still in school. After this he parted. I made no comment on Walters' positive responses to Downey's questions as his grandmother apparently does not know that he is not in school. I figured I would take that up later. Shortly afterward we parted for Cregier Vocational High School.

10:30 a.m. Arrived at Cregier and briefly chatted with Mr. Burnbaum, Placement Counselor, Mr. Peyton, School Officer, and Mr. Malley, Ass't. Principal. Afterwards Walters and I talked at length with Dr. Quiggley, Counselor, in regard to Walters getting into Cregier. The outcome was that Quiggley agreed to accept Walters on our "sponsorship," but that when he reports on Monday morning he must have his course book with him to be admitted.

12:00 n. After arriving at the HBC I called Cooley Vocational High School (the last school Walters attended). The officials at Cooley indicated that they did not have his course book, and never did, even though I distinctly remember giving it to them myself. I then called back to Cregier and left a message for Dr. Quiggley, indicating that Walters would be in Monday but without his course book. I also informed them that although the people at Cooley indicated they never had it, I remember distinctly leaving it with them. Later I returned Keith Varis' (Employment Coordinator, YMCA Detached Worker Program) call. Varis had called in regard to a job that he had come up with for Cranston Cole (17), "Los Lobos," but unfortunately Varis was not in. I left a message that I had returned the call.

1:00 p.m. Willie Brown (President, Men's Improvement Council) and Ralph Essex (MIC's Business Manager) came into the club and together we drafted a letter to those potential members who had attended the recent Smoker, regarding the next meeting of the MIC's. Brown was off work today but Essex had recently lost his job. I talked with him about the opportunities afforded by the Manpower Training and Development Act. I gave him all of the specifics which I had received from the Illinois State Employment Service (ISES), and he stated that he would definitely be at their offices on Monday morning.

3:00 p.m. Shortly after Brown and Essex left I received a call from Mr. Harrington (President of Marion College of Commerce) who had attended the meeting on the Shinner Fund yesterday. He had two referrals that he wanted to make to us for use of the Fund and appointments were made. After terminating my conversation with him, Mr. Kaminow (Ass't Principal, Crane High School) telephoned. Mr. Kaminow called in regard to an Alston Waverley whom he wanted us to talk with about the Shinner Fund. Consequently an appointment was made for him.

4:00 p.m. Parted for the OP where I remained until 5:00 p.m. and then returned to the Club to meet members of the "Em-Cees" (13-14) whom I took over to the Pioneer Room to decorate for their dance tonight.

7:30 p.m. Attended the "Em-Cees" dance. About 40 kids showed up, more girls than boys. All went smoothly.

11:00 p.m. Parted the area.

The Extent of the Organizational Effort

It is clear then that CRCs were heavily engaged, not only in organizational work in their areas, but also in providing boys with resources such as jobs, money, recreational and educational opportunities, and counselling. In this chapter we intend to review the results of their organizational work only and of the community organizational work of the Project as a whole. We reserve discussion of more direct service to boys for the next chapter.

The extent of the organizational effort may be gauged by the members of groups with which CRCs worked and the size of their membership. In the last quarter of 1962, the three CRCs, the Project directorate, and the club staffs in the target areas had either organized or established working relationships with 27 adult community groups varying in size from one member trying to get something going to 150 members of whom 30 could be called reasonably active. A year later, the number of organizations had grown to 37, total membership from 502 to 1,302, and estimated active membership from 230 to 788. The purposes of these organizations ranged over a wide variety of community concerns, from coaching boys' athletic teams to general civic improvement through political action.

The Project's organizational work was heavier in the Horner than in the Oldtown area, for several reasons. One, the need for organizational aid seemed greater in Horner. Two, the residents in Horner were more responsive to the Project's efforts. And three, the earlier experiences of the Boys

Clubs in this area had established ready contacts. In the Oldtown area, a good deal of community organization work was concentrated, not among the Italian and Mexican majority, but among the black minority in and around the public housing project. Community organization was already fairly visible among the Italians especially, and to some lesser degree among the Mexicans as well. Furthermore, the racial policy of the Chicago Boys Clubs and the resultant thrust of some of the Project's organizational efforts tended to alienate rather than co-opt the Italians and Mexicans in the Oldtown area. (More about this in Chapter 6.)

It will be instructive to review the history of growth of one community organization, the Mile Square Federation in the Horner area. We start the story here as an illustration of how community organization was practiced in CYDP, and we conclude it in Chapter 6 to show the widespread ramifications community organization can have, not only for the community, but also for the agency which fosters it.

Toward the end of March 1963, Virgil Reece, one of the two Community Resource Coordinators working out of the Henry Horner Boys Club, was asked to work on plans for a health program in the area. He began to gather information from agencies elsewhere in the city about their experiences in setting up health programs and also approached the Board of Health for their advice and cooperation. He learned about the technique of a neighborhood health fair in which various health organizations and private companies set up educational exhibits, and diagnostic medical and dental services are volunteered for one or more days. The Midwest Community Council had held such a health fair two years before not far from the Horner club, and two fairs were in the offing elsewhere in Chicago.

Reece had no sooner got started investigating the possibility of a health program when he developed a health problem of his own--he came down with chicken pox and was laid up for over a week. And it may be relevant to the enduring interest and intensive effort Reece invested in the health problems of the area over the following years that he and his family at about this time were beset with several critical health problems of their own.

When he returned to work, Reece visited a health fair at the Lower North Center and interviewed the coordinator of the March Center Health Fair

which he had missed when he was ill. In both cases his attention was directed to the myriad problems involved in such an undertaking--finding people to man committees; rounding up exhibitors; enlisting physicians, dentists, and nurses; getting supplies and borrowing equipment; and so on. Those involved complained to Reece about the lack of cooperation and enthusiasm. Reece also learned that the Midwest Community Council had no plans for a health fair that year. All of this seemed to have the effect of challenging him. On April 13, Reece recorded in his log, "I had a talk with Sal Galiento (EW) about the health fair materials I had gathered. Galiento and I feel we can do a better health fair . . ."

Between April 13 and August 14, when the Mile Square Health Fair opened, Reece spent part or all of 79 of the 85 working days on the fair. Meanwhile, he was also performing other functions of a CRC, mostly organizing and servicing block clubs, but also getting jobs for boys and men, helping families to survive crises, and so on. In June, he had a crisis of his own: his wife's mother, who lived alone, had become critically ill, and before anyone realized her danger, she had come near death from her illness and from lack of food and water. After seeing to his mother-in-law's care, Reece plunged back into the health problems of the Horner area.

Of course, Reece did not work in isolation. His contacts enabled him to pull together representatives of various agencies in the area as a Health Fair Steering Committee. On May 29, this group formally organized itself, electing officers from the Tuberculosis Institute, the Housing Authority, local churches and the county Department of Public Welfare. Reece co-chaired the subcommittee on exhibits. Meanwhile, Reece was spreading the news of the proposed fair among the block clubs, urging their support and enlisting members for service on committees. The block clubs were the source of most of about 50 area residents who attended the general meeting of the Mile Square Health Fair Committee on June 11.

It turned out that block club involvement in the successful program was the seed of the health fair's greatest potential for the future of the residents. Participation in the fair provided them with a common focus and meeting ground so that members from separate block clubs got to know each other. The fair created the necessity for some experience at coordinated

effort. Its success enlivened the block clubs and gave them a feel for their potential effectiveness. Most of the success of the Mile Square Health Fair depended on medical and social work professionals, but the participation of lay citizens and their organizations gave impetus to the movement toward community involvement in its own problems.

The Mile Square Health Fair opened with a ribbon-cutting ceremony at the Henry Horner Boys Club on August 14. The road to that event was not all smooth. There were instances of subcommittees collapsing, invitations failing to be mailed, shortages of supplies, and so on. At one point, Reece was cautioned by the Henry Horner Club Program Director that he was devoting too much of his time to this program to the detriment of his other functions. At another point, Reece himself was ready to quit in despair. Even while the fair was in progress, emergencies developed, like a promised group of physicians from a local hospital not showing up to provide examinations. However, everyone agreed that the Mile Square Health Fair was a success: from August 14 to 16, about 3500 people attended the fair, receiving about 750 physical examinations, 500 dental examinations, and 1000 preventive injections.

Afterwards Reece spent a week attending to details of the aftermath of the fair and to other projects, then took a two-week vacation. When he returned he found some of the officers of the Health Fair Steering Committee eager for further health projects and another fair the following year. (Also, the Boy Scouts who had passed out handbills publicizing the fair had not received their promised service awards yet.) Reece agreed to serve as coordinator to organize continued activities. By September 17, a meeting had been called of a new Mile Square Community Health Committee, and Reece told one community resident who was invited to join "that useful things could come from the committee if it became permanent."

Sixteen of the two dozen or so people invited showed up for the meeting of the Mile Square Community Health Committee on September 20. "However, all was not lost," Reece recorded in his log,

as the block club people present agreed to have a community cleanup week from October 7 through October 11. All Block clubs will clean up their areas, piling all rubbish so that city trucks can move it. The Cook County Department of Public Welfare will supply as many men on relief as possible to assist. There will be another meeting on October 4 at 8 p.m. at the Horner Boys Club to report on the number of volunteers.

The community cleanup campaign occupied part of every one of Reece's working days over the next month.

We should point to significant differences between the health fair and the cleanup campaign. The latter was more the kind of activity in which professional skills were not so central to success as the effort of the residents themselves. So the block club membership became more fully involved. Further, not only did they have to plan a coordinated action program, which brought their officers together, they also had to go out and make contact with their uninvolved neighbors. And the important function which had to be filled by the Chicago Department of Sanitation brought the block clubs into negotiations with an agency of the local government.

The cleanup campaign proved difficult to carry off. Putting the block club machinery to some strenuous work revealed weak and missing gears, faulty connections, and opposing forces. Block club officers and active members did not know and were not known by many of the neighbors whose cooperation they tried to achieve. Personal hostilities within clubs surfaced. The weight of dealing with the Department of Sanitation fell completely onto Reece because lay members felt inadequate to that function.

Nevertheless, enormous amounts of rubbish and garbage were gathered. The week-long campaign was extended to a second week. And much of the refuse waited days after that for collectors. Questions arose as to the size of items--rotten couches, auto wreckage, cracked plumbing fixtures--which the sanitation workers felt it was their business to haul away. A disgruntled citizen set fire to a pile he believed should long since have been collected, and the fire department came promptly, scattering the garbage to put out the fire. It is not clear whether all the garbage ever was hauled away.

Before the second week of the cleanup campaign was over, Reece was spreading the word among the block presidents about attending a meeting with the local police precinct commander. Commander Shanahan was going to talk about the problems of law enforcement and listen to citizens' complaints about the police. This meeting was arranged by the Men's Improvement Club, which Reece assisted. This was the first time he had attempted to bring the block clubs and the MIC together.

On October 18, the morning after the meeting with Commander Shanahan, a local clergyman called on Reece to talk about the impending public school boycott. Civil rights forces in the city were calling upon Chicago's blacks to keep their children out of school for a day to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the school system. The clergyman wanted Reece to get the block clubs behind the boycott. Reece informed him that at least one of the block club president's was already "in full swing on the boycott." Reece also told him that he would leave the matter of support and action to each club to decide and referred the clergyman to the Horner club director if he wanted to pursue the matter further. Later that day, the block club president who he had said was already involved in the boycott movement, called Reece,

. . . asking for ways to contact all the other block club presidents for a meeting on Saturday night, October 19, at St. Thomas' Church to discuss the boycott. He wanted me to attend but I told him I would be busy. I gave him the addresses and phone numbers of the other presidents.

On November 4, Reece began meeting weekly with all the block club presidents, the president of the Men's Improvement Club and the president of the MIC's Women's Auxiliary. That same group was later augmented, at their first meeting in December, by the presidents of some of the residents' clubs from the public housing projects. Reece recorded, of this December 2 meeting:

The group chose the name of the club as the Mile Square Federation officially. Each block club and organization was asked to pay dues to the Federation so the group could purchase letter heads, postage stamps, and other essentials necessary for an organization. The Federation decided to meet on the first and third of each month on a Monday night in order to establish a closer relationship in the entire community. The next meeting of the Federation will be held December 16, 1963, at the Henry Horner Boys Club.

CYDP efforts in the target areas seemed to pay off in some increased involvement of citizens in clubs and other organizations. The data here, and in the discussion to follow, must be considered separately for whites and blacks. For there are important differences revealed by this division which would be lost by combining the data or by presenting them separated into the Horner and Oldtown areas. Apparently, the black population in Oldtown responded to the Project more like the blacks in the Horner area.

did rather than like their white neighbors in the Oldtown area. For example, it would seem from Table 4:1 that white and black women in the experimental areas shifted about equally from non-membership to belonging to at least one club. But the nature of their increased participation is quite different, especially in terms of how much might be attributed to the efforts of the Project. Nine percent more of the sample of black women in the target areas belonged to some club in 1965 than in 1963 and this is almost wholly due to a rise of 11 percent in the proportion who joined some organization devoted to community improvement. Seven percent of these women reported that CYDP had enlisted them in the organizations they had recently joined.

But the kinds of organizations that the white women in the Oldtown area joined cast doubt on the Project's being responsible. Few of these women joined civic improvement clubs. Almost none mentioned that the Project had got them involved in any organization. But they did increasingly join religious, nationality, and athletic organizations, groups which were prevalent in the area before the Project began and for which the Project did not recruit. These data suggest a trend which seems to appear elsewhere in the data on organizational involvement of Oldtown's different ethnic groups. It appears that they gathered more closely together, joining just those organizations which were most segregated along racial and ethnic lines.

We also asked the women we interviewed to report on their husband's membership in organizations. It seemed especially important to do this since we anticipated some sex role differences among the ethnic groups with which we worked. We thought that the Project might effect increased participation in community action groups among black women, who by and large were more likely to represent their families in such matters than their husbands. But we expected that if anyone did, Italian and Mexican men rather than their wives, would get involved in community organization. The data, based on their wives' reports, indicate that neither more white nor more black men joined organizations over the Project's years; indeed, their membership may have declined slightly (Table 4:2). A look at the kinds of organizations to which the men belonged reveals shifts in participation along ethnic lines, similar to the wives': black men joined more neighborhood improvement groups and fewer church and social organizations; white men more church, fraternal,

Table 4:1

Women Belonging to Organizations by Race, Area and Time Period

Number of Organizations	White				Black			
	Experimental		Control		Experimental		Control	
	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965
More than one	22%	32	35	6	31	35	34	28
One	27	26	24	44	28	32	30	26
None	51	42	40	50	41	32	35	46
T	100	100	99	100	100	99	99	100
(N)	(73)	(31)	(62)	(32)	(82)	(62)	(79)	(97)

Table 4:2

Men Belonging to Organizations by Race, Area and Time Period

	White				Black			
	Experimental		Control		Experimental		Control	
	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965
% who belong to at least 1 organ- ization	54	52	58	53	36	24	36	29
(Total N)	(56)	(31)	(45)	(32)	(66)	(59)	(75)	(97)

and social organizations. The shifts were not large in either case, however, and, as we have seen, resulted on balance in a slight decline in membership.

So it seems that whatever effect the Project had on organizational membership was apparently limited to black women.

In order to get another perspective on the development of community organizations in the target and control areas, we asked our sample of agency executives in both kinds of areas about their perceptions. (Who these agency executives were and how they were chosen are described in Chapter 3.) We asked them about the level of organization in the communities they served and to compare them with nearby areas of the inner city. Their responses reveal no reliable change in community organization in the target areas over the years of the Project's operation. While the data on residents' organizational participation do show some change, it apparently was not of the magnitude or type to come to the attention of our samples of agency executives. As far as the latter could see, the situation was pretty much the same in 1965 as in 1963.

Efficacy of Community Action

Community organizing is not colonizing. That is, the work of organizing a community is not accomplished by imposing on its citizens a network of agencies which organizes them. Such an organization may indeed rationalize community processes and make them more efficient. It may even prove efficacious in ameliorating the problems which concern the citizens. But the agencies are not the people's in the proprietorial sense even if the agencies are on their side. Imposition of organization, however benevolent, encourages apathy and dependency. And organization so imposed can more easily lose touch with the will of the citizens because it is not answerable to them.

We have already pointed out that the Project's target areas were by no means devoid of agencies. Whether there were enough to solve the massive problems of these communities if they resolved actually to do that is a question. Whether such an arrangement could effectively solve the area's problems is another. But of professionals who sincerely wanted to help the residents there were plenty. However, this fact may itself constitute a

community problem. For identification of a population as needing help, as we pointed out in an earlier chapter, carries the message that that population is helpless. That message can be degrading and debilitating for an individual and for a whole group, and if accepted by them, self-perpetuating.

Perhaps we have here another clue to the greater responsiveness of the target area's black population to Project efforts at community organization, compared to white recalcitrance. Boys Clubs' color blindness was one factor, and another might have been the different collective perceptions of the two populations of their own need for outside, that is, extra-ethnic, help. Certainly the Italians in Oldtown had experience with effective indigenous organizations and had placed some of their own in seats of power. (There is some evidence to come that their recent losing battles against racial succession and university invasion was beginning to erode their feelings of efficacy.) But this was not true of the blacks. Quite to the contrary, help from outsiders was more consonant with their traditions and expectations whose historical roots can be found in the underground railway and the Freedman's Bureau.

CYDP's program aim was ultimately to create self-help. From this perspective, Community Resource Coordinators had two kinds of functions: they solved concrete problems for people, carried them through crises, took care of things for them, made contacts for them; and they organized them. The former function was regarded as stopgap. It served essentially two purposes, the humanitarian one of helping people to survive, and the organizational one of cementing relationships. But the helping function contained the potential for throwing a net of clinging dependency over the relationships which could hinder their organizational usefulness. Three hours of a CRC's log illustrates this problem:

WEDNESDAY, January 22, 1964

1:30 p.m. After lunch, I decided to visit some of the block club officers to review Monday night's meeting of the Mile Square Federation and to get them to carry the action to their respective clubs. I went to see Doris Jackson, 18XX Jackson, President of the 18-1900 Jackson block club. Jackson is having her usual block club problems in gossip among members. Jackson is working hard trying to keep threads of the block club together. There are so many problems in the block and so many residents of the block are involved in illegal or extra-legal activities that it is very difficult to solidify a group for any constructive projects.

2:30 p.m. I dropped in on Mrs. Harmon, 1XX Wolcott, Secretary of the 1800 Monroe block club to discuss plans. Her husband consumed most of the time talking about himself and criticizing all young people of today.

3:30 p.m. I went to see Howard Fineberg, 17XX Washington, to discuss finding employment for John Pushing, 17XX Washington, President 15-16-1700 Washington-Warren block club. Pushing has been out of work for a long time and having a very hard time.

If the Project were to reach its goals for community organization, then increased participation in clubs devoted to solving community problems should be accompanied by a feeling that progress could be made through these clubs. Furthermore, the proliferation of organizations and the potentiality for residents to solve problems should become broadly recognized in the community.

In the course of interviewing adult women in 1963 and 1965, we asked them if they believed anyone was working on those community problems which they believed were most pressing (see Table 4:3). Most of them did not believe anyone or any agency was. More white residents than black were unaware of anyone working on major community problems. However, the target

Table 4:3

"Thinking of the problem you said was the biggest one now . . .

is anyone trying to do anything about [it]?"

by Race, Area and Time Period

	White				Black			
	Experimental		Control		Experimental		Control	
	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965
% who mention someone or organization	12%	26	23	22	27	39	38	31
% who know of none	88	74	77	78	73	61	62	79
(N)	(73)	(31)	(62)	(32)	(82)	(38)	(79)	(67)

areas showed some improvement in this respect from 1963 to 1965. More white and black women in the target areas knew of agencies working on their problems later than earlier in the Project years, while fewer women in the control areas did.

Again, there is an important difference between the responses of black

and white women concealed underneath their apparent similarity. When asked who was addressing these problems, the black women in the target areas more often than the white cited organizations to which they themselves belonged rather than outside agencies. Indeed, when asked later in the interview if there were organizations to which they did not belong which were working on "making their neighborhoods a better place to live in," 14 percent fewer of these black women could think of any in 1965 than in 1963, while seven percent more of the white women could. So the data indicate that broader recognition of organizations for solving community problems among the black women in the target areas came from their personal participation, but among the white women, it did not.

It is also pertinent here to note that those few black women who did know of organizations to which they did not belong had mostly CYDP and related organizations in mind. This was not true among the whites.

How effective did the residents perceive community organizations to be? The data are in Table 4:4. They show that the women who got most

Table 4:4

Residents'* Evaluations of Organizations' Effectiveness with the
 "Biggest Problems" in their Neighborhoods
 by Race, Area and Time Period

	White				Black			
	Experimental		Control		Experimental		Control	
	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965
Excellent or good	44	50	36	57	64	54	53	64
N*	9	8	14	7	22	24	30	28

* Includes only those who said they knew of someone working on the problems they regarded as the "biggest."

involved in organizational activity over the years also grew relatively more dissatisfied. The black women, more of whom actually participated in the organizations which they were evaluating, were less likely to rate them

"good" or "excellent." On the other hand, the white women in the control neighborhoods, who were less likely to be participating, became most positive in 1965 relative to their evaluations in 1963; and the black controls, also less likely to be participants, also grew more positive over the years. We suspect that the aspirations of participants were raised so that their organizations fell more short. We also suspect that greater participation by black women in local organizations provided them with vantage points from which they could more accurately appraise the effectiveness of community agencies. The programs of these agencies were often launched with much fanfare in the local press, on radio, and with posters and leaflets in the area. Their later claims of success often appeared in the media. Non-participants depended on these messages for their view of the agencies' effectiveness. Participating citizens gained insight into the public relations character of these messages as they had more direct experience with the agencies. They became more critical.

In order to gauge residents' feelings about the effectiveness of specifically grassroots community organizations, we asked our samples of women, "Do you think a group of people around here could do a great deal, a moderate amount, or hardly anything at all . . . to improve the school? . . . [and later] about doing away with delinquency?" It was here that the scars of the Italians' and Mexicans' losing battles on community issues in the target areas seemed to appear most clearly; for they had the least confidence in their collective efficacy (see Tables 4:5a and b). By 1963, about a third of the white women in the target areas believed that local residents could do "hardly anything at all to improve the schools," compared to under 20 percent of other women, white and black. And the proportion of them who were pessimistic about doing anything about delinquency grew to a high of 42 percent in 1965.

Here too we may detect some of the impact of community organizing among the blacks in the Horner area. One of its prime targets from the beginning was Chicago's school system. De facto segregation of the schools and unequal distribution of educational resources attracted the fire of blacks throughout the city. Organized blacks understandably participated more broadly and intensively in the movement and the organization developing in the Horner area devoted a great deal of attention to this issue. So CYDP became involved in protests against the schools through its organizational efforts, especially through the Mile Square Federation. On Friday, June 11, 1965, Sam Reece

Table 4:5a

"Do you think a group of people around here could do a great deal,
 a moderate amount, or hardly anything at all
 . . . to improve the schools."
 by Race, Area and Time Period

	White				Black			
	Experimental		Control		Experimental		Control	
	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965
A great deal	36%	32	50	39	47	65	44	49
A moderate amount	32	32	31	43	39	22	38	36
Hardly anything	31	36	19	18	13	13	18	15
T	99%	100	100	100	99	100	100	100
(N)	(61)	(31)	(54)	(28)	(82)	(58)	(79)	(92)

Table 4:5b

. . . about doing away with delinquency."
 by Race, Area and Time Period

	White				Black			
	Experimental		Control		Experimental		Control	
	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965
A great deal	39%	26	51	36	57	55	47	58
A moderate amount	39	32	24	43	31	30	42	30
Hardly anything	23	42	25	21	12	15	11	12
T	101	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
(N)	(62)	(31)	(53)	(28)	(81)	(60)	(76)	(90)

recorded:

1:00 p.m. Went by Crane H.S., 2245 Jackson Blvd. to see how effective the school boycott had been on local schools. I saw several students milling around outside on the sidewalk. I went into the school and inquired from the Assistant Principal about the effects. She said between 60 and 75% of the students were absent. As I toured the area most schools appeared to be about equally as hard hit.

2:30 p.m. I heard a bulletin on the car radio that more than 200 civil rights marchers had been arrested downtown in Chicago. I knew some X-area youth were in the march. I raced to City Hall to see if the marchers had reached their destination, as well as to find out if the bulletin was true. On arrival at City Hall I found that all was true and four of our youth were in the number arrested. I proceeded to Central Police Station where the youth had been taken. I talked with the Deputy Chief of Uniformed Police and a sergeant in the Police Human Relations Dept. and many others. I notified the Horner Boys Club as to where I would be and what was going on. Finally, after quite a long wait, three of the youth, Jane Grayson (16), Veronica Grayson (17) both of 28XX W. Jackson, and Charlotte Mantrie (15), 21XX W. Lake St. were released to me. There still was one person left in jail, Glenda Asher (18), 18XX W. Jackson Blvd., I took the Graysons and Mantrie to their homes and told their parents what had happened. None of the parents were disturbed. In fact, Mrs. Mollie Grayson (mother) said she was willing to have left her daughters in jail if it would have benefitted the civil rights cause. Mrs. Grayson said she was going to go and take part in the civil rights protest to show her concern.

Mrs. Mantrie told Charlotte that her actions were a great credit to the worthy cause.

Eighteen percent more of the Horner area women thought in 1965 that "a group of people here could do a great deal to improve the schools" than believed that in 1963, while only five percent more of the black women in the control areas thought so, and the proportions of white women who thought so declined.

It may be significant that the broader feeling of efficacy of the black women in our samples came from the ranks of those who had earlier thought that people could do only "a moderate amount" about improving the schools rather than from those who thought "hardly anything at all" could be done. Table 4:5a shows that the proportion of the latter remained at 13 percent from 1963 to 1965, but the shift was from the moderate to the extreme level of confidence. It seems plausible to suppose that a certain amount of optimism about getting something done was necessary before a citizen would get involved at all in community action; that is, that the Project enlisted largely from among those who believed that at least "a moderate amount" could be done. Then these

women began to feel more efficacious, perhaps as a result of real experiences of participation or perhaps to justify to themselves their increased investments of time, energies, and hope.

The more widely felt confidence of the Horner area residents that they could do something about their community's problems did not extend to the problem of delinquency. Indeed, the black women in the control areas became more confident of their potential for "doing away with delinquency" than the women in the target areas did. It may be that widening feelings of efficacy were limited just to that arena, the schools, about which the latter were taking action. Since we inquired only about schools and delinquency, we do not know how the respondents felt about their potential for solving other problems. It is clear, however, that CYDP did not achieve the effect of encouraging the adults in the target areas that they could do something about juvenile delinquency. Not only did the black women in the control areas become relatively more confident that something could be done compared to those in the target areas, the same was true of the white women. The confidence of all the white women declined over the Project years, and the confidence of those in the target areas, as we have mentioned, declined most sharply.

The white women in the Oldtown area seemed increasingly to take the position that agencies could and were dealing with delinquency. When asked if they knew "of any neighborhood organizations or local groups which are trying to do something about juvenile delinquency," twice the proportion of these white women said "yes" in 1965 than in 1963 (see Table 4:6). Furthermore, more of those who mentioned organizations came to believe that these

Table 4:6

Proportion of Adult Women who Knew of "any neighborhood organizations or local groups which are trying to do something about delinquency" by Race, Area and Time Period

	White				Black			
	Experimental		Control		Experimental		Control	
	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965
%	18	36	31	30	51	45	37	37
(N)	(72)	(31)	(62)	(30)	(34)	(28)	(79)	(97)

agencies were doing an "excellent" or "good" job on the problem (see Table 4:7). The reverse was true among the black women: fewer in the target area (but not reliably fewer) knew of any such organizations working on

Table 4:7

Proportion of Organizations which Adult Women Believed were Doing
an "Excellent" or "Good" Job about Delinquency
by Race, Area and Time Period

	White				Black			
	Experimental		Control		Experimental		Control	
	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965
%	50	62	86	50	82	73	55	77
(N or organizations)	(16)	(13)	(27)	(10)	(44)	(37)	(40)	(44)
(N of women)	(13)	(9)	(19)	(7)	(33)	(26)	(29)	(31)

delinquency; and furthermore, markedly fewer who knew of any felt that they were doing at least a "good" job. It seems that the black women were becoming disenchanted with the efforts of agencies in this regard, although a large proportion of those who knew of agencies continued to respect their efforts.

It should be noted that the Chicago Boys Clubs were mentioned among those agencies trying to reduce delinquency, even while other youth organizations were declining in recognition. For the most part, increased recognition of Boys Clubs' efforts centered about the Oldtown Boys Club. The Henry Horner Boys Club already by 1963 accounted for a third of the organizations that residents knew were working to reduce delinquency and did not become more widely recognized. The Oldtown Club became as widely recognized during the Project years, especially by the white residents of the area.

We suspect that the differences between whites and blacks in their apparent dependency on agencies for reducing delinquency has to do at least in part with their different perceptions of who the delinquents were. The Horner area was homogeneously black and all its youth, delinquent or otherwise, could be perceived by the residents as "we." But the Oldtown area

was ethnically diverse, and it was comfortable for the residents to attribute delinquent juveniles to "them." For the white women around the Oldtown Club, this meant that the delinquency problem came from the blacks, and they themselves could do little about it. It was up to the agency which worked with the black kids--that is, the Oldtown Boys Club--to do something. And whatever disagreements they may have had with the Boys Clubs over other issues, they approved of the Boys Club efforts in this regard. The black women in the Horner area, however, were not so apt to turn the problem of "their kids" over to some agency. And they had not, during the Project years, got involved much with it themselves. Their attention was elsewhere, primarily, the schools, and secondarily perhaps, on housing conditions.

Theories of Delinquency

One might think that adults who were becoming more actively involved in improving the quality of their neighborhood schools and feeling that they had the potential to effect some change would, on that account, believe also that they were addressing the problem of juvenile delinquency. Were this true, then the black residents in the target areas should have evidenced more optimism than they did about their potential for reducing delinquency.

But the fact is that the problem of delinquency and the condition of the schools were not connected in the minds of many residents, white or black. The staff of the Project knew the relevance of the one to the other. There was no doubt among them that their own relationships with school personnel and the efforts of the community organizations that they had helped to establish were directly related to CYDP's central aim of reducing delinquency. But while residents realized that better schools would benefit their youngsters, few believed that this was a way to reduce delinquency.

We asked our samples of women "What do you think is the main reason why teenagers do things that get them in trouble with the police?" The reason most frequently cited--by from a quarter to a third of the respondents--was parental neglect or incompetence. One woman said, "Their parents just don't care--letting them run in the streets to all hours." Another said, "A lot of them don't have any fathers to control them." It is clear that a substantial proportion of the residents recognized that the family is a major source of social control, and when it does not function properly, the children are prone to delinquency.

The next most frequent reason given for delinquency was the inadequacy of recreational programs and facilities for teenagers. Behind this reason lies the adage, "The Devil finds work for idle hands," and indeed several women quoted just that in response to our question. Around 20 percent of the women cited inadequate recreational opportunities as a main reason for delinquency. It was partly this theory of delinquency which encouraged many of the residents in the area of the Oldtown Boys Club to believe that that agency was working effectively on the problem of delinquency. For the Boys Clubs opened an impressive new Oldtown Boys Club building in 1963, and had placed it where the white residents at least thought it would do the most to reduce delinquency--near the black neighborhood.

In respect to their theories of delinquency, the lay residents were in agreement with the executives of agencies which served their communities. That is, the agency executives also most often cited inadequate families as the main cause for delinquency and inadequate recreational programs were also frequently mentioned as a cause (see Table 4:8). The professionals also frequently mentioned one thing that lay people did not--"teenagers." One began "Kids nowadays. . .," another thought that a certain amount of juvenile delinquency was "a natural phenomenon of adolescence." About a quarter of the sample of executives considered the teen years as a main reason for delinquency.

It is not surprising, given their theories of what causes delinquency, that the agency executives should nominate family-surrogates or assistance to families as "the best way of handling the problem of juvenile delinquency." More than 80 percent of the suggestions they made for ameliorative programs called for agencies or individual therapists to provide the social control usually provided by families, or to support families in this function. But few believed that these kinds of programs were being offered in either the target or control areas. In effect then, from their point of view, the most promising means for reducing delinquency were not available.

On the other hand, some professionals did believe that agencies in the target and control areas were nevertheless becoming somewhat more effective in reducing delinquency. Executives in the Oldtown area frequently cited the new Oldtown Boys Club building and its contribution to recreational opportunities. In the Horner area, there was a marked increase from 1963 to 1964 in the frequency with which community organization was mentioned as a reason for greater effectiveness in the concrete reality, although few

Table 4:8

Causes of Delinquency Cited by Agency Executives

Cause	Areas			
	Target		Control	
	1963	1965	1963	1965
Inadequate parents	29%	36	36	33
Teenage "hoods"	23	24	25	19
Inadequate recreation	15	18	15	20
Poverty	17	8	9	6
Unemployment	4	5	--	5
Inadequate education	4	3	5	8
Subcultural norms	1	--	5	3
Other	4	--	5	5
?	<u>3</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>--</u>
Total	100	99	100	99
(N of responses)	(78)	(62)	(76)	(65)
(N of executives)	(49)	(40)	(59)	(43)

executives had mentioned community organizations in the abstract as a means for reducing delinquency (see Table 4:9). Apparently the most visible change in each of the target area Boys Clubs was held responsible for whatever increased effectiveness they may have achieved.

There was no significant change over the years in either the residents' or the agency executives' theories of what causes delinquency or the best means for handling the problem. The CYDP staff would have regarded increasing recognition of problems of education and employment at the root of delinquency as a sign of progress among the adults in the target areas. But the staff did not actively proselytize a theoretical position on delinquency and its cure; it acted on its own eclectic theories, putting more emphasis on some rather than others. That the common theories of delinquency did not change

Table 4:9

Reasons Given by Agency Executives for Agencies Becoming
More Effective in Reducing Delinquency by Area and Time Period

Reasons	Areas			
	Target		Control	
	1963	1965	1963	1965
Better facilities	22%*	29*	10	12
More community organization	1	21**	2	12
Closer to their clientele	20	13	32	28
More inter-agency cooperation and coordination	19	2	13	5
More efforts in job training and job-finding	--	--	2	7
More efforts in the area of education	3	--	5	9
More personal counseling	--	--	--	12
Other	15	25	16	12
Don't know	<u>18</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>2</u>
Total	96	100	98	99
(N of responses)	(81)	(48)	(62)	(57)

* Oldtown area executives account for most of these percentages.

** Horner area executives account for most of this percentage.

much should not then be taken as a major failure of the Project. It is doubtful that either residents or professionals gave or withheld support of the Project directly because of their theoretical differences.

What is important is that few residents at any time linked the organizational work of the Project to the Boys Clubs' general efforts to reduce delinquency. And only the agency executives in the Horner area seemed to recognize their relationship. As a result the black women, who participated the most, did not generally believe that they were doing anything to reduce delinquency among their children. Nor did the white women believe that community organization among the blacks would benefit their common community by reducing delinquency.

Personal Responsibility

Recently the mass media in the United States and around the world were regularly reporting the callous disregard of Americans faced with cries for help. Stories circulated of neighbors listening to Kitty Genovese being assaulted in the night but doing nothing, of passengers in subway trains standing by while others were attacked and robbed. This kind of behavior has commonly been attributed to the growing impersonality of our lives, especially in the large urban centers. People do not give aid to someone in trouble, it is thought, because they do not feel it is any of their business. The plight of the lady in the street or the man next door is no more personally compelling than had they been in distress a thousand miles away.

The more organized a community is, the more responsibility neighbors might take for one another. Because one consequence of organization is that neighbors get to know one another as individuals. Having attended the same block club meeting or worked however briefly together on cleaning up the rubbish in the stairwell, they then recognize one another on the street. After publicly promising one another among others that they will keep their children out of school on the day of a protest boycott, they begin to recognize their interdependence. Having come to see more clearly how much of their personal problems are community-wide problems, they begin to realize that they share a common fate. Under these conditions, it is reasonable to suppose, individuals will not so easily ignore their neighbors' plight.

Furthermore, participation in community efforts should encourage identification with the community-at-large among the residents. Then anything that happens in the neighborhood is in a sense happening in the individual's own place and becomes his business.

We expected to find, therefore, that if CYDP was effective in organizing the target areas, residents would more frequently move to help each other in concrete instances. Put in another way, one means by which we tested the effectiveness of CYDP's organizing efforts was to inquire about the behavior of adults when face to face with neighbors in trouble.

But while they may account for most of the apparent callousness in middle class and solid working class communities, isolation and impersonality are only partial explanations among the very poor. Another is distrust, even fear of the poor for one another. Negative stereotypes of the poor abound, and it is not important here how true these stereotypes may be. True or not, they are generally accepted, by the poor themselves as well as by the better-off. The poor, we believe, are impulsive; they are violent; they are drunk; they are criminal, their children are delinquent; they are sexually promiscuous, even predatory; they are desperate. And even efforts to help ameliorate the real conditions of poverty strengthen these stereotypes by identifying the poor as in special need for help. Consequently, the poor do not trust one another, and efforts to help them organize for collective action must deal with this fact. This problem is compounded when the poor are also black.

The problem of distrust is even further compounded when only some of the poor are black, and the others are Italian, Mexican and Puerto Rican. Suttles (1968) has described the problem of inter-ethnic distrust in the Oldtown area thus:

. . . [It] is assumed that persons will be most comfortable and trustworthy among members of their own ethnic or minority group. Accordingly, anyone who attempts to interact or affiliate himself with another group is likely to raise grave doubts and apprehensions on the part of those being approached. Negroes who make friendly advances to whites, for example, are only the more likely to be seen as "up to something." In turn, whites who "go out of their way" to accommodate Negroes are equally suspect of not being able to "make it among their own" or of having some secret design that imperils the fortunes of those who allow themselves to be ensnared. Similarly, Mexicans and Italians cannot meet each other on an equal footing without raising the issue of why they are doing so.

It would be a gross oversimplification, however, to say that the [Oldtown] area residents are just "prejudiced" or mistrustful persons. Quite apart from their own personal feelings, the public standing of these minority groups is such that their fears and apprehensions are often quite "reasonable"

Concrete evidence of residents' distrust and fear of one another, in and out of their own ethnic group, appeared frequently in the course of the Project's work. Often members would not show up at block club meetings because they would have had to walk a block or so alone to get there; or they would ask to be escorted to their apartment doors for fear of riding the elevator by themselves. If the club treasury accounts did not balance, some members quickly concluded that the treasurer had stolen the money. Organizing cooperative babysitting to free mothers for organizational work was sometimes difficult because some mothers did not trust their neighbors with their children. And, as we shall see in the next two chapters, whole ethnic groups would keep their boys away from a Boys Club because another ethnic group had "taken it over."

We tested the willingness of adults to take personal responsibility for the welfare of others in the community by asking them both about what they would do in hypothetical situations of some danger to another and also about recent actual situations of that kind which they may have witnessed. We focussed on situations involving the delinquency of teenage boys since these were directly relevant to the purposes of the Project, asking our samples of adult women what they would do, if anything, if they saw boys in their neighborhood stealing, drinking heavily, destroying property, or beating another teenager. We also asked them what they had done in actual instances of witnessing such behavior. We probed to discover what conditions would affect the behavior.

The conditions which most women set for their behavior in hypothetical situations illustrate the operation of fear and impersonality in determining their actions. Table 4:10 demonstrates that the most frequent condition set is whether the teenage victims or victimizers or their parents were personally known to the observers. The second most frequent condition is fear for their own safety. Considerably less often mentioned were the seriousness of the boys' behavior or the possibility of taking effective action.

It is important to note in the data in Table 4:10 that markedly more white women in 1965 considered whether they knew any of the people involved. Here again, we may detect an effect of other ethnic groups invading both the Oldtown target area and its control. White women who assumed in 1963 that they would know the hypothetical "teenaged boys around the block" or their families could no longer assume that in 1965. The possibility of dealing with

Table 4:10

Conditions Women Set for Doing Something in Hypothetical Situations
of Witnessing Neighborhood Teenagers Stealing, Destroying Property,
Drinking Heavily, or Beating Up Another Teenager
by Race, Area and Time Period

Condition	White				Black			
	Experimental		Control		Experimental		Control	
	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965
Knowing boys or their parents	39%	48	22	46	36	33	36	42
R. is safe	35	4	33	8	26	22	26	13
Situation per- mitted action	10	9	10	4	12	17	16	13
Boys' behavior seriously bad	9	9	14	--	9	9	6	8
Boys' behavior occurred in R's home	1	4	--	4	4	2	2	2
Other	6	26	21	38	12	17	14	23
Total	100	100	100	100	99	100	100	101
(N of responses)	(80)	(23)	(58)	(26)	(91)	(54)	(95)	(62)

the situation through informal personal relationships therefore became problematical for them.

When actually faced with teenage delinquency, most women usually did nothing. Thirty-one percent of them had witnessed teenagers drinking one or more times in the year prior to the interview and did nothing 82 percent of the time. Forty-three percent had witnessed a teenage fight and did nothing 73 percent of the time.

But the Project's effectiveness in involving more black women in community organization may be seen in the growing minority who took some action when they saw teenagers drinking or fighting in their neighborhoods (see Tables 4:11a and b). Especially with regard to boys' fighting, but also their public

Table 4:11a

What Women Did When They Witnessed Teenagers . . .
 . . . Drinking
 by Race, Area and Time Period

Action	White				Black			
	Experimental		Control		Experimental		Control	
	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965
Nothing	87%	86	70	86	97	89	82	86
Called police	--	14	13	5	--	2	4	--
Spoke to teenagers or parents	13	--	13	5	3	8	14	15
Other	--	--	3	5	--	--	--	--
Total	100	100	99	101	100	99	100	101
(N of incidents)	(22)	(14)	(30)	(22)	(32)	(36)	(50)	(55)
(N of women who witnessed one or more incidents)	(15)	(8)	(16)	(12)	(22)	(22)	(30)	(33)

drinking, the proportion of black women in the target area who did nothing dropped significantly from 1963 to 1965. Instead, more of them spoke to the teenagers or to their parents and did other things like asking some available adult male they knew to intervene. But they rarely called the police.

In these data we also see further evidence of some retreat from community involvement on the part of white women in the Oldtown area. Significantly more of them did nothing in 1965 when they saw boys fighting. Apparently, not knowing the boys or their families and fearing for their own safety amid the violence, they declined to act. Nor did more try to get the police or others to take action, a few women saying that they feared later reprisal had they called the police.

Table 4:11b

What Women Did When They Witnessed Teenagers . . .
 . . . Fighting
 by Race, Area and Time Period

Action	White				Black			
	Experimental		Control		Experimental		Control	
	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965
Nothing	58%	81	70	64	81	65	71	84
Called police	14	6	7	23	8	6	7	3
Spoke to teenagers or parents	25	13	23	9	10	17	19	9
Other	3	--	--	5	--	11	2	4
Total	100	100	100	101	99	99	99	100
(N of incidents)	(36)	(16)	(27)	(22)	(61)	(54)	(83)	(73)
(N of women who witnessed one or more incidents)	(24)	(8)	(18)	(13)	(37)	(29)	(47)	(44)

Attitudes toward the Neighborhood

One often hears a romantic motif in recollections of life growing up in the inner city. Adults fondly recount their childhood around Maxwell Street in Chicago, on the Lower East Side of New York City, in Boston's Roxbury district. The men recall how "tough" the neighborhood was, implying if not actually claiming that their adult fiber is stronger than ordinary mortals for having gone through and survived the inner city experience. The women for their part recall the neighbors and dwell on the ethnic distinctiveness of life in a closely knit subculture.

It is important to note that the romanticism is limited to recollections of the past. The don't live there anymore and wouldn't. The old neighborhood isn't the same, by which is meant it is worse than it was. It has been taken over by some other ethnic group which has made the old streets alien territory. In Chicago, certain suburban expatriates cannot understand how a

few old Jews still hang on to their apartments in the Jane Addams Project, surrounded as they are by a sea of black.

There is also some contemporary native romanticism about life in the inner city. Some young people return to claim and renew pockets of the blight. Once stylish and still substantial old houses are done over inside in a striking decor while the external facade is conserved or restored; except that the door is painted modern to advertise that inside something has been done. Or young people will occupy luxury high rises so constructed and so manned at the doors that they constitute walled castles. The attraction of the locale and the source of the new romanticism are the exciting cultural possibilities nearby--the theaters, concert halls, galleries, restaurants, coffee houses and nightclubs just minutes away. And it's marvelous not having daily to buck the traffic inching in from the suburbs to offices and stores downtown.

These new romantics remain a young crowd. For as their first child grows beyond toddling, then they have to solve problems of playspace and playmates, and of schools. So they too take their families finally to the suburbs, begin to reminisce how convenient and pleasant it was downtown and imagine that they might return there when their last child goes off to college.

Of course, some people live in the inner city because they must. And we find little romanticism among them. Most of them want out. The challenge to reformers is to make their necessity their preference, to make the neighborhoods in which they must live the neighborhoods in which they might choose to live. It is no small challenge, for we are talking now about delapidated housing, limited public facilities, and neglected schools. Clearly, CYDP could not realistically hope significantly to alter this environment.

But it was hoped that a program of community organization might light a light at the end of the tunnel. If people could get to know and trust and appreciate their neighbors, that in itself might add to the attraction of the neighborhood. If, in addition, neighborhood ties could be seen as a step toward doing something about the repelling conditions of life, then perhaps more of the residents might become encouraged to stake a claim to the neighborhood as theirs, to commit themselves to making it and their lives there better.

When the Project began, most of the women's feelings about their neighborhoods were less than favorable, and this was more true of the black than

the white women (see Table 4:12). Nor did the Project improve the attitudes of the women in the target areas. Indeed, the Project seemed to have the opposite effect, for the black women in the target areas, who as a group became most involved in community organization during the Project years, also remained most dissatisfied with their neighborhoods. The data in Table 4:11 demonstrate that more residents in the control areas regarded their neighborhoods more favorably in 1965 than they had in 1963, and fewer white residents

Table 4:12
Women's Attitudes toward Their Neighborhoods
by Race, Area and Time Period

	White				Black			
	Experimental		Control		Experimental		Control	
	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965
Favorable	52%	48	47	59	42	37	33	50
Neutral	19	36	13	16	28	29	19	16
Unfavorable	25	16	37	25	31	34	46	34
?	3	--	2	--	--	--	3	1
Total	99	100	99	100	101	100	101	101
(N)	(73)	(31)	(62)	(32)	(82)	(62)	(79)	(97)

of the Oldtown target area viewed their neighborhoods unfavorably. Apparently the growing attention paid to inner city areas during these years, and, among the blacks, the accelerating civil rights movement, had a general brightening effect on their outlook. But the black women in the Henry Horner area remained unimpressed. Just as earlier data showed them to be less satisfied with the work of community agencies, so these suggest that their growing involvement with community action groups made these women more critical of the conditions of their lives.

The increasing proportion of dissatisfied black women is also reflected in data on their eagerness to get out. We asked all the sample of adult women, "If you had a chance to live elsewhere, would you most likely move or would you stay here?" The greatest change from 1963 to 1965 is in the pro-

portion who would move among the black women in the target areas (see Table 4:13). But this increase among them is not reliably different from the smaller increase in the proportion of their controls who also say they would

Table 4:13

Women Reporting that They Would Move from Their Neighborhoods
If They Had The Chance by Race, Area and Time Period

	White				Black			
	Experimental		Control		Experimental		Control	
	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965
Percent who would move	58	42	61	69	63	77	76	79
(N)	(72)	(31)	(62)	(32)	(82)	(62)	(79)	(97)

move. The group of women who stand out as different in these data are the white women in the Oldtown target area, a significantly larger proportion of them saying they would stay. We suggest that the battle to keep the University of Illinois out was at least in part responsible for those who were not displaced digging in and meaning to stay. First, their rallying cry in the previous year or so had been that their neighborhood was worth preserving; and while they had not convinced the powers who made such decisions, some may have convinced themselves. Second, those whose houses were not cleared found themselves living in more favorable circumstances than they had perhaps foreseen; for the potential of the University had made their property values go up and had already begun to attract improved services and facilities to their vicinity.

The Project had not then had the effect of making adult residents happier about their neighborhoods or more committed to them. This is not to say that the Project's efforts to organize the residents had no effect. We have seen that more women, particularly blacks, did become involved and that their involvement was apparently related to their increased belief in the efficacy of grassroots community action. They also seemed to become more willing to take personal action in the instance of witnessing delinquent behavior. And their disaffection with service agencies coupled with greater dissatisfaction

with their neighborhoods may betoken, along with all the rest, a firmer, perhaps angrier resolve to do something for themselves.

At this writing, some seven years after the Project terminated, the Mile Square Federation is still an active organization. It has come to devote itself primarily to the health of the area residents, the problem around which it originally coalesced, and its impetus is now provided mostly by health professionals working out of a new medical center.

Perhaps some of the other effects of community organization which we have noted have, in these past few years, taken hold and spread more widely through the community (or perhaps they have since faded out). It may be that terminal measurement for effects so soon after the Project began was too soon to capture the developing impact of a frustratingly slow process which needs a critical mass before it really starts to move. But, of course, this can always be said in the face of smaller gains than one would have liked, and CYDP had been at the job of community organization for more than four years.

It is significant for the central purposes of the Project that the conditions of life for children and youth were major factors in shaping residents' feelings about their neighborhoods. We have seen that members of the Mile Square Federation were early swept up in a movement concerned with their children's schools. And we have noted that the behavior of teenagers was among the foremost problems cited by women discussing their neighborhoods. An additional item of data: When they were asked why they would move from their neighborhoods if given a chance, or stay if that was their intention, almost every woman we interviewed with but four exceptions mentioned children in one way or another. Reasons pertaining to their own children or other people's children made them want to move or stay. But there is no indication in our data that community organization efforts reached this concern. That is, women in the target areas did not believe the problem of delinquency was being ameliorated, that schools had got better, or that children's recreation was better provided for. This indicates that CYDP's work directly with youth and the institutions which served them was not so effective that parents and neighbors noticed any change. Material in the next chapter will demonstrate how accurate their perceptions were.

CHAPTER 5

Extension Work with Boys

Direct work with boys was the cutting edge of the Project. All the internal accommodations of the Chicago Boys Clubs organization to the Project and even all the efforts with adult groups and community institutions and agencies were in support of the personal contacts of workers with boys. Whatever effects the effort would hopefully achieve were to be achieved ultimately in the relationships professional Boys Club Extension Workers could establish with the boys in the target areas.

We have seen that CYDP proceeded on several related theories about the effective ingredients of these relationships between workers and boys. One theory emphasized the emotional attachment of a boy to his worker, the idea being that a boy begins to behave better because his worker whom he likes wants him to. Ideally the worker, after a time, does not even have to ask for good behavior openly because the boy begins to model his own behavior after the example of the professional adult. Thus, extension workers function as parent-surrogates, encouraging interpersonal bonds similar to parent-child relations and using them to repair or advance the socialization ordinarily successfully completed by parents themselves.

According to a second theory, the extension worker bridges the gap between disadvantaged boys and the institutions of their society. The emphasis here is not so much on the emotional relationship between worker and boy but rather on the instrumental relationship between a boy on the one hand and, on the other, the school system, the job market, the social agencies, the political structures, the police, and so on. The worker helps the boy use these institutions, making up for the boy's lack of personal knowledge and skills, for the social disadvantages of his poverty and of his ethnic and racial background, and for the inability of the boy's own friends and relatives to ease his way in the world. (At the same time,

Community Resource Coordinators work with the various institutions, trying to get them to change their criteria for selection, rejection, promotion, and so forth, so that they will be more accepting of such a boy. More of this in Chapter 6.) Better behavior on the boy's part is here conceived as a consequence of his better integration into social institutions--his ability to stay in school and perform at least adequately there; his ability to get and keep a job; the opportunities to find recreation; to stay out of trouble; etc. The extension worker is the essential catalyst; the boy's positive relationships to social institutions are the actual agents of change.

A third theory attributes a more central role to the worker in the process described by the second. Its emphasis is on the reciprocal obligations which develop when the worker intercedes for the boy in his community. Positive change in the boy's behavior is here conceived as a consequence of the worker's influence, which has been established by his efforts on the boy's behalf. For example, having managed to get the boy a job, the worker may then legitimately, from the boy's point of view, insist that the boy behave himself, not only on the job, but more generally as well. The boy behaves in recognition of the worker's help and perhaps in anticipation of future help if he behaves himself.

Finally, a fourth theory has the worker mainly programming diversionary activities, robbing time which might otherwise be spent at unconstructive and illegal pastimes. He beats the devil to idle hands, and he substitutes constructive activities, like recreation, counseling, or instruction.

In fact, CROP extension workers performed their jobs in ways dictated by all four of these theories. This was the case in part because many of the things workers did might fit several of the theories at the same time. Taking a boy camping along with his friends, for example, may simultaneously deepen his emotional attachment to the worker; obligate the boy to him; remove him effectively from opportunities to be delinquent for a whole weekend; and permit him access to the recreational facilities of an agency which, on account of the boy's history of misbehavior, ordinarily would not allow him at their camp. Differences in the theoretical commitments, skills, and personalities of the worker also contributed to the eclecticism of the Project, as did the eclectic approach of the Project directorate.

A Week in the Life of an Extension Worker

One good way to demonstrate the actual program which the extension workers carried to boys is to present an excerpt from the 1200 logs they filed on their daily activities. Here is the report of one worker covering the period from December 6 to 11, 1965.

This worker is 23 years old. He had been on the job for nine months. He was attached to the Oldtown Boys Club and worked mostly in the area close to the club. The population there was roughly half Italian, a quarter black, and the rest mostly Mexican and Puerto Rican. This worker was white, but most of the boys he contacted regularly were black or Mexican. This week of work is fairly representative of his round of activities.

The logs have been edited only to respect the confidentiality of the workers' contacts. Only addresses and the names of groups and of individuals have been changed.

MONDAY, December 6, 1965¹

1:30 p.m. I arrived at OBC [Oldtown Chicago Boys Club]. George Wilson (15) [Figures in parentheses give boys' ages], and J. T. Carter (14) were standing in front of OBC. Both said they were dismissed early from school, but Carter has been truant from Montefiore [the Board of Education's disciplinary or "adjustment" school] several days in the last two weeks.

2:30 p.m. Rich Warfield, CRC [the CYDP community organizer in the OBC area], and I patrolled the Jackson School area. No youths were loitering in Sheridan Park as was the case last week. There were no incidents. (There had been some trouble near this public school and public park, recently.)

3:00 p.m. We returned to OBC. Tommy "Bug" Rodriguez (15) was standing in front of OBC. In response to my question, he said he didn't go to school today. With concern, I advised that he go if he doesn't want to end up in Parental School [the Board of Education's residential disciplinary school] or Montefiore.

3:30 p.m. I called the Halsted Progress Center and they informed me that they are still processing the applications for employment or other help for Carl (17) and Mark (15) Perkins. I then called Allan Booker (17), who said he is still interested in putting on a play. He told me that about three of the "Town Apostles" (15-19) are now working at Memorial Hospital nights. I talked to him about the apprenticeship programs Pat Minturn (of Pantex Paper Co.) spoke to me about and he is interested.

¹Reprinted from Carney, Mattick, and Calloway (1969:146-156).

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Melvin Harris (21) came to OBC and asked if by any chance I had a possible job for him. He had been working at Arcune's but was released as the result of an intense argument with another employee. I called Dave Rice (Illinois State Employment Services-Counselor) and made an appointment with him for Melvin Harris tomorrow morning.

4:00 p.m. John Ford (15) came to OBC looking for T. Rodriguez (15). I told him that I was very concerned about T. Rodriguez's recent truancy: "If you have a chance, hit on him about school --I don't want to see him screw himself up simply because he doesn't feel like going."

4:30 p.m. I called Pat Minturn (Pantex Paper Co.) who has three apprenticeship programs, to find out if he will hire youth who have records. At present, he is also getting referrals from IYC [the Illinois Youth Commission] and is especially interested in drop-outs. The three programs: (1) machine adjuster, (2) die cutter, and (3) printer, are approved by the U.S. Dept. of Labor.

5:00 p.m. I attended the OBC Program Staff meeting for the purpose of planning OBC Xmas activities. CYDP-OBC staff will be responsible with Burnett Murrell (OBC Staff) having the main responsibility for a teen dance on Thursday, December 23.

6:00 p.m. I drove eight boys (11-14) to the Duncan YMCA for swimming.

6:30 p.m. I went home. I was due some compensatory time off.

TUESDAY, December 7, 1965

1:30 p.m. I arrived at OBC.

2:00 p.m. Ira Wilson, EW, [the other CYDP street club worker in the OBC area] and I drove to the HHBC-OP [Henry Horner Chicago Boys Club Outpost]. All the CYDP staff met with Prof. David Goldman from Boston University, School of Social Work regarding some research he is doing. We discussed such matters as youth work and potential riot situations, our reactions to the Anti-Poverty Program, and recommendations we would make regarding education and other services for so-called hard-to-reach youth.

5:00 p.m. We returned to OBC. Penny Kelsey [an OBC staff member in charge of the Guidance in Education and Employment Project] told me that Mr. Sheldon "Spike" Sedor (former OBC Board Member) is looking for a shipping clerk to work in the Merchandise Mart. I told her about Melvin Harris (21) who had asked me about a job yesterday. I had referred him to Dave Rice (ISES) today. When I called Harris, he told me he had received two job offers today but is interested in learning more about the shipping clerk position. He will come to OBC this evening to talk to P. Kelsey GEEP. I then called Fred Martin's (17) mother to ask if she knew when her son was to be in court for allegedly stealing a tape recorder from the HPC (Halsted Progress Center).

She hadn't received any notification. I suggested that she encourage her son to go to HPC tomorrow and talk to Orin Selvin [former Asst. Dir. of OBC and now on the staff of the HPC]. Martin is on the NYC [Neighborhood Youth Corps] payroll at the HPC.

6:00 p.m. Jimmy McMullan (17) came to OBC and, with some embarrassment, told me that his wife told him that he hasn't "satisfied" her sexually. He said that both of them were virgins at the time of meeting each other. He was very concerned and is considering seeing a doctor, believing that he might be impotent. We then talked about various aspects of sexual intercourse and it became apparent that he was unaware of pertinent facts.

7:30 p.m. I left the area for home. I was due some compensatory time off.

COMMENT: It was gratifying to me that McMullan felt free to share such a personal concern with me. I have spent considerable time with him, possibly too much time to be devoted to one youth, but I am reminded of the Stake-Animal concept. Some effeminate characteristics in him were evident to me during the first few months of our relationship which I felt was due to a tremendously possessive mother and the absence of a father or other respected male figure in his home.

McMullan is an influential member of an unnamed group of approximately six boys (15-18) most of whom have records of police adjustments. At least two are highly respected for their street fighting ability and one is frequently truant and has been involved in more serious delinquent behavior, at times with other members of this group. Not long after I met McMullan and other members of this group, one of them, Isaac "Gene" Jackson (16), expressed the concern that he was afraid McMullan would become a "fag."

WEDNESDAY, December 8, 1965

1:00 p.m. I arrived at OBC.

1:30 p.m. Melvin Harris (21) called to tell me he is going to the Merchandise Mart to apply for the shipping clerk job made available by Mr. Sheldon "Spike" Sentor (former OBC board member).

2:00 p.m. I drove to the American Friends Service Committee Project House, 35XX W. Jackson Blvd.

2:30 p.m. I made some home visits on police referrals: No one was home at the Rizzo residence, 15XX W. Polk St. At the home of Felix Gonzalez (14), 14XX W. Fillmore St., I talked to Mrs. Gonzalez and Pete Gonzalez (16). F. Gonzalez has been chronically truant all year. At 14XX W. Fillmore St., I talked to Mr. and Mrs. Ramos about their son, David (4) who was the victim of a sexual advance by Jack "Loco" Sanchez (16) who, apparently, has a previous record of sex offenses. The parents are interested in the OBC program and plan to send

their four oldest sons (8-12) to OBC for membership. Mr. Ramos may prove to be an effective volunteer for such activities as weekend camping trips.

4:30 p.m. I returned to OBC. Paul Matovinovich (an OBC staff member who tutors in the GEEP project) told me that Jesse Rivera (14), who has been going through an acting-out period, will be at OBC this evening for a meeting regarding a scholarship for which he and two other "Spanish Squires" (14-16) are being considered. Duane Early, AD, [the CYDP community organization supervisor] and the OBC-CYDP staff informally discussed the situation at Crane High School and the activities of the RIO (Riis School Improvement Organization) and MSF (Mile Square Federation).

5:30 p.m. I wrote yesterday's Daily Activity Report.

6:00 p.m. I called Mrs. Booker and asked her to tell Allan Booker (17) to be at OBC at 3:00 p.m. tomorrow. Pantex Paper Co. will consider him for one of their apprentice programs at 35XX Kimball Ave. When I called Mrs. Martin, she informed me that she still has received no word concerning her son's court date (Fred Martin, 17), who allegedly stole a tape recorder from the HPC. I then called Maxwell and Monroe Police Stations, but was unable to learn anything. I again called Mrs. Martin to tell her son that Orin Selvin (HPC) will be expecting him at 10:00 a.m. tomorrow morning. I told her that O. Selvin and I had discussed the possibility of getting F. Martin back into the Job Corps. He had been at a Job Corps Center in Texas for about 6 months, but was released because of excessive AWOL's (absences without leave).

7:00 p.m. I completed yesterday's Daily Activity Report.

8:00 p.m. Ira Wilson, EW, and I drove to Duncan-Maxwell YMCA to talk to the "Jive Town" boys who hang out there concerning the tension at Jackson Branch of Crane High School. We talked to two separate groups of 15 boys each (13-17). I. Wilson did most of the talking, emphasizing that a "race riot" certainly solves no problems and referring to Dr. Martin L. King's efforts through non-violence. Since they continued to sound belligerent, Wilson cautioned them, if need be, rely on "your God-given hands," not weapons. One of the fellows told us that some of the "East End Boys" (13-17) "hang" at a candy store on Morgan near the Maxwell Police Station. After talking briefly to Mr. Carlin (the Executive Secretary of that YMCA), we drove to the candy store. About 13 to 15 boys were there, including 6 "East End Boys" and one Mexican named George (16, last name not known) who is allegedly a leader of the "Jive Town" group. We talked to them about the same problem.

9:45 p.m. I. Wilson and I drove to HHBC-OP to meet 3 representatives of Boys Clubs of America in New York who are visiting Chicago specifically to learn more of CYDP. Fred Lickerman

[Ass't. Executive Director of CBC], Frank Carney, AD, [the CYDP street club work Supervisor] and John Ray [Outpost Supervisor] were also present. We discussed the project at length.

11:00 p.m. Left for home.

COMMENT: I wrote a letter to Mr. Chambley (Director of CBC Camps) today confirming camping dates for next April 1-3 (Friday through Sunday) and April 29-May 1 (Friday through Sunday). I sent Mr. Kendall [OBC Director] a carbon copy.

THURSDAY, December 9, 1965

11:00 a.m. I arrived at OBC and talked to the CYDP secretary about the typing of my reports. I then wrote yesterday's Daily Activity Report.

1:00 p.m. I called Pat Minturn (Pantex Paper Co.) to confirm my meeting with him at 3:30 p.m. I am taking Allan Booker (17) there to apply for one of the apprenticeship programs and for a tour of the facilities.

1:30 p.m. Janie Banks (21) told me that a "friend of hers" has been contacted by a North side man to push marijuana in this area.

3:00 p.m. I picked up A. Booker and drove to 35XX N. Kimball Ave., Pantex Paper Co. While he filled out an application form, P. Minturn took me on a tour of the factory. P. Minturn then gave A. Booker the Wunderlick test and another test unknown to me. He scored 9 on the first, not good enough to be considered for the machine adjuster program. P. Minturn hadn't scored the other test before we left. I was favorably impressed by the plant and their apprentice program (die-cutting, machine adjuster, and printing). A. Booker will be contacted later regarding Pantex's decision.

6:00 p.m. I drove A. Booker home and returned to OBC.

6:30 p.m. Jimmy McMullan (17) came to OBC and asked me to return the .32 automatic he gave me "to hold" on 11/15/65; he plans to sell it to a friend. Because a gun spells nothing but trouble, I told him I wouldn't return it. He accepted my decision. Marcia McMullan (17) came to OBC to talk to me about her husband, J. McMullan. She is very unhappy--"I don't feel married." Apparently J. McMullan very seldom talks or spends an evening with her. Because she has so much time on her hands to brood--she is neither in school or working--I encouraged her to become involved in some activities for her own sake; she mentioned the West Side Organization and I also suggested the Riis School Improvement Organization. She took about an hour getting all her concerns in the open. We discussed extensively the problems of married living, especially for young people.

8:00 p.m. I talked briefly to Melvin Harris (21) who is now working for Spike Sentor (former OBC Board member) at the Merchandise Mart. He is working in an experimental lab and enjoys the work.

8:30 p.m. Jim Morcheles [former CYDP-CRC] came to OBC. We discussed "old times."

9:00 p.m. I went to the Perkins' residence, 8XX S. Lytle St., and talked to Mrs. Perkins and Mark Perkins (15). Neither M. Perkins nor Carl Perkins (17) have been going to school; C. Perkins was barred earlier this week for excessive absences and M. Perkins hasn't been going "because I'm failing everything anyway." I told him that just sitting in class was more useful than going to Parental School, which could happen because of his age. He reluctantly agreed to "give it a try."

9:30 p.m. I drove 3 "Spanish Squires" (14-16) home.

10:00 p.m. I left for home.

FRIDAY, December 10, 1965

1:30 p.m. I arrived at OBC and called Pat Minturn (Pantex Paper Co.) regarding Allan Booker (17). He said that he wouldn't be able to make a decision regarding his being hired until the middle of next week.

2:30 p.m. Rich Warfield, CRC, and I patrolled the Jackson School area. There were three or four squad cars in the area. On Polk Street near May, I talked to a member of the "Spanish Squires" (14-16) who asked if the club could have regular meetings again. He reported that they have new members. When I asked, he said they are not from the area. I told him that I'm in favor of having meetings for the fellows in the area, that others are "Welcome" to attend, but they must provide their own transportation. He smiled and said, "I thought that's what you would say!" \

3:00 p.m. We returned to OBC and I drafted a letter to a friend of mine, Lenny Welburn, assistant pastor of a Lutheran Church in Rockford, Ill., who wrote to ask me if I would be willing to speak to the church's youth group about street work and delinquent youth in February. Carl Grane and Edwin Weld (Illinois State Employment Services-Counselors), who are from the Halsted Progress Center, came to OBC to introduce themselves and their program to Ira Wilson, EW, and I. They are interested in getting in touch with local youth. We said we would help them.

3:30 p.m. Two "Town Apostles" (15-19) came to OBC. They are still interested in putting on a play. We discussed the possibility of meeting on Saturdays.

4:00 p.m. I called Bob Hodgkins (connected with Hull House Theater) to confirm 8 complimentary passes to the City Player's performance of "Becket" at 6XX W. Wellington.

5:00 p.m. Jimmy McMullan (17) stopped briefly at OBC to tell me that he and his wife, Marcia (17) had a "good discussion" last evening. They have been having marital difficulties, difficulty communicating.

5:30 p.m. Allan Booker (17) called me; I informed him of my conversation with P. Minturn earlier.

6:00 p.m. Edgar "Sonny" Washington (17) and Albert Hamilton (17) came to OBC. E. Washington is on the OBC-Neighborhood Youth Corps payroll, but hasn't reported for work in about a week; he has the impression that Walter Kendall [OBC Director] will not allow him to continue working here at OBC because Kendall referred him to another job prospect. I told him I would talk to Kendall. When I asked why his brother, Buddy (15), hasn't been going to school, he said he didn't know, but that the truant officer from Jackson School is threatening to send him to Parental School or Montefiore.

6:30 p.m. I patrolled the area on foot. On Harrison Street I stopped at 12XX W., the former residence of the Wilson brothers, Oscar (16) and Oliver (16). The building is now abandoned as are most buildings on the north side of Harrison St. At Polk Street and Laflin I talked to 6 "Naturals" (15-17). I was surprised to see Jose "Poppy" Garcia (17) who had been in the Job Corps in New Jersey. He said he got tired of it and withdrew through proper procedures: "The streets is where it is, man." He says he intends to return to night school. About three of the fellows were already high on glue and alcohol. After telling them I would stop by later in the evening, I stopped at Wesley's (Ada and Taylor Streets) and talked to Dan Young (16). Two "Naturals" were also there--plus three younger "East End Boys" (13-17). Kris Nieves (14) came in later and asked if there was any possibility of visiting Joe Adams (17) who is at the Job Corps Center, Battle Creek, Michigan. I told her I would find out what the rules are concerning visitation.

7:30 p.m. I returned to OBC.

8:00 p.m. One of the boys (16) from the neighborhood rushed into OBC and reported that "Wesley is beating up Harry Banks (17)." Gary Calabrese (a Chicago Policeman by day and part-time OBC staff member at night) and I drove in his car to Wesley's Vienna Hot Dog Stand (Ada and Taylor Streets). Approximately six boys (15-17) were standing in front of the place. Just as we asked if they knew where Banks was, one of them calmly said, "There he is, now." As we turned, he (Banks) stopped in the middle of Taylor St. and threw a brick at one of the huge windows in Wesley's. It hit above the window and fell just behind us. Before he could throw another, G. Calabrese and I got to him. He did not fight back and finally dropped the

other bricks he had in his hands. As we led him to the car, he was on the verge of tears, seething with anger. He kept repeating, "I got to get him back--he beat me, he beat me." On several occasions, we had to block his path to prevent his impulse to break away. He finally, but reluctantly, got into the car, but asked several times, "Why are we going to the Boys Club?" G. Calabrese did most of the talking in the car. When we got to OBC, Banks had calmed down considerably, but was still intent on "getting back at Wesley." I presented the obvious alternatives, to go ahead and break out his windows, which would only hurt him; to forget it, which at the time was out of the question; or to use a "weapon" which is the right of a youth as well as an adult, namely the law. He decided he wanted to file a complaint. I called the police for him and was told that a car was already dispatched to Wesley's. After a second call to the same number, four policemen arrived at OBC. Unfortunately, the rule rather than the exception prevailed. The police succeeded in doing little but to increase Banks' anger. When he related that Wesley hit him first, one of the officers responded, "Don't give me that bullshit!" The senior officer softened somewhat and reminded Banks that it was his right to file a complaint if he so desired Monday (12/13/65) morning. When I. Wilson, EW, came in, he took Banks aside. I joined them in a few moments. I. Wilson assured him that if he decided to press charges, that we supported him, but "if you want to get the man where it counts, hit him in the pockets--nobody buys hot dogs at Wesley's." Jerry and Janie Banks (21) were also at the OBC. I told Jerry Banks (18) that if H. Banks still wanted to file a complaint on Monday, to be at OBC Monday morning at about 8:00 a.m. with his mother and one or two witnesses to the incident.

8:45 p.m. Phyllis Samertino (OBC staff) told me her daughter Marie (15) had just called to tell her that the "Jive Town" boys had already learned of the incident and were waiting for "the word to turn out Wesley's." She told her daughter about the boycott and to "cool it." H. Banks then left for home.

9:30 p.m. I patrolled the area. It was raining steadily which gave me cause to be alarmed about a group of about 15 Mexican youths standing on the sidewalk near 13XX W. Taylor St. After parking the car, I walked toward the gathering. From a distance I saw about four fellows pulling two others apart. Eight of those present were "Naturals" (15-17) and Gabe Lopez (16), a former "Barracuda" (15-17), James "Jungle Jim" Cruz (17), a former "Natural," some girls, and a couple of neighborhood kids (15-16). Six of the "Naturals" walked back toward Polk and Laflin Sts. as Tommy "Bug" Rodriguez (16) and Albert Hamilton stopped to talk to G. Lopez and J. Cruz. Rafael Ramirez (16), who was drunk, had walked up to J. Cruz, flipped his neck tie and slugged him in the mouth. Both T. Rodriguez and A. Hamilton asked the two to forget the incident, that R. Ramirez was blaming J. Cruz "for what happened to Joe Adams" (17). (About two months ago G. Lopez had beaten up Adams. Now Lopez blew his top: "It was me who kicked his ass--why doesn't he come after me!") I was afraid a fight would ensue because G. Lopez' remarks were very provoking, but both "Naturals" remained "cool" and

left. J. Cruz continued to rant-and-rage: "You don't think I can do it; I can bring colored, spics, Italians, from Marsh--all and Crane High Schools, all over--not by dozens, hundreds, but thousands, millions, and burn up this fucking neighborhood--Next time I walk the streets, I'll have my uncle's gun, man!" Both began to cool down somewhat as I told them I'm sure they had the good sense not to mess themselves up by "dirtying your hands with fellows who still think it's big to stand on a corner drinking from a bottle." Mr. and Mrs. Lopez, Susan (18) and Dicky (14) Lopez were standing in the doorway, Mr. Lopez holding onto their German Shepherd.

10:30 p.m. I continued to patrol the area. I saw T. Rodriguez (16) and A. Hamilton with their girlfriends going east on Taylor Street near Throop. T. Rodriguez said he talked to R. Ramirez who "will forget the whole thing."

11:00 p.m. I left the area.

SATURDAY, December 11, 1965

8:00 a.m. I arrived at OBC to transport 3 "Spanish Squires" (14-16) to 71XX S. Coles St. to take a competitive examination for scholarships at an eastern prep school. Jesse Rivera (14) was the only one who didn't show up.

9:30 a.m. I left the area after checking Wesley's (Ada and Taylor Streets), the location of an incident involving Wesley and Harry Banks (17) last evening. Since 11:00 p.m. last evening and 9:30 a.m. today, one of the windows was broken.

7:00 p.m. I returned to the area and patrolled, just in case. There was nothing unusual going on.

8:00 p.m. My date and I picked up Earl Young (18, CYDP Program Aide), his date, Jimmy McMullan (17) and his wife, Marcia (17), and drove to 6XX W. Wellington St. to attend the production of "Becket" for which I had complimentary passes.

11:30 p.m. I drove everyone home and then patrolled the area. At Throop and Taylor Sts. I talked to Harry Banks (17) and four friends (16-18).

12:00 M. As I was leaving the area, I noticed that the Moreno family, 13XX W. Taylor St. was in the process of moving.

COMMENT: I wrote a letter to the Custer Job Corps Training Center at Battle Creek, Michigan today, in an attempt to arrange a visit to Joe Adams (17) by six of his friends. I am afraid that if he is not given some moral support of dissuasion he might go AWOL and return to "the streets."

Another way to appreciate the kind of service Extension Workers brought to boys is to follow one relationship from its moment of initial contact to its dissolution a few years later. This is not a typical case,

if there is really any such thing at all. The worker's involvement with this boy lasted longer and developed to an intensity characteristic of only a dozen or so of the individuals whom CYDP workers engaged. We choose to present it here just because it demonstrates the lengths to which workers were ready to go to alter the course of a boy's life and because this narrative describes, integrated in one relationship, a wide range of specific services workers gave to boys.

Frank Cooper and Carl Houts

MONDAY, August 14, 1961

8:30 p.m. Walked over to the area of Madison and Ashland. I saw a group of boys sitting in the hallway at 8XX W. Ogden. I stopped for a match and when asked a square, I passed out 3 or 4. I sat in the corner grill for about a half hour and when I came out, I noticed they were still sitting in the hallway. These boys are 15 or 16 years old. I suspect their activities are varied. I'll check back soon.

The two older boys were Carl and Gregory, age 15. The younger boys must have told them I was from the Boys Club. I asked if they had ever been to Horner Club and their feelings are the same as the 13-year-olds--"black mother fuckers" and "coons" were expressed. They all have a fear of the Negro and have no desire to enter Negro neighborhoods. I don't think they realize they are living in the center of one of the largest Negro areas in the city--they look upon their street (Marshfield) as being separate. The older boys were dressed in black pants and T-shirts. One boy, Carl, had a duck-tail hair cut. This same boy said he was a Jr. Leader at the Duncan YMCA; also he said he doesn't go there any more. I only stayed a few minutes and told them I'd see them around when I left.

TUESDAY, October 10, 1961

8:30 p.m. Met the Marshfield group on Ashland and Jackson. As they don't have school Thursday, they wanted to plan an activity for Wednesday night. They all agreed to go to a drive-in movie. When I asked if everybody had money, they said, "Yes." We agreed to leave between 5:30 and 6 p.m. When I reminded them I had to work at the Club until 6 p.m., Carl and Greg said they would bring the fellows over to the Club about 5:45. They have both assumed a rather "sure" attitude about coming into the area. The other fellows were not so keen about coming to the Club. However, they appeared convinced that Carl and Greg knew what they were talking about. We left it that they would meet me at the Club at 5:45 p.m.

MONDAY, October 16, 1961

4:30 p.m. Ray Harry, Warren Sattler, and Duane Early and I drove over to the outpost to observe to what extent the work had progressed. Before leaving for the outpost, four of the Marshfield group came by the Club to see me. Their enthusiasm for their social club is good to see. They informed me that they

have gotten three more potential members. I believe the important fact is that they now feel free to come to the Boys Club on their own initiative. Now that the Marshfield group is on a regular schedule of two days a week, I shall begin making regular street contacts. Ray Harry drove with me around the area.

9:00 p.m. I drove up to Lincoln Club and made the arrangements for the Marshfield group to swim on Tuesday nights. This will leave Friday night open for them to decide what they would like to do.

TUESDAY, October 17, 1961

4:00 p.m. Warren Sattler and I went over to the new projects. Warren is planning future basketball activities in this area. We took a ball with us, and in a matter of a few minutes we had at least 30 or 35 fellows standing around and playing.

5:30 p.m. The Marshfield group met me at the Club. I told them we could go swimming at Lincoln Club at 7 p.m. They remained in the Games Room until 7 p.m. We drove around to their homes and picked up their suits. We arrived at Lincoln a few minutes early and had to wait outside. There was a large group of boys outside and they got on my boys right away. Fortunately, I knew most of them and I set them straight. In the pool the group hesitated before going in; however, after I went in they followed. Carl told me on the way home that this was the first time he had ever went swimming with Negroes. We stopped by the Lantern for cokes and were home by 9:30 p.m.

FRIDAY, October 20, 1961

6:30 p.m. The Marshfield group came to the Club for a meeting. There were five fellows present. They each paid 25¢ dues and decided they would call themselves the "Notables." We had an election; Carl Houts, President, 15; Eddie Oszeda, Vice-President, 14; Johnny Ball, Treasurer, 15; I was quite surprised in the manner Carl quickly asserted himself. He called the meeting to order and proclaimed that "anyone who wishes to speak must first be recognized by the President." Motions were presented as to what we would do this evening and it was decided to visit the Adler Planetarium and then pick up several pizzas and watch "Rebel Without a Cause" on TV. I had previously offered my apartment to watch this movie.

7:00 p.m. We left the Club for the Planetarium and arrived in time to see the show. I believe the fellows became bored with it towards the end as they became restless and moved about a good bit. From there we picked up two large pizzas and drove to my apartment to watch the movie. I had loaned Greg Ball and Terry Gadel a dollar apiece for the pizzas. While we were waiting for them, the fellows purchased name tags in a drugstore and also one for me. They wore them on their jackets. The movie, "Rebel Without a Cause," is concerned with juvenile delinquency and the boys became quite excited through-out the movie.

12:00 p.m. We left my house and a rather curious thing happen-

ed, as I drove Eddie home. When we turned off Van Buren onto Honore, we noticed a couple parked in a sports car on the side of the street. As our lights flashed across the car, both occupants sat upright. Someone shouted "look there." Carl then said, "Let's get the guy" and John, I believe, said "and the girl." Eddie, who was sitting in the front seat, started to open the door. The entire incident was spontaneous and I can perhaps attribute it partly to the movie we watched. I know this type of behavior is not indicative of the group's normal pattern of behavior, yet, I am sure that any couple parked in our area would be fair game. Therefore, it is perhaps indicative of the neighborhood and being so would indirectly affect these boys. After I had driven around the block, they became extremely quiet. I drove to the Club and left the station wagon keys. I took the group home in my car and by this time they had resumed their normal manner. In fact, they were over-talkative and joked about the incident.

TUESDAY, October 24, 1961

6:00 p.m. The Notables came to the Club for a short meeting and swimming at Lincoln Club. The only incident of note was concerned with Terry Gadel, age 12, born in Shiefeld, Alabama. His family moved to Chicago three years ago. After we had showered and entered the pool area, he saw there were Negroes swimming. I watched him closely and noticed his surprise. He then turned to me and said, "I can't go swimming, I've got a stomachache." He needed an excuse and the stomachache was it. He sat on a bench against the wall for the swim period. The rest of the fellows chided Terry, accusing him of being "chicken" to swim. I don't believe they sensed the real reason. We stopped for hot dogs afterwards and during our conversation, I brought up the fact that if we continue to use the Club's facilities they should take out membership in the Club. They agreed and realized it is a responsibility they should fulfill. I don't believe I was pushing in that respect, only introducing the idea. they in turn picked up on it. I suggested they stop by the Club tomorrow and obtain the questionnaire forms. They agreed and a meeting for this was set at 4 p.m., Wednesday.

TUESDAY, October 31, 1961

5:30 p.m. The Notables came to the Club. They played pool and table tennis until 6 p.m. Terry Gadel did not come--he was the boy who would not swim when he saw that the pool was integrated. We held a brief meeting at 6 p.m. and decided that Friday we would go to the Bazaar at First Church. Carl and Greg obtained Club cards.

Before going to Lincoln Club, we stopped and bought a pizza. When we arrived at the Club, we discovered that there was no swimming due to it being Halloween. We remained at the Club until 8:30 p.m. playing pool. We then drove back to Horner. While we were in the Games Room, I felt they panicked. At first they moved about freely, but after 15 or 20 minutes they hunched together behind me. Carl and Greg asked if they couldn't wait in the car--the others asked if we couldn't leave. Perhaps this feeling grew out of the fact that there were many new older fellows in the Club and the Club itself was crowded. We

left and had cokes at the "Lantern." I drove them home about 10:15 p.m.

WEDNESDAY, November 1, 1961

8:30 p.m. About 8:30 p.m., I met the Notables on Marshfield. They informed me that they had made arrangements to take girls along Friday night. I asked that they come to the Club Thursday at 5 p.m. and we would talk about it. They agreed.

THURSDAY, November 2, 1961

5:00 p.m. At 5 p.m., the Notables came to the Club. They remained in the Games Room until 6 p.m. Two of the fellows purchased Club cards. At 6 p.m., we began our meeting. The topic was tomorrow's activity and if they were able to get dates. At the beginning of the meeting, I reminded them that I had requested that earlier, any plans we make with girls should be done at least one to two weeks in advance. Transportation, courtesy, well-laid plans give best results, were reasons I gave them. I then told them that I was not able to get the station wagon because of lack of notice. This sort of shook them, but they all agreed one of the carry-alls was fine. I asked them if they were sure the girls were able to go and they said, "Yes."

We drove downtown and had a bite to eat and walked around. We returned to Marshfield about 9:30 p.m. and talked on the corner until 10 p.m. I returned to the Club and finished my reports.

MONDAY, November 6, 1961

8:30 p.m. I met the Notables on Ashland. We had cokes at the Lantern. We broke up about 10:15 p.m.

TUESDAY, November 7, 1961

5:00 p.m. At 5 p.m., the Notables came to the Club. They wanted to have a meeting, so we went into one of the Club rooms. Carl told me they took a taxi to the Club. When I asked why, he said they had some trouble with several kids around Jackson and Honore. I suggested they take Ashland to Washington when coming to the Club. The topic of the meeting was Nov. 18th. They wanted to plan an all day picnic on this date (Saturday). They said they would inform the girls tomorrow and have their answer by Friday. They are now quite conscious of allowing the girls plenty of notice. We decided the girls would be responsible for the food, and we would re-imburse them for the amount of money they might spend. The place they wanted to go to is Starved Rock. There will be about 15 in the group.

6:30 p.m. At 6:30 p.m., we left for Lincoln Club. I did not swim with them as I spent this time with Jack Fillmore talking about the incident Saturday night. After swimming, we remained in the Lincoln Gym, until 9:30 p.m.

We went to the Lantern and had hamburgers and malts. They played the juke box and talked until 10:15 p.m. Their main concern now is whether or not the girls will make it for the picnic. I suggested that if there was any difficulty, I would be glad to speak with the girls' parents and confirm my being with them. They thought this was a good idea.

I dropped them at home about 10:30 p.m. Stopped by the Club on my way home.

THURSDAY, November 9, 1961

5:30 p.m. At 5:30 p.m., I met Carl and Eddie on Van Buren and Ashland. They were just coming from school. Carl asked if I could drive them downtown later because Saturday his brother is leaving and he wanted to buy a present for him. I told him I would try and make it around 7:30 p.m.

About 7:45 I picked up Carl and four other Notables and we drove downtown. Carl purchased a scarf at Carsons. We had cokes and drove back to Marshfield. Eddie and Greg had been arguing about who was the better bowler. I suggested they bowl a game. We went over to the alleys on Ashland and they bowled one game. Greg won but this did not satisfy Eddie and a re-match was set up for next week.

We sat around the bowling alley for about a half an hour talking about the 18th and what we would be doing on the picnic. I drove them home about 10:15 p.m.

FRIDAY, November 10, 1961

7:00 p.m. The Notables held their club meeting. Dues were collected, total now \$5.00. Discussion was held regarding the merits of spending money out of the treasury or from their pockets for the picnic on the 18th. It was decided that they would all chip in for the food and gas. I informed them that I would be responsible for the marshmallows as my share. It was agreed that we would go to O'Hare Field tonight and girls would be allowed to go swimming with us Tuesdays.

The trip to O'Hare was uneventful. We ate about 10:30 p.m. and left soon afterwards. On the way back we talked about increasing our membership. They said they have about 6 or 7 fellows in mind. I'm, however, rather doubtful if the group will increase too much for they are a closely knit group, and new members would have to come from out of the area.

SATURDAY, November 11, 1961

9:00 a.m. Picked up Notables.

11:00 a.m. Left for Lake Meadows.

2:00 p.m. Packers game.

5:00 p.m. Drove Notables home.

SATURDAY, November 18, 1961

The Notables outing to Starved Rock, Illinois. Five members with dates attended. My expenses for this trip were:

Marshmallows	\$.75
Punch	1.15
Gas	1.50
Snack on return to Chicago	<u>.50</u>
	\$3.90

The group paid 30¢ apiece for gas, purchased hot dogs and buns and a case of pop. I was pleased with the pains the group took to plan this trip. The lesson they learned earlier about proper planning was evident. The trip was enjoyed by everyone.

On our return I informed the group about the banquet at Oldtown next Tuesday. They agreed to attend, and I'll pick them up at 3:30 p.m. It is my intention to slowly weave this group into Oldtown's inside program.

TUESDAY, November 28, 1961

6:45 p.m. At 6:45 p.m. I picked up the Notables. I had decided earlier that I would have to sever my relationship with this group because of the amount of work to be done in the Oldtown area. The fellows did not want to go swimming at Lincoln Club and when I asked them if they would rather go to Horner or Oldtown Club, they chose Horner.

After we arrived at the club I put them in a clubroom for their meeting and I had a talk with Mr. Shaff. I explained to him my position and that it would be impossible for me to continue with this group on a full-time basis. I suggested we set up a dual sponsorship with Warren Sattler and myself, and as the group's allegiance grows to Warren, I will be able to see them less and less until Warren has their loyalties. I believe that my choice of Warren was a good one, and this was borne out by the fact that when I told them that there would have to be another sponsor, they suggested Sattler. Also as Alfie is friends with many of the Negro boys living around Horner Club, he will be there to introduce Warren to them.

Earlier Johnny told me that Carl was beaten up and robbed Friday night. Carl said it happened on Van Buren, right off Ashland Ave. He had several cuts on his face and he said he knew the fellows were from Crane School and had seen them around the area.

I drove the fellows home about 10:15 p.m. and returned to Oldtown Club.

TUESDAY, December 12, 1961

7:30 p.m. I drove to Henry Horner Club with Frank Carney and I met with the Notables. We discussed a possible trip to Palos Park sometime this month. The group decided to become a co-ed group in order to increase their membership. John Seltzer and Terry Gadel have stopped coming to the Club. Eddie

told me that it was because I am not in that area anymore, and they do not like walking through the Henry Horner area.

I left the group and talked with Mr. Carney and Mr. Warren Sattler, regarding the transferring of this group to Sattler. I returned to the group at 8:45 p.m. Carl made a remark that perhaps, if they started getting into trouble, I would come back to that area, but I set them straight on that issue. The group has planned several parties during Christmas and New Years. I plan to drop in on each one.

TUESDAY, December 26, 1961

6:00 p.m. At 6:00 p.m. Eddie Oszeda called me to find out if I were meeting the Notables tonight. I told him that I would meet the group at 7:00 p.m. on Ashland and Jackson. I finished my work at the Club at 6:30 p.m. and left.

I was with the Notables from 7:10 p.m. until 9:00 p.m. We drove downtown and had coffee and talked. The time spent with them was rather uneventful. We talked about Christmas and New Years parties they were planning. We collected club dues and I drove them home.

SATURDAY, December 30, 1961

The Notables held a party at the home of Greg Ball. I had previously called and made arrangements for the group to go to the Stadium in the evening. I had also called several of the Jr. Dukes and arranged to meet them in front of the Stadium at 5:30 p.m.

At 4:00 p.m. I stopped by Ball's house. I met several of the parents and six fellows and five girls that I did not know. We left the house at 5:30 p.m. and met the Jr. Dukes at the Stadium. The total number in the group was 15.

As it was a triple-header we did not get out until 1:00 a.m. I dropped the Notables on Ashland and Jackson and drove three of the girls home who lived outside of the area. I also dropped several of the Dukes off on Pulaski Road.

In general, the evening was uneventful. It was, however, interesting to observe the interaction between the Notables and the Jr. Dukes. The ethnic and cultural backgrounds of the groups are quite different. The Jr. Dukes, being Mexicans and the Notables, for the most part, Southern Caucasian. Also the fact that the Jr. Dukes are highly delinquent and the Notables non-delinquent only added to their basic differences. Verbally, there was little said between the groups.

MONDAY, January 8, 1962

From 4:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. I finished last week's reports at Oldtown Boys Club. I also called Eddie Oszeda, a member of the Notables, and told him that I would meet the group about 7:30 p.m. on Ashland and Jackson.

At 7:00 p.m. the Regalettes were waiting for me on Lytle and Taylor Streets. I drove them to Union Park and told them that Mr. Wilson would be picking them up at 9:00 p.m., as I had to be somewhere else. After leaving them I drove back and picked up Presto and Chimp. We then picked up the Notables and went to the Marigold Arena.

We arrived at the Marigold Arena at about 8:00 p.m. Presto and Chimp were at first cold towards the Notables, however, after the fights began they bragged to each other of their groups' activities. During the intermission I ran into Bill Joncarlo, YMCA worker. Bill is now the Coordinator of the Y's unattached program. He had 5 boys with him.

We left the Arena at 11:30 p.m. and stopped for hot dogs and cokes. I had to loan several of the fellows money for the food.

TUESDAY, February 6, 1962

3:00 p.m.-4:30 p.m. I worked on report for 2/5/62. Received a call from Carl Houts, Notables. Carl said that he was in trouble and asked if I could come by his house and see him and his parents. I said that I would try and make it about 9:00 p.m.

On my way to Houts' house I ran into Dark and his friends. He spoke and said that he had gone to Logan and arranged his attendance. It was about 10:30 p.m. and I reminded him that he had to be in by 11:00 p.m. to satisfy his supervision governing regulations. He was not too concerned but said he was just leaving for home.

My visit with the Houts family lasted approximately 45 minutes. Houts' parents are the typical "hillbillies" that one reads about in comics. The story, as related to me, was that Houts and a friend, Walter Kappellis, age 15, made two bombs last Friday night and then went to Kappellis' girlfriend's home where Houts threw the bombs through the girl's bedroom window. Kappellis was picked up later that night and implicated Houts. I had read about the incident in the papers last Saturday but did not recognize Kappellis' name. I had met him one night with the Notables.

The girlfriend, Peggy Karcza, age 17, apparently broke up with Kappellis and this was to be his revenge. Carl was picked up Saturday by the FBI and interrogated first in their offices and again by the police at 11th and State.

The bombs were made from 7-Up bottles, filled to the brim with gasoline and the top stuffed with gas-soaked rags. The rags were ignited before the bottles were thrown into the house.

The Houts' have a summons to appear in Family Court tomorrow, 2/7/62, at 11:00 a.m. in the Complaint Department. I took Carl out for coffee after I talked with his parents. He told me that Kappellis had threatened him if he refused to help him

"get the girl." When I asked him why he threw the bombs instead of Kappellis, he replied, "Walt told me to throw them." Carl also said that Kappellis had been having steady sex relations with the girl and was afraid she would cut him off completely. I asked Carl if he knew the girl and he said, "No."

When we returned, I told the parents that I would pick them up at 10:00 a.m. and take them to Family Court.

WEDNESDAY, February 7, 1962

10:00 a.m.-1:00 p.m. Involved with Mr. and Mrs. Houts and their son, Carl, a member of the Notables, at Family Court. (See previous day's report).

When we arrived at Family Court we went directly to the Complaint Department. Also present were Mrs. Kappellis and her son, Walter; Walter's uncle, a policeman, the girl's mother, Mrs. Karcza, and her landlady. The detectives who arrested both boys were also present.

The entire group conferred with Mrs. Swenson, Probation Officer. Mrs. Swenson went over the entire case with the principals involved and set the court date for March 2, 1962 at 10:00 a.m. She asked my interest in the matter and I explained my position as Carl's group worker. I told her that I would be present at the court hearing.

At 1:00 p.m. I took the Houts family home and returned to Oldtown at 2:30 p.m.

From 2:30 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. I worked on reports and had a brief meeting with Mr. Hartman. At 3:30 p.m. I met with Dan Scheinfeld, CYDP Research Staff, and we discussed in detail the groups that I am presently working with.

At 7:00 I took the Notables to the Loyola University and Western Michigan basketball game. We returned to the area at 11:15 p.m.

SUNDAY, February 11, 1962

6:30 p.m. Arrived in Chicago. I dropped the boys at their homes and went to visit the Houts family. Mr. and Mrs. Houts were quite upset. It seems they discovered two bottles of wine and a taped wrench underneath Carl's bed. They also said that he has been truant from school and has been staying out late nights.

Carl and I talked alone and he explained that the Notables have been drinking a bit but nothing serious. He said that Greg stole the wine from his father. As to school, he said he had been having headaches but agreed to return Tuesday. Another reason for his staying away from school was that he was afraid the kids there would tease him about the recent trouble he is in.

I explained to Carl that until his court hearing, it would be wise for him to be in early at night. Any type of violation

could reflect on the court hearing. I also tried to make him aware of his parent's concern and anxiety whenever he stayed out late. I told him that I did not want him wasting my time, and that the only reason I wanted to help was because I felt he had the potential to make something of himself. "If you want to drink and carry on, go ahead," I told him, "but don't call me or expect me to help you because I only work with fellows who go half way with me." I wanted to make him feel bad and to let him know that he was not only hurting himself but me.

Carl said he would not disappoint me and would follow-up on everything I ask of him. When I left the apartment I told Mr. and Mrs. Houts that I would talk again with them before the court hearing. I left for home at 8:45 p.m.

FRIDAY, March 2, 1962

10:30 a.m.-4:00 p.m. Family Court - Houts Case. The result was that both boys were declared "delinquent" and psychiatric examinations were ordered for them. Testimony was heard and the case continued until March 16. My participation consisted of explaining my relationship with Carl and that to my knowledge this was the first "incident" Carl has been involved with.

MONDAY, March 12, 1962

6:00 p.m. I left the area and dropped tickets for the Ice Capades at Carl Houts' house. The Notables previously told me they wanted to go. I reminded Houts of his court date Friday and arranged to pick him up at 9:45 a.m., Friday.

SUNDAY, March 18, 1962

1:30 p.m.-2:45 p.m. I received a telephone call from Mr. Houts at 10:00 a.m. requesting I visit them sometime today. I told them I would be by sometime in the afternoon.

At 1:30 p.m. I arrived at the Houts home. Mrs. Houts related to me what had happened Friday at Family Court. Several times she broke down and cried while telling the story. I sympathized with her and explained that I would be in contact with the Youth Commission and would recommend that Carl be sent to one of the Forestry Camps. I also said I would try to have letters from the Boys Club requesting the same.

THURSDAY, March 29, 1962

2:00 p.m. At home. Called Illinois Youth Commission, regarding Houts case. I spoke with Mr. Olson and he suggested I call Joliet Division of IYC. I called IYC Joliet and talked with Mr. Heathering, Moderator, and arranged to visit Joliet next Wednesday. He agreed that letters from Mr. Hartman and Mr. Mattick and myself would help Carl's case. There is a possibility that Carl may be sent home if I agree to work closely with him.

3:00 p.m. I called Mr. Selvin and advised him of next Wednesday's trip. I suggested that Wilson, EW, go along with me. It will be a fine opportunity for the both of us to become acquainted with the Center.

TUESDAY, July 17, 1962

2:00 p.m. I was at OTBC and I called the Illinois State Boys Camp, at Marseilles, Illinois, regarding Carl Houts (15), Notables (13-15) member. I spoke with the director of the camp and was advised that Houts was doing very well and would be home for a furlough sometime in August.

MONDAY, August 13, 1962

7:15 p.m. I drove to the home of Carl Houts (16), former Notable member, on Ashland and Jackson Streets. Houts is home on furlough from the Illinois State Boys Camp at Marseilles, Illinois.

Carl was not at home. His parents were drinking and upset that he was out. I told them I would return around 9:00 p.m.

7:35 p.m. I drove Gonzalez to 14th and Loomis Streets.

7:45 p.m. I picked up Gerry Suttles, RA. We had coffee and toured the area.

8:30 p.m. I returned to Houts' home. I talked with the parents and Carl, together, for several minutes. This was not too successful, as they formed sides and argued with each other.

9:00 p.m. I took Carl out for coffee. I explained to the boy that, due to his family's present position (father out of work, two months back rent owed), they make him the object of their insecurity. The best thing he can do is to go along with their wishes until he is in a position to contribute something to the family.

I pointed out to him that he does have a responsibility to his family and should think along these lines. His home is not a very pleasant place to live, but it's all he's got.

I loaned the boy \$2.00 to hold him until he leaves for camp Wednesday, July 15.

MONDAY, November 19, 1962

Before I left I received a telephone call from Carl Houts (16), Notables (13-16) member. Houts was released from a State Boys Camp earlier in the day and arrived in Chicago at noon.

I told Houts I would meet him on Ashland and Van Buren Streets at 3:30 p.m.

1:00 p.m. Talked with Mrs. Guarini at Hull House. I gave her the \$30.00 to purchase food for her family, I had received from Mr. Hartman.

3:15 p.m. Left Mrs. Guarini at Hull House due to prior commitments.

3:30 p.m. Talked for half an hour with Houts. We discussed his future plans. He told me he was promised a part-time job and in January 1963 he would like to return to school. He said Lane Tech. H. S. had written him at the Camp and said they would not accept him back. Houts said he would like to go to Wells H. S.

4:15 p.m. Talked with Mr. Mattick and Mr. Carney, AD.

4:30 p.m. Left Houts and went home.

MONDAY, December 3, 1962

2:15 p.m. Picked up Carl Houts (16), former member of the Notables (13-16). Houts was paroled from IYC State Camp 11/19/62

2:30 p.m. OBC - Brief meeting with Mr. Hartman, CD, concerning week-end camp trip December 28, 29, 30, 1962.

I suggested to Mr. Hartman that I be relieved of my commitment to take the Jr. Victors (13-20) on this week-end trip. My reasons were the following: (1) the JV's have broken up leaving only the original 5 members. If I were to take the group on the trip it would bring them together--this I do not want. (2) Wilson, EW, is planning to take the Coronados (14-18) on the trip and if Campbell, EW, were to take the Jr. Chandlers (14-17) or a similar group it would give the EW's opportunity to fulfill the purpose of the joint-camping, i.e., bringing together two groups that need to understand each other in order to live in the same community. (3) It would give equal camp time to the EW's.

3:00 p.m. Worked on reports 12/1/62, 12/2/62, 11/30/62. By finishing these reports I brought my reporting up to date.

4:00 p.m. Talked with Mr. Hartman and Mr. Selvin, PD, regarding a part-time job for Houts. Through the efforts of Mr. Hartman and Mr. Selvin, I believe Houts will be placed in a part-time job at Beltin's Camera Shop on Roosevelt near Halsted Street. An appointment will be arranged for the boy Wednesday, 12/5/62.

4:30 p.m. Drove to the Duncan YMCA with Houts for coffee. I picked up John "Pancho" Gonzalez (17), Victor (14-18), on the way.

At Duncan I talked with Houts about returning to school and his future employment plans. Gonzalez also encouraged Houts to continue his education.

5:30 p.m. Drove Gonzalez home and took Houts to dinner (expense account 90c). Houts' family is destitute. They are waiting to be taken on the State Welfare roles. I loaned the boy \$2.00 (expense account).

TUESDAY, December 4, 1962

12:00 midnight. Visited Carl Houts (16), 16XX W. Jackson. Informed him that I would take him to Beltin's Camera Shop, 7XX W. Roosevelt to be interviewed for a job tomorrow, 12/5/62 at 2:00 p.m.

WEDNESDAY, December 5, 1962

1:15 p.m. Picked up Carl Houts (16), former Notable (13-16) member and recent parolee from IYC Boys Camp, on Ashland and Van Buren Streets.

1:30 p.m. Jim Marchelo, CR, and I took the boy to Beltin's Camera Shop, Roosevelt near Halsted Street. A job for Houts had been arranged through the OBC.

Mr. Beltin, OBC Board Member, received the boy well and explained his duties (general help), hours (3:00 p.m.-6:00 p.m.), and salary (\$1.00 per hour).

2:15 p.m. Meeting OBC-CYDP staff. Mr. Mattick's memo C-262 and week-end camping was discussed.

MONDAY, December 10, 1962

3:30 p.m. OBC - I was informed that I had received a telephone call that Carl Houts (16), former member of the Notables (13-16) and recently paroled from a state training camp (Charge, Mayhem) had not reported for work at Beltin's Camera Shop, 7XX W. Roosevelt (OBC had obtained the job for the boy last week).

4:00 p.m. Houts' home, 16XX W. Jackson. Houts was not at home. His parents said he had left the house about 2:00 p.m.

11:30 p.m. Houts' home, 16XX W. Jackson. The boy's parents told me he had not come home.

I drove around to various places he might be but could not locate him.

TUESDAY, December 11, 1962

2:30 p.m. Drove to 16XX W. Jackson to visit Carl Houts (16), former Notable (13-16) member and recent parolee from the IYC. Houts' family is destitute and are attempting to qualify for Public Aid. I loaned the boy \$1.00 (expense account).

THURSDAY, December 13, 1962

2:00 p.m. OBC - Outlined reports from 12/10/62 to 12/12/62. Received phone call from Carl Houts (16), former member of Notables (13-16) and recent IYC parolee. I told him I would pick him up at home later this afternoon.

3:00 p.m. Picked up Ronald Raney (16) and Jimmy Talega (15), Victors (15-19) on Polk and Laflin Streets.

3:25 p.m. St. Ignatius H. S. The student tutors for the boys were not able to work with them today. Talega and Raney were not displeased by this.

4:00 p.m. We drove to 16XX W. Jackson and picked up Houts.

4:10 p.m. Duncan YMCA (cafeteria). Houts was hungry so we all had pie and coffee. Houts also had a sandwich (expense account \$1.75).

7:30 p.m. Mr. Selvin, PD, came in with two OBC Board Members. Laura Fishman, RA, was with them. I explained a bit about our work and introduced Houts to them. The Board Members were planning to take the Houts family a food basket for Christmas.

Spike Sentor (Board Member) talked with Houts for several minutes. Sentor said later he was interested in knowing the boy better. I encouraged Sentor to become active with Houts and told him a bit of his background.

FRIDAY-SUNDAY, December 14-16, 1962

SPECIAL CAMP REPORT - GROUP, "TAYLOR CAPTAINS" (11-14)

As a schedule of events is attached to this report, I will only address particular occurrences and my general impressions of the week-end.

Campbell, EW, took 12 fellows from the Diplomats (9-12) and I had 10 Captains (11-14).

Marlo Perez (17), Victor (15-19) made the trip as a Sr. Leader. Carl Houts (16), former member of the Notables (13-16) and recent parolee from the IYC came along as my guest.

MONDAY, January 14, 1963

6:20 p.m. Carl Houts (16), former Notables (13-16) member and recent parolee came in the office.

As the boy was in need of a haircut I told him to meet me on Van Buren and Ashland Streets Wednesday, 1/16/63 and we both would get haircuts.

FRIDAY, January 18, 1963

8:45 p.m. I left with the Victors and we drove to the University Shop. Before arriving at the restaurant I stopped at Carl Houts' (16) house, 16XX W. Jackson St. Houts is a former member of the Notables (13-16) and recent parolee from the IYC.

I found the boy sitting on the steps outside the apartment. [Note: the temperature in Chicago had settled below 0° all this week.] When I questioned him as to why he was there, his eyes filled with tears. I left him there and went upstairs to the apartment.

The father was asleep, or passed out, at a table. His mother

was sitting across from the father, obviously quite drunk. She had a quart of beer and a glass in front of her. She looked at me real hard until she recognized me and then began to mumble. I had seen enough. The apartment smelled of dogs and wine, and along with the parents' conduct, was no fit place for a young man of 16.

Houts joined us for coffee.

9:30 p.m. I drove the Victors to Polk and Laflin and continued on to the boys club. I talked briefly with Fitzgerald, EW, and left.

10:00 p.m. Toured the area and left.

COMMENT: I brought Houts to my home. Next week I will try to work out a plan for him.

TUESDAY, January 22, 1963

1:30 p.m. CBC Downtown Office. I talked with Mr. Mattick and Mr. Shanower, AD, regarding Carl Houts (16), former member of the Notables (13-16), and recent parolee from the IYC (Charge-Mayhem). I told Mr. Mattick the existing home condition and that the boy was temporarily living with my wife and me.

After discussing various resources we might use, Mr. Shanower suggested approaching Duncan YMCA and trying to arrange a program with them for the boy. This program would include room and board. It will be up to me to see that he gets back in school. I feel it is imperative the boy returns to school as soon as possible. He has been out almost a year and I see signs of his idleness becoming a habit. I am to call Mr. Shanower tomorrow, 1/23/63.

THURSDAY, January 24, 1963

2:30 p.m. OBC - Wrote report 1/23/63 and finished writing report 1/18/63. I gave both reports to Mr. Hartman, CD.

I called Mr. Mal Shanower, AD, regarding Carl Houts, (16) (see report 1/23/63). Shanower said he called a Mr. Allen, Exec. Dir. Duncan YMCA, and felt a program might be worked out for the boy. I told Shanower I would go ahead and try to place the boy in school this semester.

TUESDAY, January 29, 1963

2:30 p.m. OBC - Waited for Mr. Hartman, CD, as there was to be a CYDP-JA staff meeting.

Called Lane Tech. H. S. and made an appointment for tomorrow morning at 10:30 with Dr. Ryan (Principal).

Called Mr. Shanower, AD, and arranged to meet him at the Field Office, 318 S. Ashland Ave. at 3:30 p.m.

3:15 p.m. As the meeting was cancelled, I left for the Field Office.

3:30 p.m. Field Office - I discussed with Shanower the possible resources we might use in order to help Carl Houts (16), recent parolee from IYC.

I called Bill Hustus (Assistant Boys Sec. at Duncan YMCA) and alerted him to the problem. Hustus said he would call me later in the week if he came up with anything.

4:30 p.m. Shanower and I went to the First Congregational Church, Washington and Ashland Sts. Houts is a member of this church, and it was our feeling that if we presented the boy's situation and our project's interest, the church might feel obligated to play some type of constructive role in the overall plan for the boy.

We spoke with Mr. Payne and Greta Hammer (Pastors at the Church). After presenting the situation, they agreed to give assistance. At this time they were not sure in what direction their assistance would be, but they would give it consideration and would let us know this week. Hammer gave me \$5.00 for the boy's needs.

WEDNESDAY, January 30, 1963

10:30 a.m. Went to Lane Tech. H. S. with Carl Houts (16). We met with Dr. Ryan (Principal). He questioned the boy and then agreed to re-admit him.

The following hour, Houts received his program and we met his counselor, a Mr. Costello. Mr. Costello and I talked for some time, and I feel confident he will assist the boy anyway he is able. He also will keep me informed to the boy's school progress.

12:00 noon. Attended luncheon for Bob Halstead (new housing manager of ABLA Homes). Representatives from the agencies in the ABLA area were there.

2:00 p.m. OBC - I called Mr. Shanower, AD, and advised him that Houts was back in Lane Tech H. S.

MONDAY, February 4, 1963

10:00 a.m. I called Lane Tech. H. S. and was informed that Dr. Ryan (Principal) was ill and would not be at the school today. I made an appointment for tomorrow, 1/5/63. This is concerning Carl Houts (16), former Lane Tech. student and recent IYC parolee.

1:00 p.m. Lunch with Bob Halstead (Asst. Boys Sec. at Duncan YMCA). I had previously asked Halstead if he would try and raise some money for Carl Houts.

Halstead said he had interested one person and this person agreed to give (\$5.00) five dollars a month for the boy's support. He gave Halstead a check for \$25.00.

We also discussed several young groups that are in the area of Polk, Taylor, and Loomis, and Ashland that currently came to Duncan.

WEDNESDAY, February 6, 1963

10:00 a.m. Arrived at Lane Tech. H. S. with Carl Houts (16), former member of the Notables (13-16), HH Area, and recent parolee from IYC.

We talked for about 30 minutes with Dr. Ryan (Principal) and Dr. Kurtz (Asst. Principal) regarding the school's admitting Houts. The boy was a student at Lane Tech. September 1961 through March 1962; he failed all his classes. He was sentenced to the IYC in March 1962 for Mayhem.

I had several anxious moments but they did agree to re-admit the boy under probation.

While a program for the boy was being made I talked to his counselor, Mr. Costello. Costello seemed willing to go out of his way for the boy and agreed to keep in touch with me regarding his conduct and school work.

11:00 a.m. I called Mr. Shanower, AD, and advised him of Houts' acceptance. Also that Bob Halstead (Asst. Sec. at Duncan YMCA) had a \$25.00 donation for the boy. Shanower suggested that I now call Rev. Payne, First Church, Ashland and Washington Sts. and see how they have progressed in terms of helping the boy.

WEDNESDAY, February 13, 1963

7:30 p.m. Duncan YMCA. I remained half an hour at the Y talking with Bob Halstead (Asst. Boys Sec.). We discussed the Houts' (16) case and what role, if any, the Y might play. We also discussed the various groups in the NW and SW quadrants of the Addams area.

TUESDAY, February 26, 1963

9:00 a.m. CBC Office - Conversation with Mr. Mattick and Mr. Shanower, AD, regarding Carl Houts (16). Houts had written me a letter saying he was quitting school and going to look for a job.

As I explained to Mr. Mattick and Mr. Shanower, I felt Houts felt badly about leaving his folks and the desperate situation that they are in financially.

6:30 p.m. Drove to Houts' home, 16XX W. Jackson, HH Area. Houts said he did not want to live with his parents and would return to school. I did not demand an explanation for his conduct as it was obvious it was as I stated earlier in this report.

MONDAY, March 4, 1963

10:15 p.m. After dropping the fellows home I drove to the boys club.

I talked with Mr. Shanower regarding Carl Houts (16). I asked Shanower if he would call Mr. Payne (Pastor at the First Congregational Church) and see if they will take some responsibility. We also discussed other resources that we might use.

TUESDAY, March 5, 1963

3:30 p.m. I called Mr. Shanower, AD, to remind him, as he requested last night, to call Mr. Payne (Pastor of the First Congregational Church, 1613 W. Washington). This was in regard to enlisting the church's aid in helping Carl Houts (15), recent parolee from the IYC. Mr. Shanower said he would make the call and call me back in a few minutes.

9:30 p.m. Drove to the Houts' home, 16XX W. Jackson. The mother told me she and her husband were moving to Wisconsin to live with some relatives. She did not want to leave Carl here in Chicago, but she knew the relatives did not want him to come with them.

I told them I felt it best for them to take care of themselves and that I would see to it that Carl remained in school and was well cared for.

WEDNESDAY, March 6, 1963

4:45 p.m. Received a phone call from Mr. Shanower, AD, regarding Carl Houts (16). Mr. Shanower had talked with Mr. Payne (Pastor at the First Congregational Church) requesting some help for Houts. Payne told Shanower he would continue in his efforts to help the boy and would call him later in the week.

THURSDAY, March 7, 1963

9:15 p.m. Drove to Duncar YMCA. Bob Halstead (Asst. Boy Sec.) and I had a beer on Madison and Ashland Sts. I had previously asked Halstead to give me some statistical data relative to the number of boys the Y is serving that live in our CYDP target area. Halstead said they are serving ninety-two (92) boys that live below Congress St. and east of Ashland, and north of 12th St., extending east to Racine Ave. From what I could gather the majority are living in the NW quadrant.

Halstead said he had received another check for \$15.00 for Carl Houts, 16XX W. Jackson. I told Halstead I would pick up the check next week.

FRIDAY, March 8, 1963

3:35 p.m. Drove to the Houts' home. Mr. Houts told me that Mr. Krupa (Parole Office, IYC) had been by the house and ordered him to appear in his office Monday (3/11/63). I informed Mr. Houts I would pick him up at 10:30 a.m. I also said I would have Carl, his son, with me and the Mr. Shanower, AD, would also attend.

Earlier today I had received a phone call from Mr. Shanower advising me of the meeting with Krupa, Monday (3/11/63).

MONDAY, March 11, 1963

A few introductory remarks might be helpful before writing this morning's portion of today's report.

Mr. Shanower, AD, had arranged an appointment this noon with a Mr. Krupa (Parole Officer, IYC) at the IYC downtown office. This was concerning Carl Houts (16), 16XX W. Jackson. Houts is a boy that I formally worked with when I was assigned to the HH CYDP Area. After I was re-assigned to the Oldtown-Jane Addams CYDP Area, Houts got into difficulty and was turned over to the IYC. He was paroled in November 1962.

Since the boy's parole we have been trying to work out a plan of living for him. He currently is living at my home and is attending Lane Tech. H. S.

The boy's family situation was such that a change in residence was mandatory. At present, the mother and father are planning to move to the state of Michigan, in hopes that the father will find employment.

This morning's meeting with the IYC was arranged to bring the Commission up-to-date and clarify the boy's situation. Also we felt we might receive financial aid from the Commission.

10:30 a.m. I picked up the father and, along with the boy, drove to the CBC downtown office.

11:00 a.m. CBC Office - We talked for half an hour with Mr. Mattick and Mr. Shanower, AD, as to the technique best employed when talking with the IYC.

12/15 p.m. IYC Office - We talked with Mr. Krupa and Mr. Savage (Supervisor). The boy's situation was clarified and proper communications with the Commission were established. It was agreed that if a foster home could be found for the boy, the Commission would pay \$66.00 per month--plus expense for clothing. I explained the boy's current clothing needs, and they agreed to have him come down tomorrow for clothing expenses.

Mr. Krupa said he would write the IYC Forestry Camp where Houts was detained and see if he had money due him for his work.

Although nothing was said, it was obvious that the Commission, after talking with Mr. Houts, realized that the boy should never have been returned to the home. This fact, I believe, aided us in exacting cooperation from the Commission.

TUESDAY, March 12, 1963

3:30 p.m. I took Carl Houts (16) to the IYC downtown office (see report 3/11/63). Mr. Savage (Supervisor) took Houts to Sears Store to purchase \$25.00 worth of clothing. Mr. Savage made it quite clear that my help was not needed in the purchase of the clothing.

MONDAY, March 18, 1963

7:00 p.m. This evening I preoccupied with obtaining medical aid for Carl Houts (16), IYC parolee, at OBC. Houts injured his finger playing basketball.

THURSDAY, August 8, 1963

5:15 p.m. Picked up Carl Houts (16), former member of the Notables (13-15) and recent IYC parolee. During March, April, and May of this year Houts lived at my home and attended Lane Tech. H. S. In June he began living at the First Congregational Church, Washington and Ashland (Horner Central Area). Through Miss Hammer he is now working at Illinois Masonic Hospital for the summer.

The boy has been offered a job starting Sept. 1, 1963, in Montana on a ranch through church relationships. I took the boy to dinner tonight to discuss his possible employment on this ranch. Miss Hammer had previously informed me that she has been in contact with the prospective employer and feels it would be a good move for Carl.

MONDAY, August 19, 1963

8:30 p.m. Drove to the First Congregational Church in regard to Carl Houts (16), IYC parolee. Houts has been living at the church and working at Illinois Masonic Hospital for two months. Rev. Greta Hammer and Bill Black, Church Youth Worker, have made arrangements for Houts to work and live on a ranch in Big Horn, Montana. The employer was in Chicago for one day on business. He was to be at the church at 9:00 p.m.

I called Mr. Mattick at OBC and he suggested I come to the club for a meeting with Mr. Selvin, PD, and Mr. Donald, Program Director. So I told Black and Hammer that I would be back around 10:00.

9:20 p.m. OBC - Results of this meeting were that CYDP groups could use the club facilities, however with hope that they would be made aware of their responsibility to obtain Boys Club cards.

10:00 p.m. First Congregational Church - I talked with Mr. Ellsworth Minor in regard to Houts. As the boy is on parole

Mr. Minor expressed a desire to talk with the IYC. Mr. Mattick, also present, suggested he call the IYC in the morning and pave the way explaining to the IYC that Mr. Minor was only in town one day.

Black and I agreed to keep the appointment Thursday (8/22/63) with Mr. Krupa, Probation Officer for Houts, to tie up everything.

TUESDAY, August 20, 1963

9:30 a.m. This morning's work was concerned with Carl Houts (16), IYC parolee, currently living at the First Congregational Church. Rev. Greta Hammer and Bill Black, Youth worker, arranged for Houts to be employed on a ranch in Montana. The employer, Mr. Ellsworth Minor, was in Chicago for the day. Last night Mr. Mattick suggested he call the IYC and pave the way for Black, Minor, and myself to see the Commission this morning.

This morning after conversations with Mr. Mattick and Mr. Black an appointment was arranged with Mr. Savage, Supervisor, IYC, for 10:30 a.m. today.

10:30 a.m. Very short meeting with Mr. Savage at the IYC. He readily agreed to Houts' moving to Montana.

FRIDAY, August 23, 1963

12:00 noon. IYC regarding Carl Houts (16) (see report 9/20/63). William Black, Youth Worker at First Congregational Church, was also present. Mr. Krupa, Houts' Probation Officer was a bit disdraught because of the meeting Tuesday (8/20/63). He was quite brief saying everything was done as far as he was concerned.

FRIDAY, January 10, 1964

Arrived at OBC at 2:15 p.m. Received a call from a Mr. Platz, Public Aid, requesting information regarding Carl Houts (16), formerly worked with by CYDP.

The best over-all estimate of the level of activity of extension workers at any one time is given by their regular quarterly accounting of boys with whom they were in contact over the period. For example, in the last quarter of 1963, the seven extension workers on the staff at that time were in some contact with two to three thousand boys in the two target areas, most of the boys 10 to 19 year old boys living there (see Table 5:1). The workers reported that their relationships with 554 of these were sufficiently close to enable them to influence the boys' conduct in constructive ways; the Outpost Supervisor, who had the longest tenure in the area, reported as many as 114 such influential relationships, an EW as few as 47 during this time. The seven men could recognize 2,150

Table 5:1

Intensity of Relationship between Extension Workers and the Target
Population in Target Areas during the Last Quarter; 1963

Extension Worker	Influence	Association*	Contact*	Recognition*	Boys 10-19 in Areas
1	114	230	370	550	
3	92	190	230	285	
4	67	130	165	220	
6	83	170	290	350	
7	89	200	310	370	
9	47	90	150	200	
11	62	120	155	175	
TOTALS	554	1,130	1,670	2,150	3,926
AVERAGES/ WORKER	79	161	239	307	

*N.B. Influence relationships represent the best possible empirical counts, considering the nature of human relationships. Association, Contact, and Recognition counts are best estimates for each Extension Worker, but include double-counts due to multiple relationships between staff and clients. The inaccuracy of these estimates increases in the direction of increasing numbers.

other boys by name. Between these two poles were boys with whom workers were associated--that is, met fairly regularly and had personal intercourse --and others with whom they were only in contact--that is, the worker saw them from time to time, knew their names, at least approximate ages and addresses, to which groups if any these boys belonged, and which schools, if any, they attended.

During this same period, the extension workers were servicing 44 named groups, ranging in size from five to 20 regular members, and including a total of 471 members (81 of them girls).

The clientele of the Project differed in some important respects from the usual Boys' Club membership. Indeed, the purpose of CYDP was to reach a different kind of boy. Among the boys randomly selected to be interviewed in the experimental areas, we found about 25 percent of them participating at least occasionally in Boys Club programs (they

were not all registered members). We compared these boys to the sample of boys with whom the Project was working. Project boys were as a group markedly older than Boys Clubs participants: about a third of the participants in the building program were between the ages of 10 and 11, while only a handful of Project boys in the Horner area and less than 25% of the Project boys in the Oldtown area were that young; on the other hand, boys over 16 made up two-thirds of the Horner Project groups and 41% of the Oldtown group, while only a third of the club participants were that old. The in-building program of the Boys Clubs has generally attracted the early adolescent cohort, while CYDP staff made special efforts to contact the older boys who were presumed more actively delinquent, more frequently out of school and needing jobs, and so on. As a matter of fact, more of the Project boys had police records than did the participants in the regular club program. This was partly but not entirely due to the fact that project boys were older, and older boys more often have been involved with the police. Still, at each age level, Project boys were more likely to have police records, especially boys 16 or over. It seems that these later adolescents who participated in the agency's program were a relatively undelinquent group, while Project boys in this age range were relatively more delinquent.

Another difference between participants in Boys Clubs program and boys contacted by CYDP indicates their relationships with their parents. We asked both sets of youngsters who they felt had "something to offer them." Their answers included parents, friends, relatives, and, infrequently, unrelated adults. Parents made up a third of those mentioned by Boys Clubs participants, less than 20 percent of those mentioned by Project boys. Again, the difference was most striking among boys 16 years and older: 36 percent of those cited by in-building program participants were their parents, only 19 percent of those cited by Project boys. CYDP contact boys at every age level more often named their friends, rather than their parents or other adults, as people who had "something to offer."

CYDP boys also seemed to be having more trouble in school than Boys Clubs participants. Fewer of the former were optimistic about their chances of completing high school, and indeed, those 16 or over were more likely to have dropped out of school.

Besides their participation in the Boys Club program, these boys

also more often than Project boys belonged to other organized youth groups.

According to these indicators then, the boys recruited into the CYDP program differed in important ways from boys participating in the regular in-building programs at the Boys Clubs in the target areas, ways which suggest that Project boys were a more problematic group. We should not, however, draw the differences too sharply, for there was a great deal of overlap between them. Most of the Project boys resembled most Boys Club participants in their ages, police records (or lack of them), relationships with parents and other adults, and school-going. But in the course of reaching out for unserved young clients, CYDP gathered up a certain portion of boys who seemed in special need of its services and who ordinarily did not walk through the open doors of Boys Clubs.

It is instructive also to compare the two sets of boys--CYDP contacts and Boys Clubs participants--with the representative sample of all the boys aged 17 to 19 in the target areas. It appears that the pre-adolescents and early adolescents who might have been found in the Boys Clubs on a typical day closely matched a cross-section of their age cohort in the surrounding community on the indicators we have been using here. The relatively few younger boys involved in CYDP programming, almost all of them in the Oldtown area, seem more troubled and troublesome than their age mates, however. The pre-adolescent Project boys seem to have been especially alienated from their parents. We can imagine extension workers finding them hanging with older boys at hours later than these youngsters should have been out; and the boys drawing tight with the workers in their search for meaningful relationships with adults. The pattern is quite different among late adolescents. In this age group, the Project boys were as a group almost indistinguishable from their neighborhood peers, differing only by appearing more often in police files. But those late adolescents who remained in the Boys Clubs program were a self-selected group of young citizens who were seldom in trouble with the police, seemed to get along well with their parents, expected to graduate from high school and get more education, and participated in several other programs for young people in addition to the Boys Clubs.

During the six years of the Project, extension workers associated themselves with 138 named groups of boys. Contact with these ranged

from occasional aid to frequent meetings and intensive efforts.

A common but misleading image of work with boys' groups in the inner cities goes by the label "gang work." CDDP deliberately avoided the "gang" label, both for its workers and for the groups with which they worked, simply because we did not work with "gangs" as they are imagined to exist. Nor indeed, did we become aware of any in the target areas. That is, we did not contact large organized groups of boys which already had a fairly stable membership led by a set of identifiable officers such as "President," "Vice President," "War Councilor," or "Armorer," and which engaged in delinquent activity and defense of "turf" as their central aim and frequent pastime.

The groups with which we worked ranged in size from four or five boys up to twenty-five; eight to twelve members was most common. Their membership was seldom fixed; rather, a few boys stuck together and others drifted in and out. Almost every group acknowledged a leader, but he had seldom been formally elected when the group was first contacted by a worker, although the workers frequently persuaded groups to do so later. And while a hierarchy of leadership beyond the top boy could often be discovered through long and careful observation of a group, the boys themselves seldom explicitly recognized this differentiation among them. Nor did they regularly as a group commit delinquent acts. In some groups there was wide variation, from heavily delinquent to non-delinquent members, and in other groups, hardly any delinquency at all. Group activity consisted mostly of just hanging around, and but for the adult leadership and opportunities provided by the extension workers, groups would do little else but stand around on their corners, spitting on the sidewalk.

Where were those large organized gangs of teenagers who prey upon neighborhoods and defend their domains in armed street battles? We have concluded that they are legends, that they certainly did not exist in our target areas from 1960 to 1966, and probably never did exist anywhere. We are not alone in this conclusion. Studies in New York (Yablonsky, 1962), Flint, Michigan (Gold, 1970), Boston (Miller, 1966), London (Downes, 1966) and observations in countries around the world (Cavan and Cavan, 1968) consistently reject the gang image as accurate for their time and place.

We witnessed instances of the rise and maintenance of such legends. Often one boy, caught in a helpless and frustrating situation, would

call upon or fabricate a gang legend to bolster his ego. The reader will remember the incident described earlier, in which "Jungle Jim" Cruz was slugged in the mouth by another, bigger boy. Jungle Jim had been standing on a corner talking with boys and girls from his neighborhood, so the blow was an especially acute attack on his pride. Still, to fight meant a beating and deepening insult. In his impotence and rage, Jim screamed, "You don't think I can do it! Well, I can bring coloreds, spic, Italians from Marshall, Crane (high schools), all over--not by the dozens, hundreds, but thousands, millions and burn up this fucking neighborhood. . . ."

The gang legend lived on also in the occasional actual or threatened street fight. A series of incidents or rumors of incidents would crystallize into a conflict between one named group and another, and each would pull together their core and peripheral members, and anyone else they could enlist under their banner. On such occasions, extension workers, community service coordinators, police and others cooperated to try to cool the situation.

Cooling a Gangfight

TUESDAY, January 30, 1962

After the meeting between Gary Hailot, Jack War. and Mr. Hartman, I drove both boys home. Upon returning to Oldtown I found Marchelo, Selvin, Wilson, Hartman, and Officer Jennings, of the Youth Bureau, in Mr. Hartman's office discussing a possible ruckus between the "Emperors" and "Lucy's Lads" scheduled for this evening. Selvin had received information about this from Gary Hailot. As Selvin related it to me, there were three incidents which preceded the arranged ruckus: (1) Erwin Ramirez and several of his friends were beaten up Saturday night, supposedly by a group of "Lucy's Lads," (2) Joanie, an "Empress" was slapped in the face by one of "Lucy's Lads" Monday night, and, (3) Vincent Cortez, an "Emperor," while riding around with several friends Monday night, stopped and threatened "Wings," one of "Lucy's" younger boys. "Wings," whose real name is Arnold, has had a running feud with Cortez for some time. Apparently "Wings" always backs down from a fight with Cortez but, however, when he is with his friends, he makes threats that he is after Cortez and wants to fight him.

Erin, a girl called Jane Reston, staff member at Hull House, and asked me if I had heard anything. Hartman asked me to talk with her to see if we had previous relationships with her. When I spoke to her she seemed amused at our overt concern. She expressed the hope that if there is going to be trouble, our two agencies would be able to handle it and there was no need to

make an issue out of it.

After the conversation we started a plan of strategy with Officer Jennings. I suggested that Ira Wilson and I go to Hull House and talk with their workers, relate to them what information we had, and try to obtain additional information. We also could discover to what extent our agencies could co-operate. This was agreeable to the group, and we left for Hull House.

During the interim Mr. Harrigan, Hull House staff, contacted several of "Lucy's Lads" who were intimately involved in creating this tension. Upon our arrival at Hull House, Mr. Harrigan and Jane Reston had these boys in their office. The boys that were present were: "Wings"; "Chippy," an influential member of "Lucy's" younger boys; "Brick," a member of "Lucy's Lads"; Phil Soleda, influential member of "Lucy's" older boys, also brother of Sandra Soleda, "Empress"; "Tommy," long time member of "Lucy's Lads."

I related to the group the aforementioned three incidents which had aroused the "Emperors" to the point of arranging the ruckus. I might clarify at this time how the arranging and communication between groups is done: there is a cleaner on H and T Sts. in which Dorothy Rodriguez, "Empress," is employed. Information is passed through her by both groups. Her bias lies with the "Emperors," however, because of past association with Hull House and the location of the cleaners, she makes an excellent emissary.

Explanation to the first incident was given by Chippy. He said that the younger "Lucy's Lads" had nothing to do with the beating Saturday night. He went on to say that the boys involved were former associates of "Lucy's" and have no relationship with the contemporary younger boys.

In response to the second incident, "Wings" said that *Joanle* was not slapped but pushed and that it was an accident, not a deliberate act. "Wings" naturally responded to the third incident. He did not state the origin of his feud with Cortez (I doubt if he knew it); however, he stated emphatically that he did not want to fight Cortez under any condition and was perfectly willing to end the feud.

I suggested to Harrigan and Reston that as Erwin Ramirez had recruited fellows from other areas to participate in the ruckus and as he also has great influence with the "Emperors," we bring him to Hull House this afternoon to talk with these boys and settle the matter before anything tonight. I also suggested that we bring Cortez to talk with "Wings" to settle their misunderstanding. Everyone agreed to this and Smith and I returned to Oldtown to relate what had just transpired and bring back the two boys to Hull House.

At Oldtown I called Erwin Ramirez and told him that I would pick him up in a few minutes. As I suspected, he sounded relieved and said that he was perfectly willing to go to Hull House. Mr. Hartman then arranged to have dinner with Officer Jennings, Mr. Selvin and Mr. Marchelo. Mr. Hartman also had agreed to the proposed meeting at Hull House.

Mr. Wilson and I could not find Cortez and had to go to Hull House with only Ramirez. At Hull House, Mr. Harrigan, Wilson and I sat at the table with Ramirez, "Chippy," Soleda, and "Wings." "Chippy" explained all three incidents to Ramirez. Ramirez agreed to call the ruckus off and mentioned that he had "gotten even" with the fellow who had led the attack on him Saturday night. "Chippy," quite sincerely told Ramirez that he hoped that in the future both groups could frequent each others areas at will without fear of being jumped.

As we were leaving, "Tommy," who was present at the fight Saturday night, but had refrained from participating, confirmed "Chippy's" story. He said these fellows were drunk and started the fight, not out of personal grievances but out of meanness. Tommy also said that "Bummer," instigator of the fight, planned some type of retaliation because Ramirez had gotten even with him later Saturday night. He went on to say that there was to be some type of meeting Sunday. Reston interjected at this point and asked Tommy if he thought it would help if I talked to these fellows Sunday. Tommy said he didn't know but would let her know later if a meeting was definitely scheduled. Reston took my home phone number and said that Tommy could tell her and she in turn could call me.

Wilson dropped me at the restaurant where Mr. Hartman and the group were having dinner, then we drove Ramirez home. Wilson told me later that Ramirez had a .22 pistol in his pocket during the meeting.

Harrigan arrived about the same time and we related what had happened to Mr. Hartman and the others. It was agreed that Officer Jennings and his men, also the Task Force would patrol the streets tonight in case they were needed.

About 7:15 p.m. the "Emperors" came to Addams Club for their meeting. Wilson and I had a "bull session" with them until 8:00 p.m. Their conversation dwelled mainly on the situation with "Lucy's Lads." There were about 20 "Emperors" present. The weapons that were visible to me was a black whip, a long stiletto knife, a zip gun and several pieces of steel. I assumed that Ramirez still had his pistol. I might mention that during this time which preceded the meeting at 8:00 p.m., Wilson did a good job of getting the fellows interested in a game of numbers, thereby, taking their minds off the issue at hand.

At 8:00 p.m. the meeting began. Mr. Selvin was present, also eight of the "Emperors." I related to the group the explanation given for the three incidents and then asked Ramirez to give his account of the meeting at Hull House. Ramirez told the group what happened there and that he was satisfied with the results, thereby, indirectly calling the whole thing off. At this point, Dorothy Rodriguez, of the cleaners, jumped up and said that "Wings" and several of his friends, at 6:30 p.m. tonight, heard that Cortez was in the back of the cleaners and came running into the place looking for him. She went on to say that "Wings" said that he was after Cortez and he had better not show up around here. The fellows response to this was completely negative. They all started talking at once, saying that "Lucy's Lads" had lied to us and nothing was changed by our meeting. I felt that nothing would satisfy them unless Cortez, who also was excited, talked with "Wings" face to face and settled their differences.

Wilson and I took Cortez to Hull House. Again we talked with Reston and Harrigan. Harrigan was against the idea of the two boys talking to each other at this time and convinced Cortez that he, Harrigan, would talk to "Wings." Harrigan assured Cortez that "Wings" did not want to fight him and perhaps the girl at the cleaners had misinterpreted what was said. I promised Cortez I would stop and see Harrigan tomorrow and Harrigan could then tell me what "Wings" had said to him. Harrigan did agree, however, that the two boys should get together soon and talk.

We returned to Addams Club and Cortez related to the group that he was satisfied with what had happened; this apparently also satisfied the fellows. Mr. Selvin, who earlier during the meeting, had informed the group that they could have their clubroom again, suggested we all go home.

Once outside, most of the fellows went home. A few of them were standing around on the corner so I suggested we go for coffee and then I would drive them home. We had our coffee and I drove them home. I also called Duke and asked him to get five other fellows and meet me at 3:30 p.m. tomorrow at the grill on Pulaski and Madison.

In summing up, I might say that I don't really feel the "Emperors" were serious enough or brave enough to go to "Lucy's" looking for a fight, however, I do not feel they would run if they were approached by "Lucy's Lads" in their own area. Of course, there is always the potential threat that they might have followed through, and it is this potential threat that compelled us to work so intensely with them. Such facts as: (1) Only approximately 20 fellows at the meeting and (2) no sign of friends who were supposed to help them, along with the fact that (3) we were informed of what was happening earlier in the afternoon and (4) Ramirez and Cortez were more than willing to co-operate confirmed my feelings that for the most part, the fellows create fantasies regarding gangfights and similar

activities. Granted, many of these fellows are "delinquent," however, if actually faced with the reality of a large group conflict, I feel their fantasies would disappear with their courage.

Workers not only reacted in emergencies to snuff out street brawls but also attempted to harness group energies for more constructive and respectable activities. As we have pointed out, these programs concomitantly occupied boys' time, furthered their workers' relationships with them as a group and as individuals, and drew the boys into contact with the legitimate institution of their communities. It is perhaps only by keeping these wider considerations in mind and by recognizing that they might serve to reduce the youngster's propensities for destructive delinquency that one can believe seriously that grown men, highly skilled professionals, should have spent hours and hours of their time helping fifteen boys go camping for two days.

The El Condors Go Camping

MONDAY, October 8, 1962

8:30 p.m. Met with the El Condors. We had a brainstorming session in which we listed a number of different types of activities in which the group would like to engage. Unfortunately, most of the activities were out of their financial reach. They really were enthusiastic about a weekend of winter sports at Camp Kemah. I told them the approximate cost and they started to plan a series of quarter parties to raise the funds.

After the meeting, I talked to Walter "Junior" McMahoney. Junior's father kicked him out of the house when Junior informed him that he had made a girl pregnant. Junior has been away from home since Tuesday. I suggested he go back home. He was dirty and hungry.

TUESDAY, October 30, 1962

5:00 p.m. Returned to the OP, where six members of the El Condors (16-19) were waiting for me. Not for any particular reason, the El Condors now wait for me every day and follow me around. (It has been said that some street workers' groups follow them about.) Around the OP, at Horner Club, around the neighborhood and anyplace else they can get a chance. No matter what time I arrive at the OP or what time I leave, there are always three or four El Condors around. They are very helpful and will volunteer to clean or wash the station wagon or run errands. They are usually very pleasant and easy to get along with. I really enjoy working with them.

THURSDAY, November 1, 1962

9:00 p.m. Returned to the OP and met with the El Condors where they discussed plans for a large dance. I explained the cost of a large dance and the amount of work necessary. They decided to continue to give small affairs. They are attempting to raise money for a camping trip in January. A series of affairs at the OP were planned; they included movies, a musical program, chicken dinner, and a social.

MONDAY, November 26, 1962

1:00 p.m. Arrived at OP and was happy to see four members of the El Condors (15-19) waiting for me. They informed me that there had been no trouble over the weekend. They were involved in a fight last week (see report of 11/21/62). I thought there might be repercussions, but there have been none so far. I spent most of the afternoon writing reports.

9:00 p.m. Met with the El Condors. We made plans for a trip to the CBC camp at Kemah on 1/16/63. The discussion we had was methods of raising money for the trip. About the only method is giving socials. This cannot be done before 1/16/63. The El Condors now have about \$40.00. A trip of this kind would be good for the E.C.'s. They are restless and bored. A trip away from their daily problems with some guidance might help them to reflect and see where they are now and where they can plan to go.

MONDAY, December 3, 1962

9:00 p.m. Met with the El Condors (15-19), fifteen members. A financial statement was made and the E.C.'s began to eliminate members for not paying dues. All the members who were behind in their dues started to either pay more money or promised to get the money in by the weekend. No one wished to be eliminated. Plans were made for attending camp at Kemah, Wis. on 1/17/63.

MONDAY, December 10, 1962

9:00 p.m. Met with fourteen El Condors (15-19). We discussed Xmas activities. I suggested HBC for a Xmas dance. This was turned down because of the conflict some of the members of the club have with some boys who live in the CHA-HH area. Tonight the E.C.'s said they were tired of fighting and to avoid fighting they would rather have the social at the OP. Plans for a camping trip at Kemah, Wis. were discussed and the members are very enthusiastic about this.

It was very interesting to note that the members teased Bobby Tyler (16) about his strict father. It seems that Bobby's father doesn't allow him to leave home at night very often. Bobby is a rather quiet, clean-cut boy. He is in regular attendance at Crane H. S., a third-year student. Bobby became very angry at the teasing and cussed the membership in true El Condors style.

THURSDAY, December 27, 1962

9:00 p.m. I picked up eleven El Condors at Pauline "Bits" Cassagrand's home. Bits is a girl whose home serves as a hangout for the Condors. We went to HBC where we were joined by four other members. We had a brief meeting where we discussed a trip to Kemah, Wis. After the meeting the boys played basketball for an hour and a half.

THURSDAY, January 3, 1963

8:30 p.m. Returned to the OP and had club meeting with twelve El Condors. All the members that were involved in today's drinking episode were present except McMahononey, who came in still indignant and after a brief talk with me, left indignant. The day's episodes were discussed at the meeting. Carl Davids barred Gla, Johnny Jameson and McMahononey from drinking. Johnny and Gla accepted the bar. The other members agreed that their drinking had been somewhat over-excessant and promised to "cut down" in the future. They asked for a social hour next weekend and promised there would be no drinking at all. Plans were made for weekend camping at Kemah. The meeting was very orderly and quiet. The president, Ernest Coombs (18) is beginning to have more control over the membership, although his leadership with the group seems to be fading.

MONDAY, January 7, 1963

8:30 p.m. Met with fourteen El Condors (15-19). The Condors completed plans for their trip to Kemah, Wis. Plans were made for a closed social on 1/11/63. The meeting was lengthy with several arguments that were settled smoothly by the president, Ernest Coombs (18).

WEDNESDAY, January 9, 1963

8:00 p.m. Returned to OP and talked to five members of the El Condors (15-19). The E.C.'s are planning a trip to Camp Kemah, Wis. Each member is to pay \$2.00 of his own money. As of today only \$9.00 out of a possible \$38.00 has been paid. The boys complained that they just don't have the money. The boys who are working have paid their money, the others promised they will pay by Friday. Everyone seems enthusiastic about going.

THURSDAY, January 10, 1963

8:30 p.m. Eleven El Condors started their club meeting and when the meeting was about to adjourn, eight others arrived including the president, Ernest Coombs (18). After the meeting the members played cards and ping-pong.

MONDAY, January 14, 1963

9:00 p.m. Met with fourteen El Condors (16-19). Plans were completed for a weekend camping trip at Kemah CBC Camp in Wisconsin. At this meeting, I again reminded them of the behavior that was expected on the trip. I asked them to refrain from certain multi-syllable curse words and that drinking and gambling were definitely out. We had a lengthy dis-

cussion on drinking. There are two or three members who sometimes seemed to have alcoholic tendencies.

THURSDAY, January 17, 1963

2:00 p.m. Arrived at the OP and attempted to write reports. However, I was constantly interrupted by members of the El Condors (15-19). The El Condors are planning a weekend trip to Camp Kemah, Wis. tomorrow, 1/18/63. They were all excited and full of questions concerning what to take, when they would leave, and what to expect. These questions have all been answered months ago when we first began to plan the trip.

4:00 p.m. Sidney Cla (17), Arnulf Walters (17), Coolidge Clark (17), Bobby Tyler (17), and I went shopping for the trip. We purchased such things as cigarettes, candy, playing cards, etc. I was able to get a supply of ski caps from HBC, almost enough for the entire group.

8:30 p.m. Returned to the OP. All of the El Condors (19) were present. Their fringe members were also present. From the conversation one would have thought that the group was about to embark on a safari.

9:00 p.m. I finally got the E.C.'s in a meeting. They were given their final instructions for their trip. They were told how to conduct themselves and told to bring and use such items as gloves, warm socks, deodorant, and soap.

FRIDAY-SUNDAY, January 18-20, 1963

12:00 p.m. Arrived in the Horner Area. I found Walter "Junior" McMahoney (17) standing in the middle of the street at Jackson and Hamilton. He had been drinking. He was very intoxicated. I stopped the car, and down the street came seven El Condors (15-19). None of them had been drinking, but they informed me that three of the other members were drunk. The boys had been having a bon voyage party. At 4:40 p.m., they were supposed to leave for a weekend trip to Camp Kemah, Wis. At Arnulf Walters' home, I found Carl Davids (16), Wally "Blade" Clark (18) and Bart Pinter (17) quite drunk. I told them to get sober. I explained that if anyone showed any signs of drunkenness at 4:30, they would not board the bus. I used my meanest tone of voice so that they would know that I meant what I was saying. They promised me that they would be straight by 4:30 p.m., and they would not drink another drop until they returned from the trip.

I spent the remainder of the day helping the E.C.'s bring their clothes and equipment to the OP.

4:30 p.m. All the members of the E.C.'s arrived at the OP, those who were going to camp and those who were not. Everyone was quiet and sober as we boarded the bus and rode to Camp Kemah.

At Kemah the fifteen boys enjoyed the weekend and took advantage of everything the camp had to offer. They tried to ski, they spent hours on the toboggan slide. In sub-zero weather they road horseback through snow covered fields and hiked through the woods and over icy hills. They cursed the cold but the cold did not make them inactive. They enjoyed the regular balanced meals (something that most of them are not used to). They thought Miss Hanson was a terrific cook and their living quarters were "mellow." The only complaints I heard was about the water. Most of the boys had never drank well water and they hated the taste of it. The boys' conduct was almost beyond reproach. They carried out their table setting and dishwashing duties with a very small amount of grumbling. Without being told they made their beds and cleaned their rooms in the morning and then invited me in to inspect (this I suspect some of them learned while vacationing with state authorities).

The boys were not willing to spend much time inside, even late at night. They would go tobogganing or hiking. At 2:00 a.m. a group decided to go bob sledding. The informal talks that I had planned were not as successful as I had thought they would be. However, late Saturday night Blade announced that "this is the first Saturday night in two years that I haven't been tore up" (drunk). This led to a discussion on drinking and I was able to throw in my propoganda on moderation in drinking. "There is nothing wrong in having a little taste but when it makes a fool of you, no good. You lose your cool, you lose your rap, and you don't enjoy yourself." The fellows enlarged upon this by offering examples of their past experiences when they had gotten so drunk that they could not enjoy themselves. They said if they could stay at the camp forever, they would never drink. They seemed to blame excessive drinking on having nothing to do. I brought out the fact that when they have an activity it seems like an occasion for a drink. They explained that an activity night calls for "a little high but they get real drunk when there is nothing to do and they are bored." This is, of course, slightly inaccurate.

We were housed in two separate units. I divided the boys into four different groups for work details and controls. I tried to group them so there would be no personality conflicts. Coolidge Clark (17) accused me of putting all the school dropouts together. With two exceptions, I had. Coolidge is very proud of the fact that he is still in school while most of his friends have dropped out. He strongly feels that this makes him better than the others. He constantly referred to the quarters where the other group slept as the school dropouts' house. It didn't cause trouble but it caused some discussion and some of them expressed concern for getting back into school or trade school.

On Saturday morning Elwood Chaney (Arts and Crafts Instructor --HBC) arrived. He has worked at Kemah and was very familiar with it. He was very helpful especially with the horses.

The Debutantes were supposed to arrive for dinner at noon Sunday. Because of bad road conditions, they did not arrive. We left Kemah at 2:00 p.m. and arrived at the OP at 3:30 p.m. At 4:00 p.m. the Debutantes arrived and the two groups danced the rest of the afternoon. Miss Adams (volunteer) arrived with hot chocolate and cookies. A good time was had by all. The El Condors spent the afternoon telling of their experiences at Kemah.

Boys' Views of Their Extension Workers

Boys' perceptions of CYDP extension workers at their first contact were for the most part suspicious and cautionary. While we never systematically gathered data at this point for fear of interfering with and aborting budding relationships, boys sometimes spoke later to their workers about the first impressions the workers had made. Many boys wondered if the men were cops or queers or dope pushers. Some had heard about social workers and a few had had experience with social workers in other agencies. But social workers were usually associated in their minds with welfare programs and housing authorities and, as such, were not altogether to be trusted.

Interested as we were in describing extension work as the boys saw it, we decided to wait until the end of the second round of interviewing in 1965 before delving into this topic directly. It was our intention to open the way in the 1963 interviews for boys to mention the Project and its staff in several contexts, but not to encourage mention of CYDP above other sources of help by focussing on it at any time. Indeed, boys were kept unaware that our interview had any connection with their workers or the Boys Clubs and, as far as we could tell, they associated the interviews with a University of Michigan research study instead.

During both the 1963 and 1965 interviews with representative samples of boys in the control areas and in the experimental areas, and of the contact boys, we inquired in various ways about the significant adults, agencies, and institutions in their lives. We asked for example, to whom the boys would turn if they got into trouble with the police, who they thought had "something to offer" them, and whose opinions they valued. We searched boys' responses for mentions of CYDP and its workers.

As a methodological aside, it might be well to point out here some of the pitfalls in interviewing inner city boys insofar as different language

styles between middle-class interviewers (or question-framers) and lower-class respondents are concerned. The interviewers on the CYDP research team found an interesting example of such a difference in language usage or understanding during the pre-testing of an interview schedule. For this pre-test, a youth group with whom one worker had been intimately associated for more than a year was chosen, along with some other groups in both the experimental and control areas. The interviews included a series of "funnel questions," going from the general to the particular and never betraying the relationships it sought to elicit until the respondent himself had volunteered that a relationship existed; then a whole series of follow-up questions were asked to illuminate the frequency, duration and intensity of these relations between extension workers and the boys to whom they might be related in their project work.

One worker had been associating with a particularly obstreperous and delinquent gang who called themselves the Reberls. The interviewer pre-testing the schedule is here questioning a member of the Reberls.

I: Are there any organizations in this neighborhood who are trying to help young people?

R: Yeah, I guess so.

I: Can you name some of them?

R: Let's see--the boys' club, the Y maybe or the park district. That's about all.

I: Well, of those organizations that you've named, do you know anybody who works for the boys club?

R: No.

(Same question and follow-up for other organizations.)

I: Are there any adults you know personally who are trying to help boys in this neighborhood?

R: No.

Needless to say, this sequence of questions and answers was puzzling: for it was known that the worker had been in almost daily contact with this group for many months. A check of the worker's Daily Activity Reports verified this fact. The research team was not willing to conclude that the worker had been fabricating reports about his contacts with the Reberls for almost a year. The matter was such an intriguing puzzle that the Project

Director and the Associate Director of Research decided to look into the matter personally. One night, about a week later, these two staff members went to the Reberls corner and picked up the boy who had been interviewed in the pre-test. They all went to a restaurant and the following conversation took place:

PD: Hey, did anybody come around last week and ask you a lot of questions about the neighborhood?

R: Yeah--do you know him? Did you guys send him around here?

PD: Well, we didn't send him, but he is working in another branch of the project.

R: Ha-ha. They're checking on you. You better watch it. If I'da known I'da bum-rapped you guys.

RD: Did he ask you about organizations in this neighborhood who are working with kids?

R: Yeah. I told him about the boys clubs and the Y.

PD: Did he ask you to name anybody?

R: No.

RD: Didn't he ask you whether you knew any adults working with young people in this neighborhood?

R: Yeah, I guess he did. I think so.

RD: Well? What did you tell him?

R: Nothing. I didn't tell him anything.

PD: Why not?

R: There wasn't anything to tell.

PD: You mean you don't know any adults in this neighborhood who are working with kids?

R: That's right.

RD: That's right? What about Frank Cooper?

R: Frank Cooper? What about Frank Cooper? He isn't an adult, he's one of us. (emphasis added)

PD: You mean that when he asked you about adults working with kids in this neighborhood, you told him you didn't know any?

R: That's right.

PD: But isn't Frank Cooper an adult that you know?

R: Oh yeah, I guess so.

RD: Then why didn't you mention him when you were asked about that?

R: I don't know, I never thought of it that way.

Naturally enough, boys in the control neighborhoods rarely named anyone connected with the Project. It is a matter of some evaluative importance that almost never were Project staff members cited by those boys in the neighborhood not in direct contact with workers--that is, the non-contact experimentals; but more of that fact later.

Many contact boys mentioned CYDP staff, their extension workers for the most part, spontaneously during the course of our interviews. Furthermore, they were mentioned markedly more often in 1965 than in 1963. Of those people named in the event of trouble with the police, Project personnel accounted for 35 percent in 1963 and 46 percent in 1965. Their greater importance was even more marked among the older boys on whom the Project increasingly focussed; for while boys under 13 actually mentioned CYDP workers less often over the years, the older boys named them increasingly more often. Similarly, extension workers seemed to have "something to offer" to only 23 percent of the contact boys in 1963 but to 40 percent in 1965. Eleven percent of the boys in 1963 included an extension worker among the three people whose opinions he most valued, 25 percent in 1965. All in all, 68 percent mentioned their worker sometime during the 1965 interviews.

Despite the increasing visibility of extension workers over the years, it is important to note that not by any means all of the contact boys mentioned them spontaneously as significant figures. But we must remember that workers' relationships with contact boys varied considerably from the familial relationship which developed between Frank Cooper and Carl Houts to superficial familiarity. Of course, the deeper the relationship and the more time they spent together, the more boys were likely to name their extension workers as sources of help. This accounts in part for the various proportions of the boys who mentioned their workers (as high as half, as low as 20 percent) since some characteristically established deeper

relationships.

When the main body of each boy's 1965 interview had been completed, we felt free to ask supplementary questions of the contact sample specifically about their association with the Project and its workers. Up to this point they had had opportunities to talk about this; and even during supplementary questioning, we narrowed the focus only by degrees to determine, by the specificity necessary to elicit mentions of the Project, how salient it was for each of the contact boys.

To the boys who had already spontaneously introduced the name of their CYDP worker, our interviewers said, "Now, I would like to ask you some questions about" Those who failed to mention a worker were shown a list of five names "of some people who work with youth in your neighborhood. "Do you recognize any of these?" Ten percent of the contact boys still were apparently completely unaware of the worker who had listed them among their contacts, indicating that these contacts were probably of the most superficial recognition by the worker which was not reciprocated, at least by name.

The contact boys who expressed awareness of their workers generally agreed both about what extension worker did and the relative importance of the various services they provided. From the boys' point of view, all of the extension workers worked in pretty much the same ways (see Table 5:2).

Chief among their activities, the boys reported, was giving help and advice. This reflects the time spent by workers informally counseling individual boys and groups during bull sessions at the Outpost, in the station wagons, on street corners, in coffee shops, and elsewhere. It also defines the image which encouraged the boys to seek out their extension worker when they were in a jam. The second most frequent description of the workers was that they took boys for rides, and third, that they were good guys to have around when there was trouble. References to "trouble" in this last item referred mainly to two kinds of crises, getting caught at delinquency by the police and getting involved in conflict with other boys or groups. Boys appropriately viewed the workers as men whose contacts with the authorities and with a widespread network of boys' groups enabled them to ward off or ameliorate such difficulties.

The contact boys were also generally agreed that "giving help and

Table 5:2

Ten Most Descriptive and Most Important Extension Worker Characteristics
as Perceived by the Contact Boys

<u>Rank Order</u>		<u>Items</u>
Descriptive	Importance	
1	1	Gives advice and information
2	-	Takes boys on trips and rides
3	4	A good guy to have around when there is trouble
4	2	Helps boys think clearly about things
5	3	Helps boys find jobs
6	8	Sets a good example for boys to follow
7	6	Sponsors clubs and helps put on socials
8	7	Someone to talk over personal things with
9	-	Helps boys learn or play sports
10	5	Helps boys by talking to other adults, such as teachers or police
-	9	Helps enforce the law
-	10	Provides a place for boys to get together

advice" was not only the most characteristic activity of their extension workers but also the most important. There is evidence here then that the workers were meeting the felt needs of the boys. Indeed, Table 5:2 demonstrates that those three functions regarded as most important by the boys were among the five which the boys regarded as most characteristic.

Apparently the many automobile rides and extended trips provided by their extension workers seemed trivial as ends in themselves to the boys who seldom even ranked them among the ten most important functions. From the workers' point of view, of course, the trips and rides provided many of the opportunities to provide the advice and information which the boys regarded as so important, and this was especially true in the Oldtown area where there was no outpost at which to gather.

One somewhat disturbing indication in these data is that the workers --and the Project as a whole is especially implicated here--did not help boys find jobs as much as the boys wanted. This function is ranked third in importance but fifth as a characteristic of the worker. Many of the boys, especially the older ones who had graduated or dropped out from high school, wanted jobs, but these boys had much difficulty finding them, and much difficulty keeping them, as we shall see later. So the need to serve as an employment agency was great, and apparently the boys believed it was not met adequately by CYDP.

We were able to group boys' descriptions of workers' activities into clusters in order to get a clearer picture of the various functions boys perceived workers to be filling.² The major cluster of descriptions seems to describe youth work generally and includes these items:

helps boys by talking to them
 helps boys think clearly about things
 helps youth get along with other youth
 sponsors clubs and helps out on socials
 helps youth and adults get along together
 makes it possible for boys to have a place to get together
 treats boys nice and is good to them.

²Factor analysis of the rankings boys gave to the items presented to them produced these clusters. The factors, the proportions of the variance accounted for by each, and item loadings are presented in Table 5:3.

Table 5:3

Factors in Street Work from the Point of View of the Contact Boys

<u>Factors</u>	<u>Items</u>	<u>Factor Loading</u>
I (43%)	Helps boys by talking to them	78
	Helps boys think clearly about things	74
	Helps youth get along with other youth	73
	Sponsors clubs and helps put on socials	71
	helps youth and adults get along together	63
	Makes it possible for boys to have a place to get together	63
	Treats boys nice and is good to them	58
II (6%)	Is like a mother	71
	Buys food and clothing	62
III (6%)	Plays sports	61
	Makes boys feel comfortable	51
IV (6%)	Someone to talk over personal things with	65
	Helps boys by talking to other adults	55
<hr/>		
(61% of variance accounted for)		

Some of the boys also identified a nurturing function of their workers, describing them as being "like mothers" and people who "buy you food and clothing." Others seemed to see something of friend and companion in their workers, describing them both as athletes and people who "make boys feel comfortable." And still others defined the role that workers sometimes played by intervening for them in the adult world, pointing out that their workers were both people "to talk over personal things with" and who "help boys by talking to other adults."

While there was considerable agreement among boys about what their workers did, both among the contact boys of the same workers and among boys contacted by different workers, there was little agreement among them about the kind of people their workers were. Some boys said their worker was the greatest guy in the world and that they would do almost anything he wanted; others put their workers down, relegating them to exploitation. We

presented the sample of contact boys with a series of items and asked simply if each described their worker. Table 5:4 presents the proportions of boys who said yes to each item. Statistical analysis revealed that

Table 5:4

Boys' Views of Extension Workers
(N=184)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Proportions who say item fits their worker</u>
(1) Easy to take advantage of	19%
(2) Is a phoney	6%
(3) Expects too much out of boys	26%
(4) Someone you feel close to	76%
(5) Someone whom you want to be like	56%
(6) Someone who understands you	78%
(7) Someone you respect	90%
(8) Is like a father	59%
(9) Is like a mother	23%
(10) Is like an older brother	78%
(11) Is like a friend	94%
(12) Is like a teacher	70%
(13) Is like a neighbor	59%
(14) Is like a policeman	36%
(15) Is like a priest or minister	31%
(16) Someone you trust	72%

boys put only three of these items together: "someone you feel close to," "someone who understands you," and "someone you trust." These three together describe a worker-boy relationship which is "tight." The fact that

boys cluster them is significant because, as we will see in the next section, the workers also identify this characteristic of their relationship and believe it to be important.

To summarize our impressions of extension work as the boys saw it: The boys seemed to recognize that extension workers were professionals, nevertheless believed that they were personally motivated to help boys. Boys deferred to their workers, agreeing overwhelmingly that they deserved respect, but at the same time regarded them as friends. Other roles which the workers seemed to resemble to most boys were older brother and mother. The workers seemed more clear to boys as professional workers than as people.

Most important about the workers were their adult wisdom and their effective position in the adult world, both of which they were willing to use for the boys' benefit. Boys felt that they needed less of the informal recreational opportunities than workers provided and more help with getting jobs than workers were willing or able to give.

Workers had made sufficient impression on about two-thirds of their contacts to be cited spontaneously by them as somehow important in their lives, and another 20 percent acknowledged their familiarity with a worker when prodded. Over the course of the Project, the workers assumed significant positions in the lives of a greater proportion of their contact boys. But their significance, indeed their very visibility, remained sharply limited to the boys with whom they worked fairly actively. They did not become widely known among boys in the target areas whom they did not themselves know well.

Worker-Boy Relationships from the Workers' Perspective³

When extension workers had been in the field for over a year, they were questioned systematically and intensively about their views of their relationships with boys. The research team had discussed their boys with them frequently before this and had also observed them at work with groups and individuals. At this point, an attempt was made to collect comparable

³Material for this section has been adapted from Caplan, N. S., Suttles, G., et al. (1964).

data from the seven workers on the streets at the time.

Each of the workers was provided a set of cards bearing the names of his contact boys. He was asked to sort these cards into piles ranging from "most" to "least" on a series of dimensions which seemed to be important in descriptions of worker-boy relationships. For example, each worker was asked to report the degree of contact he was having with each boy at the time. He was permitted to make as many piles as he wished, depending on how finely he could discriminate degrees of contact with his clients. After every sort, each worker was asked to describe the degree of contact which each pile represented.

These are the dimensions along which the workers ordered their relationships with boys, together with a description of scale points which were fairly common across all workers on each dimension, and with the approximate percentage of boys at each point on each dimension. (The number of contact boys will vary slightly from one dimension to another because workers were allowed to exclude any boys on whom they could make no firm judgment.)

A. Contact (N=598)

1. Getting Acquainted: The earliest stage of contact. The boy and the worker "size" one another up during this stage. The worker uses these early encounters to ascertain the boy's personal needs. (20%)
2. Programming: The worker begins to organize boys into groups, or for the first time, he begins to deal with existing groups on a group level; he encourages and helps the group to plan and carry out activities of the group's own choosing (socials, dances, parties, picnics, athletic events, etc.). (40%)
3. Personal Counseling: The worker deals with the boy on an individual basis. His objective during this stage is to help the boy work out his personal problems, while keeping the boy involved in programmed group activities. (32%)
4. Graduation: In the worker's judgment, the boy has made sufficient progress to be turned over to more conventional agency services (counseling, employment, recreation, education, etc.); or, according to the boy's needs, to be gradually eased out of the worker's program into a more autonomous social existence. (4%)

B. Influence (N=591)

1. No influence: Worker has not tried to influence yet, or boy is non-responsive to attempts at influence. (34%)
2. Some influence: Influence over boy limited to specific occasions where worker actively attempts to influence boy. Worker's influence is limited to situations where he is present. (35%)

3. Maximum influence: The boy accepts the worker's standards of conduct and acknowledges them as binding regardless of the worker's presence. (30%)
- C. Tightness (N=580)
1. None: The boy does not "open up" to the worker or confide in him. This may result because, over time, the boy has been too guarded, or because the worker has known the boy for only a short period of time. (18%)
 2. Moderate: The boy has "opened up" to the worker, but not completely. The boy will confide to the worker only on certain matters of his own choosing. (40%)
 3. Maximum: The boy has "opened up" completely. He comes to the worker with problems on his own initiative. He will freely discuss personal matters and will not resist providing private information of interest to the worker. (42%)
- D. Success (N=579)
1. No change in the desired direction. Either worker has not yet attempted to change boy or boy remains impervious to the worker's efforts. (56%)
 2. Minimum or some change in desired direction. Boy has made some progress in the desired direction but still demands close attention by the worker if he is to become a "success." Boy is pervious to further change. (19%)
 3. Maximum change in desired direction. Boy has already shown outstanding changes in desired direction. Change is viewed as an accomplished fact rather than a potentiality. (25%)
- E. How well the boy is liked by the worker (N=455)
1. Worker dislikes boy. (5%)
 2. Worker is neutral towards boy. (25%)
 3. Worker likes boy. (58%)
 4. Highest level of liking. (11%)
- F. How well the worker is liked by the boy (N=554)
1. High liking. (41%)
 2. Medium liking. (44%)
 3. Low liking. (15%)
- G. Delinquency: Worker's estimate (N=558)
1. Not delinquent: Either the boy has had little contact with law enforcement bodies or his attitudes and associations do not suggest that he would ever get into serious trouble with the law. (51%)
 2. Slightly delinquent. Has had minor contacts with law enforcement bodies. Also, current attitudes and associations are such that further contacts appear likely. (27%)

3. Very delinquent. Boy has a history of serious encounters with law enforcement bodies and has established a definite pattern of behavior in violation of legal norms. Boys range from those who regularly commit anti-social acts to those engaged in disciplined criminal activities. (22%)

H. Time spent with boy (N=608)

The following are based upon an estimated duration period of two hours for each interaction (group and/or individual context).

1. Once a month or less. (7%)
2. More than once a month, but less than once a week. (8%)
3. Once a week. (40%)
4. More than once a week, but less than once a day. (17%)
5. Once a day or more. (28%)

Note: The workers employed dissimilar criteria for the following items, making it impossible to present common trends.

- I. Prestige of boy among his peers.
- J. Need for help.
- K. Time boy has been known to the worker.

It is worth noting that the workers were least sure of how well they liked each of the boys with whom they were working; they excluded more boys from this sort than from any other. This is puzzling because they were asked here merely to indicate their own feelings with which one might expect them to be familiar. Still, the workers were more often confident of how much boys liked them than how much they liked boys. We suspect the reason for this was that however important their feelings toward their clients may have been, this was not often discussed with them as part of their work. Rather it was generally assumed by the Project staff that workers would take a professional stance, helping boys regardless of their personal feelings about them.

By correlating each worker's sorts with one another, we were able to discover indirectly what the workers believed were the connections among the various important aspects of their relationships with boys. We have seen, for example, that workers reported having a substantial degree of influence over 30 percent of their contacts. The correlations with influence on Table 5:5 indicate that the workers believed that the tightness of a relationship--the degree to which a boy confided in the worker--is that dimension most closely related to his influence over the

Table 5:5

Variables Having Similar Intercorrelations across all Workers*

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Contact	---	.56 (.43-.71)	.52 (.28-.64)	.43 (.20-.60)	.36 (.27-.47)	.38 (.33-.44)	.47 (.22-.85)
2. Influence		---	.58 (.50-.73)	.52 (.24-.70)	.48 (.28-.59)	.42 (.26-.64)	.48 (.26-.66)
3. Tightness			---	.57 (.48-.72)	.51 (.17-.65)	.48 (.42-.57)	.61 (.33-.79)
4. Success				---	.57 (.52-.63)	.39 (.27-.48)	.46 (.31-.64)
5. Liking for boy					---	.44 (.21-.56)	.53 (.43-.56)
6. Liking by boy						---	.41 (.27-.53)
7. Time spent							---

Note.--Top figure represents the mean τ_b . Lower figure represents the range.

*P < .05 for all τ 's, using a one tail test of significance.

boy. We have seen too that the workers believed that they had been successful in making good citizens of a fourth of their current contacts. They most closely associated the degree of tightness in the relationship and their liking for a boy with the degree of success they had had. It seems likely that the workers believed that tightness was often a prerequisite to success but would readily agree that their liking for a boy might have been either an aid to their achieving the success they noted or a consequence of the boy's positive responsiveness.

The extension workers apparently regarded their work in similar ways. Seven of the ten dimensions could clearly be described in common terms among them, and these seven related to one another similarly among all the workers. Together they present a description of their relationships after about a year of working with boys marked by wide variation with enough progress and success to be rewarding and encouraging. At this time, boys were in several stages of relationship, some just being brought into the Project, others already closely associated with it, few already alumni. The potential in a relationship as a means of achieving project goals seemed, from the workers' point of view, to depend most on the degree to which a boy took the initiative to share his problems with his worker and took the advice he was given. It is also clear that no single aspect of the relationship was regarded as **decisive** compared to the others.

Dynamics of the Worker-Boy Relationship⁴

The CYDP program was designed on the assumption that a worker's relationship to a boy was one of the major tools for changing the course of his behavior. We have seen that the workers themselves emphasized the emotional aspects of their relationships with boys, relating the dimension of tightness most closely to the degree to which they had achieved effective influence. It seemed important to us to investigate this belief systematically in order to discover how important this or perhaps other aspects of the relationship were for achieving the Project's goals.

We therefore examined the protocols of the interviews in 1963 with

⁴Material in this section is summarized from research reported in Mock (1965) and Caplan (1968)

186 contact boys, those reported to be the current case load of the CYDP workers. We determined as best we could from the things each boy may have said about his worker what the nature of their relationship was. (Any mention of a worker was altogether spontaneous, in the context of questions about his problems and about adults generally; for no boy was specifically asked about his worker or any aspect of the Project.) We measured the degree to which each relationship as revealed by the boy contained elements of encouragement, understanding, companionship, and friendship--the pattern of tightness. At the same time, we measured the degree to which each boy's interview presented him as a Project success, in terms of regular school attendance, aspirations for as much education as he could get, wholesome leisure-time activities, and avoidance of a delinquency record.

These data failed to support the idea that tightness was crucial to a worker's effectiveness with a boy. Boys who gave evidence of a close relationship with their workers no more epitomized Project success than boys less close. Indeed, one intriguing result of this study was that the contact boys who mentioned their workers most often in any context at all were likely to be just those who were furthest from the Project's goals. That is, boys who reported in several different ways that they were tight with their workers, that they depended upon them often for advice, and that they were frequent recipients of services, were the ones most likely to be out of school, hanging on street corners, and in trouble with the police.

But in 1963, CYDP was young. It was reasonable to believe then that the active ingredients of worker-boy relationships had not yet had their chance to work. The fact that the boys tightest with their workers turned out to be the most problematical could plausibly be explained by the workers making special efforts to get tight with the boys most needy. Given time, this strategy might pay off.

We were encouraged in this line of explanation by an investigation of the relationships the unserved boys--the boys in the control neighborhoods and the non-contact boys in the target area--had with adults generally. Among these boys we found that being tight with adults was related to their recognition of those adults as sources of guidance. This emotional element in their relationships, more than the specific kinds of expertise the adults might have had or the adults' generosity

with their time or their resources, seemed to make a mentor of the adult.

But further investigation revealed that among the controls and non-contacts as well, the desired impact on behavior was missing. Among these random samples of teenaged boys, as among the contact boys, boys' reports of their tightness with adults and their apparent acceptance of adults as guides were not related to the laudability of the boys' behavior. While such boys were not more likely to misbehave, as they were among the contacts, they were no more likely not to misbehave either. And it did not seem to us so reasonable to believe that time would tell in these cases; for the "project" of relating to these boys was not new, the adults involved were parents, teachers, and the like, and their efforts had been going on for some time.

But perhaps time would make the difference for the Project. Perhaps the professional skills of the extension workers and their opportunity to devote so much of their time exclusively to boys in need could capitalize on time.

So we followed the relationships between 109 selected contact boys and their workers for a year, making weekly observations and ratings of their progress. On the one hand, we defined the degree of success the Project seemed to be having with each boy in terms of four stages, thus:

Stage 5. Receptivity to personal counseling. The boy enters willingly into a one-to-one counseling relationship with the worker. He meets the worker privately a minimum of twice a week to discuss personal problems. He no longer views the worker as only a group sponsor, but as a personal confidant as well; the acquaintanceship becomes "tight."

Stage 6. Meaningful relationship. The boy demonstrates overt agreement with the worker's opinions concerning issues of personal and social adjustment. The boy "opens up" or "un-plugs" when discussing private feelings with the worker. Conjointly, they make plans to initiate activities designed to have life-shaping effects upon the boy's future. In social work parlance, the boy is considered "reached."

Stage 7. Commitment and preparation for change. Although there is a many-sidedness to action objectives, at Stage 7 a focussing down and more or less coherent striving around a particular change behavior objective becomes evident here. The boy commits himself verbally to the adoption of the new behaviors required to meet the objective and does not deter the worker from instituting a variety of preparatory arrangements and pragmatic intervention steps to facilitate the behavior change.

he appears ready for a conscientious effort to modify his behavior along lines which are often at variance with past or established behavior.

Stage 8. Transfer and Autonomy. The "success" stage. Whereas all prior program adjustment stages pertain to operational or instrumental goals, this stage represents the final goal. The behavior change is made manifest and survives in post-program or "real life" situations. The boy "stands on his own feet" and indicates by independent actions that he has successfully incorporated behavior changes planned during the earlier stages of the worker-boy relationship. Examples would be a boy who accepts and remains with a job after a past history of unwillingness to accept the discipline required for successful job holding or a drop out who returns to and remains in school. Specific "success" objective depends, of course, upon the individual subject and his idiosyncratic behavior. Each "success" objective is in accord with the nature of the problem presented by the subject. (Caplan, 1968:67-68).

All the 109 boys selected on this sub-study were at Stage 5 when this study began and had never been any further along.

On the other hand, we rated the amount of effort each worker devoted to each of his boys each week, thus:⁵

1. Minimal worker input. Routine recreational and social services are provided the subject. The worker may give some attention to individual problem-solving for the subject, but only in a group setting.
2. In addition to group work, low-level individual counseling or minor personal favors are provided occasionally.
3. Individual counseling is provided routinely three or more times a week in addition to worker-sponsored group activity.
4. The worker begins to provide individual services in addition to counseling; he offers a helping hand in a miscellany of individual services, e.g., lends money, provides transportation, talks to key adults such as teachers, police or potential employers on behalf of the subject. He connects the subject to resources which might otherwise be inaccessible.
5. Day to day worker-boy interaction. The worker helps the boy over and beyond what would be required routinely. He tries hard to stimulate change and explores the possibility of providing the subject greater access to potential resources in

⁵Independent raters agreed on the ratings of stages-of-success in over 85 percent of the cases, and in over 74 percent of the ratings of amount-of-effort. (Pearson r's were .81 and .85 respectively.)

order to create the proper conditions for the desired behavior change. Normally at any one time a worker can handle no more than five to seven boys at this input level without excess strain upon himself and the proportion of program resources made available to him.


6. The supreme effort. The worker's concern for the boy's welfare and adjustment reaches the most personal sphere of his own life. The worker resorts to an all-out effort to modify and influence the subject's behavior regardless of the difficulties encountered. The worker spends part of his free time in an effort to help the boy, often bringing him into his own home for periods of a few days, weeks or even longer. Without belaboring the obvious, from the viewpoint of the program the worker and his resources are largely pre-empted for a single subject. Normally, at any one point in time, a worker can handle only one or two boys at this intensive work level and, even then, only for relatively short periods. (Caplan, 1968:68-69)

It is clear that the workers made progress with these boys. All of them had begun at Stage 5 of success, and by the end of a year of observation, only 22 percent were rated at that stage or below (see Figure 5:1). Seven percent had reached that stage where the observers felt that they were now on their way to independent constructive lives. But most of the boys after a year's work fell short of success in these terms. Furthermore, Figure 5:1 invites an erroneous interpretation of the year's events, an interpretation that most boys, beginning with some fairly close relationship with their workers, advanced steadily from there toward autonomous, responsible behavior. The fact is that underlying the static image of Figure 5:1 is a series of advances and setback better represented as the series of cycles in Figure 5:2. The numbers over the straight arrows between each pair of stages are the numbers of boys who rested at the higher stage of the pair at year's end. Beneath the series of stages are reversal lines, showing the proportions of boys who reached Stage 7 of "almost success" one, two and three times, but who then retreated from it to other stages. So a barrier appears to exist between commitment to change (Stage 7) and responsible autonomy (Stage 8), one which was seldom surmounted during the year.

What effect did workers' efforts have on boys' progress and retreat from the Project's goals? Boys with whom workers established more meaningful relationships (moving from Stage 5 to Stage 6) did not receive much if any more attention than boys who remained tight with their workers (at Stage 5). It is possible that they selected themselves somehow, moving

Figure 5:1

Percent of Subjects at Various Adjustment Stage Positions One Year after Stage 5 Classification




*Reprinted from the Journal of Social Issues, 1968, 24, p. 71

more closely toward their workers on their own initiative, impelled by some attractions for him and some needs of their own. Workers' responses to boys' approaches made a difference at Stage 6, however. If a worker intensified his efforts within about five months, a boy was likely to commit himself to changing his behavior (Stage 7); and if the worker did not, the boy was more likely to retreat back into his group of peers and the relationship tended to wither.

Once a boy committed himself to change, the worker's intensification of his efforts was no more related to the boy's taking on autonomous responsibility than it was to his abandoning his commitment and resuming the previous close and dependent relationship. And the boys studied tended to do the latter much more quickly than the former regardless of

Figure 5:2*

Phase diagram of major adjustment stage reclassification trends for the three successive backsliding orders moving in a clockwise direction.



*Reprinted from the Journal of Social Issues, 1968, 24, p. 75.

the workers' efforts, those who dropped back to Stage 6 doing so on the average of about two months sooner than those advancing to Stage 8.

The workers' response to those who abandoned their commitment to change their behavior was usually to intensify their efforts. But apparently to no avail, for while their efforts might temporarily rededicate some boys to change, the boys' tendency was to retreat even further from commitment thereafter. And so on through successive cycles of increased efforts by workers, rewarded temporarily by apparent improvement in the attitudes and behavior of the boys, followed more and more quickly by the boys moving further and further from the Project's goals.

Observation of this fruitless process suggested the analog of the "stake animal" to some members of the CYDP staff (Mattick and Caplan, 1963). It seemed as though the attention of the worker was attracted almost exclusively by one boy in a group the worker was serving. That

boy's problems usually appeared more numerous and more serious than the other members', and he seemed willing, even eager, to enlist the worker's help. That boy was like the "stake animal" set out by hunters to lure a predator quarry within range. By further analogy, the worker--more precisely, the resources he had to offer--was the group's quarry.

The "stake animal" concept does not assert that the other boys in the group consciously and cunningly push one of their members forward to play this role. The idea is rather that the worker, the "stake animal," and the other boys get drawn into such a pattern of functional relationships. Several factors combine to produce this situation: the worker's motivations to be of help to an obviously needy boy who seems, in the words of Mattick and Caplan, "almost rotten ripe with the musk of potential reform"; the "stake animal's" real need for a lot of attention; and the other boys' relief from being overtly or subtly pursued to change their behavior while still receiving the benefits an extension worker offers.

At the same time, the nature of this arrangement creates resistances to change. Everybody involved gets some satisfaction out of it for a time. But the situation wears on the extension worker finally. The "stake animal," with whom the worker imagined or at least hoped he was making some progress, never quite makes it. The worker doubles and redoubles his efforts, but usually the result is the cyclic process we have described--a boy appearing to move on the vehicle of a tight relationship with his worker toward Project goals of a wholesome and independent life, only to fall back again and again before that goal is achieved.

So it was possible for extension workers to establish close, interpersonal relationships with the worst-behaved of inner-city boys, that is, to reach the unreached. But try as they did to use such a relationship to achieve a boy's enduring commitment to behave better, to strive in more conventional ways to improve his present and future, their level of achievement was generally quite low. Ultimate success, in terms of developing autonomous responsibility in boys, almost always eluded them.

This is not to state here that the Project was never successful. As we shall see shortly, CYDP was able to achieve some circumscribed success with some boys, and more important, to demonstrate some of the principles upon which success in this kind of work may be founded. Rather, these

data on worker-boy relationships indicate that their particularly interpersonal aspects, what street workers commonly call tightness, is apparently not their effective ingredient. The theoretical and folklorical emphasis placed on tightness seems to be misleading.

Before going on to examine what effects the Project may have had on specific facets of boys' behavior and attitudes, another lesson should be drawn from the previous discussion. It will be useful in understanding the next section.

We might have analyzed our data in such a way as to take account of the amount of effort workers invested in boys and the strength of the relationships between them. That is, we might have differentiated among those boys whom the workers listed as their contacts, the ones receiving more or less direct service, in order better to gauge Project effectiveness with those more and less involved in its program. What we learned from our studies of worker-boy relationships persuaded us, however, that we ought not to differentiate among contact boys in this way. For it became clear that, consistent with the function they were supposed to perform, workers invested more effort in, got closer to, and brought more program to just those boys who seemed most resistant to change. It would not therefore have been a valid research technique to measure Project success against different degrees of boys' involvements; for in practice, Project success was in part inversely determining boys' involvements. So in what follows, we treat the contact boys undifferentiated by the degree of service they actually received, pointing out where appropriate what differences that might have made.

Effects of CYDP

It was pointed out earlier that some of the goals of the Project for boys were ultimate, in the sense that they stated what finally was aimed at; others were instrumental, to be achieved in order that the ultimate goals might be reached. The ultimate goals were to reduce the amount and seriousness of delinquent behavior and to increase boys' participation in conventional and constructive activities.

Some estimates of the Project's achievement of instrumental goals among adults and institutions in the target areas were presented in the

previous chapter. In this section, we will consider CYDP's effects on boys' lives directly, first in ways instrumental to achieving its ultimate goals and then in terms of the ultimate goals themselves.

Throughout this section, we must bear in mind another instrumental-ultimate goal pattern; work with contact boys, especially work with the fifteen percent of boys in the target areas with whom workers were fairly actively engaged, was considered instrumental to affecting the total community of boys. Therefore, we will be discussing in turn the impact of the Project on the contact boys and on all the boys 10 to 19 years old in the target area, as we were able to estimate this impact by observing random samples of them over time.

Boys' Standards of Behavior

Yablonsky (1962), recounting the gang killing of young Michael Farmer, quotes a boy's explanation of why he regretted not having actually stabbed the victim himself, "If I would of got the knife, I would have stabbed him. That would have gave me more of a build-up. People would have respected me for what I've done and things like that. They would say, 'There goes a cold killer' (p. 8)." Here, in stark relief, is one of the forces with which delinquency prevention efforts must contend, boys' beliefs that delinquent behavior has status value in their communities, at least among their age-mates. Indeed, Miller's work (1958) with Boston boys has convinced him that a major impetus to delinquent behavior is its encouragement by the behavioral standards of the lowest social status.

Certainly at the time the Project was launched, delinquent behavior and a police record to prove it was a reliable way of achieving status among youngsters in the target and control areas. When the boys were asked, early on in the Project, what boys needed to do "to get other boys to look up to them," the single most frequent response advised, variously, to "be tough" and "get in trouble." Younger boys especially, the pre- and early teen group, offered this prescription; and while more older than younger boys mentioned scholastic achievement and amiability, they too most often cited delinquent behavior.

Insofar as the criteria for status among peers shape behavior among boys, the pro-delinquency norms of the cohort of target youth was a prime candidate for change. But there was not much change in these standards over the course of the Project years. Overall, six percent less of the

contact boys and nine percent less of the non-contact experimentals thought delinquent behavior conferred status in 1965 compared to 1963, while seven percent more of the control boys thought so. These differences are marginal, however, and cannot be counted on as testimony to reliable change.

One target group shifted noticeably in this regard, however, especially against the background of its control group. It alone is responsible for most of the differences outlined above. The 13- to 15-year old contact boys declined markedly in the proportion who thought delinquent behavior enhanced one's reputation among other teens: 68 percent thought so in 1963 and 54 percent in 1965. Meanwhile, ten percent fewer of their age-mates in their neighborhoods gave this response, and eight percent more of the comparable controls did (see Table 5:6). It is un-

Table 5:6

Proportion of Boys Who Say Delinquent Behavior Adds to the Prestige of Boys among Their Peers by treatment, age and time period

Age	Control		Experimental		Contact	
	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965
10-12 (N)	56 (93)	62 (105)	65 (88)	59 (118)	67 (30)	54 (24)
13-15 (N)	47 (64)	55 (89)	57 (69)	47 (47)	68 (37)	54 (53)
16-19 (N)	31 (67)	47 (53)	38 (63)	31 (61)	31 (94)	43 (131)

likely that this is a chance difference. Still, it is an isolated change and merits little attention unless it can be shown to be part of a pattern of change among these boys.

Other attempts to discover change in boys' standards for behavior revealed no significant modifications. Between a quarter and a third of all the boys in 1963 and 1965 thought that avoiding delinquent behavior was important to "getting ahead in life," and almost every boy also mentioned

some constructive path to adult success, like scholastic achievement and working hard. However, only about half of the boys believed that the paths to adult respectability and peer recognition coincided, and this pattern did not change, except, as we have noted, among the 13- to 15-year old contact boys.

School

The numbers of boys who formally quit school at their earliest legitimate opportunity was characteristically high in the Project's target and control areas, as it is in all the inner cities of the United States. Three to four times more boys were dropping out than were graduating. This fact was an important one for CYDP for it bore directly on its ultimate goals and the Project made vigorous efforts to alter it.

The literature on delinquents and on individuals who rise successfully from poverty abounds with data on academic success and failure. One of the most consistent characteristics of juvenile delinquents is their poor performance in school; one of the almost essential conditions for social mobility in modern America is scholarship at least adequate for a high school diploma if not beyond. It was clear from the start of CYDP that helping boys become better students, at minimum keeping them in school through their high school graduation would be instrumental to reducing delinquent behavior among them and easing their way to better lives. The Project intended to add its weight to the influence of parents, teachers, relatives, neighbors, and the mass media urging boys to get as much schooling as they possibly could.

CYDP did not take this task lightly. On the one hand, as we saw in the last chapter, staff members felt strongly that the boys themselves were not the only site of the educational problem, and perhaps not the major site. The school system itself seemed to need radical revision to accommodate to the nature of inner city boys, many of them sons of blacks or of European immigrants whose own education was minimal, whose own culture differed in some important ways from the schools', and who thus could offer little more support than encouragement to their sons' education. On the other hand, the staff also recognized that for some boys it was too late for school; they had grown too old or too bitter, had fallen too far behind or were too handicapped for formal education

to be feasible or profitable for them.

The Project worked on educational problems in many ways. One was to persuade those boys who had dropped out, but who seemed still to be able to profit from school, to go back; and to persuade the school, some school, to take them back. Workers, finding boys at the club or outpost doors or hanging around the street corner during school hours, urged, begged and threatened them to get them back into school. They provided no recreational programs during school hours, and they withheld aid in finding jobs if they felt a boy should be in school instead. Workers also acted as volunteer truant officers, finding boys who, they had been informed, had not shown up at school for a day or more, and making as sure as they could that the boy attended. Workers also cultivated relationships with school staffs, getting to know them and to be known, providing Boys Clubs support and services as much as possible to cement relationships with them. Then, when a boy was willing to return to school, the worker could speak with a familiar counselor or principal about taking him back and about an educational program which might hold him.

An indication of the intensity of this service is the number of returns to school which were actually effected. Workers' daily logs, for the last quarters of the years 1962 through 1965, recorded successively 66, 53, 21, and 63 returns of boys who were members of identifiable groups. (Not each of these were separate boys, for some boys were returned twice and even three times.) So extension workers averaged about eight school returns apiece during these four month periods, the busiest season for this effort. Over the years of the Project's existence, about 950 boys were gotten back into school about 1400 times.

CYDP also sponsored formal tutoring programs to support boys going to school. Many of the contact boys were poor students and potential dropouts, who, if they were to graduate from high school, needed personalized help with their lessons. Abundant tutors volunteered from local universities and even from a high school honors group from one of the best rated schools in the city. Schools, churches, and recreational agencies freely contributed space. The hardest thing to produce was the boys to be tutored. They were reluctant to participate for the same reasons that threatened eventually to separate them from school, and because of the incursions such after-school programs made on their free

time. So they were induced to come in--with gymnasium periods afterwards, with free refreshments, with transportation to and from the sessions, and with awards for attendance.

Tutors, despite their initial enthusiasm, also needed support and encouragement. Rarely were they sustained by early manifest improvement in their tutees' scholarship. They needed to be assured, in the absence of proof, that they were making a difference. Some began to feel put upon by their tutees because they thought they were being used to do homework while their tutees just sat by waiting for their assignments to be done.

Workers engaged in a lot of informal education, especially in English usage. Fluent themselves in the boys' argot, they could move from that idiom to conventional speech, attempting to move the boys with them. One worker was especially active and inventive in this area. He made it a practice, for example, to respond to boys' common inquiry, "Where it at?" with "Behind the preposition," refusing to give information until boys asked correctly. Workers taught boys new words, and dictionaries were kept at the Horner outpost to help boys discover what the worker had just said. Deliberate discussions and games were built around speech. The workers felt, along with George Bernard Shaw, that social stratification is in part solidified by differing speech patterns in the various strata, and that, if boys were to advance themselves, they would have to learn conventional English. Not only their success at school but also their job opportunities depended on it.

CYDP efforts to improve the scholarship of boys in the target areas did not go unnoticed by the contact boys. When asked in the latter part of the 1965 interview, "In what ways has (boy's worker) affected or tried to affect your life," the largest single kind of response (23 percent) mentioned education. The proportion of contact boys mentioning Project workers as having helped them with educational problems rose from 11 percent in 1963 to 25 percent in 1965. While a good many less than a majority of the contact boys had received such help, fully one-fourth should be considered a significantly large figure when one remembers that some of these boys had only brief and sporadic contact with the program and that some of the boys who were in frequent contact did not need such help.

The success of the Project's attempts to improve boys' status as

students was measured in several ways. The value boys put on their education was assessed, as well as their plans for completing high school and perhaps getting more education. They were also asked to estimate their own chances to graduate from high school. And finally, the dropout rate was ascertained for contacts and for their peers in the experimental and control areas. The findings reveal one marked change among contact boys which may be attributed to Project efforts. Asked in 1963 and 1965, "What does a teenaged boy from your neighborhood need to do in order to get ahead in life as an adult?", a little over half of the boys advised doing well at school and getting as much education as possible. More of the high schoolers mentioned education than younger boys. As Table 5:7 shows, little shift occurred during the years of the Project's existence,

Table 5:7

Percent of Boys Who Mention Education
as Important to "Getting ahead in life"
(by treatment, age, and time period)

Age	Control		Experimental		Contact	
	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965
10-12	41	41	48	35	33	33
(N)	(95)	(105)	(93)	(114)	(24)	(24)
13-15	58	32	63	61	49	65
(N)	(67)	(85)	(71)	(51)	(63)	(63)
16-19	60	64	64	58	68	68
(N)	(60)	(53)	(64)	(69)	(99)	(130)

except among 13- to 15-year olds. In the control areas, the proportion of boys who replied in educational terms dropped 14 percent, while 16 percent more of the contact boys in that age group did, and the figure for the other boys in the target areas remained substantially unchanged.

This finding resembles the shift among 13- to 15-year olds detected in regard to the qualities to be admired among boys in the neighborhood. There too the 13- to 15-year old contacts moved in a positive direction, fewer of them, compared to their controls, citing delinquent behavior. A pattern of such differences would suggest that

the Project was effective in this regard at least for a portion of its clients.

Most boys believed that their own chances of graduating from high school were "good" or better, and the older boys were the most confident of all, even though almost all the school dropouts were among them (Table 5:8). There seemed to be a general decline in optimism from 1963

Table 5:8

'... What do you think your chances are for finishing high school?'
Percent replying "very good"
(by treatment, age, and time period)

Age	Control		Experimental		Contact	
	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965
10-12 (N)	17 (98)	12 (103)	25 (93)	22 (87)	14 (21)	29 (24)
13-15 (N)	24 (67)	18 (84)	31 (68)	23 (47)	19 (62)	14 (71)
16-19 (N)	35 (55)	30 (50)	33 (60)	35 (43)	20 (89)	30 (118)

to 1965. But the oldest and youngest contact boys grew more optimistic as a group. (We will discuss this further later.)

About half the boys intended to continue their education beyond high school, in a college, junior college, or trade school. Strangely, the general decline noted over the years in boys' optimism about finishing high school is not reflected in their plans for the future; shifts in the one were not matched by shifts in the other. And again, no differential shifts in plans for further education occurred among boys involved in CYDP or among boys in the target areas compared to boys in control areas. (Table 5:9)

Nor were there changes in the pattern of dropping out of school which might be attributed to the Project. Between a quarter and a third of the boys over sixteen in the target and control areas were found to be dropouts in 1965 as in 1963 (Table 5:10).

Table 5:9

"What do you plan to do (when you leave high school)
(now that you are out of school)?"
(Percent planning further education by treatment, age, and time period)

Age	Control		Experimental		Contact	
	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965
10-12 (N)	44 (96)	30 (105)	47 (94)	34 (87)	39 (23)	38 (24)
13-15 (N)	46 (67)	42 (84)	57 (70)	49 (47)	46 (63)	51 (73)
16-19 (N)	56 (60)	57 (53)	53 (64)	54 (46)	42 (100)	47 (131)

Table 5:10

Secondary School Status of Boys 16 and Older
(by treatment, age and time period)

	Control		Experimental		Contact	
	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965
Graduate	5	6	7	7	4	2
Student	75	66	63	70	68	63
Dropout	20	28	30	22	28	35
T	100	100	100	99	100	100
(N)	(60)	(53)	(64)	(46)	(94)	(130)

The proportion of school dropouts among the contacts and the controls rose slightly, while the proportion in the target area declined from 30 to 22 percent. These contrasting shifts are of a size which might be merely chance, but they merit further discussion later after other patterns in the data are revealed.

The small but reliable signals of the Project's effectiveness in raising boys' educational aspirations arouses some optimism about youth-serving efforts such as these for several reasons. First, workers invested a great deal of concern and energy in the boys' educations, for they believed that it was a prime instrumentality for the ultimate goals of the Project. Second, they had manifest support from the wider community and from the boys themselves; for few would deny that minimal scholastic achievement would go a long way toward reducing propensities for delinquency and ensuring boys a brighter future. And third, effective work in the educational area probably was a pivotal factor in whether CYDP would reach its ultimate goals. To have failed here, given the commitment to this task, the widespread cultural support for it, and its critical relevance to the problems the Project was meant to ameliorate, might have displayed an impotence which could doom efforts such as these.

It may however, be misleading to become overly critical about the effectiveness of CYDP in this instance without recognizing the function it did effectively perform. Truants and dropouts were returned to school. Boys who most likely would have remained out of school totally and forever went back as a consequence of workers' efforts. But only about three in ten stayed, and this, it turned out, was probably about the number who would have returned to stay without the Project's intervention as the figures from the control areas show. But the Project demonstrated that it could get boys to give school another chance. The Project raised some boys' hopes about school. That perhaps defines the limit of what reasonably could be expected from workers in the field. And then responsibility, in the narrow sense, shifts to the schools.

Many of the Project staff complained that the school system was not measuring up to its responsibility, that educators had not equipped themselves for teaching inner city youth and therefore had neither relevance nor holding power for them. Some of the CYDP staff have written elsewhere, "Why don't the schools learn how to teach inner city kids instead of just

writing them off as under-cultured and therefore uneducable? Either they don't know how or they don't want to. Either way, it is a shame and a disgrace to the educators. If the educators don't know how, it is their job to learn how. If they don't want to learn how, they shouldn't be and are not, in fact, educators. It is hard for us to be temperate and calm about this" (Carney, Mattick, and Callaway, 1969).

Perhaps the most suitable close to this section on the Project's educational efforts is the history of Ray Harry's attempts to keep Grant McWhirter in school. It epitomizes the problems in the boys' backgrounds and present circumstances which make the job difficult, and also displays the forces in the youngsters' lives in the schools and in the community which abet and abort the workers' efforts. The consequences of failure are fairly obvious in this instance, both for the boy's morale and attitudes, and also for the effect it had on his friends. And, in the light of growing evidence of racial schism in this country during and since the Project's tenure, one turn of Grant McWhirter's mind seems now ominously prophetic.

Grant McWhirter Dropping Out

MONDAY, October 1, 1962

2:15 p.m. Grant McWhirter (16) and Llewellan Attlea (16) arrived at the OP. I greeted them at the door and told them to return to school. They began to offer excuses for not being in school. Grant said he was suspended until he brought his mother. Llewellan said h's last period classes were cancelled.

I did not allow them to come in the OP, informing them that they "put us in the trick bag" when they ditch school and come to the OP.

2:30 p.m. Picked up Grant and Llewellan in front of McKinley School. I gave them hell for cutting school. I was very strong and used some rather profane language, but I think I got the message across to them, especially to Llewellan. Later the boys went with me to M___ Hall, 40XX W. Madison St. where I made arrangements to rent a ballroom for the "Ambassadors." I bought the boys soda and hot dogs and assumed a calmer tone.

WEDNESDAY, October 3, 1962

3:30 p.m. Returned to the OP. Grant McWhirter (16) was waiting for me. Grant informed me that he was suspended from school.

Through further conversation I learned that he had lied when he told me that he was suspended from school. This was October 1, 1962. He lied because he didn't want me to know that he was truant. He asked me if I would go to help him get reinstated. I said no. His mother would have to go. I called his mother on the telephone. Mrs. McWhirter said she refused to go to school for Grant again. She has been going for Grant since kindergarten and it has done no good. Grant is not interested in school said Mrs. McWhirter. She said she could do nothing to help. She said she gives him everything he needs for school and she knows of no reason why he doesn't go. Grant always uses the teachers as a reason for his failure in school. Teachers don't like him, teachers pick on him, teachers are cranky or unfair. I discussed this with Grant and informed him that I would not go to school with him unless his mother consented and Grant convinced me that he would make a sincere effort to do the right thing if he were reinstated.

MONDAY, October 8, 1962

10:00 p.m. Talked to Grant McWhirter (16). He had been hanging about the OP all day looking long faced and sad. His sister called me earlier and said his mother had consented for me to help Grant to get reinstated in school. I had been refusing Grant all day, telling him that I had no assurance of his sincerity. When I tired of listening to his pleas, I suggested that he write me a letter telling me why he wished to return to school. At this time Grant presented me with a letter fairly written and a list of reasons why he wished to return to school. In the letter I heard myself. I suggested that Grant write another letter informing me what he would do if he were reinstated. I then advised him to meet me the next morning with the letter, and if I were convinced of his sincerity, I would attempt to help him get back in school.

TUESDAY, October 9, 1962

11:00 a.m. Met with Grant McWhirter (16) at HBC. Duane Early (RC) and I went along with Grant to Cregier Voc. H. S. where we were able to help him get reinstated.

(NOTE: Here we insert the CRC's account of the episode at the school.)

9:45a..m. Arrived back at HBC and began to work on CYDP activity logs. During this period of time Ray Harry telephoned me regarding Grant McWhirter (16 - Smooth Dudes). Toward the end of last week Grant had been suspended from Cregier Voc. H.S. due to both absenteeism and cutting classes. After consulting last week with Grant's mother, Ray found out that she had pretty much given up on him and was not interested in going up to school to get him reinstated but didn't mind if we did. Ray pointed out that Grant had missed three days of school and had written a few essays for him regarding the value of education and his intents if reinstated. Essentially Ray told me that Grant would be over at the Club by 11:00 a.m. and that he wanted me to go with him and Grant to get

Grant reinstated. After this conversation I resumed my work on CYDP logs.

11:00 a.m. Ray Harry, Grant McWhirter, and I parted for Cregier. At Cregier we encountered Mr. Rolf, Grant's counselor and person who had suspended him, in the corridor. I introduced Ray to him and I let Ray take it from there and found it necessary to give only a minimal amount of verbal support if indeed any was needed. During our conversation with Mr. Rolf, Miss Burke, Grant's division teacher, came up and became deeply involved in the conversation. The outcome was that they agreed to accept Grant back this time but if he goofed again he was in trouble.

TUESDAY, October 16, 1962

(NOTE: The rest of this account is the EW's.)

4:30 p.m. Talked to Grant McWhirter (16) and John Feller (15) about the Smooth Dudes club (14-16). They were a little discouraged because the club has had no recent activities. We talked about future activities and they left feeling better. I drove them home.

FRIDAY, October 19, 1962

2:00 p.m. Returning from the store I spotted Grant McWhirter (16) sitting on the stairs of a building across the street from Crane H. S. I helped Grant to get reinstated at Cregier H. S. just last week. I was told at the school that Grant had classes until 4:00 p.m. I asked Grant why he was out today. He said he had been excused to find a job. I explained that no one was hiring where he was inquiring (i.e., on someone's door step). Grant said if I didn't believe him, I could check at school. I accepted the challenge and asked Grant to go with me. He agreed and for awhile I thought I was wrong. At the school, however, I learned that Grant had not been excused, and he may have been in trouble and had not gone back. I talked to the assistant principal and Miss Burke, Grant's division teacher.

Grant was sent back to his classes.

4:30 p.m. Grant McWhirter returned from school. His father is punishing him for staying out all night. He must stay at home for two weeks. Grant begged me to call his father and ask if he could go to a dance tonight. He claimed he couldn't understand why I wouldn't do it.

THURSDAY, October 25, 1962

4:00 p.m. Grant McWhirter (16) arrived and informed me that he spent the entire day at school. Grant was extremely proud of this. I think he thought he deserved a medal.

MONDAY, October 29, 1962

1:00 p.m. Grant McWhirter (16) was waiting for me at HBC. He has been suspended again for cutting a science class. Further

discussion, however, revealed that Grant did not attend his woodshop class. This time Grant informed me that Mr. Rolf, the student counselor, had sent for me. I informed Grant that I would go, but I would not "speak on his behalf." I explained that I could no longer trust him as far as school was concerned. I went to Cregier with Grant and told Mr. Moriarity and Mr. Rolf, in front of Grant, that the next time Grant was late or missed a class or did anything wrong, that I would rather not hear about it. I explained that I thought that they had been more than kind to Grant and had given him all possible consideration. Therefore, if he didn't show his appreciation by attending his classes and doing his work then I felt he deserved any action they cared to take. Grant was a little shaken by this and gave me a surprised look. He was reinstated, however, and went to his afternoon classes.

TUESDAY, October 30, 1962

3:00 p.m. Arrived at the OP where Duane Early (RC) informed me that he had seen Grant McWhirter (16) in front of Crane H. S. earlier. Yesterday, I was at school to help Grant get reinstated after he was suspended for cutting classes. I met John Feller (15) as I was leaving the OP. Feller, a classmate of Grant, had not seen Grant at school that day. I drove around Crane H. S. looking for Grant and then went to Cregier and learned that Grant had not been at school. On my way back to the OP, I met Grant and Oren Jepson (15) heading toward Crane. I stopped, they got in the car. Grant handed me a card with a note signed by Richard Covington, probation officer with Family Court. The note stated that Grant had been in court that day as a witness in a case concerning Cortez Canfield. Grant explained that he had been in court all day and had returned too late for his classes. I asked how he happened to be at Crane at 1:00 p.m. He lied and said he wasn't there, I told him that Early had seen him. He lied again. I stopped the car and asked him to walk with me so we could talk privately. I then proceeded to scold him severely. I raised hell with him, even swore (something I seldom do), and told him that he had made a complete ass of me at Cregier for trying to help him. I told him that I never wanted to see him again; not to come to the OP for anything including Smooth Dude (14-16) club meetings. He fought back mildly, but his basic reply was, "I don't care." We got back in the car and he was quiet except to counteract some of Feller's signifying. I attempted to feign anger by saying nothing and keeping a scowl on my face. After driving for a half hour, I stopped the car and went into a drug store. I was gone for about twenty minutes. When I returned, Grant was apologetic. He begged me to allow him to come to the OP. He told me how much he appreciated what I had done and what the teachers had done to help him. He said "I just don't know why I lied." I said nothing. He begged, "Can I please come to the OP." Finally I said, "It's only because I'm not certain whether or not you're a mental case or a completely stupid jackass." The tension between us was then released. Grant was as happy as if nothing had happened. He informed me that I really had scared him. He thought that I was going to hit him. I explained that I never have hit anyone but maybe it wasn't a bad

idea. We parted friends and I believe he left with just a little more respect and admiration for me than he had before the episode.

TUESDAY, January 8, 1963

3:20 p.m. Cortez Canfield (15) arrived with Llewellan Attlea (15) enroute home from Crane H. S. and from their conversation I learned that Jonn Feller (15) had cut school to be with his friend Grant McWhirter (15). Grant was transferred from Cregier Voc. School to Logan Continuation School yesterday.

3:30 p.m. Grant and Feller arrived and asked for a lift home. I agreed to take Feller home in the station wagon. We left Grant at the OP. In the station wagon I talked to Feller about following in Grant's footsteps and winding up in Montefiore Parental School instead of Logan. I used his parents' disappointment as an appeal, for I know that he comes from a close knit family where there is a good deal of parental control. I told him that, although I may lose his friendship, I feel that for his sake I would have to talk to his mother if I found that he cut school again. He promised that he would not cut again. He realized that he had been foolish to cut so many times just to follow Grant. He blamed Grant for his past trauancies and said he would do better since Grant was no longer at Cregier. He thanked me for my interest and paid compliments to Lamont Kane (EW), Duane Early (RCO) and myself for our interest. He said, "You're all really trying to look out for us. You all are some real nice studs, and if it didn't be for you a lot of us would be in trouble."

4:30 p.m. Returned to the OP. I was greeted by Grant McWhirter who said "take me home." He had a scowl on his face and his tone was very demanding. I begged his pardon as if I didn't understand him. He repeated "take me home" and this time his scowl was broader and his tone even more demanding. I then explained in no uncertain terms that we (Early, Kane and Montez) were not supposed to furnish taxi service. That if we gave the boys a lift it was a favor and not something they were supposed to have. Therefore, I explained that they should ask as if they were asking for a favor and not as if they were demanding their rights. Grant quickly apologized and said he would walk.

FRIDAY, February 8, 1963

4:30 p.m. Grant McWhirter (16) arrived and made his daily plea of "get me back into Cregier." Grant was transferred from Cregier H. S. to Logan Continuation School last month for excessive truancy. It is not possible for Grant to return to Cregier at this time. The school officials gave him every opportunity to make good before he was finally dropped. Grant said that he attempted to enroll at Waller H. S. today and they turned him down. He also tried Wells, Crane, and Marshall. He was turned down at all of them.

MONDAY, February 18, 1963

4:00 p.m. Grant McWhirter (16) arrived. He had a note from the Logan Continuation School where he attends, referring him to the personnel department of Spiegels so that he could obtain a job. I explained that I couldn't leave the OP. Johnny Jameson (16) arrived from school. He had a pile of books in his arms. He put one book on display for everyone to see, The Negro Vanguard. Johnny announced that this book really has something to say. I spent the rest of the hour speaking briefly to some of the boys that were arriving from school.

MONDAY, February 25, 1963

7:00 p.m. Returned to the OP and held club meeting with the Smooth Dudes. The Dudes completed plans for a social in the pioneer room 3/11/63. The meeting was quiet and most of the members participated in the discussion. Grant McWhirter (16) pouted throughout the entire meeting. Earlier in the day he asked me to take him to look for a job and I explained that I was busy. Grant insisted that I take him. I flatly refused and he asked other CYDP personnel and then accused us of keeping him from getting a job. I explained in no uncertain terms that we were not running a free taxi service to take him where he wants to go. He then accused me of playing favorites. I was very severe with Grant because I have learned that this is the only way to deal with him. I have met Grant's parents and I know they give him money. I am certain that they will give him carfare to find a job.

MONDAY, March 11, 1963

3:00 p.m. Arrived at the OP. I talked to Art Carlton (18) who informed me that he has had symptoms of gonorrhea for the past week. I helped him to make an appointment with a doctor (a personal contact) so that he could get immediate treatment. John Feller (15) and Grant McWhirter (16) arrived. I talked to them very briefly about their club activities (Smooth Dudes, 14-17). Grant is a recent school drop-out. He insisted that I try to get him reinstated in school. He is currently attending Logan Continuation School. I was successful in getting him reinstated in school several times before he was finally dropped. He is now very despondent and restless. His temper is very short and we argue every time we meet. They are the results of demands that he makes of me; either I resent them or I am unable to meet them.

TUESDAY, March 26, 1963

Grant McWhirter (16) and John Feller (16) arrived. Grant talked about finding a job. He has not looked for one. However, we talked about where to go and how to look for work.

MONDAY, April 1, 1963

7:30 p.m. I held club meeting with eleven Smooth Dudes (15-17). A lengthy discussion concerning the purchasing of uniformed shirts took place. I could offer nothing to the dis-

cussion so I allowed them to talk freely. No decision was made. I learned that over the past weekend, John Feller (16) and Grant McWhirter (16) conflicted with members of the El Condors (16-19). Grant and Feller had been drinking when they encountered the El Condors. They proceeded to agitate Wally "Blade" Cord (18) and Bart Pinick (17) until a fight ensued. According to reports it really wasn't a fight. Blade hit Feller one lick and knocked him out. Bart held Grant until he cooled off. Blade and Bart then helped Feller back to his feet and helped him home. Feller and Grant have the tendency to agitate the El Condors. They seemed to enjoy making fun of the E.C.'s clothes. Feller and Grant are able to dress better than many of the boys in the area and they seem to use clothes to compensate for whatever else they feel they lack. They will spend long periods of time discussing clothes, they will criticize the way others are dressed, they will boast of the amount of clothes they own and the amount of money they pay for clothes. It is sometimes worse than a middle class woman's club. Both Grant and Feller are very small unattractive boys who really have no "claim to fame." Most of the E.C.'s have very little interest in clothes and they are constantly being attacked by Grant and Feller for being ragged, sloppy, etc. Most of the time the Condors ignore the comments but occasionally they have to remind Feller of his size. However it does no good with Feller, he continues to shoot off his mouth and pay for it with beatings. As I was leaving the OP, Ira "Bob" Halias (18) was chasing Feller down the street. Bob had become very angry because of Feller's signifying and had he caught Feller, he would have suffered another beating.

WEDNESDAY, April 17, 1963

4:00 p.m. Ten members of the Smooth Dudes (14-17) arrived for club meeting. Plans for a weekend trip to Camp Kemah were discussed. Two members will not be able to make the trip because they don't have the fee. They are Grant McWhirter and John Feller. It is interesting to note that both Feller and McWhirter come from more financially secure homes than anyone else. Both families are home owners, both mothers and fathers work, and both boys handle more spending money than any other club member. For this reason, I made no concession. Many of the members had struggled to save the four dollar fee.

WEDNESDAY, May 1, 1963

4:30 p.m. I returned to the OP and held regular club meeting with the Smooth Dudes (14-17). The S.D.'s talked at random about activities but nothing was decided. A bull session developed from the meeting and the major subjects were education and occupations. Grant McWhirter announced that he was a Negro, and the white man would not allow him to become too successful at any occupation, so why should he worry about education. (He said he had recently attended a Muslim meeting but I never learned whether he was joking or not.) The bull session ended with me giving a perhaps too lengthy speech about many Negroes who had been successful, attempting to point out that racial

discrimination made it more difficult for the Negro, but all the more reason why he had to work harder. I don't think Grant was too impressed for it was evident that his argument was a rationalization for his recent failure at school.

Jobs

We have seen that the contact boys placed a great deal of importance on whatever help extension workers might give them to find jobs. It is safe to say that most teenaged boys, especially the poor ones with which CYDP dealt, need and want jobs, both to augment their own and their families' resources and to enhance their images of themselves as independent young men.

The relationship of employment to delinquency occupies a central position in one prominent theory (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960), but the empirical basis for the relationship is mixed. Glaser and Rice (1959) traced the relationship of teenage employment to delinquency over two decades of Bostonians and found little association; indeed, there was a slight tendency for delinquency rates to rise with increasing rates of employment among 10- to 17-year olds. Of course, this does not mean that the boys implicated in the delinquency rates were themselves employed. It may be that they were just the ones left unemployed while their peers were finding jobs.

Gold (1963) has reported that the effect of employment on juvenile delinquency depends on the age of the boy: there was no association between the two among Flint, Michigan boys under 15, but fewer recidivists over 15 held jobs than agemates who had never been in trouble with the police.

One attempt to work intensively on the vocational problems of school dropouts (Massimo and Shore, 1963; Shore and Massimo, 1966) effectively reduced their proclivity to delinquency. In this effort, Massimo committed his time to the needs of ten individual boys chosen at random from among a set who dropped out of a Boston area high school. Massimo focussed his program on employment, helping the boys train for, find, and keep jobs, although he also helped them with the numerous other personal problems which they brought to him. After almost a year of help, these ten boys were demonstrably better able to maintain themselves in the labor force than those dropouts who got no special help, and the target boys also showed better adjustment on other facets of

of their lives. Most striking were their improved images of themselves. These relative gains of the boys in the treatment program persisted over several years of follow-up studies.

Prior to CYDP, the Chicago Boys Clubs had offered vocational training either directly or by providing boys with the means to get training. The Boys Clubs also helped boys find jobs, but on a limited basis. Relatively few older boys, the age group which most needed such help remained affiliated with the agency; and, as we have seen, those who did were largely self-selected from among those boys whose own capacities were more than adequate for gaining employment or continuing their education.

Meanwhile from a quarter to a third of the over 16-year old boys in the target and control areas were out of school each year and looking for jobs. Almost all of them were able to find full-time employment with the help of family and friends or by pounding the pavement. As one might expect, most of their jobs were low paying, required little skill, and had no future. About half the boys worked in positions in the bottom 10 percent of the employment hierarchy, in terms of education required and wages paid; another quarter held slightly better jobs, in the bottom 10 to 20 percent; and the rest reached up as high as the bottom half of the hierarchy.⁶

CYDP made vocational assistance a major function of workers' roles, especially to help the older boys who were not in school. Workers' daily logs over the course of the Project reveal that CYDP was responsible for about 750 job placements of about 490 youngsters. Workers devoted about one eighth of their time to pre-employment counseling, contacting prospective employers, transporting boys to placement interviews, and other job-finding activities. Community resource coordinators took the major responsibility for turning up employers and enlisting their cooperation, while extension workers instructed boys in reading want ads systematically, filling out application forms, making good impressions on interviewers,

⁶The ratings of jobs here is according to Duncan's scale (Blau and Duncan, 1967).

getting along with the boss, and so forth. Some of the vocational training was ad hoc and informal; some was formalized into PEP (Pre-Employment Project) at the Horner outpost, where men from the state employment agency, the Social Security Administration, and private companies met with boys one evening a week for six weeks, at the end of which a graduation ceremony was held and boys were given certification for completing the course.

Project effort devoted to employment was reflected by increasing visibility of CYDP as a vocational aid both among older contact boys and among their agemates in the target areas. Actually, a minority of the over-15-year olds either in 1963 or 1965 mentioned CYDP or any of its workers when asked who had given them help or advice about finding jobs. But the proportion who did mention the Project rose from three percent to 15 percent among boys not contacted, and from 17 to 39 percent among contacted boys.

Project efforts to ameliorate vocational problems among boys in the target areas were only part of a more general movement among many agencies serving these areas. Theory relating economic opportunity to delinquency (especially Cloward and Ohlin, 1960) had become dominant in the thinking of professional practitioners at this time and had encouraged widespread and intensive efforts to place deprived boys in promising positions in the job market. The Illinois State Employment Service doubled the allocation of personnel to their youth division; the Chicago Boys Clubs cooperated with the Chicago Metropolitan YMCA and the Chicago Youth Centers to launch a vocational training program for Job Opportunities through Better Skills (JOBS), financed by the Federal Government; the Chicago Boys Clubs established its own Guidance in Education and Employment Program; a Chicago Committee of major employers was established to promote opportunities for youth; and similar projects were undertaken by other agencies and private companies in the city, with both private and public support. Availability of training programs, increased communication about job openings, and more positive responsiveness on the part of employers made getting jobs for boys easier. One indication of this loosening up of the job market is that CYDP workers placed boys in 26 jobs in the last four months of 1962 and 124 jobs in the same period in 1963.

It is possible that the presence of CYDP in the target areas made

a noticeable difference in the vocational resources available to older adolescents and young adults generally. In the control areas, the proportion of these boys who named someone who had given them vocational assistance remained static between 1963 and 1965, dropping a negligible four percent. Meanwhile, 13 percent more boys in the target areas named such helpers.

However, finding boys jobs proved to be discouraging work. For even while it became easier to place boys, it became no easier to keep them placed. Seven out of ten job placements proved short-lived. In a matter of weeks, sometimes of days, most boys were unemployed again. The reasons varied: they didn't get along with their supervisors, they didn't like the work, they too often arrived late or not at all and were fired, they felt the pay was too low (it averaged about \$1.30 an hour for those working full-time), they had to travel too far to get to work, and so on. Frank Cooper's experience placing Carl Houts in a job in a camera shop, only to find that Carl did not show up for work, was not at all unusual.

Hope and self-confidence played important parts in boys' job-seeking, job-getting, and job-keeping. Among those boys 18 and over who were out of school and most needed jobs, those who aspired to hold higher paying, more highly skilled jobs some day were more likely to be employed than those whose aspirations were low. Only 29 percent of those older black boys whose aspirations reached no higher than semi-skilled work were employed compared to 74 percent of those who aspired eventually to white collar and professional positions. But then higher aspirations alone did not make the difference. Closer analysis of the data demonstrated that high aspirations affected employment rates only when they were accompanied by boys' feelings that they had the personal characteristics, the ability and perseverance, necessary to achieve their aspirations. Thus, boys with high aspirations who said they would rely on help from others to get a job were no more likely to be employed (30 percent) than boys with low aspirations; and boys who reported self-reliance and low aspirations also had relatively low rates of employment (31 percent). But older black boys who aimed high and felt self-confident enjoyed a high rate of employment (89 percent).

Boys with low aspirations and/or low self-confidence apparently

already felt defeated by life. They were mostly school dropouts or school push outs, boys who did not achieve adequately enough or behave appropriately enough in school to last. Their scholastic experiences probably helped to convince them that they would not go far, or however far they went would be on someone else's shoulders. Consignment to low level, deadend jobs further convinced them of the hopelessness of their situation. And most of them found vocational training and job-upgrading programs so reminiscent of school that they anticipated failing again.

So all the training and placement services of CYDP made no change in the employment patterns of contact boys. While boys 16 and over in the control areas were increasingly in parttime employment, no significant differences appeared in 1965 among the contact boys. In the target areas, older boys who were not in direct contact with CYDP shifted some from full-time to parttime jobs, probably in part because a larger proportion of them were then going to school (see Table 5:11). The contact

Table 5:11

Job-holding among Boys 16 and Over by treatment and time period

Employment	Control		Experimental		Contact	
	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965
Full-time	28%	25	36	17	26	25
Part-time	5	25	16	33	12	15
None	67	50	48	50	62	50
Totals	100%	100	100	100	100	100
(N)	(60)	(53)	(64)	(46)	(100)	(131)
Proportion not in school	30	32	41	30	43	38

boys as a group were static: about a fourth worked full-time, about 15 percent parttime, the rest went to school or were altogether unoccupied. But while the figures present a static picture, it is worth remembering, for the sake of accuracy, that the 25 percent of the contact boys who

were found employed when interviewed in 1965 were not all the same boys who had been employed the month before or would be employed the month after. It is likely that this proportion would continue to hover around the 25 percent figure, but would represent a constantly shifting set of boys, as they got jobs, lost jobs, and got jobs again. Of course, the same is true of the non-contact experimental and the control boys' figures.

In summary then, the Project actively entered the vocational field and its activity was reflected in acknowledgements of help given not only to those older boys in direct contact, but also to a few older boys in the target areas generally. The Project's effectiveness in finding employment for boys improved, in part most likely because there was growing social support for finding solutions to the vocational problems of inner city boys. But finding boys jobs proved to be an insufficient solution; keeping them employed remained a problem, and because that problem was not solved, the overall employment rates of out-of school boys in the target areas did not improve.

There are some clues here to where at least part of the problem lay. Boys' higher aspirations and positive self-concepts sustain them in low level entry jobs. Where these are not developed, boys quit for all sorts of reasons, few of which really matter. Job placement proved to be not enough. It appears that intensive work with boys placed, aimed at preparing them to go out and get the next and better job, would be worth trying.

Constructive Activities

It would be fair to describe undertakings like the CYDP as hunting expeditions, and the heavily delinquent boys, their quarry. The goal of the Project was, in a sense, to capture delinquent boys for conventional society. Somehow, probably years before, they had got away--away from their parents, from their schools, from the wholesome influences of organized games and respectable adult models.

Devotees of Jean Jacques Rousseau might condemn the Project for attempting to foil this escape and to limit the boys' rare freedom, until they are reminded that the boys the Project was after were not gentle Emiles. For these boys were not free. While they had got away,

they carried with them still the encumbrances of the conventions they seemed to escape, the realizations of what was acceptable and respectable to a dynamic community that had a future. Nor did they make their way to a new environment, for they had to go on living in the world arranged for those who had not escaped but had embraced the conventional. And then, in their attempts to get away, they were caught up in a bond at least as restricting, whose conventions were at least as narrow, and whose demands for conformity, at least as insistent. They did not as a result become carefree, mild-mannered, creative young men, but limited, dissatisfied, baleful people who, according to recent research (Robins, 1966) were particularly vulnerable to lifelong troubles.

CYDP was the vanguard of a drive to round these boys up. But it was not meant to comprehend the whole process of conventionalization. Having made contact with asocial and antisocial boys, the Project attempted to so moderate their behavior and alter their values that more traditional youth serving agencies conducting programs for conventional youth could take them over and carry on the socializing process while the Project turned its attention to the hunt again.

The place of the outpost in the CYDP program is a concrete illustration of this image of the Program. In Chapter 3, we described how the Outpost was deliberately designed to bridge the social gap between the street corner and the club building. Two other programmatic strategies also elaborate this image.

The first technique aimed at transforming an extant antisocial group into a more conventional social club.⁷

At the time that the CYDP staff first entered the two areas where the project was conducted, the process of social sorting had been going on for so long without any counterforces to exert pressure in the direction of conformity that there were no known, established, street groups whose reputation could be said to have been based on conforming behavior. In a bad situation, where each street gang had exerted itself to look and act tougher than the next, not unlike the international situation, the key to survival seemed to be a tough

⁷This account is taken from Carney, Mattick and Callaway, 1969:43-46.

reputation as a deterrent to the aggression of others, who were also busy looking and acting tough to deter everyone else.

In such a seeming "dog-eat-dog" world, the youngsters who sought to avoid delinquency and had an interest in participating in conventional behavior were numerous but much less visible. Their "problem" was that they were unorganized and they were outside the recognized social order. The delinquent gangs were not attractive to them and, under ordinary circumstances, they were not attractive to the gang. The more conforming youngsters were considered "square" and no public recognition was awarded to their conventional conduct because the delinquent-tending value system of the gangs publicly identified as having a tough reputation set the local standards of how to come to public notice. The way to attract attention was to be bad, or at least to be considered bad, and thus monopolize the goods, services and status available which made up the "rep" and maintained the leadership in the pecking order.

One street gang we worked with in the early days was so self-conscious of its public image that it "went Madison Avenue" and appointed a club historian whose function it was to clip all news items appearing in the press about the gang. This was unusual but indicative. Most gangs simply relied upon, and contributed to, the rumor chains and gossip of the streets to communicate the quality of their "rep" to the neighborhood. In gang-infested areas many members of the community, both juvenile and adult, seemed to gain some vicarious satisfaction from repeating the events, folklore and myths of gang exploits, much of which when traced turned out to be simple attribution, imputation or other products of mutual recrimination that may or may not have had some kernel of truth in it. While such rumor and gossip networks are high on volume and speed, they are low on accuracy, but they serve the purposes of delinquent gangs quite well as a method of inflating their insecure egos. In addition, the distinctive and colorful style of clothing, complete with emblems or symbols, that were frequently worn by gang members, served to attract attention not only to themselves but to the fact that others did not "belong." Finally, the peculiar ambivalence toward knives and guns (the latter usually the property of older brothers, fathers or uncles) which were obviously concealed or meaningfully "flashed" (why have a concealed weapon if nobody knows it?), as if to objectify an inner insecurity, was evident frequently enough to help contribute to a "tough-bad" image and a local "rep."

Our workers, then, faced the task of providing individuals who were inclined to belong to conventional groups an opportunity to achieve a reputation through group experiences which would be meaningful within the context of the high delinquency values of the street.

The delinquent values of the street could not easily be dismissed. There is a certain romance, a fervor, a dash and

excitement to gang activities on the street which make much conventional behavior seem drab by comparison. We had to face the fact that while street fighting and crime may be dangerous it also is viewed by the gangs as fun; a sort of sporting life. And so we had to initiate the establishment of a new hierarchy on the premise that high visibility and dramatic, intense personal involvement in group activities are the potent ingredients in achieving status in the street group society. Any alternative to the delinquent style of street life, we felt, must be competitively spectacular and leave lasting, memorable consequences. Thus, we decided to have a ball, literally.

We decided that our groups ought not simply to have socials like anyone else; they had to have "Big Dances," which meant formal and semi-formal dress, bands and entertainment, and a dance hall--not merely a gym or a church basement. We were able to help the groups obtain publicity, in the form of local radio and newspaper announcements and celebrity drop-in visits which added to the "something special" atmosphere. The dance simply had to be "fabulous" and above all, there could afford to be no trouble.

We found that groups who were able to hold such affairs became known as "the group which held that fabulous affair" and not as that "head bustin' rumble" group. So we helped first one and then another of our groups do some of the following things to make a "fabulous affair" a reality:

1. We hired a good, local, dance band plus acts like singing and dancing groups. (We sometimes hired two dance bands when possible in order to keep the music going.)
2. The sponsoring club members all wore their best clothes or at least distinctive, conventional clothes. In a few cases, formal gowns and tuxedo suits were worn.
3. We hired a professional, uniformed, usher service to help in crowd control measures.
4. The women guests were presented with corsages, and the men wore lapel flowers.
5. We held buffet-suppers prior to the dance to help create a celebrant atmosphere.
6. We held the dances in commercial dance halls and controlled the guest list.
7. We arranged for celebrities from the sports and entertainment worlds to "drop in" and be introduced from the stage, or to simply make "an appearance."

The weeks of planning that went into these "fabulous affairs" helped introduce many of the youngsters we worked

with to the problems of making decisions about how much food to order; which hall should be used for the dance; how much punch 500 people can drink in one evening; who will be responsible for decorating the tables; who will introduce the celebrities; who will handle the publicity, etc.

Our workers tried to provide a setting where the boys themselves could make these decisions (even if in some cases they were obviously making wrong decisions, such as not ordering enough food) so that they could learn from their mistakes and the democratic committee process. We found that this experience in committee bureaucracy, which preceded the "fabulous affair," had lasting effects on some of the boys as they later related themselves to school and work.

So the dance itself, an evening's affair, was only the superficial goal. Like the El Condors' camping trip described earlier, the professional effort demanded to produce a few hours' elegant dancing was justified only by the broader more significant goals which might be achieved by involving the boys in creating such an occasion. Its potential for conventionalizing the group's own norms, its image of itself, its image to the community, and ultimately the behavior, not only of the boys involved but also for neighborhood youth generally, directed the Project's investment in such things. The account of the time the Victors sponsored a dance is especially rich in description of the effort required, the hazards encountered, the groups who do not have the opportunity to participate in such programs, and the currents set in motion when one group does.

The Victors' Dance

MONDAY, June 10, 1963

6:45 p.m. Area of P___ and L___ Streets. Group of the Victors (15-19) were standing in front of the 15XX W. P___ Building. Jocky Alvarez (18) and his brother Arnie (16) were pitching pennies with two youths I did not know. I talked with those standing around in general terms until 7:20 p.m.

7:30 p.m. I made known the fact that I wanted a meeting. Five of the fellows got into the car. J. Alvarez, his brother, and Richy Liuzzo (15) continued to pitch pennies.

7:40 p.m. OBC - I took the five Victors on a tour of the Club.

8:00 p.m. We held a short meeting in the Club. I proposed that they consider being joint sponsors of a dance here in

the Boys Club on 7/26/63. A group from Sheridan Park would be the co-sponsor. We discussed it and the fellows felt the group would be in favor of the idea.

9:00 p.m. Mr. Mattick and I picked up Richard Fogarty (part-time staff worker, WSCC). As Mr. Panella, Director, had called Mr. Selvin, PD, OBC, and complained about my participation in the street police affair 6/6/63 (see report for same day), I felt it best that Fogarty and I straighten out the matter. Also I wanted to present my suggestion for a joint dance 7/26/63 (Victors and Smooth Dudes, 17-20, or Chandlers, 16-19).

Regarding the dance (7/26/63), Fogarty was non-committable. He said he would call me shortly. Regarding the 6/6/63 affair, he was vague and did not appear to be concerned about it. I believe Mr. Mattick's presence affected him.

TUESDAY, June 11, 1963

7:00 p.m. Area of F___ and P___ Streets. Picked up four of the Junior Victors (13-16). We sat in my auto and talked. The fellows knew of the Victors' dance (7/26/63) and asked if they might be ushers. I told them I would see if it were possible.

WEDNESDAY, June 12, 1963

7:30 p.m. Carpenter & Taylor Streets. Picked up six of the Cobras (12-15). We drove back to Peanut Park to watch the softball game. Several of the Chandlers and Cobras mentioned they had heard of the "Big Dance" on 7/26/63, sponsored jointly by the Victors and Chandlers (16-19) or Smooth Dudes (16-19).

9:00 p.m. Polk and Laflin Streets. I talked briefly with Donald Noves (18) and Robert Rancher (16), Victors. They inquired about the dance 7/26/63.

COMMENTS: Regarding the Victors-Chandlers dance, 7/26/63, Mr. Selvin, PD, informed me that Mr. Hartman, CD, had denied my request for the Club facilities for the above mentioned dance.

If the new Club is to be used by the total community and not to become 85 percent Negro, steps will have to be taken as quickly as possible to bring the Italian populace into the Club.

My suggestion to have a dance, sponsored jointly by the Mexicans (Victors) and Italians (Chandlers) in the Boys Club, will, I feel, be in effect a demonstration that the Club is open to the total community and not to only one segment of it.

MONDAY, June 17, 1963

5:00 p.m. Mr. Carney, AD, informed me that permission has been given for the Victors (15-19) dance (7/26/63).

THURSDAY, June 20, 1963

7:00 p.m. Toured area. First stop was Peanut Park where the

Chandlers (16-19) were involved in a CBC softball game. The game was interrupted when the Chandlers became quite upset over a decision made by one of the game officials. Roger "Hardtop" Cannelli (17), proceeded to "burn" second base, throw third base into center field, and then, threw the softball onto the roof of CHA. There was also a bit of profanity heard, Mr. Gianni (Boys Club staff) called the game in favor of the "Second City" (15-18).

7:45 p.m. I drove Cannelli back to Sheridan Park. I suggested to him that he and several of the team come to the Boys Club tomorrow night (6/21/63) and see Mr. Selvin, PD.

FRIDAY, June 21, 1963

2:00 p.m. Outlined report for 6/20/63. Conversation with Mr. Selvin, PD, regarding the softball incident (6/20/63). I told Mr. Selvin that I did not feel it would be in the Club's interest to drop the Chandlers (16-19) from the Boys Club Softball League.

4:15 p.m. Sheridan Park. I again asked Cannelli (17), Chandlers to come to the Club tonight to see Mr. Selvin. He said he would. Until 5:00 p.m. I walked around the Park talking to the kids.

7:30 p.m. Cannelli came into the Boys Club with six other Chandlers to see Mr. Selvin. Before the meeting I took Cannelli upstairs in the Boys Club. I explained the dance (7/26/63), the Chandlers and Victors sponsored, to him. He felt it was a good idea and said he would cooperate. I asked him not to talk about it until I spoke with Bob Fogarty, WSCC. However, I know he will.

MONDAY, June 24, 1963

4:30 p.m. Sheridan Park area. I talked to Roger "Hardtop" Cannelli (17), Chandlers (16-19), regarding his being reinstated in the Boys Club Softball League. I told him I had talked to Mr. Selvin, PD, and there was a possibility.

8:00 p.m. Polk and Laflin Streets. Picked up ten of the Victors.

8:15 p.m. OBC. Victors meeting. Mr. Spike Sentor (OBC Board member) attended the meeting. The main topic discussed was the dance (7/26/63). The tickets, advertising, band, problems were semi-worked out. Sentor made suggestions to the group.

9:00 p.m. Drove the group to Polk and Laflin Streets.

TUESDAY, June 25, 1963

5:00 p.m. Conversation with Mr. Hartman, Mr. Selvin, PD, and Al Gianni, PE Director, regarding Roger "Hardtop" Cannelli (17) and the Chandlers (16-19) softball team. The final decision was that the boy and the team are out of the Boys Club Softball League (see report 6/19/63).

THURSDAY, June 27, 1963

2:05 p.m. Sheridan Park. I talked first with Roger "Hardtop" Cannelli (17), Chandlers (16-19). Cannelli told me the dance (7/26/63) was off. The reasons were: (1) there will be fights and (2) "The mother-fuckin' club wouldn't let us play softball."

I could see that it would be useless to push the dance any further. I, instead, suggested he think in terms of the Chandlers putting on a dance at the Club, on their own, at BC. He did not respond favorably.

Dick Fogarty, Staff WSCC, was sitting across the street, He seemed pleased with Cannelli's remarks to me. He did not hear but seemed to know what we were talking about. Fogarty told me he had talked with Larry Morello (17), Smooth Dudes (16-19) member, and he and his group did not want to take part in such an adventure.

I talked to Sid (18), friend of Cannelli. He was completely negative about "social workers"--"No fucking good, don't do nothing for the kids around here--Look at the park--Nothing!"

MONDAY, July 1, 1963

7:00 p.m. Area of Polk and Laflin Streets. Picked up eight Victors (15-19) and drove around the West side. We discussed the "dance" (7/26/63).

I noticed that Arnie Alvarez (16) participated in the dance discussion more than he has since his parole from the IYC. I tried to encourage his interest by asking him to be in charge of the distribution of tickets when they are made. This seemed to impress him and he agreed, displaying, "You guys see me if you want tickets," type of attitude towards the rest of the group.

MONDAY, July 8, 1963

3:00 p.m. I called Pepsi Cola Company and arranged for five bins of Pepsi to be delivered to OBC (7/26/63) for the Victors (15-19) dance. I then called Andy Frain Corp. and arranged for two of their ushers to cover the above mentioned dance.

3:30 p.m. Meeting with Mr. Hartman, CD, and Mr. Selvin, PD, regarding the Victors dance (7/26/63). Mr. Hartman advanced me \$10.00 for expenses.

4:00 p.m. Drove to Ogden and Western to pick up the dance tickets.

7:15 p.m. Picked up ten of the Victors (15-19) on Polk and Laflin Streets. We drove to the OBC.

7:30 p.m. Victors meeting. Their dance (7/26/63) was the main topic. We discussed all facets of the affair and spent some time talking about "What to do if Negroes try to come." It was agreed that I would handle the situation if it arose.

Also agreed was the involvement of the Victorettes (14-17) and the Junior Victors (14-16), serving pop and general helpfulness. I gave each boy ten dance tickets to sell. The prize for selling the most tickets is a dinner and show downtown (Expense Account).

9:00 p.m. Drove the fellows back to Polk and Laflin Streets.

TUESDAY, July 9, 1963

3:00 p.m. Victorettes (14-16) meeting. This meeting was concerned with the Victors (15-19) dance (7/26/63). The girls were anxious to participate in the affair so it was only a matter of delegating responsibility. Each girl was given five dance tickets to sell.

We discussed briefly the fact that Negroes may come to the affair. The girls were quite negative about this happening. As we were talking, two Negro girls came into the room. The girls made several derogatory remarks toward them. Anne Perez (15) pulled the group together and they agreed to let me handle the matter.

WEDNESDAY, July 10, 1963

4:30 p.m. Sheridan Park. I talked to Roger "Hardtop" Cannelli (17), Chandlers (16-19) member regarding Victors dance (7/26/63). The boy did not appear interested in the affair. Talked to several Cobras (13-15).

MONDAY, July 15, 1963

7:45 p.m. Returned to the area, picked up four Victors and drove to OBC for a meeting. I spoke briefly to the Tambors (15-18) basketball team who were practicing in the gym. I am sponsoring this team in the Boys Club tournament. I told them that I would not be able to practice with them but would see them later this evening.

The meeting with the Victors was relatively short. I collected \$4.00 in ticket sales for the dance (7/26/63). We again discussed the mechanics of the dance.

8:30 p.m. As I was talking to the Tambors the Victors', Donald Noves (18) and Ernie Gonzago (18), tried to interest them in their dance (7/26/63). Donald (18) said to them, "We're going to have a fucking good dance." Gonzago said, "Lots of broads." I noticed that the Tambors were not impressed and put down both fellows.

TUESDAY, July 16, 1963

7:30 p.m. Ten Victorettes (14-16) arrived for their weekly meeting. I collected \$3.00 in ticket sales for the dance (8/26/63). We discussed what the girls would wear for the dance. I suggested that they wear formals and if they did, I would see to it that each girl received an orchid. This excited them quite a bit. None of the girls has ever had an orchid.

Eight of the girls said their parents were planning on coming to the dance. I encouraged them to see that at least one parent attended. I also told them that I would be visiting their homes, asking their parents to take an active part in supervising the affair.

Marie Gonzago (15) complained that the fellows did not seem to want them to sell pop or hot dogs for fear of their stealing the money. I explained to her that their parents would supervise the selling.

As we talked I tried to explain that the fellows treat them abusively because they know they can get away with it and as long as they (the girls) permit such treatment the fellows will continue.

I felt that they must first give the fellows an opportunity to show them proper courtesy and this means that they must be less tolerant and more demanding, and behave like ladies. If they demonstrate to the fellows that they will not tolerate some things and that the results of such behavior may terminate relationships, the fellows will compromise and act in the fashion that is expected of them. Such things as profanity and running around only perpetuate the fellows' attitudes toward them.

MONDAY, July 22, 1963

3:30 p.m. Twelve Victorettes (14-17) arrived for their gym period. I was told that as they did not have a lady sponsor and did not have Boys Club cards they could not come in the Boys Club. I was allowed to have a short meeting with the group. We discussed the Victors (15-19) dance (7/26/63).

4:10 p.m. I read for awhile.

5:00 p.m. Officers DiVito and Compasio, YD, came in to discuss the dance (7/26/63). They were a bit skeptical about the affair.

5:50 p.m. Dinner.

6:45 p.m. OBC.

7:10 p.m. Picked up ten Victors (15-19) on Polk and Laflin Streets.

7:30 p.m. OBC: Victors meeting. Topic was the dance (7/26/63). Ticket money was turned in and dance responsibilities were confirmed. Arnie Alvarez (17) and Richy Liuzzo (15) were hostile and obscene. They complained of not being able to sell the tickets and felt the dance was going to be a flop.

James "Rooster" Talega (15) was laughed at and kidded about the girl he was bringing. Arnie Alvarez particularly was hard on Talega. Surprisingly, Jocky Alvarez (18) was quite serious and did manage to keep the meeting orderly. I complimented

Jocky after the meeting for this. In general, I sensed a feeling of fear that the dance may not go well. The rumors of fights have upset them a bit, I believe.

8:30 p.m. After the meeting the fellows listened to the band that will be playing for the dance. During this time I talked to Talega. He has just returned from California. I told him that now would be an excellent time for him to start acting more mature. His being away affords him now the opportunity to create a new image with the group.

9:15 p.m. I made three home visits: (1) Alvarez (Jocky, 18, and Arnie, 17), (2) Liuzzo (Richy, 15), and Gonzago (Ernie, 18). These visits were with the three mothers of Victors. They agreed to help supervise the dance, also sell pop and hot dogs.

TUESDAY, July 23, 1963

4:00 p.m. Meeting with Mr. Carney, AD; Mr. Selvin, PD; Mr. Hartman, Director; and myself regarding Victors (15-19) dance (7/26/63).

5:30 p.m. Dinner.

7:00 p.m. OBC.

7:15 p.m. Area of Polk and Laflin. Picked up four Junior Victors (14-17). We drove to Northwestern University, downtown Chicago campus, for pie and cokes (Expense account, \$1.25). The fellows were a bit nervous and loud. Sancho Martinez (15), asked me how the Victors act when we go out. I told them that they act like gentlemen.

We talked only about school. Martinez said he was not going back to Crane. James Almarco (15) made it clear that he didn't like it but he was going to stay in school. I asked Ernie Gomez (15), and he just laughed.

After we ate we watched a softball game in the park next to the university. We then sat on the campus grass. The fellows padded around pushing each other. They talked about the Victors dance (7/26/63 and if they would get in free.

9:40 p.m. Picked up Mort Caronte (17) Chandler (16-19) member. I had previously promised to allow him to drive the CYDP auto. Mort is a good driver and does have a license. We went out of the neighborhood.

After he drove I gave him two tickets to the Victors dance 7/26/63 and encouraged him to come with a girl. He said several of the guys wanted to come and "mess up" the affair. He assured me he would discourage this, and if he came he would bring a girl.

10:00 p.m. OBC. Conversation with Mr. Carney, AD.

10:15 p.m. Picked up four Victors and went for a short ride.

10:30 p.m. Dropped everyone off at Polk and Laflin Streets, except James "Rooster" Talega (16). I drove him to the BC and gave him five dance tickets to sell.

THURSDAY, July 25, 1963

4:30 p.m. Purchased decorating material for the Victors dance 7/26/63.

9:00 p.m. Received phone call from Olive Sanchez (15), Victorettes (14-17) regarding dance (7/26/63). She said she heard the Shahs (15-19) were planning to come to the dance looking for trouble. I told her not to talk about this to anyone else, and that I knew most of these fellows and I would handle them if they came to the dance.

I called Ray Kruglich, CYW, regarding obtaining psychological help for Pecos (18), marginal member of most groups in our area.

5:30 p.m. Wilson, EW, and I talked with Mr. Selvin, PD, regarding the possibility of Negroes attending the dance 7/26/63. We agreed that Negro couples would be admitted. Wilson, EW, would be at the door and screen those that were not desirable. The three of us would talk to the Victors and friends tonight when they come to decorate the BC auditorium.

6:00 p.m. Dinner.

7:00 p.m. Sixteen Victorettes (14-17), twelve Victors (15-19) and five Junior Victors (14-16) plus six "friends" came to the BC to decorate for the dance 7/26/63.

7:15 p.m. Selvin, Wilson, and myself had a meeting with the total crew. A compromise was reached and the group agreed to allowing Negro couples in their affair.

7:45 p.m. After the meeting I broke the kids into five groups and assigned them specific decorating duties.

Arnie Alvarez (17) told me he had spent \$4.00 he had received from selling dance tickets on himself. He told me in a whisper. I told him this was quite serious and I would talk to him later. I suggested that perhaps he could account for the money by working hard on the dance.

Jocky Alvarez (18) was again serious and put down any fooling around during the decorating.

9:00 p.m. As it was a bit chaotic with so many kids working, I asked all but the twelve to leave.

While this group worked, I talked to Mr. Mattick. Also, four Junior Chandlers (14-17) came to the club to see about our meeting. They said the rest of the club was waiting for me at Sheridan Park.

I told them that I was without an auto and I was tied up working in the dance tomorrow night. Reluctantly, they left after I agreed to meet with them Tuesday, 7/30.

10:00 p.m. Decorating group left.

10:15 p.m. As I was leaving the area I talked with five of the Junior Chandlers (14-17) at the Sheridan Park swimming pool. I suspected they were about to sneak in the pool. After talking about our meeting next Tuesday, they decided to leave the pool area.

10:50 p.m. Left area.

FRIDAY, July 26, 1963

11:30 a.m. OTBC. Wrote report for 7/25/63 and gave it to our sweet CYDP secretary.

12:15 p.m. Picked up three Victorettes (14-17) and two Victors (James Dinardo, 18, and Carl Pecos, 18), also Alfred Tanzio, 16, Junior Victor (14-17).

12:45 p.m. I brought this group to the BC to complete the decorating for the Victors Summer Dance this evening. I stayed with the group until 3:00 supervising.

3:00 p.m. Left the area.

5:45 p.m. OTBC. Drove to 4th area with Wilson, EW, to once again remind the YD of the affair tonight. Sgt. Webster and I discussed the affair at some length. I might add that since the "Rizzos incident" our relationship has, it appears, improved.

6:45 p.m. Picked up Mrs. Alvarez, mother of Jocky, 18, and Arnie, 17, on Western and Taylor.

I next picked up Mrs. Liuzzo, mother of Richy, 16, and Mrs. Gonzago, mother of Ernie (Grog), 18, and Freddie, 15. Two additional ladies accompanied Mrs. Liuzzo.

7:20 p.m. OTBC. Last minute preparations were made.

8:00 p.m. Dance began.

Let me make several general remarks about the affair. There were approximately 160 paid participants and about 30 youth guests. There were four mothers plus two non-group mothers. Mrs. Peterson, community mother, arrived later in the evening. An IYC parole officer also attended. There were six BC staff

plus Mr. Boswell Thurston, member of the Adult Improvement Council, present. There were four YD officers present plus a regular policeman assigned to the dance. Two Andy Frain ushers worked at the door and upstairs in the dance.

I believe this affair was the finest example of group cooperation and participation in a socially acceptable and conventional activity.

The mothers sold pop and hot dogs. Their participation, plus the presence of the other adults and the strong structure of the total affair, along with the dress of the participants and the presence of two Andy Frain ushers, set the tone for the dance. These elements of "squareness" are essential to having a successful activity which is in accord with our project goals.

The Victors were proud and pleased with their affair. During the evening they were watchful for any disturbances and fully played their role of hosts.

A rumor was circulated that one of the 18th Street Boys had a gun and that a fight was planned after the dance. After investigation, I could not find any evidence to support the rumor. The fact that all of the 18th Street Boys brought their girls made me believe that they had not come looking for trouble.

Mr. Lyons, CBC staff, took pictures of the Victors and Victorettes; also several pictures of the dance crowd. I thought it wise to ask if Mr. Lyons could capture for posterity the dramatics of the affair. I am particularly interested in the fellows seeing and having the group picture of themselves.

About a year ago, a group picture was taken. This picture only confirmed their sordid opinions of themselves. The ones taken at the dance will afford them the opportunity to see themselves in a different light, one that perhaps expresses best what I believe they all would like to think of themselves. Therefore, not only did they excellently portray the unaccustomed role of host but had it projected in the form of a photograph that will be a continuous reinforcement of what they are capable of, and a contradiction of the sordid self-images they may have of themselves.

The dance terminated at 11:35 p.m.; by 12:10 a.m. the auditorium was cleaned and the group had left.

I am grateful for the help fo the BC staff, and in particular to Wilson, EW.

MONDAY, July 29, 1963

7:30 p.m. Six Victors (15-19) came for their meeting. I explained to them the money and deductions regarding the dance 7/26/63. \$175.00 gross, \$105.00 net. They must yet decide if they will pay the band \$25.00 and make a \$25.00 donation to the OBC.

TUESDAY, July 30, 1963

4:30 p.m. OBC. Meeting with Victoresses (14-17). I was a bit irritated with the girls and told them in no uncertain terms that I felt I may have made a mistake in seeing that they had orchids for the dance (7/26/63). Girls who one night can be pretty and quite ladylike--dressed in formals and wearing orchids--cannot the next night be fighting in the streets like bums. The first part of the meeting I was particularly hard on them and tried to embarrass not only Marie Gonzago (16), but the whole crew. Towards the end I softened a bit, telling them that as they had demonstrated that they could be young ladies I felt that this type of behavior was not to be expected again.

They asked me about a picnic soon and I told them we would wait a week or so and see if all the young ladies attend the weekly meetings.

In order to learn whether the Project had a noticeable effect on the nature of boys' activities, boys were asked in 1963 and 1965 to tell us to what groups they belonged and to describe the kinds of things those groups did. The degree of the Project's effectiveness in this regard could be gauged by the number of boys in the target areas who joined conventional youth programs and by the numbers of their groups whose characteristic activities were of a constructive rather than unconstructive sort.

The proportion of boys who said they were members of the Chicago Boys Clubs or of programs sponsored by the CBC in 1963 ranged from nine percent in that control neighborhood where no club was close at hand to 29 percent among the boys 16 or over in direct contact with CYDP workers. So even in this last group, less than a third acknowledged Boys Club affiliation. This is partly due to the superficiality of the relationship between some of them and the workers who included them among their contacts; it is also due to the fact that some boys who knew their workers well failed to identify them with the Boys Clubs despite the workers' openness about their affiliation.

From 1963 to 1965, the proportion of boys reporting Boys Clubs affiliation changed hardly at all (See Table 5:12). There were slight reductions in the control neighborhoods over all age groups; a mixed picture among the boys living in the target areas; a slight increase among contact boys. None of these are of a magnitude which assures their reliability; they could easily be chance fluctuations. But the

Table 5:12

Proportion of Boys Affiliated with CYDP-Related Youth Agencies
(by treatment, age and time period)

	Control		Experimental		Contact	
	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965
10-12	13% (80)	7 (77)	26 (78)	17 (74)	25 (22)	30 (21)
13-15	14 (58)	8 (63)	20 (61)	17 (40)	26 (61)	27 (68)
16-19	11 (48)	6 (42)	17 (53)	18 (42)	29 (94)	36 (116)

overall pattern of change--greatest decline in control areas and greatest increase among contacts, especially the older contacts, with the others somewhere between--suggests some CYDP impact however small.

Not immediately apparent in the aggregate figures of Table 5:12 is the marked increase in affiliation with the Oldtown Boys Club reported by black boys, especially the older ones living in that neighborhood; and the markedly fewer young white boys who reported being members. These changes account wholly for the nine percent drop in affiliation reported by 10- to 12-year olds while the older boys' proportion remained essentially steady. The history of the area around the Oldtown Club in the early 1960's pivoted around the rising proportion of blacks living there; and this movement was amplified in club membership figures as black boys became assured of the Boys Clubs unqualified integrated racial policy and white boys left to avoid black boys. It was to this development that the Victors' extension worker alluded when he urged permission to hold their dance at the club, writing, "If the new Club [a new club building had recently opened] is to be used by the total community and not become 85 percent Negro, steps will have to be taken as quickly as possible to bring the Italian populace into the Club." This development heightened the sensitivity of the issue of whether black youngsters would be permitted to come to the Victors dance and which ones.

CYDP may have abetted the increasingly black complexion of the Oldtown Club's membership. Project workers out of that club included a higher proportion of older black boys among their contacts than lived in the area, and, in the absence of a stable outpost facility, frequently brought these boys to the club building. This is a plausible explanation for the rise in black boys' reporting boys club membership occurring almost completely among the older ones. We saw in the last chapter some of the effects of this development on the adult population in the Oldtown neighborhood, and we will discuss it further in the next chapter on the impact CYDP had on the parent agency.

In any case, this change was the only clear result of the Project's effect on club membership. There is no reason to believe that reaching out accomplished significantly greater affiliation of boys with the Boys Clubs. Even were we to add affiliation with other youth agencies, of which there was very little among boys living in the neighborhood of the clubs, the picture would be the same. There is no evidence that contact boys were readied by the Project for the traditional building-centered programs and then entered them; nor that CYDP increased the visibility and attractiveness of the Boys Clubs among neighborhood youth.

While the Project did not seem to recruit boys for agency programs, it may have steered the activities of their independent clubs into constructive channels. There are two sources of data relevant to this development, the sample of women in the target and control areas who were asked about the nature of boys' groups in their neighborhoods, and the boys themselves, who were asked about the activities of their own groups.

Our interviewers inquired of the women whether they could identify any groups of boys in their neighborhoods, and it is interesting how few groups had come to their attention. CYDP workers listed several hundred groups during the course of the Project, an anthropological study of only one target area (Suttles, 1968) located 44, and boys could speak of many; but a representative sample of mothers of teenaged boys could name on the average only one group each. Perhaps this fact testifies to the breadth of the generation gap. We suspect, however, that mothers' ignorance of street clubs reflects the clubs' ephemeral nature. Workers looking for groups with which to work found or created clubs; observers, keeping a sharp eye out for them, detected them from minimal cues; but

mothers, who had little time for such things, largely overlooked them for they had really little effect on adults' lives in the neighborhoods.

Mothers reported a smaller proportion of independent street clubs and a greater proportion of clubs affiliated with some youth agency from 1963 to 1965 (see Table 5:13). The increase in affiliated groups was

Table 5:13

Adult Women's Perceptions of Influence of Boys' Groups (by treatment, groups' affiliations and time period)

	Control		Experimental	
	1963	1965	1963	1965
Good for children	72%	78	68	83
CYDP	1	3	32	33
CBC	5	9	1	---
Other agencies	62	65	34	49
Other	4	1	2	1
Bad for children	25	18	26	14
CYDP	---	6	1	3
CBC	---	---	---	---
Other agencies	3	2	1	1
Other	22	10	24	10
Neither, DK	3	4	6	2
Total	100	100	100	99
(N of Groups)	(133)	(128)	(132)	(97)
(N of Mothers)	(141)	(129)	(155)	(93)

from about 60 percent to 85 percent in both the target and control areas. Mothers also judged a larger proportion of groups "good for boys to belong to" in 1965 than in 1963, this proportion being markedly larger in the experimental than control areas. Groups affiliated with CYDP or with the Boys Clubs do not account for this rising proportion of beneficial groups, however; mothers named groups affiliated with other youth-serving agencies. Nevertheless, it is possible that the Project improved the general deportment of street clubs in the target areas.

Another measure of the Project's success in conventionalizing troublesome youth is change in the boys' images of what their groups usually did. We sorted their descriptions of their groups' activities into broad categories of "constructive" and "unconstructive." In the former we included recreation with any degree of organization, any activity supervised by adults (alert to the possibility of the reporting of bad adult influences but finding none), community service, hobbies, legitimate money-raising for themselves or others, and joint schoolwork. In the latter, we put anything clearly illegal as well as reports of loitering and "hanging." Many activities, such as watching TV or going to the movies, were categorized neither as constructive or unconstructive.

Table 5:14 shows that about half of the activities reported could be considered constructive, while under 10 percent were considered unconstructive. This is probably due partly to the tendency of boys to present a positive image to our interviewers and to suppress negative details. It is also partly due to failing to take into account the length of time spent at each activity, so that the hours spent "hanging" on street corners are not adequately represented. Nevertheless, it is true that even groups of the most delinquent boys did not spend all of their time committing delinquencies, gambling, or just standing around. They often go somewhere to "do something" like watch TV or play low organization pick-up games.

Table 5:14 also shows a small but general increase from 1963 to 1965 in the proportion of constructive activities. Only the 13- to 15-year old boys in the target area fail to register even a small increase in constructive activities. This may be a real phenomenon of life in the inner city of Chicago in those years; but it may also be a function of our data analysts, on whose judgment categorization of activities depended and who may have leaned more positively in the later year.

In any case, there is no basis in these data to believe that CYDP had any effect on the nature of group activities, either among the groups directly served or among the youth groups in the target areas generally. As far as we can tell, the Project did not significantly conventionalize the boys' groups with which it worked, or the boys' groups in the target areas.

We should point out that the data on groups not directly worked

Table 5:14

Proportion of Constructive and Unconstructive Activities
Characteristic of Boys' Groups
(by treatment, age and time period)

Age; Type of Activity	Control		Experimental		Contact	
	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965
7-12						
constructive	56	56	52	60	58	69
unconstructive	2	4	4	4	5	2
(N of activities)	(215)	(215)	(233)	(221)	(78)	(63)
(N of boys)	(80)	(77)	(78)	(73)	(22)	(21)
13-15						
constructive	55	63	59	52	49	60
unconstructive	3	7	4	11	8	10
(N of activities)	(212)	(252)	(230)	(127)	(264)	(302)
(N of boys)	(58)	(63)	(61)	(40)	(61)	(68)
16-19						
constructive	46	50	39	49	51	56
unconstructive	5	8	7	10	8	8
(N of activities)	(227)	(160)	(188)	(159)	(430)	(456)
(N of boys)	(48)	(42)	(53)	(42)	(94)	(116)

with by CYDP, i.e., on the experimental rather than on the contact groups, are the especially important data here. For the absence of change in the latter could be due either to the Project's ineffectiveness or to workers terminating their stewardship of more conventional groups and picking up different and troublesome ones. If the latter were the case, we should find evidence of success with the terminated groups in signs of more conventionalization among the experimental area boys; but we do not.

It is worthwhile pausing here to reemphasize a methodological point. The usefulness of two sets of control comparisons is obvious in

Table 5:14. We have already mentioned the importance of being able to look at the responses of boys who were living in the target areas but not in contact with CYDP. Responses of the control boys from the matched census tracts outside of the target areas have also been useful here in preventing misinterpretation of the data. For example, we might have been tempted to make something of the 10 percent rise in constructive group activities reported by the oldest experimental boys had we not realized that it could be attributed either to a general movement throughout this part of Chicago or to a shift in our data analysts' frame of reference. The trend in the control boys' responses alerted us to these possibilities.

Delinquency

The Chicago Youth Development Project was mounted as a delinquency-preventing and delinquency-reducing program. Although it had other aims as well, important in their own right, they were framed in terms of their potential effect on the problem of delinquency. The national body, the Boys Clubs of America, had publicly taken on the challenge of delinquency, and the Project's parent agency, the Chicago Boys Clubs, viewed CYDP primarily as an instrument to address that problem.

It is worthwhile to remind ourselves here that the essential innovation of the Project for the Chicago Boys Clubs was that it reached out aggressively to contact and serve the most delinquent or potentially delinquent boys in the neighborhoods of the experimental clubs. The agency realized that such youngsters were not coming through the open doors of the clubs to participate in the building-centered program. We have also seen that the Project did serve a population of boys whose delinquency records were more numerous than those of other boys in their neighborhoods, and compared to the agency's typical clientele, especially more delinquent.

Of course, Project workers gathered up more delinquents because they were looking for them. Boys were not approached in schools, churches, or recreation centers. They were found in the streets, and the more suspicious or shady their behavior, the more attractive they appeared. Workers appreciated the boys' group which had successfully sponsored a dance on their own, but they sought out the boys' group which had tried to break up that dance.

To aid its hunt for delinquent boys, the Project maintained close contact with the Youth Division of the Chicago police. One of the first things novice workers did was to introduce themselves to the youth officers assigned to the Fourth Area, which included the experimental and control neighborhoods. Nor did they hide their relations with the police from the boys with whom they worked.

The workers would wave to the Youth Division men as they drove by, talk to them openly when they were encountered walking, and took phone calls from them in front of groups with whom we were working. Our workers felt friendly toward Youth Division men and they showed it. So far as we can tell, this did not affect our relations to youth groups in the least. (Carney, Mattick, and Calloway, 1969:110)

In July of 1963, the Project took a step toward routinizing police contacts as a way of locating potential clientele. A Youth Division referral procedure was instituted whereby the Fourth Area police sent to the Project's central office a daily list of boys who had been apprehended but discharged as "station adjustments" or referred to the Family Court, but not those detained in custody. In effect, this meant that CYDP was alerted mostly to those boys whom the police regarded as less serious offenders and not being served by another agency. Further, almost all these boys were less than 18 years old, at which age Youth Division jurisdiction ended. The Project office staff identified those boys on the police list who resided in the experimental areas and informed the police that these cases would be followed up. They were then assigned to CYDP field staff according to area, acquaintance with the boy, his family or friends, and similar criteria. The workers in turn visited each boy's home to discuss the case, to inform the family of local facilities designed to deal with problems the family might be having, and to invite the boy to participate in Boys Clubs programs, including CYDP. The worker would try to establish some relationship with the boy and convey that he was interested in him.

Extension workers found that following up police referrals was one of their most difficult assignments. They felt uncomfortable about confronting a boy and his family with an unsolicited offer of help a week or so after the boy's apprehension. They expressed their discomfort among themselves by composing mock introductory speeches; for example, one worker proposed, "Once his mother opens the door, say 'Hey lady, I

hear you got a rotten son!" Furthermore, a worker was sometimes at a loss as to what to do with a boy when some relationship actually was established and an offer of help accepted; for their usual practice was to contact and work with groups of boys rather than individuals. It did not seem feasible to incorporate a police referral into a strange group of boys already involved in the Project. And it was not always possible or desirable to work with a referral's group of friends, if he had one, because it might not constitute a generally delinquent group; or if it did, it might not accept the worker even if he had the time for another group.

Despite the difficulties encountered in the Youth Division referral program, it brought the Project into contact with a very large number of alleged juvenile offenders. In the two and a half years of its operation within CYDP, 22 workers contacted 2202 referrals.

When the Project encountered instances of boys apprehended by the police, its general aim was to provide the authorities with dispositions of the cases alternative to temporary detention prior to a hearing and subsequent probation or incarceration. It was usually, but not always the workers' judgment that the less a boy's involvement with the formal police and judicial procedures the better, that the "delinquent" label thus affixed was a burden and a provocation to further delinquency and that the techniques for rehabilitation and correction practiced by the authorities were not likely to be effective. In some instances however, workers judged that measures as severe as removal from the community were appropriate, if not immediately beneficial to the boy. Sometimes the situation had reached the point where people in the community were endangered by the boy, or the boy had established himself as an effective obstacle to the worker's efforts with his group. In such cases, workers did not try to intervene in the official process. But these instances were infrequent.

An example of how CYDP's relations with the police and the court was often used to a boy's benefit is in the following account of a worker's efforts on behalf of Emencour Belmondo.

Emencour Belmondo, the Authorities, and CYDPWEDNESDAY, September 4, 1963

8:00 p.m. Picked up six Skybolts (13-16) on Taylor and Aberdeen Sts. I explained that for the next two or three weeks we would not have regular meetings and would not plan any activities. I want them to concentrate on school and adjusting to their new schedule.

While we were driving around they told me about a boy that had wrecked a stolen auto on Miller St. He was arrested about an hour ago.

Everyone in the group is in school. Most of the conversation was about classes and complaining about teachers. Several of the group are on half days; others start at 9:00 in the morning and don't get out until 5:30 in the late afternoon.

8:45 p.m. Monroe Police Station. Johnny Burke, new YD officer, was in the process of booking Emencour Belmondo (13), 13XX Flournoy for auto theft. This was the boy the Skybolts told me about. Phillips, YD officer, introduced me to Burke. Burke said he was sorry, but he had arranged for the boy to be detained at the Audy Home and will appear in the Complaint Dept. in the morning.

I talked to the boy and his parents. The boy was scared and could not talk without crying. I told Phillips there was no reason why this boy should be detained overnight. Burke knew the boy did not originally steal the car and had tried to drive it only about 30 feet. The boy's parents seemed sincere in their concern, and I felt sure they would bring him to the Family Court in the morning. Burke agreed with me and said if I had come sooner he would have released him to his parents.

FRIDAY, September 6, 1963

2:00 p.m. OBC. Received call from Bill Cartwright, Probation Officer, Family Court, regarding Emencour Belmondo (13). He was arrested for auto theft. Cartwright said he would come to the OBC Monday 9/9/63 to meet the family.

MONDAY, September 9, 1963

2:45 p.m. Bill Cartwright, Probation Officer, Family Court, came to the Club. Shortly thereafter, the Belmondo family arrived. Emencour (13) was arrested for auto theft, court date next week. I took Cartwright and the family upstairs to the CYDP room. Cartwright explained the procedure (court) that will occur following the boy's court date. We also used this time to acquaint ourselves with the family.

MONDAY, October 7, 1963

5:30 p.m. OBC. Emencour Belmondo (13), came in to see me. I reminded the boy of his court date Wednesday (10/9/63). The boy has been coming to the Boys Club regularly. I told him to return this evening with the Boys Club membership application signed by his mother.

WEDNESDAY, October 9, 1963

9:30 a.m. Family Court. Case: Emencour Belmondo (13); Charge: Auto Theft.

Conversation with Cartwright, Probation Officer, and Parker, Horner Program Director, before my case was heard.

11:10 a.m. Case heard by Judge Slater; disposition was one year probation for the boy. Outside the court room I explained to the boy and his mother the requirements of the probation department. I placed great stress on Emencour doing well in school and continuing his relationship with the Boys Club.

FRIDAY, November 15, 1963

4:30 p.m. Outlined week's reports. Emencour Belmondo (13), came to to see me to bring me his permission form to go to camp on the 22nd of this month. The boy is excited about the trip and asked me numerous questions about what we will be doing over the week-end.

THURSDAY, November 21, 1963

6:30 p.m. OBC. Five Skybolts (13-16) who are leaving for camp tomorrow night come to see about getting their physicals. I told them to be at the OBC tomorrow at 4:00 p.m. James Lansing (13) and Emencour Belmondo (14) were also present and agreed to come with the others for their physicals.

WEDNESDAY, March 4, 1964

1:00 p.m. OBC. Received a letter from a Mr. Rolland Schorling, new Probation officer at the Family Court. In the letter he asked that we have lunch in the near future to discuss his case load. He also asked me for some information on Emencour Belmondo (14), Family Court probationer. I spent an hour reading the new "Blue Book."

4:00 p.m. Home visit to Emencour Belmondo (see above). The boy is doing very well in school and in his social relations. He is a member of the "Mar-Kings" (13-16); however, he has not been involved in any of their difficulties. I informed him that I would soon be meeting with his new probation officer and he would see him shortly also.

TUESDAY, March 10, 1964

Arrived at OBC at 2:45 p.m. I called Probation Officer Rolland Schorling at the Family Court. I recently received a letter from him informing me he was now in charge of the majority of the CYDP Area; also requesting a report on Emencour Belmondo (14), Mar-Kings (13-16).

Mr. Schorling and I arranged to have lunch Monday (3/16/64) at 1:00 p.m. to discuss Belmondo and other fellows we are jointly related to. Later in the afternoon I asked Mr. Wilson, EW, if he would like to also have lunch with us and he agreed.

The measurement of delinquency in the target and control areas was both the most important and the most difficult research task of the Project. Important, because it concerned the effectiveness of the Project in achieving its central aim; difficult, because adequate measures of delinquency are hard to obtain.

One point which needs to be stressed here is that CYDP aimed ultimately "to reduce the absolute amount of illegal and anti-social behavior attributable to the target population in the experimental areas." The stress on behavior is to distinguish this aim from that of solely reducing the number of boys who are caught by the police and are counted in the official statistics. The official records are only an approximate reflection of the amount of delinquent behavior among the youngsters in an area. These figures also respond to changes in police and court practices, the number of police in an area, the crowdedness of the juvenile or family court docket, and other such factors which are to some degree independent of the actual amount of delinquent behavior. (For a thorough discussion of the uses of official statistics on crime, see Morris and Hawkins, 1970.) That is, official delinquency figures measure the behavior of the authorities as well as the behavior of the boys and need to be interpreted with this in mind. As we shall see, the Project probably had some significant effect on the behavior of the authorities which are reflected in the official figures.

Furthermore, there is a sense in which the Project's potential for reducing delinquency rates--the incidence of delinquency reported in official figures--could concomitantly increase delinquent behavior. Workers sometimes persuaded the court not to remove a boy from the community but rather to give the Project a chance to rehabilitate him in the community. The effect of this might have been to retain more delinquent boys in the community than ordinarily would have remained, boys who themselves could commit further offenses which would of course have been less likely while they were incarcerated. These boys also were among the worst influences on other, less delinquent boys and in this way too could have increased the incidence of delinquent behavior. On balance, it seemed to us more beneficial to keep most of the heavily delinquent boys at home. But consideration of the negative aspects of this practice sharpens the important distinction between delinquency rates and delinquent behavior.

It is also worth mentioning here the historical context in which we were observing delinquency rates. In 1960, O. W. Wilson assumed the superintendency of police in Chicago. Prior to that time Chicago police were under-reporting crime and juvenile delinquency. The new superintendent announced his intention to gather and publish more complete statistics even before he formally took office and warned of the "statistical crime wave" which would ensue. So the police figures we have used are perhaps more accurate than any that had been available in Chicago for some time. These figures also tended to arouse public anxiety about crime in Chicago more than it had been aroused before.

Recognizing that official counts of delinquents are only an approximation of the behavior with which the Project was concerned, we nevertheless had to rely heavily on them to gauge the Project's effectiveness because they were among the best measures available. We took several steps to overcome the weaknesses in this approach. First, we used those official figures least contaminated by official practices, those figures based on police contacts with juveniles prior to decisions about dispositions such as release with warning or referral to court. These figures include the largest number of boys, and it is possible, by taking some care, not to include among them many of those boys whose contacts with the police are not on account of their misconduct but rather on account of their having been victims of crimes or wrongly accused of crimes. We also used several different sets of such data, checking them against one another and treating them to several kinds of analyses.

In addition, we obtained independent assessments of delinquent behavior from residents and from the heads of youth-serving agencies in the area. These people are of course not often in a position to observe delinquency directly, they cannot as individuals make reliable counts, and their perceptions may be distorted; but we regard these sources of information as other helpful perspectives on delinquency in the target areas. Indeed, there is a sense in which their perceptions of the prevalence of delinquent behavior are more directly related to the goals of the Project than the actual facts; for these are the people whose reactions to youngsters' behavior determine whether or not delinquent behavior, in whatever amount, constitutes a problem. In the previous chapter, we discussed the effects of the Project on their tolerance of boys' misbehavior. Here we take up their beliefs about whether delinquent behavior

had become more or less frequent and serious, recognizing that such estimates are the usual bases for calls to action by agencies and authorities.

In both 1963 and 1965, we asked the representative samples of women living in the target areas, "Has [teenagers'] behavior changed much in the past year or so?" If a respondent said that she thought it had, we asked if that change had been for the better or worse. Most of these residents perceive no change in teenagers' behavior (see Table 5:15), but there was a slight and perhaps reliable decline in the proportion of women in the target areas who saw none. The increasing proportion who

Table 5:15

"Has (teenagers') behavior changed much in the past year or so?"
(by treatment and time period)

Adult Women	Control		Experimental	
	1963	1965	1963	1965
Yes:				
better	15%	17	12	19
mixed	*	*	*	3
worse	13	11	8	11
No	67	66	75	63
DK	5	6	4	3
Total	100	100	99	99
(N)	(141)	(129)	(155)	(90)

*Less than .05 percent

perceived some change reported variously that the change was for the better, the worse, or mixed; and on balance, directional shifts in perception among residents of the target area were not reliably different from shifts among control area residents. That is, there seems to have been no marked feeling in the experimental area that misbehavior was growing more or less prevalent either before or during the course of the Project.

We also inquired specifically about delinquency. We asked our sample, "About how many teenagers out of every ten in this neighborhood fairly regularly do things which could get them into trouble with the police?"

Over the years, markedly more residents of the control areas became unsure of the amount of delinquency going on and declined to estimate, while target area residents were about as sure in 1965 as in 1963. But there were no differences among those making estimates in the two areas; according to these data from both sets of women, the number of frequent delinquents went up (see Table 5:16).

Table 5:16

"About how many teenagers out of every ten in this neighborhood fairly regularly do things which could get them into trouble with the police?"
(by treatment and time period)

Adult Women	Control		Experimental	
	1963	1965	1963	1965
less than 3	46%	27	49	41
more than 3	31	38	28	39
DK, NA	23	35	23	20
Total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(141)	(129)	(155)	(90)

However, when those who made some estimate were asked directly, "Is that more or less than a year ago?", then significantly more women in the experimental areas replied "more" (see Table 5:17). While only five percent of them had thought in 1963 that the previous year had seen a rise in the number of delinquents, 20 percent thought so in 1965. This increase of those who were taking the dimmer view seemed to be balanced by a decline among those who thought the delinquency situation had remained stable over the previous year.

One plausible interpretation of these data is that the presence of a large scale delinquency prevention project in the experimental neighborhoods had kept more residents alert to the problem while a greater proportion of residents elsewhere ceased to pay attention. And those who remained sensitive to delinquency perceived an increasing proportion of youngsters involved in it regularly. Whether that perception was accurate or perhaps a function of selective sensitivity will become more

Table 5:17 **BEST COPY AVAILABLE**

"Is that more or less (who do things that could get them into trouble with the police) than a year or so ago?"
(by treatment and time period)

Adult Women	Control		Experimental	
	1963	1965	1963	1965
more	9%	8	5	20
same	74	63	78	53
less	14	20	13	19
DK, NA	4	10	4	8
Total	101	101	100	100
(N)	(130)	(102)	(142)	(81)

clear when we look at the actual delinquency rates among boys.

Responses from the sample of agency executives presented a somewhat different picture from the mothers'. Where the women in both target and control areas estimated a slightly larger proportion of delinquent teenagers in 1965 than in 1963, the agency executives in the target areas saw little change while 18 percent more of those in the control areas reported a smaller proportion in the latter year (see Table 5:18).

Table 5:18

"How many teenagers out of every 100 in this neighborhood fairly regularly do things which could get them into trouble with the police?"
(by treatment and time period)

Agency Executives	Control		Experimental	
	1963	1965	1963	1965
less than 30	45%	63	63	63
30 or more	29	14	22	20
DK	26	23	14	18
Total	100	100	99	101
(N)	(49)	(43)	(49)	(40)

And where more women in the target areas thought delinquency was on the rise in 1965 than 1963, agency executives did not shift in this regard (see Table 5:19). In general, more agency executives in both target and

Table 5:19

"Is that more or less [delinquents] than a year or so ago?"
(by treatment and time period)




Agency Executives	Control		Experimental	
	1963	1965	1963	1965
more	18%	9	10	8
same	51	51	49	50
less	20	16	29	15
DK	10	23	12	28
Total	99	99	100	101
(N)	(49)	(43)	(49)	(40)

control areas became unsure of the direction delinquency was tending among the youth they served.

So concerned adults presented inconsistent views of delinquency trends in the research areas. This much is clear, however: there was no improvement obvious to people in the target areas. Indeed, wherever we note shifts large enough to be reliable, they indicate perceptions of greater relative improvement in the control than in the target areas.

We turn now to the police files on juveniles to discover, insofar as these data can tell us, whether CYDP effected any reduction in delinquency in the target populations. Figure 5:3 presents these data and requires some explanation. The graphs are based on the records of the samples of boys interviewed in 1963 and 1965. The name of each boy for whom an interview was completed was sought in the files and his record, if any, noted for the several previous years. The graphs take the records back three years prior to the interview, and the ages of the boys during these years are indicated at the appropriate points. To the left of each graph are plotted the figures back to 1960 of those boys interviewed in

Figure 5:3 Proportions of Boys in Police Delinquency Files, 1960-1965 by Year, Age Cohort, and Treatment



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Boys age 10-12 in 1963 and in 1965.

Boys age 13-15 in 1961 and in 1965.

Boys age 16-17 in 1963 and in 1965.

1963; to the right are the figures back to 1962 of those boys interviewed in 1965.

The reader should note that Figure 5:3 includes data for boys only up to age 17, not to age 19 as previous tables have. This is because official figures from the juvenile files are spotty after age 17, since the jurisdiction of the Family Court ends for most boys at that age. The police eventually cull out and destroy the records of older boys who do not come to their attention again; and the records of boys who are in further trouble are usually transferred to the criminal records. So the records of boys over 17 disappear from the police files. Furthermore, the records of certain 16-year olds are also removed when the Family Court determines to waive their cases to the criminal court, a decision made for chronic and serious offenders.

The reader should also remember that the control, experimental, and target boys were all under the jurisdiction of the same area police administration and court, so that they are comparable in that respect.

Some general observation of trends in Figure 5:3 should be noted first. The data indicate a wide variation in the delinquency rates from year to year. These are due to factors such as police practices and the ages of the boys. But the overall level of delinquency of the population of boys in the control and target areas was high during the Project's tenure, confirming that the Boys Clubs had indeed selected target neighborhoods in need of special service and that the research team had selected control areas to match. (The solid and dashed trend lines of the control and experimental boys are the most informative here, rather than the contacts' dotted lines.) For example, almost one out of every five of the sample of 14-15 year old control and target area boys had been apprehended sometime during 1963 (see Figure 5:3:c). Cumulative data would show that by the time boys in the target and control areas reached the age of 16, about one in three had been apprehended by the police, compared to a city-wide average of under one in ten.

We should also point out here that the matching of control and experimental areas was fairly close. Even though the delinquency rate itself was not a criterion for matching (see Chapter 3, pp. 9-16), the rates were similar for boys in each age cohort when the Project began in 1960-61.

Age differences in these figures parallel differences usually

reflected in official data: the proportions of boys turning up in the files increase with age to a peak at about age 15, then drop off. But this pattern must be regarded skeptically; for data on delinquent behavior as reported by boys themselves have indicated continued increases in delinquency beyond the age of 15 (Gold, 1970). This discrepancy between the official and self-reported measures is due to the culling procedure we have described, which reduces the incidence of older boys in the juvenile records and makes it seem that delinquent behavior itself declines. The opposite is true and accounts for the phenomenon; for it is the increasing frequency of delinquent behavior as boys become 16 and 17 which occasions their removal from the juvenile file and transfer to the criminal statistics.

It is important to keep age differences in our delinquency data in mind as we examine them because CYDP workers contacted a disproportionately large number of the older boys in the target areas. This alone introduces differences between the delinquency records of contact boys and others, regardless of what else may have happened among them. We will therefore be comparing boys of similar ages throughout.

Figure 5:3 indicates that at each age level contact boys were more frequently apprehended than other boys in their neighborhoods. (That is, the contacts' dotted trend lines are almost always found above the dashed lines which stand for the target area boys.) This was especially true the older the contact boys were. Indeed the generally lower delinquency rates of the oldest target area boys compared to their controls can be accounted for by the removal of a significant number of the most delinquent of them into the contact category. If the contact boys were counted among their neighborhood peers, the target and control area delinquency rates among the oldest boys would be quite alike.

To summarize, this is the context in which CYDP effects on delinquency should be considered. The areas selected as experimental and control were indeed high delinquency areas according to official records. These areas seem to have been fairly evenly matched in this regard. There are age differences in the delinquency figures, partly because of actual increases in delinquency with age, partly because of record-keeping procedures; and since the Project disproportionately engaged older boys, these age differences and their sources must be kept constantly in mind and under control when comparing contact boys with the others.

Finally, all of these considerations point to difficulties in interpreting delinquency records such as these and suggest that we must proceed with them tentatively and cautiously, searching out and weighing trends for their meaning.

Returning to the graphs in Figure 5:3, we look first for signs of the effects CYDP may have had on the target area generally. Trend lines for the relatively low delinquency youngest cohort, boys aged 10-12, are quite similar and reveal no reliable differences. Among the cohort 13- to 15-years old in 1963, we note that the target area boys (dashed line) piled up at a great rate in the 1962 files while the control area boys remained essentially steady; and the target cohort 13- to 15-years old in 1965 rose steadily from null in 1962 to 15 percent in 1965, while their controls rose, then fell. And among the oldest boys, the target-control area trends are distinguishable at only one point: the target area boys began a decline in 1964 which continued into 1965, while the control area boys did not. In sum, the target area boys who grew from about 10- to 15-years old while the Project worked in their neighborhoods seemed to have got more involved with the authorities to a greater degree than their controls; and the sole positive indication of general Project effect is among the oldest target area boys.

Consider now the trends among contacts (dotted line) in the younger cohorts, 10- to 12-years old and 13- to 15-years old. The only reliable trends in their data after 1961, when the Project began to work with them, show rising delinquency rates. But it does not appear that involvement with the Project itself caused this since they are paralleled in each case by rises among age-mates in the target and control areas. It is likely that increasing age and perhaps increased referral levels by the juvenile officers account for these trends.

But trends among the oldest contacts show several dramatic shifts which demand close scrutiny. First of all is the trebling of their proportions in the police files in 1961, when they were 14- to 15-years old and the Project was beginning to gather its clientele. We believe that this sharp rise was not an effect of the Project on the contacts but rather reflects the Project's selection process. Workers sought out boys who had come to the attention of the police and courts and were in 1961 filling up their caseloads with recent offenders. At that time, the fact

of their official delinquencies that year led to their being selected as contacts rather than the other way around. Furthermore, this selection of the most delinquent boys as contacts and their consequent removal from the figures of the population of boys in their neighborhood accounts for the small drop in the delinquency rate among the target area boys.

The second sharp rise in delinquency rates of contact boys was in 1963, when the 16- to 17-year olds interviewed in 1965 had been 14- to 15-years old. Again, selection accounts for part of this, but at this point, only a small part. For extension workers were not adding so rapidly to already heavy caseloads, and furthermore, some of these contact boys had already been part of their caseloads when they were younger. The fact is that at this time a combination of the age factor and police practices were inflating the numbers of all boys in these neighborhoods who were referred to the court. The contact boys' original high level of delinquency, that is, the fact that many already had records, exaggerated this trend among these older contacts but it was paralleled by the experiences of their age-mates in the target and control areas.

And then, sharp declines are evident in the delinquency rate of the 16- and 17-year old contacts in 1965 to the level at which they were found when they were but 13- to 14. Furthermore, we have noted a similar decline among their age-mates in their neighborhoods, beginning in the preceding year. Did CYDP produce this pattern of effects? There are reasons to believe that the Project did, and the data are instructive.

The fact that our data on delinquency records included only 16- to 17-year olds and excluded 18- to 19-year olds led us to examine other data on just the 16- and 17-year old cohort. What we found were marked differences in optimism about their schooling by 16- and 17-year old contact boys compared to the controls (see Table 5:20): from 1963 to 1965, the proportion of the former who felt their chances of finishing school were "very good" rose 12 percent, while the proportion of the latter dropped 12 percent. Meanwhile, the optimism of boys in the target neighborhood remained essentially unchanged. These data parallel the differences in delinquency rate between the 16- and 17-year old cohorts from 1963 to 1965: the contacts declined, the controls rose, and the experimentals remained the same.

The similarity between trends in delinquency rates and trends in

Table 5:20
 Optimism about Graduating from High School
 among Older Boys (by treatment, age and time period)


Chances "very good"	Control		Experimental		Contact	
	1963	1965	1963	1965	1963	1965
<u>16-17</u>						
%	41	29	44	39	20	32
(N)	(39)	(34)	(41)	(28)	(64)	(73)
<u>15-16</u>						
%	32	23	45	29	16	27
(N)	(41)	(48)	(38)	(28)	(62)	(66)

optimism about completing high school among these older boys suggested that we search further. We found the same sort of parallel among the overlapping 15- to 16-year old cohort: among this age group, the 1965 contacts are markedly less delinquent than the 1963 group, while the rates rise over that same period for both the controls and the target area experimentals; and the proportions of boys who think their chances of completing high school are better manifest the identical pattern. Further exploration of the data for younger boys revealed no such similarities.

Further evidence for the reality of the link between optimism about graduation from high school and delinquency rates lies in the fact that the two best predictors in our data to a boy's appearance in the delinquency files are his age and his estimate of his chances for completing high school. Figure 5:4, including data only for the representative sample of boys--the control and target area boys, but not the contacts--demonstrates that optimism about graduating is related to low rates of delinquency, especially among the older boys (Caplan, unpublished manuscript).

Figure 5:4

Educational Expectations and Delinquency
(by age)



It becomes important then to inquire how and to what extent the Project may have contributed to the optimism of the 16- to 17-year old contacts and their neighborhood peers, and to the optimism of the slightly younger contact boys alone. We discussed earlier the general increase in the number of boys who reported getting academic help from CYDP. It is clear now that Project workers became a source of help with academic problems for a substantial percentage of the 16- and 17-year old contact boys over the years 1963 to 1965. When asked in 1963 "who the people are who give you help about problems at school," 15 percent of the then 16- and 17-year olds named a CYDP staff member; the same question in 1965 elicited a CYDP name from 36 percent of that age group. The Project became similarly more visible to younger (13- to 15-year olds) and to older (18- to 19-year olds) boys, but apparently their academic help was not so crucial for the delinquency of the younger ones, and we are not able to gauge its effect on the older ones because of the absence of records.

Another source of help with academic problems also was recognized by increasing numbers of contact and target area 16- and 17-year olds during the Project years, their mothers. The proportion of them who

mentioned their mothers jumped from between 25 and 30 percent in 1963 to between 50 and 55 percent in 1965, while the comparable proportions actually declined among their age-mates in the control areas.

It is important to mention again at this point that the Project apparently had no effect on the dropout rates among the boys worked with directly. But there was a small relative decline in the proportion of dropouts among the boys in the target area, and it may be that the Project had some part in that. It is conceivable that the help offered by the Project was sufficient to have some small ameliorative effect on the dropout rate in general but was not sufficient to overcome the multiplicity of problems presented by the contact group. Still, the Project apparently had an effect on the contact boys' hopes concerning school and their future, and that seems to have been enough to reduce their delinquency.

Disposition of Delinquents

We have pointed out that one of the Project's goals was to provide alternatives of treatment for boys found guilty of delinquency, alternatives especially to being officially labelled "delinquent," or, given that, to being incarcerated rather than placed on probation. In order to assess the degree of CYDP's success in achieving this goal, we present data on the disposition of boys coming to the attention of the police during the Project period.

These data are organized from the information on all police contacts with youth provided by the Fourth Area Chicago Police.⁸ They throw further light on whether the Project's efforts had any effect on delinquency among youth in the target areas, above and beyond any effects it might have had on the boys whom it served directly. These data support the findings of the previous sections on police records among representative samples, that there was no noticeable impact on the general population. Mainly, they provide some insights into the

⁸Some of this discussion is based on material in Block, R. The Chicago Youth Development Project: An evaluation based on arrests. Unpublished masters thesis, The University of Chicago, 1967.

Project's effects on police practices.

The reader needs to be aware at this point of a shift in the nature of the control neighborhoods. Thus far, control data from boys and women residents have been drawn from the constructed dispersed control areas, the set of non-adjacent census tracts selected to match the census tracts in the experimental areas. Here, the control data from the police files pertain to boys living in the unified control areas, the natural areas similar to but not so closely matched with the experimental areas. These unified control areas were needed both to identify comparable neighborhoods which executives of youth-serving agencies served and to obtain certain official delinquency data for comparable areas served by the same police and youth officers responsible for the experimental areas.

In the six months at the start of CYDP, Fourth Area police made 942 arrests of youth in the experimental and unified control areas, 655 of them in the Henry Horner target area and its control, 287 in the Oldtown area and its control. At that time, the juvenile population of the Horner area was more delinquent than its control, accounting for 62 percent of the arrests among the two groups, even though the 1960 Census reported fewer boys aged 10-19 living in the former. On the other hand, youth living in the Oldtown area were less delinquent than their comparable controls, about the same number of them accounting for only 40 percent of the arrests between them.

From July 1963, through December 1965, the proportion of arrests accounted for by juveniles in the Horner area fluctuated slightly around the 62 percent with which we found them, ranging quarterly from 56 to 65 percent and, in the last quarter of 1965, was 63 percent. They had averaged 62 percent over this period. Essentially, then, no change.

Youth in the Oldtown target area seemed by this measure to grow more delinquent as a group compared to their counterparts. We had first gauged them accounting for 40 percent of the arrests made of juveniles in their own and in the comparable control area. In the last quarter of 1965, that proportion had risen to 42 percent, a negligible increase. But in the seven quarters preceding that one, the proportion had ranged from 50 to 61 percent and averaged 52 percent over the period.

Insofar as arrests made of juveniles is concerned, then, youth in the target areas did not become less delinquent over the CYDP years.

Those in the Horner area continued to account for more of their share of arrests; those in the Oldtown area came to account for at least their share, perhaps more until the final few months of the Project when their relative rate sank back to the one with which we had found them.

These police data were also sorted out to address the question of CYDP's effect on recidivism. The Youth Division referral system seemed more likely to have a direct effect, not on the general juvenile arrest rate, but on the rate of re-arrests. The same might be said of much of the Project's client-finding techniques, in that they identified boys on account of their encounters with police. So perhaps CYDP was effective in reducing the number of boys who had repeated contacts with police. (The data indicate that whatever success the Project had with the *oldest* contact and target area boys was in part at least a reduction in recidivism.)

This analysis of data includes only those juveniles who *were arrested* at least once. Furthermore, it includes only those *arrested initially* in 1964. Excluded from this analysis are youngsters who may have been arrested prior to that time. In effect, this means that Project impact in recidivism has been assessed only for the last two years of its operation. It is not possible to tell from these data whether recidivism rates dropped over the whole time in the target areas compared to control areas. It is possible to determine if in its latter stages, the Project functioned to prevent repeated contacts with police.

Table 5:21
Repeated Arrests of Juveniles, July 1964 - December 1965
(by treatment)

Number of Repeated Arrests	Control Areas	Experimental Areas
None	81%	74%
1 or more	18	26
Total	99	100
(N of juveniles)	(571)	(970)

Table 5:21 presents the data on repeated arrests. From mid-1964 through December 1965, eight percent more of the youngsters in the experimental area were re-arrested, a small but reliable proportion. While we cannot ascertain whether this was an improvement or deterioration of conditions prior to that time, it is clear that the Project had not effected a less delinquent population on this score compared to a control group.

Still another opportunity for CYDP to work beneficially with arrested youth lay in creating alternative rehabilitative possibilities and thus reducing the number of youngsters subject to the full range of official procedures. When a juvenile was apprehended, police might have handled him relatively informally--scolding him, warning him, perhaps even imposing informal probation by requiring that he report periodically to the station, but not referring his case to the court. If the police did refer the case to the court, then the youngster might or might not actually appear before a judge, the matter might have been treated again relatively informally by workers attached to the court without the court assuming continued jurisdiction by declaring the offender delinquent and making him its ward. Appearance before a judge might also result in warning and dismissal, but a judge might assume control of the juvenile, imposing probation, placing him in a foster home, or incarcerating him in a reformatory. The Project supplemented these alternatives with an additional referral receiver at several stages. That is, the police, court workers, or judges could elect to refer apprehended youngsters to a CYDP worker rather than to one of the alternatives described. This has some advantages both for the community and for the youngster. For the former, the costs of legal processing and maintenance of a ward would be reduced, along with the usually heavy case loads that court workers and probation officers commonly carry. The main advantage to the latter would be that he avoids the stigma of a delinquency label and is permitted to remain at home. It should be noted that CYDP was not the only agency which provided a referral alternative; the Boys Clubs and other agencies had done so before. The Project's contribution was to increase their availability substantially and to help coordinate the process of referrals outside the court system.

There was potential in this facet of the Project's effort to increase the amount of delinquency in the target areas, that is, to counteract

its major aims; we have already pointed out that if the Project were effective in increasing police or court referrals to agencies, it would on that account maintain in the neighborhoods a larger proportion of more delinquent youngsters who might otherwise have been removed by the courts or at least kept under closer, probationary surveillance. And if CYDP or other agencies did not effectively treat their referrals, they would then contribute to the rate of re-arrests and to the number of youngsters available to encourage other youngsters in delinquent behavior. Nevertheless, while this effect was recognized, it was also understood that deeper involvement with the juvenile justice system itself increased arrest rates. So the Project staff decided that, on balance, it was wiser to try to reduce the severity of official sanctions imposed on apprehended youth.

CYDP pursued this goal in the context of an increasingly hard line being taken by juvenile authorities in Chicago. From 1963 through 1965, larger proportions of apprehended juveniles throughout the city, including the Fourth Area, were being detained by the police, referred to the court, and made wards of the State. Did the Project effectively reverse this trend in the target areas or at least ameliorate it? The answer demands a rather complicated handling of the official figures which simultaneously takes into account trends in the Fourth Area, the control areas, and the target areas. The resulting indices are not informative to the naked eye and therefore are not presented here (they are available in Block, 1967:23-25). They add up to no Project effect. Compared to trends in the unified control areas, youth in the target areas were exposed to no less of the official procedures, were no more likely to be dismissed at the station level or at the court level, nor less likely to be held in detention.

Indeed, there is some indication that the increased availability of agencies for referral resulted in more severe dispositions of some apprehended youngsters, for the availability of alternative dispositions depended upon what the authorities made of them. The aim of the Project was that boys who would otherwise be held for court appearance would be referred to the agency instead and permitted their freedom. This was usually not the case. Rather, the police tended to refer to agencies those juveniles whose cases would otherwise have been handled informally

at the station; that is, the juvenile authorities utilized the agencies largely to follow-up on the less serious and first offenders, supplementing the relatively brief attention given them at the station, in the hope, no doubt, that agency follow-up would forestall continuing misconduct. Table 5:22 demonstrates that increases in the proportion of juvenile referrals to agencies usually paralleled decreases in the proportion of station adjustments. (This was not true, however, in the Oldtown target area, where agency referrals seem to have been drawn mostly from potential station adjustments but also from potential detainees.)

What is especially striking and disturbing about the data in Table 5:22 is that the increasing proportion of referrals drawn from station adjustments did not usually account for all the reduction in station adjustments; some of those youngsters, sometimes the majority of them, were detained instead. In retrospect it seems possible that the effect of the greater availability of referral agencies was to permit police to allocate less time to informal handling of juveniles at the station and more time to the paperwork, consultation and report writing entailed in detaining youngsters. This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that the greater the absolute number of juveniles left for the police to handle after agencies had taken a certain number of referrals, the greater the proportion of those left who were released after station adjustment. The police seemed to choose between detention and referral to court on the one hand or station adjustment on the other partly on the basis of the time they had for the paperwork. Another factor to be considered here, of course, is that the capacity of detention facilities limits the number of youngsters who can be detained. When the detention home is filled, the number that become constant in the figures, and station adjustments must be made for youngsters who cannot be referred to agencies. What seems clear here is that police use of detention did not decline with the availability of referral resources. It depended on the time police had to process apprehended youngsters and referrals gave them more time.

The net effect then of CYDP's both providing an additional receiving agency for referrals and coordinating the referral procedure generally for the Fourth Area South Division, was to increase the proportion of apprehended juveniles referred to agencies, not only in the target areas, but in the control areas as well. And contrary to the Project's intent,

Table 5:22

Changes over Quarterly Time Periods in the Proportion
of Apprehended Juveniles Handled by Police in Three Different Ways
(by treatment, area and time period)

Area and Time Period	Station Adjustment	Agency Referral	Detention
<u>Henry Horner Experimental Area</u>			
From July - December 1963 to January - June 1964	-11%	+ 3	+ 8
From January - June 1964 to July - December 1964	-13	+11	+ 2
From July - December 1964 to January - June 1965	+ 1	- 1	0
From January - June 1965 to July - December 1965	- 5	0	+ 5
Over the period July 1963 to December 1965	-28	+13	+ 5
<u>Henry Horner Control Area</u>			
From July - December 1963 to January - June 1964	-12	+ 3	+ 9
From January - June 1964 to July - December 1964	- 8	+ 6	+ 2
From July - December 1964 to January - June 1965	+ 4	- 2	- 1
From January - June 1965 to July - December 1965	- 3	+ 4	- 2
Over the period July 1963 to December 1965	-19	+11	+ 9
<u>Old Town Experimental Area</u>			
From July - December 1963 to January - June 1964	- 3	- 2	+ 5
From January - June 1964 to July - December 1964	- 4	+ 5	- 1
From July - December 1964 to January - June 1965	- 9	+12	- 3
From January - June 1965 to July - December 1965	+12	-13	+ 1
Over the period July 1963 to December 1965	- 5	+ 2	+ 3

Table 5:22 (continued)

Oldtown Control Area

From July - December 1963 to January - June 1964	-11	+ 9	+ 2
From January - June 1964 to July - December 1964	+ 7	- 7	0
From July - December 1964 to January - June 1965	-15	+ 5	+10
From January - June 1965 to July - December 1965	+ 9	- 4	+ 5
Over the period July 1963 to December 1965	- 8	+ 2	+ 6

this also increased, to a striking degree in the Horner area, the proportion of youngsters incarcerated prior to their appearance in Family Court. Even in the Oldtown area, where the youth officers cooperated more fully with the Project's aims, the best that can be concluded is that the slight increase in the proportion detained signifies no change.

Conclusions

CYDP obviously was not a spectacular success. It did not effect major reductions in delinquency rates among its immediate clientele nor in the target areas which it served. It did not dramatically transform the lives and styles of its young clients nor markedly alter the quality of life in some inner city areas of Chicago. It did, however, have some salutary effects which have been documented and whose sources and dynamics can be seen. And perhaps this is the major contribution of the material presented in this chapter: that something worked, albeit on a small scale, and a lot of things didn't work, and we can say with some confidence what these are.

First of all, the Chicago Boys Clubs did serve a clientele different from the one it usually served as a result of launching a reaching-out program. By sending extension workers into the neighborhoods, the agency brought programs to boys who characteristically avoided the club buildings.

Among the younger boys, the 10- to 12-year olds, this meant involving boys noticeably different from most of the other boys in the inner-

city, pre-adolescents who as a group were already showing signs of estrangement from their families, difficulty with school, and of delinquent behavior. In contrast to busy, sports-loving, hobby-minded youngsters, these younger boys served by the Project needed but would not probably have initiated contact with any youth-serving agency. Project records demonstrate that it paid relatively minor attention to this age-group, compared to efforts expended on older boys.

While the younger boys who participated in the social and recreational programs conducted in inner-city Boys Club buildings resembled closely the age-group living in the inner-city generally, the older club members were as a group different from their peers. Older boys who entered or perhaps stuck with the traditional Boys Club program seemed as a group closer to their families, less delinquent, and more committed to getting a good education than inner-city boys generally. The Project devoted most of its resources to serving older boys and in doing so established a clientele of boys 14- to 19-years old who resembled all of that age group living in those neighborhoods. Work with them demonstrated that an agency largely unused to serving such boys can with deliberation do so, and with some success.

Contact did not prove difficult. Boys did not flee from service but accepted it, if cautiously at first, and even reached for more of it after they had got to know it better. The agency's workers became significant figures for many of these boys and for their groups.

We learned, as other researchers and street workers have^{1/2}, that the street life of adolescent boys in the inner-city is not carried on in closely knit, highly organized gangs. In order to work with groups of boys, workers had themselves to do a great deal of organizing; workers had to provide much of the stability and continuity necessary to group survival. Rather than having to wrestle with resistant group structures and entrenched group interests, workers found themselves in a more fluid situation which they could manipulate to a considerable degree, forming and dissolving groups, planning programs, and achieving new commitments.

Similarly, few boys were sullenly recalcitrant to workers' efforts. Many responded quickly and positively to extensions of friendship and service. They often did give their allegiance to workers and to their workers' goals.

But the desired effects were few. And the role of close relationships between boys and workers, while instrumental in maintaining contact, seemed not so crucial to ultimate success as provision of service which addressed the central problems of inner-city boys beginning to make their way in their society. The Project achieved some measurable reduction in delinquency rates among those boys who found that it could help them get along with and in their schools. CYDP was apparently successful in its encounter with a significant number of boys who had reached that age when the problems of their education became pivotal to them. Success depended upon the degree to which the Project persuaded these boys that, with its help, their chances were very good for completing high school and perhaps going even further.

In this way, the CYDP experiment supports the results of two other studies which effectively reduced delinquency in raising boys' optimism about their future. One, cited earlier in this chapter (Massimo and Shore, 1963), effected a reduction in delinquency by helping boys who had dropped out of school to get and keep jobs and to get some vocational training. The other (Bowman, 1959) employed special classes with especially devoted teachers to convince boys that they could make it in school.

It is worth noting that Bowman's experiment, while it reduced delinquency, no more improved boys' actual academic achievement levels any more than CYDP actually reduced the dropout rates. But both improved boys' perceptions of their life-chances. It is important to recognize the similarity between our findings and these others; for they mutually confirm and clarify in different settings, with boys from different backgrounds and by different means, one principle for reducing delinquency rates.

Agencies which aim to reduce delinquency may find here a guide for directing their efforts. CYDP seems to have achieved what success it did by becoming auxiliary to that institution, the schools, whose demands its delinquency-prone clients were least well able to manage by themselves but which nevertheless were important to them. This may be the role that agencies can and should play, at least until such time when the schools themselves have acquired the skills and resources to help such boys within the system. If this is the case, then it suggests the

kinds of personnel who ought to be recruited and the training and supervision they will need; it suggests the relationships which the agency needs to establish and with whom; what material resources need to be gathered and the kind of space needed; and which boys are most likely to profit from its program. It is probable that even successful implementation of such a program will still leave boys with other needs unserved and vulnerable to delinquency. It seems likely, however, that such programs will address the major problems of a significant portion of the population in need. Clearly, we need to identify who remains unserved or unaffected and discover means to help them as well.

We suspect that many agencies will feel relieved by the prescription we have offered here. Not only is it promising and specific, but it also avoids some of the difficulties into which other kinds of programs have led brave and dedicated organizations. Were effective programs required to change radically the social structure of a community, as some theorists and practitioners have suggested, then agencies might justifiably hesitate before the enormity of the task and the hazards of the battle. But helping youngsters with their schoolwork fits comfortably into the American image of what a youth-serving agency might do and may attract the public support needed to carry it out. We point to these considerations because what agencies like the Boys Clubs can do and what are the demands of the problems of delinquency are not necessarily compatible. It is conceivable that the CYDP experience might convince the Boys Clubs and kindred agencies to leave the problem in other more suitable hands, however reluctantly they might abandon an historical role they have meant to play. There were aspects of the Project which seriously challenged the capacities of the agency to foster it and which cast doubt on the possibility that eventually the agency might permanently incorporate something like it into on-going programs. We examine these issues in the next chapter on the effects of the Project on its parent agency.

CHAPTER 6

Effects on the Agency

An agency introduces new programs in order to enhance its effects on its clientele. But innovation has reflexive effects as well, acting upon the agency to alter it, perhaps in some significant respects. These effects may be beneficial or they may be harmful, and they are almost invariably unintended and unanticipated. They also almost always go unmarked in any evaluation of a program's consequences.

The Chicago Boys Clubs was not unmindful of the possibility that CYDP would change the agency itself. Indeed, the Executive Director believed that the Ford Foundation had supported the Project in part because of its potential salutary effects on his organization, and he was not himself adverse to this. Nevertheless, the kinds of changes anyone expected or hoped for were neither made explicit nor planned for. Still, there were noticeable changes in the agency as a consequence of the Project, and it is to these that we turn our attention in this chapter.

In doing this, we must be mindful of the mistakes we may make by attributing changes in the agency to the experience with CYDP, or to that experience alone. For the Boys Clubs has accumulating stores of experiences from which it draws; and it moves on vectors which may have been launched by a particular program or which may be using that program as a timely vehicle.

We should first clarify which changes we have chosen to discuss here. Our purpose is primarily to offer guidance to other agencies which may consider similar innovations. We do not intend to make a contribution to the theoretical or empirical literature on organizational change, although this discussion may serve as an instructive case study. We have been guided in our selection of detail by theory and research on organizations, satisfied on this topic to draw more from the literature than add to it.

In order to contribute something useful to other agencies, we have avoided discussing those characteristics of the Project and the Chicago Boys Clubs which are so unique that our experiences are not generalizable. With this in mind we do not discuss those stabilities or changes which seemed largely tied to the personalities involved. The reader may imagine that this topic engaged us in many hours of useful discussion and less useful gossiping. But here we restrict ourselves to processes related more to the role-related dimensions of organizational effects. No doubt personalities made some difference, as they must; but we proceed here on the assumption that some effects of this kind of organizational innovation may occur regardless of the personalities involved.

Similarly, we have to some degree neglected the unique characteristics of the organization of the Project as well, although these are even more difficult to separate out than the personalities involved. We have restricted our focus for the most part to the essential innovations the agency effected through this project. One was reaching out to provide service to a population typically outside its clientele. Many of the reflexive effects to be described here stem, we believe, directly from this feature of the effort and are generalizable to any innovation which has the aim of broadening an agency's clientele. Related to this, we consider the nature of the particular clientele for which this project reached, the delinquent or potentially delinquent boys in the target areas, and the effects generated by grabbing this tiger by the tail. Secondly, we consider the effects which might be attributed to the Project's methods, that is the employment of Extension Workers practicing aggressive street work and Community Resource Coordinators engaged in community organization. (We pause here to remind the reader of material covered early in this report which took care to distinguish between detached workers, more typically employed in this kind of work, and extension workers closely tied to the sponsoring agency; for this is a crucial difference underlying what follows.)

One of the unique characteristics of the Project which we have tried to ignore here is its research component. For better or worse (our bias is apparent), most action programs do not have researchers peering closely and constantly over their figurative shoulders, so the effect of this

on the agency would not be generalizable to most other projects. It is perhaps a fit subject for another report for the benefit of those agencies who contemplate careful evaluation of their effectiveness. We believe, however, that these effects were minimal, as the researchers intended. Two may be marked briefly here. First, we discuss below the effect of the Project on the agency's public image, and we are constrained to consider in this connection how the use of mass media was restricted in part for scientific reasons. Second, we should anticipate here the discussion in the next and final chapter on the implications the research findings hold for the future of the agency's efforts in this area.

We must be mindful too of another fairly unique characteristic of CYDP related to its research component--its tentativeness. The Chicago Boys Clubs was not irrevocably committed to this kind of project even while it has always been committed to the goal of ameliorating the problem of delinquency. The decision to devote so many resources to this effort had a built-in definite review date. While it was hoped that the Project would turn out to be an effective and viable instrument, everyone actually expected that some major or minor re-direction would be in order when the results were in. This characteristic of the enterprise in our view lent quite a different aura to the program than the committed zeal with which other efforts of its proportions are undertaken, however temporary they may actually turn out to be. This tentativeness might conceivably have infected the commitment of the entire staff, weakening their bonds to the agency, to their clientele, and to each other. But we do not believe that this in fact happened, even in the final days of the Project when events conspired to prevent a well-planned smooth transition into the STREETS project, a re-designed version of CYDP. While it cannot be claimed that commitment, personal or organizational, was uniformly firm throughout all personnel and over the full course of the Project, withdrawal or outright disaffection, when it occurred, was not caused by the Project's tentative quality.

One fairly unique characteristic of CYDP, the nature of its financial support, was so inextricably bound into its effect on the agency that it must be taken into account in this discussion. The fact that the Project did not depend directly on contributions from the Chicago community but instead was supported by a large grant from a national professionally-staffed foundation significantly changed some of the policy consider-

ations. This feature shaped some of the effects of CYDP on the Boys Clubs, as we shall see.

Method

In order to discover the main effects of CYDP on the Boys Clubs, we have leaned heavily on the field methods of social anthropology. That is, we here draw inferences from interviews with participants, existing documents, and personal observations. Fifteen members of the Chicago Boys Clubs staff were interviewed, including its two top executives, the two current directors of the experimental clubs and one former director, two former program directors of the experimental clubs, the director of the Project and his two associate directors in charge of the action program, three extension workers, and two community resource coordinators. We have also reviewed files of policy statements, minutes of meetings, and correspondence.¹

The inquiry was designed to converge from several points of view on a limited set of topics which the researchers selected for their relevance and importance. So the same questions were asked of several of our informants, a few questions, of all of them. The topics were defined in two ways: (1) Those specific episodes which we thought would reveal organizational change, such as specific instances of staff turnover or specific decisions to allocate particular resources. Many of these episodes are not particularly dramatic, but most of them bear at least a tinge of conflict which, we believed, made them especially informative. (2) The dimensions of organizational change on which we chose to focus: the distribution of decision-making power among the staff; kinds and levels of competence required in various positions; the image of the organization both to its public and to its staff; degree of consensus on central goals and the general program strategies for reaching these goals;

¹The field work was done by Dennis Deshaies, with some help from Gerald Suttles. Transcriptions of the interviews and documents were read and independently summarized by Martin Gold. Several members of the staff, including some of those who had been interviewed, read Gold's summary and suggested various changes.

staff morale; and communication through the organization. A separate section follows on each of the first four of these characteristics but, after those, specific discussions of morale and communication would be redundant. We return to them in our summary.

Recruitment and Competencies

Determination to reach a different kind of boy meant to the Boys Clubs hiring not only more staff but also a different kind of staff, men with different styles and skills, whose job descriptions were quite different from those on the regular program staff. Personnel who staffed the Boys Clubs' crafts shops, gymnasiums, game rooms, and meeting rooms were mostly part-time people such as especially mature high school and college students who had been outstanding Boys Clubs members, and male school teachers who supplemented their incomes with second jobs at the clubs in their neighborhoods. On the other hand, CYDP Extension Workers and Community Resource Coordinators were invariably full-time personnel, only rarely with less than one undergraduate degree and often with some graduate training, who considered their jobs in the Project integral parts of their career lines. The Project Director hired most of the staff, and he preferred applicants whose training was in a social science such as sociology or psychology to those trained as teachers or social workers. He also looked for candidates whose social origins were similar to CYDP's clients and whose college training did not leave them unsympathetic to that kind of life and culture. He also felt it desirable to hire workers who had some feel for the political processes at work among the institutions and agencies with which they had to deal. Finally, being somehow "radical," "hip," or "far out" did not disqualify an applicant if the other credentials were offered. The Project Director felt that these criteria distinguished the CYDP action staff sharply from the Chicago Boys Club staff at the time.

The effect of introducing this different kind of personnel into the Boys Clubs can be detected in matters of supervisory structure, criteria for and lines of advancement, morale and unity among staff members, and in the level of bureaucracy at which the clubs operated.

It is important first to be clear about the extent and nature of the difference between the regular program staff and the project workers.

Supervisors of CYDP believed firmly that their staff was better qualified and more competent to deal with older delinquent and potentially delinquent boys which CYDP was meant to serve:

. . . I think that the traditional Boys Clubs organization attracts people that are largely in two fields as far as professional training is concerned. One of those is people who rise through physical education channels and whose training in the social sciences or anything approaching social sciences is purely incidental to that. The other strain is school teachers, invariably part-time people who view the Boys Clubs job as a second job. And they would prefer to function inside of a Boys Club as they function in a schoolroom; that is, in a classroom situation that is structured, with a definition of roles . . . whereas the extension worker's role does not meet that kind of definition. . . . So the kinds of staff that the Boys Clubs has are rather well fitted at a relatively low level for running an in-building program. They are relatively unsophisticated and unfitted and disinclined to be in the unstructured situations that work out in the community and in the streets among these youngsters requires. (CYDP Director)

From what I've been able to see of the Boys Clubs staff, they do not want to deal with the kind of kids we have dealt with. They are, I think, threatened by them, and I think they view them very negatively. . . .

A youth worker is always threatened by loss of control of the kids he's supposed to be in charge of, and the kids we have contact with are kids that are going to test to the extreme limits of control. They will test you to see how much you can take, and they will test you to see what you can do. I don't think Boys Clubs staff like to be tested in those ways. . . . Our staff believes that there is no one on the whole club staff who can handle our kids. . . . (CYDP Associate Director)

As far as I can see the staff, the CYDP staff has more skills, more professional training, they are more prepared by their academic training and also by their experience at this point, as opposed to the in-building staff. . . . (CYDP Associate Director)

During the whole period of the project only three club staff members were recruited for CYDP positions. One of these was identified early in this report as the worker most involved in the reaching-out effort at the Henry Horner Club before CYDP came into existence. Another was shifted to CYDP at the request of his Club Director, judged to be inadequate by the CYDP directorate, and transferred back to the regular club staff (we return to his Project history later). The third was shifted from a part-time group work position on the Horner staff to extension work with CYDP and was considered an effective worker. This was the extent to which

existing club staff was a source of personnel for CYDP.

Yet, the credentials of many of the in-building staff members at the Project clubs were as respectable as CYDP workers'. It is true that the range of age, formal training, and experience in the in-building staffs extended to high school and college students, but it also included direct workers with boys who had graduate degrees and years of youth work experience. Indeed, the full-time regular staff which worked directly with boys--that is, excluding supervisors--had on the average more years of experience in youth work in social agencies and schools than did CYDP staff. Nor did the kinds of academic training really differ appreciably between the two staffs; there were about as many social science and education degrees in both.

Of course, differences in the talents of the two staffs may not be revealed by their formal credentials as they appear on application forms. Personal screening according to the characteristics sought by the Project Director may have served to differentially select the two staffs, but it would be difficult to document. That belief nevertheless was strong, and it was both recognized and encouraged by the wide difference in salaries paid to the two staffs: in-building direct workers with college degrees were earning, after two years or more with the Boys Clubs, over a thousand dollars per year less full-time equivalent salaries than the beginning salaries of CYDP workers.

This salary differential was a potential danger to the morale of in-building workers and the unity of the staff. But only one of many staff members interviewed mentioned this. One of the Project Associate Directors said:

A problem which isn't exactly apparent is the differentials in salary between the CYDP workers and CBC workers. I think there's some antagonism and jealousy about it. The club workers feel antagonistic toward the CYDP staff because some of our staff people are getting as much as program directors.

Since no one else noticed this, we are doubtful that this problem actually existed to any degree.

The belief in the specialized training of CYDP workers did affect the supervisory structure. We will discuss below the fact that the dual supervision design laid out for relating the Project to the Club structure in practice placed all meaningful supervision in the CYDP directorate. One

reason for this was that no one believed that club directors or program directors were competent to do this job. According to a comment of the Outpost Supervisor:

I think there is a belief at times that the Program Director is a supervisor of CYDP. And I think that we become afraid that CYDP will be isolated as a result, occasionally, they will remind the Program Director to remember that CYDP is not separate, it's an integral part of our program and he must give supervision to it. . . although I have never seen any supervision come from the program director as far as CYDP is concerned. . . . They couldn't really give them any direction because they were not on the line, they were not aware of the problems, they were not sophisticated as far as CYDP is concerned. . . .

Project workers, the CYDP Directorate, and CBC Executive considered the on-line Project workers equivalent in competence to in-building supervisory staff. As the Project was drawing to a close and placement of CYDP workers became a focal concern of CBC, no one conceived of hiring them as line workers in the in-building program. Those workers who wanted to remain with CBC--and more of this subject later--applied for and were seriously considered for program director posts. One extension worker indeed became the program director at his club.

He remained program director for only a short time. For extension workers and community resource coordinators apparently were not cut out, by temperament or skills, for the directorate positions in local clubs, as those positions are defined. The program director is responsible for the detailed paper work of scheduling activities, staff assignments, and ordering supplies; for the maintenance of the physical club; and for the supervision of program personnel in an agency culture which does not at this level practice professional social work supervision. And the club director must concern himself with community relations, raising money, and coordinating services; has to work gently with his board members; and participates in lengthy discussions of boys' work and policy with laymen and professionals with every degree of sophistication. Hardly the active, aggressive, free-wheeling roles enthusiasm for which led these men to CYDP and for which roles they were chosen.

CYDP staff members were professionally oriented and community-oriented in ways that most other CBC workers are not. And the introduction of this kind of staff seems to be a harbinger of a direction the

Boys Clubs were about to follow in any case. One of the old-line club directors sensed this and gave it expression when discussing his own future:

. . . I think the requirements for a club director academically are much better now than they were before, and I think that this will attract young people into the field.

The job was building boy development, fund-raising, and so on. . . . Twenty years ago, it was a different person because of the tight-fittedness of the community, ethnic groups, racial groups, and so on. But today, with the change in society and integration of neighborhoods, I think a person has to be broader academically trained at the time he starts so he will associate himself faster with the true facts. . . .

Right now, I am personally as high as I can go in the Chicago Boys Clubs. Number one, I don't have the academic requirements that are written in the job description; number two, I am getting a little old. . . . But my future is pretty good. I like it. It gives me the opportunity to do something in the environment that I was raised in and I wouldn't trade it.

At this transitional stage, the organization was ambivalent about professionalism. For example, CYDP staff members put much more emphasis on formal training as an indicator of competence and a prerequisite for selection and advancement, while regular CBC supervisors seemed both to accept this criterion and to minimize its importance. For example, when a program director was asked what qualifications he would require in a successor to himself, he said:

I would say a bachelor's degree. . . . But he should be kind of a by-product of an area where he has been taught in the streets. I think he should have street teaching and that he should have formal teaching. But wisdom and motherwit should be from the street. The formal training is fine, but he should have very good motherwit. . . . Motherwit is nothing but logic and reason. . . . This doesn't mean being able to read and write, this means just plain old basic understanding. And we find out that most people inherit this. . . .

And a club director, asked to pick his hypothetical successor:

In my short time as a club director, I have certainly found that there has been very little from an academic standpoint that really prepares a person for this kind of position. . . . Nothing is better than direct contact. No textbook, paper, or even discussion can fully prepare you for the actual working relationship with individuals on the business level as well as on a voluntary level. And, as I say, here in Chicago, this is a prime ingredient of being a club director and what's expected in this position.

These different emphases on professionalism lay at the base of the disagreements between CYDP staffs and club directorates on criteria for promotion. Staff members were asked to comment on the selection of program directors in both of the experimental clubs. Three men succeeded to program directorates during the course of the Project. One, it has already been noted, had been a CYDP extension worker, who lasted only a short time. CYDP workers applied for the positions in both of the other instances, but other staff members were preferred by their club directors.

CYDP staff members believed that the club directors' choices were comparatively poor ones. They invariably cited the superior academic qualifications of the applicants from CYDP. They believed that the club directors had illegitimately chosen cronies.

. . . They ended up picking a person who did have some experience with the Boys Clubs but not as much experience as I. He had, I think, some experience as a program director, but he did not have a degree. In fact, he was still attending college doing his undergraduate work . . . and I also heard that he was a personal friend of [the Club Director]. (CYDP Extension Worker)

The Club Director explained his choice:

Now, academic training is important, but even though I have a bachelor's and master's degrees, I graduated with guys . . . who are no more prepared or equipped or skilled than the man in the moon. . . . Now, the person I looked for was one that I could have complete confidence in, that would be more than just a program director, who could be a confidant. . . . The particular man I chose and the Board chose--and there was board involvement--was a man I had worked with for several years . . .

Finally, the professional orientations of CYDP staff members might have been construed as a kind of disloyalty to the Boys Clubs. Their commitment was to their profession. Their formal training and work experience made them journeymen social workers who could market themselves for higher pay, more supervisory responsibility, and better working conditions to the many agencies looking for what they had to offer. And indeed, the career aspirations of CYDP staff members seldom included the Boys Clubs; only one worker preferred to remain with CBC and had planned on it, and even he had gathered up some other offers to keep in reserve.

On the other hand, the Boys Clubs had traditionally raised men

through their ranks, inducting them as young part-time workers, perhaps even as members, trained them by helping them through college and by providing special Boys Clubs training programs for every level of position in the organization, and maintained an in-house professional association. These men identified with the Boys Clubs and tendered the organization their loyalties and commitments. But they are a passing breed, and the future of the organization will probably pass to the professionals of whom the CYDP staff was the vanguard.

The Agency's Image

We should not begin to consider CYDP's effect on the Boys Clubs public image without first stating a basic consideration: the Boys Clubs existence depends almost exclusively on private financial support. Less than one percent comes from boys' membership dues. Nineteen percent is collected in the annual city-wide United Fund campaign; 81% is raised by CBC itself, 50% of these funds flowing from the top 10% of donors. Obviously the clubs' image is vital, especially the face it presents to substantial citizens.

The Project's financial backing was quite different. A large sum of money was granted and assured by the Ford Foundation for six years. The Foundation is, of course, removed from the Chicago community. Its primary concern was the Boys Clubs effective use of their funds to prevent and treat delinquency through an aggressive, reaching-out program. So the Project had in part a different audience than the CBC, an audience with different criteria for performance, and one to which the Project had a somewhat different relationship than it had to the community in which it operated.

The Project had hardly got underway when policy was needed to guide the nature and use of the Project's image. The problem concerned the Project's involvement in general CBC publicity. Other Chicago agencies were effectively touting their delinquency-prevention programs to raise private funds. One agency had cooperated with a national television network to produce a kinescope about its action program, romanticizing the street-club workers' jobs and proclaiming their success. Chicago agency executives agreed that the show had boosted contributions to that agency by thousands of dollars.

But the Project staff urged several reasons why CYDP not be publicized beyond an unavoidable minimum. A major reason was that the action staff felt that the usual kind of publicity given to delinquency prevention projects would harm their relationships with youngsters. By identifying groups as "gangs"--recognizable in the neighborhood even if anonymously, CYDP's clients would be cast into the roles that workers wanted them to abandon or avoid. And workers feared that their boys would come to believe that they were being used for fund raising purposes.

The researchers also wanted to minimize publicity. They pointed out that the success of the Project could not be claimed until it was completed; for the research component intended to discover the degree of success and to announce it. How could success be claimed before it could be demonstrated? And if the evaluative research report failed to support prior claims of success, what then of CBC's image? Other agencies had not chanced contradiction by systematically evaluating their programs.

The researchers had another reason for objecting to publicity. One dimension of evaluation would be the degree to which agencies and residents in the target areas began to reflect a different image of the Boys Clubs out of their experience with the Project. Project publicity, the researchers asserted, would just be a way of telling the community how they should feel about CYDP and the Boys Clubs, independently of their experiences with the action program itself. Publicity would, in effect, be like a survey interviewer telling his respondents how to answer the interview questions.

So the CBC executives and the CYDP Directorate agreed that the Project was not to be actively publicized. There were to be no press conferences or press releases, no brochures about CYDP, nothing beyond mere mention in Boys Clubs reports to their public, no magazine articles or TV productions. This policy held the duration of the Project's course. While the CYDP staff on rare occasions responded to pressure from a newspaperman or radio-TV newsman, the Project was kept under wraps. When its findings were finally announced before an annual national conference of The Boys Clubs of America, the presentation was entitled "Chicago's Best Kept Secret". An important enabling factor here was that CYDP did not depend for its support on local donations.

Almost everyone agreed that the policy had been necessary and its effect salutary. The Project Director noted an unanticipated benefit:

Walter Cronkite did a story on a YMCA worker named D _____ and that of course everybody on the YMCA staff saw. And the YMCA workers howled with laughter because they thought it so funny that this guy was an heroic figure. At least we spared ourselves that kind of ironic reflection on the part of our own staff--that we were phony about what we were doing.

A less humorous episode occurred later when a major Chicago daily printed a long story on the YMCA program, naming youngsters and gangs. Some parents were horrified to find their sons and daughters identified as "delinquent gang members." Some boys were resentful over being left out and proceeded to enhance their delinquent image. It took YMCA workers months to repair the damage.

The CBC Executive Director was the only one we spoke to who voiced regret about the lack of publicity:

I think that we would give a great deal of consideration in the future as to the validity of this type of policy. . . . I would agree to the extent that publicity on a given program that is flashy or non-factual could be quite destructive but perhaps that is part of life. Perhaps it's the obligation of the agency to furnish the press with information regarding a program of this nature that is factual and not attempt to use it as a fund-raising device or try to change the image of the agency. What in my opinion happened by the employment of this policy is that we adversely changed the image of the Chicago Boys Clubs from one that had been a leader in street work to one which the public didn't hear of at all for a period of five years. So we suffered as a result of it . . .

I think that we defeated ourselves at one level if at none other. . . . I'm quite sure that a foundation that is interested in change looked upon this project as hopefully an opportunity to make a change in the agency. I think we reduced that possibility by this practice of not permitting publicity on the assumption that it would affect the Project. What effect it had on the Project, good or bad, I don't choose to judge. But, as I say, this was perhaps not a good policy for the Chicago Boys Clubs. I think it reduced the possibility of involvement of general staff and of boards and the public in what was continually going on that probably was good, and reduced the possibility of changing the agency.

The Boys Clubs has to create and maintain a favorable image to several audiences. Chief among these are the contributing public, especially the large contributors; the local and central boards, composed in part of large contributors; the parents of their members and

potential members and boys themselves; other agencies, public and private, whose cooperation and positive evaluation are desirable; and its staff members, who must believe in what they are doing and have some basis for allegiance to the Boys Clubs.

The Project both enhanced and sullied the Boys Clubs' image. The reaching-out program proved to have dramatic effect in one instance on the image held by parents and boys in one area. We have already seen that CYDP tended to work disproportionately with boys in the minority ethnic groups in the experimental areas. This practice had negligible effect on the complexion of the clientele in the Horner area; for blacks made up such an overwhelming proportion of that area that even the disproportionate number of Mexican, Puerto Rican, and white boys being served there still amounted to but a small number. But the Oldtown area was an area in transition; blacks were at the time still in the minority, but theirs was a large minority. The disproportionate number of black boys among Project clientele colored the residents' perceptions of the program and of the club which was its headquarters.

The Project's unsuccessful attempts to establish an outpost facility in the Oldtown area illustrates the problem of image there most clearly. There was complete consensus, even eagerness, for an outpost. Such a facility had proved eminently useful in the Horner area. It would have provided the same advantages and met the same needs. But it never could be realized.

A major desire was to get at least one outpost located outside the housing project in the Oldtown area. And there were times when [a CYDP Associate Director] and I drove around at night and looked all over. And anytime a place would look likely, he would report it to me, and then I would go out and I would look. And if it was at all apt, I would say to him, "Well, you go ahead and see if you can turn up the owner or a renting agent and let's see." On at least three occasions if not more we got to the point where we dealt with the person that could rent it. We would be wanting to rent it in the name of the Chicago Boys Clubs, and the question would then be, "If it is the Chicago Boys Clubs, does that mean that the niggers are going to come over here?" And then we would be obliged to say, "The Chicago Boys Clubs has an open door policy. They cannot discriminate." And then the person would say--sometimes very good-naturedly and not with any prejudice of his own--but he would say, "I simply couldn't live with my own neighbors if I rented this to you under these conditions. I would let it stand empty rather than have to put up with that kind of opinion or the consequences

with my neighbors." With the result that any number of times, we simply could not rent. (CYDP Director)

Without access to an outpost while nearby parks and pool were made dangerous for blacks by neighborhood boys with the support of their parents, and requiring somewhere to work with those boys who needed service, CYDP workers frequently brought black boys into the Oldtown club. After a while it became identified as the blacks' club.

We worked with a number of Italian and Mexican groups in that area. They almost never went into the club except if [an extension worker] was with them. The same thing was true as far as [another worker] was concerned . . . just occasionally for a meeting. But as far as the Negro kids were concerned, they had a pretty strong claim on that club, and it was identified as a Negro club. (CYDP Director)

That club's Director recounted:

My Program Director and I watched the club develop, and we watched the name people put on it--"nigger heaven", "this is for niggers," and that sort of stuff. We were very aware that the community was going to hold the Boys Clubs responsible for many, many things whether or not we were responsible for starting them, good or bad.

That the experimental Boys Clubs were recognized as black clubs--that is, by having heavily black personnel working largely with black teenagers--by no means created a universally negative image. "It's very much affected the way in which the Boys Clubs is viewed in the target communities," a Project Associate Director pointed out. "The Chicago Boys Clubs may be seen as good [in the Horner area] for exactly the same reason as it's seen as bad over in the Oldtown area . . . because of its identification with the Negro cause."

The Chicago Boys Clubs had always been identified with one overriding cause, the welfare of boys, regardless of race, creed, or national origin, whether their problems were medical, dental, social, or emotional, whether their needs were simply for places to play and build or whether they needed help finding jobs or getting into college. One of the effects of the Project was to entwine the Boys Clubs in other, more controversial causes in the public arena of action to achieve this primary function of the agency. In the final section of this chapter we shall see that this

direction, led by the community organization wing of the Project, garnered the least consensus among CBC staff. At this point, we shall consider only its impact on the agency's image.

CYDP's Director stated both sides of the issue succinctly:

I happen to think that the civil rights movement in the city of Chicago is a potential engine for fundamental social change. But I realize that the opposing forces, through inertia and so forth, are still very strong and for that reason to rush headlong into the civil rights movement in some open arm fashion at this stage of the game would, in effect, be to lay the organization open to serious danger.

A central office executive saw this danger clearly:

I think the role of community action, like our role in creating the Mile Square Federation and seeing the whole thing through, is a very difficult experience for our staff . . . [the Federation] became a militant group, and the very people that they would be militant toward would be the institutions that the Clubs has to work with and has to maintain relationships to in order to carry on its regular program.

Still, not without a great deal of organizational ambivalence, the Project, in the name of the Boys Clubs, did stimulate and nurture the Mile Square Federation, which remained identified as a Boys Clubs program even after moving out of the Boys Club itself and all the flap created around its moving. And the Project was heavily involved in a "March to Integrate the Sheridan Park Pool," despite the objections of the director of the club from which the march began.

Some people in the community could not fail to imagine the CBC had become a politically activist organization. This image never became widespread, as Chapter 4 demonstrates, but it cropped up often enough to concern CBC. For example, when a civil rights organization threw a picket line around a major high school serving one of the target areas, protesting crowded classrooms, inferior teaching staff, negligent maintenance, and such, the Boys Clubs was accused by school personnel of inflaming the protest. CYDP workers had been identified on the picket line. The fact was the CYDP workers were there, but were not picketing; they were cooperating with the police in cooling the situation, calming over-excited adults, diverting those boys who they knew to be especially belligerent, and were finally credited by the police with helping to keep the affair under control.

More worrisome to the Boys Clubs was what image might be forming in the minds of its board members:

The Mile Square Federation had been investigating slum housing and in the course of their investigation they learned that at least a group of the slum housing was under the control of M____ Realty Company. And they had found that S____ was one of the officers of M____ Realty Company and also was chairman of the Chicago Housing Authority, and in that capacity not only had some control and say so over the facilities of the Henry Horner and Oldtown Clubs but also sat on the Metropolitan Board of the Chicago Boys Clubs. . . . Now, at that time the Mile Square Federation by and large met at the Boys Club, and that was all right because the policy of the Chicago Housing Authority when they built that club was that it should serve the community, and the Mile Square Federation was a community organization and so they had perfectly legal access. But this was quite different from using the Horner Club as a return address.

And when they made a representation before the Board of Education at a public meeting which constituted a serious critical attack, they had made enough enemies by that time that, as I have often said, "When you fight the beast, you shouldn't be surprised if the beast fights back." You have to remember that the Superintendent of Schools is also on the Metropolitan Board of the Chicago Boys Clubs. So now the Mile Square Federation had in effect attacked two of their most powerful board members. . . . It didn't surprise me that inquiries began to filter back as to who was this organization? why was the Boys Clubs housing them? was the Boys Clubs encouraging them in these activities? and what is this CYDP outfit? are they making trouble? and so on. . . . One of the solutions to this tension was that the Mile Square Federation, which was an independent organization in the neighborhood now, not so closely identify itself with the Boys Clubs.
(CYDP Director)

[A club's board member] has made an effort to get a clearer picture of our involvement as a Boys Club in the community. I think he is highly active in the area of community organization and is very sensitive to it, and one of the things he has asked that we do is in terms of really solidifying that so that we will be able to protect ourselves from the onslaught of people who feel that the club is overstepping its bounds. . . . (Club Director)

There was still another public, the agencies whose cooperation facilitates Boys Clubs work and whose collegial opinion matters to Boys Clubs professionals. The Project, since it reached out into the community, intensified what had already been heavy interaction with other public and private agencies in the city and had thus the potential for shaping its parent agency's image for that public. The Project Director, describing his job, included such interactions as one of its chief features.

. . . It may be with a police lieutenant. It may be with a hospital administrator where one of our field workers has taken some kid who was hurt in some way. Or it may be a school principal. . . . In other words, as many of the relations this project can generate among the institutions in this city . . .

And while most such inter-agency relationships had in the past bridged across higher levels of the organizations, the Project encouraged interaction on the line and primary supervisory levels.

One of the more elaborate relationships initiated by CYDP was the Youth Division Referral System already described in Chapter 5. Recall that CYDP workers attempted to visit every teenage boy in their areas who, on account of his misbehavior, had come into contact with the police. A program director evaluated the effect of this activity on the police department's image of the Boys Clubs:

. . . I think we had a good relationship with the police, the building program as well as CYDP, in that they saw us as an agency that was concerned about doing something with difficult kids. . . . I think [the referral system] enhances the image of the Boys Clubs in terms of really trying to do something for delinquents. I think it establishes better communications and relationships . . .

Evaluating the over-all impact of the Project on his job, another program director said:

. . . I think CYDP was a learning process. There was this other thing that was extremely important, the correlation with the Welfare Council Human Relations, the Commission on Youth Welfare, these referrals to these agencies that we had never worked with before, generally stimulated by CYDP.

Youth-serving agency executives themselves were probed about their images of CYDP and the Chicago Boys Clubs (See earlier discussions of this part of the evaluative research in Chapter 4.) Most of this inquiry was made only in 1965 so as not to focus their attention on CYDP early in the Projects' tenure.

Asked to describe various youth-serving agencies, their outstanding modal description (28%) of CBC in 1965 was of a recreational agency, although there was a scatter of other images as well. Fifty-eight per cent of these executives noted a change in CBC program in the previous

three or four years, more markedly in the Oldtown area than in the Horner area. Most of those who saw changes reported more direct work with older boys (see Table 6:1). All of those who saw some change regarded it as "having important effects on the youth and community."

Table 6:1

"Have you noticed any changes in the kind of work the Boys Club (in your area) has been doing over the past four years? Would you describe those changes?"

Agency Heads in Target Areas, 1965*

	<u>Percent</u>
more aggressive street-club work	19
more teenage programs	17
more academic counseling, tutoring	15
vocational training	6
employment activity	9
community organization	15
other	<u>19</u>
	100

*N = 23 (58 percent of experimental area agency heads noticed changes)

It is clear that Boys Clubs personnel in the experimental areas were regarded in 1963 as more directly helpful to other agencies than those at the Horner control club, and of course, than those in the Oldtown control area, where there was no club. But by 1965, Boys Clubs personnel at CYDP clubs were not being singled out for their helpfulness (see Table 6:2)

Table 6:2

"Is there any person in (the agencies in your area) who support and cooperation are especially important to you in your work . . .?"

	<u>HX</u>		<u>HC</u>		<u>AX</u>		<u>AC</u>	
	<u>T₁</u>	<u>T₂</u>	<u>T₁</u>	<u>T₂</u>	<u>T₁</u>	<u>T₂</u>	<u>T₁</u>	<u>T₂</u>
Proportion of CBC people mentioned	39	19	10	18	38	6	--	2
Total people mentioned	87	37	83	51	58	32	43	42
N respondents	24	17	25	19	17	11	14	14

Similarly, the CYDP Boys Clubs were more frequently perceived to be among those doing the most to solve those youth problems which the executives regarded as most serious in their areas. On a ranking of the effectiveness of a large list of agencies, the Horner Club accounted for a third of those given the first three ranks, while the control area Midwest Club accounted for less than 20 percent. The Oldtown Club was somewhat less often ranked high compared to the Horner Club; there is no boys club in the Oldtown control area to which the Oldtown Club could be compared. Indeed, few agencies were mentioned at all as effectively working on youth problems in the Oldtown control area, and the Oldtown Club itself accounted for 27 percent of those ranked high in 1963. No marked movement seems to have occurred from 1963 to 1965 except the decline of the Oldtown Clubs' visibility in its control area. (See Table 6:3.)

CYDP-related clubs were also more frequently mentioned by executives as helping local adult groups, but executives mentioned so few agencies as helping groups of local adults that statistical analysis would be spurious.

Table 6:3

"Will you rank (the agencies on this list) from most to least in terms of who is doing the most to solve (the biggest youth problems) in this area?"

Proportion of Mentions of
Boys Clubs among the Top Three

Problem	<u>HX</u>		<u>HC</u>		<u>AX</u>		<u>AC</u>	
	<u>T₁</u>	<u>T₂</u>	<u>T₁</u>	<u>T₂</u>	<u>T₁</u>	<u>T₂</u>	<u>T₁</u>	<u>T₂</u>
delinquency, school dropout	40	40	14	24	29	19	*	*
(N mentions)	(35)	(30)	(21)	(42)	(21)	(21)	*	*
community unconcern teenage unemployment	33	28	19	14	24	17	*	5
(N mentions)	(55)	(60)	(43)	(44)	(25)	(23)	*	(44)
all problems	33	33	17	19	27	20	27	3
(N mentions)	(90)	(92)	(64)	(89)	(49)	(50)	(22)	(75)

*Too few mentions to establish a percentage

Agencies Listed

Police
 Boy Scouts
 Chicago Commission on Youth Welfare
 Onward Neighborhood House
 Madonna Center
 Newberry Center
 Emerson House
 Chicago Housing Authority
 Midwest Community Council
 Westside Community Committee
 Near Northwest Civic Commission
 Chicago Park Authority
 YMCA
 Union League Boys Club
 Chicago Boys Club
 Marillac House

Executives mentioned the Boys Clubs with increasing frequency among agencies which were becoming more effective in their work on youth problems over the CYDP years. The experimental clubs were both mentioned more often than the one control club, but the latter also grew more effective over time according to these executives (see Table 6:4).

Table 6:4

"Which agencies working on the problems of youth in this area have become more or less* effective over the past two or three years?"

Proportion of Mentions of Greater Effectiveness which are "Boys Clubs"

	<u>HX</u>		<u>HC</u>		<u>AX</u>		<u>AC</u>	
	<u>T₁</u>	<u>T₂</u>	<u>T₁</u>	<u>T₂</u>	<u>T₁</u>	<u>T₂</u>	<u>T₁</u>	<u>T₂</u>
	35	50	24	32	48	52	5	--
N mentions	58	26	39	31	23	23	19	25

*Too few agencies were marked as becoming less effective to treat these data beyond that fact.

The agency heads who had noted changes in CBC program were asked to evaluate these changes. Most of them thought the changes were for the better, but a sizable minority in the Horner area thought they were for the worse (see Table 6:5).

Table 6:5

"Would you evaluate the (changes you have seen) . . .?" (Time 2 only)

	<u>HX</u>	<u>AX</u>
very good, good	55	90
neither bad nor good	9	--
bad, very bad	36	5
?	--	<u>5</u>
	100	100
N	12	20

In every case of an agency head objecting to the direction being taken by the Chicago Boys Clubs program, their objection was aimed at active community organizing. A school district superintendent charged that CYDP was "an all-Negro subversive movement."

A good example was the business of being accused that some of our workers were marching on a picket line at _____ High School. As soon as that complaint or that misperception was effectively lodged, it had to be dealt with. And the same thing is true in connection with the police and their perceptions of the workers and what they're doing or the judges of the family court and boys' court. If they either do not understand or misperceive--or if as a matter of fact, one of the worker does something to step out of line in some way--the entire welfare of the Project can be threatened. (CYDP Director)

It proved impossible to reconcile altogether the pressures from some staff members energetically to organize communities to ameliorate the fundamental social problems they believed were responsible for juvenile delinquency with the need to protect the Boys Clubs' image among those segments of the community with which the agency must work and upon whom the agency depends for survival. So the Boys Clubs emerged from its CYDP experience with an image blemished in the eyes of its most activist staff members.

I would like to free myself of the Boys Clubs and still stay in youth welfare work. Bad image! Bad image! . . . as far as I'm concerned anyway. . . . I think the Boys Clubs is very slow and very conservative. And they would be the first to admit it. . . . Their attitude may change, but I think it will change when people like [a board member] decide there is going to be change. I really think the Boys Clubs have gotten themselves into somewhat of a bad bind. Even if there are people in the administrative structure who want this change, they themselves don't know how to bring about change. Maybe they have themselves become so dependent upon their fundraisers that there's very little they can do.

But, as we have seen, those staff members more used to the traditional in-building program were proud of the steps forward into the community that their organization was taking and a little worried lest it step too far too quickly.

Distribution of Power

. . . I think of all the things in regard to CYDP, the most difficult for the workers to work with was the dual supervision. . . . You've got two bosses; and I think that the two bosses had definite opinions, and it wasn't always the same opinion. There were times in the project when CYDP under its leadership would view things one way and the regular Boys Club would view them another way. . . . I think decisions came from down here, I don't think the Club Director was consulted too much really because there was no need for him. Then I think he found out later what the decisions were and then there was a sort of a back up. . . .
(Boys Club Central Office Executive)

. . . There is a certain amount of ambiguity because of dual supervision. Sometimes, what you end up with is responsibility without power. . . . (CYDP Associate Director)

. . . If I have to confront the Club Directors, who outranks who is a real doozy there. . . . And the same with the Program Directors. This kind of ambiguity of ranking is a bitch.
(CYDP Associate Director)

The creation of CYDP redefined existing roles and generated a new set of roles within the Boys Clubs, roles with responsibilities for implementing the Project which required them to relate to other people in the organization. These relationships acquired overtones of differential power as the parties carried out their responsibilities, but it was not clear where the power lay. Issues of power became most critical when they involved the club directors and program directors--"the regular Boys Club"--on the one hand and the CYDP Director and the two action team associate directors on the other. CYDP extension workers and community resource coordinators felt some of the reverberations from this tension at the higher level as did, to a lesser extent, the line staff of the in-building programs.

Club directors had come to expect that they would be in charge of what went on at their clubs. The Personnel Policies of the Chicago Boys Clubs states that "The Club Director shall have general direction for the Operation of the Club,; and that "He guides the supervision process and structure of the Club." His job includes the selection, training, and supervision of his club staff. Boys Clubs policy holds that most of the supervision of the line staff may be delegated to the Program Director, and the four club directors involved in this project followed this prac-

tice. Nevertheless they regarded themselves as in control. One club director described his job thus:

A key is as an administrator, responsibility toward the whole operation of the club, responsibilities for surrounding yourself with qualified individuals who can adequately assume delegative authority to carry out the integral programming and services of the club. . . . You're a judge, a jury . . .

Ordinarily then, the staffs of their clubs are responsible to them, their program directors directly and the others usually indirectly. Club directors in turn, according to Boys Clubs policy and the directors' own descriptions, are ordinarily responsible to two separate bodies. One is the Chicago Boys Clubs organization which supervises them through the Assistant Director of Clubs, Camps, and Special Projects; and the other is the lay Board of Managers of their Club, where they have a special relationship to the chairman and perhaps the chairmen of its several committees. The club directors felt a great deal of freedom in both of these relationships. Said one of them, "I think right now we in the Chicago Boys Clubs have a lot of freedom to say what we are going to put our emphases on at any given time. . . ." They reported that the mode of supervision exercised by the Boys Clubs central office is through persuasion and training, and that they are more often responsible for leading their board chairmen than being led.

The CYDP directorates was inserted into this structure for several reasons. First of all, the Project spanned three clubs originally, later two, and the Assistant Director did not have the time to spend on administering and coordinating this large and complicated effort. Second, it was felt that a special set of competencies were required to supervise extension workers and community resource coordinators and to relate the Project to the community and to the city. Later, one of the Project workers confirmed this, saying "It's very difficult for a club director to supervise CYDP because our conduct and action is radically different from in-club personnel. . . ." Third, the central office had a special relationship to the funding of this project and consequently a special obligation to see that it was carried out well. A central office executive said, "Let's face it. We had to exercise more control because we had a special obligation to the Foundation to maintain high quality."

Introduction of the roles of CYDP directors and associate directors raised questions of who was responsible to whom, for whom, and for what.

This issue was crucial in the series of incidents which led to the resignation of the first Director of Action and his Associate. A club director described the situation this way:

The Director of Action wanted complete authority over the three clubs and I think he came into a situation where a club director would cling to his authority as a club director, and he felt that the Action Director was infringing upon that authority and that he was being threatened by it. The Director of Action felt on the other hand that the only way he could work was that he had to have authority, complete authority over the three clubs and that he was not getting the cooperation he should have. This, I imagine, was one of the problems.

Another club director spoke of the early conflict in terms which captured more of the feeling tone of that time:

He was not supposed to be the dictator. His dream was to dictate to the club directors whom he would hire on the inside of his building or whom he would fire. He would especially say to those people, "You are going to work with this group, you are going to do this or you're going to do this, don't do anything 'til I tell you to do this." This didn't stick with most of us.

When the Director of Action resigned and the total project was re-organized under one director (of action and research), the conflict over power was muted but continued to reverberate through the organization. When he was asked toward the end of the Project whether he was clear about decision-making procedures and the scope of his own authority, the Project Director replied:

No I don't think so. I think this has been a continuing problem. It hasn't been a serious one, but I think it's one that has not, by its nature, been defined. And I think that it's just as well that it isn't because if you had to clearly define it, then you would get people clinging to narrow responsibilities.

The Project Director recognized that direct confrontation of the power problem would inevitably revive the early overt conflict, so as much as possible the problem was stepped around or compromised. Nevertheless, in the course of operating the Project, this unresolved issue kept cropping up to demand resolution in specific instances. Surveying the various instances of power conflict, we find that on balance the Club Director lost some control over what was going on at his Club to the Project directorate and to central office executives to whom the Project Director was responsible. It was not the case that he lost significant control over the operation

he had been running, but rather that he did not gain control over the Project-related programs which were introduced at his club. Some illustrations of this generalization follow.

Supervision of the Club Staff

The club director's job description tells him that he is responsible for the selection of his staff, in consultation with his Board of Managers. He is also directed to delegate to his Assistant Director or to his Program Director the responsibility for initial screening of applicants for positions which report to them. In practice, club directors do not often consult with the boards in the selection of personnel, but they do seek central office approval for supervisory personnel they want to hire. As part of their responsibility for constructing their club budgets for submission to the central office, club directors recommend salary increases and promotions for their personnel. They are also expected to supervise their personnel through frequent individual and group conferences.

The selection of CYDF personnel was handled somewhat differently. All applicants were screened initially by the Project Director at the central office. He usually but not always would consult with the relevant Project Associate Director before hiring anyone. When the Project directorate had agreed on hiring an applicant, he was sent to the club from which he would work to talk to the club director and/or program director there. One club director said that "The final decision on hiring lay with the local Director." That was not the Project Director's view of the situation, however:

I had defined my relationship to the club directors in such a way that, although rhetorically it was defined as an equalitarian relationship, it never was that and I never permitted it to be that. As such, if I sent a man down that I felt was qualified, that already said something. And it also saved the local club director from having to make any efforts to find somebody else. . . . I practically did all the hiring. I was the only one who was really looking for people . . .

One club director reported turning down applicants sent to him by the Project Director. The club directors held veto power over who was hired, but it was rarely used.

On the other hand, club directors could not unilaterally dismiss CYDF

workers at their clubs. There were some cases where the Project Director and a club director disagreed about the advisability of retaining a particular staff member. One extension worker was in constant conflict with the director of his club who wanted very much to be rid of him. The Project Director believed that the man was doing his job and refused to fire him until a dramatic incident occurred, on the basis of which a Project associate director successfully demanded that the worker be dismissed.

Another extension worker was hired with general misgivings, even on the part of the Project Director, who nevertheless felt that the man should be given a chance. After a few months the Project Director decided the man was not working out so he asked the worker for his resignation without consulting the relevant club director, who did not object.

The incident which best reveals the power relationship between the Project Director and the Project staff on the one hand and the club directors and the local club staffs on the other, as it involved personnel practices, concerns the community resource coordinator who had been a group worker in the building-centered program and eventually returned to that position. He had originally been recommended to the Project staff by the Club Director and was taken on as a CRC. After more than two years, the Project Directorate felt that he was still too much involved with the affairs of the regular program and not enough with his Project functions, so they suggested to the Club Director that he be released. Nothing happened until budget-approval time came up, when this CRC was recommended by the Club Director for a modest annual increment. The Project Director and his associate refused to grant the increase.

When a person is put in for a raise, then he is evaluated first by the program director of the club who makes a recommendation to the club director and to [the relevant Project associate director], and then the club director and [the associate] make recommendations to me [the Project Director]. That was the system and the way in which it worked.

The Club Director pressed the matter further, calling the Assistant Executive of the central office in on a conference with the Project directorate, the CRC, and himself. The matter was resolved by having the worker shifted off the Project budget back to his job on the in-building staff, with a 17 percent cut in his pay. Everyone agreed that had the Club Director insisted, he might have postponed this action, but that it would

have eventually worked out this way.

Neither the club directors nor the program directors routinely held conferences with the Project personnel attached to their clubs. Project workers were supervised by the Project Director and associate directors. They consulted with local club supervisors over administrative matters like scheduling the use of facilities and keeping up on their report writing. Significant to this discussion of power, line workers with the Project also held initial discussions about salary increases with the local program directors and these discussions naturally took on some evaluative aspects. But since salary recommendations were always reviewed by the Project Directorate, local club supervisors did not have much control over them.

Use of Club Facilities

Program directors are responsible for the day-to-day operations of the programs of local Chicago Boys Clubs. They coordinate the schedules, assign space, and, in consultation with their club directors on major items, purchase equipment and supplies. It was to them that line workers turned for such matters, Project workers included.

In the ordinary course of events, lines of authority were clear. Everyone related to the Project agreed that the program directors did indeed make the necessary arrangements. But what of the use of facilities which were not part of the regular in-building program and which had no tradition of being under the control of program directors? There were two such facilities supported by the Project budget but located at the local clubs: station wagons and outposts. The program directors and the club directors to whom they were responsible exercised uneven control over these.

There were two station wagons assigned to each club. It was agreed that Project workers had first call on these and that the rest of the club staff could use them only after clearing with the Project workers. However, problems of maintenance and coordinating the schedules of these vehicles inevitably arose, and it was unclear who had the authority to settle them. This unclarity led to conflict over the actual control of the vehicles. A Project associate director thought that final policy concerning the vehicles should be laid down by the Assistant Executive in the central office since "the CYDP is sort of a special program that

is attached [to the clubs]". However, when a program director decided to turn over the scheduling and maintenance problems to workers themselves, the other Project associate director reported that the workers "thought that a responsibility . . . was being forced on them which was actually a program director's." Finally the workers did coordinate and maintain the vehicles themselves under the general supervision of the Project directorate, and they shared them informally with the rest of the club staff. This modus vivendi continued until the last year of the Project when a new club director was appointed to one of the Project clubs and assumed sole responsibility for one of the vehicles assigned there. The Project workers were unhappy about the club director's presumption, but nothing was done to challenge it.

Outposts were another sort of facility somehow separate from the regular program of the clubs to which they were attached. The Chicago Boys Clubs had had experience with outposts before in the form of storefront gamerooms and such which were considered extensions of the regular in-building program. Responsibility for them had not been different from responsibility for facilities under the roof of the main club building, and therefore fell to the program directors of the clubs which had outposts. But a Project outpost had a different sort of program, staffed exclusively by Project personnel, and supported solely by Project funds. Control over such an outpost was not held by the program director.

Actually, only the Project at the Henry Horner Club had a viable outpost which lasted the duration of the Project. It was supervised by an Outpost Supervisor who was on the CYDP budget. The Project Director placed the Outpost Supervisor in the power structure thus:

I view [him] as a kind of second level supervisor. . . . He is the one person in this project with the most field experience. I do not hesitate to consult him before I implement some kind of program that will affect the workers across the board. I talk to him about those things in the same way in which I would talk to [my Associate Directors].

One of the Project associate directors described the development of the Outpost Supervisor's role:

There were no other outpost supervisors in the whole system except for him, so exactly what kinds of rights, duties, and obligations he had were not spelled out anywhere. For example, is he equivalent in rank to a program director? Well, he settled it for himself by refusing to be supervised by the Program Director and

having his kind of supervisory conferences with the Club Director, and kind of establishing an equality of rank between outpost supervisor and program director.

The Outpost Supervisor himself spoke of two supervisors--the Project Director and his Club Director--then said:

The program director's job is to direct and supervise the programming that goes on in the Boys Clubs. . . . With regard to CYDP and the Boys Clubs. And that is to be aware of some of the problems that are going on at the outpost, to give whatever assistance he can without actually coming in and taking a supervisory stand . . .

The Program Director at the Horner Club saw his relationship to the outpost as making periodic visits "to observe what CYDP workers are actually doing there. . . . Mostly just an observer." He felt his supervision was called for

. . . exclusively when CYDP activities are carried into the normal or conventional Club context. I have administrative responsibility for the outpost building. Since the Chicago Boys Clubs is responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of the building, it is the program director's duty to make regular visits to the outpost to make checks on its condition.

When asked specifically about his relationship to the Outpost Director, the Program Director reported,

We have had some difficulty in actually scheduling some supervisory conferences. It's the Outpost Director's feeling that it's difficult for a worker to commit himself to a certain date and time . . .

The Oldtown Club did not have a stable outpost; but there was sporadic use of basement rooms in the housing development nearby, and at one point, a facility which might have become an outpost was established without the knowledge or concurrence of either the Program Director or the Club Director at Oldtown. The first time the Club directorate got wind of it was when an extension worker mentioned it in one of his reports. The Program Director reported that the Club Director "was infuriated because he said this was under the auspices of the CYDP, and he had not authorized the signing of this particular lease." The Extension Worker denied that he had established an outpost. So the Club Director called in a leader of the boys' group which had been mentioned as using it. The Program Director went on, "He said it was their private club. But it was under our

auspices and [the Extension Worker] got the jukebox and he got the money for the lease and all this kind of stuff. This is what the boys said. But [the Club Director] didn't know about it, so he was still very upset"

The Project Director explained how this facility got established:

There were a number of social-athletic clubs in that area, and some of them had trouble making their rent. And I was always looking for a likely place where I might have an outfit like that, that I could use as a front, with the understanding that if we paid their rent, we could bring other groups in there. The only time I managed to succeed doing that was really through the Erls [an EW] was working with. We found an old building--it was a one-story former grocery store which stood practically in isolation from buildings on either side of it and which was pretty run down --where [the EW] on behalf of the Erls negotiated the rent for the place. . . . I attended some of their meetings, but I was really looking over the place to see what it would mean for us to assume responsibility for it in terms of the safety of the place--whether you could put a phone in the place without it being burglarized and so forth--and I never really considered the place safe so I never put any CYDP money into it. But while I was making that investigation, I think it cost \$25 a month. It was very cheap and it was stove heated. I remember once I chipped in with the [EW] out of our own money, and we bought fuel oil for the place. On another occasion, I attended an affair they held to raise money to pay for their rent. This way, they were able to maintain that place for two and a half months.

It seems clear from our respondents' remarks that the local club supervisors--the club directors and the program directors--did not lose any of their authority over those of their clubs' facilities which they controlled prior to the Project. It is equally clear that they shared a good deal of the control over those facilities which the Project introduced into their Clubs.

The Image of the Club in the Community

Community Relations:

The Club Director attends community special meetings as a representative of the Chicago Boys Clubs and/or his Club. He speaks on behalf of the Chicago Boys Clubs when requested to do so

The Club Director works closely with other social agencies in the community in order to strengthen and provide a more effective social service to the community. (Chicago Boys Club Personnel Policies)

. . . The club has to remain in the community long after the Project expires and we have to continue to work with community organizations . . . (A Club Director)

Club directors lost some control over the face their clubs presented to their community insofar as neither they nor their program directors actually supervised the CRC attached to their club. Their clubs' relations with the community were especially at issue if CRCs actively engaged in community organization. It is understandable then that two instances of community action cast into boldest relief the distributions of authority relating to the clubs' image.

The Mile Square Federation in the Henry Horner area had initially been conceived and nourished by the Project workers in that area, and eventually it acquired some self-propulsion. The Federation continued to meet at the Horner Club, however, and it used other Club facilities, like its mailing address, duplicating machines, and stationery supplies. For several months there had been general discussion and agreement among Boys Clubs personnel, at the Club and on the Project, that it would be desirable for the Federation to establish its own quarters and become even more self-sustaining. The Club Director and the Project Associate Director of Community Resource Coordination had discussed this with the officers of the Federation as well.

One evening toward the end of a short membership meeting of the Federation at the Club, the Project Director suggested to the assembly that the Federation should demonstrate that it was a viable organization by establishing its own headquarters. Given the position of the speaker in the Boys Clubs organization, the Federation's officers interpreted his remarks as an official request for them to get out of the Horner club, and they became quite agitated.

While no one in the Boys Clubs organization disagreed with the statement itself, everyone felt that it was the function of the Club Director to enunciate it. The Project Director also agreed with this but felt that since the informal discussions with the Federation had not yet got results, he would force the issue and play the villain if a villain was necessary. Better himself, who did not have to continue to work in the community, than the Club Director, who did.

The next morning the Club Director mollified the Federation's officers by dissociating himself from the Project Director's statement and affirming

his authority over his club's affairs. He reminded them that they had already discussed this matter and said that the Federation's relationship to the Club could continue on that basis. About six months later the Federation did take up other quarters, to everyone's satisfaction.

In the neighborhood of the Oldtown Club, an organization of black teenagers precipitated out of a civil rights non-violent action workshop which the CRC at that Club helped to organize. The teenagers met at the Club to form some sort of council. One thing led to another, and the youngsters determined to stage a swim-in at a public pool in nearby Sheridan Park, a heretofore lilywhite facility. While this plan was generally known around the Oldtown Club, the exact date was not known, and probably it was not set until shortly before it actually took place. The Project Director learned about it only the night before during one of his routine tours of CYDP activities. He informed other CYDP staff members but told neither the Club Director nor the Program Director. Everyone in the organization agreed that the teenagers had the right to assert their use of the public pool, but since the youngsters would be perceived by the neighbors as connected with the local club, the Club Director thought he ought to have been consulted.

We didn't know what that meeting was for. We thought it was to form a teenage council at the club which was what we were getting from the worker. Actually, it was the planning of Sheridan Park [swim-in]. . . . They called a group of girls to go swimming on Saturday which [the Program Director], who was [the CRC's] direct supervisor . . . [the CRC] worked with the group . . . [the Project Director] got word of it so he was there on Saturday, and how he got this word none of us will know. If the man says he did not get it from the workers, fine, I believe it . . .

When the Club Director's concern about this situation reached the Central Office, the Director of the Chicago Boys Clubs affirmed the Club Director's authority in the matter with a memo to the Project Director:

Consistent with our CYDP program and goals, I expect full collaboration with the Club Directors and in the instance of the current situation at Oldtown, this becomes imperative.

Essentially the introduction of CYDP into the Boys Clubs operation created a second set of roles which dealt directly with the local community alongside the regular club structure headed by the Club Director. The community did not distinguish between them as representatives of the Boys

Clubs. So a club director's control over his club's relations with the community depended upon how much control he had over the CYDP structure. This control turned out to be loose and sometimes after-the-fact. But when a club director exerted his authority in this area, he could make it stick.

Consensus

The Boys Clubs as an institution and the individuals who work within the organization have always been dedicated to the prevention and treatment of juvenile delinquency. The function of the Boys Clubs program has never been solely to provide recreation, medical care, educational opportunities and such, but to serve as an instrument for building good character and developing upstanding citizens. CYDP was accepted enthusiastically throughout the agency as another, and exciting, instrumentality for achieving this shared goal.

"Reaching out" promised to bring the Boys Clubs program to youngsters who were not ordinarily attracted but extraordinarily in need--specifically boys whose behavior was often unruly and who resisted the controlling structures of organized athletics, skilled crafts, and orderly meetings. About this there was widespread consensus. Consensus weakened, however, when CYDP attempted more than bringing programs to these boys--when efforts were made to bring the boys to the program, that is, to bring Project clientele into the on-going activities of the clubs; and when a new program, community organizing was carried to the boys' parents and to their adult neighbors. In different ways, these efforts forced some choices; for they did not simply permit more Boys Clubs activities involving more boys, but rather threatened to constrict the traditional program to the degree that CYDP flourished.

We have already considered some of CYDP's constricting effects on the regular club programs. Reaching out for the most problematical boys in the Oldtown area, CYDP workers found black boys and brought them to the Oldtown club, thus precipitating the white community's withdrawal from the club program. Involving itself and the Boys Clubs in activist movements, the Project also threatened to reduce the flow of those funds by which the total program survived.

In this section we examine the central effects of the Project on consensus among the Boys Clubs staff.

Who are the Young Clientele?

I think (a Club Director) is afraid of something, and this is understandable when you come into contact with the hard core delinquent. When he arrived here as Club Director, he had two bad episodes happen, boys firing guns in the building. This was kind of bad for a new club director to witness. And he saw numerous fights. . . . Well, when something like that happens, that only tells that the need is there, that a person is in need of help. It was something that he had not anticipated, and I think that, with other things, kind of made him reluctant. . . . (CYDP Extension Worker)

The front door as a control point is very important because if you can alleviate some disciplinary situations at the door, you don't allow it to come into your program. A guy may come in drunk or loudtalking, or smoking, or creating any kind of disturbance. If [the doorkeeper] feels a kid shouldn't be let in and that he can't handle the situation, then it's important that he alert me or someone else immediately. (Club Program Director)

There was a very real sense in which the club staff had their hands full anyway without having an exotic group like the CYDP that really seemed to be employed largely to manufacture more trouble by going out and looking for it. (CYDP Director)

No one expected that Project workers would resocialize problem boys overnight. They were urged to find those boys who could not and would not fit into the traditional Boys Clubs program and work with them-- "starting from where they are," social workers say--until they became the kinds of boys who involved themselves constructively in wholesome activities. And meanwhile, workers could rely on club resources, for they were explicitly extension workers, not detached workers.

In practice however, sometimes the strain on the in-building programs became intolerable. It was partly a simple matter of limited resources and who would use what facility when. But that is a standard scheduling problem to which program directors regularly devoted a large share of their attention. More difficult were the problems of decorum and of planning. To the degree that Project workers were doing their jobs well, they gathered around them boys whose time could not easily be structured and whose behavior frequently violated the standards for Boys Clubs membership. And, of course, no special markings distinguished CYDP boys from others in the building in

order that other boys and staff members could see they were different and judge the appropriateness of their behavior accordingly. So nothing prevented other boys from being contagated by them or cautioned staff members to react differently to them.

Frequently, a few Project boys appeared at a Boys Club entrance looking for their worker. The fact that they had no regular membership cards immediately blocked their path until a system of CYDP identification cards was worked out. When they were allowed to pass through, they would be told to remove their hats and coats, as all boys are required to do. But that was not their style and they frequently ignored, and if pressed, defied the regulation. When they found their worker, they would often sit with him in the office, space ordinarily off-limits for boys. They might smoke as they talked, a serious infraction of the rules. And if they felt like playing some basketball instead of doing nothing for a change, like as not the gym was occupied by the age group scheduled weeks before for its use.

In dramatic instances, Project boys showed up at moments of their greatest need--drunk out of their minds, cut and bleeding from a fight, or violently angry for flimsy or substantial reasons. The uncertainty of the man at the club door at those moments reflected the concrete human side of the organizational dilemma.

Of course, many Project boys could have fit into the regular program with ease. As we have seen (Chapter 5), there was considerable similarity between most regular Boys Club and CYDP clientele. But faced with a particular Project boy, one could not tell. He might make no trouble at all. On the other hand, he might also be one of those wild ones over whom a worker had little control. A Program Director observed,

It did put a great deal of tension there. Where Boys Club said, "Take your hat off" and the CYDP wasn't able to do much because the boy had not related to them well enough yet, so he could tell them, "Go to hell."

The problem of integrating Project boys into Boys Clubs programs was not unforeseen. The idea of the outpost developed not only from the desire to reach out but also from the anticipation that some Project boys could not immediately be brought into a club without some prior acculturation.

It was felt that to try to take these kids from the streets into the Boys Clubs, that this transition would be too rough--on the kids coming in, on the existing membership, and on the policies and rules of the Boys Clubs organization. They had some kind of preconception about street gangs which fitted the popular stereotypes, and they thought they would be bringing in people who would be identifiably different from the Boys Clubs membership--which I don't really believe, but they felt that. So because of all that, it was felt [outposts] would be a good idea, not only for the sake of trying to work this transition from street to outpost to club, but also as a way of getting located closer to a population that wasn't simply surrounding the clubs. (CYDP Director)

The outpost, as we saw earlier, maintained a policy of accepting all comers. If a youngster reeled in drunk, outpost workers felt he was better off there than out on the street; the same, if he came armed. Not that the outpost had no rules; but its rules were more flexible, viewed as goals to be achieved rather than conditions for belonging. Everyone involved in the Project favored the outpost concept, indeed, believed it was a crucial facility for effective street club work.

Unfortunately, racial prejudice in the neighborhood of the Oldtown Club prevented an outpost from being established there. Attempts were made from time to time to utilize apartments and basement rooms in public housing projects, but these proved generally unsatisfactory. Residents were, not unsurprisingly, less tolerant than Boys Clubs building staff of just those boys who needed such facilities the most.

In the Horner area, the converted old firehouse proved to be an excellent outpost despite occasional complaints by neighbors and a persistently hostile furnace. The Horner outpost helped significantly to blunt the effect of organizational dissensus over serving difficult boys, for they could be served in the separate facility.

(The outpost at Horner also unexpectedly proved to be the solution to another organization problem, control and use of the stationwagons. For one thing, the Project vehicles assigned to the Horner club were parked near the outpost and therefore were less accessible to the in-building staff except on special occasions by pre-arrangement. And since the Horner workers had a place to close with boys, the vehicles were not so much in demand generally. The situation at Oldtown was quite opposite: vehicles were heavily used simply as meeting rooms and were regarded as potential program tools by regular club staff as well as

by Project workers. So management of rolling stock at Oldtown was, as we have seen, a focus for power struggles and a source of frustration.)

Even with an outpost at Horner and heavy use of vehicles at Oldtown, the Project had need for the main club buildings. And at Oldtown, of course, the need was pressing. Given some of the kinds of boys involved, an exceptional degree of flexibility was required on the part of the regular club personnel. Project workers agreed that they found greater cooperation in the early years of the Project, but that cooperation deteriorated later. One said,

. . . In the early years, I could not see the advantage or disadvantage in having an outpost. I considered the Club my outpost. We could come in and go out as we wanted once we resolved the problem of membership. . . . But later I would say that the need for an outpost was vital because of the staff we had after we lost the first director.

The important difference between earlier and later years was the involvement of regular club directorate in the purposes of the Project. In the beginning, the experimental club directors, program directors, and other senior staff people in the building programs were caught up in the excitement of the innovation. Their clubs had been chosen as experimental sites in part because they demonstrated their eagerness to participate. But in time, natural turnover brought less involved personnel into pivotal positions. When one Project worker climbed into one of these positions, his involvement maintained and enhanced the accommodations between the regular club and CYDP. But, as we have noted earlier, his tenure was shortlived because the sedentary, administrative role was not his style. In addition, one of his colleagues observed, there seemed to be differences in program philosophy between him and the Club Director which not only prompted him to leave the job but also discouraged other Project workers from aspiring to it.

. . . It may have been the fact that the attitudes of most of the workers were similar to his and therefore, going into that position, there would be the same struggle to use a similar approach in dealing with staff and dealing with clientele . . .

Consequently, it became more difficult in the latter years of the Project to use the club gyms for ad hoc games among Project boys, to schedule meetings and dances, and to manage the vehicles, especially at

the Oldtown Club. The organization remained committed to reaching the most delinquent boys in their areas, but it had not developed a firm consensus about the levels of tolerance which would be set in order to integrate these boys into its on-going program.

The Uses of the Community

. . . community organization is not an end in itself in the CYDP action program. Community organization work is undertaken for the sake of coming to grips more effectively with the problems of the youthful population in the area. The constant focus and emphasis of the Resources Coordinator and the auxiliary Boys Club staff is to relate the adult organizations of the community, whether organized de novo and ad hoc, or previously existing organizations with whom CYDP staff cooperates, to the youth of the area. The members of such community organizations become, in effect, a group of volunteer laymen and professionals whose interests coincide, for the most part, with the achievement of CYDP goals. (Mattick and Caplan, 1964)

Throughout our interviews with Boys Clubs staff related to the Project and throughout Project literature, the phrases "Resource Coordinator" and "community organization" appear together, almost always to explain or imply that the former does the latter. One is struck then by the ill fit of the terms; for one expects that a Resources Coordinator will indeed coordinate resources, or, conversely, that community organization will be carried on by Community Organizers. This incongruity of language points to a fundamental weakness in the consensus among Boys Clubs personnel concerning the goal of organizational involvement in the community beyond the Clubs' doors.

On the one hand is the narrower view for which "resource coordination" is the appropriate description. It interprets the function of work in the community as support for the extension worker-boy relationship. So if a boy needs a job, the resources coordinator puts at the worker's disposal an opportunities file which he has developed from contacts with neighborhood employers; if a boy has been suspended from school, the resources coordinator has a relationship with the school administration across which bridge the worker can bring the boy back to his classroom; if the boy's gang is getting restless for action, the resources coordinator has tickets to a ball game in his pocket or access to a weekend campsite for the extension worker's disposal; or if a boy's bonds with his

parents reach a breaking point, the resources coordinator has his relationship with a women's group to which the boy's mother belongs which may provide the extension worker some familiar vantage point to ease the strain. Describing the role more strictly than anyone was really wont to do, the resources coordinator was supposed to cultivate the community to a state of readiness to respond to specific needs of youth, especially those needs whose satisfaction would strengthen boys' relationships with Extension Workers. In a somewhat less narrow view, one more close to the reality of expectations, the resources coordinators were supposed to align the community in the cause of troubled youth, raising its tolerance levels and prolonging its patience, encouraging communication and understanding, marshalling goods and energies.

On the other hand is the wider, activist view of "community organization." It was based on a principle that no one contested, that the problems of youth have their roots in the problems of their community. So community organization attacks the problems of youth at its roots--to improve the quality of life for everyone in order to widen the opportunities for youth employment, to improve the capacities of children to succeed at school, to increase the recreational options of restless boys, to strengthen the bonds of family; in short to blunt the forces of poverty and racial discrimination generally so that fewer youth will be troubled. To this end, resources coordinators were supposed to work in the political arena, nurturing grass roots organizations to strength enough to bend the established institutions--public housing, realty boards, schools, welfare agencies. And, in the long run, no one could doubt that if such efforts were successful, youth would benefit.

The Boys Clubs did not achieve consensus on the proper scope of the Project's efforts in the community. Without denying the truth of the principle underlying the community organization position and without admitting the limitations of the agency which tended to restrict it to the resources coordination view, the issue could not be faced openly and resolved. Nor was the schism clearly one between the Project staff and the regular organization, although that tended to be the case; for personnel in each program were variously committed to the activist principle or recognized the limits of the agency. On the one hand, a Club Director

said, with some ambivalence.

I think the Chicago Boys Clubs still is not willing to accept the responsibility as much as I would like it to accept in terms of where this agency is going. . . . I think if agencies are going to be effective, it means they are concerned with what residents of the community are sensitive to. I think we are somehow directly or indirectly involved in it. And I think perhaps we are somewhat afraid of our image and afraid to venture out. . . . I don't view the Boys Clubs as a little boys' agency. I think perhaps it is important to be active and well-informed, whether we participate directly or indirectly in it. But I don't think we can ignore it.

And an Extension Worker, the longest in tenure and deepest in commitment to the agency, said with similar ambivalence:

I think the community organizers became community organizers when they were really supposed to be resource coordinators. I feel that there's a great need for community organization in that community, but that wasn't what we were set up to do. . . . We started out to work far closer with the resource coordinators, and there should be more resource people out there than community organizers. Community organizers only as community organizers is not a resource for the Project. The Project is for kids, and that got out of hand.

A brief recapitulation of the history of the Mile Square Federation nicely illustrates the operational effects of lack of consensus in this issue. The Federation began simply as the sponsors of a Health Fair. Wholeheartedly endorsed by the Boys Clubs, it was cultivated by a CYDP Community Resources Coordinator. Through his efforts, the agency brought medical and dental resources to bear on the health problems of children and youth in the deprived community surrounding the Henry Horner Club. A structure of neighborhood clubs was in part created and in part strengthened to round up parents and their children to get them to the Fair. This part of the enterprise was largely the work of the Resources Coordinator who employed his widespread contacts to bring such a structure into effective operation. The Health Fair was eminently successful, so successful indeed that it was repeated the next year. Many more local people and local groups helped to organize the second fair, partly encouraged by the initial success, partly because of the CRC's effectiveness in the interim in building his network of contacts and stabilizing grass roots structures. The second Health Fair was even more successful than the first.

At this point, it seemed to everyone involved that the community organization which could produce such a worthwhile service ought not be held in reserve for just this annual event. Other problems besides health plagued the community. To these the Health Fair organization turned its attention, with the encouragement of the Project worker. Consistent with their new and broader goals, the leading members formalized the structure with a new name, the Mile Square Federation. This change marked the beginning of that phase of its history which culminated two years later in the incident already described--the Project Director urging the Federation to move out of the Boys Club and establish its separate headquarters.

For meanwhile, the Mile Square Federation, among other activities, piled uncollected garbage in the streets and alleys; picketed in protest over local housing conditions and thereby openly opposed large realty interests; and strenuously and publicly complained about the administration of the neighborhood's major high school and about what it considered the segregationist policies of the Chicago Board of Education. These, while meeting at the Henry Horner Club, running off literature on Boys Clubs mimeograph machines to mail in Boys Clubs envelopes, corresponding under the Boys Clubs letterhead, and depending for staff services on a CBC-CYDP Community Resources Coordinator. None of this had seemed anything but appropriate and commendable when the direct concern was the health of children. Nor did anyone assert that the Federation's new concerns were not legitimate and relevant to the welfare of youth. But it had pushed outside the area of consensus about what the agency should and could do about these concerns. Boys Club executives found the agency in a difficult position from which they could extricate it only with some discomfort to themselves, and by softening the issue and pointing to the advantages operation held for the Federation itself.

The were engaged in the kind of activities which had to do with the betterment of the neighborhood. And they had to, they thought, call consultations of various groups that the Boys Clubs worked with--the schools, housing, health--groups that would need Boys Clubs' support and the Boys Clubs would need these groups' support in working with the kids themselves. And it really began to appear, it seems to me, that the Mile Square Federation was actually a department of the Henry Horner Chicago Boys Club or a division rather than an organization off to itself with the sympathy of the club, which the Boys Clubs had given support to.

. . . The other thing that occurred, and that is they lose their own identity. So I think they arrived at a point and we arrived at a point where we all agreed that it would be to their best interest and to our best interest to have them seek their own location. (Boys Clubs Central Office Executive)

In the Absence of Consensus

Few direct attempts were made to reach a consensus on either the question of Project boys using club building facilities or Boys Clubs' involvement in activist community organization. On the former question, arrangements were made to provide Project boys with CYDP identification cards to substitute for regular membership cards when needed; and Project workers were permitted ample and flexible use of the facilities as long as program Directors and Club Directors were personally committed to the goals and means of CYDP. On the issue of community organization, the agency warded off criticism and tolerated strain as long as possible, meanwhile checking the Project's community organizing activities in specific instances. On neither issue was clear general policy promulgated to guide and instruct staff members regardless of their personal views. Actual and potential conflicts between the Project and the traditional wing of the agency were avoided as much as possible. Confrontation was discouraged by leaving some policies deliberately vague. This enabled people who disagreed on some issues to work together in areas on which there was consensus.

When decisions had to be made, when a potential action threatened a major consequence, or when a boundary was clearly breached, then policy was made by the persons responsible in the area. This means that what boys entered the building program under what conditions was determined, if at all, by the Club Directors, often acting through their Program Directors. And the extent of community organizing was ultimately defined by the Executive Director and his Assistant Director downtown who had to deal with the political structure of the city. In both areas, decisions were eventually reached in favor of preserving the traditional Boys Clubs program and fell short of the full aspirations of some Project personnel. But also in both areas, limits were set substantially beyond previous boundaries of Boys Clubs program.

Summary

This discussion has an interwoven texture with no clear beginning or end. Enter the fabric of any organization worthy of the name and one finds its properties so entwined that one leads to another and back again. Here, the institutional image of the Boys Clubs sharpened questions of power and control partly because of dissensus over what image should be shaped by community organization activities. Changes in the competencies required of personnel hinged on the unsettled matter of where and how a new clientele would enter the program. Supervisory relations depended upon the differential competencies of the staff, which in turn depended on which kind of clientele they were primarily charged to serve. It is by reason of this internal relatedness of the organization that the introduction of CYDP had proliferating effects.

The Project had this impact on the agency even though it was not so closely integrated with it as had originally been intended. Indeed, perhaps the nature of its impact was determined in part by its relative isolation. Its separate structure, which led from the club buildings and surrounding streets literally to the door of the Executive Director, could and did function for the most part independently of the regular structure of the agency. And because it did, when on-going relationships might have lubricated contact at the necessary tangents, they were only incompletely developed if at all.

There is little evidence of on-going communication between the Project staff and the staff of the traditional program. We have seen that meaningful supervisory relations developed only within the Project hierarchy. Arrangements for sharing resources like space and equipment were made routinely, without much relating, or they were not made; if the rather impersonal machinery for scheduling which the program directors operated did not leave ample room, it was difficult for staff at the operating levels to get together to manage the problem. Early on in the Project, personal relationships among some staff members provided a useful communication net, but these were incidental remains of an earlier history rather than an inherent and regenerating feature of Project-Club integration.

The two staff structures were joined only at the top. That is, the

CYDP Director was responsible formally to the Assistant Director of Clubs, Camps, and Programs, and communicated regularly with him. He was also in close contact with the Executive Director, a relationship developed when the latter had at the time the Project began performed the functions of the Assistant Director. Their relationship was further encouraged and maintained because the Executive Director frequently asked the Project Director to bring his expertise to bear on Boys Clubs matters unrelated to the Project.

A communication network joined firmly at the top but tenuously at other levels tends to carry only important messages, those dealing with overriding issues, having long range implications, or developing from critical situations. There is a tendency too for lighter problems, left unattended, to generate steam until they qualify for top level consideration. We have discussed, for example, several instances of personnel problems which were not resolved until critical points had been reached that required communication among personnel in the central office downtown.

This lack of integration was a matter of concern to the agency, and the concern grew as the terminal date of the Project approached. For, if the Project was to become part of the agency's program, it was desirable to ease it into the on-going operation. Some attempt was made to entwine the two in the final year when the CYDP directorate turned its attention more toward reviewing the experience and preparing reports; the direction of Project operations then was supposed to flow out into the hands of the local club directorates. But the success of this attempt was diluted by the apparent uncertain future of the program. For many reasons, not least of which was the agency's forthright refusal to trumpet their efforts' overwhelming effectiveness without supporting evidence, sufficient support to begin a redesigned innovation on a similar scale was not forthcoming. Project activity generally declined as personnel found positions elsewhere or hesitated to establish new relations with youngsters or the community which might have to be aborted.

It is difficult from our data to gauge the morale of the Boys Clubs staff prior to the time the Project was about to end. This much is fairly clear: the morale of the in-building staff was little affected by the affairs of the Project, and the morale of the Project, by the general

spirit in the agency. Each was identified with his own wing of the organization, and the relative lack of integration of the two removed each from the encouragements and discouragements of the other.

There were, however, a few noticeable infusions. For one, the excitement of the innovation itself gave the regular staff a feeling of new movement in the agency. At the Henry Horner Club, where the pilot program had been in operation for some years, the main encouragement came from the recognition of their efforts. At the Oldtown Club, the introduction of a new program, manifested concretely by fresh personnel and brand new stationwagons, raised morale. The Project especially enthused those staff members who were sympathetic to efforts to reach the most difficult boys out on the street and to get involved more actively with social movements in their neighborhoods and in the city. Later, when it became apparent that there were limits on involvement with both of these, these people were most discouraged and disillusioned with their organization.

To some degree, the Project's effect on morale extended beyond the experimental clubs, largely through communication at the top levels, from the central office to club directors and to board members. But this effect was quite limited because of the agency's policy of restricting information about the Project. Whereas the staffs and lay boards of other agencies might find such action programs lauded at regional and national conventions and in the mass media, in this case the organization was straightforwardly informed of the program's development and activities in the course of its regular meetings.

Brief mention has been made of the potentially damaging effect of the Project, with its higher paid personnel and generally denigrating view of the in-building staff, on the morale of the latter. There is little evidence to document this however. Only Project directors alluded to it or the envious view in-building staff might have of the relatively autonomous nature of the extension worker and community resources coordinator roles; none of the supervisory staff at the clubs or the central office mentioned it. We might have found more of this had we interviewed line staff in the clubs, but on the other hand, we anticipated a general reticence on their part to be frank in communicating their feelings in an inquiry identified as the Project's.

All of our direct evidence here about the morale of Project workers is larded over with the unstable situation which prevailed when this part of our field work was conducted. The Project was breaking up, men had gone to or were looking for other jobs. The agency was helping to place those who wanted help but was also hoping to keep as many as the as yet undetermined support would permit. The phasing-out of the Project, either entirely or into another design was not proceeding with the deliberation everyone desired. This of course lowered morale.

Nevertheless, every worker felt that his Project experience had developed his skills to a higher level and that, as a result, he could command higher paying positions with more responsibility. Most aspired to move into supervision. About two-thirds definitely wanted to leave the Boys Clubs, partly because their allegiance was to a profession rather than to a particular agency; and some because the agency had fallen short of their aspirations for it as an instrument for social change.

The fact that the agency designed another project based upon its experience with CYDP provides us with especially informative documentation about the effects of the Project upon it. We will not describe the entire prospectus of STREETS, the proposed project, but we will examine those features particularly relevant to some of the issues which have been raised (see Doty and Mattick, 1965, for the STREETS proposal).

The Clientele to be Served

There is no question but that the Chicago Boys Clubs intended to continue to make efforts both to reach the boys who do not involve themselves in its traditional program and to work actively with the community to alter it as an environment for youth. While some of its instrumentalities have been redesigned, STREETS' central goals are expressed in words taken almost exactly from the CYDP plan:

. . . To reduce the absolute amount of illegal and anti-social behavior attributable to the target population. . . .

. . . To increase the objective opportunities for youth in the external environment, in the fields of education, employment, and cultural experiences. . . .

. . . To develop in parents and local adults a concern for local problems affecting youth welfare, and to organize them with a view to having them assume responsibility for the solution of local problems." (Doty and Mattick, 1965:5)

In order to prevent some of the problems CYDP uncovered in trying to introduce new clientele to the building programs, several outposts were also prescribed for STREETS. The CYDP experience permitted a fuller description of an outpost program in the STREETS prospectus compared to the brief mention outposts received in CYDP plans. It is also clear that the agency made stronger resolve to establish outposts despite obstacles because they had proved to be so essential to the organization.

Community Organization

As for working with the community, significant changes in titles were introduced in the STREETS prospectus. "Community Resource Coordinators" were replaced by "Extension Workers" who head "Community Organization teams." So the issue of community organization was faced openly and endorsed. Still, there is in the prospectus a recognition that the agency must step gingerly in this area. In contrast to the CYDP design, STREETS' description placed community organizing specifically under the supervision of the club directors, twice interpolating statements of the club directors' role in paragraphs otherwise taken almost verbatim from the CYDP prospectus:

Ordinarily, community organization proceeds on the theory that cooperation will prevail, but if there are powerful interests involved or there is lack of agreement about objectives, then the potential for conflict exists. One possibility for generating conflict in community organization activities is for a new and inexperienced worker to make assumptions about a community or a situation which are incorrect. If the worker then acts on such assumptions, not only will he precipitate "unwarranted" conflict, but his time and energies will likewise be needlessly expended. Thus, the Community Organization team of the STREETS project can benefit from the consultation and guidance of the club director, who best knows the strengths and weaknesses of the area, and who is already involved in community organization activities. (Doty and Mattick, 1965:35)

It is the task of the Community Organization team to make an assessment of the local situation in the community and to decide upon the strategy of intervention in community processes that is most suitable. During the process of community assessment, the

Community Organizations teams will draw heavily upon the experience and observations of the local club director. (Doty and Mattick, 1965:37)

The Distribution of Power

We are also able to ascertain what lessons about supervision the Boys Clubs have learned from CYDP and applied to the design for STREETS. The problems of power generated by CYDP's dual supervisory structures had been anticipated. However necessary it was deemed in order to insure adequate coordination and quality control, the structure of dual supervision was regarded as temporary and specific to the first experiment with the Project.

For the duration of CYDP, the problems of power were handled in part by agreement that the Project was something special, separate from the regular program, and therefore, something over which Club Directors must share authority with the Project directorate. However, this accommodation prevented the Project from becoming more fully integrated with the regular building-centered program. Further, this accommodation was not altogether successful in avoiding covert and sometimes overt conflict between club and Project directorates, although all parties tried hard to step around issues.

In designing STREETS, the Boys Club determined to prevent problems of power from arising by omitting the dual supervisory structures. There is a clear difference in comparing supervisory roles. The CYDP prospectus reads:

The Extension Workers and Community Resource Coordinators have been added to the staffs of the participating clubs, but are directing their efforts toward youth and adult groups outside the traditional clientele of the Chicago Boys Clubs. For local supervisory purposes, on a geographical basis, they are supervised by the local Club Director as to policy matters, and by the local Program Director for purposes of coordinating the use of club facilities by CYDP youth groups with the necessities of regular club programming. For functional purposes, as specialized workers in extension work and community organization, the Extension Workers and Community Resource Coordinators are supervised by the Associate Directors of these functional subdivisions inside the action program.

The STREETS prospectus reads:

Supervisory arrangements for . . . the Chicago Boys Clubs STREETS Project calls for a hierarchical chain of responsibilities and authority to insure efficient operations. At the field level of operations, Neighborhood Aides . . . will be assigned some supervisory responsibility over the Program Aides, but under the supervision of the Extension Worker who heads each team. The STREETS Unit Director will supervise the extension workers and, through them the Neighborhood Aides and the Program Aides. The Unit Director is directly responsible to the Club Director, but will receive advice and counsel from the STREETS Coordinator whose responsibilities transcend any particular unit of the STREETS Project. He is required to coordinate the efforts of all of the separate STREETS units organized by the Chicago Boys Clubs. The STREETS Coordinator serves to link the experience of one STREETS unit to another so that both can benefit from such cross-fertilization of experience. He introduces and helps supervise uniform reporting procedures so that the Chicago Boys Clubs can render a proper accounting of funds and activities. It is also his function to see to it that newly organized and operating STREETS units benefit from the experience of past experimental projects conducted by the Chicago Boys Clubs. . . . In order to serve all these functions the STREETS Coordinator must have frequent and ready access to Club Directors, STREETS Unit Directors, and the operational field staff.

These supervisory arrangements would seem to place the STREETS Unit Director into an ambiguous relationship to the Club Director and STREETS Coordinator, in that he is directly responsible to the one but required to take advice and counsel from the other. Ordinarily, such supervisory relations contain an element of potential conflict, but, if the potential is recognized it need not develop. The key to the resolution of this conflict lies in the mutual relationship between the Club Director and the STREETS Coordinator. They must communicate freely and frequently in order to anticipate problems that may arise. At the same time, it should be clear that any action program that does not cause or raise problems from time to time is probably not doing much of anything. In the case of the STREETS Project, as was the case with earlier experimental projects, we have to agree to abide with some awkwardness in supervisory arrangements for the sake of integrating the best features of STREETS into the future standard operating procedures of the Chicago Boys Clubs. Ultimately, of course, the entire STREETS Project staff is responsible to the Executive Director of the Chicago Boys Clubs and the central office.

This supervisory arrangement raises the problems which the dual supervisory structure was designed to solve: Will the STREETS Coordinator have sufficient authority to discharge his responsibilities for coordination; and will the Club Directors or Program Directors have suf-

ficient skills to maintain the respect of the specialized workers whom they supervise and to ensure an effort of high quality?

We must remind ourselves finally that we have deliberately dwelt here overmuch on problems and conflicts. We have chosen, so to speak, to peer through the cracks. We must place all of this now in its proper perspective, that of an organization self-consciously carrying on an innovation in its service for six years and tolerating pinches, wrenches and dislocations in order to learn from it.

But most of the process was not so rough. A large staff did its work day by day with difficult clients, relying on the support of their agency. Throughout the experience, accommodations were effected, planned and spontaneous; problems were resolved without residues of animosity encrusting and deteriorating relationships; much of what could not be resolved was lived with and set aside by mutual agreement; all so that the work could go on. One definite indication of the tenor of the Chicago Boys Clubs as CYDP ended is the frankness and insightfulness with which key members of the staff spoke of the experience so that others might profit from it.

CHAPTER 7

Perspectives on Action for Youth

What can be said finally about an action project which substantially failed to accomplish its primary goals? What wisdom can be gleaned besides, "We've been that route, try another."?

It would have been simple to create the appearances of success. One might cite such facts as the CYDP staff placed 490 boys in 750 jobs and 950 dropouts were returned to school about 1400 times. Certainly it might then be concluded that such an effort must have reduced the rates of delinquency at least among the boys who were served directly if not among all the boys in the target areas, and must have markedly improved their situations.

But the fact is that CYDP had no general effect on the rates of employment among boys directly or indirectly served, nor on their dropout rates; nor on their delinquency rates. Much of the positive impact of the Project proved to be ephemeral and narrowly restricted to those boys for whom CYDP staff members temporarily achieved "most favored client" status, persuading employers to hire them, school administrators to readmit them, and police to dispose of their offenses informally. CYDP was a "success" in the sense that it substantially provided the services it was designed to provide to those who needed them. But it failed to address the roots of the problems of delinquency and youth development in the inner city in such a way as to make a noticeable, lasting difference. The processes it set in motion proved not powerful enough to overcome either the counter processes which had been causing the problems all along, or those which the Project itself generated by its program.

Still, some things were learned. We had not been certain that CYDP would prove effective in reducing delinquency or in enhancing constructive aspects of youth life in the inner city. So we had designed our research

in order that we might learn something even from failure. With this in mind, we addressed ourselves not only to outcomes of the action program but also to its processes. We hoped in this way to identify those instances, many or few, where success was achieved, and not only among the boys in the experiment, but also among the boys in the control neighborhoods where perhaps processes favorable to the project's goals might be generated by other events besides CYDP. Then we might be able to draw conclusions of the type "if we had done more of this. . .," or "if an action program can do that. . . ." We find that we can now with some certainty make such statements, that we are able, as a result of our experience, to point to some ways in which the Project's goals might have been more fully realized had we known at the beginning what we learned by the end. In this last chapter, we will bring together those findings in which our statistical analyses and our informed consensus tell us we can have some confidence. We will organize these findings in terms of the input → process → outcome model which guided our research strategy. Then we will draw implications from what we believe we have learned for the design of action programs for youth and for theories about the development of youth, especially the development of delinquent patterns of behavior.

Input → Process → Outcome

Since the input → process → outcome model will serve as the framework for this chapter, it may help the reader to review it first in general terms.

Inputs, for the purposes of this report, consist of the resources of CYDP--its staff, its organization, its equipment, and its program; the nature of the target populations which were drawn into the program; and the conditions in the agency and in the city under which CYDP worked.

By process we mean the social and institutional relationships created or changed by the Project, and the psychological changes effected in the target people. The generation of such processes is not simply unidirectional, however. When a program like CYDP sets certain social and psychological processes in motion at the same time it gives rise to and activates counter processes, unintended forces which work in opposition to the goals of the program. These too must be taken into account as part of the relevant process. So we also include here the processes which we observed

in the target and control areas which CYDP did not effect but which nevertheless were relevant to the Project's goals.

Outcomes refer in this report to the behaviors defined by the ultimate goals of the project; that is, reduction in delinquent behaviors and enhancement of constructive behaviors.

An action project like CYDP can succeed in only one way from the point of view of this model, but it can fail in two. Real success can be attributed to a project only if it so manages its resources--its inputs--that it in fact creates the processes it intends to use to reach its goals; and also if it has correctly identified the processes necessary to reach its goals. However, if it fails to set intended processes in motion; or if it effectively implements its program, but the program turns out not to accomplish the project's goals, then the project will be unsuccessful. Of course, it is conceivable that a social action program will blunder its way to its goals by having unintended but nevertheless effective impacts, but we would hesitate to call such a program a true success. In any case, we know of no such cases; success is hard enough to achieve deliberately so the chances of a fortunate blunder are slim.

When we examine the data generated by CYDP, we will look then at the two levels in the model, asking first if the inputs led to intended processes and, if so, did these processes in turn accomplish the Project's goals.

Both practical and theoretical implications of the input → process → outcome model should be pointed out. If an action program fails, it is of great practical importance to know whether it failed to implement its processes--that it did not get off the ground--or if it misjudged what was necessary to do either in terms of adequacy or direction of effort. If the former is the case, then our attention should be directed to the input → process link in order to discover what resources, what organization, or what targets might comprise more effective inputs. If, on the other hand, the process was implemented but the goals remained unrealized, then we should reexamine our theories concerning the relationships between the strategy of intervention and the nature of the social problem: is there actually no relationship between the particular social processes and the program's goals? did the program fail to take some crucial variables into account? did intervention give rise not only to positive forces but

also negative forces which, on balance, negated the program's effect?

An action program provides an experimental test of delinquency theory only in respect to the process → outcome link. For a theory of delinquency is essentially a set of assertions about what social and/or psychological processes cause delinquency. Such assertions can be confirmed or disconfirmed by changing those processes and observing what happens to delinquency. Should a program fail to generate these processes, that reflects on the adequacy of the program's resources and their management but not on the theory which guided the program. Or if the program also generates counter processes which defeat its purposes, that does not disconfirm the original theory; rather it identifies additional forces which may under the circumstances of the action-experiment have also to be taken into account. The theory may have been correct but incomplete.

In what follows, then, the results of CYDP are sifted both for the guidance they might offer for the design of youth development programs and for tests of theory about youth, especially delinquency. This summary begins with a review of our findings in the input → process → outcome model, then offers a critical analysis of the assumptions upon which the Project was designed, assumptions concerning the condition of life in the inner city and the people who live there, the etiology of delinquency, and the nature of the agency which tried to make itself an instrument of change. Finally, we propose what might be done to accomplish the Project's goals more effectively and to improve the research designed to discover if and how progress is made.

Summary of Findings

Input → Process: Changes in the Agency

CYDP successfully altered the clientele of the Chicago Boys Clubs in the sense that its own clients differed noticeably from boys whom the agency typically served. Boys involved in the Project were older on the average than the Boys Clubs' regular participants, more of them had records of delinquency, more had dropped out of school and had lower expectations about the amount of schooling they would ultimately achieve; and they had poorer relationships with their parents. That is, the Project reached the

population it intended to reach and brought them into its own special orbit within the agency.

This statement of the effect of the Project on the agency needs to be qualified in two ways. First, we must not make too much of the difference between "Project boys" on the one hand, and, on the other, either club members of the same age and other boys in the target areas. Many contact boys resembled many club members, and they resembled other boys in their neighborhoods even more. The fact is that the atypical boys were the older ones--the 16- to 18-year olds--who participated regularly in the Boys Clubs' program. CYDP was that part of the agency which served the typical older adolescents in the target areas.

Second, while the Project served these boys, they were never integrated into the traditional club program in any significant numbers. The Project's intention to somehow conventionalize its clients, then turn them over to the in-building program, was seldom realized. While some boys may indeed have been conventionalized, they became part of the general population of youth in the neighborhood which usually did not associate with the agency. Here was an instance where counter forces defeated the instruments of the Project. On the one hand, the staff and structure of the in-building program resisted the inclusion of less than exemplary boys from their neighborhoods; and most of these boys were not attracted to the kind of program that was available.

Insofar as CYDP was succeeded by a similar program (STREETS), it may be said that the project was instrumental in changing the agency's structure on a permanent basis. The agency continued through this program to reach out aggressively to a population of boys that it previously had not served so well. The nature and experience of STREETS suggest however that it also maintains the separation of clientele noted in CYDP. So while the agency has changed in this respect, it has not changed according to the original plan.

One feature of CYDP which has not been carried on into the STREETS project is the research component; and we regard that omission as serious. CYDP personnel had hoped that they agency would become committed to self-conscious and systematic evaluations of all of its programs. This has not happened.

Nor is the STREETS project and the agency in general even as ambiva-

lently active in community organization as CYDP had been. Since the effect was to generate pressures and counter pressures which netted little resultant change, and since community organization represented a major investment and major danger for the agency, its abandonment is understandable.

Input → Process: Community Organization

Clearly CYDP generated involvement among adults who were unlikely to become so involved without the Project's efforts. Among the most clearly identifiable of these were the school personnel who re-admitted boys who had dropped out, police officers who referred juvenile offenders to the Project, and employers who hired CYDP's clients. There were also volunteer tutors, theater and sports arena managers, and a host of others. This is only to mention some who enlisted more or less in the Project's efforts. There were also those who got involved in opposition: school administrators who believed that CYDP encouraged the school boycott; private realtors and public housing officials who fought any encroachment on their control of population movement and tenantry; and the managers of public but segregated recreational facilities. All of these were prompted by the Project to act in ways that they otherwise would not have acted.

Their involvement was a consequence of the Project's efforts to generate institutional changes. Most of such people were caught in the program because they occupied positions in organizations relevant to the Project's goals. We have seen that the major targets for institutional change --educators, employers, and police--were not noticeably affected; dropout, unemployment, and arrest rates did not change at the Project's instigation.

Another target of community organization was the residents. It was hoped that their greater concern for problems of youth and their greater participation in organized efforts to improve their conditions would contribute a process instrumental to the welfare of youth.

What accomplishment there was in this regard was restricted essentially to the black women in the target areas. Among them, greater involvement in community action groups under CYDP sponsorship seemed to engender perceptions that local citizens like themselves were trying to solve community problems and might be effective. However, increasing familiarity with the social agencies at work in their communities weakened the confi-

dence of involved women in these agencies' effectiveness. In effect then, organizing women in the community tended to persuade them that they themselves would have to do what needed to be done and raised their hopes that they might accomplish something in their own behalf.

One manifestation of a changing sense of efficacy on the part of involved citizens was their positive action when confronted with boys in trouble or about to get into trouble. Whereas uninvolved adults were loath to take risks and get mixed up in something unpleasant, the women who became involved in local organizations more often took personal responsibility for helping and correcting youth when the need arose.

Unfortunately, the growing sense of efficacy which appears in our data was narrowly focussed and, in our opinion, misdirected. The black women who became active believed that they and their neighbors had some potential for influencing the school system; but that did not seem to make them more hopeful of affecting the prevalence of delinquency in their neighborhoods. No link between the problem of delinquency and the operation of the schools seems to have become established in the minds of the women; thus they could aspire to change the latter but expect to have no effect on the former. Coupling their own sense of impotence with regard to delinquency with their judgment that local agencies were not effective either, the black women in the target areas, despite their growing involvement in community action, remained pessimistic about ameliorating delinquency.

Heads of agencies shared these views with neighborhood adults. The introduction of CYDP into their areas did not encourage them that the problem of delinquency was being effectively addressed. The executives generally believed that family life was the main factor in the problem, and they recognized that CYDP intended to do little about families. Since that most important element was being ignored, agency heads doubted that delinquency would subside. Nothing CYDP did persuaded them that changes in other conditions in the communities they served were likely to reduce the problem.

Input → Process: Extension Work

Over the CYDP years, extension workers became important people to many of the boys in the target areas, especially to the older adolescents who comprised the bulk of their clientele. They filled a gap in the experience

of these boys which the data on boys in the control areas indicate would not otherwise have been filled.

Contact boys generally regarded extension workers as helpful counselors. The older ones were eager for the workers to help them primarily to negotiate the transition to adult society, especially by helping them find good jobs. While CYDP's reputation for placing boys in jobs rose significantly during the time it was on the streets, it never achieved that reputation among a majority of boys of any age. Contact boys were most disappointed with extension workers in just this respect, even though a great many of them were placed in jobs. It is likely that the boys sensed the shortcomings in CYDP performance here; for while the project succeeded in getting boys jobs, it did not achieve a higher rate of employment among them. The Project was not able to do whatever was necessary--with boys, with employers, with economic conditions--to keep boys employed and advancing in the job market. CYDP seemed to achieve "a most favored client" status for contact boys, so that they were able to grasp the job opportunities which came along. But this accomplishment was limited by its nature to the contact boys, and the spread of effect to neighborhood youth generally was not achieved in this domain nor in any other.

Similarly, CYDP returned many contact boys to school after they had formally or informally dropped out. But the net effect of this effort was negligible; for many of the returned boys did not stay in school, other students unrelated to CYDP dropped out, and the dropout rate was unchanged. Nevertheless, just as the Project acquired a reputation in the target areas for being a resource for job placement, so did it become widely known as an effective mediator with the school system. Furthermore, the Project may have been influential in persuading 13- to 15-year old contact boys of the value of education, since significantly more boys in this cohort, compared to non-contact peers, reported by the Project's end that they thought it was necessary to finish high school. They did not, however, report more optimism about their likelihood of their doing so. Optimism about completing high school did grow among both the younger and older contact boys, and this, it appears was a change which was effective in reducing delinquency.

Attempts by the Project to change the processes of juvenile justice in the target areas were not successful. Indeed, they backfired. CYDP's willingness to provide services to apprehended juvenile offenders referred to the

Project by the police garnered the Project mostly boys whom the police would probably have released without further attention anyway; and the referral system left the police with more time to detain and refer to court more serious offenders who might otherwise have received less attention. Moreover, one effect of the police referral system was to keep in the community boys who were especially vulnerable to subsequent arrest. Had these boys been sent away, they would not have contributed to the arrest rates in the period of absence. Thus, one of the Project's methods of attempting to prevent the actions of formal agencies like the police and the courts from creating delinquent self-concepts in boys permitted such boys to contribute negative points to the arrest rates, which was the criterion by which the Project's success or failure was measured. In one case, for example, a boy who never committed a serious offense was referred to CYDP 14 times in two years. If CYDP had not accepted such referrals, the police might have sent the boy out of the community after his second or third offense.

Process → Outcome

We have already mentioned that the contributions that CYDP hoped to make to the positive development of adolescent boys were not realized. That is, the project did not make any noticeable difference in the schooling or employment of either contact boys or boys in the target areas generally. Nor was there any discernible increase in boys' affiliations with the Boys Clubs or other youth agencies which might have provided more constructive recreation than could be found out in the streets. The only effect CYDP had in this regard probably should be attributed to the Boys Clubs program generally: namely, the Clubs' color-blind policy, maintained during a period of racial tension and neighborhood succession, had the effect of exchanging white for black membership. In any case, we found no evidence in boys' own accounts of their daily activities that the project generated more wholesome or constructive activities in the target areas.

Falling short in these respects represents failure to reach Project goals. It also represents failures to create means for achieving another major goal, reduction of delinquency. Nevertheless, CYDP seemed to achieve limited success in reducing delinquency. During the Project's tenure, and particularly in its latter stages, there was a marked decline in the number of police contacts with 16- to 18-year olds among the contact boys and boys

in the target areas generally. This decline cannot be attributed to changes in the behavior of police: else it would have been detected among boys in the control areas, who were under the jurisdiction of the same police. It is most likely attributable to CYDP.

What is important about the finding is not the size of the reduction. While it is statistically reliable, it is restricted to the oldest boys and is not so large that it amounts to a major change in delinquency in the target neighborhoods. (It was not large enough, for example, to be noted by residents or executives of local agencies. Neither set of observers perceived that delinquency was declining in their areas.) More important is its relationship to the intervening process which the Project seemed to help generate, which in turn produced this outcome. We have pointed out that growing optimism about completing high school is that factor which distinguished the boys in question from other boys under study, and that this factor was in turn the one most predictive of a decline in delinquent activity. These relationships may provide guidelines for the development of effective programs of delinquency prevention.

A Review of Assumptions

The Project's experiences in the inner city support neither the general assumption that its residents are socially disorganized nor that they are socially organized. We gained a greater appreciation for the diversity one finds there both in degree and kind of organization. Our early decision to conduct the Project in predominantly white and in predominantly black neighborhoods provided the opportunity to witness this diversity.

The black communities in the Henry Horner area and its control more nearly resembled the image of disorganization than the white neighborhoods did. It is not that they lacked personal relationships with one another through which they helped one another as they could. Nor is it that residents had no clear roles to play in their society; for they did. But if we mean by "organized" that people have worked out ways of coordinating effective interdependent actions on their collective behalf, then very little of that was apparent in the black communities. At the time the Project was going on, residents had no recognized leadership under whom

they could take collective action, and there was no network of clubs, churches, or other institutions which could provide a ready structure for communication and coordination. The white communities, on the other hand, were hives of ethnic and religious organizations with leadership in direct connection with the political institutions of the city. One consequence of this was that the residents of the Project's black target areas were more receptive than their white counterparts to Project efforts at organization. For in the black community, CYDP moved into a relative vacuum; and in the white community, there was hardly room for another organization. That members of the black community recognized the need for organization and were capable of creating and sustaining it was demonstrated by the establishment of the Mile Square Federation. But one might also look upon CYDP's relative effectiveness in organizing the black community as still another example of a disorganized community's inability to resist being put upon by outsiders, whether for purposes of welfare or exploitation.

The common image of community organization was not matched even by the predominantly white target area around the Oldtown Boys Club. We did not find citizens participating actively in a self-conscious collective effort to safeguard and improve their lot. What organization we found was largely latent, with the capacity to become more active when confronted by some community problem. The organization was maintained between times by key figures who worked at it more or less professionally as politicians, civil servants, churchmen, social workers, and so on. One of the reasons for the differences in the degree of organization between the white and black communities was the lack of such sustaining professionals among the black population. The Project's injection of just a few of these made a marked difference.

It is misleading to assert that there was "an organization" in the white communities. More precisely, we found several, segmented along primarily ethnic and socio-economic lines. Members of these separate sub-communities seldom interacted, and when they did, it was with some mutual distrust. They worked out fairly rigid social rules about appropriate behavior when they did come together which enabled them to share the same community, keep their distance, and cooperate as necessary. The coordination among these segments was accomplished to a large degree through the

Catholic Church, although different ethnic groups belonged to different churches. Organization was also abetted at the top levels of local agencies and businesses where members of different ethnic segments shared the same socio-economic and professional sub-cultures.

One of the interests which was commonly shared by the various segments of the white community was prejudice against blacks. We were not as prepared for the force of this prejudice when CYDP began as perhaps we should have been. We were disheartened by its increasing intensity during the Project's tenure. As we have mentioned in previous chapters, this force significantly shaped the course of the Project in the white target area, seriously hampering Project efforts to implement its program among both white and black youth. The Project's determination to provide what help seemed to be needed, regardless of race, inevitably involved it heavily with the black minority in the predominantly white target area and thus alienated the whites.

The assumption that social disorganization in the inner city contributed to the delinquency of its youth seems false to us now. We have noted that CYDP worked in communities markedly different in their state of organization. But they were not markedly different in the amount or nature of delinquency. In general there seemed to be as much of a problem of delinquency in one area as the other. And the hypothesis of Cloward and Ohlin (1960)--that the types of delinquent offenses committed would differ depending on the organization of the community--did not seem to be true, either. The experience of CYDP with the relationship between community organization and juvenile delinquency has brought into even sharper focus the distinction between official delinquency and delinquent behavior than we recognized when we began.

It may well be true that official delinquency--as reflected by the statistics of the police, the courts, and social agencies--differs in amount and kind in organized and disorganized communities. At the same time, it may also be true that delinquent behavior--the offenses committed by juveniles, apprehended or not--is similar from one community to another. For official delinquency bears only slight relationship to delinquency behavior. Project workers were aware of a great many offenses which were not known to the police or to any other authority, and studies of self-reported delinquency reveal that the perpetrators of only a small proportion

of juvenile offenses--as low as three percent--are apprehended (e.g., Gold, 1970; Williams and Gold, 1972). And less than half of those apprehended appear in any sort of official statistics. There is lots of leeway for law enforcement agencies to be selective. So how many juveniles are apprehended by the police and for what kind of offense, and how their offenses are disposed of afterwards may differ according to the organization of a community, while delinquent behavior itself may not.

A recent report by the Illinois Institute for Juvenile Research also documents the difference between official delinquency and delinquent behavior (Institute for Juvenile Research, no date). A representative sample of 3100 14- to 18-year old boys and girls in Illinois responded to an anonymous checklist inquiring about their delinquency. The findings of the survey differed in several respects from the official data. For example, the racial and socio-economic differences consistently found in the official statistics on delinquency were absent in the self-reports of the teenagers. It is also interesting to note that youngsters living in Chicago reported no more delinquency than youngsters living in smaller cities and towns.

We have been led to a reinterpretation of the classic studies of delinquency areas by Shaw and McKay (1942) and furthered by Lander (1954) and Bordua (1959). They may more usefully be considered studies of the behavior of social organizations which generate statistics on delinquency than studies of individual or collective behavior of delinquents themselves. The perpetrators of delinquent acts are but one component of the larger social organization which generates delinquency rates, an organization which consists of uniformed police, juvenile bureau personnel, juvenile court workers, judges, and other citizens in the area. The addition of each delinquent to the overall rate of an area depends necessarily on the actions of those in many or all of these roles. And they act differently in different areas of a city so they accumulate delinquents differentially, whether or not juveniles themselves commit more or less delinquent acts from one area to another.

Several examples will illustrate the differential behavior of the social organizations. First, inner city areas, which ordinarily include a high density of stores, theaters, and other public places, are subject to closer police surveillance than exclusively residential areas. Since getting caught at delinquent acts is largely a matter of being apprehended in the act (Gold, 1970), the inner city youngsters who live hard by these

commercial areas are more prone to being caught, thus raising their incidence of official delinquency.

Second, several studies have demonstrated that black adolescents who are apprehended by the police are more likely than their white peers to be added to official records rather than being treated informally (Black, 1970; Piliavin and Briar, 1964). One study suggests that citizens as well as police foster this bias: Black and Reiss (1970) report that black citizens victimized by black juveniles are more insistent than white citizens that a formal complaint be entered. To the degree that black adolescents (or in earlier eras, the children of some other object of ethnic discrimination) predominate the inner city population, then this phenomenon will inflate the rate of delinquency there.

A final example is the judicial behavior which, by convicting, sentencing, and incarcerating juveniles, differentially labels as "delinquent" adolescents from the inner city at a greater rate than suburban youngsters referred to the courts (Ferdinand and Luchterhand, 1970). This is the final step in the generation of official statistics, the last act of the juvenile justice system that produces the cases that count.

Together, actions such as these may be the chief reasons for inner city rates of delinquency being higher than rates for other areas. We would be advised, we think, to be more cautious than we have been in attributing the generation of delinquent behavior itself to forces peculiar to the inner city.

On the other hand, we need also to keep in mind that the very processes we have been discussing--those that generate official rates--may themselves affect the behavior of inner city youngsters to generate more delinquent behavior among them. This may occur in at least three ways (although we have no good comparative data that proves that inner city youngsters are actually more delinquent). First, apprehension by authorities tends to produce more delinquent behavior than it deters (Gold, 1970; Gold and Williams, 1969); so those inner city youth who are more often caught probably go on to commit more delinquent acts as a result. Second, stereotypes have a way of becoming obligations. That is, a consensus that inner city youngsters are particularly delinquent may come to be accepted as appropriate behavior by those youngsters themselves, prompting them to commit more offenses because it is expected of them, in that dual sense of "expected" peculiar to English

of "predictable" and "obligatory" (Tannenbaum, 1938). Third, insofar as the foregoing processes result in a "spoiled identity" (Goffman, 1963), they make it difficult for a youngster to get or keep a job, almost guaranteeing his vulnerability to a vicious cycle of crime and arrest.

Our present uncertainty about the concentration of delinquency in the inner city implies that we would not now take for granted that delinquency prevention programs should target those areas rather than some others. Ideally, an assessment of the actual incidence of delinquent behavior should precede the selection of target areas, and such surveys could be done relatively easily with the cooperation of the schools. It may turn out that residential areas are not so sharply different from one another that certain ones recommend themselves as the sites for programs. Perhaps programs should not then be developed on an area basis. Or perhaps other criteria besides the incidence of delinquency would select certain neighborhoods over others.

We should not close this discussion of social organization and disorganization without pointing out that locating a delinquency prevention program--or any program of social reform--in a particular neighborhood tells that neighborhood something about itself. We cannot help but wonder from this perspective to what degree the location of CYDP in two inner city neighborhoods augmented the image of those neighborhoods as delinquent-prone and gave their youngsters some standard of behavior to live up to.

A major assumption guiding CYDP activity was that a great deal of delinquency is committed by gangs; even more, that it is the sub-culture and organization of the gang that generates delinquency. Our experience has loosened our commitment to this assumption.

There is no doubt that most incidents of delinquent behavior that CYDP workers became aware of were committed by more than one youngster and that the fact of companionship itself encouraged delinquency. But we feel now that there is an important distinction between a loose aggregate, "a bunch of guys who hang around together," and the stereotyped image of a gang. The latter connotes a structured collectivity with a leadership hierarchy, some division of labor, stability and continuity over time, and a program of deliberately pursued delinquent activities; while the former does not. In Chapter 5, we pointed out that the social relations among

youth groups found in the CYDP areas, when viewed as organizational forms that have mutual relations, consisted of a constantly shifting pattern that varied enormously from year to year. Sometimes the membership of groups changed drastically but the name of the group remained the same; at other times, the name was changed but the group remained largely the same. Families moved away, taking their sons with them; boys got jobs, were married, joined the army, were sent to jail; old groups broke up, new alliances were formed--change was a constant factor in the life of youth groups. Between 1962 and 1963, for example, of 35 "gangs" that CYDP workers were related to in 1962, only 15 had continuity into 1963, and of 44 "gangs" being worked with in 1963, a total of 29 were newly formed that year (Mattick and Caplan, 1964). Thus, CYDP extension workers did not find gangs, in the stereotyped sense, in the target areas. Of names of gangs, there were plenty; and loose aggregates of boys (some with girls' auxiliaries) who adopted and discarded gang names as suited them. But inasmuch as the CYDP directed its workers to work with groups, rather than individuals, in order to save time, energy and have maximum impact, extension workers found themselves, in effect, organizing youth groups and gangs. What they had actually found were small groups of current friends, some of whose members, individually or collectively, had reputations for misbehavior. The larger the group, the more varied the range of delinquent reputations of the individuals in it. Who was a member and who was not changed constantly, and the boundary of any particular group was to some degree determined by the combined effects of the worker's organizational activity and the shifting consensus of group members.

This problem of setting boundaries for delinquent gangs has become conceptualized in the literature in terms of "core" and "fringe" (cf. Klein, 1971). The practice has become to define as the core the most delinquent members, who tend to hang around with one another more than with the others; and to depict those to whom they are less closely attached as fringe members. This may be a matter of theoretical construction convenient for studying delinquency rather than an accurate description of the natural shape of the gangs. Our experience suggests that it depends largely on one's focus. The larger "gangs" with which CYDP worked were composed of sub-groups of closer companions, these sub-groups being more homogeneous with regard to levels of delinquent activity than the

group as a whole. Which sub-group comprised the core of a larger plurality depended on the cohesion of the sub-groups rather than their delinquency. If one begins by characterizing a whole collectivity as a "delinquent gang," then naturally the most delinquent sub-group would appropriately be considered to be at its "core." When later the larger group might break apart, it follows that the "fringe" members have fallen away while the "core" remains. Obviously, the sub-group has actually parted, and which has fallen away depends on earlier assumptions about the structure of the group. A crucial fact is which sub-group keeps the name, and our experience indicates that that varies widely. Often the extension worker's efforts had effected a change from a more to less ominous name before the falling away even began, so the issue was mooted.

In any case, we have come to conceive of the association of the boys with whom we worked as only loosely structured sets of companions. It became less obvious to us as time went on that it was crucial to change the norms of such collectivities in order to affect the behavior of the individuals. Working with groups of boys developed rather as a natural and convenient mode of delivering service to those whose behavior required change. And those boys who seemed more appropriately worked with individually were simply engaged alone by their workers.

It is well to remember that we are speaking here of Chicago's near-west and near-south sides in the first half of the 1960's. We should not confuse what happened, or what was alleged to have happened concerning Chicago's youth gangs in the latter part of the 1960's. The latter period was the time of the flourishing of the much-heralded Blackstone Rangers and their less well publicized rivals, the East Side Disciples. In the period when the Chicago Police Department's Gang Intelligence Unit--a unit especially formed, 300 strong, to deal with gangs--was acting as the public relations arm of the Blackstone Rangers, they appeared to be an almost city-wide gang with what was estimated as 3,000 to 5,000 members. The way in which youth groups all over the city adopted the Rangers name, as soon as the mass media had instructed them which gang label was the most disturbing to the adult community and the authorities, seemed to lend this police and media myth some credence. The fact that the Blackstone Rangers and their many name-adopting imitators were largely a stimulated creation of Gang Intelligence Unit press releases and the creation of a media event

was conclusively established when the Blackstone Rangers evaporated from public preoccupation shortly after the Gang Intelligence Unit was disbanded in 1970 by a police department reorganization. This is not to say that the Blackstone Rangers disappeared in 1970; it merely means that the myth shrank back down to the reality of what was referred to as "the main 21," i.e., the actual size of the Blackstone Rangers, before they were inflated by the organizational necessities of the police, the mass media and other beneficiaries of the myth.

One implication of this view of the function "gangs" play in the etiology of delinquency is to give more weight to individual self-selection. It weakens the credibility of the image of a delinquent gang lurking on the corner to seduce little boys growing up and newcomers to the neighborhood, into membership and a youth of crime. This image is given currency by the parents of adjudicated delinquent youngsters, who are most likely to blame "bad company" for their offsprings' behavior as a reaction to everybody else blaming "bad family." But even in the reputedly most delinquent of neighborhoods, there are opportunities for companionship across the whole dimension from highly delinquent to non-delinquent adolescents, so motivated choice must be considered as one cause for a youth to be hanging around with highly delinquent companions. And it must be the rare individual who, seeking partners in delinquency, cannot find any accomplices at all. Cohen (1955) suggests that youngsters who have problems which motivate them to be delinquent are apt to find one another in their common interest. And it is their common interest, rather than forced enlistment, which serves as the basis for common action.

A strategy for prevention that emerges here is to begin by "splitting off" from highly delinquent associations those who are least delinquent-prone and most ready to enter into more conventional modes of adolescent life. This splitting process might involve small clusters of friends or perhaps individuals. Then a worker might address himself to those remaining who are next most involved in delinquency, successively splitting off his contacts until he has isolated individuals or clusters of friends who represent the ones hardest to change and probably responsible for the most delinquency. These are his greatest challenge, requiring the greatest investment of time and resources and the most skill. We have seen that the strategy of CYDP extension workers usually began with these

youngsters and had little impact on them. It may be that their delinquency is indeed impervious to the kinds of forces which extension workers can muster and should be referred elsewhere (perhaps to the police, for the sake of the community rather than their own); it may also turn out that working with them under conditions of relative social isolation will prove more successful.

From where we stand now in our understanding of delinquency in the community, we are less enthusiastic about the potential of dramatic, massive programs which might capture the imagination of neighborhood youth and reduce their delinquent behavior. We are mindful that the forerunner of CYDP in the Henry Horner area included a program of adolescent drill teams which seemed to be highly successful. Such programs may contribute a great deal to the positive development of many youngsters and are for that reason desirable programs for agencies like the Boys Clubs. Whether they prevent much delinquency is in great doubt--no systematic evaluation was made of the effects of the drill team program at Henry Horner. We suspect that they are least attractive and have the least holding power for the most delinquent youngsters in the community, who tend to shy from adult contact and supervision and from organized activities which demand skilled levels of performance. Besides, however much such programs may divert some young people from delinquency, they do not confront the problems which have led to a delinquent solution. It seems to us that these problems are often tenacious and are likely to crop up again when the early attraction of a dramatic but superficial program wears off or when the youngster grows too old for it. So while such programs may be worthwhile both for providing constructive outlets for those who can use them and perhaps as attractive lures for heavily delinquent youngsters, delinquency prevention we think requires action more relevant to the personal and social integration of the individual.

Our data suggest that primarily recreational programs accomplish little for reducing delinquency or helping adolescents who are not already well-adapted to their social environment. The boys in the target and control areas evidenced a pattern familiar to recreational agencies: older boys less often participated in the program.. Driven away in part by the adolescent need for autonomy, they developed their own hangouts and their own programs. This pattern is by no means highly associated

with delinquency. It is true that older boys who continued to participate in Boys Club and similar programs were less delinquent than those who did not, but most older boys who did not participate also engaged in little if any delinquency. Again, we find self-selection operating in establishing a correlation with delinquency: few boys who find the program of a recreational agency attractive are motivated to be delinquent. Certainly then an open-door agency is neither going to reduce delinquency markedly nor have a significant impact on the lives of many troubled adolescents.

When CYDP extension workers reached out aggressively for the more delinquent boys in the target areas, it was not primarily to carry a recreational program to them. Automobile rides around Chicago, tickets to sports events, and camping trips were lures and vehicles for other kinds of processes. We have described these processes earlier as essentially two: improving the integration of adolescents into those social institutions most salient to their lives; and creating interpersonal relations through which socializing influences might constructively be brought to bear.

Our data raise serious doubts that efforts to create interpersonal relations are effective means to influence the behavior of adolescent boys. It appears that in many crucial instances CYDP extension workers did enter into such relationships with boys, but it also appears that these relationships were not generally instrumental for reducing the boys' delinquent behavior or leading them into more constructive life patterns. Changes in behavior were not associated with "tightness" in worker-boy relationships, whether "tightness" was reported by workers or boys. And this was true regardless of the amount of time and effort workers devoted to these relationships.

It is conceivable that CYDP might have made better use of relationships, with more positive results. We can imagine that social case workers might regard CYDP's mode of operation deficient in this regard. Notwithstanding that the extension workers were by and large skilled professionals, the pattern of their work and of their supervision did not emulate the practice of psychotherapists. For example, seldom did extension workers discuss among themselves or with their supervisor the nuances of their relationships with individual boys or the psychodynamics of their groups. A practiced eye might detect in the daily reports of extension workers many opportunities missed, personal insights unregistered and errors in therapeutic procedure. In our defense, we can only point out the CYDP did not intend to intervene

at that psychological level. The numbers of boys with whom each worker involved himself and the natural settings in which he participated with them precluded that mode of engagement except in a few cases. Extension work was intended to test whether professionals, working with large numbers of boys in settings natural to them, could acquire such significance for them that their example and influence would change the boys' behavior. The project aimed to introduce into boys' lives figures more like the fathers, older brothers, and adult male friends whose absence was assumed to be partly responsible for their delinquency, not therapists, the likes of whom the overwhelming majority of non-delinquents never encounter either.

This strategy apparently failed. Its failure has several implications. It is likely that there is no easy substitute for familial relationships, that even a boy's flawed relationship with his father has more potential for socialization than a highly satisfying relationship with a fellow who works for an agency in the neighborhood. We suppose that the former has both a vertical and horizontal reach, so to speak, which the latter does not. That is, a filial relationship has a history whose roots lie in the earliest associations of the individual and which have entwined most of the most significant relationships in the present. Bound up as it is with his memories and with his relationships with mother, siblings, and others, the filial relationship has a socializing potential which a relationship with a professional can seldom achieve. Furthermore, it is buttressed by a host of social norms of affection, deference, and obedience significantly less forceful in other relationships.

We are reminded of an incident which occurred in the Henry Horner housing project during the CYDP years. An older adolescent had showed up drunk in the playground one early evening and was terrorizing residents and passersby with a pistol. A crowd of adults and children had gathered warily around him where he stood waving the gun about, his back to the brick wall of one of the high rises. He would not accede to the urgings of the crowd to give up the gun or put it away, and they were reluctant to call the police because he was a member of a resident family. Finally, someone fetched the boy's father from his apartment. The father was a short, slight man who himself was often drunk, often unemployed, and presumably had little control over his son's behavior. But this little man

pushed his way unsteadily but unhesitatingly through the crowd to his son, struck the boy across the side of his head and demanded the gun. The boy surrendered it to his father and allowed himself to be dragged to their apartment by the collar of his shirt. Whatever the effective forces in this case--an infantile fear, deep-lying affection and respect, familial solidarity, cultural support, and so on, they are peculiarly familial and not commonly replaceable.

We suspect that developmental factors also limit the potential of even the closest interpersonal relationships newly formed in the middle of adolescence or later. E. H. Erikson (1956) has suggested that an adolescent's preparation for adulthood requires him to abandon the mechanism of identification with others and proceed to integrate what he can use of earlier identifications with his present styles and the realities of his life to formulate a coherent identity. According to this view, new relationships, no matter how important and satisfying, are no longer vehicles for interiorizing the attitudes and characteristics of the other and through him the values of the society. To do so implies operating at a level of fantasy at which most adolescents no longer engage, and surrendering a degree of autonomy most adolescents cherish too dearly. One expects to find boys 15 years or older developing a strong sense of identification with another only when they are essentially immature and in desperate search for connection. What they evince in such circumstances is akin in intensity and effect to a religious conversion, and in another era their accomodation might have taken just that form.

The adolescent progression from identification to identity formation means that adults can be useful to them not so much as models for emulation but as instruments for integration with the wider social structure. An extension worker, for example, can be so instrumental in at least two ways: he can function directly to help a boy train for and find a way into respectable adult roles, of which occupation is but one, albeit an important one; and he can indirectly provide an example of one achievement of identity. It seems likely that CYDP extension workers, in their relationships to most inner city boys, functioned more effectively as trainers and guides than as specific examples. For the particular role in which they encountered the boys, that of professional extension worker, represented a kind of occupational identity to which most of these boys could not realistically aspire (although at least three contact boys have at this writing undertaken social

work training).

The many boys who asked for help in finding jobs pointed to the instrumental function that extension workers might most effectively perform, within limits. Our data describe some of those limits all too well; for while it was at certain times fairly easy to place boys in jobs, it was never easy to keep them employed. What an extension worker can do is constrained by the availability of jobs for youth, which is the hardest group to place; and this means that inner city youth are most sensitive to the economic conditions affecting employment rates. Another set of determinants which are out of the worker's control reside in the public and private policies that create jobs outside of the inner city, out of reach of especially its younger residents. So often the best that a worker can do is to provide his boys with a "most favored client" status that enables them to take advantage of whatever opportunities there are. The worker's effectiveness is also limited by his inability to provide on-the-job or other training which will develop a boy's potential for advancement out of his low-level entry job. Those entry jobs do not have much holding power, being unattractive in pay, working conditions, and intrinsic interest. And the boys who need them and take them are just the ones who are least committed to the work ethic for its own sake. Hence, the large turn-over in employment documented by our data. If programs like CYDP are to be effective in the area of employment, then they will require institutional support by way of vocational training and public full employment policies.

Of course, there is an encompassing vocational training program of a sort available to all inner city youth free of charge--the public schools. Furthermore, the schools are central to boys' lives in other ways as well, providing, as they do, a major setting for peer associations, a training ground for citizenship, and so on. Our data demonstrate the importance of boys' believing that they are competent to complete their secondary schooling successfully: it is the clearest correlate of non-delinquency. Unfortunately, we find that the CYDP program was as unable to keep boys in school as it was in keeping boys employed. The schools cooperated with the project insofar as permitting boys who had dropped out or had been thrown out to return. But this was not enough. We believe now that the school system has to meet these youngsters more than half-way. Mere entry into the same educational program they had left soon prompted boys to leave again. While

the ordinary educational processes are adequate for holding the majority of young people, those with whom CYDP was most concerned cannot stand it. They are threatened in many different ways by schooling--with failure, loss of autonomy, punishment, rejection, etc. There was little CYDP could do to help its clients make their way in school, and this is probably as true of other agencies as well. Tutoring a few hours each week, for example, proved to be a major effort for the project but was terribly inadequate for helping CYDP boys make up their academic deficiencies. To do that job effectively might very well require an investment of time, effort, and skills greater than the extensive academic program normally available to youth. To provide that kind of program for the youth who need it will require a heavy public commitment; private agencies cannot do the job. What private agencies can do, CYDP has demonstrated, is to coax, cajole, and persuade school leavers to give education another try, school officials to let them try, and provide some support for their efforts.

There is perhaps another contribution private agencies like the Boys Clubs can make in the field of education, and that is to mount small-scale experimental and demonstration programs. We have in mind programs like the "street academies" that have sprung up in Chicago, New York, and other cities (Carnegie Quarterly, 1968). Private agencies enjoy a flexibility and opportunity to innovate which large school systems do not. Their sponsorship of experimental programs may make an important difference in adapting educational processes to the needs of atypical students. But such programs cannot be expected to continue indefinitely or to involve any but a small number of those who need them. Once such programs have been proved out, they ought to be adopted by the public institution in a way that will preserve their essential character. That implies institutional change, and CYDP's experience with an education system make us pessimistic on that account.

Can organizations like the Boys Clubs help effect change in institutions like the school system? The project's experience has been that if the organization serves only as a case-finding and referral agency, it will not be noticeably effective. Nor does it seem that calling attention to unmet needs and gaps in service is enough. But established agencies which enjoy a great deal of public support might indeed encourage changes in public policy. Agencies like the Boys Clubs are usually enmeshed in networks of directorates, with public and private executives sitting on their boards,

and their own executives sitting on other boards and commissions. This can and does ensconce them in the status quo. It can also provide leverage for change. Deliberate and energetic efforts to change institutions might be effective, especially if an agency makes such efforts from the standpoint of having created and tested out the program of change it is advocating. We have noted that one of the chief executives in the Chicago Boys Clubs during the project's tenure felt that CYDP did not exploit the resources of various agency boards enough. He believed that the project might have increased its impact on institutions in the target communities by alerting key board members to the need for changes and enlisting their widespread influence to effect those changes.

CYDP chose another route to effect institutional change--community organization. Both philosophical and theoretical considerations prompted the Project to try to work through residents to change neighborhood institutions. There is no evidence that this strategy was successful.

The agency's potential for organizing the target communities was limited for at least two reasons. First, it depended heavily for financial and moral support on individuals who were very much a part of the institutions which community organizations would target for change; and depended on widespread support from a public largely unsympathetic to the demands of those being organized. Second, the agency was regarded as alien, even antagonistic to the dominant members of one of the target areas which was already organized toward its own goals. And these goals did not include the kind of institutional change that the Project believed would benefit its youth. It is not surprising then that the agency itself was ambivalent about the community organizing efforts of the Project and that its director favored instead using the agency's links with the Establishment to reach the same ends.

New Directions

For Research

If the researchers among us had it to do over again (and in some respects we are doing it), what would we do differently?

To begin with, we would not depend exclusively on official data for measures of delinquency. Since CYDP began, a reasonably valid technique

has been developed for obtaining adolescents' reports of their own delinquent behavior (Gold, 1970; Williams and Gold, 1972). This measure seems more sensitive than official figures to fluctuations in delinquent activity in a given population and captures a greater proportion and a wider variety of delinquent behavior. It also measures another facet of the problem of delinquency, the actual incidence of violative behavior, caught or not. For the concern of a community and of a society is not only with how many juvenile offenders are caught--the more, the better, from one point of view, if they are someone else's children--but also with how frequently and how seriously delinquent juveniles actually are. Evaluation of delinquency prevention and treatment programs should consider collecting self-reports, perhaps along with official records, to assess their effectiveness.

Had we anticipated that youngsters' optimism about completing high school would be related to a decline in their delinquent behavior, we would have tried to measure that and related variables better than we did. We would have inquired more thoroughly of our respondents about what shaped their expectations, and we would have been especially alert to clues as to what the Project did that made a difference here. We also would have tried to measure those psychological variables which we believe are related to and link such optimism to delinquent behavior. These variables would include a youngster's evaluation of himself--his self-esteem--and the degree to which he believes he will occupy a respectable place as an adult in his society. Our hunch is that these are the psychological factors which an effective delinquency prevention program must alter and that a systematic evaluation should measure.

CYDP did little with regard to the families of target youth and the research program therefore largely ignored that domain. We do not believe that strategies of intervention with families are likely to be successful--most families are extremely resistant to change--but systematic measures of parent-adolescent relations might have provided important insights into the effects of the Project in boys' lives. We feel now that we should not have left off interviewing the mothers of contact boys. We had regarded them originally simply as adult observers of conditions in the community, and we found that they were neither better nor worse informants than representative samples of adult women. So we concentrated our resources on the more representative samples. Of course, the latter could not tell us about

their experiences with sons directly involved in CYDP programs. If we had it to do over again, we would try to interview boys' mothers as special sources of information.

Our early orientation toward gangs prompted us to focus on boys' perceptions of the norms of the youth group to which they belonged. We had in mind, the reader will recall, that the Project would attempt to change these norms, and we wanted to see if that happened. Now that we have a different image of so-called gangs and of boys' relationships with their peers, we would focus more on shifts in target boys' associations. We would try to keep track of who associated with whom, in terms of associates' level of delinquent activity, attendance at school, club membership, and other indicators of their style of life. This would enable us to chart boys' movements among sub-groups more or less likely to involve them in delinquency.

We would also exert greater efforts to measure institutional changes. We have here reported data on changes in the organization of the agency which mounted CYDP and, to some degree, changes in the procedures of the police. The school system merits a great deal of attention. If, as we shall discuss further on, a program with goals like CYDP's ought to try to persuade the relevant school system to adapt some to the needs of delinquency-prone youngsters, then measures of change in this process variable should be taken. We have in mind such things as systematic surveillance of the allocation of personnel and resources to students who are not succeeding in school, the programs for handling their academic and behavior problems, and the processes by which they are separated from and returned to the system. We would also monitor more thoroughly opportunities for vocational training and the job market itself.

We think that our overall research design could be improved upon most by adding an interim set of measures. We had originally intended to interview sub-samples of boys and adults in target and control areas between the initial and final stages of the evaluation. But our resources were not ample enough. We have been able to present mid-term data on contacts with police because, of course, such data were constantly being compiled. We would at this point be considerably more confident of our interpretations of data if we had interim psychological and social data as well. For example, the relationship between boys' greater optimism about graduating

from high school and their lower delinquency would be more strongly established if we could determine their concomitant change over three rather than only two points in time.

For Treatment and Prevention Programs

What new directions for action are suggested by the CYDP experience? First of all, programs might broaden the base of case-finding beyond the scope of CYDP. This project identified its caseload primarily through the juvenile justice system and out on the streets. Given its focus on delinquency and its assumptions about the functions of gangs, this was appropriate. In consequence, the Project's clientele was comprised disproportionately of older adolescents who had already encountered the juvenile justice system, but who varied widely in the degree of their delinquent behavior. If there is any merit in working with younger clients before they become involved with the police but who nevertheless give strong indication that they are heavily involved in delinquency, then the schools should become a major source of referral. Given the poor academic standing of the bulk of CYDP's most delinquent clientele, and the relationship between their educational experiences and their delinquency, it is likely that they could have been identified in school some years before. We are mindful of the problems of labelling and stigmatization inherent in early identification of "delinquency-prone children." But we submit that it may be advisable to identify such youngsters before they are drawn into the juvenile justice system and become subject to that stigma; and that programs may offer youngsters help in such a manner as to minimize stigmatization.

So the schools, we think, would be an excellent source of referral. After all, the educational system sees all youngsters for large portions of time, in a setting unfortunately but perhaps unavoidably conducive to whatever degree of anti-social behavior they are prone to exhibit. These are just the conditions under which the fewest appropriate clients for a delinquency prevention program would be missed. Furthermore, early involvement of the school system in the process of treatment and prevention would be helpful, since the provocations to delinquency often include the schools.

Early adolescents might respond more positively than CYDP's older clientele did to a program which depends heavily on interpersonal relationships to achieve its goals. Still, it seems that a program ought instead

to devote a good deal of its energy directly and specifically to helping youngsters find a place in their society. That is, we believe, an effective program will be one that concurrently opens up educational and vocational opportunities for youngsters and prepares youngsters to grasp them. In Erik Erikson's terms, such a program would focus on replacing the negative--delinquent--role identity with a more positive identity. It would make itself an instrument for finding and creating roles--occupational and others--and for identifying and developing youngsters' capacities to fill them. We hasten to add here that we do not mean that these roles should be restricted to conventional educational, occupational, and other roles usually available to such people. Effective programs will have to fashion new ways for some adolescents to be students and complete their education within the school system or in some other, separate program. Effective programs will have to be alert to new vocations which would attract certain adolescents, and different ways of being responsible, if provocative, citizens. Especially important will be the programs' capacity to support their clients beyond their entry into low level occupations or after beginning a new educational program, helping them to survive through these experiences and to progress through them to something better.

It seems to us now that CYDP would have been more successful if it had concentrated its resources on such a program. One reason is that this program would have been more compatible with the structure, capacities, and traditions of the Boys Clubs than a program which hoped both to draw a large number of recalcitrant and inappropriate youngsters into the conventional club program and to engage in widespread assertive community organization. Not only did the Project spread itself too thinly--over clients, over neighborhoods, over different methods--it also worked in some ways against the grain of its own agency. Carefully sculptured fitting of a program into its organizational setting is essential to its success--indeed to its viability. In retrospect, it seems to have required tremendous dedication, effort, and skill among personnel of the Chicago Boys Clubs in and out of CYDP to enable the Project to operate within that agency for six years.

Finally--and here the researcher's perspective creeps in again--it must be recognized that programs of youth development and delinquency prevention, along with other programs of social reform, are in their experimental stages.

The Chicago Youth Development Project, we believe, has contributed something to our understanding of what will make them work, but we recognize that we have a great deal more to learn. The journalist who predicted early in CYDP's tenure that we would conclude our final report with a plea for more research was prophetic, though perhaps not so completely so as he thought. For some things worth knowing were learned. But only a continuing experimental approach will permit further progress. No one has the answers. But the answers can be found if social reform and social science join in the effort to find them.

Gold and Mattick: Experiment in the Streets

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APPENDIX A

APPENDIX A

A Bibliography of Written Materials Related
to the Chicago Youth Development Project

1. Hans W. Mattick, "The Research Phase," Program Service, Boys' Clubs of America, New York, N.Y., Fall 1961. pp. 632-35. (a short description of the research design of C.Y.D.P.)
2. Hans W. Mattick and Nathan S. Caplan, Street Work, Community Organization and Research, Chicago Boys Clubs, Chicago, Illinois, 1962. 76 pp. (The first comprehensive statement of the action programs and research designs of the C.Y.D.P. Later modified.)
3. Hans W. Mattick and Nathan S. Caplan, The Chicago Youth Development Project: A Descriptive Account of Its Action Programs and Research Designs. Institute for Social Research, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1964. 133 pp. (A more sophisticated and complete statement, repeating about 50% of 3, above, but including some modification of the research design and two appendices that served as a mid-term report of the project's activities.)
4. Nathan S. Caplan, et al., "Factors Affecting the Process and Outcome of Street Club Work," Sociology and Social Research, Vol. 48, No. 2., January, 1964. pp. 207-219. (A statistical study of a variety of factors related to street work.)
5. Nathan S. Caplan, "The Use of Contemporary Art Forms as a Mental Health Device Among Inner-City Youth," paper presented at A.P.A. Convention, September, 1964. 9 pp. (The use of modern painting, poetry, literature and film as a point of departure for group-counseling. A cooperative effort between the C.Y.D.P. and the Ecumenical Institute to develop counseling curriculum materials.)
6. Ronald F. Gee, A Study of the Perceptions of Three Community Organization Workers of the C.Y.D.P. (A Masters' Degree paper, Jane Addams Graduate School of Social Work), University of Illinois, Chicago, Illinois, June 1965, (mimeo) iii and 243 pp.
7. Phyllis L. Bare, et al (7 others), What Does the Street Worker Do: An Analysis of Role Transactions in Interpersonal Relations (A Masters' Degree paper, Jane Addams Graduate School of Social Work), University of Illinois, Chicago, Illinois, June, 1965, (mimeo) iii and 243 pp.
8. Lois F. Mock, Influencing the Slum Boy (A Masters' Degree paper, Institute for Social Research), the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, July, 1965, (mimeo) i and 117 pp.
9. Eugene Perkins, A Study of the Dual Supervisory Structure of the C.Y.D.P. as it Relates to a Close or General Style of Supervision (A Masters' Degree paper in Group Work) George Williams College, Chicago, Illinois, December, 1965, (type-script) vi and 81 pp.

10. Hans W. Mattick, et al., "Organization of the C.Y.D.P. Action and Research Programs," Report Conference: C.Y.D.P., Chicago Boys Clubs, Chicago, Illinois, March 23-24, 1966. pp. 1-15.
11. Hans W. Mattick and Nathan S. Caplan, "Stake Animals: Loud-Talking and Leadership in Do-Nothing and Do-Something Situations," Juvenile Gangs in Context: Theory, Research and Action (eds. Klein and Myerhoff), Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1967. pp. 106-119. (A discussion of indirect intervention techniques to reach groups through the "hardest" cases and to subvert negative and uncooperative gang leaders. First published in 1964 and reprinted in several training courses.)
12. Nathan S. Caplan, et al., "The Nature, Variety and Patterning of Street Club Work in an Urban Setting," Juvenile Gangs in Context: Theory, Research and Action (eds. Klein and Myerhoff), Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1967. pp. 194-202. (A more sophisticated and fuller statement of 4, above. First published in 1964 in mimeo form.)
13. Richard Block, The Chicago Youth Development Project: An Evaluation Based on Arrests (A Masters' Degree paper, Department of Sociology), University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, Fall, 1967, (mimeo) 39 pp and 2 App. (A statistical analysis of arrests, dispositions and recidivism of about 2,500 cases during the last 300 months of the C.Y.D.P.).
14. Gerald D. Suttles, The Social Order of the Slum: Ethnicity and Territory in the Inner City, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois, 1968. xxii and 243 pp. (The materials for this book were gathered while Suttles was a Research Assistant with the C.Y.D.P. It is not about the C.Y.D.P. but includes background information and data about the population of one of the C.Y.D.P. work areas during the time the project was being conducted.)
15. Frank J. Carney, Hans W. Mattick and John D. Callaway, Action on the Streets: A Handbook for Inner City Youth Work, Association Press, New York, N.Y., 1969. 160 pp. (A "how-to-do-it" manual for street club workers first published as: Street Club Work Practice in 1968. The 1969 volume includes an "Introduction" by Mattick giving an overview and general outcome evaluation of the C.Y.D.P.).