ABSTRACT
        This article attempts to refute D.M. Perlmutter's
claim that the syntactic component in Spanish grammar can generate
structures that are grammatical at the deep structure level but not
at the surface structure level, and that it is necessary to impose a
surface structure constraint (SSC) as a filter to reject the
ungrammatical structures. The principal evidence Perlmutter cites for
the necessity of the SSC is the behavior of the Spanish particle
"se." However, it is demonstrated here that there is at least one
case in which a different deep structure analysis of "se" would
obviate the need for a SSC. Perlmutter's analyses of the other
sources of "se" are also examined critically. It is suggested that
the whole notion of SSCs deserves fresh examination. (LG)

CONSTRAINING SPANISH SURFACE STRUCTURE

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Perlmutter has made the claim that:

'..in order to characterize certain Spanish sentences as un-
grammatical, it is necessary to impose a *surface structure
constraint* that acts as a filter and rejects as ungrammatical
any sentence that contains object pronouns that are not in the
prescribed order. It happens that in certain cases where the
surface structure that results from a particular deep structure
is rejected as ungrammatical by the surface structure constraint,
there is no way to actualize that deep structure as a grammatical
sentence. As a result, there are well-formed deep structures
to which there corresponds no grammatical surface structure.'
(1971:xi)

Strong stuff indeed. He is in effect claiming that the syntactic
component can generate structures which are -- and at the same time
are not -- grammatical. Expressed rather differently: there are
semantically well-formed structures that cannot be 'put into words'.

In the late 'sixties, when the notion was first floated, there
was no public outcry against the absurdity of it all. Indeed, María-
Luisa Rivero produced a cogent argument (1970) showing that the
grammatical machinery then available was unequal to the task of gen-
erating Spanish negatives, without *recourse* to a surface structure
constraint (henceforth SSC). Contreras and Rojas (1972) are mildly
critical of Perlmutter, but seek to refine his argument, not impugn
his axiom. And in her recent review of Perlmutter's monograph, Rivero's
only faint anxiety about an otherwise 'first-rate piece of research'
(1973:701) is that 'it may appear at first ... that they [SSCs]
produce more powerful grammars and a weaker theory.'

Those worried by this turn of events will be cheered by the
uncompromising opposition of M.S.Beukenkamp, who pours withering
scorn on the whole idea of SSCs:

'At this point it is pertinent to ask about the explanatory
power of a device such as a SSC. It has none. A SSC does
not explain anything. It is merely an expression of despair,
like throwing one's arms up in the air and confessing that in
spite of all the powerful machinery we have at our disposal, we
are not able to filter out ill-formed sentences so we give up
and add an extra piece of machinery at the end of the production
line in order to discard the "bad sentences".' (1973:6)

Unfortunately, Beukenkamp's solution of generating clitics in the Base
and having at *this* point an ordering constraint identical to Perlmutter's,
advances very little along the road to explanatory adequacy.

So much by way of preamble. Perlmutter's principal, but not exclusive, evidence for the existence of SSCs is the behaviour in Spanish of the particle *se*. No sentence is acceptable which has **se se* as a sequence, yet there are, Perlmutter claims, underlying structures which are perfectly well-formed and which under normal circumstances would give rise to the forbidden sequence. After rejecting constraints on the base structures or on the transformations, he concludes that a 'template' to 'filter out' the unacceptable strings must be incorporated between the transformational and the phonological components. The purpose of this note is to demonstrate that there is at least one case in which a different deep-structure analysis of *se* would obviate the need for a SSC.

How do Perlmutter's grammatical but unacceptable structures arise? In brief, because *se* itself has three distinct sources. The first, and least controversial, he calls 'spurious': whenever two third-person clitic pronouns, the first dative and the second accusative, occur in sequence the dative (either *le*, singular, or *les*, plural) becomes *se*. Thus:

(1) Enrique dio a Carlos el diario que compraste ayer
   'Henry gave Charles the paper you bought yesterday'

may be pronominalized as either:

(1a) Enrique le dio el diario que compraste ayer,   or:
(1b) Enrique lo dio a Carlos.

The double pronominalization, however, is

(1c) Enrique se lo dio

for the sentence **Enrique le (or les) lo dio* is ungrammatical. Perlmutter follows the usual practice of accepting this as one of the inexplicable facts of life. He sets up a minor transformational rule -- apparently pre-lexical -- to produce the correct form, (1971:22):

$$
\begin{bmatrix} Pro \\ III \\ Dative \end{bmatrix} \quad \begin{bmatrix} Pro \\ III \\ Acc \end{bmatrix}
$$
$$
1 \qquad\qquad 2 \qquad \longrightarrow \quad se, 2
$$

So much for the 'spurious' variety.

Secondly, *se* may be a reflexive pronoun, exactly comparable with *me, te, nos, os*, as in:

(2) me afeito   'I shave myself'
(3) os vestís   'you dress yourselves'
(4) se divierten   'they amuse themselves'.

It is recognised that some verbs, unlike those in (2-4), are always reflexive (e.g. *atreverse, arrepentirse*), but this has no effect on the status of the clitic pronoun.

Thirdly, Perlmutter recognises a 'kind of *se* I will call "impersonal *se*", for it arises as a result of an underlying *Pro* subject which is like *on* in French and *man* in German' (1971:29). Hence:

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(5) En Méjico se trabaja mucho
    'In Mexico one [Pro] works hard'.

The situation is further complicated by two ancilliary features
of pronominalization in Spanish. The first is that a 'dative' pronoun
is not always indicative of a 'simple' indirect object: it may reflect
a construction known to Latin grammarians as an 'ethic' dative:

(6) Se me estropeó el sombrero
    'My hat got ruined (on me)'
(7) Para colmo de todo, se me le robó el dinero a mi hija
    'It was the last straw when my daughter's money got stolen (on me)'.

Of course, when the 'ethic' attribution is third person, a *se* may be
involved as a result of the 'spurious' rule:

(8) Le torcí el brazo ⟹ (8a) se lo torcí
    'I twisted his arm' ⟹ 'I twisted it (on him)'.

Secondly, in many contexts, Spanish permits the pronominalization of
a whole clause or sentence:

(9) A María le permite su padre salir hasta medianoche, pero a Laura
        no se lo permite el suyo.
    'Mary's father allows her to stay out until midnight, but Laura's
        doesn't (allow it to her)'.

Now the machinery which Perlmutter has set up to produce the
foregoing acceptable sentences, also produces large numbers of unaccept-
able ones. A reflexive verb, whether or not inherently reflexive, cannot
co-occur with a *Pro*-subject:

(*10) Si se roba, se se arrepiente pronto
    'If one steals, one soon repents (it)'
(*11) Cuando se come, se se lava las manos
    'When one eats, one washes one's hands.'

It seems, however, that there is nothing wrong with this sentence-frame:

(12) si se roba, se arriesga mucho
    'If one steals, one risks a lot'.

Similar problems arise if we have a sentential pronominalization and a
third-person dative, whether it derives from a 'true' indirect object
or an 'ethic':

(*13) A mí se me dio el permiso de ausentarme, pero a Pedro no se se lo dio
    'I was given permission to absent myself, but Peter wasn't'.
(14) Se le olvidó a mi amigo acudir a la cita
(*14a) ⟹ Se se lo olvidó
   'It slipped my friend's mind (to turn up to the appointment'.

It looks as though Perlmutter is right in claiming that the deep
structures of (*10, *11, *13, *14a) are well-formed both syntactically
and semantically, that well-motivated transformations apply to them,
and hence that only a mechanism which has access to the surface structure
can be used to block the forbidden sequence *se se.

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Before proposing an alternative analysis, I should like to draw attention to two minor -- but not insignificant -- flaws in the case as it now stands. The assertion that we can never have the sequence *se se as a surface structure is not quite accurate. It is really a question of immediate dominance: we may not have two occurrences of se in any one S-dominated structure, whether or not they are contiguous. Thus (17) and (18) -- though far from euphonic -- are grammatical, while (*19a) is not:

(17) El bañarse se prohibe
     'Bathing is prohibited.'
(18) Antes de quejarse se cercioró de tener razón
     'Before complaining, he made sure he was right.'
(19) Se me le olvidó a mi amigo acudir a la cita
(*19a) ⟹ se me se lo olvidó --

an untranslatable version of (14) with an 'ethic' dative. Secondly, the 'spurious' se rule, simple as it sounds, is not easy to formulate. Perlmutter's version is much better than, for instance, Foster's rather disastrous attempt (1970), but as he has allowed no mechanism to place the clitics in the right order to fulfil the structural condition, presumably nothing but the SSC prevents the generation of *lo le, *los le, *lo les, *los les. It seems to me indefensible to set up SSCs to prevent the generation of unacceptable strings which apparently cannot be blocked in any other way, and then to use them to block other unacceptable strings which need never have been generated in the first place.

I want now to show that Perlmutter's second and third sources of se are misconceived: in other words, his deep structure is wrong. Elsewhere (1972, forthcoming) I have argued at length that the so-called 'reflexive' in Spanish -- despite its etymological transparency -- constitutes a mediopassive paradigm and is not to be interpreted as a personal pronoun plus active verb. There are inherently mediopassive verbs (continuators of the Latin deponents) and transformationally-introduced mediopassives. Medialization is triggered in two ways: either by passivizing structures containing an (inanimate) Objective but no Agentive, or, in circumstances similar to those producing reflexive-pronominalization, by the identity of the Agentive and Experiencer or some other case-relator lower down the hierarchy. The difference is that reflexive-pronominalization is obligatory whatever the two identical cases, while medialization is only obligatory when A = E, and optional thereafter. From:

we may derive:

(20) Yo (me) compro un sombrero (para mí mismo)
     'I'm buying myself a hat' —

in which the mediopassive is optional, and so is the retention of the
prepositional phrase (for emphasis), but the reflexive-pronominalization
is obligatory. There is no: *Yo (me) compro un sombrero para mí. As
we have said above, both are obligatory in A = E structures. From:

we may derive, depending which transformations we apply:

(21) Pedro se mató a sí mismo
(21a)Pedro se mató por sí mismo
(21b)Pedro mismo se mató
(21c)Pedro se mató   —-

which all convey the basic meaning that 'Peter killed himself'.

Verbs which are inherently mediopassive, and which have to be so
marked in the lexicon, participate in a restricted range of constructions.
They all require immediate Agentive-raising -- which automatically
blocks passivization, and those which permit an Objective, introduce
it prepositionally, thus doubly blocking passivization. Moreover, the
exponent of the Agentive can never occur as the exponent of some other
case, so there is no source of reflexive-pronominalization. Examples
might be:

(22) El soldado se apoltronó
     'The soldier lost his nerve' (lit: acted like a coward)

(23) Felipe se jactó de su éxito
'Philip boasted of his success.'

The reason these structures cannot yield 'passivized' forms is simply
that they are passive already: we thus correctly predict the deviance
of *su exitó se jactó por Felipe etc.

Suppose now that we have a verb which logically requires human
agency (as the vast majority do) and that it is placed in a structure
with none expressed. The only grammatical surface structure that can
be produced is a passive. From:

we may derive, after passivization, the denotationally-synonymous pair:

(24)   {las naranjas se vendieron
         las naranjas fueron vendidas
         'The oranges were sold.'

Suppose the same verb, which pre-eminently requires human agency, were
to be placed in a structure with not even an Objective. Again, a
grammatical surface form could result via passivization: se vende.
Here is Perlmutter's Pro-subject; it is no such thing. The construction
has no subject either in the deep structure or on the surface. It
means simply, 'there is selling / selling is going on.' Notice that the
conditions already imposed preclude this solution for inherent middles:
such verbs may not be passivized and, deprived of their Agentives, all
derivations block. Notice too, that this interpretation holds good
for Latin: venire 'to come', deprived of an Agentive, may be actualized
as the impersonal passive venitur; proficisci 'to set out', a middle
verb, blocks.

In effect, this analysis shows that Perlmutter's second and third
sources of se are only one -- and one which is different from either
of his. Se is a separable but intrinsic part of the inflection of the
middle paradigm. The odd corollary is that se is never a pronoun, for
unlike the other clitics, me, te, etc, it does not have a double identity
and function as an atonic, non-reflexive, personal pronoun: the third
person equivalent of me in this sense is le.

Consider now sentences (*10) and (*11). The machinery now set up
correctly predicts their deviance, and cannot generate them. They are
ungrammatical because the *se se sequence must mean they have been
twice passivized. We need not have recourse to a SSC to prevent this!

Admittedly, this does not deal with all of Perlmutter's problem sentences, but the others are, I think, of a different order. There is a good deal of disagreement among native speakers as to how many clitics, and which permutations, are acceptable. Some would not accept sentence (19) for instance, and I am certain that one of the sentences which causes Perlmutter most difficulty (*a los generales se les da los honores*, 'Pro gives the honours to the generals') would not be grammatical for any Castilian speaker. Most of the other problems would vanish if we had a global rule allowing only one cycle of third-person pronominalization (it doesn't matter which) when the verb is third-person middle. This would deal with (*13), (*14a) and (*19a). Furthermore, Perlmutter neglects to mention an even more powerful 'sentential pronominalization' which Spanish possesses: the reduction of a repeated clause to just *sí* or *no*, which, though usually optional, I suggest becomes obligatory in such sentences as (*13):

(13a) A mí se me dio el permiso de ausentarme, pero a Pedro no.

Perlmutter is right: the semantic well-formedness of (*13) is beyond doubt, but any Spanish speaker would say (13a).

In summary, we have proved that in at least one case Perlmutter's argument for the *necessity* of SSCs is quite unfounded. The whole notion of SSCs deserves a fresh, and very sceptical, examination.

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