ABSTRACT
        This paper attempts to extract and summarize the
truth-, fact-, and reality-bases of Chaim Perelman's and Mme. L.
Olbrechts-Tyteca's "The New Rhetoric." This paper considers: the four
basic factors which the theorist needs to take into account when
interpreting "The New Rhetoric"; the descriptive characteristics of
the universal audience found scattered throughout "The New Rhetoric"
which serve as a key to the authors' conceptions of the reality
shared by a speaker and his universal audience; and the way in which
the foregoing relate to the authors' direct statements about the
nature of reality. (RB)

PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE NATURE OF REALITY IN THE NEW RHETORIC

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Underlying the work of all rhetorical theorists is a set of phil-
osophical assumptions regarding the nature of fact, truth, and reality.
These assumptions, in turn, determine how the theorist will attempt to
explain the perceptual foundations for man's rhetorical actions. If a
theorist believes, for instance, that fact, truth, and reality are a
matter of individual perception--thus varying in essence from one man's
perception to another's--his view of the rhetorical act will be markedly
different from the theorist who assumes that fact, truth, and reality
are not only knowable but perceptually unitary in nature. Hypothetically,
in the latter's philosophical view, facts could be considered definite and
not open to interpretation; reality could be believed to be experienced
similarly by all; and truth could be accepted as constant and unchanging.

The classical notion of truth, which still claims adherents, stems
from a concurrence between Plato's and Aristotle's teachings 1) that
truth is constant and knowable, and 2) that truth is discoverable through
a dialectic process (Plato),[1] or through a rhetorical process "in order
that no part of the case may escape." (Aristotle)[2] As time has passed,
new philosophical theories of truth have evolved to coincide with the accu-
mulation of knowledge and with the changing realities of the world; and
related philosophical assumptions, which have served as the underpinnings
for all rhetorical theory, have emerged from the same evolutionary crucible,
refined by the same flames.

As a consequence of this fundamental relationship between rhetorical
theory and philosophical assumptions, it would appear reasonable to hypothesize

that significant modifications in rhetorical theory might well serve as indica-

tors of corresponding changes in underlying philosophical assumptions. Within

recent years, a significant modification in rhetorical theory has been

announced by Chaim Perelman and Mme. L. Olbrechts-Tyteca through their "new"

rhetoric. In order to assist subsequent analysis and to gain a fuller

appreciation of the possible ramifications of this "new" rhetoric, this paper

will attempt to extract and summarize the truth-, fact-, and reality-bases

of Perelman's and Olbrechts-Tyteca's The New Rhetoric.[3]

The key to comprehending Perelman's truth-fact-reality assumptions

appears to rest with his concept of universal audience. Truth, fact, and

reality, he asserts, will vary according to what the universal audience

regards as real, true, and objectively valid.[4] To determine Perelman's

philosophical premises, then, it would seem necessary to examine not only

his direct statements about the nature of reality, but also to consider his

ideas about the reality perceptions connecting a speaker and his universal

audience. In the following order, then, this paper will consider: 1) four

basic factors which the theorist needs to take into account when interpreting

The New Rhetoric; 2) descriptive characteristics of the universal audience

found scattered throughout The New Rhetoric which serve as a key to Perelman's

conceptions of the reality shared by a speaker and his universal audience; and

finally, 3) the way in which the foregoing relates to Perelman's direct state-

ments about the nature of reality.

As a starting point, Perelman's basic concept of "audience" extends

far beyond the traditional notions of oratory to also include intrapersonal

as well as interpersonal communication, oral and written communication, and

mass media.[5] However, it is his extension of the "audience" concept to a

"universal audience" which has aroused the greatest curiosity and controversy.

Two assumptions--1) that it is impossible for speakers to retain moral integrity

when adapting their convictions to particular audiences, and 2) that real,

particular audiences are too incompetent to recognize truth--establish the

foundation for Perelman's concept of the universal audience, which he

defines simply as "the whole of mankind, or at least, of all normal, adult

persons."[6] These assumptions appear to be basic premises for the theoretical

construct which Perelman develops.

Secondly, a problem in understanding Perelman's treatment of the

universal audience is that he or his translators alternately refer to

"the universal audience" and then to "a universal audience." The problem

may simply be a matter of translator sensitivity to semantic usage, since in

the French language, the distinction between the "un(e)" and "le/la" articles

differs from the English usage of "a" and "the." Nonetheless, in The New

Rhetoric, frequent use of "the" as a qualifier for "universal audience"

undoubtedly has contributed to attracting criticisms, since the use of "the"

implies to the English-speaking reader that there is a single universal

audience which sets the standard for all speakers and speaking situations.

On the contrary, the concept of universal audience appears to be a highly

individual matter (as will be discussed subsequently); and, while it might

be accurate to use "the" when speaking of Perelman's concept of "the universal

audience," it would seem linguistically inaccurate to speak of "the universal

audience" in relationship to speakers in general, as if there were one single

judgmental group for all mankind.

A third factor the reader needs to recognize is that Perelman's legal

background strongly influences his rhetorical perceptions in three primary ways:

1) how he views the communication situation; 2) how he sees the relationship

between a speaker and his universal audience; and 3) the basic assumptions

he has regarding the nature of truth. As mentioned above, Perelman's concept

of "audience" may extend beyond traditional limitations but, at the same time,

his legal background imposes perceptual constraints on the interactions he

assumes occur between a speaker and his audience. Although The New Rhetoric

is wholly devoid of examples which might illustrate or clarify his points,

Perelman's theory appears to deal solely with the forensic interaction which

might occur between a defendant (or defense attorney) and a jury, or with the

tactics which would be used by a man needing to justify his actions to others.

In addition, the lawyer's perspective is evident in Perelman's discus-

sion of the speaker's options in admitting or rejecting potential members of

a universal audience. Perelman states that a speaker will identify his univer-

sal audience for a specific subject by selecting those "rational beings" who

agree with him on the premises for his argument. While he argues that it may

be the purpose of a speaker "to gain the adherence of every rational being,"[7]

Perelman also recognizes the fact that men tend to dismiss as irrational those

persons who disagree with them:

> Every person believes in a set of facts, of truths, which he
>
> thinks must be accepted by every "normal" person, because they
>
> are valid for every rational being.[8] [emphasis mine]
>
> . . . .
>
> [However,] If argumentation addressed to the universal audience
>
> and calculated to convince does not convince everybody, one can
>
> always resort to disqualifying the recalcitrant by classifying
>
> him as stupid or abnormal.[9] [emphasis Perelman's]

Since Perelman does not subsequently specify the existence of a set of facts
or truths which "are valid for every rational being," there is no indication
that he believes such a universal standard actually exists. A more accurate
interpretation of Perelman's words might be that he believes that each person
assumes a certain set of facts or truths should be valid for all mankind. As
a speaker identifies people who either disagree with his assumptions or their
universal application to all mankind, the speaker has the right--since "the
agreement of a universal audience is thus a matter. . . of right"[10]--to disqualify
those persons whom he views as recalcitrants or dissidents. In essence, this
concept of a speaker's right to exclude dissidents from his conceptual universal
audience is closely related to the legal voir dire, the lawyer's preliminary
examination of a prospective juror or witness to ascertain competence to hear
a case or give testimony. The voir dire provides a screening process to elimi-
nate incompetent or otherwise unqualified persons from serving as jurors. If
Perelman, in fact, conceives a universal audience as being formed in somewhat
the same way as a jury--by observing the same procedures or standards--the
question arises (but is unanswered) as to the extent to which the speaker may
exercise the same assumptions, techniques, and prerogatives as an examining
lawyer in determining who will compose his universal audience.

A final way in which Perelman's legal background influences his rhetorical
perceptions is that he views "truth" as a judge would in a courtroom. He rejects
the Cartesian position that whenever two men come to opposite decisions about
the same matter one of them at least must certainly be in the wrong. While
admitting that such a view may be applicable in mathematical or calculable
matters, he argues that the idea of unicity of truth does not apply to rhetoric
or dialectic since the latter concern only what cannot be decided by calculation,
measuring, or weighing.[11] Thus, Perelman assumes the position that truth may

well be contradictory. The basis for this position, he explains, lies in the

juridical tradition of the Talmud, in which "opposed positions can be equally

reasonable; one of them does not have to be right."[12]

In sum, Perelman's legal background strongly influences his perceptions

of rhetoric. He views the communication situation as, basically, the interac-

tion between a defendant-speaker and a jury-audience; his conception of a

universal audience seems closely related to a lawyer's idea of an "ideal" jury;

and his concept of "truth" is so broad as to include the possibility of

contradiction.

The third, and final, factor which the theorist must take into consi-

deration when reading The New Rhetoric is that, while Perelman makes numerous

distinctions between particular and universal audiences (e.g., a speaker might

prepare different arguments for a universal audience than he might for a parti-

cular one), these distinctions apply only to the speaker's perception of his

audience(s). Perelman assumes that the speaker simultaneously conceives two

audiences--a particular audi ce and a universal audience--and thus, must take

each of the two audiences into consideration when planning his content and lines

of argument. For example, Perelman indicates that the "objects of agreement"

will differ between a speaker and his particular audience and that same speaker

and his universal audience. Those objects of agreement which comprise the "real"

(facts, truths, and presumptions) "are assumed to command the agreement of the

universal audience"; but those objects of agreement constituting the "preferable"

(values, hierarchies and loci) "only command the agreement of particular audi-

ences."[13] Thus, according to this breakdown, Perelman is maintaining that a

speaker and his particular audience need not agree upon what is "real"; but he

is asserting at the same time that it is mandatory for a speaker and his univer-

sal audience to agree upon what is "real."

These particular audience/universal audience distinctions vanish when
a speaker's audiences are perceived by an observer, or critic. According to
Perelman, "each speaker's universal audience can, indeed, from an external view-
point be regarded as a particular audience."[14] To the observer, then, a speaker
might be seen as addressing two particular audiences: particular audience$_1$
(in the speaker's physical presence) and particular audience$_2$ (what the speaker
conceives of as his universal audience).

While it appears valid to distinguish between a speaker's perception
of his audiences and an observer's perception, Perelman has not clearly estab-
lished if his remarks about particular audiences apply equally to the speaker's
perception of his particular audience and to the observer's perceptions of two
particular audiences. Until this point is clarified, it would seem that, in
Perelman's eyes, the critic might not be in a position to judge the facts, truths,
or presumptions of a speaker, since this is a matter of agreement between the
speaker and his universal audience and since the critic might not be able to
conceive the speaker's universal audience with any degree of accuracy.

To summarize, then, the theorist reading The New Rhetoric needs to con-
sider: 1) Perelman's negative attitudes about adjusting ideas to an audience;
2) the semantic difficulty posed by prefacing "universal audience" with the
article "the"; 3) the unique perspective which Perelman maintains throughout
this book as a consequence of his legal background; and 4) the possibility of
inconsistencies in Perelman's distinctions between particular and universal
audiences.

With these factors as givens, then, it is possible to return to Perelman's
point that reality (facts, truths, and presumptions) varies according to the
universal audience. Since his assumptions about the nature of reality seem so

interwoven with his idea of the universal audience, a better understanding of
Perelman's concept of reality may come through a consideration of the charac-
teristics of the universal audience.

To begin with, a thorough reading of The New Rhetoric makes it clear
that, despite Perelman's own definition of universal audience, "all normal
adult persons"[15] do not collectively constitute an enduring, constant, universal
audience. Rather, they make up a pool from which speakers (or message-senders
of all kinds) may selectively draw universal audience members. Perelman does
not suggest, however, that speakers mentally address this entire pool of
humanity. On the contrary, as he discusses audience considerations, he empha-
sizes that the "set" of those a speaker wishes to address "falls far short of
all human beings."[16] He further describes a universal audience as a mental
construction of a speaker, composed of "those whom the speaker wishes to influ-
ence by his argumentation."[17] Since every speaker "constitutes his universal
audience from what he knows of his fellow men" in order "to transcend the few
oppositions he is aware of"; and, since all men are restricted by the human
perceptual processes to a relatively limited understanding of their fellow crea-
tures and their differing points of view, Perelman logically concludes that:
"Each individual, each culture has thus its own conception of the universal
audience."[18]

Essentially, Perelman's universal audience is what he calls an "effective
community of minds," and he has identified a whole set of conditions which must
be met before such a community is conceivable. There must be a common language
(which significantly reduces the "all-ness" contained in his definitions of
"every rational being" and "all normal adult persons").[19] There must be a com-
mon observance of social norms regulating the exchange of communication.[20] The

speaker must desire to address the members of his universal audience and must

value the opportunity to gain their mental cooperation and adherence.[21]   As

broad as these limitations are, they make it clear that Perelman's universal

audience concept does not include "all" of humanity.

On the other hand, the universal audience seems only as confined in

time and space as the speaker wishes. Perelman makes it clear that speakers

do not have to limit their universal audiences to persons within physical, or

even geographical proximity.[22]   Furthermore, the absence of a proximity require-

ment and Perelman's repeated references to the timelessness of arguments

addressed to a universal audience, suggest that a universal audience might

transcend time limitations.[23]

Lack of time and space restrictions, and an emphasis on the speaker's

valuation of the universal audience, however, are not meant to imply that such

conditions set the framework for an elite universal audience. Perelman emphasizes

that the elite audinece--traditionally conceived as the speaker's criterion

since it was "endowed with exceptional and infallible means of knowledge"[24]--must

not be equated with the universal audience. According to Perelman, the elite

audience "embodies the universal audience only for those who acknowledge this

role of vanguard and model. For the rest it will be no more than a particular.

audience. The status of an audience varies with the concepts one has of it."[25]

Those not-necessarily-elite beings who meet a speaker's criteria for

"an effective community of minds" go through a further elimination procedure.

They must agree with the speaker as to what is real. The speaker, as conceiver/

author of a universal audience, has ultimate authority and considerable selec-

tive powers in admitting, or refusing to admit "rational beings" to his univer-

sal audience. As has been mentioned previously, a speaker has the right to

disqualify persons as "not-normal" who disagree with his set of facts, truths,

and presumptions. Since individual speakers conceive reality according to their

own particular philosophical view, Perelman explains that what is considered real

in argumentation "is characterized by a claim to validity vis-a-vis the universal

audience."[26] In other words, a speaker develops certainty about what is real

as it is agreed to by his universal audience.

In sum, each speaker addresses himself to a universal audience which is

selected to coincide with the speaker's own view of reality. At the same time,

"interaction" between the speaker and his universal audience confirms the

speaker's view of reality. Since the resulting universal audience is both a

reflection of the speaker's view of reality and the means by which the speaker

subsequently validates his view of reality, Perelman seems to be saying that

speakers (will? should?) only address themselves to a reality-standard existing

within themselves. In essence, Perelman seems to imply that reality--facts,

truths, and presumptions--exists within the mind of the speaker and, consequently,

that reality will differ from one speaker to another. The conclusion thus

may be drawn that Perelman is operating from the premise that truth is a matter

of subjective reality.

This conclusion appears to be supported by 1) the differences expressed

in The New Rhetoric distinguishing Perelman's theory and Platonic theory, and

2) Perelman's specific statements about the nature of facts, truths, and presump-

tions between a speaker and his universal audience.

In the early pages of The New Rhetoric, Perelman's thinking seems to

reflect considerable Platonic influence. He concurs with Plato that rhetoric

deteriorates when it is adapted wholly to the interests of "the mob"; and he

expresses his bias against rhetorical theory which stresses that--in argumentation--

"the important thing is not knowing what the speaker regards as true or important,

but knowing the views of those he is addressing."[27]

In addition, he clearly accepts the Platonic dichotomy between reality
and appearance. In his discussion of reality in The New Rhetoric, Perelman's
initial distinction between appearance and reality suggests a close relation-
ship to Platonic thought: ". . . while appearance may correspond to and merge
with reality, it may also lead us into error concerning it."[28] Like Plato,
Perelman recommends that we avoid such error by using a mental construction of
reality as "a criterion, a norm which allows us to distinguish those aspects of
[appearance] which are of value [non-deceptive] from those which are not
[deceptive]."[29] To the extent that aspects of appearance do not correspond
to this rule of reality-construction, Perelman (like Plato) calls these aspects
"illusory, erroneous, or apparent (in the depreciatory sense of this word)."[30]

At this point, however, the parallel ends between Perelman's notion of
reality and that of Plato. Perelman utterly rejects Plato's notion of an objec-
tive reality which is constant and knowable. He severs himself from Plato with
the flat statement: ". . . the existence of this objective reality [assumed by
the ancient writers] . . . is not proved."[31]

As Perelman explains it, a mental reality-construct provides a standard
that "can only be potential."[32] Application of the standard does not produce
clear-cut reality-appearance distinctions. Moreover, Perelman continues, since
reality is a mental construct, "knowledge of it is indirect, sometimes even
impossible, and rarely capable of communication in an exhaustive and unquestion-
able manner."[33] While Perelman acknowledges the limitations of his reality-
construct theory, he rejects the contemporary philosophical theories which
argue that appearances are reality, on the grounds that these theories do not
account for the incompatability of appearances.[34]

The solution which Perelman offers to the appearance vs. reality question

is a system of philosophical pairs, of which $\frac{appearance}{reality}$ is one of the pairs,
an inseparable unit in a constant ratio-relationship. The way in which the
terms relate depends on the situation. Perelman explains, for instance, how
this relationship may vary in a single argumentation situation:

> . . . what one person terms appearance is generally what
>
> was reality to someone else, or was confused with reality. . .
>
> Sometimes the argument seems to concern the object under
>
> discussion, sometimes the idea that particular persons formed of
>
> the object, and sometimes the status that particular persons
>
> accorded . . . it for the purpose of argument. These different
>
> planes are intermingled, supporting one another.[35]

In order for an argument to deal with reality, therefore, "the person
who . . . argues, is supposed to know the criteria of reality that his audience
will apply and to act accordingly."[36] Since Perelman's theory assumes that a
speaker and his universal audience will share the same criteria for reality,
it follows that a speaker and his universal audience will view the $\frac{appearance}{reality}$
ratio-relationship in a similar manner.

This paper's conclusion that Perelman's theory is based on a philosophy
of subjective reality is further supported by his statements regarding facts,
truths, and presumptions--the composite elements of reality. According to
Perelman, the existence of facts, truths,[37] and presumptions is confirmed
through validation by the universal audience.

Facts, for Perelman, are objects of precise limited agreement which are
determined by the adherence and agreement of the universal audience.[38] Within
Perelman's system, information accepted as fact by one universal audience may
not be considered fact by another. Thus, Perelman considers facts to be neither

constant nor certain, in and of themselves. Moreover, the status of fact is

retained only as long as there is (universal?) audience acceptance, support,

and adherence.[39]

Perelman refers to truths as "more complex systems [than facts]

relating to connection between facts."[40] Truths are affected by the universal

audience in the same way that facts are.[41] Thus, just as the speaker's notion

of reality is reflected in and validated by his universal audience, the speaker's

conception of facts and truths will similarly be reflected in and validated by

his universal audience. By rejecting those humans from his universal audience

who would dispute his facts or truths as "not-normal," a speaker ensures himself

of an audience who will ag er with his perception of reality.

In discussing presumptions (that which a speaker and his audience take

for granted), Perelman explains that there is an interdependent relationship

between 1) presumptions, 2) a universal audience, and 3) the speaker's concept

of what is "normal and likely." The "normal"--as conceived by the speaker--

serves as the foundation for his reasoning and depends upon a reference group

which, Perelr : admits, is often a social group.[42] What the speaker perceives

as normal or likely must be similarly perceived by his universal audience, and

this sharing of perceptions forms the basis for their common presumptions.[43]

Thus, Perelman indirectly introduces one more characteristic of the universal

audience: members of a universal audience, in order to agree upon presumptions

with a speaker, will be members of the same reference group. Once agreement has

been reached between a speaker and his universal audience regarding presumptions

of the normal, "presumed facts are treated as equivalent to observed facts and

can serve, with equal authority, as a premise for argument."[44] If a speaker and

members of his universal audience cannot agree on what is "normal and likely," .

there will be no basis for argument.

To summarize, the basis for Perelman's philosophical assumptions rests
with his chameleon-concept of universal audience. The universal audience may
take as many forms as reasonable man can conceive, and each form inherently will
possess its own set of criteria for determining truth. At any given moment, a
speaker's universal audience will be constructed from rational beings who:
1) speak his native language; 2) observe and share the speaker s norms governing
communication exchanges; 3) are valued as intellectual colleagues by the
speaker; 4) need not be physically proximate to the speaker or to each other;.
5) may transcend time; 6) need not compose an elite audience; 7) share the
speaker's philosophical view in determining the validity of facts, truths, and
presumptions (reality); 8) share the speaker's view of the ratio-relationship
between a given reality and appearance; and 9) are members of one or more of the
speaker's reference groups. Perelman views the universal audience as the
criterion for each individual speaker but, at the same time, he argues that
agreement of the universal audience is a speaker's right. Since each speaker
has the right to exclude those dissidents from his universal audience who disagree
with his notion of reality and normality, it follows that a universal audience
is conceived in terms of a speaker's individual perception of reality. In
essence, then, the universal audience both reflects and validates the speaker's
concept of reality. Finally, since Perelman recognizes that each speaker may
have a different philosophical view, he allows for the fact that reality will
differ according to each speaker and each speaking situation. Thus, Perelman
assumes that reality has no objective existence, but is dependent upon indivi-
dual perception.

Although Perelman insists upon preliminary agreement of a speaker
and his universal audience regarding reality, he recognizes the problems of
accurately communicating about a subjective reality. Perelman explairs that
once a speaker has begun to communicate his reality to others, there is no
guarantee that the reality he expresses is one which his universal audience
will recognize. As soon as the speaker begins to talk, the reality in his mind
is modified both by his modality of expression[45] and by the lines of argument
he uses.[46] Perelman concludes: ". . . in discourse considered as reality, the
meaning attributed to the connection of the argument, to what justified the
'therefore,' will vary according to what the speaker says, and also according
to the hearer's opinion on the subject."[47] Reality, then, according to Perel-
man, is only what each of us make of it. Its subjective existence is threatened
by distortion each time a speaker attempts to communicate his reality to others.

Surely there will be many who will argue against such an ephemeral
concept of reality. Yet, these fact-truth-presumption assumptions which Perel-
man makes are a significant new effort in rhetorical theory to bridge the gaps
between ancient Platonic idealism, judicial practice, and twentieth-century
social science concepts of reality. Perelman has drawn from Plato a respect
for seeking truth: the concept of a universal audience attempts to impose on
each speaker the highest standards for truth he is capable of achieving. On
the other hand, Perelman's thinking clearly reflects contemporary trends in the
social sciences: differences in individual cognitive systems, differences in
background/environment/culture, and differences across time account for and
justify different speaker perceptions of facts, truths, and presumptions.
Finally, Perelman's legal background allows him to incorporate into rhetorical

theory the concept that truth may be relative and even contradictory. Perelman's

claim to producing a "new rhetoric" may be open to dispute in other respects,

but it would appear that in his philosophical assumptions about the nature of

reality, he has applied to rhetoric a combination of twentieth-century science

and age-old philosophy to produce some of the most provocative thinking of

the decade.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Plato, "The Method of Dialectic," Phaedrus, trans. and comm. R. Hack-forth (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1952), pp. 131-137, 264 E - 266 B.

[2]Aristotle, The Rhetoric, trans. Lane Cooper (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1932), 1.1.

[3]Chaim Perelman and Mme. L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969). In the interests of simplicity--not sexism--these co-authors hereafter will be referred to as "Perelman."

[4]Ibid., p. 33.

[5]Ibid., pp. 6-7.

[6]Ibid., pp. 20-21, 23, 25, 30.

[7]Ibid., p. 28.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Ibid., p. 33.

[10]Ibid., p. 31.

[11]Chaim Perelman, "The New Rhetoric: A Theory of Practical Reasoning," trans. E. Griffin-Collart and O. Bird, Great Ideas Today--1970 (Great Books of the Western World), pp. 284-285.

[12]Ibid., p. 284.

[13]Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, p. 179.

[14]Ibid., p. 30.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Ibid., p. 15.

[17]Ibid., p. 19.

[18]Ibid., p. 33.

[19]Ibid., pp. 28, 30.

[20]Ibid., p. 15.

[21]Ibid., pp. 14-16.

[22]Ibid., pp. 19, 20, 26, 491.

[23]Ibid., pp. 7, 19, 26, 32, 491.

[24]Ibid., p. 33.

[25]Ibid., p. 34.

[26]Ibid., p. 66.

[27]Ibid., pp. 23-24.

[28]Ibid., p. 416.

[29]Ibid.

[30]Ibid.

[31] Ibid., p. 452.

[32] Ibid., p. 417.

[33] Ibid., p. 418.

[34] Ibid., pp. 418-419.

[35] Ibid., p. 424.

[36] Ibid., p. 458.

[37] Perelman elects to discuss "truths," rather than "truth."

[38] Ibid., pp. 68-69.

[39] Ibid., pp. 67-68.

[40] Ibid., p. 69.

[41] Ibid., p. 68.

[42] Ibid., p. 72.

[43] Ibid., pp. 71-72.

[44] Ibid., pp. 73-74.

[45] Ibid., p. 154.

[46] Ibid., pp. 262-263.

[47] Ibid., p. 263.