

DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 090 690

80

EA 006 142

AUTHOR Mazzoni, Tim L., Jr.
 TITLE State Policy Making for the Public Schools of Minnesota.
 INSTITUTION Ohio State Univ., Columbus. Coll. of Education.
 SPONS AGENCY Office of Education (DHEW), Washington, D.C.; Ohio State Univ., Columbus. Educational Governance Project.
 PUB DATE Apr 74
 GRANT OEG-0-73-0499
 NOTE 218p.; Related documents are ED 085 888 & 889, ED 085 916, EA 005 798 & 799, EA 005 833 & 834, EA 005 875 & 876, and EA 005 898 & 899

EDRS PRICE MF-\$0.75 HC-\$10.20 PLUS POSTAGE
 DESCRIPTORS *Decision Making; Education; Educational Finance; Educational Research; Elementary Education; *Policy Formation; Political Attitudes; *Political Influences; Politics; *Power Structure; School Integration; Secondary Education; State Boards of Education; *State Government; State Legislation; Teacher Certification

IDENTIFIERS Elementary Secondary Education Act Title V; ESEA Title V; *Minnesota; Tax Reform

ABSTRACT

One of twelve case studies growing out of the Educational Governance Project, this report contains a description and an analysis of the process through which Minnesota State government establishes policy for its public elementary and secondary schools. This process is affected by many factors, such as the availability of fiscal and human resources, demands arising from population changes, and the power of individuals and groups who represent private interests. Lack of time and money prevented an indepth study of all these factors and necessitated the focus on the role and impact of the various actors -- official and unofficial -- who became involved at the State level in setting public school policy. Some data resulted from an investigation of the way in which three recent education decisions were determined. Additional data were derived from studies of the perceptions held by a cross section of participants of the influence relationships characterizing the operation of the State education policy system. (Author/JF)

ED 090690

U S DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
EDUCATION

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRO-
DUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM
THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGIN-
ATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS
STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRE-
SENT OFFICIAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY.

STATE POLICY MAKING FOR THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF MINNESOTA

Tim L. Mazzoni, Jr.

Field interviews for this study were conducted
by Frank DePalma, Anthony Warren,
and Joseph Imberman

EA 006 142

Prepared for
The Educational Governance Project
The Ohio State University
29 West Woodruff Avenue
Columbus, Ohio 43210

This report is one of twelve case studies growing out of the Educational Governance Project. In addition, two major reports, a comparative analysis across states and an explication of alternative models of state governance of education, are in preparation. The Governance Project began in January, 1972 and is to be completed in August, 1974. The work was funded by the U. S. Office of Education under Title V (Section 505) of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (OEG-0-73-0499). The Policy Board for the Project was composed of three chief state school officers: Martin W. Essex of Ohio, Jack P. Nix of Georgia, and Ewald B. Nyquist of New York, with the State of Ohio serving as fiscal agent. An Advisory Committee composed of eleven persons concerned with general and educational governance also served the project. Contract for the work was let to the College of Education, The Ohio State University and Roald F. Campbell and Tim L. Mazzone, Jr. were the directors.

The activity which is the subject of this report was supported in whole or in part by the U. S. Office of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. However, the opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the U. S. Office of Education, and no official endorsement by the U. S. Office of Education should be inferred.

April, 1974

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION I - SOCIOECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

Introduction	1
Socioeconomic Development	2
Political Culture	18
Governmental Institutions	26

SECTION II - THREE EDUCATION POLICY DECISIONS

Introduction	42
Omnibus Tax Act (1971)	43
Desegregation Regulations (1973)	77
Teacher Standards and Certification Commission (1973)	105
Three Education Policy Issues - Some Comparisons	120

SECTION III - POLICY-MAKING RELATIONSHIPS

Introduction	126
Fragmentation of the Education Lobby	127
Emergence of "Teacher Power"	135
Cross-Pressures on the State Department	140
Policy Determination in the State Board Arena	150
Central Role of the Governor	163
Growing Assertiveness of the Legislature	173

SECTION IV - CONCLUSIONS AND INTERPRETATION

Introduction	187
Transformation	187
Pluralism	189
Politicalization	192
Progressivism	193

FOOTNOTES	195
---------------------	-----

APPENDIX A	212
----------------------	-----

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Population Trends in Minnesota, the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area, and "Outstate" Minnesota (1940-1970)	4
2. Black and Indian Populations in Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Minnesota (1960-1970)	6
3. Civilian Income Sources for Minnesota and the United States (1971)	9
4. Educational Attainment of Minnesotans Compared with the United State Population (1970)	10
5. Minnesota's Ranking on Selected Socioeconomic Dimensions (1890-1960)	11
6. Employment in the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area Compared with the Rest of the State (1971)	12
7. Selected Population, Income, and Educational Characteristics for Minnesota and the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area (1970)	13
8. Availability of Fiscal Resources for a Representative Selection of Minnesota School Districts (1970-1972)	16
9. Minnesota Compared with the Median State in the United States on Selected Expenditure Measures (1970-1971)	20
10. Minnesota State Department of Education Upper-Level Administrators Composite Profile (N=14)	41
11. Minnesota's Pre-1971 School Finance System Compared with Other States on Selected Dimensions	44
12. Comparison of Foundation Aid and Median Maintenance Costs in Minnesota High School Districts (1963-1971)	46
13. Selected Data on High and Low Expenditure Minnesota High School Districts (1970-1971)	48
14. Property Tax in Minnesota Compared with United States Average (1970-1971)	51
15. Comparison on Selected Variables Among the Major School Finance Bills in the Regular 1971 Legislative Session	61
16. Comparison on Selected Variables Among the Pre-1971 State School Aid Program, the Governor's Original Bill, and the Omnibus Tax Act	70

17.	Minneapolis and St. Paul Compared on Different Measures of School Desegregation with the Average (Median) of Ninety-One City School Districts Outside the South	79
18.	School Expenditures and Social Class Versus Student Achievement in Six Duluth Elementary Schools (1971)	94
19.	Participants in Three Education Policy Decisions	125
20.	Educational Interest Group Unity as Perceived by Legislative Leaders and Education Lobbyists.	132
21.	Issues that Divide Educational Interest Groups as Identified by Legislative Leaders and Education Lobbyists . . .	133
22.	Influence Resources of Educational Interest Groups as Perceived by Legislative Leaders	138
23.	Relative Lobbying Influence of Educational Interest Groups as Perceived by Legislative Leaders.	140
24.	Points of Contact Between the Department of Education and the Legislature as Perceived by Legislative Leaders.	144
25.	Enactment of State Department Proposals as Perceived by Legislative Leaders	145
26.	Legislator Satisfaction with State Department Information . . .	146
27.	Policy Role Expectations for the Commissioner of Education and State Department held by Legislative Leaders and Top State Department Administrators.	149
28.	Perceptions of Informal Influence in the Selection of State Board Members.	151
29.	Interest Group Context for State Board Policy Making as Perceived by Board Members	154
30.	State Board Member Assessment of State Department Information	155
31.	Policy Role Expectations for the Office of Commissioner of Education Held by its Incumbent and by Members of the State Board of Education	157
32.	Legislator Perceptions of the Influence of the State Board on Education Legislation	162
33.	Perceptions of the Importance of the Commissioner of Education as a Source of Advice and Ideas for the Governor	171

Table	Page
34. Attitudes of Legislative Leaders, Education Lobbyists, and State Board Members Toward "Accountability" and Public School Change	175
35. Sources Cited by Legislative Leaders as Providing Useful Public School Information" to their Office or Committee.	178
36. Source of Public School Information Cited by Legislative Leaders as being "Personally" the Most Useful One to Them	179
37. Legislators' Assessment of the "Greatest Obstacle" They Encounter in Legislating for the Public Schools	180
38. Legislator and State Board Member Attitudes Toward the Education Policy Role of the Legislature and the Policy-Making Efficacy of Their Respective Roles	181
39. Conflicts on School Finance Issue Perceived as Being of "Great Importance" by Legislative Leaders	185

SECTION I

SOCIOECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

Introduction

This report contains a description and an analysis of the process through which Minnesota state government establishes policy for its public elementary and secondary schools. We have assumed that this process is affected by many factors, including the demands arising from population changes; the availability of fiscal and human resources; the traditions of the political system and its institutional arrangements; the power of individuals and groups who represent private interests; the preferences of government officials; and the structures of influence that develop among decision makers.¹

The time and money available for the research prevented an in-depth study of all such factors. The focus, instead, is on the role and impact of the various actors, official and unofficial, who become involved at the state level in setting public school policy. Our data came from investigating the way in which three recent education decisions were determined (Section II) and from obtaining the perceptions that a cross-section of participants have of the influence relationships characterizing the operation of the state education policy system (Section III).

Policy actors and their relationships, then, are the primary concerns of this study. Yet policy making cannot be understood apart from the setting in which it occurs. A brief treatment, therefore, of the socio-economic, political, and institutional context is set forth in this section. To give added meaning, comparative data are utilized, and the implications for educational governance of general trends or conditions are discussed. We hope that this description, incomplete though it is, will set the stage

for the examination of issues and relationships that are presented in the remaining sections of the report.

Socioeconomic Development

Situated at the very apex of the Mississippi Valley (the "Star of the North" is the state motto), Minnesota contains over 84,000 square miles, stretching north to south from the prairie plains of the Dakotas to a lake (Lake Superior) and rivers (St. Louis, St. Croix, and Mississippi) boundary. The physical terrain of Minnesota is striking in its diversity and natural beauty. While the features of this terrain have been delineated by many scholars, Blegen touches upon the most prominent in a few vivid passages. He writes,

Minnesotans, if asked to point out characteristic features of the state's geography, might speak first of its thousands of lakes with special mention of Red Lake, Mille Lacs, Leech, Vermilion, and picturesque Minnetonka. They might also include the international Lake of the Woods and express their joint pride with Canada, Wisconsin, and Michigan in majestic Lake Superior. They would give special attention to the state's rivers and the picturesque valleys of the St. Croix and the Minnesota. They would point to the iron country of the northeast--the Vermilion, Mesabi, and Cuyuna ranges--and the beauty of the north shore and Arrowhead region.

Many dancing waterfalls would claim affectionate attention, especially the storied Minnehaha Falls, which still 'flash and gleam among the oak trees, laugh and leap into the valley'. Minnesotans would speak of the valleys and hills of the unglaciated southeast, and of that widening of the Mississippi known as Lake Pepin, with its legend-encrusted hills and rocks. They might invite a look to the Southwest at the pipestone quarries with their Indian traditions of tobacco and peace. And they would not forget the state's far-stretching and fertile acres, its north country of primitive beauty, its summer days, its snow-mantled earth in the deep of winter.²

Some governmental services are decisively shaped by the physical geography of Minnesota, but its human resources are of more central concern to an education policy maker.

Population Characteristics and Trends

The social environment of a state confronts its lawmakers with diverse needs and pressures, those rooted in demography being among the most fundamental. Population trends--for instance, changes in size, growth rate, spatial distribution, and composition--give rise to important policy questions. For this reason, some demographic facts about Minnesota, with particular reference to school enrollments, are a necessary prelude to a consideration of educational issues and their resolution by state government.

Minnesota had nearly four million residents (3,804,971) in 1970, a total that ranked it 19th among the states. Although this number represented an addition of 391,107 since 1960, the rate of growth during this period (11.5 per cent) lagged somewhat behind the national rate (13.3 per cent). Partly this is because Minnesota, on balance, is a population exporter to other states. Its migration rate during the 1960s has been computed at a slightly negative figure (-.7), signifying net out-migration from the state.³

Population growth in Minnesota has been unequally distributed throughout the state. As in the United States generally, there has been a pronounced rural to urban shift, an exodus that has left diminishing population in many Minnesota counties. Urban places had 54.5 per cent (1,651,844 people) of the state's inhabitants in 1950. After twenty years, this population had risen to 2,526,560 and constituted two-thirds of the total.⁴ The growth in urban Minnesota has occurred primarily within the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area, a seven-county region having Minneapolis, St. Paul, and their suburbs as its focus. As can be seen in Table 1, nearly one-half of the state's population are now residing in this area and its increase has far outpaced the statewide average.

TABLE I
POPULATION TRENDS IN MINNESOTA,
THE TWIN CITIES METROPOLITAN AREA, AND
"OUTSTATE" MINNESOTA
(1940-1970)

Unit	1940	1950	1960	1970	Amount of Change 1940-1970
Minnesota	2,792,300	2,982,483	3,413,864	3,804,971	+1,012,671 (36 per cent)
Twin Cities Metropolitan Area	1,000,558	1,185,694	1,525,297	1,813,647	+ 813,089 (81 per cent)
"Outstate" Minnesota	1,791,742	1,796,789	1,888,567	1,991,324	+ 199,582 (11 per cent)

SOURCES: Bureau of Field Studies and Surveys, Education 1967 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1967), p. 157; and U. S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population 1970 General Social and Economic Characteristics, Final Report PC (1) - C 1 United States Summary (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 468-469

Growth within the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area has been very uneven as the population has surged beyond the boundaries of the central cities and out into the surrounding suburbs. This decentralizing process has meant not only a shrinking proportion of metropolitan residents living in Minneapolis and St. Paul, but also an absolute decline in the number of central city inhabitants. The population drop in Minneapolis has been quite severe, going from 482,872 in 1960 to 434,408 by the end of the decade. (Only six of America's 50 largest cities declined at a more rapid pace.) The population of St. Paul has been more stable. In 1970, it was 310,004, a reduction over ten years of only one per cent. In the meantime, the outlying metropolitan area swelled to over one million people, an increase of 47 per cent during the 1960-1970 decade.⁵ While some of the residential communities immediately adjacent to Minneapolis and St. Paul have ceased growing,

the population "boom" continues unabated in the outer rings of suburban development.

There are other metropolitan centers in Minnesota. In fact, three of these currently satisfy the Census Bureau's technical definition of a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA). The most recent to meet this criterion was the Rochester area which by 1970 had 84,104 people. The other two SMSAs each involve Minnesota with a neighboring state: (1) Fargo (North Dakota)-Moorhead (Minnesota) having 120,238 residents; (2) Duluth (Minnesota)-Superior (Wisconsin) having 265,350 residents.⁶ Yet, as is clear by these figures, none of the other metropolitan areas has a population at all comparable in size to that found in the Twin Cities region.

Metropolitanization involves more than just numbers of people. It also results in a clustering together of individuals, neighborhoods, and communities with similar characteristics. Particularly significant in this respect is ethnicity, a factor that for more than a century shaped Minnesota history. At the beginning of the twentieth century, immigrants and their offspring represented two-thirds of the state's population, with those of German, Norwegian, and Swedish origin being by far the most numerous.⁷ Over the years the proportion of Minnesota citizens of foreign stock has gone down steadily. By 1970, less than 20 per cent of state residents were either foreign born (2.6 per cent) or of foreign or mixed parentage (16 per cent). In the Twin Cities the percentages were considerably larger, being 23.9 in Minneapolis (Swedes and Norwegians have long set the ethnic flavor for this city) and 21.8 in St. Paul (Germans and Irish, as well as Scandinavians, were the important early immigrants). On the other hand, foreign stock residents amounted to some 14 per cent of the population in the metropolitan

area outside of the Twin Cities.⁸

The most significant demographic contrast, however, between the central cities and their suburbs does not have to do with foreign stock, but with race. Blacks constituted 4.4 per cent of city residents in Minneapolis in 1970 and 3.5 per cent in St. Paul. These numbers are quite small relative to other big cities, yet they loom large when compared with the proportion of blacks in the Twin City suburbs, a minuscule two-tenths (.2) of one per cent.⁹ As for American Indians, they make up just over one per cent of the Minneapolis and St. Paul populations, but are virtually not found at all in the remainder of the metropolitan area. In Table 2 are data on the black and Indian communities in Minnesota. The rapid growth in the cities of these minority communities is to be noted.

TABLE 2
BLACK AND INDIAN POPULATIONS
IN MINNEAPOLIS, ST. PAUL, AND MINNESOTA
(1960-1970)

	Indian		Black	
	1960	1970	1960	1970
Minneapolis	2,077	5,829	11,785	19,005
St. Paul	524	1,906	8,240	10,930
Minnesota	15,496	23,128	22,263	34,868

SOURCE: League of Women Voters of Minnesota, Indians in Minnesota (St. Paul: League of Women Voters, 1971), p. 149.

As is suggested by the data in Table 2, the overwhelming majority of black Minnesotans are urban dwellers. Most Indians, though, live on or near to seven Chippewa reservations in the northern part of the state, and in four very small Sioux settlements in the south.¹⁰

Basic population trends have obvious implications for the schooling needs of a state. In the fall of 1971, there was a resident enrollment of

908,433 in Minnesota's 438 school districts. In the rural regions, these districts tended to have small enrollments (the median district for the state had only 650 pupils) and to extend over many miles (rural districts generally had less than six pupils per square mile).¹¹ In contrast, approximately 47 per cent of the public school enrollment (429,749 pupils) were concentrated in the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area, which had less than four per cent of the state's land area.¹² This 1971 enrollment figure compares with the 36 per cent and the 44 per cent that were in schools in this metropolitan area in 1956-57 and in 1965-66, respectively.¹³

Within the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area, the Minneapolis school district had 65,201 pupils in the fall of 1971; the St. Paul district had 49,621.¹⁴ The remaining student population was distributed throughout the some 47 school districts in the region, many of which have had to accommodate mushrooming enrollments during the past few years. It should be noted that, because of the competition of non-public schools and a relatively low density of school-age children, the Twin Cities had only some 27 per cent of the public school enrollment in the metropolitan area, but they had 41 per cent of its total population. Conversely, minority-group students are disproportionately represented in city schools. Nearly 10 per cent of the Minneapolis enrollment in the fall of 1971 consisted of black students; the corresponding percentage was 6.5 for St. Paul.¹⁵

To summarize, rural school districts in Minnesota typically have enrollments that are small, scattered, and shrinking. The two big city districts--Minneapolis and St. Paul--have enrollments that are large and concentrated, but these also are declining in size, though the number of their minority-group students has steadily risen. Rapid growth in enrollments is a phenomenon found almost exclusively in the outlying suburbs of the

Twin Cities Metropolitan Area. As for the future, a report prepared by the Bureau of Field Studies and Surveys (University of Minnesota) contains projection data, based on annual birth rates as well as demographic trends, that indicate student populations (K-12) will drop substantially in nearly all parts of the state during the 1970-1980 decade.¹⁶ While this is predicted to be most severe in the rural regions of Minnesota (a reduction of over 20 per cent is projected), even the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area is expected to reach its enrollment peak in the mid-1970s and then gradually decline.¹⁷

Socioeconomic Resources

The capacity of a state government to meet schooling needs has as a critical element its access to fiscal and human resources. Their availability is usually a relevant consideration--sometimes the dominant one--when major educational issues are being decided. Although there is much leeway for other factors to exert influence, especially on non-fiscal education policy, the resource capability of a state government does establish some basic parameters. Moreover, the distribution of economic resources has always been the source of the central political questions of "who pays?" and "who benefits?"--questions that currently are most acute in the area of school finance. It is important, therefore, to see first how Minnesota compares with the national average in socioeconomic resources, and then how these resources are distributed within the state.

In the nineteenth century, the livelihood of Minnesotans depended almost entirely on its farms, forests, and mines. But, as in most of America, this economy gave way over time to the twin forces of urbanization and industrialization. Prior to the turn of the century over 50 per cent of the work force were engaged in agriculture. By 1940, this had declined to

30 per cent and today the figure is closer to 8 per cent.¹⁸ Meanwhile, manufacturing, trade, service, and government have come to supply Minnesotans with the bulk of their income. In Table 3 are presented the major income sources for 1971.

TABLE 3
CIVILIAN INCOME SOURCES FOR MINNESOTA AND THE UNITED STATES (1971)

Income Sources	United States (Per Cent of Total)	Minnesota (Per Cent of Total)
Farms	3.2	6.3
Mining	1.0	1.3
Construction	6.4	7.0
Manufacturing	27.5	24.0
Trade	17.1	18.8
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate	5.5	5.2
Trans., Comm., and Utilities	7.4	7.5
Service	15.8	15.0
Government	15.8	14.7
Other	.3	.2

SOURCE: Tax Study Commission, Staff Progress Report: A Collection of Staff Work Papers (St. Paul: Minnesota Tax Study Commission, January, 1973), p. 15.

Inspection of this table discloses that Minnesota was quite similar in 1971 to the nation as a whole in respect to most sources of earning, though manufacturing remained behind (24 per cent to 27.5 per cent); and agriculture, despite losing its former prominence, continued to be twice as important to Minnesotans (6.3 per cent to 3.2 per cent) as an income-producer than it was for the average American. It should be added, in this connection, that much of the manufacturing total was closely geared to farm products--Minneapolis, for example, developed as a milling center, and headquarters for General Mills, Pillsbury, and Cream of Wheat are located there. Moreover, the gross value of farm receipts for Minnesota in 1970 exceeded two billion dollars, ranking it fifth among the states.¹⁹ Finally, it is important to mention that Minnesota is the trade capital for the Upper

Midwest.

Significant as the economic transformation has been to the work patterns and earnings of Minnesotans, it has not moved the state to the forefront in terms of wealth. Relatively speaking, Minnesota is neither a rich nor is it a poor state. Per capita income was \$3,824 in 1970, some \$97 below the average for all states. As for the ability to raise public revenues, the statistic computed for Minnesota was \$395 per capita, almost identical to that for the nation as a whole.²⁰ In short, the fiscal wealth of Minnesota is accurately described by the adjective "average" when seen in relation to the other states.

TABLE 4

EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF
MINNESOTANS COMPARED WITH THE UNITED
STATES POPULATION (1970)

	Minnesota		United States
	Amount or Percentage	Ranking Among States	Average Amount or Percentage
Population (25 Years or Older) Less Than Five Years of Schooling	2.4%	9 (tie)	5.5%
Population (25 Years or Older) Four Years of High School or More	57.6%	17 (tie)	52.3%
Population (25 Years or Older) Four Years of College or More	11.1%	20	10.7%
Median Years of Schooling (25 Years or Older)	12.2 yrs.	15 (tie)	12.1 yrs.
Draftees Failing Mental Requirement for Military Service	2.1%	6 (tie)	7.8%

SOURCE: National Education Association, Rankings of the States, 1973, (Washington, D.C.: NEA, 1973), pp. 30-32.

When it comes to educational resources, the picture for Minnesota is brighter, a fact of increasing importance in an economy in which the growth sectors pivot on the skills of the labor force. Table 4 contains statistical information on five measures of educational attainment. On all of them, Minnesotans are above average and on two--the population having less than five years of schooling and the draftees failing selective service mental tests--the very small percentages for Minnesota rank it among the leading states.

To this point, current measures have been used as indicators of Minnesota's fiscal and human resources. A longitudinal perspective on the socioeconomic development of a state is found in Hofferbert's work.²¹ His application of factor analytic techniques to quantitative data produced two relatively stable dimensions--"Industrialization" and "Affluence." Hofferbert interprets the first dimension as indicative of "patterns of economic and occupational activity" and the second as representing the "characteristics of modern, affluent culture." Minnesota's rankings on these dimensions from 1890 to 1960 are set forth in Table 5.

TABLE 5
MINNESOTA'S RANKING
ON SELECTED SOCIOECONOMIC DIMENSIONS
(1890-1960)

	1890	1900	1910	1920	1930	1940	1950	1960
"Industrialization"	23	25	28	30	26	30	25	21
"Affluence"	11	16	8	8	8	13	17	17

SOURCE: Richard Hofferbert, "Socioeconomic Dimensions of the American States", Richard Hofferbert and Ira Sharkansky (eds.), State and Urban Politics (Boston: Little Brown, 1971), pp. 456 and 458.

The figures in this table suggest that Minnesota's relative position as an industrialized state actually declined until the 1940s, then improved substantially. Minnesota's rank on "Affluence", though always nearer the top than its rank on "Industrialization", was not as high in 1960, compared with other states, as it was decades ago.

Turning from a state-level description of socioeconomic resources to a consideration of their distribution within Minnesota, it first should be pointed out that the concentration of population in the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area has been more than matched by a concentration of economic activity. In 1960, for example, this area had 47.6 per cent of total state employment. By 1971, this had increased to 52.1 per cent.²² A breakdown of this total for the various economic sectors is reported in Table 6.

TABLE 6

EMPLOYMENT IN THE TWIN CITIES METROPOLITAN
AREA COMPARED WITH THE REST OF THE STATE (1971)

Economic Sectors	Employment in the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area as a Percentage of the State Total
Construction	57
Manufacturing	63
Transportation	74
Communications	58
Trade	60
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate	74
Services	63
Government	46
Other Non-Agricultural	39
Total Employment	52

SOURCE: Tax Study Commission, Staff Progress Report: A Collection of Staff Work Papers (St. Paul: Minnesota Tax Study Commission, January, 1973), p. 7.

Just as employment opportunities have gravitated to the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area, so have socioeconomic resources. Table 7 presents 1970 census figures on family income and educational attainment. These reveal significant disparities between the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area and the

state as a whole. More specifically, the metropolitan center was disproportionately endowed with such resources as well-to-do and highly educated citizens compared with the statewide average, and it had much less poverty with which to contend.

TABLE 7
SELECTED POPULATION, INCOME AND
EDUCATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS FOR MINNESOTA
AND THE TWIN CITIES METROPOLITAN AREA (1970)

	Minnesota (1)	Metropolitan Area (2)	Twin Cities Metropolitan Area		
			Minneapolis (3)	St. Paul (4)	Outside Central Cities (5)
Population	3,804,971	1,813,647	434,408	310,004	1,069,235
Income					
Median Family	9,931	11,682	9,960	10,544	12,712
Less than Poverty Level	8.2%	4.6%	7.2%	6.4%	3.1%
\$15,000 or More	20.3%	28.6%	20.6%	22.2%	33.7%
Education					
Median School Years	12.2 yrs	12.4 yrs	12.2 yrs	12.2 yrs	12.7 yrs
Completion of High School (or More)	57.6%	66.1%	58.0%	57.2%	72%

SOURCE: U. S. Bureau of Census, Census of Population, 1970 General Social and Economic Characteristics, Final Report PC (1) - CI United States Summary (Washington, D. C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 468, 469, 550, 553, 563, 564, 568, 569. The information in column 5 was not given directly in the above source, but was estimated from the other data.

But the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area, itself, is stratified along racial and economic lines. The concentration of minority groups in Minneapolis and St. Paul has already been pointed out. Even though this is the most striking central city-suburb contrast, and perhaps the most crucial, other manifestations of social stratification are to be read in Table 7. On each measure the differential is marked, and on every one of them both Minneapolis

and St. Paul were below the rest of the metropolitan area considered as an aggregate. It must be emphasized, however, that these cities continue to be the business and financial hub of the region (commercial and industrial property make up some 40 per cent of their total property base), notwithstanding the dispersal of such economic activities as manufacturing and retail sales into the suburbs.²³

The quantity and distribution of Minnesota's socioeconomic resources have obvious bearing on the capacity of its schools to provide services to their clients. Minnesotans, to repeat, are not wealthy in comparison with residents of other states. Indeed, when the magnitude of their educational task, as indicated by the proportion of school-age children in the population, is also taken into account, the fiscal ability of Minnesotans to support elementary and secondary schools is actually below the national average. Personal income per pupil in average daily attendance was \$17,893 for Minnesota in 1971; that for the United States as a whole was \$20,208. Since Minnesota ranked ninth among the states in per pupil revenue receipts for local schools (its figure of \$1,301 in 1971-1972 was some \$160 above the national average), it is evident that state residents have been willing to make an extraordinary tax effort to generate school revenues. It comes as no surprise, then, that only two states ranked ahead of Minnesota in 1971-1972 in terms of the size of their revenue receipts for public schools as a percentage of personal income. The per cent for Minnesota was 7.3 as against the United States average of 5.6.²⁴ (Minnesota's traditionally high aspirations for public service are discussed in the next section.)

Table 8 contains information on the local fiscal resources available in 1970 and 1971 for elementary and secondary education in a representative selection of Minnesota school districts.²⁵ These districts were located

In five types of communities: (1) Minneapolis and St. Paul, (2) suburbs in the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area, (3) central cities in the three other metropolitan areas, (4) small cities outside the metropolitan areas, and (5) rural towns and villages. The first point to be made from examining these data is that there was pronounced variation among the representative districts on all the measures, variations that were found even among districts of the same community type. On the wealth measures, for instance, the rural district of New York Mills had only \$4,179 per pupil in property value and \$3,796 per pupil income as opposed to rural Springfield's \$18,367 and \$9,010, respectively. The upper-middle class suburb of Edina had nearly \$17,000 in property value per pupil, but the blue collar suburb of Spring Lake Park had less than one-half that amount. And a similar differential between these two suburbs existed on per pupil income, \$13,008 for Edina versus \$5,715 for Spring Lake Park.

Despite the large differences among school districts of the same community type, some generalizations are possible. The figures on wealth indicate that the poorest districts were in Minnesota's rural areas, though many of its districts did contain high-value farm lands. None of the rural districts described in Table 8, with the exception of Springfield, came close to the statewide average on the income measure. The wealthiest districts were those in Minneapolis and St. Paul. This finding appears to be inconsistent with data in previous tables until it is recalled that the big cities, relatively speaking, have very low student densities coupled with a high concentration of commercial and industrial property.²⁶ Income and property figures for the smaller cities were fairly close to statewide averages, though Rochester was quite affluent.

TABLE 8

AVAILABILITY OF FISCAL RESOURCES FOR A REPRESENTATIVE
SELECTION OF MINNESOTA SCHOOL DISTRICTS (1970-1972)

School District by Type (1972 Enrollment Shown in Parenthesis)	"Wealth"		"Municipal Overburden"	"Educational Overburden"
	True (EARC) Property Value per Weighted ADA in 1970	Adjusted Gross Income per Weighted ADA in 1970-71	Non-School Tax Rate (Payable in 1972) in EARC Mills	AFDC-Recipient Enrollment as Percentage of Total District Enrollment, 1971
<u>Twin Cities</u>				
Minneapolis (62,026)	18,905	16,555	80	24.5
St. Paul (47,213)	16,742	18,149	65	16.8
<u>Twin City Metro. Suburbs</u>				
Bloomington (24,221)	10,482	8,476	61	2
Edina (10,922)	16,982	13,008	49	.5
Forest Lake (4,766)	7,541	7,250	33	2.6
Roseville (12,702)	12,484	6,973	37	2
Spring Lake Park (5,219)	7,473	5,715	36	3.5
<u>Other Central Cities</u>				
Duluth (22,805)	8,619	9,161	70	11
Moorhead (7,278)	8,319	8,082	31	3.4
Rochester (16,093)	13,140	11,016	38	3.5
<u>Small Cities</u>				
Albert Lea (7,252)	8,861	8,155	35	2.7
Alexandria (3,983)	10,014	8,367	45	4.1
Red Wing (3,672)	10,261	9,664	41	2.1
Winona (6,291)	10,214	11,467	47	2.9
Worthington (3,469)	11,462	9,401	42	3.3
<u>Rural Areas</u>				
Carlton (1,062)	6,847	5,068	56	8.4
Hallock (541)	12,305	6,371	34	.7
Milan (303)	15,263	5,758	33	3
Minnesota Lake (435)	4,358	5,934	21	2
New York Mills (854)	4,179	3,796	37	.9
Springfield (925)	18,367	9,010	34	1.3
Walker (846)	11,839	6,246	48	5.8
Waterville (976)	8,346	6,066	29	3.7
<u>Statewide Average</u>	9,550	9,162	-	-

SOURCE: William H. Wilken, Minnesota School Finance (National Education Association, Unpublished manuscript, 1973), pp. 15, 16, and 22.

As for the suburbs in the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area, they exhibited large disparities on both wealth measures. Some suburbs, therefore, have had the fiscal capacity to meet the schooling needs of their fast-growing populations. For others, the escalating costs of education put a severe strain on district wealth, a situation that certainly was a major contributor to taxpayer discontent.

Some statistics on both "municipal overburden" and "educational overburden" are reported in Table 8. Tax rates for non-school purposes provide some indication of the former, and the latter is measured, albeit crudely, by the proportion of students in a district's enrollment from low-income families (i.e., families receiving assistance under the federal AFDC program). As could be expected, non-school tax rates were substantially higher in 1972 in the four largest districts--Minneapolis, St. Paul, Bloomington, and Duluth--than they were elsewhere, an expression of the wide range of municipal services required by the size, density, and socioeconomic composition of their populations. Correspondingly, suburbs and rural areas generally had low tax rates to support governmental functions other than schools.

The big cities of Minnesota also had far more than their share of pupils who were "disadvantaged" with respect to the income level and educational background of their homes, neighborhoods, and communities. Nearly 25 per cent of the 1971 enrollment in the Minneapolis district were AFDC recipients, as were some 17 per cent in St. Paul, and 11 per cent in Duluth. Aside from several districts in rural areas, none of the other districts represented in Table 8 had AFDC students in excess of 4 per cent of its enrollment. Thus, the forces of "educational overburden" and "municipal overburden", along with other factors such as high costs,²⁷ come together in the large core cities of

Minnesota to create a need for fiscal resources that is equalled by few other districts in the state. And whether even the impressive wealth per pupil of Minneapolis and St. Paul (Duluth is actually below average on both property and income measures) is adequate to meet this need effectively has become one of the central issues in the politics of school finance in Minnesota.

Political Culture

National and regional forces do have a great influence on the states. Still, for the purpose of analysis, a state government may be conceived of as a political system operating in a distinctive cultural setting. That this political culture makes a significant difference for education policy making is the principal conclusion of a recent study.²⁸ It is difficult to characterize in a few pages the beliefs, values, and expectations that shape politics in Minnesota; but Elazar's treatment of political culture does offer both a point of departure and a convenient organizing framework. As interpreted by this scholar, the American political culture is a synthesis of three distinguishable orientations--the Traditionalistic, the Individualistic, and the Moralistic--each of which is strongly associated with a particular section of the country, a legacy of the migration patterns of the various ethnic and religious groups that settled the United States.²⁹

While no state completely embodies any one of the political sub-cultures, Elazar concludes that Minnesota comes closer to the "moralist" pattern than does any other state.³⁰ In his judgment, this orientation encourages (1) governmental intervention for the good of the commonwealth, (2) non-partisanship and the use of third parties, (3) citizen participation in political activity, (4) professionalism in public administration, and (5) an innovative approach toward programs. Whether Minnesota is viewed from

either a historical or comparative perspective, it is evident that these characteristics are central to the politics of the state.

Government Intervention

Like much of what Elazar attributes to the "moralistic" culture, the belief in the efficacy of government intervention was one of the cardinal tenets of Progressivism. This reform movement set the tone and agenda for Minnesota politics from 1899 to 1918, and resulted in numerous laws that extended the regulatory and service functions of the state. In spite of the return to "normalcy" of the decade following World War I, the Progressive ethos, to use Chrislock's words, retained a "tenacious hold on the Minnesota mind."³¹ And this ethos has continued to find expression in major social legislation from the New Deal to the present.

The commitment to the use of government as a positive instrument is apparent in current statistics as well as in enacted legislation. To give but one illustration, the amount of public services made available to Minnesotans compares quite favorably with that provided by other states. In Table 9 are contained 1970-71 data on expenditures by state and local governments in Minnesota. These data are shown on a per capita basis (an indicator of the level of services received by citizens) and per \$1,000 of personal income (an indicator of the "effort" that citizens must put forth to support these services). On the first of these Minnesota ranked 10th among all the states with an expenditure of \$805 per capita; on the second Minnesota ranked 15th with a figure of \$215 per \$1,000 of personal income. There is also presented in the table the allocation of this spending for local schools, highways, and public welfare. The ranking of Minnesota among other states for school expenditures--third on per capita and sixth on the basis of per \$1000 personal income--was especially high.

TABLE 9

MINNESOTA COMPARED WITH THE MEDIAN STATE IN THE UNITED STATES
ON SELECTED EXPENDITURE MEASURES (1970-1971)

	Per Capita		Per \$1,000 Income	
	Amount	Rank	Amount	Rank
Total General Expenditures				
Median State in U. S.	\$ 690		\$ 196	
Minnesota	806	10	215	15
Local School Expenditures				
Median State in U. S.	198		52	
Minnesota	266	3	71	6
Highway Expenditures				
Median State in U. S.	95		27	
Minnesota	108	20	29	22
Public Welfare Expenditures				
Median State in U. S.	69		19	
Minnesota	76	19	20	21

SOURCE: Tax Study Commission, Staff Progress Report: A Collection of Work Papers (St. Paul: Tax Study Commission, 1973), pp. 93-94.

There are, of course, many possible reasons why Minnesota has been relatively generous in its provision of public services. One recent analysis (1972) stresses demographic and geographic factors in explaining education and highway expenditures--for example, the large proportion of children, the sparsity of the rural population, and the severity of winter weather.³² These factors unquestionably have an effect. Nonetheless, they operate within the context of a political culture that traditionally has held high aspirations for the service performance of state and local government.

Political Parties

Elazar contends that party organization in a "moralistic" culture is perceived as being simply a useful political device and is not valued for its own sake. "Regular party ties", he observes, "can be abandoned with relative impunity for third parties, special local parties, or nonpartisan

systems if such changes are believed helpful in gaining larger political goals.³³ Such an attitude toward political parties has long been present in Minnesota. In no other state was nonpartisanship more firmly established in law, nor has any other state witnessed more third-party success than that attained in the 1930s by the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party.

In 1970, only twenty or so* of the more than 30,000 local, state, and federal offices listed on Minnesota ballots were identified by party labels.³⁴ Even state legislators were removed, formally at least, from partisan politics. Although the passage of the 1913 law which made this lawmaking body nonpartisan was largely a "political accident",³⁵ the legislation was in accord with Progressivism's distrust of organized parties, and its exhortation to citizens that they engage in "independent voting." Once passed, the act remained on the books until 1973. During this time, Minnesota was just one of two states (the other being Nebraska) where members of the legislature were elected without party designation.

The consequences of nonpartisanship for Minnesota politics have been much debated. Supporters assert that it effectively smashed bossism and the political machine; that in so doing it worked to purify politics and to expand opportunities for citizen involvement. In this vein, Fenton maintains that nonpartisanship contributed to the evolution in Minnesota of a distinctive "issue-oriented" approach to politics, rather than one which is "job-oriented."³⁶ But critics point to the weakness for many years of party organization, arguing that this weakness opened the way to excessive pressure group influence, irresponsible party behavior, and vulnerability to political extremism.

As for deviant party movements, even a cursory look at Minnesota's history reveals a veritable "brood of third parties." Agrarian and labor

*These offices included United States Senators, United States Representatives, State Governor, other state constitutional officers, and in some years the President and Vice-President.

protest has long been a dynamic element in the state's politics, notably at times of severe economic distress. Most significant as an organized expression of this protest was the Farmer-Labor party. Appropriating the rhetoric and crusading zeal of Progressivism (and its more radical successor, the Nonpartisan League), the Farmer-Labor party became the dominant political force in the state during the Great Depression. Although thwarted in their more radical proposals, Farmer-Laborites did push through much reform legislation, including an income tax and laws protecting the rights of labor. The crushing defeat suffered by the party in the gubernatorial election of 1938 signaled the end of an era. Unable to restore either internal unity or popular support, the electoral fortunes of the Farmer-Labor party deteriorated until it merged in 1944 with the Democratic Party to form the Democratic-Farmer-Labor party (the DFL).³⁷ From that time to the present, political conflict in Minnesota has become institutionalized in the operation of a highly competitive two-party system.

The emergence of partisanship among Minnesotans (a 1960 analysis found that the "overwhelming majority" of voters associated themselves with either the DFL or the Republican party)³⁸ should not be taken to be a repudiation of Progressivism. Certainly, this development has not brought in its wake the crasser aspects of party influence. The political boss and machine politics are far removed from the Minnesota experience and the independent spirit of its voters continues to be evident in their ticket-splitting at election time. Moreover, Republicans, as well as DFLers, draw political sustenance from the Progressive tradition and maintain their credibility by asserting its compatibility with their policy proposals. Indeed, Mitau finishes his examination of the two parties by asserting that, notwithstanding differences in degree and method of approach, they address themselves "very similarly to the urgent problems."³⁹

Citizen Participation

Restoring government "to the people" was among the imperatives in Progressive rhetoric. But though its reformers did institute the open primary, the thrust to democratize politics by legislation never attained the statutory results in Minnesota that it did in states where the initiative, referendum, and recall were enacted. There is much evidence, nonetheless, that the participatory ethic is more widely held and acted upon by Minnesotans than by the citizens of most states.

Although citizen participation in politics takes many forms, voting is the most fundamental. State-by-state rankings on voter turnout in many different kinds of elections always show Minnesota near the top. Sharkansky and Hofferbert have constructed by factor analysis an unusually comprehensive measure of a basic political dimension they label "Competition-Turnout".⁴⁰ Unsurprisingly, Minnesota ranked third among the states on this dimension.

Institutional manifestations of citizen involvement are easy to find. The use, for example, of advisory committees or task forces is widespread at both the state and local levels of government. But the most effective device, especially with respect to issue identification and problem analysis, has been the Citizens League. This organization is based in Minneapolis and most of its some 3,600 members are drawn from business, professional, and civic organizations located in the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area. The League has functioned since its beginning in 1952 as "an independent, nonpartisan educational organization...specializing in questions of government planning, finance, and organization."⁴¹ Specifically, it has conducted detailed studies and made subsequent recommendations in a variety of policy areas, with much attention being directed recently toward education problems such

as staffing, finance, and "accountability". The reports of the Citizens League are widely publicized. Since they usually are a skillful mix of technical expertise and citizen input, as well as being backed by a prestigious organization, political leaders do pay considerable attention to them.⁴² And on some issues--for example, taking a metropolitan approach to planning for the Twin Cities area--the League took the lead in setting the agenda for the state policy system.

Civil Service Reform

Given the vigor of the Progressive attack in Minnesota on the foundations of party organization, the application of civil service provisions to state administration was remarkably slow in coming. Progressive governors enjoyed no great legislative success in curbing the "spoils system", and it was not until 1939 that civil service reform for state employees was eventually accomplished.⁴³ Once adopted, though, the scope of this reform has been sweeping. As of 1973, the Governor was limited to some 240 appointments, including department heads, boards, and commissioners.⁴⁴

In no agency are civil service regulations more pervasive than in the Minnesota Department of Education. Other than the Commissioner of Education, who is appointed by the State Board of Education to a term of four years, the employees of the Department are covered by civil service regulations.⁴⁵ Protection against patronage and political control is afforded by these regulations. In this sense, the State Department of Education is a "professional" as contrasted with a "political" agency.

Innovation

Although Minnesota does not have the reputation of its eastern neighbor, Wisconsin, as a pioneer when it comes to the adoption of new programs, it

It still has been unusually receptive to innovation. Certainly, Minnesotans have been more than willing to experiment with the political party, and among their public officials are many who have taken advanced positions on critical social issues. Hubert Humphrey's courageous stand on civil rights in 1948 and Eugene McCarthy's determined crusade against the Vietnam War some twenty years later are quite consistent with Minnesota's long tradition of protest against social injustice.

The only systematic attempt to quantify the relative speed with which states accept program innovations was undertaken by Walker in the late 1960s.⁴⁶ He based his index on 88 different programs in 12 areas of governmental activity. The composite innovation score for Minnesota ranked it 12th among the states. Walker also offers some evidence that Minnesota is judged by administrators in many other states to be among their "best sources" of information and new ideas.⁴⁷ The application of Walker's index to Minnesota, in that it weighs all programs equally and does not take social need into account, produces a ranking that probably underestimates the relative willingness of the state's political system to innovate in the face of an environmental challenge. A case in point is the impact of metropolitanization. If this, under the rubric of the "urban crisis", constitutes the most serious problem confronting the states, then Minnesota's response warrants its being called a pacesetter. A Metropolitan Council with some real powers for regional planning and the provision of services has been functioning since 1967. And the Fiscal Disparities Act of 1971, if it survives court challenge, marks a promising beginning in sharing more equally the property tax base of the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area among its "have" and "have not" communities.⁴⁸

Impact on Education Policy Making

All the political characteristics that have been discussed impinge in one way or another on state policy making for the public schools. The high aspirations that Minnesotans have for public services are expressed most strongly with regard to education. The emergence of a competitive two-party system is generating a search for new political issues, one source of which is clearly education. Citizen participation finds many expressions, among the most effective being the education policy recommendations of the Citizens League. The application of civil service regulations has nowhere been more extensive than in the Minnesota Department of Education. And, finally, the willingness of the state's political system to innovate has been demonstrated by its responses to a number of educational issues. (Three of these will be analyzed later in this report.) It is essential, consequently to keep the political culture backdrop in mind when considering how Minnesota state government determines public school policy.

Governmental Institutions

The focal points in a political system are the governmental institutions that have the authority to enact, implement, or adjudicate policy decisions. Individuals and groups who seek to influence public policy must usually work through such institutions if they are to have any impact. An analysis, therefore, of state policy making for the public schools in Minnesota must take into account the institutional context within which that process takes place. This context, of course, is incredibly complex--a bewildering maze of offices, regulations, procedures, duties, privileges, norms, understandings, routines, and rituals. The following discussion is confined to its formal aspects, particularly as these contribute to the policy-making capability of the state institutions that have the primary responsibility for educational governance.

State Authority and Organization

Over one-hundred years ago (1857) the Minnesota Constitution was adopted. Among its articles was the mandate to the Legislature that it "establish a general and uniform system of public schools."⁴⁹ Within a short time these lawmakers had instituted a "neighborhood plan" for education from which has gradually come the district system of public schools that exists today. Irrespective of the "local control" of these schools, education remains a state function in Minnesota, just as it is in all other states. "School districts", in the explicit language of a Minnesota Supreme Court decision, "are governmental agencies wholly [italics added] under the control of the Legislature which may modify or abrogate their powers to any extent it sees fit."⁵⁰


Legislative enactments over the years have established a state-level structure for educational governance in Minnesota. The basic structure is diagrammed in Figure 1. As this diagram indicates, the state institutions legally responsible for governing the public schools are the (1) Legislature, (2) Governor, (3) State Board of Education, (4) Commissioner of Education, and (5) Department of Education.

Legislature

The Minnesota Legislature is one of the largest in the country. It consisted in 1973 of 134 Representatives (elected to two-year terms) and 67 Senators (elected to four-year terms). This body, until the passage of 1973 legislation, was officially nonpartisan. But for years its members caucused as either Liberals or Conservatives and these caucus affiliations became closely aligned with the DFL and Republican parties, respectively. The caucuses were fairly cohesive in their approach toward legislative issues, more so it would appear than their counterparts in most other states.⁵¹ Still,

FIGURE 1

LEGAL STRUCTURE FOR THE GOVERNANCE OF MINNESOTA'S
PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS



SOURCE: Bureau of Field Studies and Surveys, *Education 1967* (College of Education, University of Minnesota, August, 1967), p. 275.

there were significant conflicts in each caucus, with the basic cleavage involving rural and urban interests, a cleavage that kept the caucuses from being united even on important party positions.⁵²

Electoral contests between the rival parties became intensely competitive as the DFL surged forward in the 1970 and 1972 elections to capture not only the Governorship (an office its nominees had held before in 1955-1961 and 1963-1967) and the House (controlled by Liberals in 1955, 1957, 1959, and 1961), but also the Senate (a Conservative bastion for decades).⁵³ In the 1971 session, which is of particular interest to this study, the Conservatives (i.e., Republicans) still held thin margins in the House, 70 to 65, and the Senate, 34 to 33. But by the next session, the Liberals (i.e., DFLers) were in control of both houses, 77 to 57 in the House and 37 to 30 in the Senate.

The majority caucus in each house elects its candidates to the key leadership positions--the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate. Additionally, the majority caucus through these leaders selects the chairmen (normally from among its senior members) for the various legislative committees and through the Rules Committee it manages the flow of lawmaking activity. In this connection, the Speaker of the House occupies an especially powerful leadership position. He appoints all the standing committees, prepares schedules for their meetings, and refers bills to these committees. (There were 13 standing committees in the Senate and 24 in the House during the 1973 session.) It should be noted that a sophisticated bill preparation system, including computer storage of both proposed new legislation and existing laws, is provided by the Revisor of Statutes Office for legislators and state agencies.⁵⁴

The legislative committees that traditionally have had special responsibilities for public school bills are the Education Committees in both

the House and Senate, along with the House Appropriations Committee and the Senate Finance Committee when fiscal implications are apparent in these bills. After study, hearings, and deliberation--often perfunctory but on occasion at length--these committees decide whether to modify, recommend, or kill proposed legislation. And its eventual fate has generally been contingent on this decision.

Some staff support is available to aid the Minnesota Legislature in accomplishing its different functions. In the 1971 session, this consisted primarily of an Office of Senate Council, which provided "legal and technical services" to the Senate; and a Research Department of the House of Representatives, which provided "research assistance" to the House.⁵⁵ Both of these staff arms were nonpartisan and each, as of January, 1972, employed eight people.⁵⁶ Subsequently, there was a reorganization and expansion of the Senate staff. The Office of Senate Council was replaced by an Office of Senate Research. As of January, 1973, this office had 13 members, most of whom were individually assigned to a governmental area (e.g., education) for which a legislative committee had responsibility. In the meantime, the House Research Department had grown to include 10 research assistants and six legislative interns.⁵⁷ Lastly, there are small staffs who work for the leaders of the majority and minority caucuses. These staffers, unlike those assigned to the House and Senate who sometimes engage in long range studies, handle mostly day-to-day business.

Along with the Governor, the Minnesota Legislature is the final repository of state authority with regard to education. In this body are enacted, subject to the Governor's approval, the basic funding decisions pertaining to the public schools, as well as laws that set policy for many facets of education. Although the Legislature has delegated much of its policy-making responsibility

to both local school districts and the state education agency, it retains the authority to legislate for the public schools in a detailed and prescriptive manner if the members of that body choose to do so. There has been no such desire on the part of these lawmakers. Yet even in the modest role that it has customarily assumed as an education policy maker, the Minnesota Legislature has been hampered by major institutional constraints.

Whether the large size of the Legislature and the absence of official party designations hinder legislative performance have been matters of controversy for decades in Minnesota. But there are other structural features that more clearly have had this result. First, there is simply a lack of time to cope with issues. Until 1972, the Minnesota Constitution limited the Legislature to an odd-year session of 120 legislative days. A constitutional amendment was approved in that year which allows the 120 days to be used flexibly during the entire biennial period. Second, and most important, the Legislature does not have enough information-generating capability to be free of a heavy dependence on the executive agencies and private interest groups. Staffing changes have enhanced this capability. Nonetheless, all the standing committees are not staffed on a year-round, permanent basis; nor do rank-and-file members have much staff assistance. And the Legislature has few resources with which to engage in a comprehensive review of the budgetary and fiscal matters that constantly are before it. Hence, while the recent changes have probably enabled lawmakers to react more effectively--for example, they can more incisively challenge the data supplied by the various state agencies--the Minnesota Legislature still finds it difficult to develop on its own policy alternatives in fields like education.⁵⁸

The institutional capability of the Minnesota Legislature, when compared with that in other states, is probably just a bit above average. The only

systematic survey that has been done in this regard was undertaken in 1970 by the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures.⁵⁹ Applying its value judgments to a mass of quantified data about the "structural aspects" of legislatures, the Citizens Conference first ranked all the states on each of five dimensions and then on a summary measure called "technical effectiveness". On the summary measure Minnesota ranked 10th.⁶⁰ At first glance this seemingly indicates a more substantial policy-making capability than has hitherto been suggested. But closer scrutiny discloses that the Minnesota Legislature earned relatively good marks primarily due to its relationship to constituents. "Its outstanding feature," concluded the Citizens Conference, "is the general openness and accessibility of its process and activities as shown by its rank (7th) in 'accountability'."⁶¹ (Interestingly enough, DFLers made greater "openness" in the legislative process their main campaign issue in the 1972 election.) On dimensions other than this one, the Minnesota Legislature did not fare so well. And on "functionality", the set of structural characteristics having the most relevance to determining public policy, the ranking for the state was an unimpressive 27th. (On the other dimensions, the Minnesota Legislature ranked 12th on "representativeness", 13th on "informed", and 23rd on "independence.")⁶²

Governor

The formal powers of the Minnesota Governor necessarily intersect at many points with elementary and secondary education. This official is charged by statute with preparing the state budget for consideration by the Legislature, a budget that contains funds for the support of public schools and for the operation of the state education agency. The Governor reviews all measures passed by the Legislature and must either sign or

veto these bills. Further, he appoints the members of the State Board of Education. In short, the responsibilities of the office are such that the Governor of Minnesota is inevitably caught up in policy making for education, though his precise role depends on many influences.

"Even weak governors," Schlesinger states, "can dominate their legislature on matters of policy because if the governor is weak in formal powers, the state legislatures are still weaker as instruments of policy leadership."⁶³ And, as this scholar demonstrates, the Governorship in Minnesota is hardly a "weak" office as measured by constitutional and statutory authority. On Schlesinger's index of formal powers the Governor of Minnesota is in the top quartile when all the states are ranked, receiving 19 out of a possible 20 points.⁶⁴ The components of this authority are these:

1. Tenure potential - the Minnesota Governor is elected for a four-year term and there are no limitations on reelection.
2. Power of appointment - the Minnesota Governor can appoint most heads of state departments and a majority of the members of most commissions and boards.
3. Budget control - the Minnesota Governor has the responsibility for preparing the state budget and shares it only with his appointees.
4. Veto power - the Minnesota Governor has an item veto requiring a two-thirds vote of each house to override.⁶⁵

Besides these legal powers, the Governor of Minnesota has others which augment his strength. First, he is empowered to deliver an inaugural message and other special messages to the Legislature in

which he can request the passage of desired proposals. Second, he alone has the right to call the Legislature into special session. Finally, he has available to him, at least in theory, the information resources of a vast bureaucracy. And he can utilize his control over funds and personnel to develop a staff capability of his own.⁶⁶ In all, then, the Governor of Minnesota commands an impressive array of legal powers that, when coupled with other sources of influence, gives him a potential for policy leadership far exceeding that of any other actor.

State Board of Education

Like 48 other states, the structure for educational governance in Minnesota includes a State Board of Education. The nine members of this body, as is the case in 35 states, are appointed by the Governor. In Minnesota these appointments are confirmed by the Senate; are for overlapping terms of six years; and are designed to ensure representation from each of the eight congressional districts in the state. (There is one at-large member.) Furthermore, at least three of these officials must have served on local school boards.

The formal powers of the State Board of Education are not derived from the Minnesota Constitution; no reference is made to such a body in that document. Rather, its powers are statutory. In addition to appointing the Commissioner of Education, the State Board has the authority within the framework of constitutional stipulations and legislative enactments to determine policies and exercise general supervision for the public schools of the state.* Included among its specific responsibilities are (1) distribu-

*The State Board also has authority over the Department of Education and other public educational agencies. It also serves for all purposes as the State Board for Vocational Education. But except for the vocational-technical schools, the State Board has no responsibility for higher education.

ting school funds appropriated by the Legislature, (2) establishing eligibility requirements for state aid and ensuring compliance with these requirements, (3) certifying teachers and administrators,* (4) providing outlines and courses of study, (5) approving the reorganization of school districts, (6) receiving and distributing federal funds, and (7) making recommendations for needed legislation.⁶⁷ The Board decisions in these areas that are intended to serve as "guidelines" are published immediately upon their approval. But when "rules and regulations" are being decided, the State Board, among other legal steps, must hold public hearings before final adoption. Such decisions have the full force of law unless overturned by the Legislature or the courts.⁶⁸

Although the Minnesota State Board of Education is granted broad authority to set policy in many educational areas, its quasi-legislative power does not include direct access to the fiscal resources of the state. The Legislature and the Governor, it must be emphasized, make all the tax decisions, establish the level of appropriations, and decide the essential features of the distribution formula. Fiscal policy for education is outside the legal purview of the State Board and to have any influence on this crucial matter demands that it exercise informal power.

The limited authority of the Minnesota Board is not the only structural factor that constricts its role in education policy making. Like officials on other lay governing bodies, the members of the State Board serve on a part-time basis. Statutes specify a date (first Tuesday in August) for the annual meeting and require that quarterly meetings be held. Special

*This was changed by 1973 legislation, see pp. 117-119 of this report.

meetings may also be called when deemed necessary by the State Board. The result of law, along with Board member preference, have been regular meetings occurring once a month. Compensation for this service is minimal, consisting of \$25.00 per working day plus actual expenses. Lastly, the State Board has no personal staff to supply information and advice on agenda items. For these, it relies primarily on the Commissioner of Education and his staff. But the State Board has made considerable use of advisory groups, task forces, consultants, and even fact-finding committees (composed of Board members) in seeking to augment the information capability of the Department of Education.⁶⁹

Commissioner of Education and Department of Education

The Commissioner of Education is the secretary and chief executive officer of the State Board of Education,* and is the administrative head of the Minnesota Department of Education.** Selected and appointed by the State Board (28 states recruit their chief state school officers in a similar fashion), the Commissioner serves for a four-year term. His formal responsibilities include making reports and recommendations to the State Board, and organizing and controlling the myriad operations of the Department of Education. Also, the Commissioner, along with the State Board, supervises the implementation of all laws and other policies relating to the public schools.⁷⁰

The Minnesota Department of Education provides the Commissioner with advisers, specialists, data sources, and other organizational resources which he can draw upon to influence education policy making. Over the

*The Commissioner of Education also serves as the secretary or as a member of various bodies; among these are the State College Board and the Minnesota Higher Education Coordinating Commission.

**"State Department of Education" or "State Department" will be used throughout this report to refer to the Minnesota Department of Education.

past few decades the professional staff of this agency, largely as a consequence of federal funds, has expanded greatly in size. In 1944-45, the State Department had 63 people identified as professionals; by 1972 such people numbered 213 in the central office and 12 in regional locations. (Another 210 professionals were listed as working with "vocational rehabilitation programs, and state museums, libraries, archives, and library extension programs.")⁷¹ Because of the way state education department personnel are classified in the different states, it is very difficult to compare across states. Yet it would seem that the size of the Minnesota Department of Education is close to the national average.⁷²

Within the State Department there are several sections that produce policy-relevant data. In the Division of Administration there is the section known as Education Data Systems. Its personnel process data on a central computer (located in the Department of Agriculture) to generate quantitative information on such matters as pupil enrollments, ethnic backgrounds, staffing patterns, personnel characteristics, instructional programs, and physical facilities for all school districts in the state. In the same division there also is the State Aids, Statistics and Research Section. This section, among its functions, interprets statistical data on the enrollments, expenditures, taxes, and property wealth of school districts. Special studies are conducted by the sections when requested by other government officials or agencies. In the 1971 session, for instance, the State Aid, Statistics and Research Section cooperated with Education Data Systems to turn out "over 150 runs of simulation programs" for the benefit of state legislators who were trying to revise the foundation aid formula.⁷³ Aside from these two sections, there are several in the Division of Planning and Development--notably the Planning Section--

that do research and prepare reports germane to policy making. In total, the Minnesota Department of Education has the capability to furnish a vast amount of statistical data on education policy issues.

There are statutory provisions that do work against the Commissioner of Education exercising the "leadership" so widely prescribed for the incumbent of this position. First, the Commissioner and other top Department administrators are not well compensated by professional standards. The Commissioner's salary, to illustrate, was set by the Legislature at \$29,400 as of January, 1972. This ranked him 23rd among the chief state school officers of the country.⁷⁴ More significant, it was below the median (\$30,000) for local school superintendents in the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area.⁷⁵ Second, all the professional employees in the State Department, with the sole exception of the Commissioner of Education, are under Minnesota Civil Service. This means that the Commissioner must choose from among candidates on civil service lists, with final approval resting with the State Board. And civil service regulations do ensure tenure protection. This not only has lessened flexibility, and perhaps inducements, in the recruitment of professionals, but also has prevented a Commissioner from forming his own administrative team. With regard to the latter, the present Commissioner of Education, Howard B. Casmey, did not select the Assistant to the Commissioner, let alone any of the five Assistant Commissioners in the State Department. All were appointed prior to his taking office.⁷⁶

Two recent studies of the Minnesota Department of Education indicate organizational and personnel characteristics, not unrelated to the statutes alluded to above, which might further hamper a Commissioner who sought to take a policy leadership role. In December of 1972, the Governor's Loaned Executives Action Program (LEAP) concluded its examination of the executive branch of Minnesota state government. While praising the State Department

of Education for the "competence and dedication of its employees," the authors of the LEAP study were highly critical of the management system, or the lack of one, they found in that agency. In their view, the basic organizational problem was that:

Not all organizational elements and employees of the Department are working in concert with each other to reach departmental goals. The current organization consists of 36 sections, most of which are grouped into divisions which report to the Commissioner. The structure was, for the most part, determined prior to the appointment of the present Commissioner and seems based on the assumption that sections are principally units unto themselves, but must be grouped in some manner for administrative purposes. In any event, there is not a clear definition of the responsibilities of all Assistant Commissioners who head up the divisions and how they relate to one another, to cover the total responsibilities of the Commissioner. This results in certain overlapping and duplicated activities, 'power jockeying' at the section levels, garbled communications, delays in decision-making and less than optimum overall planning.⁷⁷

As a response to this problem, it was recommended in the LEAP report that the organization of the Department be modified so as to fit "conceptually defined missions of each sub-element," and that the scope of the Personnel Section be enlarged so as to ensure "definition of supervisory responsibilities" and "intensified training in the basic management skills." These recommendations, according to the report, were in the process of being implemented by the Commissioner.⁷⁸

A second study which deals with the Department of Education was undertaken by a staff member of the Educational Governance Project. This researcher employed a survey questionnaire with a sample of upper-level administrators in the state education department of each of 12 states. This sample for Minnesota included the Commissioner of Education, the five Assistant Commissioners, and eight Directors, the last group being randomly selected.

In Table 10 are shown the percentages or means for the Minnesota administrators on 23 selected characteristics, as well as their ranking as a group

among the 12 states for each characteristic.* Most noteworthy is the fact that the percentages for this sample of administrators ranked them either first or second on no less than six attributes: (1) birth within the state of SDE service (86 per cent); (2) K-12 schooling in a community of 10,000 or less population (79 per cent); (3) K-12 schooling in a "rural" community (86 per cent); (4) teaching/administrative experience in a rural school district with less than 1000 pupils (50 per cent); (5) recruited from public school administration (50 per cent); and (6) experience as a public school superintendent (36 per cent).

The data in Table 10 tend to confirm the impression of observers that top posts in the Minnesota Department of Education are filled by "locals", born and educated in the sparsely-populated areas of the state, the majority of whom enter the Department from an administrative position, often a superintendency, in an outstate district. Certainly, there is nothing inherently wrong with this recruitment pattern. But whether it results in diverse competencies and viewpoints required by a modern state department of education, particularly one functioning in a state where more than half the population reside in the metropolitan areas, is open to doubt. Equally questionable is whether the narrow orientation fostered by this recruitment pattern encourages the Department to establish relationships across the broad range of actors who participate in education policy making. The negative perceptions toward agency personnel expressed by a number of the urban legislators and schoolmen we interviewed suggest that the Minnesota Department of Education does have such a relationship problem.

*The rankings were developed for descriptive purposes only; they were not intended to imply "good" or "bad" on any characteristic.

TABLE 10
MINNESOTA STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
UPPER-LEVEL ADMINISTRATORS COMPOSITE PROFILE
(N=14)

CHARACTERISTIC	CATEGORY	Per Cent or Mean	12 State Ranking
Personal			
1. Sex	Male	93	12
2. Race	White	86	11
3. Average Age (Years)	---	46.3	10
Background			
4. Location of Birth	Instate	86	1
5. K-12 Schooling-Community Size	10,000 or Less	79	1
6. K-12 Schooling-Community Type	Rural	86	1
7. Mobility (Permanent Addresses)	Three States or More	21	9
Education			
8. Location of Undergraduate Institution	Instate	71	5
9. Location of Graduate Institution	Instate	57	9
10. Highest Graduate Degree	Doctorate	21	10
Previous Experience			
11. In Higher Education	Yes	21	10
12. As a Public School Superintendent	Yes	36	1
13. Size & Type of School District	Rural under 1000	50	2
Recruited From:			
14. Higher Education Position	Yes	0	11
15. Public School Administration	Yes	50	2
16. Non-Education Position	Yes	21	9
17. Location of Position	Instate	86	4
SDE Career			
18. Average Years with the SDE	---	8.3	11
19. Average Years at Current Position	---	5.5	4
Salaries and Reactions			
20. Salary Range	More than \$22,000	50	6
21. Salary Comparison (with others in my state)	Same or Better than Most	50	9
22. Chance to Use Abilities	Excellent	43	8
23. Adequacy of Legislative Fiscal Support for SDE Programs	Half or More of the Programs	71	6

SOURCE: Gary V. Branson, "The Characteristics of Upper-Level Administrators in State Departments of Education and the Relationship of these Characteristics to other State Variables," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1974).

SECTION II

THREE EDUCATION POLICY DECISIONS

Introduction

A twofold approach was used to study the process through which Minnesota state government establishes policy for its public elementary and secondary schools. First, a major decision in each of three issue areas--finance, desegregation, and certification--was investigated, with the focus being on the activities which brought the decision about, rather than on its content.* Second, data were gathered on the perceptions that different actors have of the way the state education policy system "typically" functions in terms of role performance and influence relationships.

The issue area approach, which is the subject of this section, required that information be sought by interviewing a variety of participants and informants, collecting pertinent documents, and examining secondary sources. To do this, field work was undertaken in November-December 1972, January-February 1973, and August-September 1973. Most of the data so obtained were amenable only to qualitative treatment, the usual tests of historical criticism being applied to statements to decide upon their credibility and meaning. The assertions that seemed to us to be most warranted by the evidence were then drawn upon in writing the descriptions.

In order to facilitate analysis, policy making was conceived of as occurring in a sequence of four stages:

Issue Definition--Process by which the preferences of individuals become translated into political issues.

*In most of the twelve states that were studied, the Educational Governance Project staff investigated a fourth issue area, this being the one where the state education agency exerted the greatest policy leadership. In Minnesota this issue area also was school desegregation.

Alternative Formulation--Process by which issues are formulated as specific proposals for a policy change or for maintaining the status quo.

Support Mobilization--Process by which individuals and groups are activated to support or oppose policy proposals.

Authoritative Enactment--Process by which an authoritative policy choice is made among alternative proposals.¹

Of course, this four-stage division of policy making is arbitrary. Different terms and definitions could be employed. And fewer or more stages could be posited. Even so, we believe that distinguishing between stages is analytically useful because it permits a fuller understanding of the activities which lie behind policy change.

The Omnibus Tax Act (1971)

In October of 1971, after a series of tumultuous regular and special sessions, the Minnesota Legislature enacted comprehensive tax-school finance reforms. These reforms were widely saluted within the state as a "fiscal milestone," and they received considerable national attention as well. For example, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, in its 13th annual report, declared that the reforms were a "Minnesota miracle" and constituted the "outstanding case study of the year."² Before attempting to explain how such innovative legislation came into being, it is necessary to describe briefly the system of state-local school finance that existed in Minnesota prior to 1971.

School Finance Background

Minnesota's pre-1971 school finance program is compared in Table 11 with other states on four dimensions: (1) "ability," (2) "effort," (3) "expenditure," and (4) "equity." Commonly-used indices are employed for

TABLE 11
MINNESOTA'S PRE-1971 SCHOOL FINANCE SYSTEM
COMPARED WITH OTHER STATES ON SELECTED DIMENSIONS

Dimension	Measure	Minnesota (Rank in Parenthesis)	U.S. Average	Low State	High State
"Ability"	Personal Income Per Child of School Age, 1970	\$14,073 (25)	\$15,063	Mississippi \$8,354	New York \$19,758
"Expenditure"	Current Expenditure for Public Elementary and Secondary Education Per Pupils in Average Daily Attendance, 1970-1971	\$ 878 (18)	\$ 868	Alabama \$ 523	Alaska \$ 1,401
"Effort"	Local and State Revenue Receipts for Public Schools in 1970-71 as Per Cent of Personal Income, 1970	6.3% (3 tie)	5.0%	Alabama 3.8%	Alaska 7.7%
"Equity"	National School Finance Project Equalization Scores, 1968-1969*	4.433 (36)	5.131	Connecticut 2.295	Hawaii 8.400

*Interpreted as "measuring the extent that state and local funds are being used to equalize the financial resources available for education in a state."

SOURCES: National Education Association, Rankings of the States, 1972, Research Report 1972-R1 (Washington, D.C.: National Education Association, 1972), pp. 36, 50, and 62; Roe L. Johns and Richard G. Salmon, "The Financial Equalization of Public School Support Programs in the United States for the School Year 1968-69," in Roe L. Johns, et al., (eds.), Status and Impact of Educational Finance Programs (Gainesville, Florida: National Educational Finance Project, 1971), pp. 136-139.

the first three of these dimensions; the fourth is measured by the equalization score computed by the National School Finance Project (NSFP). These data indicate that Minnesotans were somewhat below the United States average in 1970 in financial ability, but they made a greater tax effort than did the citizens of all but two states to provide revenues for the

public schools. The per pupil expenditure level for Minnesota ranked it 18th nationally in 1970-71. On the NSFP equity measure, however, Minnesota's relative standing was noticeably lower (36th), a reflection in part of the inadequacies in its foundation aid program.

Minnesota's foundation aid program had its legislative origins in 1957. The program, essentially, was intended to accomplish two things. First, it set a minimum spending level for school districts, a level to be funded from both state and local sources. Theoretically, this guaranteed dollar figure represented the cost of providing an adequate basic education. To participate fully in the foundation aid program, a district had to levy a tax at least as high as the state-specified minimum rate. Then the revenue yield from this local levy was subtracted from the amount necessary to support the basic expenditure level in order to determine how much state foundation money the district would receive. For 1970-71, the foundation level for maintenance costs (current operating expenditures) was \$404 per pupil unit in average daily attendance (ADA)* and the required district tax rate was 20 EARC mills.**

To finance their ever-mounting costs, school districts depended upon their own property wealth, as well as upon foundation entitlements and other forms of state and federal assistance. Some 43 per cent of district maintenance costs in 1970-71 represented the state contribution, with the balance largely coming from local levies. Throughout the 1960s the dollar

*Per pupil units reflect a "weighting" scheme. In 1970-71, each kindergarten pupil was multiplied by a factor of .5, each 1-6 pupil by a factor of 1.0, each 7-12 pupil by a factor of 1.4, and each pupil in area vocation-technical schools by a factor of 1.5.

**EARC stands for Equalization Aid Review Committee. Its purpose is to "equalize" assessed valuations from county to county. Levies on EARC valuations result in mill rates about one-third as high as the mill rates computed by county auditors.

gap between the actual operating expenditures of Minnesota school districts and the level established for their foundation support grew wider until by 1970-71 the median maintenance cost per ADA exceeded the foundation aid figure by \$332 (see Table 12). Thus, by 1970-71 the foundation formula had become quite unrealistic. Very few districts spent less than the \$404 base; none taxed at a rate as low as 20 EARC mills. And as foundation outlays failed to keep pace with soaring educational costs, their potential for equalization across districts steadily diminished. It is to this point that we now turn.

TABLE 12
COMPARISON OF FOUNDATION AID AND MEDIAN
MAINTENANCE COSTS IN MINNESOTA
HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICTS (1963-71)

School Year	Foundation Aid Level	Maintenance Costs per ADA	Difference
1963-64	\$309	\$359	\$ 50
1964-65	315	378	63
1965-66	321	407	86
1966-67	324	454	130
1967-68	345	483	138
1968-69	355	546	191
1969-70	365	604	239
1970-71	404	736	332

SOURCE: Data provided by Van D. Mueller, Division of Educational Administration, University of Minnesota (January, 1972).

The second purpose of foundation aid was to compensate for the variations in property wealth among Minnesota school districts. The general principle was that the poorer the district the more such aid it would receive. Yet there also were state provisions for flat grants that were distributed to districts irrespective of their financial ability. The most remunerative of these grants was a minimum pupil unit guarantee which was calculated as an element in the foundation formula. This guarantee for 1970-71 was fixed at \$141. This meant that a school district, notwithstanding the

revenue it could raise through its own levy, was entitled to at least \$141 per pupil unit in state assistance.* Such grants represented some 48 per cent of foundation program outlays, while the equalization grants made up 33 per cent of state payments to school districts.³

Minnesota's foundation program, other than the minimum guarantee provision, did allocate state aid in an inverse relationship to the tax base of local school districts. In 1970-71, the correlation (r) between total state aid per pupil and EARC valuation per pupil unit was $-.67$.⁴ Even so, there was virtually no association (r only .13) between state aid and local tax effort, and very substantial expenditure disparities continued to exist among school districts.⁵ In Table 13 are contained data on the ten highest expenditure districts and the ten lowest expenditure districts for the 1970-71 school year. The statistics in column two suggest that state foundation payments did have some equalization impact--the median for the low districts was \$294; that for the high districts was only \$142, slightly above the minimum guarantee. Yet this impact was hardly sufficient to negate disparities in local property valuations (see column one). And while each of the highest expenditure districts had more than \$900 per pupil unit available for school services, \$1072 being the largest amount, the lowest expenditure districts were fortunate to be spending just over \$500, with one district having a figure of \$379. Finally, as is evident from column four, the low districts would have had to tax themselves at a millage rate approximately twice as high as the ten top districts to attain the state average per pupil expenditure of \$664.

*The guarantee was adjusted downward if a district spent or taxed less than required by the foundation aid formula. This formula in 1970-71 was
 (\$404 per pupil unit in ADA) - (Revenue from 20 mills, .020, times EARC valuation) = (State aid payment, with a guaranteed minimum of \$141)

TABLE 13

SELECTED DATA ON HIGH AND LOW EXPENDITURE
MINNESOTA HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICTS (1970-71)

Districts	(Adj.) Assessed Value Per Pupil Unit (1970)	Foundation Aid Per Pupil Unit	State and Local (Adj.) Maintenance Costs Per Pupil Unit	*EARC Mills Necessary to Spend \$664
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
10 Highest Expenditure Districts:				
Humboldt	\$32,385	\$141	\$1,072	16.1
Borup	24,177	141	998	21.6
St. Louis Park	15,529	168	983	31.9
Golden Valley	17,942	141	980	29.1
Mt. Iron	4,972	290	980	75.2
Hopkins	13,724	198	967	34.0
Tintah	14,666	152	967	34.9
Storden	39,685	141	957	13.2
Cyrus	12,695	144	954	41.0
Okabena	21,968	141	947	23.8
10 Lowest Expenditure Districts:				
Foley	4,189	323	523	81.4
Walker	11,839	206	421	38.7
Pine City	5,869	291	520	63.6
Cold Spring	4,877	315	519	71.6
Grey Eagle	4,019	323	518	84.8
Osakis	6,790	264	518	58.9
Pierz	5,650	296	509	65.1
Randolph	10,821	244	506	38.8
Brandon	5,459	282	495	62.6
Red Lake	54	400	379	4888.9
Summary:				
State Median District	--	242	664	--
Median High District	16,735	142	973	30.0
Median Low District	5,604	294	518	64.3

*State Median Expenditure (State/Local) 1970-71 = \$664.

SOURCE: Van D. Mueller, "Perspectives on the Relationship of Foundation Aid Programs to Special Education Financing," Financing Special Education in Minnesota, VIII (Division of Educational Administration, University of Minnesota, Fall, 1972), pp. 62-63.

In refusing to dismiss a suit that challenged the Minnesota school finance program (Van Dusartz v. Hatfield), U.S. District Judge Miles Lord offered several clear, albeit hypothetical, illustrations of how that program actually worked to the advantage of rich districts:

The State has assisted the poorer districts with equalizing aid but in a manner which offsets only a portion of the influence of district wealth variations. To be specific, in 1970-71 if a school district's tax rate were at least 20 mills, it was guaranteed a total of \$404 spendable dollars by the State. Thus, if the local levy of 20 mills raised only \$200 (in a district with \$10,000 assessed valuation per pupil) the State supplemented this with a subvention of \$204 per pupil. If the district were sufficiently wealthy that a 20-mill levy raised more than the \$404 guarantee, it retained the excess collection and now has it available for expenditure. There appear to be a number of districts in this enviable position.

In addition, the State has guaranteed to every district a minimum state subvention of \$141 per pupil. Thus a rich district which raised \$450 at the 20-mill rate may spend \$591 per pupil. What is important about this flat grant is that it is useful only to the richer districts. Even if it were abolished, those districts poor in taxable wealth would receive no less than they now do, because the \$141 is counted as part of the equalizing aid. As in our previous example, a poor district raising only \$200 with the 20-mill local rate would receive its \$204 from the state in equalizing money even if the \$141 guaranteed minimum did not exist. Thus this latter guarantee acts in effect as a unique bonus solely for the benefit of rich districts.

Finally, insofar as districts exceed the 20-mill local tax rate (apparently all poor districts do) they are essentially on their own. For every additional mill on its local property a district with \$20,000 valuation per pupil adds another \$20 per child in spending; a district with \$5,000 valuation per pupil adds only \$5 in spending. Put another way, above 20 mills there is a high correlation per pupil wealth and the amount available to spend for education for the same mill rate.

To sum up the basic structure, the rich districts may and do enjoy both lower tax rates and higher spending. A district with \$20,000 assessed valuation per pupil and a 40 mill tax rate on local property would be able to spend \$941 per pupil; to match that level of spending the district with \$5,000 taxable wealth per pupil would have to tax itself at more than three times that rate, or 127.4 mills.⁶

Besides foundation outlays and flat grants, Minnesota's school finance program incorporated various categorical payments. This form of state

school aid (some 20 per cent of the total) was distributed primarily to reimburse a portion of local expenses for pupil transportation, educative services for the handicapped, and vocation-technical programs. Additionally, categorical grants were provided to meet special school district needs, such as those resulting from depleted iron ore deposits, military installations, and concentrations of children from AFDC families. The last of these was only a small grant of \$500,000 in 1970-71, and it went almost entirely to the two Twin Cities.⁷

Switching from the allocative side of school finance to a consideration of revenue raising, it must be reiterated that Minnesotans in 1970-71 were making a very substantial state-local tax effort, relative to other states, to support public elementary and secondary education. Some 36 per cent of overall state tax receipts went for this purpose. To sustain this effort, heavy emphasis was placed on the property tax, the source of virtually all locally-raised school revenue.* In Table 14 are presented some comparative data on Minnesota's use of the property tax. They indicate that Minnesota's reliance on this mechanism was close to the national average on three of the four measures. Only on the percentage of local property taxes going to support the schools (71.4) did the state rank particularly high (3rd). But these figures, while they depict Minnesota's property tax position relative to other states, do not show changes over time.

Property taxes in Minnesota, as elsewhere, shot upward in the latter part of the 1960s. Specifically, gross property taxes rose at an average annual rate of 15 per cent from 1966 to 1971, an increase that was double

*The various state aids were financed from Minnesota's general tax revenues. Personal income and corporation taxes produced 48 per cent of the state operating budget, a state sales tax produced 18 per cent of this budget, and 7 per cent came from excise taxes.⁸

the comparable rate for the decade preceding 1966.⁹ As for school property taxes, they went up by some 83 per cent between 1968 and 1971.¹⁰ A Citizens League survey, conducted in 1971 in the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area, found that property taxes had jumped sharply over the course of just a single year for nearly all homeowners in that area.¹¹

TABLE 14
PROPERTY TAX IN MINNESOTA
COMPARED WITH UNITED STATES AVERAGE

Measure	Minnesota		United States
	Amount or Percentage	Ranking Among States	Amount or Percentage
Property Tax as % of Total State - Local Taxes, 1970	38.7%	25	39.2%
Per Capita Property Tax Collection, 1970	\$171	21	\$168
Local Property Taxes for Schools as % of Total Local Property Taxes, 1970	71.4%	3	51.7%
Average Effective Property Tax Rate as % of Market Value (Single-Family Homes with FHA Mortgages), 1971	2.05%	22	1.98%

SOURCE: Education Commission of the States, Property Assessment and Exemptions: They Need Reform, Research Brief No. 3 (Denver: Education Commission of the States, 1973), pp. 45-47.

The residents of Minnesota school districts not only were asked to bear a heavy property tax burden, but also were caught up in a bewildering maze of state-imposed levy limitations. As described in a State Department report:

Previously [prior to the 1971 legislation] districts levied property taxes at whatever level they were permitted by state law and their constituencies to provide the education for their children. Very little consistency existed statewide. Districts

with low property valuation had to levy high taxes to provide moderate cost programs. High property valuation districts could provide high cost programs with low taxes, but in many cases their potential expenditures were restricted by state-imposed levy limitations. The levy limitations, themselves, varied from two different statewide formulas to a host of differing limitations in the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area, Duluth, and Rochester.¹²

Such was the property tax situation, in broad outline, that confronted Minnesota lawmakers at the beginning of 1971.

Defining the Issue

Escalating property taxes gave impetus to a broad-based demand for change in Minnesota's fiscal policy. Although there were schoolmen, finance scholars, and civic leaders who had long been critical of the state school aid program, the overriding public concern was clearly taxes, especially those levied on residential property. In 1967 there was a legislative response to this concern in the form of the Tax Reform and Relief Act. It established a general sales tax for the first time in Minnesota, with some of the revenue yield being specifically designated for per capita payments to school districts. The Act also ended local taxation of business personal property. School districts were reimbursed some \$40 million each year to compensate for this loss of money. Lastly, the 1967 legislation enacted a "homesteader's credit" of 35 per cent of the real estate tax up to a \$250 maximum.¹³

Whatever else can be said about the Tax Reform and Relief Act (its deficiencies were much debated in the 1970 gubernatorial election), it did not prevent a steep rise in property taxes. Within a few years the signs of public discontent were everywhere to be read. School districts especially felt the wrath of taxpayers who could not have been unaware of the fact that sharp boosts in teacher salaries translated into higher and higher

mill levies. Board meetings often were jammed with vociferous citizens questioning budget items, and school district officials experienced growing difficulties in winning voter support in bond elections.¹⁴ Many state political leaders undoubtedly shared the estimate made by State Planning Agency Director, Gerald Christenson, who recalled that:

We couldn't have continued on as we were--there would have been an explosion in Minnesota, a backlash which I think would have greatly damaged education in this state. You could see it coming: In Bloomington there were over 1,000 irate taxpayers who showed up at a school board meeting to insist that the school costs be cut; in western Minnesota serious efforts took place to organize a taxpayers' revolt.¹⁵

Taxpayer anger, in itself, does not constitute a clear-cut policy issue. Countless definitions of "the problem" can be sensibly advanced and proposed solutions can vary from simple tax relief or spending limit schemes to those which urge fundamental reforms of the fiscal system. Indeed, popular rancor with taxes has not infrequently been diverted into status and race politics. What is crucial, then, in policy making is the way that a problem comes to be delineated and the kind of issue definition which receives wide acceptance by the public. Political conflict, as Schattschneider has observed, often is over "what the issue is," and to control this definitional matter is to control in a very basic way the eventual policy outcome.¹⁶

In Minnesota, the combined issue of taxes and school finance took shape during the 1970 campaign for Governor. Both candidates--Wendell R. Anderson, a DFL Senator from St. Paul, and Douglas E. Head, the Republican Attorney General--sought from the outset to find a politically viable tax posture. Anderson, in particular, stressed the need for "real" tax relief and he derided the 1967 law for its shortcomings in this regard. The school foundation aid program did not surface publicly as a concomitant of the tax question until the middle of the campaign. This combination occurred

not as a result of candidate initiative, but because the prestigious Citizens League took several actions to which both Anderson and Head felt they had to respond.

In the summer of 1970, the Citizens League issued a report on "New Formulas for Revenue Sharing In Minnesota," a report that concentrated on the distribution of revenue, rather than on the mechanisms for raising it.¹⁷ (The Citizens League had authored a 1969 study on the property tax base in the Twin Cities area.) Its recommendations were numerous, but emphasis was placed on the need to expand state support for elementary-secondary education "up to the average per pupil unit operating expenditure in each region" and to devise a more equitable basis for the allocation of foundation aid. In this connection, the League proposed that extra assistance be given to districts with socioeconomic disadvantaged pupils, and that more accurate indices be found for measuring a district's financial ability and its revenue-raising effort.

The Citizens League not only prepared a report, but also provided a forum for the two gubernatorial candidates to state their views on the school finance issue. The chronology of events, according to one close observer, was as follows:

The Citizens League report...was issued actually in mid-summer. It did not immediately, at that point, stimulate a large discussion: It was one of a number of proposals known to and discussed by the relatively small group of persons involved with the arcane business of school finance. It became a political issue on October 1, 1970 during and after the Citizens League annual meeting dinner. [The League] had decided to have its annual meeting in St. Paul and--for the program--invite the two candidates for Governor to respond to questions from a panel of very good Citizens League members on major state and metropolitan issues. After some negotiations...both Head and Anderson agreed to appear...and were questioned in a most sophisticated way...In the course of responding to one of the questions, Anderson stated his support for the concept of state assumption of responsibility for

school finance mentioned in the League report...and in some important respects went beyond what was proposed in the League report. The Republicans...met after the session to review Anderson's comments and decided he was vulnerable on the school finance/property tax issue. Their public attack began the next day, and from there on it became the major issue of the gubernatorial campaign.

Why had Anderson chosen to take an advanced position on school finance?

As one of his political advisers remembers it, "the decision to embrace the thrust of the report was not seen by anyone as a major decision."

"This was so," he added, "because Head was also expected to support the main ideas of the Citizens League."¹⁸ Furthermore, the Anderson forces evidently believed that an issue like legislative session reform would have more electoral payoff than school finance. Then came the "bombshell" when Head expressed misgivings about the League's proposal that state government take on a vastly enlarged role in equalizing fiscal resources among school districts. When Anderson suggested that a statewide property tax--replacing, in full or in part, local mill levies--be utilized to fund his plan to more than double state school aid, the verbal battle between him and Head was squarely joined. The Republican candidate vigorously objected to both total state financing and a statewide property tax, predicting that they would lead to big millage increases across the state and the eventual loss of "local control" for school districts. In replying to such arguments, Anderson pledged himself to property tax relief and to resist any attempt to deprive local school boards of their customary authority.¹⁹ Throughout the ensuing barrage of charges and countercharges, it was evident that taxes, not state aid to schools, had primacy. This fact, perhaps more than any other, shaped the process and outcome of the 1971 legislative session.²⁰

While the emergence of the school finance issue had about it the

character of a political accident, there were several factors that seem to have contributed to Anderson's personal receptivity to this issue. First, a few DFL leaders had been concerned for years with the inequities in the foundation formula. Notable among them was Karl Grittner. This DFLer, a high school principal in St. Paul, had capped a long legislative career by serving as Senate Minority Leader from 1966 to 1970. A sponsor-protege relationship had developed between Grittner and Anderson from the time the latter entered the Legislature in 1958 as a fledgling politician. And as Anderson moved to the forefront in DFL party politics, Grittner continued to be a confidant.²¹ Besides counsel from men like Grittner, Anderson was alert to events in other states. Gerald Christenson wrote that:

I asked Governor Anderson how he became committed to the idea that the state ought to provide almost all, or all, of the finances for elementary and secondary schools. He said that he had read an article regarding Governor Milliken's efforts in Michigan to get the state to take over a far greater portion of the educational load of that state and was impressed with the argument. He began to study the situation in Minnesota and saw the tremendous disparities that existed...²²

In any case, actions taken by the Citizens League put the spotlight on the state school aid program, and out of the well-publicized exchanges between the two candidates for Governor the tax-school finance issue took on definition. These events, it should be added, occurred nearly a year before the famous Serrano school finance decision in California.

Developing Policy Alternatives

Wendell Anderson won the election in a convincing fashion (54 per cent of the vote) and began the task of formulating a budget message. If the Governor and his supporters were certain of anything, it was that their campaign pledges had to be honored. Head and other Republican leaders had been declaring for months that Anderson's proposals were so unworkable

that the Governor would be forced to back away from them. This Anderson was determined not to do and in January, 1971, he offered a "Fair School Finance Plan" to the Legislature.

Governor Anderson's proposal recommended major changes in Minnesota's state-local school finance system, including:

- *shifting most of the operating costs of the public schools, K-12, from local property revenues to state nonproperty sources, with the recommended state share being 70 per cent by 1972-73;

- *setting the foundation aid level at \$780 for 1971-72, and \$819 for 1972-73 (the estimated statewide averages), with the deductible EARC millage rate being 40 in the first year and $33\frac{1}{3}$ in the second;

- *raising the minimum pupil unit guarantee to \$215 in 1971-72, but eliminating it thereafter;

- *reducing state aid payments to districts which levied taxes above the foundation-required minimum by as many dollars as these excess taxes raised, but districts could raise additional revenue if voters approved in a referendum;

- *allowing through a "grandfather" clause above-average expenditure districts to tax at whatever millage rate was necessary to maintain their existing expenditures, plus cost-of-living increases;

- *allowing below-average districts to tax at a millage rate that over a six year period would bring them up to the statewide average;

- *giving the cities of Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Duluth additional foundation aid in 1972-73 (not 1971-72) by setting their deductible EARC mills at $28\frac{1}{3}$, not $33\frac{1}{3}$;

- *using per pupil units in ADA, as weighted in 1970-71, to distribute state school aid;

- *eliminating the provisions of the Tax Reform and Relief Act which earmarked school district payments from the sales tax and as reimbursements for districts not being able to tax business personal property.²³

Anderson called for a \$3 billion budget for the biennium. Of this amount, \$762 million represented new money (\$390 million for public elementary and secondary schools), the bulk of which was to be raised by increasing personal

and corporate income taxes, a recommendation that was in accord with the traditional DFL tax posture.²⁴

In preparing the "Fair School Finance Plan," the Governor relied upon a handful of trusted advisers organized into an ad hoc committee. Serving primarily as a source of technical expertise were John Haynes, Staff Assistant to the Governor, and Gerald Christenson, Director of the State Planning Agency. Haynes was particularly knowledgeable in the tax field, while Christenson had recently engaged in school finance research. Offering political insights were several DFL legislators--such as Karl Grittner, Senate Minority Leader until his retirement in 1970, and Martin Sabo, Minority Leader in the House for the 1971 session--as well as the Governor's campaign manager, David Lebedoff.²⁵

In describing policy formulation by the Governor's Office, it is important to note the kinds of individuals who were not involved, as well as those who did take part. Conservative Harvey Sathre, Chairman of the House Education Committee and dominant influence on school finance in previous sessions, was ignored. The role of the State Department of Education was confined to the generation of "raw data," and the Commissioner of Education, Howard Casmey, was not a participant in the main policy decisions. Neither was the State Board of Education. The educational interest groups, with the possible exception of the Minnesota Federation of Teachers, also had little involvement in the development of the Governor's plan.²⁶

All of this represented a significant departure from other sessions in which the House Education Committee, especially its subcommittee on state aids, had drawn up the formula for elementary-secondary school funding within the framework of understandings reached with the various money

committees. Key legislators on the Education Committee, such as Sathre, had worked closely with the State Department of Education in making adjustments to the foundation aid program. S. Walter Harvey, Director of the Section on State Aids, Statistics and Research, was a particularly valued source of information and expert advice. While many interest groups had access to the committees, the Minnesota School Boards Association probably was the most influential; its views being sought on all proposed changes.²⁷ Prior to 1971, then, the House Education Committee functioned as the principal "locus of accommodation" on the school finance issue in Minnesota; its proposals being the ones to which the Legislature paid heed. And the alliance among Committee, bureaucracy, and interest group clientele afforded a good illustration of the sort of triangle that political scientists have discovered to be pervasive in public policy making.

Although the Governor's proposal as translated into various legislative bills set both the fiscal and programmatic agenda for the 1971 session, Minnesota lawmakers were by no means passive in their response to this initiative. At one time during the regular session there were six separate bills dealing with the tax-school aid issue. Five of these bills were in the Senate, one was in the House, and all were active simultaneously. The House measure, sponsored by Representative Sathre, proposed only modest alterations in the foundation program. In the opinion of one reporter:

House Conservatives could not agree on a better aid formula that would avoid cutting the aid given the high-valuation rural districts. So they are proposing the same old approach--the one under which those relatively well-to-do agricultural districts fare best.²⁸

As for property tax relief, the House Conservatives' solution depended on stringent local levy limitations and the "freezing" at 1971 levels of certain financial payments to local governmental units. The Sathre bill

was pushed through the House by the controlling Conservative Caucus and sent on to the Senate.

Of the five bills that originated in the Senate, two were akin to the Sathre proposal, though they did stipulate more aid money. A third finance measure was put forward by Senator Wayne Popham, who carried a bill basically embodying the ideas of the Citizens League. Municipal overburden was a central concern of this proposal. It eventually passed the Senate, but no agreement was reached with the House.

A more radical tax-school finance bill was introduced near the close of the regular session by Conservative Senator, Jerome Blatz, Chairman of the Tax Committee. It recommended that the entire state-local tax structure be overhauled. As an element in this, the bill would have had the state assume both welfare costs and 80 per cent of school expenditures. Largely because of its complexity, the Blatz proposal did not receive much attention from the Senate. Lastly, there was the Governor's bill, sponsored by DFL Senator Gene Mammenga. It, too, met defeat during the regular session of the Legislature.

The four bills that have been mentioned differed in their approach to property tax relief and more equitable school funding. The House Conservative measure emphasized restrictive limitations on local levies and contained only modest provisions for the equalization of tax or expenditure disparities. The other three proposals, while dissimilar from each other in some important respects, all were aimed at shifting more of the school funding burden to nonproperty sources. And all, by recommending increases in the foundation base and deductible millage rate, held forth the likelihood of greater equalization in the financing of elementary-secondary education. Some comparisons among these bills on selected variables are shown in Table 15.

TABLE 15

COMPARISON ON SELECTED VARIABLES AMONG THE MAJOR
SCHOOL FINANCE BILLS IN THE 1971 REGULAR LEGISLATIVE SESSION

Variables.	Sathre Bill	Popham Bill	Blatz Bill	Governor's Bill
<u>Pupil Unit Weighting</u>				
Kindergarten	.5	.5	.5	.5
Elementary	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Secondary	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.4
Area Vocational	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5
AFDC	None	.4	.1	.5
<u>Average Daily Attendance (ADA) or Average Daily Membership (ADM)</u>	ADM	ADM	ADM	ADM
<u>Foundation Base</u>	\$467	\$677 (70-71 Avg.)		\$740
1971 - 72	\$500	\$715 (71-72 Avg. + 5%)		\$780
1972 - 73				
<u>Deductible (EARC) Millage</u>				
1971 - 72	20	50 (70 Levy pbl in 71)		52
1972 - 73	20	33 1/3	1% of Taxable Valuation	33 1/3
<u>Minimum Pupil Unit Guarantee</u>				
1971 - 72	\$141	\$181	None	\$190
1972 - 73	\$164	None	None	None
<u>Amount of State Aid for Biennium Distributed Through Foundation Formula</u>	\$660	\$872	\$733	\$970
	Million	Million	Million	Million

SOURCE: Data obtained from Van D. Mueller, Division of Educational Administration, University of Minnesota, May, 1971.

Mobilization of Support

Each of the school finance measures introduced in the 1971 session attracted some legislative support. Still, the primary line of cleavage on this issue came to lie between adherents of the Governor's plan and those who backed the position taken by the House Conservatives.

Soon after his budget address, Governor Anderson sought to build

grassroots pressure for his proposal by embarking on a speaking tour of the state. Meetings were held with business, labor, civic, and educational leaders. And the "Fair School Financing Plan" received extensive media coverage. This accomplished, Anderson reverted to a low profile stance, giving his capable aides and top DFL lawmakers the task of moving his bills through the Legislature.

The Governor had a potent asset in a talented and aggressive staff. Chief among these aides was John Haynes. A Florida native who came to Minnesota in 1966 in order to pursue graduate study in economics and history, Haynes became the Governor's expert on taxes and schools. In addition, he functioned as liaison to the Legislature, as well as to the Tax Department and to the State Department of Education. Drawing upon the latter sources, along with data generated by the State Planning Agency, Haynes acquired such a substantive and political grasp of the tax-school finance issue that DFL legislators leaned heavily upon him for information and so did more than a few influential Conservatives in the Senate. (It was such a Conservative who remarked to our interviewers that the Governor's tax aide "never gave him a bum steer.") Haynes did more, though, than just furnish information and expert advice. He also was perceived by legislative leaders as a "horse trader," identifying and testing for the Governor possible trade-offs.²⁹

Party solidarity was another resource commanded by the Governor. Even though the DFL in the past had been torn by bitter factional fights--for instance, Humphrey versus McCarthy in 1968--its state lawmakers, with rare exceptions, stayed unified behind Anderson throughout the protracted legislative struggle. To some extent this unity was due to the minority status of DFL legislators. The Conservatives held a margin of one vote

In the Senate (34-33) and five votes (70-65) in the House in the 1971 session. The DFL, therefore, had to stick together if they were to have much prospect of success. Also, many DFLers were newcomers to the Legislature; anxious to make an impression and responsive to gubernatorial leadership. Finally, Governor Anderson and his staff held frequent meetings with DFL legislators. In these meetings the technical and political facets of the Governor's program were explained and justified. Moreover, according to one participant, "DFL legislators had the opportunity to yell and scream at each other out of the sight of TV and news cameras."³⁰

While maintaining party discipline was crucial to the Anderson forces, it alone could never have gotten a bill through the Legislature. Thus, the situation which had evolved in the Senate was of equal significance. Many of the Conservative stalwarts, who had long dominated the Senate and adamantly resisted changes of the sort proposed by the Governor, had either retired or suffered electoral defeat. Stanley Holmquist had been the Senate Majority Leader since 1967. He was a personal friend of Anderson's and, like many other Conservative Senators, shared the Governor's reformist philosophy. Hence, proposals coming from the Governor's Office often enjoyed considerable bipartisan support in the Senate. This was in marked contrast to the House where the Conservative Caucus was effectively able to frustrate DFLers in getting their tax-school finance reforms passed.

Many educator organizations were aligned with the Governor, but their role in the legislative process appears not to have been very influential. The Minnesota Federation of Teachers did favor more equitable school aid to be financed by a statewide property tax.³¹ And the Minnesota Education Association voiced approval of the Governor's proposal, albeit "with reservations" on the local limitation features.³² Both of the teacher

organizations, however, devoted most of their influence resources to areas such as collective bargaining and a professional standards board, rather than to the school finance issue. As for the State Department of Education, it generated voluminous data on school district taxes and expenditures. An estimated 150 computer runs were printed out for lawmakers during the 1971 session, including continuous bill analyses.³³ Yet the State Department gave no policy direction to the process. The same can be said about the Commissioner of Education, whose role was principally one of enlisting support for the equalization thrust. The State Board of Education was not considered by other participants as having any influence at all on the issue.³⁴ The organizations that added the most political weight to the Governor's side, at least on tax questions, were not the educational interest groups, but were the traditional DFL power bases: the Minnesota AFL-CIO and the Farmers Union.

Spearheading the opposition to the Governor was the Conservative Caucus in the House. Their confrontation had a strong partisan overtone, with some members of the Caucus stating openly that they were going to "break the Governor" politically by thwarting his major programs. But there also were Conservative Representatives--notably Ernest Lindstrom, the Majority Leader of the House--who adhered to a philosophy of fiscal conservatism and who were obviously alarmed by what they saw as a "spend, spend, spend" budget. In fact, Lindstrom traveled from town to town across the state as a one-man "truth squad," proclaiming that the Governor's program for tax relief was a fraud; that "the real dollar saved is the one not spent." Sustained by his caucus, the Majority Leader was determined to trim drastically the Anderson budget and to fix tight limits on local spending. Lastly, there were influential rural legislators such as Harvey Sathre and

Aubrey Dirlam, House Speaker, who were outspoken critics of the Governor's school foundation formula, contending that it unfairly discriminated against the outstate districts which had high-value farm lands but whose residents had modest incomes.³⁵

Antagonisms were evident during the session not only between DFLers and Conservatives in the House, but between the latter and their fellow party members in the Senate. House Conservatives bitterly assailed Senate Conservative leaders, especially Stanley Holmquist, for cooperating with DFLers. Conversely, many Senate Conservatives came to believe that House Conservatives were both unrealistic and intransigent.³⁶

Aside from the House Conservative Caucus, there were other groups that sought to blunt the Governor's policy thrust. The lobbyists for business and banking interests attacked proposals to raise the corporate income tax, claiming that such taxes would drive business firms from the state, inhibit economic expansion, and foster unemployment. Spokesmen for high expenditure school districts were apprehensive about excessive equalization as well as about local levy restrictions. The Minnesota School Boards Association actively, though unofficially, worked against such restrictions, seeing them as a basic threat to the "local control" of schools. And rural-oriented groups expressed suspicion of the urban bias they attributed to Anderson's legislative recommendations.³⁷

Final Enactment

After months of futile regular and special session deliberations on taxes and school finance, an agreement was hammered out in mid-October, 1971, at the Governor's mansion by a ten-member Tax Conference Committee, appointed at Anderson's request by the legislative leadership of both houses. This agreement had sufficient DFL and Conservative backing to

win approval from the Legislature, and it was signed into law by Governor Anderson, who hailed it as a satisfactory compromise.

The legislative road to compromise had been long and tortuous. Following the Governor's budget message in late January, 1971, little happened for some four and one-half months. Then the House Conservatives pushed through the Sathre bill, while the Senate adopted the measure introduced by Wayne Popham. No agreement was reached between the two houses and the Legislature went into special session. Here the House enacted another measure similar to the existing foundation program, plus new and restrictive local expenditure limitations. The Senate passed a "Senate Summit Bill" sponsored by the Conservative leadership and approved by the Governor. A conference committee endorsed the House version and this measure was accepted by a weary Legislature in late July. At this point, the Governor moved dramatically back into the public limelight. He vetoed the Conservative tax bill, castigating it in searing language for its failure to grant tax relief or to remedy gross inequities. Anderson then announced yet another special session of the Legislature. When this session convened, the Tax Conference Committee set to work on a virtually non-stop basis and after seven days a complicated "package" of trade-offs had been put together for final enactment, which came on October 30, 1971.

Unwilling to give in on the tax relief issue, Governor Anderson had drawn upon his formal powers to call special sessions and to veto bills in order to force a legislative situation where a favorable compromise, from his standpoint, was likely to be forthcoming. Conservative lawmakers had no possibility of overriding his veto and each passing day intensified public pressure for a settlement. Time became an especially scarce resource when the State Auditor, a Republican, warned that as of November 15 the

state would run out of money unless a tax measure was adopted.³⁸ Public opinion polls indicated that the Governor's veto had popular support and the House Conservatives' opposition to tax-school finance reform was further undercut by an opinion rendered by U.S. District Judge Miles Lord.

Three suits had been filed in the federal district court in St. Paul. The Minnesota Federation of Teachers, apparently after consulting with the Governor's Office, filed the first. Subsequently, actions were brought by the Van Dusartzes, whose children were students in a suburban (White Bear Lake) school district, and by the Minnesota Real Estate Property Taxpayers Association. No trial was ever held on these suits; hence, no binding ruling was issued. Judge Miles Lord, however, was confronted by a motion for dismissal by the State of Minnesota on the grounds that the inequities which existed were not unconstitutional. In response, he wrote a lengthy memorandum which rejected the motion and advanced the opinion that conditions in Minnesota were essentially like those in California; that such a system "which makes spending per pupil a function of the school district's wealth" violated the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment. Lord concluded by declaring that his court would retain jurisdiction of the case until after the 1971 legislative session.³⁹ Coming as it did in mid-October, at a time when the Tax Conference Committee was meeting, this opinion could only serve to weaken the Conservatives' position.

The sessions of the Tax Conference Committee were held in the privacy of the Governor's mansion in "a sealed-off world where taxes ruled."⁴⁰ Several of Anderson's aides handled the person-to-person bargaining for the Governor, with John Haynes being unusually adept, according to participants, in detecting possible accommodations. The pivotal actor among the ten legislative leaders was Stanley Holmquist. A man of boundless exuberance

and patience, it was Holmquist that other participants credited with holding the group together when tempers became frayed and compromise seemed impossible. Interest groups, educational or otherwise, had little access to the final negotiations. Surprisingly enough, the only one mentioned by legislators as having an impact was the Minneapolis school district whose legislative liaison, through John Haynes, was able to get updated AFDC statistics into the bargaining process.⁴¹ And these figures, as will be discussed, did play a part in the major compromise that was struck on the school finance issue.

While many conflicts had to be overcome in devising a settlement, the principal division on school finance came to be between the big city representatives on one side and those who spoke for outstate districts on the other. The Anderson forces had been arguing for a year that Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Duluth had "special problems"--such as low student density, a high percentage of disadvantaged children, and greater competition for the tax dollar from noneducation services--that warranted extra state aid. In his budget address, Governor Anderson requested that the big cities be given a break on the required EARC tax rate for 1972-73, 28 1/3 mills rather than 33 1/3. An alternative approach was later incorporated in the bill developed by the Governor's Office. This gave each pupil from an AFDC family an additional .5 "weighting" in the foundation formula. It was the latter approach that was at issue during the meetings of the Tax Conference Committee.

Despite the money that would go to poor rural districts from an AFDC provision (only 56 per cent of AFDC children were in the three big cities), many of its legislators insisted on some quid pro quo if they were to accept this urban-oriented provision. Several actions were taken to mollify

the rural interest, the main one being a revision in the agricultural property differential. Minnesota for some forty years had levied a school tax on agricultural lands that was lower by 25 county auditor mills (8 1/3 EARC mills) than the tax rate on other property. But the statutory "ag differential" traditionally had been absorbed by non-farm homeowners and businesses in the district. The differential was retained in the compromise, but the state was required to compensate the district with a direct payment for the revenue that a 25-mill levy would have yielded.⁴²

The main changes in Minnesota's school financing system instituted by the Omnibus Tax Act were these:

1. State aid to schools was substantially increased (to an estimated 65 per cent of current operating costs in the 1972-73 school year). The new foundation formula set state aid equal to \$600 minus 30 EARC mills in 1971-72, and \$750 minus 30 EARC mills in 1972-73. The minimum pupil unit guarantee was set at \$215 for both school years.
2. A "hold harmless" clause was included. This said, essentially, that no district would receive less in 1971-72 than it received in 1970-71, nor less in 1972-73 than it received in 1971-72. Sales tax per capita aid was discontinued as was the reimbursement for exempt business personal property. The tax burden of the "ag differential" was shifted to the state.
3. Aid was provided for districts with children from AFDC families. An extra .5 pupil unit was to be added for all public school children who were from AFDC families.
4. Pupil unit computations were to be based on average daily membership (ADM), not on average daily attendance (ADA).
5. School districts that had declining enrollments were allowed to average old and new enrollment figures.
6. A statewide system of school district levy limitations was established. Districts were prohibited from increasing their per pupil current operating costs more than \$87 per pupil over the 1971-72 and 1972-73 school years. For above-average expenditure districts that amount was to be reduced by the per pupil special education grants received. A school district could exceed these levy limitations if the majority of its voters approved in a referendum.

7. The use of capital outlay funds was restricted, and new limitations were placed on levies for this purpose.⁴³

In Table 16 are reported some comparisons among the provisions of the pre-1971 foundation program, the Governor's original bill, and the Omnibus Tax Act.

TABLE 16

COMPARISON ON SELECTED VARIABLES AMONG THE PRE-1971 STATE SCHOOL AID PROGRAM, THE GOVERNOR'S ORIGINAL BILL, AND OMNIBUS TAX ACT

Variables	Pre-1971 Foundation Program	Governor's Bill	Omnibus Tax Act
<u>Pupil Unit Weighting</u>			
Kindergarten	.5	.5	.5
Elementary	1.0	1.0	1.0
Secondary	1.4	1.4	1.4
Area Vocational	1.5	1.5	1.5
AFDC	None*	.5	.5
<u>Average Daily Membership (ADM) or Average Daily Attendance (ADA)</u>			
	ADA	ADM	ADM
<u>Foundation Base</u>			
1970-71	\$404	-	-
1971-72	-	\$740	\$600
1972-73	-	\$780	\$750
<u>Deductible (EARC) Millage</u>			
1970-71	20	-	-
1971-72	-	52	30
1972-73	-	33 1/3	30
<u>Minimum Pupil Unit Guarantee</u>			
1970-71	\$140	-	-
1971-72	-	\$190	\$210
1972-73	-	None	\$210
<u>Special Equalization Provisions</u>			
	None	Below-average expenditure districts to level up to statewide average after six years	None**

*There was an AFDC payment of some \$500,000 that went almost entirely to Minneapolis and St. Paul.

**The above-average expenditure districts did have to subtract special education payments from their foundation aid payments. The special education grants averaged some \$20 per pupil unit in 1971-72.

An examination of the figures in Table 16 shows that while the Omnibus Tax Act represented a noticeable improvement over the pre-1971 formula, Governor Anderson had made substantial concessions on the issue of equalizing school district expenditures. Compared to the Governor's original bill, the compromise measure established a somewhat lower foundation base and deductible millage rate, as well as a higher minimum pupil unit guarantee, a guarantee that Anderson had recommended be terminated entirely in 1972-73. More important, the Omnibus Tax Act did not contain the Governor's key equalization provision which allowed below-average expenditure districts to bring their spending over a six-year period up to the statewide average. Consequently, the expenditure disparities among Minnesota school districts were not much different in 1971-72 or 1972-73 from what they had been in 1970-71. Indeed, the author of one study found "the importance of property wealth in determining the level of expenditures actually increased between fiscal 1971 and 1972."⁴⁴ And a second report concluded that "the new funding system has not greatly reduced disparities in school district maintenance revenues...districts that had relatively low maintenance revenues in 1970-71 continue to have them in 1972-73."⁴⁵

From the vantage point of the taxpayer, the 1971 compromise brought more far-reaching changes. Governor Anderson did have to act counter to the DFL's historic opposition to the sales tax, not to mention his own campaign promise, when he accepted an increase in the tax from three to four per cent. (It might be noted, however, that the Minnesota sales tax excludes food, clothing, and drugs.) This provided some 26 per cent of the \$581 million net increase in the \$2.8 billion state budget. But over a third of the new money came from raising the personal income tax, and another 25 per cent was derived from corporate income or bank excise taxes.⁴⁶

Both of these increases came from the revenue sources which Anderson had stressed in his budget address.

The effect of the tax changes was a pronounced shift in the revenue-raising burden away from residential property and toward income or income-related purchases. The boost in state school aid, coupled with uniform limitations on district tax levies, not only halted the escalation of property taxes, but also made for a noticeable reduction. School mills for the state went down by 18.7 per cent between fiscal 1971 and 1972, while the average total mill rate dropped by 11.4 per cent.⁴⁷ And there was a substantial leveling across districts of millage rates for operating costs.⁴⁸ In respect to taxes, then, if not the equalization of school district expenditures, the Omnibus Tax Act could rightly be judged a success.⁴⁹

Concluding Observations

Reviewing the events which culminated in the Omnibus Tax Act of 1971 gives rise to several observations. The first concerns the imprint of the "taxpayers' revolt." The popular demand for curbing property taxation was both the impetus for reform and the essential backdrop against which legislative bargaining was undertaken. The "costing out" of competing bills became, as a State Department publication noted, "critical in obtaining support, adopting or eliminating educational provisions, or compromising between educational and non-educational programs."⁵⁰ Unsurprisingly, the final compromise was oriented toward property tax relief, rather than the equalization of school district spending. The discrepancy in public saliency between these two concerns would hardly have permitted any other kind of political result.

A second and related observation is that the politicalization of school finance, as a consequence of its becoming intertwined with the tax

issue, radically altered the way in which legislation was enacted in this area. The old triangle of policy influence comprised of the House Education Committee, the State Department of Education, and the educational interest groups was bypassed in the 1971 session and these actors were relegated to the periphery of the decision process. New and powerful participants, such as the Governor and legislative leaders, and different governmental structures, such as the House and Senate Tax Committees, exercised predominant influence. And, for the first time, "trade-offs were made between educational and non-educational programs, instead of strictly between education programs."⁵¹

A third observation has to do with the crucial role of the Governor's Office in state policy making. Legislative and bureaucratic initiative had produced modest, incremental changes in the foundation aid program. But without the full commitment of the influence resources of the Governor, it is hard to see how a breakthrough in school finance could have been accomplished, unless it had been mandated by the courts. Anderson and his staff were central to the process from the time the issue was defined to the point where a compromise settlement was negotiated. This does not mean, however, that the Governor's proposals could not have been defeated or drastically modified elsewhere in the legislative system. Even if the leadership of this official was necessary to institute major changes in state fiscal policy, it was not sufficient, especially in light of the divided government which prevailed in Minnesota. Without bipartisan support in the Senate and concessions to the House Conservatives, there would not have been reform legislation.

Judicial intervention in state school finance programs is a final point that warrants mention. Speaking generally, the courts have been

policy innovators, forcing lawmakers in many states to consider how the Constitutional standard of equal protection might be met by their state school aid programs. There also was such a case in Minnesota (Van Dusartz v. Hatfield) where the Serrano principle of "fiscal neutrality" was proclaimed. Yet the judge's opinion came very late in the process and did not constitute a ruling on the facts. It probably was no more than a contributing factor in the House Conservatives' eventual willingness to compromise. Certainly, it cannot be said that Minnesota achieved tax and school finance reform only, or even primarily, because of judicial compulsion. This reform came, instead, as a result of the operation of the political process.

Legislative Postscript

In 1973 the question of school finance again confronted Minnesota lawmakers. In this session there was little of the acrimony witnessed in 1971. The DFL was firmly in control of both the House and the Senate. Moreover, the school aid bill was not treated, as it had been in the preceding session, as part of the larger tax-fiscal package. The major changes enacted by the Legislature represented, essentially, an extension of those accomplished two years earlier--with the emphasis being placed on equalization of local district expenditures and greater responsiveness to educational need. As summarized by one official, the Legislature took the following actions with respect to school finance:

1. Increased the per pupil unit (elementary = 1.0 units, high school = 1.4 units) support to \$788 in 1973-74, \$820 in 1974-75, and \$860 in 1975-76, minus a local levy of 30 equalized mills each year.
2. Enacted a six-year plan to bring up expenditures in districts spending below the state mandated aid figure at the rate of one-sixth of the amount below the state aid figure the first

year, one-third the second, one-half the third, two-thirds the fourth, five-sixths the fifth year and to equality in the sixth year.

3. Created an additional pupil unit weighted for students from AFDC families as an index of a district's educational overburden to provide for .85 pupil unit additional weighting in districts of 10% concentration of AFDC students, .7 pupil units additional in 8% to 10% concentration, .6 pupil units additional weighting in 5% to 8% concentration, and .5 pupil units additional weighting in districts below 5%.
4. Provided a new additional .25 pupil unit weighting to additional students in districts growing faster than 4% a year.
5. Provided for a loss of pupil units of only 50% of the total in declining districts to cushion fiscal effects of falling enrollments.
6. Eliminated the disequalizing minimum or flat grant aid.
7. Set up a new equalization formula for transportation aids much like the operating costs formula of 1971, whereby each district levies one equalized mill and the state pays 100% of transportation costs above what the one mill brings in.
8. Partially equalized the "capital outlay" property levy used for renovation and minor construction.
9. Continued strict 30 equalized mills levy limit on school districts unless a referendum approves an increase. (Only 6 out of 438 districts have tried a referendum to raise operating levies outside the state aid formula in the two years since the new school aid law was adopted in 1971. Only one passed.) The 1973 amendments enacted a program slowly reducing the fixed "grandfather" levy allowed high cost districts which were spending above the state mandated aid figure when the equalization law was adopted in 1971.⁵²

Of the school finance changes instituted in the 1973 session, the most important was the six-year plan to bring the low expenditure districts up to the statewide average (see point two above). Governor Anderson had been forced to put aside this proposal to effect a compromise in 1971. But at his request the equalization plan was back before the Legislature in 1973, and this time it was enacted. As for educational need, a modification

of substantial consequence, particularly for Minneapolis and St. Paul, was the additional weighting in the foundation formula for concentrations of pupils from AFDC families (see point three above). In total, the 1973 legislation made over \$1.3 billion available for education for the biennium, an amount that was more than double the state support figure for the 1969-71 biennium.⁵³

Desegregation Regulations (1973)

School desegregation has been a policy question before the Minnesota State Board of Education for more than six years. Beginning with a vague pronouncement in 1967, the State Board gradually moved toward establishing a set of binding directives. And on September 10, 1973, desegregation regulations, which have the force of law, were adopted by these officials. Even though this policy decision was a long time in being enacted and was disappointing to some integration proponents in terms of its restricted scope, the action did signify that Minnesota was prepared to use legal sanctions to end racial desegregation in the public schools. To understand how the state came to accept this responsibility requires that some attention first be given to the nature and extent of school segregation in Minnesota.

Segregation in Minnesota Schools

In 1970, less than one per cent of Minnesota's population was composed of black citizens, a smaller percentage than all but nine states. Of these 34,868 citizens, the vast majority lived in Minneapolis (19,005) and St. Paul (10,930).¹ As in other American cities, the black population in the Twin Cities was concentrated in a few neighborhoods. In Minneapolis, for instance, the number of blacks rose by 61 per cent from 1960 to 1970. Yet, notwithstanding this influx and some dispersion, the dominant picture revealed by 1970 census tracts was that of a city with two pockets of black inhabitants, one in the near-north and the other in south Minneapolis.² Similar concentrations were found in St. Paul.

Patterns of residential segregation were mirrored in the racial composition of neighborhood-based elementary and secondary schools. In 1970,

the syndicated columnist, James J. Kilpatrick, pointed to the treatment that the South had been receiving from the federal courts on the desegregation issue and picked Minneapolis-St. Paul as an illustration of racial imbalance in the North:

During the past school year, some 68,000 pupils attended the 101 schools of Minneapolis. Of these, 5,500 pupils, or 8.1 per cent were black pupils. But it is a remarkable thing. The great bulk of these black pupils of Minneapolis were concentrated in a handful of schools--at Hay, Bethune, Willard, and Field Elementary Schools, at Lincoln and Bryant Junior High Schools and at Central and North High Schools.

Meanwhile--horrible to contemplate--such elementary schools in Minneapolis as Morris Park and Lowell were lily white. Minnehaha had one black child in an enrollment of 516, Putnam had one in 455, Corcoran had seven in 667. At Jordan Junior High, there were two blacks among 1,200. At Roosevelt High School, Judge Summer found 15 blacks in a student body of 2,331.

The situation was the same last year in neighboring St. Paul. Monroe Junior and Senior High School, for example, reported not a single black student in an enrollment of 1,037. Seven elementary schools--Van Buren, Sibley, Grant, Adams, Whittier, Deane and Gordon--counted white children, 3,020; and black children, one.³

Kilpatrick's statistics were accurate. Still, racial segregation in Twin City schools was not as extensive as that found in many big city districts. Rossell has constructed several measures of the degree of desegregation in schools. One of these is an adaptation of the famous Taeuber Index. It represents the minimum per cent of black pupils who would have to be transported, if no white students were moved, to produce the same percentage of blacks in each school as in the district as a whole. In the fall of 1971, both Minneapolis (66.6 per cent) and St. Paul (50.9 per cent) would have had to reassign more than half their black pupils to have achieved a perfect score on this index. Despite their utility, it is impossible to determine from Taeuber scores what school districts intentionally did to achieve them. Rossell, therefore, employed other indices: (1) per cent of black pupils moved for desegregation

purposes; (2) per cent of white pupils "reverse integrated"; and (3) per cent of schools involved in desegregation action. The scores for Minneapolis and St. Paul, as well as for the median district in a sample of 91 city school districts in the North, East, and West, are reported in Table 17. They suggest that while the Twin Cities had done little in the way of school desegregation during the period from 1964 to the fall of 1971, most other city districts outside the South had done even less.

TABLE 17

MINNEAPOLIS AND ST. PAUL COMPARED ON DIFFERENT MEASURES OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION WITH THE AVERAGE (MEDIAN) OF NINETY-ONE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICTS OUTSIDE THE SOUTH

Measure	Minneapolis	St. Paul	Median District
School District Taeuber Index	66.6%	50.9%	56.5%
Blacks Moved for Desegregation Purposes, 1964-71	9.7%	6.8%	2.1%
Whites "Reverse Integrated," 1964-71	0%	0%	0%
Schools Involved in Desegregation Action, 1964-71	16.1%	24.7%	5.7%

SOURCE: Christine H. Rossell, "Measuring School Desegregation," in David J. Kirby, et al., Political Strategies in Northern School Desegregation (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath, 1973), pp. 181-188.

Besides Minneapolis and St. Paul, there is one other city of the first class in Minnesota, and that is Duluth. This Lake Superior port city had approximately 100,000 residents in 1970 of which some two or three per cent were non-white. There were just 268 black pupils in the Duluth school system, along with 390 Indians, 74 Orientals, and 56 Spanish-surnamed students. Only one of its elementary schools had a racial minority in excess of 30 per cent. Five additional schools, however, had student enrollments containing more than 30 per cent low income combined with minority pupils, a fact of central importance in the desegregation controversy which erupted

in that city in the early 1970s.⁴

The other large minority population in Minnesota consists of American Indians. The 1970 census showed that 23,128 Indians resided in the state, an increase of 7,632 over the 1960 figure. According to the census, most Indians lived on reservations in the northern part of the state; just 5,829 resided in Minneapolis and 1,906 in St. Paul.⁵ These figures, it should be noted, were challenged by Will Antell, the Minnesota State Director of Indian Education. In Antell's opinion, there were probably some 15,000 Indians in Minneapolis and St. Paul alone in 1972. He estimated the Indian school enrollment in Minneapolis at 2,500, in St. Paul at 750, and in Duluth at 500.⁶

Defining the Issue

In January of 1967, the State Board of Education took the first step in developing a school desegregation policy. It did so by approving a one-page statement on racial imbalance and discrimination. Racial imbalance was loosely defined as existing in a school when the number of non-white pupils was "substantial." Local districts, upon identifying this situation, were asked to "take all reasonable steps" to correct it. Yet neither reporting procedure nor penalties for non-compliance were prescribed, omissions that made the declaration mere rhetoric rather than authoritative policy.⁷

The State Board's initial statement was formulated in the context of an active civil rights movement, a movement that reached its zenith in Minnesota in the mid-1960s and that claimed among its achievements the creation of a State Department of Human Rights in 1967. (Minnesota was the first state to establish such a department.) But in the recollection

of then-Commissioner of Education, Duane Mattheis, civil rights pressures on the State Board were not intense and they were not the main reason for its desegregation decision. In his view, the Board members, along with the Commissioner, were basically "self-initiated." These officials perceived a problem--Minneapolis, in particular, had experienced some outbreak of racial tensions--and they felt that the state had a duty to proclaim a policy stand. This stand, though, was tempered by their belief, according to Mattheis, that the problem was relatively minor in scope, de facto in origins, and best left to local districts for resolution.⁸ Later, when an Equal Educational Opportunities Section (EEO), federally funded through the 1964 Civil Rights Act, was set up within the State Department of Education, its primary function was to furnish technical assistance to school districts. The desegregation push coming from the state, then, was minimal during the period from 1967 to 1969.

In February of 1969, the EEO asked for and received permission from the Commissioner of Education to revise the 1967 declaration. Members of EEO, notably its director, Archie Holmes, had found this pronouncement to be inadequate as a set of guidelines, let alone as directive policy. The Commissioner, at Holmes' request, appointed a 15-man committee to assist EEO in reworking the document. One thorny problem was the sanction to be applied to districts that refused to comply. At the suggestion of the Commissioner it was decided to recommend the withholding of federal funds from recalcitrant districts.⁹

The policy proposal was on the meeting agenda of the State Board in July, 1969. In the judgment of one State Department official, the rural members, six of the nine on the Board, "did not take us very seriously; they simply saw no great problem in Minnesota." The clause on withholding

federal funds did provoke lengthy discussion, with the Board expressing doubt as to whether it possessed such legal power. The proposal was rejected on these grounds, and EEO was told to check the authority question with both the U.S. Justice Department, and the Assistant Attorney General of Minnesota. Their lawyers advised an examination of the statutes to see if state school aid, as opposed to federal funds, could be withheld. Since Minnesota law did have this provision for non-compliance with Board regulations (Minnesota Statute, 1967, 124.15), the EEO and the 15-man committee proceeded to draft such regulations pertaining to desegregation and submitted these to the State Board in October, 1969. The proposal was accepted by the State Board for a public hearing held in November, 1969.¹⁰

The proposed regulations were aimed at "the elimination of racial segregation in the Minnesota public schools." Segregation was defined with some precision both for "minority students" and for "certificated minority personnel." Where racial segregation existed it was the duty of the local school board to prepare a desegregation plan, to submit it to the Commissioner for approval, and to implement the plan in accordance with a fixed schedule. While school districts were given leeway in the specific desegregation techniques to be utilized in the plan, it was stipulated in the proposal that "busing to achieve desegregation should not be restricted to minority students." Reporting procedures also were set forth. Finally, the penalty for non-compliance was a reduction in state school aid.¹¹

The public hearing was packed with irate citizens. "They overflowed the auditorium to fill the halls," said one official.¹² Speaker after speaker berated the State Board, with the specter of two-way busing evoking the most angry comment. A petition against the regulations containing some 7000 names was presented. From the standpoint of the Board, opposition

seemed to come from all quarters, ranging from neighborhood school defenders and racial "separatists" to state legislators. "There were only one or two individuals, such as the head of NAACP, who were completely in favor of the way the regulations stood at that time," recalled one Board member.¹³ Beset by such vocal protests, and with little visible civil rights activity to buttress its stand, the State Board decided not to go forward with desegregation regulations. Yet it did not retreat from the issue. Instead, the rural majority on the Board, for perhaps the first time, came to share the appraisal of their urban colleagues that school segregation was a serious problem in Minnesota one to which they personally would have to give much attention.¹⁴

Several forces had combined to make school desegregation a state-level issue in Minnesota. The original impetus was from the State Department of Education, more specifically from the EEO headed by Archie Holmes, with early encouragement coming from Board members who resided in the big cities. These individuals were not pressured by civil rights groups, which were largely moribund at this time, into taking a pro-desegregation stance. There were signs, though, that the State Department of Human Rights might institute litigation against one of the big city districts, and the St. Paul school system was being threatened with a suit from that city's Human Rights Commission.¹⁵ Even so, the action of the state education officials seems best explained in terms of their conviction that school segregation was legally suspect, educationally harmful, and morally wrong.¹⁶ Further, the small size of the minority populations in the Twin Cities and Duluth, compared with other big cities, gave State Board members hope that school segregation in Minnesota was a manageable problem. But their policy thrust encountered widespread resistance at the public hearing, and from that

point on state-mandated school desegregation was an issue that generated emotional, albeit sporadic, public controversy.

Formulating the Alternatives

From the time of the November hearing, school desegregation was a personal interest to members of the State Board. They became increasingly knowledgeable in the legal, technical, and educational aspects of the problem as EEO supplied them with both a continuous flow of written information and the advice of outside consultants. The latter included such recognized experts as Thomas Pettigrew, a social psychologist from Harvard, and Neil Sullivan, then-school superintendent in Berkeley, California.¹⁷ The State Board also appointed a "blue-ribbon" Task Force on Equality of Educational Opportunity.

The Task Force was made up of 67 people representing a broad spectrum of leadership in education, civil rights, politics, business, labor, and minority affairs.¹⁸ While its official charge was to restudy and possibly extend the scope of proposed desegregation regulations, the unofficial function of the Task Force was clearly to expand popular support and legitimation for these regulations. It divided into three groups whose sessions were lively and far-reaching, involving discussions of inter-cultural education and socioeconomic, as well as racial, integration.¹⁹ In April of 1970, the Task Force made reports to the State Board.

Not all of the Task Force proposals were acceptable to the Board. These officials particularly disliked a recommendation which called for a floor, as well as a ceiling, on minority-group enrollment in defining a segregated school. The politics of requiring a minimum number of minority pupils in every school of a district must have troubled Board members,

along with their stated belief that such dispersion would tend to isolate these pupils and run counter to an effective inter-cultural education program.²⁰ In any event, a special committee of Board members was set up to work with the Commissioner and EEO in drafting a desegregation policy.

As the desegregation document was being prepared, two important choices were made. The first involved an expansion of the concept of segregation to embrace a socioeconomic as well as a racial definition. At least one person on the State Board had been urging such an approach, and it had been a topic of consideration in some Task Force meetings. But, according to a Board member, the "theoretical basis" for social class desegregation came mainly from research findings presented by the outside consultants, especially the peer group effects emphasized in the Coleman Report; and the "action-oriented base" came from the Duluth situation where school administrators had completed a survey indicating that schools with a large percentage of low socioeconomic status children did not achieve at nearly the level of other schools in the district.²¹ Moreover, the small percentage of minority-group students in Duluth meant that if real desegregation were to occur in this city, it would have to take place across social class lines. Whatever the precise origin of the socioeconomic concern, it was one to which the Board became committed, in spite of the reluctance of some EEO professionals who were worried that it would "dilute" the effort to attain racial desegregation in the Twin Cities and would pose enormous problems in identifying low-income children.²²

The second choice of importance was the decision not to press for regulations, but to formulate in their place a set of desegregation guidelines for school districts. Board members were dubious about the extent of public support for regulations and anticipated enforcement difficulties.

These officials also were distressed by the fact that their principal sanction--withholding state aid--was almost certain to be applied to the big city districts, districts which Board members saw as having severe problems, and hence a critical need for financial assistance. This seemed to them to be a situation, one member explained, "of cutting off our nose to spite our face."²³

On November 9, 1970, the State Board approved a "policy statement on the leadership role for the Department of Education and the Board of Education in providing equal educational opportunity." This statement proclaimed that no challenge was more urgent than the necessity of "assuring the fullest possible education of all students, regardless of their racial, cultural, or socioeconomic background." To do this, the State Board directed the State Department of Education to "assume greater leadership" in the following areas: "(a) curriculum provisions, (b) instructional materials, (c) teacher training, (d) school administration, and (e) legislative proposals."²⁴

The following month the State Board adopted guidelines that asked local districts to desegregate their schools voluntarily. A segregated school was defined as "a public school which has a student body consisting of 30 per cent or more minority-group students, or 30 per cent or more students from low-income families." (By "low-income family" it was meant one whose total income was less than \$3,000 a year, or one receiving more than a \$3,000 income under the AFDC program.) The guidelines suggested a variety of desegregation techniques, such as busing pupils, altering attendance boundaries, constructing new schools, developing cooperative programs with other districts, and hiring minority staff members. Each school district was requested to set up an advisory commission on

inter-cultural education. The guidelines further instructed all districts to submit the relevant racial and socioeconomic data about their student populations to the Commissioner of Education by March 15 and December 15, 1971, and by the latter time every subsequent year. It was the duty of the Commissioner to notify the districts which had segregated schools and they were to have 90 days to file desegregation plans, implementation of which were to be accomplished within two years. Lastly, the Commissioner was to make a report on non-compliance, accompanied by his recommendations, to the State Board and to the local school board.²⁵

Although the EEO staff drafted the guidelines and outside experts, as well as a "blue-ribbon" task force, had input during their evolution, it was the State Board that gave active direction to the process. And it was this body that made choices as to its content in such crucial areas as the definition of school segregation. After some early hesitation, Commissioner Howard Casmey, who was appointed in February, 1970, became a forceful public advocate of school desegregation. Yet in no sense was the State Board ever a rubber stamp for his views. The available evidence supports the assessment given by a Board member who stated:

On this particular issue the State Board has been in control most of the way along. Certainly, we listened to the public, the State Department staff, and the Commissioner. And we directed the Commissioner to work closely with local school districts. There was a kind of mutual understanding here. But I think the State Board really was in charge of this. It wanted to pursue the issue. I don't think there was any time when its members wanted to back off from the integration issue.²⁶

This Board member did acknowledge that the initial push had come from the EEO, and that its professional staff continued not only to supply information, but also to be a "good conscience" for the Board.

Mobilization of Support

A basic problem which faced the State Board of Education was to mobilize sufficient support to accomplish its desegregation policy. Even though public protest had caused these officials to halt their attempt to effect a binding decision and to begin the effort at state direction with voluntary guidelines, the State Board did have several means of exerting influence. First, and most fundamental, it had a legal basis for taking strong action, including the reduction of state aid. Minnesota law authorized the State Board to make and enforce administrative regulations. (Minnesota Statute 121.11) And this law further stipulated that "state aid...shall be used... (1) To assist in providing equal educational opportunities for all school children of the state..." (Minnesota Statute 124.66)²⁷ But it must be reiterated that the authority of the State Board was entirely statutory, a legal condition that rendered its authority vulnerable to legislative modification or elimination.

A second resource that the State Board possessed was the commitment to school desegregation of the Commissioner of Education and the EEO Section. Primarily through the efforts of these administrators, Board members became well informed about such diverse facets of the subject as research findings, court cases, and district enrollment patterns. Commissioner Casmey, along with Archie Holmes of EEO, also addressed various groups throughout the state, explaining and justifying the Board's position. Some EEO staffers did have private doubts about the socioeconomic component of the desegregation approach, and undoubtedly there were State Department personnel who were displeased by agency involvement with any aspect of this issue.²⁸ Nevertheless, the State Board and the State Department, on the whole, worked harmoniously in fashioning a desegregation policy.

Another important asset for the State Board was its own internal unity. Despite a considerable turnover in Board membership, with a Republican majority being replaced by one with a DFL affiliation, these officials voted unanimously on all major desegregation decisions.²⁹ If there had been a public split into rival factions on this issue, factions that could have served as spokesmen and rallying points for conflicting viewpoints, the controversy might have grown so emotion-laden that the Board would have become immobilized in trying to reach a decision. Instead, Board members were able to maintain a united front in responding to criticism.

As for the alignment of interest groups, even during the public hearing of November, 1969, the State Board was not wholly without backing. There were, of course, long-time champions of school desegregation such as the NAACP, Urban League, and liberal religious organizations. Notwithstanding the loss of momentum and the fragmentation which afflicted the civil rights movement in the late 1960s, it retained many adherents, and by 1972 their support for Board policy had become increasingly visible. Additionally, there were two community-based organizations which were determined and energetic proponents of desegregating schools: the Committee for Integrated Education (CIE) in Minneapolis and the Parents for Integrated Education (PIE) in St. Paul. The teacher organizations, at least their human relations sections, also were supportive, although the desegregation issue for these organizations held a low priority compared with other state-level policy interests.³⁰

Board members were sensitive to the need for broad-based support. Their appointment of a "blue-ribbon" task force was partly a stratagem for enlisting such backing. Its composition reflected a desire to couple the appearance of representativeness with the legitimacy coming from the

involvement of community influentials. And, as will be pointed out, the desegregation resolutions that eventually were promulgated contained several changes incorporated by the Board to reconcile the concerns of different groups. If expressions of approval at public hearings are a valid indicator, then Board efforts met with considerable success. The atmosphere at the July, 1973, hearing was much more positive than its predecessor, held in December, 1972, which in turn represented, from the Board's perspective, a decided improvement over the initial hearing in November of 1969.³¹

While commanding several resources relevant to its task of mobilizing public support, the State Board was endeavoring with school desegregation to set policy on an issue of enormous political sensitivity. Integration as an ideal may be attractive to most Americans. Yet a number of specific desegregation techniques, especially busing, are quite unpopular. The prospect of "forced" (or "massive" or "cross-town") busing aroused the apprehensions of many Minnesotans. "Neighborhood school" groups sprang up in the Twin Cities and in Duluth. And busing came to head the agenda of conservative political organizations like the Taxpayers Party (T Party) in Minneapolis, an organization which helped make busing "the issue" in the 1971 mayoralty and school board races in that city.³²

State legislators from Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Duluth reacted to the anti-desegregation sentiment. Some lawmakers communicated their disapproval, either privately or in public forums, to the State Board. In the 1971 legislative session there were anti-busing proposals, bills to restructure the Minneapolis school board, and talk about curbing the regulatory authority of the State Board of Education. These were not translated into law, but they did indicate attitudes prevalent in the

Legislature. The effect of these "rumblings," as one Board member termed them, is hard to gauge. Persons on the Board claimed that legislator displeasure was of no consequence for their decisions.³³ But some onlookers argued that the State Board intentionally timed its actions so that controversial steps would not be taken while the Legislature was in session.³⁴ Clearly, the State Board had almost no means to reach legislators in ways that counted. There was no informal network of mutual debts and obligations linking Board members to the Legislature. While state legislators might not have had a significant impact on the decision making of the Board, its members had virtually no political "clout" with these lawmakers which might have been used to enlist their support for a desegregation policy.³⁵

The State Board and EEO did succeed in having the 1971 Legislature fund a bill for human relations training in the Twin Cities and Duluth (\$415,000) and for those districts with a high concentration of Indian pupils (\$75,000).³⁶ But the State Board legislative recommendations for the 1973 session in the area of school desegregation fell on deaf ears, even though the Legislature was controlled by the DFL. As described by a Board member:

We were not able to pass the Incentive Integration bill. We wanted money [\$4 million] for those school districts that would desegregate and we got nowhere. We wanted additional money for the human relations training bill, passed in the previous session, and there was no money for that. No legislator was in the forefront saying, 'this is a great issue, we must support it.'³⁷

The State Board, at least its DFL members, did have some standing with Governor Anderson for they were his appointees. The Governor said little publicly on the desegregation question other than a few statements to

*A "human relations component" became required in Minnesota after July, 1973, for all programs leading to certification in education.

the effect that open housing rather than extensive busing was the best answer to racial segregation in Minnesota. And in the public hearing held in December, 1972, a letter from the Governor opposing "mandatory busing to achieve racial balance in our schools" was read into the record. Such anti-busing rhetoric notwithstanding, Anderson apparently approved the State Board's general handling of the issue. He certainly appointed some individuals to the Board who were known for their civil rights advocacy, and in the judgment of one such member:

The Governor stood his ground on this one. At least, he never suggested in any way that we should water down what we're doing; that we should tread easily or warily; or that we should postpone what we had to do or do it later; and so on. He just wanted to make sure that we knew what we were going to do, and that this was not something that would produce a split vote on the Board.³⁸

But this picture of gubernatorial support is probably overdrawn. Several Board members implied that fairly regular meetings were held in 1972-73 between the DFL majority on the Board and the Governor's Office, and that the upshot of these meetings was that the State Board should soften, if not completely abandon, its stand on the socioeconomic dimension of school desegregation.³⁹ "That was always an important factor in our consideration of the socioeconomic aspect," said one such official, "that the Governor's Office felt that we were exceeding our authority to move into this area."⁴⁰ Other observers believed that politics, rather than legality, was at the root of Anderson's reluctance, particularly since the areas that would be most affected, like Duluth, were DFL strongholds.⁴¹

Aside from the Legislature and Governor, there were other state, as well as federal, officials whose actions regarding school desegregation were of interest to the State Board. One of these was the State Department of Human Rights. In the opinion of one of the Human Rights officials, the

State Board felt:

that the Department [of Human Rights] is really letting the Board down. What they want us to do is to come into a public hearing and say that if the State Board doesn't pass the regulations the way they were originally adopted, we would take the Board to court. Board members would have something, then, to fall back on; they could go back to their people and say, 'if we don't desegregate we are faced with a law suit.'⁴²

The State Department of Human Rights, added the official, was never willing to go this far; the most it did was "kind of intimate during an open hearing what the Department might do--that is, bring a law suit."⁴³ The federal government was another influence resource that the State Board could not count upon. Quite the contrary, the anti-busing speeches of President Nixon undermined the Board's position and contributed to members feeling that they "were really going alone!" in terms of federal encouragement.⁴⁴

A source of support or opposition that was of paramount concern to the State Board were the three big city school districts. Their relationships with that body, however, are best considered as factors in the State Board's decision to transform its guidelines into authoritative policy by the passage of regulations.

Enactment of Desegregation Regulations

The guidelines approved in December of 1970 concluded with the warning that if the State Board's "expectations" were not realized, it "may consider the adoption of rules or regulations."⁴⁵ The responses by the Twin Cities and Duluth school districts during 1971 fell short of meeting these expectations, and by November of that year EEO was again requesting that a Board committee be formed to work with its staff in translating the guidelines into regulations.

The Duluth Response. The State Board had remained encouraged for some

time by developments in the Duluth school district. Its Superintendent, Donald Peckenpaugh, and Assistant Superintendent, Dick Pearson, were persuaded that children of different social class as well as racial backgrounds should be brought together in schools. Surveys conducted by the district (see Table 18) indicated that Duluth elementary schools with a high percentage of pupils from minority and/or low-income families, notwithstanding their larger per pupil expenditures and equivalent teacher-pupil ratios, had significantly lower median achievement scores than did its other elementary schools.

TABLE 18

SCHOOL EXPENDITURES AND SOCIAL CLASS VERSUS STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT IN SIX DULUTH ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS (1971)

	PER PUPIL EXPENDITURE	TEACHER/PUPIL RATIO	% MINORITY OR AFDC	MEDIAN PERCENTILE SCORES ON STANDARDIZED ACHIEVEMENT TESTS. (NATIONAL MEDIAN SCORE IS 50).			
				GRADE 3	4	5	6
Congdon Park	\$761	29.0	1.65%	69	83	72	79
Fairmont	\$761	27.7	19.2%	57	56	46	61
Lincoln	\$899	24.6	31.56%	42	45	37	42
Jefferson	\$899	24.8	40.59%	42	33	29	35
Emerson	\$805	27.6	48.27%	38	25	39	40
Nettleton	\$805	26.1	51.76%	38	39	35	47

SOURCE: Dick Hubert, "The Duluth Experience," Saturday Review (May 27, 1972), p. 55.

In the Duluth system there was only one elementary school (out of 32) having a non-white enrollment in excess of the 30 per cent state guideline, but there were five other schools in this circumstance when the socio-economic criterion was applied.⁴⁶ To achieve both racial and social class balance, a pairing strategy was devised by Superintendent Peckenpaugh and

by a 7-2 vote this was passed in November, 1971, by the Duluth Board of Education. This plan, scheduled to begin in the fall of 1972, would have involved only 10 elementary schools and some 2000 pupils (up 1100 over 1971-72) would have been bused.⁴⁷

Even prior to the Duluth School Board's approval of a desegregation plan, opposition had developed in that body and in the larger community. The State Board was aware of this resistance. In a face-to-face encounter with the Duluth Board the state education officials took a "firm stand."⁴⁸ And within a short time the Duluth Board adopted a plan. Nonetheless, organized and vocal opposition continued to grow, headed by "neighborhood school" groups like the Concerned Parents and Citizens' Committee. In May, 1972, the Duluth Board of Education reversed its position and voted, again 7 to 2, to postpone indefinitely the desegregation program.⁴⁹ "What seems apparent," concluded the Saturday Review education editors, "is that the wealthy and middle-class citizens of Duluth were emotionally unprepared to lead the nation in socioeconomic integration."⁵⁰

The St. Paul Response. Unlike Duluth, the school district in St. Paul was from the outset in disagreement with the State Board over what constituted an adequate desegregation plan. In June of 1971, the St. Paul Board of Education approved a "cluster learning" program for promoting district-wide integration, while keeping it on a part-time voluntary basis. Championed by Superintendent George Young, this program required that St. Paul schools be grouped into "clusters." Within these clusters there would be "learning centers," with individual schools specializing in different subjects. A pupil would spend the bulk of his time in a "home" (neighborhood) school, but would be transported to other schools in the cluster for various specialized studies.⁵¹

Though the State Board, Commissioner, and EEO praised the "educational" aspects of the St. Paul proposal, and conceded that it would foster social integration, it did not in their estimation sufficiently desegregate the city's schools. St. Paul pupils, it was anticipated, would only be in the specialized learning centers for half a day twice each week; and the home, or base, schools would remain segregated, at least by the definition contained in the state guidelines.⁵² But it was mid-1972 before State Board members took action upon St. Paul's proposal. The delay was partly due to their hope that the city district would bring its approach more into conformity with the guidelines; partly because the State Board did not want to jeopardize the passage of a proposed district bond issue.⁵³

The bond issue was soundly defeated at the polls, and by April, 1972, Commissioner Casmey was suggesting that a number of changes had to be incorporated in the St. Paul plan if it were to be found acceptable by the State Board. Among these changes were eliminating voluntary participation, doing "some pairing within cluster schools," lengthening the time students spent in the learning centers, and enlarging the "cluster plan curriculum to include basics . . . so that all children could take advantage of it."⁵⁴ Stung by criticisms, Superintendent Young vigorously defended the St. Paul program, which was in its initial year of operation, arguing that the program resulted in "more movement of children" than in other Minnesota cities and more improvement in "the quality of educational programs." "Because we've done it on a voluntary basis," he complained, "we seem somehow to be at fault."⁵⁵

On April 10, 1972, the State Board turned down the St. Paul request and gave the district 90 days to come up with an acceptable proposal. This action prompted some bitter public comments from spokesmen for the St. Paul

Board of Education, who declared that they had not been "consulted" by the State Board; that "there was an awful lot of pressure being used through guidelines"; and that St. Paul was appropriately "concerned with integration," whereas the state was only interested in numerical desegregation.⁵⁶

Several months later the question was back before the State Board and in September, 1972, that body assented to a resolution that neither approved nor rejected the cluster learning approach. Rather, St. Paul was given a year to demonstrate that its voluntary program would meet the desegregation guidelines, with the stipulation that the district had to submit a progress report to the state each semester.⁵⁷ By this time the State Board had all but given up trying to secure compliance with its non-mandatory guidelines and was actively considering the adoption of enforceable regulations. Moreover, just as before, the State Board wanted to help St. Paul in its efforts to obtain voter approval for a bond issue, especially since new school construction was being designed to facilitate desegregation.⁵⁸ This time the district's bond campaign was successful, an event which made State Board officials more optimistic that St. Paul would be able to develop "a good overall desegregation program."⁵⁹

The Minneapolis Response. While Duluth had undergone a dramatic reversal in its desegregation policy, and St. Paul had launched a part-time voluntary endeavor that never fully satisfied the State Board, the Minneapolis school district embarked on a course that was compatible with the spirit if not always the letter of state guidelines. Ever since John Davis became Superintendent in 1967 this school district had instituted a variety of programs to equalize opportunities for both its minority pupils and minority professional staff. None of these, though, aroused much public controversy until Superintendent Davis included a "pilot pairing project" as part of a

revised set of district human relations guidelines. (The first such guidelines had been adopted in 1967.) The project entailed combining two elementary schools with contrasting racial compositions, Hale (1 per cent minority) and Field (53 per cent minority), so that both student bodies would be racially balanced. One of these, Hale, was to be a K-3 "primary" school; the other, Field, a 4-6 "intermediate" school. Supplementary resources and innovative programs were to be made available at these schools in order to foster a "quality integrated education."⁶⁰

Unlike the rest of the proposed revisions in the human relation guidelines, the recommendation of Hale-Field pairing sparked an uproar. The November, 1970, meeting in which the Minneapolis Board of Education approved by a 5 to 1 margin the Hale-Field plan was crowded to overflowing, largely with persons hostile to pairing. Mayor Charles Stenvig spoke against it as it did several Aldermen. Many local PTA and neighborhood groups criticized the plan in an atmosphere where "persons opposed to busing kept up an almost steady roar of disapproval, booed and hissed proponents, and refused to be quiet for board members to speak."⁶¹ Such was the beginning of racial desegregation in the schools of "liberal" Minneapolis.

The proposed Hale-Field pairing created intense controversy throughout the 1970-71 school year. Superintendent Davis' approach stressed careful planning and extensive citizen involvement, so that both community and staff would be "ready" for the integration experiment. Despite this cautious strategy, or perhaps because of it, the issue became the central one in the 1971 municipal and school board elections. Mayor Stenvig, who campaigned against busing, was re-elected in a landslide, and anti-pairing candidates won the two board seats that were being contested.⁶² Superintendent Davis did retain the solid backing of a majority on the Minneapolis

Board of Education, though they had delayed final adoption of the pairing plan for several months to allow more time for themselves and school administrators to build community support.⁶³

The pairing of Hale and Field began in the fall of 1971, and it was not long before the positive evaluations of visitors put to rest many of the fears that had become associated with this project. In the meantime, the NAACP and the Committee for Integrated Education (CIE) had filed a court suit aimed at forcing desegregation of all the Minneapolis public schools by 1972-73. In the words of the plaintiff's attorney, the suit was intended "to make it possible for the [Minneapolis] school board to do what it knows is right, but what is politically impossible--full integration of schools."⁶⁴

Superintendent Davis and his staff had always considered the Hale-Field project to be just one element in a much more comprehensive effort. Thus, in October, 1971, three alternative plans for district-wide desegregation were presented to the Minneapolis School Board and a month later to the State Board of Education. The latter body, while noting that any one of the three would meet its guidelines, did express regrets that a single plan had not been forthcoming and requested the city to prepare one by the first of the year.⁶⁵ The three alternative plans were the subject of some one-hundred public meetings held in Minneapolis. A new desegregation proposal was developed by mid-March and another series of public meetings were conducted. Then in April, 1972, the Minneapolis Board of Education decided upon a desegregation plan for the city, the vote being 5 to 2.⁶⁶

The Minneapolis desegregation plan envisioned that about 10,000 of the city's 68,000 pupils would be bused by 1974-75, over and above the

4,000 students being transported in 1971-72. Additionally, the plan was predicated on some \$19 million in school construction taking place over a two and one-half year period, construction that would replace 14 of the district's oldest elementary schools. At the elementary school level, the plan deferred extensive pupil movement until 1974-75, when the construction would be completed. The 1972-73 school year was to be devoted to planning; 1973-74 to staff development. In the secondary schools, where little new construction (\$450,000) was budgeted, some boundary changes were to be undertaken in 1972-73, with corresponding alterations in pupil assignments. Finally, the program called for the building of three elementary school "complexes" and six elementary school "clusters," or pairing programs, involving a total of 17 schools. Once desegregated no school was to have a minority enrollment in excess of 43 per cent, compared with the maximum in 1971-72 of some 80 per cent.⁶⁷

The initial reaction of Commissioner Casmey to Minneapolis' desegregation proposal was to commend it as "a beautifully conceived plan to bring about equal and quality education."⁶⁸ Upon further reflection, the Commissioner and State Board officials did identify publicly what they saw as drawbacks in the plan--its timetable of up to four years, its failure to involve schools in the outer areas of the city (only 42 of the 100 Minneapolis schools were to be affected), and its minority enrollment maximum in several schools of more than 40 per cent.⁶⁹ Even so, the State Board was sympathetic toward the efforts being made by the Minneapolis district and it was prepared to accommodate these efforts by drawing up desegregation regulations that were "flexible." In particular, a variation in the 30 per cent maximum was included, empowering the Commissioner of Education to allow deviations of up to 10 per cent (a minority percentage

of up to 40) in special cases.⁷⁰ But this change became academic in May, 1972, when U.S. District Judge Earl Larson put the Minneapolis school district under a court order and assumed supervision of the desegregation of its public schools.

Judge Larson concluded that Minneapolis schools were "segregated on the basis of race" and that past decisions of its school board, along with housing patterns, had produced this result. Basing his decision, then, on the existence of de jure segregation, the Judge ordered the district to desegregate its schools. He did find, however, that the Minneapolis plan was constitutionally acceptable with only minor revisions--faculty integration had to be accelerated and there could not be more than 35 per cent minority children in any school. Judge Larson retained jurisdiction over the case and ordered that progress reports from school officials be submitted every six months. This placed the court in a position where it could prevent any retreat from the desegregation plan, irrespective of whether an anti-busing majority was able to gain control of the Minneapolis Board of Education.⁷¹ (This did not come to pass; the two anti-busing candidates were defeated in the 1973 school board elections.)

The State Board's Decision to Adopt Regulations. Confronted by the absence of full compliance by any of the big city districts, the State Board of Education reluctantly concluded by the end of 1971 that only regulations "with teeth in them" could accomplish effective statewide desegregation policy. Another task force was established, this one comprised of Board members and the EEO staff. And it drafted the regulations that later were acted upon by the full Board.⁷²

The State Board was hardly doctrinaire in its approach to desegregation. Indeed, some liberal critics accused it, and the Commissioner, of

"blowing with the wind" on the issue.⁷³ As has been described, these officials in the end were willing to go along with St. Paul by granting that district what amounted to a one-year trial, and to accommodate the Minneapolis plan by incorporating a variation on the minority-group/low-income enrollment ceiling in the proposed regulations. The State Board also took the lead in supporting the Chippewa Tribe in its demand to continue, on a virtually autonomous basis, an all-Indian experimental school at Pine Point on the White Earth Reservation. This demand obviously ran counter to the desegregation guidelines and posed what several Board members confessed to be "a moral dilemma."⁷⁴ On the other hand, the State Board found the cultural and educational arguments of the Chippewa leaders to be persuasive. "They deserve," remarked one official, "at least the chance to try; they could hardly do worse than we have done."⁷⁵ The thought of "a Wounded Knee" in Minnesota further encouraged the State Board to press for a special status for the Pine Point school.

The most fundamental concession made by the State Board in its enactment of a desegregation policy occurred with respect to the socioeconomic component. When regulations were finally promulgated in September, 1973, they were directed toward racial desegregation; the low income part of the 1970 definition of a segregated school remained, but it had only the legal status of a guideline. In explaining how this came about, members of the State Board pointed to several factors. First, there was the opposition, expressed in the public hearing of December, 1972, of the big city school superintendents. Most influential among them was Superintendent Davis who cited a host of financial, logistical, and political reasons why social class desegregation, in his view, was not feasible in Minneapolis. Some one-quarter of the student population in this district were from AFDC

families and extensive cross-town busing seemed necessary to satisfy the guideline figure. According to one member of the State Board, "the man who moved us most was John B. Davis. He pleaded with us to give him a chance to desegregate the schools racially." "And," the state official continued, "we on the Board began to feel that we were throwing an awful burden on this school system all at one time."⁷⁶ Another Board member emphasized the absence of legal precedent, noting that "the three major school districts had said fairly openly that they would bring a court case against us because they thought the Board did not have the legal authority to pursue the matter." It was this member's opinion that if the State Board "had any court precedent at all showing that we could win the socioeconomic case, we probably would have gone that route."⁷⁷

Along with the resistance of the big city districts and the lack of judicial support, the State Board felt pressure from state legislators, few if any of whom favored social class desegregation. It is probable that the same kind of position was being regularly communicated from the Governor's Office.⁷⁸ Board members discounted the notion that they backed off due to "politics," but it is hard to believe that the opposition coming from state political leaders did not influence the content of the Board's policy decision. Several close observers were certain that this pressure had made a difference, one even suggesting that there might have been a trade-off in which the State Board agreed to keep socioeconomic desegregation voluntary in exchange for political backing on the racial desegregation regulations.⁷⁹

Concluding Observations

Several observations of a general nature can be made about the process by which a state-level desegregation policy evolved in Minnesota. The

first is that school desegregation, like educational finance reform, had high public saliency, yet it was dealt with by the State Board of Education and not by the general governance institutions. This was not a necessary consequence of the division of formal powers. True, the State Board did claim the requisite authority. But the Legislature could have withdrawn this statutory empowerment or could have dealt directly with school desegregation if such had been the sentiment of lawmakers. The issue, however, was a volatile one and interest-calculating legislators must have felt that the political risks outweighed the potential gains. At any rate, most were content, as a Board member phrased it, "to dump it in the Board's lap"⁸⁰ and then to snipe away at that body when this stance earned points with their constituents. The State Board, from this perspective, performed the function of "flak catcher" in a policy area that state politicians were happy to avoid. A somewhat similar posture, it might be added, had been given by the Legislature to the State Board in the late 1960s when the latter was left to make the controversial decisions on school district consolidations.

A second point that merits emphasis is that the Minnesota State Board did not avoid school desegregation, the stance adopted by most of its counterparts in the states outside the South. To be sure, the minority population was small and the State Board did make several accommodations, including a fundamental one when it decided against pushing the socioeconomic definition through administrative regulations. Still, this body ultimately did set policy for the statewide racial desegregation of Minnesota's public schools. The State Department of Education, chiefly through its Equal Educational Opportunities Section (EEO), provided the original impetus, as well as being a continuing source of information and expert

advice. Yet this was an issue on which Board members personally assumed active direction, an involvement which seems best explained in terms of their moral convictions about integration; and the fact that an appointed status, combined with a lengthy term of office, gave them a security of tenure not possessed by elected officials. If the State Board had not been somewhat insulated from the electorate, it is doubtful that it could have adhered so strongly to the personal convictions of its members.

A final observation is that the insulation of the State Board was far from complete. As the Board began to consider turning desegregation guidelines into enforceable regulations, pressures began to mount from many quarters--among them the big city superintendents, state legislators, and the Governor's Office. While the State Board did command some means of influence, its political "clout" was negligible. And in the end these officials retreated from the most contentious aspect of their policy thrust--namely, the social class dimension of school desegregation. Board members and the Commissioner of Education denied that "politics" influenced this decision, but this denial was at odds with the judgment of many informed observers. Indeed, the actions of state education officials were interpreted by some integration advocates as mere expediency, as just "blowing in the wind." But even if the political nature of their policy making is acknowledged, it can be said in defense of the State Board that this body probably went about as far down the desegregation path as its limited influence resources would permit.

The Teacher Standards and Certification Commission (1973)

The 1970s brought state policy departures not only in the financing of elementary-secondary education and in the desegregation of schools, but

also in the governance of teacher certification. In 1973, the Legislature created a Teacher Standards and Certification Commission with authority to formulate policy, subject to State Board approval, for the preparation and licensure of teachers, and with authority to grant all teaching certificates. Other than California, no state has gone as far as Minnesota in delegating to a semi-independent commission control over the entry into, continuation in, and exit from the teaching profession.

Defining the Issue

Each of the state-level teacher organizations in Minnesota, the Minnesota Federation of Teachers (MFT) and the Minnesota Education Association (MEA), took credit for originating the "self-determination" movement. The MFT apparently was on record first, its action dating back to 1961 when a spring convention voted for a proposal to have a teacher examination board certify teachers into the profession. A bill to this effect was introduced in the 1963 legislative session. The following year, the MFT addressed its appeal to the State Board, urging these officials to establish on their own a teacher certification commission. Other than keeping the idea alive, Federation efforts met with no success.¹ In 1969, the MFT, convinced that the State Board would never voluntarily appoint a teacher commission, tried the Legislature again, this time with a bill calling for a new body which would develop certification criteria for State Board approval and would supervise the issuance of teaching certificates. This legislative attempt proved abortive, partially due to resistance from the MEA. Spokesmen for this organization claimed that the MFT-proposed council would be ineffectual and promised to introduce an MEA bill in the 1971 session.²

The MEA, mainly through its own Teacher Education and Professional Standards Commission (TEPS), had been contending for years that the "profession" should be more involved in setting standards for both teaching practices and teacher certification. The first of these was given top priority in the 1960s by MEA leaders. And in 1967 a Professional Teaching Practices Commission was authorized by the Legislature as an advisory body to the State Board. Its basic function was to develop a "code of professional ethics" covering teaching practices and to serve as a hearing board for charges of code violations brought by local school boards or the Commissioner of Education.³ (Legislation passed in 1971 added teachers and teacher organizations to those who could bring complaints to the Professional Teaching Practices Commission.) The MFT fought the "ethics approach," condemning the MEA-sponsored legislation as a membership ploy and as a danger to academic freedom.⁴

Although the MEA started its legislative push for a teacher certification bill later than did the MFT--a reflection, perhaps, of the former's inclusion of college faculty and school administrators in its ranks--by the close of the decade the MEA was ready to act aggressively on the issue. In fact, its primary legislative goal for the 1971 session was the formation of a state "professional standards council" to consist mostly of teachers. Repudiating the MFT's position that final certification approval had to remain with the State Board, the MEA advanced the more sweeping demand that legal authority should be delegated by the Legislature directly to the proposed council, this authority to include the right to set and enforce standards for the licensure of teachers. Such a delegation of authority, MEA leaders asserted, would be the best way to combine lay control of education with "the teaching profession governing itself."⁵ The

MEA proposal received scant consideration by the 1971 Conservative-dominated Legislature, but Association lobbyists took some comfort in their belief that they had "fought the MFT advisory committee bill to a standstill."⁶

During the period these events were taking place in the Legislature, the State Board and State Department of Education became the arena for conflict over who should control professional certification, with the specific matter at issue being the continuing education of teachers. The Legislature in 1969 had removed all references to life certificates from state statutes and had vested authority for determining certification requirements with the State Board of Education. Up to that time, the State Department had issued a two-year certificate, a five-year certificate, and a life certificate. The first of these was granted when a teacher-training institution stated that the applicant had concluded an approved program. Each of the other two certificates required an endorsement by a local school superintendent that the candidate had completed at least a year of successful teaching during the prior certification period. "The great majority of candidates," reported a State Department bulletin, "finished their pre-service programs, received a two-year certificate, a five-year certificate, and then a life certificate."⁷ As of July, 1969, life certificates were no longer to be granted, but the rest of the certification procedure was to remain in effect until new regulations were promulgated by the State Board.

The legislative action was of immediate concern to the Professions Development Section of the State Department of Education, which also was disturbed by the MFT and the MEA proposals for teacher certification feeling that their acceptance would erode legitimate prerogatives of both the State Board and the State Department.⁸ The Professions Development Section

was responsible for the appointment of a Continuing Education Task Force consisting of administrators, teachers, college faculty members, and State Department personnel. From the beginning, the 19-member Task Force concentrated on requirements for renewing the five-year certificate, assuming that the questions of initial certification and basic competency would be dealt with by subsequent advisory groups. After a series of meetings held over the course of more than a year, and after soliciting reactions from the field (a "working draft" was disseminated to some 60,000 Minnesota educators in September, 1970), the continuing education regulations were presented to the State Board in November, 1970, when they were approved for a public hearing.⁹

At the public hearing virtually every person who testified was critical of the proposed regulations. The MEA had the meeting "packed," with 100 local presidents in attendance who spoke for hours against adoption of the continuing education plan. Other professional organizations voiced their displeasure. Only the MFT spokesmen took a somewhat favorable posture.¹⁰

Whatever the merits of the Continuing Education Task Force, its representativeness of the education profession was sharply challenged at the hearing. MEA leaders had been unhappy with the Professions Development Section for several years on this score, believing that the section's efforts to enlist broad-scale teacher involvement on certification task forces did not produce sufficient representation from the Association. The Continuing Education Task Force, in their estimation, was no exception; and from the outset its lone MEA member, then-President Robert Arnold, complained about the composition of the committee.¹¹ In addition, MEA had specific objections to the proposed resolutions, especially the provision that local superintendents would continue to endorse the completion

of a year of successful teaching, a provision that apparently was included after the Task Force had concluded its deliberations.¹² Finally, and most important, MEA leaders evidently saw the continuing education regulations as a threat to the Association's endeavor to get a statutory professional standards board.¹³

The opposition of MEA and other educational organizations notwithstanding, the State Board proceeded in February, 1971, to enact the continuing education regulations. Board members were upset by MEA "strong-arm" tactics and were receptive to the argument that this organization was seeking to usurp the State Board's policy-making authority in the area of teacher certification.¹⁴ By passing the regulations, the State Board also was responding to the mandate that it felt had come from the 1969 Legislature to establish some kind of certification policy; to have failed to act would have opened the State Board to the charge that it would not or could not carry out this obligation. Finally, it was assumed, according to State Department officials, that "amendments would be made and adopted even before the regulation became effective."¹⁵

The most noteworthy aspect of the new continuing education plan, slated to go into effect in July, 1973, was that the initial responsibility for deciding whether a teacher should receive a continuing (five-year) certificate was lodged with a local committee in each school district. This committee was composed of four teachers, elected by classroom teachers; two administrators, one elementary and one secondary, elected by the administrative staff; and one public representative, chosen by the local school board. The duties of this committee included: (1) determining the number of "renewal credits" to be awarded for the specific experiences submitted by teachers who sought to have their certificates continued,

(2) endorsing renewal applications once a candidate had accumulated 120 credits, and (3) reporting local decisions on renewals to the State Department so that certificates could be granted. Unsuccessful candidates could appeal the decisions of the local committees to a State Committee on Continuing Education. This Committee was to be made up of two teachers selected by MEA, two teachers selected by MFT, one representative of the public selected by MSBA (Minnesota School Boards Association), one administrator selected by SAM (an umbrella group of school administrators), and one teacher educator selected by MTEC (Minnesota Teacher Education Council). Decisions of the State Committee could be appealed to the State Board of Education.¹⁶

The passage by the State Board of continuing education regulations did not put an end to MEA resistance. The MEA Board of Directors in January, 1972, notified all locals not to participate in the implementation of the plan.¹⁷ In March of that year, MEA spokesmen appeared again before the State Board, requesting it to rescind the regulations or to delay their application. The State Board declined this request.¹⁸ In an interview following this meeting, Commissioner Howard Casmey was reported as saying:

The issue is between the Department and the Minnesota Education Association on who is to certify teachers...They feel they should be doing it. I feel this is public money, they're employees, and teacher certification and preparation must be controlled by the public.¹⁹

Even before the March meeting of the State Board, an "open letter" had gone out to all the MEA locals exhorting them to keep on with active opposition to the regulations.²⁰

MEA officials were not the only educators expressing disenchantment with the regulations. The Minnesota Association of School Personnel Administrators (MASPA) recommended that the certification regulations be

repealed and that the Professions Development Section "be directed to work broadly and intensively with professional groups" to prepare a new document.²¹ School administrators in a number of local districts also voiced unhappiness with many requirements of the new procedure.²²

Even in the face of considerable resistance, the State Department moved to get the program going in as many school districts as possible. In this, it retained the cooperation of the MFT. The Federation, in contrast to the MEA, supported the regulations. "The program was not Utopia," remarked one MFT leader, "but it did encompass 75 per cent of what we had been trying to get."²³ On another level, the State Committee on Continuing Education had come into being (January, 1973) and it assisted the certification program by supplying guidelines and by inviting amendments.²⁴

In May of 1973, the State Board of Education, after a public hearing and several postponements, accepted all 37 of the amendments that were offered by the State Committee on Continuing Education, the State Advisory Committee on Professional Programs, and the State Department of Education. Most of the amendments represented only minor alterations, but several did reflect major MEA concerns. School superintendents, for example, were no longer to provide an endorsement of a candidate's having a year of successful teaching experience, and reporting responsibilities were removed entirely from their hands and placed with the chairmen of the local certification committees. "With the adoption of these amendments," announced MEA President James Rosasco, "the old regulations will be almost completely revised."²⁵ While this exaggerated the extent of the revisions, it did suggest that the MEA was prepared to use the changes as a rationale to adopt a more cooperative approach toward the continuing education program. Far more consequential than these modifications, however, was the success

of the MEA and MFT in securing legislative approval for a professional standards commission. The efforts of the teacher organizations to persuade the Legislature to act favorably on this issue came to fruition in the 1973 session.

Formulating the Alternatives

Since 1969, the MFT had a bill on the governance of teacher certification before the Legislature, and in 1971 the MEA formally entered its own bill on this issue. There were a number of differences between the two approaches, chiefly in the composition of the proposed state commission and in the authority relationship between this commission and the State Board.²⁶ Both the MFT and the MEA wanted classroom teachers to be a majority on the new body, but while the MEA specifically rejected a designation of "organizational hats" for these representatives, the MFT proposed that they be elected by the two teacher organizations: four by the MFT and four by the MEA.* The MFT bill asked that three public school administrators be on the commission, as did the MEA. The MFT also requested three members from the Minnesota Education Council (an umbrella group of the various educational organizations); the MEA bill recommended instead that three higher education faculty representatives be included.

The main difference between MFT and the MEA was over the empowerment of the proposed commission. The MFT approach conceded final authority to the State Board. But the Commission, in its version, was to formulate all criteria for the education and certification of teachers, and criteria

*The active membership of the MEA in 1972 was listed as 34,376 in the Profiles of State Associations, 1972-73, published by the National Council of State Education Associations. MEA's total membership was reported as being 43,286, including students. The active membership of the MFT was "estimated" at 14,000 by one of its leaders.

developed in this manner were not "to be changed unilaterally by the Board." The MEA renounced such a linkage to the State Board and demanded that the commission be vested with appropriate policy-making power by the Legislature--these lawmakers retaining only the legal right to amend, extend, or repeal the certification act itself.

For years, the MFT and MEA had castigated each others' bills with much membership-oriented rhetoric. The MFT plan, as portrayed by its rival, provided for "just another advisory committee" and as such undermined the concept of professional self-governance. The MFT retorted that the MEA demand was totally devoid of political realism and was being put forward just to exploit the genuine desire of teachers for greater participation.²⁷ But in the 1973 session, at the insistence of committee chairmen in the House, the two organizations arrived at a compromise measure. This bill became the major policy proposal before the Legislature on the issue. The alternative was that the State Board keep complete authority to control certification, with a teacher commission if established to be narrowly advisory in function.

Mobilization of Support

In their quest for a professional standards act, the teacher groups benefited from the fact that in 1973, for the first time, both houses of the Legislature were controlled by the DFL. This meant that the Minnesota AFL-CIO had an unusually powerful voice in the session and that the labor affiliation of the MFT worked strongly to the advantage of its proposals. In the view of a MFT official:

We were able to convince the last labor convention prior to the legislative session to pass several resolutions that dealt with educational issues. The lobbyists for the labor movement . . . went into the session with high priorities on some things that

had nothing to do with education--for example, party designation or unemployment--but then you got down the list and issues such as public employee bargaining and teacher certification were official strong stands of the labor movement. This was a tremendous help when it came to getting its lobbying power behind these issues.²⁸

Moreover, the MFT "threw its lot in 100 per cent with the DFL during the 1972 campaign" and its leaders estimated that perhaps as many as 20 DFL lawmakers were Federation members.²⁹ The MEA was not without political muscle in the 1973 session, either. Although it did not, unlike the MFT, exclusively back DFL candidates in the election, the MEA did make substantial money and workers available to their campaigns.³⁰

The Legislature also was amenable to teacher arguments on grounds other than their electoral power. Much disenchantment had emerged regarding certification procedures. "I think all that really happened," said one MEA lobbyist, "is that we, as a profession, were able to persuade legislators with a lot of testimony and a lot of people from back home meeting with them that all was not well in teacher education."³¹ The concern in the Legislature for "accountability" probably contributed to the inclination of its members to allow teachers an enlarged role in the governance of their profession. In the estimation of an MFT observer:

Teacher certification was at a point in the Legislature where you could not come to a teacher and say, 'I want accountability and I want you to earn your salary increment,' and then turn around and say, 'You can't have an increased voice in your own certification.' The two views did not mix; they did not logically follow.³²

Important support for the teacher organizations came from the Governor's Office. Anderson, in his 1970 campaign, had publicly declared himself in favor of "granting teachers a meaningful voice" in certification. He also recommended the establishment of a teacher certification council under the State Board of Education.³³ And, though Governor Anderson had little

personal connection with the issue in the 1973 session, members of the Governor's staff cooperated with MFT and MEA representatives to pass the compromise bill.³⁴

Given the favorable political climate in the Legislature and in the Governor's Office, once the MFT and the MEA had settled their differences there was little doubt that a policy change would be forthcoming. There were, of course, opponents of this development, especially those who stood to have either their legal power or informal influence diminished as a result of the change. This array of forces was characterized by one teacher organization spokesman thusly:

The same people opposed us in '73 as opposed us in '71. There were the college people who felt that the transition of control was too rapid. They had always dominated different teacher certification boards. Our proposal overturned that. It didn't phase them out; it threw them out. They opposed the proposal because they didn't want to lose control of teacher education. The Minnesota School Boards Association was in opposition because it believed that the teaching profession should not have that kind of legal authority. The State Board of Education opposed this bill because they didn't believe the teaching profession, by itself, should be allowed the right to determine what programs are required to become a teacher. There was fear that, at a time when we had a teacher oversupply, we were using this proposal as a means of increasing the requirements for admission, thereby creating a shortage again and going back to the days when we dealt from that position of power. Taxpayer groups opposed the bill for the same reason. The State Department was unhappy with it because they had pretty much dominated the certification area. It was their bureaucracy and they didn't want to lose control.³⁵

While the teachers' assessment of the motivations of their adversaries is hardly to be taken at face value, these groups certainly did seek to have the State Board retain full power to govern certification. They did not devote, however, all of their lobbying resources to this purpose. For instance, the Minnesota School Boards Association committed most of its energies to the battle on the collective bargaining front, a battle that MSBA lost when the Legislature enacted a set of changes plumped for by

teachers and by organized labor. As for the State Board and the State Department of Education, they foresaw early in the session the likely legislative outcome on the issue and they eventually adopted an attitude of "let's see if we can find some area that we can work on together" in their relationship with the MFT and the MEA.³⁶ The most diehard opposition to the shift in the control of certification probably came from representatives of the teacher-training institutions, who fought the professional standards bill to the end.

Final Enactment of the Certification Bill

In May, 1973, the Minnesota Legislature passed the bill creating a Teacher Standards and Certification Commission. Unlike the collective bargaining issue, the bill never became the object of sharp party division. Even the MFT admitted that "there was no vociferous opposition out of the Republicans; there were some who objected to this or that provision, but not the scare tactics--'this will destroy education'."³⁷ The key accommodation was the one struck between the MFT and the MEA. Although there continued to be "jockeying around" between these organizations on such matters as life certificates and the ethics code, the central points at issue between them were ironed out by the compromise bill.

As set up by the Legislature,³⁸ the Teacher Standards and Certification Commission was to have fifteen members: four elementary teachers; four secondary teachers; three higher education representatives; one school administrator; two members representing the public; and one person having the responsibility of a counselor, vocational teacher, school nurse, remedial reading teacher, speech therapist, librarian, or psychologist. The Commission members were to be appointed by the Governor for four-year terms. Except for the college members and the public representatives,

all persons on the Commission had to be certificated and had to have five years teaching experience in Minnesota, including the two years immediately preceding their appointment.³⁹

The new law authorized the Commission to: (1) "develop and create criteria, rules, and regulations for the certification of public school teachers and interns"; (2) "from time to time...revise or supplement the criteria for certification of public school teachers"; and (3) "establish criteria for the approval of teacher education programs."⁴⁰ But these empowerments to formulate policy were all qualified by the phrase, "subject to approval by the State Board." If the State Board vetoed a Commission proposal, the Board had to give "written notice of such disapproval within 120 days after the receipt of the proposal, including its reasons."⁴¹

The Commission--"subject to criteria, rules, and regulations approved by the State Board of Education"--was accorded the exclusive right to issue all teaching certificates and the corresponding right to revoke them for any one of five causes specified in the law.⁴² There was no provision for teachers to appeal a Commission decision to the State Board. Aside from the usual recourse to the courts, the Commission was vested with authority to certify teachers. This power with regard to school superintendents and principals was retained by the State Board.

As has been stated, the act establishing the Teacher Standards and Certification Commission stemmed from a MFT-MEA compromise. The MEA approach found expression in most of the provisions of the bill, including the composition of the Commission where organizational representation of the sort desired by the MFT was rejected. Even so, the MEA made the most basic concession when it accepted the MFT position on the legal status of the Commission. The MEA, it will be recalled, had stood

for a body with independent policy-making authority in the area of professional standards. While the newly-created Commission possessed considerably more legal power than a traditional advisory council, having as it did the statutory authority to initiate and to formulate policy, final authorization remained a function of the State Board of Education.

Concluding Observations

The struggle over the governance of certification reveals several things about the interests and influence of the two state teacher organizations in Minnesota. First, it was the MEA, and not the MFT, which propounded the more radical position on how much authority should be delegated to teachers to control their profession. Whether the MFT's posture represented simply an assessment of political feasibility or whether it also was a manifestation of a "union mentality" in which certain traditional prerogatives were conceded to management, the Federation was much more conciliatory than its rival in dealing with the State Board and the State Department of Education. While the MEA was increasingly at odds by the late 1960s with state agency officials, the MFT did not break with them until the 1973 legislative session.

A second observation is that "teacher power" was an important determinant, perhaps the crucial one, in the policy decisions that ultimately were made on the certification issue. Opposition to the continuing education regulations had many sources, but the MEA was their principal foe. And the modification that occurred in these regulations through the amendment process was, at least to some extent, an MEA victory. More indicative of the burgeoning political strength of teachers was the passage by the Legislature of the Teachers Standards and Certification Commission Bill. After the MEA and MFT had compromised their disagreements, their combined

lobbying pressure was formidable. Moreover, they commanded other power resources such as the capacity to provide campaign contributions and the MFT's affiliation with organized labor.

Some staff professionals in the Professions Development Section of the State Department interpreted the MEA's antagonism toward the continuing education regulations as the "focal point" in the Association's more general thrust for control of the profession. And these officials, along with a majority on the State Board, hoped to forestall such a shift in control by enacting and implementing the regulations. Their efforts, however, proved to be unsuccessful once the governance issue came before the 1973 Legislature for settlement. Teacher influence was much more potent in this arena than were countervailing forces generated by state agency officials. Consequently, the MFT and the MEA achieved legislation that will significantly enlarge the realm of teacher decision making.

Three Education Policy Issues--Some Comparisons

The decisions that have been examined bolster the contention that Minnesota is a pacesetter in education policy making. The Omnibus Tax Act received much publicity to this effect, being hailed by commentators across the country as an innovation in state school finance legislation. And, as has been described, advanced policy positions also were adopted with respect to both school desegregation and teacher certification. Most state governments have not been willing to grasp the nettle of school desegregation; even among the states that have, there are several which appear to be retreating from earlier commitments. As for teacher certification, Minnesota is one of but a few states that has established a semi-independent commission having statutory authority to formulate and to administer policy.

Policy innovativeness obviously has among its root causes the political culture of a state. This culture in Minnesota embraces government as an instrument of social advancement and obvious pride is taken by residents in Minnesota serving as a model for other states. Along with this, there is a pervasive moralistic strain, an attitude which says, "we must do this because it is the right thing to do." Moral rectitude of this sort was attested to by onlookers in the resolution of all three issues, being most readily visible in the State Board's desire to confront the problem of racial and class segregation.

The presence of a reformist political culture helps explain education policy change in Minnesota. Yet it must be emphasized that the decisions which have been analyzed had their immediate genesis in the give-and-take of "politics," if by this is meant the use of power in determining "who gets what, when, and how." Neither the school desegregation nor the teacher certification decisions, to say nothing of those in school finance, were simply expressions of the preferences of officeholders or courses of action dictated by the available information. Instead, all evolved out of value conflicts among participants and their exertions of influence in the policy-making process.

Partisanship, to be sure, was not a factor of consequence in every decision. School finance and the related tax questions did become a party issue, chiefly among lawmakers in the House. This was not the case to the same degree with certification, though DFLers were generally more supportive of a teacher-controlled commission than were Republicans. The cleavages on school desegregation bore little if any relationship to partisan divisions, as politicians from both parties endeavored to steer clear of responsibility for the problem.

The three issues were dissimilar, too, in their public salience. Tax-school finance reform acquired such salience throughout the entire state. School desegregation evoked broad-scale concern in the three big cities, as well as in a few rural districts with substantial Indian enrollments. Certification remained more of an interest group issue, even if disenchantment with existing procedures for the training and licensure of teachers, coupled with the popular demand for "accountability," did contribute to the Legislature's being receptive to the demands of the MFT and the MEA. Nonetheless, whether partisan, popular, or otherwise, each policy change was certainly political in its enactment.

The pluralistic character of state education politics in Minnesota is equally clear from the issue analysis. The analysis discloses that a distinct power structure had developed in each policy area by 1970. In school finance this structure had the House Education Committee as its principal "locus of accommodation," in teacher certification this function was basically performed by the Professions Development Section of the State Department of Education. In school desegregation there was no real state-level focus; paramount influence resided with local school districts.

As demands for major policy changes intensified in the early 1970s, traditional power arrangements gave way to new participants and patterns of influence; and while school finance policy making, the breakthrough having taken place, may well revert back to customary channels, the same is not likely for either school desegregation or teacher certification. In the former, the State Board of Education and, at least for Minneapolis, the U.S. District Court have emerged as key actors. And a Teacher Standards and Certification Commission has been created to govern teacher preparation and certification. Still, irrespective of the new distribution of power

within each issue area, the influence of actors continued to vary greatly from one area to another, with one actor (e.g., the Governor) having much more to say about some kinds of policies (e.g., school finance) than about others (e.g., teacher certification). Certainly, no unified structure of power, let alone a single participant, made the important state education policy decisions in Minnesota.

Comparing the three decision processes across each of the four stages-- that is, issue definition, alternative formulation, support mobilization, and authoritative enactment--offers further insight into the pluralistic nature of state education policy making in Minnesota. To begin with, in each of the policy areas the issue originated with a different set of actors. The tax-school finance issue was precipitated by the "taxpayers' revolt," a Citizens League report, and the campaign tactics of the two gubernatorial candidates. The Equal Educational Opportunities Section (EEO) of the State Department of Education was primarily responsible for putting school desegregation on the state policy agenda, while the same function in the area of teacher certification was undertaken by the two state-level teacher organizations, the MFT and the MEA. As for the formulation of specific policy proposals, this was done by the Governor's Office and legislative leaders for tax-school finance reform; by the State Board working with the EEO for the school desegregation regulations; and by the MFT and the MEA for a teacher certification commission.

The support mobilization stage of policy making involved a large cast of characters. These participants can be loosely classified into two groups: (1) those who took the initiative in attempting to secure allies or to neutralize opponents, and (2) those whose activities were primarily in reaction to the influence efforts of other actors. A categorization of

the participants in each of the three issues is shown in Table 19, as well as the institution where authoritative enactment occurred. Admittedly, the placement of the actors is highly subjective. But even if there are misclassifications, it is evident that each decision process had its own configuration of influence.

Participation was most widespread when tax-school finance bills were before the Legislature. These bills--having redistributive implications that were both consequential and apparent--attracted representatives of broad social groups as well as narrowly organized interests. School desegregation policy making also activated coalitions of diverse participants. These coalitions, though, were quite unlike those which formed during the finance controversy and the initiating actors were not the same. And yet another influence configuration developed on the issue of governing teacher certification, a configuration that pivoted much more on professional educators than did those in the other two policy areas.

While there was no single power structure which operated across the different policy areas in elementary and secondary education, the processes which have been analyzed were not completely independent of one another; their participants were not mutually exclusive sets. The issues simultaneously confronted state decision makers who had to make choices among them in terms of the resources that would be invested in seeking to influence their outcome. And there were actors--specifically, the Governor's Office, Legislature, State Board of Education, Commissioner of Education, and major educational interest groups--who played a role, albeit sometimes a very modest one, in all three processes. Policy-making relationships among these actors will be the subject of the concluding section of this report.

TABLE 19

PARTICIPANTS IN THREE EDUCATION POLICY DECISIONS

Policy	Support Mobilization		Authoritative Enactment
	Initiating	Reacting	
Tax-School Finance	Governor's Office Legislative Leaders	State Legislators Business and Banking Corps. Minn. AFL-CIO Public Utilities Minn. Assoc. of Commerce and Industry Farm Bureau Federation Farmers Union News Media Real Estate Association Taxpayers Association Citizens League League of Women Voters League of Minn. Municipalities Local Government Officials Local School Districts Commissioner of Education State Board of Education Minn. Federation of Teachers Minn. Education Association Minn. School Boards Assoc. Minn. Assoc. of School Admin.	Legislature and Governor
School Desegregation	State Board of Educ. Commissioner of Educ. Equal Educational Opportunities Section (of the State Department) Big City School Districts	Civil Rights Organizations Racial Groups Religious Organizations "Neighborhood School" Groups Taxpayers Party (Minneapolis) Committee for Integrated Education (Minneapolis) Parents for Integrated Education (St. Paul) Governor's Office State Legislators Department of Human Rights U.S. District Court Minn. Education Assoc. Minn. Federation of Teachers Local School Districts Local Government Officials	State Board
Teacher Certification	Minn. Federation of Teachers Minn. Educ. Assoc. Legislative Leaders Professions Development Section (of the State Department)	Minn. School Bds. Assoc. Teacher-Preparation Institutions State Board of Education Commissioner of Education Professional Educator Orgs. Local School Districts Taxpayers Association Governor's Office State Legislators	Legislature and Governor

SECTION III

POLICY-MAKING RELATIONSHIPS

Introduction

Besides using decision analysis to investigate the way Minnesota state government determines education policy, we questioned a cross-section of actors regarding their perceptions of various policy-making relationships. Interviews were conducted in January of 1973 with persons selected by the organizational positions they had held during the previous biennium. Because of the timing of the interviews, the perceptual data reported in this section are based on experiences which preceded the 1973 session of the Legislature. In Minnesota, the set of respondents and the number interviewed for each classification consisted of the following:

<u>Governor's Office</u>	2
<u>Legislative leaders</u> (e.g., Majority and Minority Leaders of the House and Senate; Chairmen of the Education, Finance, and Tax Committees)	15
<u>State Board of Education members</u>	6
<u>Top State Department administrators</u>	4
<u>Educational Interest group leaders</u> (e.g., officials representing the Minnesota Education Association, Minnesota School Boards Association, and Minnesota Association of School Administrators)	5

Carefully structured interview schedules were employed with these respondents and each person also was given a short questionnaire to complete (80 per cent returned the questionnaire). Much of the information obtained from these two instruments was quantifiable. Thus, a number of data tables are used in the presentation of findings, with the function of the accompanying narrative usually being to highlight or to summarize.

To make the findings and analytic commentary more meaningful, the

section is organized around six of the main characteristics of the state education policy system in Minnesota. These characteristics are: (1) fragmentation of the education lobby, (2) emergence of "teacher power," (3) cross-pressures on the state education agency, (4) policy initiation from the State Board arena, (5) central role of the Governor, and (6) growing assertiveness of the Legislature.

Fragmentation of the Education Lobby

Iannaccone has suggested that the key to understanding state school politics is to be found in examining the organized education profession and its linkages to the institutions of government.¹ Applying this perspective to Minnesota's recent past discloses that a basically consensual pattern of relationships among educational interest groups, and between these groups and public officials, gave way during the 1960s to a pattern marked by overt conflict.²

The Period of MEA-MSBA Cooperation

At the beginning of the 1960s, the two principal educational interest groups--the Minnesota Education Association (MEA) and the Minnesota School Boards Association (MSBA)--worked in concert. The MEA represented administrators as well as teachers, with professional organizations like the Minnesota Association of School Administrators (MASA) being included under the MEA umbrella. Indeed, the leadership positions in MEA were largely controlled by school superintendents. As for MSBA, its membership consisted of people serving on local school boards, the vast majority of whom came from the rural outstate districts.

The MEA and the MSBA created structural arrangements to enhance collaboration among the groups interested in the public schools. A MEA-MSBA joint committee had been established in 1949, a committee having among its

tasks the formulation of joint legislative proposals. Five years later, the Minnesota Coordinating Committee on Education (MCCE) came into being, primarily as a consequence of MEA and MSBA urging. Its stated objective "was to gain a united front from both professional and lay educational organizations on matters relating to the structures, policies, and financial support of the public schools of Minnesota."³ The MCCE included representatives from the Minnesota Education Association, Minnesota School Boards Association, Minnesota Association of School Administrators, Minnesota Association of County Superintendents, Minnesota Citizens Committee for Education, Minnesota Congress of Parents and Teachers, and Minnesota Vocational Association. The MCCE approach reflected the belief of educators that internal differences had to be settled before the Minnesota Legislature was confronted with a major policy demand. As a MEA spokesman put it: "We felt that we wanted to organize so that educational interests and their friends could present one proposal to the Legislature."⁴

While these organizational mechanisms did foster agreement among participant groups, there were personal ties of equal importance. In particular, there was the relationship between A. L. "Bud" Gallop, Executive Secretary of MEA, and W. A. "Bill" Wettergren, Executive Secretary of MSBA. These men had attained considerable stature with the Minnesota Legislature. They were well known and highly respected as lobbyists. Both had influential friends in the legislature, especially among Conservatives, the caucus which dominated the Senate and usually held sway in the House. Gallop and Wettergren also were successful in having their advice considered by Minnesota Governors when these officials were preparing the budget message dealing with education.⁵

There was a discordant element in all of this and that was the status of the Minnesota Federation of Teachers (MFT). Because of its pro-union militancy,

the Federation was isolated from the other educational interest groups, not being included during this period among the organizations in MCEE. But the MFT apparently had little independent political power at the state level. Despite this organization having sizable memberships in city districts--notably in Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Duluth--it had no support in many areas of the state and had slight impact on the Legislature aside from its affiliation with the Minnesota AFL-CIO.

As described by Wannebo, who has produced the only scholarly work on the subject, the "education lobby" (MFT excepted) tried to operate in a unified fashion:

After the accommodations have been made, one of the organizations writes a bill to be introduced in to the Legislature. Sometimes it is the MSBA, other times the MEA, and in the area of school district reorganization, it is the State Department of Education. However, there is an understanding of what positions they will take prior to the introduction of a bill into the legislature....There was frequent interaction, activity, and belief between Gallop, MEA, and Wettergren, MSBA. Each had his own friends in the Legislature, but they tried to present a united front to the legislators. They both succeeded in running their respective organizations in the field of legislative lobbying with little restraint or interference from the organizations' memberships. When the two were not able to agree, it was convenient to be able to say to their respective organizations that they must compromise or legislation would not pass. Often they discovered from their legislative friends (sometimes former school superintendents) what the limits were prior to finalizing their respective bills.⁶

Apart from the ability to coordinate their legislative approach, the MEA and the MSBA had other resources to buttress their influence with state lawmakers. One of these was their perceived expertise on educational matters, a resource that was augmented by a capacity to provide, often in conjunction with the State Department of Education, information to legislators on complicated subjects like school finance. And on critical issues, MEA and MSBA leaders could issue "calls for help" to their memberships, the

result being energetic letter-writing campaigns and personal contacts directed toward legislators.⁷ Yet, other than the MFT, the education interest groups rejected any organized attempt to become involved in the election of state officeholders. Such a venture into "politics" was not seen as being compatible with the posture of being nonpartisan and objective.

Inter-organizational unity, expertness and information, and grassroots communications--all of these contributed to the legislative strength of schoolmen and their allies during the early 1960s. More basic, perhaps, was the traditional commitment of Minnesotans to education. The public schools held a "special place" among the objects of state government attention. Mitau observes that Conservatives, as well as DFLers, were always willing to provide support for education even as they condemned spending for "less worthy" public services.⁸

Forces for Change

Harmonious relationships among state-level education interest groups came to an end during the 1960s. The challenge to the MEA posed by the more militant MFT became intense. And competition for members, along with other factors, moved the MEA to adopt an increasingly aggressive posture on the collective negotiations issue. At the beginning of the decade, MEA officials, as well as those from the MSBA, were hopeful that the "guidelines" which they had developed for teacher-school board relationships would obviate the need for state laws. But in time MEA leaders concluded that this approach was not workable and they began to press actively for legislation. By 1966, this organization was plumping for a negotiating council in each district, a council that would represent all professional organizations. The council idea was incorporated in a "Meet and Confer" negotiation law enacted by the Minnesota Legislature in 1967.⁹

The MSBA considered these legislative thrusts to be a threat to "the local autonomy of school boards" and clearly would have preferred that no measure requiring negotiations with teachers pass the Legislature. The MSBA did introduce a bill when it became evident that there were irreconcilable differences between its position and that of the MEA. (The MFT and MASA also had separate bills before the 1967 Legislature.) The stance of MSBA became one of "defensive lobbying", a stance that it maintained in the face of continued MEA demands for a stronger negotiation law, improvements in teacher benefits, and expanded professional participation in school decision making. By the 1971 legislative session, the MEA and the MSBA were at swords points on a host of employer-employee issues.

As controversies between organized teachers and school boards erupted, the position of administrators within MEA became untenable. Their organizations withdrew from that affiliation and began to act as independent interest groups at the state level. The most influential of these was MASA, the organization which spoke for school superintendents. As for the Minnesota Coordinating Committee on Education, it did continue to function, and its membership was actually enlarged to include, among others, the MFT. Nonetheless, as a device to compromise and coordinate the legislative efforts of the educational interest groups it ceased being effective. In the pithy language of one of its founders, the MCCE in the 1970s had become "as useless as teats on a boar."¹⁰

Conflicts Among Educational Interest Groups

No longer, then, was the Minnesota Legislature the recipient of policy initiatives on which most schoolmen and their supporters were in agreement. Instead, on major educational issues the Legislature was beset by an array

of competing proposals and positions. To discover the perceptions that legislative leaders had of the conflicts among educational interest groups, the lawmakers who were interviewed for this study were asked several questions. Comparable questions also were asked of individuals having lobbying responsibility for each of the five educational organizations--the MEA, the MFT, the MSBA, the MASA, and the Minneapolis Public Schools.*

It is obvious from the data reported in Table 20 that legislative leaders did not perceive much unity among the major educational interest groups. Fourteen out of the fifteen respondents saw them acting together on only "some" or "almost no" issues. Several of these officials thought that the only thing education groups concurred on were "motherhood-type issues;" another legislator remarked that they shared only the demand for "more money." The education lobbyists, on the other hand, perceived more agreement among their organizations than did legislators. In fact, one executive secretary suggested that there was harmony on "nearly all" issues, though even he conceded that the various educational groups did lobby "separately."

TABLE 20

EDUCATIONAL INTEREST GROUP UNITY AS PERCEIVED
BY LEGISLATIVE LEADERS AND EDUCATION LOBBYISTS

Question and Response Categories	Responses By	
	Legislative Leaders (N=15)	Education Lobbyists (N=5)
"To what extent do the major educational groups act in unison and speak with one voice?"		
"Nearly all legislative issues"	0	1
"Most legislative issues"	1	1
"Some legislative issues"	7	3
"Almost no legislative issues"	7	0

*In the case of the MFT, an interview could not be arranged with its chief lobbyist. And, instead, we had to interview another top officer of this organization.

The issues identified by these respondents as dividing the educational organizations are listed by frequency of mention in Table 21. Heading the list is collective negotiations (bargaining), followed by teacher tenure and professional standards.

TABLE 21

ISSUES THAT DIVIDE EDUCATIONAL INTEREST GROUPS AS IDENTIFIED BY
LEGISLATIVE LEADERS AND EDUCATION LOBBYISTS

Question (Open-Ended)	Issues	Frequency of Mention	
		Legislative Leaders (N=14)	Education Lobbyists (N=4)
"What legislative issues tend to divide educational interest groups the most?"	Collective negotiations (bargaining)	10	3
	Teacher tenure	7	0
	Professional standards and "rights"	4	1
	Salary/fringe benefits	3	1
	State financial aid	2	1
	Teacher certification	1	0

Alliances Among Education Interest Groups

When asked about enduring alliances among education interest groups, the lobbyists for the MSBA and the MASA indicated that they did try to coordinate their legislative proposals. Additionally, both sought to work with other administrator groups, but these relationships had become strained because the school principals' organizations--the Minnesota Association of Secondary School Principals and the Minnesota Association of Elementary

School Principals--were pushing for the right to bargain collectively with local school boards and superintendents. The approach employed by the MEA was pictured as one of independent lobbying--"we go our own way in the legislature." The same posture, relative to the other educational interest groups, was taken, at least publicly, by the MFT. While the St. Paul school district did not have a legislative liaison person during the 1971 session, it subsequently hired a former DFL legislator to undertake that function, and he began to establish close ties with his counterpart in the Minneapolis district.

The answers of legislative leaders to questions about education alliances were somewhat different from those given by the lobbyists. In the first place, seven of the fourteen legislators who replied did not think that there were any educational interest groups which acted in concert on legislative issues. Two of the seven did stress, however, that the MEA and the MFT took "similar positions" and "in effect worked together" on many such issues. The other seven legislator respondents did perceive an alliance emerging among the educational organizations; specifically, they saw the MEA and the MFT putting aside old antagonisms and starting to act cooperatively.

Based on the perceptions of both legislative leaders and education lobbyists, as well as on other evidence, we would conclude that by the early 1970s the once united profession had split along labor-management lines; that this division had grown wider as additional points of dispute arose to fuel the basic conflict; and that new alliances were gradually being forged on both sides of this cleavage, the MSBA and MASA on one side and the MEA and MFT on the other. Further, non-educator groups were becoming associated with the new alignment. The MEA, for example, had moved closer to organized labor, whereas the MSBA saw an affinity of interest with employer

and taxpayer groups.

Although the labor-management cleavage affected many aspects of state education policy making, there were other divisions of consequence. Even during the days of MSBA-MEA cooperation, schoolmen from differently situated districts were often at odds, chiefly on the finance issue. The big city districts had their advocates, as did the Iron Range districts, as did those located in the farm communities, and so forth. Individually and in regional combinations spokesmen for school districts continued to make demands on the Legislature and these demands were clearly of importance to constituency-oriented lawmakers. Indeed, they probably were more influential in determining the final shape of the Omnibus Tax Act of 1971 than were any pressures coming from the state-level educational interest groups. Whether or not these geographically-based demands largely boiled down to a conflict between the "have" and the "have not" districts, as some legislators viewed them, they had primacy when major school spending decisions were being enacted.

Emergence of "Teacher Power"

Influence Resources

The major educational interest groups utilized quite different resources in their attempts to influence legislation. The strength of the MSBA, according to its leaders, rested on two things. The first was the ability to project the effects that a proposed bill would have on local school districts, an ability that made many state officers receptive to the information and recommendations offered by the MSBA. To do this, the MSBA maintained a research staff and three full-time lobbyists. The second means of influence possessed by the MSBA stemmed from the social status of its membership. Not only could this organization, since it represented

every school board in the state, claim to speak for the local taxpayer, its members often were a part of the political and economic power structure in their communities, especially in outstate Minnesota. Depicted by many onlookers as a "very conservative organization", the MSBA's principal ties to the Legislature were to Conservative lawmakers, ties that meant progressively less influence as the DFL gained power in that body.

The MEA had a variety of influence techniques that could be brought to bear on the legislative process. This organization supplied lawmakers with information and expert advice, even though its data-producing capabilities were less crucial than in the 1960s when this resource was relied upon heavily by the Association. Of a professional staff comprising 42 people, only the equivalent of one and one-half persons were focused on research as of mid-1972. The MEA did have two full-time lobbyists, plus one intern. And an effective communications network had been created so that each local MEA leader could stay abreast of legislative developments and contact the legislators from his area as to MEA desires. That these desires would not be taken lightly was ensured by the large membership in the organization (some 35,000 active members, predominantly teachers), and by its willingness to furnish both workers and money to candidates for the Legislature.

While for decades the MEA had encouraged teachers to become individually involved in politics, it did not have a "political action arm" until 1968 when the Independent Minnesota Political Action Committee (IMPACT) was formed. In the 1970 election IMPACT distributed \$17,000 in cash to 64 different candidates. Two years later, somewhat over \$80,000 was spent on the campaigns of 120 or so legislators and other candidates for public office.¹¹ From the point of view of its chief rival, the MSBA, it was precisely the expenditure of such large sums in elections that gave the MEA most of its

"clout" with the Legislature.

Through its Committee on Political Education (COPE), the MFT also backed political candidates and had for many years. And, in spite of the membership of MFT (an estimated 14,000) being only a fraction of that in the MEA, it was concentrated in the large cities. Like the other big educational interest groups, the MFT maintained a lobbying force, two full-time persons, in the capitol. None of these means, though, was the main reason for its influence with legislators. That reason was to be found in the Federation's affiliation with the Minnesota AFL-CIO and, as an outgrowth of this affiliation, the MFT's access to DFL lawmakers.

One leader of the MFT summarized the elements of his organization's anticipated legislative strength in the 1973 session as follows:

Our political influence is in three ways: First, there is the labor movement, some 400,000 strong in Minnesota, and we are the official branch for teachers within that movement. This means that we can call upon the labor people through convention resolutions or directly through lobbyists. That is the biggest force. Next, we have between 18 and 21 Federation members in the 1973 legislature. That is three times what we once had. Third, we historically have backed the DFL, even in lean years; we were totally in support of the group that is in power now [1973] in the Legislature. The MEA has gone wherever they thought they could win...putting the same amount of money into Conservative campaigns as in Liberals.

The legislative leaders we interviewed were asked to identify the means of influence employed by the school groups which they rated as having the most impact on education and school finance legislation. For the three top-ranked groups--the MEA, the MSBA, and the MFT--these perceptions of influence resources are shown in Table 22. These listings, as can be seen, were pretty much in accord with the assessments offered by the education lobbyists. The legislators' view of the MEA relying on resources which translated into votes--that is, membership, money, and organization--is

noteworthy. As one state official acknowledged, "perhaps an education organization cannot get you elected, but it can certainly stop you from being elected." Clearly, "teacher power" had emerged by the early 1970s as a significant element in state education politics in Minnesota.

Lobbying Influence

Notwithstanding their political power, the 1971 legislative session was a frustrating one for organized teachers. While the MFT with its labor connection had considerably more access to the Governor's Office than did the MEA, neither interest group had much to say about the school finance policy formulated by Governor Anderson and his staff.

TABLE 22

INFLUENCE RESOURCES OF EDUCATIONAL INTEREST GROUPS AS PERCEIVED BY LEGISLATIVE LEADERS

Influence Resource*	Legislative Leaders Frequency of Mention For		
	MEA (N=11)	MSBA (N=10)	MFT (N=7)
Size of membership	10	0	4
Social status of members	2	9	0
Campaign contributions	9	0	4
Lobbying activity/ability	4	3	2
Source of information	2	4	0
Grassroots organization	5	0	0
Affiliation with labor	0	0	5

*Coded from open-ended question.

As for the Legislature, the year 1971 in MEA rhetoric was one in which "the pendulum of political contempt for teachers completed its full arc."¹² There were not only proposals demanding "teacher accountability" and a statewide salary schedule, but also anti-tenure bills which ranged from mild amendments to outright repeal. Working with "strange bedfellows" (i.e., the MFT), the MEA and its legislator friends did stop these "punitive" measures from reaching the Governor's desk.¹³ But the 1971 Legislature declined to even consider the MEA's top priority, establishing a professional standards council,

and teacher attempts to strengthen the collective negotiation law experienced no success until the special session.

During this period, the relationship between the MEA and its legislative allies of the 1960s, the Conservatives, grew increasingly hostile, with the latter charging that teachers were only "self-interested" and were expending campaign money to obtain what they wanted, and with the MEA publicly denouncing Conservative lawmakers as being "unbelievably archaic in their attitudes."¹⁴ Historically, the MFT, though it always of necessity cooperated with some Conservative legislators, was aligned with the DFL. By the 1970s it had become clear that the MEA, with a new-found militancy and labor orientation, also had moved far in this direction.

The educational interest groups, taken together, constituted a powerful lobby in the judgment of Minnesota legislators. In fact, six of our fifteen legislator respondents rated them as being "the top group" and eight thought that they belonged at least "among the top groups." Only one legislative leader evaluated the educational organizations as being "among the less important groups." Of the educational interest groups, the MEA was most frequently ranked first by legislators, followed by the MSBA. The MFT was considered by more than half the respondents to be influential. None of the administrator organizations was placed by any legislator among the top three educational interest groups, and only two legislative leaders even mentioned them in passing as being a lobbying force of any weight. The rankings for the MEA, the MSBA, the MFT, and the MASA are reported in Table 23. It should be emphasized again that these, and the other rankings (ratings) appearing in this section, are based on perceptual data which antedate the 1973 legislative session.

TABLE 23

RELATIVE LOBBYING INFLUENCE OF EDUCATIONAL INTEREST GROUPS
AS PERCEIVED BY LEGISLATIVE LEADERS

Rankings by Legislative Leaders (N=14)	Educational Interest Groups			
	MEA	MSBA	MFT	MASA
Number of Legislators Ranking #1	9	5	0	0
Number of Legislators Ranking #2	4	4	5	0
Number of Legislators Ranking #3	0	4	4	0

Cross-Pressures on the State Department of Education

Interest Group Relationships

As an operating agency, a state department of education is always vulnerable as a middleman, caught between the lawmaking institutions of state government on one hand and local educational agencies on the other. This vulnerability for the Minnesota Department of Education was heightened by the conflicts among its client groups--that is, among the groups representing teachers, administrators, and school boards. A decade ago, these groups worked with each other and with the State Department in developing programs and promoting their legislative enactment. With the fragmentation of this coalition, the State Department became the object of cross-pressures from the contending educational interest groups, the result being for state officials an uneasy alliance with some groups (the MSBA and the MASA) and some basic disagreements with others (first the MEA and later the MFT).

While there were points of friction between the MSBA and the State Department, mainly over state-mandated programs which necessitated local funding, spokesmen for the MSBA portrayed its relationships with state administrators in positive terms. The MSBA leaders saw themselves as being generally in agreement with the policy thrust of the State Department, though the Commissioner of Education was viewed as being "way ahead of his times" on the

issue of equal educational opportunity. The school board respondents felt that they were always consulted when policies of importance to their organization were being prepared by the Commissioner and his staff. And, according to one such respondent, "MSBA's policy input made a difference sixty per cent of the time."

The State Department maintained a close association with the MASA. This was hardly surprising given both the administrative mission of the Department and the direction supplied to each organization by school administrators. At any rate, MASA spokesmen reported that their group concurred with the policy emphasis of the Commissioner and his staff, consulted with them on all matters of mutual concern, and considered MASA advice to be "always incorporated" in final Department proposals.


MEA officials, on the other hand, were openly critical of the State Department, referring to it as "a bunch of ex-superintendents." These officials considered their organization to be at odds with the Department, especially over the role of teachers in determining policy for professional certification and school curricula. Additionally, the teacher organizations opposed the State Department's assessment ("accountability") program. MEA leaders acknowledged that teacher representatives sat on the many advisory committees and task forces used by the State Department and the State Board of Education. These leaders expressed doubt, however, that the teacher input counted for very much in the enactment stage of the decision process. While the MFT respondent shared some of the attitudes of his MEA counterpart, the Federation appeared to have a closer working relationship with the State Department than did the Education Association.

The State Department, from the vantage point of its top administrators, was in the posture of "being in the middle between contending groups." Indeed,

these administrators saw themselves involved in a triangular struggle to control public elementary and secondary education in Minnesota. The elements of this triangle are depicted in Figure 2.

FIGURE 2

THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OVER EDUCATION: A STATE DEPARTMENT PERSPECTIVE



State Department officials interviewed for this study did not agree on how much effort the Department put forth to unify the educational interest groups. One respondent thought that many attempts were made to get these groups to support Department proposals and to push them with legislators, though this administrator conceded that on specific measures, as opposed to general pronouncements like more state aid for schools, there was "no continuity of support among educational groups." Another Department administrator denied that many efforts were made to coordinate the educational organizations. In his view, "the Department made no attempt to pull the educational interest groups together on issues or as a general point of operation." Each of the interest groups, in his opinion, had its own resources and its own legislative goals, a pattern that the State Department could do little to alter.

Legislative Relationships

Conflicting expectations for the Minnesota Department of Education came, of course, from sources other than the educational organizations. Even more fundamental were those which originated with the Legislature. Traditionally, the State Department had linked itself to the Legislature through the education committees of that body, particularly the Education Committee in the House. This linkage was quite evident in the perceptual data provided by the legislative leaders we interviewed. When questioned about their contacts with the State Department, these lawmakers replied as shown in Table 24.

Two State Department administrators, along with the Commissioner of Education, were pointed to by legislators as communicating, formally and informally, with the House and Senate Education Committees: Farley Bright, Assistant Commissioner, Division of Administration, and S. Walter Harvey, Director, State Aids, Statistics and Research Section. But none of these administrators seems to have had much visibility to the lawmakers who headed the various "money" committees of the legislature. Indeed, one such chairman claimed that he "wouldn't know the Commissioner of Education if he walked into this room." The two House and Senate leaders who initiated contacts with the State Department said that they did so for statistical information, generally about school finance, and that for this purpose they usually went to S. Walter Harvey. This administrator, it might be added, was praised by a number of legislators as being a "very good facts and figures man."

The six legislator respondents who held top leadership positions in either the House or the Senate in the 1971 session were requested to evaluate the influence of the Commissioner of Education. Specifically, they were queried as to whether his strong opposition to an education bill would

TABLE 24

POINTS OF CONTACT BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND
THE LEGISLATURE AS PERCEIVED BY LEGISLATIVE LEADERS

Questions	Legislative Leaders (N=15)					
	Those Responding as Education Committee Leaders (N=5)		Those Responding as "Money" Committee Leaders (N=4)		Those Responding as House or Senate leaders (N=6)	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
"Does the Commissioner of Education, or his staff, communicate with your Committee or Office?"	5	0	0	4	1	5
"Do you, or people from your Office, personally contact the Commissioner, or his staff, with regard to public school legislation?"	4	1	0	4	2	4

greatly diminish its prospects for passage in the Legislature. Three of these respondents replied that the Commissioner's opposition would "hurt the bill's chances" or would mean "the bill had only a small chance of passage." Two other legislative leaders disputed this assessment, arguing that the Commissioner's position "made no difference" on controversial educational issues. And one of the respondents declared that he "didn't know," since, he said, "the Commissioner and Department never came out fighting; they simply accepted what came out of the Education Committee."

All fifteen legislator respondents also were asked to estimate the success of the Commissioner of Education and his staff in getting their proposals enacted by the Legislature. These perceptions, categorized by caucus affiliation, are contained in Table 25.

An examination of the figures in Table 25 discloses that a majority of legislators rated the Commissioner and his staff as being "successful most of the time" in having the Legislature approve their proposals, though

TABLE 25

ENACTMENT OF STATE DEPARTMENT PROPOSALS AS
PERCEIVED BY LEGISLATIVE LEADERS

Question and Response Categories	Responses of Legislative Leaders (N=15)	
	Conservatives (N=8)	Liberals (N=7)
"How successful have the Commissioner and his staff been in getting their proposals enacted by the Legislature in the last session or two?"		
"Almost always successful"	0	0
"Successful most of the time"	5	3
"Successful about half the time"	1	1
"Successful less than half the time"	0	2
"Almost always unsuccessful"	0	1
No Response	2	0

Liberal lawmakers attributed less success to them than did Conservatives. However, in explaining this success ratio, respondents cited three factors that had little to do with the capability of the State Department staff. These factors were (1) the support Minnesotans traditionally gave education, (2) the emphasis that Governor Anderson placed on school finance reform, and (3) the low saliency of State Department proposals, especially those without major fiscal implications.

Legislative leaders did believe that the Commissioner of Education had some means of exerting policy influence. Most said that Commissioner Casmey was respected in the Legislature for his sincerity and knowledge, albeit a few respondents perceived him as being primarily the advocate for an "educational bureaucracy." Nearly all interviewees agreed that Casmey's principal resource stemmed from the ability of his agency to develop information ("the facts"). None of the legislators looked upon him as operating in a partisan way or even as being "political." Several respondents were critical on the latter point, suggesting that while the Commissioner and State Department were well versed on formal legislative procedures, they did not

have much "political know-how." In this connection, a number of legislators intimated that the State Department did not work effectively with educational groups to marshal support for its proposals. And a few expressed the belief that Commissioner Casmev was hampered in exercising leadership by the lack of confidence the Legislature had in State Department personnel and by the excessively close ties that the Department had maintained with Conservative officeholders.

As has been mentioned, the main influence resource that the State Department was perceived by legislative leaders as having was the capacity to generate policy-relevant information. This does not mean that these officials were entirely satisfied with the information received from the Department. Most legislators felt that this information at least "usually" met their needs (see Table 26). Several Liberal leaders, though, did indicate considerable dissatisfaction.

TABLE 26

LEGISLATOR SATISFACTION WITH STATE DEPARTMENT INFORMATION

Question and Response Categories	Responses of Legislative Leaders (N=14)	
	Conservatives (N=7)	Liberals (N=7)
"In terms of meeting your needs in deciding upon educational and school finance bills, how would you rate the information coming from the State Department of Education?"		
"Almost always meets needs"	2	3
"Usually meets needs"	4	1
"Sometimes meets needs"	1	3
"Almost never meets needs"	0	0

Legislator respondents, in assessing State Department information, stressed its completeness and accuracy. Many commented to the effect that "the Department staff provides us with a lot of hard information." But seven of the respondents did identify some weakness that detracted, in their estimation,

from the utility of this information. Several said that it was not categorized into usable formats nor accompanied by concise summaries. Others cited "jargon" and "bias" as reasons why data furnished by the State Department were not of much assistance to them. Thus, while about half of the legislative leaders we interviewed appeared to be generally satisfied with Department information, the other half indicated that their expectations in some respects were not being met.

It may be, of course, that the Commissioner and State Department had more influence in the 1971 Legislature on education policy matters than our interviews with a selected group of legislative leaders would have us believe. Certainly, Commissioner Casmev and several Department administrators did invest considerable time in communicating with legislators. During the 1971 session, Casmev, Bright, and Harvey were on the Hill on almost a daily basis. They presented testimony in hearings; consulted with Education Committee leaders; supplied lawmakers with statistical information and bill analysis; appointed legislators to State Department advisory committees; and generally, to quote one Department official, "worked damn hard over there [the Legislature]."

Several reasons were offered by Department administrators in explaining why their many efforts had not met with greater success. One was that the Commissioner had taken policy stands in trying to advance the cause of education which were unpopular with legislators. His positions on school desegregation and district consolidation were cases in point. Another reason was the absence of political muscle associated with the position of Commissioner of Education. To the degree that such muscle was necessary to pass controversial education legislation, the Commissioner was in a weak position.

Reasons such as these are not to be discounted. Yet there were other participants, within and without the Legislature, who attributed the State Department's legislative difficulties primarily to its own role expectations and performance. They observed that the Department had tended to assume a "data resource" posture, a posture that neither led to political sophistication nor a willingness "to come out fighting" on big legislative issues. Even the data provided by the Department were criticized by many policy actors as lacking in utility for their purposes, a feeling that probably contributed to the Governor's turning to other people and agencies, and to the attempts by legislators to develop staff resources of their own.

Whether the Minnesota Legislature really wanted the State Department of Education to take a leadership role in formulating and implementing education policy is hard to determine. Most of the lawmakers who were contacted voiced such a hope. And their responses to the questionnaire items shown in Table 27 suggest that legislative leaders desired that the Commissioner of Education and his staff assume such a role. So did top Department administrators judging from their answers to the items reported in Table 27.

Such expectations, however, were not consistent with the treatment the State Department received from the Legislature. Personnel recruitment and promotion procedures that were narrowly restricted by civil service regulations, and salary levels that were not competitive with metropolitan school districts-- these were hardly the sort of thing which promoted professional leadership. Moreover, as one Department administrator noted, "the Legislature had steadily increased the Department's work load with, in most cases, no corresponding increase in the Department budget." One need not accept fully

TABLE 27

POLICY ROLE EXPECTATIONS FOR THE COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION AND STATE
DEPARTMENT HELD BY LEGISLATIVE LEADERS AND
TOP STATE DEPARTMENT ADMINISTRATORS

Statements	Legislative Leaders (N=9)		Top State Department Administrators (N=4)	
	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
"The Commissioner of Education should administer the Department of Education and leave school policy matters to other state officials."	1	8	0	4
"The Commissioner should be the principal advisor to the Governor on school policy matters."	8	1	4	0
"The Commissioner should work actively with members of the Legislature in the development of school policy for the state."	8	1	4	0
"The Legislature should limit itself to determining broad goals for the public schools and leave most policy-making authority to the State Board or Commissioner."	6	3	3	1
"The State Department of Education should use every means at its command, including withholding state funds, to ensure that all state standards are being met by local districts."	7	2	3	1

this viewpoint to wonder if legislative leaders were serious in their talk about the need for greater State Department leadership; or if there were not conflicts among lawmakers about the part the Department should play in education policy making, conflicts which like those among client groups made it all the more difficult for the State Department to determine a role for itself.

Policy Determination in the State Board Arena

The Legislature is not the only arena where state policy for Minnesota public schools is determined. Another such arena is the State Board of Education because of its broad power to interpret statutes and to enact administrative regulations. And on some educational issues, most notably in school desegregation, the State Board took a very visible policy leadership stance. Referring to these efforts, and the attendant controversy, one State Department official commented: "In 1967 people were talking about abolishing the State Board because it didn't do anything; by 1970 the talk was about abolishing the State Board because it was doing too much."

Board Member Recruitment

In Minnesota, the formal aspects of state board selection involve appointment by the Governor and confirmation by the Senate. Informal influence in this process was perceived as being exercised largely by members of the Governor's staff, by party officials at the Congressional district level, and by legislative leaders (see Table 28). Significantly, however, though partisanship and political figures were central to the recruitment of members of the State Board, once seats had been taken on that body such considerations receded to the background. Observers, as well as Board members, were unanimous in their conclusion that these officials did not take "political sides on issues."

While the State Board had gained the reputation of being Republican and rural in its makeup, these attributes no longer characterized that body at the beginning of 1972. Governor Anderson's appointments, by this time, had created a DFL majority on the State Board. Moreover, four of the nine officeholders were from Minnesota's big cities (two from St. Paul, one each from Minneapolis and Duluth), another resided in a Twin Cities suburb, and

TABLE 28

PERCEPTIONS OF INFORMAL INFLUENCE IN THE SELECTION OF STATE BOARD MEMBERS

Individual or Group	Frequency of Mention by Members of the State Board (5), State Department (2), Governor's Staff (1)*		
	Very Influential	Somewhat Influential	Not Influential
Current State Board Members	0	4	3
Commissioner of Education	0	3	4
Teacher Associations	0	2	5
Administrator Associations	0	2	5
Governor's Staff	7	1	0
Legislative Leaders	5	0	2
Party Leaders, other than Legislators	7	1	0
Local School Board Members	0	2	5

*All eight respondents did not check every item.

two more were from smaller cities in the state.¹⁵ Whether these affiliations made much difference in Board decision making was disagreed upon by its members. Three of the six whom we interviewed denied that either they or their colleagues spoke for particular geographic regions. But the other three maintained that nearly all members did represent such regions, two of these respondents citing the saliency of Twin Cities versus outstate orientations. A State Department administrator indicated how these divergent perceptions might be reconciled by observing that the State Board typically sought to act for the state as a whole, but there were some issues (e.g., consolidation of local districts) where regional commitments noticeably affected the decision process.

Decision Style of the State Board

Despite differences in regional attachment--as well as in philosophy, partisanship, and other such characteristics--the State Board was not split into majority and minority factions, nor was it subject to frequent issue-

specific divisions. Board member interviewees, without exception, declared that they were "usually in agreement" when a major policy question was being resolved; other observers corroborated this description. As pictured by Board members and State Department administrators, there was usually discussion and sometimes considerable disagreement before votes were taken ("we hashed things out," commented one official), but this was always accompanied by a strong desire to reach consensus on final decisions.

A combination of factors encouraged a consensual approach. Board members were similar in social background. They did not have political constituencies. There were informal norms approving of being "flexible and open-minded," and repudiating the representation of "special interests." Finally, the State Board operated from a common information base--namely, that supplied by the State Department of Education. While the consensual approach did make it possible for the State Board to move expeditiously through crowded agendas, and to do so in a manner which reduced vulnerability to external groups, it was not a decision style that facilitated the generation and searching examination of policy alternatives.

Accessibility to Interest Groups

By law all meetings of the State Board (held at the Capitol Square Building in St. Paul) were open to the public. Average attendance, according to a State Department observer, was forty or so people. But at some public hearings (e.g., on school desegregation) hundreds of citizens turned out. The major state-level education organizations, along with the PTA and the League of Women Voters, had representatives at each Board meeting.

Educational interest group spokesmen not only attended meetings and testified at hearings, but also encouraged on occasion their local leaders

to contact Board members. None of this activity was interpreted by them to be "lobbying," for the State Board, in their view, was "an entirely different kind of animal from the Legislature." By this apparently was meant that the State Board had less need for interest group information and expert advice than did the Legislature, since it had the State Department to provide these; and had less susceptibility to pressure tactics, since both structure and tradition tended to insulate the State Board. More important, probably, was the belief of education lobbyists that the State Board was not, by and large, where the big decisions were made; that the influence resources of the educational organizations were more productively expended in the Legislature and Governor's Office.

Board member interviewees, when questioned as to the frequency with which various groups "communicated their views" directly to the State Board, gave the estimates shown in the first column of Table 29. Educators or their organizations head the list, followed by parents and racial-ethnic groups. Except for the last, a manifestation of the desegregation controversy, not a single non-educational group was seen as often contacting the State Board. These respondents also were asked to identify the groups which "most often sought to influence" the State Board when that body was deciding a policy issue. Their replies are contained in the second column of Table 29. The MFT, the MEA, and the MSBA received the largest number of mentions as organizations attempting to influence the State Board.

Board members, understandably, were very reluctant to single out any organization as being "the most influential." One official did name the MSBA. Another pointed to "special education" as having the "strongest lobby in the state." Our respondents from the educational interest groups offered a somewhat different assessment. Two picked the MSBA, stressing that at

TABLE 29

INTEREST GROUP CONTEXT FOR STATE BOARD POLICY MAKING
AS PERCEIVED BY BOARD MEMBERS

Groups Listed	Named by State Board Members (N=6) as	
	"Often Communicating their Views"	"Most Often Sought to Influence"
"Vocational Education"	6	1
"Special Education"	5	3
Local Superintendents	5	2
MEA	5	4
MFT	5	5
MSBA	5	4
Administrator Associations	5	2
Parent Groups and PTA	3	0
Racial-Ethnic Groups	3	1
Labor Groups	0	0
Business Groups	0	0
Farm Groups	0	0
Religious Groups	0	0
City Government Officials	0	0

least three members of the State Board by law had to have local board experience. Two others thought that the MEA was most influential because of its powerful grassroots organization. But the remaining respondent said, in effect, that "no one has the inside track." In any event, the State Board policy arena was clearly one where the educational establishment groups were continuously represented, while other groups appeared on the scene only during a controversy.

Policy-Making Resources

State Board members, notwithstanding their formal authority to enact decisions, had few resources of their own with which to formulate education policies. Whatever their leadership intentions, they had to rely heavily on the Commissioner of Education and the State Department. Service on the State Board was done on a part-time basis (most Board member respondents estimated that they spent four to six days a month on Board work); and meeting agendas not only were lengthy, but were crowded with routine matters (most

Board member respondents indicated that from one-quarter to one-half of an average meeting was devoted to such matters). Board agendas were not prepared by its members. Instead, this was undertaken by the Commissioner and his staff. And Board members depended on the State Department for nearly all of their information on the agenda items.

Of the six Board members we interviewed, three implied that they had no data source other than the State Department; the others mentioned only materials coming from one of the major educational organizations. Several Board members did insist, though, that they often urged the Department to provide more detailed information than it initially supplied. Nearly all Board members said that the information made available to them by the State Department either "almost always" or "usually" met their needs. These replies are shown in Table 30, along with the evaluation given by legislative leaders reported earlier in this section. Judging from the responses of the two groups, the State Department did a somewhat better job of satisfying the information needs of Board members than they did of legislators.

TABLE 30

STATE BOARD MEMBER ASSESSMENT OF STATE DEPARTMENT INFORMATION

Question and Response Categories	Responses By	
	State Board Members (N=6)	Legislative Leaders (N=14)
"In terms of meeting your needs in deciding upon education policies, how would you rate the information provided by the State Department?"		
"Almost always meets needs"	2	5
"Usually meets needs"	3	5
"Sometimes meets needs"	1	3
"Almost never meets needs"	0	1

Relationship with the Commissioner of Education

The key figure in the State Board arena was the Commissioner of Education.

Regardless of his legal subordination to the State Board, the Commissioner's acknowledged status as an educational expert, position at the apex of a vast state bureaucracy, and control of technical information put him in a pivotal role with respect to education policy making. To examine the policy expectations held by State Board members and by the Commissioner for the latter's position, a number of statements were included in both the structured interviews and the questionnaire. Respondents were asked to express their agreement or disagreement with each statement. Their reactions to thirteen statements are presented in Table 31.

The data in Table 31 reveal that there was considerable consensus among Board members in their policy expectations for the Commissioner of Education. On just a few items did more than a single Board member dissent from the majority, and there was only one statement on which Board member respondents split down the middle, this being on whether the Commissioner should become involved in the recruitment process for the State Board. A second point that warrants mention is that Board members emphatically rejected the classic policy-administration dichotomy and indicated that they wanted their Commissioner to be a major policy participant. In his relationships with other actors, including the State Board, the Commissioner was expected by Board members to be an innovator, formulator, advocate, and influential in the determination of education policy. Third, the Commissioner not only concurred with Board members on an expansive policy role for his office, but went beyond them, particularly in his expressed willingness to interact with party leaders. Finally, the majority of Board member respondents and the Commissioner differed only on whether the State Board should supervise the activities of the Commissioner (they agreed; he disagreed), on whether the main function of the State Board should be to approve proposals developed

TABLE 31

POLICY ROLE EXPECTATIONS FOR THE OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION HELD BY ITS INCUMBENT AND BY MEMBERS OF THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION

Statements	State Board Members (N=6)		Commissioner	
	Agree/Disagree	Agree/Disagree	Agree/Disagree	Agree/Disagree
"A State Commissioner should assume leadership in shaping the policies enacted by the State Board of Education!"	5	1	X	
"The major function of the State Board of Education should be to approve programs developed by the State Commissioner and his staff."	2	4	X	
"A State Commissioner should administer the State Dept. of Educ. and leave school policy matters to other state officials."	1	5		X
"The responsibility of the State Board of Educ. should include supervision over the activities of the State Commissioner."	5	1		X
"A State Commissioner should work to have people he respects become members of the State Board of Education."	3	3		X
"A State Commissioner should be the principal advocate of major changes in state education policy."	4	2	X	
"A State Commissioner should maintain a neutral stand on education policy issues that are very controversial among the citizens of his state."	1	5		X
"A State Commissioner should take a policy position in which he believes even when most professional educators may be hostile."	6	0	X	
"A State Commissioner should actively seek to influence legislative leaders with regard to education policies."	6	0	X	
"The State Commissioner should be the principal advisor of the Governor on school policy matters."	4	2	X	
"A State Commissioner should actively work with party leaders in order to attain education policy goals."	1	5	X	
"A State Commissioner should actively seek to influence federal legislation that affects public education in his state."	5	1	X	
"The State Department of Education should use every means at its command, including withholding state funds, to ensure that all state standards are being met by local districts."	6	0	X	

by the Commissioner (they disagreed; he agreed), and on whether the Commissioner should actively work with party leaders (they disagreed; he agreed). In review, the expectations portrait of the Commissioner's policy role which emerges from the responses in Table 31 is that of a strong political executive, one who is expected to exert influence in dealing with a broad spectrum of policy-making actors.

Commissioner Casmey's relationships with educational interest groups and legislative leaders were discussed earlier in this section. There it was suggested that the Commissioner had problems in assuming a policy leadership role with some of these actors. But this difficulty was not because he hid behind a cloak of professional neutrality. Quite the contrary, Howard Casmey began his term in 1970 by insisting that the State Department "publicly take stands on issues." He, himself, forcefully spoke out on education controversies, including those over school desegregation, district consolidation, metropolitan reorganization, and school funding equity. Attracting considerable media attention (at least in the Twin Cities) and appearing before countless groups, the Commissioner helped draw attention to the need for "equal educational opportunity for a quality program," and he effectively functioned in this regard as a policy advocate. Still, taking advanced public positions created enemies and this, along with the other factors that have been pointed out, probably cut into the Commissioner's influence with both schoolmen and politicians.

Working relationships between Commissioner Casmey and the State Board, as depicted by our respondents, were supportive and collegial. All respondents agreed that there was no opposition bloc to the Commissioner on the State Board. Indeed, their comments indicated that there was very little conflict between the two, though issues such as busing and school finance needs were

mentioned as producing occasional friction between Casmev and a few Board members. Such disagreements as did exist evidently were resolved before the Board came together in formal meetings.

In formulating policy proposals, the Commissioner did not interact very much with Board members on an individual basis. Nor was extensive use made of Board committees. (The State Board did not have standing committees, but ad hoc ones were created for special purposes.) Instead, the approach employed by Commissioner Casmev, according to both Board members and State Department officials, was to outline or to test his policy ideas before the entire Board in order to obtain reactions from its members. One administrator observed that "when the State Board met, the Commissioner often acted as one of its members. Frequently he would ask questions of the staff like other Board members; then he would offer recommendations." The detailed proposals presented for final Board action were prepared by the Assistant Commissioners and the personnel in their sections of the State Department of Education. These proposals took into account, apparently to a considerable extent, the preference of Board members. Three of those interviewed believed that the Commissioner of Education "often" took ideas or suggestions from them; three other Board member respondents said that he did so at least "sometimes."

Several Board member respondents made it a point to emphasize that the governmental body on which they served was "independent" of bureaucratic direction. In the opinion of one:

This Board is very independent. The Commissioner is a creation of the State Board of Education. We appoint him and listen to his suggestions because we respect him. But we are independent of him and, especially, of the State Department of Education. We expect them to listen to us, too, and we don't accept their ideas merely because they are professionals. That is why there is a lay board, and this Board is very strong. I have been on many civic bodies, but I've never known one where each member had

such firm convictions about education, including the conviction that we cannot leave education to the professionals. That is why we are members of the Board. We expect the Department to listen very carefully to what we have to say because we provide them with their budget. Through the Commissioner we run the State Department.

Educational interest group respondents, whose organizations had representatives at all Board meetings, were divided on how much "real direction" was given to the Commissioner by the State Board. Three of these respondents perceived the State Board, reflecting the views of its members or those voiced at its hearings, as often modifying recommendations made by the State Department. Two other educational interest group spokesmen, however, did not think that such positive action characterized the Board's decision behavior. One evaluated the State Board as being just a "screening and reacting agency;" the other termed this body a "rubber stamp" for State Department-developed proposals.

Legislative Initiative From the State Board

In its study of "Accountability In Schools," the Citizens League implied that active leadership had not been the traditional posture for the State Board and the Commissioner of Education. To quote this report:

The Commissioner and State Board of Education have used their authority primarily to insure that minimum educational inputs are provided. Although the Legislature has given them rather broad power to interpret the statutory provisions regulating the public school system in the state, and to formulate rules and regulations to enforce them...we learned that traditionally they have not opted to exercise the full range of their authority to decide education policy.¹⁶

Whatever the truth of this generalization for an earlier period, and many of our respondents expressed the same opinion, by the early 1970s there were issues on which the State Board and Commissioner had assumed direction (e.g., school desegregation and educational assessment) and new areas were emerging (e.g., regional services and school finance equity) where leadership

from these officials was evident as they prepared for the 1973 legislative sessions. In short, the State Board arena, albeit slowly and haltingly, was becoming an increasingly important source of initiatives into the policy system. Nonetheless, there was, as one of its members acknowledged, a "great hole" in this thrust and that was in the area of legislative relationships.

Whereas the Commissioner and the State Department had moderate influence with the Legislature, at least on education bills that were not "too political," the State Board of Education, if considered as a separable entity, was almost outside the legislative policy system in its perceived impact. To be sure, the State Board did adopt recommendations which were then presented to the Legislature, and occasionally Board members testified in hearings or initiated personal contacts with lawmakers. Yet nearly all of the legislative leaders we interviewed saw State Board recommendations as being communicated by the Commissioner or his staff. Only five of fifteen legislator respondents reported that they were ever personally contacted by Board members regarding a bill; those who were contacted could name only an individual or two on the State Board who ever actively engaged in "personal lobbying."

When requested to evaluate the importance of the State Board in formulating and working for education legislation (see Table 32), our legislator interviewees, regardless of caucus affiliation, assigned that body a minor role. A few asserted that the State Board was "not important at all" as an actor in the legislative process dealing with education. Most of the lawmakers could offer no explanation for the State Board's being only a minor participant; they apparently accepted this as being simply the way the legislative process worked. Others did advance some reasons. Four legislators stated that the State Board in its relationships with the Legislature was "overshadowed" by the Commissioner and the State Department. And the State Board's lack of

TABLE 32

LEGISLATOR PERCEPTIONS OF THE INFLUENCE
OF THE STATE BOARD ON EDUCATION LEGISLATION

Question and Response Categories	Responses of Legislative Leaders (N=14)	
	Conservatives (N=8)	Liberals (N=6)
"How would you assess the importance of the State Board in actually formulating and working for education legislation?"		
"Single most important participant"	0	0
"One of the most important participants"	1	0
"A participant of minor importance"	5	5
"Not important at all as a participant"	2	1

political resources, along with an apolitical tradition, were cited by several of these respondents as contributing to its lack of significant involvement in education legislation.

As for the State Board, two of the six members that were interviewed maintained that they had no base of influence with the Legislature; that they had no "clout" with these lawmakers. Two other Board members believed they had such influence yet suggested little beyond formal presentations as to how this was attained. Only two of the respondents said that Board influence depended upon their "willingness to lobby," implying that this was a necessary adaptation to the political milieu in which they were being called upon to function. Nevertheless, so long as most members of the State Board rejected the notion that they, individually or collectively, should actively seek to influence legislators, the State Board was unlikely to be an important force in legislative policy making for education.

There was, of course, another way for the State Board to affect legislation and that was through the Governor's Office. But contacts between this office and the State Board traditionally had been minimal. There usually was one formal meeting a year, and some informal communications did occur. Still, as one State Department administrator put it, "the Governor took a

hands-off policy once he made Board appointments." A Board member explained his appointment thusly:

When the Governor [Anderson] appointed me, I made sure I had a chat with him. I told him that I had no intention of following his policies on education if he was looking for that. He replied, 'I have no policies except that we should give every child an equal educational opportunity. That is my whole policy. If you do that while you are a member of the Board, no matter how you do it, then whether I agree with you or not has nothing to do with it. That will be your job.'

Likewise, the State Board's influence with the Governor was not seen by most Board members we interviewed as being very great, though they did believe, and our Governor's staff respondents agreed, that he respected the opinions of the State Board.

Once Governor Anderson's appointees had come to be a majority on the State Board, contacts between that body, or at least its DFL members, and the Governor's Office appeared to increase. A few knowledgeable even suggested that by 1973 regular meetings were being held, with school desegregation being a principal topic of discussion. Such a change was consistent with the enlarged role in education policy making being assumed by the Governor, a role that we need now to examine.

Central Role of the Governor

The formal authority lodged in the Governor's Office in Minnesota is such that its incumbent, of necessity, is an actor in the determination of state policy for the public schools. Prior to Wendell Anderson's becoming Governor in 1971 there were several chief executives who had become politically involved with educational issues--for instance, Orville Freeman with school finance in the 1950s and Karl Rolvaag with collective negotiations in the 1960s. Nonetheless, knowledgeable observers of Minnesota state government could not recall any previous Governor being as visible, direct, and

Influential a participant in education policy making as Governor Anderson was in the 1971 legislative session.

Emphasis on School Finance

During the first two years of his tenure, Governor Anderson recommended new programs or expressed his views on a variety of school issues, such as "the right to read," teacher certification, collective bargaining, and aid to parochial schools. Yet all of these were overshadowed by Anderson's personal and political commitment to reforming the tax and school finance structure for the state. Most of Anderson's predecessors, in the estimation of several legislative leaders, had tried "merely to set guidelines" for school finance, had been content to "work behind the scenes" on this issue, and had not sought to wield much influence in its resolution by the Legislature. As our analysis of the events leading to the 1971 Omnibus Tax Bill makes clear, none of these behaviors typified Governor Anderson's approach toward this policy area. Instead, he and his staff publicly defined the issue, formulated the main legislative proposal, exploited fully their influence resources, and extracted in the end a favorable compromise from the Legislature.

The legislators we interviewed were almost unanimous in pointing to the Governor as being the driving force on the tax reform-school funding issue. Even most Conservative respondents conceded that the Governor's policy leadership decisively altered the decision which eventually was reached. (Anderson's dramatic resort to the veto was singled out by legislator interviewees as being critical in forcing the final compromise.) A few House Conservative leaders did claim that "the Legislature would have gone in the same direction without the Governor's impact, but would not have

gone as far relative to reform." As for the Governor's legislative tactics, our respondents mentioned his adroit use of the media to foment public pressure; his "turning loose" of very skillful staff persons, notably John Haynes, to inform and persuade lawmakers; his constant efforts to sustain party discipline among the DFLers; his capacity under stress to maintain bipartisan relationships with several key Senate Conservatives; and, finally, his willingness to plumb fully the formal authority inherent in the Governor's Office. Unsurprisingly, most legislator respondents judged Governor Anderson to be "politically shrewd"; a few House Conservatives thought the appellation "heavy handed" to be more appropriate.

Policy-Making Resources

The legislative leaders we interviewed stressed three influence resources, aside from legal powers, that Governor Anderson could command when dealing with education policy. First, both position and personality gave the Governor enormous leverage in determining what should or should not be a political issue. No other actor had nearly the same capacity to set the agenda for the policy system. And a Time reporter did not exaggerate too much when he argued that Anderson was "a startlingly effective TV performer, one of the best since John Kennedy."¹⁷

Second, besides being able to create or dramatize issues for the broader public, Anderson's high standing among DFL leaders ensured that the Governor's proposals had fairly solid party backing. It should be added that Anderson's pledge of "no new tax increases" in his 1973 budget message did frustrate many in his party who had hoped to push through the DFL-controlled Legislature what they believed were needed, albeit costly, social programs. And there were several respondents who predicted that the DFL, once having attained

for the first time a majority status in the Legislature, would be beset by factionalism.

Third, Governor Anderson developed his own staff resources, apart from the State Department, to assist him in formulating programs relative to education and school finance, and to work for their enactment by the Legislature.

Two persons were especially valuable to the Governor. Most important was John Haynes who served as the staff official for taxation and school finance. Described by many legislators as a "quick study," Haynes combined technical ability and political sensitivity in a fashion that made him highly effective as a program designer for the Governor and in a liaison role with the Legislature. A second close advisor was Gerald Christenson, Director of the State Planning Agency. The staff of this agency numbered some seventy people, three or four of whom became involved with education, and it had the capacity to generate tax-school finance information that was perceived in the Governor's Office as being much more "politically usable" than the voluminous data coming from the State Department. Moreover, Christenson, himself, had engaged in educational research before being appointed by Anderson. Christenson's expertness, coupled with that which Haynes supplied, was heavily relied upon by the Governor during the 1971 legislative session. The final person on the Governor's staff whose responsibilities included education was Wenda Moore.* Her primary task was one of liaison for the Governor with the State Board of Education and with other education commissions, boards, and committees.

Reasons for Involvement

A number of reasons were given by respondents as to why the Governor chose to play a central role in school finance legislation. The ever-

*Ms. Moore was appointed by the Governor to the Board of Regents for the University of Minnesota in 1973.

Increasing magnitude of state education expenditures would have made it hard for any Governor to avoid more active involvement and let school finance continue to be decided in semi-isolation from general fiscal policy. The importance of this consideration was underscored by John Haynes, who also provided some relevant statistics:

The day when decisions in educational financing can be made without consideration of the fiscal and tax limitations is dead. Education is the largest single item in the state budget. Direct aids for local school districts for the current state budget ran past \$1,100,000,000, about 40% of the State's general fund budget. Adding higher education pushed the education share past 50%. Even after the 20% cut in school property taxes due to the new school aid law, schools take 52% of all property taxes levied in the state (down from 57%). State and local spending for education has doubled since 1967. The decision on the school finance formula and its coordinated levy limits is the most important single spending and tax decision the Governor and the Legislature has to make.¹⁸

Even more significant in explaining the Governor's policy role than the actual growth or size of the state education budget were the widespread manifestations of discontent over escalating local millage rates, the bulk of which went to support the schools, and of heightened citizen concern over the distribution, efficacy, and "accountability" of educational spending. Public reaction to teacher militancy, student unrest, and desegregation controversies further contributed to the politicalization of education in both local and state policy arenas. Friends and foes alike of the Governor agreed that he was sensitive to the emerging political context of the school finance issue. The espousal of local property tax relief had great electoral potency and it was significant that Anderson retained this as his sine qua non throughout the protracted legislative wrangling over a tax and finance compromise. By the 1973 legislative session, "Spendy Wendy" (the label given by Republican detractors), while still calling for a DFL program of "social

Justice," had pledged himself to a financial framework of "no new tax increases."¹⁹ Governor Anderson's political pragmatism was probably also a factor in the school desegregation controversy where he appears to have privately cautioned the State Board to go slow, especially on the socio-economic aspects, even as he maintained a public profile that could hardly have been lower.

While politics undoubtedly was an integral part of Governor Anderson's response to education issues, this is not to say that principles were unimportant. Several different policy stances were feasible within the parameters established by the "political realities," and Anderson at an early date revealed a personal commitment to tax and expenditure equalization. Although defeated with regard to the latter in the 1971 legislative session, the Governor in his 1973 budget message again demanded an equalization plan to "bring the low-spending districts up to the average over a six-year period." And in the 1973 legislative session the equalization proposals backed by Governor Anderson met with considerable success.*

Relationship with Educational Interest Groups

Whatever his motives, Governor Anderson was more independent than his predecessors of the advice and information offered by the state-level educational interest groups. The MFT, due principally to its ties with organized labor, did have access to the Governor's Office, especially on issues such as collective bargaining. So did spokesmen for the big city school districts, a reflection probably of Anderson's political strength in these areas. The interest groups, however, that traditionally had exercised predominant influence in state education politics--that is, the MEA and the MSBA--were excluded, at least initially, from the Governor's inner council. These organizations, as

*See page 75 of this report.

top DFLers saw them, were narrowly focused in their orientation and "tied to the Conservative Party." Consequently, the major educational interest groups had little role in the preparation of Anderson's tax-school finance proposals; and their support, or lack of it, was but a marginal consideration in the strategy employed by the Governor and his aides in the 1971 legislative session.

With the passage of time, Anderson's relationships with the MEA became more positive. Spokesmen for this organization said that they were in accord with the Governor's education policy emphasis and that they had gained satisfactory access to his staff. Moreover, the leaders of MEA considered themselves as being on good terms both "professionally and personally" with Governor Anderson. More to the point, perhaps, the MEA commanded resources that translated into voting strength, a fact that was evident in the 1972 elections and that could have hardly escaped the political calculations of the Governor.

While the influence status of MEA with the Governor's Office improved during the first two years of Anderson's term, the same was not the case for the access to this office possessed by the MSBA or the MASA. The MSBA respondent did state that he could support the Governor on "ninety per cent of the things" pushed for by the chief executive. Yet the points of conflict were serious, notably those which touched on whether state government or local school boards were to set education policy. State-imposed levy limitations, and other aspects of the Governor's program that seemed to threaten "local control," made MSBA leaders apprehensive. Additionally, there had been political friction between the Governor and the MSBA. As for the MASA, its officers saw their organization as being in serious conflict with the Governor's priorities for education policy on such matters as parochial

school aid and local levy limitations. The MASA respondent did not consider either himself or MSBA representatives as having much access to Anderson or his staff. This respondent, like most others from the educational interest groups, perceived only the MFT and, to a lesser degree, the MEA as having substantial input into the Governor's Office.

Relationship with the State Department

Governor Anderson's relationships with the State Department, though generally cordial and cooperative, were not characterized by any high degree of rapport. Several factors seem to have contributed to this situation. First, the statistical data furnished by the State Department were not viewed in the Governor's Office as being of much utility in either formulating policies or in persuading legislators to support them. State Department administrators insisted that they did make "the facts" available to the Governor's Office. But the aides to the Governor we interviewed maintained that Department data often needed to be supplemented, categorized, or summarized before they could be brought to bear on the legislative process. Related to this was the conviction among the Governor's staffers that their initial policy task in 1971 had to be comprehensive tax-spending reform. And from their perspective, the State Department, like other educator organizations, was prone to treat school finance within an unrealistically narrow context, one that ignored general tax and fiscal questions. Finally, the State Department was looked upon by persons close to the Governor as being partial to the Conservatives' philosophy and as being closely linked to legislators of that party. The Commissioner of Education, who had been appointed before Anderson took office, was a DFLer and certainly shared the Governor's concern for equalization. Nonetheless, as one insider phrased it, the Commissioner "was not the Governor's man politically."

The State Department administrators we interviewed rated the status of the Commissioner of Education as a source of advice and ideas for the Governor higher than did other respondents (see Table 33). In justifying these ratings, the administrators mentioned the Commissioner's personal access ("he just picks up the phone"), ability to supply requested information, influence with Governor-appointed State Board members, objective approach toward policy making ("he doesn't play politics"), and standing with the "education constituency." To this, one State Department official added: "The Commissioner does not publicly oppose the Governor's programs with which he disagrees; however, he might not actively push some of them."

TABLE 33

PERCEPTIONS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE COMMISSIONER
OF EDUCATION AS A SOURCE OF ADVICE AND IDEAS FOR THE GOVERNOR

Question and Response Categories	Responses By		
	State Department Administrators (N=2)	Governor's Staff (N=2)	Education Lobbyists (N=4)
"Compared to other sources of ideas and advice available to the Governor, how important is the State Commissioner?"			
"Most important single source"	1	0	0
"Among his most important sources"	1	1	2
"A relatively minor source"	0	1	2
"Not at all an important source"	0	0	0

The two educational interest group respondents who evaluated the Commissioner as being just a "minor source" for Governor Anderson attributed this weakness primarily to political reasons, contending that Commissioner Casmev sometimes took public positions which were "politically embarrassing" to Anderson and that the Governor did not relate to Casmev as "a person he could trust politically." Members of the Governor's staff we interviewed also intimated the presence of political factors, but they were explicit only in pointing to alleged planning and information-generating deficiencies of the State Department.

One potentially significant change in Governor-State Department relationships had to do with the flow of policy proposals to the Legislature. Prior to Anderson's becoming Governor, the Department had introduced its proposals, once they had received approval from the State Board, directly into the Legislature through the vehicle of its majority caucus. Such a procedure for Department-initiated legislation was not acceptable to Governor Anderson and these administrators were directed, according to one respondent, to have all their legislative proposals "screened and coordinated" by the Governor's Office. While this could be interpreted as enhancing the rationality and coordination of the program requests coming from the executive branch (as such it fit in with Anderson's stated concern for reorganizing this branch), it certainly increased the likelihood of the Governor's Office becoming the focal point in legislative policy making for the public schools.

Relationship with the State Board

The lack of frequent contact between the Governor and the State Board already has been mentioned. The State Board, to a considerable extent, was insulated from the politics of both the executive and legislative branch, and its influence with these powerful lawmakers tended to mirror its isolation. The transition from a Republican to a DFL majority on the State Board, a consequence of Anderson's appointments, was accompanied by more interaction between this body and the Governor's Office on issues like school desegregation and the 1973 budget message. The Governor's position on these issues (e.g., his opposition to extensive busing and to new tax increases) no doubt was communicated to Board members, or at least to those of a DFL persuasion, along with the expectation that these officials were to pay some heed to gubernatorial concerns. It is equally probable, on the other hand, that the State Board was encouraged to take a more active leadership role on such

education policy matters as more equitable school funding. As reported by Commissioner Casmev, the Governor did agree that the State Board and State Department, both on the periphery of school finance policy making in the 1971 session, were to prepare the state foundation aid formula for a consideration by the 1973 legislature.

Summary

In review, the term "education Governor" is apropos for Wendell Anderson in spite of his reliance on people other than school officials and their allies. He and his staff were the key participants at every stage of the process which resulted in the tax-school finance reforms of 1971, and their actions apparently had effect on other educational policies as well. Informal relationships with the State Department and State Board were marked by growing gubernatorial influence. Both directly and indirectly, then, elementary and secondary education were increasingly brought within the policy orbit of the Governor's Office.

Growing Assertiveness of the Legislature

Along with the Governor, the Minnesota Legislature is the ultimate repository of state authority for education and is the fulcrum of activity for fiscal decision making. The relationships between this governing institution and other state-level policy actors have been described earlier in this section. But it is necessary here to consider briefly the Legislature itself, and the willingness and ability of its members to take an active part in the formulation of state policy for the public schools.

Reasons for Involvement

By the 1971 session, the role of the Legislature in school policy making had become increasingly assertive. This was partially a consequence of the disunity among the educational interest groups, and between these groups and

the State Department. No longer were the spokesmen for these organizations considered by lawmakers to be the source of objective and expert testimony on education, nor could the most important of these organizations concert their influence resources behind a common legislative program. Instead, many of our legislator respondents looked upon the state-level educational groups as narrowly self-interested and as trying "to build empires for themselves." And even though the emergence of "teacher power" was recognized by these legislators, it was resented as well as respected.

Besides the fragmentation of the public school interests, there were constituency and party considerations that motivated legislators to seek a greater voice in education policy making. Mounting public concern was expressed in countless ways. Yet from the vantage point of the capitol it was the "tax clamor" that was politically fundamental. Minnesota legislators, like their counterparts in other states, were extremely tax-conscious and several that we interviewed were convinced that the Legislature was going to have to adopt some sort of cost-benefit approach toward the schools. These officials perceived constituency pressures on other education issues, such as racial desegregation, teacher militancy, student discipline, and parochial school aid. Obviously, the politicalization of education worked to activate legislators just as it did the Governor.

Some of the attitudes of our legislator respondents toward accountability and educational change are indicated in Table 34. For the purpose of comparison, the responses of State Board members and education lobbyists also are shown. As can be seen from these data, most legislative leaders did not subscribe to the proposition that "local control" ought to be the basic principle guiding state education policy making. Conversely, a majority of State Board respondents and those from the educational organizations accepted

this proposition. Another difference among these groups was in their answers to the question of whether educators "keep asking for ever-increasing state spending without being willing to show any real return." Most legislator respondents replied in the affirmative as did half of those on the State Board. Four of the five education lobbyists disagreed with this statement. Finally, nearly all of the respondents shared the attitude that "fundamental changes in the public schools are going to be necessary if they are ever going to work well for all our children."

TABLE 34

ATTITUDES OF LEGISLATIVE LEADERS, EDUCATION LOBBYISTS, AND STATE BOARD MEMBERS TOWARD "ACCOUNTABILITY" AND PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE

Statements	Percentage of Agreement By		
	Legislative Leaders (N=9)	Education Lobbyists (N=5)	State Board Members (N=6)
"Local control of education is the basic principle that should guide the state in making policies for the public schools."	33%	60%	67%
"The demand for accountability in education is being met by the improved professional quality of our teachers."	33%	20%	33%
"Educators keep asking for ever-increasing state spending without being willing to show any real return for the taxpayer's additional dollars."	56%	20%	50%
"Fundamental changes in the public schools are going to be necessary if they are ever going to work well for all our children."	78%	100%	83%

Several momentous party developments occurred within Minnesota during the past decade and these no doubt added to the willingness of its state legislators to act on education issues. First, a highly competitive two-party system had evolved by the 1960s and the constant search for issues generated by this system had extended to education. School finance and collective bargaining,

especially, were decided within the context of party division. Second, the five years from 1968 to 1973 witnessed a dramatic shift in party dominance from the Republicans (Conservatives) to the DFL (Liberals). Writing after the 1972 election, one analyst summarized the DFL advance as follows:

Putting the finishing touch on an advance that began in 1968, the DFL took control of both the Minnesota House and Senate for the first time.

In the last three elections approximately 50 legislative seats have fallen from Republican control, along with the Governorship, Lieutenant Governorship, one of the three posts on the Public Service Commission and one seat in the U. S. House.

The only major office to fall to the Republicans during that period - a casualty of one of the recurring fights within the DFL party - is the Secretary of State's.

Meanwhile, the DFL has retained its hold on Minnesota's two seats in the U. S. Senate, and its occupants have become more powerful in state politics than ever.²⁰

Speaking generally, the ascendancy of the DFL meant an emphasis in the Legislature on urban labor measures. While most Conservative leaders had come from outstate Minnesota, the Speaker of the House, Martin Sabo, for the 1973 session resided in Minneapolis and the new Senate Majority Leader, Nicholas Coleman, hailed from St. Paul. And, in light of the political association between the DFL and the AFL-CIO, it was predicted by a number of our interviewees that 1973 would be "a labor session", with the influence of business interests not matching that wielded in previous years.

The switch to DFL control in the Legislature posed for the major educational interest groups, other than the MFT and the big city districts, a basic problem of adjustment. Throughout the 1960s, the MEA and the MSBA concentrated on building alliances with the dominant Conservatives. With the growing power of the liberal caucus, these organizations found it necessary to seek new points of access and to forge new relationships. The MEA had

trouble doing this in the 1971 session, but by 1973 it seemed that the adjustment had been successfully made. On the other hand, MSBA continued to maintain the old ties. Given the conservative outstate composition of this organization, it probably could do little else. Yet the likely outcome, as one of its officials admitted, was that the MSBA would experience "difficulties" in having its legislative proposals favorably considered. A top DFL leader, who believed the MSBA had been arrogant in its past relationships with legislators of his party, was more blunt in his response, predicting that this organization "would be lucky to get a bill out of committee" in the 1973 session.

Policy-Making Constraints

While a confluence of different factors having to do with interest groups, voting constituencies, and political parties attracted, or pushed, Minnesota lawmakers in the direction of becoming more involved with the public schools, their ability to undertake such a role was constrained by the limited policy-making resources available to the Legislature. True, the Minnesota Legislature probably had more of such resources in the early 1970s than did this institution in most states. And it was clearly moving toward being a modern, professional lawmaking body.* Even so, the quantity and capacity of its staff were far from sufficient for the Legislature to research, design, and initiate education policy on a continuous basis.

The dependence of the legislative leaders we interviewed on information provided by the executive branch (e.g., the State Department and Governor's staff) and by the educational interest groups (e.g., the MEA, the MFT, and, for Conservatives, the MSBA) is readily observable in the data reported in Table 35. Although most legislator respondents named a variety of competing sources as supplying "useful information about the public school," only

*See pages 30-32 of this report.

three of the fifteen identified any of the staff available to the Legislature as being among them.

TABLE 35

SOURCES CITED BY LEGISLATIVE LEADERS AS PROVIDING
"USEFUL PUBLIC SCHOOL INFORMATION" TO THEIR OFFICE OR COMMITTEE

Sources*	Frequency of Mention By		
	Liberal Legislators (N=7)	Conservative Legislators (N=8)	All Legislators (N=15)
State Department	6	6	12
Teachers Association (MEA)	4	6	10
Teachers Union (MFT)	4	5	9
Local School Officials	3	5	8
School Boards Association (MSBA)	1	6	7
Governor's Staff (and State Planning Agency)	5	2	7
Department of Taxation	1	2	3
Principals' Associations	0	2	2
House or Senate Staff	1	1	2
Individual Legislators	1	1	2
Parent-Teachers Association (PTA)	0	2	2
Citizens League	1	1	2
"Taxpayer Groups"	0	1	1
"Metropolitan Groups"	0	1	1
Caucus (or Party) Staff	1	0	1
School Administrator Association (MASA)	1	0	1

*Coded from open-ended questions.

Interestingly enough, as can be seen from Table 36, the same three leaders said that the legislative staff resources were "personally the most useful to them." More noteworthy in Table 36 is the fact that half of the Liberal respondents pointed to the Governor's staff and the State Planning Agency as being their most useful suppliers of information about the public schools. By way of contrast, the State Department was cited by only two legislators. And just a single educational interest group, the MSBA, was even mentioned, and that but once, by any lawmaker as being his best information source.

In addition to identifying the people who made useful information available to them, legislator respondents were queried about "their greatest obstacle" in determining policy for the public schools. Their answers, which we subsequently grouped into broad categories, are contained in Table 37.

TABLE 36

SOURCE OF PUBLIC SCHOOL INFORMATION CITED BY LEGISLATIVE LEADERS
AS BEING "PERSONALLY" THE MOST USEFUL ONE TO THEM

Sources	Responses By		
	Liberal Legislators (N=7)*	Conservative Legislators (N=8)**	All Legislators (N=15)
Governor's Staff and State Planning Agency	4	1	5
State Department	1	1	2
House or Senate Staff	1	1	2
Caucus or Party Staff	1	0	1
Local School Officials	1	1	2
Individual Legislators	0	1	1
Taxpayer Groups	0	1	1
School Boards Association (MSBA)	0	1	1

* Identified two sources

** One Conservative leader said "no particular group"

In one way or another, nearly half of these respondents suggested that the escalating cost of schooling, along with an inability to relate this to learning, was the main difficulty they faced as lawmakers for education. "Our biggest problem," one stated, "is trying to justify the number of dollars we spend for education." Four of the interviewees emphasized the paucity of legislative resources, specifically time and staff, as severe restraints upon their effectively deciding complicated education policy questions. A long-time Conservative leader, in commenting upon this deficiency, pointed out that the Governor's Office through its budget control exercised enormous programmatic and fiscal initiative, and that the Legislature simply did not have the policy-making capacity "to deviate very much from what the Governor presents." This respondent further noted that "the Legislature is in the position of depending on those seeking dollars for the information we must use to decide upon their requests." Another obstacle mentioned by more than a single legislator was the lack of political currency in education controversies. In the estimation of several legislative leaders, there was a considerable political risk in taking

TABLE 37

LEGISLATORS' ASSESSMENT OF THE "GREATEST OBSTACLE"
THEY ENCOUNTER IN LEGISLATING FOR THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Category	Reponses By		
	Liberal Legislators (N=6)*	Conservative Legislators (N=8)*	All Legislators (N=14)*
Public concern over escalating school costs and the inability to demonstrate the effectiveness of these costs	2	4	6
Insufficiency of legislative resources such as staff and time to decide complicated education policy questions	3	1	4
Political liabilities of education controversies (i.e., high risks but small gains in becoming an active participants)	1	2	3
Pressing social need for school programs for the poor and disadvantaged	1	0	1
Excessive "bureaucracy" in educational organizations	0	1	1
Detrimental impact of tax-school finance changes on the "business climate" of the state	0	1	1
Governmental trend toward too much "equalization" in tax-expenditure policy	0	1	1

*Some legislators indicated more than one "greatest obstacle".

public stands on "tough issues" like desegregation or in "getting caught in the middle" between the competing teacher groups. One respondent implied that the political payoff for championing education was unlikely to be great because, according to him, "school people do not support a legislator who supports them when it comes to votes or campaigns or finances."

Legislative Leadership

Despite the various constraints which have been cited, our legislator respondents were unanimous in their belief that it was up to the Legislature

to take the lead in deciding upon public school needs for the state, though most felt that this did not require detailed prescriptions. And, like State Board members, virtually all the legislative leaders we interviewed appeared to be very positive about their efficacy as policy makers, a reflection perhaps of the reformist political culture in Minnesota. The questionnaire items and responses that indicate these attitudes are presented in Table 38.

TABLE 38
LEGISLATOR AND STATE BOARD MEMBER ATTITUDES TOWARD THE EDUCATION POLICY ROLE OF THE LEGISLATURE AND THE POLICY-MAKING EFFICACY OF THEIR RESPECTIVE OFFICES

Statements	Percentage of Agreement By	
	Legislative Leaders (N=10)	State Board Members (N=6)
"While other officials may initiate some education policies, it is up to the Legislature to take the lead in setting forth what ought to be done about state public school needs."	100%	67%
"The Legislature should limit itself to determining broad goals for the public schools and leave most policy-making authority to the State Board or State Commissioner."	60%	100%
"There is much that a public official in my position can do to initiate new policy ideas for education."	90%	100%
"A public official in my position really doesn't have the time to study the consequences of policy decisions he made, say, four or five years ago."	10%	17%
"Many educational issues are so complicated that a policy maker cannot really make wise decisions."	10%	17%

Over the years there has been strong leadership from both caucuses within the Minnesota Legislature, some of it with special expertise and interest in the education field. Focusing on the 1971 session, two Conservative lawmakers stand out, one because he was the principal legislator architect of the tax and expenditure reforms incorporated in the Omnibus Tax Act; the other because his role as prime mover in the area of school finance came to an end in that

session. The first of these was Stanley Holmquist from Grove City, who had been Majority Leader of the Senate since 1967. A former superintendent of schools, Holmquist had been in the House for eight years before being elected to the Senate in 1954, where he served until retirement in 1972.

Senator Holmquist not only held the key leadership position in the Senate, but wielded vast personal influence as well. Despite some conservative critics who berated him "for being in bed with the Governor," and who even ridiculed his effervescent political style, the Grove City Senator commanded widespread respect for personal attributes as well as educational knowledge on both sides of the aisle. In his tenure as Majority Leader, Holmquist had been instrumental in opening up the legislative committee system to minority caucus members and to newly-elected conservatives. Thus, the political debts owed the Senator were substantial. Moreover, Holmquist, for years, had maintained good working relationships with the educational interest groups and had often sponsored their proposals. Finally, and most significantly, Holmquist was a personal friend of Governor Anderson's, going back to their days together in the Senate, and the two shared many of the same ideas.

All things considered, Stanley Holmquist was in a unique position, as several of our legislator respondents interpreted it, "to do something good for education before he retired." When he joined forces with the Governor, a bipartisan alliance was forged that eventually broke the stalemate on the tax-school finance issue. Without Holmquist's leadership, especially during the heated bargaining in the Tax Conference Committee, the Governor's policy thrust, notwithstanding Anderson's political prowess, might well have been blunted by a determined conservative opposition. As it was, the forces led, or at least represented, by these two powerful leaders combined to effect a major policy change.

A second legislator who warrants brief comment is Harvey Sathre. In the 1971 session Sathre was the Chairman of the House Education Committee, the body which traditionally had formulated the state school aid program. A dairy farmer from Adams in rural Minnesota, a region he reflected in his conservative approach toward educational finance reform, Sathre had been a member of the House since 1963. Due to a strong personal interest and considerable acquired expertise, he had become probably the single most influential legislator on the content of the aid formula. While there was interaction with the "money" committee chairmen, the educational organizations, and the State Department, Sathre had always managed to keep school finance treated by the Legislature as something separate from tax and general fiscal questions.

In the view of detractors, the Adams Representative and his educator allies had contrived a "closed system" to deal with the allocation of state school dollars. But this system was shunted aside in the 1971 session when school finance became inextricably linked to tax considerations. With prodding - from its leadership, chiefly from Holmquist, power on this issue shifted in the Legislature from the Education to the Tax Committees; and the Governor, along with a few legislative leaders, made the crucial decisions. By the end of this process, Sathre's influence on the school finance issue, as well as the influence of the groups who relied upon him as their primary access channel, had largely evaporated. Sathre was not included on the Tax Conference Committee, though he did offer advice to spokesmen for the House Conservatives, and he was defeated in the 1972 election.

School Finance Policy Making

Though our legislator respondents rated the Tax Committees as being the decisive ones when the school finance issue was before the 1971 Legislature,

most felt that this was a "one-time thing"; that the issue would again become the prerogative of the committees responsible for education and appropriations. Yet several legislative leaders indicated that there would be no reversion to the kind of process which prevailed under Representative Sathre. In the first place, according to them, policy making for school finance would no longer be allowed "to operate in isolation from the overall tax and revenue structure of the State." A second change anticipated by these legislators stemmed from their conviction that the "blank check for education" ended in the 1971 session. "We are going," warned one respondent, "to keep close track of educational programs." Consistent with this attitude, the Legislature had included in the Omnibus Tax Act provisions mandating that local districts submit detailed reports and undertake other procedures to show compliance with the Act. (The 1973 Legislature went even further in its demand for "accountability" by stipulating that the State Board develop a plan by November 15, 1974 for budgeting by schools and by educational program.) Finally, a few DFL interviewees pointed to the need for a more visible and participatory committee system in the Legislature, including those dealing with school finance and other education policy areas. (The 1973 Legislature moved in this direction by prohibiting private executive meetings by its committees.)

Regardless of the changes which occur in the process by which school finance legislation is decided, that decision will continue to be affected by a multiplicity of conflicts. Virtually all the legislative leaders we interviewed attached at least some saliency to every one of the conflict types listed in Table 39. More lawmakers (11 out of 15) perceived regional conflict as being of "great importance" than they did any other. These respondents, though, did not generally see this in terms of any simple urban-suburban-rural

division. Several thought that the basic cleavage in the Legislature was between the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area and "outstate" Minnesota. Other legislators called attention to the "unique problems of the big cities." Still others forecast a new alliance emerging, with the "poor core city and rural areas" acting in opposition to the "wealthy suburbs." And there were legislator respondents who stressed that within each community type there were policy-significant divisions (e.g., property-rich rural districts versus property-poor rural districts) and who argued that the importance of the city-farm cleavage was "greatly overemphasized." Thus, while regional

TABLE 39

CONFLICTS ON SCHOOL FINANCE ISSUE PERCEIVED AS BEING OF "GREAT IMPORTANCE"
BY LEGISLATIVE LEADERS

Type of Conflict	Frequency of Mention as Being of "Great Importance"		
	Liberal Legislators (N=7)	Conservative Legislators (N=8)	All Legislators (N=15)
Regional (e.g., Cities versus Suburbs or Rural Areas)	5	6	11
Governor's Supporters - Governor's Opponents	4	2	6
Political Party	2	2	4
Ideological	2	2	4
Business-Labor	2	1	3
Wealthy Districts - Poor Districts	2	0	2

affiliations were perceived by most of the leaders we questioned as being crucial determinants in legislative policy making on school finance, these affiliations apparently came together in many cross-cutting patterns of cleavage and are not easily depicted in terms of a few categories.

Summary

To sum up, a number of forces--educational interest group fragmentation, mounting constituency concerns, two-party competition, and DFL ascendancy--presaged an assertive posture for the Minnesota Legislature on state public

division. Several thought that the basic cleavage in the Legislature was between the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area and "outstate" Minnesota. Other legislators called attention to the "unique problems of the big cities." Still others forecast a new alliance emerging, with the "poor core city and rural areas" acting in opposition to the "wealthy suburbs." And there were legislator respondents who stressed that within each community type there were policy-significant divisions (e.g., property-rich rural districts versus property-poor rural districts) and who argued that the importance of the city-farm cleavage was "greatly overemphasized." Thus, while regional

TABLE 39

CONFLICTS ON SCHOOL FINANCE ISSUE PERCEIVED AS BEING OF "GREAT IMPORTANCE"
BY LEGISLATIVE LEADERS

Type of Conflict	Frequency of Mention as Being of "Great Importance"		
	Liberal Legislators (N=7)	Conservative Legislators (N=8)	All Legislators (N=15)
Regional (e.g., Cities versus Suburbs or Rural Areas)	5	6	11
Governor's Supporters - Governor's Opponents	4	2	6
Political Party	2	2	4
Ideological	2	2	4
Business-Labor	2	1	3
Wealthy Districts - Poor Districts	2	0	2

affiliations were perceived by most of the leaders we questioned as being crucial determinants in legislative policy making on school finance, these affiliations apparently came together in many cross-cutting patterns of cleavage and are not easily depicted in terms of a few categories.

Summary

To sum up, a number of forces--educational interest group fragmentation, mounting constituency concerns, two-party competition, and DFL ascendancy--presaged an assertive posture for the Minnesota Legislature on state public

SECTION IV
CONCLUSIONS AND INTERPRETATION

Introduction

The research findings on the process through which Minnesota state government determines policy for its public schools have been set forth in the last two sections--the first based on an examination of three recent decisions, the second based on perceptual data obtained by interviewing a cross-section of actors. These findings will not be restated here. Instead, this final section contains more general descriptive and interpretive comment organized in relation to four main conclusions about Minnesota's state education policy system: (1) it has undergone a major transformation; (2) it is highly pluralistic; (3) it has become more politicized; and (4) it embodies the Progressive cultural traditions of the state.

Transformation

Ten years ago, if the research of Wannebo¹ and the recollections of long-time observers are accurate, there existed a relatively stable state education policy system; interaction among organized schoolmen, agency bureaucrats, and elected officials occurring in a generally predictable fashion. The two dominant educational interest groups--the MSBA and the MEA--had established structural mechanisms and personal relationships which linked themselves to each other and to other public school supporters. An integral part of this linkage structure was the State Department of Education. Indeed, only the dissident posture of the MFT kept the profession from being united.

Schoolmen were able to develop considerable internal agreement on their major legislative initiatives. Working closely with sympathetic lawmakers, primarily Conservatives whose caucus always controlled the Senate and usually

held a majority in the House, the MSBA and the MEA constituted an effective education lobby. To attain this status, these organizations relied heavily on their perceived expertise, information-generating capacity, grassroots communications, and the "special place" that schools held among the objects of legislative attention. MSBA and MEA spokesmen were also solicited for their advice by Governors when these public officials were formulating the education portion of their budget message. Typically, however, Minnesota Governors did not take an active hand in school policy making. And even more quiescent was the State Board of Education.

Powerful forces converged in the 1960s to produce a new configuration of state school policy making.² First, collective negotiations between teachers and school boards arose as a divisive issue, both in local districts (a major teachers' strike occurred in Minneapolis), and in the Legislature where competitive lobbying between the MSBA and the MEA supplanted the earlier cooperative approach. Secondly, spiraling educational costs fueled a broad-based "taxpayers' revolt" and, combined with growing doubts about the efficacy of schooling, they contributed to a popular demand for "accountability" in education. As a consequence, the fiscal sensitivities of elected officials grew acute, and lawmakers began to scrutinize more actively educational program requests. The visibility of education as a governmental function was further heightened by the publicity given to student unrest, racial disputes, and controversy over district consolidation. A third factor that significantly altered state education policy making occurred in the realm of partisan politics--namely, the evolution of an intensely competitive two-party system and the coming to power of the DFL. Two-party competition generated a search for political issues, one source of which clearly was education. The ascendancy of DFL brought into office a new group of political leaders, most notably

Governor Wendell Anderson, who saw the state as having the responsibility to ensure an "equal educational opportunity" for Minnesota children.

By the beginning of the 1970s, influence in the state education policy system had become diffuse, relationships were in flux, and power in the system was increasingly "up for grabs." The former allies--the MSBA and the MEA--were publicly at odds on a host of employer-employee issues. Various administrator groups sought to play an independent role at the state level. All of these organizations, along with the MFT became the sources of competing legislative initiatives. Cross-pressures mounted on the State Department which found itself caught in the middle among contending educational interest groups. "Teacher power" became a political reality for elected officials as both the MEA and the MFT poured thousands of dollars, along with their potent local organizations, into electoral contests. Responding to constituency concerns, state lawmakers adopted a more assertive posture on education legislation, and Governor Anderson made the cause of tax-school finance reform his overriding priority. Even the State Board moved away from a passive and reactive role, attempting with considerable success, in concert with the Commissioner of Education, to exert policy leadership in several areas of its delegated authority.

Pluralism

As is evident from the above description, the state education policy system of the early 1970s was anything but a monolithic entity. Precisely the contrary was the case, pluralism having become a more fundamental characteristic of that system. The education lobby, to repeat, had split into warring factions and non-educators were more involved with school policy making. Each issue--for example, education finance, school desegregation, and teacher certification--attracted its own distinctive cluster of actors especially interested

In the kind of decision enacted in that area. The actors in each constellation did not wield equal influence, nor did they undertake the same functions in a decision process. While the issue area clusters did overlap, the influential participants in one did not necessarily hold the key positions in the others. In point of fact, Minnesota had numerous decision arenas involved in the authorization of state-level school policy. These included the Governor, each house of the Legislature, federal and state courts, State Board of Education, Commissioner of Education, and newly-created Teacher Standards and Certification Commission.

From the perspective of comprehensive planning and rational decision making, a multi-centered system of issue area clusters has some obvious drawbacks.³ It works against policy participants taking an overall view of educational problems or adopting a unified approach toward confronting them. It hinders coordination of educational programs, to say nothing of their articulation with non-educational state services, and it promotes duplication of effort. Yet these shortcomings are offset by some positive strengths, several of which were embodied in the operation of the Minnesota state education policy system. First, this system offered multiple points of access to decision makers and ample opportunity for participation. The "sealed room" decision making of the Tax Conference Committee was, however, a glaring exception to this generalization.* And it does remain to be seen whether persons who are not professional educators will have much access to or influence with the Teacher Standards and Certification Commission. Second, the pluralistic policy-making system enabled each constellation of participants to push ahead on the problems it deemed important. A tax-school finance breakthrough was achieved by the Legislature and Governor, while the State Board of Education was the arena where policy

*The Minnesota Open Meeting Law, passed in 1973, prohibits closed executive sessions.

Innovation on school desegregation took place. Similarly, the groups concerned with teacher preparation and licensure could focus their attention on the Teacher Standards and Certification Commission.

Before leaving the subject of pluralism, one final observation must be made. This concerns the prospect that education politics in Minnesota will become structured by the labor-management cleavage.⁴ Instances of cooperation between the MEA and the MFT became more frequent in the 1971 and 1973 legislative sessions, the two interest groups being able to reach a working compromise on a certification governance bill. Even though the leadership of each organization continues to claim exclusive credit for favorable legislation, and to berate its rival with membership-oriented rhetoric, the behavioral differences between the MEA and the MFT, apart from the latter's affiliation with the AFL-CIO, have largely ceased to exist. Additionally, there are basic economic considerations--the oversupply of classroom teachers, the cost consciousness of legislators, and the resistance of local school boards in collective negotiation sessions--which undoubtedly will motivate the two groups to seek common approaches and, perhaps, to merge into a single organization. Along with this development, it can be anticipated that the teachers will expand their contacts with other public employee groups and with organized workers, generally.

On the other side of the labor-management cleavage, the MSBA and the MASA have worked cooperatively for years. And it seems likely that the various principals' organizations will eventually cast their lot unequivocally with management. Further, school board members have become prone to see an affinity of interest with employer and taxpayer groups. Thus, some consolidation is already apparent on the management side as well as among the labor forces. If these trends persist and rival alignments solidify, then the pluralism of

Minnesota's education policy making may well give way to a bifurcated pattern in which labor-management conflict is the pervasive theme.

Politicalization

The broadening of participation, intensification of group conflict, and eruptions of public controversy--all were aspects of the politicalization of the state education policy system. To be sure, "politics" in a basic sense had always been present, but the emergence of a system that was participative, conflictual, and visible made its political nature unmistakable even to a casual observer. Politicians, such as the Governor and legislators, took an active role; and some educational issues, such as school finance and collective bargaining, became matters of party division. The MEA abandoned its apolitical stance and, along with the MFT, was determined to exercise "clout" through intensive lobbying and campaign activity.

Many of the state-level educational organizations experienced difficulty in adjusting to the politicized milieu in which they had to function. The MSBA found that its information and advice counted for less in a DFL-dominated Legislature than one in which Conservatives had control. The influence of school administrators in state education policy making declined more precipitously. At one time, they had provided leadership for the MEA and were closely aligned with the State Department. But their dominance of the MEA came to an end in the 1960s and their other resources did not translate into much influence in the legislative arena. The State Board of Education, while seizing the initiative on several issues, carried little weight in the Legislature. The Department of Education bore the brunt of conflicting expectations from schoolmen as well as from lawmakers. And this situation, added to organizational and personnel problems within the agency, made it difficult for the Department to determine its policy role in the changed context of the 1970s.

The politicalization of state school policy making was very disturbing to persons who believed that education decisions should flow from the "neutral" competence of professionals, rather than the influence-based accommodations of contending groups.⁵ The latter kind of decision process did, however, more fully reflect the diversity of interests among Minnesotans and the intensity with which these interests were advanced by policy participants. Moreover, this report provides much evidence to support the contention of one close observer that "several important and innovative policy changes in education began to happen precisely as groups beyond the education establishment came into the problem area."⁶ Still, the political character of state education policy making, coupled with its pluralism, does increase the risk of the system moving by an aimless drift instead of by a purposeful direction. Consequently, there is great need for policy leadership--for persons who can enlist both widespread involvement of interested groups and thoughtful consideration of relevant educational information in the building of effective coalitions of political influence.

Progressivism

One cannot study any facet of public policy making in Minnesota without being impressed by the pervasive impact of the cultural setting. And the Progressive orientation of the state gives us optimism that its people and institutions will respond creatively to the educational challenges which face Minnesotans, challenges such as declines in pupil enrollments, shortages in energy resources, and inequities in the schooling of minority-group children. True, state education policy making has become more politicized, yet this trend does not necessarily mean that educational decisions will become infused with the crasser manifestations of partisanship. In Minnesota, to quote a recent commentator, "politics is almost unnaturally clean--no patronage, virtually no corruption."⁷

Besides demanding "clean" government, Minnesotans have long been willing to use its power as an innovative instrument in coping with social problems. The three education policy decisions that were analyzed in this report fit within this reform tradition. In educational finance, school desegregation, and teacher certification, Minnesota can rightly be labeled as a "pacesetter" among the fifty states.

Lastly, a word should be said about the capacity of Minnesota's political system to generate policy leadership, the need for which having been emphasized in the preceding section. Over the years, this political system has developed a remarkable collection of national and state leaders. And it continues to recruit an unusual number of able young citizen-politicians. "Politics is an honorable profession in this state," explained one such activist. "In other states, people don't gamble away their best years in politics. Here it's expected, because we feel it is important enough."⁸ Imbued with such a view of public service, Minnesota is far more likely than states where distrust of elected officials is endemic to encourage the sort of leadership that will be required to meet the education policy tasks of the future.

J

FOOTNOTES

SECTION I: SOCIOECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

¹A full discussion is found in Roald F. Campbell and Tim L. Mazzoni, Jr., "Investigating State Education Policy Systems" (Unpublished paper, Educational Governance Project, May, 1972). (Mimeographed.)

²Theodore C. Blegen, Minnesota (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963), pp. 12-13.

³National Education Association, Rankings of the States, 1972, Research Report 1972-RI (Washington, D.C.: National Education Association, 1972), pp. 8-9.

⁴U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population 1970 General Social and Economic Characteristics, Final Report PC (1) - CI United States Summary (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 470.

⁵Official 1970 census statistics reported in Minneapolis Tribune, July, 1970.

⁶U.S. Bureau of the Census, op. cit., pp. 549-550.

⁷Carl H. Chrislock, The Progressive Era in Minnesota, 1899-1918, (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society, 1971), p. 32.

⁸U.S. Bureau of the Census, op. cit., pp. 550, 563-564.

⁹Official 1970 census statistics reported in Minneapolis Tribune, July, 1970.

¹⁰League of Women Voters, Indians in Minnesota (St. Paul: League of Women Voters, 1971), p. 27.

¹¹Commissioner's School Finance Task Force, "School Finance Task Force Report" (St. Paul: School Finance Task Force, January 1973), p. 121. (Mimeographed.)

¹²ibid.

¹³Bureau of Field Studies and Surveys, Education 1967 (Minneapolis: College of Education, University of Minnesota, August 1967), p. 176.

¹⁴Figures are from 91-city data in David Kirby et. al., Political Strategies in Northern School Desegregation (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath, 1973), pp. 247-248.

¹⁵ibid.

¹⁶Bureau of Field Studies and Surveys, An Assessment of Elementary and Secondary School Services and Needs by Minnesota Planning Regions (Minneapolis, College of Education, University of Minnesota, August, 1970), pp. 38-39.

¹⁷ibid.

- ¹⁸Blegen, op. cit., p. 556; Bureau of the Census, op. cit., p. 353.
- ¹⁹National Education Association, Rankings of the States, 1972, p. 38.
- ²⁰William H. Wilken, "Minnesota School Finance" (National Education Association, Unpublished manuscript, 1973), pp. 44-45. (Mimeographed)
- ²¹Richard Hofferbert, "Socioeconomic Dimensions of the American States", Richard Hofferbert and Ira Sharkansky (eds.), State and Urban Politics (Boston: Little Brown, 1971), pp. 456 and 458.
- ²²Tax Study Commission, Staff Progress Report: A Collection of Staff Work Papers (St. Paul: Minnesota Tax Study Commission, January, 1973), p. 7.
- ²³Betsy Levin and Thomas Mueller, The Financing of Schools in Minnesota (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, April 1973), p. 96.
- ²⁴National Education Association, Rankings of the States, 1973, Research Report 1973-RI (Washington, D.C.: National Education Association, 1973), pp. 36, 48.
- ²⁵The selection was made by William H. Wilken, op. cit., p. 12.
- ²⁶This point is emphasized in Levin and Mueller, op. cit., pp. 94-95.
- ²⁷On the "fiscal problems of the central cities", see Tax Study Commission, op. cit., pp. 323-332.
- ²⁸Joel S. Berke and Michael W. Kirst, Federal Aid to Education (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath, 1972), pp. 387-389.
- ²⁹Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States, 2nd ed. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1966), pp. 93-107.
- ³⁰ibid., p. 107.
- ³¹Chrislock, op. cit., p. 198.
- ³²Tax Study Commission, op. cit., p. 88.
- ³³Elazar, op. cit., p. 98.
- ³⁴G. Theodore Mitau, Politics in Minnesota, 2nd rev. ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1970), p. 64.
- ³⁵Charles R. Adrian, "The Origins of Minnesota's Non-Partisan Legislature", in Rhoda R. Gilman and June Drenning Holmquist (eds.), Selections from Minnesota History (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society, 1965), p. 286.
- ³⁶John H. Fenton, Midwest Politics (New York, 1966), pp. 75-116.
- ³⁷On the Farmer-Labor Party, see particularly Arthur Naftalin, "A History of the Farmer-Labor Party of Minnesota" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1948). (Mimeographed.)

- 38 Fenton, op. cit., pp. 95, 100.
- 39 Mitau, op. cit., p. 53.
- 40 Ira Sharkansky and Richard Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Policy" in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines (eds.), Politics in the American States, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971), p. 336.
- 41 Citizens League, "New Formulas for Revenue Sharing in Minnesota" (Unpublished report by the Citizens League Committee on Revenue Distribution, September 1, 1970), p. 62. (Mimeographed.)
- 42 Interviews with Minnesota legislators, January, 1973.
- 43 The reform was instituted by Republican Governor Harold Stassen. Blegen, op. cit., p. 538.
- 44 The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1973-1974, compiled by Arlen I. Erdahl (St. Paul: State of Minnesota, 1973), p. 155.
- 45 Interview with the Commissioner of Education, January, 1973.
- 46 Jack L. Walker, "Innovation in State Politics", in Jacob and Vines (eds.) Politics in the American States, pp. 357-358.
- 47 Ibid., p. 381.
- 48 Tax Study Commission, op. cit., pp. 333-348.
- 49 Article VIII, Section 1
- 50 Kramer v. Renville County, 144 Minnesota 195, 175 N.W. 101 (1919).
- 51 Belle Zeller (ed.), American State Legislatures (New York: Thomas Crowell, 1954), pp. 190-191.
- 52 Mitau, op. cit., pp. 86-95.
- 53 Ibid., p. 83.
- 54 Legislative Manual, 1973-1974, pp. 34-40.
- 55 The Minnesota Legislative Manual, 1971-1972, compiled by Arlen I. Erdahl (St. Paul: State of Minnesota, 1972), p. 125.
- 56 Ibid., pp. 125-126.
- 57 Staff interview with member of Minnesota legislative staff, January, 1973, and February, 1974; Legislative Manual, 1973-1974, pp. 62, 113.
- 58 See pp. 177-179 of this report.
- 59 Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, The Sometimes Government, (New York: Bantam Books, 1971).

- 60 ibid., p. 49.
- 61 ibid., p. 239.
- 62 ibid., pp. 52-53.
- 63 Joseph A. Schlesinger, "The Politics of the Executive", in Jacob and Vines (eds.), Politics in the American States, p. 230.
- 64 ibid., p. 232.
- 65 Legislative Manual, 1973-1974, pp. 154-156.
- 66 See pages 165-166 of this report.
- 67 These are described in League of Women Voters, Equality of Educational Opportunity (St. Paul: League of Women Voters, 1970), p. 8.
- 68 Bureau of Field Studies and Surveys, Education, 1967, p. 245.
- 69 See the discussion of the school desegregation and the teacher certification issues in this report for examples of the State Board's use of these committees and task forces.
- 70 Sam P. Harris, State Departments of Education, State Boards of Education, and Chief State School Officers (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 175.
- 71 ibid., p. 42.
- 72 ibid., pp. 42-43.
- 73 Minnesota State Department of Education, "Partnership in Priorities" (Biennial Report, July 1, 1970 - June 30, 1972), p. 51.
- 74 Harris, op. cit., pp. 92-93.
- 75 Clifford P. Hooker, The Supply and Demand of Public School Administrators (Division of Educational Administration, University of Minnesota, Winter, 1973), p. 3.
- 76 Legislative Manual, 1973-1974, pp. 229-230.
- 77 Governor's Loaned Executives Action Program, "Final Report" (St. Paul, December 23, 1972), p. 60.
- 78 ibid.

SECTION II: THREE EDUCATION POLICY DECISIONS

School Finance

¹These categories are adapted from those developed by Schneler. See Edward V. Schneler (ed.), Policy-Making in American Government (New York: Basic Books, 1969), pp. xi-xii.

²Sections of the ACIR report are reprinted in Minnesota State Department of Education, Update (March, 1972), p. 5.

³Percentage figures are from Anthony Morley, "Minnesota," A Legislators Guide to School Finance (Denver: The Education Commission of the States, August 1972), p. 34. Despite a few minor errors, Morley's account of the tax-school finance reform effort in the 1971 Minnesota legislative session is an accurate and insightful one. We have drawn heavily upon it for certain parts of our description.

⁴William H. Wilken, "Minnesota School Finance" (National Education Association, unpublished manuscript, 1973), p. 5.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota, Third Division No. 3-71 Cir. 243, pp 4-5.

⁷Wilken, op. cit., p. 3.

⁸Percentage figures are from Morley, op. cit., p. 34-35.

⁹Rolland F. Hatfield, "Report to Governor's Minnesota Property Tax Study Advisory Committee" (Unpublished report sponsored by Minnesota State Planning Agency, November, 1970) p. 1.

¹⁰Gerald F. Welszhaas, "The 1971 Omnibus Tax Act," Staff Progress Report: A Collection of Staff Work Papers (Unpublished report by the Minnesota Tax Study Commission, January, 1973), p. 31.

¹¹Results of the study for 49 of the 81 communities surveyed are reported in Minneapolis Tribune, March 8, 1971.

¹²Minnesota State Department of Education, "Financing Education in Minnesota: 1972-73, A Primer," Update, (Summer, 1972), p. 4.

¹³Morley, op. cit., p. 36.

¹⁴Some comparative data on school bond referenda are contained in Frederick M. Wirt and Michael W. Kirst, The Political Web of American Schools (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1972), pp. 138-141.

¹⁵Gerald W. Christenson, "Planning for Human Resources Development for Minnesota in the 1970's," Financing Special Education in Minnesota (Division of Educational Administration, University of Minnesota, Fall, 1972), p. 83.

¹⁶E.E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehard and Winston, 1960), p. 74.

¹⁷Citizens League, "New Formulas for Revenue Sharing in Minnesota," (Unpublished report prepared by the Citizens League Committee on Revenue Distribution, Minneapolis, Minnesota, September 1, 1970).

¹⁸Interview with state legislator, June, 1973.

¹⁹Finlay Lewis, "School-Tax Proposal May Decide Governor Race," Minneapolis Tribune, October 11, 1970.

²⁰Morley, op. cit., p. 37.

²¹Interviews with state legislators, January and June, 1973.

²²Christenson, op. cit., p. 81.

²³Morley, op. cit., pp. 38-40.

²⁴ibid., p. 40.

²⁵Information based on interviews with state legislators and Governor's aides, January and June, 1973.

²⁶ibid.

²⁷Information based on interviews with state legislators and educational interest group leaders, January-February, 1973.

²⁸Peter Vanderpoel, "The Times Aren't A-Changing as Legislators Debate School-Aid Programs," Minneapolis Tribune, April, 1971.

²⁹Interviews with state legislators, January-February, 1973.

³⁰ibid.

³¹Morley, op. cit., p. 43.

³²Minnesota Education News, March 12, 1971.

³³Minnesota State Department of Education, "Partnership in Priorities," (Biennial Report July 1, 1970-June 30, 1972), p. 51.

³⁴Assessments of the Impact of the SBE, Commissioner, and State Board are based on interviews with state legislators and educational interest group leaders, January-February, 1973.

35 For articles summarizing the legislative conflict, see the Minneapolis Star, November 1, 1971.

36 ibid.

37 This corresponds to Morley's assessment. Morley, op. cit., pp. 43-44.

38 Minneapolis Star, November 1, 1971.

39 Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, pp. 3-11.

40 Minneapolis Star, November 1, 1971.

41 Information based on interviews with state legislators, January-February, 1973. Six of the ten members of the Tax Conference Committee were interviewed by our research staff.

42 ibid.

43 Minnesota State Department of Education, "Tax Bill Increase School Aid to \$500 Million," Update, (November-December, 1971), pp. 1, 2, 11.

44 Betsy Levin and Thomas Mueller, The Financing of Schools in Minnesota, (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, April, 1973), p. 12.

45 Wilken, op. cit., pp. 34, 37. Also see the data reported in the Minneapolis Tribune, November 7, 1972.

46 John S. Hoyt, "The New Minnesota Tax Law," T.G. Evensen Newsletter, (November, 1971), p. 1, 2.

47 Unpublished State Planning Agency data, November 27, 1973. (Mimeographed.)

48 Wilken, op. cit., pp. 17-19.

49 Minneapolis Tribune, November 11, 1972.

50 Minnesota State Department of Education, "The 1971 Tax Law: A Special Report," Update, (March, 1972), p. 1.

51 ibid.

52 Speech by Gerald W. Christenson, Minnesota State Planning Director to Statewide Conference on "Education-Changing Perspectives," League of Women Voters, Seattle, Washington (Unpublished manuscript, December 8, 1973), pp. 3-5.

53 ibid., p. 5.

School Desegregation

¹League of Women Voters of Minnesota, Indians in Minnesota (St. Paul: League of Women Voters, 1971), p. 149.

²Sam Newlund, "City's Black Population Rises 61 Per Cent," Minneapolis Tribune, May 23, 1971.

³James J. Kilpatrick, "Lack of Integration in Twin Cities' Schools is Noted," Minneapolis Star, September 17, 1970.

⁴Figures on Duluth are from Dick Hubert, "The Duluth Experience," Saturday Review (May 27, 1972), p. 56.

⁵League of Women Voters, op. cit., p. 149.

⁶John Kelly, "Duluth, Twin Cities Back for Indian Educational Funds," St. Paul Dispatch, March 11, 1972.

⁷Minnesota State Department of Education, "Policy on Racial Imbalance and Discrimination in Public Schools," January 1967, p. 2. (Mimeographed.)

⁸Interview with Duane Matthels, June, 1973.

⁹Information based on interviews with SDE administrators, August, 1973, and Minnesota State Department of Education, "Historical Background on Board's Guidelines and Proposed Regulations on . . . School Desegregation," n.d., pp. 1-2. (Mimeographed.)

¹⁰ibid.

¹¹Minnesota State Department of Education, "Regulations on Racial Segregation," n.d., pp. 1-7. (Mimeographed.)

¹²Interview with SDE administrator, August, 1973.

¹³Interview with State Board member, August, 1973.

¹⁴Interviews with SDE administrators, August-September, 1973.

¹⁵Interviews with officials in the State Department of Human Rights, August, 1973.

¹⁶Interviews with State Board members, January and August, 1973.

¹⁷Information based on interviews with SDE administrators and State Board members, August, 1973.

¹⁸Minnesota State Department of Education, "Persons Invited to Serve on the Task Force on Equality of Educational Opportunity," February 27, 1970, pp. 1-4. (Mimeographed.)

- 19 Interviews with officials in the State Department of Human Rights, August, 1973.
- 20 Interview with State Board member, August, 1973.
- 21 Interview with State Board member, August, 1973.
- 22 Interview with SDE administrator, August, 1973.
- 23 Information based on Interviews with State Board members, August, 1973.
- 24 State of Minnesota, Board of Education, "Policy Statement on Educational Leadership Role for Department of Education and Board of Education in Providing Equal Educational Opportunity," November 9, 1970, pp. 1-9. (Mimeographed.)
- 25 State of Minnesota, Board of Education, "Guidelines Relating to Equality of Educational Opportunity and Desegregation, Inter-Cultural and Inter-Cultural Quality Education," December 14, 1970, pp. 1-11. (Mimeographed.)
- 26 Interview with State Board member, August, 1973.
- 27 Minnesota State Department of Education, "Historical Background . . . School Desegregation," p. 2.
- 28 Interviews with SDE administrator, August-September, 1973 and with officials of the State Department of Human Rights, August, 1973.
- 29 Interview with State Board member, August, 1973.
- 30 Information based on Interviews with State Board members, January and August, 1973.
- 31 Interviews with State Board members, August, 1973.
- 32 See the accounts in the Minneapolis Tribune, June 9, 1971.
- 33 Interviews with State Board members, August, 1973.
- 34 Interview with SDE administrator, August, 1973.
- 35 See page 161 of this report.
- 36 Minnesota State Department of Education, "Partnership in Priorities," (Biennial Report, July 1, 1970 - June 30, 1972), p. 23.
- 37 Interview with State Board members, August, 1973.
- 38 Interview with State Board member, August, 1973.
- 39 Interviews with State Board member, January and August, 1973.
- 40 Interview with State Board member, August, 1973.

- 41 Interviews with SDE administrators, August and September, 1973, and with officials in the State Department of Human Rights, August, 1973.
- 42 Interview with official in the State Department of Human Rights, August, 1973.
- 43 ibid.
- 44 Interview with State Board member, August, 1973.
- 45 State of Minnesota, Board of Education, "Guidelines . . .," p. 3.
- 46 Dick Hubert, op. cit., p. 56.
- 47 Minneapolis Star, May 10, 1972.
- 48 Interview with SDE administrator, August, 1973.
- 49 Minneapolis Star, May 10, 1972.
- 50 "SR Education Update: Duluth," Saturday Review (June 24, 1972), p. 49.
- 51 Minneapolis Star, June 2, 1971.
- 52 Minnesota State Department of Education, "State Board Lauds Duluth Pairing Plan," Update (November-December, 1971), p. 3. Also see Pioneer Press (St. Paul), April 10, 1972.
- 53 Interview with State Board member, August, 1972.
- 54 Pioneers Press, April 10, 1972.
- 55 ibid.
- 56 Bob Protzman, "State, City Education Boards Drift Apart on Integration Plan," Pioneer Press (St. Paul), April, 1972.
- 57 Greg Pinney "Board Asks St. Paul for School Race Mix Reports," Minneapolis Tribune, September 12, 1972.
- 58 ibid.
- 59 Interview with State Board member, August, 1972.
- 60 Minneapolis Public Schools, "Memorandum to Faculty and Staff from John B. Davis, Jr.," January 29, 1971, p. 4. (Mimeographed.)
- 61 Deborah Howell, "Pairings Pass Amid Uproar," Minneapolis Star, November 25, 1970.
- 62 Minneapolis Tribune, June 9, 1971.

- 63 John Greenwald, "Field-Hale School Pairing Delayed," Minneapolis Star, January 27, 1971.
- 64 Gwennyth Jones, "Sult Seeks Full City School Integration," Minneapolis Star, August 11, 1971.
- 65 Minnesota State Department of Education, "State Board . . .", p. 3.
- 66 Minneapolis Star, April 26, 1972.
- 67 Details of the plan are from Jim Talle, "School Desegregation Plan Approved, Cheered," Minneapolis Star, April 26, 1972.
- 68 Pioneer Press (St. Paul), March 3, 1972.
- 69 Minneapolis Star, April 27, 1972; Minneapolis Tribune, April 10, 1972.
- 70 Minneapolis Star, May 3, 1972.
- 71 Based on the account in Gwennyth Jones and Deborah Howell, "U.S. Court to Watchdog City Integration," Minneapolis Star, May 24, 1972.
- 72 Minneapolis Star, May 3, 1972.
- 73 Interviews with officials in the State Department of Human Rights, August, 1973.
- 74 Interviews with State Board members, August, 1973.
- 75 ibid. Also see Mary Jo Richardson, "Indian School Averts White Merger," Christian Science Monitor, June 23, 1973.
- 76 Interview with State Board member, August, 1973.
- 77 Interview with State Board member, August, 1973.
- 78 Interviews with State Board members, August, 1973, and with SDE administrators, August-September, 1973.
- 79 Interview with official in the State Department of Human Rights, August, 1973.
- 80 Interview with State Board member, August, 1973.

Teacher Certification

1 MFT efforts are outlined in Henry Winkels, The Most Unusual Year: A Story of MFT Lobbying, 1973 (St. Paul: Minnesota Federation of Teachers, 1973), pp. 18-19.

2 Interviews with SDE administrators and MEA representatives, August, 1973.

3 Interview with MEA representative, August, 1973.

4 Winkels, op. cit., p. 18.

5 Minnesota Education Association, MEA Legislative Objectives 1971 (St. Paul: Minnesota Education Association, 1971), pp. 1-2.

6 Interview with MEA representative, August, 1973.

7 Minnesota Department of Education, "Continuing Education in Minnesota: A Decision for Involvement" (Minnesota Department of Education, October, 1972), p. 1. (Mimeographed.)

8 Interview with SDE administrator, August, 1973.

9 Minnesota Department of Education, "Continuing Education in Minnesota," pp. 1-2.

10 Interviews with former SDE administrator and MEA representatives, August, 1973.

11 Interviews with MEA representatives, August, 1973.

12 Interview with former SDE administrator, August, 1973. A full list of "official" MEA objections are contained in Memorandum from James J. Rosasco, President, to MEA Local Association Presidents, January 27, 1972. (Mimeographed.)

13 According to reporter Grey Pinney, the President of MEA, James Rosasco, "acknowledged in an interview yesterday that the association fears the new certification system might kill the possibilities of getting a standards board in the future." Minneapolis Tribune, March 14, 1972.

14 Interviews with State Board members and SDE administrators, August, 1973.

15 Personal correspondence with author from SDE officials, February 19, 1974.

16 Minnesota Department of Education, "Continuing Education in Minnesota," pp. 2-3.

17 Memorandum from President, James J. Rosasco, to All Local Association Presidents, January 13, 1972. (Mimeographed.)

18 Grey Pinney, "Recertification Plan Upheld by Education Unit," Minneapolis Tribune, March 14, 1972.

- 19 ibid.
- 20 Interview with former SDE administrator, August, 1973.
- 21 Memorandum from Minnesota Association of School Personnel Administrators to State Board of Education, n.d., (Mimeographed.)
- 22 See, for example, the letter from administrators of the Albert Lea Public Schools to Commissioner of Education, March 10, 1972.
- 23 Interview with MFT representative, August, 1973.
- 24 Minnesota Department of Education, "Amendments to Edu 540-551, Issuance and Renewal of Continuing Certificates Approved for Public Hearing by the Minnesota Board of Education," (Minnesota Department of Education, October 2, 1972), pp. 1-9. (Mimeographed.)
- 25 Minnesota Education Association, "State Board Decides--Finally," Minnesota Education News (May 25, 1973).
- 26 Main features of the MEA bill are described in Minnesota Education Association, "A Professional Standards Act for Minnesota," Minnesota Education News (February 26, 1971). For the MFT's position, see Winkels, op. cit., pp. 15-19.
- 27 Interviews with MEA and MFT representatives, August, 1973.
- 28 Interview with MFT representative, August, 1973.
- 29 Winkels, op. cit., p. 5; Interview with MFT representative, August, 1973.
- 30 See page 136 of this report.
- 31 Interview with MEA representative, August, 1973.
- 32 Interview with MFT representative, August, 1973.
- 33 Anderson's statement was printed in Minnesota Education Association, Minnesota Education News (October 9, 1970).
- 34 Interviews with MEA and MFT representatives, August, 1973.
- 35 Interview with MEA representative, August, 1973.
- 36 ibid.
- 37 Interview with MFT representative, August, 1973.
- 38 Amending Minnesota Statutes 1971, Sections 125.04; 125.05; Subdivisions 1 and 2; 125.06; 125.08; 125.09; 125.181; 125.182; 125.183; 125.184; and 125.185.
- 39 Minnesota Statutes 1973, Section 125.183.

40 Minnesota Statutes 1973, Section 125.185.

41 ibid.

42 Minnesota Statutes 1973, Sections 125.05 and 125.09.

SECTION III - POLICY-MAKING RELATIONSHIPS

¹ Laurence Iannaccone, Politics in Education (New York: Center for Applied Research, 1967), pp. 39-40.

² In Iannaccone's language, this transformation constitutes a shift from a "monolithic" to a "fragmented" pattern of state education politics.

³ Frithjof R. Wannebo, "'Meet and Confer' A Study in Minnesota Politics of Education" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, December, 1971), p. 59. Wannebo's dissertation is the only analysis of Minnesota state education politics in the late 1960s and we have relied upon it heavily for our description of that period.

⁴ ibid., pp. 59-60.

⁵ ibid., pp. 63-64.

⁶ ibid., pp. 66-67.

⁷ G. Theodore Mitau, Politics in Minnesota, 2nd rev. ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1970), pp. 123-126.

⁸ ibid., p. 125.

⁹ These events are analyzed in Wannebo, op. cit., pp. 65-197.

¹⁰ Interview with an educational interest group leader, January, 1973.

¹¹ Interview with an educational interest group leader, January, 1973. Also see Minnesota Education Association, Minnesota Education News, December 11, 1970 for IMPACE's "election scorecard".

¹² Minnesota Education Association, "Gallop: Political Contempt for Teachers Completes Arc," Minnesota Education News, August, 1971.

¹³ Minnesota Education Association, "Intensive Lobbying Preserves Tenure; Repeal Threat Joins 'Strange Bedfellows'," Minnesota Education News, May 29, 1971.

¹⁴ Minnesota Education Association, "Gallop: Political Contempt for Teachers Completes Arc," Minnesota Education News, August, 1971. Interviews with state legislators, January, 1973.

15 The State Board, at this time, consisted of the following:

Congressional District	Name	Residence
1	Ralph H. Peterson	Albert Lea
2	Daniel Burton	Mankato
3	B. Robert Lewis*	St. Louis Park
4	Mrs. Mary Jo Richardson	St. Paul
5	Louis R. Smerling	Minneapolis
6	David Brandon	Montevideo
7	Henry Schroeder*	Sabin
8	Richard L. Bye*	Duluth
at-large	Mrs. Dorothea Chelgren	St. Paul

*Former local school board members

16 Citizens League, "Accountability in Schools" (Report prepared by the Citizens League Committee on Achieving Excellence in Schools, November 22, 1972), p. 31. (Mimeographed.)

17 "Minnesota: A State That Works," Time, August 13, 1973, p. 35.

18 Commissioner's School Finance Task Force, "School Finance Task Force Report" (A Report to the State Board of Education, January, 1973), p. 41. (Mimeographed.)

19 Governor Wendell R. Anderson, "Budget Message to the 68th Session of the Legislature of Minnesota" (January 17, 1973), p. 53. (Mimeographed.)

20 Minneapolis Tribune, November 12, 1972.

SECTION IV - CONCLUSIONS AND INTERPRETATION

¹Wannebo's dissertation, completed in 1971, constitutes the only research on Minnesota state education politics in the 1960s.

²These forces were at work, of course, in states besides Minnesota.

³See the insightful discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of pluralism in Wallace S. Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, Governing New York City (New York: Sage, 1960), Chapter XIX.

⁴A number of scholars, most notably Myron Lieberman, have called attention to this possibility. See his "The 1973 NEA Convention: Confusion is King", Phi Delta Kappan (September, 1973), pp. 3-5, 88-89.

⁵On the growing politicalization of education politics, generally, see Frederick Wirt and Michael W. Kirst, The Political Web of American Schools (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1972), pp. 241-248.

⁶Personal communication from Citizens League staff member, February, 1974.

⁷The quotation is from an 11-page feature article in Time magazine on Minnesota. See "Minnesota: A State That Works", Time (August 13, 1973), p. 24.

⁸ibid., p. 34.

APPENDIX

Since the persons interviewed for this case study were assured that they would not be individually identified with statements appearing in the report, our respondents are listed here by only their organizational affiliation:

Structured Interviews (January-February, 1973)

Legislature	15
Governor's Office	2
State Board of Education	6
State Department of Education	4
Educational Interest Group	<u>5</u>
Total	32

Unstructured, Issue-Oriented Interviews (November-December, 1972, August-September, 1973)

Department of Human Rights	2
Legislature	1
Department of Education	3
Department of Education (former)	2
University or College	3
Reporter	1
Civic Organization	3
Educational Interest Group	4
State Board (former)	1
Local School District	2
Legislative Staff	<u>1</u>
Total	23