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ABSTRACT

The objective of the professional consultants conducting the study was to examine local chief executive use of ten Federally assisted mechanism (planning and coordinating procedures which have developed independently in various Federal offices and departments) for local-level planning and coordination of Federal programs. The mechanisms are: comprehensive area-wide health planning; community mental health center planning; Cooperative Area Manpower Planning System (CAMPS); law enforcement assistance planning; Elementary and Secondary Education Act Title I planning; Community Coordinated Child Care planning (4C); Model Cities planning; Community Action Agency "Checkpoint Procedure"; "Certification Sign-Off" on HEW programs by Model Cities directors; and Office of Management and Budget A-95 project notification and review. The study determined whether the mechanisms provided an opportunity for increased local influence in federal programs; observed developments in local planning and management capacity associated with the use of mechanisms; and identified problem areas for the cities of Newark, Dayton, New Orleans, Tucson, and Pasco, Washington. (AG)

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COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT EVALUATION SERIES No. 8

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Coordinating Federal Assistance in the Community Use of Selected Mechanisms for Planning and Coordinating Federal Programs



U. S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING
AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

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PREFACE

In recent years observers of the "urban crisis" have identified "governmental fragmentation" as one source of the nation's inability to deal effectively with domestic problems.

The problem is endemic to all levels of government and to their working relationships with one another. Nation's Cities summarized the difficult current situation: "Under today's setup the cities have most of the domestic problems, the federal government has most of the money, and the states have most of the authority to make the needed changes." (February, 1972: "Municipal Bootstraps")

In the United States, there are over 80,000 units of government: cities, states, townships, counties, sanitation districts, school districts, planning districts, etc. In various cases, governmental administrators must relate to two different cities, two different counties or even two different states.

Federal assistance, under the categorical program approach, frequently contributes to this splintering of local responsibility: HEW by dealing with school districts, HUD by dealing with urban renewal agencies and public housing authorities, OEO by dealing with community action programs, etc. All of this serves to isolate the local general purpose government from many of the federally assisted programs coming into the city. Local chief executives are confronted by a dilemma: they are trying to solve major city problems with programs and money over which they have no control.

The Model Cities program, established by the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, was a tentative step toward remedying this situation. Based on a strong commitment to planning, the Model Cities program provides local chief executives with "supplemental," i.e., flexible funds to be used for combating "urban blight in the cities' highest priority problem neighborhoods. The Model Cities program has provided participation cities with essential experience in building local capacity to plan for, manage, and monitor federal program efforts at the local level.

Subsequent federal efforts, and especially those within the Department of Housing and Urban Development, have strengthened the trend toward increasing local capability and capacity. HUD has reorganized internally, gathering most of the programs which related directly to Community Development under one Assistant Secretary. It has decentralized decision-making responsibility and authority to regional and area offices. It has embarked upon several demonstration efforts aimed at minimizing federal intervention in local program efforts (specifically, the Annual Arrangement and Planned Variations demonstrations.) It will be among the first federal departments to be affected by special revenue sharing legislation.

All of these efforts have placed a special responsibility upon state and local general-purpose governments. Attempts to assume an expanded role with inadequate staff and budget have often resulted in frustration. But they have also produced valuable lessons in the uses of existing coordinative mechanisms and programs. This segment of the Community Development Evaluation Series focuses on these local experiences with supplemental funds and with these various coordinating mechanisms. The information contained in these reports should be of value to local government as they gear up for Community Development revenue sharing. Several of the reports are joint efforts of the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. They were prepared under contracts to those agencies by the consultant firms of Marshall Kaplan, Gans & Kahn and The Research Group.

The sections of this series are:

Community Development Evaluation Series #8
Coordinating Federal Assistance in the Community
Use of Selected Mechanisms for
Planning and Coordinating Federal Programs

This report is a joint HUD-HEW effort. It speaks directly to the issue of building local capacity in the context of existing coordinative mechanisms. It specially discusses the following items:

- a) uses of existing mechanisms: such as, the OMB Circular A-95, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration plan, Labor's CAMPs mechanisms, HEW's 314(b) (Comprehensive Area Health Planning) 4C's Councils, Elementary and Secondary Education Act, and certification sign-off, and OEO's Community Action Agency Checkpoint procedure
- b) use of these mechanisms as tools for local government influence on federal programs
- c) use of these mechanisms as a management tool for local executives
- d) constraints on the development of local government leadership through use of the described mechanisms.

The report also contains descriptions of each of the mechanisms and selected experiences with the mechanisms in five cities.

Community Development Evaluation Series #9
Use of the CDA Sign-off in Model Cities for
Planning and Coordinating HEW Programs

Another HUD-HEW effort, this report discusses the general utility of the HEW Model Cities sign-off mechanism. It addresses the following points:

- a) the overall effectiveness of the sign-off mechanism
- b) the role played by regional offices in the sign-off procedure

- c) level of involvement of CDAs in the sign-off procedure, and
- d) the relationship of the HEW pre-application process to the sign-off procedure.

The report includes recommendations for improving HEW sign-off procedures and the role played by the local chief executive. Because the report involved interviews with federal, as well as local, staff it presents an informative composite of views.

Community Development Evaluation Series #10
The Federal Grant Process - An Analysis of the Use of
Supplemental and Categorical Funds in the Model Cities Program

Report #10 examines local use of Model Cities "supplemental" funds. (Supplemental funds were the flexible monies provided local governments for program activities under the Model Cities umbrella.) Because one of the legislative objectives of supplemental funds was to permit more innovative programming at the local level, the report looks at the actual use of the funds, the relationship between supplemental funds and the categorical programs and funds that were part of the Model Cities package, use of joint-funding sources in Model Cities program, and program transfers from supplemental to categorical funds.

The report examines the various ways in which cities used "loose" or flexible funds and is timely for cities a. they consider the use of revenue sharing funds.

Community Development Evaluation Series #11
Local Government Participation in the A-95
Project Notification and Review System

Another joint HUD-HEW effort, CD Evaluation Series #11 discusses the A-95 Review process. Based upon the Intergovernmental Coordination Act of 1968, A-95 (an Office of Management and Budget issuance) is an attempt to coordinate federal development aid for an area with that area's existing comprehensive plans. The report focuses on the following issues:

- a) federal commitment to the process as an intergovernmental effort
- b) the role played by the states, and
- c) local government participation in A-95.

The report contains recommendations for both the federal and the local levels of government and pinpoints issues (such as, the role of areawide clearing-houses vs. local governments) which must be resolved if local governments are to participate actively and effectively.

Community Development Evaluation Series #12
The Changing Demand for Local Capacity -
An Analysis of Functional Programming and Policy Planning

Based upon a case study approach for five cities, the report examined two major types of local capacity: a) the local capacity for such skills as programming, budgeting, resource allocation, and evaluation and b) the policy planning framework within which these activities are undertaken.

The report also contains brief sketches of the development of demand for local programming and planning skills, as well as a discussion of present trends in federal programming and the impact they are likely to have on local staffing patterns.

Case studies of each of the five cities in the study are included in the report.

Department of Housing and Urban Development
Office of Community Development
Evaluation Division

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Overview

INTRODUCTION

Purpose

Our objective in the present study was to examine local chief executive use of ten federally-assisted mechanisms for local-level planning and coordination of federal programs. We were asked to determine whether the mechanisms provided an opportunity for increased local influence on federal programs, and to observe developments in local planning and management capacity associated with the use of the mechanisms.

Context

The national administration has repeatedly emphasized its commitment to the goal of "responsible decentralization", and the development of local government leadership. Most of the current revenue sharing proposals emphasize an expanded planning and management role for state and local general government, rather than the special-purpose agencies and bureaucracies which have dominated federal assistance programs. The theory is that increased leadership by the local chief executive and local general government will result in programs which are better coordinated and more responsive to local needs.

Although recent national policy discussion has focused on revenue sharing and related efforts, such as grant-in-aid consolidation and simplification, there are also a number of existing mechanisms which support planning and coordination of federal programs at the local level. Only a few of these are specifically concerned with expanding the role of the local chief executive; all of them, however, represent attempts to broaden participation in local-level planning and coordination. The present study sought to determine whether local chief executives perceived the mechanisms as opportunities to extend their influence on the use of federal funds, and attempted to use the mechanisms in this way.

The Mechanisms

The term "mechanism" as used in this report refers collectively to a variety of planning and coordinating procedures, which have developed independently in various federal offices and departments. They include planning requirements for specific assistance programs, mechanisms for multi-agency planning, and various arrangements for review and comment on proposed federal projects. The ten mechanisms included in the study were chosen in consultation with HEW staff, in response to special interests of the department. They are listed below by functional area and sponsoring federal agency.

Mechanism	Functional Area	Sponsoring Federal Department
Comprehensive Area-wide Health Planning (314[b])	Health Care	Department of Health Education and Welfare
Community Mental Health Center planning	Health Care	Department of Health Education and Welfare
Cooperative Area Manpower Planning System (CAMPS)	Manpower Development	Department of Labor
Law Enforcement Assistance planning	Criminal Justice	Department of Justice
Elementary & Secondary Education Act Title I planning	Education	Department of Health Education and Welfare
Community Coordinated Child Care planning (4-C)	Child Care	Department of Health Education and Welfare
Model Cities planning	Multi-Functional	Department of Housing and Urban Development
Community Action Agency "Checkpoint Procedure" (for local review of CAA funding applications)	Multi-Functional	Office of Economic Opportunity
"Certification Sign-Off" on HEW programs by Model Cities Directors	Multi-Functional	Department of Health Education and Welfare
A-95 Project Notification and Review	Multi-Functional	Office of Management and Budget

Focus of the Study

The cities: The report focuses on the use of these ten mechanisms in five cities: Newark, New Jersey; Dayton, Ohio; New Orleans, Louisiana; Tucson, Arizona; and a smaller community, Pasco, Washington. Most of the report is based on the larger cities' experience. A separate section presents observations and conclusions about Pasco.

The selected cities were ones which HEW staff regarded as especially interested in making full use of federal assistance programs. The four larger cities

all operate Model Cities programs, for example, and all were under consideration for special HUD programming as "planned variation" cities.

The local chief executive and his administration: The field observations concentrated on the local chief executive and his administration, rather than "city government" in a more general sense. Attention to local legislative bodies, boards and commissions, and citizens' groups was limited to cases in which they related directly to the local administration's participation in one of the mechanisms.

Overview of developments, not evaluation: Because of time and budget constraints, as well as HEW study priorities, we did not attempt to evaluate the impact of the individual mechanisms or achievement of specific mechanism objectives. Rather, we confined our attention to responding to HEW's request that we determine if and how local governments are using the mechanisms to gain leverage over federal assistance programs. It should be understood, in this context, that most of the mechanisms were not designed primarily as instruments to increase local general government influence over federal assistance programs. Such influence, however, was seen at the outset of the study by HEW staff as an important and possible result of their use.

Note on terminology: For convenience, the term "local government" is used frequently in the report. Unless otherwise indicated, this refers to "local general government", and more specifically, to the local chief executive and the units for which he has direct administrative responsibility.

FINDINGS

1. The Mechanisms as Tools for Local Government Influence on Federal Programs

The ten mechanisms discussed in this report are planning or coordinating activities associated with funds equal to about half of the total federal assistance to state and local governments. Under present regulations, the various mechanisms would have applied to between \$15 and \$16 billion in grants-in-aid and direct federal activities expenditures in Fiscal Year 1971. Total federal assistance to states and localities in FY71 is estimated at \$30.3 billion.

Collectively, the ten mechanisms present an uneven range of opportunities from the local chief executive's point of view. Some of the mechanisms, such as Model Cities and Criminal Justice planning, offer money for planning and action programs, as well as a leading role in the planning process for local governments. Most of the other mechanisms also make provisions for local government influence on federal funds, but the local role is less well-defined, and the leverage on resources less certain. In these instances, the mechanism is potentially useful to local governments in two ways:

To Provide Information: Through the use of the mechanisms the local government can gain access to information about certain federally-funded activities of agencies operating within the local jurisdiction, which might not otherwise be available.

To Legitimize a Local Government Planning Role: With the single exception of ESEA Title I, all the mechanisms contain provisions which imply some form of local general government involvement in the mechanism procedure. These provisions may be no more than legislative or guideline references to the desirability of bringing federal programs associated with the mechanisms into conformance with local government plans. Such provisions enable government officials to justify an involvement in programs which might otherwise be viewed as political interference or encroachment in the affairs of independent agencies.

Thus in some cases, such as CAMPS, LEA, or Model Cities, federal officials are actively encouraging and defending the role of the local chief executive. In others, such as Community Mental Health planning or A-95, local government officials may have to advocate their involvement with federal, state, or local independent agencies, citing little-known or enforced provisions of legislation and guidelines.

Most of the mechanisms are at best opportunities for local general governments to exert influence on federal programs operated by other agencies, over which they would normally have no control. The degree to which such

influence achieves changes in the programs to meet general government objectives is likely to depend mainly on the planning and negotiating skills of the local government, as well as its political influence, rather than on authority inherent in the mechanisms.

2. Local Government Use of the Mechanisms

Most of the mechanisms are relatively new. For this reason, local officials generally are not well informed about them, and much of the local government response is still formative. In a few cases, cities were aware of mechanisms, but had decided not to use them because the potential benefits did not seem to justify the costs in city staff time or political friction. In addition, the mechanisms were sometimes irrelevant as coordinative devices because the local governments already had close informal cooperative relationships with the agencies involved, which assured adequate coordination. Frequently, however, the cities were not yet aware of the mechanisms and their implications, and thus were not participating, or not making full use of the opportunities to do so.

The local chief executive, his staff, or other city government representatives were nonetheless involved in some way in most of the mechanisms. Model Cities, CAMPS, and LEA, which provide staffing funds to local governments, were predictably active areas of local government interest in each city. Virtually all of the mechanisms were viewed by local officials in one city or another as potentially useful, however, and city staff were frequently playing a more influential role in some mechanisms than their respective guidelines specify for local general government.

In most of the cities included in the project, participation in the mechanisms reflected a broad interpretation by the local chief executive of his administration's leadership responsibility in the community. The cities' responsibility, in this view, was seen to include influencing resources to deal more effectively with problems, whether the programs involved were operated by city departments or by other local or state agencies.

3. Leadership through the Mechanisms: A Management Problem for the Local Chief Executive

Although local government response to the mechanisms is still formative, cities were already experiencing needs for new management approaches to deal with them. In part, the problem is one of absorbing new staff into the existing city government structure. More generally, the management problem involves maintaining effective local chief executive supervision and coordination of local government relationships with federal programs. The major management problems facing the local chief executive focus on two areas: deficiencies in local policy planning capacity, and problems in local chief executive supervision.

● Deficiencies in Local Policy Planning

Cities were experiencing a need for more specialized planning capacity in such functional areas as education and health.

In a few cases, cities had identified opportunities for

influence through mechanisms, but lacked staff to formulate specific policies and strategies for their implementation.

Officials in each of the cities were also concerned about developing more comprehensive policy planning, and various experiments in comprehensive policy planning were under discussion or in the beginning stages of implementation in each city. Some of the experiments were focused on more effective planning and budgeting of local revenues, while others had the longer-range goal of relating the city's involvement in federal and other programs to local revenue supported activities.

The cities had very little experience in successful comprehensive planning to draw on in these experiments. Planning commissions and budget offices, which project staff viewed as possible sources of initiative and expertise in this area, had generally been performing fairly limited physical planning or accounting functions. The cities were generally setting up new units or structures for more comprehensive planning or budgeting.

● Problems in Local Chief Executive Supervision

Participation in the mechanisms involved a complex network of relationships. The local chief executive himself, his staff and some officials not directly under the local chief executive's control (Councilmen, Planning Commission members) represented city government interests in the various mechanisms. Often a number of city government units or individuals were simultaneously involved in a single planning or review process. Although local chief executives were personally and continuously involved in some mechanisms, they and their immediate staff were only vaguely and intermittently aware of local administration involvement in other mechanisms. In a few exceptional cases, the local chief executive's office was completely unaware that certain units or individuals in the administration were representing "city" policy positions in some mechanisms. Although there were nominal lines of authority to provide chief executive control in most cases, the expansion of local involvement in federal programs was clearly causing problems in chief executive coordination and control. Most of the cities were making changes in the local government structure for more effective chief executive management of federal program activities, either through the creation of new departments or new inter-departmental coordinating devices.

4. Constraints on the Development of Local Government Leadership Through Use of the Mechanisms

Several constraints on local government leadership were identified during the course of the study. These constraints deal with problems inherent in the locality, as well as problems with federal government support.

● Limited Interest of Local Officials in Expanding Their Influence on Federal Programs

For a variety of reasons, some of the local officials interviewed were not particularly interested in expanding general government influence over programs the local government did not control. These officials were usually preoccupied with fiscal crises, which made the maintenance of traditional local government services a prime concern. Moreover, they were anxious to avoid involvement in programs which might lead to financial obligations that the local government could not meet.

The "credibility" of the mechanisms, and of federal programs in general, was questioned by a number of local officials. Typical of this view was the comment that the federal government has "a two-year attention span" in encouraging a new program or coordinating arrangement, after which the focus and support shift to a new "cure-all."

Generally, many local officials were only vaguely aware of the overall federal policy of decentralization, or were skeptical about sustained and effective federal support of the idea. Furthermore, the mechanisms have been introduced by the various federal departments independently, and at different times, and cities have responded on an ad hoc basis. As a result, only a few local officials were beginning to talk about developing general strategies for dealing with federal funds through the whole range of openings.

● Lack of Information about the Mechanisms

Local officials were not generally well informed about most of the mechanisms, or about their implications for expanded local government influence. The lack of general knowledge about the various planning and coordination mechanisms stems in part from the fact that there are so many, and that most have been instituted relatively recently. The growth in planning assistance programs alone illustrates the problem. An unpublished federal government report in 1969 identified 36 separate legislative titles for planning assistance to state and local bodies. These programs were funded for a total of \$252 million in FY69. The programs were associated with such diverse functional areas as urban mass transportation, flood prevention, and outdoor recreation; several of the programs were for comprehensive planning assistance. Twenty-seven of the 30 programs had been formulated after 1964. The report also cites more than 80 grant-in-aid or loan programs with planning requirements.

The report only considered planning programs and requirements which had been legislated. However, there is also an undetermined number of non-legislated planning arrangements, such as CAMPS, and a variety of non-planning mechanisms for coordination, such as the review and comment mechanisms included in this study. In addition, since the 1969 report, new planning

and coordinating mechanisms, such as Criminal Justice planning and 4-C, have also been introduced.

In short, simply to identify all the existing arrangements for state and local planning and coordination of federal assistance programs would be an ambitious project in its own right. Understandably, most local officials are familiar with very few of the mechanisms which are available for local influence over federal funds.

● Lack of Strong Executive Leadership in the Local Government Structure

An assumption underlying much of the interest in increased local government leadership is that a strong executive, preferably one who is elected, will focus and coordinate policy-making and implementation efforts of the city government. Much of the discussion of local government leadership has focused on the role of the mayor in a strong mayor form of government. Cities and counties with commissions or other more diffuse political leadership may be less well-equipped to exert sustained and coordinated policy influence through the mechanisms. For example, in one of the cities studied, the mayor was titularly the local chief executive in what was otherwise a council/manager form of government. This seemed to create ambiguities in lines of authority, particularly in regard to new staff working with the mechanisms. Such problems are likely to interfere with the ability of local government to provide consistent leadership in use of the mechanisms and to coordinate local participation in federal programs.

● Deficiencies in Local Government Staffing

Because most of the local governments were just beginning to adjust their response to the various mechanisms, project staff were not able to assess local staffing needs precisely. Even within the same city, various local officials had different views regarding the level of staff which was needed for planning and coordinating activities.

In some cases, local officials had identified openings to influence federal programs in areas of concern, but did not have staff available to follow up effectively. However, there were also complaints by a few local officials that planning and coordination staff already available to the cities were not being used efficiently.

Generally, however, it seems clear that if local governments are to play a greater leadership role in federal programs, they will need more staff to do so. Much of the initiative and capacity for the present involvement in the mechanisms in the four larger cities is due to the staff resources of Model Cities, CAMPS, and LEA.

● Deficiencies in Federal Government Approach to the Mechanisms

In addition to local constraints on effective use of the mechanisms, the study identified deficiencies in federal government support to increase a local government leadership role. In specific terms, these deficiencies were related to federal legislation and guidelines, support through funding procedures, and federal field support. Deficiencies in federal support reduce the credibility of the mechanisms with local officials, and increase their reluctance to invest local resources in mechanism use.

Lack of uniformity in legislation and guidelines: The independent development of the mechanisms over time by different national administrations, congressional committees, and federal agencies has resulted in variations in guidelines and procedures among them. These differences complicate the participation of local government, and make it difficult for local governments to respond to a variety of mechanisms in a coordinated fashion. Sometimes, as in the case of review and comment mechanisms included in this study, such variations obscure basic similarities among the mechanisms.

Limited support in funding procedures: A number of local officials feel that federal agencies do not place enough credence in the opinions of local-level planning and coordinating bodies in making funding decisions. As a result, local investment in planning and review of applications has had little demonstrable impact on the federal funding process.

Federal agency "protectionism": In several cases, local officials felt that federal officials evidenced a narrow viewpoint, focusing on their own agencies' mechanisms, which interfered with local attempts to manage a broad range of relationships (as, for example, by insisting that CAMPS or Model Cities staff report directly to the mayor, rather than through a department set up by the local government to coordinate federal programs).

Inadequate federal field support: Field support and technical assistance to local governments for the development of local participation in the mechanisms has been deficient. The present study indicated a demand both for more information about individual mechanisms, and for overview information on coordinated use of the mechanisms to accomplish comprehensive local objectives. In addition, there was insufficient information available locally on the possible utility of the various mechanisms in the context of the federal policy of decentralization.

At present, there is no systematic assistance to local governments by federal staff with an "intergovernmental" point of view. Federal field staff from the various line agencies are generally not aware of the range of planning and coordinating mechanisms sponsored by other departments, or in some cases, even of their own department's mechanisms.

ANALYSIS: A CHANGING LOCAL ROLE

Many of the mechanisms included in the present study were just beginning to have impact at the local level when the field visits were conducted. Local government adjustments to the new openings were formative in most cases. Nonetheless, the findings of the study suggest the broad outlines of a newly emerging relationship of local general government to federal assistance programs.

1. The Changing Local Government Relationship to Federal Assistance: From "Grantsmanship" to Policy Planning and Advocacy

The main feature of expanded leadership is likely to be a shift in role from the present situation in which local general government is one of the many local "grantsmen" applying for and operating federal assistance programs. Many of the existing mechanisms, as well as some of the administration's decentralization proposals, imply an expanded local government role in developing broad community strategies for the use of federal and other resources. Local governments would implement such strategies through direct administrative control of some federal funds, but also increasingly through advocating the interests of the local jurisdiction in multi-agency planning, and in negotiation with individual agencies about specific projects.


In the pattern that seems to be emerging, local government relationships to federal assistance would be a mix of direct control and various degrees of influence over most of the federal funds affecting the local jurisdiction. (See Figure 1, page 11.) These are discussed in more detail below.

Funds under direct city control: Direct grants from federal departments to local general government units are likely to remain an important element in federal assistance. General revenue sharing and grant consolidation are intended to increase the flexibility of such funds to local government planning efforts.

Funds channeled through or allocated by multi-agency planning bodies: Increasingly, planning for the use of federal assistance funds is likely to be conducted by areawide or local functional-planning bodies representing various local-level interests, including the interests of the agencies operating programs in the given functional area. Law Enforcement Assistance, as set up in most states, already follows this pattern, with local or area-wide councils representing various agencies involved in criminal justice administration. The special revenue sharing proposals for manpower training and transportation will also involve multi-agency planning. In addition, local governments already have opportunities to influence federal resources through representation on a variety of other multi-agency mechanisms, including areawide health planning (314[b]), Councils of Government or

Regional Planning Commissions, or multi-jurisdictional special service districts such as sewer districts and water districts.

Experience with existing mechanisms suggests that expanded leadership for local government is likely to mean advocacy for its objectives with multi-agency bodies which are not under local government control. Even "prime sponsorship", as is proposed for manpower training assistance, is not likely to give complete control of funds to local general governments. To achieve change in the operations of various independent agencies, local governments will probably have to negotiate.



Negotiation with individual agencies on specific projects: Even under the various proposed revenue sharing proposals, much federal assistance would still be provided through categorical grants. Review and comment provisions, such as A-95 and HEW sign-off, would seem to have a valuable place in keeping local governments informed of funding activities, and in providing opportunities for the local governments to advocate conformance of the projects to local plans.

Generally then, the mechanisms should be viewed in the context of an evolving local government relationship to federal assistance. The basic feature of that evolution is an expanded role in determining community strategies and in implementing these strategies through a broad range of resources. If the local chief executive and his administration accept this interpretation of their responsibilities, as was the case in several of the cities included in the present study, the various mechanisms can be viewed as potential tools to be used selectively in bringing federally-funded activities into conformance with local government plans.

2. The Changing Management Problem for the Local Chief Executive in Influencing Federal Funds

Findings of the present study suggest a new management role for the local chief executive which will be qualitatively different from the "grantsmanship" approach to federal funds. The difference is best defined by way of comparison.

During the early and mid-60's, many local governments began doing enough business in federal grants to justify a new staff specialist, the "grantsman." His work was with categorical grants, and tended to emphasize the funding process rather than program content. The criterion of success was to bring in money. The skills involved were the ability to locate federal programs with available funds and tolerable matching requirements, and to develop successful applications.

The basic priority setting in this system was mainly at the federal level, where the decisions were made about which programs would receive appropriations and at what local share requirements. There was little incentive for local governments to develop comprehensive strategies or a broad range of staff expertise. Changes in the availability of federal funds could make both obsolete.

Management of grantsmanship by the local chief executive was a fairly simple process. The local executive could be kept up to date through frequent informal discussions with one or several grantsmen. The presently evolving situation is greatly expanding the opportunities for local influence through the various mechanisms. Our observations suggest that local governments are moving towards new management structures to develop and implement strategies with regard to the new openings.

The new management problem is different from the grantsmanship problem mainly in the need for sustained city commitment of skilled staff to achieve objectives through multi-agency planning and negotiation. As more

local government staff become involved in various functional areas, the local chief executive must develop a more structured process for staying in touch with strategy development and implementation by his administration. The local governments observed are well into the organizational problems of expanded participation. They are at various beginning stages in developing solutions.

3. Need for Increased Federal Support of a Local Government Leadership Role

The federal government policy of decentralization implies an expectation that local governments are willing and able to extend their leadership role in federal assistance programs, and that such leadership will result in improved coordination and beneficial innovation in service delivery. With regard to these expectations, the present report should be sobering, but certainly not pessimistic. The observations should be sobering to anyone, and particularly federal policy makers, who believe that the cities now have the planning and management capacity to define and implement broad community strategies for the use of federal funds in various functional areas. Some of the cities included in the project have national reputations for dealing effectively with federal assistance. (The selection of cities was repeatedly criticized by various federal officials for being atypical and misleading in this respect.) Still, the local officials interviewed would doubtless readily agree that they are not prepared to play such a role now.

The following observations are nonetheless indicative of a growing local willingness and capacity to exert leadership:

- At least some chief elected officials are willing to assume an expanded role in federal assistance programs.
- Some imaginative thinking is taking place about how to manage participation in the mechanisms, and about the development of policy planning capacity.
- There are already a few instances in which the local government has developed new strategies for certain functional areas. These strategies seem to reflect an "overview" by the planners involved which cuts across lines of agency specialties. They also suggest the possibility of some substantial improvements in overall program effectiveness.

Perhaps the most important implication of these observations is that the development of local government capacity to fulfill the leadership role will take time and effort. Increasing local general government influence may eventually result in more effective programs, but decentralization in itself is not a panacea. Experience with the existing mechanisms suggests that the answers to difficult urban problems are not necessarily more obvious at the local level than when viewed from Washington.

At present, the federal-level expectations for effective local government leadership seem to be running well ahead of the federal commitment to assist in its development. In part, this may reflect misconceptions about present local government capacity ("some of them have had PPB for years") or general and unproven theories about the advantages of local authority ("they are closer to the people"). Exaggerated expectations become a problem if they limit federal assistance, and dominate the evaluation of local government response to the new leadership opportunities.

Earlier federal attempts to create local planning and coordinating processes, such as the Community Action Program and Model Cities, came under heavy criticism within a few years of their initiation. At least in part, the vulnerability of these programs to criticism was due to their failure to demonstrate dramatic improvements in a relatively short time and with a relatively limited commitment of federal resources. Similarly, the current decentralization efforts could result in disillusionment, and premature termination, if federal decision-makers expect too much, too soon, and for too small an investment.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

The preceding findings and analysis suggest a number of policy implications which should be considered by local and federal officials.


Local Officials

1. Local chief executives should re-examine their coordination role with regard to federal assistance to their communities in the light of current federal policy development and of new opportunities to exert influence. For a variety of philosophical, political, and technical reasons, some chief executives may choose not to assume a broader responsibility for community coordination of federal resources. Others, however, may determine that an expanded leadership role is both beneficial to the community at large, and politically advantageous to the chief executive.
2. The local chief executive and his staff should review the various mechanisms for local planning and coordination, and select for special attention those which seem useful in supporting their coordination efforts. The usefulness of the mechanisms included in the study will depend on the special situation in any given community, and on the local chief executive's interpretation of his coordination responsibility. The present study suggests that most local governments would discover some new opportunities to achieve their objectives, or new approaches to existing procedures, in the course of a systematic review of the various mechanisms.

3. The chief executive should consider formation of a local "clearinghouse" to coordinate his administration's involvement in federal assistance programs. As the local government becomes increasingly involved in the various mechanisms and the programs connected with them, supervising the efforts of staff and managing the expanding information flow within the administration is likely to become a major problem. The staff involved would include the various representatives dealing with multi-agency bodies and individual agencies, as well as a network of staff within planning offices and line departments whose special expertise would be useful in policy formulation and review. (See Figure 2.)

2

Local "Clearinghouse" Relationships



----- Information on Issues, Intent to Apply for Grants, etc.

----- Policy Guidance or Advocacy

Problems in staff supervision and information management which are already apparent in the cities included in the study suggest the need for a "clearinghouse" function within the local administration, particularly in larger communities. Such a clearinghouse would have the following basic purposes:

- Circulate information on issues surfacing through local government involvement in various planning and coordinating mechanisms to the appropriate local government officials and departments for review and policy recommendations.
- Keep the local chief executive systematically informed on the major policy issues with which various administrative representatives are involved, so that he can coordinate the development and implementation of local government strategies.

Such a clearinghouse function might be contained within the kind of consolidated comprehensive planning department some of the cities included in the study are attempting to develop. Alternatively, it might be an interdepartmental council or special office within the immediate office of the chief executive.

Federal Officials

Our findings suggest that existing mechanisms could be useful in achieving the overall goal of increased local government leadership. To be effective, however, they seem to require increased federal support.

The following actions should be considered:

1. Developing a coherent federal approach to local-level planning and coordination of federal programs. The emerging "system" for the delivery of federal assistance threatens to be at least as difficult for local governments to cope with as the categorical grant process. The following recommendations are directed to the development and application of a more coherent federal policy:
 - Defining a consistent federal approach to local-level planning and coordination of federal programs: Much of the complexity of the mechanisms from the local viewpoint can be traced to their independent development by various departments with limited interdepartmental communication. Interdepartmental discussions should be expanded, with the goal of developing a coherent approach to local-level planning and coordination to which the various existing and proposed mechanisms should conform. Such discussions should focus on the collective impact of the various mechanisms at the local level, as opposed to the fairly narrow focus on individual departments or program concerns that has dominated much of the policy development to date.

- A central concern of such discussions would be the definition of relative roles in local-level planning and coordination of federal programs for state agencies, areawide bodies, cities and counties, and various special-purpose governmental units. Federal policy-makers have tended to view such units indiscriminately as sources of "local" viewpoints, which has contributed to the present complexity and fragmentation.
- Procedures for the various sign-off arrangements should be uniform, to make them more convenient and attractive for local government use. This might be done by adopting the A-95 procedures for prior notification and timing of reviews as a model, and bringing other review procedures into conformance.
- The guidelines for local participation in joint-planning differ confusingly in philosophy and language. Some further standardization seems possible and desirable. Local general government authority for the planning and coordinating mechanisms is designated variously to the "local chief executive", the "chief elected official", or more anonymously, the "interests of local government". Local governments can qualify for planning staff support directly from the federal government if they are larger than 25,000 population in the case of HUD; 100,000 in the case of DOL, and 250,000 for DOJ. Recent HEW discussions have centered on a 500,000 population minimum for an independent, federally-supported role in social services planning. This degree of variation doubtless has rationale in terms of the individual programs and departments involved. The sum result, however, is confusion at the local level.

The argument may be advanced that a more consistent federal approach would be too prescriptive, and that the individual states and localities should develop their own approaches without federal assistance. This argument ignores the fact that the largely uncoordinated mechanisms associated with various federal programs already constitute a "model" with which localities must contend. Some rationalization of this model, with appropriate flexibility to differing local conditions, would make the development of effective planning and coordination at the local level much easier.

- Designating responsibility for interdepartmental coordination of intergovernmental policy development: Developing a more coherent federal intergovernmental policy requires establishment of a broad, general strategy. It also requires a multitude of "tactical" decisions

by the various federal departments as they develop guidelines and procedures for individual programs.

The Domestic Council has clear-cut authority to establish a general strategy within the framework of existing and proposed legislation. However, such a high-level policy group is not well-suited for day-to-day monitoring of the numerous and complex decisions of the individual departments. Working-level coordination of intergovernmental policy development seems to be divided at present among a number of federal offices with claims to responsibility in this area. Among these are the Vice President's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs, the Office of Management and Budget, and HUD's Community Planning and Management Office.

At present, none of these groups seem able to take an effective lead role in interdepartmental coordination of policy with respect to local-level planning and coordination of federal assistance. Designation and assumption of such responsibility would seem to be prerequisite to developing a more coherent federal approach. Coordination responsibility might be vested in one of the existing entities mentioned above, or in some alternative structure and process for interdepartmental coordination.

- Strengthening federal department support of planning and coordinating mechanisms: Individual federal departments should strengthen their support of local planning and coordination efforts.
 - The various agencies within some departments are still not indicating support for mechanism procedures. Stronger central enforcement should be undertaken.
 - When applications for federal programs exceed the available funds, special preference should be given to assistance applications with local government approval, or which are part of local-level multi-agency plans.
 - Efforts to make categorical assistance programs more responsive to local planning and coordinating efforts should be continued and expanded. Local governments are reluctant to invest effort in planning when most of the meaningful decisions have already been made in Washington or the state capital. Current efforts by various federal departments to consolidate grant categories and provide advance notice of fund availability are useful steps in this regard.

- Federal staff training: Maintaining a consistent federal policy towards developing local leadership depends, in the final analysis, on the efforts of working-level staff who are most frequently in contact with the localities. For most departmental staff members, the emphasis on local general government role is still a new and unfamiliar complication to their on-going responsibilities in fairly narrow program categories. Training should be conducted to make federal staff more aware of the rationale for involving local governments in their programs, and more supportive of the procedures for accomplishing this objective.

2. Increasing federal technical assistance to local governments. Project findings indicate a clear need for more information to local governments on the rapidly changing opportunities to influence federal funds. The most pressing need is for "overview" information on the range of various mechanisms and their longer-range implications for basic changes in the federal system. Federal staff could also be helpful in some cases in suggesting some options for local government management of mechanism participation. The latter assistance should not attempt to impose stereotyped solutions. Federal staff should recognize present local initiatives and variations in local situations. Several sources should be considered in delivering federal assistance in mechanism participation:

- Intergovernmental representatives: There is a clear "inter-governmental gap" in federal government relations with localities. This problem has been observed before, but it seems likely to become more acute as decentralization proceeds. One way to deliver assistance on the overall pattern of local relationships to the various departments would be to use federal staff, independent of any one department, who are responsible for just that.

- Individual federal departments: In lieu of, or in addition to, special intergovernmental staff, the various federal departments should encourage their field staff to be aware of the efforts of other departments when assisting local governments with the mechanisms for which they are directly responsible. Unfortunately, many federal staff people most frequently in contact with local governments seem to be ill-informed about the efforts of other departments, and in some cases, about their own. (When asked about a recent guideline change in a planning program sponsored by his department, a regional office official of one federal department said he didn't know, but referred the question to a staff member of a Washington-based public-interest group. "When we want to find out about something, we often call him. It's easier than trying to get a clear answer through our Washington people.") Training for federal technical assistance staff should be conducted, with the following objectives:

- Federal staff should have a greater understanding of the purpose of expanding local leadership and the longer-range implications for the federal system.
- Field staff should be aware of the range of opportunities in which local governments could be involved, not just those of their own departments. At minimum, for example, they should be aware of possible "economies of scale" which might accrue to local governments in developing joint approaches to a number of similar mechanisms sponsored by different departments.
- Field staff could also receive periodic briefings on current developments in various local governments. This should include special attention to differences in local philosophy of participation, decision-making structure, etc.

● Technical assistance through non-federal sources: Federal officials should explore various means of disseminating information about decentralization policy and the planning and coordinating mechanisms. The following specific possibilities should be considered:

- Federal departments could involve state municipal associations and similar public interest groups in disseminating ideas about current intergovernmental developments through direct contact with local officials.
- Local officials with experience in using planning and coordination mechanisms could also provide valuable assistance to other local governments just beginning to approach such problems. Federal departments should consider providing assistance in this manner, contracting for services with experienced officials on temporary leave from their regular positions.

3. Increasing federal funding to support local staffing. If local governments are expected to increase their efforts in developing and implementing strategies locally, they will need more people to do it. This seems axiomatic, but at least one recent argument holds that further federal support for local planning and management staff should be withheld. According to this point of view, more local staff would inevitably result in more federal control of planning and thus defeat the purpose of decentralization. This is not an argument project staff heard at the local level. The local officials interviewed during the present study want more staff support.

Descriptions of the Mechanisms

DESCRIPTIONS OF THE MECHANISMS

The following descriptions of each mechanism are based upon legislation, guidelines, and views of federal officials. In addition, this section examines some general characteristics of the mechanisms as tools for local chief executive influence on federal funds.

Individual Mechanism Descriptions

The ten mechanisms considered in this report are of two basic types: review and comment mechanisms and planning mechanisms.

Review and Comment Mechanisms

Although each of these mechanisms is administered independently by different federal departments, they are similar in intent and process. The objective is to involve the local government to some degree in the planning by independent agencies for federal grant applications. In these mechanisms, the federal funding agency requires that local applicants inform the general government (through a clearinghouse in the case of A-95) of their intent to apply for grants, and secure some form of "sign-off" to indicate this has been done. None of these mechanisms provides the local government automatic veto power on proposals. The final decision remains with the federal agency. The arrangements do give the local government access to information about applications before grant award, and an opportunity to negotiate with the applicants on points of concern. This prior notification also gives the local government an opportunity to exert influence informally on the funding agency if problems are not solved through negotiations with the applicant. (See Figures 3a through 3c, page 23.)

OEO Checkpoint Procedure

Date Initiated: 1966

Mechanism Provisions: To assure that Community Action Agencies (CAAs) coordinate their activities with general governments and other local agencies, OEO requires a sign-off on CAA applications by the chief elected official of the given community, as well as from other designated local agencies. OEO grant applications contain a special form, CAP 46, for this purpose.

Funds Affected: In Fiscal Year 1971, OEO expenditures of \$336 million were subject to the checkpoint procedure.

HEW Certification Sign-Off for Model Cities Program Directors

Date Initiated: 1969

Mechanism Provisions: This sign-off arrangement is intended to support the planning and coordinating role of Model Cities agencies within model neighborhood areas. HEW requires a sign-off by the Model Cities director on applications for HEW programs which are expected to have most of their impact within the model neighborhood. According to the guidelines, the Model Cities director is also expected to consult the local chief executive as part of the review process.





Funds Affected: HEW officials estimate that approximately \$200 million of the department's Fiscal Year 1971 funding was subject to certification sign-off.

A-95 Project Notification and Review System

Date Initiated: 1969

Mechanism Provisions: This mechanism is an intergovernmental effort implemented as part of the Office of Management and Budget Circular #A-95, and is usually referred to as A-95. A-95 covers about 100 federal assistance programs in a number of functional areas. The object of the A-95 process is to bring the activities of these programs into closer conformance with comprehensive planning objectives of state and local governments, as well as areawide planning bodies. Federal agencies require applicants for programs covered by A-95 to submit brief descriptions of the proposed project to state and areawide clearinghouses for review. A-95 also requires that federal departments planning direct development activities, such as construction or property acquisition, consult with local authorities. They may do so through the clearinghouses. Virtually all states have designated A-95 clearinghouses.

Local government participation in A-95 can take place in two ways. The areawide clearinghouse is usually a Council of Governments or Regional Planning Commission in which local units are represented. Thus the local government has some voice in the review and in any negotiations with the applicant conducted by the clearinghouse itself. The clearinghouse is also required to forward "notices of intent to apply" to local government and other agencies which may have special interest in them. The local government may then conduct its own review and negotiation with the applicant independently of the clearinghouse. The clearinghouse is also required to forward the written comments of the local government to the federal funding agency.

3aOEO Checkpoint Procedure**b**HEW Certification Sign-Off for Model CitiesProgram Directors**c**A-95 Project Notification and Review System**d**Model Cities Planning

Flow of Assistance Funds



Influence

Funds Affected: No estimates of the amount of federal funding covered in the procedure are available for Fiscal Year 1971. However, a survey conducted by the National Service to Regional Councils indicates that areawide clearinghouses reviewed project applications for a total of \$15.5 billion in federal and local matching funds in Fiscal Year 1970.

Included in the \$15.5 billion figure are an undetermined number of applications which were reviewed but eventually not funded. Thus the actual federal expenditures subjected to A-95 review in Fiscal Year 1970 were probably of a lesser amount. However, the number of programs covered by A-95 was nearly doubled in April, 1971 to the present coverage of about 100 programs. A very rough estimate by project staff suggests that if the present regulations had applied throughout Fiscal Year 1971, approximately \$8 to \$9 billion in grants-in-aid expenditures would have been covered by A-95 review procedures. An additional \$3 to \$4 billion in direct federal activities would also have been covered by A-95 requirements for consultation with local officials.

Planning Mechanisms (See Figures 3d through 3j, pages 23, 27 and 29.)

Model Cities Planning

Date Initiated: 1966

Mechanism Provisions: The Model Cities program provides flexible funds directly from HUD to local governments. The objective of the program is to demonstrate significant improvement in selected neighborhoods using a number of programs in a wide range of functional areas. HUD requires and funds a comprehensive planning process involving neighborhood citizens. A plan acceptable to HUD officials is required for action funding. Model Cities staff are usually local government employees, although many local governments have allocated staffing funds to independent, neighborhood-based corporations.

The Model Cities agency is expected to delegate projects to other agencies for administration, which means that some joint planning with proposed project operators must take place. Furthermore, the Model Cities program is expected to terminate after five years. This may provide inducement to Model Cities planners to work closely with other local agencies, so that on-going programs will be continued on a permanent basis when HUD funding ends.

Funds Affected: Federal expenditures in the Model Cities program during Fiscal Year 1971 are estimated at \$356 million.

Law Enforcement Assistance

Date Initiated: 1968, amended 1970.

Mechanism Provisions: The Department of Justice provides planning and program funds to states to support improvements in law enforcement, rehabilitation, and court systems. States are required to establish state planning agencies and to develop plans for the allocation of assistance funds. To assist with the development of a state plan, many states have established regional or areawide bodies as adjuncts to the state agency. Regional bodies are usually supplied with professional staff and empowered to review the applications of local governments. Both the state planning agency and any areawide planning units must be "representative of . . . units of general local government", as well as other public agencies involved in law enforcement.

The Law Enforcement Assistance Act, while designating states as the direct recipient of most assistance funds, contains several provisions to assure that funds will be passed through to local governments. Forty percent of planning funds and 75 percent of the action funds received by the state must "be available to units of general local government or combinations of such units". In addition, state plans must provide "for the allocation of adequate assistance to deal with law enforcement problems in areas characterized by both high crime incidence and high enforcement activity". Local special-purpose agencies both public and private may also receive grant funds, but must apply through a unit of general local government or areawide body representing such units.

Since the 1970 amendments to the Act, the Department of Justice has been working to insure that states provide grants for planning staff directly to the larger cities. This is in response to the complaint of cities in many states that they were not given an effective voice in decisions about the use of LEA funds. In such cities, criminal justice planners would be hired by and would report to the local chief executive. They would usually prepare plans expressly for the given city.

Recent amendments to the LEA Act also allow local governments or combinations of governments of at least 250,000 population, to supplement available planning funds with program funds to create criminal justice councils. Such councils are usually composed of representatives of all criminal justice agencies and are chaired by the chief executive of the local government, who also appoints the staff. These councils are intended to improve coordination and planning for all law enforcement activities.

The degree of LEA fund flexibility to local planning efforts is likely to depend on the administrative approach of the state LEA planning agency. Some states offer cities a virtual block grant, within the limitations of the federal legislation. If acceptable to the state agency, the city's plan is incorporated as a component of the state plan. Cities in other states may have to develop plans in conformance with more restrictive state requirements, and without a fixed allocation of funds against which to plan.

Funds Affected: The funding level for LEA has expanded substantially since its initiation in 1968, from \$60 million in Fiscal Year 1969 to \$250 million in Fiscal Year 1971.

Cooperative Area Manpower Planning System (CAMPS)

Date Initiated: 1967, revised 1971.


Mechanism Provisions: This mechanism is designed to develop interagency coordination in planning and operating manpower training and supportive service programs. At the local level, CAMPS is in a transition similar to that in LEA. DOL has recently provided funds to cities with populations over 100,000 for the establishment and staffing of Manpower Planning Councils (MPCs). The Mayor is expected to be chairman of such a council. Membership on the MPC is expected to include representatives of agencies which provide manpower and supportive services, of business and labor, and of the client population to be served.

CAMPS differs from Model Cities and LEA on a critical point. Unlike the latter, CAMPS planning is not directed at an identifiable body of flexible funds. Local representatives on MPCs do not control the allocation of funds among the categorical manpower programs administered by DOL. As the project fieldwork was in progress, there was no clear arrangement by which DOL could respond flexibly to local plans. In effect, the local planning process takes the projected DOL categorical funding as a given, and works from there.


DOL officials at the Washington level are working in several directions to increase the flexibility of funds for CAMPS planning. These efforts include the legislative proposal for special revenue sharing as well as negotiation towards inter-agency agreements to make the local government chief executive the prime sponsor of a number of programs. Internally, the Department is developing procedures to make allocation of categorical funds at least marginally responsive to locally-defined priorities.

At present, however, the joint planning in MPCs seems limited to changes which can be made within the fixed structure of categorical manpower funding. This may


3e Law Enforcement Assistance



1 Cooperative Area Manpower Planning System (CAMPS)



9 Comprehensive Areawide Health Planning (314[b])



← Flow of Assistance Funds
 ← "Dominant" Influence
 ← - - - Influence

still provide considerable flexibility for local governments to develop strategies, using such flexible funds as Model Cities money or private resources to fill gaps.

Funds Affected: Department of Labor and OEO funds with which the CAMPS process is primarily concerned included an estimated \$998 million for manpower training and \$375 million for employment services in Fiscal Year 1971.

Comprehensive Areawide Health Planning (314(b))

Date Initiated: 1966, amended 1967

Mechanism Provisions: The Partnership for Health Act, Section 314(b), provides for support of areawide health planning councils, frequently referred to as "314(b) agencies". Council membership should include health service providers, consumer representatives, and representatives of the "interest of local government." As in the case of CAMPS, the 314(b) agencies do not plan for any specific action funds. The councils are expected to develop community plans which will guide the efforts of various local, state, and federal bodies involved in providing health services locally. The councils also review and comment on local applications for certain HEW health programs. At least some HEW agencies accord 314(b) comments a virtual veto authority. Some state health departments also involve 314(b) agencies in their planning for state funds.




Funds Affected: Expenditures in the federal programs covered by 314(b) review and comment authority totaled an estimated \$200 million in Fiscal Year 1971.

Community Coordinated Child Care (4-C)

Date Initiated: 1969

Mechanism Provisions: 4-C committees provide a local level coordinating mechanism for day-care and pre-school programs. HEW's Office of Child Development certifies 4-C committees, which are organized voluntarily by local agencies and individuals. No planning or action funds are provided presently, but several pending legislative proposals would substantially increase the funds available for child care programs. 4-C committees may play an important planning role if such funding becomes available. At present, the committees are concerned with developing coordination arrangements and mechanisms for common services. Local government participation in 4-C committees is not a requirement for certification, but program guidelines encourage such involvement.

Funds Affected: The administration's welfare reform legislation would include an appropriation of \$700 million for child care



← Flow of Assistance Funds
 ←--- Influence

assistance, mostly through consolidation of existing programs. Other legislative proposals would authorize up to \$2 billion for child care, but it appears unlikely at present that the legislation finally approved by Congress will include that level of funding. The administrative role of 4-C in any of the child care proposals is presently unclear.

Community Mental Health Center Planning

Date Initiated: 1963, amended 1970

Mechanism Provisions: The Community Mental Health Centers Act establishes two categorical programs: (1) construction grants are allocated by formula to the states. States must designate a state agency to plan and administer the program, and that agency must set up an advisory board. States are not required to designate planning or operating agencies at the sub-state level, though some states have done so; (2) Staffing grants are made directly from the HEW Regional Office to applicants, which may be any public or private non-profit agency which owns or operates a health center.

The guidelines for the construction grant program require state plans to show that "to the maximum extent practicable, there has been coordination with city, metropolitan area and interstate planning agencies" This provision would legitimize some local government involvement in state planning as it affects the localities, but the funding agency has apparently not made much effort to enforce such involvement. Local general government involvement in staffing grants could occur only if the local government were itself a sponsor, or through informal contact with sponsoring agencies.

Funds Affected: Estimated expenditures for these programs in Fiscal Year 1971 were \$28 million for construction grants and \$90 million for staffing grants.

Elementary and Secondary Education Act - Title I Planning

Date Initiated: 1965, amended 1970

Mechanism Provisions: Funds under Title I are allocated to local education agencies by formula, and may be received upon application approved by the state education department. Among other conditions, an application must set forth a comprehensive plan for meeting the special educational needs of disadvantaged children. The plan must state its objectives and provide criteria and procedures, including objective measures of educational achievement, to evaluate progress. The local education agency must also describe how the application was made available to parents and other members of the general public.

As a result of the 1970 amendments to the Act, the Commissioner of Education has issued regulations requiring each local education agency to establish an areawide council composed of parents of children participating in Title I programs to advise the agency with regard to the program. Existing parents' groups are eligible so long as they include a majority of Title I parents. The Commissioner also encouraged agencies to establish councils for each school participating in the program. Councils are to be informed about all aspects of Title I, to be involved in planning of annual applications, and to have opportunities for suggesting improvements in program operations.

No planning role for local general government is specified. The 1970 amendments to Title I made mandatory the advisory councils, which were previously voluntary but widely used by local education agencies. The amendments also clearly specified that these advisory councils should be composed of parents. The legislative history indicates that a proposal for general community representatives on advisory councils was defeated. Consequently, local government participation in Title I planning could be more restricted than it has previously been.

The amendments additionally provide that all documents related to Title I must be made available to parents and the general public. This provision at least will allow local government to be informed about the local education agencies' activities with regard to Title I. Local government officials could then enter into negotiations with local education agencies directly about any matters of concern.

Funds Affected: Expenditures for Title I programs were an estimated \$1.5 billion in Fiscal Year 1971.

Mechanisms as Tools for Local Chief Executive Influence on Federal Funds

Each of the ten mechanisms represents some attempt to broaden the assistance delivery process beyond an isolated "proposal submission-grant award" relationship between the federal funding office and the local applicant agency. Some form of joint planning or coordination is stipulated. Depending on the mechanism, local interests are represented in different ways. From the point of view of the local chief executive and his administration, four characteristics of the mechanisms are of particular interest:

Funds Affected by the Mechanism

Flexibility of Funds to Local Planning Efforts

Local Government Role in the Mechanism

Availability of Staff Support to Local Government

Funds Affected by the Mechanisms

As estimate of the federal funding covered by the ten mechanisms in Fiscal Year 1971 totals \$15 to \$16 billion. By way of comparison, total federal assistance to state and local governments is estimated by OMB at \$30.3 billion during the same period. Moreover, the \$15 to \$16 billion estimate is for federal expenditures only, and does not include state or local matching funds, or other non-federal resources associated with the affected programs. The level of federal funds affected by the ten mechanisms in Fiscal Year 1971 is summarized below:

<u>Mechanism</u>	<u>Sponsoring Federal Department</u>	<u>Funds Affected</u>
OEO Checkpoint Procedure	OEO	\$368 Million
HEW Certification Sign-Off	HEW	\$200 Million
A-95 Project Notification and Review	OMB	\$8-\$9 Billion
Model Cities Planning	HUD	\$356 Million
Law Enforcement Assistance Planning	DOJ	\$250 Million
Cooperative Area Manpower Planning System	DOL	\$375 Million
Comprehensive Areawide Health Planning (314[b])	HEW	\$200 Million
Community Coordinated Child Care (4-C)	HEW	\$700 Million (Proposed)
Community Mental Health Center Planning	HEW	\$118 Million
ESEA Title I Planning	HEW	\$1.5 Billion

Flexibility of Federal Funds

Local influence over the use of federal funds can involve allocation decisions affecting the distribution of funds among various functional areas, or it can involve more limited operational planning decisions related to specific categorical programs. The level of influence is determined by provisions of each mechanism. (See Figure 4, page 35.)

For example, the Model Cities program provides what is essentially a block grant. Model Cities planners have the opportunity to decide the amount of money to be spent on various functional areas such as education, health services, or economic development. They can also participate in project planning. The HEW Certification Sign-Off mechanism, by way of contrast, involves local officials in much narrower operational questions, such as the location of facilities with respect to client populations, supportive services requirements, or staff hiring practices.

Both types of mechanism are potentially useful to local chief executives in influencing resources to better support overall community strategies. However, mechanisms which enable allocation decisions at the local level obviously offer greater flexibility to meet locally-defined needs.

In addition to promoting planning and coordination of specific federal programs, many of the mechanisms are intended to encourage the development of broad community strategies. Such strategies would not be restricted to a specific federal program, but would represent attempts to coordinate a wide range of community resources in designated functional areas.

Local Government Role

The local government role prescribed in the legislation and guidelines differs basically among the mechanisms. The role ranges from one in which general government is a passive recipient of information to one in which participation in the mechanism is itself supportive of general government leadership. Local government participation in the various mechanisms can be considered in terms of the following categories:

Information Only: For example, the federal guidelines for Title I do not mention local government participation, although they require that planning documents be public information.

Local Government as an "Equal Participant": In theory, at least, 314(b) health planning, 4-C, Community Mental Health Center planning, and the three review and comment mechanisms are opportunities for local government participation, more or less as an equal partner, in planning for federal programs. In the case of the review and comment mechanisms, this classification assumes that if there is disagreement, local governments and the applicant agency will have equal opportunity of appeal to the federal funding agency.

Dominant Local General Government Role in Planning: The federal structuring of LEA, CAMPS, and Model Cities gives the larger local government special leverage in the respective planning processes. In LEA and CAMPS, the local chief executive or his representative is usually the chairman of

the planning council, and the planning staff for the mechanisms are under local government control.

The Model Cities program places not only planning staff, but also what is effectively "prime sponsorship" of program funds under local government control. The Model Cities agency receives a block of funds and in turn contracts out program operations to other agencies, as determined in the Model Cities plan. Although the Model Cities agency has a dominant position through its contract power, there is likely to be bargaining. The Model Cities agency is likely to impose conditions, and the proposed operator can simply refuse the grant if the conditions are too onerous.

Only a few of the mechanisms reflect an effort by the federal agencies to build in a leadership role for the local government. However, changes in some of the mechanisms over the past few years are clearly part of the trend toward increasing that role. The development of DOL's CAMPS process clearly indicates the movement towards increased local involvement which is taking place in a number of program areas of federal activity. The CAMPS process initiated in 1966 opened the way for some general government involvement in coordination of manpower programs. Later, to counter state employment service domination of CAMPS, the local chief executive of a city over 100,000 population was encouraged to assume chairmanship of the CAMPS committee, and DOL provided funds to support staff under his control. Over the past year, DOL has been attempting to further strengthen the local general government role by making the local chief executive "prime sponsor" of a number of manpower programs. These efforts have not as yet succeeded, but local government "prime sponsorship" is part of the administration's special revenue sharing proposal for manpower training.

Availability of Staff Support to Local Government

Three mechanisms provide cities with funds to support staff. CAMPS provides complete funding for a secretariat staff for Manpower Planning Councils. Model Cities provides ninety percent funding for staff for a CDA. LEA provides through state planning agencies complete funds for local planners and three quarters of the funds for secretariats to local Criminal Justice Councils. For the remainder of the mechanisms, local government must rely on existing staff to perform the functions necessary for participation.

FLEXIBILITY OF FUNDS, LOCAL GENERAL GOVERNMENT ROLE AND AVAILABILITY OF STAFFING SUPPORT TO THE
LOCAL GENERAL GOVERNMENT

Mechanism	Flexibility of Federal Funds		Local General Government Role in the Mechanism			Federal Support Available for Staffing Local Government Involvement
	Operational Planning Within Federal Categories	Some Degree of Resource Allocation Planning at Local Level	General "Com- munity Strate- gy" Planning for Various Federal and Other Programs	Mechanism is Source of Informa- tion Only	Mechanism is Opening for Participation by Local Government	Local Gen- eral Govern- ment has Dom- inant Role in Planning
CAA Checkpoint 1. Procedure		X			X	
HEW Certification 2. Sign-Off	X				X	
3. A-95	X				X	
4. Model Cities planning		X	X*			X
Law Enforcement						
5. Assistance planning		X	X			X**
6. CAMPS	X		X			X**
Areawide Health 7. planning (314[b])	X		X		X	
8. 4-C	X		X		X	
Community Mental 9. Health Center planning	X				X	
ESEA-Title I 10. planning		X		X		

* Within the Model Neighborhood

** Only for Cities of 250,000 Population or More, in the Case of LEA, and 100,000 or More in the Case of CAMPS

CITY EXPERIENCE WITH THE MECHANISMS

The following three sections present an overview of mechanism involvement in each of the larger cities, a description of each of the mechanisms in a specific city situation, and an examination of the special problems of mechanism use in Pasco.

Overview of Local Government Involvement in the Larger Cities

The following overview descriptions discuss mechanism participation and policy planning developments in Newark, Dayton, New Orleans, and Tucson.

NEWARK

The City

Newark suffers perhaps the most extreme case of urban decay among American cities. A mature city, its available space has long been developed for housing, commerce and industry. The surrounding area has likewise been developed into suburban towns. Middle-class and blue-collar families have departed for the suburbs. The economic base of the city, along with employment opportunities, has withered. At present, Newark has the highest percentage of dilapidated housing of any city in the nation, the most crime per hundred thousand people, the heaviest per capita tax burden, and the highest rate of venereal disease, maternal mortality and new cases of tuberculosis. The city is second in the nation in infant mortality and birth rate and is seventh in the absolute number of drug addicts.

The Chief Executive

Newark has a strong mayor government form. The present mayor was elected to office with the overwhelming support of the black population, defeating an incumbent who was under indictment for corruption. On assuming office, the new mayor found an impoverished city treasury and a hostile and ineffective bureaucracy. At the same time, his supporters held high expectations for change. Fulfilling their expectations for rapid improvements has been the new administration's greatest concern. Because of Newark's continuing fiscal crisis, more federal funds, and more city government control of existing programs, have been viewed as essential to dealing with the city's many problems.

Policy Planning

The mayor, an engineer by training, is interested in developing a systematic approach to policy planning. City officials have discussed

centralizing policy planning in a single office for purposes of coordination. However, when the study team last visited Newark there was no determination as to where the planning responsibility would be located within the city structure. (See Figure 5, page 38.)

Several city agencies were possible locations for the major planning responsibility. The Community Development Administration (CDA) was under consideration because of its extensive staff and legislative mandate. The Business Office was also a possible location because of the ability of the business administrator. There was also talk of structuring the activity in the mayor's immediate office.

The Community Development Administration has by ordinance the authority to undertake all planning and coordination for the city government as well as all relations with federal and state governments. Subsumed within this agency is the old planning department, the law enforcement planning staff, and some health planners, as well as the Model Cities planning staff. However, the agency is still little more than the administering agency for the Model Cities program. It has involved itself in the organization of individual Model Cities projects to the extent of acting as operating agency for several projects. In the view of some local officials in other departments, this focus on operation has detracted from the CDA's planning activities and has retarded its development of competence in policy planning for other programs and other city departments. Some local officials are beginning to regard the CDA as another line agency, rather than as a planning arm for the mayor.

The Business Administrator is a professional city manager generally regarded as highly competent. He is handicapped by a lack of skilled staff and severe budget restrictions which preclude further hiring. In spite of these constraints, he has attempted to develop improved management and budgeting by requiring each line department to produce statements of management objectives, which his office can then monitor. A recent seminar for department heads on the development of such objectives represented the first initiative towards comprehensive, inter-departmental planning by the new administration.

The mayor has a small staff in his immediate office, some of whom also took a leading role in the effort to develop management objectives for the local administration. These officials expect to remain involved with further efforts to broaden policy planning.


City Involvement in Mechanisms

The mayor has articulated an aggressive philosophy for his administration with regard to the mechanisms, and to federal funding generally. For example, the mayor has taken a personal role in state law enforcement planning. The mayor requested that the governor appoint him to the State Criminal Justice Council, which he did. In the Council, he acts as an advocate of major city interests in the development of the state plan. The mayor has also pushed successfully for a separate Newark sub-council of the areawide health planning agency, to deal with the special problems of Newark. Similarly, the city's CAMPS staff have been following closely the various legislative and administrative attempts by the Department of

City Experience with the Mechanisms

5

City Administration Structure (simplified): Newark



NEWARK

CITY REPRESENTATIVES INVOLVED IN THE MECHANISMS

	HEW CDA OEO	sign-off	A-95	Model Cities	LEA	CAMPS	314-(b)	4-C	CMH	ESEA Title I
Mayor	X			X	X	X				
Business Administration										
CDA Director					X	X	X			
CDA Planners	X	X						X		X
City Planning Commission Staff			X							
Health Department							X			
Police Department					X					

Labor to give local chief executives "prime sponsorship" of manpower training programs. The mayor plans to request designation as prime sponsor as soon as new legislation makes this possible.

The city has attempted to coordinate its various planning activities by centralizing the staff in the CDA. For this reason, the mayor requested repeatedly that the CAMPS staff be part of the CDA. The Department of Labor insisted that the CAMPS coordinator report directly to the mayor, and the mayor reluctantly accepted the condition.

DAYTON

The City

Dayton officials express pride in a long tradition of effective city government, tracing back to the adoption of one of the nation's first manager/commission charters in 1906. In recent years, an important indicator of that effectiveness has been the ability to attract federal funds to help solve the city's growing problems. The local administration has expended substantial effort in dealing with federal programs, including stationing a member of the manager's staff in Washington to oversee the city's interests there. Alluding to the numerous federal demonstration programs the city has attracted, a local columnist recently dubbed Dayton the "Test-Tube City".

The Chief Executive

The manager traditionally exerts strong leadership in Dayton's manager/commission form of government. The current manager is dedicated to expanding the scope of city government responsibility beyond its direct operations. He has demonstrated a willingness to seek influence over city programs in a variety of instances. The manager places high priority on developing new public and private resources available to the poor and minority groups in his jurisdiction.

The manager has also placed a high priority on innovations in the city's decision-making process. These include a major effort to develop neighborhood-level priority setting for certain city funds, as well as continuing efforts to make the city's PPBS experiment an effective policy-making instrument.

Policy Planning

At the time of the project field visits, none of the units with planning responsibilities was exercising systematic influence on policy development for the local administration as a whole:

The Management Services Office, responsible for the planning, programming, budgeting system (PPBS), after two years still exerted minimal influence over the city's fiscal process.

The Finance Department functioned mainly as the city bookkeeper.

The Plan Board was structurally isolated from the manager and his administration, and while it produced plans for the Department of Community Development as well as a city housing strategy, the activities were restricted to physical development concerns.

The Model Cities administration acted as a line agency exclusively serving the needs of minority residents in the Model Neighborhood, as represented on the Model Cities Board.

The Human Resources Department was limited due to a shortage of city staff, despite the assistance of the CAMPS coordinator, who was assigned to that department.

The manager was concerned with developing a more comprehensive and systematic planning process, and was taking a direct and active role in expanding the participation of city department heads in planning and budgeting through a "Task Force Management" concept. The goal of this approach, just getting under way as the project field visits were conducted, was to involve all department heads in the allocation of city government resources, and to hold officials accountable for administration operations. Federal assistance funds to the city government are expected to be included as part of these resources.


In addition, a citywide Model Cities administration was to be organized under "planned variations" to centralize neighborhood assistance, provide an increased liaison with other governmental bodies outside the administration, and work with various planning and coordinating mechanisms.

City Involvement in Mechanisms

The city of Dayton currently participates in most of the mechanisms. In some instances, in which the opportunity to influence appears minimal, the city has sought alternative approaches to exert influence in the given functional area.

Dayton's broad involvement in the mechanisms at the present time does not reflect a comprehensive city strategy. Involvement developed as city units individually became aware of specific opportunities. The manager has few direct ties to the diverse representatives from different levels of city government who voice policy by means of mechanisms. Health issues, for example, are addressed by staff from the health center of a satellite corporation funded through Model Cities which is a legal entity twice removed from the manager's office.

Recently the city manager and his staff have expressed interest in an expanded role in the mechanisms. Increased emphasis on the mechanisms would require certain changes in the way the city now views participation. For example, an understanding of the mechanisms and the kinds of opportunities they might provide was generally lacking except in the manager's office. Even there, the manager was unaware of the OEO checkpoint procedure, and his staff were unclear about how to obtain project notification

7City Administration Structure (Simplified): Dayton

DAYTON

CITY REPRESENTATIVES INVOLVED IN THE MECHANISMS

3

	HEW CDA sign-off	OEO	A-95	Model Cities	LEA	CAMPS	314-(b)	4-C	CMH	ESEA Title I
Mayor/Commission			X	X	X	X				
City Manager	X									
Manager's Staff			X		X	X				
Management Services				X						
CDA (director and staff)	X					X				X
MCPC (citizen board)			X				X			X
Satellite Corporation Staff	X	X			X	X		X		X
Plan Board			X							
Human Resources Department						X				
Police Department					X					

from the areawide A-95 clearinghouse. With the exception of the manager and a special assistant, no one could identify the city representatives or staff who were involved with more than a few mechanisms.

Policy planning within the city has not yet reached the stage where the chief executive can exert systematic leadership in various functional areas. While the manager of Dayton has substantial influence over his administration, citywide planning still occurs on a relatively ad hoc basis. The developments in policy planning and management described in the preceding section should increase the manager's ability to exert coordinated policy influence through the mechanisms.

NEW ORLEANS

The City

New Orleans shares the problem of many center cities - a shrinking tax base, high unemployment, an increasing low-income black population, and an exodus of the white middle class. The governmental structure in New Orleans presents special problems. The local general government must deal with an unusually large number of influential boards and commissions at the local level, and with a traditionally indifferent or hostile state legislature and a highly restrictive state constitution.

The Chief Executive

New Orleans has a strong mayor form of government. The present mayor was elected by a narrow margin, with the backing of a new coalition of blacks and white liberals. He has attempted energetically to exert leadership, with much of his effort directed at securing additional revenues through constitutional amendments and from a reluctant state legislature. Other major areas of mayoral concern have been relations with key independent boards, and the development of major projects to counter the decline in the city's economic activity and its rising unemployment.

Federal funding is a major concern for the local administration. The City Demonstration Agency, including the Model Cities program and other offices concerned with federal assistance, has had a leading role in increasing substantially the flow of federal funds into the city over the past two years.

Policy Planning

The city's capacity for policy planning is presently limited. The budget office has almost no latitude for resource allocation. Available local revenues are "locked in" to providing minimal city government services. The planning commission, in addition to its physical planning activities, has a theoretical opportunity to exert policy planning influence on other city departments through its capital improvements planning. In practice, there is not enough money available for capital improvements to do much

planning. The planning commission has neither staff nor interest in comprehensive planning for the city's use of federal funds. (Figure 9, page 46.)

Most of the city's present initiative in policy planning is through staff supported by Model Cities, LEA, and CAMPS. However, this staff capacity has been almost completely committed to those federal programs and there has been little effort as yet to develop plans for other city departments, or comprehensive plans for the use of various federal resources.

New Orleans is presently attempting to expand policy planning capacity. The city is moving toward a bi-partite structure of city government. The CDA is developing as the policy planning and federal program coordination arm of the local government, with operations under the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) as the other major unit. The mayor sees the CDA developing its capacity toward the eventual goal of conducting comprehensive policy planning for both local revenue allocation and use of federal funds in the community.

Some local officials speculated on an eventual city structure in which all fiscal control activities associated with Model Cities would be shifted to the CAO's control, and all planning activities centralized in five basic units in the CDA. This remains only one viewpoint, however. Some of the local officials involved would be likely to resist the change. (Figure 10, page 46.)

City Involvement in Mechanisms


The mayor and various local officials are involved in most of the mechanisms. This involvement reflects the local administration's philosophy of active involvement in a broad range of local activities, not just those traditionally within the sphere of local general government. In most cases, the mechanisms are viewed as potential openings to influence resources, and the city's involvement reflects this goal.

Directly, or through the CDA or other officials, the mayor is kept informed about most of his administration's involvement. He can intervene in policy issues when he chooses, even though he is directly and continuously involved in only a few of the mechanisms. This high degree of supervision by the mayor is due largely to the special role of the CDA director, who supervises or coordinates much of the city's participation for the mayor.

Although the administration's approach to the mechanisms is active and relatively well supervised, its effectiveness seems limited at present by the lack of policy planning capacity discussed previously. Current thinking about the mechanisms has been at best, piecemeal. There is no comprehensive strategy for relating the city's efforts in the different functional areas. In some areas (health, recreation), the administration's policies are not clearly formulated. In other functional areas, the city has general strategies, but doesn't have the staff to implement the strategies by exerting influence through existing opportunities. Local officials view the development of policy planning capacity as an incremental process to be conducted over the next several years.


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City Administration Structure (simplified): New Orleans



10

New Orleans: Possible Future Structure



NEW ORLEANS

CITY REPRESENTATIVES INVOLVED IN THE MECHANISMS

	OEO	HEW CDA sign-off	A-95	Model Cities	LEA	CAMPS	314-(b)	4-C	CMH	ESEA Title I
City Council			X							
Mayor	X			X	X					
Mayor's Health Coordinator							X		X	X
CAO's Office					X					
Criminal Justice Coordinator					X					
CDA Director	X	X			X	X	X	X		X
Model Cities Staff		X								X
Manpower Coordinator						X				
Federal Programs Coordinator			X							
Police Department					X					
Plan Commission										

TUCSON

The City

Tucson and its economy are dynamic and growing. In the past ten years, the population has increased nearly 20 percent and the assessed valuation has increased nearly 49 percent. Due to the fact that 40 percent of city land is undeveloped and 150 miles of streets remain to be paved, the city is thus faced with the problem of extending basic city services. At the same time, the city is enjoying an uncommonly high level of prosperity; a fact that is underscored by a million dollar contingency fund in its 1971-1972 budget.

The Chief Executive

Although Tucson's charter provides for a council-manager form of government, the mayor is designated the chief executive officer of the city. While the council-manager form is being questioned by a majority of the city council, charter revision to develop a strong mayor form seems impossible at the present time. The net effect is that Tucson has two local chief executives neither of whom has a strong or stable mandate. The mayor is more aggressive than the manager in the search for federal funds and has taken a more active role in dealing with the various mechanisms. The manager concentrates on the administrative aspects of his office and gives priority concern to the maintenance of existing city services. Both, however, emphasize the desirability of limiting city financial commitments and influence to programs directly operated by local government. Although federal programs are nominally coordinated by the Department of Community Development, individual departments budget for local share requirements and seek federal funding independently.

Policy Planning

Policy planning with regard to federal funding is presently fragmented among various city departments, which are generally autonomous in their dealings with federal programs. The following city units are potential sources of coordinated policy planning for the local administration. (Figure 12, page 50.)

City Manager's Staff: The manager's immediate office has recently been expanded and restructured to give the manager increased capacity for supervision and coordination of city department activities. This effort is formative at present, with staff from the manager's office concentrating on the development of liaison relationships with various line departments.

Finance Department: The budgeting process is not viewed by senior local officials as a tool for centralized policy planning, or as a forum for major allocation of resources decisions. Requests from line departments, usually involving only marginal changes in allocation from the previous year, generally determine

most of the local revenue allocation. Although finance department staff have discussed a "management by objective" type of budget process which would expand the policy planning role of the department, there are no current plans to implement the idea.

Planning Division: Some of the planning staff are interested in developing a comprehensive planning capacity in the division, building on the present capital improvements planning, which would develop general, long range plans for the various city departments. The planning division lacks the organizational mandate to perform such a role now.

Model Cities: Model Cities planners represent a major part of the city's resources for policy planning. The program has had almost no impact on policy planning for other departments, or in the development of citywide plans, however. Model Cities in Tucson has focused entirely on the Model Neighborhood. The close identification of the mayor with the program has limited the city manager's involvement with the program, although he has nominal supervision of Model Cities. This in turn has tended to isolate Model Cities from other city departments under the city manager's direct supervision.

The expansion of the city manager's office seems the most likely means of increasing policy planning coordination in the Tucson situation at present. However, the efforts of the new staff will be absorbed for some time in developing liaison and monitoring of locally-funded department operations.

In response to discussions associated with the present study, staff in the city manager's office are planning to set up an Inter-departmental Coordinating Committee. The Committee would provide for systematic information sharing about the proposed use of federal funds by internal city departments, and would conduct reviews of project applications forwarded by other agencies through review and comment mechanisms.


City Involvement in Mechanisms

The city is represented in all of the mechanisms studied. Participation has not been effectively supervised by the manager since the majority of participation is by the mayor and the Model Cities Department. Model Cities is involved in all cases for mechanisms which are not related to present city government responsibilities and seeks to influence resources for the Model Neighborhood. The mayor is the city representative on the Council of Governments, which is the A-95 clearinghouse, and on the Criminal Justice Council. He is also the direct supervisor of the city's CAMPS coordinator who acts as chairman of the CAMPS committee. The manager is not kept aware of the issues in most mechanism involvement due to his lack of contact with the majority of city participants.

Although the individuals from the city actively participate in the mechanisms, effectiveness seems limited by the lack of supervision, coordination and policy planning. Current thinking about the mechanisms is done piecemeal

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City Government Structure (simplified): Tucson



Formal authority

Informal authority

TUCSON

10

CITY REPRESENTATIVES INVOLVED IN THE MECHANISMS

	OEO	HEW CDA sign-off	A-95	Model Cities	LEA	CAMPS	314-(b)	4-C	CMH	ESEA Title I
Mayor/Council	X		X	X	X	X				
Manager and Staff			X							
Dept. of Community Development:										
- Federal Programs	X		X							
- Planning Division			X			X				
Model Cities Department:										
- Staff		X			X	X	X	X		X
- Citizens		X				X			X	
Finance Department			X		X	X				
Police Department					X					
Personnel Department						X				

Dept. of Community Development:

- Federal Programs
- Planning Division

Model Cities Department:

- Staff
- Citizens

Finance Department

Police Department

Personnel Department

and is, for the most part, isolated from the on-going activities of the city administration under the city manager. There is no comprehensive strategy for relating the city's efforts in different functional areas. In areas for which the city has no operating responsibility, there are no citywide strategies.

Tucson is being drawn into a wider definition of city responsibility most dramatically by Model Cities and by the personality of the mayor. More federal support for the city manager's policy planning and implementation staff capacity would enhance the city's ability to assume an expanded leadership role.

Some Specific City Experience with the Various Mechanisms

The following section describes in greater detail the involvement of various cities in each of the mechanisms. These selected local experiences are included here to give a better sense of the "nuts and bolts" problems of local use of the mechanisms than is possible in overview descriptions.

<u>Mechanism</u>	<u>City Described</u>
CAA Checkpoint Procedure	Dayton
HEW "Certification Sign-Off"	New Orleans
A-95	Dayton
Model Cities planning	Tucson
Law Enforcement Assistance planning	Newark
CAMPS	Newark
Comprehensive Areawide Health Planning (314[b])	Newark
Community Coordinated Child Care	Tucson
Community Mental Health Center Planning	New Orleans
ESEA Title I planning	Tucson

These descriptions were selected by project staff as particularly illustrative of various types of local government experience with mechanisms.

CAA Checkpoint Procedure: Dayton

The Mayor's check-off on OEO programs has never taken place in Dayton, as far as anyone can remember. Neither the CAA director nor the city manager and his staff knew about the procedure.

City officials cited an example of possible usefulness of the procedure which arose the previous year. At that time, the manager would have preferred delaying the poverty program annual funding package until certain points were clarified relating to the CAA's community organization plans.

The issue involved was a housing rehabilitation program scheduled to be undertaken in one neighborhood by the city's Department of Community Development. This effort, according to the manager's view, required resident understanding and acceptance in order to succeed. Simultaneously, however, the poverty program planned to send organizers into the area to ensure that residents received an independent, or different, understanding of the project than that conveyed through city channels. The potential conflict in the situation concerned the manager until both city and CAA efforts proved abortive.

City representation on the board of the Community Action Agency is not an adequate means of influencing the direction of their policy, according to the assistant to the Manager for Development. Although representatives from various areas of city government (including the City Commission) and neighborhoods comprise the majority of voters on the county CAA board, they do not redirect any activity. While three out of the five members of the CAA finance committee come from the city government (two commissioners and the manager's special assistant), they rarely meet. City officials plan to use the checkpoint procedure in the future to supplement the limited influence gained through board membership.

HEW "Certification Sign-Off" for CDA Directors: New Orleans

Although the CDA reflects mayoral interests in controlling federal programs in the city, and although the mayor has personally expressed an interest in a sign-off for all federal money coming into the city, the "certification sign-off" appears to be largely a pro forma exercise in New Orleans. CDA officials feel that they do not have adequately trained staff to effectively critique many HEW grants which have an impact on the Model Neighborhood. Because the sign-off was viewed favorably by many applicants as a kind of "extra points" or preferential treatment on HEW applications, the CDA did not find it difficult to be included, but the CDA found it "did not have the capacity to check on the overlap." Nonetheless, the CDA has used the sign-off procedure successfully in several instances. One example was a Headstart proposal; the CDA used sign-off to force the applicants to be more specific in defining "educational day care". The CDA wanted to ensure that there would be a quality program, and therefore insisted that the sponsors rewrite the proposal specifying a set of minimum standards and specific activities which would be included in the program. The CDA has also held up funds after sign-off as a means of enforcing compliance for a basic city objective -- open employment. For example, the CDA held up funding of supplemental funds in a joint grant with NIMH in order to secure employment of minority group health workers.

A-95 Project Notification and Review System: Dayton

Dayton's administration has not received regular and formal notification of project proposals to be reviewed by the Miami Valley Regional Planning Commission (A-95). Information on the activities of the A-95 review process for the most part flows through informal channels to the city administration. When he wants to know what is happening in the region, the director of the Plan Board visits the Planning Commission's office. Similarly, the Development Administrator sits in unofficially when MVRPC meets to keep informed on proposed projects. He in turn informs the manager on proposals that have come up for review at these meetings. This, however, could be considered as notification after the fact.

One City Commissioner and the Chairman of the Plan Board receive agendas for the monthly Regional Planning Commission meetings at which they represent the city of Dayton. Ostensibly, the agendas serve to give advance notice of proposals under review, but in fact proposals which have not been listed prior to the meeting often receive consideration. The representatives do not relay information back to the manager's office. The City Plan Board has made no attempt to encourage the Regional Planning Commission to forward A-95 notifications to the city administration in general or to its own office. When asked where in the city they might send notices of "intents to apply" and "proposals under review", staff of the Regional Planning Commission indicated that they would send all information to the manager's office. This would allow the manager to decide which among his departments should perform the review.

Thus far the manager's office has not encountered difficulties with projects developed outside the city administration that might have been avoided through A-95 review. However, the staff feel that this may not always be the case. They offer the example of a highway which might threaten city interests as a situation in which the administration should have input before final approval in the A-95 review.

Model Cities Planning: Tucson

The mayor has direct involvement in the Model Cities program. He has assigned Councilmen to participate in various aspects of the program and has direct contact with the Model Cities director. The program represents for the mayor a vehicle for realization of his personal objectives for the city -- "getting the city off the dime; making things easy for people; working with the federal government to bring in necessary money." The mayor and council have taken an active role in Model Cities planning and have on several occasions altered the neighborhood's submission of component programs. It then was the Model Cities director's responsibility to go back to the community and explain the changes.

The manager has not participated actively in the Model Cities program. He has accepted the approach but conceives of it as a special purpose program directed to the major blighted area of the city. His department and division heads have been involved individually on various projects, and through participation in task forces and the Study Group Council, with varying degrees of commitment.

The establishment of Model Cities as a separate department resulted from the mayor and Model Cities director's desire to interpret literally Model Cities guidelines which call for direct operational access to the mayor and council. The director reports administratively through the manager but in practice can go directly to the mayor when he chooses to do so. The manager feels that he had better linkage to Model Cities when it was a division of the Community Development Department than now as presently structured because the Director of Community Development previously helped to supervise the planning and execution of the program. The relationship of the manager to the program has contributed to the result that Model Cities has had more impact on agencies outside the city government than on the city government itself.

Law Enforcement Assistance Planning: Newark

In accordance with the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, the State of New Jersey established the State Law Enforcement Planning Agency to develop a state plan governing the dispersal of funds to localities under the Act. For 1971, the state plan consists of some 36 approved program categories for which local governments may make application for funds. Communities may not apply for funds for programs not appearing in the approved list. This precludes, for example, applications from local police departments for shopping lists of equipment. The state plan is prepared by the State Agency staff and reviewed and approved by the Council of the State Agency, the members of which are appointed by the Governor. Up until now, local communities have had little opportunity to contribute in the preparation of the plan.

It is the desire of the State Agency as well as a condition of the recent amendments to the Act that localities be allowed to prepare their own plans. When the State Agency was first established, it attempted to develop local participation in the preparation of the state plan by creating regional criminal justice planning bodies. However, the state was quickly confronted by the question of what was a viable region, and also by the opposition of most localities to the idea of a regional agency. In the second year, the state abandoned the regional concept and offered planning funds to counties and cities to prepare their own plans. The result of that strategy was disappointing to state officials, since few localities had the capacity to do adequate planning. Responsibility for preparing a plan was usually turned over to the police department, which did little more than prepare project applications.

In this current year, the state has given planning funds to those communities which appear to have an ability to plan, and is providing training and technical assistance in the hope of building capacity. They hope that by the end of the year a number of communities will have prepared satisfactory local plans which may be incorporated into the 1972 state plan.

To improve local coordination and involvement in planning, the state is requiring after the first of July, 1971, that all localities receiving planning grants establish local criminal justice councils. The mayor or county administrator would chair a council and invite all local officials who have responsibility in the area of law and public safety, as well as

representatives of the general public, to be members. The local planners would become the secretariat and staff to the council, but would most likely take direction from the mayor. Planning activities would have the benefit of comments and guidance from all council members. A council can also serve as a forum for various officials to discuss coordination and relationships between functions. In most communities there is no present arrangement for police, the courts, the jails and the probation staffs to meet together and discuss common problems.

The Newark administration saw the Law Enforcement Assistance Program with its planning requirements and flexible funds as one that could well suit its own purposes. The mayor quickly made application for planning funds and placed the responsibility for planning in the Community Development Administration, which had already become involved in the field of law and public safety through its Model Cities work.

The mayor, as chief official of the largest and most urbanized city in New Jersey, became concerned that the State Council did not include representatives who would advocate the needs of the major cities. Responding to amendments to the Omnibus Crime Act calling for State Planning Councils to include representatives of "units of general local government", the mayor requested the governor to appoint him to the Council. The governor did so, and the mayor has addressed the Council on several occasions to express his concern that program monies be made available in greater amounts to cities which have unusually severe problems with crime. By and large, the Council and the state staff have attempted to respond to this concern.

Early in the current year, the state staff told Newark's law and public safety planner that if the city would prepare an acceptable city plan, the state would reserve in the next year \$2.5 million to fund the plan, and the city would be exempt from the program requirements of the state plan. The state also offered Newark technical assistance and loaned staff, if necessary, to prepare the plan. The city administration viewed the offer as highly advantageous to Newark.

The planner and his staff immediately began to prepare the requisite plan, which they completed in the first week of May. The plan ran into the objections of the chief of police, who did not agree with its priorities. The chief's first priority is the construction of a new police headquarters. Unfortunately, Newark has no resources to pay for such a project, and thus the chief had been looking eagerly to outside funds, particularly Law Enforcement Assistance Act funds. Under the New Jersey State Plan, LEAA funds cannot be used for construction projects. However, the chief insisted that if the city would use its influence with the state, it could obtain approval for such a project. Discussions between the chief and the Community Development Administration over this issue consumed a month or more, delaying the submission of the plan to the state.

The disagreement between the chief and the CDA on priorities emphasized the need to integrate line departments more in the planning process. The mayor supports the establishment of a criminal justice council in Newark as a vehicle to do this.

The state gave a planning grant not only to Newark, but also to Essex County. As there is some overlap in county and city law enforcement and criminal justice functions, the two planning bodies have had some conflicts, since there is no coordinative link between them. For example, private agencies applying for funds to operate a drug program have attempted to play one government off against the other. In one case, an agency which did not wish to abide by the city's conditions has been able to obtain funding through the county. This is of concern to the city officials because they feel that Newark has higher standards and requires more controls to ensure that the grantee conforms to city objectives. The state feels that it cannot solve this problem altogether because of the overlapping functions of the two governments, but has indicated an interest in developing some formal communications link between the two planning agencies.

Cooperative Area Manpower Planning System (CAMPS): Newark

The mayor appointed as staff director to the CAMPS Committee a political associate, an aggressive man with experience in social programming. In the several months of his tenure, the director has created a functioning committee. He followed closely the development of new federal regulations and began to act in anticipation of new opportunities. He has, for example, received the mayor's support to have the city of Newark designated as prime sponsor for manpower programs should legislation be approved providing for it.

The Department of Labor's interpretation of its regulations presented problems for Newark. Mayor Gibson originally requested that CAMPS planning funds be granted to the Community Development Administration. Since the CDA is part of the Office of the Mayor, and has been designated by the City Council to do manpower planning, he felt that this arrangement fitted the regulations. The manpower planning staff would be integrated with planners from other functional areas to ensure an easy interchange of information and ideas. Such an arrangement would provide the mayor with the proper forum for coordination and resolution of conflicts. This arrangement would also mean that the review of Model Cities applications by the CAMPS Committee would be handled administratively by the same unit, which the mayor preferred.

The Department of Labor vetoed the city's request on the grounds that it would not provide for a CAMPS Committee directly responsible to the mayor. DOL staff maintained that the committee must be separate and independent of any other activity and that the committee is a unique coordinating mechanism whose jurisdiction extends beyond manpower programs. In the view of some of the Department of Labor staff, CAMPS should be used to coordinate the Model Cities program, the Community Action Agency, and other federally supported activities. After several unsuccessful appeals, the mayor agreed to the conditions and did establish the CAMPS staff within his office, but separate from the Community Development Administration. The CAMPS staff director seems satisfied with the present structural arrangements and quite happy to be free from the large bureaucracy which is now the Community Development Administration.

The separation of manpower planning from the other social planning activities of the Community Development Administration does raise questions of coordination. So far those have not been serious, since neither agency has had resources available for extensive manpower programming. However, if the CAMPS Committee does become the prime sponsor for all manpower programs and if Newark receives increased Model Cities funding under "planned variations", the need for coordination will be much greater.

Comprehensive Areawide Health Planning: Newark

In response to Section 314(b) of the Partnership for Health Act, Health Planning Councils have been established in New Jersey. The State of New Jersey has viewed these councils as a valuable apparatus and empowered them with state health programming responsibilities. It first gave them responsibility to review and comment on state-sponsored health grant-in-aid programs. In this way, the Councils became involved in the review of a number of federal formula grant health programs operated by the state but excluded from the federal review procedures. Recently, New Jersey enacted legislation requiring state certification of all health care facilities and establishing administrative machinery to review the charges for medical services billed under the State Medic-aid and Blue Cross programs. The comprehensive health planning councils were designated as the primary body for review of applications for certification and are given a role in the review of medical care costs. Thus with both federal and state responsibilities, the New Jersey health planning councils have a significant role in health services.

The Health and Hospital Council of Metropolitan New Jersey is the regional health planning council for a four county district, including Essex County and the City of Newark. It has been dominated by insurance and hospital interests, primarily because they were the only institutions to contribute funds to provide for the local share of the grant. The council membership ostensibly had a majority of health consumers, but many of the consumer members were also hospital trustees or otherwise affiliated with hospitals or insurance companies. Also, there had not been more than one disadvantaged person on the council. The health planning and coordinating activities of the council have been primarily hospital-oriented, dealing with such issues as a cooperative laundry for all institutions in Newark.

The Newark mayor and his staff quickly recognized the increasing importance of the health planning council and decided to attempt to subject it to greater city influence. Their efforts, however, were slowed because of a vacancy in the position of City Health Director. A two-pronged strategy for dealing with the council was developed and is still in negotiation. First, the mayor requested that up to seven seats on the Health and Hospital Council Board be made available for appointment by him. He planned to fill these seats with his new health director as well as several residents interested in health problems. Second, the mayor requested establishment of a Newark Health Planning Council as a sub-agency of the Health and Hospital Council. Sub-agencies are recognized in the Partnership for Health Act but have been seldom utilized. The city argued that the health problems in Newark vastly differ from those of the suburban areas surrounding the city and that a discrete health plan for Newark is

necessary as well as a generalized plan for the region.

The Newark council would be appointed by the mayor and chaired by the City Health Director. The planning staff would be added to the existing health planning staff of the Community Development Administration which presently is funded through the Model Cities and the Regional Medical Program (a special grant program to assist regions with coronary and other serious diseases). Approval of the mayor's request would force the Health and Hospital Council to give up to Newark \$36,000 from its current year grant. The council and its staff have not been happy about this proposal and have also had difficulty in understanding Newark's demands. Negotiations on the mayor's proposal are underway, involving not only the council but also federal and state government agencies.

Community Coordinated Child Care: Tucson

As an outgrowth of a Tucson Community Council planning committee, and with Model Cities encouragement, the Tucson Association for Child Care (TACC) was incorporated in 1970 to plan for the distribution of child care funds. Model Cities funds provide half the local share, which is placed in trust with the State Welfare Department to secure federal funds for day care services.

Model Cities staff is also participating in the current discussions regarding the designation of TACC as Tucson's Community Coordinated Child Care Committee. The major point of contention is whether TACC should be supplemented by a planning capability or if a separate entity should be constituted for this purpose.

Tucson Model Cities representatives also encouraged the state to initiate 4-C activity. In response, a staff person in the governor's office has worked with the task force which drafted a state child care plan. Local child care committees have been invited to, and have participated in, the task force meetings. However, the state is not prepared to organize a 4-C Committee until federal purpose and guidelines become more clear and funds are provided.

Neither the mayor nor the manager is involved in this mechanism, although the mayor is aware of Model Cities participation with TACC. However, a manager's staff member acted as recorder for some sessions of the group studying 4-C and presented a report at a work session of the mayor and council.

Community Mental Health Center Planning: New Orleans

At present there are five different mental health clinics serving the five catchment areas in New Orleans. NIMH funds three of the clinics, which are run by the universities. According to the State Mental Health Commissioner, there is no consideration of income or population density in the way the catchment areas are drawn (along census tracts), and hence in how resources are allocated. Both the State Health Officer and the Mental Health Commissioner said they were unaware of inequities in the distribution of resources to these catchment areas. The Director of the City Health Department,

who sits on the Mental Health Committee, stated that the districts are divided in such a way that Louisiana State University, which runs one of the centers, receives a third of the resources and a tenth of the patients. The state facility (located across the river from New Orleans) is the only clinic available to the majority of poor people in the ghetto areas.

The State Mental Health Commissioner set up a planning committee for the New Orleans area, which has been in operation about a year. The committee has, in the words of the Commissioner, "only the power I give it". Nonetheless, it represents the first attempt to coordinate the programming of the five clinics. The mental health committee is currently composed of representatives from the five mental health centers, the City Health Director, a representative of the Mental Health Association (a body of laymen who were the only coordinative body before this committee was structured), and the mayor's health coordinator. The goals set forth by the chairman of this committee, a physician from Charity Hospital, are fairly limited; e.g. speeding up out patient entry into Charity Hospital, and continuity of record keeping among the five clinics. The committee currently has 314(d) funding for a general inventory of mental health service needs.

The mental health committee chairman said that he would like to "see everything in Orleans Parish coordinated by the mayor", but he did not feel that the infrequent visitations of the mayor's health coordinator to the committee sessions were adequate to ensure coordination.

Model Cities staff and the mayor's health coordinator did talk to the Mental Health Commissioner about developing a mental health program in the schools. The Commissioner agreed that mental health in the schools was the priority area. The Commissioner reports these discussions bogged down, after some initial enthusiasm. (He wanted Model Cities funds.) The mayor's health coordinator has tried to get the mayor involved, but there is no comprehensive city strategy at this time. Generally, the city's involvement in mental health planning at this point seems mainly aimed at keeping informed. The mayor's health coordinator is involved in too many areas to concentrate more time on mental health, at least in regard to a mechanism which at present seems to offer little opportunity for effective city influence.

ESEA Title I Planning: Tucson

The Model Cities Department's Education Planning Specialist provides liaison between the Model Cities Education Task Force and the ESEA Title I Advisory Board. This Advisory Board both reviews and participates in local planning for Title I funds.

A combination of Model Cities participation, cooperation of the School District and a change in the federal ESEA guidelines resulted in changes in the expenditure of ESEA funds from distribution among twenty schools to consolidation into ten schools, all but one of which are located in the Model Neighborhood. Moreover, utilization of Title I monies is closely coordinated with Model Cities education programming, which the mayor and council have approved.

The Model Cities Education Planning Specialist has no contact with the city manager. While he thinks that the Model Cities director keeps the manager informed, the manager indicates that he knows nothing about ESEA Title I planning. Although the mayor is also unfamiliar with Title I planning, he understands that it is linked in some way with Model Cities.

The Mechanisms in a Small-City Situation: Pasco, Washington

The City

Pasco, with a population of 14,000, is one of a cluster of small, contiguous communities in a two-county region of South-Central Washington State, commonly referred to as the "Tri-Cities" area. Benton and Franklin Counties have a combined population of about 90,000, with no major cities. The area has experienced substantial growth since the mid-40's, primarily due to the activities of a major Atomic Energy Commission installation. Pasco has most of the area's minority and low-income population, which has confronted the city with special problems not shared by the neighboring communities. These problems intensified in the late 60's, with racial conflict, budget deficits, and a breakdown in the city's ambitious urban renewal program.

The Chief Executive

Pasco has a council-manager structure. The present manager was hired recently from outside the state as a "trouble-shooter" to deal with the city's multiple crises. He accepted the position with the explicit understanding that he would have maximum flexibility to develop responses to the numerous problems. He is generally recognized as an aggressive and effective administrator. As a matter of practical necessity, the manager's first priority has been to "get the City legal" by rectifying existing budget deficits, and this crisis has absorbed most of his time and energy since he accepted the position.

Policy Planning

Policy planning activities are limited in Pasco by the size of the city staff. The manager has virtually no staff for broad policy analysis and planning. The city planner has no staff, and must spend his available time on physical planning problems. The finance director is also the city clerk.

The primary procedure for policy formulation is the manager's weekly staff meeting with department heads, during which problems are discussed and solutions determined. Also, new state regulations for local budget formats require a functional rather than line item approach. The manager hopes to use the new approach for more effective policy direction through the budgeting process.

The manager has also used the services of other agencies, and particularly the area's community action agency, as a resource for policy analysis and program development which would benefit the city.

City Involvement in Mechanisms

There is virtually no staff other than the manager to participate for the city in most of the mechanisms. The volume of the manager's personal workload coupled with the city's lack of staff and money have put the city in the position of responding to requests for cooperation with outside groups, rather than initiating such efforts. The lack of available staff and resources seems to have limited the manager's present capability and desire to expand his influence over resources not previously under the city's control. The manager has reacted positively to efforts by other agencies (notably the CAA) to have the city participate in various programs. However, such cooperative efforts must depend largely on the specific group's ability and willingness to supply staff to perform the required program development activities.

Unfortunately, the various areawide bodies operating in the Pasco area are in a position to provide only limited assistance to the city. Because there is no major city in the area, the mechanisms studied are relegated to a 'balance-of-state' category. The state agencies seem to have given the Tri-Cities area relatively low priority; and the mechanisms are generally at a very formative stage. The areawide groups generally do not have their own professional staff. They must depend on contributions of time made by the busy professionals who are members of the groups, and on the very limited technical assistance available from the state. The substantive 'products' that accrue from these groups, such as construction of a Community Mental Health Center in the Tri-County area, seem to have resulted from extraordinary efforts by various individuals.

Even if the various areawide groups were better staffed, Pasco would probably have difficulties in dealing with the city's problems through areawide planning. The city does not have sufficient staff resources to perform an advocacy role in such planning efforts. Because most of the area's racial and ethnic minorities live in Pasco, the city's interests may not be adequately recognized in areawide approaches to problems without such advocacy. For example, the city manager expresses grave concerns about the merits of a Tri-City consolidation recently recommended in a regional governmental modernization study. Because Pasco's blacks and Mexican-Americans would constitute such a small percentage of the population of the consolidated city, the manager is concerned that they would not be able to assume a politically viable role in relation to the 'new' city's governing body.

Pasco can use the review and sign-off mechanisms more readily, since they are not expected to require additional staff. However, the city manager will probably not be able to participate in all the various planning mechanisms to the extent necessary to successfully influence resources.

Selected Examples: A-95 and CAMPS

The following experiences with specific mechanisms were selected to illustrate in greater detail some typical problems in the Pasco situation.

A-95: The Benton-Franklin Governmental Conference (BFGC) is the A-95 Clearinghouse for District 10 of the State of Washington. The state is divided into thirteen uniform planning and development districts established by executive order of the governor. The office of the governor has been designated as the state clearinghouse.

BFGC was organized in 1966 and has taken the approach with respect to its membership that all governmental entities within Benton and Franklin Counties should participate, including school districts. The Conference presently has twelve members and does not include Pasco School District No. 1 which presumably does not participate because of the financial obligations of membership. Pasco is represented by one of its councilmen, who indicates that he does not report extensively about BFGC to the rest of the Council because they are "businessmen and very busy and can't remember all this information anyway."

BFGC has three professional staff members - a director, an associate regional coordinator and a land use planner. The associate regional coordinator's responsibilities are to monitor the implementation of the grants for which BFGC is the applicant and assist member jurisdictions in the application for funds by providing information on available programs, appropriate forms, names of contacts, funding sources and copies of similar applications. The land use planner does in-house studies, e.g. Bi-County Recreation and Open Space Plan, Transportation Plan, etc. BFGC has been the grantee for several studies - Governmental Modernization with a HUD 701 demonstration grant, a Solid Waste Management Study with state funds, a Bi-County Non-Urban Area Water and Sewer Plan with funds from the Farmer's Home Administration, and several projects with Law and Justice (LEA) funds including a 20-year law and justice plan presently being prepared by a consulting firm.

The A-95 process was just getting underway in District 10 when the project field visits were conducted. BFGC conducted its first orientation for its members about A-95 in the spring of 1971. The few A-95 notices of "intent to apply" which had been processed thus far by BFGC pertained primarily to state highway matters.

There remain differences of opinion about how the A-95 procedure will work. For example, BFGC's director says that the state has agreed that all local intents to apply will be sent to BFGC, which will in turn forward them to the state clearinghouse and to local entities for review and comment. However, state staff indicated the procedure is that local applicants forward intents to apply to the state and local clearinghouses simultaneously. When questioned about this inconsistency, the state representative said that BFGC's director must have missed the last state-sponsored meeting for local clearinghouse staff.

The state and BFGC utilize common forms developed by the state. In addition, both the state and the director of BFGC are suggesting that local entities utilize the clearinghouses for all programs, regardless of coverage under A-95.

Since the operation of the clearinghouse is at an embryonic stage, there is some discrepancy between the statements of the BFGC director about the way in which the clearinghouse will function, and the perceptions of the Pasco city manager about the ways in which the clearinghouse does function.

The major discrepancy in their respective descriptions of the process regards the point at which intents to apply are forwarded to concerned agencies for review and comment. While the director of BFGC indicates that intents are sent out as they are received, and prior to BFGC meeting agenda materials, the city manager's filer support his contention that the only intents sent to date have been attached to the agenda materials. BFGC's director indicates that eventually intents will be sent out to concerned agencies by the third working day after they are received by BFGC. Pasco's city manager would receive the intents not only for all projects to operate within the city but also for those projects which are proposed for anywhere in the surrounding area. In addition, a full set of agenda materials will be sent to each conference member and the city manager for duplication and distribution to the other councilmen. Moreover, BFGC's director would also send an agenda individually to the police chief and the city engineer if there were an item that might interest them. (The director assumes that the city manager will take responsibility for circulating the agenda to other city staff at the manager's discretion.)

The city manager is uncertain about how A-95 will function. He attends the meetings and several months ago expressed concern that he was only receiving the agenda and no back-up information. He characterizes the present A-95 review activities of the conference as "live and let live". With respect to the roles of BFGC's professional staff, he was also unclear. However, he has been appointed by BFGC to head their budget review subcommittee, and in this context, he will be involved in reviewing BFGC staff activities.

The manager has a fundamental disagreement with the position taken by BFGC that they will assume no coordinative or planning role with respect to social and education programs except those specifically covered under A-95. Feeling that there is a need to have such a resource for coordination and information, he is working in cooperation with others in the Bi-County area to form what is tentatively called the Benton-Franklin Social and Education Liaison Board. It is his hope that social and education agencies and organizations will voluntarily use this forum to share information about and to coordinate their respective programs.

Other city staff members, including the police chief, city engineer, city planner, and recreation and parks director, expressed interest during project interviews in receiving intents to apply for informational purposes. Upon hearing that other staff members were interested in seeing intents to apply, the manager hypothesized that they could be presented at his weekly staff meetings and reviewed by various departments as needed. The results of the reviews could be discussed at the next meeting, so that he could determine a unified course of action for the city.

CAMPS planning: The city presently has no relationship with the Tri-City Area Manpower Coordinating Committee (CAMPS Committee), which is composed solely of the operators of manpower programs and chaired by the representatives

of the state Employment Security Department (ESD). A spokesman for ESD said that they are continuously "elected" as chairman because it is the path of least resistance. (Another member of the committee remembers no election and assumed that ESD chairmanship is required.) ESD feels that the burden of work is on them; the ESD spokesman could see no particular benefit or problem in having the city participate.

The executive director of the Governor's Manpower Coordinating Committee assessed the Tri-City Area Manpower Coordinating Committee as one of the "weaker" committees. Because of a personnel shortage in his office, the state staff person providing supportive services to that committee also must provide the same services for three other area committees. The executive director is hoping that during the next year the staff person will have to provide service to only two other committees in addition to Tri-Cities.

The state staff was wrestling with the implications of the new Department of Labor issuance relative to the structure and function of CAMPS. They foresee the need to make drastic changes in the composition of the State Committee and hope that the State Committee will make recommendations with respect to the composition of local committees. The state staff will be pushing for representation from local general purpose government. Although state staff view themselves as intermediaries between local committees and state departments, the local ESD spokesman said he goes directly to individual state departments with problems or requests, but tries to be "careful of channels because of diplomatic considerations."

The assistant to the governor who is chairman of the State Manpower Coordinating Committee feels that because of the rigidity of the categorical manpower programs, it is unrealistic to think of local committees developing a plan as such, but rather a system of linkages between programs. He expressed an additional concern that the Department of Labor "urged" that the state CAMPS planning staff be structured separately from the planning staff in the state's Planning and Community Affairs Agency (PCAA). The governor would have preferred to locate it in PCAA.

In response to the proposed implementation by the Department of Labor of an "Operational Planning and Control System", whereby program money is to be allocated to the regional offices in accordance with each region's recommendations relative to program mix, the regional office asked its constituent states to submit a new type of State Plan. These would include recommendations concerning program mix, and alternative plans assuming a ten percent increase and a ten percent decrease in available funds. The State of Washington's Plan incorporated the recommendations of each area committee, rather than making recommendations of its own. Therefore, to the extent that the views of local government were reflected in each area plan, those views are part of the State Plan. It remains to be seen to what degree the Department of Labor will follow the State Plan recommendations in its funding.

The director of the local community action agency, a member of the Tri-City Committee, seemed to indicate that the dominant influence of ESD was an integral problem of the Committee and, because of this, "members of the Committee do not come in with ideas or needs, and do not attempt to use other programs to solve the problems."

When asked to explain his objectives for the city, the manager mentioned employment for the residents of Pasco in two different contexts. When this came up later in a conversation about which mechanisms might be desirable to pursue, the manager said "maybe manpower planning is the place to go."

Conclusion

The Pasco situation presents a dilemma for federal policy-makers concerned with supporting the development of local-level planning and coordination. At first glance, the Tri-Cities area suggests an ideal situation for policy-planning on an area-wide basis, with existing mechanisms playing a major role. None of the individual communities are large enough to support extensive policy planning capacity on their own. Furthermore, the area represents a distinct and coherent economic region.

There are two problems with the areawide approach in the Pasco situation. First, most of the areawide planning and coordination mechanisms are dependent on state support, and the area has not had high priority in state efforts. As a result, the mechanism bodies are relatively understaffed and generally at a formative stage of development.

Second, the interests of the various localities in the area are not homogeneous. Pasco has almost all of the area's racial and ethnic minorities and the major concentration of the area's low-income residents. This has meant special problems for the city not shared by surrounding localities. Because the city is only one of the several communities in the area, and represents only about 15 percent of the area's population, Pasco officials are concerned that the city's special problems will not be given adequate weight in areawide planning. Furthermore, Pasco lacks the staff resources to advocate its special interests in areawide, multi-agency activities.

The dilemma for federal policy centers on the use of the limited federal funds available to support local-level planning and coordination. On one hand, the federal government is clearly committed to the development of areawide planning, for reasons of efficiency and comprehensiveness of viewpoint. On the other hand, a large number of federal programs reflect a concern for channeling scarce resources to meet the special needs of disadvantaged citizens. The Pasco city government is at present one of the major advocates for the interests of the disadvantaged in the area.

The areawide bodies operating in the Tri-Cities could clearly benefit from increased federal support for staffing. At the same time, however, Pasco also needs more staff to advocate its special interests in areawide planning and coordination activities. Given the limited federal resources available at present to support local-level planning, the Pasco situation, and similar situations in other regions or metropolitan areas, seem to present federal policy-makers with a difficult choice among competing values.

Types of Policy Planning and Coordination Activity

TYPES OF POLICY PLANNING AND COORDINATION ACTIVITIES

Field staff observed staffing, administration organization, and procedures designed to assist the chief executive in defining goals and directing activities. Because approaches to the selected mechanisms were just developing in most cases, field observations were not limited to planning and coordination directly related to the mechanisms. Rather, project staff attempted a more general assessment of policy planning capacity in the various cities which the local chief executive could draw on in making use of the mechanisms.

Four kinds of coordination activity were being conducted or were under consideration in the cities included in the study:

- Comprehensive planning and budgeting for local revenue-supported activities of city departments.
- Central coordination of federal assistance applications from city departments.
- Policy planning and coordination efforts regarding federal assistance programs operated by independent agencies.
- Comprehensive policy planning encompassing both local revenue-supported activities and federal assistance to the community.

Comprehensive Planning and Budgeting for Local Revenue-Supported Activities of City Departments

Policy planning, in the sense of a basic re-examination of problems, goals, activities, and their interrelations, was largely absent in the budgeting process of most of the cities. Rising service costs and fixed revenues have forced local officials to concentrate on "holding the line", maintaining basic services which have been cut back to or below minimum levels. With most revenues viewed as "locked in" to essential services, the budget process in many of the cities was largely a matter of replicating the previous year's budget. Attention was focused on minor adjustments, while the basic pattern of resource allocation was accepted without much review.

Recent experiments with a more comprehensive planning and budgeting process had been attempted in several of the cities. None of these efforts was considered to have had much meaningful impact on local government activities. Viewed together, they suggest that it is extremely difficult to re-examine the basic goals of traditional services.

Nonetheless, local officials in each of the cities were discussing or taking action to expand the comprehensive planning associated with the budget process. Dayton has had the most experience in this area, and the continuing effort there provides an example of one approach.

Dayton participated in a major national experiment in Planning-Programming-Budgeting Systems (PPBS), the "5-5-5" project sponsored by the Ford Foundation and conducted by George Washington University. A first exercise in PPBS had been conducted in the city government two years ago, but the process had not yet become an effective part of city operations. In the words of one senior official, "We're like the company looking at the new computer they bought without knowing how to use it."

In an attempt to utilize PPBS, the city manager was developing a "Task Force Management" process. Directors of all key city departments and divisions will belong to at least one task force, the titles of which derive from PPBS program objectives. (For example, "Security of Persons and Property", "Home and Community Environment", etc.) These titles relate to categories in the capital and operating budgets of the city.

The expected main product of the task forces will be recommendations on city budget allocations within the various objective areas. In effect, the various members will be expected to reach agreement among their competitive interests for funding. In the first year, the starting point in planning will be a distribution of expected revenues among the task forces in proportion to the previous year's budget. In subsequent years, the task forces would also recommend reallocations among task forces.

The task force concept was not yet operational as the field visits were conducted, and local officials were not sure how well it would work. However, the city manager had made clear that he was committed to the idea. He instructed department heads to expect to devote half their own time to planning activities. He also indicated openly that the administrators' jobs depend on effective participation in the process.

The existing planning commission and budget office were not expected to take a leading role in the Dayton approach. In Dayton, the "secretariat" for the task force process is a unit in the office of the city manager. The budget office, planning commission, and CDA will participate in the task forces essentially as line departments. A similarly limited role for budget offices and planning commissions was emerging in the tentative developments towards comprehensive planning and budgeting of some of the other cities. The limited role for nominal "planning" and "resource allocation" offices in the cities was contrary to the expectations of project staff. The city officials involved seemed to prefer developing new structures, rather than altering radically the capacity and mission of existing units.

Central Coordination of Federal Assistance Applications from City Departments

In each city, various city departments were identifying and applying for federal grants related to the individual unit's activities. In at least one of the cities, federal assistance applications were viewed as basically the independent concern of the department involved. Departments determined which grants were appropriate, included provisions for local share in their budget requests, and prepared applications, with little effective central review or coordination.

However, officials in each of the cities were indicating a concern for increased central coordination of grant applications; some of the cities

had taken steps to achieve greater central control. The basis of this concern was the recognition that few federal grants are actually "free"; rather, most grants place demands on scarce city resources, either immediately or in the future. In determining the mix of federal programs for which it will apply, the local government is actually setting priorities on the use of its own resources. Some of the considerations which have led to a concern for central coordination can be categorized as follows:

Local share: Most federal programs require some form of matching effort by the recipient. Depending on the program, this may involve cash contributions, or "in-kind" services such as staff time or office space and equipment. These are not unlimited quantities. Local governments heavily involved in federal programs may reach the point at which choices must be made as to which additional applications can be backed with the required local share.

Continuation responsibility: Many federal grants are intended as demonstrations, with federal assistance terminating after one or a few years. The local government is then left with the problem of finding alternative financing or shutting down the project involved. The latter option would frequently mean the politically difficult task of terminating new services. Local officials were concerned about the increasing number of demonstration projects, which were creating future financial obligations that expected local revenues could not meet.

Integrating proposed projects into the existing local government structure: Absorbing a new project activity into the local government requires the anticipation of a number of practical questions involving various local units. Generally, projects must conform to city ordinances, staffing must conform to civil service regulations, facilities and supportive services such as accounting, purchasing, maintenance, etc., must be provided. Some of the local officials interviewed felt that it is better to work out general solutions to problems of this type before submitting applications, rather than on an emergency basis after grants are awarded.

Several of the cities had developed procedures for interdepartmental review of federal assistance applications generated by city units. The process in New Orleans provides an example.

The Chief Administrative Officer of New Orleans has established a State-Federal Programs Review Committee, which is assisted by staff from the city's Federal Programs Coordination Office. The committee is composed of the Assistant Administrative Officer as chairman, the Operations Administrator, the Operating Budget Supervisor, the Federal Programs Coordinator, the Director-Secretary of the City Planning Commission, the Capital Budget Supervisor, the Director of Property Management, the Director of Finance, the Director of City Civil Service, and the affected department heads. This committee is supposed to review each application for federal programs filed through the Federal Programs Office of the CDA seven days prior to the application deadline.

Since its inception in January, 1971, the policy memorandum from the CAO's office setting up the review committee has been revised several times to meet criticisms about its organization. The membership has been expanded to include a wider range of decision-makers including the director of property management and the director of the city civil service. This enables the city to make a better assessment of the complementary budgeting necessary to develop a project. In several instances questions about the building space for a suggested activity and the number of staffing positions have been raised as a result of the attendance of these officials. The revisions have also reduced the number of days from twenty to seven for notification of the Federal Programs Office prior to the submission of applications. In the past, the backlog of applications made review of many proposals, such as the Model Cities reprogramming package, a somewhat cursory exercise. The reduction in the time to review the applications further complicates this problem.

According to the CDA director, there has been a considerable improvement in the utilization of this review since its inception. Several applications, including a communicable diseases application from the health department and an application from the quasi-independent parks commission which required matching city money, have been reviewed recently by this committee and have been rejected. One cited example of utilizing this review body involved a critique of a neighborhood playground application, in which a "comprehensive recreational survey" was challenged as another meaningless, obvious study, and the proposal was revised to shift some funds to site planning.

The committee was still at an experimental stage as the field visits were conducted, and most of the local officials involved were reserving final judgment on its utility.

Policy Planning and Coordination Efforts Regarding Federal Assistance Programs of Independent Agencies

Local government officials differed in their approach to planning and coordination with regard to federal programs operated by independent agencies. Some officials favored an "adaptive" approach to coordination with other agencies. Others assumed a responsibility for more active leadership in defining community strategies and seeking conformance to those strategies by other agencies, as well as by city government departments.

"Adaptive" coordination: Some of the local officials interviewed were not interested in trying to influence the federally-funded programs of independent agencies operating within their jurisdiction. Some of these officials basically approved the existing diffusion of service-delivery authority, usually on the grounds that the city was hard-pressed to maintain its own traditional activities, much less intrude in the spheres of other agencies. Other officials felt that the political costs of pressuring independent agencies for changes in their activity would outweigh any possible benefits. In either case, the officials viewed their authority and responsibility for influencing programs as limited to traditional areas of city service delivery. They preferred a "live and let live" relationship with other agencies operating federal programs in the local jurisdiction.

This more conservative view of local authority and responsibility did not preclude an interest in coordination. Although the officials interviewed used other terminology, emphasis tended to be on information sharing and voluntary adaptation among various units, with the local general government acting in the process as one agency among equals.

Possible benefits of this kind of coordination can be hypothesized; these might include voluntary reduction of program duplication or concentration of resources to attain mutual goals. The cities included in the study had not had enough experience with the selected mechanisms to indicate how beneficial adaptive coordination activities associated with them are likely to be. Some tentative indications from other sources suggest that adaptive coordination activity may be cost effective. For example, in response to a survey conducted by the National Service to Regional Councils, area-wide clearinghouse officials indicated that the savings traceable to A-95 reviews substantially outweighed the costs of the review process. Much of the "success" of the reviews was apparently due to the reduction of overlap in physical development programs proposed by adjacent local jurisdictions.*

Some local officials interviewed in the course of the present study felt that the various mechanisms would be useful mainly in providing advance notice of other agencies' development plans, so that city departments could anticipate new demands for city services and respond more efficiently. Other officials, however, were skeptical about whether the benefits of adaptive coordination efforts through the mechanisms would justify the costs in staff time to use them.

"Community leadership" coordination: Most of the chief executives of the cities included in the study were adopting an approach to federal program activity in their jurisdictions of the leadership coordination type. Two basic factors seemed to be leading to this result: (1) most of the cities were facing severe and growing problems and a corresponding demand for expanded services, and (2) locally generated revenues were not adequate to meet new service demands, or in some cases, even to maintain existing service levels. Caught in this squeeze, local officials were looking to other sources of revenue, and federal assistance programs were viewed as one of the major opportunities.

The major thrust with regard to federal assistance was grantsmanship: securing federal grants and operating projects through city departments. The impact of such funds is substantial. For example, one city estimated that about 20 percent of total local general governmental activity is supported through various federal programs,

*"Regionalism, A New Dimension in Local Government and Intergovernmental Relations", National Service to Regional Councils, Washington, D.C., page 17.

and that portion was expected to rise to 25 percent in the next fiscal year. The impact of the federal money on local policy is probably even greater than these figures suggest. Most local officials interviewed agreed that almost all local revenue was inflexibly committed to the maintenance of a minimum level of traditional basic services. Federal assistance programs provided most of the opportunity for policy initiatives to meet newly-identified problems with new program approaches.

Although grantsmanship seemed to be the major federal assistance emphasis, officials in some of the cities visited were indicating increasing interest in federal assistance resources under the control of other independent agencies. The concern was to use various means of influencing at the city's disposal to redirect resources for greater concentration on priority problems, as defined by the local government.

The definition of a broad leadership role in the community by the chief executives involved was based on assumptions about their responsibility within the political system. The political rationale and incentive for leadership coordination were clearer in Newark and New Orleans, which both have strong mayor government structures.

The present mayor of Newark is the first black incumbent of that office. His election represents a victory by a new coalition of blacks and white liberals over a long-entrenched political alignment which had been compromised in recent years by corruption in the highest offices. The new mayor views his election as a mandate for major change in the community, particularly in regard to the disadvantaged citizens who are most dependent on public services, and who were a major factor in his election. He has explicitly defined his leadership role as including a concern for all services provided within the community, and has stated his intention to use the powers and influence of his office to concentrate all available resources on the city's problems as his administration defines them.

The election of the present mayor of New Orleans also represented a victory by a new political alignment dependent on the growing political power of the city's minority groups. An important element of the new administration's approach has been to increase the impact of federal funds on the city's problems. The mayor has stated his concern to be informed about all federal funding within the jurisdiction, and to have an opportunity to influence the use of such funds.

For both mayors, facing deficits in local revenues which threaten even the maintenance of basic services, increased influence on federal assistance represents one of the few opportunities to produce visible benefits for their constituencies. Moreover, budget restrictions and civil service regulations severely limit the

opportunities to bring new people into the local government structure. Staff positions associated with federally-funded projects are a major source of staffing flexibility for bringing the chief executive's supporters, and particularly minority group representatives, into active participation in local government.

For these reasons, the two mayors, and to various degrees many other local officials in the various cities, were interested in greater leadership coordination of a wide range of federal assistance programs.

The mechanisms included in the study were presenting new openings for local chief executives interested in a broad community leadership role. Using these openings presented two closely-related management problems for the local administration. First, there was a developing need for broader policy planning to define goals and preferred activities encompassing the spheres of other agencies as well as internal city departments. Frequently, the policy planning involved translating the local chief executive's general concern (for example, to "do something about improving health service delivery in the community") into specific goals and courses of action. Second, supervising the activities of local government units and individuals representing local government policy positions through the various mechanisms was an increasing problem, as the number of city staff and offices involved in such activities expanded.

- Developing "community" strategies: Policy planners associated with Model Cities, CAMPS, LEA, and other city units were frequently developing strategies for policy areas in which the local governments involved had not previously assumed responsibility or conducted program activity. This required the development of new expertise and of new working relationships with other agencies. To deal effectively with agencies which had already accumulated years of experience in the various functional areas, city planners had to become familiar with the problems involved, know the existing programs and possible alternative approaches, and define city goals and workable program approaches. Finally, city staff had to develop tactics for implementing their plans in cooperation with agencies which frequently resented city involvement in their traditional spheres. Such efforts were proving to be very expensive in terms of skilled staff time.

The various local governments were just beginning to use the mechanisms as means to exert policy influence within the community. The few clear examples to date of local government policy planning in relation to the mechanisms varied considerably in their sophistication.

In some cases, city units were using the mechanisms to intervene in the program planning of other agencies on ad hoc issues, often in the interests of disadvantaged groups within the community. For example, Model Cities agencies had used sign-off negotiations to secure more jobs for Model Neighborhood residents on the staff of proposed projects, or to direct more services into the Model Neighborhoods. Such interventions, although beneficial in the view of local officials, did not generally involve a basic re-examination of community strategies for service delivery.

In other cases, the goals of city involvement were more complex, and suggestive of the special overview the local general government could contribute to multi-agency planning. One city, for example, is trying to shift 314(b) planning from what city officials view as a narrow, health professionals' focus. "They spend most of their time talking about things like combined laundry services for the hospitals. We're trying to get more thinking about how we can make some basic improvements in delivering health services in the center city."

A multi-agency controversy over LEA priorities in New Orleans suggests the kind of role local governments could undertake. The independently-elected criminal sheriff of Orleans Parish placed top priority on construction of a new facility to replace the Parish jail -- generally recognized as "one of the most medieval institutions in the country." (An inmate revolt at the jail recently received national publicity.) LEA planners in the city government recognized the deplorable conditions in the facility, but argued that the problem should be viewed in a broader context. The city's analysis suggested that about 40 percent of the inmates were held for narcotics-associated violations. Perhaps another 40 percent of the inmate population could be traced to the overloaded court system. On the basis of these figures, the city took the position that the resources should be devoted to dealing with root causes rather than a large expenditure for incarceration facilities.

The sheriff was most concerned with his own area of responsibility, which he viewed justifiably as a crisis situation. City government staff were able to take a broader view of the problem, across the jurisdictional lines of various agencies, and arrive at different ideas about solutions.

- Chief executives supervision of his administration's involvement in the mechanisms: Policy planning is clearly only part of the problem in community leadership coordination. The local government's goals must be implemented through the efforts of various representatives dealing with other agencies in the community. Supervision of these efforts with regard to the mechanisms included in the study was creating a new kind of management problem for the local chief executive.

Local chief executive control of federal funding activities seems to have been unstructured until fairly recently in most of the cities. The chief executive could stay on top of the grantsmanship process through occasional informal sessions with one or a few officials responsible for the effort.

Expanding local government participation in the various mechanisms for federal program planning and coordination seems to have gradually and quietly swamped the unstructured approach to chief executive control. Although formal lines of supervision exist, effective supervision and coordination is sometimes not taking place. Many of the problems seem to lie in organizing the flow of information about mechanism involvement, either horizontally between departments or vertically between working staff and supervisors or official representatives.

In some cases, local government individuals or departments are participating in mechanisms, but without involving other administration units which might be concerned. Frequently, grant applications for local government review are not being circulated for comment by administration officials who might be concerned with the functional areas involved. The OEO checkpoint procedure, if functioning at all, was almost entirely a perfunctory sign-off which never went beyond the chief executive's office. When informed of the procedure, various officials expressed an interest in reviewing the applications.

Similarly, "city representatives" in certain planning bodies were sometimes working in isolation from the rest of the administration. No one in the city manager's office in one city knew that Model Cities planners had been working for some time with the school system's Title I planning process, for example. More frequently, various officials were vaguely aware of mechanism participation by other units, but had little time or opportunity to be informed about the issues at stake.

The need for communication is becoming clear in situations where more than one city unit is involved in a functional area, or dealing with the same mechanism. One city was embarrassed by having the police department and the Model Cities Agency independently develop and submit similar applications for an LEA discretionary grant. The applications were returned with a request that the city clarify who really wanted to do what. The opportunities for this type of confusion are clearly expanding. LEA, CAMPS, and the various Model Cities functional planners are increasing the number of local government representatives involved in the same functional areas.

Theoretically, the various planning councils (LEA, CAMPS, 314[b]) should be helpful in catching problems like the dual application mentioned above. However, dealing with such councils presents other coordination problems for the local government. One LEA episode illustrates the difficulty of having various organizational levels of the city administration dealing with the same mechanism. The chief executive of one local government became interested in methadone drug treatment, and asked the police department to develop an LEA proposal for a program to be operated by the city. In the course of developing the proposal, the planners decided to delegate the project to a local independent agency. The assistant city manager, who is the city's representative on the areawide LEA council, knew the police department had been involved. He voted for the project without question, and the council approved it. The chief executive presumably learned the grant had gone to a private agency, rather than to a city department as he had wished, when he read the grant announcement in the newspaper.

On paper, or more specifically, according to the organization charts, none of these problems should occur. Nominal lines of authority should achieve coordination through a common structure of supervision. What seems to be happening is that key officials, and particularly the chief executive, are becoming overloaded with supervisory duties. In addition to their general administration, ceremonial, and political functions, some of the chief executives had Model Cities, CAMPS, LEA, and other special units reporting directly and separately to them.

In practice, this puts the burden not only of guiding the individual units, but also of coordinating their efforts almost solely on the chief executive.

Officials in each of the cities had been confronted with supervision and coordination problems, and were making attempts to deal with them. Both Newark and New Orleans, for example, were working to centralize planning and federal assistance activities in single departments. Newark provides an example of extensive administrative reorganization for central control of planning and coordination.

Planning and coordination had been declared by ordinance a responsibility of the mayor and the authority for such activities delegated to Community Development Administration. The ordinance gives the CDA responsibility for the following functions: preparation of plans for the human resource and physical development of the city; the maintenance of relations with county, state and federal government, as well as with other governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations operating programs within the city; the collection and analysis of information dealing with the social, physical and economic conditions in the city; and the evaluation of operating programs and projects. It has also taken over the duties and staff of the city planning department and is responsible for the operation of Newark's Model Cities program.

At the time of the field visits, it was difficult to assess how well the Newark centralization approach is likely to work. Dislocation associated with the change of local administration and the heavy work load associated with the development and operation of the Model Cities program, seemed to be limiting the CDA's overall coordinating role, particularly in regard to the activities of other city departments.

Comprehensive Policy Planning Encompassing Both Local Revenue-Supported Activities and Federal Assistance to the Community

The preceding sections describe three types of coordination by the local chief executive, including both local revenue allocation and management of federal assistance-related activities. Prior to the field visits, project staff hypothesized that some cities might be attempting to combine these activities in a systematic and comprehensive planning process.

Such a process would be an expansion of the local budget procedures to include a broad definition of local government goals, and a systematic examination of the various programs, both locally and federally financed, which might contribute to achieving the goals. The basic objective of the process would be to identify changes which would reduce overlap, and focus programs more effectively on priority local goals. The resulting comprehensive plan would be the basis of the local budget, and would guide

local government departments in selecting and preparing applications for federal programs. It would also provide direction for local government representatives in their attempts to influence multi-agency bodies and various independent agencies in regard to federal assistance outside direct local government control.

In fact, some local officials were speculating about such a process, but none of the local governments included in the study were very close to conducting planning of this type. Two basic obstacles were evident. First, as the previous sections indicate, most of the cities were just beginning to expand their policy planning capacity. Even with regard to the relatively limited problem of traditional local government services, the definition of goals and re-examination of activities in the light of those goals was proving difficult. The local governments were not ready to expand the planning viewpoint to a broader range of goals and resources.

A second obstacle is the nature of the federal funding process. From the local viewpoint, federal program funds are too unpredictable in amount, too uncertain in timing, and too restrictive in their use to justify a comprehensive planning effort. For example, to integrate planning for federal assistance programs into the local budget planning process, local officials would need to know fairly early in the planning process how much money would be available to the locality in the various federal programs during the following year. At present, federal funding agencies are not capable of providing such information. (HUD's Community Development Office is initiating "annual arrangements" with cities in regard to its own programs, with the object of providing better information on expected funding to aid local planning.)

Program inflexibility also reduces the initiative for comprehensive local planning. There is little point in local officials' defining goals and priorities if the choice presented to them is basically "take it or leave it" with regard to narrowly-defined program categories in which funds happen to be available. Budget officials generally viewed funds associated with federal programs as resources which were for practical purposes altogether unrelated to the "real" money included in the local budget.

In spite of the present obstacles, some local officials were talking about a parallel development of local planning capacity and, hopefully, reform in the federal funding process which would make more comprehensive planning possible.

For example, some key New Orleans officials see the city expanding its policy planning capacity incrementally over the next few years. The central feature of the developing structure would be the division between planning activities, centered in the expanded CDA, and operations under the chief administrative officer. Planning staff in the CDA would develop the basic structure of objectives to guide both local revenue allocation and the city's influence on federal assistance resources. The functional planners in the expanded CDA would work directly with city line department staff and with officials from independent agencies in developing objectives. The budget office would remain in the chief administrator's office, and continue to perform what is essentially an accounting rather than planning function.

Some of the governmental re-structuring required to implement this model has already taken place. In addition to the Model Cities program, the Youth Opportunity coordinator, a health planner, and CAMPS staff report formally to the CDA director, as does the Federal Programs Coordination Office, which was recently shifted from the Chief Administrative Officer's control. The CAP agency, though independent, has close ties to the city government and its director works through the CDA. Formally, the LEA staff report to the Chief Administrative Officer, but in practice, they work directly with the mayor.

Further re-structuring would shift financial management activities out of the CDA into the operational department. Other planning activities would either be absorbed in the expanded CDA or brought into closer relationship with it. This approach is a longer-range goal, rather than an established fact. In New Orleans, as in the other cities, there are different views among city officials, and the approach described here is not unanimously accepted. However, the mayor supports its key points, and some of the preliminary steps have already been taken.

Summary

Most of the chief executives of the cities included in the present study were interested in some approximation of leadership coordination roles in their communities. Their attempts to use the various mechanisms towards this end were at a formative stage, but already problems in policy planning and internal coordination were evident. Local officials were acting energetically to deal with these problems in some cases. Although the chief executives involved clearly viewed such efforts to be in the best interests of their communities, it was too early to assess the benefits to be derived from the coordination activity.

APPENDIX:
**Federal Decentralization Policies
and Local Planning and Coordination**

APPENDIX: FEDERAL DECENTRALIZATION POLICIES AND LOCAL PLANNING AND COORDINATION

Federal assistance to states and localities has increased exponentially over the past two decades, from about \$2 billion in 1950 to an estimated \$30.3 billion in Fiscal Year 1971. Although such assistance is generally recognized to have brought substantial benefits, there has been increasing concern about coordination of the numerous assistance programs at the state and local level.

This concern is reflected in planning requirements associated with many federal programs, and in legislation directed specifically at supporting coordination efforts. For example, Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 provided for review of applications for many physical development programs by areawide planning bodies. The Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 expanded the review process to include state and local governments, and provided for the review of social and economic development projects as well as physical development assistance.

The present federal administration has placed special emphasis on the role of state and local general government in coordinating federal assistance, as part of the general policy of "responsible decentralization." The administration has proposed a number of changes under this general heading which, collectively, are intended to substantially restructure the delivery of federal assistance. Some review of the problem definition, the goals and the approaches of the current federal decentralization effort is useful in clarifying the context of the present study.

The Problem

Most federal assistance has been provided in the form of "categorical" grants -- special purpose grants for programs in federally-defined categories of need. Often these grants have been made to existing or newly-created special purpose agencies at the state or local level. The resulting system has created a set of interlocking problems which can be summarized under three headings:

Lack of coordination: An analysis by the Federal Office of Management and Budget (OMB) cites "Overlapping programs at the state and local level," often operated by "new and frequently competitive state and local governmental institutions."*

*The quotations cited in this section might have been excerpted from any of a number of administration policy statements or documents. These citations are from Special Analyses, Budget of the United States, FY 1971, Section D; and from the President's Special Message to Congress on Revenue Sharing, February 4, 1971.

Reduced effectiveness due to program rigidity: State and local governments must accept federally-defined priorities implied in the legislation and guidelines associated with categorical grants. The administration has defined this problem as follows: "The major difficulty is that states and localities are not free to spend these funds on their own needs as they see them . . . Because the categories for which the money is spent are often extremely narrow, it is difficult to adjust spending to local requirements. And because these categories are extremely resistant to change, large sums are often spent on outdated projects. Pressing needs are often ignored, therefore, while countless dollars are wasted on low priority expenditures." This problem has been compounded by the administrative burden of dealing with the complexities of the grant system, and preparing applications which meet the complicated requirements.

Limited leadership role for state and local chief executives: OMB cites the "decline in the authority and responsibility of chief executives, as grants have become tied to functional bureaucracies." This decline is traceable to the program rigidity and the creation of "new and frequently competitive" governmental institutions described above.

A substantial portion of the federal assistance to any locality "by-passes" local general government completely, and is administered by state departments or various local special-purpose bodies (school districts, hospitals, housing authorities, and many others). Few chief executives are likely to have complete knowledge of how much assistance affects their jurisdictions, or how. The problem is compounded by overlapping general governmental jurisdictions. For example, a county may be operating programs within a city's jurisdiction with little or no consultation with the mayor. Much of the assistance which does go directly to the local general government is subject to the program rigidities discussed above. In either case, whether the assistance by-passes local government or is provided in narrow categories, the local chief executive has at best limited influence on how the assistance resources are used.

The Goals

Strengthening leadership at the state and local levels seems to be a goal in its own right for the present administration, reflecting basic assumptions about the advantages of decentralized authority. Increasing the leadership role of states and localities, and particularly the executive leadership roles of governors, mayors, and other chief officials, has two broad objectives with regard to federal assistance:

Innovation for more effective programs: States and localities are viewed as potential "laboratories for modern government."

Increased state and local influence over federal resources is expected to result ultimately in more effective use of those resources. "Because (state and local) officials live day in and day out with the results of their decisions, they can often measure costs and benefits with greater sensitivity and weight them against one another with greater precision. Because they are closer to the people they serve, state and local officials will often have a fuller sense of appreciation of local perspectives and values." The states and localities, if granted greater influence, are expected to be agents for beneficial change.

Coordination: Various legislative proposals envision a role for general government, and particularly for the mayors and managers of larger cities, in coordinating the federally-funded activities of independent agencies. For example, mayors or city managers would play a leading role in local-level, multi-agency planning for most federal assistance in manpower training and law enforcement.

In general, then, the federal administration's expectation for increased state and local leadership in federal assistance is that it will produce more effective, better coordinated programs.

Approach to Decentralization

The various legislative proposals to support state and local leadership have two main thrusts: (1) to increase the authority of state and local officials -- particularly governors and mayors -- over federal programs, and (2) to support an expanded policy planning and management capacity in state and local general governments.

Increasing state and local government authority over federal programs: The administration has proposed a series of measures which would make federal programs more flexible for state and local planning, and give governors and mayors more authority over what an OMB analysis refers to as "nearly autonomous functional bureaucracies at each level of government." The legislative proposals, which have been widely discussed, include "general" revenue sharing and the various "special" revenue sharing measures.* The latter proposals are essentially consolidations of existing categorical grants into broader categories ("Urban Development," "Transportation," etc.) which permit more flexibility for state- and local-level planning. In addition, the various federal departments are working towards a number of non-legislative changes to consolidate and simplify existing grants.

*Urban Community Development, Rural Community Development, Education, Manpower Training, Law Enforcement, and Transportation.

Collectively, the various proposals represent an attempt to shift authority over resources, between governmental levels, and in some cases, towards a reshuffling of authority within governmental levels. General revenue sharing, as both its proponents and opponents agree, would mean more authority over the given funds for states and localities, and correspondingly less authority for Congress and the federal departments. The grant consolidation efforts would have a similar effect, although authority to allocate funds among the major functional areas would remain in Washington.

Some of the proposals would also increase the authority of general governments, and particularly of mayors and managers of larger cities, in the allocation of funds and program management. In effect, this would represent a shift of authority to the chief executives from the independent agencies and functional bureaucracies operating at the same governmental level. For example, special revenue sharing in manpower training would establish local general government as the "prime sponsor" of manpower services. This arrangement is intended to expand greatly the influence of general governments over other agencies involved in manpower training, such as public employment offices, local education institutions, and welfare agencies.

Supporting policy planning and management: In conjunction with the revenue sharing measures, the administration has proposed an expansion of the comprehensive planning assistance program administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (the "701" planning program). The program would be retitled the "Community Development Planning and Management Program". Its general purpose would be "to help states and localities develop the capacity to manage their own resources effectively, as well as those made available under Federal programs." Proposed funding for the "new" program is \$100 million in Fiscal Year 1972, double the 1971 funding for HUD's 701 program.

The federal definition of planning and management capacity -- what it is, and what it is expected to accomplish -- was somewhat unclear as field work on the present project began. HUD administrators of the 701 program express interest in shifting from the original fairly narrow emphasis on physical development planning to more general support of "executive management", and recent program guidelines reflect this thrust in very general terms. Some states are reportedly beginning to use 701 funds in this way, building up the planning capacity of governor's offices for more effective control and coordination of the various state departments and agencies. There has been no experience as yet with HUD grants direct to localities under the new guidelines.