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ABSTRACT

This survey paper will deal with the form and possible explanations of Colombia's urban diversity; the conscious effort to encourage it which is taking place both in the national government and in the regions and cities themselves; with the international interest in the phenomenon and the supportive efforts which follow; and with the relatively sophisticated (fully in form and substantially in practice) structure of planning and administration for urban and regional development. An attempt is also made to evaluate the contribution which international agencies have made, or can make, in assisting Colombia to meet its problems of urban growth and the urban environment. Sections of this paper discuss: (1) Toward a True Urban Majority; (2) The Depth of Regionalism; (3) The Structure of Government--and the Cities; (4) Colombia's Urban Array; (5) The Action Agencies for Urban and Regional Development; (6) The Depth of Urban Skills; (7) The National Plan for Regional Development; (8) The Flavor of Cities; (9) Metropolitan Government--And Bogata; (10) Planning for Bogota; (11) The Housing Conditions of the Urban Poor; (12) Toward an Urban Reform Law; (13) International Assistance; (14) A Clash of Strategies. [For related documents in this series, see UD 013 731-732 and 013 734-744 for surveys of specific countries. For special studies analyzing urbanization in The Third World, see UD 013 745-UD 013 748.] (Authors/SB)

An International
Urbanization Survey Report
to the Ford Foundation

Urbanization in Colombia

This working paper was prepared as supportive material for an International Survey of Urbanization in the developing countries, which was organized by the Ford Foundation late in 1970 and was completed late in 1972. The purpose of the Survey was to provide findings and recommendations to guide the Foundation in making informed judgments on its future participation in programs related to the urban condition in the less-developed countries.

The Survey was directed neither to perform nor to commission original research. Its work was to be reportorial, analytic, and indicative of program choices. To serve these objectives, the Survey was essentially a field operation in which the staff travelled widely in the countries where the Foundation maintains field offices and drew not only upon its own observations but upon the experience of Foundation personnel assigned to the developing countries. The staff's own field notes on phases of urbanization in specific countries were expanded into working papers both to record observations and to clarify the deductive processes and the analyses of data which were to form a demonstrable basis for the Survey's conclusions. Additional working papers were provided by Foundation personnel with a depth of field knowledge, and by consultants expert either in specific countries or in topics of special interest.

The Survey working papers and special studies were originally intended only for internal use. It became evident, however, that the body of material had values which argued for wider exposure. Accordingly, the Foundation is publishing the papers for those with special country or topical interests and for those interested in the material as a whole.

The working papers carry disclaimers appropriate to the circumstances of their preparation and to the limitations of their original purpose. The reader should not expect to find in them either the product of original research or a comprehensive treatment of the processes of urbanization in the particular country. Rather, they are occasional papers whose unity derives from their use as exemplary and illustrative material for the Survey.

But unity of form and substance is not the measure of their value. Each report and special study is an essay on some aspect of urbanization in the developing countries. In most instances, they are what a good essay should be – unmistakably personalized and therefore reflective of the insights and the convictions of informed authors.

The International Urbanization Survey

John P. Robin, Director
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Urbanization in Colombia

by

John P. Robin and Frederick C. Terzo

Consultant: Jaime Valenzuela

International Urbanization Survey

The Ford Foundation

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

URBANIZATION IN COLOMBIA

INTERNATIONAL URBANIZATION SURVEY

estimates must be used instead of actual counts. There are discrepancies both in the estimates and in the extent of the urban areas on which the estimates are based. We will, as does the United States Agency for International Development, use the figures of the Departamento Nacional de Planeacion.* Using those figures, we find that Bogota, the nation's capital, had an estimated 1970 population of 2,540,000 which is expected to reach 3,605,000 in 1975. Metropolitan Medellin, the second city, is given 1,400,000 inhabitants in 1970, and projected to 1,946,000 in 1975. Cali should be at the one million mark at present, and grow to 1,392,000 in the next four years. Barranquilla, at the mouth of the Magdalena river, has an estimated population of 690,000, and together with the other coastal towns of Cartagena and Santa Marta, forms an urban skein of more than one million population on the Caribbean sea.

Admittedly, Colombia is a larger and more populous country than most in South America; with twenty-one million people, it ranks third in population on the continent, second only to Brazil and Argentina. But Argentina, with only three million more people, shows a classic case of urban primacy with its enormous concentration at Buenos Aires.

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* As given in the Plan de Desarrollo Economica y Social 1970-1973. Bogota, Departamento Nacional de Planeacion, Unidad de Desarrollo Regional y Urbano. December 1970. Tomo I: Capitulos del I al VIII.

The survey paper will deal, therefore, with the form and possible explanations of Colombia's urban diversity; the conscious effort to encourage it which is taking place both in the national government and in the regions and cities themselves; with the international interest in the phenomenon and the supportive efforts which follow; and with the relatively sophisticated (fully in form and substantially in practice) structure of planning and administration for urban and regional development.

We will also state the basis data which the survey is accumulating for the countries which it will cover and we will--in accordance with our mission--attempt to evaluate the contribution which international agencies have made, or can make, in assisting Colombia to meet its problems of urban growth and the urban environment.

TOWARD A TRUE URBAN MAJORITY

Before describing the country's distinctive urban pattern, it would be useful to inquire into the total urban-rural ratio in the national population, to look back on trends and summarize projections, and to put forward the thesis that by 1980, a majority of Colombians will live in cities of more than 50,000.

As usual, there are conflicting definitions of "urban" and "rural." The 1964 census reported that 53 per

cent of the population had become urban, as against only 29 per cent when the previous census was taken in 1938. But the census view of "urban" is any place which is the headquarters of a municipio regardless of its size, which means that the urban count covers settlements as few as 1,500 people. Dr. Hernan Mendoza Hoyos, former chief of the Population Division of ASCOFAME* uses a 50,000 population figure as an urban demarcation in his 1968 paper on the general characteristics of Colombia's population.** We would agree with this authority and accept his viewpoint as appropriate in the context of the nation.

A large percentage of total urban growth is taking place in the country's four largest cities--Bogota, Medellin, Cali, and Barranquilla. These cities have been growing so fast that they almost double their size in every decade. The Bogota rate of annual increase has been 7 per cent; Medellin's has been 6.5 per cent, and Cali's growth rate has been a little more than 7 per cent. Barranquilla lags somewhat at 4.5 per cent.

But significantly, the cities of more than 100,000 and less than 500,000 are growing at an even faster

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* Asociacion Colombiana de Facultades de Medicina, Division de Estudios de Poblacion Estudios Socio-Demograficos.

** Hernan Mendoza Hoyos. "Caracteristicas Generales de la Poblacion Colombiana," in Urbanizacion y Marginalidad, ed. by Ramiro Cardona Gutierrez, Bogota, ASCOFAME, 1968.

aggregate race than the "big four." this group, which contained about one-quarter of the true urban population in 1964, will hold about one-third of it in 1975. Cities which are now in the 50,000 to 100,000 population group will continue to grow, but their aggregate share of the total urban population will decline.*

These projections emphasize that the regional distribution of urban population in Colombia is not about to shift to dominance by Bogota or any other center, huge as the leading cities may someday grow.

The regional character of Colombia is historic and accepted, and (with or without the stimulus of official regional planning) both history and geography have determined that the country will have many urban growth poles on which to base its national economic and social development.

THE DEPTH OF REGIONALISM

Colombia is divided into twenty-two departamentos (states), the Distrito Especial and a number of administered territories. The authoritative atlas** also divides it

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* Departamento Nacional de Planeacion. op. cit.

** Instituto Geografico "Augustin Codazzi". Atlas de Colombia (2nd edition). Bogota, Republic of Colombia, 1969.

into eight "ethnic" regions, and classifies their inhabitants as Costeno, Caucano, Narinense, Tolimense, Atioquena, Cundi-Boyacense, Santandereano, and Llanero.

There is a historic strength to regionalism. The country divided on the issue early in its history, much as did the United States, with advocates of strong central government adhering to one party, the Conservatives, and those favoring local automony forming the Liberal party (both of which exist to this day). Simon Bolivar has been compared not only to George Washington but to Alexander Hamilton; his associate, subsequent enemy and successor, Francisco de Paula Santander, to Thomas Jefferson. A Conservative stronghold, so it is said, will have a statue of Bolivar in its main square; a Liberal stronghold will erect a monument to Santander.* (Bogota has fine squares named for each hero, as befits the national capital). A newly set bronze placque on a splendid new building in the city of Ibague, capital of the departamento of Tolima, commemorates the chartering of the "sovereign" state of Tolima in language which would not be unfamiliar in Columbia, South Carolina. In actual fact, strong central government exists, as in the United States, and again, in actual fact, it exists although

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* Pat M. Holt. Colombia Today - and Tomorrow. New York, Praeger, 1964. p. 27.

the Liberals, who historically championed "states' rights," have come to be accepted as the natural majority party in the country.

Despite the ultimate centralization of authority, under which the President appoints the governors of the departamentos and the governors appoint the mayors of the cities, the tradition of regional strength and local pride is very strong. It fosters the efforts of the departamentos and the cities to maintain their individuality, which is marked, and to promote their own development.

Urbanization in Colombia has been a function of both time and space. History and geography have each played their part in determining urban locations, with an added element of accident if human traits of character can be so classified. As to time, it is of the present; Bogota itself had no more than 350,000 people in 1940. It is also of the past, in that many of Colombia's present growth points were first marked as place names in the sixteenth century. Santa Marta dates to 1525; Cartagena to 1533; Bogota to August 6, 1538. Cali, Popayan, Neiva were all founded before 1600. But since World War II, when the current shift to urban concentration began, many Colombian cities are adding more population in one decade than they did in their total growth of three preceding centuries centuries.

The spatial factor is the extent of Colombia's

440,000 square miles: divided by three great ranges of the Andes; containing the rich valley of the Magdalena and the still richer valley of its major tributary, the Cauca; the Caribbean coast with its ancient ease of access to the West Indies and the mother country and its present immediacy to the United States; the tropical plains, the llanos which drain to the Amazon; and the rain forests both on the Pacific and the Putamayo. Colombia has also the slopes and the soils and the skills which produce the finest coffee in the world, just as French vineyards produce the finest wines. This rhapsodic language is on point, although it reads as though it were the product of the national tourist agency. The point is that it explains the diversity (and in diversity, the strength) of the country's pattern of urban settlement.

One may wish in this survey report to write an urban geography of Colombia but neither time nor knowledge will permit it. We will deal with certain major centers in some detail. But there is a pattern which does emerge from the maps and the statistics which is clear and can be summarized. It looks like this:

1. Bogota, the capital, 750 miles inland, 8,000 feet in altitude, relatively isolated on its fertile upland savanna. Governmentally, it is a Distrito Especial surrounded by the departamento of Cundinamarca.

2. Metropolitan Medellin, in the very distinctive departamento of Antioquia. It is also relatively isolated from other major urban centers. Its productivity is very high. With not much more than half of Bogota's population, it very nearly equals it in value added by manufacture and in the number of its industrial workers.
3. Cali, in the departamento of Valle del Cauca, which has risen from an agro-industrial base into a center of many enterprises, including manufacturing. Cali has a wide area of urban influence, including its port city of Buenaventura, and other cities of the Cauca valley, such as Palmira.
4. The cities of the Caribbean coast: Barranquilla, Cartagena, and Santa Marta. Each is the capital of a departamento: respectively, Atlantico, Bolivar, and Magdalena.
5. The "coffee cluster" of Manizales, Armenia, Pereira. Their combined population is 735,000 and they fall in the contiguous departamentos of Caldas, Risaralda, and Quindio.
6. Ibague, the capital of the departamento of Tolima, which is an agro-industrial city whose economy is based on rice, but which is now hoping to diversify its economic base by promoting itself as an

alternate location to Bogota. It is the closest sizable city to the capital, but it is distant enough to maintain its own identity.

7. Bucaramanga, the capital of the departamento of Santander, which is also strongly differentiated region but without the economic good fortune that has come to Antioquia. Bucaramanga has 314,000 people.

There are also oil towns, frontier towns, steel towns, traditional regional capitals, cattle towns, and the gateway points to the llanos and the Amazonas. We will not catalogue them here, but will discuss them, together with the major centers, in the section of the report treating regional planning and regional development.

THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT--AND THE CITIES

Formally, the Government of Colombia is completely centralized. Dix in his book Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change writes:

> It is ultimately on the President and the central government that all the organs of administration throughout the country depend. The administrative tradition inherited from the colony is thereby largely maintained. Local government, which Tocqueville considered a bulwark of democracy in North America, is correspondingly weak. As it is, the government of the Colomiban municipio is responsible in the first instance to the governor who appoints its mayor, rather than to the community. Popular

> participation in the political process is to that extent frustrated and the distance between government and people is widened. The ancient Spanish tradition of the municipality lingers mainly as a memory.*

He is right in that the executives of the departamentos and the municipios are in a chain of appointment, and therefore command, which leads to Bogota and to the President. We believe he is in error in assuming that this destroys regional and municipal loyalties, which we found very strong, or that it eliminates the desire of the governors and the mayors of the cities to respond to what they believe is a public demand for improvement and visible progress within their jurisdictions.

We also found that Colombian cities are highly diversified in their character and traditions, and determined to maintain their diversity. Their leadership shows a high degree of opportunism in searching for development opportunities. Financing does largely flow from the central government (as must approval of external assistance) and Colombian officials are as adept as their most able American colleagues in using chances to obtain special funds when they have a "happening" that warrants it.

Bogota's mayor, for instance, used the occasion of the Pope's visit to the city in 1968 as the basis for a

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* Robert H. Dix. Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1967.

major public improvement program in the Distrito Especial which he directed. The relatively small city of Ibaque found 200,000,000 pesos (ten million dollars) to prepare itself as host to the National Games in 1970, using the money for permanent improvements in the city's public environment and services. Cali is taking similar advantage of its selection as the site of the Pan-American games in 1971. The departamento of Atlantico, and its capital city of Barranquilla, are operating a lottery to raise funds to build a bridge across the Magdalena river and accumulating the proceeds of present ferry tolls for the same purpose.

The press, which is relatively free in Colombia, exerts pressure for community improvements, and the municipal councils continue to be elected by the communities where they serve. Mayors and governors are not necessarily residents of the departamentos and cities which they are appointed to direct. But they are not a professional bureaucracy, subject to a national service, as are provincial commissioners in the civil service systems of Asian and African countries which are still following colonial practice.

The Distrito Especial is indeed something special. It is the government of metropolitan Bogota, excised from the state of Cundinamarca in 1954. Seventeen years later, the director of the Departamento Administrivo de Planifica-

cion Distrital believes that metropolitan Bogota has already outgrown the generous boundaries which were set at the time of the ordinance which created the special district.

Medellin and Cali have large urban spill-overs. Problems of municipal jurisdiction have arisen as major development occurs in adjacent municipios which are not yet annexed to the principal city, and which may, as in the case of Cali's industrial neighbor, Yumbo, resist such annexation because of a high and favorable ratio of taxable values to population.

All of this relates to the complex nature of Colombia's institutions dealing with urban problems. The straight-line pattern of government is very simple and direct. The actual mechanisms which have developed are ad hoc and marvelously varied.

COLUMBIA'S URBAN ARRAY--IS ITS CUP RUNNING OVER?

If institution building is the necessary precursor of development, as the traditional wisdom has it, then Columbia is a fully developed country in its recognition of its urban problems and in its desire to understand and overcome them. It has a very full kit of agencies dealing with urban planning and development, and the inventory that will follow shows few vacant places in the country's

table of organization for urban progress.

Performance is of course another matter, but we are convinced that the interest of the Government of Colombia in its cities is not mere formalism.

In our own moment of formality, we classify the institutions dealing with urban and regional development into four groups:

1. Those that gather data;
2. Those that do research in urban and regional issues, and train others to do so;
3. Those that make policy; and
4. Those that implement programs.

Many agencies combine all or some of these functions, as for instance, a national ministry does when it has a research branch in its own structure, or a planning agency when its staff gathers data which is necessary to its work.

But in order to make a proper listing we will use the categories suggested and repeat the agencies in the appropriate classifications when they are multi-functional.

The Data Gatherers

The Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica, known as DANE.

The Instituto Geografico Agustin Codazzi, which is attached to the Ministerio de Hacienda y Credito Publico.

Research staffs in the following ministries: Gobierno;

Hacienda y Credito Publica; Salud; Trabajo y Seguridad Social; Desarrollo Economica; Educacion; Obras Publicas.

Research staff in the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Planeacion.

Research staffs in the following organismos descentralizados: Corporaciones Autonomas; Cajo de Credito Agrario, Industrial y Minero; Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje, known as SENA; known as ICT; Instituto de Investigaciones Tecnologicas; Instituto de Fomento Industrial; Instituto Colombiano de Construciones Escolares, known as ICCE; Instituto Nacional del Trasporte, known as INTRA.

The planning offices at departmental and municipal levels.

The Asociacion Colombiana de Facultades de Medicina, known as ASCOFAME, through its Division de Estudios de Poblacion.

The various schools of architecture, engineering, and the social sciences in the universities.

Various research centers which will be named and discussed subsequently.

Several of the most important of these institutions, rated by their primary mission of securing and publishing data necessary to urban development, will be described briefly.

DANE, the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de

Estadisticas, is the most important of the data assembling mechanisms in Colombia. It has the responsibility of conducting the periodic census of population, of building and housing, of educational facilities and achievements, and of agriculture. Annual publications include a general statistical yearbook for Colombia, a foreign trade yearbook, a Bogota yearbook, and an industrial guide. Its Boletin Mensual de Estadistica includes statistical data and the results of surveys and research carried out at DANE. It has been published continuously for several decades. DANE's recent work of special interest for urban studies is its Encuesta Nacional de Hogares, now being published, which is a survey of 10,000 households in several cities, including information on demography, living standards, employment, economic opportunity, education, health and housing. DANE was reorganized and improved in 1968. It will carry out the 1972 census, and it is hoped that its increased efficiency will result in more rapid publication than was the case after the 1964 census.

The Instituto Geografico Agustin Codazzi gathers geographic information and directs the country's mapping programs. As its publication of the 1969 Atlas de Colombia shows, the quality of its maps is excellent.

ASCOFAME's Division de Estudios de Poblacion may be rated as among the best sources of population data in Colombia, and its publications have wide circulation and

command scholarly respect.

One of the research centers that has also been active in collecting basic data is the Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Economico at the University of Los Andes, known as CEDE. Its surveys on family income and family spending, and on employment, have provided illuminating information for all workers in urban research. It and other research agencies will be the subject of the next section of this survey paper.

The Researchers.

The most significant urban research in Colombia is being carried out at CEDE, ASCOFAME (already noted under data gatherers), the Centro de Planificacion y Urbanismo of the Universidad de Los Andes, known as CPU, and the Centro de Investigaciones para el Desarrollo at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, known as CID. CID and CEDE also prepare development plans for municipalities and thus qualify as planning organizations in addition to their primary function as research centers.

ASCOFAME has concentrated that portion of its research work which has distinct urban application in studies of urban population trends and internal migration. During the period from 1966 through 1968 CID carried out a comprehensive study of Bogota, a pioneering study that has been influential in defining the work program of the

official planning office for the Distrito Especial. Urban research carried out at CID has included studies of housing for the "popular sector" in urban centers, a study of construction costs (under contract with DANE), studies on income distribution in the cities, and studies of the marketing of food in urban areas. It has also made development plans, as noted, and its current publication of a development plan for Manizales is considered to be one of the most complete planning documents produced to date within Colombia.

CEDE has also made plans for cities of intermediate size, while directing its research program toward the economic factors that affect urban families. CPU has concentrated its research and consulting work in physical planning. Its current research program includes an interdisciplinary investigation of housing.

Research and actual plan preparation are, therefore, intermingled in several of the agencies which are primarily research oriented. It is now appropriate to consider the agencies which are primarily planning bodies with official status, but which must perform research functions in order to fulfill their planning responsibilities.

The Planning Agencies

Colombia has the full hierarchy of planning agencies. It accepted the principle of national planning for develop-

FIG. 1

ORGANIZATION OF DEPARTAMENTO NACIONAL DE PLANEACION



ment with enthusiasm. Colombia was, according to Holt,* "the first country in Latin America to produce a comprehensive economic-development plan of the type envisaged by the Charter of Punta del Este." A ten-year plan was formally announced in 1961, with estimates of desired economic growth rates, industrial and agricultural targets, and statements of the amount of foreign resources which would be needed to help the country meet its goals.

Colombia is still deep in the planning process. The Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Planeacion (DNP), which reports to the President of the Republic, is responsible for defining the norms to be followed by the planning office of the various ministries and other public entities as they develop their capital investment programs. The DNP is also responsible for reviewing and coordinating general plans for socio-economic development and their submission to the National Council on Social and Economic Policy, for evaluating the implementation of planning proposals and the effects of their achievement, and for proposing modifications and adjustments as such evaluation indicates should be made. It has a highly developed interest in urban and regional development.

It is Unidad de Desarrollo Regional y Urbano that is of particular interest to us, and its work and proposals will be discussed in some detail in this survey report.

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* Holt. op. cit. p. 151.

There are planning agencies in some of the *departamentos* and the large and intermediate cities have planning offices of their own. So does the government of the *Distrito Especial* for metropolitan Bogota.

We discuss subsequently the series of Bogota development plans which have been prepared over the years, and we have seen as a sampling the general development plans recently published for Neiva, Barrancabermeja, and Manizales, and the traffic plan for Cali.* Colombia has the desire, and many of the skills, necessary to plan for its cities. It also has what seemed to us, after visits to seven Colombian cities, a strong drive toward their improvement in which plans are not (as in all too many countries) advanced as a substitute for action. The country has a multiplicity of action agencies which can be and are used by aggressive cities and regions to further their development goals.

THE ACTION AGENCIES FOR URBAN AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

An inventory and analysis of all the public bodies in Colombia which affect urban and regional development would

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* *Neiva*, produced by CID; *Barrancabermeja, Plan de Ordemamiento*, produced by CPU and CEDE; *Plan de Desarrollo Urbano Manizales*, produced by CID, and *Estudio Plan Vial de C[illegible]*, produced by the Oficina Planeacion Municipal of Cali.

be a year's work and a doctoral dissertation in either public administration or urban and regional planning. There is a long list of national bodies, such as the Instituto de Credito Territorial which directs public housing programs in the cities, departmental organizations such as the Instituto de Desarrollo de Antioquia which is a municipal development bank operating in that economically strong departamento, regional organizations such as the Cauca Valley Corporation, and municipal bodies both within and outside the official framework of the local governments.

For illustrative purposes, we file a listing of organizations which have a policy making and implementing role in regional and urban development in Colombia:

1. Ministries and their Organismos Descentralizados:

Gobierno:

Fondo de Desarrollo Comunal

Hacienda y Credito Publico:

Instituto Geografico Agustin Codazzi

Defensa Nacional:

Caja de Vivienda Militar

Agricultura

Corporacion Autonoma de Tumaco

Corporacion Autonoma Regional del Cauca (CVC)

Corporacion Autonoma Regional del Quindio

Corporacion Autonoma Regional de la Sabana de Bogota (CAR)

Corporacion Nacional de Desarrollo del Choco

Corporacion Regional de Desarrollo de Urbana

Corporacion Regional de los Valles del Rio Zulia

Instituto Colombiano Agropecuario (ICA)

Instituto Colombiano de la Reforma Agraria (INCORA)

Instituto de Mercadeo Agropecuario (IDEMA)

Caja de Credito Agrario, Industrial y Minero

Trabajo y Seguridad Social:

Superintendencia Nacional de Cooperativas

Instituto Colombiano de Seguros Sociales (ICSS)

Salud Publica:

Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar

Instituto Nacional de Fomento Municipal

Desarrollo Economico:

Fondo Nacional del Ahorro

Instituto de Credito Territorial (ICT)

Zona Franca Industrial y Comercial de Barranquilla

Artesanias de Colombia

Corporacion Financiera del Trasporte

Instituto de Fomento Industrial

Educacion:

Instituto Colombiano de Construcciones Escolares (ICCE)

Obras Publicas:

Fondo Nacional de Caminos Vecinales

Fondo Via Nacional

Instituto Colombiano de Energia Electrica

Instituto Nacional del Trasporte (INTRA)

Puertos de Colombia.

2. Departamentos Administrativos and their Organismos Descentralizados

   Nacional de Planeacion (DNP):

      Fondo Nacional de Proyectos de Desarrollo (FONADE)

   Servicio Civil:

      Fondo Nacional de Bienestar Social

3. Gobernaciones (Departmental Governments) and their secretarias Departamentos Administrativos (including planning) and Organismos Descentralizados

4. Asembleas Departamentales (legislative bodies at departmental level)

5. Alcaldia Mayor de Bogota, its secretarias, Departamentos Administrativos (including Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion Distrital, DAPD) Empresas Descentralizadas and other autonomous agencies (including Empresas Publicas, and Caja de Vivienda Popular)

6. Concejo de Bogota

7. Alcaldias Municipales, their secretarias and offices (including urban planning), and Organismos Descentralizados (including Obras Publicas)

8. Concejos Municipales

9. Banco Central Hipotecario

10. Commissions and Advisory Groups to the executive bodies

11. Institutes for regional development:

Fundacion para el Desarrollo Industrial del Valle

Fundacion para el Desarrollo de Risaralda

Corporacion para el Desarrollo de Caldas

Instituto de Desarrollo de Antioquia (IDEA)

Fondo de Desarrollo Industrial de Santander

Instituto de Desarrollo de Boyaca

Fundacion para el Desarrollo Economico y Social del Quindio

Asociacion papa el Desarrollo del Tolima

Fundacion para el Desarrollo de Cartegena

Fundacion para el Desarrollo del Atlantico

The words autonoma and organismos descentralizados are self-translating. They also will immediately arouse the interest of students of government and development processes Their proliferation indicates, one must assume, that the formal structure of government operating through its regular chain of command (national ministries, departamentos, municipios) has not been able to cope with the complexities of urban and regional efforts, and that in a pragmatic desire to get things done, special purpose agencies have multiplied and flourished. The situation is reminiscent of some areas of the United States where autonomous port authorities, highway authorities, housing authorities, transport authorities, redevelopment authorities, public parking authorities, water supply agencies,

and sewage treatment districts have been created to perform functions which the established governmental units were unable, because of lack of jurisdiction or financing, to do for their people. It makes a very untidy organization chart, which must from time to time be brought back into some form of order and control. But it also means that special purpose agencies are more likely to attack their special purposes with vigor and success than the standard units of government, with their established procedures and their routine obligations.

It is possible that Colombia is in the process of accumulating more development agencies than it can staff and administer. But the fact that it is creating them and setting them to work, very often under local impetus, seems to us an indication of strength. What may seem to be disorder on the organization table is usually resolved at the meeting table, when a government and its people strive for progress.

That is not to say that there are no conflicts. The decentralized agencies, being what their name implies, do not always coordinate their policy and implementing decisions with those of the regularly constituted governmental agencies. The investigations of research agencies are not necessarily understood or utilized at the operating level, and the research organizations may have priorities which are not those of the policy makers who theoretically

should be the beneficiaries of research findings. Consequently, the studies carried out at the specialized centers may have only academic interest, while the research programs of the public bodies may lack the depth and professional quality which would more surely guide the institutions making and executing public policies.

A select group of urban experts met in 1969 at a seminar organized by the Division de Estudios de Poblacion of ASCOFAME* and listed their criticisms of the existing system. The problems identified were:

A lack of understanding of the urbanization process in Colombia's policy making bodies;

A lack of coordination between existing projects;

Under-utilization of research performed;

Lack of a theoretical structure for the formulation of policies;

Under-utilization of trained personnel;

Lack of relation between the universities' programs in training and research and the realities of urban problems and programs;

Lack of evaluation of the significant effects of programs carried forward in the urban field;

International assistance through the assignment of foreign specialists who do not have a true understanding of the national realities.

As a result of this seminar, a group of its participants proposed the creation of an Inter-Institutional

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* II Seminario Nacional sobre Urbanizacion, May 15-18, 1969.

Service for Studies of Urbanization that would function as a communications center. Communication and coordination were considered a necessity in a country which had so many institutions working in urban affairs. The Servicio has now been formalized by the President of the Republic:* office space has been provided, and operations will soon begin. As projected, the Servicio will have four components: communciations, internal reseach in its specialization of inter-agency relationships, mobilization of professional skills to improve training programs, and professional support for research projects which may be suggested or designed in urban subjects.

THE DEPTH OF URBAN SKILLS

The 1964 census found that Colombia had 52,070 university graduates. In the professions directly related to urban and regional development, the census counted 2,214 architects, 4,171 civil engineers, 2,342 economists, and 222 sociologists. A significant percentage did not practice the profession in which they were enumerated; for instance, about 20 per cent of the architects, 40 per cent

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* The document which established the need for the Servicio was "Propuesta para la Creacion de un Servicio Inter-Institucional para Estudios sobre Urbanizacion en Colombia," Ramiro Cardona y Jaime Valenzuela, Bogota, February 1970.

of the economics graduates, and about half of the sociologists were not employed in the skill for which they had been trained.

In 1970, an estimate in the number of professionals* listed 2,769 architects, 5,030 civil engineers, 3,177 economists, and 151 sociologists. One-third of the architects were based in Bogota.

Civil engineers, architects, and public administrators may be said to form the "steel frame" of urban planning and development. Their skills are basic to the construction and operation of urban complexes, but it is recognized that many other arts, professions and sciences are necessary contributors to the multi-disciplinary functions of urbanism. Colombia's eleven schools of architecture, with a student enrollment of about 2,500, now offer specific courses in "urbanism" and have departments either of urbanism or planning. There is an increasing emphasis on analyzing urban problems not only in their physical context but within their social and economic dimensions. It is now common for the schools of architecture to integrate their programs with other faculties in their university groupings, as at the Universidad de Los Andes at Bogota, where a graduate program in urban studies and planning is under consideration.

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* As given by the Facultad de Psicologia. Revista de Psicologia, Vol. X, N° 2, Bogota, University Nacional. p. 66.

Colombia's first graduate program in city and regional planning was operative at the Universidad del Valle, Cali, from 1962 until 1966. Since 1968, the School of Architecture at the Universidad Nacional de Medellin has offered a master's degree program, officially described as Estudios Fisica Urbana which despite its nomenclature has included courses in the social sciences as well as in physical planning.

The OAS-supported Centro Interamericano de Vivienda y Planeamiento (CINVA) has operated a Curso Superior de Vivienda y Planeamiento as a one year program in which many Colombian professionals have participated, but it is now restricted primarily to housing matters and has been cut back to less than six months.*

There are seventeen schools of civil engineering in Colombia. As of the present, their urban relationship is restricted to the traditional public works base.

A count of the courses open at Colombian institutions of higher learning which might be related to urban and regional planning and development yields forty-nine institutions and 125 educational programs.

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* Present plans call for CINVA to be closed in mid-1972. An Inter-American Information Service on Urban Development, organized to assemble and disseminate technical information needed to facilitate policy formulation and program development within member countries will be created in its place. (ed. note).

THE NATIONAL PLAN FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

One of the agencies which may be expected to use the Servicio will be the Unidad de Desarrollo Regional y Urbano of the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Planeacion; that is, the Regional and Urban Unit of the National Planning Department. This is the group within the Planning Department which has been assigned the task of "making the necessary studies to determine the present and future development centers, the metropolitan centers, the metropolitan areas, and the socio-economic regions of the country" and to "recommend regional and urban development policy and its institutional organization." It is also charged with studying the current status and the financial resources of the departamentos, the municipios and the decentralized organizations at the departmental and municipal level; with evaluating and analyzing needs in public investment and methods of finance available to meet them and proposing pertinent solutions; with defining policy as to the internal debt of public bodies; and with advising the departamentos, municipios and corporaciones regionales on the organization and functioning of their own planning offices.

We are concerned with the policies it is developing in regard to regional planning because of the effect such plans are assumed to have on the distribution of urban

population. The last National Development Plan* devotes an entire chapter to the política de desarrollo regional y urbano. The policy is increasingly familiar in Latin America: decentralization by regions and the stimulation of growth poles which would act to deflect urban population growth from one huge or several very large centers.

The chapter on regional development is divided into five sections:

--The first deals with the basic subject of territorial (or regional) disequilibria and corrective measures already adopted.

--The second spells out the plan's goals for an urban and regional development policy.

--The third describes the "model" of regionalization.

--The fourth gives the basis for the policies proposed.

--The fifth and final section states the means proposed to implement the policies.

The Plan identifies territorial disequilibria as the concentration of population and economic development in some regions to the disadvantage of others. The Plan finds that the four largest cities--Bogota, Medellin, Cali and Barranquilla are too big now, growing too fast, and absorbing more than their "adequate" share of economic development. It states that the four cities

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* Departamento Nacional de Planeacion. op. cit.

> generated in 1967, 67.7 per cent of the value added by manufacture in the country and absorbed between the years 1957 and 1967 approximately 95 per cent of the new industrial employment, while they concentrated 58 per cent of the population of centers of more than 20,000 inhabitants. In the field of education, Bogota had in 1967, 55 per cent of the student enrollment in institutions of higher learning; the cities of Cali, Medellin and Barranquilla had 29 per cent and the remaining centers of the country had only 16 per cent.

As a result of these and other factors, the Plan finds that "a stagnation of the financial capacity of many departamentos and municipios" is produced with consequent "institutional and administrative deterioration.".

The Plan then lists various actions taken by the central and local governments to "correct" this trend, such as measures to promote administrative and fiscal decentralization, assumption by the central government of the cost of various local services in whole or in part, transfres from the national budget (revenue sharing), and the creation of new departamentos. (The division of the departamento of Caldas gave capital city status to Pereira and Armenia in the new departamentos of Risaralda and Quinda. This is thought to give them a long sought parity with Manizales, and to help all three of them by eliminating rivalries and stimulating their growth.) The Plan also mentions initiatives taken to integrate the country by sectors such as the supply of electric power, greater equality of educational opportunity, more

widespread distribution of hospital services, and more general promotion of tourism.

After making a very strong case against the "disequilibrium" which it finds prevalent, the Plan then shows some natural ambivalence as to what to do about it. It says that the policies for regional development, or more properly, dispersed development, "must be compatible with the needs for the expansion of the national economy; in this sense, excessive dispersion of investments could in the intermediate and in the long run produce a stagnation of economic growth, but that excessive concentration of them could accentuate the regional disparities, leading to an inequitable distribution of the benefits of economic development." The Plan assumes that regional disequilibria will not be corrected spontaneously, and that the Government must intervene with a coherent policy whose purpose would be the establishment of what are the admissible disequilibria which would allow at the same time a growth of the national economy and the equitable distribution of the resultant social and economic benefits between regions."

General goals are directed toward the physical integration of regions by better communications, economic integration by the widening of markets and the use of investment incentives in regions with "high development potential," and socio-political integration. Specific

goals include the "improvement of the standard of the living in the regions"; the orientation of rural-urban migration away from both the present largest centers and from areas of low economic potential in the intermediate cities, presumably with high economic potential; the strengthening of the intermediate cities, i.e., those with from 30,000 to 100,000 people and their conversion into competitive industrial centers in order to "protect and improve the urban network of the country, facilitating job creation in order to moderate the migration flow to the largest cities; the strengthening of regional competition and efficiency in utilization of resources; improvement in the efficiency of social investments; and a joint effort of the public and private sector."

The "Model of Regionalization" is the Plan's conceptual basis for the policy it advances. The concepts have their origin in an extension of Francois Perroux's definition of growth poles. A great deal of effort was expended in the national planning agency to differentiate regions, and such regional variables as population, value added by manufacture, value of checks cleared, number of hospital beds, enrollment in colleges and universities, and many others were analysed. Not unexpectedly, the existing major growth poles and the secondary ones were in correlation with the population of the larger and the intermediate cities. The areas of influence affected by

the growth poles were mapped as areas of in-migration, areas of economic dependency, and areas of climatic and topographic similarity. These zones of influence were then matched against the established and administrative divisions of the country. With "gaps" in the urban network identified, it would become possible to "strengthen or create the centers necessary to accomplish the goals of the urban and regional development policy."

Regional planning areas were made legally possible by 1968 amendments to the Colombian constitution. It now reads that "the divisions relative to....planning to economic and social development need not conincide with the general division" for political and administrative purposes of the country. The Constitution also permits "the law to establish diverse categories of municipalities according to their population, their fiscal resources, and their economic importance and to provide for a differentiation in their administration." In accordance with the provisions of the Constitution cited, the Plan proceeded to define four regiones para la planeacion, i.e., planning regions, and suggest five additional "possible regions." The nine suggested planning areas are shown on a map which appeared in the plan and which is reproduced in this report. They are necessarily consolidations of the existing departamentos, which are the Republic's political units, and they cut across existing

departmental boundaries in the process of forming what the planners consider more logical planning areas.

To no one's surprise, the plan designates metropolitan Barranquilla as the major growth pole for its proposed Costa Atlantica region, metropolitan Bogota as that for its Central Region, metropolitan Cali for its Sur-Occidental Region, and metropolitan Medellin for its designated region of Nor-Occidental. These four regions have approximately sixteen million people, or more than three-fourths of Colombia's total population. The Plan document does not identify growth poles for the five "possible regions" which it suggests but states that the selection of a growth pole for the region of Magdalena Medio is under study. It would be surprising if the study does not select Barrancabermja (an oil town now approaching 100,000 population) as the regional growth point.

No formal proposal is set forth for the organization of the regional planning areas, nor has any action yet been taken to create them and make them operational.

The Plan lists six levels of cities in its consideration of regional development. They are (and the reverse order is the Plan's, not ours):

VI. Metropoli Nacional, which is Bogota.

V. Metropolis de equilibrio, cities which can compete with the national metropolis in development terms, namely Medellin, Cali, and Barranquilla.

PLANNING REGIONS

FIG. 2



URBANIZATION IN COLOMBIA

INTERNATIONAL URBANIZATION SURVEY

IV y III. Ciudadades intermedias, which are the intermediate cities that now recur in Colombian planning usage, with populations of from 30,000 to 200,000.

II y I. Centros Locales, smaller urban places which are intended to "serve fundamentally in bringing the benefits of economic and social development to the inhabitants of the rural areas."

The Plan also proposes reorganization of governmental structures for metropolitan areas, a subject of considerable interest to the Survey. We will discuss its proposals for new legislation in a later section of this report when we deal with the quality, character, and administration of Colombia's principal cities.

Granting that the Departamento Nacional de Planeacion has worked at a high professional level and stimulated a special interest in the intermediate cities, as will be noted in the subsequent discussion of international assistance to urban and regional development in Colombia, some important questions can be raised both as to its theses and its recommended policies. Colombia does have disequilibria in its distribution of urban population and economic development, but absolute or even relative equality between regions, cities, and even city neighborhoods has not yet been achieved in either the developed or developing world. Colombia is fortunate in that it

has four urban centers of major strength, which have not yet reached the undetermined point where size itself puts an intolerable strain on the environment or produces economic disadvantages through undue congestion, overload on essential services, or social stresses attributable to population mass. Bogota does not overwhelm Colombia, as Lima and Caracas do their respective countries. The planning agency is wise, of course, in warning now against the future, and its concern as to the primacy of Bogota is properly anticipatory of that future. The intermediate cities within the population grouping of 100,000 to 500,000 are, contrary to the implications of the planning document, more than holding their percentage of the country's total urban population against the "big four," and the number of cities in this category is increasing; according to the Plan's estimate, there will be twenty-three "free-standing" (i.e., not included in another center's metropolitan area) cities of more than 100,000 in Colombia in 1975, as against sixteen estimated for 1970. And the same projections show that three more cities will be so close to the 100,000 mark as to be added to it if there is only a slight positive margin of error in the estimates.

There are theoretical challenges which can be made to some of the Plan's concepts: for one instance, if the national aim is the more equitable distribution of the benefits of economic development, geographic distribution

and social distribution are not necessarily identical and can be contradictory. For another, the Plan's identification of growth poles as the seats of industrias motrices, which can be translated as industries which promote economic take-off in development terms, is considered faulty by some Colombian specialists who would like to see a more detailed analysis of the industrial base of cities and a more sophisticated methodology of rating industrial variables. And there is, leaving theory aside, a less than complete acceptance of the Plan's stated policies for effecting the objectives set forth in its model.

Frankenhoff* urges that the regional development policies of Colombia be limited in application to "middle-sized cities related to the major metropolitan centers and to those few cities which offer special locational advantages for the production and marketing of certain products." He recommends that "the formulation of a metropolitan development policy be given priority." He is also critical of the major employment study sponsored by the International Labor Organization (the Seers Mission study) because in his judgment "major elements in the strategy

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* Charles A. Frankenhoff. "National Urbanization Policy in Colombia." (Manuscript). University of Puerto Rico, Rio Piedras, San Juan, August 19, 1970.

recommended by this study are faulty because no effort was made to relate their findings to the development aspects of the urbanization phenomena now existing in the country."

Frankenhoff, as we read him, argues for an urban-regional strategy which would promote satellite cities in the areas of influence of such existing major centers as Bogota and "opportunity" development in those intermediate cities which appear to have special advantages. He says, for example, that there are "some 46 cities in the valley where Bogota is located. The industrial development of Zipaquira or Facatativa might well relieve congestion in the metropolitan area. At present, the CAR* is developing an extensive set of electric, water, and telephone services in the valley which, together with a good highway system, could reduce the new residential pressures on Bogota itself." The "cities" which Frankenhoff cites are actually rather small settlements at present, which does not mean, of course, that they are not subject to rapid growth as satellite communities if planning and investment procedures push them in that direction. Frankenhoff cites as an urban complex with "clear locational advantages" the Manizales-Pereira complex centered between Medellin and

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* CAR is the acronym for the Corporacion Autonoma Regional de la Sabana de Bogota which deals with the area adjacent to but not contained in the Distrito Especial which governs metropolitan Bogota. Frankenhoff expresses considerable respect for this agency.

Cali, and reasonably close to the port of Buenaventura.

The Seers Mission* in its discussion of the "rural-urban balance" argues that "policies need to be devised and implemented to alter the hitherto prevailing trends of migration and urban growth." It proposes a "functionally differentiated hierarchy of population centers" in which there would be stimulated village settlement, linked to small centers (1,000 to 3,000 population) which would be related to administrative and market centers of 3,000 to 10,000 people. It adds that "the establishment of small and medium sized centers (say, up to 50,000 in population) toward the present rural frontier, linked by road to the already populated parts of the country, would help prevent the emergence of future imbalances and act as an incentive to accelerated spontaneous--or partially spontaneous--rural colonization." Its recommendations "so far add up," it says, "to a plea for the considerable strengthening of the smaller towns--of those urban areas, that is, which were shown to have been left behind during the last thirty years."

Recent changes in the direction of the Departamento Nacional de Planeacion, with the appointment of a new chief and number of staff changes, may affect its program of regional planning studies.

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* Seers, Dudley et. al. Colombia Employment Programme. (Manuscript). Geneva, I.L.O., 1970.

Our own view is that the DNP has done well to call attention to the need for regional planning and development in Colombia, with a conscious effort to diversity urbanization and development spatially within the country. We would argue that its proposals for planning regions which do not coincide with political and administrative boundaries are unrealistic; we remain unconvinced that its proposed program of incentives and disincentives to promote regionalization would, even if adopted as public policy, be decisive against the present hard facts of locational advantage. We consider that Colombia's urban pattern is a fortunate one. It has developed through historic settlement, variations in local energies and aptitudes, adaptation to climate and land forms, and a dispersed pattern of natural resources. We would speculate that the vigor of individual cities, competitive in their own developmental actions and in their claims against national resources, will be the most effective measure of varying urban growth.

We would, however, agree that a public policy favoring investment in both the infrastructure and the productive capacity of intermediate cities would tend to equalize development opportunities and serve as a catalyst for the acceleration of processes already taking place. Colombia has, in our judgment, a strong base for the accommodation of its projected increase in urban population,

capable of absorbing benefits from planned national and regional programs but capable, in addition, of benefiting from improvisation and pragmatic action as proposed and carried out in its various urban centers.

THE FLAVOR OF CITIES

There are statistical indices, and these survey reports will necessarily use many of them, which are important in making judgments as to the quality or urban life and the present and future shape of cities. But there are also aspects of urbanism which are not subject to measurement, but which exist in the eye of the beholder and in the heart of the participant. Strong cities have a character, a special flavor, which is individual and sometimes eccentric, but which we believe to be important in maintaining a city's will to live and prosper. We found such flavor in those cities of Colombia which we were able to visit, and we consider that it should be noted as a factor in the diversified urban pattern which Colombia now enjoys and seems likely to perpetuate.

Medellin, for example, is a very special case--a tight and tidy city, industrial in character, with few of the environmental scars we associate with industrial communities, obviously well-managed and well ordered. Medellin is a "second city" which, like the number two

company which rents automobiles, appears to try harder; its people are famous for their work ethic and their city shows it. Medellin's development appears to have no locational base except that is is the center of Antioquia. One writer says:

> The inhabitants of the Colombian department of Antioquia differ from other Colombians. The Antioquenos themselves, and outsiders, have long recognized the contrast. The precise nature of the Antioqueno distinctiveness, however, has not been clearly identified. It is often remarked that these people are self-confident, industrious, proud of being Antioquenos....The Antioqueno proclivity for commercial and industrial activity is well-known; in Antioquia economic development began earlier and has proceeded further than in all other parts of Colombia. Among other distinctive features, Antioquia is generally recognized as the best-governed department in Colombia--although paradoxically Antioquenos are not known as 'politicians.'*

Statistics also support Medellin's special character. Its per capita public revenues are more than twice those of Bogota, excluding payment for utility services such as telephone and water, and almost four times those of Barranquilla.**

Medellin is the Valle de Aburra's metropolitan area of influence. A 1970 estimate of the metropolitan population was 1,400,000, a 1975 estimate is expected to be about two million. Medellin officially says of itself that after it

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* James L. Payne. Patterns of Conflict in Colombia. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968.

** Plan de Desarrollo Economico y Social 1970-1973. Capitulo V, Cuadro N° 3.

became the capital of Antioquia in 1826, "its consequent growth, owing to the vigor and tenacity of its inhabitants, made it for many years the leading industrial city of Colombia."* It is still very close to Bogota in the annual total of value added by manufacture.

Medellin seems important to us as evidence that economic and physical analysis alone will not predict or explain the growth of cities. Human energies are not quantifiable before the fact, and no index made on any other basis would have predicted the economic drive and organizing ability of Antioquenos. Not that they are wholly without a sense of poetry; they also describe their capital as "a city of eternal spring and the capital of flowers."

Cali, which is Colombia's third city, has had a much more recent growth and a much greater quantum of foreign investment. It struck us, on the strength of a rainy morning's tour, as a city still in its adolescence--somewhat rough, touchy, unfinished. It too has one million people now, and will have 1,393,300** in 1975.

Barranquilla, Cartagena, Santa Marta are cities of the Caribbean coast, a region of Colombia distinct in character from the great inland river valleys and from the Andean

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* Plano Turistico de Medellin. Medellin, La Oficina de Turismo y Fomento de Medellin, 1969.

** These are DNP figures.

hills. The three cities are also themselves very different. Barranquilla is a working town near the mouth of the Magdalena, serving much the same function in Colombia as New Orleans did when the Mississippi was the principal means of transport into the interior of the United States. By a coincidence, Barranquilla, like New Orleans, suspends work for Carnival, the only major Colombian city to do so. We saw it on Mardi Gras, when it was definitely not a working city. Barranquilla has another element of special flavor: it is building (we were told with public as well as church funds) a monumental modern cathedral which will rival Coventry in style and--we would judge--exceed it in size.

Metropolitan Barranquilla had an estimated 1970 population of 690,000 and it is projected at 860,000 in 1975.

Unlike Barranquilla, Cartagena is not building a new cathedral. It is restoring an old one. The city was founded in 1533, and construction of the Cathedral was begun toward the close of the sixteenth century. In the 1920s, the Bishop of Cartagena decided that the Cathedral was too drab and old-fashioned; he decided to do it over in pastels and plaster. Now the Cathedral is being stripped down to bare Spanish austerity once again, because the Cartegenos have found that the flavor of their city, and its value to them and the world, lies as much within its historic walls as it does in the new Mamonal petrochemical

complex that has once again made Cartagena a very important place.

The city has strict rules now to protect the buildings and the character of its old Centro (which is still very much alive as a business center). The former Palace of the Inquisition is a museum and the headquarters of the tourist office; the municipal administration will soon move into the colonial customs house. A sense of continuity is appropriately preserved, while modern Cartagena spreads toward its beaches and its islands.

Cartagena's 1970 population was given as about 300,000; it is expected to reach 380,000 in 1975. In addition to historic preservation and modern industrial development, the city is given to both the sacred and the profane in other ways which add to its character. Each year, on February 2nd, there is a pilgrimage to the Convent of La Popa when thousands of people carry candles to the Virgin of the Candles whose shrine is at the Convent which overlooks the city; each year, in November, Cartagena has the national beauty contest where Miss Colombia is chosen. The latter ceremony will someday, perhaps, be seen as more typical of the Santa Marta that is to be. Santa Marta, the oldest point of Spanish settlement on the mainland of South America, is a rather scruffy town of 132,000 people. It is very likely to become the urban focus for a new series of beach resorts

which are rising in the sheltered coves that lie east and west of the city. The setting compares to the Riviera; the water and the winter climate are better.

Ibaque is a music center for Colombia. Popayan is the mother of presidents as Ohio was when the United States was a Republican country. The people of Pasto are the butt of the nation's jokes.

The point of this, some of it trivial, is that Colombia displays urban diversity in character as well as in space, and that psychological as well as geographic factors should work to maintain the urban identities (and hence the separate and comparable growth) of Colombia's large and intermediate cities.

Megalopolis formation in Colombia is well in the distant future.

The three Caribbean cities are nodes that will one day be connected by a major bridge and a fast highway system, but they are sufficiently distant to maintain their identities and special functions. There will be a line of urban development from Medellin to Cali. It is still in the early stages of development. One professional urbanist who has served as advisor to the President, believes that the westerly departamento of Choco will be a future development zone with consequent urbanization. We might, working purely from instinct, make a gambler's throw to suggest an important urban growth center at Cucuta, on the Venezuelan

frontier, at Villavicencio as the gateway city to the easterly plains, and--if a satellite city strategy is adopted for Bogota--at various points on the Bogota sabana and at Giradot.*

Bogota is, of course, the primate city of the country. As a metropolitan city, it is expected to have 3,605,000 people in 1975, and it is no mean place.

METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT--AND BOGOTA

Before commenting on the urban quality of Bogota, it might be appropriate to discuss briefly the problems of metropolitan government in Colombia, and the proposals made by the national planning agency to deal with them. Bogota has been, as we said earlier, a Distrito Especial since 1954, with a chief executive, functioning from the office of the Alcaldia Mayor de Bogota, who is appointed by the President and with an elected Council. As we have also noted, the director of the district's planning agency believes that the boundaries which seemed generously drawn less than two decades ago now seem too restrictive in view of the city's rapid and unanticipated growth. But for

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* It should be noted that this is wild speculation, ready for demolition by professionals who know Colombia far better than we do.

immediate governance, Bogota does have a metropolitan government with competent jurisdiction. It is building itself a new headquarters for that government, at a site which will give it both practical and symbolic significance.

The urban and regional planners in the DNP find that eight other cities (Medellin, Cali, Barranquilla, Bucaramanga, Manizales, Pereira, Armenia, and Sogamosa) must include their conjunctos urbanos, i.e., adjoining municipalities, if a true estimate of their urban population and their strength as urban centers is to be statistically presented. The national planning agency has proposed legislation which would provide "general" standards and methods for the organization and function of metropolitan areas." As summarized in the Plan, the metropolitan areas would become what in American terms would be "bodies corporate and politic," with powers conferred upon them to deal "with the execution of plans for the physical, economic and social development of the metropolitan area, provision of common services to the municipalities contained within the metropolitan area, the regulation of land use and other aspects of urban order, and the provision of technical assistance to contained municipalities."

The metropolitan government would be under the management of a Junta and a Metropolitan Prefect. With the approval of the Junta, the metropolitan government could adopt plans and programs for area development, could approve

the annual budget of proposed expenditures and anticipated revenues. The Metropolitan Prefect would be the chief executive officer: he would direct, control and coordinate the performance and financing of the agency, and from time to time present project proposals to the Junta.

This proposed law has not yet been adopted by the Colombian Congress.

Congress has adopted a law, Number 14 of 1969, which controls the creation of new municipalities, in accordance with the planning agencies view that the multiplication of municipal governments is not "an instrument adequate for the solution of the problems of local development." This law as digested in the Plan, provides that such new municipalities as may be created must correspond in their boundaries to socio-economic units competent to carry out integrated local development and have the capacity to provide for such development, that they have sufficient population to be an "urban nucleus" exerting a "zone of influence," and that they have the capacity to provide the minimum services which are expected at their level of government.

The pattern of metropolitan government in Colombia has obviously not yet reached its final form, but the proposals of the planning agency indicate that the problems are understood and that structural changes in the hierarchy of government are needed.

They would have seemed strange proposals, indeed, in Bogota's formative years. The original city, founded on August 6, 1538, was a settlement of twelve straw huts and a small church. The "city" center then was the same as it is now, for the huts were built where the Cathedral stands on the Plaza Bolivar. Two years later, Charles V decreed that the small settlement should be recognized as a "most noble and most loyal city"; some centuries later, the loyalties had frayed and the first grito de Independencia from Spain was raised in the city on July 20, 1810. It was declared the capital of the Republic of Colombia on December 17, 1819.

The city, originally one of the many called Santa Fe by the Spanish settlers in the Americas, was deep in the interior, high on a plateau, sheltered by mountain ranges, temperate in climate, and surrounded by the fertile and well-watered sabana de Bogota which is rich agricultural land. It was healthy for the Spaniards as it was above the fever zone, and unhealthy for the Indians after the Spaniards came until the indigenes had established their immunities against measles and small-pox. The city was also wholly safe from the raiders, from Drake to Admiral Vernon, who harried the Caribbean coasts of Colombia, particularly Cartagena, as pirates, buccaneers, and organized naval storming parties.

There seems to be an element of chance in Bogota's

achievement of urban primacy in Colombia; it is not on the navigable Magdalena but has been supplied, until the very late coming of the railroad,* by trans-shipment from such river ports as Giradot; it is not the beneficiary of unusual natural resources on which to form an industrial base; it is not at the geographical crossroads of Colombia. Apparently the selection of the city as the country's capital assured its future, and the momentum that usually comes to capital cities has done the rest.

To repeat the population figures, metropolitan Bogota's 1970 total was estimated at 2,540,000; in 1975, it is expected to have 3,605,000. If its present 7 per cent growth rate is extrapolated, it will pass the five million population mark in the 1980s. That will make it a very large city indeed.

It has thus far shown what seems to us a capacity to meet the stresses of rapid growth. It functions. It is not a glittering city; its mood and its skies are somber; it has no great vistas nor superlative public places. There is much good architecture of the present (and some fine elements of the past) but the city fails, it seems to us, to achieve either the unity of grand design or the careful attention to civic detail (which can compensate for design deficiencies) which one would have hoped would

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* A proper railway link to the Caribbean was not completed until 1961.

be within its grasp and in its potential for achievement.

This is especially true at Ciudad Kennedy, the satellite city which had an injection of international support from USAID programs, and which has now reached an estimated population of 200,000. It is not a satellite city in a literal sense; that is, it is not separated from Central Bogota by a green belt but will be in fact a suburban increment to the urbanized area of Bogota. We found it depressingly drab and unimaginative. It lacked focus, color, developed public space, community sense, an internal center. It would be interesting, although perhaps futile, to examine the reasons why the project is no better than it is: to find out, for instance, whether it was professional incompetence, or legislative restrictions, or lack of executive imagination and energy that produced so commonplace a result. One is saddened by the missed opportunity, and wonders if it is not too late to make amends.

A city does not live, of course, by design alone. Culturally, Bogota is pleased to call itself the Athens of Latin America, and while that claim may be disputed, it is the cultural and communications center of Colombia. Metabolically, the city's problems are the usual ones of the urban condition: refuse disposal, water supply, mass transportation, sewage treatment (there is none), and air pollution which is not yet a serious problem but wisely

under study at the Distrital planning agency.

We will discuss housing for the urban poor later in this report; now to Bogota's very interesting chronicles of city planning.

PLANNING FOR BOGOTA

Bogota has not grown without the benefit of professional planning. It has a unique museum of urban development, housed in a colonial mansion in the old central city, whose exhibits illustrate its growth from colonial times to the present and show (in some cases using the original drawings) the development plans that have been put forward as guides to the city's growth.

The oldest plan is that commissioned by Viceroy Espleta and executed by a Spanish engineer, Domingo Esquiaqui, in 1791. Esquiaqui was planning for a modest city (by 1812, it had grown to 20,000) but he set forth the gridiron pattern, emanating fr the plaza mayor--now the Plaza Bolivar--which is still the basic element of Bogota's street and land development pattern today. The numbered carreras and calles (avenues and streets) have become typical of urban centers throughout Columbia.

The newest plan is not yet on display, because it was completed only in the fall of 1970. It is Phase I of the Bogota Transport and Urban Development Study, carried out by

Freeman, Fox, Wilbur Smith and Associates and Restrepo y Uribe Ltda., under the direction of the World Bank as the executing agency for United Nations Development Program. The planning firm of Freeman, Fox, Wilbur Smith and Associates is an Anglo-American partnership, and Restrepo y Uribe are Colombian planning consultants.

Bogota has previously had German, Franco-Swiss, and American planners, whose work is on display at the Museum and one of whom, Le Corbusier, is very famous indeed.

From 1791 until 1938, the growth of the city was guided by a series of surveys and maps of various sub-divisions--urbanizaciones--for the expanding capital. The state assembly of Cundinamarca resolved in 1919-20 that it was necessary for Bogota to be developed in a manera cientifica which would take note of its commercial, hygenic and aesthetic needs.* A German architect, Karl Brunner, completed a development plan for Bogota in 1936 when the city's population was approaching 330,000. The Brunner plan continued the gridiron pattern, and did not consider the impact of traffic volume on the operating efficiency of the street system, and Brunner made little provision for the future growth of the city. His scheme was essentially a downtown plan, which did not suggest links with outlying neighborhoods, such as Chapinero

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* Quoted in 1934 by Ing. Enrique Uribe Ramirez, chief engineer of the department of public works of Cundinamarca at that time.

which had already become an important adjunct to the city. Given his limited vision of the future city (or perhaps the constraints imposed by his commission), his plan had surprising survival value in subsequent plans continuing his concentration on the gridiron pattern and the central nature of the Plaza Bolivar.

In 1945, as Bogota began its great period of post-war expansion, the Colombian architects tried their hand at planning the city. The Sociedad Colombiana de Arquitectos (SCA) plan, suggested the extension of several roads to the north, with Carrera 7 as a main avenue. Expansion to the west was also proposed, along Calles 6 and 13, and the Avenida de las Americas. A major SCA proposal was the development of an urban cordon, which would be used to delimit the extent of urban development. SCA proposed a relocation of the existing line of rail so that it would form a loop around the city and make a cordon sanitaire. No development was to be allowed on the outer side of the tracks. The proposal was, however, unworkable; the mountain rim of Bogota's eastern border would not permit rail construction or operation on that side of the city.

In 1951, the planners came to Bogota again, this time in the person of Le Corbusier, Swiss-born but essentially French in practice. Le Corbusier was invited to replan Bogota after the bogotazo as the great riot of 1948 is called, in which the rioters destroyed or damaged

many buildings in the central city, near the Plaza Bolivar. Le Corbusier prepared a pilot plan for the city as a whole and a detailed urban design plan for the central area affected by the bogotazo. His work was followed by that of Jose Luis Sert and Paul Lester Weiner, then based in New York, who made their proposals in 1953. Le Corbusier was their consultant.

Le Corbusier's Plan Piloto and the Sert-Weiner Plan Regulador, whatever their aesthetic and functional merits, were both wildly wrong as to population projections. They were predicated on the belief that Bogota would reach a population of 1,500,000 by the year 2000; as noted, it passed the one million and a half mark in 1964, only ten years after the planners' work was published.

The Le Corbusier-Sert-Weiner effort, however, made important contributions to the development of planning theory in Bogota. It recognized that urban growth was taking place in a definite north-south direction, with growth potential to the west limited by the railroad lines and, more importantly, by low-lying land that was subject to severe flooding. Their plans exploited the existing growth tendencies. To enhance and protect those tendencies, they proposed a compact linear city in which housing densities were increased within the urban perimeter, which was to be defined by high speed arterial highways.

Theory and events have come into conflict, although

some of the Le Corbusier-Sert-Weiner concepts still have value in the much greater urban concentration than they were able to foresee. Their error was to view Bogota as an island in space, capable of internal planning without regard for the numerous housing settlements which had even then grown up at the perimeter of the city, although not then included in administrative Bogota. These settlements have since been brought into the Distrito Especial, which is metropolitan Bogota, and have necessarily been the subject of expensive programs of infrastructure installation and service.

Subsequent Bogota plans of 1957 and 1961 were the responsibility of the Departamento Administrativo de Planeacion Distrital. The 1957 plan was formulated in response to the creation of the special district, which increased the jurisdiction of the municipal government of Bogota by annexing the neighboring townships of Bosa, Engativa, Fontibon, Suba, Usme, and Usaquen. The plan suggested increased growth as an increment to existing developed areas so that lower housing densities could be achieved by such expansion. Its proposals aimed at the full urbanization of the special district within its newly set boundaries. The plan recognized the need for heavy capital investment in the infrastructure necessary to serve growth areas. Its major significance was its acceptance of the spontaneous housing developments which had arisen

outside the original city limits, and recognition of the need to bring them into the city's development framework.

By 1961, growth to the east and south-east had brought about a semicircular form of development around the historic center of Bogota. The 1961 plan incorporated this previously uncontrolled settlement into its proposals (a logical development from the 1957 statement) and suggested an increasingly dispersed pattern of industrial and commercial zones, bringing them closer to the housing areas. It also proposed regional service roads for such areas.

The 1961 plan was a short-term plan, projected for ten years, which provided essentially for an accommodation to, and a development of, the growth tendencies which were already evident. The plan is significant in that it was the first Bogota plan which went beyond physical planning to include a statement on the probable impact that Bogota's economy would have on its physical form, e.g., how an increase in automobile ownership and usage, as a concomitant of economic growth, might disperse development to increasing distances from the central city.

The economic issues are addressed at some length in the 1961 study Alternativas para el Desarrollo Urbano de Bogota D.E. published by the Centro de Investigaciones para el Desarrollo of the Universidad Nacional de Colombia. This study considered the economic aspects of urban

transportation, commercial development, land costs, and housing production as bases for the development of two alternatives for the growth of Bogota. The alternatives are either increased density of development with restricted boundaries or continued perimeter growth--obvicusly planners for Bogota have been taking sides on this for a generation but perimeter growth has always won in the field if not on the drawing board. This work is an early attempt at a comprehensive plan which weaves the metropolitan area's economic and physical elements into a coordinated planning fabric. The study parallels much of the current work at the planning agency for the Distrito Especial.

Meanwhile, back at the World Bank and UNDP, the emphasis has again turned to physical planning. These international assistance agencies are currently involved in comprehensive planning for Bogota because the Government of Colombia asked the World Bank for financial support for highway construction in the Distrito Especial. One thing led to another. A traffic and transportation study was needed as a basis for a loan; traffic and transportation studies require projections of the land uses which the transportation system will be constructed to serve. Nor are highways in themselves now considered to be the only basis for transportation in a metropolis; mass transit systems must also be reviewed for feasibility. And if you have a mass transit system, you must have a related road system to

support it.

All of this has brought about the Freeman, Fox, Wilbur Smith and Associates transport and urban development study, which is still another physical development plan for metropo itan Bogota and which proposes still another set of planning choices to guide Bogota's future growth. We meet again the old alternatives of increased density or peripheral growth, with the refinement that peripheral growth is projected as alternately possible either to the north or the west, or to nodal development points separated from the city by a system of green belts withheld from development.

The Distrital and the National Planning agencies are now considering the first phase report of the transport and urban development study. If they approve a second phase, there will be still another development plan for metropolitan Bogota. At issue will be the quantum of social and economic research and information which will contribute to the "comprehensive" quality of the new plan.

THE HOUSING CONDITIONS OF THE URBAN POOR

In the survey report on Peru, we deal at some length with the phenomena of the barriadas and the recognition that has been slow in coming that such settlements have an essential role in the transition from a rural to an urban society.

In the Colombia report we deal with a country which has a more complex system of urban adjustment (because it has greater differentiation between its cities) and we find it a convenient station in our work to discuss a variety of "popular" settlements and the place of the "popular sector" in the development of Latin American cities.

"Popular" in the direct passage from Spanish to English which is now common to Latin American urbanists undergoes a semantic change. It is hard to find an English substitute which makes the meaning clear, but the old phrase, now out of fashion, "the masses" seems as close to it as any. The masses are not the elite, of course, nor the middle classes; they are the majority in all nations except those few which have reduced poverty to the exceptional, rather than to the expected level of life. But being poor is also relative. Personal or family income are not the sole indicators of the general welfare of the masses--access to educational opportunity; the ownership of property, no matter how little; the degree of social status and the sense of participation in the community and national life; the possibilities of upward or even latteral mobility are all factors which affect the "popular sector" and the definitions hich are used in relation to it.

It is generally agreed that development is more than the absolute increase in a nation's GNP; it is also the process of distribution which carries the benefits of such

increase into the society and brings to it both the sense of goals fulfilled and the realization of goals yet to be achieved. It is also commonly accepted that there is a strong correlation between urbanization and development, because economic growth both requires and accelerates a shift from the traditional countryside to the energizing urban environment. It is important therefore, in considering the general processes of development, to understand as best we can how these companion processes of development and urbanization are affecting the masses, or the "popular sector," or (leaving all euphemisms aside) the urban poor.

It is necessary also to be clear as to what is meant by "popular settlements." In theory, these can be defined as those parts of a city where poor people live, but in reality such areas are not wholly inhabitated by people of "low income," nor do all people of "low income" live in them. When we are talking of the "popular sector" as a segment of the population we must be aware that it is not homogenous (or if it is, the homogeneity is very difficult to identify), and that when we talk of "popular settlements," we must note that they too are not what a biologist would call a pure culture. Neither in theory nor in practice are such settlements homogenous.

Simply, not all people who live in "low income" areas have low incomes, and in the Latin American context, where

there is a very numerous live-in servant class, all people with residence in "high income" areas are not well off in terms of income.

This last point is made clear in Colombia where in the "good" residential areas, the service population is at least 20 per cent of the total, and where studies show that a large number of people in "low income" areas may have incomes well above what was assumed to be "typical" slum level. In Cali, researchers classified the city's neighborhoods into five "socio-economic levels"--upper, upper middle, middle, lower middle and slum--on the basis of a presumed "a priori ecological differentiation." The investigators found that 84 per cent of the families living in "slums" had incomes above what they had defined, again a priori, as typical slum income of 500 pesos, or 25 dollars, a month. They found similar disparities in all of their ecological zones.*

Some urbanists in Colombia use a more precise measure than total income in defining the popular sector: subsistence levels. The subsistence level is what the family must spend on food, which can be as much as 85 per cent of total income. The variation between this level and total income

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* Michigan State University-Cauca Valley Corporation. Market Coordination in the Development of the Cauca Valley Region, Colombia. Research Report N° 5. Lansing, Michigan State University, 1970. Table 2.14, p. 52.

is then what the family has left to obtain access to the other variables of total welfare. In a study being carried out at the Centro de Investigaciones para el Desarrollo at Bogota (CID), it has been observed that the pattern of consumption changes substantially only when income rises to three times subsistence level. An estimate of subsistence level for a family in Bogota is accepted at 750 pesos ($37.50) per month. Three times that amount is 2,250 pesos ($112.50) a month. The "popular sector" lies within that range.

In defining popular settlements, we must consider two basic situations:

1. That of those families which do not have the resources to buy or rent a "standard" (i.e., a house for sale or lease in the commercial market) house, and therefore rent a room in such a house, which will have varying standards of quality. These families may also participate in an "invasion" of land to which they have no title but proceed to build their own shelter, or buy a lot in an illegal sub-division, or gain occupancy of a house in a publicly subsidized project;
2. That of those families which, although they have higher incomes, take any of the courses described above, or acquire a lot in a legal sub-division.

The permutations of these situations produce five recognizable types of popular sector settlement in Colombian cities:

1. Inquilinatos: These are single family housing structures that are sub-divided into dwelling spaces for two families or more. Typically, each family lives in one or two rooms, and shares such basic domestic services as the cooking area, washing area, bath, and toilet facilities with other families. Inquilinatos are usually concentrated in the central city areas, as the result of the conversion of older houses, often in bad repair, but may also be found in houses built in illegal sub-divisions, invaded areas, public projects, and, indeed, in any area where municipal regulations are not strictly enforced.

2. Invasiones: These are settlements created through the illegal occupancy, initially by a mass movement, of public or private land. Families in such invaded areas build their own houses, sometimes with the help of neighbors or with the employment of skilled workers who execute the more difficult parts of the construction. Invasiones are usually found in peripheral areas of cities, or on land not suitable because of location or topography for development in standard economic terms.

3. Urbanizaciones piratas: These are illegal subdivisions, i.e., land which has not been approved for development according to law and municipal regulations. They are usually found on the outskirts of the city, and plots of land within them are sold by the owners without regard to law and in the knowledge that proper municipal services may not be provided. They do have access roads, though these are often unpaved and not graded or scraped.

4. Public housing projects for low-income families: These, too, are usually at some distance from the central city because of lower land costs in peripheral areas. A large element of self-help, i.e., a contribution of construction materials and labor by the occupant is injected into many of these projects. Such publicly sponsored projects are increasingly being planned as "site and service" schemes in which the lot is provided with infrastructure such as water supply, sewerage, electric power, and access roads, but the occupant provides the major shelter elements.

5. Urbanizaciones populares: These are legal subdivisions where the purchasers of lots are expected to be families of low income. Standard services are expected within a

stated time period, but do not differ greatly in appearance from the pirate sub-divisions or from invasion areas which have had time to consolidate themselves.

Invasiones are not all alike. Some invaded areas are provisional only in that they do not improve over time into permanent areas of settlement. This is because the areas are too small, or because they are on land which is too central in location and too strongly committed to what in American real estate language is called its "highest and best" use. Other urban invasiones are progressively improved and become recognized and enduring neighborhoods. In intermediate cities, and sometimes on the edges of large municipalities, the invasiones assume a semi-rural character, in that the plots are large enough to permit some subsistence agriculture.

Colombia's cities vary in the degree to which they have been affected by the various forms of popular settlement. Bogota, for instance, has had few invasiones but has many and extensive urbanizaciones piratas and inquilinatos. Cartegena has clusters of invasiones, one of which, at the approach of the walled city, is in the process of clearance and renewal by the Instituto de Credito Territorial.

CID has investigated the sixteen largest cities of Colombia to determine variations in housing patterns. The organization used the housing data gathered by the 1964

census, which may no longer be completely indicative because of the rapid growth rates of the Colombian urban centers. But there are some surprises. Barranquilla, for example, had a higher than average number of individual housing units, owned by their occupants and provided with the basic public services of water supply, sewerage, and electricity. The hasty observer, on his way to the ferry slip and its surrounding shacks, would not have guessed this to be true. Cali and Santa Marta were above the national average in housing quality, but below in basic services. Santa Marta looks scruffy once the visitor leaves its water-front, and evidently it is. Bucaramanga, Monteria, and Cucuta have a higher percentage of shacks than the national average (the ratio calculated is that of temporary structures as against solid buildings) but score well in services; Cartagena and Neiva had the same high percentage of temporary structures but did not service their housing as well as the preceding cities.

Bogota and Ibague had more than the national average of solidly built multi-family units, and met or exceeded the national average in services; Medellin, surprisingly, had permitted a greater degree of dilapidation in its inquilinatos. Manizales, Pereira, and Armenia had multi-family structures in similar percentages to Bogota, Ibague,

and Medellin, but were deficient in services.*

With its current population growth, Colombia needs at least 60,000 new housing units annually to meet the demand generated by new family formation.** This figure does not take into account the desirable replacement of unsound existing dwellings, nor does it make allowance for the shift of population to the urban centers. The Instituto de Credito Territorial, which is responsible for Colombia's public sector housing, believes that this estimate is low. Using the census definition of "urban" (all settled places of 1,500 population), ICT suggests that between 1970 and 1975, new urban families will be formed at an average annual rate of 162,000, which makes a total of 810,000 for the five year period. The trend will accelerate, as the compounding of annual increases must suggest, in the five year period from 1975 to 1980, when there will be (according to the projections) more than a million new family formations in urban settlements, averaging 213,000 per year.***

According to the same ICT source, the most optimistic

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* Valenzuela, Jaime G. y Jorge Rodriguez G. Situaciones de Vivienda Urbana en Colombia, 1951-64. Bogota, Universidad Nacional, CID, 1971.

** IDB Social Progress Trust Fund Ninth Annual Report 1969. Socio-Economic Progress in Latin America. Washington, D.C., Inter-American Development Bank. March 6, 1969. p. 274.

*** ICT. Boletin de Estadistica N° 4. Bogota, ICT, 1969, Cuadro N° 6.

projections of increase in the housing supply will leave urban Colombia with a housing deficit of 1,200,000 units in 1980. The present deficit is placed at 539,000. This estimate assumes that the annual number of housing starts will, in 1980, exceed the present rate by 58 per cent, with the private sector increasing its addition to the housing supply by 75 per cent.

Table I presents the past, present, and estimated future urban housing needs in Colombia. (It should be remembered that this table, as all ICT information cited, uses the census definition of "urban").

TABLE I

National Urban Housing Deficit (000's): 1951-1980

Year	Urban Families	Annual Construction ICT Units	Annual Construction Other Units	Units in Housing Stock	Urban housing Unit Deficit
1951	772.2	1.2	17.6	660.3	111.8
1964	1,674.2	8.5	54.5	1,344.1	330.1
1970	2,380.0	19.8	82.5	1,840.0	539.9
1975	3,190.7	17.5	111.0	2,371.2	819.5
1980	4,277.5	17.2	144.3	3,035.0	1,242.5

Source: ICT. Boletin de Estadistica N° 4. Bogota, ICT, 1969. Cuadro N° 6.

The ICT estimate of housing deficit is subject to some reduction in that many new families will live with relatives or rent quarters in existing housing. It is also

an estimate by rule, rather than by fact, in that houses which are presently incomplete, or which are dilapidated, or which are over-crowded, are counted in the deficit, but are subject to improvement by their occupants, thus reducing the deficit to some degree. This does not mean that the figures are not an index of need, nor that a sharp rise in housing standards and expectations would not increase rather than diminish them.

In response to the demand for housing, ICT's programs have produced more than 144,000 units since the agency was founded in 1942. The main thrust of its effort came in the decade of the 1960s, when IDB and USAID guarantee programs became available and were widely used. The ICT programs have a wide range in the character of the housing which the agency assists, in the financing mechanisms which it employs, and in the loan terms granted to the purchaser. The Instituto has four major programs for infrastructure development and community development and nine separate programs which support housing construction. Two of these programs--direct construction and assisted self-help housing--account for 75 per cent of ICT's housing volume. The volume is shown on the following page.

TABLE II

ICT Housing Volume: 1942-1968

Program	N° of Units	% of Total
TOTAL	140,[illegible]	
Direct Construction	44	31.72
Self-Help	62,372	44.24
Shared Finance	15,437	7.14
Loans to Lot Owners	9,888	7.02
Tugurio Improvement	2,292	1.63
Other Schemes	6,250	4.44

Source: Information in a letter from Rafael V. Stevenson, ICT, May 20, 1970.

Although the two major programs are (in the nature of public activities) nominally oriented to low-income families, the constraints of cost--land, infrastructure, and construction--make it very difficult to reach the lowest income groups through ICT-supported action. The direct construction programs, for example, supply housing units which range from $1,750 to $4,500 in stated cost. Down payments average $800, and the units are financed on fifteen year repayment terms at 14 per cent annual interest. The income range to qualify under these programs is from $120 to $175 in monthly earnings.

Income data are elusive in Colombia but it has been estimated by ICT itself that "a shocking and growing number of our people receive a monthly salary of less than 600

pesos," i.e., $30.*

Income figures developed by Urrutia and de Sandoval** support the ICT statement, in that they show that in Medellin and Manizales, the percentage of families with monthly incomes below $40 is 36 per cent and 62 per cent respectively. In the same cities, the percentage of families which might be eligible for participation in the ICT direct construction program would be about 20 per cent and 10 per cent respectively. Obviously, the direct construction program does not penetrate deeply into Colombian society, for the simple reason that too few people have incomes high enough to permit them to participate.

The self-help program tries harder, and does better. Under this sceme, ICT provides developed land, building plans, materials, and technical assistance. The cost of a finished unit comes to about $1,400, financed on terms of repayment in twenty years at an annual interest rate of 10 per cent. With a down payment of $150 and monthly carrying charges of $12, these units, according to ICT, are within the financial capacity of families whose incomes range from $50 to $85 a month.

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* ICT. Vivienda y Desarrollo Urbano. Bogota, ICT, 1969.

** Urrutia, Miguel M. and Clara Elsa V. de Sandoval. Distribucion de Ingresos Urbanos para Colombia en 1964. Bogota, CID, 1970.

The sad fact is that even ICT's self-help housing does not meet the needs of the very numerous fraction of Colombia's population who earn only enough to supply themselves with the basic necessities of daily life, principally food. No housing program can do so, unless there is a break-through, not yet foreseeable, in the costs of land, infrastructure, construction, and interest rates--or conversely, in the income level of the urban masses.

ICT does not forecast an increase in its activities. It was responsible for 20,000 housing starts in 1970; in 1980, it projects that its programs will be responsible for only 17,200 units. Its share of the development of urban housing in 1970 was 20 per cent; in 1980, it will drop to 10 per cent.

There are several possible reasons for this decline. It could be that private builders are expected to take over much of the program, or that the market which ICT has found will be exhausted if incomes do not rise, or that ICT is itself unable to foresee the financing sources it will require to meet increasing demands for the subsidies it pays to keep down interest rates. It is also likely that that the decline reflects increased investment in infrastructure projects for low income barrios, which would not add to the count of housing units constructed.

ICT has put 60 per cent of its program activity into the largest cities (Bogota, Medellin, Cali, and Barranquilla)

and 33 per cent in the intermediate cities which have populations of more than 100,000 but less than 500,000. Seven per cent of the program has gone to smaller communities. It would be a fair guess, but only a guess, that ability to pay has been the unacknowledged criterion of ICT investment. It is evident that income, and hence demand (assisted perhaps by superior organizing abilities and executive energies) have served to concentrate the ICT program.

Public housing programs in Colombia will have to be reappraised and re-directed if they are to be directed toward regional development, as one objective, and at specific application to low income families as another. This is easier to write than to perform.

Whatever may be the short-comings of the ICT program, the 144,000 dwelling units which it has constructed have brought improved housing to 835,000 Colombians*--a figure which exceeds the total present population of Barranquilla. It has meant visible and enduring improvement for the urban environment of the cities in which it operates.

TOWARD AN URBAN REFORM LAW

The word "reform" is subject to many meanings. Senator

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* The average urban family size in Colombia is 5.8 persons, according to the 1964 census.

Roscoe Conkling, a snarler in the grand manner and the embodiment of machine politics, once snarled that "when Dr. Johnson defined 'patriotism' as 'the last refuge of a scoundrel' he forgot the potential of the word 'reform'." Reform in its North American context usually means a mild change in the direction toward which all "right-thinking" citizens would wish to go. In its Latin American context, it is more likely to be charged with emotion and convey a sense of radical, if not revolutionary action. Colombia, true to its sense of public concern with urban affairs, has a history of proposals for urban land reform, with a bill presented by the present administration as the latest effort to shape urban land po..cies to fit desired goals in urban land use.

Pedro Pablo Morcillo* has described past efforts at "urban reform" in Colombia. A bill was introduced in 1966 which deservedly failed. As Morcillo rightly says, "it fostered the belief that housing is subject to expropriation, leading to a contraction in construction acitivity due to the risk of investing in housing which might later be expropriated. Since a socialized economy was not substituted for the present system of private property, the effect was counter-productive, as it is obvious that no one would wish to build only to have the investment expropriated

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* Morcillo is a professional urban planner who is now an advisor to President Pastrana on public administration.

at a later date. Thus dependence on the private economy continued, but a private economy threatened with expropriation."

A second urban reform bill was introduced in 1969. It also failed of passage. Morcillo does not lament its failure because he believes that the country needs a comprehensive series of acts dealing with the following:

1. Municipal aspects, both administrative and financial;
2. Physical development and land ownership;
3. Financing of housing;
4. Regional development;
5. Training of specialized personnel for municipal planning and administration.

The Government introduced still another urban reform bill on October 22, 1970, which is not of the comprehensive character which Morcillo evidently would prefer. The specific objectives of the legislation were:

a. to reform the structure governing urban development so that the use of urban land is in accord with the country's social needs;
b. to provide housing and governmental services to Colombia's "popular sector."

The bill now proposed will undoubtedly be substantially amended in the Congress, where it will require a two-thirds majority (as does all legislation) to be adopted. The

legislation proposes rather complicated tax penalties as means of diverting construction from luxury to lower income housing and as a means for forcing owners to develop under-utilized urban land.

INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

Colombia has consistently sought both technical assistance and financial support from international agencies, which seem to regard Colombia as a favored area of operations. It has had, in spite of sporadic internal violence, the enduring party truce called the National Front which constitutionally provided for sixteen years of political stability, and it was an early convert to the institutional structures for planning and development which international assistance agencies find comforting. The World Bank has directed a consortium of assistance agencies which had the mission of helping Colombia find external support for its development plans. The country was an early and eager participant in the Alliance for Progress and Alberto Lleras Camargo, one of Colombia's former presidents, had been for seven years Secretary General of the Organization of American States. Assistance from the United States has been welcome, including a substantial Peace Corps presence when that program was in flower, and the Agency for International Development continues to operate a country program out of Bogota. International planners who have worked in

Colombia include such well-known persons as David Lilienthal, Le Corbusier, Lauchlin Currie, and Dudley Seers.

Our interest, however, is in the contribution which international agencies are making to urban and regional planning and development. USAID is presently negotiating a loan of $24,000,000 to assist Colombia in the development of its intermediate cities. The Departamento Nacional de Planeación has been much interested in regional development, as noted, and the role of intermediate cities is obviously an important one in regional planning.

The current USAID loan proposal, included at the time of writing in the country field submission for Fiscal 1972, is a major change of direction for USAID.* The amount represents one-third of the loan funds programmed for Colombia and is therefore important in money terms. It is also important in terms of doctrine, and, if judged successful, may well have an effect on USAID policy throughout the world.

According to the USAID submission documents, the purpose of the loan will be:

> to assist in redirecting migration away from the four major cities of Colombia through job creation and municipal infrastructure improvement in intermediate cities; to improve living conditions in the four major cities through

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* Subsequent revised submissions vary as to the loan amount and the Colombian agencies involved, but the broad objectives and implementation strategy of the proposed program remain substantially unchanged. (ed. note).

extension of public services to low income areas; and to improve local and regional planning capacities.*

The borrower of the USAID funds will, of course, be the Government of Colombia, and the implementing agencies will be:

1. Fondo Financiero de Desarrollo Urbano--a rediscount line in the Bank of the Republic which finances municipal infrastructure improvements from the sale of its own bonds.
2. Fondo Financiero Industrial--a rediscount line in the Bank of the Republic that finances small and medium industrial development from the sale of its own bonds.
3. Departamento Nacional de Planeacion--the national planning agency already discussed in this survey paper.
4. Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo (FONADE)--the agency in charge of feasibility studies.

In order to stimulate the construction of urban infrastructure, the loan will be directed at promoting those programs which can be made self-liquidating through the widely used valorization technique. Valorization is a form of benefit assignment against properties which have received such improvement as water lines, sewers, and

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* USAID. "Urban/Regional Development Sector Loan". Country Field Submission FY 1972, Colombia. p. 28.

street paving. The central government will make available the initial funds which municipalities may use for valorization programs; with support from the USAID loan, the amount available would be scheduled to increase from $16,800,000 in 1970 to $47,500,000 in 1975. The hope is by that time it would be a self-sustaining revolving fund, meeting new demands from repayments. The national planning agency estimates that the requirement and absorptive capacity of Colombian cities for water supply, sewerage, and street paving projects is $50,000,000 annually. It is estimated that half this amount can be financed by valorization.

It is also proposed that the USAID loan will assist in the creation of eight new municipal banks, operating at the level of the departamento, by the end of 1972. Such banks would be modeled on IDEA, the Instituto de Desarrollo de Antioquia, which makes loans and provides technical assistance to municipalities for the construction of all types of public works. The Antioquian experience has been very successful, with a 100 per cent completion record for the projects which received loans and a 95 per cent repayment to the Instituto.

The USAID proposal contemplates assistance to the national government in financing similar municipal development banks in the departamentos of Caldas, Boyaca, Santander, Norte de Santander, Huila, Tolima, Valle, and Sucre. These departamentos have about one-third of the

country's total population. There is a caveat in the USAID consideration of this, however, in that there is some discussion in the national government of setting up municipal banks in each of twenty-two departamentos and territories. We would agree with the cayeat--such dilution of effort would probably vitiate the program.

The USAID proposal also would provide additional credit for industrial development by making it possible to increase the capitalization of the Fondo Financiero Industrial from its 1970 level of $11,250,000 to $29,750,000 in 1975. The portion of this allocated to loans in the intermediate cities would increase from 20 per cent in 1970 to 40 per cent at the close of 1972.

The USAID program would give financial assistance to newly formed Regional Industrial Development Institutes and stimulate the creation of more of them, with the target figure set at from six to eight. A presently functioning example of this type of organization is the Fundacion para el Desarrollo Industrial del Valle (FDI). This agency, locally based and organized at Cali, carries out studies to identify problems impending industrial growth, explores possible solutions to these problems, and analyzes overall industrial growth potential.

The USAID loan will also be used to improve the capability of municipal, departmental, and public service corporation policy units to perform their duties. Under

this target, a suitable institution will be selected to design and conduct a series of short courses for the personnel of such agencies; out-of-country training will be provided for selected staff in economics, public administration, and city planning leading to M.A. and Ph.D. degrees; and a revolving fund would be set up to finance, on behalf of departamentos and intermediate cities, "studies of various types including general plans, prefeasibility studies, project design and valorization studies."

These proposals are not yet in final form, and obviously, therefore, no loan agreement has yet been concluded. There will probably be some variations in the program as finally agreed upon. But working from the proposals, it is possible to discuss its philosophy, contemplated procedures, and probable results.

As the project is presently conceived, there would be reason to question whether it is as sharply focused as it might be. If its purpose is to promote development in the intermediate cities, while progress in the cities of more than 500,000 is left to existing instruments, it can be argued that it should do that and only that. As the project is now written, the funds can be expended both in the largest cities and in the smallest hamlets. IDEA, for instance, has made loans to more than ninety of the 105 municipalities in Antioquia; it is hard to see how newly

established municipal banks can avoid the same pressures and the same necessities.

It will take either iron determination on the part of the disbursing agencies or an iron-clad agreement negotiated by USAID to direct the augmented funds made available to the Government of Colombia and its agencies to the intermediate cities that are its projected target. Granting that this might be done, the additional funding will be available to all of the intermediate cities, which may number from sixteen to twenty-three over the expenditure period of the loan, if the figure of 100,000 population is employed. The scale of development assistnace to a particular city would be established by the operation of a free market, i.e., funds would be directed to those cities which demonstrate the greatest capacity to claim and utilize them. The scale of assistance would thus be a function of the entrepreneurial skills of administrators and civic leaders in any single city.

This approach to the distribution of funds has been the subject of much discussion among urbanists in Colombia and in the international assistance agencies. At issue is the possibility that the loan funds will be distributed so thinly that the critical mass of investment needed to achieve a spurt in development will not be reached in any one city, except as the loan funds supplement other more strongly funded efforts. It can be, and is argued, from an

altogether different point of view, that those cities which already have a high level of absorptive capacity will take the lion's share of the funds (by acting most agressively to obtain and use them) unless the program to improve local planning and managerial ability is very rapidly effective in the weaker cities. We would be more concerned with the first possibility, which is the objective of the program, as we understand it. The aim is not equality of growth among a class of cities but the stimulation of opportunity planning and opportunity action in those intermediate communities best able to respond.

Experience will be the ultimate arbitrator in this debate. But it is clear that the relatively complete set of operating, planning, and executive agencies which now exist in Colombia will make it possible for the USAID proposal to become effective, if its terms and its amounts are sufficient to add significantly to the urban strength already shown by the intermediate cities in Colombia.

The effectiveness of this sector loan as ultimately negotiated and executed may well have a broad impact on the type and scale of urban assistance in future USAID programs. The agency's past involvement in urban matters has been limited, with few exceptions, to project planning for specific urban centers, housing, and related infrastructure. It is the view of some staff memebers at USAID, Washington, particularly the urban specialists

within the Technical Assistance Bureau and the Bureau for Latin America, that the loan proposal for Colombia might be a prototype for future USAID programming in urban development.

USAID and the Colombian Government have made an initial cooperative effort in regional planning and development. Four studies, financed through AID grants, are in progress. They deal with migration flows, the marginal cost of urban infrastructure, and the existing constraints on the expansion of industry and infrastructure in "intermediate" cities. American specialists are carrying out the studies, which will be completed in 1971. The client is the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Planeacion, which will use them in developing the national investment budget for 1972, and in its annual up-dating of the current three year plan.*

There are, of course, other international assistance agencies working in Colombia that are concerned with urban problems and programs, but for orderly progress in this section of the report, we will continue with USAID experience. There was a small American involvement in the planning process at Cali, where USAID assigned four advisors to the planning agency for relatively brief terms of service. There are conflicting reports as to their

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* Plan de Desarrollo Economico y Social 1970-1973.

effectiveness.

USAID has supported housing programs in Colombia, both directly and through the Foundation for Cooperative Housing. Its investment guarantee program has committed $34,800,000 to housing projects, and its loans to the Government of Colombia have totalled $19,500,000. According to AID's reports, the direct loan program helped to finance 22,000 housing units, largely under self-help

Supported by USAID's Latin American regional program, the Foundation for Cooperative Housing (FCH) has been active in Colombia since 1964. Its first study was completed in that year for the Colombian Federation of Housing Cooperatives (FEDECOOP), which was organized to sponsor cooperative housing. FCH subsequently helped develop a comprehensive program nd assisted in the establishment of a technical service for cooperatives. This last was sponsored by the Instituto Credito Territorial, FEDECOOP, and Promotora de Vivienda Cooperativa (PROVICOOP). PROVICOOP's Banderas project in Bogota, has programmed the construction of only 970 units, and the combined total of other cooperative projects in the country account for even fewer housing units than are proposed for Banderas.

The Inter-American Development Bank, (IDB) has sponsored an important housing program in Colombia. From 1961 to 1970, it assisted in financing the construction of more

than 29,000 units, representing $34,100,000 in IDB loans. Most of the IDB program was placed outside of Bogota; there were twenty-eight communities included in one year's commitments (1964) alone.

IDB and the World Bank have both financed programs in urban infrastructure. IDB made loans totalling $38,000,000 between 1961 and 1968 for infrastructure development in Cali, Medellin, Cartagena, and Cucuta. Its loans to the Instituto Nacional de Fomento Municipal provided financing for water and sewerage systems in 367 smaller communities. The World Bank has supported expansion of the power supply systems of Bogota and Medellin, and expansions of water supply systems in Bogota, Cali, Palmira, and Bucaramanga.

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the World Bank has acted as the founding father of a consortium of aid-giving countries and agencies. It set up a Grupo de Consulta in 1962, which has brought the assistance agencies and the Government of Colombia into an annual consultation. The countries include the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland, Spain, and Canada and the agencies include IDB and the World Bank itself. The aid-giving countries have their special areas of interest, and urban problems have not had a high priority with most of them. The Grupo keeps an inventory of both assistance requested and assistance granted, and as such can serve as a focus for international interest in Colombian urbanization.

But there are always problems, even for the World Bank. Its recent sponsorship, together with the UNDP, of the transport and urban development study by Freeman, Fox, Wilbur Smith and Associates has left some hard feelings in Bogota. Its cost in dollars is moderate ($207,000 in UNDP funds and $64,000 in counterpart money), and its quality is professional. According to some urbanists in Bogota, the staff of the Departamento Administrativo de Planificacion Distrital was not significantly involved in the planning process. These observers suggest that the staff was called upon primarily to supply data, and that they acquired little knowledge of the detailed analysis that went into the report. The report, which is discussed more fully in our treatment of planning for Bogota, proposes a choice between five possible patterns of growth for the metropolitan city. Because local staff did not participate in the analysis, it is difficult for them now to be of maximum service, observers note, in advising as to the various lines of development outlined in the study.

The International Labor Office proposed a World Employment Program, under which "pilot" country missions were to be set up to study, with the help of other agencies, the causes of unemployment in particular countries and to bring out what needed to be done both internationally and nationally. The then President of Colombia, Lleras

Restrepo, was first in line in asking for such a survey and made a special plea that it be carried out before the expiration of this term of office in August, 1970. Dudley Seers, Director of the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, was the leader of the mission which included twenty-six specialists provided by no less than twelve organizations. Although the group did not include a professional urbanist or regional planner as such, its report necessarily discusses urban and rural relationships in their Colombian context.

A CLASH OF STRATEGIES

The international agencies or more properly various specialists representing or employed by them, are supporting development strategies which would, if successfully executed, have sharply differing effects on Colombia's urban environment. The key word is "successfully" for there can be no guarantee that a national strategy, even if accepted and announced, can be carried out in practice over a sufficient period of time to have more than a marginal effect upon the courses which the people themselves have chosen.

All international agencies, and no doubt many Colombians, would recommend a pronounced decline in Colombia's rate of population growth. With a slow decline

in fertility, the population in 1985 is projected at 34,500,000, and at the end of the century at 50,500,000. With a faster decline in fertility, the figures would be 32,500,000 in 1985 and 48,000,000 in the year 2000. These calculations assume an annual gain in life expectation for men of six-tenths of one per cent and for seven-tenths of one per cent. The fertility assumptions in the slow decline calculation are a drop from 0.213 in 1965-70 to 0.123 by 1990-95; the faster decline projections assumes that the 1990-95 fertility rate will be reached in 1980-85.*

A more substantial drop in family size would effect a rapid reduction in the need for educational facilites, and accelerate, one would think, the per capita increase in the national income, and, over a longer time period, reduce the number of persons seeking employment from the figures which now must be projected to a somewhat lesser number, depending upon its timing and intensity. There is no evidence that the growth of the urban areas would be significantly reduced, but conventional demographic wisdom would suggest that a falling birth rate would show itself most strongly there. This might decrease the rate of natural increase in the cities, but it would not necessarily reduce the rate of in-migration which is the origin of their extraordinarily rapid population growth.

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* Seers. op.cit. Chapter II, p.2.

As a matter of fact, there is no evidence yet that Colombians are ready to limit the size of their families to the extent that the limitation will in any way balance declining death rates. Nor will their government urge them to do so. There may be a slow reduction in family size in the years ahead, but if it comes, it will be a societal decision and not a public one.

A population control strategy will certainly not be effective in Colombia in the next decade and possibly not in the decade after that. The people that Colombia must be concerned with in the next three decades are either already there or reliably forecast.

The Seers Missions, sponsored by the ILO, recommends a "full employment" strategy to create five million jobs. We must comment that its suggestions on the role of urbanization are "thin" even if we do not join in Frankenhoff's strictures that the Report has an anti-urban bias. He takes particular exception to the statement in the Report that "accelerated urbanisation would bring into Colombia even more rapidly the problems found in all the world's big cities--social dissolution, rising crime rates, growing use of drugs, increasing noise and filthier air. Anyone contemplating international experience would hesitate before setting off a strategy that positively invites these problems."* We would mildly suggest that anyone contemplating

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* Ibid. Chapter IV "A Full Employment Strategy". p. 3.

Colombian experience, even with our limited knowledge, might have kept in mind that crime is not necessarily confined to cities; Colombia's notorious period of rural violence which is said to have taken more than 200,000 lives is the best possible evidence of that.

Chapter VII of the Seers Mission Report deals with "the Rural-Urban Balance" and is the Report's only sustained discussion of urban and regional policy. It is only twelve mimeographed pages of the several hundred contained in a very voluminous document. As we noted earlier in the Regional Planning section of this survey, its recommendations "so far add up to a plea for a considerable strengthening of the smaller towns--of those urban areas that is, which were shown to have been left behind during the last thirty years." It is not clear how this is to be done, as the language is itself full of qualifications and doubts. We quote:

> Our discussion has attempted to shift the emphasis to the small towns, and to the idea of integrated regional planning. This task, however, is formidable in view of the fact that the whole exercise has to start from scratch. No experience exists at present with this type of regional policy; the number of mistakes that could be made is very large, and the financial implications are also rather overwhelming. We suggest therefore that it may be necessary to designate, say, three pioneer areas so that the limited resources available will not be squandered by fragmentation, and in order to acquire the necessary experience before attempting to set up these mechanisms on a national scale. Another advantage would be to set up a focal region where external as well as internal resources can be concentrated

> and coordinated to achieve general strategic objectives in place of individual uncoordinated projects. The choice of these areas obviously raises extremely difficult problems of a political as well as a socio-economic nature, especially since, although the ultimate objective it to reduce inequalities between regions the immediate impact may be to increase inequalities within them. All we would suggest there is that they should cover between them a sufficiently wide range of situations to make the effort relevant to the rest of the country, and that the pressing claims of the least developed regions of the country should be fully taken into account. Such areas might be selected, for example, from the Atlantic Coast region representing mainly export crops, irrigation and tourism, from a coffee region like Caldas where money is available from coffeé revenues for speeding up diversification, and from the Narino/Putumayo region representing the Andean mountains and colonisation problems.*

The report does not accept what it calls "the strategy proposed by Dr. Lauchlin Currie" which, as we understand it from secondary sources, calls for a complete rationalization of Colombian agriculture and the absorption of the surplus rural population in an urban environment and in urban employment. It states that "we started by asking the question: what would be involved if all of the 5,000,000 extra jobs had to be provided outside the agricultural sector--broadly the strategy proposed by Dr. Lauchlin Currie. Since there are now 2,500,000 full-time jobs in the rest of the economy, employment there would have to treble, i.e., rise by some

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* Ibid. Chapter VII, pp. 8-9.

eight per cent a year over these fifteen years."*

The Seers Mission Report does strongly urge what we understand to be one of Dr. Currie's points when it states that "the most suitable dynamic force" for achieving its goals is "construction, including private housing."** One would normally consider construction to be an urban related industry.

We did not have an opportunity to meet Dr. Currie nor have we, at the time of writing, had access to his own writings on Colombian development policy. His views are likely to be of increasing importance; his appointment as advisor to the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Planeacion was announced while we were in Bogota.

Frankenhoff*** who is at swords drawn with the Seers Mission Report, advocates a strategy which would give "special priority to metropolitan development programs." "The objective," he writes, "of such a metropolitan development policy would be to offset the disequilibrium situation being produced by centralization of resources in Bogota and the selection of those middle city centers which broaden the base of metropolitan development in Bogota." He goes on to say that what he is suggesting

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* Ibid. Chapter IV, p. 2.

** Ibid. Chapter XX, p. 1.

*** Frankenhoff. op. cit. p. 43.

"implies not only a need for a stragegy of metropolitan development but also, and integrally, an employment strategy. This metropolitan employment strategy is distinct from and almost incompatible with the employment strategy" developed by the Seers Mission, which Frankenhoff unflattering calls "a classical example of the perils of short term international technical assistance, developing a strategy of employment foreign to the Colombian reality and to its planning objectives." USAID is ready to assist the official planning policy of developing intermediate cities as growth poles, as noted in the discussion of international agencies working in urbanization programs in Colombia.

We are sure that we could find experts who would argue that there would be nothing untoward in further concentration of Colombia's urban population and development processes at Bogota, and that the idea of "disequilibria" and the doctrine of growth poles should be disregarded. This is the line taken in a recent report rendered to Venezuela's Direccion de Planeamiento, Ministerio de Obras Publicas, by an international consulting firm. (This report will be discussed in our country survey of Venezuela.)

We are not so rash as to contribute still another strategy to the various proposals now advocated. Our judgment would be that there will be no clear-cut decision to commit the nation fully to any of the policies which

theoreticians may more safely advance than governments. We do not think that Colombia faces "an urban crisis" which would compel so final a choice, nor do we know any methodology which could--in a democratic society and in a mixed economy--be powerful enough in its effects to make any of the proposed strategies fully effective.

We think that the debate is a healthy one, and that its issues will be settled in the market-place of conflicting pressures arising from the needs and energies of the cities and regions of the country.

Colombia, it seems to us, has been fortunate in having available to it a pattern of urban settlement which lends itself to a development mix rather than a development doctrine. There is room for natural selection as well as for pre-determination by planning and channeled investment, and their interplay should carry the country into its urban future with some degree of confidence. The caveats would be the continuance of the political stability which has prevailed under the National Front, whose constitutional authority expires in 1974, and a public willingness, because of a conviction that things are getting better and not worse, to be satisfied with the reality of incremental gains rather than the promise of instant satisfaction of all wants.

It seems to us that Colombia, with its wide and varied territories, its energetic and productive popula-

tion, its differentiated cities, its willingness to construct and alter urban institutions, has a physical and social base which is strong enough to support a population of 40,000,000 in 1990 without a serious deterioration in its environment and with a rise in the living standards and opportunities open to an increasingly urban population. The country is self-sufficient in foodstuffs, energy sources, and skills. Its agricultural land is not yet at full productivity. Its specialized agriculture has produced a source of export earnings, and its industrialization should make its manufactured products competitive in external markets as well as reasonably priced for domestic consumers. Its geographical advantages are fixed, and its disadvantages are capable of correction by the steady improvement of internal transportation, which has been in progress in the years since World War II. We believe that Colombia has a favorable ratio of population to natural resources and we believe that it can adjust one to the other through this century.

An International
Urbanization Survey Report
to the Ford Foundation

Urbanization in Venezuela

This working paper was prepared as supportive material for an International Survey of Urbanization in the developing countries, which was organized by the Ford Foundation late in 1970 and was completed late in 1972. The purpose of the Survey was to provide findings and recommendations to guide the Foundation in making informed judgments on its future participation in programs related to the urban condition in the less developed countries.

The Survey was directed neither to perform nor to commission original research. Its work was to be reportorial, analytic, and indicative of program choices. To serve these objectives, the Survey was essentially a field operation in which the staff travelled widely in the countries where the Foundation maintains field offices and drew not only upon its own observations but upon the experience of Foundation personnel assigned to the developing countries. The staff's own field notes on phases of urbanization in specific countries were expanded into working papers both to record observations and to clarify the deductive processes and the analyses of data which were to form a demonstrable basis for the Survey's conclusions. Additional working papers were provided by Foundation personnel with a depth of field knowledge, and by consultants expert either in specific countries or in topics of special interest.

The Survey working papers and special studies were originally intended only for internal use. It became evident, however, that the body of material had values which argued for wider exposure. Accordingly, the Foundation is publishing the papers for those with special country or topical interests and for those interested in the material as a whole.

The working papers carry disclaimers appropriate to the circumstances of their preparation and to the limitations of their original purpose. The reader should not expect to find in them either the product of original research or a comprehensive treatment of the processes of urbanization in the particular country. Rather, they are occasional papers whose unity derives from their use as exemplary and illustrative material for the Survey.

But unity of form and substance is not the measure of their value. Each report and special study is an essay on some aspect of urbanization in the developing countries. In most instances, they are what a good essay should be— unmistakably personalized and therefore reflective of the insights and the convictions of informed authors.

The International Urbanization Survey

John P. Robin, Director
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Urbanization in Venezuela

by

John P. Robin and Frederick C. Terzo

Consultant: Jaime Valenzuela

International Urbanization Survey

The Ford Foundation

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

URBANIZATION IN VENEZUELA

INTERNATIONAL URBANIZATION SURVEY

INTRODUCTION

If, as F. Scott Fitzgerald wrote, the very rich are different from the rest of us, Venezuela should be a very different kind of country than its Latin American neighbors, and indeed, than most countries in the world except those which are pleased to call themselves fully developed. It has a per capital income of $900 per year--which is more than that of the Republic of Ireland and more than that of Greece ($651) and Spain ($707). Its Gross National Product, which is shared by about ten and a half million people, is 8.7 billion dollars. Colombia, with more than twice Venezuela's population, must make do with a GNP of 5.0 billion dollars. Peru and Ecuador together have a smaller GNP than Venezuela alone; Peru's GNP has reached only 4.0 billion dollars and Ecuador's is only 1.6 billion.

Venezuela has a very favorable balance of trade. It has a very stable currency. Its industrial workers are well paid by most standards, with an average monthly wage of $130. There are 550,000 motor vehicles in the country, or one passenger car for every 25 persons; in Colombia the ratio is one to 182, and in Peru it is one to 59.*

* The figures cited in these opening paragraphs are taken from The New York Times Encyclopedic Almanac 1971. New York, 1969. They are subject to correction and updating, but the relative position of the countries would not, in all likelihood, be substantially changed thereby.

Nor is income distribution so markedly skewed as is sometimes thought. The 5 per cent of Venezuelans with the highest incomes get 26 per cent of the national income; the 50 per cent with the lowest incomes get only 14 per cent. Which is shocking enough until one looks at the United States and the United Kingdom; in those two countries, the upper five per cent of the population by income receives 20 per cent of the total, while the lower 50 per cent gets 23 per cent. The disparity between the countries is not as great as one would have imagined, and the income available for the "middle class" in Venezuela is substantial.*

The source of the country's wealth is, of course, its oil. It is the world's third largest producer, following only the United States and the U.S.S.R. Only 20 per cent, however, of the country's GNP is not attributed to mineral production. Our interest in Venezuela is not in its relative wealth as such, but in the effects which such abundance of resources has had on the urban development of the country, upon its pattern of population distribution, and upon the conscious effort of the Venezuelan government--with investment monies available to it that are matched in few developing countries--to reshape its

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* These are the figures cited in the Seers Mission Report: Seers, Dudley et. al. Colombia Employment Programme. Geneva, ILO, 1970.

population pattern by the planning of new urban centers and by the opening of previously undeveloped areas to settlement and industrialization.

The country's population has been heavily committed to its coastal fringe (unlike Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador with their thickly settled Andean highlands). The coastal areas are also Venezuela's principal oil-bearing lands, and the country's exploitation of its oil resources, beginning in 1918, strengthened the coastal zones even where they had been previously (as the Lake Maracaibo region had been) classified as among the poorest and least important areas of the country. Maracaibo as a city had 40,000 people in 1917; today it has an estimated population of more than 700,000.

The form of settlement in Venezuela is not unlike that of California, with its population heavily concentrated on the coast and within the valleys of the coastal ranges. The large cities begin with Maracaibo on the west, jum the narrow mouth of the lake of that name to Coro; continue east to the megalopolis that is forming around Caracas, and extend east again to Barcelona-Puerto La Cruz, after which there is the emptiness of the Orinoco delta. Venezuela has 11 urban centers with populations of more than 100,000; six of them are within a few miles of the Caribbean sea.

Venezuela has become a highly urban country; an urban majority is certain to be shown in the 1971 census,

whose preliminary returns may be available before the end of the year. The census was taken on March 15.

According to 1967 estimates*, the urban concentrations of more than 100,000 population had a combined total of four million people, or 40 per cent of the country's total. The 1961 census classified as urban all settlements of 2,500 or more, and came out with an urban-rural ratio of 67.8 per cen. urban to 32.2 per cent rural. By raising the urban threshold to places of 5,000, the national urban percentage became 57.6. The United Nations urban standard of 20,000 reduced the urban quotient of the population to just less than a majority: 47.1 per cent.** Projections which use the 5,000 classification give Venezuela a 1970 urban percentage of 68.2 per c. t, carry it to 75.9 per cent in 1980, and predict a total population of 28,146,000 in the year 2000, with 86 out of every 100 inhabitants living in an urban place.***

The speed of urbanization has been very rapid. A generation ago, in 1930, Venezuela had only six cities of

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* Sociedad Venezolana de Planificacion. Cuadernos 62-63. Caracas, April 1969.

** Yabour de Caldera, Elizabeth. La Poblacion de Venezuela: Un Analisis Demografico. University de Oriente. Cumana, November 1969.

***Universidad Catolica Andres Bello, Centro de Estudios del Futuro. Poblacion. Caracas, 1968.

more than 50,000 inhabitants; their combined population then was less than that of Caracas alone in 1970. The country's rate o. population growth is itself very high, but its rate of urban concentration (and as we have noted, the zonal concentration of the major urbanizing areas) has been of startling rapidity. If present trends continue, it is probable that two out of every three Venezuelans will be living in a city of more than 100,000 population by 1980. The Caracas-Maracay-Valencia megalopolis alone will hold more than 30 per cent of the country's total population.

Away from the coast, there are as yet no great urban centers in formation. Barquisimeto, with an estimated population of 288,000, is the largest of the inland urban centers; Ciudad Guayana, with a population of 130,000, is the newest. Guayana, far to the south and east of the country's present center of gravity, is one of the world's best advertised efforts to change the settlement and development pattern of a nation by a massive program of channeled investment. Because the investment decisions were not only those of resource opportunity (iron ore and other minerals, a great river navigable deep into the interior, another river with enormous potential for hydroelectric development) but of stated public policy to encourage regional growth, the history and the prospects of

Ciudad Guayana and its region are of great interest to us. This interest is heightened by the creation of a special national agency, the Corporacion Venezolana de Guayana (CVG), to plan and execute the regional development program and the employment of an international team of advisers, recruited by and administered by the Harvard-M.I.T. Joint Center of Urban Studies, to assist in the planning of the new city which was selected as the urban focus of the developing region.

We will therefore devote a considerable portion of the country survey of Venezuela to Guayana, which we were able to see on its own grounds. We will also--as in all the survey reports--hope to discuss the urban condition generally as we found it in our much too brief visit to the country; deal with a very special agency peculiar to Venezuela called FUNDACOMUN*; and speculate as to the nature of the two-tier society, ultra-modern and traditional, which flow of such easy money as oil revenues may bring to a developing country in its cities and in its national life.

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY - A CASE STUDY OF VENEZUELA

The above sub-title should be surrounded by quotation marks

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* Fundacion Para el Desarrollo de la Comunidad y Fomento Municipal

because it is the title of a book by John Friedmann, a distinguished regional analyist and planner. His book and one by Lloyd Rodwin have been read carefully by us in preparing this initial survey report, and can be interpreted by us on the basis of our field survey to the Guayana site and our own reference to various documents issued by the CVG. To quote initially from Friedmann:

> Venezuela may in many ways be considered the perfect prototype for a study of regional policy. The spatial structure of its economy has a classical simplicity. Until recently, it was molded chiefly in the image of the center-periphery model. Political power, wealth and population were heavily concentrated upon Caracas, while the periphery, excepting the oil regions, deteriorated out of mind of Venezuela's central decision makers.
>
> This basic simplicity was undisturbed by political and cultural cleavages that in so many other countries (India, Canada, Nigeria) create a fierce antagonism among regions. Venezuela's government is a unitary one, and its twenty-three provinces have no independent political existence. Since they have only small resources of their own, they are unable to affect their economic welfare in any ways that are significant. To a large extent, local populations are still the creatures of central policy determination.
>
> When Venezuela carried through its decisive social revolution in 1958, a democratic and progressive government initiated a system of national planning that quickly gained a high reputation throughout the continent. At about the same time, the government also launched an important program of regional development in Guayana.*

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* Friedmann, John. Regional Development Policy: A Case Study of Venezuela. Cambridge, the M.I.T. Press, 1966. p. 123.

Rodwin puts it this way:

> New policies sought to establish modern basic industry and thereby reduce the dependence of Venezuela on petroleum. A complementary aim was to promote an urban growth zone in an area other than Caracas or Maracaibo, and thus provide a new migration target for the population leaving the poorer regions. Both aims found remarkable expression in the development of Ciudad Guayana and its surrounding region.*

Sir Walter Raleigh found the Guayana region magnificent when he sailed up the Orinoco in 1595. He saw and marvelled at the falls of the Caroni, did some bird-watching, and found "the air fresh with a gentle easterly wind; and every stone that we stoo-d to take up promising either gold or silver by his complexion." The stones did not fulfill their promise, and his failure to produce the promised riches led him to the Tower and the block. No one else used Raleigh's salesman's language (although the Callao gold deposits were productive in the nineteenth century) until the 1950s, when the iron ore bodies at El Pao and Cerro Bolivar were brought into commercial mining for subsidiaries of Bethlehem and United States Steel.

The ore went to Sparrows Point in Maryland and to the Fairless Works on the Delaware via the Orinoco (improved

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* Rodwin, Lloyd. Nations and Cities: A Comparison of Strategies for Urban Growth. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1970. p. 33.

for ore carriers) from the small river town of San Felix. The mining people built their neat "company town" at Puerto Ordaz. The "old government" sponsored the construction of an integrated steel plant on Venezuela's own soil, and the development of power from the falls of the Caroni to supply it and the nation with energy.

The new regime took these elements of development and decided to use them, not as disparate projects, but to combine them into a regional program, as Friedmann and Rodwin have described. The region was to have a planned headquarters city first called Santo Tome de Guayana, now more secularly called Ciudad Guayana.* The new city, encompassing the existing settlements of San Felix and Puerto Ordaz, might have, it was thought, 400,000 inhabitants by 1975. That will not happen, although the integrated steel plant is functioning and to be expanded, the bridge system is in place, an aluminum plant is operating, a pulp and paper mill is soon to be constructed, an Intercontinental Hotel overlooks the rapids of the Caroni, and the turbines are producing abundant energy from the completed Guri reservoir and dam.

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* The explanation is that when the city was founded officially on July 2, 1961, it was with the nombre historico of Santo Tome de Guayana but that for practical reasons it has become better known as Ciudad Guayana. The older name still is to be encountered in the literature.

The Corporacion Venezolana de Guayana is in charge of all this. It is an autonomous public body, with sumptuous headquarters in the Shell Oil Company's office building in Caracas.

We cannot challenge the decision of the Venezuelan Government to invest so heavily in a major effort to diversify both the sectoral and spatial base of its economy. It has an obligation to use its good fortune in having a conjunction of natural resources which permit it to develop its own steel industry, and to develop it on a competitive base. It seems wise, also, if transportation and other economic factors permit, to cluster new industrial developments in a diverse series of regions, of which Guayana may be the first, rather than concentrate them further in the Caracas megalopolis. We assume that steel and aluminum and processed wood pulp can be produced in the Guayana region, where the raw materials and energy resources are abundant, as cheaply as they could be elsewhere, and that the transportation system, installed or to be developed, will distribute them to external and internal markets without pricing penalties inflicted by location.

By 1968, the total public and private investment in the Guayana regional program reached $1,320,000,000. According to a CVG report, "The Guayana Economic Program, Key to the Development of Venezuela," the 1965--68 invest-

ment in Guayana took 10 per cent of the total national development expenditure for these years. Guayana claimed 25 per cent of Venezuela's investment in new industrial capacity, 10 per cent of its total investment in resource development, and 5 per cent of its total investment in housing and urban infrastructure.

This is a heavy investment which may be justified by the new industrial's contribution to Venezuela's economy. But the Guayana experience to date does not indicate that labor-intensive industries produce rapid urban growth, and that new planned urban centers do not necessarily grow as planned.

The original planning estimates for Ciudad Guayana projected a population of about 100,000 in 1966 and of 400,000 by 1975. These estimates were later changed, Rodwin says, to 90,000 by 1966 and 221,000 by 1975. Friedmann, publishing in 1966, projected a population of 600,000 "in the late eighties." A preliminary census carried out in July, 1969, gave the city a population of 115,725.* The ten year report of the CVG**, which

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* CVG. La Ciudad. Informe Anual Separate. Caracas, CVG, 1969. p. IV-12.

** CVG. Guayana a los 10 Años de la Corporacion Venezolana de Guayana 1960-70; Caracas, CVG. Pages unnumbered.

included 1970, gives the population as 140,000. The 1971 census will establish a firm figure but planners now on the ground believe the population growth has slowed (with perhaps some out-migration after the construction peak was reached) and estimate present population at about 130,000. Some of this growth antedated the official creation of Ciudad Guayana, coming in the 1950s with the opening of the iron mines and continuing with the construction of the steel plant. By 1962, the population of the urban settlements included in Ciudad Guayana was estimated at 50,000.

The official planning figure is now set for 300,000 in 1980, and the present development plan for Ciudad Guayana is based on that assumption.

The CVG engaged the Joint Center for Urban Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University to act as its consultants in the planning and development of Guayana. The relationship continued for five years, after which "the Joint Center left Guayana, parting on very amicable terms with their associates at CVG."* The project is therefore not only an example of planning for regional development and for a new city, but of international collaboration in the effort.

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* Rodwin, Lloyd. op.cit., p.67.

Guayana was born as a planning region on December 29, 1960, when President Romulo Betancourt issued Decreto Numero 430 establishing, by publication in the Gaceta Oficial, the Corporacion Venezolana de Guayana, which is responsible for:

> Studying the resources of the Guayana, both in the area of development, as well as outside the area, when the nature of the resource makes this necessary;
>
> Studying, developing and organizing the exploitation of the hydro-electric potential of the Caroni River;
>
> Programming the integrated development of the Region in line with the priorities and the framework of the Plan de la Nacion;
>
> Promoting the industrial development of the Region, through both the public and private sectors;
>
> Coordinating the activities in the economic and social field carried out by the various public agencies in the Region;
>
> Contributing to the organization, programming, development and operation of those public services necessary for the development of the area;
>
> Carrying out any other task delegated by the National Government, including operations outside the area where there is a close linkage to the development program of the area.*

Considerable governmental reorganization was involved in the creation of CVG, which had been preceded by a Research

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* CVG. The Guayana Economic Program, Key to the Development of Venezuela. Caracas, CVG, 1968.

Commission for the Electrification of the Caroni in the Ministry of Development, by the Government owned Venezuelan Iron and Steel Authority, and by the President's Commission for the Guayana Region. CVG consolidated the functions of these predecessor public bodies and those of the privately sponsored Iron and Steel Syndicate.

The Assembly of the State of Boliva on June 29, 1961, created a Distrito Municipal Caroni with an area of 1,799 square kilometers, and on the following day it decreed the founding of Ciudad Guayana as an entity within Caroni District. On July 2, 1961, the President made it official by approving the Assembly's action, and that day will be remembered as the founding date for the city.

Ciudad Guayana included within its boundaries the existing towns of San Felix and Puerto Ordaz, which were and are its nuclear urban elements. The Government of Venezuela gave 17,500 hectares of public land to the CVG for developmental purposes, to which CVG added 18,500 hectares by its own purchases, giving it control of 36,150 hectares to serve as the base for the new city. CVG had created its own Division de Estudies, Planificacion y Investigacion to "among other functions, determine the demographic growth of the future city and to its integral planning and its development strategy." The Division became the immediate agency of collaboration with the Joint Center.

CIUDAD GUAYANA

PLAN FOR 300,000 POPULATION

FIG. 1



CIUDAD GUAYANA - THE URBAN PLANNING EXPERIENCE

This time, the above sub-title is our own. The Plano Director for Ciudad Guayana as distributed by CVG shows a linear city extending for 15 miles from the wood pulp mill at the extreme east of San Felix, adjacent to its Orinoco river port, to the steel plant at the extreme west. Ciudad Guayana is bisected by the Caroni river which meets the Orinoco there, after flowing for six hundred miles through the wilderness of south eastern Venezuela. San Felix is on the east side of the river, connected with Puerto Ordaz and the development area to the west by a bridge which was one of the first elements of development in the new city.

It is also an element of regret. The planners from the Joint Center saw the bridge as an opportunity to build a structure which would be symbolic of the new city, "as meaningful for the residents of Ciudad Guayana as the Ponte Vecchio was for the people of Florence."* But they came too late to effect the matter for the bridge had already gone well into final design, which the planners' judgment was neither symbolic nor sufficient to meet anticipated traffic needs. The best they could do was to get separate lanes installed for bicycles and pedestrians. Rodwin**

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* Rodwin, op.cit., p. 38.

** Rodwin, Ibid., p. 67.

comments on "emotional outbursts sparked by the design of a bridge" and those of us who have tried to reconcile design quality with the pressures of time and money can sympathize with all parties to the issue.

The planners did save Punta Vista, which overlooks the last rapids of the Caroni, for a park and cultural center (culture including the site of the Intercontinental Hotel) lying on the far side of the bridge. The bridge itself is one element of the Avenida Guayana, which is to become the spine of the linear city. Alta Vista, the civic center which they propose for the city, is still undeveloped except for the local headquarters building of CVG itself, and the proposed shopping center site, still further to the west, is now open land. The city has simply not grown as fast as the planning staff thought it would, and it has grown incrementally--within or adjacent to existing settlements--instead of leap-frogging them to establish the new residential and shopping areas where (according to plan) they are ultimately to be developed.

Ciudad Guayana in 1971 is not the model city which planners, in the nature of things, hope always to achieve. It is essentially a more populous San Felix, the old town where 74 per cent of the inhabitants of Ciudad Guayana still live. For the future growth pattern, CVG hopes to shift the population ratio to a 55-45 division between the

populations that live on the west side of the Caroni and those who stay on the east. The earlier hope was that a ratio of 56-36 could be realized. To push the city's growth in the desired direction, CVG has a four point strategy:

1. Coordinate investment activities of other agencies so that they would more precisely reflect the proposals suggested in the plan;
2. Promote the development of the Alta Vista Center and its surrounding residential areas;
3. Open the western development zone to all income levels by providing a wider range of housing opportunities;
4. Limit, if not eliminate, illegal residential growth in San Felix.

Housing development in Guayana reflects either a sluggish response by the public agencies upon which CVG depends for housing, or a more sluggish demand than had been anticipated at the levels of cost at which new housing can be provided. In any case, only 8,850 dwelling units have been built by the public and the private sectors. This total includes construction sponsored by such public bodies as the Banco Obrero; FUNVICA, a local recipient of FUNDACOMUN housing funds; the Division de Malariologia, and the Fundacion de la Vivienda Popular. These publicly

sponsored units were for families with incomes of more than 500 bolivars a month, approximately 110 dollars. In addition, 4,600 housing sites made ready for self-help shelter development were available to families with incomes of less than 500 bolivars per month by FUNVICA's Programa de Mejoramiento Urbano Progresive, known as MUP.

¿POR QUE CIUDAD GUAYANA?

The sub-title asks "why Ciudad Guayana?," and is a rhetorical question asked and answered in the CVG's ten year report. It is an illuminating passage which we quote in full:

> We observe at present in the whole world a process of urbanization which is manifested principally by the concentration of the population in the great cities. Two principal factors give rise to this phenomenon: the actual methods of production and the attraction, always growing stronger, which the great city offers to its inhabitants through its facilities for living.
>
> An important city offers to industry the following advantages: the industry is freed of a heavy investment in housing and in services; the city provides an ample labor market and the ability to attract and train all required personnel; it makes possible the agglomeration, at a higher operational level, which permits the utilization of common services and of the industrial specialization which together contribute to lower costs of production.
>
> A city at a scale of no less than 300,000 inhabitants is necessary to provide to its population those full opportunities which permit the individual to make a choice of his employment and activity, to become educated and qualified as he prefers, and to achieve the housing standards and the services which are required for family life.

> Ciudad Guayana is then the response to the necessity of creating an important and stable urban nucleus, capable of promoting and accelerating the utilization of the hydro-electric, mineral, agricultural, and forest resources of the whole region of Guayana, offering at the same time improvements in the social and economic order.*

This is a utilitarian view of the city's function, from an organization whose primary goal is economic development, and which can more readily deal with the relative simplicity of mono-purpose industrial and resources development projects than with the complexities of constructing and directing an urban center. Differences arise, therefore, between the CVG, with responsibilities in an investment program in which the city was viewed as an instrument and not a goal in itself, and the urban specialists who are concerned with the quality of city life as well. Rodwin says:

> Consensus, however, disappeared when the discussion turned to more specific questions about housing, schools, and local government. On still other matters, there was never any clear agreement. These involved sensitive social questions such as the relative emphasis to be placed on employment as opposed to growth; participation and decentralization as opposed to efficiency; and general welfare objectives as opposed to development. Interestingly, CVG generally stressed economic development goals, centralized administration, and maintenance of the national image of the agency, whereas the Joint Center placed more emphasis on welfare goals, decentralization, and local participation in the decision-making process.**

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* CVG, Guayana a los 10 Anos de la Corporacion Venezolana de Guayana, CVG, Caracas 1971, (n.p.)

** Rodwin, Ibid., pp. 41-42.

We visited Guayana on a weekend, when cities do not exhibit their typical weekday liveliness and urban attitudes. But Ciudad Guayana has obviously not yet become the vibrant unified city which its planners sought to provide for and achieve. CVG has not moved its own main headquarters to the city; and while there is much unused investment in such infrastructure as public utilities and streets, there is a very slow increment in the development of the city's surface amenities such as parks, recreational facilities, and its cultural base. There is, for instance, an as yet undeveloped zoo, for which the management must engage a specialist from Caracas to fly in from time to time to identify its few animals. The open space at Alta Vista was planned and installed as flat paved area until a senior official from the capital complained (and rightly, considering the climate of Guayana) about its lack of trees and shade. The viewing area at the Guri dam is a dismal public space, on what could be a prime recreational site. These are little things, but it is thousands of such details which shape a city for the enjoyment of its residents.

The summing up would be that the development of the Guayana region as a contributor to Venezuela's economy is spectacular. The urban successes at Ciudad Guayana (with all the resources and expertise that were applied to it) are at best modest ones.

REGIONAL PLANNING - FACT AND THEORY

Whatever the present limitations of Ciudad Guayana as an urban center, there can be no reasonable doubt that CVG has succeeded brilliantly in maintaining an impetus of resources development and economic productivity in the Guayana region. CVG is a "sharp" operation in an outward corporate sense: it has lavish offices, handsome publications, specialized and competent public relations services, and we would judge from the record a persuasive way with public and private investors. If CVG will not go down in history with Peter the Great or Alexander of Macedon as a founder of a great city, it knew that a city was needed and it is (with missed opportunities and perhaps mistaken priorities) constructing one. Its Planta Siderurgica del Orinoco (steel mills) represents an investment of about $440,000,000 with annual product sales of $110,000,000 and employment for 6,000 people. Its power developments, first at Macagua and then at Guri, represent 40 per cent of the installed capacity for the generation of electricity in Venezuela. The development of additional units at Guri will raise the installed capacity to more than two million kilowatts by the end of this decade, when Guayana will have not less than 50 per cent of the nation's installed capacity. This power is already being sent to Caracas.

Alumino del Caroni, S.A. (ALCASA) is a joint venture of CVG and Reynolds International, Inc. It has a present installed capacity of 22,700 metric tons of primary aluminum per year, with a planned expansion program which will permit it to meet Venezuela's own needs and to produce for export to other South American countries. A pipeline for natural gas (Gasoducto Anaco-Ciudad Guayana) was completed in 1970, which brings a gas supply to the Guayana industrial zone from a point of origin that is 228 kilometers to the west and north. It has installed a cement plant, and a pulp processing factory is under construction. Softwood plantations of Caribbean pine are being set out over an area of 60,000 hectares, for the purpose of supplying a pulp and paper industry with this superior wood on a sustained yield basis. Ten million trees will be planted by the end of 1971.

CVG's growth pole map now shows four urban centers, the largest of course being Ciudad Guayana, the centre industrial. Ciudad Bolivar, the state capital and traditional urban point in the Guayana region, is designated as the centro de servicios administrativos; El Tigre, to the northwest, is the centro servicios petroleros; and the fourth center, now under CVG's planning and development aegis, is Tucupita in the Orinoco delta. It is classified as a centro de servicios agropecuarios, i.e., a center of

farming and livestock production. CVG has a program of agricultural development in the delta area known as La Isla de Guara. This agricultural development, in what are described as rich deltaic lands, is to be complementary to the industrial Ciudad Guayana area, satisfying the market to be developed there for agricultural products. The river town of Tucupita is at the edge of La Isla de Guara and is now accessible by paved highway. Tucupita has 12,000 people today; the three stages of planning for its future bring it successively to 25,000, 36,000, and 50,000 inhabitants. No time period is set in the CVG ten year report.

Friedmann* rightly says that Guayana has been a "special case," and if lawyers can say that hard cases make bad law, planners can argue that special cases make their own rules. He forecasts that the effects of Guayana will be felt primarily in Venezuela's eastern region, predicts an eventual decline in importance for Ciudad Bolivar (which is not all that important now) and a strengthening of "regionally important" towns such as Upata, Maturin, and Tucupita because of demand for their goods and services which will be generated at Ciudad

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* Friedmann, op. cit. p. 224.

Guayana. He projects a Guayana Development Zone, a Central Development Zone, and a Coastal Development Zone for eastern Venezuela, and that those areas will have a pattern of flows that will bind them into a tight economic subsystem of the national economy. By the late 1980s, after roads and major bridges have been constructed, he predicts that eastern Venezuela will be dominated by three large metropolitan centers. Barcelona-Puerto la Cruz, "with its diversified economy, may have grown to within 900,000 in population; Santo Tome de Guayana to about 600,000; and Maturin to perhaps ten times its present size, or 500,000. All three of these metropolitan regional economies would have reached the 'take-off' stage."* And in the meantime, Friedmann predicts the coastal states of Sucre and Nueva Esparta will have:

> experienced a renaissance of their own. The rise of metropolitan centers along their perimeter, together with expansion of their own cities (Cumana, Carupano, Porlamar) will have absorbed a large part of their population...Nearby urban markets can be expected to exert a generally positive influence and lead to gradual adjustments in agriculture, including heavier capitalization. The tourist industry will be stimulated as the region and the country as a whole become more opulent... In brief, the fortunes of this area, appearing bleak and hopeless now, may well begin to be reversed before the end of the century.

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* Friedmann, Ibid., p. 194.

But the achievement of this happy state of affairs, he writes further is "neither automatic nor, to a significant extent, within the range of the capabilities of the Guayana Corporation."

Because in this survey document we are beginning to consider some general statements as to urban and regional development, Friedmann's "practical planner's wisdom" is worth noting:

1. Learn to live with an imperfect world that is perfectible in the part only, never in the whole.

2. Learn to appreciate that some improvement is better than none at all.

3. Do not try for symmetry in the design of solutions: tailor solutions to local circumstances and needs.

4. Do not attempt to solve all problems at once; do not even try to understand them all; you will find yourself plumbing a bottomless pit. Concentrate on the truly important things first. Some problems may vanish if you leave them alone.

5. Proceed stepwise, incrementally, along the path of least resistance: among the important things to do, turn first to those that are easy to solve.

6. Do not be overly concerned with overlapping functions, fuzzy boundaries, conflicting jurisdictions. Some redundancy may be worthwhile, uncertainty makes one proceed with caution, competition is also a problem-solving device.

7. Step back occasionally to regard your handiwork: assess the total situation with a keen, objective eye, divine the changes in values that have occurred, if necessary redefine your problem, clarify your objectives, critically review your strategy and tactics.

These rules are not meant as an invitation to license. They are not easy to obey and yet obtain

> the best results achievable. Their purpose is to bring the planner to an awareness of some features of the real world - a world in movement, apparently capricious, elusive, and understood only in fragments. Mind seeks to act on such a world. To gain a measure of success, it must do so in awareness not only of its own severe shortcomings but also of the characteristics of the situation it wishes to transform and of which it is a part itself.*

THE EXPERTS DISAGREE

The conventional planning wisdom in Venezuela has supported diversification of urban growth and decentralization of the country's population and economic patterns. The example of Guayana, with its concentration of heavy national investment in a regional development program, has inspired other regions, states, and cities to hope for similar nationally supported efforts. The spread of benefits and opportunities equally across a nation makes such a good political case that it is (if logically pursued) dangerous to a realistic regional development program, which recognizes the inevitability of differentials.

This has been challenged in a report to the Direccion de Planeamiento, Ministerio de Obras Publicas, on September 4, 1970. The report is the product of PADCO, a Washington based international consulting group specializing in urban development. The heart of the PADCO report states:

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* Friedmann, Ibid. p. 256.

> Considering that Venezuela still has only ten million inhabitants and that Caracas is already a very large and highly differentiated city, with a very considerable attracting power upon the rest of the nation, planning for very large population centers in other parts of Venezuela is presently not a meaningful economic proposition. The situation may have changed by the year 2000 but one should not now make heavy commitments of high alternative use value in these other regions. Population centers are emphasized because, as indicated above, capital investments--in processing and shipping facilities and in heavy machinery at Maracaibo, in Ciudad Guayana, etc.--should continue to have the highest priority. But heavy investments in infrastructure in these regions--in housing, streets, and various public facilities--involve very substantial risks of creating 'sunk costs' which in turn might inhibit desired mobility of people and other resources. In the sense of being able to provide jobs, rising incomes, stimulating and interesting environments, for very large numbers of 'seekers,' none of the mentioned places is presently an 'economic base.' This raises the question of the worthwhileness of the major costs associated with such centers as Ciudad Guayana, both in the opportunity costs of the substantial infrastructure and the dislocation and other costs for the migrants seeking but not finding employment. *

The PADCO document is written principally in economic terms, but also deals with such social needs as education and

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* PADCO. Preliminary Analysis of Planning and Information System Needs for Direccion de Planeamiento, Ministerio de Obras Publicas. Caracas, PADCO. September 4, 1970. p. 18. The report is transmitted by John D. Herbert, Senior Vice President of PADCO, and its economic arguments are carried forward by one of its authors, Roland Artle, in a paper "Urbanization and Economic Growth in Venezuela", Working paper No. 135. Berkeley Center for Planning and Development Research, University of California. October 1970.

employment opportunities. It recognizes that environmental constraints, which it calls "neighborhood effects," increase as population densities increase, and it recognizes also that economic efficiencies must be balanced against social equities. It is "revisionist" in its views on urbanization in the developing countries, arguing that a number of aspects of urbanization are often misinterpreted:

> The 'low productivity' employment in services in major centers, conditions in rancho areas, the intensive use of land and other features of urban development often are regarded as bad as a result of mistaken interpretation through the eyes of upper and middle-class observers. For the street vender and the ranchero, the opportunities for higher incomes, education and richness of experience are far greater in Caracas than in the rural areas and small centers from which they came. The move to the city is in part a push from desperate conditions elsewhere but largely a pull forward to genuinely greater opportunities. The increasing variety of tertiary activities, even though they yield wages far below those considered acceptable in the relatively developed countries, are a reflection of the increased specialization associated with urbanization.
>
> It is strong in its position to the point of sledge-hammer repetition.
>
> In Venezuela's immediate future, the processes of growth and modernization can be supported much more productively in both social and economic terms through programs focused on the major centers than they can be through programs aimed at dispersed investment and settlement....For Venezuela as a whole, growth can be accelerated most effectively through concentrated urban growth.*

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* PADCO, Ibid., p. iii.

THE CARACAS MEGALOPOLIS

The metropolitan city which the PADCO report sees as the logical area for concentration of Venezuela's urban population has already reached a population of more than two million, or 20 per cent of the national population. It has the qualities of a megalopolis, in that the cities of Maracay and Valencia, which Friedmann as recently as 1966 saw as "an emergent" element in a bipolar urban region, are now--in our judgment--well within the zone of influence of Caracas and are assuming the character of urban growth points satellite to the Caracas center. The Maracay-Valencia-Puerto Cabello complex now has more than 500,000 people. A large satellite city at El Tuy, southeast of Caracas, is proposed, and its planning is based upon an expected population of 250,000.

The Caracas megalopolis will include the city proper, Marinda, Aragua, and Carabobo. Their combined area is 8,769 square miles* (2.6 per cent of Venezuela's 352,150 square miles. The 1971 census returns will give accurate figures. The area will probably contain more than 30 per cent of the country's total population. It is not yet one continuous urban mass. Much of the area is mountain, some of it is lake, and the intra-montane valleys have

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* Compare with New Jersey's area of 7,856 square miles, and population of more than seven million.

rich farm lands. But the highway linkages are such, and with them the economic and financial links, that the area will be a dominant urban center of a size and strength that could not have been predicted only one generation ago.

In 1926 Caracas had only 167,941 people. In 1941, the population had grown to only 354,138. (It is said that Juan Vicente Gomez who ruled Venezuela from 1908 until his death in 1935 did not like Caracas and favored Maracay, which is still a military center.) But by 1950, Caracas had grown to 693,896, and by 1961 to 1,336,464. As noted, its present population is more than two million. During the period 1951--64, its percentage of increase was 125.8, placing it fifth in rate of growth among all the world's cities with more than one million people.*

We are uncomfortable with Caracas and uncertain of our judgments. The oil company advertisements which are placed internationally describe it as a second Manhattan. Friedmann says it is a "futuristic" metropolis. The Encyclopaedia Britannica says it is "a model of city planning."

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* Miles, Simon R. Metropolitan Problems. Toronto, Methun Pub., 1970. Table 1-4, p. 17. The same table puts Bogota in first place and Lima in second position.

Every commentator sooner or later contrasts the gleaming opulence of Caracas' new office buildings and its luxury apartments with the poverty areas called ranchos which climb its hills and which hold 23 per cent of its inhabitants. We believe that Lewis Mumford would call the city, as indeed he does Manhattan, "standardized chaos" and its expressway system "urban devastation."*

Obviously, many billions of dollars have been invested in the growth of Caracas in the last 25 years. The increase in land values must have brought billions in development increment to its owners. The system of parkways and expressways, typical of the American freeway excesses of the 1950s in its disregard for urban values, dominates the city visually and to us, at least, most disturbingly. Nor does it appear to solve the city's traffic and transportation problems. The traffic moves slowly at peak hours, as might be expected, and a study for a

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* Mumford comments that "with motorways as with the building of skyscrapers, we find superb technical skill in mechanical organization and practical design united to paralysing social incompetence and cultural illiteracy." He argues in The City in History that "currently, the most popular and effective means of destroying a city is the introduction of multiple-lane expressways, especially elevated ones, into the central core." The book was originally published in 1961. The quotations are from the Pelican edition, 1966, Graphic Section Three, Plate 46-47.

subway system is in progress.

The city is dominated too by its high rise buildings--glittering complexes such as the Plaza Bolivar, ingeniously built on air rights over a major highway; office buildings more conventionally sited; apartment towers and apartment slabs. It is indeed very American, very modern, and to us, very nouveau riche--not in the sense that its display is necessarily vulgar in detail for its buildings individually are as good as those which are usually found in the world's cities, but in the sense that it has all come too fast and too easily. An influx of money, and energy, and engineering and construction skills have built in Caracas a city which seems too shiny, too slick, too much on the move, too separated from its past. It might well be, however, that if one is in the higher income brackets, it is a very pleasant place in which to live. But to us it seems one more instance where the resources and the opportunity were there, but in the thrust of the American "way of life," a chance to build a great city on a magnificent site has been forever lost.

We must state that this is an impression only. To make it a final judgment, we should know much more about Caracas than we do. But the impression lingers, and it causes us concern for the shape of urban life and the form and function of cities in those developing countries which

are fortunate enough to be above the poverty level and be able to afford what their own demands and what world culture now calls "the best."

As to the ranchos, we would for the moment put aside all of their sociological implications and express concern for their impact on the ecology of Caracas. Building on steep slopes can be done in an urban system (as witness San Francisco), but it is expensive and it can be dangerous. Settlements such as the ranchos are one characteristic of urban growth in South America* but we are concerned that their slope location in Caracas destroys the wooded lands that should be part of the cityscape and creates dangers of erosion and slides which will menace the settlements themselves. Lima is rainless so the problem does not arise there. Bogota has a policy, not fully effective but a policy nonetheless, of preventing settlement on its adjacent mountains by refusing to bring water above a certain demarked level. We would hope that the new development plan for the Federal District of Caracas, now in final preparation, will deal with this issue.

We were able to see both Marcay and Valencia very

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* See the Survey reports Urbanization in Peru and Urbanization in Colombia for a fuller discussion of transitional urban settlements.

hurriedly. They are now connected to Caracas by a limited access highway, which in a real sense makes them satellite cities. The highway, as limited access roads must, by-passes the settlements that lie between the cities and is therefore deceptive as to the urbanization that is taking place. Valencia has a very successful industrial park with an impressive series of factories. Maracay has military installations on ~~one~~ side of the through highway and an industrial zone on the other; we were not able to form a judgment as to the urban quality of what lies between them. Maracay has the reputation of being a flower-bedecked garden city; we hope it is so. For nothing that we saw in Venezuela indicated a great concern for urban charm, urban character, or urban beauty. And we have been told that Maracaibo, which we were not able to see, falls below rather than above the Venezuelan urban standard.

THE OTHER URBAN CENTERS

With Ciudad Guayana and the Caracas urban complex, we have dealt--admittedly briefly--with four of the eleven Venezuelan cities of more than 100,000 people. And in discussing the regional development of eastern Venezuela, we mentioned Friedmann's prediction that Barcelona-Puerto La Cruz and Maturin would become important population centers and

development points. The 1967 population of Barcelona-Puerto La Cruz was estimated at 250,000; Maturin's was estimated at 112,000.

The second city of Venezuela is Maracaibo. It had an estimated 1970 population of 647,000 and is expected to approach one million by 1980. It is the capital of the state of Zulia, where a vigorous regional planning development effort is in progress. The state of Falcon, across Lake Maracaibo, would necessarily be included in any regional plan for the Lake area. Its towns are straggling ones, with Coro the most important center. This is Venezuela's oil producing area par excellence, and one would expect its residents to demand a greater return in development and infrastructure than they have so far received. Political and "equity" pressures make it difficult to apply such purely rational analysis as is suggested in the PADCO report.

Barquisimeto competes with Valencia in the rank order of Venezuelan cities, and the two of them have been in the first four for half a century--after Caracas and Maracaibo. Barquisimeto is on the main road between Caracas and Maracaibo. It is an important trade center, and serves one of the most rapidly expanding agricultural regions in the country. Its 1967 population was estimated at 288,000.

San Cristobal is on the Andean periphery, a border city close to Cucuta in Colombia. It is possible that its border location will be important in the future, if international relations permit Venezuela's "high income" economy to play something of the same role against Colombia's "low income" economy as the United States does with Mexico. San Cristobal had an estimated population of 183,000 in 1967. The Andean area is considered underdeveloped although, paradoxically, the country has been governed for more than half of the twentieth century by dictators who came from the Andean state of Tachira. A Study Commission for the Andes was active in the early 1960s; it would be interesting to know if it has survived, and in what form.

FUNDACOMUN--A UNIQUE INSTITUTION

Government in Venezuela is administered through the departments and special agencies of the central government at Caracas, through 20 states, three territories and the Federal District of Caracas, and through 168 distritos, which are similar to American counties. Local self-government is guaranteed under the 1961 Constitution and the guarantee is honored in actual practice. It would be pleasant to report that the local governments are therefore independent, well-organized, well-staffed public bodies but it would not be true. One of the country's

major needs is thought to be the improvement of its municipal governments and the augmentation of their resources in skills and money, which is the function of FUNDACOMUN. The acronym stands for the Fundacion para el Desarrollo de la Comunidad y Fomento Municipal (The Foundation for Community Development and Municipal Improvement). It was established by decree of Venezuela's reforming president, Romulo Betancourt, in 1962. The president of FUNDACOMUN and its executive secretary are named by the President and are removable at his pleasure, as are the seven members of its board of directors and their alternates. The agency is financed by appropriations from the national budget, but has been assisted by substantial loans and grants from international agencies.

FUNDACOMUN's mission is to increase the capacity of local governments to deal with the financial, legal and administrative issues which accompany the growth and development of cities; to provide capital assistance to improve the urban environment; and to promote and encourage community development activities which will strengthen cooperative action at the local level.

The agency operates from four centers: Puerto la Cruz for the East, Barquisimeto for the West-Central Zone, Caracas for the capital region, and Merida for the Andean region. It accepts what it calls the national commitment

to regionalization as "wholesome" and cites its own decentralization as evidence of its support.

The most measurable activity of FUNDACOMUN is its program of matching grants to the municipalities for the construction of useful public works. It operates on a 60--40 basis, i.e., for every 60 bolivars which come from FUNDACOMUN, the local agency must be prepared to supply 40. FUNDACOMUN had by 1970 put $68,000,000 into the programs of local governments and authorities, which, with the addition of local contributions, financed a program in which total expenditures came to $104,000,000. The projects were many and various: public markets, passenger terminals for bus services, water and sewerage projects, abattoirs, the purchase of refuse collection equipment and housing. FUNDACOMUN programs financed the construction of 19,519 housing units.* The index of repayment of FUNDACOMUN loans is not altogether reassuring; repayment schedules are in arrears in 37 per cent of the loan programs.

FUNDACOMUN has recognized that the municipal bodies are not getting the tax revenues to which they are entitled.

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* FUNDACOMUN. Al Servicio del Municipio Venezolano. Caracas, FUNDACOMUN. November 1970. p. 16.

To aid them in increasing their revenues, it began a major program of financing and providing technical assistance to cadastral surveys (designation and reassessment of real properties). FUNDACCMUN has invested about one million dollars in the nuts-and-bolts of public finance as represented in a proper registration of properties for tax purposes. And with good results. In representative cases, total municipal revenue can be expected to at least double through the systematic recording of all urban real estate. Two cases are cited in the "Final Report" submitted by the Institute of Public Administration on the "Technical Aid to Fundación para el Desarrollo de la Comunidad y Fomento Municipal (FUNDACOMUN)," covering the period of Ford Foundation--I.P.A. assistance to the agency. To quote briefly from it:

> In the case of the Puerto La Cruz municipality, income from property taxation actually declined from Bs 417,177 in 1964 to Bs. 270,801 in 1966. Then in 1966, with a loan from FUNDACOMUN and technical assistance from IPA consultant Robert Huck, the Puerto La Cruz municipal council initiated a cadastre program which has in one year more than quadrupled property taxes from Bs. 270,801 to Bs. 1,214,643. In 1968, property taxation was estimated to account for 17 per cent of municipal revenues as opposed to four per cent in 1966.
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> The FUNDACOMUN cadastre program in Valera helped double property tax income from Bs. 112,647 in 1964 to approximately Bs. 230,000 in 1968.*

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* "Bs" are bolivars, which is Venezuela's unit of currency. The 1971 rate of exchange was 4.5 bolivars to the U.S. dollar.

> It is evident that municipal officials in Venezuela are interested in establishing systems of local taxation for increasing the capacity of local government to perform more effectively. Practically every municipality over 20,000 has initiated a cadastre program with the aid of FUNDACOMUN, has such a program under active consideration, or has begun its own program of independent assistance from FUNDACOMUN.

The technical assistance program which FUNDACOMUN renders to Venezuelan municipalities is divided into seven sub-programs:

1. Municipal public services, concerned with the organization and administration of service functions which are the obligations of local government. Preference is given, FUNDACOMUN says, to refuse collection, public transportation and slaughter houses.
2. Legal assistance, whose purpose is to procure competent legal instruments for the municipalities, offering legal assistance to the municipal councils which require it, and providing legal training programs for municipal personnel.
3. Fiscal administration. FUNDACOMUN prepares technical manuals and other instructional material, and offers courses and seminars for training municipal personnel.
4. Urban planning. The FUNDACOMUN unit promotes the organization of local planning bodies, renders

technical assistance in the field, and has the stated objective of seeing the municipality through the stages of initial procedures, installation of the planning office, the preparation of work programs, and the training of personnel.

5. Urban cadastral surveys. This has been described above.
6. Training and preparation. This unit is for general instruction and in-service training of municipal officials in the scope of their tasks and methods of administration.
7. Economic orientation section. This is the latest unit to be set up in FUNDACOMUN's technical assistance service. It is to "orient municipal councils as to the economic activities which would best suit the resources of their community and its area, advise the councils in selecting appropriate mechanisms for industrial promotion; guide the councils in their relationships with regional and national development agencies, gather sufficient economic information as to each of the country's districts so as to form a 'municipal information bank,' and as to a catch-all, to perform any other function related