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ABSTRACT
              This report is a continuation of a review done in
1958 by the Ford Foundation in an attempt to identify and define a
productive role in Latin America..Contained herein are as follows:
The Introduction includes: (1) Urbanization in Latin America, The
Role of the Ford Foundation; (2) Urbanization in Brazil, the
Involvement of the Ford Foundation; (3) The Need for a Frame of
Reference in Approaching Urban Problems; (4) Whether 'Urban Problems'
Constitute a Cognizable, Effective Category for Foundation Activity;
(5) a Definition of Urbanization; (6) The Elements of an 'Urban Frame
of Reference; and (7) The 'Frame of Reference' Origin of the Present
Paper. The second section, Urbanization in Brazil, deals with: (1)
The Absence of an Urban Tradition; (2) Physical Setting; (3) The
Settlement and "Urban" History of Brazil..The third section,
Brazilian Responses to Urbanization, includes: (1) 'Societal'
Perception of Cities; (2) Governmental Responses to Urbanization; (3)
Other Institutional Responses to Urbanization; and (4) 'Urban Policy'
in Brazil. Tables and charts are included throughout the text. [For
related documents in this series, see UD 013 731 and 013 733-744 for
surveys of specific countries. For special studies analyzing
urbanization in The Third World, see UD 013 745-UD 013 748.] (SB)

ED 079451

An International
Urbanization Survey Report
to the Ford Foundation

Urbanization in Brazil

UD 043732

This working paper was prepared as supportive material for an International Survey of Urbanization in the developing countries, which was organized by the Ford Foundation late in 1970 and was completed in 1972. The purpose of the Survey was to provide findings and recommendations to guide the Foundation in making informed judgments on its future participation in programs related to the urban condition in the less-developed countries.

The Survey was directed neither to perform nor to commission original research. Its work was to be reportorial, analytic, and indicative of program choices. To serve these objectives, the Survey was essentially a field operation in which the staff travelled widely in the countries where the Foundation maintains field offices and drew not only upon its own observations but upon the experience of Foundation personnel assigned to the developing countries. The staff's own field notes on phases of urbanization in specific countries were expanded into working papers both to record observations and to clarify the deductive processes and the analyses of data which were to form a demonstrable basis for the Survey's conclusions. Additional working papers were provided by Foundation personnel with a depth of field knowledge, and by consultants expert either in specific countries or in topics of special interest.

The Survey working papers and special studies were originally intended only for internal use. It became evident, however, that the body of material had values which argued for wider exposure. Accordingly, the Foundation is publishing the papers for those with special country or topical interests and for those interested in the material as a whole.

The working papers carry disclaimers appropriate to the circumstances of their preparation and to the limitations of their original purpose. The reader should not expect to find in them either the product of original research or a comprehensive treatment of the processes of urbanization in the particular country. Rather, they are occasional papers whose unity derives from their use as exemplary and illustrative material for the Survey.

But unity of form and substance is not the measure of their value. Each report and special study is an essay on some aspect of urbanization in the developing countries. In most instances, they are what a good essay should be—unmistakably personalized and therefore reflective of the insights and the convictions of informed authors.

The International Urbanization Survey

John P. Robin, Director
Colin Rosser
Frederick C. Terzo

Urbanization in Brazil

by

James A. Gardner

International Urbanization Survey

The Ford Foundation

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Ibid. p. 139, Cf. comment Fig. 2 supra.

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| 0 km | 1000 | 2000 | 3000 | 4000 |
| 0 miles | 1000 | 2000 | 3000 |

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INTRODUCTION

URBANIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA,
THE ROLE OF THE FORD FOUNDATION

In 1958 the Ford Foundation conducted a review in an
attempt to identify and define a productive role in
Latin America. As part of that review a report was
commissioned by the Overseas Development Program of the
Foundation, to "serve as a guide to problems" in Latin
America. The final written report, by consultant Sidney
Mintz, was a lengthy statement about Latin America, and
"potential program areas" there. The report suggests
a number of areas "particularly amenable to focal develop-
ment activity." The first of these was "urbanization":

> ....Latin American cities are growing at a
> remarkable rate. From a purely factual point
> of view, this urbanization process is not
> well documented, nor is it well understood.
> The sociology of urbanization in Latin
> America is hardly studied, when compared to the
> same process in North America and Europe.
> Basic urban sociological research is hence
> a need of the first order in Latin America.
> Urban community development programs, designed
> to deal with the problems which arise in
> situations of rapid and uncontrolled urban-
> ization are almost wholly lacking....Housing
> development and housing cooperatives are
> an essential part of urban development in
> Latin America....more could surely be done
> in this field of activity. Urban and in-
> dustrial planning are not assigned sufficient
> importance in the curricula of Latin American
> schools of architecture and engineers, nor
> is urban planning related sufficiently to
> sociological techniques and knowledge. Most
> such planning is done by architects, and the
> resources of the social sciences are rarely
> employed in planning activities.

Some fourteen years later Mintz's sweeping gener-
alizations need qualification, specificity and, in some
cases, expansion. But his comments do not ring of the
cold war _Zeitgeist_ of their origin, or of any distant
intellectual vintage. On the contrary, as discussed in
the paper that follows, the analysis has aged relatively
little over the past decade and a half. Unfortunately,
the Foundation's involvement in the urban sector of Latin
America has also been relatively little defined or developed
over this same period. Confronted with the fastest rate of
urbanization in the world, the Foundation has remained
relatively uninformed and uncertain in urban Latin
America. With several notable exceptions the Foundation's
involvement has been characterized by false starts within
disparate programs. It has played a modest and less than
fully productive role.

URBANIZATION IN BRAZIL,
THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE FORD FOUNDATION

Brazil, the subject of the present report, was no ex-

ception to this general Foundation trend. An early

ad hoc and relatively uninformed approach to the urban

sector of Brazil led the Foundation to make an underpro-

ductive $220,000 research grant to an action organization,

in the field of municipal administration. In reviewing

the Foundation thinking behind this underproductive

grant, in November of 1970 I discussed the "undefined

Foundation role in the urban sector" as follows:

> As has been previously pointed out, the
> Foundation's activities have been defined
> on a disciplinary basis--agriculture, the
> social sciences, education, science and
> technology, and population. The problems
> to which the Foundation would address itself
> in the urban sector, however, cut rapidly
> across these Foundation constructs. Yet,
> perhaps through some whorfian distortion
> arising out of problem and program definition,
> we have not yet developed and articulated
> the appropriate role of the Foundation in
> the urban sector. While this process is
> now under way internationally (i.e., the
> Robin study) and in Brazil (i.e., my own
> embryonic research), this grant was made
> in the absence of an adequate, articulated
> 'urban' frame of reference....Future
> involvement in the urban sector should come
> in the context of a reasoned and articulated
> (and criticized) rationale of Foundation
> involvement.

THE NEED FOR A FRAME OF REFERENCE
IN APPROACHING URBAN PROBLEMS

A subsequent memorandum, of February 1971, discussed the

advantages of the so-called urban "frame of reference"

as follows:

> Posited by the very idea of an urban frame of refer-
> ence is a greater concentration of our own effort
> in the area, presumably carrying with it an
> increased awareness and capacity to make
> decisions. The capacity to make decisions
> is obviously related to the information
> available, and the information available is,
> by definition, a basic element of the urban
> frame of reference. Similarly, an urban
> frame of reference can restructure and
> 'decompress' the Foundation decision-
> making process, spreading it out over a
> greater period of time rather than trying to
> decide at the same time both how to respond
> to a proposal and what we should be doing
> overall. Moreover, the frame of reference
> should allow us to make meaningful 'linkages'
> within problem-related but institution-isolated
> grantees, e.g., the demographers', agricultural
> economists', and political scientists' related
> work on rural-urban migration, or the numerous
> but 'desligado' research projects on urban
> marginality. And the frame of reference should
> enhance our capacity to adequately respond
> to new proposals arising from the urban sector.
>
> At this time we have on file in Rio various
> proposals and would-be proposals in such areas
> as favela rehabilitation, urban ethnic attitudes
> in Brazil, low-cost housing technology research,
> an urban law program, (two) Master's programs
> in urban studies and, of course, the municipal
> administration proposal. And there are more
> proposals coming down the pike, whether for
> a high-powered CEBRAP-like urban research
> center or applications for bolsas and individual
> grant and study awards. And it is reasonable
> to expect the Foundation to receive an even
> heavier volume of requests in the future. I
> base this assertion on an increasing Brazilian

and grantee interest in urban problems, and
on increasing problems inherent with an extremely
rapid Brazilian urbanization process. (It has,
for example, been predicted that there will
be, within thirty years, in a Rio-Sao Paulo-
Belo Horizonte megalopolis of 100 million people,
half of the country's population.) How, other
than by developing something resembling what I
have described as an urban frame of reference,
is the Foundation to be responsive to these
Brazilian interests and problems, how to respond
to new proposals, make existing grants more
productive and better connected? I don't
think we have adequately answered these questions,
nor do I feel the recently discussed urban-
ization conferences or the Foundation's inter-
national urban stocktaking can, or pretend to,
offer guidelines of sufficient specificity
to respond to national and institutional
vicissitudes within the various countries of
Foundation involvement. We currently have
'disciplinary' frames of reference within
Brazil, e.g., in agriculture, population and
the social sciences. But in the inherently
interdisciplinary urban sector it seems to
me we are simply, woefully short on knowing
what we are about.

WHETHER "URBAN PROBLEMS" CONSTITUTE
A COGNIZABLE, EFFECTIVE CATEGORY FOR FOUNDATION ACTIVITY

There was, of course, a need to respond to the legitmate

question from Foundation colleagues, as to "why we

should designate a Foundation program in urban affairs."

In April of 1971 I attempted to respond to one such

inquiry as follows:

> You query why we should designate a Foundation
> program in 'urban affairs.' An initial answer
> would be that any denomination, including
> an 'urban frame of reference,' carries
> the advantages and disadvantages of a sort of
> whorfian 'cognitive set.' 'Urban affairs,'
> for example, introduces into the Foundation's
> basically disciplinary weltansicht a con-
> ceptualization which is more immediately, and
> more responsively, interdisciplinary. The more
> fundamental issue you are raising, I believe,
> is the very existence of a nexus of problems
> sufficiently distinct, important and related
> to be incorporated under the same program
> umbrella, whatever the 'urban' denomination.
>
> My own reaction is that this issue is about
> as shallow as it is broad. Basically I think
> that there are distinct and important urban
> problems of an interdisciplinary nature,
> and that it is more responsive and more
> productive for the Foundation to approach
> these problems in a coordinated, interdis-
> ciplinary way. I have made the latter argument
> in an earlier memorandum and will address the
> former briefly here.
>
> Urban and non-urban problems do, of course,
> frequently have common intellectual, discip-
> linary, economic and psychological under-
> pinnings, and the oversimplified rural-urban
> dichotomy or the Redfield folk-urban continuum
> should not be overstated. At the same time
> there are some important qualitative differences
> between urban and non-urban environments. As
> Leeds has pointed out, favelas are not merely

rural slums in the city (Frank Bonilla's
1961 article and Lewis' culture of poverty
notwithstanding). Social organization,
residence, occupation and transportation are
common urban and rural problems, for example,
but they take on a strongly environmental
character. Similarly, the more ephemeral
problems of participation, identification,
alienation, and anomie take on an urban
character. (I suppose I would have to
cite the Simmel, Park, Wirth school).

Delinquency offers one example of this urban-
non-urban difference with which I am reason-
ably familiar. Quantitatively and qualitatively
urban and rural delinquency are quite
different. The developmentalists like Erikson
and Piaget may find a common psychological
base, as 'do the Freudians, such as Wrong.
And some sociologists, such as Durkheim, find
a common societal base. Beyond these 'global'
underpinnings, however, the more immediate
social and subcultural environment is of
prime importance, and is empirically and
perhaps causally related to various forms of
human welfare and behavior, including
delinquency. Given this importance, these
diverse human environments, including agglom-
erations, need to be studied and understood in
their various forms. It does not make sense,
for example, to approach the delinquent acts
of Brown's 'Manchild,' Miller's 'lower class
milieu,' Thrasher's 'transitional areas' or
White's 'street corner society' in the same
way one would approach rural delinquency.
(Racial conflict and gang warfare, for example,
are simply not major problems down on the
farm). The motives, acts, and effects of
'urban delinquency' are meaningfully separable
from rural delinquency, and empirically, sub-
stantively related to the different environ-
ments in which the respective acts occur.
While there is a certain amount of 'redis-
covering the wheel' in saying it, there
are demonstrably different or distinct 'urban'
problems. Moreover, these problems, such as
delinquency, are obviously interdisciplinary
and equally obviously important. Given the
almost staggering Latin American and worldwide
growth of urban areas, I think 'urban' problems

will inevitably become increasingly important
for most organizations attempting to 'advance
human welfare' on a broad scale. Suffice
to say I think there does exist a nexus of
problems sufficiently distinct, sufficiently
important and sufficiently related to be
incorporated under the same 'urban' umbrella.

A DEFINITION OF URBANIZATION

Eventually I was pressed to define "urbanization."
In May of 1971 a very modest working definition was
stated as follows:

> It has frequently been pointed out that the
> concept of 'urbanization,' or 'urbanizacao,'
> does not refer to the same thing when used
> by Anglos and Latins.[1] Thus when the Brazilian
> groups working on 'urbanizacao das favelas'
> describe their objectives and endeavors, the
> 'urbanization' concept which emerges is
> demographic, spatial and usually service-oriented
> in nature. By 'urbanizing' favelas they mean
> physical planning, and they mean introducing
> urban services such as water, light, sewage
> and the access to transportation.

International and Latin scholars have, of course,
broadened this conceptualization and definition in a
myriad way. There is a demographic focus on "population
concentration," looking at rate levels and rates of
urban population growth; the sociologists' "urbanism
as a way of life," focusing on the social and "urban
values" dimension of human agglomeration; the economists'
focus on urbanization as a development process reflecting
technological and industrial development; the historians',
and sometimes the philosophers' view of urban "modernization";
the political scientists' focus on urban political entities

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1. See, e.g., R.M. Morse. "Recent Research on Latin
American Urbanization: A Selective Survey with
Commentary". Latin American Research Review 1.
No. 1, Fall 1965. pp. 37-75.

and participation; and the architects' and planners'

perception of physical design and spatial dimension.[2]

There is, however, something of a withdrawal from the

multiple variable definitions of urbanization, to a focus

on the demographic and spatial dimensions.[3] This more

"functional" approach has the advantage of being consistent

with the "Latin" and Brazilian usage. It also leaves

open, for researcher and "practitioner" alike, the existence

and the nature of the relationship between the urbanizacao

and urbanismo variables. As stated by one writer:

> Our preference is to define the city in
> demographic and spatial terms. In this
> way, a consistent conception can be stated
> which is not only close to usage but also
> leaves open the question of the socio-
> economic causes and consequences of urban-
> ization.[4]

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2. Alternative definitions have been reviewed at some length
   in Albert J. Riess, Jr. "Urbanization", in Julius Gould
   and William L. Kolb (eds.). A Dictionary of the Social
   Sciences. New York, Free Press, 1964. p. 738. See also
   Leo F. Schnore and Eric Lampard. "Social Science and the
   City, A Survey of Research Needs", in Leo F. Schnore and
   Henry Fagin (eds.). Urban Research and Policy Planning.
   Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1967.

3. See, e.g., Gino Germani. "Urbanizacion, secularizacion y
   desarrollo economico". Revista Mexicana de Sociologia 25.
   No. 2, 1963. pp. 625-646.

4. Kingsley Davis. "Forward: Urban Research and its
   Significance", in P. Gibbs (ed.). Urban Research Methods.
   Princeton, D. Van Nostrand, 1961. pp. XI-XXII. In
   making a similar argument against a more complex defini-
   tion, Schnore and Lampard stated this same non-inclusion-
   of-potentially-independent-variables position as follows:
   "a definition that includes both demographic and organ-
   izational aspects virtually precludes any subsequent
   analysis of the interrelation between the two." Schnore

By way of emphasis, a demographic-spatial definition obviously does not exclude the broader social and economic concerns that are the principal focus of much of this paper. On the contrary, the demographic-spatial definition "although considered fundamental, constitutes a point of departure which will be complemented by analysis of our demographic variables...."[5] Thus "urbanization" becomes, as a definitional base, a quantified concept--the demographic and spatial growth of cities.[6]

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and Lampard, in Schnore and Fagin. op. cit. See also Luis Unikel. "The Process of Urbanization in Mexico: Distribution and Growth of Urban Population", in Francine F. Rabinovitz and Felicity M. Trueblood (eds.). Latin American Urban Research. Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1970. pp. 247-302.

5. Unikel, in Rabinovitz and Trueblood. op. cit. p. 247.

6. Here I part ways with Davis who defines urbanization as neither absolute growth, nor a rate or form of growth, but rather as a level of growth, the ratio of the urban and rural population at any time; or, more specifically, as the rise in the ratio of the former over the latter. In so doing, the Davis definition allows for "negative" urbanization in a situation involving absolute urban growth, but, vis-a-vis the rural population, relative decline: "Since the total population is composed of both the urban and the rural, however, the 'portion urban' is a function of both of them. Accordingly cities can grow without any urbanization, provided that the rural population grows at an equal or greater rate." Davis, in Gibbs. op. cit. pp. 41-42. As stated by Schnore and Lampard: "The rural-urban population dichotomy may not be worth all that much." Schnore and Lampard, in Schnore and Fagin. op. cit. p. 28.

THE ELEMENTS OF AN "URBAN FRAME OF REFERENCE"

Even given some general recognition of the need for an

urban frame of reference and a modest working definition

of urbanization, an earlier memorandum was the touchstone

for the present paper and the emergent urban rationale

of the Brazil office. This earlier memorandum, of February,

1971, attempted to set forth the basic elements of an

urban frame of reference as follows:

> Ideally a frame of reference should be based
> on an understanding of the urbanization process
> in a given country and region, including the
> historical, demographic, physical, economic,
> legal, sociological and psychological dimensions.
> It should be based on, and demonstrate, an
> awareness of the nature and direction of the
> present and future urbanization process. And
> it should contain some analysis of major
> problem areas inherent in that process. Within
> this context an urban frame of reference should
> contain information on and evaluations of
> relevant institutions, individuals, and projects.
> We should be aware of the objectives, staffing,
> research, resources, 'linkages,' impact and,
> in short, the role and competence of relevant
> entities. This awareness should encompass
> Federal, Regional, State and Municipal institutions
> and the relative role of the Universities,
> international and private entities (including
> industry), the various professions, and the legal,
> fiscal, intellectual, aesthetic, cultural and
> fundamentally human ingredients that pull the
> pattern together--or apart. An institutionally
> immediate element of this frame of reference is
> the current role of the Foundation and Foundation
> grantees in the urban sector (both within the
> country and the region). What grantees are cur-
> rently involved, with what kind of staff,
> programs, and research; how do they relate to the
> overall process of urbanization, to each other,
> and to prospective Foundation grantees. Within
> this context, and cognizant of the financial,

institutional, research and human resources
available, a frame of reference should set out
priority areas of Foundation involvement, hope-
fully identifying promising institutions,
individuals, research objectives and 'linkages'
therein. More simply, an urban frame of
reference should be based on and attempt to
increase our understanding of the urbanization
process, and the responses thereto, including
our own. And it should begin to identify
opportunities for increasing the productivity
of present and future Foundation involvement.

[14]

THE "FRAME OF REFERENCE" ORIGIN OF THE PRESENT PAPER

The present paper is a part of the "frame of reference"
document of June, 1971. There were four major Sections
in the original paper: Section I--"Introduction," including
a discussion of objectives, "urbanization," urban problems,
the need for a "frame of reference" in approaching same, and
the institutional biases of FordBrazil; Section II--"Urban-
zation in Brazil," including a description of the settle-
ment of Brazil and the twentieth century emergence of
Brazil as a predominantly urban society; Section III--"Bra-
zilian Responses to Urbanization," including an evaluation
of the major entities attempting to understand and respond
to the urbanization process in Brazil, and containing an
analysis of "urban policy" in Brazil; and Section IV--"The
Ford Foundation in the Urban Sector of Brazil," including
a discussion of the current Foundation acitvities in the
urban sector, principally through programs in the social
services, population, and agriculture, also including a
discussion of the appropriate role of the Foundation in the .
urban sector, and a general program statement and recom-
mendation. The present draft omits Section IV entirely,
as related more to the institutional interests of the
Foundation than the issue of Brazilian urbanization per se.
The Section I, "Introduction," is similarly related to the
institutional interests of the Ford Foundation. It also

relates to the context, methodology, and qualifications

which necessarily embrace the two Sections which follow,

and hence is incorporated, in part, in the present

"Introduction." As stated in the original "Introduction":

> When Banfield says there is no such thing as
> an 'urban expert,' one can only nod in agreement:
> I, at least, don't claim to be one and cite
> this paper as proof. By way of placing cards
> on the table, my training is in sociology and
> law. I have worked and lived in Brazil for
> nearly two years, as Assistant to the Represen-
> tative. Most of my time has been spent working
> with grants related to, but not directly in,
> 'urbanization' (i.e., political science, soci-
> ology, social anthropology, administration, law,
> economics and agricultural economics). I did
> inherit the one directly 'urban' FordBrazil
> grant, in municipal administration....And I wear
> the 'urban' hat in the Rio office when 'urban
> related' fellowships, conferences, and grant
> proposal issues arise.
>
> In large measure this memorandum arises out of
> that experience in general, and out of the
> municipal administration experience in particular.
> I became increasingly convinced that urban prob-
> lems are among the largest, most difficult,
> and most enduring to be faced by Brazil in the
> foreseeable future. And I became convinced that
> Brazil and the Foundation are ill prepared to
> meet these problems. After ten years in Brazil
> the Foundation did not have an urban policy.
> We had no way, other than ad hoc evaluation, of
> relating the urban component of existing grants,
> or of responding to urban related requests
> for Foundation support. Nor did we know
> where 'urban' Brazil is going, what problems
> were likely to arise, or the appropriate role
> of the Foundation with regard thereto. Brazil,
> meanwhile, was and is becoming an urban country
> at a staggering rate. The problems of and
> interest in the urban area increase propor-
> tionately. For a number of reasons it became
> apparent that the Foundation role in urban
> Brazil needed rethinking. Stated more affirmatively,
> I became convinced that the Foundation had a

[16]

    more productive role to play in the urban
    sector in Brazil.

    My methodology has been relatively crude, largely
    contact with grantees, open-ended interviews,
    sporadic library research and the interesting role
    of 'participant-observer.' The time and
    literature available has been limited, and
    the number of interviews relatively few.
    Thus much of what follows will have to pass
    as professional judgment. It should be
    added that this is a draft document, quite
    explicitly requesting discussion and criticism.

The two Sections that follow were quickly written

in this spirit. They were written to pull together,

principally for myself and for Foundation colleagues,

some general information on the urbanization process and

the Brazilian institutions responding thereto. While it

is obvious that the materials which follow are very general

statements and analyses of the Brazilian urbanization process

and actors, a few more immediate comments and qualifications

are in order.

Section II, "Urbanization in Brazil," is historical

and descriptive in its approach, and basically economic

determist in its underlying and unstated theoretical base.

It should be noted, however, that the cities of Brazil

probably fit a dependencia analysis as comfortably as the

cities of any Latin American country. Following this school

of inquiry, Brazilian urbanists often look more concertedly

and causally at the role of external "models" of urban

and economic development, first Portuguese, then English,

and more recently French and American. And they look to the

role of an "externally" determined economy in rubber, sugar,
cocoa, coffee, and minerals, in the development of
Brazilian cities. I believe the dependencia analysis is the
conceptual first cousin--albeit narrower and more linear
in scope and reach--of a more general approach which looks
to the subtle and complex interaction between cities and
processes of social, political, legal and economic change
and "development." Section II does not, however, attempt
to develop explicitly a theoretical model of urbanization
in Brazil or apply extant models to a "reality" I perceive.
Nor does it focus at length on a number of enduring
theoretical issues: the more precise relationship
between urbanization and "development" in Brazil,
between rural and urban sectors, the interrelations
between or within systems of cities, etc. In short,
Section II is not an explicit theoretical statement;
it is descriptive and, in a general way, quantitative,
and a synthesis of materials heretofore disparate. It
should be read as such, and no more.

Section III, "Brazilian Responses to Urbanization,"
is composed of two parts, an inventory and brief analysis of
the various actors in the urban sector, and an analysis
of urban policy in Brazil. The former is a quick general
review for the pledge "practitioner" in Brazil's urban
sector. Whatever merit this Section has will be fleeting.
Brazil's urban sector is, if anything, fast moving. In

fairness to my analysis it should be noted that Section IV,
here omitted, supplements this taxonomy with a more specific
review of much of the social science oriented urban
research presently underway in Brazil. The concluding
analysis of "urban policy" will also age, though I believe
some of the conceptual propensities identified have
greater longevity. It will be noted that I tried to
cite my sources rather extensively. This was done
because many of the references are not otherwise collated,
and because I had access to considerable unpublished
material which may be of interest to the Brazilian urban
professional,

THE ABSENCE OF AN URBAN TRADITION

One of the most striking characteristics of the urban-
ization process in Brazil is the absence of any pre-
colonial urban tradition. Unlike other Latin American
countries, such as Peru or Mexico, there were virtually no
urban settlements in Brazil when the Portuguese arrived.
Whatever "causal" factors were to play a part in the
Brazilian urbanization process, they were to function in
the absence of prior restraints or stimuli arising out of
any urban tradition in Brazil.

PHYSICAL SETTING

The urban character of Brazil is obviously reflective in
some measure of the physical setting. The fifth largest
country in the world, Brazil covers 3.3 million square
miles, or approximately half of the continent of South
America. Brazil's land area is greater than that of
the continental United States (by approximately 185,000
square miles). The clay of the northeastern coastal strip
and loam of the southern plateau offer rich soil for
tropical and sub-tropical crops. The largest part of the
land mass is made up of highlands that seldom reach above
3,000 feet. Following the natural tilt of the highlands,
however, most of the large rivers drain inward to the
interior, and often northward to the Amazon and southward
to the Rio de la Plata. Only the Amazon can be navigated
far into the interior. A steep slope known as the Great
Escarpment rises sharply along much of the Atlantic Coast;
for years this coastal wall limited travel into the
interior. The interior is even more insulated from the
west, by the continent-dividing Andes with dense, almost
impenetrable forests covering its eastern slopes. These
factors, plus the precious metal orientation of the
Spanish colonialists and the politics of Europe, conspired
to people the coast of Brazil and extend the ambit of the
Brazilian nation over a vast and sparsely settled area.

THE SETTLEMENT AND "URBAN" HISTORY OF BRAZIL

Coastal Settlement--"scuttle along the seashore like crabs" (1500-1600)

Even before the discovery of Brazil, the 1494 Treaty
of Tordesilhas granted the Portuguese the right to lands
east of an imaginary line situated 370 leagues off the
Cape Verde Islands. Lands west of the line were to belong
to Spain. Thus Portugal had color of legal claim to the
coast of Brazil even before it was discovered. Brazil's
actual discovery and settlement was merely a chapter in the
European maritime expansion of the sixteenth century. Stum-
bled upon in the search for another route east, Brazil was
initially seen as a barrier to be cirumnavigated, but also
as a potential source of wealth and power. The idea of
settling Brazil arose primarily as an adjunct to the
commercial motivation, as discussed by Prado:

> The idea of peopling the new territory did not
> initially occur to any of them. It was commerce
> that interested them and hence their relative con-
> tempt for this primitive and empty American ter-
> ritory. The idea of occupying the new lands by
> means of effective settlement arose accredibly,
> as a need imposed by new and unforeseen circum-
> stances....For the commercial ends in view,
> occupation could not be effected in the form of
> establishing simple trading stations....It was
> necessary to broaden this basis, to create a
> settlement that could supply and support the
> trading stations established and organize produc-
> tion of the commodities needed for trading. The
> idea of settling the new lands arose from this
> need, and this need alone.[1]

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1. Caio Prado, Jr. The Colonial Background of Modern Brazil.
   Berkeley and Los Angeles, The University of California

Commercial development and transient settlement
of the colony began almost at once. Brazil was discovered
in 1500. Portuguese expeditions returned in 1501 and
1503, confirming earlier reports of an absence of mineral
wealth and spice, and the presence of a valuable coastal
dyewood, brazilwood. Within twenty years trading posts
dotted the coast. These small, crude and frequently
transient settlements were predominantly economic in
character. Poppino describes the trading posts as
follows:

> The trading factories were the first Portuguese
> settlements in Brazil. Scattered from Pernambuco
> to Sao Vicente, they were invariably found
> on the coastline, on islands, bays, or inlets
> opening onto the sea, for their location was
> determined by the availability of a protected
> anchorage near large stands of brazilwood....A
> few factories became substantial and reasonably
> self-contained establishments with large
> numbers of native allies living outside the
> walls. In these posts the Portuguese not
> only learned the cultivation of manioc and
> other products of the land, but also intro-
> duced plants, fowls, and domestic animals from
> the Atlantic islands to supply the needs of
> the garrison and to provision ships for the
> return journey to Portugal. In most instances,
> however, the factory was little more than a
> simple camp, with a stockade enclosing a few
> crude structures to house the factor, his
> staff, and the merchandise being collected
> for export on the next ship. Such factories
> were maintained only until the immediate supply
> of brazilwood was exhausted or until they were

Press, 1967. **p.** 11. Prado oversimplifies somewhat.
There were also strong geopolitical and "manifest
destiny" motives behind the initial settlement of Brazil,
as discussed below. See Rollie E. Poppino. Brazil, The
Land and the People. New York, Oxford University Press,
1958. pp. 40-67.

> destroyed by the natives or by the French,
> who long contested with the Portuguese for
> control of Brazil.[2]

Not only the French, but the Spaniards and the Dutch were to threaten Portugal's claim to Brazil. It was largely in response to the early French incursion into Brazilian territory and trade that the Portuguese Crown decided to establish permanent settlements. Thus in 1530 a first "viceroy," Martim Afonso, was sent to Brazil with a broad mandate to run the country, and specifically to establish permanent settlements. Settlers and their families were taken along. In 1532 the first permanent town was established at Sao Vicente near Santos. While the coastal topography and the commercial and political intrigues with the French had some influence on the character of this town, the Iberian stamp was indelible. A church was built, a municipal government inaugurated, and town lots and rural lands were apportioned amoung the 400 members of the expedition. Cattle and sugar cane were quickly introduced and a sugar mill erected. With the help of a castaway turned chief, friendly contacts were initiated with the Indians.

Even before the return of Martim Afonso to Portugal a few years later, the Crown had decided that numerous, permanent settlements would be needed to hold the new

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2. Poppino. op. cit. p. 47.

[24]

lands. They resolved to dot the coast with "captaincies,"
a colonization system successfully employed in the Atlantic
islands in the previous century. The "captaincy" was a
separate colony tract united only by common ties with
Portugal. From Maranhao to Santa Catarina the land was
divided into fifteen parallel strips, extending inland
from the sea to the vaguely defined line of Tordesilhas.
These "captaincy" tracts were granted to donatarios,
noblemen who enjoyed the king's confidence. The objective
of "captaincy" policy was to settle permanently and
control the Portuguese domain in the Western Hemisphere.
A strange mixture of feudalism and capitalism, the policy
met with mixed success. Two generously financed and
well garrisoned "captaincies," Sao Vicente and Olinda,
prospered initially. A number survived Indian uprisings and
economic deprivation and left their names in six states
(Maranhao, Ceara, Rio Grande do Norte, Pernambuco, Bahia
and Espirito Santo). By the time the first governor
arrived in Brazil in 1549, approximately fifteen towns and
villages with Portuguese inhabitants had replaced the
earlier, transient trading factories. By the middle
of the sixteenth century the largest and most powerful
cities in Brazil were Salvador, Rio de Janeiro, and
Joao Pessoa, followed by Olinda and Sao Vicente.[3]

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3. Aroldo de Azevedo. "A urbanizacao no Brasil Colonial",
   in Brasil, A Terra E O Homen. Sao Paulo, Companhia
   Editora Nacional, 1970. p. 222.

Poppino describes this settlement process, and the
emergence of Rio de Janeiro, as follows:

> In the course of the prolonged contest with
> the French, the Portuguese perforce explored
> most of the coastline from Sao Vicente to the
> Amazon, conquered or expelled many of the
> hostile Indians from the coastal area, and
> established numerous new settlements to hold
> the land against foreign encroachment. The
> capital cities of the present states of Paraiba,
> Rio Grande do Norte, Ceara, Maranhao, and Para
> owe their origins to Luso French rivalry
> for empire. The earliest and by far the most
> important of the new Portuguese towns, however,
> was Sao Sebastiao do Rio de Janeiro....With the
> pacification of the region a Jesuit mission
> was erected at Rio de Janeiro and colonists
> were attracted from other parts of Brazil and
> from Portugal. Because of its excellent harbor
> and strategic location, Rio de Janeiro quickly
> became the leading port and administrative
> center for the southern part of the colony,
> serving briefly as co-capital of Brazil on
> several occasions after 1572. Its rise
> accompanied and contributed to the gradual
> decline of Sao Vicente, which long marked the
> southernmost limit of Portuguese colonization
> in America.[4]

With the "captaincies" came the beginnings of an urban
dimension: (i) permanent settlement of the Brazilian
coast, (ii) European urban structure, society, and in some
measure, values, (iii) the beginning of a plantation system
economy, and (iv) according to some authors, the roots of
Brazilian regionalism.[5] Poppino describes the "urban"
flavor of the colonization of Brazil as follows:

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4. Poppino. op. cit. p. 65.

5. Ibid. pp. 53.

> Doubtless the two most lasting innovations
> deliberately introduced during the captaincy
> period were European-style urban communities
> and a plantation economy. Both of these were
> in the Iberian tradition and were specifically
> indicated in the charters of the respective
> captaincies....the newcomers expected to live
> in urban surroundings--primitive though these
> might be--and under regulations and officials
> such as they had known in Portugal. Thus the
> first task of the donatory was to found a
> town and appoint municipal officers. Almost
> immediately thereafter, he allotted the
> adjacent lands to those reputable colonists
> who possessed the means to make them productive.
> When conditions warranted, once the surrounding
> lands were taken, the entire process was
> repeated with the founding of a new town and
> the distribution of rural lands at some distance
> from the first settlement. This was the process
> by which the donatories sought to expand the
> occupied area of their colonies, and it was
> the process that was followed throughout
> the colonial period nearly everywhere that new
> lands were brought under the control of the
> government. Initially, at least, the process
> was used in part because the Portuguese preferred
> community life to the isolated existence of
> the frontier, in part because the town offered
> relative security to settlers in hostile
> territory, and in part because the municipal
> authorities might exert control over the
> individualistic and often unruly elements among
> the colonists.[6]

The character of these emergent Brazilian settlements

was heavily influenced by this Portuguese urban tradition,

and by the political, economic, legal and religious

realities of the Portuguese Crown. This proximity to the

Crown meant that the early settlement was, except for its

vital geopolitical importance, rather uninnovative in

structure and function. At the same time they did develop

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6. Ibid. pp. 53-54.

a kind of feudal autonomy from the local state, and

isolation from other Brazilian settleme ts. This parallel

"dependence" and autonomy of the early Brazilian settlement

is discussed by one urban historian as follows:

> The colonial Brazilian municipality functioned
> more freely at the margin of the state than
> did the Spanish American, but, formally speaking,
> it was even less innovative with respect to the
> metropolitan prototype. Because the Portuguese
> crown lacked resources for discovery and
> conquest, overseas territories were infeudated
> to the opulent Order of Christ, and in the
> case of Brazil, subinfeudated, as it were, to
> proprietors or donatarios. The latter were
> empowered to establish municipal centers to
> nucleate colonization, but because these were
> contained in senhorios such centers could be
> no more than vilas. Subsequent ecclesiastical
> organization of the colony forced an accommodation
> to the fact that bishops, as first-ranking
> nobles and titular princes, could not be
> ensconced in vilas that were subject to the
> proprietr but required 'cities' (cidades) that
> stood on alodial land. In creating bishopries
> the king, as grant master of the Order of
> Christ, emancipated the land to be used for
> the Order's central purpose, service of the faith;
> then, as sovereign, he elevated the designated
> vila to the status of cidade. (Vasconcellos 1916)[7]

Even when elevated to cidades, however, the early

coastal settlements remained isolated enclaves. Prado

describes the difficult coastal environment which con-

tributed to their "pocket like" character:

> These coastal centers were not only cut off
> from the interior, but were also isolated from
> each other on account of the difficulties of
> overland travel. Luis Tomas de Navarro, a
> judge commissioned in 1808 to investigate the
> possibilities of establishing a postal route
> along the coast from Bahia to Rio de Janeiro,

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7. Richard Morse. A Framework for Latin American Urban
   History. (Reprint). p. 4.

made notes on the obstacles that isolated the
towns and settlements from each other:
rivers diffi   it to ford, beaches covered with
thick layers of fine sand that render traveling
extremely difficult, and steep promontories
that advance into the sea from the interior and
involve a steep climb. Hence these settlements
were left to vegetate, forming sm. 1 separate
pockets whose only outlet was the sea and
supporting a precarious way of life by the
production of a handful of commodities--flour,
fish, and some coffee--for export to Bahia
and Rio de Janeiro. There was still a further
obstacle to development in this unhappy region,
the hostility of the natives. The mountain and
forest served as a shelter and final refuge
for the natives who resisted the advance of
the white man and refused to submit to white
occupation of this part of the colony.. The
colonists attacked the Indian tribes in a broad
pincer-like movement from two sides, the coast
and Minas Gerais. Harassed from both sides,
the still numerous survivors were obliged to
seek refuge in this intermediate area, which
still retained its natural cover of dense
forest that colonization had not yet had time
to penetrate, and remained there up to the
nineteenth century. From their strongholds
they descended periodically on the coast,
sacking and destroying the settlements.[8]

This "natural" isolation was amplified by the "exterior"

or European orientation of the residents.

The widely separated clusters of settlement
remained largely isolated from each other
except by sea, although by the end of the
sixteenth century overland routes for riders
and pack animals had been opened between
the towns and plantations from Bahia to Paraiba
in the north, while in the south Sao Paulo
was connected by precipitous trails with the
ports of Santos ar Rio de Janeiro. Except
at Sao Paulo, howe   , the Portuguese continued
to cling to the sea. ard, for they were still
tied spiritually, culturally, and economically
to the mother country and had not yet discovered

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8.   Prado. op. cit. p. 33.

EXPLORATION AND URBANIZATION, 16TH CENTURY

FIG. 1

COLOMBIA

VENEZUELA

GUAYANA

SURINAM

FR. GUAYANA

Natal—1599

FILIPÉIA — 1585
Igaraçu — 1536
Olinda—1537

São Cristóvão — 1590

SALVADOR — 1549

PERU

Ilhéus -- 1536

Santa Cruz — 1536
Pôrto Seguro — 1535

BOLIVIA

Vitória — 1551
Espirito Santo — 1551

PARAGUAY

São Paulo—1558
RIO DE JANEIRO 1565
Santos— 1545
São Vicente —1532
Itanhaém — 1561
Cananéia — 1600

Cities

Towns

Areas probably under urban influence

Populated areas without city or town

URUGUAY

0 Km	1000	2000	3000	4000

0 Miles	1000	2000	3000

URBANIZATION IN BRAZIL

INTERNATIONAL URBANIZATION SURVEY

the mineral wealth that would later lure
many of them permanently into the
trackless interior.[9]

As observed by one of their contemporaries, Frei
Vicente do Salvador, the early colonists were content
merely to "scuttle along the seashore like so many
crabs."[10] The exploration and "urbanization of the
sixteenth century is shown in Figure 1.[11]

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9.   Ibid. p. 31. See also Poppino. op. cit. p. 66.

10. Prado. op. cit. p. 31.

11. Azevedo. op. cit. p. 131.

Settlement of the Interior--uti possidetis (1600-1700)

Late in the sixteenth and early in the seventeenth
century, incursions were made into the uncharted interior
of Brazil. The opening of this vast region is described
by Poppino as follows:

> The exploration and conquest of the interior
> cf Portuguese America was directed from four
> principal centers. The vast Amazon
> Valley--which was separated administratively
> from the rest of Brazil in 1626--was subdued
> largely by expeditions dispatched, usually under
> official auspices, from the town of Belem at
> the river's mouth. On the southern fringe of
> the colony, the establishment of fortified
> outposts on the Rio de la Plata and in Santa
> Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul were primarily
> military enterprises, supervised at times by
> the governor-general at Bahia and more often
> by the crown in Lisbon. In both the North
> and South, the cross and the flag preceded
> or accompanied the first settlers. But in
> the hinterland of the plantation colonies
> in the Northeast the occupation of the backlands
> of Bahia and Pernambuco was initially a spon-
> taneous movement by mixed-blood renegades and
> cowboys, and by the predominantly European
> owners of cattle herds escaping from the
> comparatively overcrowded and closely regulated
> coastal communities. Colonial officials
> usually made no serious effort to impose the
> laws of God or King in the Northeastern
> sertao until the regions had been penetrated
> and partially pacified by such unwitting agents
> of the empire. Only in this area of Brazil
> did the opening up of the frontier approximate
> the process of the great plains of the United
> States three centuries later.
>
> The (south-central) remainder of the Brazilian
> wilderness was first traversed by the bandeirantes
> from Sao Paulo, who were the most spectacular
> trail blazers and Indian fighters to emerge
> in South America. The bandeirantes were so
> called for the bandeiras, or quasi-military
> expeditions that they mounted into the interior

for a century and a half after 1600. The men
from Sao Paulo were also the only group to
take part in the exploration and subjugation
of every major region included within the
boundaries of modern Brazil.[12]

Several prominent characteristics of these seven-

teenth century settlements are worth noting. As they

were motivated primarily by geopolitical and economic

considerations, the character of these settlements was

often starkly utilitarian and military. And cities of

the interior, as all Brazilian cities, began to modestly

reflect the strongly regional character of Brazil.

"Manifest Destiny" in Amazonia

The settlement of Amazonia was "a deliberate process

of imperial aggrandizement, designed to enhance the

grandeur of Portugal."[13] Motivated mainly by territorial

imperialism, dreams of gold, and the meager economy of

a region that has been called "green hell" and the

"last chapter of Genesis," forts, missions, trading posts,

and fishing villages were established along the Amazon,

including a fort at Manaus in 1669. A few Spanish

Jesuits coming down from the west established missions

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12. Poppino. op. cit. p. 72.

13. Ibid. pp. 90-91. "The Amazonian tropas were similar
    in organization and composition to the bandeiras of
    Sao Paulo. There were few land trails, however,
    so that nearly all incursions were waterborne.
    Thus canoes and boats powered by Indian oarsmen were
    the explorers' chief means of travel into the heartland
    of tropical South America. Some tropas were veritable
    flotillas, with dozens of boats and more than a
    thousand men."

under the flag of Spain (1687), only to be expelled by
force. Poppino describes the military and "geographical"
nature of the settlement of the Amazon as follows:

> Two Franciscan friars from Quito, who had
> begun to establish missions among the Encabelado
> Indians in the upper valley, arrived at Belem.
> The governor of Para, regarding the activities
> of the Spanish Franciscans as an encroachment
> of his domain, immediately dispatched a large
> expedition to claim the area formally for
> Portugal, and to make this fact known to the
> Spanish authorities in Quito. The expedition
> could not have enjoyed royal sanction, for
> the king of Spain still ruled over the
> Iberian colonies in the New World. and in any
> case virtually the entire Amazon Valley lay
> beyond the line of Tordesilhas. The governor's
> actions have been explained as a manifestation
> of resurgent Portuguese nationalism. In
> October 1637 the expedition of more than
> 2,000 men, including some seventy Portuguese
> and 1,200 Indian bowmen under the command of
> the notorious Indian fighter, Pedro Teixeira,
> set out for Quito. It returned to Belem
> twenty-six months later, after accomplishing its
> mission and completing one of the longest
> treks in the annals of Portuguese imperialism.
> In August 1639 at the confluence of the Napo and
> Aguarico rivers--which marks the easternmost
> point of modern Ecuador--Teixeira founded the
> settlement of Franciscana to mark the boundary
> between the dominions of Spain and Portugal
> in the Amazon basin.[14]

Military and Cattle Settlements of the South

The initial settlement of the far south was similarly
political in nature. It was also motivated by the cattle

---

14. _Ibid._ p. 92.

economy of the interior.[15] In an openly expansionist

move the Portuguese erected a military outpost on the

unoccupied north shore of the river across from Euenos

Aires. This was well over a thousand miles from the

southernmost settlement in Brazil, and well beyond the

line established by the Treaty of Tordesilhas. The

presence of this military settlement caused protracted

armed conflict with Argentina, again involving missions of

the Spanish Jesuits. In spite of a subsequent coloni-

zation effort, the "outpost" community remained essentially

a military garrison. The Portuguese eventually gave up

Uruguay as well as the outpost. But the stronghold in

Rio de la Plata allowed time for the gradual settlement

of the southern coast. Four small but enduring coastal

settlements had been established by the middle of the

seventeenth century--Paranagua, Sao Francisco do Sul,

Curitiba and Florianopolis.

The Grazing Penetration of the Northeast

In the Northeast, penetration of the interior began

from two principal points, Bahia and Pernambuco. The

settlements of the sertao reflected an economic impetus.

---

15. Ibid. p. 109. "The crown's interests in peopling the
     southern pampas were primarily geopolitical--to
     strengthen and expand the outpost of empire on the
     Rio de la Plata--but it was livestock, chiefly
     cattle, that attracted men to the area and provided
     the economic basis for settlement."

[34]

The far flung cattle settlements related back to the market
in the large towns, as described by Prado:

> ....it is to the grazing industry that we owe the
> occupation of a good part of the colony's
> territory....calculated in terms of the total
> area effectively colonized, it surpassed that
> opened up by mining....the cattle estates always
> spread in a continuous movement from a point
> that represents the radiation center....the
> radiation centers generally corresponded to
> an agricultural nucleus or sometimes to a mining
> center....The principal and oldest of these
> agricultural centers, those established along
> the littoral in the northeast sugar zone from
> Pernambuco to Bahia, also gave rise to the largest
> and most important grazing zones.[16]

Prado describes the settlement process in the cattle country
as follows:

> The rapid advance of the cattle estates is
> explained, on the one hand, by the growing
> demand for cattle in the coastal and mining
> regions, coupled with the low economic density
> and productivity of the industry, and on the
> other, by the incredible ease with which a
> ranch could be established in the backlands.
> The would-be rancher need only put up a simple
> dwelling covered with a palm-thatch roof....and
> throw together a few makeshift corrals, bring
> in the cattle and his three leagues of land
> had been transformed into a ranch. Only ten
> or twelve men were needed to run the ranch.
> There was a ready supply of labor....Another
> factor contribution to the rapid increase of
> the ranches was the system adopted for paying
> the herdsmen (vaqueiros). The vaqueiro received
> one out of every four calves born on the ranch;
> a payment that accumulated to be handed over
> only at the end of his first five years of
> work. In this way, the vaqueiro received a
> large number of beasts at one time and could,
> therefore, set up on his own.[17]

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16. Prado. op. cit. p. 59.

17. Ibid. p. 219.

"Heartland"

The Brazilian heartland presents a somewhat different
and unfolding pattern of settlement. Throughout the
seventeenth and into the eighteenth century the settlement
of the heartland was practically non-existent. Sao
Paulo, for example, was one of the earliest "interior"
settlements--an isolated, crude frontier town, heavily
influenced by the Indians. Poppino describes the rural,
primitive, Sao Paulo as follows:

> The frontier mentality and way of life of the
> Paulistas revealed a strong ethnic influence.
> By weight of numbers Indians--of whom a majority
> were free men--predominated in the society of
> Sao Paulo in the sixteenth century and probably
> through most of the seventeenth, while mamelucos,
> both legitimate and illegitimate, comprised
> a substantial and growing segment of the
> population. The latter outnumbered persons of
> European descent at least until late in the
> colonial era. The leading families, moreover,
> generally bore some Indian blood in their veins,
> and those who could claim descent from the
> Tupi consorts of Joao Ramalho or similar
> sixteenth century squaw men took pride in their
> native ancestry....the successful bandeirantes
> were those who adopted Indian practices
> that permitted them to find their way and to
> survive in the wilderness to the North, West and
> South of Sao Paulo. They seem to have inherited
> from Indian forebears or acquired by exposure
> to their Tupi companions a wandering streak
> that was often merely the sheer excitement
> and adventure of discovering new lands....They
> generally wore short trousers and an over-shirt
> of cotton, perhaps covered by a leather jerkin
> or vest, and a fur cap or broad-brimmed hat
> for protection against sun and rain. On treks
> into the interior they usually traveled
> barefoot....By and large they used the weapons
> of their Indian allies and enemies--the bow
> and arrow or spear. The bandeirantes prized

firearms, especially the shotgun and a long-barreled
musket, but possessed relatively few of these
expensive arms. Their basic food and many
utensils likewise were Indian. Maize, beans, and
to a lesser extent, manioc, were staples in the
Paulista diet. They slept on hammocks or on
leather cots. Imported household items were
extremely rare. Richard Morse reports that only
one decent European-style bed existed in the
town of Sao Paulo as late as 1620. Indian
influence extended even to the speech of the
Paulistas. Portuguese was always the official
language, in which formal records were kept, but
few Paulistas were trained in Portuguese grammar
or other areas of academic study....The common
speech of Sao Paulo was the <u>lingua geral</u>, a
variant of Tupi-Guarani tongue, which served as
a <u>lingua franca</u> throughout the interior of Brazil
and in Paraguay. The European and <u>mameluco</u>
males in Sao Paulo, as elsewhere in Brazil,
readily adopted the attitude of the Tupi toward
native women. Casual alliances with the compliant
squaws were customary, and some <u>bandeirantes</u>
were renown for the number of concubines who
accompanied them on their ramblings through the
<u>sertao</u>.[18]

While the Sao Paulo <u>bandeirantes</u> traveled through

much of Brazil's interior, their contribution to the

settlement of the interior is limited, in some cases even

negative. In search of labor to work sugar plantations, and

always in search of precious minerals, the <u>bandeirantes</u>

"traveled as explorers, not as settlers."[19] The <u>bandeirantes</u>

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18. Poppino. <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>. pp. 74-76.

19. Prado. <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>. p. 31. See also Vienna Moog.
     Bandeirantes and Pioneers. p. 165. Even in criticizing
     their "predatory and extractive" nature, Moog probably gives
     the <u>bandeirantes</u> more territorial credit than is their
     due. "Among us the <u>bandeirante</u> spirit ended by nearly
     always triumphing over the constructive, pioneer
     spirit....in the sense of the tamer of the wilds, whose
     purpose is to create something enduring....the initial
     absence of a constructive pioneer spirit in favor of
     the <u>bandeirante</u> spirit, predatory and extractivist,

often "left the interior less populated than they had
found it."[20]

The pattern of wide exploration and occasional
settlement continued throughout the seventeenth century.
The military, utilitarian settlements which did result
were minuscule dots in the vast interior of Brazil. The
larger and richer cities remained on the coast, and
the majority of Brazilians remained in or near the growing
cities. In the Northeast in particular, a distinctly
Brazilian pattern of urban life was beginning to emerge.
Based on the sugar economy, the urban character and
structure of these Northeastern coastal cities was a
synthesis of Portuguese and later Dutch and African
influences in a distinctly Brazilian hybrid. There were
major ports at Rio, Joao Pessoa, Olinda and Salvador, all
dependent on the export sugar economy. The lucrative

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was to produce in the long run the inestimable
good of the expansion of national territory...."
See also Pierre Monbeig. Pionniers et Planteurs
de Sa, Paulo. p. 171. Monbeig's Sorbonne
prize-winning thesis speaks to this point as follows:
"....a myth of the bandeirante has been created that
has an absolute psychological efficacy. When one
wishes to extol a rancher or a planter, the razer
of forests, the founder of towns and cities, there
is no more flattering title to bestow upon him than
that of bandeirante. When one has said of a man
that he is a real bandeirante, one has said every-
thing. Let us allow for a very Latin overemphasis
and not be astonished at seeing the bandeirante
receive an indirect and posthumous promotion to
colonizer."

20. Poppino. op. cit. p. 71. "....the demand for
Indian slaves, which reached its peak during the

[38]

sugar industry also attracted invaders, and from 1632
to 1654 the Dutch held Olinda and a wide area of the
sugar producing Northeast. When they were finally driven
out, the Dutch moved the sugar technology and much of the
market to the Caribbean. This was the beginning of a
long, irregular period of decline for the Northeast. The
seventeenth century witnessed the decline of Olinda
relative to Recife (though there was continuing rivalry
between the two neighboring cities, leading to civil
strife in the Peddler's war of 1710-1711).[21] Through the
seventeenth century, Salvador (population: 30,000) was
the center of beauty and splendor in the entire new world,
rivaled only by Rio de Janeiro (population: 12,000).[22]
Salvador's rich and numerous churches are a striking
contrast to the grim and utilitarian North American
counterpart in its day, Jamestown, Virginia. A large
portion of the slaves imported into Brazil came to the
sugar plantations of the Northeast coast. The African

interruptions in the regular African traffic before
1648, supplied the strongest incentive for probes
into the sertao....Primarily they were forays by men
operating from settlements on or near the Atlantic,
who left the interior less populated than they found
it."

21. See C. R. Boxer. The Golden Age of Brazil (1695-
1750). Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of
California Press, 1969. p. 301.

22. Azevedo. op. cit. p. 223.

EXPLORATION AND URBANIZATION, 17TH CENTURY

FIG. 2

VENEZUELA
GUAYANA
SURINAM
FR. GUAYANA
COLOMBIA

Vila Bosa do Conté - 1637
Gurupi - 1651
Alcantara - 1637
BELEM - 1616
Camatá - 1637
S.AC LUIS - 1612

Aquirás - 1709

Natal

PARAÍBA
Igaraçu
OLINDA - 1576
Vila-Formosa - 1627
Pôrto-Calvo - 1636
Alagoa do Sul 1636

Penedo-1636
Itabaiana - 1665
S. Amaro dos Brotas - 1697
São Cristóvão

São Francisco - 1693
Cachoeira - 1693
Jaguaripe - 1693

SALVADOR

Cairu - 1608
Camamu 1693

Ilhéus

Santa Cruz
Pôrto Seguro

PERU

BOLIVIA

Guaratinguetá 1651
Taubaté - 1645
Jacareí 1653
Moji das Cruzes 1614
Jundiaí 1656
Parnaíba 1625
Itu - 1663
Sorocaba - 1661
SÃO PAULO

PARAGUAY

Curitiba - 1693

URUGUAY

Vitória
Espírito Santo
Guarapari - 1609
Campos - 1677
S. João da Paraíba - 1697
Macacu - 1697
CABO FRIO - 1615
RIO DE JANEIRO
Angra dos Reis - 1608
Paratí - 1667
Ubatuba - 1637
S. Sebastião - 1636
Santos
S. Vicente
Itanhaém
Iguape - 1665
Cananéia
Paranaguá - 1653
S. Fransísco do Sul - 1660

Cities

Towns

Areas probably under urban influence

Populated areas without city or town

| 0 Km | 1000 | 2000 | 3000 | 4000 |
| 0 Miles | 1000 | 2000 | 3000 |

influence in Salvador is obvious in the Portuguese
spoken,[23] as it is in the _candomble_, the music, or
the pigmentation of this heavily negro and mulatto
region. The Southern coastal cities also grew in size
and number as immigration increased; sugar and cattle
economy eventually developed. The overall settlement
pattern of the seventeenth century is shown in Figure
2.

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23. Gilberto Freyre. The Masters and the Slaves. New
    York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1968. pp. 342-343.

The "Golden Age of Brazil" (1700-1800)

The eighteenth century has been called "o seculo do desenvolvimento das cidades."[24] At the end of the seventeenth century gold was discovered in unprecedented quantities in Minas Gerais and Goias. Brazil was subject to the first great gold rush in modern times.[25] The country and the interior, were flooded by the first great wave of immigrants.[26] The mines also provided a new market for slaves imported from Africa. Although the immigrants, and the miners, were frequently Portuguese Emboabas, the mining migration was of "melting pot" composition.[27] By 1700 there were at least 30,000 residents in the mine region of

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24. Azevedo. op. cit. p. 223.

25. Boxer. op. cit. p. 47. Boxer describes the migration into the interior as follows: "Nothing like it had been seen before and nothing like it was seen again unt. 1 the California gold rush cf 1849. The only effective check on the number which came pouring in was the sterile nature of the soil and the impossibility of providing food for all those who wished to come. One of these pioneers recalled in his old age how some of the early optimists had started out on the month or six-week journey to the mines without carrying any provisions at all. Many died of malnutrition or starvation before reaching their destination, and it was not unknown for a starving man to murder his comrade for the sake of a handful of maize.

26. Celso Furtado, cited in Wagley. An Introduction to Brazil. 1963. p. 54. Furtado says that between 300,000 and 500,000 Portuguese came to Brazil during the eighteenth century, more than doubling the number of Portuguese.

27. See Jesuit Antonil, quoted in Boxer. op. cit. p. 41. "Each year a crowd of Portuguese and of foreigners come out in the fleets in order to go to the Mines. From

the interior which had previously been largely vacant.[28]
More gold was subsequently discovered, major discoveries
in 1718 and 1725 and numerous smaller finds. A pattern
reminiscent of the boom and bust gold towns of the
American West was repeated. Vast amounts of gold were
extracted,[29] and reasonably large cities sprang up almost
overnight.[30]

The gold provided an incentive for tighter admin-
istrative and political control from Lisbon, and several
"captaincies" were established in the interior. The
"captaincies" were located in the three areas where the
mining communities clustered--Minas Gerais, Goias, and
Mato Grosso.[31] Prado describes the mining settlement

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the cities, towns, plantations, and backlands of
Brazil, came Whites, Colored, and Blacks, together
with many Amerindians employed by the Paulistas. The
mixture is of all sorts and conditions of persons:
men and women; young and old; poor and rich; nobles
and commoners; laymen, clergy, and religions of
different orders, many of which have neither house
nor convent in Brazil."

28. See Poppino. op. cit. p. 96.

29. Wagley. op. cit. p. 53. Wagley asserts that "....
during the eighteenth century Brazil produced 44 percent
of the world's supply of gold." See also Boxer. op.
cit. pp. 59-60.

30. Wagley. op. cit. p. 54. Wagley estimates that Ouro
Preto grew to 100,000. It is presently less than 10,000.

31. The regions developed in chronoligical order as stated
above. For a more detailed narration of these three
areas, see Prado. op. cit. pp. 53-58.

pattern as follows:

> [The mining communities] impelled settlement in
> an abrupt drive from the littoral to the heart of
> the continent; there was no continuity in its
> expansion. The mines were situated far from
> the primary sources of the currents of immigration
> that flowed toward them, and the intervening
> space remained a wilderness, crossed only by
> the few lines of communication that had been
> opened up. These links between the mining
> centers and the coastal towns, which were their
> source of life and provided 'he outlet for their
> production, did not even follow the routes of
> the early trails opened up to reach them.
> Thus, the settlements that sprang up around the
> mining establishments of central Minas Gerais,
> which were chronologically the first to be ex-
> ploited and were destined to remain the most
> important, were cut off from the original points
> of departure for the explorers. They were
> detached from Sao Paulo, the original center
> from which the pioneer prospectors had pushed
> forward their discoveries and also the point of
> departure for the first batch of settlers. They
> were also detached from Bahia, the second center
> from which settlement had spread out to occupy
> them; and communications converged on Rio de
> Janeiro, from which a route had been opened up
> only in the early years of the eighteenth cen-
> tury when the mining area was already well popu-
> lated. The older trails from Sao Paulo to Bahia
> were relegated to a secondary position. This
> illustrates the nature of the dispersion of
> settlement provoked by the discovery of the mines.
> It was so sudden and so violent that it even
> lost contact with its original sources.[32]

Boxer describes something of the character of the early

mining community:

> The earliest mining camps were naturally of the
> most makeshift description, and even when they
> began to take on a more permanent form and become

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32. Ibid. p. 51.

embryo townships, the housing elements were very
simple. Walls were of crossed sticks and mud,
or of poles on end (pau a pique) with roofs of
palm thatch, leaves, or straw. The next develop-
ment was dwellings of the wattle-and-daub type
with a cover of thatch, but the floor in all
cases was of bare earth. As the settlements grew
in prosperity and stability, the walls became
plastered, inside and out, wooden or stone floors
were provided, and thatched roofs were replaced
by tiled. Verandas and balconies were later
refinements, and finally came the best type of
colonial house with cedar corner posts and sleepers,
tile roofs, and plastered-over bricks. This last
type evolved slowly, and even in 1711 there was
only a single tiled house in Ouro Preto, which
was one of the oldest and most prosperous
settlements.....One of the first indications of
permanent settlement was the erection of one o.
more chapels. These were naturally of the
pau a pique or wattle-and-daub variety, though
they were usually among the first buildings to
be graced with a tiled roof. Vendas, or small
trading shacks, sprang up about the same time;
whether these or the chapels came first is a
problem similar to that of the chicken and the
egg. In any event, conglomerations of neigh-
boring mining camps (arraiais) united to form the
present towns, which still straggle up hill and
down dale, with long winding streets and steep
stairways connecting the original nuclei. This
loose pattern of town settlement can clearly be
seen today in cities such as Ouro Preto, Sabara
and Sao Joao d'El Rei, where some of the wards
(bairros) retain the names of the original
settlers, as for instance, that of Antonio
Dias in Ouro Preto.[33]

Finally Poppino describes something of the adminis-

trative structure, and the changes in the urban hier-

archy, as follows:

During the first half of the eighteenth century
a dozen towns and five new captaincies were
created in the interior of Brazil as the crown
sought to maintain authority over the constantly

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33. Boxer. op. cit. pp. 49-51.

expanding population of the scattered mining dis-
tricts. Initially, the region of the mines was
included within the captaincy of Sao Vicente--still
nominally a possession of the heirs of Martin
Afonso--and the sprawling camps of the Serra do
Espinhaco (the mountain range in Minas Gerais)
were subject to the jurisdiction of the town
council of Sao Paulo. In 1709, however, the
crown purchased the remaining.rights of the
donatory and created the royal captaincy of Sao
Paulo e Minas de Ouro. The governor sent out
from Lisbon the following year resided in the
mining zone. The disturbances of the War of the
Emboabas, and the French attacks on Rio de
Janeiro in 1710 and 1711--which commanded the
attention of the governor--convinced the court
of the necessity for permanent administrative
organs in the mining camps. In an attempt to meet
this need, the crown in 1711 raised three of the
larger camps to the status of towns (vilas) with
elective municipal councils. These were Vila
Rica de Ouro Preto, Ribeirao do Carmo, and Vila
Real de Sabara. At the same time, in partial
compensation for its loss of jurisdiction over
the new vilas, Sao Paulo was made a city (cidade).
In the next seven years five additional mining
camps in Minas Gerais were given the rank of
vila: Vila Nova da Rainha, Pitangui, Sao Joao d'El
Rei, Sao Jose d'El Rei, and Vila do Principe. In 1720
Minas Gerais was detached from Sao Paulo and created as
separate captaincy, with a governor appointed by
the crown. Thereafter municipal government was
introduced into other mining regions soon after
rich strikes were reported or a sizable population
had gathered....

The captaincy of Sao Paulo, which had lost the
southern regions of Santa Catarina and Rio Grande
do Sul in 1738, was completely dismembered a
decade later, when Goias and Mato Grosso became
separate captaincies, and the rest of its ter-
ritory was placed under the authority of the
governor at Rio de Janeiro. Sao Paulo did not
reappear as a captaincy for fifteen years....The
most compelling evidence of the impact of
mining on the colonial administration occurred
in 1762, when the capital of Brazil was trans-
ferred to Rio de Janeiro.[34]

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34. Poppino. op. cit. pp. 102-103.

The mining settlements were governed through a
synthesis of "internal" law and the standardized "tra-
ditional" law imposed by the Portuguese Crown. While
the former may have contributed to the raucous flavor,
and autonomy, of the boom settlements, the Portuguese
governance of the mining towns was severe and innovative.
Several authors have pointed out that the Portuguese
attempted to impose far stricter control on the mining
towns than on the coastal towns.[35] Morse has noted
that the basic legal order the Crown was imposing on
urban Brazil was vintage Lusitania.

> By the end of the colonial period neither had
> the crown ever issued an order specifically
> concerned with municipal administration in
> Brazil, nor had any distinctive mutation
> appeared in the colony itself. The only marks
> of special recognition accorded Brazilian
> cities were the award to half a dozen camaras
> of the privileges of the municipality of
> Porto and an occasional concession reserving a
> camara's office for the native-born or allowing
> it to appoint interim governors. Otherwise
> municipal life was governed by codes promulgated
> for the whole Portuguese realm.[36]

In essence, then, the mining settlements of the
interior were rather crude and utilitarian in char-
acter, prospering or declining with the extractive economy
upon which they were initially based. Significantly,

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35. See, e. g., Boxer. op. cit.

36. Morse. op. cit. p. 41.

however, these communities were both the furthest removed
from the Crown, and the most rigidly controlled by the
Crown. The strain of this conflict was ultimately to
produce the first movement for independence--appropriately
from the mining settlements of the interior.

The 1750 Treaty of Madrid--The Law of "Possession"

In 1750 Portugal and Spain signed the Treaty of
Madrid, establishing Portuguese dominium over an area
substantially in excess of the earlier 1492 Treaty of
Tordesilhas (p. 21 above). Although motivated in both cases
by a desire to avoid friction, the two treaties reflect an
important shift. The earlier treaty was geometric in nature,
an externally imposed "property line." The latter was
founded in the principle of uti possidetis ("as you
possess").[37] As we have seen, between the signing of the
two treaties the interior of Brazil was opened by the tropas,
the vaqueiros, the bandeirantes, the military, the clergy
and the miners. And it was dramatically, though sparsely,
peopled by the small, pedestrian, utilitarian and often
para-military settlements. With the acceptance of uti
possidetis large and undefined parts of the explored and

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37. Prado. op. cit. p. 53. The preamble reads "....each
    party will retain its present possessions." The
    criterion and extent of "possession," however, re-
    mained ambiguous.

sparsely settled interior belonged to Brazil.[38]

The Ascendance of Rio de Janeiro

Rio de Janeiro had been a principal population center
since as early as the middle of the sixteenth centu.v,
second only to Salvador. The "gold economy" and the
political and military ferment of the eighteenth century
were to signal its primacy. Aware that vast amounts of
gold were being mined in the interior, the Crown attempted
to collect its "fifth" by channeling all gold through
Rio. In 1702-1703 the smelting and minting operations
were moved from Sao Paulo, Bahia, and Pernambuco to Rio.
The Sao Francisco river route to Bahia was officially
closed, but the effort was a failure because the route

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38. _Ibid._ p. 27. Compare Prado's assertion that this
    treaty "....proves a priori that the Portuguese
    had in fact colonized the whole of the immense ter-
    ritory that constitutes Brazil. The deciding factor
    in Brazil's favor was occupation." That the defin-
    itional or geographical limits of _uti possidetis_
    were not known is shown by the subsequent treaties of
    1777 and 1778, the settlement of the Uruguayan
    conflict in 1820 and the rush to define the western
    border with the rubber boom of the nineteenth cen-
    tury. Part of the territorial line between Brazil
    and Bolivia remains undefined "_fronteira em demarcacao_"
    even today. The expansion of Portuguese possession
    via _uti possidetis_ is probably best explained by the
    precious metal orientation of the Spanish colonists and
    the presence of gold and abundant labor in the Andean
    Plateau, the geographical "givens" of the continent,
    the hard pressed position of Spain, and the force
    and consistency with which the Portuguese settled,
    and met "intrusion" (usually by Spanish Jesuits).

[48]

continued to be heavily traversed (and permanently settled),
and the mints were eventually reopened in Bahia and Minas.
Rio de Janeiro, however, was the main urban heir to the
mining economy. As mentioned by Poppino, early political
and military strife with the French, and the protracted
conflict with the Spanish in the far South centered around
Rio. Although Salvador (population: 50,000) was larger
than Rio (population: 40,000) even at the end of the
eighteenth century, the former city was increasingly remote
from the mining, financial, and military activity in the
South. The capital was transferred to Rio de Janeiro in
1763. Rio was to remain the financial and political
capital of Brazil for almost two hundred years.

The Settlement of the Coast and the Interior In Perspective

The ascendance of coastal Rio de Janeiro was sympto-
matic of the overall eighteenth century settlement pattern.
By the middle of the century the mining boom was drawing to
a close and the settlement of the interior stabilized.
After the middle of the century new settlements in the
interior were few and small, and usually tied to the cattle
economy. Except for these isolated communities, settlement
remained sparse. Poppino sums up the settlement of the
interior and the "urban" character of colonial Brazil as
follows:

There were simply not enough people in the
colonies to occupy the land. The population
of Portuguese America, which probably ⌐ripled
during the seventeenth century, and increased
again by roughly ten times before 1800, still
averaged only one person per square mile at the
end of the colonial era. Nor was there a
frontier line, in the usual sense, between
settled and unoccupied area :. Al⌐hough the
great majority of the inhab⌐:ar⌐s were concen-
trated in Minas Gerais and in a few ports and
planation areas along the coast, the map of
Portuguese America was dotted with islands of
urban settlement. From the Oyapoque to the
Lagoa Mirim, and from the Serra do Mar to the
Guapore, these hollow frontiers were surrounded
by empty lands, perhaps thinly held in large
cattle ranches, but more often left entirely
to the aborigines. The Tape Indians in Rio
Grande do Sul were not subdued until 1801,
Botocudos st⌐'l dominated from the Province
of Rio de Janeiro to Porto Seguro after the
mid-nineteenth century, and much of Santa
Catarina remained Indian country until the
twentieth century. The Indians have since
been absorbed or expelled from all but the
most remote regions of the country, but the
hollow frontier evident in the eighteenth
century is still characteristic in Brazil.[39]

At the same time the coastal towns, like Rio de

Janeiro were gaining importance. As summarized by Prado:

Despite its violent impact on the colony's
economic and population structure, the brief
heyday of the mines, lasting little more than
half a century, was not long enough to swing the
balance definitely in favor of the interior.
As we have seen, by the end of the century,
when the drift to the interior had already long
since ceased, the coast still far outstripped
the interior in the number of its inhabitants.
Its economic importance had similarly been
reestablished, and it once more surpassed that
of the interior....even as late as the middle
of the eighteenth century and the beginning of

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39. Poppino. op. cit. p. 112.

[50]

the nineteenth territorial disputes had
already been finally and exclusively
transferred to the froniter zone. Approx-
imately sixty percent of the population,
that is almost two million inhabitants, was
was concentrated along a coastal belt
which was seldom more than thirty miles
wide.[40]

One index to this relationship between coastal

and interior settlement is the size of major cities at the

turn of the century, as follows:[41]

Salvador......................................50,000

Rio de Janeiro...............................40,000

Vila Rica (Ouro Preto).......................30,000

The eighteenth century settlement pattern is shown

in Figure 3.

A Comment on the "Urban" Dimension of the Colonial Weltansicht

The Brazilian attitude toward _urbanismo_ as it

developed in the colonial centuries is complex and often

contradictory. As we have seen, many urban values and

and structures were brought with the _Lusitanos_, and

_____

40. Prado. _op. cit._ p. 32.

41. Azevedo. _op. cit._ p. 223.

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FIG. 3

Legend:
- ● Cities
- ∴ Towns
- ■ Areas probably under urban influence
- ▨ Populated areas without city or town

Scale: 0 Km — 1000 — 2000 — 3000 — 4000
0 Miles — 1000 — 2000 — 3000

modified by the topographical, economic, social,

racial, religious, and military realities of Brazil.

It has been asserted, however, that there emerged in

colonial Brazil a strong anti-urbanismo.[42] This

posture finds some generalized support in the

positivist and nationalist intellectual history

of Brazil.[43] And it finds indirect support in the

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42. Ibid. p. 222. "O problema e dos mais interessantes
    porque nos leva a abordar um tema bastante dis-
    cutido por sociologos e historiadores--, anti-
    urbanismo do Brasil colonial. Sem duvida o .
    fenomeno existiu, porque o homen colonial tinha
    verdadeira aversao a vida urbana, preferindo
    viver en suas propriedades rurais."

43. The coastal cities and literature were perceived
    as "building a European facade for the country..
    ..still listening to the lullabies from afar....
    They turned their backs on the mystery of the
    land." Joao Cruz Costa. A History of Ideas in
    Brazil. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University
    of California Press, 1964. p. 251. For the
    emergent "nativist" thinkers, and for Costa,
    Brazilian thinking had to be filtered through
    the jungle or echo of the interior to be Brazilian.
    Their patron saint was Euclides da Cunha. Their
    hero, the backlander himself: "One man made the
    nostalgic intellectuals of the coast realize the
    full significance of the fact that the people
    who had retreated to the sertao....were now engaged
    in a jungle revolt to demand a reform: a reform
    of the Brazilian intellect...Euclides da Cunha [is]
    the initiator of the reaction against intellectual
    sybaritism, against the 'the blind toil of the
    copyists' and 'borrowed thinking.'" This sertanismo
    of Brazilian writers Eduardo Frieiro asserts, stems
    from the Volkgeist which in Latin America corresponded
    to the desire for cultural liberation from Europe. See

nativist movement in Brazilian literature, as manifest
in the <u>coroneis</u> of Jorge Amado's cacao region, in
the <u>jaguncos</u> of Guimaraes Rosa's <u>Backlands</u>, or <u>Os Sertoes</u>
of Euclides da Cunha. And at least one very perceptive
student of urban history in Brazil maintains that the
predominant characteristic of the Brazilian city, from
the colonial period on, is the pervasive "ruralness,"
with the locus of wealth, prestige and political power
resting in the rural sector.[44] At the same time, other
observers have noted the pervasive urban ethos of colonial
Brazil.[45] Certainly most of the population in colonial

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also Costa. p. 397 n. 320: "....reacting against
the cosmopolitan spirit of the urban centers, which
they mistakenly believed to be the cause of a
depersonalization, the nativists turned toward life
on the plantations and the soul of the interior.
Hence an exaggeration: that 'life in the <u>sertao</u>
is more typical and more representative than that
of the cities....stylize the <u>sertanejo</u>,'or
backlander, depicting him as <u>invariably</u> strong,
honorable, brave and manly. In this way the poetic
successor to Rousseau's noble savage has been concocted.'"

44. Emilia Voitti da Costa. Urbanization in 19th Century
Brazil. To be published by the University of Wisconsin
at Milwaukee.

45. See Moog. <u>op. cit.</u> p. 168. "The fact is that during
the first three centuries there was no taste for rural
life in Brazil. The great fascination was exercised
by the city, not the country. Hence the prevalence of
the European tendency toward urban concentration on
the littoral, causing nearly all the rural landholders
of some wealth to maintain a dual residence--one in the
country, another in the city....Between the country and
city the planters of the sixteenth, seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries did not hesitate. They chose the
city...." See also Poppino, pp. 25-26 of this report.

Brazil lived in or near the cities, and most of the

migrants (including Amado's) flowed into the cities.

It has been repeatedly asserted that the colonialists.

preferred the city.[46]

Moreover, as noted above, "concentrated" settlement

was the official colonization technique, whether of the

Indians of the interior,[47] the Rio de. la Plaza or

Manaus "territorial" settlements, or the immigration

and "captaincy" policy under which the colony was secured

and developed. The translation of these contradictory

"urban" attitudes into public policy will be discussed

at a later point in this paper. Suffice to say these

contradictory "urban" currents are well rooted in the

history of Brazil.

46. See Prado. op. cit. p. 95. "This preference
[for commerce] by the Portuguese resulted in the
concentration of the white element in the urban
centers, particularly in the most important of
these. This was noted by all the foreign travelers
who visited Brazil at the beginning of the last
century; the proportion of whites, small in the
rural areas, was in the cities in direct ratio to
the importance of the agglomeration...."

47. Ibid. pp. 96-116. This includes Prado's discussion
of Pombal's legislation.

Urbanization in the Nineteenth Century (1800-1900)

The nineteenth century is generally characterized
by gradual agricultural and technological expansions under
the monarchy and, in the last decade of the century, the
explosive changes in the economy and population, and con-
comitantly in the cities of Brazil.

The Empire in Brazil (1807-1822)

The more dramatic "urban" developments of the early
part of the century were technological, political, or
cultural in nature. With the approach of Napoleon's army,
Don Joao VI left Portugal in November of 180/ to establish
the Portuguese Empire in Brazil. He stopped briefly in
Salvador, but the royal family settled in Rio de Janeiro.
With the Crown came vast economic and social changes for
Brazil, and especially for Rio.[48] The Brazilian ports were

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48. Calogeras. A History of Brazil. New York, Russell &
    Russell, 1963. p. 55. "....it knew neither hygiene
    nor sewerage. No provision was made for clearing the
    streets or the disposal of refuse. The standard of
    living, in comparison with European cities of equal
    size, was low. Life was rather dull and drab. Fes-
    tivities, not numerous, were mostly those organized
    by the religious orders: processions, Te Deums,
    sermons. At rare intervals the viceroys gave
    receptions. Slaves were the mainstay of all domestic
    and public services. The arrival of the Portuguese
    court wrought a tremendous upheaval in the placid
    life of the colonial capital."

EXPLORATION AND SETTLEMENT 1801–1822

FIG. 4

COLOMBIA

VENEZUELA

GUAYANA

SURINAM

FR. GUAYANA

BELÉM

SÃO LUÍS

OEIRAS

PARAÍBA
OLINDA

SALVADOR

PERU

BOLIVIA

GUIABA
1818

GOIÁS
1818

MARIANA

PARAGUAY

CABO FRIO
RIO DE JANEIRO
SÃO PAULO

■○ Cities

■∙ Towns

■ Areas probably under urban influence

▨ Populated areas without city or town

URUGUAY

| 0 Km | 1000 | 2000 | 3000 | 4000 |

| 0 Miles | 1000 | 2000 | 3000 |

URBANIZATION IN BRAZIL

opened at once, breaking the Porutguese trade monopoly.

The prohibition on manufacturing was also rescinded

making Brazil somewhat less dependent on an external

market. In Rio de Janeiro schools of medicine, commerce,

the military, and fine arts were established, a printing

press was set up, the Botanical Garden opened--and the

carioca society became, if anything, even more European

in outlook. Rio's position as the center of commerce,

politics and culture was strengthened conside-ably.[49]

The more general exploration and settlement pattern

which emerged under the Crown is shown in Figure

4.

Monarchy (1822-1889)

Between 1822, when independence was declared and Don

Joao VI returned to Portugal, to the end of the monarchy

in 1889, the development and the settlement of Brazil was a

reasonably smooth, slow process. In large measure this

reflected the gradual agricultural expansion of the economy

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49. Both R.᠈ and Salvador entered the century with a
population of approximately 100,000. By the census
of 1872, Rio had jumped to 274,972, Salvador only
to 129,109. Azevedo. op. cit. p. 224.

and the population. Spur_ed on by war in the South,
railroad and telegraph linked major southern cities.
The war also fostered a minor boom in private industry
around Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo.[50] There was,
during the monarchy era a more general "coming of age"
in Brazil, with the great technological innovations in
transportation, communications and industry slowly taking
hold. For the first time, mass urban infrastructure and
transportation faci_ities were built in the coastal
cities. At the same time the power of the rural
aristocracy was slowly being balanced by the emergence of
a new urban mass.[51]

Poppino describes the nineteenth century urban envi-

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50. Poppino. op. cit.. pp. 205-207.

51. C. S. Haring. Empire in Brazil. Cambridge, Harvard
University Press, 1968. pp. 64-67. See also
Emilia da Costa. op. cit. I believe Emilia da
Costa would dispute this point, arguing that the
nineteenth century Brazilian city was still controlled
by the rural agricultural sector, and by the
external market. While I have as yet to see her
arguments in print, I believe Emilia would deny
the emergence of any meaningful urbanismo until
well into the twentieth century. If I understand
her argument clearly, I believe it will be
persuasive in general though perhaps less than
fully responsive to what was happening within the
the cities during the nineteenth century. Any
meaningful discussion of these issues, however,
will have to await publication of the paper.

ronment as follows:

> Many conveniences of urban life that are now
> taken for granted, such as paved, lighted
> streets, running water, sewage disposal, and
> public transportation, were first introduced or
> notably improved in Brazilian cities in the years
> following the Paraguayan War. These became
> symbols of growth and prosperity for the com-
> munities that could afford them, and aspirations
> for the smaller ones that still measured
> 'progress' in the number of public fountains or
> square meters of streets paved with cobblestones.
> The pace of modernization was uneven, for such
> services were costly to establish and required
> continuing outlays for maintenance. Yet, by the
> end of the empire municipal water systems had
> been modernized, running water had been piped
> into private residences, and sewerage systems
> were in operation or under construction in Rio
> de Janeiro, Salvador, Recife, and half of the
> smaller provincial capitals from Porto Alegre
> to Belem. Other innovations that spread rapidly
> after 1870 included gas lighting and tramways.
> As with railroads, a start had been made earlier
> in Rio de Janeiro, where a few gas street lights
> and horse-drawn streetcars had appeared in the
> central district in the 1850's. By 1880 they
> were becoming commonplace. Gas lighting had
> been installed for public and private use in more
> than a dozen cities and towns, and at least twenty
> had either trams or street railways linking the
> city center with sprawling suburbs or adjacent
> towns....It was a new streetcar line, authorized
> in the 1870's 'to facilitate sea-bathing for the
> population,' that eventually made Copacabana
> beach part of the city of Rio de Janeiro and
> added a new dimension to the life of the Carioca.
> A similar change occurred in other coastal
> cities as public transportation services were ex-
> tended to formerly isolated beaches, converting
> them into popular recreation sites. While the
> beaches did not become fashionable residential
> areas until after 1920, entire new suburbs were
> developed and old districts were refurbished by
> those who shared in the rising level of pros-
> perity after 1870. The increasing comforts and
> attractions of life in town, plus the ease of
> rail transportation from the interior, drew many

> wealthy planters and their families to the
> cities for at least part of the year. There
> they built fine town houses that added to the
> architectural beauty and air of modernity of
> imperial Brazil's growing urban centers....At
> the same time, new working-class neighborhoods
> sprang up around the factories and workshops that
> were erected on the edge of town, for the
> growth of industry, which accompanied the expan-
> sion of the railroads and the modernization of
> the cities was also an urban phenomenon.[52]

"European" Colonization during the Monarchy--Immigration

during the monarchy was relatively light. The

Brazilian colonization policy was distinctly ethnic and

rural in character. Thus while Chinese and Africans were

excluded, there were several attempts to tract rural

colonists from northern Europe.[53] The settlement of 1,700

Swiss at Nova Friburgo near Rio de Janeiro was one successful,

though expensive colonization attempt. Another was the

1824 land grant to the German mercenaries who had fought

in the South, resulting in San Leopoldo. An attempt to

settle Irish mercenaries in Bahia was, however, unsuccessful.

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52. Poppino. op. cit. pp. 209-210.

53. Ibid. p. 184. "....because they were believed to be
     more industrious and to employ more advanced agricul-
     tural techniques than immigrants from the Latin
     countries. It is expected, moreover, that they would
     improve the quality of the population and help
     to reverse the progressive Africanization of Brazil."

Thereafter the Crown restricted new European colonies
to the temperate southern provinces or the mountains
near Rio, and half a dozen such communities were founded.
These ethnic agricultural colonies added yet another
dimension to the Brazilian settlement pattern.

> For decades the agricultural colonies remained
> small, self-contained, subsistence-level com-
> munities which had no direct or frequent contact
> with the political and economic centers of the
> province or the empire. Fewer than 12,000
> colonists immigrated between 1820 and 1840....as
> late as 1867 there were only about 40,000
> European farmers in sixty-eight different
> colonies scattered across Brazil from Maranhao
> to Rio Grande do Sul. In most instances these
> were located in remote, empty regions where
> there was little or no local citizenry to be
> affected by their example of industry and cul-
> ture. The European colonies thus developed as
> isolated replicas of the villages from which
> the immigrants had come. The transplanted
> Swiss or German farmers retained their own
> language, customs, and values. Later when
> colonies of Italians were founded in Rio
> Grande do Sul and Espirito Santo, a similar
> situation developed....As the isolated colonies
> expanded, they imposed cultural patterns of
> the European settlers....By hard labor and per-
> severance the immigrants transformed large
> stretches of wilderness into productive farming
> areas, thereby hastening the disappearance of
> the aboriginal population....In the southern
> provinces the steady expansion of the population--
> much faster than the trickle of new immigrants
> would indicate--gave rise to a phenomenon not
> previously known in Brazil. This was the
> continuous, inland-moving line of settlements,
> similar to the western frontier in the United
> States until 1890.[54]

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54. Ibid. pp. 185-186.

Due to the urban biases of many of the immigrants, however, and the absence of a homestead policy, the existence of slave labor, and the relatively small flow of immigrants during the monarchy, the role of the immigrant in settling Brazil should not be overstated.

> By and large the early European agricultural colonies failed to meet the expectations of their sponsors, either as benevolent influences on the native population or as meccas to attract large-scale immigration into the hinterland. Most of the foreigners and the recently arrived Portuguese settled in the coastal towns. Rio de Janeiro alone had received over 4,000 foreigners by 1822, and the influx continued. The quiet colonial capital, which had only about 50,000 inhabitants in 1800, expanded to about 100.000 in 1822, and to perhaps 150,000 in 1830. By the latter year less than 7,000 Germans and probably even fewer Swiss had entered Brazil. By no means all of those settled in rural areas.[55]

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55. _Ibid._ See also pp. 187-189.

IMMIGRATION TO BRAZIL 1851-1950   FIG. 5

PERIOD	IMMIGRANTS 000'S	PERIOD	IMMIGRANTS 000'S
1851 – 1860	120	1901–1910	670
1861 – 1870	95	1911–1920	795
1871 – 1880	215	1921–1930	835
1881 – 1890	530	1931–1940	285
1891 – 1900	1125	1941–1950	130

URBANIZATION IN BRAZIL

INTERNATIONAL URBANIZATION SURVEY

The Turn of the Century--Toward an Urban Society (1880-1920)

At the end of the nineteenth century a series of developments conspired to bring about radical changes in the urban pattern and urban economy of Brazil. Many of these changes originated outside of the cities themselves, as discussed below.

Immigration

The expanding economy, the abolition of slavery, and the end of the Paraguayan war in 1822 triggered the first great wave of immigrants. Of approximately four million immigrants to Brazil to date, roughly 2,800,000 arrived within thirty years after the turn of the century. The level of immigration is shown in Figure 5.

The impact on Brazil, particularly southern and urban Brazil was substantial. The population of Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo and Espirito Santo increased by fivefold between 1872 and 1920, from 1,916,000 or 19 percent of the total for Brazil, to about 9,750,000, which represented one-third of all Brazilians. As stated by Poppino:

Immigration has also contributed heavily
to the spectacular rate of urbanization
in Prazil since the last quarter of the
nineteenth century. Although this
phenomenon occurred in all regions of
the country, it was most pronounced in
the areas that received the largest con-
tingents of immigrants. For while Brazil
looked to immigration as a source of
agricultural laborers, many of the
foreigners preferred life in the cities.

The immigration was particularly heavy into Sao Paulo
and Rio de Janeiro.

[Sao Paulo]....was a sleepy country
town of 31,000 inhabitants in 1872.
Even then 8 percent of its popu-
lation was foreign-born. In 1890
it had grown to 65,000 residents, of
whom 22 percent were immigrants. In
the next decade Sao Paulo nearly
quadrupled in size to 240,000 and
was known as a city of Italians.
By 1920 it contained half as many
people as Rio de Janeiro and more
than twice as many of the total
for Salvador and Recife, the third
and fourth cities of Brazil. Of
its 579,000 residents, 35 percent
were foreign-born. This was the
high point. While the number of
immigrants remained large, they com-
prised a steadily decreasing propor-
tion of the city's population,
falling off to 27 percent in 1940,
and to 14 percent in 1950. Rio de
Janeiro, as the major port and national
capital, had attracted a disproportionately
large immigration population since 1808.
By 1872 it was a city of about 275,000,
of whom 84,000--or 30 percent--were
foreigners. Thereafter, however, the
influx of immigrants failed to keep
pace with the growth of the city.
Since 1890 Rio de Janeiro has had a
smaller proportion, but a larger num-
ber of foreign-born residents than

Sao Paulo. The population of the capital sur-
passed half a million in 1890, of whom one-fourth
were immigrants, while in 1920 barely one-fifth
of the 1,158,000 persons in Rio de Janeiro were
foreign-born. The immigrant share of the city
population dropped to 12 percent in 1940, and to
9 percent in 1950. Santos, Campinos, Curitiba,
Porto Alegre, and other cities in southern Brazil
followed a similar pattern during the period
under review.[56]

Accompanying this wave of immigrants was a spectac-

ular economic boom at the turn of the century. The expan-

sion not only changed the cities, but it brought foreign

firms (particularly British) and professional immigrants

who were to play a major role in the development of

Brazilian cities.[57]

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56. <u>Ibid</u>. pp. 196-197. See also pp. 230-231.

57. <u>Ibid</u>. p. 203. "The most striking transformation,
however, was the revitalization and beautification of
the cities after the turn of the century. The
improvements in the physical and financial health
of the community, and the introduction of electricity
as an inexpensive source of power, proved a boon
to domestic industries, which still enjoyed
considerable, if unequal, tariff protection.
Between 1899 and 1910 more than 200 large national
and foreign firms were registered to operate in
Brazil." This direct foreign entrepreneurship has
strengthened the <u>dependencia</u> analysis of Brazilian
urban development. For a more comprehensive
discussion of the role of the foreign entrepreneur
in the development of Sao Paulo, see, e.g., Manoel
Berlinck. Dependencia Economica e Estructura
Urbana: o Caso de Sao Paulo. (Mimeo.)

One of the   .immigration and settlement
episodes in the   an history of Brazil involved approx-
imately 4,000 former Confederates who fled the South after
the Civil War (to a   ~y where slavery was still legal).
Most of these settlem   particularly in the Amazon, were
not successful, and most of the immigrants returned to the
United States. Some, however, stayed on building lasting
communities, such as Americana in Sao Paulo.

The major, dramatic urban changes which transpired in
the latter part of the century, however, were those based
on radical changes which transpired in several sectors of
the agricultural economy.

Coffee

Introduced to Brazil in the 1770's, coffee spread from
Rio de Janeiro rapidly southward in the latter part of the
century, to the Sao Paulo plateau. In 1796 about 127 tons
of coffee were exported. A decade later that figure had
risen to 1,200 tons and by 1850, 158,000 tons of coffee
were exported annually--more than 50 percent of the world's
supply.[58] The interior in the South was opened and settled
with this "coffee-rush" and for a time Santos was the
fastest growing port in the nation. Together with cotton
and sugar (and the rail system that transported it), coffee

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58. Poppino. op. cit. p. 149.

was to furnish the financial basis upon which much of the
industrial south, and Sao Paulo in particular, would
be built.[59]

Cacao

The turn of the century cacao boom in Bahian southern
coast is hard to separate from the myth that surrounds it.
The volume of cacao exports expanded nearly sixtyfold, from
an annual average of about 1,100 tons in the 1820's to
more than 63,000 tons in the 1920's, making cacao the third
most important product in the century.[60] The crop started

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59. This is obviously a complex issue, one which cannot
be pursued at length here. Suffice to cite G. Edward
Schuh, in behalf of the above-stated position and to
note Fernando Enrique Cardozo's word of caution
in "O Cafe E A Industrializacao de Sao Paulo." Cardozo
warns against attributing the development of Sao
Paulo simply to the accumulation of wealth from coffee
production. Arguing that this could have been in-
vested elsewhere, Cardozo emphasizes the shift of
the coffee planting from the Paraiba valley to the
western lands and the subsequent development of
Santos, the growth of towns and a petty bourgeoise
in the interior, expanding internal demand for
industry, and the impetus which coffee planting
gave to the profit motive and to the encouragement
of entrepreneurship. Without denying the importance
of the factors Cardozo cites, and other factors such
as the railroads, I remain persuaded that the agri-
cultural economy contributed heavily to, and concom-
itantly profited from the growth of Sao Paulo.

60. Poppino. op. cit. p. 146.

in the Amazon but was soon concentrated on the Bahia coast. From 1890 on Bahia w _ the scene of explosive expansions of plantations and ports, such as Ileus and Itabuna. Through Jorge Amado's novels we have rich and important narration of the urbanizacao during the period, and an interesting portrait of the hybrid urbanismo and "ruralismo" which characterized these northeastern cacao towns. The cacao boom was over by 1930. As cacao production increased in other parts of the world, the urban centers of the northeast cacao region slowed their pace.

Rubber--Fordlandia

This same turn of the century period witnessed a spectacular rubber boom in the Amazon, in Acre in particular. This area, nominally part of Bolivia, was settled almost entirely by Brazilian rubber gatherers, approximately 60,000 in number. With the rubber boom came revolution, Brazilian intervention, and the final definition of Brazil's westernmost boundary. Also with the boom came the explosive development of Belem and Manaus (and the construction of the famous opera house in Manaus). These large Amazon cities were economically and culturally oriented towards Europe, and towards the export economy. The rubber boom also engendered numerous small villages along the rivers, utterly dependent on the waterways for

transportation and communication.[61]   The rubber boom

collapsed in the second decade of the twentieth century,

with the increased rubber production in the Far East.

With its collapse, the grand cities of the Amazon went

into a period of decline. Symptomatic of this general

"boom and bust" syndrome is the brief flourishing of

another strangely American settlement on Brazil's urban

map--Fordlandia.   In the interest of institutional

modesty I quote Moog's sardonic account:

> Around 1928 Henry Ford was in the grip of a
> fixed idea. He wanted to find a solution to
> the vexing problem of supplying rubber for
> his enterprises. He was tired of putting up
> with the prices imposed on him by the English in
> Ceylon and the Dutch in Java. And he had decided
> that the rubber empire in the hands of the
> English was immoral, and that the way to purify
> and redeem that empire was to transfer it from
> the backward guardianship of English capitalism
> to the progressive tutelage of young, healthy
> American capitalism. How? By planting rubber in
> Amazonia. Hadn't the English subject Henry
> Wickham smuggled the shoots of the Amazonian
> tree to England? And hadn't those shoots, after
> being acclimatized in the hothouses of Kew
> Gardens--the London botanical gardens--flourished
> in the Orient, becoming the greatest rubber
> plantations in the world?....Since, when Henry
> Ford got ideas, they immediately took form and
> issued forth to be converted into action and
> be the object of ecstasy and applause on the part

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61.   For an excellent portrait of one such waterway com-
munity, see, e.g., Wagley. Amazon Town: A Study of
Man in the Tropics. New Yor', 1955.

of the American press and people, the world immed-
iately got news of the new plan of the demiurge
of Dearborn. England trembled. Brazil exulted.
And then the government of the state of Para,
with the acquiescence of the federal government,
welcomed the emissaries of Ford as it habitually
welcomed Americans in general--with open arms.
So Mr. Ford wanted to plant rubber in Para.
Splendid, an excellent idea. And where did Mr.
Ford want to set out his plantations. On the
banks of the Tapajos? Perfect. And what was the
amount of land he desired for the undertaking?
Two million, four hundred and seventy thousand
acres? Why, of course. But, converted into
square kilometers, how many would that be, more
or less? And, ore or less, to what could such
an extent of land be compared, just to get an
idea? Exactly five-sixths of Connecticut. Ah,
then everything was fine....five-sixths of
Connecticut....Meanwhile in Dearborn, on Lake
Michigan, activity was feverish. Ships are being
outfitted for the conquest of Amazonia. They are
to carry a whole city, disassembled, 'knocked
down,' but ready, as if it were a question of
automobiles emerging from the Ford Motor Company
assembly lines: houses, hospitals, cafeterias,
drugstores, cement, sand for the tennis courts,
sanitary apparatus, bulldozers, sawmill--a
complete city to be set up. Not since the
departure from Amsterdam of the fleet with which
the Dutch conquered Pernambuco and the Northeast
in 1624 had such a well-fitted-out civilizing
expedition set sail for Brazil....Once arrived
at Fordlandia, they tie up to the river bank.
All this time, the world press is shouting. The
battle between Mr. Ford and the Amazon jungle
has begun. In North America newspapers report
the struggle in minute detail. The jungle growth
resists, but retreats. And with it the jaguars,
monkeys, parrots, and snakes, as the bulldozers
go knocking over trees for the clearing where the
city is to be erected....Now the houses have
begun to take shape, and the hospital, and the
hygienic facilities and tennis courts, and the
directors' mansions, and the workers' dwellings,
and the cafeteria, and the drugstore, just as in
New England or the Midwest. In the Amazonian
jungle the Yankee had caused a new city to
spring up....In 1936 Edward Tomlinson, in the
December 12 issue of Collier's proclaimed, full
of enthusiasm: 'In the very heart of the region

where inquisitive archeologist and self-styled
scientists, bitten by the adventure bug, go out
in search of the walls of mythical cities and
peoples descended from Phoenician nomads and
other ancient peoples, deep in the jungle, Henry
Ford is laying the foundations of a civilization.'
Fordlandia was indeed resplendent. It was,
on a smaller scale, an industrial city as
complete for the ends to which it was destined
as Dearborn itself. It had a refrigerating
plant that could store food for more than two
thousand persons for six months. It had a
hospital that was the last word in efficiency
and comfort. The Amazonian half-breed, who had
never before known anything better than his
one-room mocambo, now enjoyed a house with as
many as three rooms, and running water....Suddenly,
the humble half-breeds turn into wild beasts.
They start by smashing up the cafeteria, they
tear everything down. A riot. The officials
of the Ford Motor Company run with their families,
all terrified, for the freighters anchored
in the port. The caboclos, armed with clubs
like the French in the taking of the Bastille,
march on the strongholds of the directorate
and management, roaring something unintelligible
to the listeners aboard ship. What can they
be howling about so angrily. Can it be 'Down
with Mr. Ford!'? Can it be 'Down with the
Ford Motor Company!'? Nothing of the sort. It
appeared that it was a personal disagreement
with Popeye the Sailor. What the half-breeds
were yelling was, 'Down with spinach! No more
spinach!' The breaking and smashing during the
night helped to calm them down. Only next day,
when the military detachment from Belem arrived,
did the managers learn what the affair was all
about. The caboclos were full of boiled spinach
and well-vitaminized foods: they could not even
look at spinach any more. As for corn flakes,
better not even mention them. They wanted dried
meat, and a feijoada now and then. Hasn't a
man got a right to a good feijoada and a shot of
rum once in a while?....Meanwhile, Henry Ford
was receiving and reading reports. And these
told rather different stories from those that
figured on the front pages of newspapers.
Besides the caboclos riot there were some tech-
nical difficulties. For example, the sawmill
intended for cutting all the trees of the
heterogeneous tropical forest had proved

ineffectual....But the worst of all was yet to
come. The worst thing was that the million
rubber seedlings were dying from the excessive
sun and lack of humidity ＇ ＼d humus....For lack
of the protection of tropical forest shade, Mr.
Ford's army of rubber trees was going to die in
the sun....Afterwards, silence, Fordlandia
yielding first place, and the first page of
newspapers, to inventors and producers of the
synthetic rubber, with which the United States
would, from 1944 on, solve the rubber problem.
To cut the story short: in January of 1946
the melancholy news goes round the world:
Ford Withdraws from Brazil. It was the end.
The whole outcome of the story is summed up in
that headline. For that matter the whole
history of Fordlandia can be concentrated in
the telegraphic style of the newspaper and
magazine headlines. And, to reconstruct it, it
suffices to gather up these headlines at random,
as they were catalogued in its own book by the
New York Public Library from 1928 to 1946 under
the subject 'Rubber.' They constitute the
summary of a fascinating story. In the first
phase they reflect the euphoria of great expecta-
tions: 'Reply of American to British Monopoly
of Rubber.' 'End of British Control of Rubber.'
'Freeing the Rubber Market.' In the second
phase expectation becomes certainty: 'Rubber
for America: Factory in United States,
Plantations in Brazil.' 'Taming the Jungle
in the Amazon Basis.' 'Jungle Gold: Fordlandia,
where Brazil's Rubber Returned to Life.' 'Ford
in Brazil.' 'Ford on the Tapajos.' 'Rubber
Plantations in Fordlandia.' 'Miracle City of
the Amazon.' Finally, the first unexpected news
of failure and the abrupt retreat: 'More News
About Rubber.' 'Golden Leaves of Rubber Tree
Affected by Sunlight.' 'Synthetic Rubber.'
'Ford Withdraws from Brazil.'[62]

Brasilia and Belo Horizonte

The final and perhaps most important urban development

of the latter nineteenth and early twentieth century was the

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62. Moog. op. cit. pp. 26-32.

planning of Belo Horizonte and the formalization of
Brasilia. The latter idea dates from the early eighteenth
century, with the opening of the mines in the interior.
The idea was revived at the time of independence, and
was formally included in the Constitution in 1891. Belo
Horizonte was inaugurated in 1896, to remove the capital
of Minas Gerais from the confinement of the mining hills
around Ouro Preto. Both Belo Horizonte and Brasilia are
monumental urban planning exercises, subsequently overtaken
by a series of unplanned changes, not the least of which
was heavy rural-urban migration. Today Brasilia and Belo
Horizonte are strikingly modern cities of approximately
500,000 and one million respectively. Growing at explosive
rates, and always under construction, these huge planned
cities have paved the way in opening the still virtually
empty heartland that surrounds them.

Toward an Urban Society, Quantified

During the period of radical change at the turn of
the nineteenth century, the Brazilian population as a
whole increased by 265 percent, while the urban popu-
lation grew 412 percent.[63] The largest Brazilian cities

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63. See Nancy Alessio. "Urbanizacao, Industrializacao e
    Estructura Ocupacional (1872-1920)". Dados, Instituto
    Universitario de Pesquisa, Rio de Janeiro. p. 108.

in the nineteenth century were as follows:[64]

1800	
Salvador	50,000
Rio de Janeiro	40,000
Ouro Preto	30,000

1872	
Rio de Janeiro	274,972
Salvador	129,109
Recife	106,671
Belem	61,997
Niteroi	47,548
Porto Alegre	43,998
Fortaleza	42,458
Cuiaba	35,987
Sao Luis	31,604
Sao Paulo	31,385

1890	
Rio de Janeiro	522,651
Salvador	174,412
Recife	111,556
Sao Paulo	64,934
Porto Alegre	52,421
Belem	50,064
Fortaleza	40,902
Manaus	38,720
Niteroi	34,269
Teresina	31,523

1900	
Rio de Janeiro	691,565
Sao Paulo	239,820
Salvador	205,813
Recife	113,106
Belem	96,560
Porto Alegre	73,674
Niteroi	53,433
Manaus	50,300
Curitiba	49,755
Fortaleza	48,369

The continued ascendance of the "cidade maravilhosa,"
Rio de Janeiro, is obvious in the census figures, as is
the beginning of Sao Paulo's rise as an urban power. Also
obvious is the continuing growth of the Northeastern cities
of Recife and Salvador. These figures marked the prelude
to a period of rapid urban growth and transformation which
is still under way. Within this increasingly urban context
significant changes were taking place. The regional diver-
sity of Brazilian cities became more clearly distinguishable,
and the boom and bust pattern of urban development became

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64. Azevedo. op. cit. pp. 224-225.

an integral part of the development process. The overall
urban pattern continued to move erratically and very
slowly away from the overwhelming primacy of the coastal
city. With the various booms in the interior, and
the planning and inception of Belo Horizonte and
Brasilia, the "Marcha Para Oeste" (March to the West)
was beginning. And yet the census figures from the
turn of the century reflect the continued absence of
heartland cities (other than Sao Paulo, which has a
satellite port in Santos). Within the cities themselves
there were analogous continuities and changes. Although
the power of the landed gentry and the employer-employee
patrao complex served to perpetrate many of the tradi-
tional rural values and mores, the emergent urban society
was beginning to change some basic political and behavioral
dimensions of Brazilian society. Mass political partici-
pation and influence increased substantially during this pe-
riod.[65] For the first time the rural aristocracy was
challenged, and sometimes joined or absorbed by, a new
urban and industrial elite. A middle and lower-middle class
work force emerged which was to become a major source

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65. Maria Antonieta de A.G. Parahyba. "Abertura Social e
    Participacao Politica no Brasil (1872-1920)". Dados,
    Instituto Universitario de Pesquisa, Rio de Janeiro,
    1970.

[74]

of support for the Vargas government and the Brazilian

military government later in the century.[66] Several

dimensions of this increasing _urbanismo_ will be discussed

more specifically later in this paper.

66. John Johnson.   The Military and Society in Latin
     America.   Stanford, California, Stanford University
     Press, 1964.   pp.   216-218.

The Twentieth Century--Brazil as a Predominantly Urban Society (920-1970)

Poppino summarizes the major transformation of

twentieth century Brazil as follows:

> The growth of industry has been the most
> striking phenomenon in the economic develop-
> ment of Brazil since 1920, dwarfing the
> accomplishments of the preceding fifty years.
> Although the national economy is still heavily
> dependent on the export of a few agricultural
> commodities, Brazil has become the most
> industrialized country of Latin America....Between
> 1920 and 1960 the number of plants increased more
> than eightfold....During the same period while
> the population more than doubled, the industrial
> labor force in Brazil expanded nearly seven
> times. The rise of industry in Brazil after
> 1920 could not fail to encourage and reflect
> sweeping changes in the urban social structure
> and to affect the balance of political power
> between urban and rural areas. Confined, as
> it was, almost entire' to the large cities and
> towns, industrializat   was both a cause and
> effect of rapid urban growth....millions of
> migrants from the countryside swarmed into the
> cities, drawn in part by the lure of jobs....[this]
> massive increase in the urban electorate [contrib-
> uted] to a sharp rise in the political influence
> of both employers and workers in industrial
> centers.[67]

We have seen that the roots of the twentieth cen-

tury industrial and urban growth reach comfortably back

into the latter part of the nineteenth century.[68] Spurred

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67. Poppino. op. cit. pp. 238-239.

68. I am discussing here an empirical, not a linear or
     necessarily "causal" relationship between urbanization
     and industrialization. In this regard see, Alessio.
     op. cit. The Alessio article concludes that "urbaniza-
     cao acompanha, a grosso modo, onde se concentra o
     desenvolvimento industrial, mas ha uma tendencia para
     o crescimento de uma cidade independente do apareci-
     mento de industrias."

on by Vargas and the economic nationalists of t e early and

mid-twentieth century, industrialization became synonymous

with development and progress.[69]   As the economy became more

industrial and the agriculture more mechanized, the portion

of the population working in the rural, agricultural sectors

decreased steadily.[70] The "urban centered" sector of the

of the economy--industry, commerce, finance, government,

transportation and communication -increased proportionally,

as did urban unemployment.[71]

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69.   Poppino. op. cit. pp. 239-241. "Within a single life-
      time the goal of an industrial economy was converted
      from an impractical dream into a national objective
      ....by the 1960's dependence upon agricultural exports
      was generally decried as a major deterrent to economic
      development, while a high degree of industrial self-
      sufficiency had come to be almost universally accepted
      within Brazil as indispensable to the well-being of the
      population and the state."

70.   See, e.g., the following excerpt from: G. Edward Schuh.
      "Inter-Relations Between the Farm Labor Force and
      Changes in the Total Economy". "Farm employment has
      declined from 13.4 million in 1920 to 5.6 million in
      1965. As a proportion of the labor force, it has
      declined from 26 percent in 1929 to 9.7 percent in
      1961....and even further by 1966. Similarly, farm
      population as a percent of total population declined
      from 25.1 percent in 1929 to 8.1 percent in 1961. The
      most rapid decline has occurred since World War II in
      both the farm labor force and farm population. This
      decline in farm labor force has been almost continuous
      since 1929."

71.   See, e.g., G. Edward Schuh and Morris Whitaker.
      "Migration, Mobility, and Some Problems of the
      Labor Market". "....The labor which is leaving the
      agricultural or rural sector in relatively large num-
      bers is essentially sealed off from the industrial
      sector in which average productivity is increasing
      rapidly. It is forced to take employment in the

Thus much of the manpower for Brazil's industrial
and urban expansion was supplied, and sometimes over
supplied, by this internal migration, heavily rural-urban,
and by immigration and natural population growth. With
regard to the internal migration, there are several studies
which indicate that Brazilian migration is highly responsive
to industrialization and earning differentials.[72] Whatever

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service sector, driving average productivity down in
that sector. The consequence is a partial frustration
of the possibility of growth by the simple transfer
of labor from the less productive sector to the higher
productive sector. Moreover, the fruits of the very
rapid gain in productivity in the industrial sector
are shared by only a very few." See also Morris
Whitaker. Labor Absorption in Brazil: An Analysis
of the Industrial Sector. Unpublished doctoral dis-
sertation, Purdue University, 1970.

72. Jose Francisco de Camargo. Exodo Rural do Brasil,
Ensaio Sobre Suas Formas, Causas e Consequencias
Economicas Principais. University of Sao Paulo, Facul-
tade de Ciencias Economicas e Administrativas, Boletim
No. 1, 1957. Gian S. Sahato. "An Economic Analysis
of Migration in Brazil", The Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 76, No. 2, March/April 1968. See also
Douglas Graham. "Divergent and Convergent Regional
Economic Growth and Internal Migration in Brazil 1940-
1960". Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol.
18, No. 2, April 1970. pp. 362-382. Martin Carnoy
and Martine L. Katz. "Regional Urban Earnings Dif-
ferentials in Brazil". The Stanford Center for Research
in International Studies, 1969. (Mimeo). Morris
Whitaker. op. cit. It is my impression that research
is needed to supplement the "economic and rational man"
model and the "absorption" focus of Brazilian migration
studies. It would be helpful, for example, to have
more information on the more "irrational" motivation
behind urban migration, including a more sociological
focus on kinship, achievement motivation, information
resources and perception of opportunities, the role of
primary group and the mass media, and transportation
advances, etc. For a general discussion of Latin

[78]

the various motivational explanations, Brazil has
witnessed heavy waves of internal migration over the past
several decades. Some migration is periodic, reflecting
crop changes, or, in the Northeast, draughts. Much of the
migration is interregional, and is heavily to, and in, the
rich agricult ral and industrial states of the South.[73] The
census reflects this overall regional and heavy rural-urban
s ft. Between 1940 and 1950, for example, the urban and
suburban population increased by 41.5 percent and 58.3
percent respectively, while the rural population increased
by only 17.4 percent.[74] The 1970 census shows many rural
areas with actual losses in population. This includes not

American migration research, see Rabinovitz, in
Rabinovitz and Trueblood. op. cit. pp. 12-15.
See also Browning and Feindt, in Rabinovitz and
Trueblood. op. cit. p. 45. I should also
take note of my reservations about the motivational
"push" and "pull" conceptualization, or at least
rhetoric, all too often employed in analyzing rural-
urban migration. This oversimplified dichotomy
obfuscates more than it conveys about human motiva-
tion and the complex mixture of needs, values and
perceptions which go into the move from the rural to
the urban sectors. Cf. Harley L. Browning. "Migrant
Selectivity and the Growth of Large Cities in
Developing Societies".

73. IBGE. Contribuicoes para o Estudo da Demografia no
Brasil. p. 380. Most of the government (IBGE) popu-
lation statistics give absolute figures with regional
breakdowns. While this regional information is help-
ful, it does not offer much precision with regard to
the rural-urban shifts, inter and intraregional.

74. Ibid. p. 385. IBGE uses two "urban" definitions:
(i) political and geographic, the city limits of
the seat (sede) of the government, and (ii) demo-

percent.[83] The rate of increase has been rapid and

relatively stable, varying between 69.8 percent in

the first decade (1940-1950), 78.4 percent in the

second (1950-1960), and 70.8 percent in the third decade

(1960-1970).[84] By 1980 it.is projected that Sao

Paulo will be the fourth largest city in the world. [85]

The migration to Sao Paulo, particularly by the

young, and often female, continues to increase, from

661,944 in 1940-1950, to 977,600 in 1950-1960, and

1,227,480 in 1960-1970.[86] This migration has been

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83. One--can sympathize with the mayor's familiar plight:
     "The mayor of the city of Sao Paulo, Figueiredo Ferraz,
     stated in a conversation with Congressmen from Sao
     Paulo in Brasilia that the state capital's growth must
     be stopped temporarily because it was becoming chaotic.
     At present only 50 percent of Sao Paulo's streets had
     water supply and only 33 percent had sewers. Every
     year the city population increased at a rate equivalent
     to the entire population of Brasilia and Campinas.
     Traffic had reached the saturation point. The first
     stretch of the subway would be ready just in time to
     keep street traffic from coming to a complete stand-
     still. He urged Congressmen to do everything possible
     to obtain federal funds for tackling the city's prob-
     lem." "Sao Paulo's Growth Gets Out-of Hand". Brazil
     Herald, June 4, 1971.

84. Recursos Humanos da Grande Sao Paulo. Vol. 1, Secre-
     taria de Economia e Planejamento, 1971. p. 20.

85. United Nations General Assembly Twenty-fifth Session,
     Item 49. op. cit. p. 47. (Larry's Salmen's pro-
     jection on same, to be published). Berlinck portrays
     the ascendance of Sao Paulo, and the eclipse of Rio
     de Janeiro, in terms of percentage of national indus-
     trial output, as follows:

	1907	1965
Rio	33.0%	9.0%
Sao Paulo	16.5%	57.6%

86. Recursos Humanos da Grande Sao Paulo. op. cit. p. 90.

only the impoverished states of the North and Northeast, but Minas Gerais and Sao Paulo. As a whole, rural areas may have grown at only 1.5 percent per year over the past ten years. In the 1950's, more than six million people left the countryside for cities, in the 1960's, more than eight million.[75] Looked at over the past several decades, this population shift is a striking phenomenon, witnessing the rapid transformation of Brazil into a predominantly urban society. The census figures are as follows:

CENSO	URBANO (%)	RURAL (%)	TOTAL
1940	31	69	10J
1950	36	64	100
1960	45	55	100
1970*	53	47	100

*Estimated for 1970 Census.

Looked at in terms of the growth of specific cities, this urbanization process is as follows:

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graphic, including as "urban" cities of 5,000 or more; in this case they use the latter definition.

75. IBGE. 1970 Census. U.S. Department of State, Rountree summary A-546, Doc. 28, 1970.

1940 Census

		Urban Population
1.	Rio de Janeiro	1,539,538
2.	Sao Paulo	1,269,485
3.	Recife	327,178
4.	Salvador	294,397
5.	Porto Alegre	262,678
6.	Belo Horizonte	179,770
7.	Belem	167,054
8.	Santos	158,774
9.	Fortaleza	142,439
10.	Niteroi	125,974
11.	Curitiba	101,214
12.	Maceio	80,910
13.	Campinas	78,914
14.	Juiz de Fora	72,380
15.	Joao Pessoa	72,063

1950 Census

		Urban Population
1.	Rio de Janeiro	2,303,063
2.	Sao Paulo	2,017,025
3	Recife	512,370
4.	Salvador	389,422
5.	Porto Alegre	375,049
6.	Belo Horizonte	338,585
7.	Belem	225,218
8.	Fortaleza	205,052
9.	Santos	198,505
10.	Niteroi	170,868
11.	Curitiba	138,178
12.	Campinas	99,156
13.	Maceio	99,088
14.	Santo Andre	97,444
15.	Natal	94,812

1960 Census

		Urban Population
1.	Sao Paulo	3,300,218
2.	Rio de Janeiro	3,223,408
3.	Recife	788,569
4.	Belo Horizonte	663,215
5.	Salvador	638,592
6.	Porto Alegre	625,957
7.	Fortaleza	470,778
8.	Belem	380,667
9.	Curitiba	351,259
10.	Santos	263,054
11.	Nova Iguacu	257,516
12.	Santo Andre	231,705
13.	Niteroi	229,025
14.	Sao Goncalo	195,872
15.	Sao Joao do Meriti	191,872

1970 Census

		Urban Population
1.	Sao Paulo	5,901,533
2.	Rio de Janeiro	4,296,782
3.	Belo Horizonte	1,212,708
4.	Recife	1,078,819
5.	Salvador	1,000,647
6.	Porto Alegre	885,567
7.	Fortaleza	842,231
8.	Belem	642,514
9.	Curitiba	603,227
10.	Brasilia	544,862
11.	Goiania	388,296
12.	Niteroi	342,367
13.	Manaus	303,155
14.	Natal	270,124
15.	Maceio	269,415

These figures point up the obvious ascendance of Sao
Paulo, and the rapid growth of Brasilia. Also worth noting
is the spectacular growth of Belo Horizonte, from the
drawing board to a city of over one million in just half

a century. Between 1960 and 1970 Belo Horizonte grew
77.79 percent, making it the second fastest growing city
of over one million in the world.[76] Manaus grew by
72 percent in the same period, Belem 59.76 percent,
Fortaleza 63.59 percent, Natal 66.20 percent, Joao
Pessoa 42.78 percent, Recife 35.32 percent, Salvador 52.59
percent, Curitiba 66.95 percent, Porto Alegre 38.11 percent.
The population of the various capital cities of Brazil
increased, on the average, by over 52 percent during the
ten-year period. There are now some sixty Brazilian
cities of more than 100,000 residents, ten cities with
more than 500,000, and five cities with more than one
million. The greater Rio area has grown to over seven
million, the greater Sao Paulo area to over eight million.[77]

In the 1970's Brazilian cities should add about nine-
teen million people to their population, eight million of
them from the countryside.[78] It has been predicted that
Brazil is twenty years away from a Rio-Belo Horizonte-
Sao Paulo megalopolis which might be as large as one

76. Larry Salmen's figures, based on United Nations General
    Assembly Twenty-fifth Session, Item 49 figures. Housing,
    Building, and Planning Problems and Priorities in Human
    Settlements. August 1970. The 1970 Census shows Minas
    Gerais growing at a rate of 1.4 percent annually, while
    Belo Horizonte grows at 5.9 percent annually.

77. IBGE. Censo Demografico de 1970, Resultados
    Preliminares.

78. IBGE. 1970 Census. U.S. Department of State, Rountree
   summary A-546, Doc. 28, 1970. p. 3.

hundred million, half of the country's population.[79]

There are some interesting dimensions in the 1970 census data available thus far. The State of Amazonas, for example, declined in population in the 1960-1970 period, while the capital city of Manaus grew by 72.89 percent to 303,155. Even rapidly expanding agricultural sectors, such as Parana and Sao Paulo, are increasingly concentrating in cities.[80] And in the newly opening frontier in the West there is, in some cases, startling urban growth. Thus the fastest growing capitals in Brazil are Goiania (which grew 153 percent to 388,000 between 1960 and 1970) and Brasilia (which grew 284 percent to 545,000 in the same period).[81]

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79. James Theberge. "Some Major Issues Affecting Brazil's Position in the Hemisphere and World by the Year 2000 A.D.". I believe the figure is somewhat high. Isaac Kerstenetzky, Director of IBGE, said at one point that he was comfortable with the 100,000,000 figure, as is Salmen. Harry J. Cole would put it lower, and Morse's 20,000,000 projection for Sao Paulo proper indicates his overly conservative estimate. These figures are from: Briefing at Georgetown University. June 21, 1968. (Mimeo).

80. See, e.g., Constantino Comminos. Aspectos Demografi-cos da Urbanizacao no Parana. (Reprint). Atypically, Comminos finds the large cities (50,000 and over) and the small ones (10,000 and under) increasing most rapidly. The urban population of Parana was still only 31 percent in 1960, up from 25 percent and 24 percent in 1950 and 1940 respectively.

81. IBGE. Censo Demografico de 1970, Resultados Prelim-inares. The complete 1970 census including the

COMPARATIVE GROWTH OF BRAZILIAN CITIES

FIG. 6

Rio de Janeiro's rate was much lower over the last ten
years (30 percent), though it still grew by more than
one million and is approximately the eleventh largest
city in the world.[82] The growth of Brazil's major
cities over the past thirty years is shown in
Figure 6.

The Ascendance of Sao Paulo

Because it is so important, and because there
is good data available, Sao Paulo offers an interesting
case study of Brazilian urbanization. In 1872 Sao Paulo
had 31,000 residents. With 8,031,486 residents,
greater Sao Paulo is now the eighth largest city in
the world. Between 1940 and 1970 it grew from
1,568,645 to 8,031,486, an increase of over 400

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urban-rural breakdown is only partially complete at
the time of this writing. Sao Paulo, Rio and Minas
are not yet complete, though two "agricultural"
states, Rio Grande do Sul and Goias, are. In Goias
42.3 percent of the population live in urban areas
(there are two cities with more than 100,000 inhabit-
ants). In Rio Grande do Sul, 47.8 percent of the
population lives in urban areas (there are six cities
with 100,000 or more residents, twenty-four with
50,000-100,000 residents, fifty-eight with 20,000-
50,000 residents).

82. United Nations General Assembly Twenty-fifth Session,
     Item 49. op. cit.

percent.[83] The rate of increase has been rapid and

relatively stable, varying between 69.8 percent in

the first decade (1940-1950), 78.4 percent in the

second (1950-1960), and 70.8 percent in the third decade

(1960-1970).[84] By 1980 it is projected that Sao

Paulo will be the fourth largest city in the world. [85]

The migration to Sao Paulo, particularly by the

young, and often female, continues to increase, from

661,944 in 1940-1950, to 977,600 in 1950-1960, and

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     be stopped temporarily because it was becoming chaotic.
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     Traffic had reached the saturation point. The first
     stretch of the subway would be ready just in time to
     keep street traffic from coming to a complete stand-
     still. He urged Congressmen to do everything possible
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84. Recursos Humanos da Grande Sao Paulo. Vol. 1, Secre-
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     de Janeiro, in terms of percentage of national indus-
     trial output, as follows:

	1907	1965
Rio	33.0%	9.0%
Sao Paulo	16.5%	57.6%

86. Recursos Humanos da Grande Sao Paulo. op. cit. p. 90.

particularly heavy to the outlying municipios of
greater Sao Paulo (196,895 in 1940-1950, 378,838 in
1950-1960, and 881,271 in 1960-1970)[87] In this same
1940-1970 period the death rate decreased, and fertility
and the rate of natural population growth increased.[88]
As a result the increasing migration accounts for a
decreasing portion of the greater Sao Paulo growth over
the 1940-1970 period.[89] The er⁻ result of the migration
and natural population growth, and the decreasing growth
of Sao Paulo proper is an explosive rate of growth in the
outlying communities. This is shown in the following table:[90]

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87. Ibid. p. 93.

88. Ibid. p. 100.

89. Ibid. p. 100. (Migration accounted for 55.1 percent,
     50.9 percent and 44.5 percent of the growth for each
     of the respective ten-year periods).

90. IBGE. 1970 Census. U.S. Department of State, Rountree
     summary A-546, Doc. 28, 1970. p. 2.

Population of Sao Paulo State

	1960	1970	Yearly Growth Rate
	(In Thousands)		
Sao Paulo City	3,825	5,902	4.4%
Ninety-one Towns of More than 30,000 in 1970	3,262	7,160	8.2%
Towns of Less than 30,000 in 1970	5,888	4,654	-2.4%
TOTAL	12,975	17,716	3.2%

Thus while greater Sao Paulo grew by factors of 69.8, 78.4 and 70.8 percent over the 1940-1970 period (or 5.45, 5.96, 5.50 percent annually), the outlying municipios grew at 91.9, 106.5, and 130.2 percent over the thirty-y period (or 6.75, 7.50 and 8.70 percent annually). [91]

The "Paulista" urban and industrial explosion is obviously spreading rapidly beyond the immediate Sao Paulo area. Even the casual visitor cannot fail to perceive the surging power and drive of the former home of the bandeirantes.[92] A recent study of the nearby valley of ç of Paraiba, for example, showed an explosive rate of industrialization, a gradual decrease in the rural population,

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91. See Recursos Humanos da Grande Sao Paulo. op. cit. p. 58.

92. For a discussion of the "quality of life" in urban Sao Paulo see p. 84, footnote no. 83 and pp. 109-112 of this paper.

and rapid increase in the urban population.[93] As Brazil
approaches the last quarter of the century the basis of a
megalopolis has already formed.

Potpourri: Some Comments on the Cities of Brazil[94]

Perhaps the most striking feature of large Brazilian
cities is their number and variety. Unlike other Latin
American countries, except perhaps Colombia, the Brazilian
urban reality is characterized by a network of diverse
cities rather than the more common pattern of one primary
city. From the hungry strength of Sao Paulo, to the
crowded, mountainous beauty of Rio de Janeiro, the mon-
umental openness of Costa's and Niemeyer's Brasilia, the
raw provincialism of Belo Horizonte, the African and
colonial heritage of Salvador, the surging Northeastern
growth and poverty of Recife and Fortaleza, the river

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93. See Nice Lecocq Miller. O Fato Urbano no Bacia do
     Rio Paraiba-Sao Paulo. Instituto Brasileiro de
     Geografia, No. 23, 1969. pp. 79-81. Harry Cole's
     recent study is one of the same "Corridor of Urban-
     ization." The Cole study plans a new city of
     100,000, the "Nova Cidade de Porto Real."

94. This off-the-cuff section represents a series of
     personal observations of the "personality" of
     urban Brazil. For a general statement on the
     "urban community" in Brazil see Wagley. An
     Introduction to Brazil. p. 176. Wagley's general
     view is that "Brazilian cities differ in many
     respects from North American and Northern European
     cities;—they are comparable in some respects to the
     Mediterranean cities."

nurtured "sea port" of Manaus, 1,200 miles up the Amazon,
the large cities of Brazil have a rich, "personal"
character. To this add the urban nooks and crannies of a
German Sao Leopoldo, Amado's Itabuna, Tiradentes' cobbled
Ouro Preto, a Swiss Nova Friburgo, an American Fordlandia,
and the lonely growing strength of the frontier cities
such as Porto Velho, Goiania, and Uberlandia. The gestalt
is a very rich and diverse urban mosaic. Given the size
and the regional diversity and disparity of Brazil it
could hardly be otherwise.

Brazilian cities are frequently old. Many of the
major cities, including Santos, Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro,
Salvador, Recife (Olinda), and Natal, were founded in
the sixteenth century. By the end of the seventeenth
century almost all of the present coastal cities were
established. These older coastal cities are often
unplanned, with winding, narrow streets at irregular
intervals. The pracas and colonial churches contribute
richly to the character of these older cities, such as
Salvador. But this historical dimension of urban Brazil
is rapidly decaying with age and inattention on the one
hand, and succumbing to use and desenvolvimento on the
other. New, planned Brazilian cities have been built.
They often have heavy French influence; open, modern,
sweeping, with wide avenues and generous green areas within

a geometric design. City planning is something of a
passion in Brazil. Only Brazil has a Brasilia, an expen-
sive, starkly monumental capital of approximately 600,000
people in the heartland. Similarly, Belo Horizonte is a
planned capital of over one million; Goiania, a planned
capital or over 380,000; and Teresina, a planned capital
of over 42,000. Additional new towns are planned, (e.g.,
in the Vale do Paraiba or along Transamazonica). There
are also new, planned "industry" towns such as Ipatinga and
Volta Redonda. Harry Cole's private firm recently planned
a new city between Rio and Sao Paulo. He was subsequently
asked if he wouldn't like to plan ten more, for the
Transamazonica.

As mentioned above, Brazilian cities are large and
numerous, with five cities of over one million and sixty
cities of over 100,000. While this numerical and geograph-
ical diversity begins to diminish, the urban leadership
of Rio de Janeiro and especially of Sao Paulo, can be
expected to hold economic "primacy" throughout much of
the twenty-first century.[95] With the overall increase
in population and the widespread exodus from rural areas,

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95. The "primacy" referred to here is not, however, a mere
continuation of Sao Paulo's present status, as the
"industrial city" of Brazil. The reference is rather
to its emergent role as the most important area
of concentration in an increasingly expanding and
complex urban and industrial "web."

however, almost all Brazilian cities are growing rapidly:
the capital cities are increasing by approximately one-
half every ten years. Some of the "interior" capitals
in particular grew at explosive rates between 1960 and
the 1970 census (Manaus 72.8 percent, Porto Velho 76.76
percent, Belo Horizonte 77.79 percent, Cuiaba 79.61
percent, Goiania 155.35 percent and Brasilia at 284.40
percent). There is every reason to expect these heart-
land cities to continue their runaway growth. Even so
the major cities, often coastal, take the overwhelming
brunt of the population and urban increase: thus Belem
increased by 240,334 in the last decade, Fortaleza by
327,413, Recife by 281,535, Salvador by 344,912, Rio de
Janeiro by 989,619, and Sao Paulo by 2,076,182. The
small satellite towns on the outskirts of these major
centers are often growing at staggering rates. The
overall pattern shows a more rapid rate of growth in the
interior and overwhelmingly greater absolute growth in
the large and powerful cities, often coastal, of Sao
Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Recife, Salvador,
Porto Alegre, Fortaleza, Belem and increasingly, Brasilia
and Goiania--it is overwhelmingly these larger cities
and their satellites that absorb the population increase
in Brazil.

The Brazilian cities manifest a very great commitment
to the automobile, the bus, and the truck, as the means

of mass transportation.[96] While many "modern" urbanists
tend to regard the automobile as the destroyer of cities,
the Brazilians have thus far been willing to remove
buildings and _favelas_ alike, extend (and isolate) beaches,
and rill lakes to accommodate the automobile. As a result
the larger cities, Rio and Sao Paulo in particular, are
choking with cars (metro systems and additional freeways
are now being constructed in both cities). The general
commitment to the automobile is also manifest in the
"national integration plan" (a highway system), and in
the major planned cities of Belo Horizonte and Brasilia.
The planner of Brasilia, Lucio Costa, for example,
talks fondly of the car as "a member of the family."
The value attached to the car is immediately obvious
when one looks at Brasilia--or attempts to walk through
it.

A second striking characteristic of Brazilian
cities is what might be called a "suburban explosion."[97]

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96. There are, of course, complaints, as in Recursos
Humanos da Grande Sao Paulo. "uma via expressa
exclui tudo e todos que nao seja o automovel."

97. A dichotomized suburban-core city model is, of
course oversimplified and the interaction of the
various sectors of Brazilian cities a more complex
and subtle phenomenon than the following comment
admits. Even given this, however, the suburban
dimension seems distinct enough to merit attention
as a particularly interesting nuance of a larger and
more complex urban process. See, e.g., Wagley.
An Introduction to Brazil. p. 179. "Brazil friends
were always a   ed when I told them I lived in a suburb
in New York. In Brazil the suburbs are lower-class
areas, even for a professor."

It has already been noted that although the cities are growing faster than the population as a whole, the suburbs are growing even faster than the cities.[98] The character of the suburbs is in many ways the reverse of suburbia, U.S.A. In Brazil urban services such as water, sewage, paved streets, etc. are generally better in the urban core, and often do not exist in suburbia. Similarly the zoning laws are more demanding in the city than in the suburbs, where zoning is often nonexistent. In short, the central city is often relatively healthy and prosperous, while the areas of poverty, mixed residential-industrial land use, and totally inadequate or nonexistent urban services are often concentrated in the suburbs. The pattern is both caused by and contributes to a rapid and distinct pattern of suburban growth. The lower socio-economic groups are attracted to the suburban areas by cheaper housing, kinship ties, cultural continuity and, sometimes, the job markets on the periphery. And they are out of the central city either by statutory restrictions and "controlled" migration, by internal resistance (from other lower socio-economic groups, insecure in their own "squatter" communities), or by the sheer realities of central city

98. See pp. 78-79, this paper, showing the suburban areas growing approximately 20 percent faster than the urban areas of Brazil. See also p. 85, footnote no. 87, discussing the same phenomena in Sao Paulo.

housing costs and availability. This so-called "marginal"
population is often forcibly "removed" from the central
city to the suburbs. These factors combine to create and
reinforce increasing economic and social segregation
within cities; increasing homogeneity within neighborhoods,
and heterogeneity between neighborhoods. In essence, the
central city prospers, often at the expense of the
periphery. While the political implications of this
increasingly "marginalized" suburbia remain to be seen, some
students feel it may be a future source of political
radicalism and "suburban guerrilla warfare." Whatever
the political implications, this reversal of the American
core-suburban pattern is a self-reinforcing character
of Brazilian cities. The phenomenon sometimes implies
a corresponding reversal of urban roles and processes;
it can lead, for example, to reverse commuting, with
marginalized Brazilian suburbanite commuting into the
cities for their domestic or manual employment.

Reflecting the economics of this pattern, the
center-city in Brazil is often characterized by high land
values and rich and often vertical commercial and architec-
tural growth. The surprising verticality is equally
obvious in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, and in the
striking skyscapers of the frontier cities in the vast
interior--not only Belo Horizonte and Brasilia, but
Goiania, Uberlandia, Cuiaba, etc. The starkly modern

and graceful architecture of Brazil, usually in reinforced
concrete, sometimes gives the center city an architec-
tural personality more modern than the society which builds
it. (A good example of this is the horse-and-buggy provin-
cialism of Belo Horizonte). This same architecture gives
concrete form to the disparity of social and economic
positions in the highly stratified Brazilian society. Vir-
tually all apartments in Brazil have a front "social" side
and a back "maids" quarters, with separate elevators,
entrances, baths, etc. The cities also reflect the growth
of population and the economy; new construction is a con-
stant fact of life. Apartment construction is particularly
heavy, and Brazil is increasingly a country of apartment
dwellers (and, via the National Housing Bank, apartment
owners).

The presence of the National Housing Bank (BNH) is
one of a number of factors which may, over the long run,
temper the diversity of Brazilian cities. The growing
strength of the federal government and the uniform,
national policies of such urban organizations as BNH and
the Federal Housing and Urbanization Service (SERFHAU) may
have a homogenizing influence, as will the advances and
standardization in national education, leisure (soccer),
transportation and communications, the standardization of
construction (technique and materials), of city planning,
etc. The diversity of cities may also be tempered by

increasing interaction between them, by heavy internal
migration, by the penetration of generally "urban" values
into the rural sectors, and by the partial breakdown and
absorption of ethnic subcultures in Brazil. But that is
speculation, and some time removed. For the moment,
Brazil's urban pattern is one of economic, social, ethnic,
physical and regional diversity.

The Quality of Life in the Brazilian Urban Environment

In general it is probably safe to say that the
quality of life in Brazilian cities compares favorably
with other cities in Latin America, and the world. Many
have beautiful coastal topography with famous palm-lined
beaches. To the extent that one can generalize, Brazilian
cities are often friendly and--except for the manifest
insanity of Brazilian drivers--safe places. As commented
by Wagley, "one feels more at home walking in dark streets
in a Brazilian city than in its North American or
European counterpart....one feels safe."[99] Most manage
to retain something of a small "community" character,
wherein businessmen traditionally go home for lunch,
laborers nap in the midday heat, and friends stop to
chat in the street.

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99. Wagley. An Introduction to Brazil. p. 182.

In discussing the way Brazilian towns seem small and
personal in relation to their population figures, Wagley
asserted that this was "because only a small segment of
the population participate fully in urban life. The great
masses of people are unable to make full use of the urban
world."[100] While there is great merit in this explan-
ation, other factors are also involved. Physical factors
such as the relative scarcity of neon and the abundance
of outdoor cafes and pracas contribute to this "community"
atmosphere. More important, however, is the subtle
"personalism" of Brazilian society. Traditionally
reticent about coercion and personal confrontation, urban
Brazil seems to have retained or evolved a widely shared
system of values and expectations. For me urban Brazil
represents the almost anti-institutional society of the
jeito ("getting by") and the calor humano (roughly,
"warmth"). Although quietly and extensively separated by
considerations of class and race, urban Brazilians
nevertheless interact relating easily, e.g., in recreation
at the beach, the soccer game or Carnival. They are also
relatively open with regard to foreigners, for example,
freely giving directions and assistance for the asking.
In short, Brazilian urban society often seems to be a
partial contradiction of a shift sociologists--particularly

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100. Ibid. p. 182.

American urban sociologists--usually expect in the urban sector, from "primary" to "secondary" relationships, and to impersonal interaction. Similarly, as will be discussed below, family and kinship ties seem to survive the rapid urbanization process rather better than one might expect. It is a surprisingly personal kind of urbanismo.

There are, of course, many more tangible advantages to be derived from urban Brazil. There are more high-paying jobs, resulting in a level of income approximately three times that of the rural sector. Urban Brazil is also the situs of the much sought after movimento, for example, soccer, music (Brazilian and American), and films (often American, with Portuguese subtitles). There are also advantages of diversity, availability of material goods, services and jobs, specialization of skills, mass communication, centralized educational, political or governmental participation. Even on a fairly visceral level there are numerous factors which would lead one to conclude with considerable justification that Brazilian cities can be rather pleasant and human places to live. Perhaps the best index to the accuracy of this generalization is the confidence and pride most Brazilians feel toward their city--and their distaste for the stereotyped, dangerous and dirty North American city. In terms of "quality of urban life," Brazilians too aim high.

There are, of course, distinct and painful urban
problems as well. This paper will focus on them as areas
of Foundation concern. Brazilian cities have not escaped
the advance of Volkswagen and Honda. As mentioned above,
the automobile has an important place and the rapidly
rising "automobile population" is only now having
far-reaching effects on social behavior. It represents,
for example, a technological exception to the "personalismo"
mentioned above; Brazilian drivers ask and expect no
quarter. In many places the automobile is overrunning
the city, particularly the old coastal cities with narrow
and irregular streets. It is also having a marked deja
vu impact on juvenile behavior, from dating and drive-in
theaters (in Rio and Sao Paulo), to mobile peer groups,
and an interesting kind of throwback to the automobile
ethos of Rebel Without a Cause.* Although I am not sure of
the precise figures, I believe the auto accident rate in
Brazil is proportionately about ten times higher than the
rate in the U.S.

While the general movimento of Brazilian cities may
stand out in contrast to the countryside, the cities

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* There is, for example, a kind of "chicken" played in con-
temporary Rio de Janeiro, by sliding around sharp corners
for the benefit of a sometimes large and cheering audience.
Having lived for two years on the Lagoa in Rio, near the
"Curva da Morte," I can testify that this game is almost a
weekend ritual, beginning at approximately midnight and
screeching on--with occasional police interruption--until
the small hours.

themselves would not strike the urbanite of San Francisco, London, Rome or Buenos Aires as culturally sophisticated or active places. On the contrary, except for perhaps Rio and Sao Paulo, most would seem quite provincial. Moreover, Brazilian cities are not particularly "modern" in technological terms. It is, for example, very common to see a horse-and-buggy stop at a street light in cities as large as Belo Horizonte and Salvador. And there are many everyday technological inconveniences--electricity and water frequently fail, telephone service is often difficult to secure, and unpredictable. These "inconveniences" are, of course, a way of life for millions of urban Brazilians whose standard of living does not include water, electricity or telephone. It is, for example, common to see a cluster of women and children waiting in line at a water outlet, and subsequently walking back to a favela with a lata of water steadied on their heads. In general, Brazilian cities retain a kind of perpetually "unfinished" character, for they are constantly torn up and under construction. The Brazilian reaction to these inconveniences is generally one of rather casual acceptance, and resolution by jeito. Perhaps the most disturbing dimension of life in contemporary urban Brazil is an ephemeral kind of political indifference, coupled with a sweeping nationalism and a petty materialism, fostered in large measure by the

present political structure. While it is obviously dan-
gerous to generalize, it is safe to say that the cities
of Brazil are not politically or intellectually lively
at the moment. Rather, the day-to-day urban ethos is one
of complementary entrepreneurship, desenvolvimento, and
relaxation--vintage Marcuse.

On a more tangible level, Brazilian cities obviously
face many of the same "urbanization" and "over-urbanization"
problems common to other cities in Latin America and the
world. As discussed above, there is a painful lack of
good jobs. There is a huge housing shortage, particularly
at the lower socio-economic level. And there are pressing
problems of air and water pollution (in Rio de Janeiro,
for example, raw sewage has made Guanabara Bay an open
sewer, unsafe for swimming). Transportation and education
facilities are inadequate and overburdened, and there are
serious health problems. There is an increasing concern
with drugs and organized crime. And there is a familiar
paucity of municipal resources. The inadequacy and often
total absence of urban services is almost staggering.
Approximately 50 percent of the municipalities of Brazil
have water systems, and approximately 35 percent have
sewage systems.[101] In short, the rural-urban flow and the

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101. IBGE. Brazil Series Estatisticas Retrospectivas.
    1970. p. 255. BNH estimates the actual figures
    to be 40 percent of the urban population with water

natural population expansion of the past several decades have conspired to produce a staggering, quantum leap in the urban sector, and the cities have not been able to keep up. As a result, they juxtapose much of the country's wealth and poverty. The most concentrated areas of under and unemployment, inadequate housing, physical deprivation, poor health, and legal and residential insecurity are not in the Northeast or in the Amazon, but in the cities themselves (including those in the Northeast and the Amazon).

Because many of the problems of "over-urbanization" are more visible and pressing in the favelas,[102] this paper will examine them in greater detail. There is an increasing body of literature on lower socio-economic "integration" and "marginality" in Latin America, and on

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services. See BNH. Abastecimento de Agua Equaciona-mento Em Nivel Nacional. January 1971. p. 7. Even the above-cited figures are misleading, because these urban services are only very partially and differ-entially available, even when present. The figures may also be misleading in that the physical reality of agglomeration alters by quantity of water fil-tration and sewage decomposition process.

102 "predominantly residential areas whose only uniform identifying characteristic are the illegal and unor-dered origins by accreditive or organized invasion." Anthony Leeds. "The Significant Variables Determining the Character of Squatter Settlements". América Latina, Centro Americano de Pesquisa em Ciencias Sociais, Rio de Janeiro, 1969. "Favelas" is variously translated as "slum," "squatter settlement," "squatment," "shantytown," "Marginal community," etc.

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the favelas in particular.[103] In general, it is safe
to say there are two reasonably distinct "schools" of
thought about the so-called "marginal" groups: (i) the
"optimistic" school of Leeds, Turner, Currie, Morse and
Beyer, emphasizing stability, integration, achievement
motivation, upward mobility and adaptation, and (ii)
the "tinderbox" school of Haar, Shulman, Burnett and
Johnson, emphasizing physical deprivation in terms of
health, housing and services, and focusing on frustrated
ambition, alienation, crime and radicalization.[104] Some of
the statistics and perceptions arising out of these two
schools of inquiry are worth noting, as a kind of counter-
point "quantification" of the quality of life in these
"squatter" agglomerations.

The Favelas of Rio de Janeiro--The favelas of Rio de
Janeiro will serve as a case study, in large measure
because there is better and more recent data on
Rio's favelas, because I know them better, and
because they are the focal point of conflicting
research on, and responses to, the problems of the favelas

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103. See, e.g., "Bibliografico", in Renato R. Boschi and
      Rose I. Goldschmidt. Populacoes Faveladas do Estado
      da Guanabara. Instituto Universitario de Pesquisas
      do Rio de Janeiro, 1969-1970. p. 113.

104. See Rabinovitz and Trueblood. op. cit. p. 12.

generally. The 1971 census indicates that there are
564,930 favelados in Guanabara, or approximately one out
of every seven residents.[105] Twenty-three percent of
these favelados are on federal land, 27 percent on state
land and 44 percent on privately owned land.[106] The
conflicting and sometimes synthesized portrait of favelados
which follows is drawn from two recent studies, arising
out of the "optimistic" and "tinderbox" schools.[107]

Of the relative poverty of the favelado there is
little dispute. The Boschi study found 15.26 percent of
the families have a total income of less than one "mini-
mum salary" (i.e., Cr$187.20 or US$36.85/month), 35.74
percent have incomes up to two minimum salaries (i.e.,
US$73.70/month), 22.48 percent up to three minimum
salaries (i.e., US$110.55/month) and 12.04 percent earn
four salaries (i.e., US$147.40/month) or more. This
means that over half of the favelados in Rio have a
gross family income of less than US$73.70/month.[108]

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105. IBGE. Resultados Preliminares do Censo de 1970.
This is a very conservative figure; other estimates,
including CHISAM's are twice as high.

106. CHISAM. Metas Alcancadas e Novos Objetivos de
Programa. p. 77.

107. Ibid. and Boschi and Goldschmidt. op. cit. These
two studies represent, respectively, the "tinderbox"
and the "optimistic" schools.

108. Boschi and Goldschmidt. op. cit. p. 45. The CHISAM
study gave the following breakdown: less than one
monthly salary 17 percent; one to three monthly salaries
57 percent; three or more salaries 27 percent. CHISAM.
op. cit. p. 77.

The studies are also consistent in showing a rather high number of consumer goods present in the _favelas_, and erratic but generally very low availability of urban services. In the famous Catacumba _favela_, for example, the CHISAM study found no sewer system, though 61 percent of the shacks had toilet bowls, 23.5 percent had water, and 79.49 percent had electricity. In terms of basic appliances, 81.36 percent had stoves, 27.24 percent had refrigerators and 19.56 percent had television.[109] The Boschi study indicated a somewhat higher level of material possession: 47 percent had television, 53.5 percent with refrigerators, 83.5 percent with radio, etc.[110]

The _favela_ population is generally quite young, enters the labor market at an early age, and performs manual, often unskilled labor.[111] While most of the

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109. CHISAM. _op. cit._ p. 91.

110. Boschi and Goldschmidt. _op. cit._ p. 45. Steven Conn comments on this propensity to invest in portable, luxury goods rather than in homesteads as follows: "given the country wide inflation that makes saving futile and his slim chance of receiving just value for improvements that he cannot carry off if he is removed, the squatter who so invests is prudent." Steven Conn. "The Squatters Rights of Favelados". _Ciencias Economicas e Sociais_, No. 100, December 1968. p. 91.

111. CHISAM. _op. cit._ p. 92. CHISAM reports that 40 percent of the _favela_ population is under twenty years of age, that the labor market is entered at age fourteen, and that 73 percent of the laborers are unskilled _biscateiros_. The Boschi study (p. 42) rejects the "marginal" model, finding only 9 percent unemployment, 25 percent holding employment for two years, 18 percent for five years, and 28 percent for ten years or more.

favelados are urban born, a substantial portion are of

rural origin.[112]   Almost invariably the favelado arrives

in the city via a "step" migration from other, often

smaller cities.[113]   The composite picture which emerges

from the optimistic Boschi study portrays a relatively

highly motivated,[114] literate,[115] and reasonably sat-

isfied[116] favelado.   In addition, Boschi's favelado

would not, in most cases, return to a rural area even

if given the opportunity in the form of land or employ-

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112.   Boschi and Goldschmidt.   op. cit.   p. 48.   Boschi
       found 43.77 percent were of rural origin.   In
       leaving the rural area, of course, the rural-urban
       migrant frequently gives up the patrao relationship
       with his "provider," though there is often an attempt
       to reestablish this kind of paternalism in the city.
       As stated by Wagley.   An Introduction to Brazil.   p.
       107.   "The patrao complex is not a thing of the
       past.   It is still the basic form of relationship
       between people of different social classes in most of
       the communities of Northern Brazil and it is far from
       extinct in Sao Paulo."

113.   Only 15 percent of Boschi's group come directly to Rio;
       60 percent made one stop, 25 percent two, and 12
       percent more than two stops.   This "step migration,"
       confirmed in other Brazilian migration literature,
       would seem to be substantially different from the "one
       shot" migration reported in Bogota or Mexico.   See
       Rabinovitz and Trueblood.   op. cit.   pp. 13, 45 and 83.

114.   Forty-three percent, e.g., would prefer non-manual or
       professional work.   Boschi and Goldschmidt.   op. cit.
       p. 53.   Motivation was found to be higher in those of
       urban background.   Ibid.   p. 77.

115.   Ibid.   p. 41.   Boschi asserts that 65.06 percent of the
       favelados in his study could read and write with various
       degrees of profiency.

116.   In response to the question "O senhor esta contente com
       sua vida atual?" only 17.06 percent expressed discontent;
       55.02 percent were "mais ou menos" and 27.10 percent
       declared themselves quite satisfied, ibid.

ment.[117] Fatalistic in outlook[118] and concerned mainly

with his own occupation and residence,[119] Boschi's _favelados_

were basically affirmative in their view of the government,

though overwhelmingly opposed to moving out of the _favela_

for public housing.[120] As indicated above, there is a

large and growing body of literature in support of the

"optimist" school.

The CHISAM "tinderbox" research is less consistent

and less objective than could ideally be hoped. The com-

posite picture of _favela_ life which emerges is sometimes a

reasonably "optimistic" view of a well informed,[121] entre-

preneurial,[122] and even idealized[123] _favelado_. At other

times the "tinderbox" CHISAM study waxes highly, even

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117.   _Ibid_. p. 50.

118.   _Ibid_. p. 55.

119.   In response to the question "_O que senhor faria
       primeiro para mudar sua vida, se pudesse?_" the first
       response was a better job (25.50 percent), followed
       by better house (19 percent), move to another place
       (19 percent), and improve the _favela_ (12 percent).

120.   Sixty-six point forty-five percent "_acha ruim_" to
       move to public housing; only 18.46 percent "_acha
       bom_." _Ibid_. p. 58.

121.   CHISAM. _op. cit_. p. 84. "....is little concerned
       with the country's political regime beyond its relation
       to his own survival. He is aware and informed about
       any governmental change connected with his life or the
       community in which he lives....[he] reads newspapers,
       listens to the radio and watches television...."

122.   _Ibid_. "a typically capitalist organization with
       great economic vitality."

123.   _Ibid_. "intelligent, experienced, understanding,
       orderly and generally peaceful."

emotionally, negative in portraying the quality of life in the favela[124] and the favelado desire to leave.[125]

In spite of the authoritarian heavy-handedness of the CHISAM study, part of the focus of the "tinderbox" school may temper some "optimistic" overstatement with regard to the quality of life in the favelas. Although the "optimists" have effectively and appropriately balanced the earlier, overly-negative approach, there are, in fact, problems of crime, health and material deprivation in the favelas, and an uncertain and even "threatened" existence. This "threatened" status is nowhere more obvious than Rio de Janeiro, where hundreds of thousands of favelados are rapidly being moved by CHISAM). Perhaps the most dramatic narration of day-to-day life in the favela is the diary of Carolina Maria de Jesus.[126] The third section of this paper will

124. Ibid. "....it is easy to find adolescents rolling marijuana cigarettes in full daylight, taking part in forbidden games and threatening the persons and property of others....Life in some slums is a school for crime. The promiscuity, in which the majority lives, leads the adolescent to sex crimes, seduction and rape." CHISAM will be discussed later in this paper.

125. Ibid. p. 95. "he continues to show his desire to move," and upon moving "to show his joy and confidence."

126. Carolina Maria de Jesus. Child of the Dark. Signet, 1960. p. 34. "I classify Sao Paulo this way: the Governor's palace is the living room, the mayor's office is the dining-room and the city is the garden. And the favela is the backyard where they throw the

[108]

examine the Brazilian response to the favelas of Rio de Janeiro.

The Casas de Comodo--Concern for the quality of life in the urban environment is obviously not confined to the favelas. At one socio-economic step above the favela, for example, is the casa de comodo, or "house of rooms." A recent study indicates that as many as 200,000 people live in casas de comodo in Rio de Janeiro, and as many as 700,000 in Sao Paulo.[127] The casa is frequently an old mansion (averaging

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garbage....I'm not going to eat because there is very little bread, I wonder if I'm the only one who leads this kind of life. What can I hope for the future? I wonder if the poor of other countries suffer like the poor of Brazil. I was so unhappy that I started to fight without reason with my boy Jose Carlos....A truck came to the favela. The driver and his helper threw away some cans. It was canned sausage. I thought: this is what these hardhearted businessmen do. They stay waiting for the prices to go up so they can earn more. And when it rots they throw it to the buzzards and to the unhappy favelados." (p. 45) "May 27--It seems that the slaughterhouse threw kerosene on their garbage dump so the favelados would not look for meat to eat. I didn't have any breakfast and walked around half dizzy. The daze of hunger is worse than that of alcohol. The daze of alcohol makes us sing, but the one of hunger makes us shake. I know how horrible it is to only have air in the stomach.... I began to have a bitter taste in my mouth. I thought: is there no end to the bitterness of life? I think that when I was born I was marked by fate to go hungry. I filled one sack of paper. When I entered Paulo Guimaraes Street, a woman gave me some newspapers. They were clean and I went to the junk yard picking up everything that I found. Steel, tin, coal, everything serves the favelado."

127. Larry Salmen. The Casas de Comodo of Rio de Janeiro. Columbia doctoral dissertation, 1970. See also Morse, in Rabinovitz and Trueblood. op. cit.

seventeen rooms) sublet on a family per room basis, with
shared facilities. With an average occupancy of 3.1
people per room, or fifty-four people per unit, Salmen
sees existence characterized by lack of privacy, material
deprivation and interpersonal conflict.

The Urban Environment--On a broader scale, there is
increasing concern about the quality of human life
in the metropolitan areas generally--the impact of
the urban environment on material, institutional,
behavioral and psychological dimensions of human
existence in Brazil. Earlier in this paper I dis-
cussed this issue in a personal way. Several pieces
of work have recently come out of Sao Paulo, however,
which begin to address this "quality" issue directly.

Recursos Humanos,[128] a government supported research
project, points out that material necessities are wanting.
More than 50 percent of the families in Sao Paulo earn less
than Cr$500.00/month (or US$98.43).[129] Forty-seven point
six percent of the houses in the greater Sao Paulo area
are still made of terra.[130] Only approximately 55 percent

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128. Recursos Humanos da Grande Sao Paulo. op. cit.
     pp. 15-41.

129. Ibid. p. 21. If the poorer suburbs of greater Sao
     Paulo are included, 71 percent of the families earn
     less than Cr$500.00/month.

130. Ibid. p. 402.

of the units in greater Sao Paulo have sewage and 54
percent have water.[131] Thus it is not surprising that the
"Paulista's" first concern is urban services.[132]

The Recursos project also discusses aesthetics,[133]
the "appreciation" of the city[134] and the more general
quality of life. Looking at data on such dimensions as
neighborhood societies,[135] lower birth rate, "traditional"
achievement motivation, perception of needs,[136] and the
divisions of leisure by sex and age, the Recursos project
perceives two emergent Brazilian urban types. The first
is the rather philistine morador (resident), who has a low
"culture of poverty" level of expectation, and is defen-
sively satisfied with his lot. The morador is thus a sort
of Brazilianized "tradition directed" man. The model is a
migrant who has managed to cut out a niche in the metrop-
olis, then attempts to "humanizar" the city by maintaining

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131. Ibid. p. 404.

132. Ibid. p. 31. "....os servicos....sao deficientes, ou
pelo menos sao notoriamente percebidos como tal pela
populacao...."; other concerns, in order, are "police
and security," "communications" and health.

133. Ibid. p. 16. "....no juizo das gentes, a cidade, se
nao e considerada feia, no atrai particularmente a
atencao."

134. Ibid. p. 17. "....cidade que so serve para
trabalhar."

135. Ibid. p. 34. Only 3.1 percent belong to sociedades,
16.7 percent belong to private clubs.

136. Ibid. p. 31.

old kinship structures and contacts, and by defining

less ambitious objectives.[137] For the "cidadao"

(urbanite), however, the city becomes more than an object

to be parlayed and consumed. It becomes a system of urban

values, a new form of communication and a novo estilo de

participacao, modern and mass in character, and homogenizing

in impact (except for the elites). The Recursos analysis

asserts that Sao Paulo's realization of an urbane style

of life has been slowed by the burden of building adequate

occupational, residential and transportation infrastructure

to accommodate the ever-increasing moradores.

There is some support for this general model in an

earlier work on urbanization and family structure in Sao

Paulo.[138] This study points up some of the difficulties

inherent in transferred theory, the Chicago school of

urban sociology in particular, and describes a very

distinct system of "help patterns" and traditional family

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137. Noting that only 25 percent of those interviewed
      were born in Sao Paulo, but that 73.8 percent were
      satisfied with their housing, the Recursos document
      continues, ibid. p. 23. "....o morador e, antes
      de tudo, um migrante que ao conseguir sobreviver
      na cidade, alimenta-se, veste-se e abriga-se, gan-
      hando o primeiro round de sua batalha." For a
      more general statement of the urban worker's not
      so mobile station in life see Frank Bonilla. "The
      Urban Worker", in John Johnson (ed.). Continuity and
      Change in Latin America. Stanford, California,
      Stanford University Press, 1964. p. 186.

138. Bernard C. Rosen and Manoel T. Berlinck. Modernization
      and Family Structure, in the Region of Sao Paulo,
      Brazil.

ties in "urbanized" Sao Paulo society.[139] If the <u>Recursos</u>
and Rosen-Berlinck models are accurate it would be reason-
able to hypothesize that the major impact of the urban
environment on family and society in Brazil is only now begin-
ning to be felt.[140] And it would be reasonable to expect
that the evolving <u>urbanismo</u> will continue its particularly
Brazilian, personal, bitter-sweet, provincial-urban and
<u>morador-cidadao</u> flavor.

<u>Comment</u>--The foregoing does not pretend to even scratch the
surface of the "quality of life" in urban Brazil. There is

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139. <u>Ibid</u>. p. 87. "Since the urbanization process has
      been intense and based on a rural migrant population
      and since the industrialization process has been
      incipient, many of the traditional characteristics
      of the social structure could be preserved in
      Brazil....The gap between the urban growth and the
      industrialization process has created a labor surplus
      in the society's economy. As a consequence all
      sectors of the economy have been functioning under a
      condition of unlimited labor supply. This labor
      supply, in turn, has contributed to the reinforcement
      or the emergence of at least four main structural fea-
      tures in the urban scene: the survival of many
      relatively traditional industrial and commercial enter-
      prises; the expansion of the services; the maintenance
      of many traditional family linkages; and the expansion
      of a marginal urban population....Under conditions of
      unlimited labor supply, family cohesion and cooperation
      becomes a functional mechanism for the survival of
      those relatives that are unemployed."

140. For a recent and comprehensive review of the litera-
      ture on the urban values and norms, see Richard M.
      Morse. "Sao Paulo: Case Study of a Latin American
      Metropolis", in Rabinovitz and Trueblood. <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>.
      p. 151.

no mention, for example, of the quality of life in the huge
standardized public housing units, which house approximately
3.4 million Brazilians, and will probably house twice that
number within a few years.[141] Nor is there discussion of
the quality of life in 4,000 municipios in Brazil,[142] of

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141. The National Housing Bank alone has put up 60,000
units in the last several years, will put up another
600,000 by 1973. I do not know of any research on the
quality of this vast and standardized BNH structural
environment.

142. See Wagley. An Introduction to Brazil. pp. 154-159.
Wagley's is an excellent discussion of the Brazilian
municipality, excerpts as follows: "Brazilian small
towns are above all bureaucratic and commercial cen-
ters. If the town is the seat of a municipio, there
are federal, state, and municipal employees and office
holders. If it is only the seat of a district, the
bureaucracy is smaller but still exists....It is a
safe guess that in most small municipal seats at
least 20 percent of all families receive at least
part of their income from the public coffers. An
even higher percentage of townsmen are involved in
commerce in one way or another....Brazilian commer-
cialism does not stop at the public market or weekly
fair. Municipal seats with as few as 2,000 inhabitants
frequently have from twenty to thirty general stores
selling the same kind of merchandise....The number
of commercial transactions in any Brazilian small
town is enormous. Everyone sells something to every-
one else....Each Brazilian small town has its upper
class, people who are essentially white-collar workers.
These people are the local leaders. They are usually,
but not invariably, of Caucasoid ancestry. They are
profoundly urban in their ethos. These bureaucrats
and small businessmen are generally more aware of
events in the distant big cities than of the life of
the peasantry in the surrounding rural zones. They
employ household servants; follow fashion styles and
dress in suit, tie, and hat; maintain social clubs;
and if they can afford it, send their children to
be educated in the city. They look down upon the
poorer townspeople and especially upon the rural
peasants, who are referred to as caboclos, matutos,

"regional" communities,[143] or ethnic subcultures,[144] and of various dimensions of Brazilian urban life such as the very real and complicated class and racial consciousness, social

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caipiras, tabareus, and other terms that carry the connotation of hick and yokel. Such people feel greater solidarity with relatives and friends of similar social status in other towns and in the cities than with their townsmen of lower status. The class structure of the small Brazilian town means that it is almost impossible to solve local problems through voluntary or cooperative agencies. In all small towns, there is an avid interest in politics. The local upper-class leaders are directly concerned with changes in political regime, since so many of them hold government posts. There is hardly anyone in this sector of a small-town population whose brother, sister, cousin, or some other relative is not dependent on political events. Thus, generally, two or more political parties split the allegiance of the townspeople, promoting intense feelings of hostility between close neighbors and sometimes between kinsmen....Along with divisions of social class, political schisms make any cooperative endeavor almost impossible in most Brazilian small towns. The Brazilian small town in which so many Brazilians live, is not, then, a homogeneous, neighborly, demo-cratic community close to the soil in its way of life. The idea of a New England town meeting would be a joking matter in most Brazilian small towns. In Brazil, the small town is but an extension of the urban scene--a highly stratified society based on differences in the presitge accorded to various types of occupations, widely different degrees of wealth and power, differences of racial type, differences of education, and differences of family background. These same small towns are guardians of old Brazilian traditions, both good and bad, including the compadre system, large families and a large parentela (kin group), and the estivals of Sts. John and Peter. Brazilians regard the small town of their childhood with affection but they like to move out of it."

143. See, e.g., Wagley. Amazon Town: A Study of Man in the Tropics.

144. See, e.g., Bertram Hutchinson. Conditions of immi-grant assimilation in urban Brazil. UN document General E/CN-12/URB/13, Santiago, 1958.

and occupational mobility, politics and urban guerrilla
warfare, religious movements, urban architecture and
aesthetics, etc. In short, this section does not
pretend to say what the quality of human life in the
Brazilian urban environment "is," or to precisely define
problems. Rather the purpose is to state some general and
specific observations about Brazilian cities and the
quality of human life therein, and to indicate the presence
of enduring urban problems which should be of concern to
Brazilian planners, policy makers, and scholars--and to
the Foundation. Many of the problems are quite ephemeral,
as human values and choice, opportunity, interaction,
security, "identification" and quality of life. Even
these issues, however, may manifest themselves in tangible
forms--a high rate of "divorce" and suicide in Brasilia,[145]
the removal of several hundred thousand favelados in Rio
de Janeiro, or the explosive and unpredicted growth of an
area (such as Belo Horizonte). Many other urban issues are
as concrete as the "pathological" employment pattern in
Rio, Salvador and Recife,[146] the widespread urban unemploy-

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145. Reported in an interview with Glaucio Soares, Federal
University of Brasilia; Glaucio is now doing research
in this field.

146. See Morse. op. cit. p. 163. While 53.7 percent of
Sao Paulo's population is employed in the tertiary
sector, Rio employs 71.2 percent in that sector. I
do not know of good research on the tertiary sector
of Brazil.

[116]

ment and underemployment, the sewage and health problems

of a _favela_ such as _Alagados_ or a city such as Sao Paulo,

or the sheer statistics of housing, feeding, transporting,

educating and employing Brazil's increasingly predominantly

urban society.

BRAZILIAN RESPONSES TO
URBANIZATION

The Brazilian response to urbanization is obviously complex, reflecting the nature of the issues and the phenomena involved. This section will focus briefly on some "societal" perception of cities. Then it will examine the governmental responses in general, and at the various federal, regional, state, metropolitan and municipal levels. There is also a brief discussion of nongovernmental responses. The section concludes with an analysis of "urban policy," including a case study of the Brazilian response to the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, and a more general statement with regard to the "frontier-oriented" and "underdeveloped" nature of urban policy in Brazil.

"SOCIETAL" PERCEPTION OF CITIES

It has been asserted that Brazil's population is "one of the most rural in the world," that the Brazilian is "a man without a community" and that Brazilian cities are "lacking an esprit de corps."[1] To whatever extent my own observations are accurate, these assertions ring of overstatement and imbalance. Brazilians are obviously not among the most rural people in the world if one looks at the size and growth of the cities, the increasingly "urban" composition of the population, and the distinct and complex urbanismo dimensions of life. On the contrary, Brazil is a predominantly, increasingly urban society. In absolute figures, approximately twice as many people live in metropolitan areas in Brazil as in any other country in Latin America.[2] With regard to "community spirit," Brazilians are as much Paulistas and Cariocas as Americans are "Chicagoans" or "San Franciscans." Perhaps the most vivid statement of community feeling is Amado's narration of the Itabuna-Ilheus rivalries in the days of the cacao boom. The assertion that Brazilian cities lack esprit de corps also seems inconsistent with the

1. T.L. Smith. Brazil: People and Institution. 2nd ed. Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 1954. pp. 162, 497.

2. See John Miller and Ralph Grackenheimer. Latin American Urban Policies and the Social Sciences. p. 16. To be published by Sage Publications.

pride in Brasilia, the affection for Salvador, and the
national love affair with Rio de Janeiro (the famous
carnival song concludes "cidade maravilhosa, coracao do
meu Brasil"). It has been pointed out that Brazilians are
profoundly urban in their aspirations[3] and even the favelados
look down on the provincials they left behind.[4] The same
favelados have little desire to return to the land.[5] Even
the smallest town has an affinity for what has been called
an "urban ethos."[6]

In discussing the conflicting urban attitudes of
colonial Brazil it was noted that there was a strong
romanticism with regard to the interior. This romanticism

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3. See pp. 51-52 and pp. 113-114, footnote no. 142, above.

4. See p. 106, footnote no. 118 of this paper, and see
   Wagley. op. cit. p. 185. "There is a tremendous
   social distance between most inhabitants of the concen-
   trated centers and the people of rural neighborhoods."

5. Ibid.

6. Marvin Harris. Town and Country in Brazil. New York.
   1956. Wagley discusses one particular dimension of this
   "urban ethos" as follows: "One of the most complimentary
   statements that might be made about a Brazilian small
   town is that it has movimento. This seems to mean more
   than just commercial activities and a busy social life,
   but it means these as well. It also means noise and
   general bustle. A town of any importance has one or
   more public address systems, often in competition with
   one another. Records are played; public announcements
   are made of births, deaths, birthdays, and marriages;
   advertisements are broadcast for products and stores;
   and political announcements and campaign speeches are
   carried through these loudspeakers. They operate at a
   volume which is deafening to the unaccustomed ear but
   which is part of the concept of movimento. Many

was rather paradoxically coupled with a preference for life in the city, and with a view of the city as the locus of culture and _movimento_ and the center (if not the very embodiment) of colonization and of development.[7] They represent the centers of wealth (and poverty), education, entertainment, commerce, and national strength and, in Brasilia, identity. At the same time size and concentration are increasingly seen as undesirable per se.[8] There is a common Brazilian refrain--"the city is great but there are too many people." But in spite of a desire to somehow hold the backlander in the overly-romanticized interior, the _cidadao_ and the immigrant alike see the city as the place to be. As stated by Bonilla:

> Romanticism about the persistent yearning for a
> 'return to the land' and the wholesome moral con-
> sistence and effective solidarity of rural life
> notwithstanding, the mass exodus to the cities
> continues. It does not seem too great a task
> to make confirmed city people of rural migrants,
> but the reverse seems almost impossible.[9]

Brazilian small towns depend on diesel-run generators for their electricity, and current is cut off during many hours of the day and at 10:00 or 11:00 P.M. The visitor then gets some relief from _movimento_."

7. See pp. 50-54 of this paper.

8. The _Jornal do Brasil_ recently editorialized as follows: "A megalopolis nao e apenas uma conquista que assinala desde agora, nos seus indicios, a marca do novo seculo. E tambem uma ameaca pelo grau de desumanizacao com oue afeta o homem." _Jornal do Brasil,_ May 2, 1971.

9. Bonilla. _op. cit._ p. 190.

The policy impact of Brazil's contemporary urban-rural

weltansicht will be discussed in greater detail.[10] Suffice

to say, at this point, that Brazilians are increasingly

urban in their existence, and yet erratically and incon-

sistently rural in their dreams.

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10. See the concluding part of this section. It should be
noted that there is relatively little information on
the perception of urbanization by several of the most
important institutions in Brazil--industry, the military
and the Church in particular. It would be interesting,
for example, to know the Church's view of cities, and
the impact of this view on information resources in
the rural sector, and perhaps on rural-urban migration.

GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES TO URBANIZATION

The Brazilian government responds to urbanization on three
"primary" levels: federal, state and municipio. The
municipio corresponds roughly to the county in the United
States. Made up of distritos (corresponding to townships),
each municipio has a sede (seat) of government which is, by
Brazilian definition, a cidade. There are approximately
4,000 municipios in Brazil, approximately one-sixth of
them (720) in Minas Gerais. A municipio may have a popu-
lation of over five million, as does one of the municipios
in Sao Paulo, or a population of fifty. In areas like Mato
Grosso and Amazonas a municipio may be the size of a
European country. Whatever its demographic or physical
size, the municipio is the basic governmental unit between
the soil and the various states. There are twenty-two states,
ranging in size from the city-state of Guanabara to Mato
Grosso, Para, and Amazonas, any one of which is half again
the size of France. The traditional locus of political
power, much like the American colonies, the states were
meaningfully nationalized only in the mid-twentieth century,
under Vargas. The federal government is now the ultimate
repository of practically all governmental power.

In addition to the "primary" levels of urban govern-
ment there are two "secondary" levels: "regional" and
"metropolitan." The "regional" agencies are primarily

organs of the Ministry of the Interior, such as SUDENE
and SUDAM. Though part of the federal government, these
interstate agencies function at a regional level somewhere
"between" the state and federal government. Similarly
there is the beginning of a governmental "presence"
between the state and the municipio level, in the form of
associations of municipalities and, more important, the
beginnings of an inter-municipio, metropolitan govern-
ment. At the moment the latter does not exist (Sao
Paulo, for example, is made up of thirty-eight autonomous
municipalities). Enabling legislation to create metro-
politan government does exist, however, and implementation
is being discussed between the related Ministries of the
federal government. What follows is a brief discussion
of the "urban response" of these various levels of
government.

The Federal Responses to Urbanization

Within the federal government, the executive branch
has not focused its attention on the problems of the
cities.[11] There are, of course, a myriad of "urban related"
federal entities and projects within the open ended and
fundamental "urban" definition used in this paper. The
Ministry of Labor has a number of programs and research
projects with regard to labor demand, flow and absorption.
The Ministry of Transportation is involved in numerous
transportation projects (the Rio-Niteroi bridge is one
example). The Ministries of Education and Planning are
supporting the training of personnel for local government,
and the Ministries of Industry and Health (among others) are
similarly involved in "urban related" problems and policies.
The principal federal actors inthe urban sector, however,
are the Ministry of the Interior and, to a far lesser extent,

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11. One exception to this assertion might be Kubitschek
      and Brasilia. Even this urban focus, however, must
      be qualified in that (i) Brasilia was site specific;
      the Brasilia "urban" concern did not carry over in any
      immediate sense to other cities, or to urban problems
      in general (on the contrary, Brasilia probably absorbed
      resources which would otherwise have partly gone to
      other urban areas); also (ii) the raison d'etre for
      Brasilia, opening the interior via "a marcha para
      oeste," was more geographic and "interior" than urban
      in focus. The major concerns of the federal government
      have been regional (Northeastern and, more recently,
      Amazonas) and industrial in nature. Even those
      decisions relating immediately to the urban sector, such
      as industrialization or housing, have often been con-
      ceptualized in relatively narrow terms, not as relating
      to the overall urbanization process.

the Ministry of Planning.

The Ministry of the Interior

Minister Jose Costa Cavalcanti is the highest figure
in the Brazilian government to address the issue of urban-
ization reasonably directly.[12] Cavalcanti's attention to the
urban sector accurately reflects the primary locus of federal
"urban" concern, the Ministry of the Interior. Within it
are located the National Housing Bank (BNH), the Federal
Housing and Urbanization Service (SERFHAU) and the housing
companies (COHABs and cooperatives "sindicatos").[13]

The National Housing Bank (BNH)--BNH is the most impor-
tant single entity in the urban sector. Established
in 1966 under the then powerful Minister of the
Interior, General Albuquerque Lima, the Bank's initial
mandate was to meet a housing deficit of eight million units,

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12.   "O fenomeno inevitavel da urbanizacao que se constata
       por toda a parte, e ainda a mudanca de atitude social
       de grandes massas de populacao...." text of Cavalcanti's
       address to the Inter American Housing Conference. O
       Globo, April 8, 1971. p. 10.

13.   BNH is discussed below; COHABs are public (state)
       housing finance agencies, financing housing for families
       with up to three minimum salaries (Cr$561.60 or US$110.55
       per month). The cooperatives are private, civil syn-
       dicates or associations of interested parties with
       family incomes of up to six minimum salaries
       (Cr$1,123.20 or US$221.10) per month.

estimated to be growing at 5,000 units per year.[14] To deal
with this acute shortage, BNH was given access to investment
funds which have been estimated to equal 6 percent of the
gross national domestic product,[15] and a broad mandate to
respond to the housing problem. The total investment of
BNH was recently estimated at $US4 billion.[16] In applying
these considerable assets, the BNH housing financing
program has aimed at home ownership (not, as in U.S. public
housing, rental), the rhetorical goal being "a private home
in reach of everyone."

The housing finance system established by BNH is

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14. BNH-70 (unfortunately there are no page numbers to cite
    in this and in many of the BNH publidations). According
    to BNH-70 only 127,000 housing units were financed or
    constructed by public entities between 1939 and 1963.

15. Frankenhoff's internal Foundation memorandum dated May
    30, 1969. The major resources tapped by the Bank are (i)
    the guaranteed employment fund (Fundo de Garantia de
    Tempo de Servico (FGTS)), (ii) the speculative savings
    represented by the sale of Letras Imobiliarias, and
    (iii) the private resources which come to the Bank
    through the savings and loan system. The FGTS chan-
    nels 8 percent of all wages earned in Brazil to the
    Bank. BNH reports total housing investment of approx-
    imately US$3.5 billion over the past few years; BNH
    also reports that they completed 1970 with net assets
    of approximately Cr$7.5 billion (or approximately
    US$1.5 billion) and that 85.9 percent of their credit
    resources come from FGTS and 8.8 percent from savings
    and loans. (SBPE, discussed below) BNH-70.

16. Interview with Lordello de Mello.

quite complicated, but functions through two basic channels:
(i) the financial intermediaries of BNH, such as the invest-
ment banks, COHABs, commercial banks, social security
institutes, private corporations, etc., and (ii) the
Brazilian savings and loan system.[17] BNH financing is
always tied to the "mini-devaluations" of Delfim Neto's
Ministry of Finance, thus offering a monetary correction
hedge against inflation.[18] Through these various channels
BNH has financed approximately 660,000 housing units by
1970.[19]

By aiming primarily at middle and lower middle class
urban housing, however, BNH narrowed its mandate considerably.

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17. ."The Brazilian savings and loan system (SBPE) has
    been established to stimu'ate savings patterns in
    relation to the housing deficit. The SBPE consists
    of three major institutional groups: (a) the real
    estate credit societies--(Sociedades de Credito
    Imobiliario), and (b) Federal and (c) State Brazilian
    Societies--(Caixa Economica Federal and Caixa Economica
    Estadual)." Frankenhoff, op. cit. p. 4.

18. There is, in effect, an additional subsidy for the
    low cost COHAB housing, via a decelerated, yearly
    rather than, for example, monthly monetary correction.
    This allows repayment with inflated cruzeiros. Some-
    times BNH also offers a second subsidy, selling public
    land at below market cost. Interview with Alvaro
    Pessoa.

19. One hundred twenty-seven thousand (127,000) were
    financed in 1970 alone; BNH estimates that they are
    reaching more than 3.5 million people with their
    housing sector. BNH-70 Resumo Technico-Financeiro.

In the late 1960's, BNH concluded that its housing objec-
tives were being realized, citing the decrease in rent,
the decrease in cost per unit, and the development of
private construction companies and material industries.[20]
BNH resolved that in addition to housing, they would
address the area of basic urban "infrastructure" and urban
services. In "sanitation" BNH decided to work exclusively
with water and sewage problems. Convenios for water
systems were signed with 983 municipalities. BNH asserts
that the new water plan, PLANSA, will reach 63 million
urban Brazilians by the end of the decade.[21] Reflecting an
increasing interest in "urban services," the sanitation
portion of the BNH budget doubled between 1969 and 1970,
from 3 percent to almost 6 percent. BNH is also becoming
involved in water pollution problems,[22] as well as
construction and material industries.[23] Even before it had

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20. Interview with Mario Trindade, President of BNH; also
    BNH-70 Resultados.

21. BNH-70. The municipios and, via a Fund for Water and
    Sewage (FAE), the states also contribute to the
    expenses of the water programs. See generally Abasteci-
    mento de Agua Equacionamento em Nivel Nacional.
    January, 1971. This PLANSA program definition was the
    work of fourteen colaboradores, twelve engineers and
    two economists.

22. Cr$163 million (or US$32.6 million) in 1970. BNH-70.

23. Cr$411 million (or US$82.2 million) in 1970. This is
    the so-called RECOM program. BNH-70.

to address infrastructure problems of sanitation, pollution,
and construction, BNH had developed a third basic program
area, in urban planning and development with SERFHAU
(discussed below). Housing finance, however, remains
the principal program thrust of BNH. The relative importance
of these respective areas is shown by the budget projection
for 1971-1973: housing finance Cr$6.3 billion (US$1.26
billion to reach 644,000 units); basic sanitation, Cr$730
million (US$146 million); and local development and planning,
Cr$60 million (US$12 million). Research has not been
strongly supported by BNH.[24]

Comment on BNH--BNH is financing the construction
of a huge number of housing units, some individual,
some block apartments, all standardized. So
overwhelming is the BNH "presence" that it stamps
the entire federal policy in urban Brazil as,
in the first instance, a housing policy.[25] The BNH

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24. The Cr$2,818,000 1970 budget shows a similar allocation:
    housing finance via agencies 78.9 percent; construction
    materials 15.1 percent; sanitation 5.7 percent; admin-
    istrative expenses are calculated to be 1.74 percent;
    if the minuscule "studies, research, and technical
    assistance" portion (0.12 percent) is included, admin-
    istrative expenses amount to 1.86 percent. BNH-70.

25. See Charles Frankenhoff. National Urbanization Policy
    in Brazil. August 1970. pp.2-3. "Urban development
    policy in Brazil is an offspring of the national
    housing systems....the housing momentum of BNH is so
    strong that it completely overshadows its urban
    development systems."

approach is above all physical--houses, sewage and water
systems, and housing materials.[26] Most of the BNH staff
are engineers, lawyers, economists, statisticians and
accountants. Trindade himself is an engineer. Although
physical in its orientation, BNH has tended to use the
language of economists and urban geographers. Thus there is
a focus on "the housing problem and the employment need,"
analyzed in the syntax of "forward and backward linkages"
and labor absorption. And there is much talk of "sphere
of influence" and "urban poles of development."[27] Under-
lying these conceptual currents are several "political"
concerns, or motivational theories. There has been an
explicit "diffusing of the masses" thread in BNH's thinking.[28]

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26. BNH has, however, come under severe public attack by
    the national architects association in Brazil. See
    "Arquiteto critica plano e acao do BNH". Correio da
    Manha, April 1 1971.

27. "O BNH Financia a Criacao de Novos Polos de Desenvolvi-
    mento Urbano". A Casa Propria ao Alcance de Todos,
    suplemento de Manchete no. 991.

28. The basic relationship posited is a direct one, between
    material well being (particularly housing and jobs) and
    social tranquility; "more important than the physical
    or financial results which were obtained was the
    reduction of social tension through the absorption
    of manpower" Mario Trindade's lecture at the Superior
    War School, Rio de Janeiro, July 28, 1969.

There is also a rather consistent view that urban growth,

particularly from rural-urban migration, is undesirable.[29]

And there is a reasonably consistent theme that concen-

tration is undesirable.[30] The BNH-Ministry of the Interior

"response" to this particular conceptualization will be

discussed later in this section. For the moment, it is

worth noting that BNH and Trindade are obviously aware of

29. In discussing the success of BNH Trindade warned:
     "the success of this sector has had its price--
     the raising of the potential of rural-urban migration,
     due to new enticements...." Trindade further reported
     that the Minintry of the Interior's response to
     urban density was the "macro-regional" integrated
     planning program, the responsibility of the Regional
     Superintendencies. Ibid. p. 10. This speech to
     the Superior War School also offered a "strategic"
     reason why urban concentration would be undesirable:
     "do we have strategic defenses, when eleven nuclear
     warheads can obliterate such concentrations in
     Brazil?" The speech also analyzed "increase in tension"
     between urban and rural areas, and concludes that the
     "costs of the trend" are not tolerable. Ibid. p. 13.

30. At least four reasons why concentration is undesirable
     have already been mentioned: (i) the danger of
     "tension" in the urban masses, (ii) the danger of
     tension between urban and rural groups, (iii) the
     increasing cost of maintenance, (iv) the "strategic"
     danger of concentration. Trindade also sees concen-
     tration as a threat to the social and moral fabric of
     the society: "O que ate hoje nos nao sabemos, no
     mundo inteiro, e se a urbanizacao por si so e capaz de
     melhorar a qualidade de vida da humanidade. E se
     tem demonstrado justamente o oposto, em termos de
     poluicao, em termos de destruicao de escalas de
     valores morais, ou sociais, em termos de aumento
     do indice de criminalidade ou outros que tais.
     E para esta busca que nos que estamos aqui, devemos
     todos nos sentirmos convocados." Ibid. p. 5-6.

their role as the prime actors in the urban sector, equally
aware that there are serious problems in the cities of
Brazil,[31] and that housing is not the entire answer to
these problems.[32]

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31. An awareness of the IBGE urban geographers' rather
    basic but dramatic demographic data is a consistent
    intellectual component of the BNH analysis of the
    problems facing Brazil. See, e.g., "Presidente do
    BNH preve a duplicacao da populacao do Brasil dentro
    de 30 anos". Jornal do Brasil, March 30, 1971.
    This focus and awareness should bode well for those
    who would have BNH take on a broader urban role,
    as indeed they are beginning to do (via "sanitation").

32. "A solucao do problema habitacional e inseparavel da
    solucao dos problemas do desenvolvimento urbano". Con-
    ferencia proferida pelo Dr. Mario Trindade no III Con-
    gresso Inter Americano de Habitacao, 20.03.71; "the
    experience of forty-three months work showed the
    necessity for establishing a 'system of systems,'
    which would be able to provide the necessary components
    towards the production and marketing of houses, the
    promotion of infrastructure facilities, e.g., water,
    electricity, sewage, planning of integrated urban and
    local development, methodological definition which
    would enable better techniques and methods for
    financing and allocation of resources; training of tech-
    nical personnel....the establishment of research and
    development centers...." Lecture at the Superior
    War School. p. 6. Trindade waxed even broader in
    his "quality of life" talk on "Marginalizacao do
    Desenvolvimento". p. 3. "....nao era possivel nos
    atermos, unica e exclusivamente a habitacao. Tinhamos
    de encarar o problema da urbanizacao como um todo
    buscando....atacar, a partir da habitacao como o
    meio, o problema da geracao de empregos e, a seguir,
    o planejamento do desenvolvimento urbano das nossas
    cidades. E preciso que cuidemos da elevacao da
    qualidade de vida dessas populacoes. E ai, nao valem
    simplesmente a renda per capita ou quaisquer outros
    indices qualitativos do padrao medio de distribuicao
    de riqueza. E para a definicao do que entendemos
    como qualidade de vida que estamos todos buscando
    aquilo que chamamos o modelo brasileiro de desenvolvi-
    mento....Definiremos como fundamentais neste trabalho:

The Federal Service of Housing and Urbanization (SERFHAU)--
SERFHAU was set up at the same time as BNH, as a housing
and planning agency under the aegis of the Ministry
of the Interior. Concern on the part of BNH's first
president led to a political struggle in which SERFHAU
quickly lost out. As a result, the principal Brazilian
"planning" entity (SERFHAU) was initially subordinated to
the principal Brazilian "housing" entity (BNH)--something
of a reversal of roles. SERFHAU functioned as a low cost
(COHAB) housing financing agency, the organizational heir
to the Fundacao da Casa Popular. For the first several
years of its existence SERFHAU was an overstaffed, under-
productive appendage to BNH. In 1967 SERFHAU's directorship
was taken over by a Brazilian architect-planner, Harry Cole.
Cole trimmed the staff and turned the organization to
promoting and financing local planning.

As SERFHAU promoted the development of "integrated"
urban planning, the maintenance of an information center
and technical staff became the principal program objectives.
A more recent objective is the support of municipal

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pesquisa e desenvolvimento, aplicadas as ciencias
sociais e a tecnologia; seja a tecnologia de
planejamento da ordenacao espacial, da ocupacao
territorial....seja na pesquisa do conforto humano,
seja na investigacao da qualidade de vida...."
Intellectually, if not always programmatically, the
broad gauge concerns manifest in this statement offer
a comfortable rationale for a more humane, less
"physical" approach to urban problems on the part
of BNH. (Emphasis mine).

[134]

administration. SERFHAU has not yet evolved into a national
urban planning or policy agency, although this role is
being discussed.

With regard to SERFHAU's planning program there are two
basic phases: the 1967-1969 Cole policy involved a two-step
planning process, beginning with a "preliminary study" to
develop a plano de desenvolvimento local integrado (PDLI).
This approach was designed to encourage a federally
financed, locally controlled plan, the possession of which
would be a precondition to and a guide for the application
of federal funds. This planning effort was not particu-
larly successful, in some measure because of its external
impetus, the architectural and physical planning bias (in
spite of the rhetoric about planejamento integrado) and
because of the diffusion of decision making in applying
resources to the municipalities (i.e., the plans were often
ignored by other agencies). The plans were not even
integrated with BNH's own decision making processes.[33] The
effectiveness of the plan was also undercut in some cases
by the Balkanized political reality of the municipios in
Brazil, making metropolitan planning difficult or impossible.
By common agreement most of the PDLI plans ended up
gathering dust in the various prefeituras.

Beginning in 1969, SERFHAU's planning program was
incorporated into a Program of Concentrated Action (PAC)

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33. Interview with Harry Cole, former director of SERFHAU.

within the Ministry of the Interior. The PAC program
selected approximately 457 municipalities as priority
areas for the allocation of the Ministry's resources.[34]
For the cities participating in the PAC program, there
are three types of plans: (i) the "relatorio preliminar"
(RP), a simple plan for the smallest municipalities,
(ii) a more complicated "plano de acao imediata" (PAI),
for cities identified as poles of development, and
(iii) the new, upgraded "plano de desenvolvimento local
integrado" (PDLI) for larger cities, the "poles of
macro-region."[35] The actual planning is realized through
private agencies selected by SERFHAU (thus offering a
substantial subsidy to private architect-urbanists).
The plans are often based on modest research, usually
from secondary data or a relatively quick survey by
the contracted "urbanists," administrators, economists,
etc. The planning process is monitored by SERFHAU, in

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34. The participating municipalities were initially
quite systematically selected from the 200 macro-
regions of the Brazilian Institute of Geography
and Statistics. The "sample" was subsequently
enlarged for a number of geographical, economic,
demographic and explicitly political reasons (e.g.,
all state capitals are included). Interview with
Herberto Lima at SERFHAU. The PAC cities chosen
represent approximately 10 percent of the total
number of municipios in Brazil, 50 percent of the
population and 80 percent of the productivity.
Interview with Vitorio Pareto, SERFHAU.

35. SERFHAU. Programacoes Executadas 1967-1970. March
1971.

accordance with their how-to-plan manuals.[36] By way of
quick evaluation, the PAC planning series offers little,
if any, improvement on the earlier PDLI. The PAC plans
suffer from all of the defects of the earlier PDLI, and
they are perhaps more narrow and physical in approach than
the earlier PDLI plans. Moreover, the planning process
is becoming increasingly bureaucratic within SERFHAU,
and the already miniscule local participation has decreased
to the point of nonexistence (now SERFHAU picks the
planner, supervises and approves or disapproves the
plan). The end result is an increasingly "external" and
imposed planning process which thus far, has been redeemed
mainly by its failure to be applied.[37] This planning
process and the private consultant, "quick and applied"
research which accompanies it may, however, be establishing
an unfortunate tradition and understanding of what
constitutes "urban research." In spite of these reserva-

36.   See, e.g., SERFHAU. Orientacao Quanto a Elaboracao
      E A Apresentacao Dos Relatorios Preliminares De
      Desenvolvimento Local Integrado. March 1971. SERFHAU.
      Orientacao Quanto A Elaboracao E A Apresentacao Dos
      Planos Macro-Regionais De Desenvolvimento Integrado.
      March 1971. SERFHAU recently announced a plan to
      launch a master's program in urban planning, with OAS
      support and University of Edinburgh visiting staff.
      "SERFHAU Nacionaliza Planejamento Urbano". Ultima
      Hora, April 1971.

37.   This is clearly the explicit view of some of Brazil's
      better known urbanists. This evaluation is also
      influenced by my recent trip through most of the major
      cities of Brazil, and the frequent reaction within

tions about the merit of the integrated planning program,
PAC is giving SERFHAU considerable national visibility
as the federal fund dispensing and planning agency in
urban Brazil.

SERFHAU's urban role was recently broadened when
it absorbed the Servico Nacional dos Municipios, thereby
putting it in the business of giving administrative
assistance and training courses in the various munici-
palities.[38] There are permanent schools for civil servants
in several cities (Sao Paulo, Brasilia and Porto Alegre).[39]
SERFHAU is still struggling to absorb and integrate these
new, administrative responsibilities. If they are success-
ful the national presence of the organization will be
increasingly felt.

A third role of SERFHAU is one of information
gathering and research. With modest assistance from
USAID (approximately US$160,000) SERFHAU has established

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the prefeituras that the plans, in the absence of
funds, political jurisdiction and greater depth
of knowledge, were not applicable.

38. The move into municipal administration puts SERFHAU
and IBAM (discussed below) precisely in the same
area, with SERFHAU having the advantage of more direct
access to federal funds, IBAM having the advantage of
of experience and know-how.

39. The courses given are practical and focus on immediate
issues as they arise at different parts of the
year--how to collect taxes, balance books, etc.
Interview with Vitorio Pareto, SERFHAU.

an information center for planning (CIDUL).[40] With a

staff of over thirty, a 1971 budget of Cr\$2,704,809 (or

US\$524,187), and an extremely well-organized system of

information retention and retrieval,[41] CIDUL holds out

great promise as a national information center.[42] SERFHAU

could also become something of an applied research arm of

the Ministry of the Interior. SERFHAU was, for example,

recently contracted to study internal migration. At the

present time, however, their research experience and staff

are quite limited.

It has been asserted that "SERFHAU has some of the

elements, including the important element of vision, which

might permit it to become the centralized, coordinating

authority for the development of national urbanization

policy" in Brazil.[43] While many highly competent Brazilian

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40. CIDUL is not a data bank per se, but rather a
    sophisticated index to other (often unsophisticated)
    data. CIDUL is now supported entirely by SERFHAU,
    i.e., the Brazilian government. The cost of implan-
    tation, including computers, is estimated to be
    US\$1,187,000. CIDUL. March 1971. p. 51.

41. Ibid. pp. 19-26, and anexos.

42. The Ministry of the Interior directives of 1971
    projects five regional "centers of information," one
    in each regional secretariat, the center in Rio
    de Janeiro. See "O Desdobramento Futuro do CIDUL".
    CIDUL. ibid. p. 15.

43. Frankenhoff. National Urbanization Policy in Brazil.
    p. 19. The person to whom the "vision" was attributed
    now rejects this assertion. Former SERFHAU staff feel
    that Frankenhoff's information is dated and that

urbanists are prepared to reject Frankenhoff's assertion

in its entirety, the ultimate role of SERFHAU is very

much up in the air. Within SERFHAU national urban policy

is considered to be a "very delicate question"[44] raising,

as it does, the issue of SERFHAU's relationship with BNH,

and the relationship between the Ministry of the Interior,

the Ministry of Planning and the Ministries of Finance and

Justice. There appears to be little question but that

SERFHAU would like to formulate national policy guidelines,

and in some measure coordinate governmental urban decisions,

including those of BNH.[45] For the moment, however, SERFHAU

SERFHAU is lost in politics, and in a bureaucratic
and external planning procedure. One well-known
urbanist-planner dismisses SERFHAU as "a lost cause."

44. Interview with Vitorio Pareto, SERFHAU. As described
by Pareto, the Ministry of the Interior is responsible
for local and regional development and the Ministry
of Planning for national development. There is an
increasing awareness of urban and metropolitan problems
within these ministries and--as with the current
discussions of a metropolitan level of government,
discussed below--considerable inter-ministerial
"shouldering" into the relatively new but very active
urban area. An autonomous Ministry of Urban Affairs,
with SERFHAU playing a central role, is reportedly
being discussed with the federal government, though
the exact organizational or, more important,
professional inputs of such a Ministry are still
undefined at the time of this writing.

45. See Frankenhoff. National Urbanization Policy in
Brazil. p. 2. "In the past SERFHAU has been merely
the intermediary between the municipality seeking
planning financing and BNH, with little attempt
at policy integration. The present trend of thinking
in SERFHAU is to become an independent technical
institute capable of developing and spending its

is establishing an increasing national "presence" while
struggling to manage its programs of planning, administration
and information coordination. The definition of SERFHAU's
ultimate "urban policy" role may have to aw it a ...re
systematic handling of these tasks, and resolution of
the inter-Ministerial issue of "urban jurisdiction."

The Center for Housing Research (CENPHA)--The Center
for Housing Research (CENPHA) is a university-affiliated
research arm of BNH. Staffed mainly by a small,
modestly trained group of economists and engineers,
CENPHA has not shown much strength as a teaching

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own budget in the area of urban policy." It is
interesting to note that SERFHAU recently signed a
convenio with the Pritish Government and the OAS for
a technical office in SERFHAU, one objective of which
would be the "Formulacao da Cena Politica de Desenvol-
vimento". SERFHAU. p. 6. My own understanding is
that Edinburgh entered SERFHAU unaware that OAS was
already there. Edinburgh's input is principally in
research (three architect planners in place for only
four to six months) and training (again by architect
planners, most recently Mr. Leonard who is in SERFHAU
for at least one year). The OAS is doing very much
the same thing, but they are also attempting to
formulate a policy for urban development, to be
included in the national plan. The idea is not so
much to develop the plan as to have accepted a proposal
to elaborate same, with SERFHAU as the policy agency
(or Ministry). Personalities will obviously play a
role in the SERFHAU emergence as a national urban
policy agency. The present head of SERFHAU, engineer
Leo Sergio Abreu, is married to the niece
of Minister of the Interior, Calvalcanti. (Since the
foregoing was written Trindade has resigned from BNH,
reportedly with pressure from Cavaicanti, and this
change may increase SERFHAU's autonomy).

or research organization. While there are technically
six departments,[46] the basic research activities of
CENPHA are carried out in the Department of Housing
Research and the Department of Technological Research.
The former, staffed primarily by economists, focuses on
pragmatic housing-related issues such as housing demand and
rent level. The latter, technological arm is staffed
primarily by engineers conducting research on building
materials. CENPHA has subcontracted some research on
housing investment (Frankenhoff) and the favelas of Rio
(Parisse). It also gives some short technological
training courses, often taught by outside staff. In
general, CENPHA can be characterized as a relatively low
power and technocratic research organization which does
not appear to enjoy the strong support of BNH.[47]

Projeto Rondon---Projeto Rondon is a Ministry of the Interior
coordinated VISTA-like program to involve young (often)

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46. Department of Housing Research, Department of
    Technological Research, Department of Training,
    Department of Documentation, the Savings and Loan
    Research, and Administration.

47. As noted above, BNH spends approximately one tenth
    of one percent (0.12 percent) on all research.
    BNH-70.

vacationing) Brazilian students in social action.
The five year old program has absorbed more than 14,000
participants, usually from technological or professional
schools. The regional focus of Rondon has been
predominantly in the far west and the north, specifically
in the small municipalities. The connection between
Rondon and urbanization is somewhat tenuous, but it is
considered by the Brazilian Government to be a part of a
plan for regional and urban development.[48]

The Ministry of Planning

The second major federal entity in the urban sector
is the Ministry of Planning, headed by a Yale trained
economist, Joao Paulo dos Reis Velloso. As indicated
above, the overall urban role of the Ministry of Planning
remains to be defined. It is unlikely, however, that the
Ministry of Planning will become the major urban policy
agency in the near future. Rather the federal "urban"
responsibilities will probably be fragmented for some time to
come. Within the Ministry of Planning there are two
principal urban related programs: (i) the reasearch arm

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48. See Metas e Bases para a Acao do Governo. September 19
1970. p. 116. Some the Rondon volunteers have been
used to collect data on SERFHAU projects, usually
for the Relatorios Preliminares of the smaller
municipios of the interior. See Frankenhoff. op.
cit. p. 13 and SERFHAU. pp. 17-20.

of the Ministry (IPEA), and (ii) the Brazilian Institute
of Geography and Statistics (IBGE).

The Institute of Applied Research (IPEA)--The ˜nstitute
of Applied Research (IPEA) is an arm of the Ministry
of Planning.   While there is a rubrical urban and
regional development sector in IPEA, the research
program and staff have demonstrated a strong rural and
agricultural bias. This led to the quiet departure,
several years ago, of IPEA's urban economists, and the
virtual closing down of the urban sector. It appears,
however, that IPEA has a renewed interested in urbanization.
Directed by an urban economist (Hamilton Tolosa, Ph.D.
Pennsylvania) its urban sector is planning staff expansion
and several research projects. The largest of these
projects involves a recent US$472,000 grant to the Catholic
University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC). Its general
objective is to encourage research and training in
economics and social sciences. One portion of the grant
is for research and training in urban and metropolitan
development. In IPEA the nascent interest is predominantly
in urban economics. Given this very preliminary state of
urban-related concerns, the Ministry of Planning and
Coordination has generally played more of a coordinating
than a planning role in the urban sector. Thus federal
initiative i˜ the urban sector usually comes less from

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IPEA than from the Ministry of the Interior. Perhaps
reflecting this tilt to the 'inertia" Ministry, the current
"regional and urban development"-plans show a strong
"regional" and a rather weak "urban" flavor.[49]

The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE)--
The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE)
is also within the Ministry of Planning. Staffed mainly
by statisticians, urban geographers and economists,
IBGE is the main census, data, and information gathering
agency of the federal government. The Institute has strong
leadership in Isaac Kerstenetzky, an economist. But
IBGE's facilities are limited (they are only now, for
example, purchasing their own computer). And its urban
staff is undertrained, or perhaps merely of rather limited
disciplinary or professional expertise. As indicated
by the name, IBGE is the center of "applied" urban
geography in Brazil. There is a divisao regional (headed
by Pedro Geiger, urban geographer) and a Setor de Geografia
Urbana (headed by Roberto Lobato Correia, urban geographer).
IBGE is usually quantitative and chronological in approach,

49. See Metas e Bases para a Acao do Governo. p. 97. This
    document states that the regional and urban development
    policy is to promote integrated regional development
    in the Northeast, Amazon, Rio Grande do Sul, Minas
    Gerais and Espirito Santo. Another objective is to
    promote the integration of the Rio-Sao Paulo-Belo

often regional in focus. Heavily influenced by the
French,[50] the geographers of IBGE deal in the gross
variables of agricultural production, transportation,
communication, commerce, finance, urban services, migration,
population, etc. And they very consistently translate
these variables into a visual product, such as a map,
graph or chart. The underlying economic or motivational
dimensions, however, are only faintly visible in the
brightly colored maps and charts, and the grey rows of
figures. The IBGE impact on the conceptualization of
Brazilian urban "reality," however, is substantial,[51]
and, with the generally excellent 1970 census, increasing.
Its role, however, is mainly that of gathering data
(often within a regional context). They have generally
not attempted to synthesize the intellectual or theoretical
latch-strings of the urban processes and "reality" they
depict.

Horizonte agricultural-industrial axis, and the
development of the principal megalopolis of the
country, Rio and Sao Paulo, via the PAC plan.

50. See, for example, the urban sector's only publication,
Cidade e Regiao no Sudoeste Paranaense. Approximately
one-half of the bibliography is French.

51. The IBGE demographic, regional, and census material
is probably the single most important quantitative
and visual element in the federal and BNH urban
thinking. There is a lengthy list of urban-related
IBGE publications, e.g., on migration, urbanization,
urban services, etc.

Regional Responses to Urbanization

At one level "below" the Federal Government, there are several regional attempts to respond to urbanization.[52] This programmatic "regionalism" is probably a response to the regional diversity of Brazil, and the "regionalism" of Brazilian public policy[53] and of public data.[54] Within the Ministry of the Interior there are four regional secretariats: SUDESUL in the South, SUDECO in the West, SUDAM in the North and SUDENE in the Northeast. Of these the latter two are by far the most important. These regional agencies coordinate the application of government and private resources within their respective areas, though without any coordinated urban component or policy.[55] As a result

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52. Most of the "regional" programs originate in the Federal Government, within the Ministry of the Interior and SERFHAU in particular. Since "regionalism" will be investigated at length by the Robin group, my own treatment of this level will be brief.

53. As discussed above, p. 124, footnote no. 11.

54. See p. 78, footnote no. 73 and pp. 144-145 of this paper.

55. This is also true of the various development banks working within these regions, e.g., the Bank of the Northeast, Bank of Amazon, etc. These "regional" banks have not concentrated resources on urbanization per se, though their overall development and human resource approach and their staff and research capacity make them important entities in the "urban" sector.

the "urban policy" of these organizations is an offshoot of their various regional development attempts, e.g., industrialization, housing, transportation, human resources, etc. SUDENE officials, for example, regard their basic urban effort as the program in housing, water and sewage.[56] They leave the urban planning either to the municipios, the state (as in the case of the new industrial city outside of Salvador, Aratu, or the federal government, usually via SERFHAU.

There is a second "regional" response to urbanization, in the form of joint planning and association of municipios in a given region. This SERFHAU sponsored association has mainly been attempted in the south of the country. Even there, however, the collaboration has been limited, confined principally to the elaboration of the SERFHAU plans.

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56. Interview with Dr. Riberato, Director of SUDENE, Salvador.

State Responses to Urbanization

The states attempt to respond to the problems
of urbanization in a variety of ways. The various
state secretariats, particularly public works,
transportation, housing, welfare, etc. are often very
"urban" in their activities. In the absence of a viable
form of metropolitan government the state has often
stepped in to attempt to coordinate the activities of
contiguous urban municipios. In some major cities, as in
Manaus, this has resulted in state controlled water and sewage
services. In Salvador, Recife and Rio de Janeiro there
are state agencies set up to work with favela urbanizacao.[57]
In Sao Paulo the State Secretary of Planning has
established a planning agency (GEGRAN) for the Greater
Sao Paulo area.[58] Also involved are the state development

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57. The Rio Agency is CODESCO, discussed below.

58. This agency has spent something in the range of US$8
    million over the past ten years, producing three major
    plans on: (1) mass transit, (2) PUB, the basic urban
    plan for the city of Sao Paulo (contracted by the
    municipio of Sao Paulo, but not confined to it), and
    (3) the GEGRAN state supported plan, recently completed
    but not yet published. Sao Paulo has relatively little
    to show by way of implementation of these plans. The
    thirty-eight municipalities of Sao Paulo remain
    largely autonomous ("they decide what they want to
    do") and GEGRAN lacks the political clout or the
    financial control to make implementation effective.
    As a result Sao Paulo planning is extremely diffuse,
    located in the various municipio planning agencies,
    and the various state secretariats and Federal
    Ministries. Interview with Joao Carlos Pimenta,
    Director of GEGRAN. Pimenta estimates that 50-60

banks, the state housing agencies (COHAB's) and several
state research foundations. [59] The state is also directly
involved in municipal government through the appointment,
by the (appointed) governor, of the various mayors.[60] In
general it is safe to say that the state itself is one of
the most important and least coordinated political actors
in urban Braz'l.

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percent of the money going into urban infra-
structure is state money. Given even a superficial
understanding of the disjunctive nature of planning
in Sao Paulo, it is amazing that the system works
as well as it does.

59. FAPESP in Sao Paulo, for example, was set up in 1962
as a state supported research foundation (not unlike
the National Science Foundation). FAPESP receives a
statutory 0.5 percent of the state budget, which
amounts to approximately 12 million dollars in
annual income. It has been estimated that FAPESP
supports 80 percent of all research in Sao Paulo
(even while putting 50 percent of their income into
bonds, to build an endowment). The social sciences
receive approximately 10 percent of the research
budget. These funds are sometimes channeled into the
urban sector, though without any clear cut priorities.
FAPESP's main activity (40 percent of their budget)
goes into human resources training. Interview with
a FAPESP consultant.

60. These "appointments" assure some state-municipal
cooperation, and mutes any otherwise independent
urban voice within the Federal Government.

Metropolitan Responses to Urbanization

The Brazilian constitution provides for the union of the various <u>municipios</u> of a given area, to form a metropolitan government.[61] The enabling legislation does not, however, define the governmental <u>situs</u> of the proffered metropolitan government, whether an outgrowth of an association of <u>municipic</u>: or an arm of the state or federal government.[62] Given the political realities, it is likely that metropolitan government will ultimately be an extension of or at least tightly controlled by the federal government.[63] Even at the federal level, it is unclear which Ministry would have jurisdiction over metropolitan government. At the same time there are some city-wide problems, such as sewage and transportation, which create a pressing need for a metropolitan response. Aware of this, the federal government is currently discussing the jurisdictional issues with the Ministries

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61. Article 1353 "....no caso da metropole, seus diversos municipios poderiam entao unir-se em associacao para atenderem interesses comuns, eventualmente com a participacao da Uniac e dos Estados." The federal government also has the power to "estabelecer regioes metropolitanas, constituidas por Municipios que.... facam parte da mesma comunidade socio-ecoi. mica." (Article 164).

62. "O artigo 164 nao define a forma institucional da regiao metropolitana: pode ser uma autarquia regional do governo federal ou do governo estadual....ou uma modalidade de associacao de municipios." <u>Organizacao Administrativa das Areas Metropolitanas.</u> SERFHAU, March 1971. p. 27.

63. The SERFHAU article, however, advocates metropolitan

of Justice, Interior and Planning.[64]   Until this political

struggle is resolved, however, or until the problems

become sufficently pressing to force a rapid resolution,

metropolitan government will remain something of an

occasional affair. It is principally in Rio de Janeiro,

Sao Paulo, and Porto Alegre that meaningful attempts at

metropolitan government and planning have been discussed,

thus far with relatively few results, however.

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government as an organ of state government. Ibid. p. 31.

64. The major power struggle is apparently between the
     Ministry of the Interior, responsible for municipal
     and regional planning, and the Ministry of Planning,
     responsible for national planning and the coordination
     of all ministerial plans. There is also considerable
     opposition to metropolitan government from the entrenched
     powers within the various municipios. It is reported
     that the model of metropolitan government currently
     being discussed at the federal level would consist
     only of a voluntary association of municipalities,
     governed by a policy-making counsel composed of managers
     from the federal and state government, and one each
     from the municipalities. The counsel would be assisted
     by a technical advisory board. If participation in
     such a structure were voluntary it would not bode well
     for metropolitan government in Brazil. Without some
     form of metropolitan government, however, it has
     been difficult if not impossible to make coordinated,
     city-wide decisions.

Municipal Responses to Urbanization

It has been asserted that the municipios of Brazil probably have more autonomy than similar levels of government in any other country in Latin America.[65] This autonomy is assured by the Brazilian contituution[66] and is further fostered by a tax feedback as revenue sharing systems.[67] In some cases, particularly in heavily industrial or urban municipios, this feedback contributes to a very sizable municipio budget. Many of the wealthier municipios have large urban services departments and separate planning agencies, some of them, as in Curitiba Porto Alegre and Sao Paulo, quite strong.[68]

As mentioned above, when using their own funds the municipios can and sometimes do disregard attempts at state or federal control. At the same time it should be noted

65. Frankenhoff. op. cit. p. 1 (citing Lordello de Mello).

66. "A autonomia municipal sera assegurada...." Constituicao do Brazil. IBAM. p. 15.

67. In this plan Brazil is a step ahead of the United States. There is an automatic percentage feedback on taxes collected within the municipios jurisdiction, 5 percent of the national income tax and 20 percent of the state sales tax, via the Fundo de Participao dos Municipios.

68. Interview with Harry Cole. Cole sees the municipio as the most productive level of city planning in Brazil today. Frankenhoff more persuasively asserts that "the municipality is a relatively autonomous political institution which has little control over its development process." Frankenhoff. op. cit. p. 19.

that many of the municipios resources come from outside,
often from the state and federal government. Even the
Fundo de Participacao funds come with many federal
strings attached. Moreover, the mayors of many of the
larger or "strategic" cities are appointed, placing
them in a position of indebtedness to the state govern-
ment. In the balance the municipios have considerable legal
and occasionally financial autonomy, but it is an "autonomy"
which is often washed away by the financial and political
realities, and controls, of the diffuse Brazilian govern-
mental response to urbanization.

OTHER INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO URBANIZATION

There are also a number of quasi-public entities attempting
to respond to urbanization in Brazil. The principal
entities are IBAM, the Brazilian Universities, the inter-
national institutions, the private planning and consulting
agencies, and the industrial and business community, as
discussed below.

and the Brazilian government.[69] With this staff and these
resources, IBAM provides a number of basic administrative,
technical and legal services to the municipalities.[70] It
performs well in this role, and is the strongest municipal
administration organization in Brazil, and probably in
Latin America.

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69. The government funds come from the Ministry of
     Education. IBAM also has Ministry of Planning
     support for some administrative training courses now
     being initiated. It has also received considerable
     support from USAID. IBAM's overall urban role is
     ambiguous vis-a-vis the Ministry of the Interior
     and SERFHAU, and vis-a-vis the growing private con-
     sulting companies. IBAM has talked of concentrating on
     the larger cities, and of moving more heavily into
     training. The Ministry of the Interior appears to be
     moving (via SERFHAU) more directly into municipal
     administration. In that SERFHAU is following the IBAM
     model very closely, with some additional leverage
     inherent in SERFHAU's institutional position and
     funding, there is something of an "institutional
     identity" issue at IBAM. There is also strongly
     entrepreneurial leadership from Lordello de Mello,
     rapidly increasing revenue--and expenses--and a
     backlog of valuable experience.

70. This assistance ranges from quasi-legal "opinions"
     (pareceres) given in response to specific queries
     from municipal administrators, to administrative reor-
     ganization, to publication of relevant "how to" infor-
     mation, to training of administrators, accountants,
     secretaries, etc. IBAM also serves in a general way
     as a national representative for the municipalities.
     But see p. 137, footnote no. 38 of this paper.

Brazilian Universities

The Brazilian universities are also attempting to respond to the urbanization process. The traditional response has been via the schools of architecture and their departments of planning and urbanization. This predominantly "physical" interest is sometimes complemented by an urban focus in departments of geography and engineering, both or which are traditionally strong--and currently well-supported--within the Brazilian universities. (Brasilia, Sao Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul are three good examples of this architectural origin of the university response to urbanization). Similarly, the schools of public administration are often urban in their focus, and traditionally and currently receive priority treatment within the federal universities. The social science disciplines have only recently begun to address the urban sector in a concerted way. They do so without strong federal financial support, though the "interdisci-plinary" university reform has probably hastened the entry of social scientists into the urban field.[71] Urban sociology is beginning to appear,[72] but the discipline

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71. Both Brasilia and, more concertedly, the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC), are moving into the urban sector from a multidisciplinary base, with substantial federal support. See p. 143 of this paper.

72. The department of sociology and anthropology in Brasilia, for example, has a course on urban sociology, taught by a Brazilian Professor, Fernando Correia Dias.

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is extremely weak, relying heavily on imported and
gene_ally untested theory.[73] s ilarly, urban politics,
urban economics, and urban la   beginning to appear
in isolated institutions--often _elying very heavily on
foreign theory, foreign training and visiting professors.[74]
The social sciences are also beginning to enter the
universities "urban response" even more directly via
a number of urban research centers being discussed or
planned.[75]   Thus, there are signs that the universities

73.   The most obvious exception would be the research of
      Mancel Berlinck and the CEBRAP . esearchers in
      Sao Paulo. I believe this work represents the
      encouraging basis of an urban sociology and social
      theory in Brazil. Other "pockets" of urban sociology
      include the Museu Nacional and Candido Mendes
      Institute in Rio de Janeiro, and the Department of
      Political Science in UFMG, Belo Horizonte.

74.   The department of political science in the Federal
      University of Minas Gerais, for example, has a
      course in urban politics, which is being taught
      by Judson de Cew, from the Fletcher School; a Harvard
      professor, Martin Katzman, is teaching urban
      economics at IPE and, on a short-term basis, at
      other Brazilian universities; and one university-
      based research and training organization, CEDEPLAR,
      in Minas Gerais, is setting up an urban economics
      program; urban law is being taught at Candido Mendes
      by CEPED- and Yale-trained Alvaro Pessoa, and
      urban politics at that same institute by MIT-trained
      Brazilian Amaury de Souza. All of these examples
      are centers of promise. But they are only begin-
      ning to develop the "urban component" of their
      respective disciplines.

75.   The Federal University of Rio de Janeiro has 'he
      idea of setting up an "integrated" urban program,
      located in (and strongly influenced by) the school
      of architecture; Rio Grande do Sul has set up a
      "master" program in urbanization, located within

are moving toward a more integrated response to the
urbanization process. In spite of these new and
encouraging initiatives, however, the university response
is still overwhelmingly concentrated in the traditional
Faculties of Architecture, Geography, Administration
and Engineering.

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the school of architecture; PUC of Rio de Janeiro
has plans to establish an urban studies program
within the Center of Social Sciences, and Candido
Mendes also has very general plans for an urban
center at some time in the future.

[160]

International Organizations

International organizations have also attempted
to respond to the Brazilian urbanization process in a
variety of ways.[76] USAID has been involved; its approach
was basically physical and organizational in nature,
directly complementary to the Brazilian Government
policies. Thus, the largest USAID projects were directed
at the physical problems of housing[77] and sanitation
(predominantly sewage and water). USAID also supported
the establishment of CIDUL, the information-gathering
service within SERFHAU. And USAID has supported IBAM
heavily, for specific training projects, for the develop-
ment of IBAM's staff, and for the spectacular IBAM
building. Reflecting increasing Brazilian attention to
precisely these problems, and reflecting drastic reductions
in USAID's budget, the Housing and Urban Development Office
in USAID has been closed entirely.[78] The United Nations
is directly involved in urbanization in Brazil in only one

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76. This section will be very brief, both because my own
    information is very limited and because the Robin
    group plans to sound this issue in greater depth.

77. The most famous example is the low-cost housing
    project, Vila Kennedy, outside Rio de Janeiro. This
    project is generally regarded as a failure, and it is
    highly doubtful that USAID would follow this same
    course of action again, even if it had the staff and
    money. USAID is now conducting an international review
    of its urban activities.

78. Interview with Mr. Bill Lawson, head of public

BNH-located project.[79] The United Nations is also working
"indirectly" in the urban sector through a $5 million
human resource development program being set up in
conjunction with the Ministry of Planning.[80] The
Organization of American States is also working in
a modest way for the urban sector. OAS support is
located at the Candido Mendes Institute in Rio de
Janeiro and takes the form of fellowships to train social
scientists abroad, and support for research on selected
problems (still to be defined) in urban marginality.
A Center of Urban Studies is contemplated for some time
in the future.[81] Accion Internacional and Acao
Comunitaria do Brasil are active in community development
and, more recently, in attempting to set up a research
center on urban marginality and human resource development.[82]

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administration, USAID. The relevant sub-divisions
of USAID were: Housing Construction Division, Housing
Finance Division, Housing Guaranty Division, and the
Urban Planning Division.

79. This project supports a Stanford-affiliated researcher,
Juppehlatz, working within BNH on decision-making
processes. The U.N. has also given SERFHAU technical
assistance in the past. Interview with Mr. Alberthal,
U.N. Director in Brazil.

80. This is a UNESCO, ILO, UNDP project, to coordinate
various governmental human resource development
projects, particularly those in the Ministry of
Planning, Labor, Education and Interior.

81. Interview with Candido Mendes. The OAS is also in
SERFHAU, as discussed in this paper, p. 139, footnote
no. 45.

82. Included among the research projects will be a

[162]

The overseas development office of the British Government

has given technical and staff development (fellowship)

support to SERFHAU. A number of the international organ-

izations, among them USAID, the Ford Foundation, and IDB are

currently reevaluating their involvement in urban matters.

Ministry of Labor-supported project on urban under-
employment, looking at five cities: Curitiba, Sao
Paulo, Belo Horizonte, Rio de Janeiro, and Recife.

Private Planning and Consulting Agencies

Although it would be very helpful, there is little

written evaluation of the role of private planning and

consulting agencies in the urban sector of Brazil. It

is safe to say that these private entities are among

the most important actors responding to urbanization.

The governmental response, at all levels, is characterized

by heavy reliance on the private firms, whether for the

planning of cities of the development of BNH-financed

projects. In Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro the large

consulting firms may have well over one hundred employees,

usually heavily concentrated on technical assistance.[83]

Although the governmental response to urbanization draws on

some university-based research and consulting entities (e.g.,

CEDEPLAR, Candido Mendes, UFMG political science, etc.), and

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83. Some of the Brazilian social scientists and urbanists
    feel that these firms are establishing a very poor
    tradition of "urban research," based on secondary
    data, with a more or less decorative social service
    input. One obvious exception is the Sao Paulo research
    organization CEBRAP. A partial exception would be the
    CEBRAP-affiliated National Institute of Development
    Studies (INED). The latter nonprofit, private organ-
    ization was created in 1967 for research teaching and
    consulting in the area of urban and regional planning.
    Directed by Rubens de Mattos Pereira, an engineer turned
    planner, INED has concentrated somewhat more on "inte-
    grated planning" and "urban legislation" in Brazil, and
    the development of a plan for the Vale do Paraiba. Most
    of the students also come from architecture courses
    or planning. The CEBRAP staff has participated rather
    heavily in the INED training program.

[164]

on the governmental agency staff (e.g., SERFHAU, or the various state and <u>municipio</u> planning agencies), a very substantial portion of the urban research, consulting and planning in Brazil is done by private firms.

Industrial and Business Communities

With regard to the industrial and business comuntiies, their indirect role in responding to and contributing to urbanization is obviously substantial, though undefined.[84] There has also been a substantial business and industry role in all federal programs--the entire BNH program, for example, is built around the banking and construction community--and a substantial role in the expansion of urban services, and in the loteamerto (subdivision) expansion of the cities themselves. In terms of direct nonprofit response to urbanization, however, the industrial community has restricted itself largely to the factory town situation, as in Volta Redonda and Ipatinga.[85] In general it is probably sa 'n say that the business community has tended to view the city as a business matter. Thus the Brazilian business and industrial community has not had a strong tradition of civic participation or philanthropy.[86]

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84. See p. 75, footnote no. 68, this paper. See also Bonilla. op. cit. p. 186, "in Latin America the tide of urbanization (or at least the growth of agglomerations) seems to flow inexorably, irrespective of advances in the economy." And see Berlinck. op. cit., as cited p. 63, footnote no. 57 of this paper.

85. See, e.g., Werner Baer. The Growth of the Brazilian Steel Industry. p. 29.

86. Interview with Fernando Henrique Cardoso. If the above-stated observations are accurate it would seem to be a marked contrast to the rather extensive, if often ultimately self-serving, role of the business community in civic affairs and philanthropy in the United States. It should be noted that others, e.g., Salmen, would give the business community much higher marks, citing as an example the support given Accion.

"URBAN POLICY" IN BRAZIL

Somewhere through the interface and synthesis of the foregoing perceptions, entities and programs, there emerges a "Brazilian" response to urbanization. The response is obviously complex, as is the phenomenon. In general, however, it can be characterized as diffuse in structural origin, conceptually underattended and underdeveloped, and ultimately and profoundly "physical" in its nature.

The Acephalous Nature of the Brazilian Response to Urbanization

Perhaps the most outstanding feature of the Brazilian response to urbanization is its diffuseness. The response emerges from the varying perceptions, organizations and programs, and the results are often uncoordinated and repetitive if not actually conflicting. The various federal, regional, state, metropolitan and municipal agencies function without a central policy. There is no coordinating entity or individual. Rather, there are a series of intricately related and often ad hoc or situation-specific responses, without much awareness of the broader context. As stated by Frankenhoff, "important decisions influencing the urbanization process are taken without being coordinated with one another."[87] No organization or policy exercises vertical control over the various levels of governmental response. Nor is there horizontal coordination between "parallel" institutions.[88] Obviously Brazilian "urban" organizations are explicitly

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87. Frankenhoff. op. cit. p. 8.

88. The BNH housing decisions and the SERFHAU urban plan, for example, are not integrated. As stated by Frankenhoff, "PAC is a highly decentralized program because its efforts have not yet been integrated into the BNH decision making process." Ibid. p. 10. As noted above, SERFHAU would like to move into a national coordinating role.

aware of this uncoordinated, acephalous approach.[89] Organ-
izations or programs capable of coordinating responses to
urbanization may emerge, either from SERFHAU, the Ministry
of the Interior or Planning, or in the interministerial
groups meeting to define jurisdictional issues with regard
to setting up a system of metropolitan government, or even
from a central, coordinating urban agency or Ministry.

It is reasonable to expect, however, that present
diffuseness will continue into the near future. This
uncoordinated response--and some of the limitations of
"coordination"--are shown in the Brazilian response to the
favelas of Rio de Janeiro.

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89. "Uniao, estado (ou estados) e municipios desempenham
    atividades autonomas, cada qual exercendo suas
    atribuicoes de acordo com a reparticao constitucional
    de competencia com base na definicao de interesse
    predominante que toca cada um muitas vezes com
    interferencia um na competencia do outro, sem no
    entanto, satisfazerem as reais necessidades comuns da
    area em questao." Organizacao Administrativa das Areas
    Metropolitanas. SERFHAU, March 1971. p. 11.

The Favelas of Rio de Janeiro--A Case Study of
Diffusion and "Coordination"

In discussing the quality of life in urban Brazil
the second section of this paper focused in part on the
favelas of Rio de Janeiro. By conservative estimate there
are well over 500,000 favelados in Rio and the favela popu-
lation increases approximately 10 percent annually, so
the sample is not insignificant. The "optimistic" and
"tinderbox" schools of thought with regard to these favelas
were noted. In Rio these conflicting schools manifest
themselves dramatically in two organizations: the "optimistic"
view is manifest in CODESCO, a state organization established
to urbanizar (or remover) the upwardly mobile and stable
favelas of Rio. The "tinderbox" view of favelas is manifest
in CHISAM, a federal organization established to remover or
(or desfavelizar) these undesirable areas of crime,
prostitution and physical deprivation in Rio. In that these
conflicting institutional responses have something
significant to say about diffusion and "coordination" in
the Brazilian response to urbanization, the are worth
looking at in greater detail.

The Companhia de Desenvolvimento de Comunidades
(CODESCO) is an entity of the State of Guanabara, though
funded predominantly by the National Housing Bank and the
federal government.[90] In "urbanizing" favelas CODESCO

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90. Approximately 20 percent of the CODESCO budget comes

attempts to: (i) develop basic infrastructure for urban

services such as water, sewage, electricity, (ii) pass

land title to the favelado, (iii) assist in housing

development projects undertaken by the favelados themselves

(CODESCO offering low interest loans for material, technical

assistance on individual housing design and construction,

and overall planning), and (iv) promote community develop-

ment and social assistance. In essence, it attempts to

combine "site and service," "entitlement," and "community

development" approaches to the favelas of Rio. The overall

approach obviously relies on and responds to an "optimistic"

model of the favelas.

There are three specific CODESCO projects in Rio de

Janeiro, each of them differing in accordance to the char-

acter of the respective favela. The main project, however,

is Bras de Pina, in the suburban North Zone of Rio. [91] Bras

de Pina was partially "removed" in the early 1960's by the

the Lacerda government. Before a very large area was

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from the state government, and the other 80 percent
from BNH. Interview with Jorge Romualdo Estrella.

91. The complete discussion of the Bras de Pina experience
will have to await the forthcoming book of one of the
major figures in this CODESCO project, architect
Carlos Nelson. I understand that other concerned pro-
fessionals of the "optimistic" school, e.g., Leeds
and Turner, are also writing about the project.

cleared, however, the removal was halted by violent favela

opposition. For a number of years thereafter the

government's attitude towards the favela was marked by

tergiversation and inactivity. But the favelados of

Bras de Pina formed a comite de urbanizacao and began to

develop their own "urbanization" plan. In 1966 they hired

a group of young architects to work with them and, along

with the other favelados of Rio, they attempted to

mobilize public pressure in favc of "urbanization" of

Bras de Pina.[92] With eventual support from the governor

of Guanabara, CODESCO was established in 1968. It was

announced as a project for the human development of the

favelas, and a rejection of the removal policy which had

been a "fiscal, social, economic and political disaster in

Vila Kennedy."[93] CODESCO quickly hired the (Carlos Nelson)

team of planners who had been working with the Bras de Pina

comite.[94]

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92. "Favelados de Bras de Pina esperam a urbanizacao
     que foi prometida pelo governo". Jornal do Bras.1,
     August 13, 1968. "Favelas: Promocao Humana e a
     Meta Principal na Urbanizacao". Ultima Hora,
     September 14, 1968. See also "Favelado de Bras de
     Pina Ve no Urbanismo Uma Vida Melhor". Jornal do
     Brasil, September 15, 1968.

93. Ultima Hora, September 14, 1968.

94. As stated in the newspapers at the time, "Tao
     competente era a equipe que a propia CODESCO decediu
     confiarlhe as planos de urbanizacao." Ibid.

The implementation of the Bras de Pina project is a
rich story of community building, and only a quick outline
can be touched on in this paper. The earlier aborted
"removal" project had left Bras de Pina with a cleared
area. This allowed for (and was required for) the
"bootstrap" approach which CODESCO eventually used in Bras
de Pina: "urbanize" the cleared area, help the residents
to build and move in, then "urbanize" the vacated neighbor-
hood, etc. As requested by the favelados, the area to
be "urbanized" was first subdivided into matchbook-size
regular lots, and urban services were brought in. Then the
lots were parcelled out to the Bras de Pina residents, with
CODESCO serving in some measure as arbiter. Bras de Pina
families were entitled to purchase (for approximately US$90)
the lot of their preference. This meant the important
parts of the favelados' lives were increasingly structured
by the favelados--the shopkeeper moved to the corner, two
brothers side by side, a worker away from his mother-in-law,
etc. The residents moved their own belongings to the new
lot, often with the help of friends and relatives in a kind
of "house raising." First a shack would be built, often
with materials removed from the former house. Although
there was no requirement that a new home be built, most of
the residents eventually did so. CODESCO imposed a few
basic restrictions (must have a bathroom, most be
ventiliation in all rooms, etc.). CODESCO also developed

several model plans, based on the _favelados_ own designs.
But in each case the individual was responsible for
designing and building his own home.

The resultant community is, to my own eye, a Jane
Jacobs world. The houses go up in weird combinations of
shapes, forms and colors, as desired by the residents. A
few are of wood construction, including some two-floor
units. Most are of block and tile with concrete overlay.
The first buildings that went up were generally simple,
one-floor affairs. Now, however, two-floor units are
increasingly common (the second floor is often rented to
pay off the loan on the materials). The colors of the
completed units are frequently clashing and brilliant.
Most of the houses are highly personalized, e.g., with
small individually decorated patios, and with the
ubiquitous surrounding fence. Barber shops, garages and
markets edge out on the street at odd intervals, and small
merchants and trades abound. There is an occasional
private garage and one or two of the new, larger units have
dependencias for maids. The _gestalt_ is a copy and a
caricature of middle- and upper-class housing in Brazil.[95]
It is not a pretty place, with garbage littering the street,
and some of the completed houses looking sufficiently dirty

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95. As Nelson said at one point, "architects hate _Bras
    de Pina_; they see themselves caricatured there."

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and cramped to qualify as candidates for removal. Some
streets and yards are awash.in mud (pigs, indicentally, are
not allowed, but chickens are common and dogs are legion).
Other houses and streets are solid and clean, and buildings,
are increasingly sophisticated as the community gains
construction expertise. The right (permissao) to partici-
pate in the Bras de Pina program has become a valuable
commodity, and a resident can now sell out his permissao for
as much as US$1,000 (up from US$100 just several years ago).
More than 80 percent of the Bras de Pina residents have
stayed, however, and the community has been preserved and
strengthened. When a house of prostitution was set up in
Bras de Pina, for example, it came under such strong
community pressure that it had to close. The community was
also "legitimized" by the removal of the cloud of
"illegality" which formerly defined a favela. And the
community obviously has better housing and services because
of the project. In my own mind, however, the most striking
characteristic of contemporary Bras de Pina is its
vitality. On almost every street, and sometimes at every
house on a street, individuals and groups are building
scaffolding, mixing cement, laying tile, etc. There is
considerable social interaction in the street, and an
eternal soccer game in the (CODESCO designed) plaza.
Bras de Pina is, in short, an uninspiring but enthusiastic
community of the morador, complete with stability, upward

mobility, materialism and even petty conspicuous con-
sumption. While many of the problems facing the urban
poor, e.g., jobs, persist in Bras de Pina, the project
was never seen as a talisman. It was intended to improve
and strengthen the community of Bras de Pina, to improve
the physical environment of housing and services, and to
increase the degree of choice and control the individuals
and community exercised over a very immediate and important
part or their lives. In terms of these objectives the
project was quite successful.

It is interesting to note that CODESCO claims
"removal" is prohibitively expensive, that "urbanization"
costs approximately half as much. CHISAM, on the contrary,
asserts that "urbanization" is prohibitively expensive,
as discussed below. And yet the Bras de Pina experience
demonstrates in one small place that "the 'urbanization'
of the community is economically feasible."[96] For the
900 families and 5,000 individuals living in Bras de Pina,
and for those who worked on the project over the past six
years, it is at least a partial justification of the
confidence the optimist school places in the (former)
favelados.

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96. Charles Frankenhoff. "An Economic Analysis of
    Favela Urbanization in Rio de Janeiro". May 1969. It
    should be noted that Bras de Pina is not an isolated
    attempt at favela "urbanization" in Brazil. Similar
    efforts, based on the Bras de Pina model, are under
    way in Salvador and Recife.

The CODESCO-Bras de Pina project is, however, only
one of many federal, state, municipal and international
responses to the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. The diverse
programs reflect the diffusion and lack of coordination
which characterizes the Brazilian response to urbanization
in general. In an attempt to rectify this situation the
federal government established a "coordinated" approach to
"housing of social interest in Rio de Janeiro."[97] The
"coordinated" federal approach to the favelas of Rio was,
however, located in a new institution steeped in the
"tinderbox" school--CHISAM.

The Coordination of Housing of Social Interest in
Metropolitan Rio (CHISAM) is, in fact, something of a

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97. "....it was found absolutely necessary that the
housing problem be attacked with one guiding policy
for the federal government and the state governments
of Guanabara and Rio de Janeiro. No less that 110
public and private organs were engaged in housing, each
of them with different policies, ideas and practice.
While some believed in social welfare assistance
through gifts, clothes and food, others sought the
elimination of the "favelas" at all costs and means.
Promotional and electoral measures of all kinds, which
were merely palliative, were advocated and carried out
by different persons and agencies....What was lacking
was a coordination of the different persons and agen-
cies with the idea of delegating tasks and decentral-
izing their execution. It was decided that the best
way of reaching the desired objectives would be through
a guiding agency with standard norms to coordinate the
agencies of the federal government, the two state
governments and private organizations with credentials
to do the task." CHISAM. p. 78.

caricature of the "tinderbox" school.[98] Their program is directed basically to the end of "desfavelacao"[99] or removal of the favelas. Directed by engineer Gilberto Coufal (also a director of BNH), CHISAM attempts to respond to the "problem of the favelas" by removing them.[100]

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98.   See pp. 106-107 of this paper.

99.   It is probably worth noting the different intra-
       and extra-favela audience, of the CODESCO objective
       to "urbanize" (the favelas) and the CHISAM objective
       to "desfavelar" (the city).

100.   As mentioned above, the CHISAM objectives are actually
       much broader; it was set up in March 1968 to coordinate
       housing agencies and policy in Rio, including social
       welfare agencies, new low-cost housing agencies
       (COHAB's), and entities working in favela rehabilita-
       tion (i.e., CODESCO). Although there are many
       intellectual cross currents in the CODESCO view of
       the favelado, the basic "externality" of the favela
       could not be more explicit: "The slum complexes built
       irregularly and illegally make a contrast with the
       urban area in which they are located. They do not
       form part of the city's urban home complex. Since
       the slum dwellers do not pay taxes and other obligations
       of legally constructed property, they do not have the
       right to enjoy the public benefits." CHISAM. p. 79.
       It is because this "legal" and "tinderbox" view have
       materialized in the form of a massive favela removal
       program that I say that the basic end of CHISAM is
       desfavelacao.

       The favelados were also well aware of CHISAM's objec-
       tives and united against CHISAM. "Favelado a Negrao:
       Remocao Para A Zona Norte Nao E A Solucao". Correio
       da Manha, September 4, 1968. (Os Favelados da
       Guanabara vao pedir ao Governador Negrao de Lima que
       no autorize qualquer remocao de favela da Zona Sul
       para os suburbios e Zona Rural, por considerarem que
       "as medidas tomadas anteriormente, como nos casas
       da Cidade de Deus e Vila Kennedy so serviram para
       agravar os problemas dos transferidos"). A Federation
       of Favela Associations was formed, which drew up
       complaints against the idea of living three hours, and

Under the CHISAM program favelados, under the supervision
of massed riot police, are removed en masse to public
housing. The favela is torn down behind the departing
favelado by wrecking crews.[101] The favelados are
taken to public housing in accordance with their capacity to

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two cruzeiros, from the city. "Favela Finca Pe e Nao
Quer Mudar". Correio da Manha, September 5, 1970
("trabalhamos perto daqui e nossos salarios noa dao
para pagar os alugueis....nem as passagens....estamos
prontos a lutar contra a remocao"; "Moradores da
Ilha das Dragas Reagem a Plano da CHISAM". Correio
da Manha, September 4, 1969.). CHISAM and Coufal
responded with realpolitik flexibility, talking of
removing only those who wished, and of urbanizing
where that was possible. ("Gilberto Coufal diz que
com ele no posto, favelado nao vai sofrer pressao,"
emphasis mine). The Secretary of State of Rio
announced in favor of urbanizacao and against removal,
and Minister of the Interior Albuquerque Lima came
out for both removal and urbanizacao (O Globo, Septem-
ber 26, 1968.). The favelados called a congresso
and, meeting under an urbanizacao sim remocao nao
flag, took a position against renewal. "Favelados
Fixam Posicao Conjunta Contra Remocoes". Correio da
Manha, November 3, 1968. As reported by the papers,
the favelados congress was attended by the president
of the Leao XIII Foundation, and by two secret ser-
vice (DOPS) agents. CHISAM and Coufal, however, went
ahead with building and removal plans. Initially on
an isolated basis ("Desfavelamento Continue". Ultima
Hora, February 27, 1969.), but soon promising to
remove all favelas from the Lagoa area, CHISAM
rapidly developed large plans ("215 favelas do Rio
desaparecerao em 2 anos". Jornal do Brasil, July 7,
1969.). They still talked in part of urbanization.
At one point favela do Pinto was to be urbanized
("Favela do Pinto sera urbanizada". Jornal do Brasil,
March 12, 1969.) but it was eventually removed, burning
in the process. In the face of constant government
pressure and inducement, early opposition to removal
decreased in size and effectiveness.

101. Quite literally the roof is town off as soon as the
    family moves out, and the favela is later town down

FAVELA REMOVAL (CHISAM PROGRAM) RIO DE JANEIRO   FIG. 7

GUANABARA BAY

I. DO GOVERNADOR

EMAG

N.S.OE LORETO

CIOAOE ALTA

PORTO VELHO PARQUE
FAZENOA AREAL   GUAPORÉ

NOVA HOLANDA

R. PEREIRA

FAZENOA BOTAFOGO

BENTO CANOOSO
COSTA RICA

RUA GRATO

TEIXEIRA DE CASTRO

ESTRADA OE
AGUA BRANCA

ENGENHO OA RAINHA

PARQUE RAMOS

PARQUE SÃO JOSÉ

STA. LUZIA

RUA OA BICA   PARQUE MANGUINHOS

AV. SUBURBANA

G U A N A B A R A

MARACANÃ

COL. MILITAR

MARGARIDA   RIO FUNDO

MIGUEL PEREIRA
M. ANGELICA   SÃO
JOÃO   STA. TEREZINHA

CIOADE OE DEUS

CHAC. DA CABEÇA   BABILONIA
V. FLORESTA   IS BRAÇAS
M. SOBRINHO   CHACRINHA
MARC DE SÃO VICENTE
PIRAOUÉ   CATACUMBA
ALTO SOLAR
DO PINTO   CÓ PEG
BAIANO   I. ORAGAS

● Favela
■ Re-housing project

ATLANTIC   OCEAN

0 km 2   4   6   8   10   20   30

0 miles   2   4   6   8   10   20

U R B A N I Z A T I O N   I N   B R A Z I L

I N T E R N A T I O N A L   U R B A N I Z A T I O N   S U R V E Y

pay.[102] The CHISAM removal operations are on a large

scale.[103] The removals are expressly out of the wealthier

South Zone of Rio de Janeiro, as shown in the CHISAM map

(Figure 7).

It is difficult to evaluate CHISAM objectively. At

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to the ground, and the materials burned. Several
years ago the favela do Pinto was burned, accidentally
or otherwise, before the residents departed. More
recently the favela Macedo Sobrinho was set afire by
unidentified parties immediately after removal (see
"Incendiario Toca Fogo . Favela Abandonada". O Globo,
February 8, 1971.). Recently CHISAM has publicly
admitted they set fire to the favelas after removal
to prevent the favelados from returning or using the
materials.

102. CHISAM estimates that they cannot provide housing for
17 percent of the families removed (Jornal do Brasil,
January 26, 1971.). A recent BNH study indicated
that approximately two-thirds of the removed favelados
could not afford new apartments (Correio da Manha,
May 13, 1970.). Salmen's estimate is 70 percent
unable to pay (interview). It is reliably reported
from within COHAB-Rio that more than 60 percent of
the favelados removed have not been able or willing to
pay for the new housing. COHAB is now faced with the
option of overlooking the nonpayment, in which case
they assume it will get worse, or foreclosing which
will merely create a new pool of favelados (albeit,
presumably, out of the south zone of Rio de Janeiro).
There is a legal limit on rental payment (25 percent
of family income, not including utilities). CHISAM's
figures make it difficult, however, to determine the
economic cut-off point (they divide minimum salaries:
one, one to three, three and above; the crucial thresh-
old is in the one to three breakdown). Capacity to
pay should take into consideration not only housing
costs (approximately Cr$90.00-110.00 monthly), but
transportation cost (approximately Cr$60.00 monthly
for the transportation of each family member working
in the city). A solid piece of socio-economic
research on removal is very much needed.

103. CHISAM recently submitted a report to the Ministry of
the Interior which projected the removal of twenty

a minimum the organization is insensitive to the favelados
situation,[104] authoritarian in its style,[105] and dogmatic
in its "tinderbox" view.[106]   The removal operation does
sometimes improve public sanitation (and legal title) for
those residents who can afford their new housing.   These

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fave_as and 250,000 people by 1972, clearing the south
zone ("CHISAM promete extinguir mais 20 favelas em 6
meses...."   "Favelado sai da Zona Sul ate 72".   Jornal
do Brasil, January 26, 1971.).

104.   See p. 106, footnote no. 120 and p. 107, footnote no.
125, this paper, discussing the "desire" of the
favelado to leave the favela and cf. the favela resis-
tance to removal, the presence of the riot police,
the burning of the favela to keep the former residents
from returning.   See also CHISAM's stated Guide Lines
and Objectives: "his removal to a distance will cause
him economic hardship" (CHISAM.   p. 79.), and the
fact that all favelados are removed to the   stant
north or rural zone.   This locational poli   s
explained in terms of a "potential" work market.   "As
familias devem ser localizadas em unidades residencias
proximas da favela de onde sairam, ou do mercado de
trabalho do favelado, ou ainda, de local onde exista
um mercado de trabalho em potencial."   (Jornal do
Brasil, January 26, 1971.   Emphasis mine)..

105.   "....the resident's participation in moving is total.
When the resident first starts to leave he is anxious
for his turn to come....He goes daily to the Housing
Coordination group to learn if the order for his
moving has been given.   He continues to show his
desire to move.on. getting the moving order, he asks
the coordination officials whether he can give his
friends things left over, or the building materials..
..he learns that it is forbidden for the building
materials that might be used in building another
shack be taken from the slum area.   He approves of
the idea....he and his family show joy and con-
fidence."   CHISAM.   p. 95.

106.   "Dogmatic" is not too strong a term: "on completing
the program of the progressive slum clearance of the
greater Rio area, we ran into some problems rising

favelados are satisfied with the move,[107] and there is some

support for removal in the press.[108] At the same time, there

is no way of measuring the human costs of the removal, not

only for those 60 percent or so who are "lost" in the process,

but for the "acted upon" status, not to mention the financial

and social expenses, even on those who can afford the new

housing. Generally there is a surprising amount of strong

and even bitter criticism of removal from the press in

Brazil.[109]

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from ideas, hypotheses, and theories about the 'favelas' slum and its people....We were sure that we would get a reaction from those who believed that the slum should be urbanized or improved, keeping the favelas where they were....the opinions we heard and the books we read did not help much....we chose the hard but fruitful cause of eradicating the slums." Ibid. pp. 83-84.

107. In one study done in Vila Kennedy, satisfaction with. the new housing was found to vary directly with the income of the family. See Larry Salmen. "A Perspective of Squatters in Brazil". America Latina, Ano 12, No. 1, Janeiro-Marco 1969, Rio de Janeiro, Brasil.

108. Usually in the Jornal do Brasil. When the new governor of Guanabara, Chagas Freitas, took office, the Jornal do Brasil (March 17, 1971) editorialized: "The program for eradication of slums must continue using the same pattern.....the new governor should not lend his ears to those who advocate urbanization instead of eradication." See also the bromides of the economic survey of the First National City Bank: "The hillside shantytowns-- the favelas--of Rio de Janeiro and other large cities are beginning to disappear as the government opens new suburban apartments for the former slum dwellers."

109. Nem na Catacumba eles tinham tantos problemas....Correio da Manha, January 21, 1971, discussing the high rent, travel, floods and anomie; ("Quem nao pode pagar vai ter que sair....E ninguem sabe dizer para onde....Para os que conseguirem ficar, sera um pessimo negocio: Os

Comment--CODESCO and CHISAM claim to be working in confort-
able coordination, CODESCO urbanizing favelas that have
condicoes, and CHISAM removing favelas that don't. But the
deep intellectual and programmatical differences between the
two institutions meant they would inevitably clash.[110] In
terms of power and financial support CHISAM unquestionably
holds the upper hand. It is the dominant federal "coordin-
ating" agency, while CODESCO's institutional position and
support appears to be seriously threatened.[111] At the same

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apartamentos nao valem nada"); Por que a remocao nao
resolve. Correio da Manha, January 28, 1971 ("O
favelado e tratado como mercadoria"). Isolamento faz
faltar tudo em Paciencia. O Globo, May 2, 1971. p.
15. "Nao ha luz ou assistancia medica; nao ha
conducao ou mesmo comercio regular"). Favelados
descontentes com programas de remocao. Correio da
Manha, June 18, 1971. ("Na Rocinha onde seus
moradores contam com iluminacao, agua encanada,
esgoto, grupo escolar, igreja, posto policial e ate
ha pouco tempo, um ambulatorio medico, a inseguranca
assusta aqueles que deverao ir para o Parque
Proletario, onde as casas de triagem sao praticamente
inabitaveis....O problema deles e a alta mensalidade
que terao que pagar, a distancia de seus empregos,
e as dificuldades matriculas para os filhos....").

110. I predicted in February 1961 the complementary,
      condicoes rationale would shatter and the institu-
      tions would clash. In that the present conflict is
      rooted in different and conflicting schools of thought
      and is a continuation of a controversy which dates
      back to the 1940's, this was not an especially adven-
      turesome prediction. (See "A Batalha do Rio".
      Parisse, Favelas do Rio de Janeiro, CENPHA, 1969).

111. CHISAM's director, Coufal, is reportedly advocating
      a post-renewal "community reorganization" role for
      CODESCO, in effect taking CODESCO out of the
      urbanizacao business.

.time the economic and human costs of removal are being
increasirgly felt, as removed favelados are unable to
afford new housing and transportation, and as opposition
continues in the mass media, the academic community, and
within the favelas. It is questionable how long CHISAM
will be le, to perpetrate their present, large-scale
program as these human and economic costs become more
apparent. The removal controversy is currently focused
on Rocinha, one of the largest favelas (approximately.
80,000) in Rio de Janeiro. CHISAM's position vis-a-vis
Rocinha has vacilated from total removal to no removal to
partial removal of approximately one-fifth of the favela
most threatened by landslides.[112] While CODESCO will
probably be overwhelmed in the present situation, it is
doubtful that the present "batalha" of Rio will be the
Armaggedon of the favelas, or of the "urbanization"
model. On the contrary, the conflicting models and
approaches can be expected to endure, though with
varying degrees of acceptance and, I would add, each having

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112. Both CODESCO and CHISAM deny having socio-economic
data on Rocinha. The one-fifth decision was made on
the basis of a geo-technical survey of the terrain.
Rocinha's location in the south zone and CHISAM's
well defined and explicitly stated clear-the-south-
zone objectives indicate that it is very likely
Rocinha will ultimately be removed. See Jornal do
Brasil, May 4, 1971. "Fontes da CHISAM informaram
que ainda nao ha nada de concreto sobre o futuro
da Rocinha, mas adiantaram que a urbanizacao da
area esta fora de cogitacoes 'pois foge a filosofia
do nosso orgao'").

[184]

a radically different impact on the lives of <u>favelados</u>.

In terms of the present analysis, the rather painful "removal and eradication" approach of CHISAM raises an obvious question for those who call for coordination in the urban sector: "coordination of what?" In some circumstances coordination can avoid overlap, repetition, isolation, or even conflict, between disparate programs and policies. And for this reason it should, in general be encouraged in the context of the acephalous response to urban problems. At the same time, the approach obviously offers no talisman, for coordination per se can be bankrupt in terms of the context and the conceptual competence of the policies involved; coordination can even be detrimental, by implementing counter-productive policy more effectively. Stated somewhat differently, the coordination of poorly conceived policy is very likely to produce poorly-conceived, coordinated policy. CHISAM's policy conceptualization has already been discussed. The more general conceptual character and the competence of "urban policy" in Brazil is discussed below.

The Conceptual Competence of "Urban Policy" in Brazil

By way of general comment, there is a surprising dearth of research and published materials on the cities of Brazil and the quality of human life therein. For organizations working on urbanization, as for students of the area, this deficiency is immediate and obvious. There is a general lack of analysis, discussion and understanding of cities, and an apparent lack of awareness, particularly in policy-making quarters, of the Brazilian urbanization phenomenon.[113] There is a concomitant reduction of capacity to explain and predict, or to formulate and evaluate public policy.[114] There is no solid economic or political science research on such issues as the embryonic level of metropolitan government. And there is a lack of nond corative research on policies, e.g., _favela_ removal, highway colonization, or the "integrated planning" program. On a somewhat broader scale, there

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113. I am reminded of the saying "the last to discover the water will be the fish."

114. It should be noted that there are a number of innovative urban policies in Brazil, from revenue sharing, to state research foundations (FAPESP), to a fiscal incentive industrialization policy, to a rather remarkable record of city planning. In this section, however, I am discussing a more comprehensive focus on urban policy in Brazil, and on the quality of conceptualization and depth of understanding underlying that policy.

is also a lack of information and understanding about the
quality of life in the Brazilian urban environment or
about the social diseconomies and dysfunctions of metro-
politan growth, or the economics of size and spatial
distribution of Brazilian cities. Similarly, there are
vast untouched areas of urban law, for example, welfare
legislation (and, e.g., the impact on migration), zoning
laws (e.g., the impact on suburban growth), property laws
(e.g., adverse possession in the favelas, the inheritance
of favelado property, or the indemnification for removal),
criminal law (e.g., delinquency, or the integration of
informal controls with the legal system, the levels and
exercise of police discretion), tax law (e.g., the impact
of the revenue sharing on municipio government, or more
general studies of the tax base and allocation in metro-
politan areas). And there is relatively little work on
the relationship between the urban and rural sectors,
urbanization and industrialization, or urbanization and
overall development.[115]

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115. There are obvious exceptions to the foregoing,
      including in particular much of the CEBRAP and
      Berlinck research in Sao Paulo, and including Conn's
      work on favela law, Bonilla's work on the urban
      worker and a number of research projects being con-
      ducted with Foundation support. These and other
      intellectual resources notwithstanding, it is my
      impression that the overall level of conceptualization
      is wanting, and that the conceptual tools available
      are too infrequently used in the diffuse Brazilian
      "urban policy."

Without attempting any listing, suffice it to say

there are vast and little understood areas of the Brazilian

urban sector.[116]   There is not even a good general statement

o- book on urbanization in Brazil, and the research

available is under-supported and sometimes disregarded.[117]

In general, it is safe to say that urban policy is based

on very partial and inadequate understanding of the cities.

As Bonilla states somewhat more forcefully:

> In Latin America....writing about the city
> has been left largely to the Sunday supple-
> ment panegyrists, tourist pamphleteers and
> nostalgic literary elder statesmen. While
> smaller, more compact communities have been

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116.   A number of writers, among them Silvert and Morse
have recently noted the growing body of urban research
in Latin America. See, e.g., Morse's Trends and
Issues in Latin American Urban Researches 1965-1970
Latin American Research Review. Vol. VI., No. 1,
Spring 1971. p. 3. And see Rabinovitz and Trueblood.
op. cit. Generalization about a lack of research and
understanding should obviously not be lightly made,
nor overstated. A supplementary and more specific
review of Brazilian urban research will be discussed
in the next section of this paper. In general it is
my impression that socio-economic urban research is
qualitatively strong but often of limited "molecular"
scope, and quantitatively very thin. Relatively little
of the "Latin American urban research" is Brazilian.
Much of the so-called "urban" research in Brazil is
technocratic in nature, and the conceptualization of
urban policy reflects this input.

117.   The policy making organizations such as BNH, for
example, have thus far supported mainly technocratic
research (as in CENPHA), and even this lightly (0.12
percent of BNH's budget). In these projects, as in
SERFHAU's "integrated plan" or the research of the
private consulting companies, the social science
input is all to often decorative, and a broader
theoretical understanding of the urban environment
lacking. CHISAM goes one step further in its dogmatic

intensively analyzed, few attempts to go beyond the census data on big cities have yet been completed.[118]

The "Interior" Focus of "Urban Policy" in Brazil--The "Heartland Mystique"

There is one very interesting dimension of urban policy in Brazil which serves to demonstrate a kind of conceptual inadequacy. That dimension is the consistent focus of "urban policy" on the interior of Brazil, and the consistent failure to focus on the cities in any concerted way.

As far back as the first settlement of Brazil, and more dramatically in *uti possidetis*, the determination to settle the interior amounts to a national passion. In an analysis of Brazilian national aspirations, historian Jose Honorio Rodrigues calls the occupation of the land, "a national dream." The major national efforts of the past decades have been directed in very large measure to opening of the interior, whether via a city (Brasilia) or via a highway and colonization (Transamazonica). The newspapers editorialize that "one of the foremost targets of Brazilian

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"we-don't-find-books-helpful" posture. See pp. 180-181, footnote no. 106, this paper.

118. Bonilla. *op. cit.* p. 188. In fairness to the Latins and the Brazilians, this entire line of argument should be balanced with a recognition that urban policy, and the quality of urban life, in the United States are also seriously wanting.

economic policy is settling people in large areas of
the interior where environmental conditions are suitable."[19]
And the Minister of Transportation, Mario Andreazza,
recently defined Brazil's great national objectives as
(i) the conquest of virgin regions, (ii) development of new
economic areas, and (iii) occupation of our frontiers and
expanding progress into the interior.[120] As discussed
earlier in this paper, fascination with the interior has
deep historical and intellectual (nativist) roots. And it
is preserved in the bittersweet contemporary view of the
cities, and the interior. In some measure one is tempted
to observe that its appeal is particularly strong for those
who live in the cities and plan to continue to live in
the cities. In any event, the hinterland mystique seems
to be less than fully persuasive to the rural-urban migrants
who historically and increasingly flock to the cities. The
simple fact is that the population in vast areas of rural
Brazil is decreasing in relative and even in absolute terms,
while the cities continue their unbridled growth. As
stated by Wagley, "Brazilians will continue to move, when
they can, from the country to the town and from the town
to the city."[121]

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119. O Estado do Sao Paulo, April 21, 1971.

120. Brazil Herald, April 21, 1971.

121. Wagley. Introduction to Brazil. p. 182.

Unfortunately urban policy in Brazil has not sepa-
rated this "heartland mystique" from the hard facts of
urban reality. The response to urbanization is primarily
physical and issue-oriented, in terms of houses, sewers,
water, streets and city plans.[122] The next level of urban
policy does not conceptualize the city as a process or
system, as an integrated entity, or as an integral part
of a developmental process. Rather, Brazilian urban policy
above the "infrastructure" level is "underdeveloped," and
often nonexistent. In some measure "urban policy" becomes
instead a sort of "conventional wisdom," population
distribution policy--to diffuse growth away from large
cities, and to hold and settle Brazilians in the
interior.[123] Government officials are quite explicit that
"a large population should live in Brazil's interior."[124]
In advocating settlement of the interior, the Estado de Sao
Paulo is equally explicit: "this will reduce the exodus

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122. "Urban development policy in Brazil is an offspring of
      the national housing system." Frankenhoff. op. cit.
      p. 2.

123. It is perhaps significant that the federal organ
      most involved is, in fact, the Ministry of the
      Interior.

124. Minister of Transportation Andreazza, Brazil Herald,
      April 21, 1971. pp. 2-3. See discussion of BNH's
      rationale as to why concentration was undesirable,
      this paper, p. 131, footnote no. 29 and footnote
      no. 30.

from the countryside to the big cities which has caused difficult problems of unemployment."[125] This "heartland mystique," and the concomitant underdeveloped or nonexistent "urban policy" is nowhere more obvious than in the most powerful single urban entity in Brazil, the National Housing Bank. In Trindade's important speech to the Escola Superior de Guerra, he not only argues that "national urbanization policy is necessary" but further provides a draft of a national urbanization policy which includes among its basic objectives: (i) by means of the planned urbanization to delay and, if possible, avoid the excessive urban concentration of the megalopolis sort, (ii) to promote the progressive occupancy of the national territory, (iii) to establish interdependent city-country areas, in conformity with the great lines of penetration into the Brazilian hinterland, by means of successive "urbanization

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125. Tom Sanders recently noted the (related) impact of the interior on population policy in discussing the "The Politics of Population in Brazil," as follows: "Brazilians find themselves caught between the overlapping waves of two attitudes toward population, one associated with its past history, the other with its future. The former emphasizes expansion of population and uses terms like colonization, occupation of space, exploitation of resources, and national greatness through a sizeable population. The other is centered on planned national development and is slowly beginning to incorporate the contribution of demography to the analysis of economics, urbanization, health, and the quality of human existence."

centers" supported by existing or prospective poles of
development, and (iv) to concentrate the rural population
in new nuclei. While Trindade's speech went into consider-
able detail,[126] the basic "heartland" and "new settlements"
thrust of the national urbanization policy advocated is
best demonstrated in Trindade's maps. The following
Trindade maps present, in sequence, (a) a view of the
interior as "nearly void of population, a natural environ-
ment suitable for settlement," (b) a view of "the present
population-migration trend," and (c) a proposed "national
urbanization program to slowdown rural-urban shift of
population," respectively, Figures 8, 9 and 10.

Without belaboring the point, the "interior" focus
of urban policy may be very desirable as a conceptual
approach.[127] Unfortunately, however, the settlement of the

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126. The speech also discussed labor absorption and the
need to balance rural and urban income levels.

127. I should emphasize that I have no doubt that Brazil
will settle the interior in the long run, nor do I
question that settlement of the interior is an
entirely natural and important component of urban
policy in Brazil. What I doubt is the efficacy of
the "interior focus" as any kind of an adequate or
comprehensive urban policy. And I question whether
contemporary Brazilian thinking about the interior is
well developed and prepared, for example, to recognize
and deal with the staggering rate of urbanization in
the interior. The future of the interior promises
"decentralized centralization"--large urban enclaves
in the interior, and webs of cities along the coast.
Brazil will have to develop a genuinely urban expertise
and policy to respond to genuinely urban problems.

DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION AND NATURAL
SETTLEMENT ENVIRONMENT, 1960

FIG. 8

HOT & WET
REGION

HOT & DRY REGION
Low level of Productivity
Less natural environment
Special design
required

GUAYANA

VENEZUELA
SURINAM
FR.
GUAYAN

COLOMBIA

HOT & WET REGION
Needs special environmental design

NEARLY VOID OF POPULATION
NATURAL ENVIRONMENT SUITABLE
FOR SETTLEMENT

PERU

BOLIVIA
LOW LANDS
AND
SWAMPS

REGION OF
COOL WINTERS

PARAGUAY

Zone suitable for settlement
in natural environment

POPULATION DENSITY 1960

0 - 5 in Habitants/km²

5 - 10 in Habitants/km²

10-100 in Habitants/km²

URUGUAY

0 km	1000	2000	3000	4000
0 miles		1000		2000	3000

PRESENT POPULATION MIGRATION TREND FROM
RURAL TO METROPOLITAN AREAS AND LARGE CITIES BY 1990

FIG. 9

GUAYANA

VENEZUELA

SURINAM

FR. GUAYAN

COLOMBIA

1990 - 62 million persons in rural areas
and 45 million in other towns throughout hinterland

VOID HINTERLAND REGION

PERU

1990 : 7,002,000 inhabitants
1970 : 3,000,000 inhabitants

BOLIVIA

1990 : 40,000,000 inhabitants
1970 : 13,000,000 inhabitants

PARAGUAY

1990 : 4,000,000 inhabitants
1970 : 2,000,000 inhabitants

URUGUAY

51 million inhabitants in
3 main metropolitan regions

| 0 Km | 1000 | 2000 | 3000 | 4000 | |
| 0 Miles | | 1000 | 2000 | | 3000 |

URBANIZATION IN BRAZIL

INTERNATIONAL URBANIZATION SURVEY

A NATIONAL URBANIZATION PROGRAM TO
SLOW DOWN RURAL—URBAN SHIFT OF POPULATION

FIG. 10

RETAIN POPULATION IN HINTERLAND
WITH URBANIZATION PROGRAMME
FOR 62,000,000

62,000,000 REMAIN RURAL

LARGE CITY
1990 - 1,000,000

METROPOLITAN AREA
1990 — 22,000,000

LARGE CITY
1990 - 2,000,000

COLOMBIA

VENEZUELA

GUAYANA

SURINAM

FR. GUAYANA

PERU

BOLIVIA

PARAGUAY

URUGUAY

| 0 Km | 1000 | 2000 | 3000 | 4000 |
| 0 Miles | 1000 | 2000 | 3000 |

interior is all too often presented as the urbanization
policy, rather than a part of a more comprehensive policy
which also takes cognizance of and responds to the problem
of extant urban centers, large and small. With regard
to the large agglomerations there is something of a
conceptual void in Brazilian urban policy. This void
is probably hidden and perpetuated by the "hinterland
mystique." In Brazil, where it would take half a dozen
new Brasilias to absorb the growth of Sao Paulo alone
over the next ten years, a parallel policy, focused on
the urban areas per se is imperative. At present the
conceptualization of urban policy is lacking in analysis
and understanding of this increasingly urban character,
and lacking in comprehensive policy with which to address
urban growth and problems.

The "Physical" Nature of "Urban Policy" in Brazil

The geographic, "hinterland" focus is consistent with another more specific dimension of the Brazilian response to urbanization. As mentioned, the overall response is physical and technocratic in nature. Consistent with the demographic, spatial and service-oriented concept labelled "urbanization," the institutional responses focus on such issues as housing (BNH), water (BNH), sewage (BNH), planning (SERFHAU), administration (SERFHAU and IBAM), statistics (IBGE), renewal (CODESCO), or removal (CHISAM). This conceptualization of "urbanization" and these institutional responses reflect the intellectual training and human resources of the "urban profession" in Brazil, the architects, engineers, administrators, urban geographers and, increasingly, the economists.

The "Urban Profession" in Brazil

In Brazil as elsewhere, the architects were the first professionals to confront urban problems. As indicated in the "Brazilian Universities" section above, it is within the traditionally strong schools of architecture that most Brazilian city planners and "urbanists" are trained. Within these schools (and their departments of urbanization), the focus is heavily on urban planning, frequently "integrado" in name and physical in nature. If there is a second focus of concern it is on housing. As discussed, the federally

subsidized support of local planning further supports the
architectural influence, which further strengthens the
pool of human resources with an architectural and physical
planning orientation working in the urban sector.

Another strong "urban profession" in Brazil is
the public administrator. In general, the public admin-
istrators have focused on the structural and financial
administration of cities and municipios, primarily the
latter. And they have focused on accounting and legal
procedures (and personnel) necessary to work in the area.
The administrators have applied these skills mainly to
urban services, tax structures and, to a lesser extent,
administrative research and planning. The development
of this "urban" profession has been fostered by relatively
strong university departments, and by strong federal
support. It has been strengthened by the administrative
bent of such organizations as the Brazilian Institute of
Municipal Administration (IBAM) and the Getulio Vargas
Foundation, and by the fellowship support of USAID.

The urban geographers have also developed strong
support within the Brazilian educational and public infor-
mation system. Their focus is on demographic and physical
change over a period of time, quantified and often reduced
to maps. Their approach is usally macro, often national
or regional in scope, and their concern is with variables
relating to population, migration, services, industry,

communications, transportation, commerce. Strongly
..fluenced by the French school, the Brazilian geographers
have made "poles of development" and "spheres of influence"
the in'ellectual touchstones for urbanists.

The planner, the administrator and the urban geogra-
pher have often been assisted, and perhaps more often led,
by the engineers, the builders of houses, bridges, and water
and sewage systems. Thus the approach to urbanizacao has
been markedly physical in nature. As indicated above, the
economists and the lawyers are also playing an increasingly
important, albeit often technocratic role. Only within the
last decade have the "softer" social sciences focused on
and been applied to the complex urban problems in Brazil.

The "physical" nature of the Brazilian response to
urbanization is perhaps nowhere more evident than on the
board of CHISAM. As discussed, this agency is responsible
for coordinating all activities relating to housing of
"social interest," and for the removal of several hundred
thousand people from their homes, and the destruction of
the favelas. The board of CHISAM is composed of engineers
and lawyers. The BNH board is similarly made up predomi-
nantly of engineers and lawyers. The national planning
agency (SERFHAU) breaks down its professional input as
follows:

--<u>Setor físico</u>	58.9%	(engineers, architects, agronomists and geologists)
--<u>Setor economico</u>	15.6%	(economists and statisticians)
--<u>Setor social</u>	5.8%	(sociologists and social assistants)
--<u>Setor institucional</u>	11.8%	(lawyers and administrators)
--<u>Outros</u>	7.9%	(doctors, professors, military and accountants)

In short, in terms of "urban professionals," institutions, and policies, the Brazilian response is characterized by its strong "physical" bent. As discussed above, it is also characterized by its uncoordinated and diffuse character. And it is characterized by underdeveloped and sometimes limited conceptualization, a dimension of the Brazilian response which is founded in intellectual inattention to the cities, and manifest in the utopian "hinterland mystique" which often passes for national urban policy.

If there is a general conclusion to this rough-hewn piece, it is that Brazil is only partially aware of the urban era it faces, and partially aware of its own predominantly urban character. For a nation with Brazil's resources, it overall "urban response" is paltry indeed in terms of governmental and intellectual attention, and in terms of policy. A second general conclusion is also

implicit in the foregoing analysis: there is a certain

policy and intellectual purblindedness in the Brazilian

response to urbanization, characterized as it is by

institutional diffusion and conceptual underdevelopment,

and by a rather limited "physical" and "professional"

orientation. In the case of CHISAM and SERFHAU, for

example, there are few easy answers with regard to

"favela removal" and "urban planning." But it does seem

reasonable to argue that decisions on these very human

concerns should not be taken in the absence of a better

understanding of the urban sector, and in the absence

of a strong and effective input from the social sciences.

As stated by Beyer:

> The urban problem cannot remain solely in the
> hands of urbanists, architects and planning
> experts if among them a marked influence is
> not exerted by the sociologists, anthropologists,
> psychologists, economists, jurists and poets....
>
> Blenn H. Beyer, The Urban Explosion in
> Latin America, (p. 13).