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ABSTRACT

This social studies guide for teachers, interdisciplinary in nature, offers an introductory, objective approach toward the study of conflict and war. The basic underlying assumption of the book is that the institution of war represents a problem to be studied and is amenable to human intervention and resolution. Teachers are encouraged to employ inquiry and discussion techniques which force youth to raise and analyze values and issues dealing with conflict. The book is arranged into six chapters. Chapter one, offering a few theories on the sources of attitudes toward war, reviews historical, philosophical, sociological, economic, biological, philosophical, moral, and ethical factors involved in war. Aspects of conflict and its control -- particularly the nature of group conflict -- are dealt with in chapter two. In chapter three an actual experiment of inter-group conflict which can serve as a model of the dynamics of conflict is described. Chapter four provides suggestions for a number of topics and sources of materials for building a classroom unit. A classroom game of conflict and cooperation is presented in chapter five. The final chapter, sources and resources, contains annotated bibliographies of: background books, classroom materials, and miscellaneous materials. (Author/SJM)

Teaching Youth About Conflict and War

William A. Nesbitt Norman Abramowitz Charles Bloomstein

Teaching Social Studies in an Age of Crisis—No. 5

TEACHING YOUTH ABOUT CONFLICT AND WAR

WILLIAM A. NESBITT
NORMAN ABRAMOWITZ
CHARLES BLOOMSTEIN, Editor

Woodblock Prints by Jack Perlmutter

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PREFACE

This book is a collaborative effort among three individuals and their organizations. William A. Nesbitt, the principal author, and Norman Abramowitz have been involved not only in the general planning of the work but have written the chapters bearing their names. Charles Bloomstein, who developed the idea for the book in conversations with Daniel Roselle, editor of *Social Education,* served as the general editor. All the participants continuously reviewed and commented on each other's work, and although individual chapters were prepared independently, the book was conceived and produced as a single whole.

We would particularly like to thank the Institute for World Order, whose generous grants to the Center for International Programs and Comparative Studies made possible William Nesbitt's work on materials that appear in this book.

At various points in the preparation of the book, parts or all of the manuscript were read by a number of people, much of whose constructive criticism and advice found its way into the final draft. We are deeply indebted to these people, who include: Professor Muzafer Sherif of Pennsylvania State University, who directed the actual Robbers Cave Experiment, and has written extensively about it; Professor Carolyn W. Sherif, also of Pennsylvania State University; Professor Lewis Coser of the State University of New York at Stony Brook; Dr. Jerome Frank of the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine; Professor Richard C. Snyder, Director of the Mershon Center at Ohio State University; Betty Reardon of the Institute for World Order; Mrs. Martha Silber, a teacher of social studies at William Cullen Bryant High School, Long Island City, New York; Martin Ilivicky, Principal of that high school; Professor Ruth Jacobs of Boston University; Paul Wehr of the Consortium for Peace Research and Education; and

INTRODUCTION

On May 9, 1969, U. Thant, then Secretary-General of the United Nations, predicted that the nations had precious few years left "in which to subordinate their ancient quarrels and to launch a global partnership to curb the arms race, to improve the human environment, to defuse the population explosion, and to supply momentum to world development efforts."

Regardless of how much time we have in which to solve them, there is generally agreement that these problems may well overwhelm mankind. The arms race, the environmental problems, and the rich-poor nation gap reinforce each other's capacity to increase international tensions. Present trends indicate that three of the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse—plague, famine, and death—are likely to ride across the globe with increasing frequency during the last quarter of this century. And their combination may very well mean that war, the fourth horseman, will also be a familiar prospect.

Invoking the human crisis is a cliché, and like many clichés, it runs the danger of being ignored. But, one wonders, how many people are really optimistic about the future? Surveys indicate that most Americans believe that human nature makes wars inevitable, while studies of youth reveal that high school students are quite pessimistic about the future and expect nuclear war sometime during their lives. But if human survival depends on a realistic understanding of the problems we face, there is at least the possibility that we can take appropriate action. To be effective, such action by our leaders will have to be backed by sufficient numbers of people. Education for this is nothing less than education for survival.

While our secondary school curricula do include, often in great detail, the study of wars, it is usually from the vantage point of chronological history and historical description. Particular wars are analysed in terms of discrete causes, battles, and effects. Some selected con-

Robert E. Freeman, Director of the Diablo Valley Education Project of the Center for War/Peace Studies.

Needless to say, any errors and inaccuracies are the responsibility of the authors and the editor, and the views expressed are their own and not necessarily those of the National Council for the Social Studies, the New York State Education Department, or the Center for War/Peace Studies.

CHARLES BLOOMSTEIN, Editor

cepts from political science are also taught, and our literature classes frequently study war from the perspective of human emotions.

But war needs to be studied as a social phenomenon, as an institution which is presumed to serve a wide range of human needs. Such an approach, used as an organizing concept, enables us to draw on a variety of disciplines, including psychology, biology, economics, and other social and physical sciences.

War can best be understood as one aspect of conflict—the most terrible. Any study of war requires investigation of conflict, and once we begin that analysis we must discard any single-cause theory of the origins of war and comprehend it as a complex of events, attitudes, emotions, values, and technological organization embedded in an institution. To deal with such a complicated situation, we must be able to draw upon all the branches of knowledge available.

This book presumes to serve only as an introduction to the study of conflict and war, and tries to approach these objectively. An analysis of the component parts permits each of the various aspects to be better understood and thus better acted upon to produce the conditions that can lead to peace. It is the authors' basic assumption that the institution of war presents a problem that can be studied and is amenable to human intervention and resolution.

The study of peace is seen as another subject, one which can be added to the study of conflict and war, which must come first. Peace can be seen as also represented through institutions, and few believe that we can achieve it without a vast increase in the sense of world community, expressed through world law, world order, and world organization to achieve economic development, respect for basic human rights, conservation of the world's resources, control of ecological problems, and similar advances over a wide range of human problems.

This book begins with a review of some historical, philosophical, sociological, economic, biological, psychological, moral, and ethical factors involved in war. These are presented under specific headings to provide some guidelines for question and inquiry. The teacher will probably find this chapter helpful for himself, if not directly for his students. It will be useful in organizing and structuring his own views and attitudes, and in helping him recognize and identify the views of others.

Because of the interdisciplinary nature of the subject and the need to deal with data and material from many

knowledge bases, Chapter 2 discusses conflict as a concept, together with some value questions involved. While the discussion is primarily from the perspective of sociology and political science, this framework aids organizing and analysis, and can also stimulate classroom discussion and student thinking.

Good theory can have practical application, and Chapter 3 moves us from the abstract to describe in some detail an actual experiment which is almost a perfect model of the dynamics of conflict. While its scale is miniscule, and there is danger in extrapolating directly to the juggernaut of war what we can learn from this model, it is also clear that we can begin to objectify conflict and analyse its dynamics at simple levels. These are the tools we will need if our students are to be able to do the same with war.

Part of Chapter 3 should be duplicated and distributed to the students, and is so noted. The remainder of the chapter includes a series of notes for the teacher as well as discussion questions which can be used either directly or as a basis for developing other questions.

Chapter 4 provides some suggestions for the teacher who wants to build his own classroom unit, suggesting a number of topics, with sources for materials. Other topics that may be of interest are also listed, primarily to show the range of what is possible.

Chapter 5 consists of a game we think both teacher and students will find not only stimulating but educational through its more direct involvement of the class.

The remainder of this book consists of: annotations of background books in the field; annotations on other classroom materials and on the organizations and projects producing them; annotations on miscellaneous materials; and other data, including a list of organizations working in the field.

This book tries to raise some serious concept and value questions about conflict and war, in the belief that the professional responsibility of teachers requires them to deal with such universal questions without attempting to provide ultimate answers. Such answers may not be found soon, but by the intelligent use of data and analysis we can help students gain important insights into matters with which they will eventually have to deal as mature citizens. We look upon this as a vital function of education, and we hope that teachers will use this book for that purpose.

CHARLES BLOOMSTEIN

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

PHILOSOPHY OF WAR

1

WHY WAR?

NORMAN ABRAMOWITZ

Poets, theologians, and peasants generally regard war as a calamity, statesmen accept it as a necessary evil, and generals tend to see it as a trade. Insofar as we know the record of human beings on earth, war has always been with us. Quincy Wright, in his monumental *Study of War,* defines it as "the legal condition which equally permits two or more hostile groups to carry on a conflict by armed force." The key word here is "legal," which implies acceptance and societal approval. Despite this legality, war is generally viewed as an expression of man's basic brutish nature and imperfectibility, a tragic but natural and unavoidable phenomenon.

Yet, in the face of other natural calamities, such as the failure of crops and the flooding of fields, or typhoons, earthquakes, or epidemics, human beings have always used all their talents to reverse the judgment of nature, rather than yield to it. They have adapted all their science and technology to that end, as well as all their knowledge of human nature, both biological and psychological. Curiously however, up to this point in time, when it comes to conflict resolution, science and technology have more often been put at the service of the soldier rather than the peacemaker. Only now have the advances in the social sciences made possible a systematic study of the technology and structure of peace and the control of war.

A cartoon has been omitted here because of copyright restrictions. It is from the New Yorker Magazine, copyright 1971.

Karl Deutsch has said that war "has been considered legitimate by many millions in most countries, who have seen it as good and right, or as a necessary means to a good end, or at least as a normal, expectable part of human life." Others have expressed their resignation in the face of war, like playwright Berthold Brecht, who on the eve of World War II observed sadly that "war is like love: it always finds a way."

How did this come about? What are the sources of our attitudes toward war? In this short space we can only touch lightly and briefly on a few of the theories. Those interested in going further are referred to the bibliographies.

War as an Institution

Historically, it has been possible for wars to have been waged without touching more than a fraction of the populations involved. Some wars we note as having been particularly terrible, since they devastated entire peoples and areas—particularly the Punic Wars between Carthage and Rome and the Thirty Years War in Germany. But now we face a different situation. Modern technology has made war far more destructive; modern communications have made it more global; and modern ideologies have enabled it to be more brutal. In the last

400 years there has been a steady increase in the proportion of the population engaged in military service and in the numbers dying from war-related causes, and in the number of civilian casualties. Our horror at the enormity of nuclear war has served to obscure the fact that conventional weaponry has also become far more effective. Not only that, but these modern conventional arms, in their very nature, cannot be limited to the opposing military forces. To maximize their capacity, they must be used in places where civilian casualties become inevitable.

War disrupts normal production and transportation, and since the more advanced a society is the more dependent it is on foodstuffs and goods brought in from elsewhere, the more dangerous is this disruption. Civilians in areas where food must be imported are subjected to starvation, as well as firepower, in wartime. Disease rates skyrocket, with epidemics common in areas lacking strong health services. While estimates vary, it is presumed that the military and civilian war-related deaths in World War I range from 30 to 40 million, those caused by World War II reaching perhaps 60 million. Together, almost 100 million people!

Despite its destructive character, now potentially so great that a single major nuclear war might mean the end of civilization as we know it, war persists because it has served many of men's needs in terms of providing security, excitement, fellowship in a great cause, cooperative effort, and many other things human beings want, need, or think they need. Because of this, war must be looked upon as another human institution* which, so long as it serves human needs (and perhaps for a considerable time after it has ceased serving those needs, indeed has become counterproductive), will persist. What we are attempting to do here is examine not particular wars, but war as an institution, as well as human conflict that can lead to war.

Our assumption is that regardless of how long it has existed, any human institution has been created by and can be changed by human beings when it no longer suits their purposes or when it ceases to fulfill expected functions. After all, slavery also has existed as long as recorded history, and it too had been sanctioned by law,

*A human institution is here considered to be an organized means of meeting human social needs that is legitimized by tradition, folklore, accepted values, the socialization process, the media of communication, and the entire societal apparatus, including the legal foundations for its functioning.

custom, tradition, religion, and human acceptance. But we have at last succeeded in abolishing slavery, save for some tiny areas where it still persists. The same kind of education, analysis, and cooperative endeavor that enabled civilized nations to end slavery as a legal institution should enable us to deal similarly with the institution of war.

War has always been seen as the prerogative and expression of sovereignty. Indeed, the modern state is often described as being the creation of war. When western civilization was centered in small units, such as the city-state or the federal barony, wars between people who spoke the same language and shared substantially the same culture were common and legitimate. But any attempt from within to usurp the authority of the ruler or to overthrow him was illegal, as was violence against fellow-members of the political unit. The nation-state, which grew out of these smaller units (usually by war and conquest), seeks to eliminate all forms of internal violence, seeing such correctly as threats to its sovereignty and as political challenges to order and authority. There has been built up over the years, through the ethics provided by religion, the mores and customs required by society, and the power needs demanded by the state, a domestic law that tolerates no competition to its assertion that the state, and it alone, has the authority to engage in violence. This it does for the common good.

One might speculate that the next step, if this process of ever-larger states continues, would be regional sovereignties and finally a single world sovereignty that would eliminate war. Though logical, such a development is not necessarily probable. Further, the process through which such unification proceeded and maintained itself would determine whether or not it was desirable or achievable. Indeed, if the historic method of war and conquest were employed, human survival would be at risk. Also, many people would question the prospects for individual freedom and cultural diversity under a single world government, and there is much to be said for that position. Finally, in such a situation, the ultimate appeal for change would be civil war, often the most deadly of all.

But these are merely speculations. More to the point is that recently nations have not been absorbing more territory, rather the reverse. While some large powers have been extending their influence over groups of other nations, and while some very weak regional associations

do exist, many post-World War II states have found themselves unable to cope with the ideological, language, and cultural differences within their borders and have broken into separate sovereignties (Palestine, India, Pakistan). And even some of the older governmental units are being subjected to great popular waves of separatism (Quebec, Ireland, Belgium). Under these circumstances, projection of world unity as a continuation of forces long in action would go contrary to the present trend. If at all, unity will be a long time in coming. We can, however, reasonably expect a growth of functional transnational organizations which will take over responsibilities formerly non-existent or left to the individual states. In the meanwhile, what can we do with the institution of war?

War and Law

The need to establish domestic order to ensure the continuity of the ruler brought with it ethical problems of its own. Executive authority, whether in dictatorships or democracies, has frequently used bloodshed and repression to put down dissent and prevent rebellion. And since it is possible for a man to receive medals for killing a foreign soldier and be hanged for killing a fellow citizen, national leaders have all too often tried to divert domestic unrest and dissatisfaction by engaging in foreign military adventures.

Especially within industrialized countries, domestic order has brought with it domestic law, legitimized political systems, socialization, and cooperation. Despite continuous and sometimes flagrant misuse, law has helped promote peaceful change, albeit very slowly. Internal violent group conflict has been sharply reduced, again mostly in the developed countries, and commercial and professional competition now largely take place within limits set by law. The struggle for internal power continues, but is now more frequently channeled through the insitutions of law rather than through violence.

But the rise of domestic law has not helped control war. The state has central control within its boundaries and is itself subjected to the law it has developed. These have strengthened the internal structures of the nation-state, in terms of taxation, administration, and citizen participation—and all these combine to increase its capacity to wage war more effectively.

But conflicts between countries have no arbiters, and for all practical purposes, sovereignty is unbounded in

foreign relations. There are substantially no legal limits that can be placed on the nation-state from outside, except those that can be enforced by war.

While international law has been growing by leaps and bounds, especially during this twentieth century, until such law does receive substantial enforcement powers it cannot be looked upon as an effective force to prevent war. The League of Nations, the United Nations, the World Court, the regional associations of nations, the various multilateral treaties and agreements, and a growing number of international organizations are all, directly or indirectly, adding to the body of international law. As of this moment, however, that law does not play the same powerful role as does domestic law in providing legitimate peaceful channels for the resolution of conflict.

As one illustration, we might note that assassination and terror have always been used as instruments of national policy, to achieve objectives without war or to weaken the opponent's capacity to wage war. The Bible is replete with such instances, and the Borgias were not the only practitioners in the Renaissance, which is well stocked with that kind of activity. It would be a mistake to think that these no longer exist. Operation Phoenix, in South Vietnam, was an assassination campaign to eliminate the clandestine leadership of the National Liberation Front, and was carried out by the South Vietnamese and United States governments. The NLF's temporary occupation of some major cities during their 1968 Tet offensive gave them the same opportunity, which they seized, according to reports. While contrary to existing law, as embodied in the 1949 Geneva Conventions regarding treatment of civilians and prisoners, those who commit such actions always either deny them or claim the requirements of military necessity.

War itself has always been looked upon as a legitimate instrument of national policy. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 was the first serious effort to outlaw war as such an instrument, and its principles are now embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. But the Pact lacked enforcement power, and its main effect was to change the rhetoric of international politics rather than the means of pursuing conflict. The Pact permitted defensive war, and thereafter nations simply found ways of defining as defensive the wars they wished to fight. Even Hitler, invading Poland in 1939, called his action "counterattack with pursuit."

The "Just War"

Asoka of India, after having slaughtered 100,000 enemies and taking 150,000 more captive, and after having eliminated all possible rivals to his rule of his expanded empire, became a convert to Buddhism. He renounced war and identified peace as synonymous with righteous governance. He may have been the first, and possibly only, head of state who became a pacifist. In effect, he said it was impossible for war to be just. This first attempt to end war, millennia ago in India, lasted only as long as its creator, although the pacifist elements in Buddhism are still potent forces in Asia.

While defensive war has always been legitimate, the thesis that a "just war" validates killing also has a very long history, and now has been revived by the ideological crusades of the twentieth-century. The Old Testament sanctioned war against foreign enemies as a legitimate means of achieving independence, securing the boundaries of the state, and establishing domestic peace and tranquillity in order to fulfill the will of God. Indeed, the Hebrews knew that their wars were righteous when they won, but clearly sinful when they lost, since God determined the outcome. Despite this, there was still a strong feeling that war was an abomination, a necessary evil. The prophets Micah and Isaiah foretold that war would disappear as man approached God's purposes.

The ancient Greeks also had a concept of a "just war" which included defense against attack and the restoration of peace and order. The Romans also used these standards and included the vindication of justice as a rationale for going to war. But, as Livy said, "to those to whom war is necessary it is just." At various times, under various heads of state, the Romans tried to distinguish between the innocent and the guilty, and indeed developed a policy that the victor must either exterminate his enemy (as in the case of Carthage) or befriend him—any middle course serves only to irritate him. As a consequence, the Romans offered full citizenship to the conquered peoples, a policy which led to centuries of Roman Peace in the conquered territories, described by Edward Gibbon as a safe but dreary prison.

Writing in the early seventeenth century, Hugo Grotius compiled an impressive list of ancient acts of violence committed against enemies without regard to their civilian status. Grotius deemed these as just, if the war itself had been for a just cause. This concept of the just cause

became Christianized Europe's way of dealing with the proscription, in both the Old and New Testaments, against killing one's fellow man. Augustine defined a "just war" as one which was designed to enhance justice and which excluded atrocity, reprisal, and vengeance.

When the concept of justice came to include love, some theologians carried this to a bizarre conclusion, arguing that only love was a sufficient basis for making war. Some of the motivation for the Spanish Inquisition was also rooted in the theological perception of love. The love for one's fellow's soul demanded that one do what was necessary to save that soul, even if that meant killing its possessor. A modern counterpart is today often found among those who support wars of "liberation" of the downtrodden, which can result in the destruction and devastation of those they are meant to benefit.

As these theses developed, they were accompanied by efforts by the Church to limit violence in war. Thus the number of days during which war might be waged (the Truce of God and the Peace of God) was regulated, as were the classes of persons who might legitimately become combatants. But these rules did not apply to ideological campaigns against unbelievers. Thus, when Pope Urban II called for the First Crusade, in the eleventh Century, he urged his listeners to "wrest that land from the wicked race and subject it to yourselves. That land which, as the scripture says, 'floweth with milk and honey' was given by God into the possession of the children of Israel." He ended that famous sermon at Clermont with the words "God wills it." The Crusades failed, but more to our purposes here, the Christian side of that war was waged completely without respect to any of the admonitions and restrictions that had been so slowly built up over the years.

In Europe, with the rise of absolute monarchy, the integration of the nation-states, and the improvement of technology, wars increased both in frequency and cruelty. There was an attempt, after the Thirty Years War, to codify the rules of conduct among nations, and this served primarily to develop further the concept of the absolute sovereignty of the nation-state. It, and it alone, was the final judge of its own conduct.

The nation-state was seen by some (like Rousseau in the eighteenth century) as the ultimate repository of the general will of the people; by others (the German romanticists of the nineteenth century) as a mystical embodiment of the soul of the people. All accepted the right of the state to make war to achieve its ends. Early at-

tempts at describing what international law should be (as by Emerich de Vattel in the eighteenth century) asserted that the right of the state to make war was in harmony with the law of nature so long as the force used was to defend and preserve natural rights, such as self-defense, retaliation against aggression, or punishment of violators of treaties. Since it is generally accepted among political scientists that all states violate treaties when it is in their interests to do so, such standards allowed each nation to interpret their enemy's violation as a cause for a "just war."

This remained substantially the situation until the first attempts after World War I to create an international organization which would serve to eliminate war. The League of Nations was, as we know, not very successful at that task, primarily since the nation-states lacked basic confidence that any judgment save their own would be in their interests. They refused to surrender any of their sovereignty and retained the right to decide when they wanted to go to war. The United Nations suffers very much under this same handicap, although it has developed a number of international functional organizations which perform many needed tasks.

Do Social Institutions Cause War?

With the rise of the behavioral sciences in the latter part of the nineteenth century, theories about war and conflict began to distinguish more carefully between the two, with war increasingly becoming viewed as conflict expressed in its most extreme form. Conflict was seen as having its own dynamic, not necessarily escalating into war if proper steps were taken in time. Historians and social scientists also began, and continue, to discriminate more carefully between the pretexts for war and the actual reasons and societal forces that have led nations to wage it.

Social critics have long sought to explain how wars have come about. The earliest commentaries have been by the historians, who recorded the causes of wars and their results. Of these, some have seen war as maintaining the established status of nations and the established international order, spreading the culture and institutions of the victor, creating national states, legitimizing government, and playing on the whole rather constructive roles. Others, like Arnold Toynbee, have argued the reverse, that "war has been the proximate cause of the

breakdown of every civilization which is known for certain to have broken down."

The acceptance of war was virtually unchallenged until the Renaissance, when men began to perceive or conjecture that it was possible to question the usefulness of human institutions, and to work to improve them. Philosophers began to dwell upon war as one institution which, from a variety of viewpoints, did not serve human purposes. Emeric Crucé, in the seventeenth century, postulated a world community resulting from the abolition of war and made possible by improved agriculture, industry, commerce, and the practical sciences. Immanual Kant, in the eighteenth century, believed that man had a natural predeliction for stability and order and that the very horrors of war would force a world federation and perpetual peace. Kant, like Machiavelli before him, felt that man could improve his lot through conscious action, a basic tenet of humanism as contrasted to the fatalistic view that all that exists is the result of God's will.

Rousseau believed that society corrupted the naturally good man, and thus made wars possible. The concept that society would prosper when it accorded to nature's laws, and that these were fundamentally benign and pacific, spurred the early English economists to examine the sources and motives of economic dislocations, seeing these as a prime source of war. Later liberal thinkers, like John Stuart Mill, saw protectionist mercantilism as the basic cause of war, and argued for free trade and free markets which would, they claimed, lead to a natural division of labor based on the comparative advantages provided by resources, culture, and skills and would maximize production in all nations, thus leading to increased prosperity for all and hence peace.

In the later nineteenth century, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels argued that it was not mercantilism but capitalism itself (production for profit) that was the major cause of war. They called themselves "scientific socialists" as a means of distinguishing their theories from those they called "utopians" and claimed that from their scientific pinnacle they could see capitalism as merely a temporary, but necessary, stage in the natural evolution of man toward an international cooperative commonwealth. The dynamics of capitalism required ever-expanding markets and exploited labor, creating unrest at home and imperialism abroad. And the competition among capitalist countries for the needed foreign markets and sources of raw materials inevitably

led to war. This would end only when the working classes seized power, introduced socialism, and ended exploitation and imperialism, thereby abolishing the major causes of war and revolution.

Some twentieth-century economists, like Thorstein Veblen and Joseph Schumpeter, saw rising militarism as the main cause of contemporary wars. They viewed militarism as essentially feudal in character and felt that it could not survive in an expanding and prosperous industrialism. On the other hand, William G. Sumner, in the early part of this century, argued that war was a human expression of the immutable Darwinian laws of nature, that it was part of the struggle for existence that permitted only the fittest to survive. Some early sociologically-minded people, like Emile Durkheim, argued that war was functional in that it fostered social cohesion through nationalism. The whole general question of the role of nationalism led to an examination of that phenomenon by Hans Kohn and others, to identify the elements of national mythology, history, and leadership patterns that make for war or peace.

Is Man's Nature Responsible for War?

Since World War I the distinction between combatants and non-combatants has become even more blurred. The bombing of cities, which first occurred in that war, was sharply stepped up, by both sides, in World War II (Coventry, London, Dresden, Hamburg, and Tokyo are examples which preceded the atomic bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki). In wars of "liberation," as in Vietnam, it becomes increasingly difficult to discriminate in the field between the guerrillas, those who shelter them, those terrorized by them, and those who oppose them. All are in the same geographical area, all "look alike," all share the same culture. Add mass weaponry to this mixture, especially from 30,000 feet up, and the non-combatants are bound to be slaughtered.

Possibly as a by-product of this lumping of civilians and military, at any rate concomitant with it, there has also been a retreat from norms that had previously been generally accepted by Europeans for the treatment of their own citizens. Thus we see the introduction of slave labor camps for dissidents, and the taking and killing of hostages and political prisoners. The death camps in Germany during World War II processed the murder of 6 million Jews, a good number of these being Germans and Austrians, as well as millions of non-Jewish citizens

of other countries, including some 3 million Russian prisoners of war, and several million Poles, Slavs and other peoples. Robert Conquest estimates that Stalin's prison camps led to the death of 20 million of his own countrymen, and this reveals much about the strength of modern ideologies, group psychology, and the use of technology within a modern totalitarian society. What makes all this possible? How can human beings be brought to do these things?

Freud postulated a "death wish" innate in all humans, which combines with potent effect with the need to discharge stored aggression, the latter arising inevitably and inescapably from the necessary socialization process which thwarts anti-social infantile desires. Much of the current thinking about these problems stems in one way or another from Freud's theories.

There have also been a number of empirical sociological and anthropological studies by people like Sir James Frazer and Margaret Mead, who examined "primitive" societies in an attempt to discern universal elemental behavior patterns. This whole question of whether human nature is itself a cause for violence and war has led to a new school of thought which sees war as an expression of innate human aggressiveness, a school well known through the work of Konrad Lorenz and Robert Ardrey.

Lorenz says "Unreasonable and unreasoning human nature causes two nations to compete, though no economic necessity compels them to do so; it induces two political parties or religions with amazingly similar programs of salvation to fight each other bitterly, and impels an Alexander or Napoleon to sacrifice millions of lives in his attempts to unite the world under his scepter." Lorenz's theory of innate aggression seeks to explain this by describing this trait as essential to survival of the species, having been developed slowly during the course of evolution. Ardrey has carried this somewhat further and wider, through his popular writings, stressing man's instinct to fight to preserve "territoriality," that is, an area under his control.

But most anthropologists disagree strongly. Alexander Alland argues that human aggression must be separated from war, that the two are different phenomena, that theories about aggression postulate that man is by nature self-destructive, while the fact is that he is neither good nor bad. Man is not driven by instincts but is born with a set of capacities and potentials which are

A drawing by Robert Osborn from Missile Madness by Herbert Scoville and Robert Osborn, published by Houghton Mifflin has been omitted here because of copyright restrictions.

developed or thwarted by early learning and acculturation. Man can go either way.

David Pilbean points out that in those contemporary hunting societies that are still primitive, relations between bands of humans are amiable, and individual relations are cooperative and based on reciprocity. Some researchers argue that violent aggressive behavior was unknown in man's "natural" state as a hunter, and that under normal conditions in the wild, neither apes nor men resort, except rarely, to violence against their own species.

Some social psychologists and psychoanalysts, like Robert Jay Lifton, are trying to probe into human aggression as manifested in group violence and murder. Experimental psychologists are measuring and assessing the significance of fear, frustration, and ego identification in relation to the psychological mechanisms of displacement, ambivalence, projection, and scapegoating in influencing human behavior. Much of this work is very recent and unknown to the public. There is much disagreement as to whether a "fighting instinct" exists, and at the present time those researchers who believe that violence is biologically determined are clearly in the minority.

What Must We Know?

The conclusions emerging from these sociological, biological, and anthropological studies are as contradictory as those arising from economic, political, and historical deductions. Is there a relationship between war and a human instinct for aggression? Do humans have such an instinct for aggression? It seems clear that there are not now any reliable answers to these questions. And it is also clear to those who have devoted extended time to the study of war as a human institution that its existence cannot be explained in simplistic single-cause terms.

We know that in modern societies, and in the past as well, that relatively few men actually make the decision on whether or not to go to war. The Pentagon Papers reviewed in detail the arguments for the war in Vietnam as presented by those responsible for the decisions. Any reading would fail to disclose much aggressive instinct being revealed. Rather there was a cool rationality, a measuring of goals against cost, and reliance as well on computerized systems analysis. Stored aggression, within the American people as a whole, may have made

that war acceptable, but it does not seem to have been a cause.

But even if we postulate this instinct for aggression, we know that war is not the only outlet for the conflict that may arise from the expression of that aggression. We know that cultural systems define and regulate the circumstances under which conflict is carried out, and provide guidelines for legitimate forms which such conflict may take. While this is true for internal conflicts within the nation-state, there are fewer cues and certainly fewer rules for dealing with human beings in other nations and cultures.

We also know that when there is war, humane, religious, and legal proscriptions break down quickly. Public opinion easily accepts brutalities and violations of the rules of war if these are presented as unavoidable by-products of military necessity, or if they are seen as vital to survival. There have recently been some very interesting experiments and depth interviews testing the strength of the obligation to obey orders. On the whole, these reveal that that obligation seems to be so strong as to overcome the normal distaste involved in inflicting pain on other human beings.

There is not much disagreement that competition and conflict are inevitable, certainly at least so long as humans have differing goals and so long as desired values and resources are in short supply. The prime question is whether these can be resolved only by violence. If the answer is in the negative, then what alternative means for channeling aggression can be institutionalized by society, to replace the existing institution of war?

Norman Cousins has said "it is not enough to shudder over bloated bodies floating up on a beach, or of maggotted corpses piled up like cork wood. All the poetic fervor in the world against war will not abolish it if we do not understand how wars begin and how peace can be made." War and war preparations have influenced the lives of every American and have exacted an exorbitant price. According to Seymour Melman, the economic cost of preparing for war, just for the United States and the Soviet Union from 1946 to 1971, is about $1,500 billion, a capital sum which could provide an annual income which could have financed indefinitely world economic development at a rate many times that now being expended by those two nations for foreign aid. The United States alone during this period has committed more to its military budget than the total present value of all residential structures within its borders. This

is an economic price we pay in addition to the human horrors that war entails.

The ultimate fate of human survival in this nuclear age may rest on three slender reeds: how well we understand the lessons of our past (our history); how well we understand the nature and culture of man (our psychological/biological heritage); and how well we can express our concerns through our institutions (our society and our government). The history and philosophy of war, the sociology and psychology of man, and the dynamics of the democratic nation-state each presents a vantage point from which profound questions can be asked about the nature and causes of conflict and war.

We can ask whether it is ever justified to kill another human being; whether democracies are less prone to war and atrocities than dictatorships; whether man's biological or sociological nature makes war inevitable; whether our economic system, or anyone else's, is really based on war; whether there are better ways to achieve reasonable and desirable national security than the present balance of arms and terror; whether social justice and national liberation can be achieved without recourse to violence and violent revolution; and whether, ultimately, man's loyalties and concern for his fellow men can be extended beyond national boundaries in a way that obviates the need for war.

In short, we can ask what our sophisticated students are now asking. Such questions make for more than relevant teaching—they make for serious learning. The hypotheses of war/peace researchers can be integral to such education. Some of these are now studying alternatives to contemporary national policies, alternatives that are global in scope, futuristic in perspective, and transdisciplinary in content. They involve concepts of governance heretofore not seriously considered. Others are studying small group behavior in stressful situations, like the Robbers Cave Experiment treated in Chapter 3 of this book.

This research can add a substantial dimension to traditional courses in history and international politics. Our schools are now sufficiently advanced in interdisciplinary studies to investigate the roots of war with scholarship and objectivity, and without apology. This book attempts to provide teachers with a few insights into this work, with bibliographic references for those who wish to undertake further exploration.

One of President John F. Kennedy's favorite stories is about French Marshal Lyautey's gardener, who sought

to put off the persistent Marshal by reminding him that the trees he wanted planted would not flower for 100 years. "In that case," the Marshal replied, "plant them this afternoon."

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COLUMNS ALONG THE WAY

2

THE MEANING AND CONTROL OF CONFLICT: FROM PLAYGROUND FIGHTS TO DOOMSDAY WAR

WILLIAM A. NESBITT

Over a hundred years ago Clausewitz referred to war as "a conflict of great interests which is settled by bloodshed, and only in that is it different from others." The great Prussian military thinker, writing long before the weapons of warfare could reduce civilization to radioactive rubble, used words with a very modern ring. Contemporary social scientists agree that war is an expression of conflict, the highest on a scale of violence and scope. Clearly, there are significant similarities between conflicts over great interests and others—and even playground fights may tell us something about how to avoid doomsday war.

This chapter is an attempt to suggest aspects of conflict, and its control, that may have particular meaning for social studies teachers. The emphasis will be upon the nature of group conflict at various levels, including war. Although practical exercises for classroom teaching about conflict will be offered, the principal objective will be to provide the teacher with a kind of traveling concept kit that can be hauled out for examining conflict situations and the means of coping with them, as a doctor uses his medicine kit. Put differently, it is hoped that the overview of conflict theory will help to cue the teacher to teaching possibilities, whether in a history, psychology, or sociology course, or wherever conflict can properly become a subject for study.

It is important to understand that conflict and conflict resolution is a field in which there is considerable disagreement among scholars, and this accounts for the frequent use of hedging phrases, such as "some authorities would say" and "perhaps" or "may." The subject is also highly interdisciplinary, and draws upon sociology, psychology, political science, and history. Consequently, these few pages can only touch upon a few of the propositions subsumed under the concept of conflict, and the teacher may feel it desirable to read some of the works suggested in the bibliography that follows. And even there, a caveat is in order; the bibliography includes only a sampling of a vast literature.

Universality

It would be difficult to find a word that better characterizes human affairs than conflict. Today, the high divorce rate, racial tensions, the generation gap, women's liberation movements, and labor strikes are but a few of the indications of conflict within American society. At the international level, a long and bitter war has at last ended, but peace in Southeast Asia is still uncertain, conflict is always on the verge of violence in the Middle East, and Catholics and Protestants fight in Ireland. Potentially most serious of all, the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union signifies a continuing Cold War conflict, despite SALT agreements and President Nixon's trip to Russia.

The past reveals no Golden Age when men were satisfied and at peace. Indeed, history seems to be largely the chronicle of violent conflict. Wars, revolutions, riots, assassinations, and the like take up a large share of the pages of history texts; and much of what remains is about conflict without war—the struggle of groups for equality and civil rights; of labor for a larger share of income; of political parties for power; or of nations for influence, markets, a place in the sun.

Men have long projected a future time when conflict would end. Marxist philosophers envision a peaceful world with the triumph of the proletariat and the ushering in of a classless, hence conflict-free society. Others have dreamed of utopias or the City of God on earth when men are naturally good and strife is ended. But given present trends, even an optimistic view of the immediate future promises more, not less, conflict. The rising expectations of the poor and powerless, within and between nations, threatens massive violence, since

the projected shortages of food and natural resources can worsen the conflict between haves and have-nots. A growing sense of identity of ethnic groups, especially in the Third World, may result in many Nigerias, inviting intervention by the great powers. Ideology and nationalism may further polarize the world into competing armed camps. It is perhaps an understatement that Roy Price and his colleagues at Syracuse in "Major Concepts for Social Studies" observed that "conflict has been a powerful, if not the MOST powerful, force structuring the world of today."

Levels of Conflict

Conflict has long been an important word in the lexicon of many teachers. For example, we may speak of Johnny being in conflict with himself, meaning that he is torn between two courses of action or feelings, or English teachers may refer to the conflict in a story and may mean that the hero must cope with difficulties in the natural environment. But such intrapersonal conflict and man-nature conflict is outside the province of our present concern. By conflict we here refer to those occurring between people—social conflict. However, as will be seen below, intrapersonal conflict can motivate an individual to engage in conflict with others; and, if such a person were a national leader with his finger on the nuclear red button, the result could be disastrous for mankind.

Dean Rusk used to say about negotiations, "It takes two to tango." Similarly, we can say that it takes two to engage in conflict. Social conflict is generally defined as involving two or more parties in a process of interaction; that is, the individuals or groups must be in direct or indirect contact. Conflict, then, involves communication; indeed, it may bring the parties into some relation with each other, whereas before the conflict they had no contact at all. The parties may be individuals (interpersonal conflict); or they may be small or large groups (intergroup conflict). And the groups may be as large as nations or groups of nations (international conflict). An individual, of course, may be a party to conflicts at all levels. For example, a man may be in conflict with his wife, in conflict with his employer as a member of a labor union, and as a citizen, a party to an international conflict, all at the same time.

It may be laboring the obvious to delineate levels of conflict, but these can have important implications for

the social studies teacher. Examples of interpersonal conflicts that are familiar to children may be used by the teacher to get at types of conflict at larger, more complicated, more remote levels—such as the international. There are dangers, to be sure, in suggesting that a fight on the playground is like one between nations. Such personalization can lead to a serious oversimplification of how peace might be achieved. Still, Johnny's fight with Jimmy might enable the youngsters to understand better at least some aspects of conflict, such as the meaning of escalation and the role of some kinds of misperception (see below).

Towards a Definition of Conflict

Wherever people are in contact with one another, their interrelationship could be placed somewhere along a scale between total conflict (as in a fight to the finish, no holds barred) and total cooperation (as with a couple deeply in love). Pure conflict or pure cooperation happens but rarely, and most relationships are somewhere in the middle of the scale; that is, neither particularly conflictual nor cooperative.

But at what point during the interaction of two parties can we say that a conflict has begun? Many authorities on conflict would say that it has not occurred until the parties are aware of it. A mistreated and deprived group may have reasons for conflict with their oppressors, but there is no conflict until the parties take conscious action. For example, serfs on a medieval manor or slaves on a Southern plantation in the early nineteenth century cannot be said to have been in conflict with their owners until they refused to accept their lot and took overt action. While the reasons for conflict were there, the two parties lived in harmony.

What kind of behavior is involved in conflict? Generally, scholars maintain that conflict is present when action taken by the parties is intended to damage, thwart, or control the other. The interests or goals of the parties, then, are incompatible. What one has, the other wants, and the success of one is the loss of the other. It helps to think of the interaction in terms of game theory. Conflict is like a zero-sum game in which the points the winner receives are, in effect, subtracted from the loser. Kenneth Boulding refers to this as the Duchess' Law, in which Alice in *Alice in Wonderland* is given the moral by the Duchess, "The more there is of mine, the less there is of yours." One of the best known

authorities on conflict, social psychologist Muzafer Sherif, in his book *In Common Predicament,* has summed up the cake-dividing attitude in conflict as follows: "Two or more groups that transact with one another, directly or indirectly, will be competing with, disliking, and eventually fighting one another if winning a goal desired by one party amounts to loss for the other group(s)."

Conflict involves the pursuit of goals by one party that are threatened or blocked by another. What kind of goals do men pursue that lead to conflict? On the interpersonal level they may be as trivial as the use of the family car, or at the international level as large as control of a continent. In both these cases, something tangible is involved. Or, conflict may be "small" in that it is over the status of a student with his peers, or large in that it involves the honor of a nation—in which instances something intangible is at stake.

Conflict is often said to be about something in short supply, whether about a girl whose affections are sought by two boys, or about oil in the Middle East. We can also think of intangibles, such as personal prestige or being the number-one country in the world, as goals of conflict. Sometimes the distinction between the tangible and intangible is referred to by the words "resources" and "positions." As one study put it, "Conflict relations always involve attempts to gain control of scarce resources and positions."

One of the most comprehensive and meaningful definitions is provided by Robert North of Stanford's Conflict and Integration Studies Center:

> A conflict emerges whenever two or more persons seek to possess the same object, occupy the same (physical or status) space, play the same role, maintain incompatible goals or undertake mutually incompatible means for achieving their purposes, and so forth. Whenever one party says "yes" and another party says "no," one says "faster" and the other "slower," one says "left" and the other says "right," one says "good" and the other says "bad," there is an issue for conflict.

Kinds of Conflict

Most, if not all, conflicts have something to do with values, depending upon how we define both conflict and values. Conflicts are about something, even if only in the minds of the parties. As has been seen, the something

may be tangible or intangible. In the now vast literature about values in social studies education, there are almost as many definitions of values as there are people who have written about them. Values are variously referred to as goals, ideals, things for which men strive, beliefs and norms, what has worth, what is admired, what people desire, moral principles, ground rules for morality and conduct, etc.

It is clear that men have sought or fought to defend, even to death, great principles; such as liberty or a set of values that can be labelled democracy or communism. But they have also sacrificed themselves for a piece of property. An individual at age 16 might place a very high value upon a motorcycle, to which his fearful parents might object, thus contributing to the furtherance of the generation gap. A husband who highly values a vacation camping in the Adirondacks may conflict with, even separate from, his wife, whose ideal vacation is going to the theater in New York. Recently, two men fought and one died over a place in line while waiting in a department store for their children to see Santa Claus.

Before attempting to clarify the role of values in conflict, it is important to distinguish between value conflicts within an individual and values about which men and groups conflict. Most often social studies education is concerned with the problem caused when one value held by someone conflicts with another value held by someone else. For example, the value of the right to hold private property may conflict with the value of equal opportunity of races to live where they wish; or the value of majority rule may conflict with that of the rights of a minority.

In considering types of values involved in a conflict, it is useful to consider values more broadly than is commonly done in social studies. For the sake of discussion, we may borrow the definition and part of the typology given by Ted Robert Gurr in *Why Men Rebel*, which, as the title suggests, is concerned with conflict. He states that "values are the goal objects of human motivation" or "the desired events, objects, and conditions for which men strive."

Gurr first discusses what he calls "welfare values," such as "food, shelter, health services, and physical comforts—and the development and use of physical and mental abilities." In a cross-nation survey to determine about what people were most concerned, Hadley Cantril found that material values were highest. At least 60 per cent of the people surveyed expressed hopes and fears

about the basic economic essentials of life. Only in three advanced Western nations was the greatest concern about something else—health.

Another category identified by Gurr is "power values." While he subsumes a number of personal goals here, those values most related to conflict involve participation by people in decision-making in matters of concern to them, and security from undue interference in their lives. The Cantril study found that people around the world were more concerned by far about war than any other single problem affecting their country. And it is a hypothesis worth serious attention that the quest for national security through armaments arouses fears in potential enemies who, in turn, build ever larger armed forces. Certainly an arms race was a factor in causing World War I and has fueled the Cold War. The thwarted desire for participation in the political process has long been a factor in conflict; note the great revolutions of the past 200 years, and Hungary and Czechoslovakia since World War II. At the present time, in the United States and elsewhere, such participation is an important factor in conflict involving women's liberation and the movement for Black and other minority rights; and the future may bring increasing conflict by groups denied a role in the decision-making that affects their perceived vital interests.

A third category of values is concerned with status and prestige, which, as Gurr states, involves "fears about discrimination and inequality, and fears of social injustice." These two concepts, while not synonymous, are closely related. While there is no need to define the terms here, we may say that the higher the status the higher the prestige. Conflict often emerges from status aspiration of lower groups and classes in the social structure, who often constitute a threat to a higher class that controls most of the welfare and power values. It is not necessary to agree with Karl Marx that the dialectic of history is essentially rooted in class conflict to realize that status is often present in social conflict, whether we are talking about the French Revolution or racial conflict in many parts of the world today. Also, declining status, as in the case of the middle class in post-World War I Germany, can lead to great frustration and conflict.

We may also speak of status and prestige as important values for nations and a source of conflictual behavior. National leaders often express fears of their nations being humiliated or reduced to second-class powers, or

of their desire to be second to none. Prestige and status among the great powers was an important reason for Austria-Hungary's aggressive behavior in July 1914, and American leaders have been accused of continuing the war in Vietnam over questions of prestige. The continuing inferior status of the largely nonwhite Third World, in terms of welfare and power values, has been considered as a potentially explosive situation for world peace in the future.

Fred W. Newmann and Donald W. Oliver in *Clarifying Public Controversy* have given the name "creed values" to a fourth category. While these authors are concerned entirely with American creed values, those "to which most Americans would proclaim allegiance and commitment," their list is suggestive: "the worth and dignity of the individual, equality, inalienable rights to life, liberty, property, and pursuit of happiness, consent of the governed, majority rule, rule of law, due process of law, community and national welfare, and rights to freedom of speech, press, religion, assembly, and private association." These values are an integral part of the American political system, embodied in the law and constitution. Newmann and Oliver also cite a number of values that most Americans would hold, although these are less "constitutionally oriented," including charity, competition and rugged individualism, compromise, loyalty, and perseverance and hard work.

Such creed values largely make up what can be called the American ideology. Similar lists could be made up for other countries to determine their creed values. At the present time it would appear that those nations whose creed values are most different and, at the same time, whose material and military resources are great, are most in conflict with the United States. While opposed creed values were no insurmountable obstacle to the American-Russian alliance during World War II, still, in analyzing the causes of conflict, it is important to identify conflicting values, along with those that are shared. In the case of China, or the Soviet Union, the list might include the primacy of the larger community over the individual, the means of production owned and controlled by the state, individual freedoms circumscribed by the party and severely limited in the interest of solidarity, etc.

Some scholars would add national images to creed values in constructing a national ideology. Images include those of the nation itself and world views formed through past experiences and the socialization process,

education, the media, etc. This ideology and the inevitable ethnocentrism and misperception involved in images of self and others are important factors in international conflict.

To categorize various types of value conflicts is to perform a Procrustean operation. Some values do not neatly fit under a particular label and could as well be placed in another. Most importantly, to distinguish between values involved in conflict should not imply that they are unrelated. Welfare and power values, for example, are often closely interrelated with creed values. How societies determine the distribution of material resources and power is an important aspect of creeds that claim, in the words of Newmann and Oliver, "that something is good, right, should or ought to be." A decline or unfulfilled expectation of welfare and power values can cause a rejection of creed values in favor of an ideology that offers more promise. When a society cannot meet the basic functional needs and goals of its people, in time its fundamental precepts will be questioned and, perhaps, rejected. Even a country as rich as the United States is aware of the erosion of creed values. Intensified teaching of loyalty to the traditional values does not seem to be the answer; rather, it is necessary to give deprived groups access to welfare values and participation in the political process. If we consider the Third World, where huge populations lived under colonial systems until recently, the competition of creeds to achieve welfare and power values is obvious. The conflict that is a concomitant of such competition may result in endemic violence in the future.

As has been seen, value conflicts are about "something," whether tangible or intangible. Such conflicts can be realistic and objective; that is, they really are about something. To put it another way, realistic conflict is instrumental; it is a means to achieve some desired value controlled by the other side, or one that is threatened from another party. Conflict, however, can often be about something that is really not "out there" but stems from emotional needs, misperception of reality, or ignorance. To understand when conflict is unrealistic is of enormous importance, whether at the interpersonal or international level.

We are all familiar with the individual who has a chip on his shoulder or is spoiling for a fight. In a famous cartoon by Peter Arno in the *New Yorker* several years ago, a man standing at the end of the bar shouted to his fellow patrons, "I hate everybody, irrespective of race,

creed, color or national origin." We can surmise that there was no issue involved; that he was expressing his general feelings. If a fight ensued, it resulted from his need to vent feelings, to displace hostility upon a convenient object. In such cases, Lewis Coser states, it is "in the aggressive means and not in the result that satisfaction is sought." Groups, too, may release tensions upon innocent substitutes—scapegoats—as did many Germans upon Jews in the Nazi period.

Man's instincts, evolved in millions of years of biological development, have been considered as the source of much violent conflict. Konrad Lorenz in *On Aggression* speaks of a "fighting instinct" in man directed against members of his own species. William Golding's *Lord of the Flies,* widely used in high-school English classes, suggests that humans, when freed from the constraints of their culture, will revert to their "natural" state as bloodthirsty savages. Stanley Kubrick spoke of Alex and the violent youths in his film *A Clockwork Orange* as symbols of "man in his natural state, the way he would be if society did not impose its 'civilizing' processes upon him." The play *Lion in Winter* reflects a popular feeling about the causes of war when Eleanor of Aquitaine says to her son John, "We're the origins of war. Not history's forces nor the times nor justice nor lack of it nor causes nor religions nor ideas nor kinds of government nor any other thing. We are the killers; we breed war. We carry it, like syphilis, inside." A survey by Louis Harris and associates in 1968 found that 58 per cent of the American people believe that "human nature being what it is, there must always be war and conflict."

Whether man has an aggressive instinct or not is still an open question; certainly, most men display a capacity for violent behavior under certain circumstances. But the evidence is that nurture is more important than nature. As psychiatrist Jerome Frank put it:

> . . . in any society the ways in which impulses to violence and sex find expression depend more on social norms, customs, and traditions than on innate factors. Just as innate coital patterns tell us nothing about courtship behavior, innate patterns of biting, scratching and kicking have nothing to do with pulling the trigger of a gun. To conclude that because patterns of violence are innate, war is inevitable would be as specious as to conclude that because certain sexual behavior patterns are innate, temple prostitution is inevitable.

Dr. Frank calls attention to another important way of characterizing types of conflict—whether they are institutionalized or not. A barroom brawl or a race riot are examples of conflict situations that are not part of an institution. They are relatively spontaneous and disorganized, lacking leadership, legitimacy, and legal authority. By contrast, a strike by organized labor takes place under laws adopted by legislative acts, with the protection of the courts and the police. Of course, a wildcat strike would be non-institutional. War is a prime example of an institutional conflict since it is conducted by the institution of the nation-state and even recognized by international law. On the other hand, a border raid by guerrillas unauthorized by the state from which they came would be non-institutional.

Even if man is innately aggressive, it does not seem very useful or fruitful to postulate that war exists to provide an outlet for an instinct. But analysis of the concept of unrealistic conflict does provide some insight into the sources of war, sources that can be substantiated with historical data. One such source is false information. The spiralling of the nuclear arms race in the early 1960's, for example, was based to a large degree on erroneous intelligence reports that a dangerous missile gap existed in favor of the Soviet Union. The Bay of Pigs landing was attempted because information, immediately proved totally false, indicated that Cubans would rise in favor of the invaders against Castro.

Information may be received by an individual but its meaning may be misinterpreted or misperceived. Johnny, for example, may observe his girl in animated conversation with Jimmy at a dance and think that Jimmy is trying to "make time," when in fact all that Jimmy is doing is talking about what a great guy Johnny is. On the international scale, what is intended as a defensive act of one nation (such as the Russian mobilization in July 1914) may be misperceived by the other side as offensive. Misperception tends to become more pronounced when a crisis is escalating, and will be discussed in that context below.

Another possible source of nonrealistic conflict stems from behavior by a leader out of concern for his self-image as a person of strength, virility, and virtue. Key decision-makers tend to identify themselves closely with their nations, and may meet challenges to their self-image as though they were threats to the nation—or vice versa. Both the Kaiser and the Czar in July 1914 clearly countered their own fears and self-doubts with

A drawing by Robert Osborn from Missile Madness by Herbert Scoville and Robert Osborn, published by Houghton Mifflin has been omitted here because of copyright restrictions.

aggressive decisions, lest they be seen personally as weak and indecisive. Recently, critics of both President Johnson and President Nixon have argued that continuation of the clearly unpopular war in Indochina was to preserve presidential self-image (President Johnson had said that he did not want to be the "first American president to lose a war").

The influence of past experiences may also be an important factor in nonrealistic conflict. Individuals may react because of early childhood experiences, and nations because of their historic past. Many Americans saw Great Britain as a threat long after the reasons for conflict, arising from the American Revolution and the War of 1812, had largely disappeared. The bitterness between France and Germany after World War I persisted to the disadvantage of both in meeting postwar problems. And it may be that continuing conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States has elements of unreality in view of the common interests of both superpowers in coping with world environmental and survival problems and with domestic needs. An image, albeit exaggerated, may be suggestive: two enemies may continue fighting on a sinking ship, their common superordinate goal of survival ignored.

Conflict and Competition

Some scholars would distinguish between conflict and competition. As we have said, conflict involves an effort to injure or impede the other party which threatens or controls some value, and hostility is often present. Competition emphasizes the striving for a scarce prize or resource that neither side controls. The primary object in competition is the prize, not the damage or control of the opponent. In competition, the means tend to follow some rules, whether established in law or custom and enforced or tacitly agreed upon and adhered to. A football game or a prize fight are obvious examples. Indeed, if there were no competitors, then there would be no prizes.

Other forms of competition may not be so obvious. In business, for example, one company may attempt to get as much of the market as it can from its competitor—but the market is not under the control of the opponent. And usually business competition conforms to rules or laws established by government. Also, the market is not seen as static, a pie to be divided so that one's gain is another's loss. The market can be expanded

and, as in the case of Avis and Hertz, the competition can actually benefit both sides.

It should be pointed out that even in the most virulent form of conflict—war—there are at least some rules, whether because of respect for international law or fear of retaliation. Prisoners are generally not summarily shot, and not all available weapons are used. In a playground fight, certain norms are usually observed, such as not hitting below the belt. It is also important to realize that conflict has a binding effect; it brings parties together in "a common predicament," as Muzafer Sherif has said. Even a total war may result in working out ways to reconcile the former enemies, as happened after World War II between the Allied Powers and Germany and Japan.

Competition, as any sports enthusiast knows, can lead to conflict in which the rules are forgotten and the goal ceases to be a prize. Hockey matches and football games especially can turn into fights where the injury of an opponent is sought. International economic competition can also become conflictual, as happened in the period of imperialism before World War I. Even the competition for a political office can lead to serious conflict between the candidates; for example, when Bella Abzug ran for the nomination of a New York Congressional district against her old friend and fellow democrat, William F. Ryan, the *New York Times* reported in the middle of the race, "They are no longer speaking to each other, and their public statements, in which they refer to each other more in sorrow than in anger, are likely to become harsher as the campaign progresses."

Social Conditions for Conflict

So long as men differ in their values, interests, beliefs, and perceptions of each other and reality, there will be conflict. But under what conditions are large-scale, violent conflicts most likely to occur? To try to answer such a question is to discuss the reasons men rebel or go to war—a task beyond the scope of this inquiry and, perhaps, beyond man's present knowledge. Here we may take up several social conditions for conflict, useful to teachers of history and social studies.

First, there is evidence that conflict is more likely to occur in societies experiencing rapid, profound social change. Urbanization, population increase, high social mobility, technological development and other factors in growth generally mean more social instability and con-

flict. In the developed nations there are some means for institutionalizing conflict and keeping it short of large-scale violence. Whether in the future violent conflict can be kept to tolerable levels is open to question. Alvin Toffler uses the expression "future shock" to refer to a degree of change in the "advanced" nations so pronounced that the effect is a "shattering stress and disorientation" upon individuals. If such trends continue, conflict of all kinds will surely worsen.

In developing nations, the process of modernization has resulted in conflict at all levels: at the intrapersonal, for example, in the conflict between following the old, traditional ways and values and the new; at the interpersonal, as sons and daughters become "modern" and "citified" and break with their families. There is statistical evidence that intergroup violent conflict tends to be significantly higher in developing nations—tribe against tribe in some African nations, peasant versus landlord, labor versus management, etc.

Conflict may be more likely, of course, in societies in which there are religious or ethnic groups and social classes which feel that they are not receiving a "fair shake." Put differently, when men feel a discrepancy between "their real state of affairs and the preferred state of affairs," as Robert North put it, they will attempt to close the gap. Gurr, in *Why Men Rebel*, similarly sees a major source of political violence and revolutionary movements in the gap between what people expect in values and what they are realistically capable of getting—what he calls relative deprivation. Certainly it is now easier for word to get around in the "global village" through mass media, direct observation, word of mouth, and education that other people are leading a better life than oneself. When the poor, for example, perceive themselves as deprived and when others, by the accident of birth or opportunity, have what the poor want or thwart what are viewed as justifiable expectations, there are the makings of conflict.

A number of writers, including Barbara Ward, have been calling attention to the alarming gap between rich and poor, both within countries and between. The upper 20 per cent of the population in such countries as Ceylon, Colombia, India, and Mexico, to name only a few, receives over 59 per cent of the national income. In India it is over 64 per cent. In such countries, the bottom 40 per cent of the population receives only between 10 and 15 per cent of the national income. For example, in Pakistan before the independence of Bangladesh, 66 per

cent of industrial capital and more than 80 per cent of banking were in the hands of 20 families. While the gross national product there had been growing at an impressive 5 per cent annually, most people were not better off than decades before. In fact, average daily calorie consumption had declined. Even in the United States, with one of the healthiest income distributions, the upper 20 per cent receives about 41 per cent of the national income and the bottom 40 per cent about 17 per cent. Relative deprivation theory suggests that violent conflict may become increasingly widespread unless income is more equitably distributed.

Barbara Ward, Gunnar Myrdal, and others see the growing gap between rich and poor nations as a source of large-scale violence in the future. Per capita gross national product for the rich quarter of the world's population ranges up from $2,000 per year and promises to rise to over $5,000 by the year 2000. Average per capita gross national product in the poor half of the world is less than $200 per year and, at the assumed average annual growth rate of 3 per cent, will reach only about $400 by the year 2000. Of course, income and gross national product discrepancies are only one indicator of gaps in many areas. Gurr's welfare values—food, shelter, health services, and physical comforts—are proportionately maldistributed. By the year 2000, United States per capita public health expenditure should reach about $300; in the poor half, perhaps $3. There will be about 2,000 physicians per million of the population in the United States by 2000, but no more than 300 per million in the poor half. Infant mortality will still be about three times higher in the poor half than in the rich quarter. To these economic and welfare discrepancies must be added another important factor in possible conflict. Most of the poor half of the world is nonwhite, while the rich quarter is largely white (Japan being the major exception). Barbara Ward has predicted large-scale violence and war around the year 2000 across not only economic but racial lines.

One other social condition for conflict might be mentioned here. Some authorities have seen power differentials as an important source of conflict. If power is defined as the extent to which men can influence the actions of others or prevent unwanted actions from taking place, most of the peoples of the world are powerless. The poor, ethnic, and religious groups may seek the right to participation in or control of decision-making and, in many cases, the power to change the system by

which resources are distributed. Those with power, if history provides lessons, will seek to retain the status quo.

Conflict as Process

Conflict is not something that happens at a single moment in time. Rather, it is a process of interaction between two or more parties. While many conflicts may remain stable or be resolved by peaceful means, others may spiral into violence. It is of crucial importance in the study of conflict to understand the dynamics of such escalation. The following description of what tends to happen in the process of escalation of conflict applies mainly to the international level, although some of the dynamics may apply to other conflict situations as well.

When two parties are in conflict, one may take action, which it perceives as necessary and justifiable, to which the other reacts, often with more stringent measures. The reaction will produce a counter action, etc., with each new level of the spiralling process seen as "defensive." H. L. Nieburg has called this process "push-push, push-kill." Increasingly, the responses by the other side rather than the original issues in conflict will be seen as justifying the escalation. Along with the action-reaction process, attitudes of distrust, suspicion, fear, and then hatred develop apace. Each party becomes more willing to believe the worst of the other. Once only rivals, they may become dehumanized enemies, against whom any weapons are morally acceptable.

During the escalation spiral, the tendency is for communication to break down. "Messages" received by each party are distorted; that is, each selectively perceives the other side according to its own increasingly biased images. Enemies tend to see each other in stereotyped ways. They "filter out" information that might contradict what they want to see and actions are interpreted as fulfilling the more pessimistic expectations. As the psychologists put it, parties in conflict may see their prophecies fulfilled. Also, the increasing stress under which the parties labor causes them to notice fewer options for achieving any objectives; the parties suffer from "tunnel vision." The conflict has become increasingly nonobjective in respect to initial goals, and the methods used become less instrumental to achieving realistic ends.

This description of an escalating conflict is theoretical. But examples abound, many familiar to the student in his daily life and through his study of history. Johnny

pushes Jimmy because of an incident in the lunch room, and Jimmy pushes him back harder, etc. The "push-push" process does not often result in "push-kill," but the dynamics of escalation apply even to the very young. Street gang "warfare" provides an example of aspects of the process that are strikingly similar to what happens among nations. One of the best historical examples is the situation of July 1914, leading up to the outbreak of World War I. This, in fact, has been called the prototype of the escalating process, with virtually every element discussed above involved. The assassination of the Archduke justified Austria-Hungary's actions against Serbia. These, in turn, provoked the "defensive" mobilization of Russia, which "necessitated" the mobilization and declaration of war by Germany. As Ralph K. White indicated in *Nobody Wanted War,* both sides in the conflict engaged in tragic misperceptions of the other. They saw their own behavior as highly moral and justified, the enemy's as immoral and unjustified. One side's defensive action was perceived by the other as offensive; etc. As the crisis developed, the alliance systems tended to lose sight of the goals they were seeking and the crisis itself provided sufficient cause for new levels of escalation. The war that ensued destroyed three empires and resulted in problems for the European powers far more serious than those that ostensibly "caused" its outbreak.

Effects of Conflict

World War I is a prime modern example of how destructive conflict can be—perhaps 30 million war-attributable deaths, hundreds of billions of dollars of damage to property, mountains of irreplaceable resources lost, authoritarian regimes established in most countries of Eastern Europe, and a generation demoralized. World War I also provides an example of how a spiralling conflict can have unexpected results. It is not true to say that "nobody wanted war." Many, especially among the military, did desire a war, at least a small one. But very few anticipated the war they got. Similarly, if a war were to develop out of a crisis between the nuclear superpowers, it is possible that few would foresee a catastrophic result, at least during the early stages of the escalation.

But conflict need not lead to massive violence to produce negative results. The Cold War, for example, has been costing over $170 billion in arms annually and diverting badly needed human and material resources

from domestic problems and Third World development. Moreover, the arms race has not produced security for either side; rather it has exacerbated tensions that have further increased the arms burden.

Small-scale conflicts without overt violence can also produce results that seem to benefit no one. When the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the New York Mets baseball team announced the results of a two-week strike in the spring of 1972, he said, "Everybody recognizes that nobody won." Labor-management conflict can bankrupt an industry, benefitting neither side. Racial conflict can result in bitterness and backlash, from which nobody gains.

Even in the more deadly conflicts of the past, there may be, however, beneficial effects over the long run. It should be understood that "beneficial" is a highly value-laden word. What is a positive function of a conflict for one person, group, or country may not be for another; it depends upon the eyes of the beholder. Also, whether the same, or even better, effects could have been produced by less violent means is another question. It has been said, for instance, that the North could have bought the freedom of every slave in the South at a fraction of the financial cost of fighting the Civil War. But was this option open to Northern leaders in the 1850's? Still, the Civil War did result in ending slavery, as well as establishing eventually a more durable union. The French Revolution brought about in the long run a more egalitarian society while the American Revolution led to the establishment of a democratic United States. Even from the massive destruction of World War II, there emerged a United Nations, a more united Europe, a democratic Japan and Germany, etc. The often bloody conflicts of labor and management in American history resulted finally in the establishment of rules and institutions for settling labor disputes without resort to violence. And the conflict between Blacks and Whites since World War II has brought about improvement in the economic and social position of Blacks. Perhaps most important of all, racial conflict has called attention to injustice and caused Americans to reexamine values expressed in the Declaration of Independence and Constitution.

Although conflict, even in its violent forms, can function to bring about desirable changes in society, much depends upon the cost of conflict in relation to its effects. Certainly it would be difficult to envision a nuclear holocaust as having any positive effects that would outweigh the cost. Nevertheless, as Lewis Coser wrote in

The Functions of Social Conflict, "Conflict . . . revitalizes existent norms and creates a new framework of norms within which the contenders can struggle." Or, as H. L. Nieburg said in *Political Violence,* conflict "constitutes a great force in keeping things loose, capable of adaptation and adjustment, ready to endure other trouble-making generations."

In discussing the functions and dysfunctions of conflict, we have thus far omitted the internal effects upon the parties involved. The Robbers Cave Experiment (see Chapter 3), by Muzafer Sherif and colleagues, shows that often the solidarity of a group is enhanced as the members join to meet the challenge of conflict. One sociologist wrote that the distinction between "ourselves, the we-group, or in-group, and everybody else, of the others-groups, out-groups" is clarified. If we think of a group as a number of people with shared values, norms, and experiences, conflict can cause reaffirmation and strengthening. In World War II, for example, Americans of different color, social backgrounds, and political views worked in harmony to defeat the fascist threat to values that became more than ever shared. Internal conflicts were reduced and a high level of consensus developed better to wage the global conflict against a common enemy.

However, not all conflicts result in an increase of internal harmony. As the war in Vietnam demonstrated, a prolonged, costly, frustrating conflict without very clear objectives will arouse discontent and disunity. Closely related is the question of whether the conflict threatens cherished common values, perhaps even the very existence of the group. The cohesiveness of the group at the onset of conflict is also an important factor. France, for example, faced the Nazi onslaught with serious cleavages between parties and classes. Rather than binding groups together, the threat further divided them. Lewis Coser concluded, "Social systems lacking social solidarity are likely to disintegrate in the face of outside conflict. . . ."

A threat to a group from outside may result in other dysfunctional consequences. The need for unity can lead to the persecution of individuals and minorities who do not seem loyal or might be potentially disloyal, such as the witch-hunting against Americans with German names or accents during World War I and the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II. A threatened group, especially if things are not going well, may engage in the slaughter of scapegoats, as the Nazis

did to millions of Jews in Germany during World War II.

A major conflict against a serious outside menace also often results in the violation of traditional values, perhaps even those for which it is fighting, as the American examples above suggest. In a famous interview on the eve of America's entrance into World War I, Woodrow Wilson expressed his fears about what the war might do: "Once lead this people into war and they'll forget there ever was such a thing as tolerance. To fight you must be brutal and ruthless, and the spirit of ruthless brutality will enter into every fibre of our national life. . . ." The setting aside of the First Amendment in many cases during both World Wars; the fire-bombing of German and Japanese cities in the Second; and the civilian bombing and atrocities, such as My Lai, in Vietnam, all attest to Wilson's insight.

Conflict can also have a negative effect upon the internal political systems of the participants. Government may become highly centralized, even despotic. Legislative procedures may be replaced by executive decisions. The most aggressive leaders may come to the fore; and, in the case of a national threat, the military may have a role in decision-making that can persist after the threat has abated. Wilson said in 1914, "We couldn't fight Germany and maintain the ideal of Government that all thinking men shared." And today, when tens of millions of Americans derive their livelihood from defense or war-related activities; when nearly two-thirds of every tax dollar goes to pay for past, present, or future wars; when nearly half of all adult males are in or have been in military service; when executive decisions determine whether American forces will go into action in far-off places, or, in fact, whether nuclear weapons will be launched; many may well wonder if it is possible to live in such an age of conflict and "maintain the ideal of Government" that Americans share.

Controlling or Resolving Conflict

Conflict resolution has become a popular expression, but may be misleading if it implies that conflicts can always be finally and completely settled to the satisfaction of the parties involved. To be sure, many immediate conflicts are resolved, but the great issues that divide groups may not be amenable to ultimate resolution. Too often educators have led each other and their students to believe that if we are men of good will, or, in matters of war and peace, if we have "international understand-

ing," differences among people can be reconciled. Good will and understanding are, indeed, important for coping with conflicts. Still, the serious interests and values that divide races, classes, and nations may not be permanently resolved.

As has been pointed out, conflict is not only universal and inevitable but can also serve useful functions. The question is not how to eliminate but how to control conflict so that it does not tear domestic or world society apart. Paul Bohannan in *Law and Warfare* concisely sums up the need, "Conflict is useful. In fact, society is impossible without conflict. But society is worse than impossible without the control of conflict." The important objective, then, is to channel conflict, to shift the processes by which conflict is carried out from violent to nonviolent, and to provide institutions and rules through which conflict can be carried on so that it functions to bring about needed change in society.

Analyzing Conflict

There is reason to believe that the control of conflict is aided when the parties involved are able to treat the conflict situation as a problem-solving exercise. Obviously, in the midst of a bitter and violent conflict it would be naive to expect that the opponents could very often step outside their feelings and interests to analyze the conflict objectively, although this has happened, as John Burton indicates in his *Conflict and Communication.* However, before a conflict has escalated to the point where reason is no longer applied, an attitude of problem-solving may be possible. Moreover, most conflicts are not violent and allow for peaceful techniques of control.

Many factors to be considered in analyzing conflict have been discussed above; others will be suggested in the section below entitled "Analyzing Conflict in the Classroom." Here we briefly consider some of the more important questions involved in conflict situations.

First, it is essential to know just who are the parties in conflict, which is not always obvious. Are both the parties perceived as involved really the ones that are? In the case of nonrealistic conflict, one of the parties may be only a scapegoat for feelings stemming from within the other. Also, especially in international conflict, one or both parties may be a few leaders rather than an entire people.

Second, are the mutual perceptions of the parties

in conflict accurate? Frequently the parties perceive the other side as evil incarnate and themselves as good, just, honest, and right. They may also exaggerate the threat posed by the opponent. Accurate perceptions can help produce the needed empathy for taking actions to de-escalate a conflict and find solutions.

Third, are the issues and goals involved clearly identified? Once determined, are they really important? Are the values at stake commensurate with the dangers from continuing, perhaps escalating, the conflict? Or, put differently, is the cost of conflict out of proportion to possible gains? Accurate determination of the cost/benefits ratio is critical, for example, in conflicts between the major powers when nuclear war may result from escalation.

Fourth, is the conflict really a cake-dividing or zero-sum situation where what one party gets the other loses? Or is there the possibility that both sides may emerge achieving at least minimum objectives through co-operating to enlarge the pie? For example, a labor-management dispute that destroys a company can result from zero-sum thinking, whereas both sides might compromise to increase the success of the company, bringing gains to both.

Fifth, what are the possibilities for de-escalating the conflict through taking unilateral initiatives which do not sacrifice vital interests and may put into motion reciprocal actions leading to control or resolution?

Finally, are there overriding, "superordinate" goals that both parties share which are being overlooked in the conflict? A number of international authorities, including Richard Falk in *This Endangered Planet,* have seen the reduction of the worldwide ecological threat as an example of a superordinate goal that all countries share and which is worsened by superpower conflict.

Analyzing Conflict in the Classroom

Much that has been said about conflict has been theoretical. While examples have been provided that may suggest to the teacher opportunities for applying concepts in the classroom, thus far a great deal is left to the interest, knowledge, and imagination of the teacher. There are a number of possibilities for experiential learning about conflict. The Robbers Cave Experiment (see Chapter 3) is one exercise for getting at a number of aspects. Simulation games, such as *The Oil Islands Dispute, Guns or Butter, Star Power, Conflict, Crisis, Dangerous*

Parallel, and many others (see Chapter 5), are a stimulating and informative vehicle. Teachers may use an inquiry approach in drawing upon the student's own personal experiences. Such an inquiry might begin with questions like, "How do fights (or a particular fight) begin? Were the issues of the fight largely realistic or nonrealistic? Etc."

A useful technique is suggested by Andrew M. Scott in *The Functioning of the International Political System.* As the title indicates, the Scott book is concerned with international conflict, but it has application for other levels of conflict as well. He uses a number of scales for analyzing conflict, some of which are included below, along with others. Teachers will doubtless discover other scales that might be used. The list provided here is not intended to be exhaustive.

The teacher—or, even better, the students—should identify some conflict. It could be one familiar to the students from firsthand experience; for example, between groups in the school or community. It could be at the national level between racial groups, labor-management, the sexes, political parties, the young and adults, etc. It could be at the international level—between Catholics and Protestants in Ireland, Israel and Arab nations, the United States and the Soviet Union, etc. Or, it could be an imaginary conflict devised by the teacher or students. In the latter case, especially, there is the further possibility of having students role-play the two sides. From the questions provided and others that might be thought of, the student is asked to mark some point on the scale that best characterizes the conflict. Another possibility is to divide the class in half, with one group analyzing the conflict from the perspective of one party and the other half from that of the other party. Then, the analyses may be compared.

INTERESTS

COMMON ——————— CONFLICTING

To what extent are interests in conflict? What common interests do the parties have? (It may help to think of interests as values, whether material or nonmaterial—"desired events, objects, and conditions for which men strive." (See above discussion of values.)

BEHAVIOR

COOPERATIVE ——————— CONFLICTUAL

To what extent are the actions of the parties conflictual? Do they cooperate in some areas of their interrelationships?

Attitudes

Friendliness ⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔ Hostility

To what extent do the parties show a friendly or hostile attitude toward each other? (It is important to note that interests and even behavior can be conflictual without a marked hostility.)

Types of Conflicts

Realistic ⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔ Nonrealistic

To what extent is the conflict about actual interests? To what extent is it the result of displaced hostile feelings?

Institutionalized ⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔ Non-institutionalized

To what extent is the conflict characterized by rules and actions that operate through some institution?

Techniques

Nonviolent ⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔ Violent

What techniques are being used in the conflict? (These can range from a dirty look or a harsh word to fighting in interpersonal conflict. In international conflict, the techniques can range from a belligerent speech to all-out war.)

Process

De-escalation ⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔ Escalation

Is the conflict escalating, de-escalating, or remaining constant?

Communication

Frequent ⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔ None

Are the parties in conflict communicating frequently or infrequently?

Images

Positive ⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔ Negative

Do the parties see each other in a positive or negative way? (This involves the question of stereotyping by either side.)

Cost

Low ⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔ High

What is the possible or probable cost of carrying on the conflict? Is the cost worth the goals being sought?

Power

Weak ⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔ Strong

What are the various elements of power that may be applied in the conflict? How do the power resources of the parties compare? (Power should be thought of as not only the ability to inflict damage on the other side, but also in terms of influence and other nonviolent capacities.)

OUTCOMES

FUNCTIONAL ⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔⊔ DYSFUNCTIONAL

Did the conflict accomplish any positive results? Did it pave the way for cooperative behavior later? (Even a conflict as destructive as World War II eventually led to a democratic and cooperative Japan and Germany.) Or did the conflict have negative, dysfunctional results?

Institutionalizing Conflict

Conflicts carried on without benefit of governmental or judicial institutions usually has meant one of several courses—one party left the scene and/or gave up its objectives, or one party defeated the other. But avoidance, the relinquishing of goals, or conquest seldom means that the conflict is controlled, much less resolved, in such a manner that the parties and society alike derive any advantage. There is always the possibility of that conflict resuming, in perhaps more violent forms.

Whether we are talking about Western Europe in the early Middle Ages, China in the period of war lords, or the American Wild West, non-institutionalized conflict has tended to be chronic, unregulated, and violent. It has meant suffering by the weak, always a majority, and the triumph of might, which is not necessarily right. It is not surprising, then, that the instruments of law and order have spread through the centuries with increasing acceptance, for they serve the functional interests of the vast majority of people. Raymond W. Mack and Richard C. Snyder in an article for the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* concluded, "It is difficult to escape the conviction that the resolution and control of conflict are intimately related to the nature and degree of institutionalization."

Of course, the control of conflict through institutions does not necessarily imply a democratic system. An authoritarian regime can institutionalize conflict; and, at least for a time, such a system can have legitimacy. There is reason to believe, however, that flexible, open societies in the long run are more effective in meeting new demands of groups than closed, inflexible ones. In democratic societies conflict can better serve to keep "things loose, capable of adaptation and adjustment, ready to endure other trouble-making generations." In open societies, rival claims to values can be expressed and lead to a better distribution and creation of new norms. As Lewis Coser states, "A flexible society bene-

A cartoon drawn by Herbert Goldberg and published in The New Yorker Magazine (copyright 1970) has been omitted here because of copyright restrictions.

fits from conflict because such behavior, by helping to create and modify norms, assures its continuance under changing conditions." Rigid and closed societies, on the other hand, tend to suppress conflict and drive it underground. While such societies may continue for some time without manifest disruption, eventually there is the danger, as Coser puts it, of "catastrophic breakdown" as in Czarist Russia and Batista's Cuba.

When conflict is expressed and controlled in open societies through institutions, two things take place. One is that groups become organized with leadership that has legitimacy with followers. The formation of organized groups allows for bargaining from a power base (strikes, voting, etc.). Secondly, institutionalization means the opportunity for third-party intervention in controlling conflict. The third party may help to bring the conflicting parties together for mediation, as in labor disputes. There is machinery for arbitration or adjudication of conflict by courts of law, backed by enforcement agencies. Most important, there is the means of changing the rules by which scarce values are allocated through

election of new legislators; indeed, there is the possibility of changing the political system through nonviolent means.

Most of the above applies more to the control of conflict within a nation-state. At the international level, the control of conflict through institutions has serious shortcomings. There is a United Nations and an International Court, plus a vast body of international law. There are many functioning international regulatory agencies that effectively control such matters as the flow of mail and electronic communications, air routes, etc. The United Nations has been especially successful in aid and development programs for the Third World. But for the control of major conflict, existing international organizations have lacked the authority, legitimacy, and financial base that characterize domestic institutions.

It is argued that increasing global interdependence will result in the growth of institutions to control conflict, through a kind of functional imperative; that the world is too small now to allow for the continuance of international anarchy under sovereign states which can no longer meet the demands of their people in such areas as security, economic development, and control of pollution. It is also argued that the emergence of adequate institutions for controlling international conflict must wait until there is a greater consensus of shared values (it is the shared values which make domestic institutions effective). There may be no alternative but the slow route, but the question is increasingly being asked, and with ever greater urgency, whether the superordinate goal of survival in a world threatened by ecological breakdown, population growth, endemic violence, and nuclear annihilation must not soon make a giant leap to the institutional control of conflict.

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

TWO SIDES

3

THE ROBBERS CAVE EXPERIMENT

A STUDY IN INTERGROUP CONFLICT AND COOPERATION

WILLIAM A. NESBITT

Most teachers would agree that finding out why nations fight and how they can learn to cooperate are of crucial importance for the future progress of mankind. But conceptually organized study of international conflict is usually so remote from the students' daily lives that learning is apt to be by rote. Simulation games, such as "The Oil Islands Dispute" in Chapter 5, can provide some opportunity for experiential learning; but these too have limitations. Many games are necessarily restricted in the number of concepts dealt with, and more important, they usually do not move explicitly from the more familiar inter-small group level to the international. (An outstanding exception is the unit "Simulating Social Conflict," developed by Sociological Resources for the Social Studies, published by Allyn and Bacon.)

The Robbers Cave Experiment may be unique in the scope of conflict theory it covers, the interest it generates because it deals with young people, and the possibility it provides of moving from the inter-small group level to the international. This experiment is described here at greater length and with more of an eye to implications for international conflict and cooperation than it is in other materials available to social studies teachers. Following the description under "For the Student," there

are suggestions "For the Teacher" in using an inquiry approach with a class.

For the Student

How is a cohesive group formed? How does conflict develop between two such groups? What happens within a group in the course of conflict with an outside group? How can rivalry and hostility between groups be turned into cooperation and friendliness? The final answers to such questions may never be known with certainty, so complex are the causes of conflict and cooperation. But several social scientists, under the direction of sociologist Muzafer Sherif of Pennsylvania State University, conducted a series of fascinating experiments with 11- and 12-year-old boys in summer camps that shed light upon important aspects of why groups may conflict and how they may be brought to work in harmony.

What follows is a description of the last of the series, the Robbers Cave Experiment, so called because it took place at a Boy Scout Camp in Robbers Cave State Park, Oklahoma. The cave was given that name because Jesse James and Belle Starr were supposed to have hidden there in the days of the Wild West.

The experimenters went to great lengths to select the boys who would be the subjects of the experiment. A major objective was to assemble a group of boys who would not have any reason to get into conflict, except for what was to happen during the three-week camping trip. The 22 finally chosen, from among 200 considered, were well-adjusted, white, middle-class Protestants from Oklahoma City. All were average or above-average students. None of the boys knew each other before arrival at the camp site.

The boys did not know, of course, that they were "guinea pigs" in an experiment. None suspected throughout the three weeks at Robbers Cave that most of the camp staff were social science researchers observing their behavior. The activities in which the boys engaged were introduced by the staff and seen by the boys as reasonable and normal for a summer camp. Especially important to understanding the experiment is to realize that at no point were the boys encouraged by words or actions of the staff to hold either feelings of hostility or friendliness toward their own or the other group; rather, the attitudes which emerged were a result of the existence of two groups, with every reason to get along, involved in a series of situations.

Stage I: Formation of In-Groups

The 22 boys were divided into two groups as equally matched as possible in size and skills. The groups were brought to the Park in separate busses, settled in bunkhouses about a half mile apart, and deliberately kept unaware of each other's existence during most of the week that was Stage I. By prearrangement of Dr. Sherif and his colleagues, there were no other campers at Robbers Cave State Park during the experiment. Visitors, including parents, were not allowed. Thus, outside influences upon the boys' behavior were eliminated. Toward the end of the week, each group was allowed to "discover," quite accidentally, the existence of the other group.

While it was not until near the end of Stage I that the two groups gave themselves names, for the sake of convenience we will refer to them as the Rattlers and the Eagles in describing the formation of in-groups.

The Rattlers. The boys became acquainted during their bus ride from Oklahoma City, and on arrival at the Park were plunged into a variety of activities requiring sharing, taking turns, and general cooperation. They went on hikes, explored Robbers Cave, and had a treasure hunt. They also took an overnight camping trip, for which the food was deliberately provided in bulk so that there would have to be a dividing up of the work to prepare the meal. Also, group singing was organized as a part of church services and campfire programs; in fact, before long the boys began referring to particular songs as "theirs."

Swimming quickly became a very popular part of the day and played an important role in in-group formation. The boys found a swimming hole up Moccasin Creek that ran near both camp sites. While by any objective standards it was not the best place to swim, for these boys it was the best place and—what is more important—their very own. The boys organized a buddy system for keeping track of each other in the water and soon undertook to improve "their" swimming hole, using a chain gang to build a rock approach, and making a diving board. One day the boys found paper cups at the site and blamed "outsiders" for intruding upon their place (the boys themselves had probably left the cups there the day before). By the end of the week, the good swimmers were helping the beginners so that all could share in the fun. One non-swimmer, sidelined with an injured hand, was told by the others that when his hand

had healed they would help him "so that we will *all* be able to swim."

A canoe was secretly placed near the cabin by the staff, and the boys decided to take it to the swimming hole. This required the cooperative effort of a number of boys because of the canoe's size. One boy hurt his toe but kept quiet about it, and this was the beginning of a series of minor hurts—as always happens in camping—and a stoical reaction of not complaining or crying.

Not by accident, caps and T-shirts were made available by the canteen, and the boys decided to adopt the name of Rattlers (they had encountered rattlesnakes in the Park) and stencil it on the shirts, along with a snake design. A flag was made and similarly marked. With the growing sense of group feeling and belonging together, it is perhaps not surprising that one of the boys put up a sign in their cabin reading "Home Sweet Home."

Baseball was the favorite sport of both groups. During Stage I, the Rattlers, as well as the Eagles, organized a team in which positions became well-established. They each engaged in "workouts" (rather than competition) on the one baseball diamond, but at different times. Toward the end of the first week, the Rattlers "discovered" the Eagles. The next day the Rattlers were talking resentfully of the intrusion on "their" baseball diamond, on which they had made some improvements. When informed by staff that the other group wanted to challenge them in a baseball game, their reaction was, "They can't. We'll challenge them first. . . . They've got a nerve. . . ." But the challenge was readily accepted; indeed, the boys thought of other possibilities for competition with their new found rivals.

The Eagles. The other 11 boys underwent a similar development in group feeling through activities encouraging cooperation. They, too, went on an overnight campout, had a treasure hunt and practiced baseball. They had also discovered a swimming spot, to which they had carried a canoe. Despite the fact that they had killed a dangerous copperhead snake nearby, saw another snake in the water, and had a much more attractive place to swim elsewhere, by the third day of Stage I it had become "their" place. Unlike the Rattlers, they organized to make a rope bridge across the creek that would support a half dozen boys at one time.

The Eagles had trouble with homesickness, which the Rattlers did not. By the end of Stage I, two Eagles were clearly unhappy, one crying often. They were quietly allowed to leave; and when their departure was dis-

covered, the other Eagles seemed to feel strengthened. The weak ones were now gone. As one boy put it, "They chickened out." Another boy, who had previously shown signs of homesickness himself, said, "They are the only boys who will."

In the case of the Eagles, it was the discovery of the other group that led to the adoption of a name, stencilled T-shirts, and caps with an "E" on them. They also made a flag with an eagle insignia to fly on the baseball field when they played.

Stage II: Formation of Intergroup Rivalry

By the end of Stage I, each group was anxious to engage the other in competitive games, and they were enthusiastic when the camp staff proposed a whole series of events in a tournament with prizes, including highly desirable knives. The contests were of two kinds: those requiring physical skill and strength (baseball, tug-of-war, touch football, and tent pitching), and those requiring different talents (cabin inspection, skits and songs, and treasure hunting). The latter events were included so that if one group tended to dominate in the games requiring physical skills, the staff could even things out, to some extent at least, by giving the losing group advantages in the other contests. A running score on rising "thermometers" was kept for all to see.

The first event was baseball, and the tone was set when the Eagles approached the field with their flag on a pole and singing the theme from Dragnet. This was followed by name-calling, in which the Rattlers excelled. In the course of the game they called out, "You're not Eagles, you're pigeons!" and sang, "The first Eagle hit the deck, parley-voo . . .," etc. At the same time there were displays of sportsmanship, and at the end of the game the teams cheered each other.

After the baseball game, which the Rattlers won, the two groups ate together for the first time in the mess hall. Here the name-calling and razzing continued. The saying of grace by the boys became an opportunity to thank or appeal to God for victory. For example, one Rattler prayed, "Dear Lord, we thank Thee for the food and for the cooks that cooked it, and for the ball game we won today." Prayers were also offered before games and at night, and the leader of the Eagles sincerely believed that prayer had turned the tide the third day, when the Eagles won in baseball.

The Eagles also lost the first tug-of-war, even though

they had practiced for 45 minutes. Craig, who had become the Eagle leader in the peaceful First Stage, walked away from the rope when he saw the Rattlers were going to win. Three days later he was to take a back seat in an Eagle raid on the Rattlers. In fact, Craig had little stomach for the intense rivalry and conflict that increased daily during the Second Stage. The baseball captain, Mason, was more aggressive and soon replaced him as leader.

After a day of defeats, the Eagles were dejected and claimed that the Rattlers must be at least 8th graders. On the way back to their cabin, the Eagles noticed that the Rattler flag was still on the ballfield backstop where it had been placed at the beginning of the game. They pulled it down, tried to tear it up, and decided to set it on fire. What was left of the burned flag was put back up, whereupon the boys sang "Taps." Mason said to his followers, "You can tell those guys I did it if they say anything. I'll fight 'em!"

The next morning the Rattlers discovered what had happened to their flag and planned revenge. The Rattler baseball team captain would ask the Eagles whether they burned the flag; if they said yes, he was to begin fighting and the others were to join in. Simpson, the baseball captain, did ask, and the Eagles admitted their act. While words were hurled back and forth, some Rattlers seized the Eagle flag and burned it. The encounter led to fist fighting, and the staff had to intervene.

(It is important to note that very often the boys who clamored most loudly for drastic action against the other side were not the most popular boys within their own group. The same low status members were also the ones to use the most extreme language against "the enemy." However, aggressive acts, such as raids, were not carried out unless approved by the leaders, or boys of high status.)

After the fighting was stopped, the second baseball game took place and the Eagles won. They attributed their victory not only to prayer but to the fact that the Rattlers swore all the time. The Eagles decided that they would not do any cussing henceforth; and, because the Rattlers were so bad, they would not talk to them anymore. Rattler morale dropped after the game and the boys began to blame each other for letting the team down. Two boys became so disgusted they said they were going to write their parents for permission to go home. Unity was finally restored by some joking, and the two boys tore up their letters publicly.

The second tug-of-war was won by the Eagles by a clever strategy—they dug their heels into the ground and let the Rattlers tire themselves out. The Rattlers, feeling they had lost the tug-of-war by unfair tactics, raided the Eagles' cabin that night after "lights-out." Mason distinguished himself by his bravery, whereas the former leader, Craig, pretended to be asleep. The Eagles wanted to retaliate at once and talked of using rocks, but the staff stopped any further action that night. The Eagles, however, counter-raided after breakfast the next day.

At the beginning of the last day of the tournament, the Rattlers were one point behind. But Rattler morale was high and, as the Eagles entered the mess hall for breakfast, they sang, "The enemy's coming. . . ." After breakfast, the Rattlers decided to put their flag on "everything that's ours," including "home" (their cabin) and "our baseball diamond." Despite their spirit, the Rattlers lost the tournament by a narrow margin. All the prizes of knives and medals went to the previously underdog Eagles, and Mason broke down and cried with joy.

While the Eagles were away at their swimming hole in a victorious mood, the losers raided their cabin, stealing the knives and medals. When the Eagles returned and discovered the damage and thefts, they rushed to the Rattlers' cabin. Challenges to fight were flung back and forth. Mason refused to fight either of the two biggest Rattlers, and the smaller ones refused to fight Mason, whereupon he strode away toward the Eagles' cabin. The Rattlers followed, jeering all the way. Violence broke out, and the staff had to force the Rattlers back to their cabin. As they were pushed up the trail, the Eagles followed, yelling that the Rattlers were cowards and running away. Later the Eagles persuaded each other that they had chased the Rattlers "over halfway back to their cabin" and won a "victory."

Relations between the two groups had reached the point by the end of Stage II that they did not even want to eat in the same mess hall at the same time. Contact produced name-calling, the Eagles calling the Rattlers "poor losers" and "bums"; the Rattlers calling the Eagles "sissies," "cowards," and "little babies." Each group viewed the other with hostility and mistrust. Raids and destructive acts were expected even when not being planned by the opponents. The Eagles inspected their swimming place and concluded that more rocks had been deliberately put in the water by the Rattlers, although this was not the case.

At the end of Stage II, the boys participated in one more contest—the bean toss—although they did so unwillingly because it meant further contact with the other group. In this event, beans were tossed out on the ground by the staff, and the object was for each boy to pick up as many beans as he could in a minute's time and place them in a paper bag. They were told not to bother counting the beans as they deposited them in the bags since they would be counted later.

Afterwards, all the boys went to the recreation hall where they were shown on a screen by means of an opaque projector what was supposed to be each boy's collection. Actually, 35 beans were shown in every case; however, the picture remained on the screen for only 5 seconds, too little time to count the beans. The boys wrote down their estimate of the number of beans for each boy. The winner of the bean toss was that group, Rattler or Eagle, that had the best record in estimating the number of beans for each boy. Both groups overestimated the performances of boys in their own group and underestimated those of the other, but the Rattlers came closest and won the $5.00 prize.

At the end of Stage II the experimenters asked each boy to express his opinion of boys in both groups by use of adjectives from a list. Almost without exception, the boys chose three favorable words to describe their own group—"brave," "tough," and "friendly." Members of the other group were described as "sneaky," "smart alecks," and "stinkers." The head of the experimental team of social scientists summed up intergroup behavior at this point as follows:

> If an outside observer had entered the situation at this point, with no information about preceding events, he could only have concluded on the basis of their behavior that these boys (who were the "cream of the crop" in their communities) were wicked, disturbed, and vicious bunches of youngsters. (Muzafer Sherif, *In Common Predicament*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966, page 85.)

Stage III: Formation of Intergroup Cooperation

The investigators were now faced with the task of trying to find ways in which the two groups could overcome their rivalry and feelings of hostility and become cooperative with each other. In another, similar experiment with 11- and 12-year-old boys, Dr. Sherif and colleagues had introduced a common threat to both groups:

that is, a third group which became rivals of the first two combined. This method did result in cooperation between the two original groups, but, by adding a new enemy, conflict was not eliminated but transferred to another group. At Robbers Cave, the experimenters decided to attempt other ways of reducing or eliminating the friction between Rattlers and Eagles.

First, they tried bringing the boys together in situations where they were in contact but not competing. (Behind this method is the notion that if people are brought together, they will come to know each other and become friends.) So, the staff tried such strategies as deliberately keeping the two groups waiting in front of the mess hall before meals so that they would rub elbows. However, this led to further name-calling and friction. (A favorite taunt of the group that entered the mess hall last was to yell at the other, "Ladies first!" Later the boys adopted a system of taking turns going into meals.) Battles during meals, using food and paper as weapons, became frequent, along with the usual name-calling and yelling. The staff tried changing seating arrangements so that not all of each group could sit together as a bloc, but that simply caused more food throwing. Another means of bringing the boys together was to show films to Rattlers and Eagles at the same time. This, as well as other efforts, produced little noticeable improvement in intergroup relations.

Mere contact between the groups having failed, the social scientists tried introducing "spontaneous" situations in which cooperation between the two groups was required to reach a goal both desired. The first of these was to create a problem of water supply for the groups. Staff members closed the valve from the storage tank about 1¼ miles above the camp and put boulders on it. The faucet at the tank was stuffed with sacking which the boys would have to find some way of removing in order to get a drink when they finally arrived very thirsty from inspecting the long pipe for leaks. The removal of the sacking turned out to be a long job that involved most of the boys without much regard for group membership. A Rattler, for example, offered the use of his knife, to which a leading Eagle replied that he would shake hands with him if it worked. While the group effort to restore the flow of water to the camp resulted in somewhat better relations, at supper the "garbage fight" (as it had come to be called) was resumed.

The second project placed before the boys was to rent a movie which was too expensive for either group alone.

The movie, *Treasure Island*, would cost $15. The camp agreed to pay something, but not all, and the boys would have to assume some of the cost. There were various suggestions: one Eagle said the camp should pay $5, the Rattlers (winners of the bean toss) $10, and the Eagles nothing. A Rattler suggested that the Eagles pay $5 and the Rattlers $2. An Eagle suggestion was eventually adopted—that each group pay $3.50, with the staff and the camp paying the rest. Several boys from each group figured out how much each individual would have to pay, and the movie was rented and enjoyed by all.

One situation came up quite accidentally. Rattlers had been chopping a big, dead pine tree, and had reached a point where they could chop no longer without danger to themselves, but dared not leave it standing. A Rattler suggested that they all have a tug-of-war against the tree; and, to their mutual satisfaction, both Rattlers and Eagles joined in pulling the tree down with the same rope that had been used to pull against each other.

A major activity in bringing about cooperation was a camp-out to a lake some distance away. Two trucks transported Rattlers and Eagles and their gear separately. Soon after arrival, the boys whetted their appetites by a good, long swim. While they were in the water, one of the trucks was driven off by a staff member. And, after the swim, it was arranged that the other truck would "break down" as it was about to go pick up food for the hungry boys. The tug-of-war rope had been brought along and casually left (by a staff member) near the truck. A Rattler got the idea of using the rope to pull the truck to get it started, and the rest enthusiastically joined in. After the boys got it going, as a result of using a "heave, heave" rhythm to get it up a hill, a Rattler shouted, "We won the tug-of-war against the truck!" An Eagle answered, "Yeah! We won the tug-of-war against the truck." This was followed by much backslapping and friendliness over a task well-done.

The same camp-out was used for similar experiences. Tent poles and other accessories had been carefully mixed up by the staff, requiring the groups to swap parts before they could pitch their tents. The truck was deliberately "stalled" again, with the same tug-of-war resulting. Food was brought in bulk, necessitating a division of labor and cooperation to prepare the evening meal.

Another trip was planned, this time into Arkansas. After the boys' enthusiasm for the trip was high, it was announced that the trip might have to be canceled since

one truck clearly was not dependable, as the boys knew from the camp-out. After some disagreement and hesitation over the idea of all going in a single truck, two boys said "Let's go!" and started running for a place in the truck. The others took off after them, settling the issue by action. The trip itself provided further opportunities for getting together: group singing, coke stops at which seating could not be by groups, etc.

The last night of the experiment, there was a campfire program devoted to skits and singing. The groups took turns entertaining each other and sang songs together. The next and last day, the boys agreed that they would like to go back home on one bus. When they got on the bus, the seating was no longer by groups. During the refreshment stop, the Rattler leader suggested that they use the $5 they had won on the bean toss to treat all to malted milk shakes, which was readily agreed to by the other Rattlers. As the bus neared Oklahoma City and home, some of the boys in the front started singing "Oklahoma," from the musical. The rest went crowding into the front and happily joined in the singing, now as one group.

For the Teacher

If students are to gain the greatest possible value from discussion with an inquiry approach of the Robbers Cave Experiment, the teacher should be thoroughly familiar with the concepts of conflict and cooperation described in Chapter 2. Suggestions for further background reading are provided in the bibliography at the end of this section.

An inquiry approach, as used here, includes at least the following seven steps:

1. Data is presented to the students in the form of a description of the Robbers Cave Experiment.

2. Students are encouraged to ask questions about the experiment.

3. Students are encouraged to formulate hypotheses about conflict and cooperation, as a product of the line of questioning.

4. Hypotheses are submitted to analysis: Are there exceptions to the propositions that emerge? Is there enough data available to substantiate the hypotheses or must the hypotheses remain tentative?

5. Additional data is gathered by the students where required.

6. Hypotheses are further analyzed in light of the additional data.

7. Generalizations may be formulated. (For an overview of inquiry, see Rodney Allen, *et al.*, *Inquiry in the Social Studies: Theory and Examples for Classroom Teachers*. Social Studies Readings No. 2, National Council for the Social Studies, 1201 Sixteenth Street N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036. Also, Edwin Fenton, *Teaching the New Social Studies in Secondary Schools: An Inductive Approach*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966—especially Chapters 10 and 11.)

Inquiry can be thought of as organized brainstorming. Students should be encouraged to bring in ideas and data from their personal experiences as well as from history and their social studies courses.

As will be seen from the questions suggested below, the teacher may move from a discussion of conflict and cooperation between the small groups involved in the Robbers Cave Experiment to other small groups (those within the school, including teachers and students; street gangs; etc.) and to larger groups (blacks and whites in this country; labor and management; nations and groups of nations; etc.). The questions on implications for larger groups and nations might best be taken up in courses where students have studied such groups in conflict and can refer to examples they have examined. The teacher is cautioned about the danger of making broad generalizations about large groups, perhaps especially nations, from data about the behavior of small groups. Much of this danger may be avoided if the distinction between a hypothesis, which is always tentative, and a generalization, which is universally true, is kept constantly in mind.

Conducting the Inquiry

After the students have read the description of the Robbers Cave Experiment, the teacher should explain what is meant by the inquiry method. Then the teacher should begin the process of questioning, looking toward hypothesis-building. What follow are suggestions as to the kind of questions that might be raised, and in parentheses following some questions are comments. Also included are possible hypotheses the students might

develop through inquiry. The major purpose of the actual Robbers Cave Experiment was to test out certain hypotheses about conflict and cooperation. In a sense, the inquiry with the students will be a reverse of the process used by Muzafer Sherif and his colleagues; that is, the student will be attempting to discover hypotheses, some of which were tested in the experiment.

Preparing for the Experiment

Why did the experimenters choose boys from similar backgrounds who did not know each other? (To eliminate as much as possible causes of conflict other than what happened at Robbers Cave.) Why did they choose boys who had not reached puberty? (So as to eliminate problems of adolescence as a cause of conflict.) *Hypothesis suggested:* that even groups made up of very similar kinds of people will become conflictual when they engage in certain kinds of activities.

STAGE 1: What kinds of activities did the boys engage in during this stage? How did these encourage the formation of a group? (Need to emphasize those activities requiring interdependence to achieve goals, rather than competition.) *Hypothesis suggested:* a group can emerge when a number of individuals interact in pursuit of common goals which can be achieved only through interdependent activities. What would have happened if the activities had been highly competitive?

Would leadership need to develop in the group? What qualities for leadership would be important at this stage? (Note: The experimenters found "effective initiative" was the best indication of leadership.) Would some boys emerge with higher status than others? What factors might determine status in the groups? Why was food deliberately provided in bulk for an overnight camping trip? Was it necessary for jobs to be divided up or for people to take different roles? *Hypothesis suggested:* as Sherif wrote, "A group of strangers who are brought together in some common activity soon acquires an informal and spontaneous kind of organization. It comes to look upon some members as leaders . . . [and] divides up duties." Might the development of leaders and roles in a group cause some friction and resentment?

Why did the boys develop a sense of ownership over certain places, such as a swimming hole? Would this be true of any group? (The teacher might wish to take up the question of territoriality or an "instinct" for oc-

cupying and defending an area, but scientific information would then need to be brought in.) Would boys raised in Communist China have acted the same way?

How would killing a dangerous snake affect group feeling? *Hypothesis suggested:* shared experiences, especially if dangerous, increase group solidarity.

What came to be the most acceptable or admired kind of behavior in difficult or painful circumstances? Do all groups do this? *Hypothesis suggested:* in the course of interaction, a group develops norms regulating behavior. How would such qualities affect intergroup rivalry? Would they tend to make the group stronger or weaker? Would they tend to make conflict more serious or dangerous?

Why did the boys adopt symbols and names, such as a flag with an eagle? Why were the particular symbols of eagle and rattler adopted? Why would the awareness of another group lead to the adoption of the Eagles' flag and name? What do such symbols and names do to group unity and rivalry with other groups?

Why were the boys so willing to engage the other group in competition? (Possible explanations: American norm, at least for males, is to be competitive. Boys had formed baseball teams and wanted to have a competitor. Etc.)

Wider implications: Would there be any parallels between the formation of the groups at Robbers Cave and the formation of a nation? For example, in the establishment of the United States, did people have to work together and become interdependent to achieve goals? Would facing a danger that was successfully overcome increase solidarity in a nation? What about the formation of leadership, roles, status, and standards of behavior (norms)?

STAGE II: How did rivalry with another group affect the solidarity of each group? *Hypothesis as cited by Sherif:* "Conflict between two groups tends to produce an increase in solidarity *within* the groups." What were the differences between the kinds of activities each group engaged in before it "discovered" the other group, and those engaged in with the other group? Why did intergroup competition encourage hostility and conflict between the groups? *Hypothesis as cited by Sherif:* "When members of two groups come into contact with one another in a series of activities that embody goals which each urgently desires, but which can be attained by one group only at the expense of the other, competitive

activity toward the goal changes, over time, into hostility between the groups and their members."

What was the shift in the Eagles' leadership? What new qualities of leadership seemed necessary at this stage? *Hypothesis suggested:* when groups are in conflict, more aggressive leadership seems required. Might such a change intensify the conflict and make cooperation more difficult?

What was the effect of the early losses upon the Eagles? (The Eagles resorted to more extreme measures, such as burning the Rattler flag.) *Hypothesis suggested:* a setback to one or two competing groups can result in an escalation of the conflict.

How do you explain the fact that boys with low status were the most anxious to use extreme methods? *Hypothesis as cited by Sherif:* "Low status members will tend to exert greater efforts which will be revealed in more intense forms of overt aggression and verbal expressions against the out-group as a means of improving their status within the in-group."

What was the effect on the Rattlers of losing the second baseball game? *Hypothesis suggested:* defeat may produce group dissension; but such dissension may eventually result in greater determination and solidarity. What might have been the effect upon either group if it had lost consistently? *Hypothesis suggested:* serious defeat promotes group dissension or even the breakup of the group; or, a group consistently defeated or humiliated may lapse into passivity. What was the effect upon the Eagles of their victory in the second baseball game? *Hypothesis suggested:* success by one group in conflict with another promotes unity and encourages a belief in its moral superiority or the notion that God is on its side. Why would the boys take so seriously what was simply a series of competitive games, to the point of crying over victory? *Hypothesis suggested:* competition can escalate into conflict. The students might explore possible differences between conflict and competition. They might discover that in competition there are agreed upon rules and "sportsmanlike conduct" prevails. In conflict, groups cease to operate under rules (although they may stop short of serious violence or killing) and each tries to inflict damage or humiliation upon the other.

In what ways and for what reasons did the two groups' views of each other become distorted by the end of Stage II? *Hypothesis suggested:* groups in conflict will develop negative stereotypes of each other. What happened to the groups' views of themselves? *Hypothesis suggested:*

groups in conflict will tend to develop a moral self-image.

How do you explain the Eagles' claim to "victory" in the fight after the tournament when the staff was pushing the Rattlers away? (The Eagles had not had much success in the encounter and needed to maintain their own self-image that they had forced the Rattlers to retreat.) *Hypothesis suggested:* a group in unsuccessful conflict may invent victories.

How do you explain the Eagles' belief that the Rattlers had deliberately put rocks in their swimming place? *Hypothesis suggested:* a group in conflict may attribute imaginary wrongs to the opponent.

What did the bean toss tell us about the behavior of members of groups in conflict? *Hypothesis suggested:* members of groups in conflict will exaggerate their own accomplishments and minimize those of their opponents.

Wider implications: Does what happened in Stage II have implications for larger groups and nations? How would rivalry between nations (or between racial groups, or labor and management, etc.) affect internal unity? What happens to leadership when nations are in conflict? (E.g., Winston Churchill, a dynamic and aggressive leader, became Prime Minister in 1940.) How might losses affect a nation at war? (Students could examine the effect of Pearl Harbor in stiffening United States national unity. They might also consider the war in Vietnam in terms of American unity.) Will persons of low status (or those who feel themselves to be of low status) in large groups or nations advocate extreme measures when their group or nation is in conflict? (Students might be encouraged to bring in examples of their own, the teacher being alert to stereotyping.) Is competition between nations viewed as conflict? (The students might consider trade or the "race to the moon" between the Soviet Union and the United States. In both cases, competition could be of mutual benefit but is usually viewed as conflictual.) Do nations in conflict (not necessarily violently) tend to view the opponent as worse than he really is, or themselves as better—or both? (U. S.-U.S.S.R. and U. S.-People's Republic of China relations afford many examples. The teacher may wish to consult Chapter 7, "The Image of the Enemy," in *Sanity and Survival,* by Jerome D. Frank. New York: Vintage Press, 1968. The Center for War/Peace Studies also has interesting materials on misperception between nations.) Do nations tend to claim victories that are, at the very least, open to question? (Students may consider that both the United States and the Soviet Union claimed

the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis as a victory. The Vietnam war is full of such examples.)

STAGE III: What happens to groups in conflict when a threat or rival to both is introduced? *Hypothesis suggested:* groups in conflict will cooperate in the face of a threat or rival to both. However, can one say that to introduce a rival to conflicting groups really reduces conflict? (Need to get across the idea that there may still be conflict; indeed, the conflict may widen.)

What is the usual assumption (or hypothesis) about bringing groups in conflict together? (That understanding and harmony are promoted by bringing groups into contact.) Is this hypothesis invalid?

What kind of activities helped the groups to cooperate and, eventually, become friendly? (Such activities had to be appealing and important, perhaps propose a threat to some value; and they had to require the effort of both groups for their achievement. Sherif calls such activities "superordinate goals"—that is, more compelling than the previous goals of each.) Did the goals have to be pleasant? (This would depend upon what is meant by "pleasant." Two men who hate each other might cooperate if the goal of survival depends on it, but pleasant might not be the right way to describe that goal.) The activities introduced into Stage III suggest what hypothsis or hypotheses? *Hypothesis suggested:* when groups in conflict find goals of great appeal and importance, which can only be attained by cooperation, they will pursue them jointly.

How did pulling down the dead tree or getting the truck started involve a very different concept of "winning" from that in Stage II? (The competition was not against the other group. In this form of "competition," neither side lost and both sides gained. The teacher may wish to discuss the difference between zero and non-zero games to illustrate the change from Stage II to Stage III. In zero sum games, what the winner wins by, the loser loses by; that is, if in a football game one team wins by 7 points, the other has lost by 7 points. The sum, then, is 0. In non-zero sum games, both sides may win or both sides may lose. One of the best ways to illustrate this is by a game that involves both zero sum and non-zero sum aspects. For an example, see "The Oil Islands Dispute" game in Chapter 5.)

Wider implications: Can you think of examples from world affairs or history in which the emergence of a rival brought two conflicting nations together? (Athens

and Sparta in the face of Persia, France and Austria against Prussia in the eighteenth century, the U. S. and the U.S.S.R. against Nazi Germany, etc. Has the emergence of China as a "threat" to both brought the Soviet Union and the United States together?) What would happen to conflicts between nations today if the world were threatened from outer space?

Does bringing Americans into contact with Chinese and Russians necessarily promote understanding? (Contact at Olympic games can promote harmony; but contact can also reinforce hostile feelings.)

Are there superordinate goals that can bring blacks and whites or labor and management to cooperate? (The elimination of poverty, urban blight, and violence are examples to consider as goals around which whites and blacks need to cooperate. Labor and management need to cooperate in keeping down inflation, in promoting efficiency and productivity so as better to compete for national and world markets, etc.)

Are there superordinate goals in the world that could bring about cooperation between rival nations? (Students should consider the problem of pollution of the oceans and the atmosphere, which cannot be resolved without cooperative effort. They might also consider the problem of arms expenditures that make it nearly impossible for nations to provide adequate resources to meet domestic problems. The agreement of the U. S., the U.S.S.R., and other nations to ban atmospheric nuclear testing is an example of cooperation mutually advantageous to conflicting nations.)

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McNeil, Elton D. (ed.), *The Nature of Human Conflict.* Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1965.

An overview of the study of human conflict by well-known authorities in the social sciences. Not easy reading, but some chapters are worth the effort.

Sherif, Muzafer, "Experiments in Group Conflict," *Scientific American.* November 1956. Reprint available from W.H. Freeman, 660 Market Street, San Francisco, California 94104.

A six-page article describing the three experiments with 11- and 12-year-old boys on conflict and cooperation.

_____, *In Common Predicament: Social Psychology of Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation*. Boston. Houghton Mifflin, 1966.

A most useful book for the teacher. Contains a description of the Robbers Cave Experiment, with the hypotheses investigated. Especially useful in moving from small group conflict to international. One of the best and most readable conceptual overviews of conflict and cooperation. Out of print under this title, but same text is available in an English edition published by Routledge, Kegan Paul, *Group Conflict and Cooperation: Their Social Psychology*.

_____, *et al., Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation, The Robbers Cave Experiment*. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Book Exchange, 1961. (Out of print.)

Contains the full account of the experiment, but the book is not easy to find.

Sherif, Muzafer and Sherif, Carolyn W., *Groups in Harmony and Tension*. New York: Octagon Books (Farrar, Straus & Giroux), 1966.

Reports the first of the three intergroup experiments.

_____, *Social Psychology*. New York: Harper and Row, 1969.

Contains a complete account of the three experiments.

Simulating Social Conflict, "Episodes in Social Inquiry Series." Boston, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon, 1971.

A classroom unit with teacher's guide prepared by Sociological Resources for the Social Studies. Contains a number of exciting games that enable students to examine aspects of conflict and cooperation.


war
humanity
imperialism
culture
aggression
violence
militarism
peace
compassion
instinct

THE THREE R'S

4

SUGGESTED UNITS ON WAR-PEACE TOPICS

WILLIAM A. NESBITT

1. "Human Nature and War"

SIGNIFICANCE: Studies indicate that most Americans, including the young, are pessimistic about the prospects for peace because of their beliefs about the nature of man. (See Judith V. Torney and Donald N. Morris, *Global Dimensions in U.S. Education: The Elementary School*. New York: Center for War/Peace Studies, 1972, pp. 8-14.) The world that many students experience around them, and too often what they study in school reinforces the notion of a "killer instinct" in man, of which war is one expression. But, scientists and scholars are divided on this issue. Many do not believe in innate human aggressiveness, while those who do often still postulate that culture remains the primary determinant of human behavior.

SOME KEY QUESTIONS: Does "human nature" explain violence and war? If man is, in fact, innately aggressive, does this mean that he is doomed to continued warfare?

CONCEPTS: Instinct, aggression, territoriality, culture, crowding.

GRADE LEVEL: Much of the reading on the human nature question is relatively difficult, except for novels which present only one side. For a balanced treatment of the subject, using at least some scientific materials, the students probably need to be better than average, upper-high-school level.

How to Fit into the Curriculum: Because the topic is so highly interdisciplinary, ideally it should be presented in mini-courses titled "What is Man?", "War-Peace Studies," etc. A unit on aspects of the subject could be taken up in such courses as sociology, psychology, biology, and English. Almost any social studies course will deal with war, revolution, and other forms of violence and could very well include the study of whether there is anything "natural" in these phenomena.

Suggested Materials: A widely used book (made into a popular film) in secondary schools is William Golding's *Lord of the Flies* (New York: Capricorn, 1959), which assumes that many youngsters in a "state of nature" will revert to being killers. *On Aggression* by Konrad Lorenz (New York: Bantam, 1963) maintains, largely from the study of animal behavior, that man has been programmed from his evolutionary development to be aggressive. Books by Robert Ardrey, especially *The Territorial Imperative*, take the position that man has an innate propensity to defend a territory and that this, along with man's aggressiveness, makes war all but inevitable.

The other side of the question is taken up by various authorities in *Man and Aggression*, edited by M.F. Ashley Montagu (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968). Teachers will find *War: The Anthropology of Armed Conflict and Aggression*, edited by Morton Fried, *et al.* (Garden City, N.Y.: The Natural History Press, 1968) a valuable source. The best, most balanced overview, is in Alexander Alland, Jr., *The Human Imperative* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).

Books by Desmond Morris, especially *The Human Zoo* (New York: Delta, 1969) and *The Naked Ape* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), take up the human nature question, including the factor of crowding, in a lively fashion.

A moving and educational "humanities approach" is provided by Humanities, Inc., White Plains, N.Y., in its slide-tape program titled "An Inquiry into the Nature of Man: His Inhumanity and His Humanity."

Materials developed by the Anthropology Curriculum Study Project and published by Macmillan under the title of "Patterns in Human History" relate to the human nature question, particularly "Studying Societies." "Man: A Course of Study," a multi-media set of materials developed by Educational Development Center in Cambridge, Massachusetts, for the 5th and 6th grades, takes up the question of how primitive peoples handle aggressive behavior.

The New York State Education Department's Center for International Programs and Comparative Studies has prepared a collection of interdisciplinary readings titled "Human Nature and War" and an annotated bibliography, which includes films. It contains selections from Lorenz, Ardrey, Desmond Morris, and others, and several from anthropological studies of primitive peoples that suggest the crucial importance of the culture.

2. "The Outbreak of World War I: A Case Study"

SIGNIFICANCE: Robert North, Director of Stanford University's Studies in International Conflict and Integration program, has called the six weeks following the assassination of the Austrian Archduke in 1914 "a prototype of international crisis, against which more contemporary crises can be measured with profit."

SOME KEY QUESTIONS: How do national decision-makers behave in an international crisis? How can an incident escalate into a major war that few foresaw and nobody won? How do national decision-makers tragically misperceive their own and other nation's words and actions? In causing a war, how important is a crisis situation as compared with underlying divisions between nations?

CONCEPTS: Escalation, misperception, nationalism, imperialism, militarism, international system, decision-making process, multiple causation, etc.

GRADE LEVEL: The outbreak of World War I can be taught at any high-school grade level, although some concepts may best be taught to juniors and seniors.

HOW TO FIT INTO THE CURRICULUM: Any history or cultures course dealing with the modern world will include something about World War I. It may be desirable to spend more time teaching about World War I, perhaps comparing it to the Cuban Missile Crisis (which did not lead to war), instead of teaching "one damned war after another."

SUGGESTED MATERIALS: An annotated bibliography of books and audio-visual materials on World War I is contained in *The July 1914 Crisis: A Case Study in Misperception and Escalation* (see description below), available from the New York State Education Department.

Several well-researched and readable accounts are: René Albrecht-Carrié, *The Meaning of the First World War* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), of which the first 46 pages are an overview of the under-

A cartoon drawn by Robert Osborn and published in Missile Madness, by Herbert Scoville and Robert Osborn (Houghtbon Mifflin) has been omitted here because of copyright restrictions.

lying and immediate causes; Lawrence Lafore, *The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War I* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1965), a lively but long account; George Malcolm Thomson, *The Twelve Days: 24 July to 4 August* (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1964), an exciting short book by a journalist; and Barbara Tuchman, *The Guns of August* (New York. Dell, 1962), the first part of which deals especially with the role of the military at the outbreak.

The first 33 pages of *Nobody Wanted War: Misperception in Vietnam and Other Wars* by Ralph K. White are concerned with the misperception leading up to World War I and establish a framework for considering misperception in any international crisis. This is an indispensable book for the teacher (and for the better student) who wants to consider the important psychological factors in war causation.

The Shaping of Western Society: An Inquiry Approach by John M. Good, in the "Fenton series" published by Holt, Rinehart and Winston, has a stimulating chapter on World War I misleadingly titled "War and Peace." This includes a role-playing, decision-making exercise on the alternatives open to the principal nations on the eve of the war.

The July 1914 Crisis: A Case Study in Misperception and Escalation, published by the Center for International Programs of the New York State Education Department, is a unit for the social studies classroom which treats the July 1914 crisis as a case study that can be used as a springboard for examining the danger of war in the contemporary world or the world of the future. The unit, requiring a week or more of class time and outside reading, includes: an exposition, drawing upon concepts in both history and the social sciences, of the role of perception and misperception, escalation, the international system, crisis decision-making, and historical factors in the outbreak of World War I; a collection of primary source readings for use with an inquiry approach through which the student discovers for himself examples of misperception and other causes of the war; and an annotated bibliography of books, films, and other kinds of materials of interest to students and teachers. Available separately is a simulation, "The Alpha Crisis Game," along with a Teacher's Guide, which is designed to introduce *The July 1914 Crisis: A Case Study in Misperception and Escalation.* Students play the role of national leaders in a crisis that replicates that of July 1914, although the countries' names and those of the actual leaders are changed. The game is

not only a motivating experience for the student, but also conveys considerable historical information useful for understanding the causes of World War I.

3. "The International State System and Its Change"

SIGNIFICANCE: As the problem of pollution and its control can be understood adequately only by examining the global ecological system, so war and its prevention can be understood adequately only by examining the international state system.

SOME KEY QUESTIONS: What is meant by an international state system? How has the international state system changed since the eighteenth century? What are the principal characteristics of an international system? Why is it no longer sufficient to consider the behavior of national governments in examining questions of war and peace? Why has the international system been so war-prone since the eighteenth century? What changes are necessary to reduce the danger of a major and highly destructive war in the future?

CONCEPTS: International state system, balance of power, deterrence, collective security, decision-making, bargaining, arms race, etc.

GRADE LEVEL: Some aspects of "systems thinking" can be taught to young children, but many of the materials for teaching about the international system are most appropriate at the upper-high-school level. By using simulations, important concepts can be understood by students of average or even below average ability. However, there is still a serious shortage of reading materials on the subject for the high school student.

HOW TO FIT INTO THE CURRICULUM: Modern European, United States, and World History courses all lend themselves to the topic, although the ideal course might be one on International Relations.

SUGGESTED MATERIALS: "The State System Exercise" (Markham Publishers, 3322 West Peterson Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60645) involves three simulation games: (1) "The Classical State System" of the eighteenth century, (2) "The Modern State System" of the period before World War I, and (3) "The Contemporary International System." The games are not difficult to run or play, are highly motivating, and yet get at a number of the key concepts. *Guns or Butter* (SIMILE II, P.O. Box 1023, La Jolla, California 92037) is another simulation that is useful in demonstrating the problem of maintaining security, while at the same time promoting other values

in the international system. The game can also be used as a springboard for discussion and study of ways to change the system.

For understanding the present and future international system, teachers will find *International Education for Spaceship Earth* by David C. King (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1971) very useful, both for theory and practice. *International Politics* by K.J. Holsti (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967) can be a valuable text for the teacher in providing a conceptual framework with historical examples of international systems. Especially see the first 94 pages. Andrew M. Scott, *The Functioning of the International Political System* (New York: Macmillan, 1967) is an excellent handbook on concepts for the teacher. Finally, teachers will find practical suggestions for a unit using a systems approach to the study of international relations in "The International System," available in mimeographed form from The Center for Teaching International Relations. (See bibliography for address.)

Peacekeeping—past, present, and future—is taken up in two sets of curriculum for the high school student. *Peacekeeping: Problems and Possibilities* by Jack R. Fraenkel, Margaret Carter, and Betty Reardon (New York: Random House, 1973) examines four models—the League of Nations, the United Nations, mutual deterrence, and limited world government—and their functioning through case studies. *World Order* by Byron G. Massialas and Jack Zevin (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970) considers the ways that nations have used to resolve conflicts in the past and might use in the future.

The simulation game "Conflict," (SIMILE II, 1973—see above; some copies available from the Institute for World Order), is unique in offering an opportunity for students to become involved in how a limited world government might handle a crisis in the year 1990. Another way of having students consider a preferable future international system is through using scenarios; for example, see "Using Data and Scenarios to Explore the Future," Pennsylvania Social Studies *Review,* November 1972. Also, write the Institute for World Order for further information about futurism and scenarios.

Some Additional Suggestions

1. *A unit in U.S. history on the period under the Articles of Confederation.* OBJECTIVE: To consider factors making for the integration of political units. The concept of func-

tionalism is particularly important in this case, which may be compared with the development of the Common Market. (See Karl W. Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1968, pp. 166-168; 191-209.)

2. *A unit in U.S. history on the Rush-Bagot Agreement and the demilitarization of the Great Lakes.* OBJECTIVES: (a) to examine problems of arms control and disarmament, including the question of arms as a source of tensions rather than security. (b) To consider factors necessary in creating what Karl Deutsch (see above) calls a pluralistic security community. The New York State Education Department, Center for International Programs, has a unit on the subject, including a role-playing exercise in which students act as American and British negotiators in considering arms on the Great Lakes in 1815.
3. *A unit in European history or culture using the Crusades as a case study.* OBJECTIVES: (a) To begin to understand the role of ideology and misperception in international conflict. (b) To examine the variety of motives and values and the corruption in war of seemingly high ideals. (c) To help students realize the possible indirect benefits of war, including technological development and cultural diffusion.
4. *A unit on war and peace-making in the Middle Ages in European history or culture.* OBJECTIVES: (a) To examine the relationship of war-making to the social class structure. (b) To understand conflicting values in western civilizations on war and violence. (c) To explore the meaning of international law and "municipal" law. (d) To consider the need for a central authority to apply legitimate force under law to bring "domestic" peace.
5. *A unit in European history or culture on the consolidation of feudal principalities in a particular area into a monarchical state.* OBJECTIVE: To show the disadvantages of many small political and economic units in terms of security and economic development.
6. *A unit in European history or culture on the conflict between Athens and Sparta.* OBJECTIVES: (a) To point out the effects on the participants of prolonged violent conflict. (b) To consider alternative means for conflict resolution. (Education Development Center, 15 Mifflin Place, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, has such a unit under development to be published commercially in 1973. See page 98.)

7. *A unit in world, U.S., or European history on the interrelationship of science and technology with war.* OBJECTIVES: (a) To demonstrate the growing destructiveness of war from the time when bows and arrows were used to the present nuclear age. (b) To recognize that war can now be so destructive that national goals may be lost in the process even if the war is "won." (c) To examine the economic and social cost of the modern war system. *Data on The Human Crisis: A Handbook for Inquiry* (see page 91) can be used for inquiry into aspects of this unit.
8. *A unit on the Hague Peace Conferences in a modern history course.* OBJECTIVES: (a) To consider reasons for the past failure of arms control and efforts to "humanize" war. (b) To consider weaknesses in past attempts to create legal machinery for peaceful conflict resolution. (The Hague experience may be contrasted to the SALT talks and Moscow agreements on control of nuclear weapons.)
9. *A unit in modern history on arms races; for example, pre-1914, pre-1939, and post-World War II.* OBJECTIVES: (a) To recognize the dynamics of arms races. (b) To realize that arms races may not prevent war as much as they encourage mistrust. (Simulations, such as *Guns or Butter*, can provide a student with the experience of an arms race.)
10. *Encourage the Mathematics Department to include war/peace problems in the learning of mathematics*; for example, students can learn about exponential growth through the population problem, or they could figure percentages of GNP that nations spend on the military. (See table on page 17, *Data on the Human Crisis: A Handbook for Inquiry* [see page 91], or *World Military Expenditures*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.)
11. *Encourage the Science Department to do a unit in biology on bacteriological or chemical warfare, or a unit in physics on the meaning of nuclear fission and fusion and the destructiveness of nuclear weapons.* (See *Data on the Human Crisis.*)
12. *Encourage the English Department to do a unit or minicourse on the changing nature of war through the literature of World Wars I and II, and of civil wars.*



THIS IS THE GAME

5

"THE OIL ISLANDS DISPUTE: A CLASSROOM GAME OF CONFLICT AND COOPERATION"*

Introduction

Simulation games are, perhaps, the best technique yet devised for giving the student a direct experience in conflict and cooperation. "The Oil Islands Dispute" game described below may be useful not only for the student but for the teacher who is unfamiliar with this relatively new teaching method. (See the listing at the end of the chapter for other simulations available.)

It should be understood that "The Oil Islands Dispute" is different from most classroom simulations in being essentially a two-person instead of a group game. Also, it may teach the advantages of cooperation in a quantifiable way more explicitly than most simulations. But the exercise does combine the two essential primary elements of simulations—role-playing with a scenario and a game format in which strategies have clear outcomes for the players.

*This game was developed by William A. Nesbitt, based on "Prisoner's Dilemma." See Anatol Rapoport, *Fights, Games, and Debates*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960. For a brief, clear description of game theory and international relations, with examples from "Prisoner's Dilemma," see Karl W. Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968.

Procedure for the Teacher

First, divide the class into groups of three. Two students will play the game, and the third will be referee and scorekeeper. Second, the students should be given the following scenario, either orally or in writing, as an example of a conflict situation which the game may illustrate. The teacher may propose other situations or the students may devise scenarios of their own.

SCENARIO

It is the year 1980. Vast oil deposits have been discovered on islands in the Bering Straits area between the United States and the Soviet Union. Neither country had pressed their claims to these islands before, although both had good historical and legal arguments to do so. Now, however, with a serious shortage of oil clearly ahead for the world, both countries consider the oil islands of extreme importance. Indeed, the continued economic development of both countries may depend on access to this oil.

Procedure for the Student

In the game you are about to play, one student will represent the United States in the dispute over the islands; the other the Soviet Union (you can flip a coin to decide who plays which). A third student will act as referee and scorekeeper. Players will have to make one of two action choices: (1) to cooperate in developing the oil and sharing the profits; (2) to attempt to seize an island. There will be 10 rounds of action choices; each can be thought of as involving a different island.

The choices will be indicated as follows: each player will hold a blue chip and a red chip under the desk or table. The referee will say, "1, 2, 3, show!" At the command, the players will show, at the same time, either a red or a blue chip. A red chip will mean seize the island; a blue chip will mean cooperate with the other country. If both players indicate cooperation, they will each receive $1 billion as shared profits. If one player indicates seizure and the other cooperation, the island will be considered as successfully seized. The country showing the red chip will receive all the profits, $2 billion, and the player showing the blue chip will lose $1 billion, signifying loss of prestige to his country.

If both try to seize the island by showing red chips, each will lose $1 billion, representing the cost of naval and amphibious operations.

The gains and losses from moves are represented in the following matrix:



The referee must keep track of the gains and losses in each of the 10 rounds. A piece of lined paper with two columns, one headed U.S. and the other U.S.S.R., is adequate.

For the Teacher

Variations on the game can be played with the same class immediately after the first rounds and without discussion or "debriefing." One variation is to increase the penalty for attempted seizure by both countries a $billion each time, indicating the cost of escalation of conflict; that is, the first time both countries show red chips simultaneously, the cost of conflict would be $1 billion, the second time it would be $2 billion, the third $3 billion, etc. Another is to allow the two countries open communication before each decision choice is made. Also, a nuclear war could be said to have broken out the third time both went for seizure, with a cost, in terms of the oil islands, of all oil; that is, the game would be over and both would get zero.

Debriefing the Game

Indicate the highest scores in the game on the blackboard. Next to those scores indicate the number of successful and unsuccessful seizures. Then, determine some

of the lower scores, along with the number of seizures. Inquire with the students into which was more successful, cooperation or conflict.

If the variations given above were tried, discuss with the students their effect on the outcomes. Did escalation and the threat of nuclear war stop seizures? Did communication between the two sides encourage cooperation? Did efforts to seize the islands increase mistrust? Did any groups establish trust without communication? Why?

Have the students write other scenarios that might be used with the game. Can they think of historical situations that might be used with the game?

Other Simulation Games

Some classroom simulation games are described below, briefly. These are particularly suitable for examining war/peace concepts at the high school level. For further information about these games and others, see *The Guide to Simulations/Games for Education and Training*, David W. Zuckerman and Robert E. Horn. (See page 99.)

Conflict. SIMILE II, P.O. Box 1023, La Jolla, Ca. 92037.

Simulates a crisis that breaks out in the year 1990 and demonstrates the possibilities for a disarmed world to cope with a threat to the peace without risking the dangers of a massive military force under a central world authority. Useful for enabling students to test out means of controlling international violence in the future.

Crisis. SIMILE II (see above).

Students play the roles of national decision-makers facing a crisis over a vital resource. Explores the dangers of military solutions to problems and the means of peaceful resolution of conflict.

Dangerous Parallel. Scott, Foresman and Company, 1900 East Lake Avenue, Glenview, Ill. 60025.

Students as cabinet ministers are involved in a fictionalized crisis that parallels the Korean War at the time of the American decision to cross the 38th parallel. A primary purpose of the game is to teach about the factors needed for rational and realistic foreign policy decision-making.

C· ·r.* SIMILE II (see above).

play the roles of leaders in five countries with dif- ·sources and must consider their country's domestic dev.. pment as well as its national security. The game enables the players to examine the nature of the international system, the problems of escalating an arms build-up at the sacrifice of "butter," and how the system might be made safer in order to promote basic human values.

Inter-Nation Simulation Kit. Science Research Associates, Inc., 259 East Erie Street, Chicago, Ill. 60611.

Student teams represent leadership roles in the international system and must consider domestic economic development along with foreign affairs and defense While this high school version of a classic game is complex, the rewards are proportionate to the effort.

Simulating Social Conflict, "Episodes in Social Inquiry Series." Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971.

"Resources and Arms" is a simple simulation of an arms race between two nations. Different versions enable the student to test out ways of reducing arms costs and increasing natural and human resources.

Simulation: The Decision-Making Model. World Affairs Council of Philadelphia, 3rd Floor Gallery, John Wanamaker Store, 13th and Market Streets, Phila., Pa. 19107.

Students play government officials and influential citizens in five nations who must make economic and military policy for their countries and negotiate agreements with each other. Resembles important characteristics of the Inter-Nation Simulation, but is much simpler.

Starpower. SIMILE II (see above).

While not directly concerned with international affairs, the game dramatically raises questions about how those with power tend to exclude others from access to resources and participation in decision-making.

The State System Exercise. Markham Publishers, 3322 West Peterson Avenue, Chicago, Ill. 60659.

Students play the roles of national leaders in three kinds of international systems: eighteenth century; late nineteenth and early twentieth century; and the contemporary. Very useful in history courses for teaching the nature of international systems and the factors making for war and peace.



6

SOURCES AND RESOURCES: A GUIDE TO MATERIALS

CENTER FOR WAR/PEACE STUDIES*

The compilation of any bibliography presents problems in standards and evaluation, here complicated by the fact that both conflict and war are enormous fields, each with a massive literature. Consequently, we make no pretense here of being complete, or even of covering all the basic ground. Indeed, it is our view that the more titles included, the less valuable the end product, since choice for the user becomes more difficult. The selected bibliography which follows is therefore only a beginning.

One additional matter is the reference listings that follow several of the chapters. This bibliography does not repeat any of those important titles, with the sole exception of Quincy Wright's *Study of War,* a truly seminal work.

The bibliography is divided into sections which we think teachers will find useful. Since we have listed only books we recommend, the annotations are quite brief, just enough to give some idea of the content. We have tried to list only the least expensive editions. The annotations of classroom materials are more extensive, so that teachers can determine whether or not they fit into their syllabi and grade levels.

*Prepared by the Center for War/Peace Studies' Curriculum Materials Program, directed by Larry E. Condon.

For those who wish to go further than this bibliography, we have listed two additional sources under a a special heading, Bibliographies. We recommend these highly and have used them extensively in the preparation of this listing. William Nesbitt, the author of one, is also one of the authors of this book. We are grateful to Robert Pickus and Robert Woito for permission to use annotations from *To End War*. That work includes, besides an extensive carefully annotated bibliography, a series of excellent analytical essays that teachers will find very useful as organizing tools.

A number of individuals besides the authors contributed suggestions for inclusion in the listings. The final selection was made by Larry E. Condon.

General Background References

The Causes and Strategies of War

Barnett, Richard J., **Roots of War: The Men and Institutions Behind U.S. Foreign Policy**: New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1972, $10.00.

Examines the roots of war, especially Vietnam, in three broad areas: "the national security managers" and the bureaucracy that surrounds them, the public, and the American capitalist system. Describes how well-meaning leaders have dehumanized decision-making.

Bloomfield, Lincoln P., **Disarmament and Arms Control**. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1968, $.85.

An able historical outline, reporting on the current status of, and future prospects for, disarmament agreements. Special focus on the problem of achieving universal participation, particularly by Communist China, in such agreements.

Buchan, Alastair, **War in Modern Society: An Introduction**. New York: Harper & Row, Colophon Books, 1968, $2.45.

A concise, balanced, readable interdisciplinary introduction to the causes of war, its changing nature in history, the dangers in the nation-state international system, and various possibilities for controlling war. Perhaps the best short, single volume on war and war prevention, in a historical context, to be found.

Hoffman, Stanley, **The State of War: Essays in the Theory and Practice of International Politics.** New York: Praeger, 1965, reg. ed. $5.95, text ed. $2.75.

A study of the function of war as a major institution, and its role in Western political life.

Kahn, Herman, **On Escalation**. Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, Pelican revised edition, 1968, $1.65.

A detailed study of the relationship between levels of violence and types of disagreement causing that violence. Attempts to apportion the level of violence to the end sought.

Noel-Baker, Philip, **The Arms Race: A Program for World Disarmament.** Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1959, $2.00.

A careful historical analysis with specific recommendations. A classic on disarmament.

Rathjens, George W., **The Future of the Strategic Arms Race: Options for the 1970's.** New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1969, $.60.

Clarifies many complex issues by examining the basic premises on which strategic decisions are made.

Wright, Quincy, **A Study of War: An Analysis of the Causes, Nature, and Control of War.** Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Phoenix abridged edition, 1964; unabridged second edition, 1965, Phoenix $3.45, unabridged $20.00.

The Phoenix paperback edition is a shortened and updated version of the two-volume study originally published in 1942. This classic should be at every teacher's hand as a reference. Even a perusal of the table of contents is an education in conceptualizing war. For history teachers such chapters as "The History of War," "Changes in War Through History," "Causation and War," and "Nationalism and War" can provide valuable information and data. The unabridged version is expensive, but the tables and graphic materials (omitted from the abridged edition) are useful for inquiry possibilities and may well make it worth the price.

International Politics and War

American Assembly, Alastair Buchan, (ed.), **A World of Nuclear Powers.** Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966, $1.95.

Five authors study nuclear proliferation and its consequences for nuclear and non-nuclear powers. They offer a variety of alternatives to proliferation.

Bloomfield, Lincoln P., **The United Nations and Vietnam.** New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1968, $.60.

An analysis of why the United Nations has had no useful role to play in the Vietnam conflict. Argues for a non-U.N. international presence as part of a peace agreement.

Borgese, Elizabeth Mann, (ed.), **A Constitution for the World.** Santa Barbara, Calif.: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1965, $1.00.

An attempt to accomplish the difficult task of formulating a constitution which would eliminate war and establish the preconditions of peace with justice.

Clark, Grenville, and Sohn, Louis B., **World Peace Through World Law: Two Alternative Plans,** third revised and enlarged edition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966, $5.25.

This is the most thorough and detailed attempt to provide a model for world law under a strengthened United Nations. It specifies with great care the roads to achieving that goal,

and considers systematically the spectrum of political, military, economic, and legal problems involved. Argues for two possible routes: U.N. charter revision or a treaty on world disarmament and world development growing out of the United Nations.

Fall, Bernard, **The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis,** second revised edition. New York: Praeger, 1967, $10.00.

Probably the best single source for unraveling the political and military complexities of the Vietnam conflict.

Fisher, Roger, **International Conflict for Beginners.** New York: Harper & Row, 1969, $1.95.

A delightful book on the conduct of foreign affairs, with a high level of empathy and reason. The chapter "Law and Legal Institutions May Help" uses the Cuban Missile Crisis as a case for considering the role of international law in international conflict.

Fitzgerald, Frances, **Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam.** Boston: Atlantic-Little, Brown, 1972, $12.50.

A beautifully written, universally acclaimed book that may be especially useful in understanding the Vietnamese cultural background. It goes a long way toward explaining American misperceptions involved in the war.

Holsti, Kalevi J., **International Politics: A Framework for Analysis,** second edition. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972, text ed. $9.50.

One of the very best discussions of the whole field of international relations. Teachers will find the author's description of international systems, with historical examples, of great value in history courses.

Larson, Arthur, **Questions and Answers About the United Nations.** Durham, N.C.: Duke Rule of Law Research Center, Duke University, 1969, $.25.

Written to counter the attacks so often based on misinformation or misunderstanding. Valuable also for its succinct presentation of the nature, organization, operation, utility, and limits of the United Nations.

Morgenthau, Hans J., **Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,** fourth edition, revised. New York: Knopf, 1967, reg. ed. $12.95, text ed. $9.95.

Basic text in the field, which argues for a realistic assessment of national interests (as opposed to moralistic or legalistic concerns) as the best guide to formulation of foreign policy. Morgenthau considers the development of supranational authorities consistent with national interests.

United Nations, **Basic Facts About the United Nations.** United Nations Office of Public Information, updated regularly, $.50.

A description of the U.S. structure, membership, committees, and activities.

Van Slyck, Philip, **Peace: The Control of National Power.** Boston: Beacon Press, 1963, $1.75.

A carefully ordered seminar on the fundamental problems of achieving world order. A dated but excellent introduction to problems of world law and world government.

The United States and International Relations

Alperovitz, Gar, **Atomic Diplomacy.** New York: Simon & Schuster, 1965; New York: Random House, Vintage Books, $2.45.

Argues that the cold war began in 1945 as a result of President Truman's attempt to reverse Roosevelt's policies toward the Soviet Union.

Kennan, George F., **American Diplomacy, 1900-1950.** Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951; New York: New American Library, Mentor Books, $.75.

Kennan covers U.S. foreign policy during several crises, from the Spanish-American War to the Berlin Blockade. Included is Kennan's famous "Mr. X" article outlining the justification for the containment strategy adopted in 1948.

_____, **Realities of American Foreign Policy.** New York: Norton, 1966, $1.25.

A discussion of the principles which Kennan believes should underlie U.S. foreign policy. He criticizes the United States for too frequently applying moral and legalistic categories to problems to which they are not relevant.

U.S. Department of State, **A Pocket Guide to Foreign Policy Information, Materials, and Services.** Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969; $.10.

Lists the publications, periodicals, historical documents, and newsletters which give official State Department and Presidential views. Includes Speakers Bureau Information and available audio-visual materials.

Religious and Ethical Questions About War

Bainton, Roland, **Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace.** Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, Apex Books, 1960, $2.25.

A historical survey and critical appraisal by a well-known scholar.

Bondurant, Joan V., **Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict,** revised edition. Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 1965, $2.45.

An important contribution to conflict theory, and the best exposition of Gandhi's ideas, using concrete examples. Criticizes the frequent identification of power with military force, citing Gandhi's success in transforming his "enemies."

Fortas, Abe, **Concerning Dissent and Civil Disobedience.** New York: New American Library, Signet Books, 1968, $.60.

An argument for civil disobedience as a means of conducting conflict without violence. Fortas feels that those truly committed to civil disobedience must also be committed to accepting the legal consequences and must make clear precisely what law or practice they hope to change through this tactic.

Frank, Jerome D., **Sanity and Survival: Psychological Aspects of War and Peace.** New York: Random House, 1967, Vintage Edition, $1.95.

A clearly written, indispensable book by a well-known psychiatrist, on the various psychosocial factors in violence and war. He discusses the obstacles to and possibilities for reducing violence, and the need for world order under law. He concludes that education and improvements in child-rearing must be our "main reliance."

Lefever, Ernest W., **Ethics and United States Foreign Policy.** Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1958; New York: World Publishing Co., Meridian Books, $2.25.

An attempt to determine the relevance of ethical considerations to the realities of power politics.

MacGregor, C.H.C., **The New Testament Basis of Pacifism.** Nyack, N.Y.: Fellowship Publications, 1966, $1.25.

The acceptance of suffering is presented as a Christian obligation. A traditional Christian pacifist statement and a careful analysis of the New Testament by a British theologian.

Pickus, Robert, **Judaism and War.** Berkeley, Calif.: World Without War Council, 1968, $.50.

An anthology of materials on five different perspectives on war encountered within the Jewish tradition. Prepared for high school discussion, useful for adults.

White, Ralph K., **Nobody Wanted War: Misperception in Vietnam and Other Wars,** revised edition. New York: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1970, $2.50.

A study of the complex of emotions and prejudices which, the author holds, causes international conflicts. From a study of World War I, World War II, and the Vietnam War, the author concludes that misperceptions produce tensions which can lead to wars.

World Development

Falk, Richard A., **This Endangered Planet: Prospects and Proposals for Human Survival.** New York: Random House, 1971, Vintage edition, $2.95.

An examination of mankind's plight and what must be done to survive. The author demonstrates the interrelationship of international violence and war with such problems as population growth, pollution, depletion of natural resources, poverty, and the denial of human rights. Such problems,

incapable of solution by nation-states acting alone, are manageable only by a world order that can promote values all human beings share, such as survival.

Ward, Barbara, **The Lopsided World.** New York: Norton, 1968, $1.25.

Miss Ward describes the growing disparity between the rich and poor nations of the world and calls for an energetic program of foreign aid designed to meet the problem of economic deprivation. She sees such a program as a just and necessary response to an economically, religiously, and socially interdependent world.

Classroom Materials Produced by Projects and Organizations

The Amherst Project. The Amherst Project develops curriculum materials using inquiry approaches for the study of history in secondary schools.

All titles are available from: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Menlo Park, California 94025. Single copies, $1.32 list, $.99 net. Teacher's Manual, $.64 list, $.48 net.

Collective Security in the 1930's: The Failure of Men or the Failure of a Principle. Perceiving collective security as the foundation of American foreign policy, the intent of this unit is threefold: (1) to give students an understanding of collective security and our national experience with it in order better to comprehend current international affairs issues; (2) to raise cautionary questions about the use and misuse of "history," or our perception of history, in policy making; and (3) to develop, in the pursuit of historical understanding, critical skills which will lead to the appreciation of the limits and tentative nature of generalizations. Through an analysis of the failure of collective security, the authors examine the principles and practices of international peacekeeping.

Hiroshima: A Study in Science, Politics, and the Ethics of War. The decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima is examined through three central questions: (1) Why was the decision made? (2) Was it a wise decision, considering the alternatives? (3) Was it morally right? The material, mostly primary sources, explores the political, military, scientific, moral, and human factors that brought about the decision. The student is asked to form his own conclusions, but only after he has considered all the influences and has been made aware of the complexity of the decision-making process. This awareness is the basic objective of the unit.

Korea and the Limits of Limited War. The compatibility of democracy and limited war are examined, focusing on the problems presented by a limited war with limited objectives versus an unlimited war seeking victory. The unit deals specifically with the shaping and forming of foreign policy, and

aims at having students see the various factors which affect this shaping, as well as the difficulties faced by those who must cope with these problems. Finally, the student is asked to relate any insights he may have gained to the Vietnam war.

The Center for International Programs and Comparative Studies, The State Education Department of New York, 99 Washington Avenue, Albany, New York 12210. The Center for International Programs and Comparative Studies works to strengthen opportunities and resources for international and comparative studies at all levels, and in cooperation with educational agencies throughout the nation. It has a special interest in the societies and cultures of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and seeks to reflect recent scholarship in the social sciences and humanities which explore significant aspects of American society in relation to developments elsewhere in the world.

Its programs include in-service institutes, seminars, development of research and teaching materials dealing with crucial issues of global concern, and developing overseas opportunities for teachers and faculty members. Its Foreign Area Materials Center, at 11 West 42nd Street, in New York City, is concerned with the preparation and distribution of materials on foreign areas on the undergraduate and graduate levels.

Data on the Human Crisis: A Handbook for Inquiry, with Teacher's Guide. The handbook contains data sheets, most of which are in graph form, that succinctly summarize important information. The data sheets are organized under the following categories:

(1) International and National Violence; (2) The Cost of Arms; (3) Population Growth; (4) Pollution and Depletion of Natural Resources; (5) The Rich-Poor Nation Gap; (6) Rapidity of Change; (7) International Cooperation; (8) Interrelationship of Problems and the Future. A Teacher's Guide suggests ways the data can be used with an inquiry approach and provides questions and possible hypotheses for each data sheet.

The July 1914 Crisis: A Case Study in Misperception and Escalation and "The Alpha Crisis Game." (See page 73.)

Readings on Human Nature and War. A collection of interdisciplinary readings is under development for junior or senior high school students that helps to explore the question of whether war and other forms of mass violence are to be explained by something innate in man. These readings, from such fields as ethnology, psychology, biology, and anthropology,

will be accompanied by discussion questions getting at whether aggressive behavior is innate or learned. The questions will also encourage students to develop hypotheses on ways to reduce the level of violence in conflict situations. The materials will point out the crucial difference between individual aggressiveness and the highly organized, institutionalized phenomenon of warfare. A bibliography, including films and additional readings is provided.

Teaching About War and Its Control: An Annotated Bibliography for the Social Studies Teacher. (See page 100.)

Center for Teaching International Relations, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, Denver, Colorado 80210. CTIR seeks to improve the teaching of international relations within existing social studies curricula at the secondary level. It conducts workshops in world politics for social studies teachers and for prospective teachers; develops new instructional materials; maintains a Materials Distribution Center; and serves as a regional clearing house for the dissemination of information about organizations, programs, materials, and services available in this country and abroad on international education.

Conflict Resolution. A teaching unit, based on the film Little Island, which encourages students to analyze various modes of communication; includes games of strategy and a case study on the Cuban Missile Crisis. Grade level: 7 through 12. Price: $1.00.

Intelligence Gathering. A role-playing exercise designed to motivate inquiry into the roles that various "intelligence communities" play in policy making. Illustrates the problems of decision making in crisis situations. Grade level: 7 through 12. Price: $.50.

Nationalism Kit. A study kit including an inquiry lesson with slides, a slide tape show, etc., which, by focusing on the nation-building experiences of the United States and selected Third World countries, seeks to clarify the concept of nationalism. Grade level: 10 through 12. Free kit description on request.

Other materials available from CTIR include: International Organizations; System Imperiled; Pakistan: A Case Study in Nationalism That Failed; Comparative Race Relations and Modernization. Inquiries about the Center and its materials should be addressed to: Materials Distribution Center, Center for Teaching International Relations, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, Denver, Colorado 80210.

Center for War/Peace Studies, 218 East 18th Street, New York, New York 10003. The Center for War/Peace Studies is a research, development, and consulting agency concerned with education about our global society. It works with and through educational institutions and voluntary organizations across the United States and seeks to increase public awareness and knowledge about our world, most importantly about the roots of conflict and change. It promotes, among students and teachers, the search for constructive alternatives for the fulfillment of international responsibilities, the resolution of conflict without war, and the furtherance of democratic values.

Although the Center's efforts thus far have focused on the secondary level, initiatives are underway from kindergarten through the university. Its programs include: in-service and pre-service workshops for teachers; surveying and collecting materials suitable for teaching about world problems; creation of new materials where the need exists; an in-depth project in a large school district; publication of *Intercom* and *War/Peace Report;* and joint projects with many leading educational organizations. The Center is a program of the New York Friends Group, Inc.

Intercom is published three to five times each year, as suitable material becomes available. These and all future issues are designed for direct classroom use, and cover a specific subject. Usable for from three to ten sessions, depending on interest. Each contains a background essay, a complete teaching unit not needing outside material, and annotations on additional resources and organizations if deeper study is desired. Flyers available for each issue. Single copies, $1.50. Subscriptions: 5 issues, $6.00; 10 issues, $11.00; 15 issues, $15.00.

Intercom #68—Understanding U.S.-China Relations, November 1971. A background essay by A. Doak Barnett, and three high school teaching units, which include primary source readings and situations for role-playing. Examines China's view of the world, the evolution of Sino-European relations, and the impact of China's entrance into the U.N. Annotation of syllabi, curriculum units, and bibliography currently available. Suitable for grades 10-14. 72 pp. $1.50.

Intercom #69—Development: New Approaches, April, 1972. A unit ready for classroom use. A background essay, plus teaching lessons consider the imbalance between rich and poor, the reactions of the Third World, and the nature of U.S. responsibility toward the developing nations. Five concluding role-playing scenarios take off from earlier discussions of readings and graphs. Extensive annotated references and resources. Suitable for grades 10-14. 68 pp. $1.50.

Intercom #70—Southern Africa: Problems and U.S. Alternatives, September, 1972. This teaching unit provides provocative readings and inquiry-oriented questions on these issues: the form and extent of U.S. business and government activity in Southern Africa; the compatibility between black and white civilizations; prospects for the liberation movements; the role of international organizations; and portents for the future. Background material includes thumbnail sketches of each country, and extensive annotated references and resources. Suitable for grades 10-14. 70 pp. $1.50.

Intercom #71—Teaching About Spaceship Earth: A Role-Playing Experience for the Middle Grades, November, 1972. An imaginative role-playing experience for the 4th, 5th, and 6th grades, which, in conjunction with some simple science projects and an experimental spaceship voyage, enables a child to learn about the interrelatedness of ecological systems. Concluding section provides inquiry into the economy and cultures of four underdeveloped countries. Annotated resources. 66 pp. $1.50.

Intercom #72—Population. A teaching unit including a short essay on why schools should teach about population; some problems teachers will encounter; a summary of the various issues and problems for both the developed and the developing countries; and a series of self-contained lesson plans. Also, annotations on additional materials, resources, and organizations. $1.50.

Intercom #73—Teaching Toward Global Perspectives. A brief introductory essay touches on several ways in which our world is becoming increasingly interdependent and reasons for adding a global perspective to education. The major portion of the issue consists of a number of short exercises and classroom lessons designed for a wide variety of disciplines and courses, suitable for use at elementary and secondary level. $1.50.

Intercom #74—The Multinational Corporation. Explores the potential of multinational corporations as a force for peace and the problems of establishing safeguards against their use as agencies for exploitation and domination. $1.50. (publication—summer, 1973).

Global Education: Long Range Goals and Objectives. A timely reprint of Lee Anderson's article "An Examination of the Structure and Objectives of International Education" from the November 1968 issue of *Social Education* on "International Education for the Twenty-First Century." This is by far the best and most complete current single piece on the content and goals of global education. A superb introduction to the field for teachers who understand the need to work on global issues. 12 pp. $.50.

Sample Unit/New Approaches—*So You Want to Teach About . . .* (Concepts in War/Peace Studies) offers guidelines, brief demonstration lessons, and further resource suggestions for alternative approaches to traditional curriculum or for

developing curricula in new areas. 6-12 pages each. Separate units deal with: Current World Events; Interdependence; Power and Authority; Conflict, as a Concept; Development; Conflict in U.S. History Courses (Junior High School and High School Level). Available from Social Studies School Service, 10,000 Culver Blvd., Culver City, California 90230. $2.00.

War/Peace Report: A bimonthly journal of fact and opinion on progress toward a world of peace with justice. Covers current developments in world affairs, critical issues affecting war and peace, and general information useful to teachers. Subscriptions available from Gordon and Breach, One Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016, at $8 per year. Students $5; Libraries and Institutions $17.50.

Harvard Social Studies Project. The Harvard Social Studies Project has produced a series of issue-oriented unit books which delineate basic value conflicts, and work with values and concepts from the social sciences, law, and philosophy. They are designed primarily to help the average high school student clarify and deal with his own position on public issues.

All titles are available from: American Education Publications, Education Center, Columbus, Ohio 43216. $.35 per book in sets of 10 or more, with teacher's guide.

The American Revolution: Crisis of Law and Change. This unit raises the following questions within the context of the American Revolution: (1) What is a proper government, and where does its power originate? (2) In what ways should people—as groups or individuals—be able to express themselves to constituted authority? And what responsibility do rulers have to listen? (3) When and how is authority to be challenged? Are there rules which tell us when control becomes tyranny? Is there any way of knowing the point at which dissent may properly turn to revolt? Is violence ever the "right" course? The problems are presented as "open-ended" questions with no clear-cut "right" or "wrong" answers.

The Civil War: Crisis in Federalism. This introduction to some of the issues of the Civil War poses the following questions: (1) Who should be held morally responsible for slavery and its effects? What duties does such moral responsibility create for individuals and governments? (2) On what kinds of issues must there be a single uniform national policy? For what issues is it reasonable to allow local determination of policies and institutions? (3) On what grounds is it legitimate for a person, group, or government to withdraw from a contract or agreement to which they have been a party by tradition or choice? (4) Under what conditions, if any, would a person or local government be justified in deliberately violating federal law? (5) What are the advantages and disadvantages of responses such as martyrdom, peaceful civil disobedience, rioting, secession, or revolu-

tion by groups that feel they cannot tolerate existing national policy? Modern analogy cases dealing with Huey Newton and the Watts riot pose similar questions in a contemporary context.

Diplomacy and International Law. The nations of the world rely on international law and diplomacy as the chief agents for maintaining stability. This unit examines the form and use of treaties, international courts, and established customs as means of maintaining peace. Working toward a definition of international law, students also are asked to examine how international agreements are enforced and to make distinctions among law, diplomacy, and politics. In addition a case study is presented for change brought about by an unusual force, non-violent action.

The Limits of War: National Policy and World Conscience. This unit explores problems of world violence, world peace, and justice. It begins with an historical overview of the major changes in attitudes toward war from the limited professional armies in medieval times through the United Nations Charter outlawing aggressive war. Seeking to define the limits of modern war through a study of the Nuremburg trials, it raises the question of what limits of violence can be tolerated in the modern world. The justification and use of nuclear weapons is discussed in the Hiroshima case study, with the implications for the future raised in "A War for Tomorrow."

Organizations Among Nations. Types of international organizations explored in this unit include: (1) functional structures, (2) regional structures, (3) UN type of world organization, and (4) the world government approach. The basic issue is whether it is possible to control major powers or superpowers by any form of international organization, including full-scale world government. The underlying premises behind the various types of organization are analyzed along with the feasibility of movement toward a more stable international system.

Revolution and World Politics. Intervention and revolution are the major themes here. Among the questions dealt with are: (1) Under what conditions should a nation intervene in the affairs of another nation? (2) Are some means of intervention more justifiable than others? (3) When should an international group intervene? (4) How do revolutions abroad affect the vital interests of the United States? The focus is on decisions, aims, and objectives.

20th Century Russia: Agents of the Revolution is described as a unit on the process of revolution in modern societies. The main issues are: (1) Should change be allowed to arise only "naturally" within a community, or is outside agitation justified in some circumstances? (2) Is it morally right to use violence to gain political power, and if so, under what circumstances? (3) To what extent should government be responsible for people deprived of property or security during periods of rapid political and economic change? (4) To what extent should different levels of government take leadership in promoting

dra[illegible] that will affect large numbers of citizens? (5) W[illegible] should be the role and the obligations of an individual caught in the midst of revolutionary mass movements?

Institute for World Order, Inc. (formerly Institute for International Order/ World Law Fund), 11 West 42nd Street, New York, N.Y.. 10036. The School Program of the Institute develops curriculum materials, devises teaching methodology, and trains teachers in the use of such materials and methods for social studies courses; grades 7 through 12. Its audiovisual materials, games, and readings are all inquiry-oriented in approach and encourage a participatory learning style. These world order studies depend heavily upon "futuristics" and value analysis, and attempt to develop student skills of prediction and planning in connection with devising plans for preferred world systems based on the values of peace, social justice, economic welfare, and ecological balance.

The Human Person and the War System (*Intercom,* Center for War/Peace Studies, February 1971), edited by Betty Reardon. Offers a framework of inquiry into issues related to war crimes; 7 articles, each of which constitutes a lesson-plan. Grades 9-12. Order from Institute for World Order. $1.50.

Intervention: The Middle East. Filmstrip on the phenomenon of intervention in the changing international system; how it has affected the Middle East and the world system. Teacher's guide and readings. Grades 10-12. $34.50, with record; $39.50, with cassette. Order from Social Studies School Services.

Let Us Examine Our Attitude Toward Peace, edited by Priscilla Griffith and Betty Reardon. A booklet of readings on the psychological and political barriers to world peace. Discussion questions and activities suggestions. Grades 11-14. $1.00. Order from Social Studies School Services, SSSS order no. WLF01.

Conflict, a simulation game, presents a projected futuristic disarmed international system which students are encouraged to analyze and evaluate through a simulated crisis occurring within that system in the year 1999. After September 1973, order from SIMILE II, P.O. Box 1023, La Jolla, Calif. 92037. Price (tentative): $50.

Another audiovisual material which deals with the international system is: *Confrontation,* Ralph Meyers and Garry Thorpe, available from Social Studies School Services (SSSS), 10,000 Culver Blvd., Culver City, Calif. 90230. The unit contains four sound filmstrips using American and original Cuban and Soviet sources to show the background and perspectives of the protagonists in the Cuban Missile Crisis, and analyzes

the decisions made during this crisis by placing students in the roles of advisors to policymakers. Also available from SSSS are: *Age of Megaton*, Robert Hanvey—a sound filmstrip reviewing development of nuclear arms with discussion questions and activities; *Peace Games,* Betty Reardon and Gary Thorpe, a sequence of simulation games, including sound filmstrips and readings, packaged with U.N.A.; *Revolution: China and Mexico,* Ralph Meyers—two sound filmstrips and a book of readings.

The Fund has produced course outlines and units on such topics as disarmament and aggression, war, and peace. It has produced a film of its own, *The Hat*, available from McGraw-Hill, and has teaching guides to a variety of other films which can initiate discussions into the values related to world order studies. Further information on all materials can be obtained from the Institute for World Order.

Additional Classroom Materials

Appeasement in the 1930's—Why Did Diplomacy Fail? Robert W. Gillette. Scholastic Book Services (Great Issues Series), 904 Sylvan Ave., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 07632. 1966. $.75. This booklet focuses on options available to those who must deal with the threat of aggression. The author sees the possibilities as four: appeasement, negotiations on the basis of equality, economic sanction, and war, and it is around these that the unit is organized. The failure of the League of Nations and the Western democracies to find ways to deal with aggression is examined through the primary sources and selected materials.

Athens and Sparta in Confrontation. Education Development Center, Inc., 15 Mifflin Place, Cambridge, Mass. 02138. (To be commercially available in 1973.) Athens and Sparta in the fifth century B.C. provide the focus for this unit on conflict and change, which tries to provide an understanding of the nature of these two societies and their behavior during the Peloponnesian Wars. Some fundamental questions posed are: "To what extent does war transform the nature and characteristics of a society? What moral questions do a state and its citizens confront in war? What resources and standards does a society draw on to deal with the dilemmas of war? Can it remain true to its ideals? Finally, is war inevitable or are there other alternatives for nations in conflict?" The unit does not try to survey or cover Greek history, but rather it focuses on and analyzes the behavior and value systems of a society at a particular time.

Vietnam Curriculum. (New York Review Book published with Boston Area Teaching Project, Inc.) The New York Review of Books, 250 West 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10019. 1968. 4 volumes $10.00. A massive piece of work, the *Vietnam Curriculum* contains sets of original documents which students can study and use as a basis for their own conclusions. While the topic is Vietnam, the unit emphasizes general U.S. foreign

policy. Other topics covered include: Third World development and revolution, the American electoral process, race relations. attitudes toward violence. the historical background of Vietnam, the dilemma of individual American responses to the war, and many others.

World Order. Byron G. Massialas and Jack Zevin. (World History Through Inquiry Series), Rand McNally and Company, School Division, Box 7600. Chicago, Illinois 60680. 1969. Student edition, $1.60; teacher's guide $1.60. *World Order* emphasizes problem-solving skills. It is concerned with ways of achieving and maintaining a world without war. Students are asked to analyze war as a way of resolving conflicts, and to look at alternative models of world organization in the year 2000.

Information About Simulation Games and Films

"Abbreviated Games and Simulations Guide," *Social Education.* (November 1972.) A very handy guide from the Social Science Education Consortium, Inc., Boulder, Colorado 80302. Contains information for each game on where to order, grade level, subject area, number of players, time to run game, and price.

A Bibliography of Educational Simulations Available for Rent from the Church Center for the UN. National Council of Churches, Church Center for the UN, 777 United Nations Plaza, Room 10E, New York, N.Y. 10017. 1971. Free. A list of 18 games dealing with international affairs, which can be rented from the Center for a small fee.

The Guide to Simulations/Games for Education and Training, 1973. David W. Zuckerman and Robert E. Horn. Information Resources, P.O. Box 417, Lexington, Mass. 02173. $15.00. An indispensable 500-page annotated bibliography of simulation games in all fields. Extensive information in brief form for each game, including playing data and underlying objectives. Also contains "A Basic Reference Shelf on Simulation and Gaming" by Paul A. Twelker that annotates most of the relevant books, articles, and organizations in the field.

Simulation Games for the Social Studies Classroom. William A. Nesbitt, Thomas Y. Crowell, New York, N.Y. 1971. $2.50. Discusses what simulations are, the kinds of simulation games, and their values, limitations, and prospects. Also includes an annotated bibliography of simulation games and books.

War/Peace Film Guide. Lucy Dougall. World Without War Council, 1730 Grove Street, Berkeley, Calif. 94709. 1970. $1.50. This guide includes an annotated list of some 200 films which deal with the problem of war. Both short and feature films are included. The guide describes many of the best films concerned with war, the arms race, international economic development, and other related areas.

References on Teaching the Issues

Education on War, Peace, Conflict, and Change. Intercom #65. Center for War/Peace Studies, 218 East 18th Street, New York, N.Y. 10003. (Fall 1970.) $1.50. An overview of the international dimension in education, listing and describing developments, curriculum projects, and resources, including bibliographic and organizational references.

International Education for Spaceship Earth. David C. King. (New Dimensions Series:) Thomas Y. Crowell, New York, N.Y. 1971. $2.50. Suggests a "spaceship earth" perspective for education in response to our new global interdependence. Reviews recent curriculum projects, innovations in teaching methods and resources, and introduces strategies for change.

Teaching About War, Peace, Conflict, and Change. Intercom #67. Center for War/Peace Studies, 218 East 18th Street, New York, N.Y. 10003. (March/April 1971.) $1.50. More overview of the international dimension, focusing more directly on the classroom. Together with *Intercom #65* above, these provide a complete and up-to-date review of the state of the art.

Teaching About War and War Prevention. William A. Nesbitt. (New Dimensions Series.) Thomas Y. Crowell, New York, N.Y. 1971. $2.50. Develops an understanding of the causes and nature of war, examines the international system and approaches to preventing World War III, and offers approaches to teaching war/peace concepts.

Bibliographies

Teaching About War and Its Control: A Selected Annotated Bibliography for the Social Studies Teacher. William A. Nesbitt, ed. (Abridged edition available.) Studies in International Conflict Project, Center for International Programs and Comparative Studies, The State Education Department, Albany, New York 12224.

To End War. Robert Pickus and Robert Woito. World Without War Council, 1730 Grove Street, Berkeley, Calif. 94709. 1970. $1.95. Introductory, comprehensive guide to all the topics affecting the problems of war and peace. Identifies and annotates the best current books, all of which can be ordered through the World Without War Council. More than a bibliography, it rationalizes a complex field.

Some Organizations in the Field

American Friends Service Committee
160 North 15th St.
Philadelphia, Pa. 19102

Center for Teaching About Peace and War
754 University Center Building
Wayne State University
Detroit, Mich. 48202

Center for Teaching International Relations
Graduate School of International Studies
University of Denver
Denver, Colo. 80210

Center for War/Peace Studies
218 East 18th St.
New York, N.Y. 10003

Coalition on National Priorities and Military Policy
100 Maryland Ave., N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002

Foreign Policy Association (FPA)
345 East 46th St.
New York, N.Y. 10017

Institute for World Order, Inc. (formerly Institute for International Order/World Law Fund)
11 West 42nd St.
New York, N.Y. 10036

League of Women Voters of the U.S.
1730 M St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

SANE
245 Second St., N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002

Studies in International Conflict Project
Center for International Programs and Comparative Studies
The State Education Department
Albany, N.Y. 12210

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)
Washington, D.C. 20451

World Without War Council of the U.S.
1730 Grove St.
Berkeley, Calif. 94709