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ABSTRACT

This paper explores the responsibility of social researchers in contributing to the policy formation of our governments regarding financial assistance to the poor, to blacks, and to varied social reform programs. It is suggested that, regardless of the intent on the part of authors of social research, their findings have been used as justification for cutbacks. The problem is approached from three angles: 1) the impact of the still prevalent idea of "neutral" or value free social science research might have in leading to the abuse of such research; 2) that there does exist an ever increasing body of research rationalization for specific policy decisions in Washington; and 3) that such policy formation is likely to have a deleterious effect on those who most urgently need increasing amounts of social policy assistance rather than less. It is stated that social researchers have a responsibility to explore all the policy implications of their research, as well as the assumptions, suppositions, and context in which it took place and then, with the appropriate cautionary statements written into it as prominently as possible, and only then, release the findings. Studies are discussed and analyzed to determine to what uses the findings were put and policies subsequently formulated. (JMB)

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RECENT TRENDS IN ANTI-EGALITARIAN SOCIAL RESEARCH

A CONSIDERATION OF THE POSSIBLE DETERRENT EFFECTS ON
EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY FOR MINORITIES

Presented to

American Educational Research Association
New Orleans
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and
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An increasing spate of what one might refer to as "anti-egalitarian" social policy research has been published in the past four years. This trend in research has paralleled the coming to power of Richard Nixon and his conservative administration and has steadily increased as Nixon's policies have become more strident in opposition to aiding the nation's human resource areas. While Nixon has been busy declaring peace in Vietnam, peace on poverty, and war on blacks and lower-income whites and those in health, education, welfare and housing, he has been aided and abetted in his task by certain researchers in the social science areas. This is not to say that we are accusing those in the research field who have created "scientific" reasons for certain Nixon policies of "bad faith." To question motivation is not the concern of this paper, nor would it be of any use in any case given the purely conjecturalist nature of that type of an approach. What we are suggesting is that certain major pieces of social policy/educational research have been used to rationalize and buttress the confiscation of funds from the human resource areas. And that wittingly or unwittingly, these social researchers have therefore contributed to this policy formation. Again, we are not searching here for causal factors linking the research works we shall talk about to the Nixon domestic policy formations. We want to suggest only that regardless of intent on the part of the authors of this research, they have been used as justifications by Nixon spokesmen for cutbacks here, confiscation there.¹ Certainly correlations can be drawn between policy research and Nixon's recent policy rationale.

¹ Erlickman, Weinberger, Phillips and other high administrative officials have frequently repeated the Nixon charge that the "war on poverty" domestic programs have "not worked" and must be scraped. A businesslike judgment of these programs has been expressed with such profit-minded public statements as "we're not getting our dollars worth."

We will approach this problem, then, from three angles: 1) the impact the still prevalent idea of "neutral" or value-free social science research might have in leading to the abuse of said research; 2) that there does exist an ever increasing body of research rationalization for specific policy decisions in Washington; and 3) that such policy formation is likely to have a deleterious effect on those who most urgently need increasing amounts of social policy assistance rather than less. Again, a word of caution. We do not say that it is the fault of social science researchers that aid to the poor has been cut off, nor do we for a minute suppose that if there were no social science justifications for program abolition, Nixon would be off in Harlem or Harlan County exploring how to aid the economically deprived. And we are not even going to argue that the War on Poverty, or the compensatory education programs were shining successes and that all that is needed to solve our social ills is to pour more money into more liberal programs. But, and this is critical, we do state most emphatically that social researchers have a responsibility, a primary responsibility, to explore all the policy implications of their research, as well as the assumptions, suppositions, and context in which it took place and then with the appropriate cautionary statements written into it as prominently as possible, only then release the findings - and even that might not be appropriate given certain circumstances. That there are instances, we think, where it might be best to withhold research findings for an indefinite period of time given the social milieu in which such research takes place. It is imperative that education/social researchers stop acting as though they live in a socio-political vacuum.

Before exploring different facets of the "problem" however, we ought to define what is meant by "egalitarian/anti-egalitarian" since such nebulosity can, we realize, drive those of an analytic/linguistic bent up walls.

To explain in both a stipulative and descriptive framework what is meant by "egalitarian," we recall its politico-historical roots in the French Revolution where the concept became a watchword of the Jacobins and Montagnards. Albert Soboul, a historian of the Revolution, states that egalitarianism stemmed from Rousseau's idea that the social state was of no use to any man unless everyone had something and no one had too much. This became a more specific program with the sans-coulottes who felt that the "products of the earth belonged to all men," and that riches and poverty should both be banished. In a less heady tone, the Temporary Commission of the Commune-Affranchie stated that, "if perfect egalitarianism were to prove impossible, it is at least possible to greatly narrow the gap between rich and poor." And coming closer to our concern the Jacobins, sans-coulottes saw education as a means of achieving equal incomes not as a means of equal opportunity to achieve high incomes and a "meritocracy" with the same inequalities between the rich and the poor. But, egalitarianism was, to extrapolate from its etymological origins, not merely an equalizing of inputs, but a decided commitment to equality of outputs.

Anti-egalitarianism, then, represented that sentiment which was opposed to equality of the socio-economic order. It was, to paraphrase Vergniaud, "that feeling which seemed to be against equal rights for social man." Or, as stated by Felix Lepeletier, "the anti-egalitarians are those who are against an end to

inequality of incomes." Interestingly, Lepeletier believed that it was absolutely necessary to have equality of opportunity in order to achieve equality of incomes.

More recently, R. H. Tawney, in his excellent tract, *Equality* (Tawney, 1931) presented what best corresponds to our own programmatic definition of egalitarian.

For Tawney, egalitarian meant -

"The removal of collectively imposed social and economic inequalities; the equalizing of opportunities for all to secure certain goods and services; the education of all children to make them capable of freedom and more capable of fulfilling their personal differences; and the enlargement of personal liberties through the discovery by each individual of his own and his neighbor's environment."

With this, he carefully noted, however, that -

"To criticize inequality and to desire equality is not, as some times suggested, to cherish the romantic illusion that men are equal in character and intelligence. It is to hold that, while their natural endowments differ profoundly, it is the mark of a civilized society to aim at eliminating such inequalities as have their source not in individual differences...but in its own organization, and that individual differences, which are a source of social energy, are more likely to ripen and find expression if social inequalities are, as far as practicable, diminished."

And, recognizing the rationalizations that academicians often make, Tawney was quick to point out that -


"The obstacle to the progress of equality is something simpler and more potent than finds expression in the familiar truism that men vary in their mental and moral, as well as their physical characteristics, important and valuable though that truism is....It is often explained with redoubled assurance that the relative position of classes is wholly uninfluenced by environmental influences or economic conditions, or legal institutions, but is determined by the innate biological characteristics of the individuals composing them - characteristics whose effects no change in the external order can hope to modify, and with whose mysterious, ineluctable operation misguided reformers will tamper at their peril...(but in fact) the obstacle to equality is the habit of mind which thinks it, not regrettable but natural and desirable that different sections of a

community should be distinguished from each other by sharp differences of economic status, of environment of education and culture and habit of life. It is this temper which regards with approval the social institutions and economic arrangements by which such differences are emphasized and enhanced.

Another definition that might further clarify our use of "egalitarian" and "anti-egalitarian," is the idea of justice that is argued by John Rawls (Rawls, 1971), in his remarkable thesis on ethics, A Theory of Justice. Placing a high priority on individual liberties and civil rights Rawls suggests that injustice is an arbitrary inequality in the distribution of good things and that all inequalities in liberty are justifiable only as being an advantage to the least advantaged. The moral point of view would consist in the rectification of nature's causalness in distribution. According to Rawls, "no one deserves his place in the distribution of native endowments any more than one deserves one's initial starting place in society...." And, as Stuart Hampshire states in The New York Review of Books, "The fairness (justice) aimed at (by Rawls) is the negation not only of aristocracy but also of meritocracy." (Our emphasis.)

It is to Gunnar Myrdal (Myrdal, 1969), however, that we turn for a statement or definition that we would like to use as a basis for theoretical emphasis throughout the remainder of this paper. At the conclusion of Objectivity and Social Research, Myrdal states that the goal for social researchers should be all human equal rights and the equalization of living and working conditions for all human beings.

This, of course, is a value judgment on Myrdal's part, as is our concept of egalitarian/anti-egalitarian. But so is every sentence in this paper, or in any paper



for that matter, even one composed by a computer (which some social researchers seem to confuse themselves with nowadays). We say there is not, or can be any completely "neutral" or "value free" social science research and the impact that this mistaken concept has leads to the abuse of such research.

We might begin with Nietzsche's humbling statement to the effect that "Truths are illusions about which we have forgotten that this is what they are." By quoting this statement we are suggesting that there is a pressing need for epistemological examination of the neo-positivistic/empiricist foundations upon which much of the educational/social policy research structure in the United States has been built. By this we mean that there has been little critical examination of the premises or theories that ultimately determines how we research our subjects. In other words, there has been, we believe, an unwitting reification which has permeated almost every aspect of educational research in the U.S., the language used being one of the glaring and yet paradoxically subtle examples of this.

What we need, then, is a set of questions that address assumptions we had forgotten (or never knew) we were operating on.² And we cannot lay the blame for our failure to ask these necessary questions at the feet of philosophers, since they have been abandoned the ultimately facile and dead-end assumptions of empiricism for the past twenty years.

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Indeed, American and British philosophy cannot even be blamed for, what we feel, has been a highly uncritical stance in the educational/social research profession. In fact, British/American philosophy (insofar as such an animal can be said to exist), has long since given up its parochial base of empiricism/logical positivism, and has shifted, albeit somewhat uncomfortably, to addressing itself to those "forgotten assumptions."

We are not asking researchers to romantically renounce the scientific method and take up some radical subjectivist stance. We are saying that researchers who do lay claim to the scientific method need to have an encompassing sense of just what that means, however, and would do well to look to the words of caution given by some of the major scientists in quantum physics and genetics.

The uncritical extension of some current research premises seems likely to further rigidify perceptions of available alternatives and institutionalize the very value premises and assumptions which have led to or now sustain existing difficulties in moving toward a greater equality in our society. By questioning the groundwork of theoretical research premises, we can hopefully break out of the reified molds which we are now in.

Let us examine just what we mean when we suggest there be a renewal of critical questions prior to any research. 1) Education/policy researchers must certainly take into account the social construction of that reality which they are examining. That is, we have become so acculturated to the myth of value-free research that we very often miss seeing the forest while we feverishly go about examining the bark of the trees. Again, we are not saying we should not be examining the bark but only pleading with everyone to constantly keep in mind the forest. We are, after all, social beings existing within a particular time/space context, and the valuations of ideologies that are part of every given macro/micro-context clearly affect our Weltanschauung in very conceivable way.

By valuations, we mean those beliefs or patterns of programmatic thought which express our ideas of how a given situation ought to be or ought to have been

(Myrdal, 1969). Those concepts of "value" might mean also how we approach a given situation; the priori and dialectical interactional judgments that we project (consciously or unconsciously). Ideology, as we use it, would take in most of the socially constructed perceptual baggage of the researcher (Mannheim, 1936). Ideology is the total view of a "system" by which one tries to relate chosen events; it provides the basic descriptors of a situation and, in large part, the method for choosing the events one is likely to consider significant. We believe like Mannheim, that no human thought is immune to the ideologizing influences of its social context (Berger and Luckmann, 1967).

All this is not to say, that our individual and social perceptions cannot be mitigated, in part, by a systematic understanding of and coping with the valuations and ideologies which pervade our ways of knowing. But it is to suggest that far too often, they are only paid lip-service or not even dealt with at all. This shutting out of thorny problems or unpleasant realities, of course, seems to us to lead to not only greater errors in perception of research outcomes, but more importantly, to the possibility of the greater "misuse" of such outcomes. To quote Friederichs (1970), "some researchers have banished from their programs all questions of value, but the questions of human value are inescapable and those who banish them at the front door, admit them unavowedly and therefore uncritically at the back door."

In response to the above criticism, some researchers might say, "yes, we admit that there may indeed be biases, value judgments and the like shading out perceptions of research outcomes, but, at least, our methodologies and our techniques

are reasonably 'pure'." We disagree. Every tool of positivist/empiricist research in the social/behavioral sciences carries with it the values contained in the positivist/empiricist mindset, which we claim are considerable. In anticipation of the next question now being mulled over in the minds of said researchers, we would say, of course every other ideation and philosophy of human research contains within itself a store of valuations and ideologies. What we say in reply is that at least the other methodologies or conceptions of research take into account rather prominently that they do represent a particular outlook, and they do make dealing with ideologies and values an integral part of their design. This seems to be an enormous step in the direction of clearing away a great deal of unadmitted intellectual clutter. Or at least, it fosters a considerable gain in understanding our long-neglected epistemological groundworks. We think that most American educational researchers have hidden away their values and biases much like Victorian families hid mentally defective children in attics, pretending in some preposterous solipsistic fashion that if they were hidden away, one would rarely have to admit to their existence. And if they did, it would only be in a sheepish, half-joking kind of acknowledgement. We believe that this sort of action is either dishonest or ignorant of the problem at hand - or both.

It should be recognized that the policy science/research professions, perhaps as much as or more than medicine and law, have ideologies and technologies which become powerful modes for definition and structure of problems. Krieger (1972) emphasizes that "the esoteric character of the modes (or technologies) guarantees that the professions retain control of them for sometime after the process of definition. As a result (and this is critical to our discussion), there is no way

of expressing alternatives - either as ideas or action - for implicit cooptation takes place in using the old descriptors." Which again brings us back to our point that all research and its descriptions are based on some worldview. In fact, data can only have meaning in the context of some larger worldview.

What we are saying, then, is that the tools, techniques, and techno-methodologies of the "orthodox" neo-positivistic educational researcher are as permeated by values as are the techniques of other modern social science methodologies.

Except, as we said before, the neo-positivist rarely if ever admits to this, which makes his policy "science" even less scientific. Tribe points out that

The myth endures that the techniques in themselves lack substantive content, that intrinsically they provide nothing beyond value free devices for organizing thought in rational ways - methods for sorting out issues and objectively clarifying the empirical relationships among alternative actions and their likely consequences. The user of such techniques, the myth continues, may turn them to whatever end he seeks. Ends and values, goals and ideologies are seen as mere inputs in a machinelike and hence inherently unbiased, process of solving problems consistent with the facts known and the values posited....Only animistic thinking, we are told, can obscure the essential neutrality of this 'machine':

Tribe suggests we approach such claims with skepticism

"...inasmuch as every other language imposes its own categories and paradigms on the world of experience. Even in that "never-never land" of Pareto optimals and Von Neumann-Morganstern game theory, there attach certain systems of thought which obscure or hide some perspectives and possibilities in stating and solving problems, or even exploring any random area of study.

Detachment, non-involvement, and wrapping oneself in mathematical formulae, then, are ultimately doomed to failure in the neo-empirical search for neutrality, which we down-home folk used to call snipe-hunting. Rather, this "cloak of impartiality" and fear of value judgments carries with it a strong smell of con-

servatism and/or a support of the status quo, along with degenerating into the banality of "fact fetishism" (Kuenzlen, 1972). Stated another way, "this employment of algebraic formulas (however useful they may be for mastering complicated relationships), Greek letters, and other symbols facilitates the escape from stating clearly implied assumptions and in particular, from being aware of the valuation load of main concepts...." This lack of independence of research in the social and behavioral sciences is illustrated by the fact that it rarely blazes the way to new perspectives unlike research in the natural sciences (Myrdal, 1969). Goldman (1969) adds that the ahumanistic, ahistorical and aphilosophical attitude which is the hallmark of neo-empirical education/policy research, favors implicit or explicit, the current technocratic society. Because of this such departments in our universities seem to run the risk of turning out a host of "illiterate scholars." But then, this is all the better for making amoral technocrats. This fetishism with discreet, separable quanta of "facts," leads to what Goldman describes as a state of human research science where, "countless pure scholars pass their lives in small, limited and partial fields... always working under the supervision of the quantitative and of measurement," cranking out reams of scientific trivia.

And trivia it is for the most part. For this pseudo-scientific sur-relativist (Goldman) abstractionism produces at best only a partial of the subject and object of knowledge. And while we recognize the difficulty in explaining the totality of human behavior from any theoretical or methodological framework, it does seem to us that there are better means to do so than with neo-empiricism.

Ultimately the process of research cannot be separated from the utilization of that research. The social function of social science/educational research is determined not only by the choice of the problem area under study but even more so by the methodological approach and structural frame of reference used. Within the neo-empiricist methodology/idealology, this means a fragmentation and separation of almost everything - the investigator, the investigated, and the interaction between the two. This denial of the coterminous nature of the investigator and investigated, as well as the absurd idea of seeking to analyze the whole by the sum of its parts and then searching out correlations between parts of a social whole, is, of course, doomed to failure.³ To deny or shunt off to the side, the basic importance of the interaction of the observer and observed, the dialectical relation between the two, and not to recognize that the whole of any social phenomenon (a) is greater than - and (b) different from - the sum of its parts, is to obscure and/or deny interrelationship and dynamic not only in the observed object/subject/phenomenon, but also in ones self. If educational/policy researchers are so eager to ape the methodology and comprehensiveness of understanding in the natural sciences, then we should learn from them the absolutely critical nature of this interrelationship dynamic to the understanding and growth of knowledge within those areas (Heisenberg, 1971; Monod, 1971).

In the utilization of research, however, we see a reification taking place within this positivist negation of dialectic and dynamic which can only help to build a

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We cannot help being shocked at the seeming disregard of the basics of John Dewey's thought by especially those in the educational research area.

reified social order. It is the reified social order of a technocratic corporate capitalist society which hides its politics in the palid language of bureaucracy and in an ideology proclaiming the separation of science, research and politics (Willhelm, 1972). Bell's "end of ideology" was nothing more than the politics of the status quo pushed under the rug. By reification, then, we mean the legitimization of practices of the present on the grounds that they are "factual" and unvarying standards for human adjustment. It is the technical trivialization (Gurvitch, 1971) of knowledge, and its fetishism with discreet packets of facts that is tied quite closely, we believe, to the fetishism of commodities which is a foundation of present day America. By concentrating on the empirical work of quasi-objective facts, we believe researchers make the given socio-political reality appear natural and objective (Colfax and Roach, 1971). Lichtman (Colfax and Roach, 1971) states that in this reification process, "what is" is implicitly supported because

Objects of research are just that - objects, things - fixed, delimited, amoral, without potentiality, devoid of moral process. The subject is an impartial recorder, surrendering itself to the facility of the world in a passion of self-abnegation. Nothing matters but the fact, the thing itself, except perhaps the impartial collection of these facts. As human beings become thing like, alienated, inquiry comes to reflect this condition in the reification of its own methodology.

But Lichtman points out further on

No one, not even a positivist can make him/herself into a thing. The positivist is just as much a purposive, conscious, selective being as any other inquirer. The denial of this irrepressible fact is merely a disguise which permits the actual conservative selectivity to be carried out under the pretense that no selective choice has been exercised at all. That is, if the facts are regarded as speaking for themselves who can possibly speak against them?

Again, we add a word of caution here. We know there will be protestations to the idea of no selective choice, and while we agree that Lichtman may have overstated the case, he does not do so by very much. That is why researchers may say, "we know we exercise selectivity and choice," we must say in response, "do you really? - or is this knowledge of choice merely some knee-jerk response, an automatic half-unconscious gesture culled up from the depths of some remembrance of methodology courses past?" The answer to this is critical, because we suspect the latter is closer to what is actually going on in most research circles.

To recapitulate, then, we see the foundations of "anti-egalitarian" use/abuse of the human research/policy sciences in the very methodology of the disciplines themselves. What we think this calls for, is a very serious soul-searching on the part of researchers in the policy sciences - an epistemological house cleaning if you will. If there isn't, we fear that things will continue as usual, with researchers half-consciously realizing they are the "servants of power;" or being in the unenviable position as Kaplan states, "of knowing the sources all right, but never knowing what game their in."

All this probably sounds as if we reject the possibility of a research/policy science out of hand. We don't. We do, however, as must be obvious by now, reject the traditional positivist/empiricist framework for these sciences. But this is not to say that we, therefore, repudiate all quantitative uses in methodologies or that we exclude all of the bases for a more empirical study of human action. To paraphrase Sellars (1963), if we reject the framework of empiricism it is not because we want to say that empirical knowledge has no foundation. For to put it

this way would suggest that it is really "empirical knowledge so-called," and to put it in a box with rumors and hoaxes. But insofar as it gives us a picture of a person, people, human action as static, then it is misleading. No, we don't reject the necessity of quantitative studies and the avoidance of value judgments insofar as this is possible (Stammer, 1971), but we most certainly reject the kind of simple-minded empiricism/positivism which is only that, and therefore is seen by its practitioners as being a "pure" science, for all intents and purposes, knee-jerk protestations notwithstanding - ideology masquerading itself as strictly quantitative analysis. We must agree with Mannheim (Laslett, Runciman, Skinner, 1972), that purely objective accounts of human action require a God-like presuppositionless stance which it is hard to make sense of, let alone claim to occupy.

It should be seen, then, that an uncritical approach to the human research sciences can lead to serious abuses in policy prescription, not the least of which is the edification of the present social order. Of course, we admit that it is our definition of abuse. We realize that some people think the social order is just fine the way it is, and only needs some oil here or there and a new gimmick or two in education to keep things running smoothly. But then this is a matter of valuation, isn't it?

We could (and it might seem proper to some researchers after we have laid down a barrage of criticism against how they do whatever it is they do) offer next some methodological/theoretical alternatives to the kind of research formulations which we have been discussing. But however worthwhile we think that would be, it is clearly not within the scope of this particular paper to perform this function.

We would suggest a serious exploration into the theories of social knowledge of Husserl, Habermas (1970-1971), Gurvitch (1971), Merleau-Ponty (1962), Kuhn (1970), Marcuse (1964), Schutz (1967), Friederichs (1970), Dehrendorf (1959), Laslett, Runciman (1967-1972).

We say "seriously explore" because we suspect that after coming this far with us some folks might be saying, "Yes, well, after all Jensen, Herrnstein and Schockley might be easy targets for anyone, and if everyone is grounded in some ideology, all we would have to do is to pay lip service to our own and be on with it." Of course we don't buy this for a minute. We think with Goldmann (1969) that this sort of relativism leads nowhere. Are all methodologies of equal value as far as the search for "truth" goes? Is the choice of one over another only a matter of individual preference? No. "Viewed in terms of their effect on scientific thought, different perspectives and ideologies do not exist on the same plane. Some value judgments permit a better understanding of reality than others. When it is a question of determining which of two conflicting sociologies has the greater scientific value, the first step is to ask which of them permits the understanding of the other as a social and human phenomenon, reveals its infrastructure, and clarifies, by means of an immanent critical principle, its inconsistencies and limitations." Along with leading toward a greater "understanding" (Goldmann), or how it would satisfy Scriven's three "truth conditions" of adequacy, accuracy and relevancy, we must, of course, deal with any methodology from the standpoint of goals. We think we were fairly clear about our position at the beginning of this paper; sadly most researchers don't, and this, we believe to be indefensible because as we emphasized, whether we like it or not,

goals and methodologies are closely intertwined. Like assumptions and premises, goals cannot be assumed away. Hence, we suggest that you might as well be honest and clear about where you want to go right from the start. At least then, you will make a "known" out of a ghost that will be in your work in any case.

This brings us to the second major point in this paper - that there does exist an ever-increasing body of research "rationalizations" for specific policy decisions being made in Washington, which are, in the main, highly regressive toward any previous policy aimed at ameliorating socio-economic inequality. Because if educational/policy research deals in very important ways with real live human beings, who are, much like you and me, it is absolutely necessary to keep goals, and possible uses, misuses carefully in mind. Indeed the probability of some research policies affecting each one of us is very great and extremely obvious. The Vietnam War is of course, the most perverse and glaring illustration of all of this.

We think it was the Vietnam War which really blew the lid off the cover of the "end of ideology/neutrality of goals". Indeed, all the king's bombers and all the king's Rand research experts couldn't put behavioral/research science back together again. How could things ever be the same? How could researchers not now admit to the critical importance of goals and the non-neutrality of research after the empiricist follies of Vietnam, the growth of the Defense establishment, the "now-you-see-it, now-you-don't" methods of program planning and budgeting and other assorted shenanigans brought about by many of the positivist "whiz-kids" research and planning teams of the 60's. Actually, we think this kind of

"neutrality" stance would be rather funny, along the lines of the absurdist humor of Heller or Pirandello, except that its cost in lives and human suffering can never be adequately described. How, indeed, can research/policy-making ever be the same?

Tragically, we see the beginnings of a "domestic Vietnam War." Not in spending of course, but rather in terms of the perverse effects of policy decisions. And we see some researchers grinding out the "scientific" justifications for such politics, much as we noticed the policy science boys producing rolls of computerized data which proved the efficacy of the Vietnam War. Since we cannot obviously take into account any great number of specific researchers, we intend to discuss here only a select few who we feel provide particularly good illustrations of what we are talking about. They would include Arthur Jensen, Richard Herrnstein, Nathan Glazer, Daniel Moynihan, David Armor, and Edward Banfield.

We agree with David Cohen (Cohen, 1971) that the evaluation of any educational policy program is a political enterprise, carrying within it strong value implications. Indeed, "evaluating social action programs in education is only secondarily a scientific enterprise. First and foremost it is an effort to gain politically significant information on the consequences of political acts. To confuse the technology of measurement with the real nature and broad purposes of evaluation will be fatal. It can only produce increasing quantities of information in answer to unimportant questions (Cohen, 1971). We would agree that generally it is mostly innocuous trivia that is produced under such purportedly apolitical, ahistorical auspices, but we cannot agree that all such policy information is of

this nature. The politics of the research of Jensen, Herrnstein, et al are examples of the potential danger of this reified scientism. We suspect that this is what Cohen is talking about when he talks of the danger of confusing the technology of measurement with the politics of evaluation.

Such neutral posturing or begging off of responsibility for how one's research is used very often follows in the wake of such confusion. But anyone who is not mindful of the political implications of his/her research evaluations must be either ridiculously naive or have almost no mind at all. Of course, we do not even hear any disclaimers about the political usage of their research emanating from Jensen, Herrnstein and Moynihan. They are apparently satisfied with such policies which have been justified, in part, because of their research. This is even more responsible for, in their cases, the cloak of scientific neutrality is not so much a case of unwitting self-deception as it is a process of deceiving others. As we have previously stated, this sort of empiricist embellishment that serves to cover these policies can lead to an aura of "scientific justice" to the most irrational expression of vested interest (Friederichs, 1970).

Research evaluation, then, "produces information which is...potentially relevant to decision-making. Decision making, of course, is a euphemism for the allocation of resources - money, position, authority, etc. Thus to the extent that research information is an instrument for changing power relationships within institutions, evaluation is a political activity...its salience in any given situation is directly proportional to the overt political states involved...small in curriculum reform in a suburban high school...and very great in the case of

national efforts to eliminate poverty." (Cohen, 1971). We must all recognize that research analysis can have a profound effect upon political action. Which is the reason for our prior argument against the empiricist research notion of cavalierly presenting facts without regard to their contexturation, implications and possible use.

But aside from the logistical difficulties in the research methodologies which can cause such political myopia, Cohen also identifies a conceptual difficulty which may blur the political ramifications for researchers. That is that educational researchers tend to become ethnocentric within their particular field, and because politics or political economy is not part of the established paradigm within which the discipline operates and also because they are involved in what their colleagues will understand and what will bring them prestige within the field, they tend to neglect the issue of politics. Sadly, the manifestly important moral and political aspects of research as public policy make this a particularly distressing situation - especially given our present regime in Washington.

We suggest now that certain research analyses might well be excellent rationalizations for policy decisions taking place in Washington; decisions which we feel are likely to have a deleterious effect on equal educational opportunity and other social assistance programs. Like Hodgson (1973), we believe that this research will probably be used to rationalize a new period of indifference to issues of justice and social reform. John Brademas, a Democratic Congressman from Indiana, is "afraid that these educational research findings, misunderstood or deliberately misrepresented, "will be used to justify savage cuts in federal aid to elementary and secondary education and to make opposition to such programs respectable." He

feels that the opponents of educational spending will be able to use the researchers' evidence in a way they find politically advantageous, often disingenuously. (Hodgson, 1973).

A recent editorial in the New York Times (9/10/72) stated that such research findings shore up arguments against education/social policy spending since they seem to label educational reform ipso facto futile. Thus they only offer encouragement to reactionaries who want to starve the schools..." Christopher Jencks, co-author of the recent study, Inequality, agrees with this assessment of the uses of some recent educational research. Indeed his own study, often labeled the "Jencks Report (Jencks, et al, 1972), has also been used as ammunition in the President's war against the poor. And while we believe that a close reading of the study can yield no such nefarious policy justifications, Jencks has, unlike Jensen, Herrnstein and Moynihan, shown he understands very well the linkage between goals, ideologies, research findings and politics. Almost every day since his report was published, Jencks has been issuing disclaimers regarding the political uses of his research. As Jencks says (New York Times, 12/1/72), we should never use the fig-leaf of social research to claim that glaring problems aren't really important.

But this is just what Banfield, Glazer and Moynihan, et al are doing. Or, as Jensen/Herrnstein have done, researchers can perform roughly the same function by making the problems appear to be virtually unsolvable. Such research elicits the predictable response in present-day Washington or "why try, if nothing is going to work in any case?" Nixon's 1974 fiscal budget is a clear example of

this kind of reasoning. Thus, rather than viewing the investigation of a particular problem as developing some sort of guide in the policy/action spectrum, we see that, by these examples, the investigation becomes a way of viewing the situation so that it no longer seems problematic and, the irritations associated with the problem researched are laid aside. Which is not to say that we obviate the irritating situations, but rather we reinterpret the problem in such a way that it seems less irritating or we blur it from our sight (Krieger, 1972). Such epistemological terpsichore, however, can only serve as a snake-oil non-remedy for what is a festering social malady.

From Edward Banfield (Banfield, 1971), for example, we learn that, "the situation of most Negroes would not be fundamentally different even if there were no racial prejudice at all...that the discomfort and inconvenience experienced by most of those classified as poor are seldom acute and persistent...(and that) Unfortunately ...in a free society infants cannot be taken from their parents on the grounds that they are lower-class." Banfield would also have us believe that, "poverty in its lower-class form consists of people who would live in squalor and misery even if their incomes were doubled and tripled." (Banfield, 1971).

This genre of conservative/reactionary thinking continues with Nathan Glazer's studies (Glazer, 1971) on the roots of problems in the inner-city. Glazer exhibits the same kind of confounded reasoning as Banfield when he blames welfare and other social service policy for the ills that have befallen the poor. He insists that, "Social policy itself, in almost every field, creates new and...unmanageable demands..." That it causes, "the breakdown of traditional modes of behavior which

is the chief cause of our social problems." Further, the loss of incentive to work, crime, drug addiction, low educational achievement, and filth in the streets are mainly the result of giving welfare, according to Glazer. We agree with Piven and Cloward's rebuttal to Glazer (Piven and Cloward, 1972) - "Now the assertion that welfare causes...most of the evils that Glazer lists is familiar enough (note England's Poor Law commissioners a century and a half ago)...but this is the first time anyone has discovered that filth in the streets is caused by doling out money to the poor."

We also see this trend of anti-egalitarian thought in the research of Daniel Moynihan. Moynihan was one of the first policy scientists of recent vintage to lay much of the blame for the problems of the inner-city on the black social structure and on liberal social researchers (Moynihan, 1962, 1970). In his research, Moynihan concluded that many of our urban ills were brought on by the very victims of that society.⁴ And since it now seems obvious that liberal programs such as the War on Poverty⁵ can do little to effect the major transformations needed to reduce inequality, we have Professor Moynihan ready to tell us that it really was not our fault that these policies have failed.

⁴ All this blaming the victim, to use Ryan's phrase (Ryan, 1971) is not a recent innovation, of course - it was a major enterprise of Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century social science to justify slavery, whether wage or chattel, in glowing "scientific" rationalizations.

⁵ The only war in which many Americans have seen fit to quickly concede defeat.

Rather than blame those who control the socio-economic forces in this society for the social problems the system incurs and fix the responsibility for the failure of liberal programs because a) the resource inputs were inadequate for problem: directly effecting the poor; b) the tactics and strategies of poverty programs were often confused and contradictory; c) the real beneficiaries were the professional middle-classes who were receiving the bulk of the poverty funds; and d) that no one with the power to make a difference was willing to recognize that some of our socio-economic ideologies would have to change more than a little if we were really sincere about moving toward greater equality in this society (Reissman, 1972). But rather than provide such changes, Nixon has seemingly built his domestic policies on the Banfield/Glazer/Moynihan kind of research which, in a not-so-subtle way, focuses the blame for inequality squarely on the poor and their "deficient" social structure and "deficient" genetic makeup.

The most prominent theoretical and statistical elaboration of the hypothesis that deficient genetic makeup is responsible for socio-economic inequality have come from Arthur Jensen and Richard Herrnstein (Jensen, 1969; Herrnstein, 1971). Jensen would have us believe that the major reason many blacks have educational difficulties is probably a result of their genetic traits, as can be seen by the fact that they score an average fifteen points lower than whites on I.Q. tests. And proceeding from this position, Herrnstein argues that if poor folk are not particularly smart to begin with, then given what he assumes to be our meritocratic society this must be the reason why they are poor. That is, instead of stating the "traditional liberal idea that 'stupidity' results from the inheritance of poverty, Herrnstein contended instead that poverty

results from the inheritance of stupidity." (Cohen, 1971).

In the turn toward the right that our society has taken, we see greater numbers of people, even within the academic community, looking to this "I.Q.ism" (Bowles and Gintis, 1972) of Jensen and Herrnstein as a means to explain the "failures" of liberal educational programs and the burgeoning urban crisis. We see in this, the law of cognitive dissonance at work. That is, given the present political situation, many people have resigned themselves to a four year "winter of discontent," and in order to avoid the ulcers that might develop from fretting over social problems, they have found themselves a cozy theory that will explain away the growing inequities, which they felt they couldn't do anything about anyway. We call this process a "theoretical fix," and the "pushers" of the "junk" are Jensen and Herrnstein. They, along with the "big man" in the White House, are the new ideological "Godfathers of Inequality. Carrying the analogy further, these theories serve much the same function as hard narcotics. That is, they serve to deaden the minds of many people to the possibility that the social order could be significantly different, and at the same time keep those wealthy and powerful ever more firmly entrenched.

Since such theories have been widely disseminated, we think a closer examination of the premises and pronouncements are in order. And, indeed, after the initial shock waves from the Jensen and Herrnstein expositions have subsided, growing quantities of counter-arguments, mainly from liberal "environmentalists" began to appear in the academic journals and popular magazines. We find most of these critiques of Jensen and Herrnstein rather effete, and not particularly relevant. (Light, et al, 1972; Kagan, et al, 1969; Stinchcombe, 1969). Perhaps this is too harsh, however, for most of these accounts do contain some important statistical and methodological

criticisms. But, keeping in mind our earlier discussion of the ramifications of ideology and theoretical foundation, we feel they bypass the primary target. It is, we believe, Bowles and Gintis (1972), Cohen (1971), Jencks (1969, 1972), Lazerson (1972), and Miller and Ratner (1972), and Chomsky (1972) who make the most penetrating and sometimes devastating assessments of the Jensen and Herrnstein hypothesis because they do take into account the foundational ramifications.

Lazerson, Bowles and Gintis, and Cohen all deal with the historical framework of the "hereditarian/I.Q." thesis, a point overlooked by every other critique, and one which we believe is absolutely necessary for any adequate understanding of the present trend toward "I.Q.ism." Jensen suggests that intelligence is that measurable phenomenon which can be quantitatively derived from specific tests. These tests measure something called I.Q. which to Jensen, Herrnstein and a number of other researchers equals intelligence. Jensen asks us to believe that this intelligence is about 80% genetically determined, and that genetic embodiment differs among racial groups. From this he argues that educational practices which ignore group ability differences are doomed to failure and offers a very pessimistic appraisal of any compensatory education program.

Statisticians tell us his statistics are misused, but we think that if one is going to base a counterattack on Jensen's statistics, yet continue to accept the basic theory of I.Q., then Jensen is going to come out ahead every time. Since a full discussion of the statistical material used by both sides would be beyond the scope of this paper, we refer those interested to the writing of Light, Kagan, Bowles, Jencks, Cohen, et al, and the excellent bibliographies contained in most of them. Like Christopher Jencks, we find it reasonable to say that I.Q. tests are

quite accurate in measuring I.Q., whatever that may be, and that if one is going to stipulate, as Jensen does, that I.Q. means intelligence and that this particular intelligence is X% hereditary, then we say, fine, but remember, this theory is constructed within a particular framework of reference by the stipulative definition of particular people within a set space/time - which is not quite the same thing as "natural law."

We refer the reader to Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking Glass dialogue between Alice and Humpty-Dumpty. "When I use a word," said Humpty-Dumpty, "it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less." "But the question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things." "The question is," said Humpty-Dumpty, "which is to be master - that's all." And, this is the basis of our argument with Jensen and Herrnstein - the answers given reflect the questions asked. We feel that the computer scientist's dictum (GIGO) is very pertinent here -- if you put garbage in, you get garbage out.

But this does not explain away the problem of why such questions have been asked in the first place. Which brings us to Humpty-Dumpty's major postulate, "which is to be master," i.e., political power. Indeed, the use of tests actually has very little to do with the validity of testing itself, with the accuracy with which test measure intelligence or with the role intelligence plays in an individual's future success. Instead, tests are a part of educational policy and practice. We decide what we need for smoothly functioning schools, and ask if tests fit these demands. If they do, we use them (Lazerson, 1972).

Predictably, I.Q., school achievement, and socio-economic status were all related.

That is, historically, high I.Q. children have tended to do well in school and come from middle and upper socio-economic backgrounds. "These findings led to a number of intense debates: what was the nature of intelligence and how could it be measured? Did socio-economic status determine intelligence? Was intelligence inherited or a product of environment?" and so on (Lazerson, 1972). But whatever the variety of answers obtained in academic debates, the schools continued to perform their functions of socializing, stabilizing, selecting, and acting as a surplus absorber for the prevailing corporate socio-economic system. (See Edwards, 1972; Carnoy, 1972; Gordon, 1971; Jencks, 1972; Freire, 1970; Katz, 1968, 1970, 1971; Karier, 1972; Spring, 1972; Greer, 1972). And tests continued to be the primary means of rationalizing the selection process. As Lazerson says, whether tests really made a difference in later life was beside the point. Tests were important to and used by American educators because they accorded with the corporate society's demand for categorization and efficiency. Tests offered "scientific" justifications for the differentiated curriculum, vocational education, "gifted child" programs and specialized administrative needs.

Such evidence goes directly against the liberal assertion that Jensen and Herrnstein, et al have misused I.Q. testing. We argue that they have not. The tests continue to serve the function they always have and that is selection for the corporate-capitalist structure. Ultimately the outcome of the debate over testing does not lie with the reliability or validity of the statistical arguments over I.Q. and heredity, but with the way we organize our educational and economic institutions (Lazerson, 1972). As we previously stated, their goals cannot be neglected since, in fact, they are an integral part of any research.

With an administration as insensitive to inequality as the present one in Washington we see increasing reduction in programs for the poor in coming announcements from HEW, HUD, and any other department or bureau concerned with human resource allocations. And the theoretical rationale will have been provided (although never publically disclosed) from the Jensen/Herrnstein-type research.

Let us assume these researchers did not realize what sort of Pandora's box they would be opening when they decided to do such research in the first place. If so, then Jensen and Herrnstein have exhibited a remarkable lack of political acumen. But if they did consider the possible consequences of their findings, as we are inclined to believe, then they have placed themselves in the position of directly aiding the anti-egalitarian policies of certain politicians. Indeed, then, ex post facto explanations of the legitimacy of inequality are the academic trump cards of reactionary capitalism.

Whether or not Jensen is correct in stating that more of the variability in I.Q. is explained by heredity than by environment, or whether Herrnstein's correlations between I.Q. and different occupations are sound is not the issue. Even if they are accurate in their initial research findings, this still does not answer the basic questions surrounding the I.Q.-meritocracy argument. What is I.Q.? Is it intelligence? "Yes," some researchers will emphatically answer, but they are only giving their definition, and what this really comes down to is, who has the power to define.

Cohen (1971) contends that "the environmental differences between blacks and whites are profound and ancient, and they can be expected to endure for some time. Until

such major differences have become a thing of the past, it is hard to see how respectable research can be done on the sources of the racial-I.Q. gap." If such equality is attained, however, Cohen suspects that the very fact of equality will cause everyone to lose interest in the question. After all, who now measures whether Polish-Americans have lower I.Q.'s than Anglo-Saxon Americans, or whether Italian-Americans have lower I.Q.'s than Jewish-Americans?

By connecting intelligence, heredity, occupation, and income, Herrnstein concludes that America is moving toward a stable meritocracy, based on inherited I.Q. This is an extremely culture-bound argument, since it requires the assumption that success must be rewarded in quite specific ways (Chomsky, 1972). For example, Herrnstein states that wealth and power will tend to concentrate in a hereditary meritocracy, but this follows only if one believes that those of assumed high intelligence opt for wealth and power as the rewards for their achievement. "And if this assumption is false and society can more or less be organized in accordance with the socialist dictum, then nothing is left of Herrnstein's argument, except that it will apply to a competitive society in which his other assumptions hold... the crucial step in his syllogism amounts to the unfounded claim that the ideology of capitalist society expresses universal traits of human nature...therefore, we must turn to the question of the social functions of the conclusions and ask why the argument is taken seriously...The praise lavished on Herrnstein's argument suggests we are not dealing simply with a question of scientific curiosity." (Chomsky, 1972).

We would now like to return to the question of whether Herrnstein's "other assumptions" hold true. That is, whether and how much I.Q. is a basis of wealth and

power in America. Cohen (1972) finds that I.Q. (if by that we mean intellectual ability) and economic status are about equal in their influence on college admission, but that "these comparisons do not reveal what must be the most important fact - namely, that ability and status combined explain somewhat less than half the actual variation in college attendance (Cohen, 1971; Jencks, 1972). Cohen also points out that Herrnstein's averages of I.Q./occupations do not reveal the considerable dispersion of I.Q.'s within occupational groups, nor whether I.Q. was really that important in getting people into those occupations. Recent studies suggest that I.Q. is of marginal importance at best especially as it relates to the function which Herrnstein claims for it (Jencks, 1972; Bowles and Gintis, 1972). And after examining this problem historically, Cohen says that "nowhere can we find any empirical support for the idea that brains are becoming increasingly more important to status in America."

In his summary of the I.Q./meritocracy argument, Cohen draws four main conclusions: 1) America is not a meritocracy - if by that we mean a society in which income, status, or power are heavily determined by I.Q.; 2) America seems not to have become any more meritocratic now than in the last fifty years; 3) Schooling seems to determine success more than I.Q.⁶, and 4) among the many factors which lead to socio-economic inequities in our society, I.Q. is not one of them. "Being stupid is not what is responsible for being poor in America."

Bowles and Gintis provide the best analysis we have seen to date on the crucial I.Q./meritocracy issue. They argue that

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Schooling, of course is not to be confused with learning or education as such.

The emphasis on intelligence as the basis for economic success serves to legitimize an authoritarian, hierarchial, stratified, and unequal economic system of production, and to reconcile the individual to his or her objective position within this system. Legitimation is enhanced merely when people believe in the intrinsic importance of I.Q. This belief is facilitated by the strong associations among all the economically desirable attributes - social class, education, cognitive skills, occupational status, and income - and is integrated into a pervasive ideological perspective...actual access to an occupational status is mainly contingent upon a pattern of noncognitive personality traits (motivation, orientation to authority, discipline, internalization of work norms) as well as a complex of personal attributes including sex, race, age and educational credentials through which the individual aids in legitimating and stabilizing the structure of authority in the (corporate socioeconomic system)...Thus inequality of opportunity is a by-product of the organization of production itself, and cannot be attached either to the dysfunctional attributes of the underclass or to the unfeeling perversity of (some inescapable meritocracy).

We believe there will be an increasing rationalization for "inevitable" inequality in our society and this will occur because of the reactionary attitudes of those presently holding political power in Washington, and because of the growing fiscal crisis of the U.S., especially within the public service sectors under federal, state and local government control. "I.Q.ism" which serves the function of selection stabilization and legitimization in the corporate society, will provide the theoretical basis for the "politics of inequality." It was Marx who pointed out in The German Ideology, (1846) that "the ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships - the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas."

Finally, we want to briefly discuss David Armor, whose recent study on busing (Armor, 1972), provided theoretical support for the political stance of the White House, the U.S. Justice Department, and a majority in Congress. Armor concludes that busing does not work and says that busing to achieve school integration

neither "raises the academic achievements, aspirations and self-esteem of black children nor improves race relations...in fact, black students seemed to suffer a decline in educational and job aspirations and self-esteem after busing..." In a rather backhanded manner, Armor did admit that the results of his study were not conclusive, and that he favored "voluntary" busing if everyone agreed to it. But given such a cautionary statement, he might as well have not issued any disclaimer at all. Anti-egalitarian forces (Irene McCabe - to mention one) eagerly spread the results of Armor's research.

Certainly Armor is correct in saying that the results of this research are not conclusive proof. Pettigrew and his associates (Pettigrew, 1973), find four major disagreements with Armor, "1) He establishes unrealistically high standards by which to judge the success of school integration... 2) He presents selected findings from selected studies as the evidence on busing. The bias here is two-fold. On the one hand the few studies mentioned constitute an incomplete list and are selectively negative in results. Unmentioned are at least seven investigations from busing programs throughout the nation, that meet the methodological criteria for inclusion and report positive achievement results for black students... 3) the paper's anti-busing conclusions rest primarily on the findings from one short-term study conducted by Armor himself... and 4) objections must be raised to the basic assumptions about racial change that undergrid the entire study.

We agree with Kenneth Clark (New York Times, 10-72) who said that "studies such as those by Armor represent a sophisticated type of backlash." They only serve to "cloud the issues...Courts should decide questions of school integration not on the basis of uncertain research findings, but on the basis of the constitutional and equity rights of human beings."

We believe that the research studies of Jensen/Herrnstein and others serve to reinforce some of the most despicable features of our society. The relationship between race or class and intelligence cannot be determined scientifically and even if it could its potential social abuse far outweighs any possible social benefits.

All this is to say, as we did at the beginning of the paper, that there is no such thing as value free, neutral social research. And that research will generally find its uses/abuses somewhere. This places a heavy burden of responsibility upon social researchers for the way in which our society evolves.

We hope no one takes from this that we are arguing against the scientific method and all aspects of empiricism in research. Not at all. In fact, as Myrdal has said (Myrdal, 1969), "the scientific study of society should increase not decrease the effectiveness of moral and political discussion." Nor do we subscribe to the notion that all the empirical research of the last generation has been done to reinforce the corporate infrastructure. But we have seen opportunistic evasions, self-delusions, and pseudo-scientific smoke-screens being created by researchers in these recent Nixon years that have certainly lent themselves to being used as rationalizations for anti-egalitarian social policies. And unless researchers begin to conduct permanent and continual critiques of their own findings and their own thought processes, as well as begin to relate their premises and methodologies to the entire social infrastructure, which they are an integral part, we think policy formulations will probably turn increasingly, albeit subtly, away from what was once a pervasive general commitment to some kind of equality, and move toward the powerful anti-egalitarian pressures of the present administration. We

would not like to see the Jensen, Herrnstein, Banfield kind of research become anymore widespread than it already has. For we would conclude by saying that these researchers have placed the thorny crown of neo-empiricism on black people's brows and crucified the poor on a cross of statistics.

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