DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 077 815 SO 005 741

TITLE	Report on the Inquiry: Utilization of Scholarship in Teaching About War, Peace, and Social Change.
INSTITUTION	Diablo Valley Education Project, Orinda, Calif.; New York Friends Group, Inc., New York. Center for War/Peace Studies.
PUB DATE	21 Mar 70
NOTE	46p.; Summary of and Papers presented at the Utilization of Scholarship in Teaching about War, Peace, and Social Change Conference (San Francisco, California, March 21-22, 1970)
EDRS PRICE	MF-$0.65 HC-$3.29
DESCRIPTORS	Aggression; Antisocial Behavior; Behavioral Sciences; Concept Teaching; Conference Reports; Conflict; Cooperative Programs; Curriculum Development; Human Relations; *Intellectual Disciplines; Interdisciplinary Approach; *International Education; *Peace; *Social Change; Violence; *War; Workshops

ABSTRACT

Eighteen individuals representing eight social science disciplinary approaches, seven observers representing various educational positions, and eight staff members participated in an inquiry to discover how academic scholarship can be used to determine the understandings required in teaching about war and peace. Three substantive concepts -- conflict, violence, and authority were discussed in an effort to determine what should be learned by students about each; the problem of interdisciplinary research on these and other topics was given theoretical consideration; and suggestions as to future work by individual and sponsoring organizations were explored. The inquiry provided an occasion for individuals with different academic viewpoints to discuss these inter-relationships and, offered an exchange between academics and educators. A brief critique of the inquiry program indicated it was overly ambitious, discussion was forced, the group too large, and that there was some misunderstanding as to whether the conference was to examine content rather than techniques of teaching about war/peace. Brief summaries of formal presentations exploring the three concerns above are attached to this report. Also included is an edited version of suggestions concerning what participants thought to be the most important about the war/peace field in education. (Author/SJM)

A REPORT ON THE INQUIRY: UTILIZATION OF SCHOLARSHIP IN TEACHING ABOUT WAR, PEACE AND SOCIAL CHANGE

March 21-22, 1970
San Francisco, California

This was an Inquiry to discover how academic scholarship can be used to determine the understandings required in teaching about war and peace in our schools. Three activities were pursued in this attempt: First, three substantive concepts - conflict, violence and authority/obligation - were discussed in an effort to determine what should be learned by students about each; second, the problem of interdisciplinary research on these and other topics was given theoretical consideration; third, suggestions as to future work by individual and sponsoring organizations were explored.

Participants and Observers

Eighteen individuals, representing eight disciplinary approaches (political science, international relations, psychology and psychiatry, sociology, anthropology, social welfare and linguistics) attended as formal participants with primary responsibility for exploring the three concerns above. Seven observers representing various responsibilities in education (curriculum development, teacher training, administration and adult education) and eight staff persons attended as commenters and respondents providing insights as to the future needs of education for scholarship in the field of war and peace.

Sponsorship

The Inquiry was sponsored by the West Coast Office of the Center for War/Peace Studies. Formal co-sponsorship was provided by the American Orthopsychiatric Association, which hosted the meetings at the Mark Hopkins Hotel in conjunction with its 47th Annual Meeting; the International Studies Association, whose committee on Interdisciplinary Programs provided leadership for the meeting; and the Diablo Valley Education Project, one of the first projects to identify the need for more interdisciplinary work required to teach about the war/peace field in education.

Accomplishments

The war/peace field involves a broad range of knowledge which lacks delineation by a clear framework of concepts to guide education about it. Each discipline has a crucial contribution to make in defining

concepts in this field, since many, such as conflict or authority, cut across several disciplines. Rarely do individuals with different academic viewpoints meet together to discuss these inter-relationships. The Inquiry provided such an occasion and initiated a process which will undoubtedly continue within the sponsoring organizations and independently among participants.

Similarly, an interchange was begun between academics and educators which, it is hoped, will provide continuing contact between these related professional areas. Such contact is, again, unusual especially in functional discussions of war/peace topics. The Inquiry revealed the desire of academics to learn how better to serve teaching needs and established the need for a continuing means of interaction with the teaching profession.

Four papers were presented at the meetings, with formal discussants commenting from different academic backgrounds. These formal comments together with the discussion constituted an important advance in a field receiving little formal attention. Attached to this report are brief summaries of these presentations.

A listing obtained at the close of the meeting concerning what participants thought to be most important about the war/peace field in education has proven to be an additional valuable aid, both in clarifying how academics can relate to this endeavor and in pointing out what additional content areas need further work. An edited version of the suggestions is attached to this report.

An unexpected accomplishment of the Inquiry has taken place through the Council on Social Issues (CSI) of the A.O.A. Through the participation of A.O.A. Council members Herman Schuchman and Vera Rubin, meetings held by the Council during and after the Inquiry were greatly influenced by Inquiry objectives. The CSI has established a Task Force with significant staff time and money which may well focus on affective learning related to conflict, violence and social change.

Critique

The Inquiry program was too ambitious. Discussion of three complex concepts as well as an approach to interdisciplinary research was simply too much to accomplish in two days. Further, the focus of interest of participants was misjudged, considerable time wasted trying to force the discussion into a preconceived pattern with which few were comfortable. It was assumed that participants could easily state their different definitions of conflict, violence or authority and from these a synthesis of views could be derived. This proved to be a highly frustrating assignment which was ultimately resolved by having, as Irving Janis put it, "each person sing his own song". This resolution provided some useful dialogue, as can be seen from the summaries

attached, but did not accomplish the original objective of developing "a clear statement of what needs to be understood about three substantive concepts: conflict, violence and authority."

A problem which affected the entire program was the fact that the group was too large for good discussion. It also suffered from some turnover in participants due to personal schedules conflicting with the meetings. A possible solution to both the size and focus problem is that of careful preparation of papers on a single topic followed by their circulation to a few people (four-six) from different disciplines and then group discussion by the same few. Another alternative, probably less productive, would be to conduct smaller group discussions without the prior consultation. Either of these processes might then be followed by discussion in a larger group such as was gathered at the Inquiry.

A second misunderstanding was that this conference was to examine the techniques of teaching about war and peace rather than the content of what should be taught about war and peace. This was resolved in favor of content to the dissatisfaction of some participants and with the effect of confusing some of the discussion. The presence of some educators as observers probably helped to confuse this issue rather than clarify the need for sound content as had been intended. This problem would probably have been obviated had smaller groups discussed specific topics in advance of the Inquiry and then reported their conclusions to educators for comment. The reverse might also have been helpful; educators could have benefited from criticism by academics of curricula they developed.

Summary

The Inquiry was as useful in its outcome as it was flawed by the kinds of problems just discussed. Interest in the proceedings, in the experience of the Diablo Valley Education Project (from which the need for an Inquiry grew) and in the possibility for further contributions was high and has resulted in a number of valuable contacts for work in this field. The staff responsible for the meetings has a more realistic idea of the kinds of input which can be expected from the various elements represented at the meetings. Definitional work attempted through the Inquiry, though not as well treated as we had hoped, has provided useful insights and suggested alternative means for pursuing the needed intellectual work.

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SUMMARIES OF PRESENTATIONS AND COMMENTS

"The Utilization of Scholarship in Teaching about War, Peace and Social Change"

Gwyneth Donchin	About the Diablo Valley Education Project
Wilson Yandell	The Concept: Conflict
Lee Anderson	Comments on Wilson Yandell's Presentation, "The Concept: Conflict"
Robert North	Violence: Interpersonal, Intergroup and International
Irving Janis	Symptoms of Groupthink -- Comments on Robert North's Presentation, "Violence: Interpersonal, Intergroup and International
Thomas Milburn	Comments on Robert North's Presentation "Violence: Interpersonal, Intergroup and International
Marvin Zetterbaum	Self and Political Order
Stanley Coopersmith	Comments on Marvin Zetterbaum's Presentation, "Self and Political Order"
David Marvin	Comments on Marvin Zetterbaum's Presentation, "Self and Political Order"
Thomas Milburn	Problems of Integrating Academic Disciplines in the Study of War, Violence and Social Change
Kathleen Archibald	Comments on Thomas Milburn's Presentation, "Problems of Integrating Academic Disciplines in the Study of War, Violence and Social Change"
David Hays	Comments on Thomas Milburn's Presentation, "Problems of Integrating Academic Disciplines in the Study of War, Violence and Social Change"

GWYNETH DONCHIN: "ABOUT THE DIABLO VALLEY EDUCATION PROJECT"*

We are primarily a curriculum development project attempting to determine what is being and should be taught about war, peace, conflict and change and associated concepts and sub-concepts. Our objective is to develop a variety of instructional materials and techniques for use in kindergarten through twelfth grades to improve the teaching of concepts and ideas in the existing curricula and to develop new units and new strategies for teaching war/peace concepts not now in the curricula. We are focusing primarily now on the secondary level because it is the level at which we must identify the complete range of ideas we are dealing with. Perhaps the key to the attitude and concepts development will lie in the elementary level, but first we need to go through this process of clarifying what it means to prepare a student for graduation and active citizenship. We hope eventually to prepare a curriculum guide which would show the age placement and subject recommendation for these concepts and sub-concepts, from kindergarten through twelfth grade. And in the whole process we will develop models which can be used by educators all across the country.

The emphasis thus is experimental rather than implementational, although we hope through this process to lay the pathways for implementation in the schools. We are going in with no pre-set solutions as to what the instructional units should be: we want to remain very open to a whole variety of approaches and to engage teachers and students in determining what should be learned and how to go about it.

So we've come up with two major principles for guiding the work: one is that in order to undertake constructive change in our local schools, the role, responsibilities and problems of students, teachers, administrators, school boards and the community must be respected and understood and all those elements brought into cooperative relationship. And two, the classroom itself should be the focus of change, with contemporary knowledge and skills adapted to its needs.

A further major thrust of this work is to strengthen school-community relations. We are trying to avoid polarizing the school from the community, the teacher from the parent or student, the conservative from the liberal - the kind of divisive controversy and discussion that often emerges with change in the local school system.

We have had, then, to undertake several enormously ambitious tasks. We did this with the help of the Center for War/Peace Studies

Gwyneth (Mrs. Jerry) Donchin is past Director and a founder of the Diablo Valley Education Project. She is currently on leave from the Project Executive Board in Micronesia, where her husband is on Peace Corps assignment. These remarks were made at the Inquiry, "The Utilization of Scholarship in Teaching about War, Peace and Social Change," March 1970, San Francisco, sponsored by the Center for War/Peace Studies, in cooperation with the American Orthopsychiatric Association, the International Studies Association and the Diablo Valley Education Project.

and Bay Area consultants. We made a preliminary definition of the war/peace field which provided a framework, so that when we did engage the elements in the schools I have mentioned, we had a frame of reference to assess what was actually happening. We stated very clearly some assumptions which deal with democratic values and governmental principles, with war and conflict, with the value structure which determines choices about these. In our democratic society a responsive government acts within the existing climate of public aspiration and understanding. And we feel that those citizens, and thus our students, need to develop a commitment to democratic values in order to apply them to both domestic and foreign policy issues. They need to encounter and understand a range of social and economic concepts which suggest alternatives to war and violence.

To encourage an atmosphere where such alternatives can be successfully discussed, the Project has set a firm context itself which I would like to read to you now:

> We are concerned to prevent the following influences, prevalent in the war/peace field, from affecting the goals of the Project:
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> 1. The tendency in the United States to see the various communist countries as a single, unchanging entity, uniformly dedicated to establishing a world communist system. This view allows the label "communist" to block constructive thought, particularly on issues related to war and violence.
>
> 2. The organized propaganda effort allied to the various communist nations and political movements which attempts to direct concern for peace to a one-sided attack on American policy or institutions or to issues and attitudes which appear to have only humanitarian objectives, but are actually designed to forward various communist policies and understandings.
>
> 3. The many views which reject war but offer no responsible alternative measures or policies to preserve the security of our society and the democratic values that are its heritage.
>
> 4. The serious polarization between those who regard the school's only legitimate function in this field to be the teaching of a patriotic obligation to support our national leaders in whatever military activity is deemed necessary and those who, in their zeal to change U.S. foreign policy, recognize no obligation to support our nation's democratic decision-making process.

I think it would be helpful now to explain what we are actually doing. We are working in the biggest school district in Contra Costa County, Mt. Diablo Unified. It has a real cross-section representative of different student populations and different economic backgrounds; the range is almost complete from the migrant worker to the high income and

college bound student. The county population is about 400,000 and the district we are involved in has 60,000 students in it. We have placed teachers from the same school in teams responsible for curriculum unit development and provided it with administration support. Through training workshops we help the teachers be alert to the kinds of political pressures that are moving, to the problems of terminology and definition in the war/peace field. We provide a variety of consultants in content areas on the subjects they are teaching as well as aid in learning theory and strategies. We identify and evaluate resources on war/peace topics. (Teachers don't have resources any more than students do.) And we are exploring with teacher training institutions ways to prepare the teacher for this entirely different set of problems than the traditional approach has prepared them for.

Education desperately needs a kind of gathering and thought and focus we are bringing to the problems here today. There have been no guidelines. There have been few recommendations. The things we have found and the experiences we have had seem to be verified by educators across the country. I think we've got a fairly good approach, but we certainly need from you and others in the intellectual community clearer statements of the generalizations and concepts which students should understand as they approach the great issues of war, peace, conflict and change.

WILSON YANDELL: "THE CONCEPT: CONFLICT"

Much of man's inner life experience is one of conflicting wish and fear or conviction and doubt. Ambivalent feelings and opposing ideas, intents and interests produce internal conflict between individuals or groups. Conflict itself results in anxiety or tension which always demands some outlet for expression. When the source of tension is consciously recognized and the individual (or group) feels sufficiently free, the tension may be verbally identified and the associated emotions expressed as feeling. More commonly, particularly when the conflict results in very threatening anxiety, the source of tension and especially the feeling content, or affect, may remain unconscious. Much of human behavior may be seen as an attempt to adapt to conflict, the roots of which remain concealed from awareness. This effort often serves more as a defense against overwhelming anxiety than as an effective response to the situation stimulating conflict.

We are increasingly recognizing that man's greatest problem is dealing with man himself. We view biological and psychological forces in the shaping of man and his development as equaled in importance by the impact of man's evolving culture and institutions of social organization (the latter so infested with the conflict and compromise equally present in individual human character).

Until we can devise new socio-cultural norms and new and more satisfying means of adaptation to man's prolonged childhood and his need to explain his world and his relationship to it, we may assume that conflict, or crisis, will characterize man's experience at all levels. In the same manner that individual life experience influences both one's perceptions and responses, so inter-personal encounters and one's identify as member of a particular group, nation or ideological "ism" affect responses singly and collectively. Those additional factors impinging upon group responses to conflict include forces within group interaction which generate further intra- and inter-group conflict. Predominant attitudes may have little to do with conditions bearing upon the present conflict. Group interaction itself contributes socio-economic and political forces which not only provide additional stimuli to conflict but hindrances as well as strengths to the capacity for conflict management.

The mutual distrust that grows in an atmosphere clouded by anxiety, generated by conflict and burdened by the resulting distorted perceptions and skewed communications between individuals or groups encourages a stereotyped exaggeration of differences and a minimizing of similarities between

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**Wilson Yandell, Child Psychiatrist. These comments were made at the Inquiry, "The Utilization of Scholarship in Teaching about War, Peace and Social Change," March 1970, San Francisco, sponsored by the Center for War/Peace Studies, in cooperation with the American Orthopsychiatric Association, the International Studies Association and the Diablo Valley Education Project.*

opposing individuals, groups or nations. Often more destructive than frank and direct violent action is that behavior symbolic of violence once-removed in which the contrived significance of acts viewed as non-violent may be treacherous and devasteting. Warfare has been institutionalized by society as group violence licensed and rationalized by multiple criteria often remote from the emotional experience of its actual participants and victims.

Must we view conflict, then, as inevitably destructive in its effects? By no means, for as a natural consequence of factors in human life, the anxiety of conflict may serve as an alarm mechanism - a signal alerting either individual or collective man to identify its source: an intra-psychic, inter-personal, inter-group or inter-nation problem requiring attention and,hopefully, eradication or resolution.

Unfortunately such elimination of conflict is more often an illusion than reality , and we must content ourselves to adaptations, accomodation and the tension of cold-war strategies more often than to comfort, equilibrium and peace. Yet the very disequilibrium which results from this state of affairs forces engagement, interaction and effort toward resolution out of which has come much of man's social progress.

We must recognize the relationship of conflict to violence and explore those alternatives to paralysis or disintegration on the one hand or violence on the other in seeking more creative and successfully adaptive methods of ongoing conflict management. The institutions currently existing in our society are inadequate of such achievement and require revision and overhaul. The prerogative of individual integrity and freedom cannot exist in the absence of legitimized authority based upon values which transcend the power available by mere force alone. The maintenance of such a system, based upon democratic values, requires individual responsibility and participation in the decision-making process of society which in turn requires an informed and educated citizenry. The individual autonomy of such a citizenry requires that sense of personal mastery that can be present only in the context of a sense of personal and group identity based upon freedom of choice, confidence through experience and self-acceptance within a community of tradition and ritual we know as cultural form. Upon these must the privilege of those elite in the future of society depend.

Finally, in our effort to deal with omnipresent conflict and the resultant dilemmas affecting our individual and collective lives, we must, as Erikson has pointed out, seek ever more inclusive collective identities truly embracing man as one race, as one with nature, bound to his spaceship earth even as he characteristically seeks to escape its limits. And we must explore and refine those limits of the application of non-violence in men's affairs exemplified by the "truth-force" of Gandhi in search of more stable and mutually considerate acceptance of the presence of ongoing conflict.

LEE ANDERSON: COMMENTS ON WILSON YANDELL'S PRESENTATION, "THE CONCEPT: CONFLICT"*

At the beginning of Dr. Yandell's remarks he indicated what might be defined as three kinds of educational objectives: the development of a self-awareness about conflict on the part of the students; the development of a capacity to tolerate dissidence; and the capacity to participate actively in the process of learning. I'm sure none of us can dissent from this. Now the problem that bothers me is not so much the question of what there is about conflict that we ought to teach, that is, what the various disciplines have to say. I can't dissent as a commentator from any of the points Dr. Yandell makes and I would certainly agree with the five, six or seven things he observes as being important about the phenomenon of conflict to communicate to children.

I'm sure that one can think of ways in which to teach abstractly about certain aspects of conflict and conflict resolution in the context of a U.S. history course. But on the whole I wonder if the existing organization or structure of school curriculum allows us to get at many of the most important things about conflict. For example, let's take self-awareness, which, I assume, implies several things: it means the capacity to perceive a conflict situation in your own life and the community life; it means the capacity to use the tools of social science; it means I see myself involved in a zero-sum game or I see myself not involved in a zero-sum game but my opposition does see it as a zero-sum game. I see it as role conflict; I know myself well enough to know the kind of conflict situations in which anxiety is produced. With this self-awareness I go into a conflict situation knowing that anxiety will be there and that my response to anxiety is to withdraw, to get angry, to get irrational or something like that.

This kind of learning seems terribly hard to get at in the context of the existing curriculum. This active participation in experimental learning, of making sense out of your own world, comes very hard if in fact you are confined to the medium of teaching about a conflict between American colonies and Britain or in the American Civil War. It's like asking a horse to pull the Twentieth Century Limited down the track. I think in the context of the elementary schools, in contrast to high schools, there's much more room to maneuver here. The curriculum isn't so set, it isn't so stable and perhaps something like what we are talking about can be accomplished.

Obviously the phenomena of conflict, violence and authority are part of a whole package here, involving attitudes toward man as a species and toward oneself. This in turn raises in my mind a fundamental

*Lee Anderson, Department of Political Science, Northwestern University. These comments were made at the Inquiry, "The Utilization of Scholarship in Teaching about War, Peace and Social Change," March 1970, San Francisco, sponsored by the Center for War/Peace Studies, in cooperation with the American Orthopsychiatric Association, the International Studies Association and the Diablo Valley Education Project.

value question for us. Because as far as I can see, and as Dr. Yandell points out in his paper and Bob North in his, existing social institutions for conflict management simply are inadequate. I see very little hope of the species surviving for very much longer as long as the territorial state system evolved in the last three centuries lasts. What does this mean? If the Project are serious about this, I believe it casts you in a subversive role. You are involved in a process of eroding away the base of latent support for the existing nation-state system. You do this by secularizing beliefs and attitudes toward conflict, violence, and authority. That is, what we really want to do is to equip human beings with the concepts and language in which they can look at themselves, their own groups and the world about them in language that is not bound up in their own cultural commitment. They can then stand, at least on occasion, dispassionately and with some degree of detachment and say, "you know, it's not always necessary to analyze international conflict in terms of good and bad, that indeed there are alternative concepts for thinking about these kinds of phenomena."

I think the net effect of this whole process is the secularization of politics - by which I mean the eroding away of the normative bonds that link the individual to the ideology of his society. Once you've secularized war it's much harder to march off to war under the mantle of defending the national interest or making the world safe for democracy or stopping communism. For once war gets secularized, the politicians' call for allegiance to national bureaucracy seems to be so much ideology.

Freeman: I hear you saying that one of the things you get out of the study of conflict is a removal of one's self from his immediate environment in an attempt to view a conflict situation as a problem which needs solution rather than to view things simply as one of the combatants. This, therefore, raises value choices because of the recognition that one can't remove himself from his immediate environment: that is, in the classroom or here, one is a Californian, one is an American - even though he's trying to remove himself to look at conflict situations from another perspective.

Anderson: Which may mean nothing more than I'm self-consciously aware of the fact that I'm viewing the world as an American.

Freeman: But you're saying something further, which is that that is going to be interpreted as bad, as subversive.

Anderson: I don't see how it can be anything but that.

ROBERT NORTH: "VIOLENCE:
INTERPERSONAL, INTERGROUP, AND INTERNATIONAL"*

Before I really approach the models that I would like to focus the discussion on this afternoon, I would like to say something about the State. One definition of the state is that it is a monopoly of violence by a ruling elite. I think this definition stands up pretty well across cultures and through time. States differ in terms of how the ruling elite got its monopoly of violence, although in looking through sweeps of history I am pretty well convinced that most ruling elites got it through force of violence. By and large when I look through history and anthropology for societies which have successfully avoided large scale violence, none of them are on the state level. I think this becomes, then, a very sobering consideration and a very important one for today and for the future. For instance, I think we have far too often been glib when talking about a world government - as though world government were going to solve these things. But if you establish a world government after the model of the nation-state, I would say "God help us!" This becomes a very basic dilemma and I think that all kinds of people can work on this dilemma and never see it clearly. We are in a bind because we have no really good alternative to offer either, but we don't often like to admit it.

One more proposition I would like to put forward: I would say that the state system is a stable system if you include conflict as part of the system, which one has to do, because that's what a state is for in a way - to moderate conflict, regulate it, keep it within certain bounds. But how about violence? The violence produced by wars is very stable. It has fluctuations, but its inherent structure is very stable. We could spend a lot of time arguing whether this type of system is effective or not. I think the argument could be made that when we were buffered by time and space it was an effective system for some societies. But whether it is an effective system for anybody in the future becomes a very critical question.

Turning now to the models I want to discuss, let me begin where our work began - with crises. We were using basically Charles Osgood's mediated response model. This familiar model is based on a perceptual feedback process. Party A perceives - rightly or wrongly - that he is being threatened or injured by party B. Taking what he considers to be defensive action, A behaves in a way which B perceives as injurious or threatening. When B responds "defensively," A, perceiving now that his initial observations and fears have been validated, increases his activities, and thus the conflict spirals.

Robert North, Director, Institute for the Study of Conflict and Integration, Stanford University. This paper was presented at the Inquiry, "The Utilization of Scholarship in Teaching about War, Peace and Social Change," March 1970, San Francisco, sponsored by the Center for War/Peace Studies, in cooperation with the American Orthopsychiatric Association, the International Studies Association and the Diablo Valley Education Project.

It is my own conviction by now that this kind of system is fundamentally unstable. It began to seem to us that crises were only the tip of a very dynamic iceberg indeed, and if you didn't get down to the antecedents of crises, you really didn't have much. You might be able to head off one crisis, or two or three, but eventually one is going to explode. In other words, crisis management is not much to pin our hopes on. I'm in favor of managing crises as long as we have nothing better. But I think we need something considerably better.

The results thus far of our work on the long term antecedents of crisis can be summarized symbolically as follows:

$$\frac{P \times T}{R} = L.P.$$

This says that population (P) times technology (T) (by which we mean levels of knowledge and skills), divided by resources (R) gives rise to what we have called lateral pressure, or the tendency to invest more energy farther away from the center of a social grouping. I think in the past there has been a tendency to think that technology equals resources, which of course it doesn't. Technology uses resources. Similarly, a rise in population creates a drain on resources. Now looking through history we see that both population and technology are increasing (becoming available) exponentially, while resources are at best increasing only arithmetically. It can be seen then that the numerator of the equation above is increasing tremendously, while the denominator is hardly increasing at all - relatively speaking. At the same time an increase in technology increases people's perceived needs which are expressed as societal demands. The tendency of a society, if demands grow, is to want to do something about it. Essentially what a society does is to take some measure of human energy, some measure of knowledge and skills and some measure of resources and invest this in a specialized capability in order to try to meet these demands. This investment in specialized capabilities gives rise to lateral pressure. Now this may be in the form of a trip to the moon, commerce, conquest, financial investment or a number of other things.

It is interesting to note, then, that within this context we would say that Lenin's theory of imperialism isn't wrong, but that it is a special case of lateral pressure. Now this becomes important because we see that Lenin went forward on the assumption that if you got rid of the profit motive and capitalism then war would disappear. What we're asserting is that the capitalist system and capitalist investment and profit is only one form of energy investment. And essentially the same outcome will emerge from other types of investment - including those used currently by powerful, so-called socialist states. This means in a sense that just taking the rascals out of power is no solution to the problem; it just means that instead of having one set of rascals running this thing, you have another. But the thing is, they're not even rascals. More and more as we look at the behavior of nation-states in terms of large numbers of variables it appears that the decisions made by millions of private individuals, each in pursuit of his own personal and legitimate goals, provide a tremendous inertia, if you will, a drift. If there is a conspiracy of power we are all parties to it. Now we've got what we

think is pretty good evidence that the head of state doesn't really have much decision power. He is caught within parameters which all of us have helped create. We think of him as a powerful man, but no matter what he says when he's out of the office, when he gets into office his policies begin to look more and more like his predecessor's. And on really crucial issues such as tendencies toward international conflict and violence there is not much change.

This, in my mind, is a very discouraging situation. Primarily because however bad things are now, they're probably going to get worse before they get better - if they're going to get better. And they're only going to get better when very basic decisions are made which may even involve a totally new organizational system from top to bottom.

A final note on this. If we are serious, and I don't know whether we really are, we have to have a balance, a viable balance of population, technology and resources. This is where a start has to be made. In terms of the model this means we must control the numerator (PxT), i.e., reduce population and maintain it at a low level while maintaining a high technology, in order to maximize the denominator (R). We need to give up activities that put a high drain on the denominator. We need to make careful calculations in our technology of degradation/ benefit ratios, that is, how much harm is done to the denominator per unit of benefit to the numerator. But furthermore, we have to have a more judicious, a more even, a more equal allocation of access to resources, access to technology from country to country around the world and also within societies, between various strata. I think there are at least three principles here. The first is the Confucian statement of the Golden Rule: "Don't do anything to another that you wouldn't want done to you." This implies a minimum of essential regulation at the world level and autonomy on many dimensions at lower levels. Second, power and sovereignty must reside with the individual on any given problem. And power on one dimension should not be transferable to another dimension. Third, equal access for all persons to resources and benefactions must be guaranteed. Abstractly, these are the mimimal rules, it seems to me, for a stable future society but many "realists", I am sure, would dismiss them as visionary. We are way past the point where I think good will on everybody's part is going to solve it. In the first place, I don't think we are going to have good will on everybody's part -- it's asking too much. But the second point is that we can all die in a euphoria of good will. In other words, the good will has to be associated with hard-headed efforts to solve a number of crucial and very difficult environmental problems and even more difficult organizational problems involving paradoxes of freedom, minority rights, legitimacy, authority, and sanctions. There are no easy solutions. Now this emerges as a very complex set of problems from physics on one hand all the way through the social sciences to the humanities on the other. And I think one of the places we have to start is with the individual so that more individuals can learn to live with ambiguity and uncertainty. The tendency is to respond to ambiguity and uncertainty in a kind of crisis type response. And that's not enough. So I see then a whole range of attack points. I really think we have to hit most of them, if not all of them.

IRVING JANIS: "SYMPTOMS OF GROUPTHINK"
COMMENTS ON ROBERT NORTH'S PRESENTATION, "VIOLENCE: INTERPERSONAL, INTERGROUP AND INTERNATIONAL"*

One of the central points that runs through Professor North's paper is that national leaders will always try to move their nation in directions which reduce whatever discrepancies they perceive between the real state of affairs they believe they are living in and the state of affairs they prefer. What we have to deal with here are problems of policy-making by, as North pointed out, the ruling elites of large states who have to make decisions about how they are going to use their resources, whether or not to escalate violence, how to prevent crises, how to deal with crises as they arise and so on.

Now the particular type of inquiry I want to talk about involves a series of case studies of what could be called "historic fiascoes." The policy decisions that led to these fiascoes (examples: Bay of Pigs Invasion, the Korean War decision, the Chamberlain government, appeasement of Hitler, escalation of the Vietnam war) have in common the fact that each was made by a small number of individuals who formed a cohesive group sharing certain norms, certain outlooks and certain misperceptions in looking at the enemy. This fits in very nicely with one of Professor North's main points--that psychological reality is the reality we have to be concerned with: how the policy makers perceive their opposite numbers, not what the reality may actually be, as assessed by outside objective observers.

It seems that the members of a decision-making group become strongly cohesive whenever there are stresses that are being shared by all the members of the group. Of course, any basic decision has its intense stresses, particularly if it's in an international crisis situation. And in a crisis, when the decision-makers form a cohesive group they become motivated to avoid being too harsh in their judgments of their colleagues. They begin to adopt a soft line of criticism instead of making their conflicting views explicit.

Conflict within the policy-making group in such situations, however, has a very positive value. It can also be corrosive, if there are no ways of resolving it, if you have such a wide disparity of values and so on. But a certain amount of diversity and a willingness to speak up to differences in values and differences in outlook certainly can be valuable. But in a cohesive group we often see the opposite kind of tendency, where everybody begins to get soft and uncritical in his thinking. The members move in the direction of trying to share a nice,

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friendly consensus where there is little bickering, where everybody can share the same values and the same estimates about the risks that are being taken and the same ideas about the best means for achieving their values.

I use the term "groupthink" to refer to a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive group, when consensus-seeking becomes so dominant that it tends to override the usual forms of critical thinking that members of a group would be capable of engaging in. The symptoms of "groupthink" may be familiar to any of you who have looked into small group psychology. First, the most dominant trend is a shared illusion of invulnerability about risk-taking: "We're a great group," "What we do is fine because we have decided to do it," "Everything is going to be all right." Schlesinger makes this point very clearly about the Kennedy administration group and the Bay of Pigs decision. Everything had been going our way, he said. We felt we couldn't lose, and therefore, even though we could see that there were lots of things wrong with it, we felt somehow, just as everything else had come about (Kennedy got the nomination, he got elected, so on) this too is going to go our way.

Second there is an unquestioned belief in the inherent morality of the in-group. The dominant theme is "We are a good group." And, of course, anybody who is being dealt with as an out-grouper is likely to be immoral "if he doesn't go along with us." But above all, there is no need to consider the moral implications, the ethical aspects of what is being done--or even the quasi-ethical aspects such as using up the few remaining resources that our earth may have.

Third--the counter-part of number two--any out-group regarded as the enemy is evil and is too weak or too stupid to be able to deal effectively with the very clever plan being plotted by the in-group. For example, in dealing with somebody like Castro, the group members assume that he is much too weak to be able to do anything about a handful of men that is going to be landing in Cuba, and that in any case, the invaders could always escape to the mountains to join up with the guerillas and help overthrow Castro, who is too weak to survive anyhow. Nobody bothered to take a look at a map to notice that the Bay of Pigs happens to be separated by one hundred miles of impenetrable marshland from the Escambro Mountains, which is where the guerillas were hiding out.

A further characteristic of "groupthink" is a sense of unanimity within the group. And this is exactly where the lack of critical thinking comes in, because it is an illusion of unanimity that the members of this group, as loyal group members, try to maintain. In order to maintain it, they have to make certain assumptions, such as the fact that the silent members of a group are going along with what the more talkative members are saying.

As for the dissenters, they remain silent. In order to avoid deviating from the group's norms, they impose self-censorship. For example, Bowles attended one of the Bay of Pigs planning sessions

because Rusk couldn't be there, and as Deputy Secretary of State, Bowles was his replacement. Bowles was shocked to hear the assumptions that were being made as the group talked about this crazy plan. But he didn't say a word. Nor did Schlesinger speak up. Schlesinger wrote a few memos which were perfectly fine; Bowles, too, wrote a memo which he gave to Rusk, who promptly buried it in the State Department files. Schlesinger describes his own reaction as a fear of disapproval, a fear that these people would turn against him, that he would no longer be regarded as a loyal member of the group. And not only that, a negative comment from him would reflect badly on Kennedy because Schlesinger, as a Harvard professor in the presence of military and CIA people, would embarrass the leader if he were to speak up and raise various kinds of objections. Now Fulbright was invited to one meeting and did speak up. But what he said got a beautiful reception from the White House group: it fell absolutely dead and everybody went on talking as though he had never said anything.

Finally, you get the emergence of self-appointed mind-guards within the group to protect the minds of the policy-makers from any damage by fresh ideas which might question their assumptions. A good example is Rusk's handling of Bowles' memorandum. Bowles stated very specifically what he found objectionable to the plan, and Rusk looked at the memo and said, "Look, there is no need for us to transmit this because Jack Kennedy is perfectly aware of all these things himself, and he has already said that it's not going to be a real invasion. It's just going to be a quiet little infiltration." That had become the slogan: a quiet little infiltration. It would be buried on the inside pages of the New York Times somewhere, and nobody would even notice. They maintained this all through the days when the New York Times was already having front page stories about the planned invasion, two weeks before it was scheduled. But that was the way the group conceptualized it. Anyhow, that was the reason Rusk gave for suppressing Bowles' memo, so it never got fed into the system.

What I am proposing, then, is a level of analysis that fits in with the kind of schemes that Professor North gave, but looks at the matter from a different standpoint. This is not from an individual standpoint, which is where the Osgood model comes from, dealing with the effects of communications and threats and so on. And it is not at the level of institutions and nations, which is the level of analysis that Professor North was talking about when he gave us the various formulas about population, technology and the sciences.

I'm proposing to look at some of these problems from the standpoint of the group of decision-makers and in terms of the way they interact to make policy. Now, if we contrast the series of fiasco-type decisions with the kind of decisions that don't lead to fiascos and that don't show the symptoms of "groupthink" (examples: Cuban Missile Crisis, the Marshall Plan decision) we have a possible way of ferreting out some of the conditions that may prevent stupid risk-taking. It's this kind of inquiry that I propose pursuing.

A few hypotheses have emerged: one that is very clear is that when you have a secretive group, when you have a group that becomes very exclusive, then all the conditions for forming a cohesive group and engaging in "groupthink" are there. And the concept of "need to know" is usually utilized in such a way as to keep the decisions very close to a small group of people who are not experts in the area. When, for example, the Chief of Intelligence in the State Department approached Rusk to say, "I just accidentally heard from Allen Dulles that there is a plan to invade Cuba, and I think that our people on the Cuban desk ought to be in on this," Rusk said, "Oh no, this is too sensitive a decision. We can't have any of those experts in on this." Obviously, one way to prevent that sort of situation is to set up multiple groups: each representative of a department in a central group who meets at the White House returns to his home group, where properly qualified people brief him and discuss the issue; then he goes back to the White House to represent his group's point of view in the central body. A tradition of that kind, instead of the one we have now of secrecy, would go a long way toward preventing exclusiveness and "groupthink."

The absent-leader procedure that Kennedy innovated in the Cuban Missile Crisis is another way to reduce the chances of groupthink. And above all, if the leader is present when the group members are just beginning to discuss a new policy issue his abstaining from setting the norm is essential. If the leader absents himself or merely listens and abstains from announcing his own viewpoint until everybody in the group has been allowed to sound off, that again might prevent some groupthink tendencies from giving rise to a premature consensus, before the alternatives have been explored.

Various special devices we are becoming familiar with, such as role-playing devices and role reversals, are additional means which could be introduced into these policy-making groups to get them, for example, to break down stereotypes regarding the enemy.

There is more detail to be filled in here, of course, but this will give you an indication of what I think is a promising set of concepts and a promising way of plugging in what we already know about group dynamics into an analysis of the policy-making groups.

THOMAS MILBURN: "PROBLEMS OF INTEGRATING ACADEMIC DISCIPLINES IN THE STUDY OF WAR, VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL CHANGE'*

The problems we face here are quite big - so big they really are overwhelming. Moreover, the problems are multi-faceted, and I don't see the possibility within the intellectual capabilities of any one discipline to attempt to solve them. One of the interesting things about war, violence and social change is that they all still contain so many aspects that are problematic - that is, whatever we may say that we know about them, there is still a lot that we don't know. And this, of course, is one of the reasons for us to be concerned with working together. The problems may be immense, but it is this multi-faceted nature of the problems that seems to me really calls for interdisciplinary research. Problems that are complex often yield more readily to heterogeneous groups; if you have a group of people, all of whom are bright but with overlapping knowledge and diverse skills, you do much better at solving problems than otherwise. It takes more than diversity that way. It also takes cooperation, which is hard to generate.

None of this is to imply that the disciplines should merely work together even in an interdisciplinary approach. The disciplines should have to cooperate with practitioners as well. In this case it seems to me the practitioners clearly are educators and the educators, among others, very much need to be invited in and involved in formulating the research problems.

One obstacle to interdisciplinary work is that the particular area of research we are concerned with produces anxiety in many people, and with anxiety they retreat to the security of their own fields. Thus conflict and violence are like other areas such as religion or sex, each of which is also hard to study because it arouses anxiety resulting in withdrawal to safe problems in one's own discipline. Note, by the way, that in order to cooperate it is necessary to be daring, to take a chance, to respect others even when you see that when they talk about your area they do not know as much as you do. You have to find some criteria by which you can decide to trust them when they are talking in areas about which you don't know so much and about which it can be harder to judge them. Each research area has its own methods and some of the strongest emotional commitments I know are to methods.

Another problem, it seems, is the tendency to regard the things that we work on in our own discipline as problematic: i.e., 'these are the problems and everything else is a given.' For example, the economist

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who studies developing countries usually regards sociological factors as exogenous; he doesn't even look at them.

One way to overcome these obstacles is to be aware of the fact that there are conceptual convergences that exist across disciplines. One in particular seems quite relevant to conflict, the notion of the non-zero-sum game which can result in win-win or lose-lose relationships in which both parties come out ahead or behind. Win-win games look analogous to the principle of comparative advantage in international trade, to that of role complementary in sociology, creative relations in psychology, constructive symbiosis in biology. And lose-lose games look like neurotic or psychotic relations in psychology, role conflict in sociology or a kind of mutual parasitism in biology; they may also look like wars.

These conceptual convergences exist independently of cooperation. But they set the stage for cooperation across disciplines, and they suggest that we really do have something to communicate about if we can get into it, if we are willing to tolerate the fact that we have somewhat different languages. It takes a while to be aware that we are closer than we knew. We can abet cooperation if we concentrate first on similarities across disciplines (for example, the concepts) before emphasizing differences.

There remain many different kinds of things to be done, and there are new methods and new concepts that make cooperation easier. For example, the man-computer simulation can prove a good way to study conflict. Another is this whole notion of system - putting together hypotheses that have some meaning at different levels of societal complexity.

These are ways to talk and work together. We still, then, are faced with the problem of sitting down and realizing it is going to be tough and it is going to be abrasive and we are going to have a hard time tolerating one another. But this game is worth the candle.

MARVIN ZETTERBAUM: "SELF AND POLITICAL ORDER"*

I'm starting from the context of traditional sources of authority, whenever you may have seen them - a religious tradition, a set of moral principles, natural law, governmental authority and so forth. All of these are now regarded with considerable skepticism, and they are no longer acting to hold the allegiance of individuals in our society today. As in every other mass or multi-faceted society, however, there are vestiges of authority still prevailing.

The major thrust of contemporary man is toward something which I have chosen to say is the realization or fulfillment of the "self." How important that concept of the self is may be seen in the controversy surrounding alienation, in the reaching for authenticity, being a person and such terms.

Now I sense a conflict between the demands of what I call political order and the demands of self. Whether these demands are absolutely antithetical, as I sometimes tend to think they are, or whether they can occasionally be meshed together seems to me the problem I would like to present to you.

I deliberately chose the terms self and "political" order because I mean to convey by political order some notion of community without defining the geographical extension of that community.

The self has no equivalent, as far as I can see, prior to the sixteenth or seventeenth century. What there was before and clearly what substituted for self was the idea of the soul, which is a very different thing, I think. Primarily, the soul had to do with fitting in with a scheme of things, a cosmic order, as it were, which is outside the individual, and the individual finds his proper place within that transcendent context. Now what has happened in modern times, of course, is that this transcendent cosmos has disappeared - or its authority for us has disappeared - and hence we can no longer conveniently speak of a soul in the ancient sense.

The entire classical conception of the state or city-state or whatever you want to call the community is to bring about a reverence for whatever it is that that common conception of the city is. That is, all individual interests, primarily, are to be sacrificed in the name of this common interest. Particularly striking, I think, is the classical belief that this common sense is buttressed by a sense of divinity. That is to

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say that what holds a community together is essentially something which transcends man. It is a divine gift, and a community which rejects the gift in the classical terms cannot really succeed as a community.

Fundamentally what has happened today is that we have rejected the divine gift because it makes no sense to us any more, and for that reason, among others, the problem of community is very problematic today.

Any democracy, including contemporary democracy, faces the problem of freedom. The structure is meant to hold the people together. Yet freedom encourages diversity. It has a centrifugal effect upon the community. It does everything possible in its power to destroy the sense of commonness and identification with the community, even to the very principles of the regime itself, because freedom encourages us to be subversive.

Is there really any sense in which we are a community? What common perception holds us together? How is it possible to alleviate conflict? How is it possible to stabilize the regime? Stability often is compatible with slow changes, but how do we find a fundamental stability of such a kind that we do not revert to a violent upheaval? What are the preconditions for stability? The phenomenon of the human race today is at the point where perhaps the only meaningful question to us seems to be how to avoid conflict, or violent conflict. And we are faced with a radical lowering of standards in order to simply achieve stability or avoidance of violent conflict. I would allege that that is a fundamentally new experience, because in the past, up until say the First or Second World War, it was possible to resolve conflict without destroying three quarters of our entire human race.

Now turning to the problem of self, I must ask what is the self? The ultimate point is that how we define the self determines for us the kind of political order we want. (I have been particularly influenced by Nietzsche on these points.) Perhaps nothing is more striking about the modern world than our emphasis on the uniqueness of the person, which I believe stems from uniqueness of the body, in a very radical sense. Traditionally what was moral was what was for the common good, which does not define what one experiences uniquely - one's own lust, one's own desires, fears or ambitions. What it means to be moral now, or the claim for morality, is to express one's self; self-expresiion, self-realization--these become the goals of modern man. And to express oneself, to be oneself, to realize oneself is the highest claim of morality.

In stressing the uniqueness of the individual, Nietzsche does not think that all men are equal; and, in fact, he says that some men are clearly more equal than others. And those who are more equal than others are those who fundamentally have more passions within them and who do not try to organize their passions in some hierarchy but manage to live in such a way that they are able to fulfill each of their passions. That is the greatest desideratum of being a human being - to have a multiplicity of passions and then to be allowed or encouraged to experience all these passions. The worst evil would be to deprive a person of his

experiencing of some of his passions. So Nietzsche argued that greatness lies in a person's range and multiplicity, in the wholeness, in manifoldness. And I think that this is pretty much also imbued in our own notions of the self.

There has been however, a kind of democratization, or even a vulgarization of Nietzsche's teachings. Nietzsche, of course, was an aristocrat and I think when you try to make a transformation from an aristocratic teaching to a democratic society you will inevitably distort that teaching. I just recently had a graduate seminar on Nietzsche, and the graduate students in my department are very unhappy with everything they are doing, and they are crying for greater freedom and so forth. They were anxious to read Nietzsche, but they became disturbed because Nietzsche says you have to learn linguistics and have twelve years of languages and forty-seven years of this and so on. What my students want to do is accept the freedom part of Nietzsche but not the other part -- the discipline

Kariel, with another view, carries the notion of self in the direction of the assumption of roles, so that his idea, as far as I can follow him, of what the ideal person or self would be is a person who constantly is trying on roles, who uses the political environment around him to select in some ways the kinds of roles he wants to play. He accepts the ultimately irreconcilable character of our roles and therefore defines as mature whoever has the capacity for playing diverse parts and remaining an unreconciled being.

I would argue that you can't really speak of what it means to be a self unless there is some notion of what it is that unifies the parts of one's self into some meaningful whole. There must be an appearance of a genuine self, constituted by the organization of passions, ideals and responsibilities into a meaningful whole, or into what was formerly embraced in the context of character.

Now, what Etzioni does, in looking at this problem of self and political order in the tradition of Martin Buber and others, is to argue that there is no such thing as an individual social self and a kind of disparate political order, but, rather, that there is an inter-connection of self and order in what he calls the social self. A man is not unless he is social. What he is depends on his social being; and what he makes of his social being is what he makes of himself. In my mind Etzioni does not succeed in freeing us of some of the problems that are involved there. However, he says, and I believe this is absolutely valid, that the redefinitions of men that are formulated in the interchange between man and society must be, and I quote, "recorded in social tablets. The social embodiment of values has an element of objectivization, but it also enables each member to lift himself." And then a sentence which I think is absolutely true: "Human beings cannot reweave anew the normative fabric of society each morning." That is, if we have a concept of self we need to have a certain kind of stability that that concept of self will be valid tomorrow as it is today.

Now, in this sense, I wonder whether political order can be maintained at any level if the social tablets of moral understandings are erected on sandstone in place of granite. If, however, our notion of the self is very ephemeral, our social mores, our tablets of law and order are themselves as ephemeral as our concept of the self, then it seems to me we are in difficulty.

I think I will conclude, because I have tried just to express some of the difficulties of the concept of self. And perhaps just to show that I'm not wholly old-fashioned, I want to say that there is no denying the attractiveness of the concept of self that is characterized by autonomy, experimentation, freedom from singleness of purpose, occupation or role, release from the stultifying conformism of mass society and the capacity for self correction and growth that arises from the opportunity for redefinition. This is what I would like for myself as well as for other selves. But, I do not find in the writings in contemporary political and social philosophy any integrated principle of self upon which we could rely for the accomplishment of these ends. Nor do I find the necessary provisions for the stable political order that would allow us to do these kinds of things. If everything is in flux, if our political order is in flux as well as our concept of the self, then I do not see how we can go about the task of defining ourselves and realizing ourselves.

STANLEY COOPERSMITH: COMMENTS ON MARVIN ZETTERBAUM'S PRESENTATION, "SELF AND POLITICAL ORDER"*

After reading Marvin Zetterbaum's paper, I came to the conclusion that its ending point is really a beginning. What Marvin has done is to clarify the history and significance of the relation between self and social order and whetted my appetite for his conclusions and projections. By ending as he does, Marvin suggests that the concept of self and its relation to social order are too ambiguous for ready definition, and that there is no consensus as to how they are to be treated. At this moment of flux and potential danger, we cannot reach agreement on this topic even among this relatively select group of individuals. In our deliberations about this important topic it is notable that our conclusions and definitions are so ambiguous and inconclusive.

Secondly, I think I would note that while Marvin examines historically the relationship between self and social order, what he doesn't do is point out that in any given point in history, and particularly at this point, there are differences in definition within a society. It is one thing for us, as intellectuals, or as given professionals, to have a definition relating self and social order, but this may not be shared by the lower middle class and the upper lower class, and the majority of society may have a totally different idea of where we are and what we should be doing, and what the self is like - therefore, the definition we come to may be a very personal, selfish, entirely satisfying one to us intellectually, but meaningless in terms of producing any change.

Now, if we attempt to induce change, if we want to modify, one of the things that has to happen is there has to be an indication that we believe things are possible. There must be a hope, an expectation of success, a conviction that the efforts and powers that will be exerted will not be expressed in vain. My own studies in self-esteem indicate that the person who has an image of himself as influential and powerful is likely to make efforts to change his personal and political situation, while those with a more modest self-image are likely to remain passive and acquiescent of the prevailing social order. The radical students, the militant blacks, the vigorous right wing all have beliefs that they can and must affect action in a given direction, and their beliefs mobilize and sustain them. The majority of the population does not share this mobilized self-image -- a necessary reminder that there are great differences in the images that individuals and segments of the population hold. In short, when we talk about self and social order,

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we are talking about a relationship that is interpreted differently by various segments of our society.

I would like to raise another possibility here - namely that the notion of self, the notion of change, the notion of self and social order really require a new vision. We are at the point now where it may no longer be a question of an interdisciplinary social science approach to the subject; it may be that the artists and the musicians and the poets have more to say on this matter than people like myself. The pressures for redefinition that come will not come from people like myself sitting around a table. The pressures will come from large numbers of people who will say 'there must be an alternative, there must be a way out of this.' And they will believe that and they will say there is an alternative. And it will not be because we will have more knowledge of group dynamics, or abstract definitions and statements of the political process. It will be when we say there is a possibility, and there is a dream, a vision of the future which is an alternative possibility. Just having that vision provides courage and hope for the future. Without that vision we are unlikely to mobilize the large numbers of persons required to affect governmental policies and expenditures.

What are some of the directions of that vision? Let me speculate with you. It seems clear from what is happening today and what will happen tomorrow, that the young are going to have to accept and carry out that vision. Not necessarily that the young differ from us (my own studies of the generation gap indicate more similarities than differences between adolescents and parents), but rather that the young are more vocal in their expression and more ready to act on the basis of their beliefs. Part of the vision is expressed in greater concern for interpersonal relationships, greater emphasis upon the present than either the future or the past, a greater search for and acceptance of subjective experience and a greater focus upon the individual as a private, independent force than upon his role in the social group. The vision derides such abstract goals as honor, truth and morality in favor of concern for the way people directly and materially treat other people. The vision lauds sincerity and authenticity, emotional expressiveness and the adventure of life over adherence to a public code acted in a forward and stereotyped fashion. According to this vision national boundaries are less important than the brotherhood of men; America should live up to promises and commitments of human rights and diminish its role as an intrusive, exploitative world power. The concept of the self is of an individual guided by personal rational values concerned with others, but focusing upon developing his personal interests and abilities. In relating to the social order the individual proceeds first on the basis of his own needs but with appreciation of the needs of the group.

That this focus upon self does not preclude concern and action for the groups is borne out by the social and political actions of the past three or four years. These actions have really gone beyond political rights -- but expressed in that arena because it is the only one available. What is happening now is an elaboration of social rights and biological rights; biologically, we are now talking about population explosion and pollution; socially, do I have a right to be treated as a dignified

human being? Do I have the right to be treated as an individual? Do I have the right to have an abortion; to vote for birth control? Do I have a right for a biologically clear environment; to expect there will be no pollution? These are not ways of conceptualizing the rights of an individual that have ever been considered in a system of government. Governments have historically focused on political rights -- they are now being pressed on emerging issues of social and biological necessities.

Another thing happening with students is they are open to the possibility of alternative bases of judging worthiness. Now most people have bought the myth that you are in a position of judging your worthiness by how much money and status you have. Then they find out it's not true. They get the degree, they get the money, and they realize, 'My God, it hasn't solved the problem, I still don't like myself.' Or there is a notion of toughness, or the notion of masculinity - that somehow one must be bellicose, one must be overtly tough and resilient or one is not truly a man. And that's a notion of worthiness associated with brute force and strength. Now, is it possible to develop an alternative vision that gentleness, that tenderness are also valid expressions; this is part of an elaboration of other ways of being male than being warlike.

Finally, I believe it is necessary to provide an alternative concept of human nature that includes man's altruistic and loving actions as well as his selfish and destructive deeds. The image of man in general and his "basic nature" in particular are part and parcel of the baggage each of us carries in his concept of himself, and the expectations he places upon the social order in which he lives. During the past three years I have been involved in a study of rescuers who saved hundreds of thousands of Jews from death at the hands of the Nazis during the second World War. Because of the extermination of millions, the use of the Bomb; the racism war, and the assassinations and systematic starvation of the past decade, many persons have devised a totally pessimistic picture of man - a cruel killer whose impulses cannot be readily controlled. What is ignored is that there are persons who are willing to take risks, who express love, who are considerate and cooperative. We need to learn about these people and present them as constructive, active, positive models for ourselves and our children. We lack people in whom we can truly believe, we distrust motives that are not selfish, we cannot accept unselfishness without suspecting that it reflects weakness. When we studied the characteristics of rescuers we found out that they were destructive in some regards, but generally ordinary people with firm principles by which they live. They are people who are trustworthy, fitting models to follow if we wish to provide a more positive and mixed image of man. Models of such people are needed before other persons can engage in positive actions for their fellow men. Models provide guidance and mobilize others. Who are the persons we trust, whom are we willing to follow and who do we feel accept enough to internalize into our self-image?

To develop a new vision for the future, including the belief necessary to mobilize to achieve it, we need a different way of defining values, we need alternative bases of competence, we need heroes and we may need leaders in the creative arts as well as those providing conceptual

framework. For to achieve our new vision, we need mobilization as well as a rational structure for the intellectual framework to maintain that vision.

DAVID MARVIN: COMMENTS ON MARVIN ZETTERBAUM'S PRESENTATION, "SELF AND POLITICAL ORDER"*

I find myself responding very strongly and favorably to Zetterbaum's paper, partially because of personal circumstance. In my department we have a faculty member whose line to his students is 'every man's experience is his own and unique' and who thus celebrates the uniqueness of person that Marvin Zetterbaum speaks of. We get this played back in all of our classes. I reflect whether I should characterize this man as living a lie; he says everybody's experience is unique and then sets himself up as a teacher and gets large bodies of students before him to give them the common experience of him.

Why do students respond so strongly to this perversion? I think the fact of people distrusting authority has a lot to do with this. Students want to feel that they are free of authority - and my colleague's line gives them some sort of authority to reject authority. Lee Anderson yesterday defined secularization as erosion of the basis, the norms and so on which we use in pondering life. Students are very open to this secularization.

Students, in their seeking for uniqueness, enjoy the rap session. They want to rap - which is very troubling to me because I want to conduct a course of study. Yet we teachers want to give students emotionally, as well as intellectually satisfying experiences. Now the two may or may not jive. And that is the real issue.

Students, although they want to celebrate the uniqueness of the person, also don't know where they are. They don't know where their selves are. They come to school wanting "to put it all together." And I would say where we should stand, particularly in the Project, and where I think the academic profession should stand, is that we must believe we have something to impart in the way of curricular content, and this must be imparted in a way which is meaningful, emotionally satisfying and which enables the student to realize himself in some fashion.

Now this gets to the question of the concept of authority. Can it be taught? Should it be taught? And I've come to feel that we would do best to discard it. Now, Marvin Zetterbaum on the first page of his paper uses the term authority in a rather broad sense: that is, the authority of the Bible, or 'I can cite good authority for this particular statement,' and so on. But I think there is a semantic problem here. The term authority is imbued with certain other unfavorable kinds of

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meanings; in effect, the concept falls victim to the secularization process. So I've been reflecting on approaching the problem of getting curricular content across in terms of other concepts. And this is where it goes to the question of getting the student to internalize something which we then will presumably feel as part of a self.

I approach this in what was called yesterday a holistic way - the thing an individual is looking at and feeling within a context. And instead of talking about authority and legitimacy, I might speak of competencies. There is a competence connected with role, that is, technical competence. A person behaving as a typist presumably should be a good typist. Another type of competence is that which is associated with the notion of political efficacy.

I would suggest that these concepts of competence are embedded in some large framework, some larger ideas. And the question then arises; how do you move the student to feel the meaning in these terms? To internalize this? To, in a sense, feel obliged, feel obligation? I use the term obligation in a very large sense - as Zetterbaum used authority on his first page - meaning that the situation in its context and frame of reference seems to point toward certain kinds of attitudes and actions on the part of individuals.

One fairly clear case in point is the amateur, in the presence of a skilled craftsman plying his trade. Admiring recognition of skill carries with it a kind of obligation to give deference, at least within the scope of the work situation. As another example, on a higher level of complexity, we might take the business of smog and the automobile. Everyone who drives an automobile contributes to the smog. Now, how is the individual ever to develop a sense of obligation with respect to that smog - perhaps a sense of obligation to discard or at least to minimize use of the automobile? He is unlikely to be able himself to draw the connection between his driving, and that yellow stuff out there, let alone be able to work out a rational solution. But if we and the schools, research people, teachers, can impart a notion of how the system works and might possibly be made to work, there might develop the notion that maybe the automobile ought to be discarded, etc.

Another level here is that of obligation and role. If we can impart to students as part of the content of a curriculum some sense of how socialization and small group decision making works, we can impart to them some sense about how a sense of obligation can develop. Finally, we might note the level of ideology or belief system. Some particular sense of obligation is a characteristic of every such system. Each system gives some indication to those experiencing the ideology or belief system of what attitudes and actions they should adopt under situations defined or encompassed by the given system.

What I am talking about is really a strategy, not a philosophy. We need a strategy for getting the student to examine how it is that human beings may come to feel obligation, to establish within themselves a "social self," to accept, in the broadest sense, authority, social and

and political order. We do have something to impart to students about all this, although many students, given their present nihilistic state of mind, may reject even that statement.

To sum up, I would discard the notion of authority, for semantic reasons, and pick up the notion of obligation - with the emphasis upon exploration of senses of obligation that might be associated with models, systems, frames of reference, and ideologies. I believe these frames of reference carry some sense of location, of obligation and of self with them.

THOMAS MILBURN: COMMENTS ON ROBERT NORTH'S PRESENTATION, "VIOLENCE: INTERPERSONAL, INTERGROUP AND INTERNATIONAL"*

The whole North investigation tends to be holistic, global or systems-oriented. I think one of the reasons that it is possible for him to have such objectivity and detachment as he talks about a number of different situations is that the situations that he deals with are remote in time. But also, he is willing to be systems-oriented rather than take a position of one of the sides, one of the parties to the conflict. In one sense this can be regarded as ecological.

In North's research he does suggest that there are a number of different factors (note his fifty-seven variables). Wars have many causes, and if wars have many causes, simplistic solutions are inapplicable and inappropriate. One of the things he is saying in various ways is "forget too much simplicity or forget simple solutions for dealing with war." However much we might like them, they don't fit. And, North suggests, it is the nature of the interaction, of the conflict itself as a primitive system, which makes conflict so difficult to handle.

There were two main sets of factors that Bob North talked about. One, of course, was the ecological variables. And certainly these look exceedingly important. We can note that the developed countries have more wars than underdeveloped countries, are more susceptible to violent wars than the underdeveloped countries, which should be the case if the development and utilization of energy and resources are antecedent conditions for conflict.

It has been only for a brief time that Bob North and his research team have been saying something about ecological factors as significant determinants of violence, especially global violence, in conflict situations. I regard that as optimistic, because it seems to me that we haven't had a chance to do something with these factors yet. Now we are more aware of the need to have populations stabilized, to recycle other products through the system, to stabilize and decrease the total amount of energy we use, and so on.

The other set of factors that Bob North talked about was the "functionally autonomous Richardson equation" sort of things: The arms race, the Crisis Processes, etc. In respect to this, it seems to me that it is probably worth defining crisis. There are some key aspects. One is the notion that crises particularly involve the nation of "perceived threat" to important values. There is perceived threat to valued entities,

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to values that we have - and they have to be important values to have a crisis. Secondly, there is time pressure. There is pressure to make a decision in a hurry, which I think is relevant to the small group processes that Irving Janis talked about. And thirdly, there is no ready-made programmed solution. We can't go and look in the book and say, "Oh, this is how you take out an appendix." If we can do that, it's not a crisis.

With those three factors - threat, time pressure, and an unprogrammed quality - making a crisis, it is worth noting that there are a number of distortions; that is, there is a group of factors which distort man's effectiveness in times of crisis and makes the situation less stable than otherwise. We know there is a time distortion. Time becomes highly salient: now is forever; there is no tomorrow. One's own alternatives seem restricted in a crisis situation, and our opponent's alternatives look less restricted, making our situation look more desperate. And there is a tendency for thinking to be more concrete in crisis than at other times. That is, in a crisis ambiguous threats tend to be more disturbing than in ordinary times. Ambiguity, which may ordinarily be hard for us to tolerate, is harder to tolerate in crisis than at other times. And there are, of course, related factors: for example, defensiveness, out of the fear of being wrong, of being scared, of making the wrong actions under pressure. These kinds of crisis reactions--or distortions--contribute to the difficulties beyond what might otherwise be the case.

What I'm suggesting is that North's model is applicable to more than just relations between nation-states. It is applicable within systems, and is applicable between groups as well. It is also supported by convergences, not only in political science data, but from psychological and sociological data as well. Some people have suggested that North's position is anti-U.S.. It seems to me that it is also anti-China or Russia or England or any other nation-state. What his position says is that we have to have new social invention, that we can't be limited merely to the nation-state. And it is probably easier to think of adding new forms to existing ones than of dismantling the present framework.

To summarize, Bob North has taken a holistic, ecological, gestalt, systems orientation for his theme, which has permitted him a kind of detachment and objectivity that otherwise would be exceedingly difficult. And he has pointed out two kinds of factors, one of which is especially a systems property--namely the ecological one. The crisis aspect looked like a special case of sub-optimization too, but he has made important contributions to the understanding of crises, as has Janis. Much of this work looks as if it may be highly generalizable, including generalizable across levels of social complexity: it is not only true globally or at the nation-state level, but also in relations between groups and among individuals. So, its scientific merit is considerable.

KATHLEEN ARCHIBALD: COMMENTS ON THOMAS MILBURN'S PRESENTATION, "PROBLEMS OF INTEGRATING ACADEMIC DISCIPLINES IN THE STUDY OF WAR, VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL CHANGE"*

I think the study of conflict has developed as an interdisciplinary area, at least relative to other issues. But if you ask how do we take it to the next steps, I think it is an institutional problem. You have to face the fact that it is very hard to do interdisciplinary work in the University, even in the so-called interdisciplinary institutes. This is very noticeable when one moves, as I have done, from a university to a place like RAND: RAND doesn't do its interdisciplinary work well, but it is certainly way ahead of most Universities. I think it is easy to say what we need to do; it's much harder to start the change process that allows one to make institutional arrangements for the interdisciplinary work.

It seems to me that beyond doing good interdisciplinary research, there is another important step: that is moving work in areas like conflict and change into a more useful applied direction. I'm partly saying that to have a good applied discipline it has to be interdisciplinary. And I think in the field of conflict we have gone some distance toward solving that. What we haven't come very far in solving, however, is how do you do good applied work in the field.

There are alternatives for the researcher or expert working in the field. One alternative is the one generally followed by social scientists in universities who are concerned about war/peace issues. They want to work in the area; but essentially they stay oriented to their discipline, hoping that what they do can be made relevant by a middleman who will "translate" their findings so they will be useful for the decision-maker. The research, therefore, is not designed to meet the needs of the practitioner, or decision-maker, because the researcher isn't sure himself how that translation should be done. I call this approach "discipline oriented" for although the academic may wish to make a practical contribution as well as a disciplinary one, in fact, the thing that gives primary shape to the research he does is his discipline and not the demands of the practical problem.

A second kind of orientation takes the boundaries of the problem being looked at as the boundaries of the client. I call this "client oriented," and it is represented by the human relations approach, the organizational development approach, the client change approach. In this orientation the consultant attempts to make an organization better

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able to cope with its problems. So that, for example, with this orientation if you're working for OEO, you don't worry about the task in the real world that OEO is struggling with. You are trying, instead, to make OEO good enough so that it can solve its own problems. In other words, you don't try to solve its external problems; you try to solve its internal problems. The underlying model is borrowed from psychoanalysis, only now applied to an organization.

A third kind of model is what I call "decision oriented." This seems to me closer to the RAND way of operating, to the way operations researchers and economists tend to consult. They are looking at the real problem in the real world. But they don't look at the total problem and all that leads into it because they are, in fact, working for a decision-maker, let's say OEO. I call this approach "decision oriented" as distinct from "problem oriented," because the work is undertaken at the intersect of (1) the real problem in the real world and (2) the capability of the client to deal with the problem. With this orientation you don't tackle the whole problem but only those aspects of it which are under your clients jurisdiction. So when you are working with OEO on reading improvement, the problem is defined in terms of the variables that OEO controls or can affect. The difficulty here is that, while your research may have some influence in improving the situation, its utility is limited by the capabilities of your client. If other decision-makers control most of the important levers that could ameliorate the problem, your research will have little impact.

I think the best we can do at the moment is to combine the decision oriented approach with the client oriented approach. The decision oriented approach is pretty good at turning out a nice blueprint for the client specifying the alternative he should prefer. But what is not considered is whether the client's organization, at the operational level, is capable of doing the job. So what comes out of the operational end of the hopper often looks very different from the original blueprint. The client oriented approach has a lot to offer on this kind of problem, so I expect a lot of progress could be made by combining the decision oriented and client oriented approaches. This is assuming, of course, that we can solve the interdisciplinary problems. Part of the hang-up here is disciplinary; it's the psychologists and social psychologists who tend to move to the client oriented approach and the economists who almost automatically move the other way. The resulting communications problems are partly disciplinary.

I'd like to end by suggesting a further refinement; can't we think about an orientation that is really "problem oriented?" In this approach, the problem would be analyzed first and the key levers of action identified, then the researchers would approach and work with those who control these levers; that is, those decision-makers who have what it takes (authority, resources, influence, etc.) to make significant progress towards solving the problem. I can think of few cases where any thing close to this has been done. And, of course, one of the reasons is--who supports the researchers while they do it? It's not the kind of work that, currently, can be done within a university. It's expensive and you'd have to spend a lot of time looking at levers of action with a very

applied orientation. So what you need to do this kind of work is an applied research institute that is not dependent on client contracts for its support.

Perhaps we can think about ways to accomplish this. Ways to move in on a problem and say, "Okay, who are the clients we work with on this?" "What are the levers of action we move on that?" This means thinking of large institutional questions - because, unfortunately, you can't get ten good-hearted bright people together for a few weeks or months and solve the problems. You have to have some sort of an organization that permits good people to work on important practical problems on a long term basis.

DAVID HAYS: COMMENTS ON THOMAS MILBURN'S PRESENTATION,
"PROBLEMS OF INTEGRATING ACADEMIC DISCIPLINES
IN THE STUDY OF WAR, VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL CHANGE"*

I don't know how many of you have had the experience of inserting a hand between a knife and its target, but that happened to me a couple of weeks ago. The young man who was wielding the knife, a straight bladed knife, a knife at least six inches long, was trying to use it to pick the lock on the door to the President's office at my University, and I had to put my hand in between even though he said then that he does believe in the use of violence. But it turned out that he didn't believe in it enough to do it when the case came. I'm going to take a minute to tell you how I got into that situation and then say a few things about what I think this interdisciplinary research might bring to a related problem.

I started getting into that situation by going to Harvard when I was 19 years old; I got a Ph.D. in Sociology there. Since then I have been with the Center for Advanced Study; with the RAND Corporation working on studies of radar networks and then, for ten or twelve years on computational linguistics; and about a year-and-a-half ago I went to New York University at Buffalo to organize a Linguistics Department. I had, in the meantime, invented the ultra-microfilm library and decided I was neither a scholar nor a researcher but an inventor by trade. I don't belong to a discipline anymore; I had belonged to the psychological, sociological and statistical associations for a long time; I've done mathematical modeling and computer work; and I've worked in the field of education for Encyclopedia Britannica. So I find now that I am really a generalist.

I do not believe that you can train interdisciplinary specialists from the beginning. I think that everybody's got to have one, two - some disciplines and then he can say he is a generalist. I also feel that if I hadn't bought my new position - my new position is that I'm not going to do any work any longer - and if I hadn't paid for that with twelve or so years of hard detailed effort, then I think maybe I wouldn't deserve it.

I came to the University, then, for the first time when I was about forty years old to take my first full-time university job. And I took it with the certainty that every professor has a paternal obligation to his students. So that in the first year I stood between a column of police and a line of strikers, and when the strike came up this year I knew I had to get into it somehow. And inevitably I'm involved. I feel

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that we are all inevitably involved in the things around us. And to walk away and close your eyes and say you won't worry about it is just impossible.

Now the most important thing to remember about interdisciplinary work, it seems to me, is that whenever you tackle a problem and say you will put an interdisciplinary effort into it, you are by that act creating a new discipline which will have its view of what reality is - which will have its theory that draws on the theories of all the disciplines put together. Its specialty will be the examination of interactions among variables that are the properties of the several disciplines which you draw on to create it. None of the disciplines is interested in the interactions of variables - some inside and some outside their fields - and so the new field has this specialty of its own, these interactions that nobody previously had thought about working on.

For example, as you think about applying solid science or basic knowledge to practical problems it seems to me that you have to forgive the solid scientists for disclaiming the responsibility for making the transfer to the practitioners themselves. The scientists are not specialists in the transfer of knowledge from their level of abstraction to that of the practitioner. There is a new specialty: the specialty of the people who write review articles. Some articles are by scientists for scientists, but some are by specialists in gathering up knowledge and rewriting it in forms that make sense to practitioners. Now, that's not an art that a lot of people know, but it is one which could prove invaluable to our work here.

Finally, I would like to propose a kind of experimentation which it seems to me the new discipline of conflict studies might induce. There are beautiful examples of violent conflict and semi-violent conflict on our campuses. The story I began with here is a perfect example of this. And the thing is that the protagonists on both sides are us and our friends. And therefore, it's possible to be in touch with the leaders in the administration and the faculty, and among the striking, rioting students. Now, the anti-rationalist bias of the students, particularly the ones who are likely to be on strike or building riots, is fairly strong. But I think it may be possible to get through to them and convince them to study themselves as they carry on the riots so that society can understand them and they can understand themselves better. And they can then see more clearly what their goals really are and what mechanisms for reaching their goals are most efficacious.

So, to summarize, we need to recognize that interdisciplinary work, if it is to be successful, creates a new discipline out of the two or four or however many inputs there are. And one purpose for one such new discipline could be the study of conflict, with an eye to non-violent solutions of situations like the one I was involved in as opposed to choosing sides in, or polarizing, the problem.

WHAT SHOULD BE TAUGHT

On the suggestion of Kathleen Archibald, at the end of the inquiry each participant made a brief statement of "What we think should be taught to kids at whatever level we want to define it." Following are edited statements of the responses given.

Archibald: One thing I'd like to get across to students is the notion of escalation and the idea that escalation of conflict is not a self-limiting process, rather it is self-generating once it gets started. If you look at a "positive" social process that is dependent on reciprocation, like getting to know somebody, getting to like him, it's very interesting that it escalates for a while, but it has a self-limiting feature built into it. You get to know the other person better until eventually you reach some areas in which you don't want to get to know him any better. You're satisfied and the escalation of friendliness levels off. But the dynamics of a conflict process work in the opposite direction. There is no self-limiting feature built in; the more it escalates the greater the motivation to up the ante of retaliation. Brakes on the process can, of course, be introduced, but they are not built-in while an accelerator is built-in. An understanding of how an escalation process works and the dynamics behind it which make it such a dangerous process are an essential ingredient to understanding conflict.

Milburn: I think that I would emphasize distortion in perception as it relates to behavior in general and particularly as it relates to escalation in crises. We can emphasize what students and all of us know experientially about escalation of conflict. Whenever I work at getting somebody mad, I know that person well enough to get him mad; I know in a fairly precise way what things to do or say to escalate the conflict. Likewise from that kind of common experience we know something about de-escalation. We know what things to do or not do, to say or not say which will either tend to level off the escalation or deescalate the situation.

Schuchman: I would like to see people, including children in school, have an opportunity to see that conflict itself is not necessarily bad or negative, but rather that it is a natural part of one's life experience. One therefore has to learn how to deal with conflict rather than repress or avoid it. Viewed in this way we can see not only the negative side of conflict but also the possibility of the good and fruitful conduct of conflict.

Pilisuk: I think we should try to tell students that there has been one important question that they have helped to raise which social scientists in the area of conflict have not raised. I'll quote it here as one of them said it,

> What kind of system is this that disenfranchises people in the South, leaves millions impoverished and excluded from the mainstream and promise of American society, that creates faceless and terrible bureaucracies, that

> consistently put material values before human value, and still persists in calling itself free and in finding itself fit to police the world? What place is there for ordinary men in that system and how are they to control it, make it bend itself to their wills rather than bending them to its? We must name that system. We must name it, describe it, analyze it, and change it.

Lagerstrom: The human struggle is to decide what you can change, what you can't change and what to do about both. If we can help students and teachers learn non-violently to deal with these ambiguities that are present at all stages of life from the inter-personal through the community level to the international level, I think we will have rendered a great service.

Marvin: We are concerned with questions of structure and process in society. Both of these are very complex, and it seems to me that in the interlocking of structure and process with all the possible outcomes that emerge from the interlocking, you have the paradoxes and ambiguities that we have been talking about.

Hays: Mankind doesn't have to destroy itself totally just because it loves violence. It only destroys itself totally if it can't figure out how to express and release its craving for violence without engaging in that form of mass organized violence we call war.

Yandell: I would like to make another pitch for the idea of experiential learning begun as early as possible in the life of each individual in an atmosphere of inquiry limited only by the child's level of cognitive and emotional development.

Berlin: My concern is that you can't teach very much about violence, peace or war unless you can get teachers to act democratically toward kids and involve them in the learning process. And that, it seems to me, is the precursor. If we ignore the precursor I wonder if you can get to the other aspects of how you teach.

Fraenkel: I'd like to see us structure a number of experiences for teachers that would put them into a situation where they could feel the kind of things that they would want to engender in students. The emphasis should be on learning rather than teaching. And, in whatever is done, there should be a heavy emphasis on a comparative approach between similarities and differences of people all across the world in terms of the concepts, such as violence or conflict, being learned.

Donchin: I'd like to see in education a system of process, with the emphasis on developing an obligation to ourselves. And this self-obligation should be seen as a continuing responsibility of man as

a social animal. I think, then that through one's own sense of worth he will see reflected a sense of worth in others.

Freeman: I'd like to see us somehow give students the faith that the problem of war can actually be tackled; and to do this we need an undergirding of values that allows them to cope with the world as it is while they, and we, are engaged in the process of trying to put war behind us.

Kent: I think it's important to conduct much of the teaching through experience, that is, through some kind of guided experience. Also I think you can go a long way by distinguishing conflict situations from other kinds of situations, looking for the values that matter, recognizing where the values come from, pointing out the difference between incompatibility and simple differences of values.

Anderson: Once the three concepts - violence, conflict and authority - have been defined I would like to say something about the interrelationships among them. This means in part showing the children that there is no simple one-to-one correlation among these various phenomena. For example, there is no simple one-to-one correspondence between the presence or absence of violence in the existence of government. The relationship between authority and violence is much more complex than the more simple minded notions that come out of our normal cultural socialization.