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ABSTRACT

Published bi-monthly by the Understanding China Committee, the Newsletter aims to report and interpret what is happening in China; to evaluate developments in U. S. policy toward China; and to encourage United States and Chinese cooperation. Typical issues include an editorial page and several essay-type articles concerning the People's Republic of China that deal generally with social, economic, and political facts relevant to everyday life in China and, more specifically, with Marxist and Maoist philosophy, war and peace, and foreign policy. Past issues provided annotated bibliographies, book reviews, resources for teaching a course on China, and special reports by the editors. This issue includes articles on China's Third World policy; how the Chinese drug problem was solved; study groups in China; and an American view on the factory conditions in China. For an annual subscription a contribution of \$3.00 or more is requested. A free sample copy will be sent if a long, stamped, self-addressed envelope is enclosed with the request. (SJM)

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UNDERSTANDING CHINA NEWSLETTER

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No. 2

CHINA, THE THIRD WORLD, AND THE SUPERPOWERS

By Edward Friedman

"China belongs to the Third World," announced China's central ruling group last June in honor of a meeting of foreign ministers of non-aligned countries. While the identification of radical Chinese nationalism with the fate of other poor peoples of the world goes back at least as far as 1920 (then disillusionment with Wilson's performance at Versailles on equality for small and weak nations led many politicized Chinese to look for a new principle identifying their own fate with that of oppressed and progressive humanity), the recent emphasis of China as a developing nation is a quantitatively new development. (See John Fincher's article in the Jan.-Feb. 1973 issue of the Newsletter, "In Defense of National Economic Rights".)

But what do the Chinese do besides offer words of encouragement to the poorer and weaker nations? As a poor country committed to putting her own limited resources into use for her own rapid development, China does not have much aid to offer these Third World countries. It can and does offer Chile some aid and buys some of her copper to help her fight against the big U.S. copper companies, but it cannot compete with the economic giants. It surely has no navy to send to protect Peru from foreign encroachment.

Consequently, it stresses self-reliance and cooperation. Third World countries should unite, as the petroleum exporting countries have been doing, to win more control over their own resources and fairer prices. Coffee producers, copper producers, they should all unite. They

should also increase trade with each other so as to decrease dependence on those who control ships, insurance, and commodity markets.

Chou En-lai explained on July 21, 1972 that China would like to help a great deal, "but our work still remains insufficient. Our level of national economic development is not high and the help we supply to friendly nations is limited."

Nonetheless, the Chinese do not have to be ashamed of the aid they give. It tends to meet crisis needs which otherwise might force a nation with a weak capital or gold reserve position to become further dependent on some great power or combination of powers. The aid tends to be at the lowest of interest rates at a time when most aid-giving bodies are raising interest rates. Considering how poor China is, it is nothing short of amazing that her recent aid commitments to Third World countries have exceeded those of the USSR.

Furthermore, as a member of the Security Council and as a nuclear power participating more and more in the International Monetary Fund and other such organs, China can do much to reform and limit the terms of exploitation under which the poorer nations suffer.

But may not these reforms serve to stabilize that exploitative international economic system just as labor unions, once fought by owners as the enemy of capitalism, served to stabilize the labor market? Indeed, there is a danger that

China as one of the more successfully developing poor nations may end up, like certain successful labor leaders, as one of the exploiters, as well as one of the exploited.

Already Mao Tse-tung's foreign policy confidant, Kuo Mo-jo, has accepted the Kissinger-Nixon notion of the world as a five pointed star, that is, China as one of the five great economic units along with the U.S., Russia, Japan, and Western Europe. And now, despite the protests of Iranian students in the U.S., China fetes Farah Pahlavi, the Shah's wife, as a Hsinhua reporter notes that Iran "has become the third largest oil producer in the Third World." Apparently, late in 1962 when China was suffering from a joint Moscow-Washington oil embargo, Iran sold her some oil. Later in March 1972, China signed an aid agreement with Iran to be repaid in ten years with oil exports to China. Once a struggling nation, China may now be learning how to protect itself against the vicissitudes of the international market.

Russian analysts argue -- and the statistics seem to bear them out -- that the Third World serves China as a source of scarce resources and an export market to earn the foreign exchange needed to purchase advanced materials from the more industrialized nations. But how long can this pattern successfully continue and not conflict with China's

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Edward Friedman is a member of the political science department at the University of Wisconsin in Madison, specializing in Chinese foreign policy.

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Editorial

Now that a peace treaty has been signed and active U.S. military involvement in Vietnam has ended, all of us cannot help but feel a deep and grateful sense of relief. We would all like to erase the memory of the war and restore the old order to our lives. But can we forget the millions of soldiers and civilians that have died, the families that have been uprooted and shattered, the jungle and ricelands that have been systematically ravaged? Can we block out the pictures of deformed infants, napalm burned children, and young mothers and old women injured by the plastic fragments of anti-personnel weapons that even an x-ray machine cannot detect? Don't we have some responsibility to remember the lessons from this war and to prevent future Vietnams? Don't we have a moral obligation to help repair the damage inflicted by us? Critics may argue that the U.S. has not been alone in inflicting damage in Indochina and that the money is needed at home. No doubt there is some truth in their arguments, but we believe an overriding obligation still exists for us. If we are sincerely interested in establishing a real peace with honor and justice for all the Indochinese people, it is not too soon to start the task of rebuilding.

In joining with the people of Indochina in the work of relief and reconstruction, it may be helpful to look at U.S. efforts in China after World War II. Granted there are important dissimilarities between post-war China and post-war Vietnam. In China, during and immediately after the war there was at least a facade of nationalistic unity and cooperation between the Communist and non-Communist forces in the face of the foreign aggressor, Japan. In the early and mid 1940s the U.S. was not seen as the enemy by either Chinese party. After the war, the surrender of Japan was clearly recognized by all, instead of both sides claiming victory for themselves.

But aside from the dissimilarities, the parallels between the two post-war situations are striking. In both China and Vietnam, a civil war was combined with an international war, or an anti-imperialist war as many people believed. The Communist side won greater support from the people because 1) their movement was linked to a nationalistic cause and 2) their opponents were corrupt and could be seen as the puppets of a foreign power. In fact, in Indochina the U.S. assumed the earlier colonialist position of Japan and later France.

After World War II, the U.S. poured economic and military aid into China, just as we are now contemplating doing in Indochina. In China, however, most of the aid went only to one side, Chiang K'ai-shek's. The small amounts of aid intended for the Communists were largely diverted by the Nationalists and never made it through the lines. Instead, much of it ended up in the private pockets of Nationalist officials who were thus able to amass large fortunes. In addition, the Nationalist government spent considerable time and money lobbying with U.S. Congressmen to keep the aid flowing and to ensure that certain private Chinese interests would benefit by contracting and subcontracting arrangements. Few guidelines or inhibitions were set up by the U.S. government to assure that the aid was effectively or properly used.

As a result of this pattern of U.S. aid, the positive attitude which the Chinese Communists had initially adopted toward the

U.S. changed to one of bitter hostility in less than four years. While Mao, himself, in 1944 and 1945 had talked of possible post-war U.S. aid and had even sent a cable to President Roosevelt asking to meet with him in Washington, lack of U.S. response forced the Chinese to depend completely on the Soviets. Finally, the U.S. never recognized the internal dynamics of the post-war situation and the Communist rise to power. Instead, we felt that the two Chinese parties could be reconciled through U.S. intervention and, when that failed, that by increased aid to the Nationalists we could prevent a Communist victory. Thus by 1950 some people blamed U.S. State Department officials for the "loss of China", never realizing that China was never theirs to lose.

The lessons for the U.S. in Vietnam are clear. The same dangers exist of funneling aid only to the Saigon government and into the pockets of Saigon officials, rather than throughout Indochina. Many still seem to feel that we can mediate between the two sides and that we are responsible for the success or failure of the mediation. When we see that the struggle continues, will we still feed the need to intervene again or accept the "loss of Vietnam" and "peace without honor" with the resulting recriminations in the U.S.?

In the months ahead we should keep these points in mind and try to ensure that the U.S. government does not repeat its mistakes in China. We should also remember the primary point of this aid: to help rebuild Indochina as the people there see fit rather than to provide jobs and profit for American experts and corporations.

There is no need to wait for the government and these corporations to act. Citizens from other nations, like Sweden, have already begun to send aid. We as individuals can take upon ourselves the moral responsibility of making our own peace and helping in the reconstruction work with all the people of Indochina.

-- L.B.B.

Groups involved in Indochina reconstruction:

1. AFSC, 160 N. 15th St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19102. To date has worked in the South in a rehabilitation and prosthetics center at Quang Ngai and in the North in providing surgical equipment and medicines.
2. Collecte-Vietnam, P.O. Box 283 Station Outremont, Montreal, Canada. Sends money for medical supplies and reconstruction to the DRV.
3. Medical Aid for Indochina, 474 Centre St., Newton, Mass. 02158. Organizes educational efforts in the U.S. and sends equipment and medicines to the Red Crosses in the DRV, the PRG of south Vietnam, the National United Front of Cambodia, and the Lao Patriotic Front.

THE UNDERSTANDING CHINA
NEWSLETTER

Louise B. Bennett, Editor

Published bi-monthly by the Understanding China Committee. Local Board: Charles Cell, Michael Fonte, P. Hooper Gramlich, Rhoads Murphey, John Musgrave, Joanne Russell, William Wei, Ernest Young. National Board: Irving and Jean Abkin, Jackson Bailey, Irving Barnett, Colin W. Bell, Sidney R. Bob, Walker Bush, Bruce Douglas, Albert Fields, James Gould, Stuart Innerst, Russell McArthur, Ben Seaver, Edward F. Snyder, Osmyn Stout, Byron Weng, John Watt, Frank F. Wong and Clarence Yarow.

The purpose of the Newsletter is to make at least a small contribution toward improving U.S.-China relations by:

- seeking to report and interpret what is happening in China.
- evaluating developments in U.S. policy toward China.
- encouraging more communication in the belief that increased mutual understanding will provide an atmosphere more conducive to the settlement of differences and increased cooperation.

Comments, questions, and suggestions are welcome.

How the Chinese Solved their Drug Problem

By Paul Lowinger

It is frequently startling to read the U.S. government reports on opium production and distribution in China because they emanate from a source publicly hostile to the People's Republic and allied with the Chiang K'ai-shek government in Taiwan. They are now quite different in tone from the reports which originated in the 1950s with Harry Anslinger in the Bureau of Narcotics that said that China produced opium for export as a national policy.

The U.S. Bureau of Narcotics stated in 1967 that no opium was exported from China. In 1970 the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs reported that the Chinese production of opium was 100 tons a year, which was just sufficient for their medical needs. Even information from those who left China between 1949 and 1953, often for political or economic reasons, indicates a significant drop in the number of opium users.

In attempting to explain the success of this campaign after 200 years of a grave narcotic addiction problem, what immediately impresses one is the drastically changed ideology of the young people, which has monumentally reduced the supply of new addicts. This is a fundamental solution to addiction since the perpetuation of narcotic addiction depends on a supply of new users. The old users spend less money to buy narcotics since they die, go to jail, and are "clean" for intervals. New users are the major impetus to the supply and distribution and commit most of the crimes to get money to buy narcotics.

Much information is available about the changing morale and morals in the People's Republic. In a country that is 80 percent rural, land distribution, collective farming, and new opportunities remain the essential issues. The Chinese village and the Chinese city were drastically reorganized, providing the social background for the total ideological transformation of the younger generation since the Communist revolution.

Chinese society was reintegrated through small street committees that offer political and cultural leadership. The basic unit of government is based on a

residential group of 100 to 200 people that is part of larger community organizations. Such a basic unit was effective in carrying out national decisions because members of every third or fourth family in such groups were neighborhood activists. The local cadre was responsible for propaganda, agitation, and indoctrination in the anti-opium campaign and also helped in the detection and social censure of those who continued to use opium. He reported the successes and failures of this campaign to higher authorities.

Addicts were offered medical care, and difficult cases were referred to rehabilitation centers. National health campaigns, including the one against opium from 1950 to 1953, also had the local support of a disciplined Communist party of six million members.

The enemy in the anti-opium campaign was a class enemy.

"To import opium in large quantities to China is a most pernicious means of the imperialists to destroy the Chinese nation. The imperialists have intended to eliminate our resistance and to enslave us as their colonial people . . . In the past, the reactionary governments of the various regimes were governments representing the feudalists, bureaucrats and compradores, who colluded with the top imperialists to do evil and did not dare to offend the imperialists. They, therefore, could not and would not dare to suppress and exterminate the opium evil; but their actions were just nominal. On the contrary, under the cloak of prohibiting opium, they implemented the narcotization policy and utilized the name of opium suppression to exploit the people. Thus the more they suppressed the opium evil, the wider

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Paul Lowinger, M.D. is an associate professor of psychiatry at Wayne State University. His article is a modified version of an essay that appeared in the July/August 1972 issue of *Social Policy*, reprinted here with their permission. *Social Policy* is published by the Social Policy Corporation, New York, N.Y. 10010.

Study Groups: Relating Marx to Daily Life

By Janet Goldwasser and Stuart Dowty

China today is a vast school -- with millions of workers and peasants studying philosophy, politics, and technical materials. Study groups are organized during work, in spare time, in the neighborhoods, and some even within families. They meet daily or weekly depending on individual or local needs.

Workers and peasants are teachers as well as students. As one factory worker explained to us: "Through study we learned to overcome difficulties in doing technical innovations. Workers who study well give lectures to others; technicians teach technical theories; old workers teach techniques they have learned through practical experience. Study helps guide our work and our practice."

The Chinese are socialists, and the materials they study draw heavily upon socialist theory: the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. Of course, they also study the works of Mao Tse-tung who, they say, concretely applied Marxism-Leninism to the specific conditions of China.

In addition to these theoretical and philosophical writings, workers also told us they used newspapers and periodicals for study materials, paying attention to current events in the national and international news. Sometimes older workers draw upon their own experience for material to discuss and study, comparing conditions of the old society with the present. And, the everyday problems and tasks which they face at work in the shop are also subjects for evaluation, study, and action.

Contrary to reports in the Western press, Mao's thought, as we could observe, was not studied as a dogma. It was not memorized and recited as a panacea for solving problems. Mao's writings were taken seriously. The general, philosophical principles of these works were studied, discussed, and applied concretely to daily life.

Study was often called "class education" by people we talked to. It seemed to have five separate, but also related, social functions.

1) Workers studied to "change their work" outlook"; to combat selfishness and individualism. A woman at the No. 3 Textile Mill in Chengchou described to us how "class education" had helped solve a problem of selfishness:

"Twenty-three of us work together in the spinning department -- twenty-one women and two men. The factory works three shifts and we rotate shifts each week -- one week mornings, the next afternoons, and the third week nights. One young woman in our group often asked for unpaid personal leave when it was our turn to work nights. She would be off two or three days in a week when we worked at night. We didn't know why she requested leave so often, so we talked to her friends and to other workers who knew her situation.

We found out that she simply didn't like working nights. She was young. She and her husband had only one child and her husband worked. They didn't need much money. She told us she would rather have the time to herself than have the pay for the work.

So we went to one of the older workers and asked him to talk to her about the old conditions. This young woman, herself, was from a poor peasant family, but now she only wanted to enjoy her good life with her family. The old workers talked to her about conditions before Liberation; how we had worked twelve to twenty hours a day. We all talked to her to help her change her outlook. We said her work, and ours, is all part of the revolution. We don't work just for ourselves; we work to support people in other countries who have not yet made their revolution. Two out of three people in the world today are still oppressed; they are our class brothers and we should all work to help them."

2) Study helped people, especially younger people, understand their role in society and was an important tool in fighting alienation. Another young woman in the same textile mill talked of her own problem adjusting to her job:

"I work in the preparation department of this mill. I'm a middle school graduate and came to work here in 1968. At first, I didn't like my job; I looked down on my work. I thought that with all my years in school I should do better work than this. I thought I could contribute more elsewhere. So my work was not very good . . .

Some of the older workers here in the factory talked and studied with me. They reminded me of my class background, how my parents had been poor peasants who had gone begging in the streets. They talked of their own past lives, how men and women had worked 12 hours a day and more, and how they had had to sell their sons and daughters.

The older workers said, "There are millions of jobs in our country, but all of them serve the revolution. All of them should be done well." They said it was our international duty to work hard and to help others.

They set an example for me in their own lives. They came and helped me with my washing and mending. We all studied together and they took an interest in my education. I was deeply moved by their actions and this class education. I was determined to do my job well, and I changed in my work."

3) Workers used study to solve contradictions (problems) they faced in their own work. A cadre in the Shenyang Transformer Factory told us:

"We have a drying furnace that is used by two different workshops. Both workshops were trying to overfulfill their production quotas and each demanded first chance at the furnace. They had a contradiction. Leaders of the two workshops met and discussed the problem. They suggested all the workers get together and study Chairman Mao's article "On Contradiction". They then used ideas from that article to analyze their situation.

They looked at the production of the whole factory

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Letter from the Shop Floor

Janet Goldwasser and Stuart Dowty visited China for seven weeks in April and May of 1972. Janet has worked until recently as a research clerk in an office in Detroit, Stuart as a spotwelder in a Detroit automobile plant. They are now preparing a book on their trip, Huan-yi: Journey Through Workers' China.

During that trip they paid special attention to study groups and factories. This article, excerpted from an open letter Stuart wrote to friends he had worked with in an auto plant in Detroit, was written shortly after he returned to the U.S.

Below they pose with Chinese guides at Mao's birthplace in Shaoshan, Hunan Province.



Above, students learn from an old peasant conditions in the old society along the Yellow River.

**Ed. Note -- In many factories technical and administrative personnel may receive more than 108 yuan, especially the more elderly with pre-1949 experience. It appears that in the future, however, wages for such personnel will be reduced.*

Dear Friends:

A factory in China is much more than just a place to work. All Chinese factories have a wide range of activities which are not normally part of factories in the U.S. For example, most factories provide inexpensive housing for workers and their families. Chinese plants have nurseries and kindergartens, and many run primary and middle (high school age) schools that charge usually only for food and supplies. Dining halls, with a large variety of hot food, provide three meals a day -- although how often you eat there is your own choice. Medical care is free for workers and one-half cost to family members. Some factories run health sanatoria in the countryside. Others run farms, nearby or in the countryside, and workers sometimes take turns doing agricultural work.

Factories in China also have a wide range of recreational and educational programs. They usually have a basketball court outside, and ping pong, volleyball, football (what we call soccer), and morning exercises. Some even have their own swimming pools. They have factory libraries and "workers' cultural centers" which are large auditoriums for films, plays, operas, and performances for songs and dances. A Chinese factory will usually also have amateur sparetime groups in all these types of activities.

One factory we visited was the main plant of the East is Red Automobile Factory in Peking. The major product of their 4000 workers was a four-wheel drive jeep with canvas top (75 hp, 4 cylinders, and regular three-speed gears). They made about 10,000 of these, in addition to about 100,000 auto unit parts sent to Northeast China for assembly. Production was low compared to our standards, but they told us that until the mid 1950s China didn't have an auto factory at all.

About one third of the workers were women. We saw women doing many different types of work, including welding, running overhead cranes, driving hi-lows, and working on lathes, grinders, and milling machines.

As for working conditions, workers had an eight hour day (including a half hour to an hour for lunch) and a six day work week. They very seldom worked overtime, and breaks and lunch periods were determined by themselves. At this plant no regular breaks were scheduled during the day, but the pace of work, which workers also set themselves, was reasonable and allowed for short breaks like going to the john and getting a cup of tea.

Wages were paid by the month, as salaries. They were low compared to U.S. standards, but so were living costs. Average wages here were 50 yuan a month (one yuan is U.S. \$.42); the highest were 108, the lowest 34 yuan a month.*

How much a person got in wages was determined by a combination of factors. Workshop groups of 20 to 30 workers discussed each other's wages, considering such things as political consciousness, skill, and experience. It seemed that experience, or seniority, was most important. The group decisions were sent to the factory leadership for final approval, though individuals could appeal workshop decisions. There were no privileges or high wages by job classification. A person on the line might be making more than a tool and die man (or woman!).

Leadership in the East is Red Auto Factory rested with two

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STUDY GROUPS: RELATING MARX TO DAILY LIFE LETTER FROM THE SHOP FLOOR

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and identified the contradictions -- when each workshop was key, when each was secondary to the total process of production. Then they worked out a priority in the use of the furnace that satisfied everyone."

4) Study promoted technical innovations and increased production. Women workers at the Red Flag Embroidery Factory in Tientsin declared that study had played a vital part in making a new "three-headed" sewing machine. A veteran worker explained:

"This three-headed sewing machine was developed only through repeated struggle against erroneous ideas. When it was first suggested, many workers said that it could never be done. But others of us felt our productivity was not high enough to meet the needs of the revolution and it was important to develop such a machine. We followed Chairman Mao's teaching that the Chinese people can catch up with the rest of the world.

We began experimenting, but we soon faced problems. We studied Chairman Mao's teaching that "the emergence of any new thing has to follow many twists and turns. It won't do to have clear sailing; if we did, we wouldn't be tempered." (Note: This is not a direct quote, but their own paraphrase of ideas in several different articles.)

So we persisted in our experiments. We learned from Mao's spirit, through his writings, and we all worked enthusiastically. Then we found that the three pieces the machine produced were not all the same; some had defects. To solve this problem, we followed Mao's teaching that we should look for the primary contradiction in the machine. After we found the principal contradiction, we could make the machine more precise, and we were successful in developing and perfecting it."

5) Study was an important part of understanding national and world affairs.

For these women, as for the workers throughout the country, study was a living, vital part of their lives. They studied not to memorize but to apply. Philosophy was a tool used by people in everyday life, not by scholars in an academic retreat.

Study was also a group effort -- part of their collective effort to develop their society. A woman at the Loyang Tractor Works summed it up:

"In study we learn from the advanced, help the backward, and all march forward together."

* Ed. Note. Many of the conditions and procedures mentioned here were introduced as a result of the Cultural Revolution. The "three in one" revolutionary committees, the "two joins", the use of political consciousness as a criterion in determining wages, and the de-emphasis on expertise, are all relatively new practices, though in the past some of them were tried at times. Before, following the Soviet model, the Chinese tended to rely on "experts" and directors to run the factories, and emphasized skill as opposed to political consciousness. Even today, these new practices are still undergoing change and experimentation, though the general direction seems set.

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committees, the Party Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Revolutionary Committee. There was no "management" in the sense that we know it. The Party Committee and the Revolutionary Committee were made up of a "three in one combination" -- workers from the shop floor, cadres (those who worked almost full time in administrative jobs), and representatives from a nearby Army unit.

To be on the Party Committee a person had to be a member of the CCP. About 13 percent of all the workers in the East is Red Factory were Party members. The Revolutionary Committee had both Party and non-Party members. The factory had 29 members on its Party Committee and 43 members on its Revolutionary Committee.

Cadres also spent time in manual labor. Usually this meant at least one day a week in the shop. In addition, workers said they had the "two joins" -- cadres join in labor and workers join in administration and leadership.*

Probably the biggest difference between a factory in China and one in the U.S. was the attitude of the workers themselves. Chinese workers liked their work, and they were proud of their jobs. Besides working together, they also held regular workshop discussions and studied together (see other article).

What really brought out for me the differences was an automatic spotwelder at the East is Red Factory. In that factory I had sought out the metal shop, looking for spotwelders like the ones I had worked with in the U.S. Sure enough, I found them -- very much like those in Detroit. But then the Chinese workers took us to see a new automatic one just like the one installed in our plant in Detroit recently. The Chinese were very proud of their machine -- their automatic spotwelder had been built by the workers, cadres, and technicians in that factory with no outside help. Many workers had even stayed after work, with no extra pay, to help design and build it.

I thought about the similar spotwelder in our plant in Detroit. I remembered how we hated it, how we loved to see it break down. Some people had even "helped" it break down on occasion. We griped because it sped up the line. And I remembered what we said about automation and machines like this causing unemployment and lay-offs.

In Peking the automatic spotwelder helped production but did not result in speed-up or unemployment. The Chinese workers themselves wanted to increase production because they benefited and their whole society grew. I had to ask myself why the same machine was a friend in Peking and an enemy in Detroit. It's my opinion that the reason lies in the very nature of the two different systems, capitalism and socialism.

I hope I haven't made it sound like everything is perfect in China. It isn't. We visited factories that had problems -- two in particular where cadres seemed as detached from workers as bosses are from workers in Detroit plants. But in Detroit separation between workers and management is part of the system itself. In China such separation was a problem which could be dealt within the context of their system. Socialism, as Chinese workers see it, won't solve things unless workers themselves use it -- it's not a cure-all. But, they believe, it opens the door, allowing workers to advance in the direction and with the pace that they determine, themselves.

"Narcotics addiction is a symptom of the unhealthful state of the individual in an unhealthful society. . ."

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the use of opium was extended. Chiang K'ai-shek's suppression of opium in narcotics was an explicit example." (C. Shao-wen, "Develop with Fanfare, the Anti-opium and Anti-narcotics Movement", *Hanchow Ch'ang Ching Jih Pao*, June 4, 1952, in *Current Background*, no. 188, June 30, 1952, American Consulate General, Hong Kong.)

Meetings about addiction for everyone were part of the national action program in which all people spent an hour a day discussing political and health topics of national importance. The testimony of former addicts was important to all levels of this reformation, including newspaper stories, small community groups, and rehabilitation centers. Mass meetings, slogans, and flags used the words of the ex-addicts. Addiction was denounced as anti-social and unhealthful because it was an imperialist and capitalist activity.

Destroying the production of opium and stopping the opium traffic were of the utmost importance to the anti-opium campaign and a conscious policy of the Chinese government. Distribution of the land from the landlords to the peasants was followed by a change from the cultivation of opium, a cash crop to the badly needed food crops. As Chinese reports state, "Before liberation about 200 mou of land in the suburbs of Canton were given to poppy cultivation. By the spring of 1951 the suppression of poppy cultivation was successfully accomplished."

At the same time, actions to suppress banditry and local despots and to accomplish agrarian reform hit at the sources of opium distribution as Chiang K'ai-shek's anti-opium program never had.

Next came the rehabilitation of opium addicts. This began with their registration. Arrangements by city anti-opium committees included treatment to break the habit at home, in clinics, and in hospitals. The Canton newspaper of June 3, 1951 reported an anti-opium clinic and hospital with accommodations for more than 500 patients was opened on April 16, 1951 by the Canton Municipal Committee for Suppression of Opium and Narcotics. The experience of addict Chang Yueh was typical:

"During the days of the reactionary regime, he tried, without success, to rid himself of the habit on no less than four occasions. Before he entered the present hospital, he was filled with doubts and anxieties. He feared the suffering he must go through during the cure, the long time it would take, the repetition of his past failures, relapses after cure, the treatment by authorities as a criminal, the unsanitary state that would be found in the hospital, the need to sleep on the floor, and a host of other things.

He found all his fears entirely unfounded. Only a few days after entering the hospital, he became visibly relieved and told his fellow addicts gratefully: "There is really a difference in the People's Government. The workers here are so considerate and attentive to our needs. Fellow inmates are so friendly and helpful to one another. Family members may visit us three times a week. How can I but become confident in being able to achieve my cure smoothly?" The addicts live a group life in the hospital. At 7:30 in the morning they take their first dose of their medicine. They then meet to discuss the current affairs and evils of the habit they had. Breakfast is served at 9:00 after which patients are seen by the doctor by rotation. Many spend their time in the cultural and entertainment reading room. In the afternoon, two hours are spent in studies and discussions. In the evening there are also social gatherings. The cure is being carried out with medical treatment supported by cultural amenities and group discussions.

In this way the addicts apparently found the cure more palatable. Cures were effected on the average in 12 days. Those physically weak or with other complications necessarily needed a longer period, usually more than one month. The method of gradual reduction of the habit was normally applied." ("New Life for Canton's Opium Addicts," *Canton Nang Fang Jih Pao*, June 3,

1951 in *Current Background*, no. 86. June 21, 1951).

This was the general treatment for most addicts.

Leniency was recommended for employees of the opium traffickers, but there were heavier penalties for those controlling the traffic, manufacture, and growth. Repeatedly one reads and hears of the drastic measures employed by the People's Republic to eradicate drug addiction, but the evidence, while real, does not appear great and needs qualification regarding the particular circumstances.

The New China News Agency reported on March 29, 1951 that of 10,000 addicts discovered in the previous year, thirty seven had been executed by firing squad. Difficult cases of addiction were required to undergo labor reform similar to the rehabilitation of landowners, businessmen, and social criminals. Mass meetings were held at which opium, heroin, and narcotics equipment were burned. At one meeting there was a public exhibition of twenty traffickers and addicts who had refused to register but were exposed and then sent to prison.

How do China's experiences in opium control relate to attempts at narcotics suppression in the U.S.? First, we must recognize the fundamental political nature of addiction. Narcotics addiction is a symptom of the unhealthful state of the individual in an unhealthful society where there is poverty, racism, repression, and lack of national purpose. There is no American equivalent to the change in national purpose which the Chinese underwent in their Revolution of 1949.

Second, while the suppression of opium in China was a popular and consistent government policy, in the U.S. no such consistent national drug policy exists. The punishment of marijuana and heroin users contrasts with the increasingly well-documented covert collaboration between government, police, and law enforcement agencies in the heroin trade both inside and outside the U.S.

Finally, the Chinese experience shows us that the rehabilitation program for an addict must include total medical, community, and political rehabilitation and must enjoy the support of the police and all other members of the society.

CHINA, THE WORLD, AND THE SUPERPOWERS

(Continued from Page 1)

newly chosen identity as champion of the small and medium sized nations against the super-powers?

This is not to suggest that this new primary concern for Asia, Africa, and Latin America is not real. Too much is at stake. One can see it as the deemphasis of the socialist bloc as an international force and with it as the slighting of the role of such old socialist friends as Albania, Korea, Rumania, and Vietnam.

However, one must place this new vision of China as primarily one of the developing countries in the larger context of her attempt to undercut the two super-powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. In this context Third World countries serve mainly as pawns for the PRC in preventing the USSR from carrying out a forward hostile encirclement of China which could facilitate some future intervention.

Higher-ups in Washington take this as a very real possibility. They know, as most Americans do not, that when the Indian army trained and armed Bengal rebels and then intervened on humanitarian grounds on behalf of the Bengal people and refugees against a Pakistani army of occupation, some people in India were arguing for applying the same course of action in Tibet.

There are 20,000 or so Tibetan refugees south of Tibet. According to Tibetan journals themselves, some did try to create armed incidents in Tibet during the Bangla Desh crisis. The Dalai Lama chose that moment to give a news con-

ference on behalf of an independent Tibet.

In short, any principled Chinese foreign policy concern for Third World independence cannot help but be compromised and limited by overriding security concerns. The threats to China have not been mere figments of the imagination meant to enlarge a military budget.

Nonetheless, the very categories of China's comprehension of international relations can blind one to the fact that what is good for China need not be good for other developing nations. No doubt Russia's involvement in India frightens China. Nevertheless, the Chinese depiction of that Russian involvement in Indian affairs which is invariably portrayed as undermining Indian independence distorts matters.

The truth is that Soviet aid in heavy industry and oil exploration, balanced trade, sale of military equipment without a hard currency component, and much else has enhanced New Delhi's prospects for independent maneuvers not dictated by her creditors in the West.

But as Peking sees its successful rapprochement with Washington spoiling this hostile Moscow-inspired encirclement, more room is opened up for a more principled Third World policy. Although China is involved with a number of rebel bands to her south, her involvement, however, does not arise from an ideological commitment to revolution. On the contrary, in response to two decades during which paramilitary organs of the USA intentionally kept tensions alive on and

over China's southern borders, China had to get defensively involved with other groups in those areas for the most immediate kinds of security reasons.

China can become in the immediate future more militantly insistent on securing these frontier regions, including Taiwan. But first she needs to buy time by a rapprochement with Washington in order to improve relations with Moscow. People have become so fascinated by the PRC-USSR dance towards war that they have paid insufficient attention to the huge growth of Sino-Soviet trade in 1971, a far greater leap than that with any other major power. China wants to normalize relations with Russia before the next possible major international war.

Indeed, Peking believes that a confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union over the Middle East is possible, that the dollar will continue to decline, and hence that Washington may strike out wildly to hold its waning imperium. All this can make for war, but it will not make for revolution until the hegemony of the super-powers is undermined by their internal strife.

In short, China's Third World policy is limited not only by minimal resources but by a vision of world history that teaches that people can do little on their own behalf until rulers fight among themselves and so weaken themselves that new paths appear. On its own China sees no way for Asia, Africa, and Latin America to break out of the economic hegemony of the powers and therefore China acts out the only possible role for this period, one of liberal reform.



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