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ABSTRACT

This report is principally a study of various alternatives to the existing set of elements that constitutes the University of Calgary's salary system. The study is based primarily on personal interviews with academics and administrators at the University of Calgary and on a set of responses to letters sent to academics and administrators throughout Canada. The first section of the study deals with the general salary structure particularly as related to the relative income status of University of Calgary academic staff and the resultant social and economic status of the academics; market pressures and the problem of overlapping scales; the peculiarity of the faculty of medicine; flexibility as a means to greater efficiency in the salary system; flexibility via market supplements; flexibility via salary overlaps between ranks; and the question of should academic rank be abolished. Section 2 deals with the question of merit increments, section 3 discusses the length of the contract year, and section 4 analyzes the question of supplementary income. (HS)

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D. A. Seastone

Professor of Economics

The University of Calgary

A Study Conducted at the Request of the President

and the Board of Governors of

The University of Calgary

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PREFACE

Attached hereto is the final report of the study commissioned by the Board of Governors of The University of Calgary in the spring of 1971 and conducted during the spring and summer of 1971.

The report is principally a study of various alternatives to the existing set of elements that constitutes the University's salary system. I have made no recommendations with regard to the relative desirability of the various alternatives, although I have no illusions about my ability to exhaustively cleanse any of my studies, reports, or formal publications of the value system I bring to them. Thus, it is possible that the reader will be able to identify some areas in which my own preconceptions have coloured the examination of issues.

The study is based primarily on personal interviews with academics and administrators at The University of Calgary and on a set of responses to letters sent to academics and administrators throughout Canada. President A. W. R. Carrothers, at my request, consented to send formal queries to presidents of universities across Canada concerning their philosophies about and experiences with the various salary issues involved in this study. The responses--from presidents, vice-presidents and other administrative officers--were of considerable value, not only with regard to the variety of experiences they afforded but also in relation to the various educational philosophies these administrators bring to the issues involved. Letters of substantive content were received from various administrators of the following Universities: Acadia; Alberta; Carleton; Guelph; Laurentian; Lethbridge; McGill;

McMaster; Memorial University of Newfoundland; Moncton; Montreal; Mount Allison; New Brunswick; Ontario Institute for Studies in Education; Prince Edward Island; Queen's; St. Francis Xavier; Saskatchewan; Saskatchewan (Regina); Simon Fraser; Sir George Williams; Toronto; Trent; Waterloo Lutheran; Western Ontario; Windsor; and Winnipeg.

Letters from officers of faculty associations of six universities across Canada were received from a total of fifteen letters of inquiry; in addition, six members of the staff of The University of Calgary responded to the President's announcement of the study and his invitation to submit statements concerning the four major areas of inquiry. Although letters from faculty association officers across Canada and from University staff were few in number, the quality of the correspondence was most helpful in completing the study.

Correspondence and personal interviews constituted the major source of information for the study for the reason that publications of faculty associations were of peripheral value to this report because of their overriding concern with issues of tenure and academic freedom. Only occasional references to the salary issues analyzed herein were found in these publications. Similarly, publications of university-related groups seldom seem to be concerned with the problems discussed here.

Thus, I am particularly indebted to faculty members and administrators at The University of Calgary and at universities throughout Canada who were generous enough with their time to seriously ponder the difficult policy questions which represent the thrust of this report.

DL

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TOWARDS AN OPTIMAL UNIVERSITY SALARY SYSTEM

by D. A. Seastone
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I. The Salary Structure

An emerging university encounters serious problems in attracting quality academic staff, many of whom are reluctant to venture to an untested academic environment. One of the clear objectives of the new university's salary structure, if the Provincial resource base and political decisions are permissive, will be to attract quality staff through the use of market pressure. In operational terms, this means establishing a salary scale high enough to overcome the reluctance of competent academics to brave an unknown intellectual atmosphere and, possibly, geographic region.

In the case of The University of Calgary, emerging as a university during the 1960's, the problem of attracting competent faculty was compounded by the existence of a "seller's market" for most disciplines. The vast expansion of post secondary education in North America, plus the alternative professional opportunities for a significant number of potential academic staff, meant that the University was forced to deal within the "macro" context of an aggregate supply and demand situation which was rapidly pushing up salary schedules. At the same time it had to consider the unique "micro" problems of attracting professionals already in short supply to a new academic environment.

The result of these variable forces is partially reflected in Table 1 which shows the distribution of salaries in Canadian universities for the academic year 1970-71. Based on salaries across all ranks,

including university deans but excluding the Faculty of Medicine, The University of Calgary's mean salary was $16,172. Five Canadian universities had a higher mean figure, including the University of Alberta's $16,703.[1]

The University's mean salary for all full professors outside the Faculty of Medicine was $23,011 in 1970-71, and was exceeded by three Canadian universities, including the University of Alberta's $23,280. The University's mean salary for all associate professors outside the Faculty of Medicine in 1970-71 was $16,794; exceeded by six Canadian universities, including the University of Alberta's $17,085. The University's mean salary for all assistant professors outside the Faculty of Medicine in 1970-71 was $12,784 and was exceeded by 16 Canadian universities, including the University of Alberta's $12,804.

A study appearing in the Bulletin of the Canadian Association of University Teachers in Winter, 1970, uses the phrase "leaders and laggards" in describing university salary schedules in Canada. The study suggests that the leaders and laggards are fairly uniform over time and that the leading universities in Alberta and Ontario are typically the leaders. Thus, as the data in Table 1 suggest, The University of Calgary has moved toward the accomplishment of its objective of using market pressures to attract quality academics from Canada,

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[1] According to the data in Table 1, supplied by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics and reported in the 1971 Spring Bulletin of the Canadian Association of University Teachers, the six leading average salary institutions in Canada in 1970-71 were: (1) Althouse College of Education, $18501, (2) The University of Waterloo, $17,011; (3) McMaster University, $16,815; (4) Queen's University, $16,764; (5) The University of Alberta, $16,703; and (6) The University of Calgary, $16,172.

Table 1 - SALARIES OF FULL-TIME LAY TEACHING STAFF AT CANADIAN UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES, 1970-1971
(Salaries paid to religious staff on a scale less than that applying to lay staff are omitted)

University	Full professors			Associate professors	Assistant professors	The rank immediately below assistant professor	The rank immediately below the preceding	Others (including visiting staff)	Overall average	
	Department heads, etc. who are full professors (1)	Other full professors (2)	All full professors (total of 1 & 2) (3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	Including deans (9)	Excluding deans (10)
	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$
Acadia University										
Number in rank	13	13	26	32	44	42	-	-	-	-
Floor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	..	..	17,030	14,220	10,240	8,220	-	-	-	-
Average	19,210	18,713	18,962	15,250	11,727	9,830	-	-	13,506	-
90th percentile	..	..	22,040	16,280	13,160	11,380	-	-	-	-
University of Alberta[1]										
Number in rank	57	231	288	457	401	43	-	62	-	-
Floor	20,230	19,730	-	14,630	10,920	8,215	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	23,270	20,210	20,395	14,857	11,423	8,686	-	8,427	-	-
Average	26,336	22,941	23,613	17,321	12,923	10,341	-	11,864	17,022	-
90th percentile	30,030	25,673	27,360	19,685	14,371	10,867	-	16,585	-	-
University of Alberta[2]										
Number in rank	39	199	238	388	368	38	-	50	-	-
Floor	20,230	19,730	-	14,630	10,920	8,215	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	21,298	20,186	20,320	14,747	11,428	8,676	-	8,753	-	-
Average	25,610	22,824	23,280	17,085	12,804	10,118	-	12,500	16,703	-
90th percentile	29,210	25,603	26,320	19,470	14,386	10,837	-	16,595	-	-

Table 1 (cont'd)

University	Full professors			Associate professors (4)	Assistant professors (5)	The rank immediately below assistant professor (6)	The rank immediately below the preceding (7)	Others (including visiting staff) (8)	Overall average	
	Department heads, etc. who are full professors (1)	Other full professors (2)	All full professors (total of 1 & 2) (3)						Including deans (9)	Excluding deans (10)
	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$
Althouse College of Educati										
Number in rank	9	7	16	22	22		-	-	-	-
Floor							-	-	-	-
10th percentile	..	..	21,438	17,500	11,880		-	-	-	-
Average	23,166	21,928	22,625	19,943	14,927	15,774	-	-	-	18,501
90th percentile	..	..	23,166	21,438	18,360	..	-	-	-	-
Collège de Bathurst										
Number in rank	-	3	3	3	8	13	-	-	..	-
Floor	-	14,000	14,000	11,500	9,500	7,900	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	-	..	..	..	..	..	-	-	-	-
Average	-	..	..	..	10,575	8,680	-	-	10,227	-
90th percentile	-	..	..	..	..	..	-	-	-	-
Bishop's University										
Number in rank	3	11	14	19	41	4	-	-	-	-
Floor	17,055	17,055	17,055	13,394	10,435	8,500	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	..	..	..	13,490	10,482	..	-	-	-	-
Average	..	18,955	19,269	14,631	11,590	..	-	-	-	13,563
90th percentile	..	..	..	16,510	12,790	..	-	-	-	-
Brandon University										
Number in rank	10	2	12	21	39	21	-	1	-	-
Floor	-	17,000	-	12,900	10,000	-	-	..	-	-
10th percentile	..	..	..	13,810	10,480	8,610	-	..	-	-
Average	18,565	..	18,363	14,895	11,492	9,352	-	..	-	12,751
90th percentile	..	..	..	16,090	13,510	10,130	-	..	-	-

Table 1 (cont'd)

University	Full professors: Department heads, etc. who are full professors (1)	Full professors: Other full professors (2)	Full professors: All full professors (total of 1 & 2) (3)	Associate professors (4)	Assistant professors (5)	The rank immediately below assistant professor (6)	The rank immediately below the preceding (7)	Others (including visiting staff) (8)	Overall average: Including deans (9)	Overall average: Excluding deans (10)
	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$
University of British Columbia[1]										
Number in rank	59	301	360	395	612	52	100	-	-	-
Floor	15,800	15,800	15,800	11,700	9,500	7,800	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	21,790	18,742	19,013	14,006	11,066	8,530	7,800	-	-	-
Average	25,964	22,112	22,743	16,449	13,123	9,909	9,829	-	16,060	-
90th percentile	30,039	26,195	27,083	19,050	15,395	11,680	12,600	-	-	-
University of British Columbia[2]										
Number in rank	41	270	311	348	533	Instructor II	Instructor I			
Floor	15,800	15,800	15,800	11,700	9,500	43	83	-	-	-
10th percentile	22,310	18,700	18,782	13,976	11,040	7,800	-	-	-	-
Average	25,722	22,029	22,516	16,046	12,778	8,508	7,743	-	-	-
90th percentile	30,018	26,100	26,695	18,324	14,718	9,783	9,793	-	15,768	-
						11,570	12,570	-	-	-
Brock University										
Number in rank	13	12	25	26	74	26	-	-	-	-
Floor	-	18,100	-	14,000	11,100	8,800	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	..	..	18,183	14,087	11,193	9,460	-	-	-	-
Average	21,608	20,446	21,050	16,019	12,773	10,392	-	-	-	14,311
90th percentile	..	..	23,750	18,040	14,187	11,347	-	-	-	-
University of Calgary[1]										
Number in rank	42	81	123	259	253	19	-	7	-	-
Floor	-	19,715	-	14,630	10,920	8,215	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	22,120	19,905	20,415	14,930	11,415	8,590	-	..	-	-
Average	25,978	22,286	23,533	16,904	12,897	9,886	-	11,648	16,479	-
90th percentile	30,980	25,063	27,385	19,178	14,339	10,855	-	..	-	-

Table 1 (cont'd)

University	Full professors: Department heads, etc. who are full professors (1)	Full professors: Other full professors (2)	Full professors: All full professors (total of 1 & 2) (3)	Associate professors (4)	Assistant professors (5)	The rank immediately below assistant professor (6)	The rank immediately below the preceding (7)	Others (including visiting staff) (8)	Overall average: Including deans (9)	Overall average: Excluding deans (10)
	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$
University of Calgary[2]										
Number in rank	27	80	107	246	238	19	-	7	-	-
Floor	-	19,713	-	14,630	10,920	8,215	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	22,070	19,900	20,330	14,892	11,425	8,590	-	..	-	-
Average	25,140	22,293	23,011	16,794	12,784	9,886	-	11,648	16,172	-
90th percentile	29,530	25,067	26,140	19,080	14,094	10,855	-	..	-	-
Carleton University										
Number in rank	13	81	94	150	212	20	-	-	-	-
Floor	-	17,800	-	13,700	10,800	7,500	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	..	18,455	18,508	14,329	11,204	8,300	-	-	-	-
Average	21,373	20,643	20,744	15,905	12,719	9,905	-	-	-	15,190
90th percentile	..	23,045	23,087	18,017	14,036	11,250	-	-	-	-
Collèges militaires canadiens (R.M.C., Royal Roads and C.M.R. réunis)										
Number in rank	17	17	34	47	34	57	-	2	-	-
Floor	18,500	17,750	-	13,500	10,650	7,150	-	..	-	-
10th percentile	18,785	18,070	18,540	14,770	12,370	9,036	-	..	-	-
Average	21,868	20,121	20,994	16,256	13,434	10,681	-	..	15,245	-
90th percentile	25,730	22,530	24,730	18,026	14,176	11,530	-	..	-	-
Dalhousie University[1]										
Number in rank	40	67	107	122	196	62	-	-	-	-
Floor				revisions planned						
10th percentile	17,650	17,043	17,093	13,074	10,272	8,546	-	-	-	-
Average	22,258	20,786	21,337	16,055	13,155	12,223	-	-	15,669	-
90th percentile	30,550	27,030	28,015	20,060	18,080	21,080	-	-	-	-

Table 1 (cont'd)

University	Full professors: Department heads, etc. who are full professors (1)	Full professors: Other full professors (2)	Full professors: All full professors (total of 1 & 2) (3)	Associate professors (4)	Assistant professors (5)	The rank immediately below assistant professor (6)	The rank immediately below the preceding (7)	Others (including visiting staff) (8)	Overall average: Including deans (9)	Overall average: Excluding deans (10)
	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$
Dalhousie University[2]										
Number in rank	23	49	72	91	144	40	-	-	-	-
Floor				revisions planned						
10th percentile	17,230	16,795	17,007	13,030	10,087	8,529	-	-	-	-
Average	18,999	19,566	19,385	14,420	11,522	9,418	-	-	-	13,671
90th percentile	21,070	24,055	23,580	16,032	13,052	10,650	-	-	-	-
University of Guelph										
Number in rank	37	104	141	179	266	89	18	-	-	-
Floor	-	18,000	-	14,100	11,000	9,100	7,800	-	-	-
10th percentile	21,670	19,120	19,322	14,938	11,589	9,348	7,980	-	-	-
Average	24,517	21,722	22,455	16,989	13,226	10,602	8,982	-	15,736	-
90th percentile	26,765	24,960	25,195	18,910	15,035	11,805	10,320	-	-	-
Huron College (Ontario)										
Number in rank	-	3	3	7	8	6	-	-	-	-
Floor	-	-	-	12,100	10,000	8,000	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	-	..	..	..	..	..	-	-	-	-
Average	-	..	..	12,793	10,981	9,183	-	-	-	-
90th percentile	-	..	..	..	..	..	-	-	-	-
Lakehead University										
Number in rank	8	9	17	48	78	57	-	5	-	-
Floor	18,190	18,190	18,190	14,270	11,315	9,450	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	..	..	18,190	14,720	11,680	10,035	-	..	-	-
Average	20,587	19,315	19,914	16,065	13,281	11,029	-	9,038	13,949	-
90th percentile	..	..	21,430	17,720	15,770	12,033	-	..	-	-

Table 1 (cont'd)

University	Full professors			Associate professors (4)	Assistant professors (5)	The rank immediately below assistant professor (6)	The rank immediately below the preceding (7)	Others (including visiting staff) (8)	Overall average	
	Department heads, etc. who are full professors (1)	Other full professors (2)	All full professors (total of 1 & 2) (3)						Including deans (9)	Excluding deans (10)
	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$
Université Laurentienne										
Number in rank	10	7	17	38	96	23	14	-	-	-
Floor	18,700	18,700	18,700	14,475	11,400	9,425	7,400	-	-	-
10th percentile	..	..	19,450	14,456	11,560	9,458	..	-	-	-
Average	21,255	21,482	21,349	16,257	12,971	10,426	8,752	-	-	13,767
90th percentile	..	..	23,200	18,364	14,427	11,435	..	-	-	-
Université Laval[1]										
Number in rank	49	179	228	233	462	3	296	30	-	-
Floor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	16,363	16,823	16,670	13,426	11,027	..	8,240	9,950	-	-
Average	20,991	19,445	19,777	15,820	13,619	..	9,772	16,606	14,407	-
90th percentile	26,110	21,128	21,920	18,635	17,040	..	11,547	22,525	-	-
Université Laval[2]										
Number in rank	40	156	196	200	381	3	281	30	-	-
Floor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	16,533	16,665	16,587	13,400	10,964	..	8,228	9,950	-	-
Average	19,506	18,866	18,997	15,127	12,691	..	9,755	16,606	13,725	-
90th percentile	21,200	20,980	20,980	17,550	15,548	..	11,530	22,525	-	-
University of Lethbridge										
Number in rank	7	12	19	36	74	8	-	-	-	-
Floor	-	19,513	-	14,522	10,805	8,040	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	..	..	20,090	15,065	11,340	..	-	-	-	-
Average	21,673	21,926	21,833	16,866	12,956	9,356	-	-	-	15,004
90th percentile	..	..	25,410	18,640	14,330	..	-	-	-	-

Table 1 (cont'd)

University	Full professors: Department heads, etc. who are full professors (1)	Full professors: Other full professors (2)	Full professors: All full professors (total of 1 & 2) (3)	Associate professors (4)	Assistant professors (5)	The rank immediately below assistant professor (6)	The rank immediately below the preceding (7)	Others (including visiting staff) (8)	Overall average: Including deans (9)	Overall average: Excluding deans (10)
	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$
Loyola College										
Number in rank	-	12	12	45	90	60	29	-	-	-
Floor	15,700	15,700	15,700	12,400	10,000	8,150	6,000	-	-	-
10th percentile	-		..	12,950	10,610	8,150	6,595	-	-	-
Average	-	19,973	19,973	15,448	11,886	9,480	7,573	-	-	11,837
90th percentile	-	..	..	21,450	16,990	10,600	8,510	-	-	-
University of Manitoba[1]										
Number in rank	60	104	164	310	411	127	-	2	-	-
Floor	-	17,000	-	12,900	10,000	-	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	19,300	18,036	18,079	13,650	10,609	7,419	-	..	-	-
Average	23,500	21,090	21,971	15,600	12,440	9,199	-	..	14,729	-
90th percentile	28,300	24,550	26,650	18,100	14,040	11,330	-	..	-	-
University of Manitoba[2]										
Number in rank	45	86	131	282	359	117	-	1	-	-
Floor	-	17,000	-	12,900	10,000	-	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	19,350	18,010	18,053	15,070	10,600	7,419	-	..	-	-
Average	22,916	20,693	21,456	15,364	12,168	9,124	-	..	14,344	-
90th percentile	27,550	23,230	25,380	17,516	13,700	11,130	-	..	-	-
McGill University[1]										
Number in rank	63	178	241	389	419	119	-	-	-	-
Floor	17,700	17,700	17,700	13,800	10,650	8,850	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	19,930	18,668	19,112	14,205	11,027	9,107	-	-	-	-
Average	24,428	21,986	22,274	16,396	12,999	10,674	-	-	15,936	-
90th percentile	30,470	27,040	27,590	21,320	16,229	12,810	-	-	-	-

Table 1 (cont'd)

University	Full professors								Overall average	
	Department heads, etc. who are full professors (1)	Other full professors (2)	All full professors (total of 1 & 2) (3)	Associate professors (4)	Assistant professors (5)	The rank immediately below assistant professor (6)	The rank immediately below the preceding (7)	Others (including visiting staff) (8)	Including deans (9)	Excluding deans (10)
	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$
McGill University[2]										
Number in rank	47	136	183	307	326	84	-	-	-	-
Floor	17,700	17,700	17,700	13,800	10,650	8,850	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	19,970	18,640	18,692	14,043	11,015	9,103	-	-	-	-
Average	23,067	21,281	21,740	15,692	12,292	10,146	-	-	15,308	-
90th percentile	26,130	24,140	25,235	17,477	13,894	11,153	-	-	-	-
McMaster University										
Number in rank	18	92	110	135	161	32	2	-	-	-
Floor	19,000	17,500	-	13,700	10,700	7,800	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	20,380	18,103	18,200	14,740	11,500	8,840	..	-	-	-
Average	24,248	22,342	22,653	16,691	13,128	10,137	..	-	16,815	-
90th percentile	30,090	27,813	27,850	18,735	14,694	11,728	..	-	-	-
Memorial University[1]										
Number in rank	28	34	62	93	208	116	8	7	-	-
Floor	17,000	17,000	17,000	13,400	10,300	7,650	6,200	-	-	-
10th percentile	18,020	17,080	17,460	13,479	10,372	8,340	..	..	-	-
Average	20,814	18,979	19,808	14,970	11,915	9,620	8,675	12,200	13,044	-
90th percentile	23,055	21,030	22,597	16,557	13,620	11,060	..	..	-	-
Memorial University[2]										
Number in rank	21	30	51	91	196	108	6	5	-	-
Floor	17,000	17,000	17,000	13,400	10,300	7,650	6,200	-	-	-
10th percentile	18,003	17,067	17,405	13,476	10,371	8,290	..	..	-	-
Average	20,005	18,493	19,116	14,926	11,830	9,365	7,733	10,380	12,724	-
90th percentile	23,048	20,067	21,073	16,490	13,580	10,673	..	..	-	-

Table 1 (cont'd)

University	Full professors: Department heads, etc. who are full professors (1)	Full professors: Other full professors (2)	Full professors: All full professors (total of 1 & 2) (3)	Associate professors (4)	Assistant professors (5)	The rank immediately below assistant professor (6)	The rank immediately below the preceding (7)	Others (including visiting staff) (8)	Overall average: Including deans (9)	Overall average: Excluding deans (10)
	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$
Université de Moncton										
Number in rank	4	5	9	28	66	55	-	-	-	-
Floor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	..	..	..	12,790	10,575	7,583	-	-	-	-
Average	..	18,020	..	14,895	11,882	8,802	-	-	-	11,718
90th percentile	..	..	..	17,010	14,038	10,058	-	-	-	-
Université de Montréal[2]										
Number in rank	33	104	137	197	284	120	-	11	-	-
Floor	-	17,700	-	14,050	10,730	8,630	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	18,415	17,774	17,792	14,086	11,014	8,630	-	..	-	-
Average	20,564	19,927	20,079	15,552	12,257	9,563	-	14,841	14,416	-
90th percentile	22,670	22,313	22,378	17,076	13,680	11,200	-	..	-	-
Mount Allison University										
Number in rank	-	19	19	18	44	27	-	-	-	-
Floor	-	17,000	17,000	13,200	10,300	8,200	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	-	18,090	18,090	13,590	10,820	8,770	-	-	-	-
Average	-	19,421	19,421	15,017	12,085	10,033	-	-	13,351	-
90th percentile	-	22,010	22,010	16,720	13,660	11,015	-	-	-	-
Mount Saint Vincent University										
Number in rank	3	1	4	8	20	20	-	-	-	-
Floor	16,000	16,000	16,000	13,000	10,000	-	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	..	..	..	..	10,015	7,050	-	-	-	-
Average	..	..	..	13,500	10,913	8,370	-	-	10,801	-
90th percentile	..	..	..	..	14,500	10,033	-	-	-	-

Table 1 (cont'd)

University	Full professors: Department Heads, etc. who are full professors (1)	Full professors: Other full professors (2)	Full professors: All full professors (total of 1 & 2) (3)	Associate professors (4)	Assistant professors (5)	The rank immediately below assistant professor (6)	The rank immediately below the preceding (7)	Others (including visiting staff) (8)	Overall average: Including deans (9)	Overall average: Excluding deans (10)
	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$
University of New Brunswick										
Number in rank	19	46	65	91	159	41	14	9	-	-
Floor	16,600	16,600	16,600	13,100	9,900	8,000	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	17,590	17,050	17,413	13,710	10,773	8,337	..	..	-	-
Average	20,203	19,252	19,534	15,050	12,093	10,017	7,557	12,461	13,912	-
90th percentile	22,205	22,125	22,130	16,473	13,483	11,790	..	..	-	-
Notre Dame University of Nelson										
Number in rank	-	1	1	11	11	12	-	1	-	-
Floor	-			still being negotiated						
10th percentile	-	..	..	..	..	..	-	..	-	-
Average	-	..	..	11,750	9,335	7,282	-	..	9,097	-
90th percentile	-	..	..	..	..	..	-	..	-	-
Nova Scotia Technical College										
Number in rank	7	3	10	19	33	4	-	1	-	-
Floor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	..	..	..	13,290	10,715	..	-	..	-	-
Average	18,178	18,167	18,175	14,487	12,227	..	-	..	-	13,435
90th percentile	..	..	..	16,210	13,785	..	-	..	-	-
Université d'Ottawa[1]										
Number in rank	37	82	119	134	264	120	3	-	-	-
Floor	17,100	17,100	17,100	13,400	10,250	8,100	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	20,670	17,205	17,298	14,217	11,048	8,171	..	-	-	-
Average	25,215	20,527	21,984	16,642	13,297	10,417	..	-	15,338	-
90th percentile	29,415	24,480	26,410	19,750	15,590	13,067	..	-	-	-

Table 1 (cont'd)

University	Full professors: Department heads, etc. who are full professors (1)	Full professors: Other full professors (2)	Full professors: All full professors (total of 1 & 2) (3)	Associate professors (4)	Assistant professors (5)	The rank immediately below assistant professor (6)	The rank immediately below the preceding (7)	Others (including visiting staff) (8)	Overall average: Including deans (9)	Overall average: Excluding deans (10)
	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$
Université d'Ottawa[2]										
Number in rank	28	74	102	119	249	114	-	-	-	-
Floor	17,100	17,100	17,100	13,400	10,250	8,100	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	20,090	17,193	17,255	14,200	11,023	8,171	-	-	-	-
Average	24,135	20,525	21,515	16,481	13,169	10,368	-	-	15,030	-
90th percentile	26,520	24,460	25,740	19,000	15,528	12,860	-	-	-	-
Ecole Polytechnique										
Number in rank	9	30	39	62	66	8	-	2	-	-
Floor	19,900	17,000	-	13,500	10,500	8,100	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	..	18,467	18,473	14,060	10,780	..	-	..	-	-
Average	21,841	20,047	20,461	16,126	12,283	10,288	-	..	-	15,349
90th percentile	..	21,600	22,005	18,860	13,540	..	-	..	-	-
University of Prince Edward Island										
Number in rank	4	2	6	34	43	32	2	3	-	-
Floor	-	17,000	-	14,250	10,800	8,750	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	..	..	..	14,938	11,307	8,873	..	..	-	-
Average	..	..	18,363	15,843	12,335	9,766	..	..	-	12,884
90th percentile	..	..	..	17,560	14,035	10,590	..	..	-	-
Université du Québec à Chicoutimi										
Number in rank	1	4	5	10	67	17	-	-	-	-
Floor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	..	..	..	..	12,181	9,285	-	-	-	-
Average	..	..	..	15,640	13,338	10,628	-	-	13,457	-
90th percentile	..	..	..	..	14,809	11,430	-	-	-	-

Table 1 (cont'd)

University	Full professors: Department heads, etc. who are full professors (1)	Full professors: Other full professors (2)	Full professors: All full professors (total of 1 & 2) (3)	Associate professors (4)	Assistant professors (5)	The rank immediately below assistant professor (6)	The rank immediately below the preceding (7)	Others (including visiting staff) (8)	Overall average: Including deans (9)	Overall average: Excluding deans (10)
	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$
Queen's University[1]										
Number in rank	42	133	175	232	218	60	-	-	-	-
Floor	-	18,200	-	14,300	10,900	-	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	22,083	18,500	18,850	14,397	11,860	10,300	-	-	-	-
Average	27,232	22,166	23,383	17,013	13,371	11,451	-	-	17,257	-
90th percentile	32,775	25,600	28,033	19,780	15,760	14,033	-	-	-	-
Queen's University[2]										
Number in rank	32	120	152	192	190	45	-	-	-	-
Floor	-	18,200	-	14,300	10,900	-	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	22,040	18,450	18,740	14,380	11,800	10,360	-	-	-	-
Average	25,306	21,870	22,593	16,538	12,982	11,109	-	-	16,764	-
90th percentile	29,080	25,533	26,827	18,790	14,400	12,075	-	-	-	-
St. Francis Xavier University										
Number in rank	7	9	16	32	74	37	8	2	-	-
Floor	-	17,700	-	13,900	10,800	8,900	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	..	..	18,820	13,940	10,863	8,990	..	..	-	-
Average	..	..	19,697	15,278	11,936	9,554	8,053	..	-	12,627
90th percentile	..	..	20,660	16,680	13,160	10,730	..	..	-	-
Saint Mary's University										
Number in rank	3	8	11	24	75	30	1	-	-	-
Floor	-	16,500	-	12,500	9,500	-	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	..	..	..	12,565	9,850	8,100	..	-	-	-
Average	..	16,529	..	14,559	11,305	9,265	..	-	12,037	-
90th percentile	..	..	..	16,170	12,725	10,100	..	-	-	-

Table 1 (cont'd)

University	Full professors			Associate professors (4)	Assistant professors (5)	The rank immediately below assistant professor (6)	The rank immediately below the preceding (7)	Others (including visiting staff) (8)	Overall average	
	Department heads, etc. who are full professors (1)	Other full professors (2)	All full professors (total of 1 & 2) (3)						Including deans (9)	Excluding deans (10)
	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$
University of St. Michael's College										
Number in rank	5	8	13	12	15	9	-	-	-	-
Floor	17,300	17,300	17,300	13,000	10,500	8,600	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	..	..	..	..	10,750	..	-	-	-	-
Average	24,290	18,438	20,688	13,908	11,310	10,344	-	-	14,288	-
90th percentile	..	..	..	..	12,075	..	-	-	-	-
Université Saint-Paul										
Number in rank	-	8	8	7	6	3	-	1	-	-
Floor	-	15,500	15,500	12,500	9,500	7,500	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	-	..	..	..	..	..	-	..	-	-
Average	-	17,684	17,684	12,929	11,133	..	-	..	-	13,436
90th percentile	-	..	..	..	..	..	-	..	-	-
St. Thomas University										
Number in rank	-	5	5	6	21	21	-	-	-	-
Floor	-	16,600	16,600	13,100	9,900	8,000	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	-	..	..	..	10,028	8,003	-	-	-	-
Average	-	17,860	17,860	14,983	11,141	9,392	-	-	11,517	-
90th percentile	-	..	..	..	12,395	10,690	-	-	-	-
St. Thomas More College										
Number in rank	1	-	1	3	13	6	2	-	-	-
Floor	-	18,050	-	14,000	10,600	8,150	7,650	-	-	-
10th percentile	..	-	..	..	..	..	..	-	-	-
Average	..	-	..	15,308	12,004	10,607	..	-	12,144	-
90th percentile	..	-	..	..	..	..	..	-	-	-

Table 1 (cont'd)

University	Full professors			Associate professors	Assistant professors	The rank immediately below assistant professor	The rank immediately below the preceding	Others (including visiting staff)	Overall average	
	Department heads, etc. who are full professors (1)	Other full professors (2)	All full professors (total of 1 & 2) (3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	Including deans (9)	Excluding deans (10)
	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$
University of Saskatchewan[1]										
Number in rank	75	102	177	366	374	56	78	75	-	-
Floor	18,050	18,050	18,050	14,000	10,600	8,150	7,650	-	-	-
10th percentile	19,350	18,260	18,694	14,193	11,106	8,632	7,696	6,083	-	-
Average	23,306	22,077	22,597	16,097	13,509	10,293	8,959	10,490	15,228	-
90th percentile	31,350	36,320	36,314	17,885	13,982	10,779	9,637	13,250	-	-
University of Saskatchewan[2]										
Number in rank	59	80	139	335	331	55	61	72	-	-
Floor	18,050	18,050	18,050	14,000	10,600	8,150	7,650	-	-	-
10th percentile	19,363	18,089	18,623	14,244	11,085	8,925	7,802	6,073	-	-
Average	20,925	19,969	20,375	15,663	12,488	10,086	8,507	10,270	14,290	-
90th percentile	23,110	21,700	22,405	17,750	13,920	10,774	9,295	12,980	-	-
Université de Sherbrooke[1]										
Number in rank	19	19	38	138	168	97	-	1	-	-
Floor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	17,990	16,995	17,980	14,083	11,190	8,574	-	..	-	-
Average	21,828	21,121	21,474	16,926	13,469	10,383	-	..	14,746	-
90th percentile	24,110	27,010	24,920	20,320	15,940	12,110	-	..	-	-
Université de Sherbrooke[2]										
Number in rank	3	11	14	85	112	89	-	1	-	-
Floor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	..	..	..	14,021	10,944	8,573	-	..	-	-
Average	..	17,882	..	15,559	12,728	10,354	-	..	13,244	-
90th percentile	..	..	..	17,825	14,680	12,010	-	..	-	-

Table 1 (cont'd)

University	Full professors: Department heads, etc. who are full professors (1)	Full professors: Other full professors (2)	Full professors: All full professors (total of 1 & 2) (3)	Associate professors (4)	Assistant professors (5)	The rank immediately below assistant professor (6)	The rank immediately below the preceding (7)	Others (including visiting staff) (8)	Overall average: Including deans (9)	Overall average: Excluding deans (10)
	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$
Simon Fraser University										
Number in rank	7	44	51	87	154	35	-	-	-	-
Floor	-	15,800	-	11,700	9,500	7,800	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	..	18,525	18,720	13,900	11,525	9,660	-	-	-	-
Average	23,272	21,915	22,101	15,648	12,819	10,897	-	-	-	14,813
90th percentile	..	25,875	26,190	17,870	13,975	13,500	-	-	-	-
Sir George Williams University										
Number in rank	17	35	52	123	139	20	-	1	-	-
Floor	-	16,500	-	13,500	10,000	8,500	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	17,757	17,483	17,715	13,552	10,643	8,500	-	..	-	-
Average	22,056	20,133	20,762	15,062	11,567	9,635	-	..	-	14,159
90th percentile	22,530	24,050	23,080	16,670	13,803	11,250	-	..	-	-
Trent University										
Number in rank	8	8	16	33	60	8	-	-	-	-
Floor	-	18,200	-	14,000	10,800	8,500	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	..	..	..	14,233	11,220	..	-	-	-	-
Average	22,975	21,284	22,130	15,688	12,162	9,413	-	-	-	14,332
90th percentile	..	..	..	17,257	13,450	..	-	-	-	-
University of Trinity College										
Number in rank	7	7	14	7	14	5	-	1	-	-
Floor	17,800	17,300	-	13,000	10,500	8,600	-	..	-	-
10th percentile	..	..	..	..	..	..	-	..	-	-
Average	21,843	19,257	20,550	15,571	11,929	9,000	-	..	-	15,218
90th percentile	..	..	..	..	..	..	-	..	-	-

Table 1 (cont'd)

University	Full professors: Department heads, etc. who are full professors (1)	Full professors: Other full professors (2)	Full professors: All full professors (total of 1 & 2) (3)	Associate professors (4)	Assistant professors (5)	The rank immediately below assistant professor (6)	The rank immediately below the preceding (7)	Others (including visiting staff) (8)	Overall average: Including deans (9)	Overall average: Excluding deans (10)
	$	$	$	$	$	$ Sr. Lecturer	$ Lecturer	$	$	$
University of Victoria (B.C.)										
Number in rank	16	29	45	97	170	2	63	36	-	-
Floor	16,500	15,500	15,500	12,200	9,500	-	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	19,750	18,200	18,587	13,753	10,950	..	8,715	16,800	-	-
Average	22,795	20,888	21,566	15,973	12,286	..	9,929	11,994	13,902	-
90th percentile	26,670	23,115	24,650	18,050	13,600	..	11,085	8,120	-	-
Victoria University (Ont.)										
Number in rank	8	22	30	30	20	17	2	4	-	-
Floor	-	17,300	-	13,000	10,500	8,600	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	..	17,820	17,800	13,220	10,567	9,043	..	..	-	-
Average	21,363	21,323	21,333	14,482	11,723	10,035	..	..	-	14,603
90th percentile	..	22,880	23,800	16,550	12,900	11,030	..	..	-	-
University of Waterloo										
Number in rank	23	132	155	216	209	62	-	-	-	-
Floor	19,900	18,700	-	14,400	11,100	-	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	21,300	19,800	19,950	15,000	11,500	9,000	-	-	-	-
Average	26,291	23,261	23,711	17,223	13,334	10,615	-	-	17,011	-
90th percentile	29,850	28,700	29,000	19,500	14,900	12,260	-	-	-	-
Waterloo Lutheran University										
Number in rank	5	13	18	35	55	28	1	-	-	-
Floor	-	18,100	-	13,900	10,900	8,800	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	..	..	..	14,438	11,207	9,090	..	-	-	-
Average	19,620	18,896	19,097	15,461	12,301	10,059	..	-	-	13,482
90th percentile	..	..	..	16,393	14,050	11,020	..	-	-	-

Table 1 (cont'd)

University	Full professors			Associate professors (4)	Assistant professors (5)	The rank immediately below assistant professor (6)	The rank immediately below the preceding (7)	Others (including visiting staff) (8)	Overall average	
	Department heads, etc. who are full professors (1)	Other full professors (2)	All full professors (total of 1 & 2) (3)						Including deans (9)	Excluding deans (10)
	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$
University of Western Ontario[1]										
Number in rank	36	133	169	228	307	107	44	-	-	-
Floor	17,800	17,800	17,800	13,450	11,150	8,800	7,600	-	-	-
10th percentile	24,360	19,830	20,[illegible]8	14,083	11,530	9,046	7,624	-	-	-
Average	27,912	23,672	24,575	16,991	15,643	11,077	8,234	-	16,316	-
90th percentile	32,040	28,090	29,810	20,510	16,265	12,765	9,390	-	-	-
University of Western Ontario[2]										
Number in rank	21	116	137	190	252	94	44	-	-	-
Floor	17,800	17,800	17,800	13,450	11,150	8,800	7,600	-	-	-
10th percentile	24,210	19,760	19,870	14,025	11,505	9,043	7,624	-	-	-
Average	26,688	23,638	24,105	16,393	13,094	10,690	8,234	-	15,703	-
90th percentile	30,090	28,140	29,530	19,330	15,027	12,445	9,390	-	-	-
University of Windsor										
Number in rank	22	71	93	135	165	41	6	29	-	-
Floor	19,250	18,200	-	14,900	11,200	9,000	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	19,420	18,255	18,543	15,450	11,792	9,455	..	6,023	-	-
Average	21,806	20,095	20,500	16,775	13,357	10,543	5,333	9,467	15,327	-
90th percentile	23,990	21,895	22,590	18,588	15,042	11,645	..	17,010	-	-
University of Winnipeg										
Number in rank	-	11	11	28	53	52	25	12	-	-
Floor	-	17,000	-	12,900	10,000	-	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	-	..	..	12,947	10,215	8,160	6,125	..	-	-
Average	-	17,523	17,523	14,094	11,408	9,632	8,272	6,021	-	10,921
90th percentile	-	..	..	15,820	12,290	10,880	11,750	..	-	-

Table 1 (cont'd)

University	Full professors: Department heads, etc. who are full professors (1)	Full professors: Other full professors (2)	Full professors: All full professors (total of 1 & 2) (3)	Associate professors (4)	Assistant professors (5)	The rank immediately below assistant professor (6)	The rank immediately below the preceding (7)	Others (including visiting staff) (8)	Overall average: Including deans (9)	Overall average: Excluding deans (10)
	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$	$
York University										
Number in rank	13	93	106	114	222	162	23	-	-	-
Floor	-	17,600	-	13,200	10,700	8,500	-	-	-	-
10th percentile	..	19,000	22,043	14,200	11,500	9,000	5,700	-	-	-
Average	23,057	22,674	22,721	16,636	13,319	10,855	8,145	-	14,899	-
90th percentile	..	27,500	25,740	20,000	15,200	12,500	9,800	-	-	-

[1] Including medical staff

[2] Excluding medical staff

Source: From data supplied to the Dominion Bureau of Statistics by the institutions and reproduced in Bulletin, Canadian Association of University Teachers, Spring, 1971, pp. 26-37.

Europe, the United States and Asia and it can properly be described as "among the leaders" among Canadian universities in salary structure.

As The University of Calgary enters a different stage in the process of attaining intellectual maturity, the objectives of its salary structure will expand. Not only will it be forced to compete with other Canadian and North American universities in acquiring intellectual talent, the University will face the additional task of retaining the academic competence it has acquired over the years. While this process will be importantly influenced by relative salary levels, it will also be influenced by other variables in the salary system such as procedures for merit increments, the possibility of overlapping salaries between ranks, length of the contract year and University policy toward supplementary income. These salary variables will be discussed subsequently in this report.

The Relative Income Status of University of Calgary Academic Staff

The word "leaders" as used in the previous section and appropriate to university salary schedules throughout Canada may create misconceptions about the status of academic salaries relative to other professions. Before leaving the question of salary levels, it is appropriate to contrast academic salaries with salary levels of these other professions. One of the most recent studies of the relative income status of the academic profession was published in the Bulletin of the Canadian Association of University Teachers in winter, 1970, referred to previously in the discussion of "leading and lagging" salary institutions. The study was conducted by Professors Richard

Holmes and Gideon Rosenbluth and suggests that academic salaries are not only below those of similar professions but have deteriorated significantly relative to other professions during the 1960's. Table 2, for example, shows academic and independent professional salaries from 1961 to 1967. Data are from the Dominion Bureau of Statistics and reflect the most recent information at the time of the study.

In 1967 the listed professional groups had net professional income means ranging from $25,000 for medical doctors and surgeons to $6,100 for teachers and professors. The median salary for university teachers as a group separate from other teachers was $11,200; there is no a priori reason to believe that the mean university teacher salary would be significantly different from the median.

According to these data, derived from tax information filed by professional respondents, all other professions save teachers enjoyed net income greater than university professors. The range was between $13,000 for accountants to $19,700 for consulting engineers and architects to the higher medical averages. The differentials may be somewhat overstated since the income data for university teachers do not include external consulting income. Professors Holmes and Rosenbluth suggest that this income supplement is not likely to average more than $1,000-$2,000 for academics and thus would not change the income ranking, except possibly for the relationship between professors and accountants. Average net professional income in any event would still exceed median university salaries by a significant margin, despite the fact that the percentage change in income from 1966 to 1967 was greatest for university teachers.

Table 2 - NET PROFESSIONAL INCOME IN INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONS AND SALARIES OF PROFESSORS AND TEACHERS

Occupation	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
	$'000	$'000	$'000	$'000	$'000	$'000	$'000
Dentists							
- Average Net Professional Inc.[c]	11.5	12.7	12.7	13.8	14.7	16.1	17.2
Annual Percentage Change	-	10.4%	nil	8.7%	6.5%	9.5%	6.8%
1961-67 Percentage Change	(49.6%)						
Lawyers and Notaries							
- Average Net Professional Inc.[c]	13.6	13.0	14.2	15.2	17.0	18.6	19.6
Annual Percentage Change	-	-4.4%	9.2%	7.8%	11.8%	9.4%	5.4%
1961-67 Percentage Change	(44.1%)						
Accountants							
- Average Net Professional Inc.[c]	10.7	10.0	9.8	11.8	12.2	12.6	13.1
Annual Percentage Change	-	-6.5%	-0.2%	20.4%	3.4%	3.3%	4.0%
1961-67 Percentage Change	(22.4%)						
Medical Doctors & Surgeons							
- Average Net Professional Inc.[c]	15.6	16.7	18.1	20.0	21.8	22.8	25.0
Annual Percentage Change	-	7.1%	8.4%	10.5%	9.0%	4.6%	9.6%
1961-67 Percentage Change	(60.3%)						
Consulting Engineers & Architects							
- Average Net Professional Inc.[c]	12.6	13.3	13.2	14.6	16.8	18.6	19.7
Annual Percentage Change	-	-2.4%	7.3%	10.6%	15.1%	10.7%	5.9%
1961-67 Percentage Change	(56.3%)						
Total Professionals							
- Average Net Professional Inc.[c]	11.2	11.4	12.5	13.5	14.4	15.5	16.2
Annual Percentage Change	-	1.8%	9.6%	8.0%	6.7%	7.6%	4.5%
1961-67 Percentage Change	(44.6%)						

Table 2 (cont'd)

Occupation	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
Teachers and Professors[a]	$'000	$'000	$'000	$'000	$'000	$'000	$'000
- Average Salary[c]	4.5	4.5	4.8	5.0	5.3	5.6	6.1
Annual Percentage Change	-	nil	6.7%	4.2%	6.0%	5.7%	8.9%
1961-67 Percentage Change	(35.6%)						
University Teachers							
- Median Salary[b] [c]	8.4	8.6	8.9	9.1	9.7	10.2	11.2
Annual Percentage Change	-	2.4%	3.5%	2.2%	6.5%	5.2%	9.8%
1961-67 Percentage Change	(33.3%)						

Original
Source: Computed from Department of National Revenue, Taxation Statistics, Part 1, Table 13, various issues except where otherwise noted.

Notes

a - Averages and trend for the group reflect the salaries of school teachers since university teachers constitute a small minority.

b - From D.B.S. Cat. No. 81-203, for 1966-67, Table 5, p. 15.

c - Data from Taxation Statistics are for the taxpayer's business year ending in the year shown. Data for university teachers are for the academic year ending in the year shown.

Secondary
Source: C.A.U.T. Bulletin, Winter, 1970.

During the 1961-67 period, only accountants experienced a smaller percentage change in income than did university teachers. According to data in Table 2, the median salary of university teachers increased by 33.3 per cent contrasted to incremental income of 44.6 per cent for all professions and 60.3 per cent for medical doctors and surgeons. Professors Holmes and Rosenbluth conclude with the observation that "there is no doubt that in comparison with the independent professions, academic salaries are very low and have been falling further behind since at least 1960."[1]

The Ontario Confederation of University Faculty Associations puts the matter as follows:

> The tables in Appendix IV, show that the growth in earnings of the B.A. group (about 52.5% overall) accurately reflects the general expansion of the economy at a rate of about 4% per year. The growth in earnings of the Ph.D. group (about 35% overall) indicates the relative movement in the career prospects of the vast majority of university teachers. The growth in earnings of the Professional Degrees group, (about 70% overall) indicates the relative movement in the prospects of those occupations competing directly with university teaching for our most talented graduates. In the ten-year period 1956 to 1966, in other words, university teachers lagged one third behind the general rate of increase, while other learned professions exceeded the general rate of increase by a third.[2]

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[1] C.A.U.T. Bulletin, Winter, 1970, p. 54.

[2] Newsletter, Ontario Confederation of University Faculty Associations, January, 1971, p. 6. Appendix IV from the OCUFA study is reproduced as Table 4, p. 54. The C.A.U.T. and OCUFA findings are consistent with the conclusions reached by Professor S.G. Peitchinis of The University of Calgary in various studies, e.g., The Market for Academic Personnel--Their Employment and Salaries in Canada, p. 29, undated.

The Resultant Social and Economic Status of Academics

The picture that seems to emerge from this brief analysis of the changing income status of university professors is quite likely to create some confusion in the public's perception of the profession.

In the first instance, the university professor during the last ten to fifteen years seems to have emerged as a claimant to a much higher standard of living than the community has traditionally reserved for the academic arts. The mean salary level at The University of Calgary--$16,172--suggests an income status and ability somewhat different from the historic stereotype of the university professor in baggy tweeds, content to putter in his garden and laboratory and watch from a distance the activities of his more affluent professional brethren. With salaries for distinguished academics at the full professorial rank ranging into the upper twenty and lower thirty thousand dollar levels, the tweeds have given away to more stylish costume and garden activities relegated to secondary importance behind international air travel and occasional country club soirees.

The community perception of this new academic affluence is troubled by at least two factors. Firstly, community value structures change slowly and it is difficult, perhaps, to discard the old image. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that the old perquisites of academic life remain. A university professor is very much akin to the independent professional practitioner who has a good deal of discretion over the allocation of his time. He can still putter in the garden on a summer morning, and conduct his professional experiments

or write for professional journals in the evening. But only the morning, non-work activity is observed and some public confusion about his professional requirements results.

The second complicating factor in the changing social and economic status of academics results from the perception that academics have of themselves. Unlike the public, which remains somewhat amazed by the abrupt professorial transition from have-nots to haves, the academic himself is troubled by his inability to match economic gains with his peer groups in other professions. While at least some part of the community continues to contrast current academic incomes with the old perception of academic living standards, university teachers contrast their income status to medical doctors, lawyers and engineers. They reason that the nature of their profession and its educational requirements suggest income parity with other professions and will strongly resist any attempt to analyze their social and economic status on other grounds.

What the effect of the convergence of this academic self-perception with a softening market for academics will be is conjectural and beyond the scope of this study. It is interesting to speculate, however, that the flurry of organizing activity in the United States and the resulting tendency toward collective bargaining between university administrations and academic bargaining agents may be a first result of these conflicting forces.

Market Pressures and the Problem of Overlapping Scales

Turning now from the more general discussion of salary levels at The University of Calgary in absolute and relative terms, it was observed in the previous section that market forces in recent years have had the effect of increasing the income status of university professors, although less than that of comparable professional groups. These market forces have been characterized by aggregate supply and demand conditions that saw the supply of academics grow slowly relative to the massive increases in the demand for university and college education. The result was an upward pressure on the market price for those persons qualified for academic positions.

While these salary developments make no case for reversing the direction or decelerating the rate of changing professorial incomes, they may require a re-examination of some of the basic, early salary principles developed at The University of Calgary during this period. These principles relate to policy issues such as no salary overlap between academic ranks; the system of merit increments; the desirability of consulting income; the optimal length of the university contract year, etc.

In this section the issue of overlapping salary scales will be examined in conjunction with the other methods of accommodating market forces, such as market supplements.

It is significant that the salary structure at The University of Calgary is a blend of forces that in some ways reflects market variables and in other ways defies them. For example, the salary trend is clearly a function of aggregate market variables exerting upward

pressures on salary levels and the desire of the University to use these market pressures to attract a competent professional staff.

At the same time, other elements of the salary structure defy, quite deliberately, the operation of market forces. The existence of salary ranges for each rank which are uniform across the University (except for the Faculty of Medicine) is an example of how market forces can be disciplined in the interest of a more equitable salary structure. There can be little doubt that the market would force vastly different salary ranges among disciplines if allowed to work unchecked.

The development of the salary structure at The University of Calgary has been characterized by an orderly and uniform salary structure across Faculties (except for Medicine) based on academic rank. Presumably, the interests of the University in recruiting competent staff members and the interest of academic staff in maximizing income have coincided in a system whereby the upward pressures of the market have been reflected in upward movements in the salary ranges for various academic ranks. The academic staff, through its faculty association, has pressed for a system, which the University also considered desirable, of uniform salary minimums by academic rank across all disciplines (except for the Faculty of Medicine). Simultaneously, the University salary system has included maximal salaries for each academic rank. The impact of this latter element must be promotion to higher rank when the maximal salary has been achieved or the accumulation of increasing numbers of people toward the upper end of the academic rank salary range.

This relatively rigid salary structure evidently met the University's basic salary objectives until confronted with a market phenomenon that could not be ignored--the creation of a Faculty of Medicine. At this point in the development of the salary structure, the University decided that it would be impossible to hire competent staff for the new Faculty according to the existing salary ranges and to observe traditional criteria for academic rank simultaneously.

As a result, the University developed a salary structure for the Faculty of Medicine that in effect created a system of overlapping salaries between ranks among Faculties. This was accomplished in several ways. Initially, a separate salary schedule was formulated for the Faculty of Medicine which was several thousand dollars above the salary schedule for the rest of the University for each rank. The impact of this factor alone was sufficient to create overlap between ranks among the Faculties.[1] The stated rationale for a separate salary schedule was the fact that teaching duties in the Faculty of Medicine extend over a period of eleven months.[2]

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[1] However, the principle of non-overlapping scales was carefully observed within the Faculty of Medicine.

[2] With regard to the commitment of all University faculty to The University of Calgary throughout the contract year, the Faculty Handbook distributed by the University in November, 1970, p. 24 reads:

> " All appointments to the full time faculty are on a twelve month basis of which one month shall be the vacation period ..."
> "Unless special arrangements are made, all full time faculty members are expected to remain on campus during the academic session, that is from

In addition to a separate salary schedule for the Faculty of Medicine, market forces were further recognized by the provision of a market supplement of up to $4,000 for persons entering the Faculty. The market supplement was justified on the specific grounds of alternative income opportunities for medical academics. A market supplement is a further means of creating salary overlap between ranks among different Faculties, or perhaps, even within the Faculty of Medicine. The Faculty of Medicine has found it necessary to use the market supplement for virtually all assistant and associate professors in the clinical area although it has been used sparingly at the full professorial rank. Market supplements have not been required in the research fields, where medical training and practice are not required.

Recognizing yet another element of market pressure--that from other medical faculties--The University of Calgary Medical Faculty received authority to offer potential staff further supplementary income in the form of a transitional allowance. A transitional allowance of up to $8,000 for full academic rank and up to $6,000 for

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September 1 until Spring Convocation. The balance of the year is expected to be used for the advancement of knowledge and for the betterment of the individual. Arrangements to be absent shall be made with the Head of the Department, and in certain cases must be approved by the appropriate Dean and/or Dean's Council as set out earlier."

Thus, the justification of a separate and higher salary schedule on the basis of eleven months teaching duties may have interesting implications for other Faculties with regard to the relative importance of teaching, research, university and public service as they relate to professional development. A more negative interpretation relates to the possible assumption that a significant percentage of the University staff outside the Faculty of Medicine work fewer than eleven months a year.

lower ranks is available in the Faculty of Medicine, and is essentially a guaranteed consulting income until the individual faculty member can build up his own consulting practice. At the time this report was written, the Medical Faculty reported only one transitional allowance in operation.

Finally, a specific set of rules was identified for consulting income for medical faculty which is more liberal than that spelled out for funded research for the other Faculties. A full professor at the minimum $23,000 salary scale without market supplement, transitional allowance or administrative honorarium can earn up to $19,500 in consulting income, consistent with the salary maximum for 1970-71 of $42,500. However, all consulting income of professors in the Faculty of Medicine is subject to a "loading charge", the rate of which increases as the consulting income increases. This loading charge is paid into and retained by the Ambulatory Care Centre or, in the case of secondary and ceiling loading charges, paid into a Medical Trust Fund established by the University.

This discussion of salary arrangements in the Faculty of Medicine has been extended into some detail for the purpose of demonstrating how the University came to grips with the problem of providing sufficient flexibility in its salary system to hire people with a high market value and, at the same time, maintain the concept of academic rank.

The Peculiarity of the Faculty of Medicine A next question logically follows: is there some principle of equity, some principle of efficiency, or some market principle which is peculiarly applicable

to the Faculty of Medicine? The hypothesis upon which subsequent analysis will be based is that there is nothing unique about the existing market for physicians and surgeons. If the University were in the market for corporate executives to staff the Faculty of Commerce it would find the same set of constraints on the ability to hire. For example, a university president comments as follows on the relationships among the professional disciplines:

> After 1965, it became evident that the market value of people in the professions would be far above the corresponding market value of people in the remaining disciplines. In recent years, it has become obvious that an erosion in rank has taken place. For example, for a number of years, the lowest rank appointment in Business Administration and Commerce took place at the associate professor level. People were being promoted to the rank of full professor because there was no other way, in a rigid salary schedule, to pay them the salary they could command elsewhere. In medicine and dentistry a number of devious ways were used to pay the salaries required, in order to prevent a mockery of the rank assigned.

That is, there is no market principle or set of efficiency conditions that sets aside physicians and surgeons as a unique case for university salary purposes. They merely represent one point on the salary continuum, at this point in time in relatively short supply, and therefore able to command relatively high salaries consistent with general market principles. Simultaneously, it is apparent that no principle of equity suggests that a Faculty of Medicine represents a unique case. If the recruitment of competent staff implies responding to the market across the set of disciplines required by the University,

equity and efficiency conditions require a system of rewards for retaining staff which extends across disciplines.

However, there is often a significant difference of opinion between academic staff and academic administrators and among academic staff about the requirement of meeting market prices in hiring short-supply skills such as physicians. For example, a staff member at The University of Calgary has suggested:

> We do not want people in the University who would rather be elsewhere but are attracted by special salary deals like 'market' supplement. For whom do we need the supplements? Equal pay for equal university work; other systems are unfair . . . To my knowledge professions where at present there is a high market value can already take advantage of their university position for consulting work. This work is very necessary for the relevance of their teaching and so should be encouraged. At the same time, it provides the 'market supplement' at no cost to the taxpayer.

Presumably, in this case, offers would be made according to the University's general salary structure. Either consulting income plus regular salary scales would be sufficient to attract physicians for the Faculty of Medicine or it would not be staffed.

On the other hand, a university president suggests that:

> There is no universal relationship between the salary required to obtain and retain good members of an academic staff, and the academic rank that should be assigned. There does not exist a universal salary schedule that will satisfactorily meet all of the salary needs of the multitude of disciplines now in existence in universities. It is better to have no salary schedule than a multitude of schedules.
>
> The present situation has led me to the conclusion

> that there is no salary schedule, be it rigid, flexible, overlap or what have you, which will meet the diverse needs of the different faculties. The use of market supplements is an attempt to patch up an undesirable salary structure, and shows an unwillingness to re-think our whole philosophy of such structures.

In "re-thinking our whole philosophy" and in analyzing the various salary system alternatives in the subsequent pages, the assumption will be made that in hiring and retaining academic staff across disciplines the market can be manoeuvred and occasionally bent but it cannot be ignored.

Flexibility as Means to Greater Efficiency in the Salary System In tracing the brief history of salary system formulation at The University of Calgary, we have noted that with the creation of the Faculty of Medicine an important innovation in the University's salary policy occurred. Consistent with the policy of developing a salary schedule designed to use market incentives to bring competent staff to the University, it was decided that greater flexibility in the salary system was necessary to hire a competent medical staff. Flexibility was provided through the various devices discussed previously.

In all probability the University will continue to explore other avenues of flexibility in seeking a more efficient salary system, given its objectives of recruiting, retaining and treating equitably a competent academic staff.

The salary alternative with the greatest flexibility, of course, is that which is not constrained by any formal schedule. This system is fairly common in the United States, seemingly non-existent in Canada. It is characterized by individual bargaining between the institution and each faculty member. It results in a set of bargains in which it is possible, for example, for a full professor in one discipline to be paid a smaller salary than an assistant professor in another. If ever used in Canada, it has been discarded for the most part if not entirely, probably because of the serious questions of equity it entails.

A different means of attaining sufficient flexibility to recognize the market value differences among disciplines is the use of separate salary schedules for different Faculties. Again, this practice seems to be most unusual in Canada, probably for the reason that outside Alberta most universities use an overlapping salary schedule which precludes the necessity of differential salary schedules. In any event, a separate salary schedule by Faculty was not recommended by a single respondent in this study and seldom, in fact, even discussed. When mentioned, it was with considerable distaste.

Flexibility via Market Supplements The University of Calgary and the University of Alberta are two of the few, if not the only, universities in Canada to use market supplements. At the two campuses of the University of Saskatchewan, where no salary overlap among assistant, associate and full professors is allowed, market supplements are not used. According to data gathered during the course of this

study, including correspondence from university presidents, other administrators and faculty associations, there is little if any agitation to initiate market supplements. The reason again probably relates to the use of salary schedule overlap, or simply the widespread use of salary minima by rank without maxima.

Market supplements commended themselves to The University of Calgary because they provided some flexibility in the salary schedule without running afoul of administrative and/or faculty association opposition to salary overlap between ranks. The fact that market supplements and other Faculty of Medicine salary elements created de facto overlap between ranks among Faculties was either overlooked or judged to be relatively unimportant.

Still, the question remains, what principles of efficiency or equity suggests the provision of market supplements for one Faculty alone? Unless physicians and surgeons represent a unique element commanding unique treatment in the market place, which they do not, the case for market supplements is considerably weakened. From a president of a prominent university in the East, "Economists, lawyers, medical staff. etc., get some advantage from their market position. We accept realities in this respect."

One difficulty, then, with using market supplements but restricting them to one Faculty is that this practice ignores the high incomes available to selected other disciplines which a university requires. Beyond that, it ignores the high incomes available to distinguished persons in disciplines which are not generally in the medical, law or economics supply cycle but who, by virtue of individual

effort, have generated high income opportunities. How are these men recruited and retained when their opportunity price is as high as physicians but who may not have the specified qualifications for high academic rank? To reiterate, flexibility problems may currently be most acute in the Faculty of Medicine but are clearly not peculiar to that Faculty. Thus, if market supplements are to be used, the rationale for restricting them to one Faculty is in no sense clear.

On the other hand, to extend market supplements to all Faculties on the basis of individual bargaining between academics and deans in effect introduces a system of effective salary overlap without carefully measuring the advantages and disadvantages of the overlap system. To repeat the words of a distinguished administrator with considerable experience in the field: "The use of market supplements is an attempt to patch up an undesirable salary structure and shows an unwillingness to re-think our whole philosophy of such structures."

Still it should be pointed out that the use of market supplements in the Faculty of Medicine will probably have the effect of saving the University considerable salary expense over time because market supplements can be rescinded when they become unnecessary. Had the additional funds been paid in the form of basic salary in a schedule permissive of overlap between ranks it would be more difficult to minimize University salary payments as, for example, a professor's consulting income increased. This suggests that there may be special situations, although not necessarily unique to the Faculty of Medicine, in which short-term flexibility can be attained at least cost through a system of market supplements.

Flexibility via Salary Overlaps between Ranks

Eventually, the question of salary system flexibility must contemplate the net benefits, if any, of a system of salary overlap between academic ranks. As noted previously, all universities outside Alberta and Saskatchewan which reported the details of their salary structures currently use overlapping salary schedules. At least one has recently moved from a rigid schedule to overlap and the president reports that it has provided "a most useful incentive for professional development and performance." There is administrative agitation for using the system in Saskatchewan. Thus, it becomes essential to examine the merits and demerits of the system in some detail.

One of the distinguishing characteristics of salary overlap contrasted to the University's market supplements is its applicability to all faculties of a university. In Canada, there appears to have been little if any rationale for limiting overlap to one or a selected set of faculties. Indeed, if the device is used as a technique for maximizing flexibility, there is little if any reason to restrict its use to specified faculties. Accordingly, it may provide a more flexible system than do market supplements, which have been introduced on a selective basis.

In making a positive case for salary overlap, a prominent Canadian economist says:

> First, the floors are set for the University at large, and cannot be expected to accommodate the differences in market prices among disciplines. Secondly, (and more fundamentally) the basis for deciding salary in individual cases differs from the criteria for deciding upon promotion,

> and if the academic rank system is reduced to no more than a salary scale it will become something of a farce. I would argue that there are many cases where it would be appropriate to pay an assistant professor more than the minimum salary for an associate set for the university as a whole; and his peers in his department should not then be forced to promote him to justify the salary.
>
> Any other approach seems to me to be untenable in the long run. If the floors are treated as ceilings for the next rank below, the relatively high-priced disciplines will have a continuing incentive to lower the qualifications required for promotion in order to prevent a decline in their academic standards; and to continuously press for higher floors. (If they are successful, of course, the real beneficiaries will be those in the low-priced disciplines and the total salary budget would be unnecessarily high. The long-run result is likely to be excellence in low-priced disciplines and mediocrity in high-priced disciplines.)

Thus, one of the major advantages of an overlap system is the flexibility it generates in hiring people with a high external market value, although they may lack the traditional academic credentials for the rank necessary for the required salary.

Increased flexibility via overlap may work in yet another direction. In addition to providing leverage externally, overlap will also provide a university the means to emphasize certain areas or disciplines internally. That is, if a university uses an overlap system, it will be in a position to hire staff and allocate them to areas it may choose to emphasize. At The University of Calgary, the Faculty of Environmental Design may illustrate the concept of concentrating limited financial resources in an area of considerable current interest.

Hiring and allocating staff to the rapid acceleration of that Faculty, and paying salaries that attract high-priced specialists from the fields of urban planning, regional analysis, etc. may be difficult enough to void the effort if traditional criteria for academic rank and a rigid salary schedule are followed. Note that the Faculty of Environmental Design is used for illustrative, not normative purposes.

A problem that administrators at The University of Calgary suggest may occur in the absence of salary overlap is the accumulation of a large number of persons at the top of an academic rank, particularly the associate professor level. These people have presumably been moving through the ranks at a normal rate, yet do not have the qualifications for promotion to full rank by the time they reach the top of the associate professor pay scale. While it may be that at least some of these associates should have had their salary progress slowed toward the middle of the ranks, such was not the case and now some build-up at the upper range is threatened. What is most feared in this respect is the disincentive effect on the work effort of those associates who cannot qualify for full rank and know it. Will they work as effectively if their salary progress is stopped as they would in the situation where they can look forward to continued increases in income based on professional performance? In this regard, it is also suggested that equitable treatment of these associate professors requires an over-lapping scale in order that they may be rewarded for continued meritorious service even though some may lack the necessary record for

promotion. At McMaster University,for example:

> In certain cases, we have found it necessary to provide a faculty member with a salary above the floor of the next higher category. This arrangement may reflect the market situation in certain Faculties; it may also result when a member has earned a salary increase which brings him into a higher salary range although he has not yet satisfied our requirements for a promotion to a higher category.

Another oft-cited illustration of desirable flexibility provided by salary overlap is the situation in which the University is able to match a salary offer from a competing organization for an academic it wants to retain. With overlap the salary can be matched without provoking a promotion question; without overlap, promotion may be necessary although unlikely in order to retain the services of an outstanding academic.

The Case Against Salary Overlap Between Ranks

A first and persuasive case against the introduction of salary overlap at The University of Calgary is institutional rather than strictly conceptual--the Faculty Association opposes it. Given the mature and responsible attitude of the Association on salary and related matters, the opposition cannot be taken lightly. The Association reasons, quite correctly, that the use of salary minima and maxima without overlap increases its ability to push successfully for increased salary minima for all ranks over time. If maxima were eliminated, some part of the ability to increase salary floors might

well be sacrificed. The Association therefore feels that the use of the minima-maxima-no-overlap salary schedule has been partially responsible for meeting the salary objectives of the University, i.e., providing a salary schedule capable of recruiting a quality professional staff.

With regard to the problem of accumulation of persons at the top of an academic rank, it is suggested that it is not the rigidity of the existing system that is at fault. Rather, it has been the inability to make proper merit increment decisions that has fomented trouble. If persons have been passed through the ranks at a rate inconsistent with promotion decisions, this reflects administrative inability somewhere along the line. If the correct decisions had been made, no difficulty with regard to accumulation, disincentives, etc. would occur.

On closer inspection, this reasoning may turn out to be the most cogent case against salary overlap. If minima and maxima salary systems are used in conjunction with a merit increment system, there should be some tendency to force a consistent relationship between merit increment decisions and promotion decisions. If a person is not making reasonable progress toward promotion to the next higher rank, this should be reflected in annual increment decisions. In the absence of this inter-related mechanism, decisions relating to annual increment may well be made independently of reasonable progress toward promotion and serious inefficiencies and inequities result. For example, at Sir George Williams University, 'Our salary 'schedule' is limited to establishing a minimum for each rank. Salary overlaps exist primarily due to continuing application of automatic increments to salaries which

started out differently for valid or invalid historical reasons."

Also with regard to the problems of accumulation at top of ranks, disincentive effects, etc., it has been suggested that the difficulty does not lie with the minima-maxima-no-overlap system but with the archaic requirements for promotion. The current University of Calgary Handbook for Faculty[1] says that appointment at or promotion to the rank of full professor "requires evidence of national or international reputation supported by eminent external referees." It is sometimes suggested that these criteria reflect a European tradition that has little to do with higher education in Canada. Would these criteria be permissive of hiring an outstanding surgeon with no academic credentials; a retired Supreme Court Justice with no experience in academe; a corporate executive whose reputation outside business circles is nil? Would they be permissive of promotion to full professor of a university's outstanding undergraduate teacher who had chosen not to allocate his time to research and publications but to teaching, counselling, and university and community service? Given the changing values in universities and increased demands for involvement and relevance at all levels of university education, these questions are hardly trivial.

On the other hand, the following comment of a University of Calgary professor suggests that the current system has support:

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[1] The University of Calgary, Handbook for Faculty, 1970, p. 5.

> In terms of promotion, particularly to the rank of full professor, it should be necessary to have an absolute mandatory rule that reference be made to internationally reputed referees in the subject. Promotion to a professorship should be based on quality and distinction. Again in this respect, it is relevant to point out overlapping scales are pertinent, and that an associate professor could get increment not necessarily promotion.

The Canadian System--Minima without Maxima

Without making a further case for or against a salary overlap system, it may be instructive to note that the typical Canadian university operates on a minima without maxima system. Only the minimal salaries for each academic rank are specified and no mention is made of maximal salaries. Clearly, this is the salary device by which overlap between ranks has been introduced.

This need not imply that overlapping salaries are of no concern within Canadian universities. For example, a respondent from Queen's University remarks:

> Our general salary schedule here at Queen's consists simply of a minima for each rank. There are no maxima, and our salaries in fact overlap in varying degrees. However, the overlap, unless special reasons exist, is usually an indication that the person to whom it applies is in line for promotion at a convenient time. We have no so-called market supplements but our salary levels do reflect market conditions.

Similarly, from Carleton University, the comment:

> Our general system is based in the usual way on floor salaries for the various ranks. We do not have rank

> ceilings, and some salaries may be higher than the floor of the rank above. We find this a sensible practice because fairly often it turns out that such higher salaries seem to be well-justified by experience or performance in some direction, even though promotion has not occurred. In some areas, we had had to offer somewhat higher comparative salaries because of scarcity of good people. But we have kept this practice to a minimum and have endeavoured to iron out differentials as soon as possible. And I think we have been reasonably successful in this as the Faculty Association, which has breakdowns of average salaries by rank and faculty or main division, seems satisfied. I do think it important to keep any such differentials to a minimum and to smooth them out through movements between ranks as soon as possible.

Thus, in many situations where salary overlap occurs, it signals the need for promotion consideration. Such consideration could be made an annual requirement in cases where salary overlap occurs.

A minima-without-maxima system should not be confused with the system widely used in the United States of having no salary schedule at all. An obvious difference is that the minima-no-maxima system does treat the equity questions posed by the great differences in earning power among disciplines. For example, from a western university, this comment:

> I do not mean to imply that floors do not serve a useful purpose. I think they are important, but at the same time there is a danger in trying to make them serve too many functions. As I see it, floors prescribe minima, and no more; and the purpose of this is to maintain a a degree of equity by protecting individual faculty

(especially in the low-priced disciplines) from being neglected.

Accordingly, floors should be raised more or less as the average salary is raised. I have sometimes found administrators reluctant to raise floors on the argument that they should not feel obliged to push up the salaries of the least deserving faculty. But, of course, if floors are not raised for this reason, it implies that the "least deserving" are relatively less deserving than they were before. And, in any event, good procedures for salary adjustments, promotion and tenure and turnover are more suitable for dealing with the undeserving. Floors that are so low that they are non-operative are probably worse than no floors at all, because the apparent salary structure is then illusory.

Should Academic Rank be Abolished?

The issue of the viability of a system of academic rank may seem at first glance peripheral to the question of university salary systems but upon closer inspection is seen to bear a close relationship to salary matters. In fact, the preceding discussion is dependent upon the continuity of academic rank for its pertinence; if academic rank were abolished, further discussion of salary overlap would terminate.

There is current agitation elsewhere in Canada for the abolition of academic rank. The University of British Columbia Faculty Association has proposed to the Board of Governors that rank be abolished at UBC. The rationale for abolition seems to rest primarily on the propostion that rank is currently not related to any functional activity in universities. It is, some allege, not related to ability,

but rather to time; salary, too, is not related to rank, but to longevity; there is no way to equitably assess qualifications for rank and thus a great waste of time occurs in the attempt; and it is inconsistent with academic goals since it serves anti-equilitarian ends. Often, the opponents of academic rank suggest that it be replaced by a dual system of tenured and non-tenured faculty, with no other academic distinction being made.

At The University of Calgary there seems to be little agitation for eliminating the system. At this University, as throughout Canada, there is a close correlation between academic rank and salary--see Table 1. Of additional importance is the fact that at The University of Calgary teaching load is also a function of rank, at least in terms of contact hours. It is claimed by the proponents of academic rank that it forces an appraisal of faculty performance in terms of University objectives. Thus, with a workable if not optimal promotion system, rank implies achievement rather than simply longevity. Proponents of continued academic rank do not always opt for the present system of professor, associate professor, assistant professor and lecturer and/or instructor. Some would prefer the British tradition--senior lecturer, reader, etc.--because it would suggest a more functional division of labor; or an expanded system to include professional titles such as senior lecturer.

Perhaps for these latter reasons, there seems to be a popular belief at The University of Calgary that academic rank should be retained--though this is by no means a unanimous verdict. It is,

however, strong enough to suggest that the difficult questions of salary schedule flexibility will have to be resolved within the context of continued differences in academic rank.[1]

II. The Question of Merit Increments

Forms of Salary Adjustments other than Merit Increments

Although it is occasionally alleged that all salary increases in a university should take the form of merit increments, this philosophy has not prevailed in any Canadian university analyzed in this study. Indeed, there is a wide variety of factors outside individual merit that occasions salary increases in Canadian universities. As a preface to the discussion of merit increments, some of the other forms of salary adjustments will be identified.

Probably the most common criterion for non-merit increments is an upward change in the cost-of-living, commonly measured for salary purposes by changes in the consumer price index compiled by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics. The objective, of course, is to prevent absolute declines in real income as the value of the dollar declines. In the words of a pragmatic university president in the east: "One should attempt to keep pace with the cost-of-living. People hate losing ground."

A second common ground for salary increases aside from merit increments relates to increases in national productivity. If a specified

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[1] For a recent discussion of the viability of academic rank, see the statements by Professors Walter Young and Cyril Belshaw in UBC Alumni Chronicle, Spring, 1971.

measure of national productivity is growing in real terms at a rate of 3-5 per cent, e.g., gross national product, gross national product per capita, or personal income, this will often form the basis for a separate increase in faculty salaries. Table 3 illustrates the use of cost-of-living and productivity criteria--the salary schedule at the University of Prince Edward Island for the academic year 1971-1972. Both factors are computed on a percentage basis. The table also illustrates the step increases in salary associated with merit increments. Cost-of-lving increments range from $357 for assistant professors, to $462 for associates, and $584 for full rank. Productivity increments range from $238 for assistants, $308 for associates, and $389 for full professors. These two elements combine for an increase in the basic salary schedule of $595 for assistant professors; $770 for associate professors; and $873 for full professors. In this instance, the productivity increase is withheld from the first salary level at each rank, evidently for promotion reasons.

The question of productivity adjustments raises interesting issues with regard to the appropriate size of the adjustment. If the national index being used is four per cent, should this amount be used as the criterion? Should some part of this productivity increase be reserved for individual merit increments? Alternatively, if educational services are peculiarly responsible for increaes in national productivity--economic growth through technological change, for example--should the productivity factor at universities be greater than the national productivity increase?

A detailed statement of criteria for university salary

Table 3 - COST-OF-LIVING AND PRODUCTIVITY SALARY ADJUSTMENTS

University of Prince Edward Island, 1971-72

Year In Rank 71-72	Movement Through Rank Index	Minimum Salary Before Adj.	Adj. I (Cost of Living)	Adj. II (Productivity)	1971-72 Proposed Scale of Minimums
A. Rank Immediately Below Assistant Professor					
1	0.80	8,640	274	-	8914
2	0.83	8,964	274	183	9421
3	0.86	9,288	274	183	9745
4	0.89	9,612	274	183	10069
4+	0.89	9,612	274	183	10069
B. Assistant Professor					
1	1.00	10,800	357	-	11157
2	1.04	11,232	357	238	11827
3	1.08	11,664	357	238	12259
4	1.12	12,096	357	238	12691
5	1.16	12,528	357	238	13123
6	1.20	12,960	357	238	13555
6+	1.20	12,960	357	238	13555
C. Associate Professor					
1	1.30	14,040	462	-	14502
2	1.35	14,580	462	308	15350
3	1.40	15,120	462	308	15890
4	1.45	15,660	462	308	16430
5	1.50	16,200	462	308	16970
6	1.55	16,740	462	308	17510
6+	1.55	16,740	462	308	17510
D. Full Professor					
1	1.65	17,820	584	-	18404
2	1.71	18,468	584	389	19441
3	1.77	19,116	584	389	20089
4	1.83	19,764	584	389	20737
5	1.89	20,412	584	389	21385
6	1.95	21,060	584	389	22033
6+	1.95	21,060	584	389	22033

Source: Correspondence from administrative officials at the University of Prince Edward Island.

increases is provided by the Ontario Confederation of University Faculty Association's Newsletter of January, 1971:

1. OCUFA's Salary Objectives

OCUFA's salary objective for 1971-1972 is 9.1% increase for all continuing faculty. This increase is the amount needed simply to maintain an individual in a constant purchasing power position over time. A university cannot justify retaining the services of an individual who does not merit at least this amount of financial reward for his services. Additionally, provision must be made for progress through the ranks and merit increments without which the salary profile as it now exists could not be maintained over time and the incentives it provides would deteriorate. Finally, the total salary profile of university teachers in the province, needs to be adjusted upward in order to redress a steadily deteriorating situation vis-à-vis other professional groups including non-university teachers and other education personnel.

Because some amendments have been made in these factors this year the formula for calculating these percentage increments is included here.

A	Factors	1970-1971
A1	cost-of-living index	4.1
A2	purchasing power maintenance	1.1
A3	share of increase in national wealth	3.9
A4	provision for basic career progress	2.6

Note that these "A" factor percentages relate to 1970-1971 discussions. In addition to these "A" factors, OCUFA includes a "B" factor with a value of 8 per cent.

Our profession is in competition with other major professions for the recruitment of highly talented graduates. A failure to attract them now will lead to the perpetuation of the current situation into the 80's. Thus, even if the market argument were based on sound factual premises, it would be a mistake to base a salary policy on it when one takes into account the consequences of such a policy for the future.

The 8.0% adjustment is necessary to halt the widening of the gap which is indicated by the examination of salaries paid at other educational and research institutions financed directly or indirectly out of public funds, not to mention the

> deteriorating position of university teachers vis-à-vis other highly trained personnel (see Appendix IV).[1]

"Appendix IV" is reproduced here as Table 4.

Memorial University of Newfoundland has two components in its salary structure in addition to merit increments. The first is a cost of living factor. The second is "a small adjustment factor to ensure that new appointments will not be made at the same salary as appointments made the previous year. That is, there is a small differential varying from 1 to 2% to recognize the one year experience." Evidently this element is worked out in an automatic increase in the basic salary schedule from year to year.

Waterloo Lutheran University uses a common format in making salary adjustments. Apart from merit increments, adjustments are made for increases in the cost-of-living plus an element designed to provide a share of increasing national wealth--the productivity factor discussed previously.

At the University of Toronto, salary increases for 1971-1972 are broken down into a 3 per cent cost-of-living factor and a merit factor of 4 per cent.

A "working paper" used as background for salary discussions at The University of Calgary suggests the following system of salary elements:

Salary Adjustments

> Salary adjustments should perhaps be examined in two categories--the first being adjustments pertaining to the staff

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[1] Ontario Confederation of University Faculty Associations, Newsletter, January, 1971, pp. 6-7.

Table 4 - STANDARDIZED LIFE-TIME EARNINGS OF CERTAIN PROFESSIONAL MANPOWER, CANADA 1956-1966

Educational Level	Standardized Life-time Earnings 1956 $	1966 $	Increase %
1. B.A.			
Arts	160,091	244,615	52.80
Science	190,860	268,384	41.14
Engineering	191,928	303,435	58.10
Agriculture	162,153	247,417	52.58
2. M.A.			
Arts	189,845	272,804	43.71
Science	271,577	339,384	24.96
Engineering	306,374	353,183	15.28
Agriculture	214,756	304,746	41.90
3. Ph.D.			
Arts	244,583	337,735	38.08
Science	322,615	418,600	29.74
Engineering	313,247	429,459	37.10
Agriculture	260,866	371,950	42.58
4. Professional Degrees			
Architecture	409,126	636,740	55.61
Dentistry	355,880	499,032	40.02
Law	372,204	629,857	69.49
Medicine			
a) Gen. Prac.	380,705	680,530	78.75
b) Med. Specialty	458,018	875,847	91.23
c) Surg. Specialty	521,120	1,001,829	92.24

Source: Table 3 from Health Services, Volume 3 of the Task Force Reports on the Cost of Health Services in Canada. Published under the authority of the Honourable John C. Munro, PC, MP, Minister of National Health and Welfare.

Presented in Ontario Confederation of Faculty Associations, Newsletter, January, 1971.

as a whole and the second pertaining to a specific person or specific groups of persons.

A. General salary adjustments

These adjustments would normally be reflected in a change in the base salaries of each rank although there may be occasions when the current staff would be entitled to an adjustment to meet cost of living increases, but the market situation would not really warrant a change in the basic salary scale. These general adjustments are made to take into account such items as:

1. changes in cost of living
2. changes in relative market demand
3. general increases in the salary levels of all groups in society

B. Particular salary adjustments

These adjustments would pertain to individuals or specific groups of individuals to reflect:

1. salary correction of an individual having been initially appointed at too low a level for his qualifications or contribution
2. salary adjustments for an individual or persons in a particular discipline or speciality to reflect changes in market demand
3. salary adjustments to reflect changes in responsibility or for certain specific continuing contribution to the University

Salary Increments

Salary increments should basically be used as a means of recognizing the personal development of an individual and his increasing value to the institution and to society.

Similarly at Simon Fraser University, the following propositions have been advanced in salary discussions:

The propositions reflect those objectives which should be part of a comprehensive academic salary policy:

1. recognition of changes in the cost of living
2. recognition of changes in market conditions for faculty members
3. recognition of individual merit

4. meaningful floor and ceiling salary differentials between ranks
5. consistency of merit recognition across the University

The introduction of a national cost of living variable protects the individual against any diminishment in the purchasing power of his salary dollars. Since competition for salary is on a nationwide basis, national indices ought to be utilized in any intra-University adjustments to reflect changes in this variable. Recognizing that a lag will exist between the actual occurrence of any change in the cost of living and its publication in statistical form, reflection of this factor in annual salary levels will require either forecasts or averages based upon historical changes. Implementation of this factor to take the form of across-the-board increases in the floors and ceilings associated with each rank as well as in individual salary levels.

A reflection of market conditions in annual salary adjustments requires that the University identify that institution or institutions with whom it aspires to compete in the labour market. The introduction of market conditions as a second variable is an effort to insure that the University maintains a competitive position vis-à-vis both attraction and retention. In order to accomplish this objective, any shift in salary ranges must be accompanied by comparable shifts in the salaries of present staff.

Thus, there is a wide variety of systems and proposed system elements related to salary increases apart from merit increments. The reason for discussing them here in some detail is to emphasize the basic differences in concepts of salary adjustment; and to suggest that an optimal approach to salary adjustment probably requires a strict separation of merit increases from other salary elements.

For example, one university reports as follows on its merit system:

We firmly believe in merit increments and have put 30-40% of the funds for increases into this category. We have tried various schemes for distribution, all of which have centred about a rating system. For example, each faculty member is given a rating number from 1-5 by the departmental committee. Those who rate 1 receive no selective increase, those with 5 the maximum. We set a dollar value for each rank in consultation with the Faculty Association. The ratings are

> made in the departments taking into account teaching, research and scholarship, and service to the University and community. . . . We call the increases 'selective' rather than 'merit' because this allows us to adjust people simply because they are out of line with their associates although they may not be more meritorious (underlining supplied).

The last sentence in the quotation illustrates the need for isolating merit from other kinds of salary adjustment, including the equity problem of differential salaries for persons of similar ability. In the above system, it would appear imperative to separate rather clearly merit increments from other salary adjustments, including those necessary to curb inequities and inefficiencies that have developed in the salary structure over time. Serious distortion in the merit system will result otherwise.

The Concept of Merit Increments

Opinions and practices vary widely from person-to-person and place-to-place with regard to what constitutes an optimal merit increment system.

One difficulty in analyzing the concept of merit increments derives from the nomenclature that has evolved in various universities at various times with regard to the definition of a merit increment. One of the potentially useful, but somewhat confused, synonyms for or forms of merit increment has been the phrase, "normal increment." For example, in the handbook distributed to the faculty of The University of Calgary in 1969 was the following description of "salary increments."

> All salary increments (as distinct from scale or general adjustments) are based on merit and are not automatic. There is, however, an incremental structure of 'normal' increments, the amounts of which are from time to time determined by the Board as a result of discussion with the Faculty Association.

> It is the responsibility of the Head of the Department to initiate proposals for all increments in his department.
>
> An Instructor, Assistant Professor or Associate Professor who has satisfactorily carried out his duties will normally receive an annual salary increment. Advancement through the salary steps of these ranks will normally be steady so long as the faculty member carries out his duties in a satisfactory manner. Merit will come under more detailed scrutiny as progress through the rank of Associate Professor occurs and, in the course of this progression, emphasis in the evaluation of performance will shift from competence towards special merit. For any person in this group cause must be shown by the Head of the Department to the Faculty Promotions Committee if it is proposed to grant less than a normal increment.[1]

The language used in discussing "salary increments" is modified in the 1970 handbook as follows:

> All salary increments (as distinct from across-the-board adjustments) are based on merit and are not automatic. There is, however, a differential increment structure, the amounts of which at each rank are from time to time determined by the Board as a result of discussion with the Faculty Association.[2]

The use of the word normal is reserved for discussion of promotion. For example,

> It is the duty of the Head of the Department to notify a faculty member promptly if <u>normal</u> advancement is not being recommended. The Faculty Promotions Committee shall pay particular attention to such recommendations, and the Dean shall also notify, in writing, the faculty member and the Vice-President (Academic) of the recommendation to <u>deny</u> normal advancement.[3]

An important, if somewhat obvious, principle emerges from this handbook discussion of salary increments and promotion. Given

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[1]The University of Calgary, <u>Information for Appointees to the Regular, Full-time Academic Staff (Instructional)</u>, undated, p. 5.

[2]The University of Calgary, <u>Handbook for Faculty</u>, 1970, p. 23.

[3]<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 12.

the formulation of salary increment and promotion decisions within the context of a specified salary structure, the concept of a normal merit increment is necessarily tied to normal progression toward promotion. That is, given a salary schedule with minima by rank, with or without maxima by rank, there is inevitably built into the salary structure some conception of how long it should normally take an academic to progress through the ranks. At The University of Calgary this is about seven years for the assistant and associate professor ranks, and this appears to be typical of most Canadian universities. Normal does not connote average, unless the particular university has an average faculty. If the faculty is superior, the average time of rank progression will be less than normal; if the faculty is inferior, the average time of rank progression will be greater than normal. Thus, a normal merit increment should accrue to those persons who demonstrate normal progress through the ranks, i.e., those who demonstrate normal progress toward meeting the criteria for promotion. Thus, the criteria for promotion turn out to be the same as the annual criteria for normal increments, i.e., specified achievement in teaching, scholarship and service to the university and community, in most universities.

If properly defined, then, the concept of a normal merit increment need not confuse the discussion of merit increments, but actually defines the norm for annual merit salary adjustments. A faculty member demonstrating less than normal progress toward the next rank should be rewarded with less than the normal merit increment and a faculty member demonstrating greater than normal progress toward the next rank should be rewarded with more than the normal merit increment.

This, of course, is built into the salary schedule at The University of Calgary where normal merit increments for assistant professors are $530; for associate professors, $680; for full professors, $800; and for the rank immediately below assistant professor, $450. The attainment of this level of increment implies normal or satisfactory progress toward promotion according to the assumptions built into the schedule with regard to the proper number of years in rank. To repeat, The University of Calgary's seven-year assumption seems to be characteristic of the overwhelming majority of universities in Canada. At the University of Winnipeg, for example, the concept of normal merit increment denotes normal progress toward promotion in about seven years. About 10 per cent of the faculty will receive less than this normal merit increment and about 10 per cent will receive more than a normal merit increment in a representative year. Of course, the question of normal merit increments for full professors is more difficult because there is no promotion sequence to be quantified annually in the form of merit increment. In this case, the concept of a merit increment must be defined in relation to expected performance unrelated to promotion considerations.

All this does not imply that the term normal merit increment is clearly superior to other phrases that can be used in discussing the characteristics of merit systems. As used in this discussion, however, the phrase normal merit increment has the advantage of clearly identifying the necessary relationship between merit increments and normal progression through the academic ranks.

There are, as would be expected, semantic problems in the use

of the term normal merit increments. Some respondents use the phrase standard increment to mean the same thing, some use the phrase standard increment to mean normal merit increment as defined above, but use the term merit increment to refer to some performance standard greater than is implied by normal progress through the academic ranks. An administrator at The University of Calgary has remarked that,

> the question of merit increments is a serious one, but the first principle which must be established and stringently adhered to is that when a person performs according to the expectation of his assignment, he should be thanked but should not be awarded any merit increment unless he exceeds the boundaries of his assignment in a way that is meaningful to the University.

Presumably, this criterion could be accommodated within the context of normal merit increment by awarding double or triple increments for superior performance, i.e. greater than normal progression toward promotion.

Finally, attention is called to the fact that the phrase normal increment has not been used in this analysis; the word normal has been used in conjunction with the word merit in the phrase normal merit increment. The significance of this distinction will be made clear in the next section.

The Concept of Automatic Increments

What appears to trouble most people who have responded to this problem is the relationship between normal merit increments (or standard merit increments) and the automaticity with which they are awarded. As a matter of definition, it should be recorded that normal merit increments as defined in the previous section are not automatic but imply positive achievement before they can be awarded. That is,

they are merit increments, earned and not awarded automatically as a function of time. In a competent university faculty, it should be expected that relatively few members will not be able to achieve the normal professional progress implied by a normal merit increment. If the faculty not worthy of a normal merit increment is greater than some arbitrary percentage, say 10-15 per cent, it speaks ill for the university's recruiting process. Nonetheless, a normal merit increase involves a deliberate, systematic effort by departments, heads, deans and committeess to assess academic performance in relation to specified professional standards. If the standards are not specified, then an intolerable uncertainty is likely to exist which may have an undesirable effect on academic efficiency. Specification of standards, however, does not imply some easy translation of performance into quantifiable terms.

Most of the persons contacted personally or via correspondence during this study are of the opinion that normal merit increments are earned and therefore are not automatic. There are academics and administrators, however, who make a strong case for automatic increments. For example, from a prominent university president:

> Having seen merit increments year after year being given on an automatic basis, it is my belief that they should be made automatic within a particular rank. It is foolish, and a waste of time, in my opinion, to attempt to evaluate the work of every member of staff every year. After initial appointment at the assistant or associate professor rank, 7 or 8 increments respectively should be granted on a statutory basis. However, careful scrutiny should be given to a persons' work before a promotion is given. The committee would usually have 7 or 8 years of work to assess, and with this amount of information a reasonable judgement might be made.

From a president of another university,

As the former head of a very large department, I dislike the usual kind of merit system. I much prefer a fast, normal, and slow (or nil) promotion system. The typical merit system poses all sorts of problems. Does one have merit when a book is finished, accepted for publication, published, or favorably reviewed? I know someone who parlayed his thesis through all those stages to a full professorship. If someone has merit one year, can he lose it the next? On a normal, fast, slow promotion system, however, you can make a total judgement based on your expectations of his meeting the criteria for the next rank. If the difference in salary between two ranks is divided into a number of segments equal to the normal time in rank, something like 80%, say, should go through the assistant professor rank in the normal time, 60% through the associate rank in the normal time (or whatever the situation is or should be in the institution). I would expect no more than 10% to go more rapidly than normal through either rank. I would expect, say, 10% to take longer to go through the assistant rank, and 30% to take longer to go through the associate rank. Some may never get through either rank.

The great advantage, I think, of such a system is that it is easier to define the criteria for the ranks than to define merit in any given year. It is also much better to make judgements on people only every three years or so. I found it intolerable in a department to have to make judgements every year. You were no sooner through the appeals for one year than you were starting all over again. And the bitterness built up every year.

I would also make increments for the first three years in each rank automatic, subject to minimum satisfactory performance. One should be able to back one's judgement that the appointment or the promotion was justified for that long. If someone does start slacking, it is unlikely that he is going to do it the moment he is promoted or appointed. And there are other ways of showing him the error of his ways.

Under the system I favour, once the period of automatic increments is passed, there is basically one kind of decision to make: is this man working in such a way that he is likely to meet the criteria for promotion in the normal way, less than normal, more than normal. If it is less, then some years he will not get the 'through the rank' increment. If it is more, in some years he will get 1 1/2 or 2 'through the rank' increments. (I prefer doubles). Most will be normal.

Thus, a variation of an automatic increment involves automaticity

only for the first three years in rank, subject to some minimal performance standard.

Yet another variation of automatic or semi-automatic increments is suggested by the following opinion of a western economist:

> Once the average increase to continuing staff is determined, the question of distribution of increase can be addressed. My own inclination (which, of course, is not shared by some of my colleages) is toward flexibility, and discretion on the part of departments. The largest proportion of the budget for salary increases should be devoted to what might be called a 'standard increment'. We normally calculate the required standard increment by rank. Most faculty would receive this standard increment, but a small fraction (the 'least deserving') receive less (or zero increase, as long as they do not fall below the floor).
>
> The remaining portion of the salary budget can be devoted to merit increases, to supplement the standard increase for particularly outstanding people. The appropriate fraction of the budget to devote to this purpose is a matter of judgement: but merit increases should be recognizable as significant, hence, the fraction receiving them should be small and the amount appreciable.
>
> Thus, the administrative decisions in any year are reduced to a recognition, on the part of each professor's Head or senior colleagues, of the relatively few people in the department who are notably less deserving, and the relatively few who are outstanding. Based on my experience, this is quite easy, and it is as much as it is necessary to do to maintain an equitable distribution of salaries in the long run.
>
> But administrators should be encouraged to exercise their discretion in recognition of excellence or incompetence. In small departments, particularly, there is a temptation to distribute the increases equally to avoid unpleasantness. A possible safeguard is to make the merit increment budget available only on the basis of specific recommendations, and up to some limit in numbers. And by allowing administrators to redistribute the budgetary savings from the less-than-standard increments to the least deserving. But if the latter is carried too far, the system becomes totally discretionary.

Strongly opposed to the idea of automatic increments is the conceptual approach to salary issues of a distinguished professor at

The University of Calgary:

> Salaries are of central significance to employees and are likely to influence every aspect of the individual's relation to an institution. Decisions about salaries therefore deserve the most careful consideration and it should be expected that a lot of time will be spent on the general problems, as well as the specific salary of each individual.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> It is impossible that financial rewards will be absolutely 'fair' and, even less possible, to expect that they will appear to be absolutely fair. Nevertheless, the university's duty is to tempt to minimize unfairness. We should not dismiss the roblem as insoluble and do little about it.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Salaries and increments should be used to reward what the university wishes to encourage. When the university does not reward activities which it wishes to encourage, such activities are likely to decrease.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Burdens are so unfairly shared and rewarded that many of the faculty members who have made great sacrifices on behalf of the university now feel that they have been fools.

The fear is expressed by other members of faculty, at The University of Calgary and elsewhere, that an automatic increment system runs the serious danger of rewarding longevity at the cost of performance. The impact of this system of rewards for the least deserving is to penalize the most deserving, with the concomitant tendency to lose the most able to competing institutions or markets.

By way of repetition, when the phrase "normal merit increment" is used in this study, it refers to a salary adjustment which is discretionary rather than automatic, based on some substantive professional performance rather than simply longevity, and attuned to a specified

period of progress through academic ranks.

Unless The University of Calgary faculty is truly outstanding, which may well be the case, the data in Tables 5, 6 and 7 on merit increments by rank for the University for three academic years suggest that merit increments had become almost automatic by 1970-1971 For example in that year, fewer than 3 per cent of the University faculty received less than one merit increment--16 out of 569. In 1971-1972, on the other hand, about 12 per cent of the University faculty received less than one merit increment. The change derived from a more rigorous definition of professional performance standards.

The difficulty of making judgements about annual increments has given rise to some support for a merit increment system in which these discretionary judgements are made every two or even three years rather than annually. A sound case can be made for awarding merit increments every two or three years because of the greater array of information that can be made available for judgement on that basis. One difficulty with this system is the problem of innovating it under an annual budget system. Perhaps, when annual performance has to be judged for the awarding of annual merit increments, the functional relationship between these judgements and promotion decisions--when fully realized and operational--will make the annual decisions somewhat less traumatic.

Still it would be feasible to adjust salaries every year for all other reasons than merit, such as cost-of-living, productivity, etc.; and to make the decision about normal progress toward promotion every two or three years. In this event, a normal merit increment would be

TABLE 5

U N I V E R S I T Y S U M M A R Y

Increments (1970-71)

(after GPC)

	0.00	0.50	1.00	1.25	1.50	1.75	2.00	2.25	2.50	3.00	AVERAGE
Assistant Professor	9	4	144 (11P)	19 (3P)	36 (13P)	1	32 (7P)	2 (2P)			1.19
Associate Professor	2	1	111 (6P)	27 (1P)	47 (5P)	8 (1P)	22 (3P)	1 (1P)	3	1	1.29
Full Professor		5	39	18	14	1	21			1	1.35

Summary of changes made and appeals heard by GPC (for 1970-71)

a) GPC raised 5 FPC recommendations (2, A & S; 2, Med.; 1, Phys.Ed.)

b) GPC denied 16 appeals for raises from FPC recommendations (12, A & S; 1, Eng.; 3, Ed.)

c) GPC approved 7 appeals for raises from FPC recommendations (5, A & S; 1, F/A; 1, Bus.)

d) One appeal from Fine Arts recommendation Pending

Note: (P) means promoted.

TABLE 6

U N I V E R S I T Y S U M M A R Y

Increments (1969-70)

(after GPC)

	0.00	0.50	1.00	1.25	1.50	1.75	2.00	2.50	2.75	3.00	AVERAGE
Assistant Professor	4	8	125 (13P)	8 (3P)	33 (11P)	1 (1P)	26 (8P)	2 (2P)	1 (1P)	1 (1P)	1.21
Associate Professor	4	3	83 (5P)	6	26 (3P)	4 (1P)	35 (1P)	1		2	1.33
Full Professor			34	7	10		13				1.31

Summary of changes made and appeals heard by GPC (for 1969-70)

a) GPC raised 5 FPC recommendations (1 each in: A & S, Eng., F/A, Ed., & Med.)

b) GPC lowered 6 FPC recommendations (1, A & S; 3, F/A; and 2, Phys.Ed.)

c) GPC approved 11 appeals and raised FPC recommendation (6,A & S; 1, Eng.; 2, F/A; and 2, Business)

d) GPC denied 3 appeals, no change in FPC recommendation (2, A & S; and 1, Eng.)

Note: (P) means promoted

TABLE 7

UNIVERSITY SUMMARY

Increments (1968-69)

(after GPC)

	0.00	0.50	1.00	1.50	1.75	2.00	2.25	2.50	3.00	3.00+	AVERAGE
Assistant Professor	4	1	123 (9P)	10 (4P)	2	31		1 (1P)	7 (3P)	1(3.50)	1.28
Associate Professor	5	1	67 (6P)	3 (1P)		33 (2P)	1 (1P)	1 (1P)	7	1(4.00)	1.41
Full Professor	2		18	1		18			1		1.46

Summary of changes made and appeals heard by GPC (1968-69)

a) GPC lowered 16 FPC recommendations (1, Soc.Welf.; 3, A & S; 8, Fine Arts; 4, Education)

b) GPC raised 1 FPC recommendation (Phys. Ed.)

c) GPC approved 1 appeal, raised FPC recommendation (A & S)

Note: (P) means promoted

twice or three times as large as it is now, and progress toward rank promotion would be assessed two, three or four times rather than six, seven, or eight (depending upon the normal expectancy of time in rank--six, seven or eight years). Faculties, of course, should be expected to harbor some reservations about this system since to faculty members there is an opportunity cost--i.e., the difference between the present value of an increment and the value of an increment one year hence. These reservations could be deflated somewhat through a system of automatic partial increments between the years when vital increment decisions are made; or by a system of automatic annual increments which could be rescinded, if necessary, when merit decisions are made.

Merit Systems in Canada

The selected illustrations that follow provide an idea of the range of merit systems currently used in Canada.

The University of Saskatchewan uses a combination of automatic increases within rank--an automatic normal merit increment--plus special increases for special merit.

> 1971-1972 will see us apply special increases to 70 of 138 full Professors, 40 of 238 Associate Professors, and 60 of 268 Assistant Professors. We apply them occasionally at the rank of Lecturer and Instructor. In total we have applied 187 special increases to 762 members of Faculty--roughly 25%. I am under the impression that this is somewhat higher this year than previously and may relate to the reduction of our scale increase to the $350-400 range.

The University of Saskatchewan (Regina Campus) uses much the same system, specifying in correspondence, however, that the regular (automatic) increments may be withheld for cause if the reasons are specified. These regular (automatic) increments do not apply to ranks below assistant professor nor to full professors beyond the third step in rank. While the University's promotions committees study questions

of merit, promotion and equity, the latter is separated from merit and promotion and studied on an ad hoc basis as the occasion demands. Thus, the difficult decisions relating to merit and promotion are kept separate from questions relating to the equity of original salaries, etc. All associate professors at the University, having reached the mid-point of the salary scale for that rank can progress past that point only upon a forthcoming recommendation that they be so promoted. The general review provided for above includes all recommendations for promotion past this mid-point.

The University of Winnipeg uses the concept of a normal increment.

> The question of merit increments follows a fairly definite pattern of moving a person normally through the rank in a seven-year period. He moves through the rank on the basis of merit rating, insofar as we take into consideration what knowledge we have concerning his teaching ability, his research work and his contribution to the general life of the academic community and/or the community beyond. This evaluation, of course, is much easier in a smaller institution, like ours, where we have the opportunity to know most of the staff people more intimately. Nonetheless, we depend upon recommendations from ' department and assess these in relation to the other knowledge we have. To the normal increment we may well add a merit increase for those who have demonstrated their ability in one or all of the areas mentioned and this may include as many as 10% of the rank. At the same time, we may give another 10% of that rank less than the usual increment, indicating that we do not consider that they are performing at a level expected of them.

At Queen's University about half or a little more than half the annual salary adjustment is used for merit increments. For 1971-1972, for example, a 4 per cent salary increase relates to merit, 3 per cent to scale, and 1 per cent to promotions and special circumstances. In this case, scale increases represent automatic increments to staff, as

is true for all universities studied when the basic scale rates are increased. Merit increases, then, relate to movement through the ranks according to specified expectations.

At St. Francis Xavier University,

> We do provide merit increments, but have no set policy. The total number and size and the recipients are determined by the Dean of the individual faculty. The total amount is budgeted a year in advance and has generally been a very small amount, approximately 1% of the total faculty salary budget. This arrangement is unsuitable to the Deans, who would like to increase the amount in the merit basket and reduce correspondingly the amount awarded as a cost-of-living bonus or as the regular increment. The individual merit increases have been given to no more than 5 per cent of the staff in any year and vary in size from $200 to $1,000.

At the University of Guelph some 30-40 per cent of funds for salary increases are used for merit (special) increments; the other 60-70 per cent goes for other salary adjustments. At Guelph a departmental committee is responsible for ranking each departmental member on a specified scale.

At the University of New Brunswick, the step increases within rank are referred to as merit increases, and, again, correspond to what has been defined above as normal merit increments. They are not automatic, some persons may receive no merit increases and in exceptional cases a double merit increment may be awarded.

At Acadia University the term merit increment is reserved for special circumstances.

> Whenever a faculty member is given an outstanding recommendation by the Head of his department and it is recognized by the Dean of the Faculty or School concerned and by others who are in a position to know of the person's performance, a merit increment is given. We have no specific limit on the number of these that may be given by Department, School, or Faculty. The size

of the increment has varied according to the circumstances.

Waterloo Lutheran Universi·· has moved from a

rigid schedule of stated minimums, maximums, and inflexible annual increments 'for satisfactory service', to a flexible basic salary schedule to be used essentially for recruitment purposes, and as a guide in establishing a new staff member's salary.

In addition,

A Merit Committee was established as an advisory committee to the President. Committee membership included the Vice-President: Academic; the Dean of the particular faculty involved; the Chairman of the particular department, and four faculty members of the University at large. The faculty members consist of three professors above the assistant rank and one assistant professor, recommended to the President by the W. L. U. Faculty Council. The term for the faculty members is two years, with half the faculty members retiring each year.

The merit stipends are determined by a very flexible schedule, classified in categories ranging from A to C for normal awards, with provision for special stipends for outstanding service.

The total of merit stipends must, of course, be within a predetermined budget figure.

First year experience with this system was excellent. The Merit Committee determined criteria which was deemed workable and relevant, using the following reports as sources of information for merit consideration:

(1) Faculty Report: A factual statement by the faculty member of his academic activities and development during the preceding year.

(2) Student Evaluation Report (when available).

(3) Chairman's Report: Contribution of the faculty member to the development and effective operation of the department.

(4) Dean's Report: Factual statement of the member's contribution to the development and effective operation of the University.

(5) Vice-President: Academic report: General evaluation concerning the individual faculty member.

In summary, salary increases resulting from the increase in salary scale minimas are intended to compensate for:

(a) Increased cost of living, and

(b) Share of increasing national wealth.

Merit increases are awarded for individual performance and effective contribution to the University and the teaching profession.

At Carleton University,

We have avoided, so far at least, increments labelled only as 'merit'. In addition to a general increase related to changes in the floors, we have a further increase each year related to experience, general development, and performance of the individual. These are based on ratings by the department concerned, with the addition of the views of the appropriate dean. In making these assessments we do not use any quantitative criteria, but try to be fair as possible in relating the increments to the work of the person in teaching, research and other service to the University. In practice, we establish a total over-all percentage increase and then work out the individual increments to fit within these and to come out at the established over-all average.

At Sir George Williams University,

Merit increments have taken up a relatively small portion of our available salary money. The Faculty Association pressure has been to maximize the automatic increment at the expense of merit increases In general, an attempt is made to relate an individual's total salary to that of his colleagues, with some particular faculty members taken as bench marks. Adjustment beyond the automatic increases are then recommended by Chairmen to Deans to the Vice-Principle, Academic. To the degree that these recommendations can be met within the small total available, they are accepted.

At Memorial University of Newfoundland,

Each department is supposed to grade the faculty on the basis of a five point scale, and it is the function of the Dean of the Faculty to ensure that the same criteria are being used in each department. . . . One, however, has to be sure of the good judgement of the Deans and of the Heads of Departments to ensure that equity is being done. The size of the increment and the number that can be awarded each year depend upon budgetary factors.

At the University of Western Ontario,

In the last few years, there has been a cost-of-living increase plus merit increases (3% cost-of-living and an average of 5% for merit in 1971-72). Those faculty members whose salary exceeded $25,000.00 were confined to a maximum increase of 8% in 1971-72 regardless of exceptional merit.

The "Proper" Dollar Amount of Merit Increment

While no one has succeeded, for obvious reasons, in quantifying the "proper" dollar amount of merit increment, there has developed a pattern in many Canadian universities of allocating half or more of annual salary adjustments to the merit category. As noted in the previous section, administrations in some universities in which merit increments account for less than half the total salary adjustment would like to increase the percentage allocated to merit increments.

The Faculty Association of The University of Calgary explains the 1971-1972 salary adjustment as follows:

> Based on the average University salary, the package is 3.7% for the academic year 1971-72. The average increment is 4.63%. The combined percentage is 8.33%. This compares favourably with the agreements concluded at the other two Provincial Universities. An additional advantage of our agreement is that 3.7% gain in benefits is presently tax free, with the exception of the increment adjustment in point two (on the average .29%). In terms of taxable dollars the percentage value of the new benefits will be 5.11% to 6.82% depending on the marginal tax rate of the individual.[1]

Thus, considerably more than half the funds to be expended by the University for salary adjustments in 1971-197_ will relate to merit increments. This amount is a function of the size of increment by rank--$800, $680, $530 and $450—and the number of persons in each rank. It is also affected by the average number of increments the Board of Governors chooses to make available for merit purposes. Thus, if the Board decides to award an average of one increment per staff member, the merit increment total will be a smaller part of total salary adjustment than if a higher figure, e.g. 1.5 per staff member, were awarded.

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1 The University of Calgary Faculty Association, Newsletter, Vol. II, No. 11, p. 6.

The only comment received from other universities with regard to the appropriate amount to be allocated to merit increments was volunteered by a prominent university president in the West who suggested that the 4-5 per cent range for merit increments was probably close to an optimal mark. This, in fact, appears to be the range most often used in Canadian universities.

An unresolved question concerns the relationship between the percentage amount of merit increments and national gains in productivity. Are merit increments related to national productivity or is productivity properly a separate element of salary adjustment? Many universities follow the procedure of granting productivity gains based on national economic performance in addition to merit increments, as advocated by the Ontario Confederation of University Faculty Associations. Others appear to reflect productivity increases in their merit increment system.

Policy alternatives in this regard are obviously legion. They range from the system used at The University of Calgary where no mention of productivity gains is made and thus productivity gains are presumably built into the increment system, or some other unidentified salary adjustment; to the system at the University of Prince Edward Island where productivity gains are used in addition to normal merit increments built into progression between ranks.

There is some theoretical analysis available to recommend productivity as a criterion for salary adjustment in universities. Economists working in the field of economic growth, for example, have attempted to identify the sources of this growth process and in so doing have found reason to place heavy emphasis on technology and its

application to the industrial arts as a basic determinant of growth. The role of the university in the development and implementation of this technology, in addition to its impact on the quality of the labour force, lend credence to the claim that average productivity gains should be minimally reflected in university salary adjustments and that this sector of the educational process may indeed warrant additional salary growth on the basis of contributions to national economic growth.[1]

Another possibility with regard to productivity measures is to use provincial rather than national growth indicators as the basis for productivity increments. In Alberta, this would probably mean a larger productivity element in salary adjustment. Using increases in real personal income as a proxy for economic growth from 1950-1969, it is observed that the real annual growth rate in Alberta is in the neighborhood of 5.5 per cent, significantly higher than national growth over the same period.[2]

With regard to the absolute dollar amount of merit increments, as distinct from the percentage of salary increase to be allocated to merit rather than other factors, the fundamental decision that must be made is the amount of time that is considered normal or standard or desirable in each academic rank. As pointed out previously, the number

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[1] See, for example, N. H. Lithwick, Economic Growth in Canada, 2nd ed., 1970, University of Toronto Press.

[2] See, for example, D. A. Seastone, Economic and Demographic Futures in Education: Alberta 1970 to 2005, Alberta Human Resources Research Council, June, 1971.

of steps within each rank in conjunction with the desired salary spread between ranks will determine the size of the normal merit increment associated with normal progression between ranks. This can be illustrated as follows. Suppose the basic salary minima are:

Assistant Professor	$12,000
Associate Professor	$15,500
Full Professor	$20,400

Assume also what appears to be the typical Canadian case, that about seven years in rank is considered normal. Then the assistant and associate professor salary scales are as follows:

Year	Assistant	Associate
First	$12,000	$15,500
Second	$12,500	$16,200
Third	$13,000	$16,900
Fourth	$13,500	$17,600
Fifth	$14,000	$18,300
Sixth	$14,500	$19,000
Seventh	$15,000	$19,700

In this example, it is assumed that the normal rate of progress through an academic rank is seven years; that the normal merit increment will be awarded only if this progress is accomplished; therefore, that the increment is not automatic; and that the normal merit increment is thus a function of normal progression toward the next highest rank. Nothing can be said about average progress or average performance since that is a function of the quality of the faculty involved.

In this example, the number of increments to be awarded should

ideally be determined by the performance of the faculty and the amount of dollars made available accordingly. To award merit increments on a one-to-one ratio to faculty (i.e., 500 faculty, therefore 500 increments) assumes that the faculty performance on the average just matches the normal progression assumptions. This, of course, is only true fortuitously and could be incorrect in either direction. The awarding of an average increment of say, 1.25, affords an opportunity to reward outstanding accomplishment with more than one merit increment without assuming an equal amount of inferior accomplishment by the less deserving.

The suggestion has been made at The University of Calgary and elsewhere that the amount of increment built into the step progression between ranks should be less than the example shown or the amount currently in force at the University. Note that this is not feasible unless the corresponding assumption is made that more than seven years is the normal time in an academic rank. In the illustration used above, the difference between the floor of the assistant and the associate professor scales is $3500. Under the assumption that seven years in rank represent normal progress from assistant to associate professor, the normal merit increment is $500. To lower this amount to $350 is simply to say that it is expected that it will normally take ten years for a person to progress from the rank of assistant to the rank of associate professor.

While this is clearly an alternative merit increment system to the one currently used at the University, there may be some question about making such a change at The University of Calgary when most other Canadian universities appear to operate on the alternative, shorter-progression assumption.

On the other hand, the University's $530 to $800 increment scale is not universal in Canada, as the following data on step increments at McGill University demonstrate:

1971-72 Academic Salaries
McGill University

> Because the amount of the Quebec grant has not yet been announced, there is as of now no final agreement between M.A.U.T. and the Administration on salaries for the coming year. In the interim, the Administration prepared a budget providing for a six per cent increase in average salaries
>
> The minimum increases in this budget follow:

	Professor	Associate	Assistant	Lecturer
Change in floor	$ 300	$ 200	$ 150	$ 150
Value of step	440	440	400	330
Step paid to those appointed to their present rank during or after	1963/64	1966/67	1966/67	1968/69
Minimum Salary 1971-72	$18000	$14000	$10800	$9000

The 10-year-in-rank alternative is defended in terms of the attraction it may have to academics who see the possibility of moving quickly through the professorial ranks because of the availability of a large number of increments. That is, since the normal merit increment under this alternative would be small, it may be possible to encourage excellence in recruitment by emphasizing the possibility of a large number of merit increments for outstanding performance, thus making it possible to move through professorial ranks in fewer years than is normally expected even under the existing system.

No comment was received during this study from sources outside The University of Calgary with regard to the appropriate relationship between the floors of the various academic ranks. The Faculty Association of The University of Calgary has sometimes taken the position that the salary floor for full professor should be about 1.8 times that of the assistant professor. Thus, if the assistant professor floor is $12,000 the floor of full professorial rank would be $21,600.. This 1.8 factor is found in the present system in which the salary floor for full professors is $19,715 and the floor for assistant professors is $10,920.

The Faculty Association suggests the 1.8 factor is necessary for optimal incentive and retention effects within the University's faculty.

Merit Increment Differentials by Rank

The University of Calgary salary system includes a feature characteristic of most Canadian universities--merit increments that increase as a function of higher rank. The University's Faculty Association has formulated a strong case for larger increments for higher ranks, based largely on efficiency considerations. The Association bases its position on differential increments on three factors:

1. Significant differentials in salary increments are necessary to harness long-range incentives of the academic staff within the University;

2. Significant differentials in salary increments by academic rank will thereby tend to minimize resignations of existing staff, particularly those persons of outstanding merit;

3. Significant differentials in salary increments by rank will tend to facilitate hiring of experienced and highly-qualified academics, particularly at the senior level.

Opposition to differential salary increments by rank derive largely from equity considerations. In fact, no negative opinion with regard to differential merit increments by rank observed during the course of this study was based on efficiency factors.

The equity problem most often pointed to is a sub-set of the general set of market phenomena in professional disciplines which finds salaries increasing with age, and hopefully, achievement. It is, of course, true that money income, along with salary increments increase with age and rank. It is also true that by the time a person reaches the full professor level within a university he may be in a position to contemplate a smaller level of personal expenditure by virtue of the fact that his children are approaching maturity. Hence the position that it is the younger academic at the lower rank who needs the larger salary increment because of his relatively larger and increasing family size.

While this latter position is certainly not without merit, all that can be suggested here is that when efficiency and equity considerations are juxtaposed, as may be the case with differential increments, a university may be compelled to opt for efficiency in the salary system, looking elsewhere perhaps for monetary devices to minimize the equity burden thus imposed. For example, universities will frequently provide some housing aid in an effort to minimize some part of the difficulty associated with entrance into the profession.

In the meantime, the University can take some comfort in the fact that its senior academics have laboured through the same process and that universities are in no sense unique in rewarding experience.

Criteria for Merit Increments

The University's 1970 Handbook for Faculty reads as follows with regard to criteria for salary increments: "The criteria used in determining salaries and the awarding of salary increments are the same as those outlined in Section 2 of Part One - 'Criteria for Appointment and Promotion'."[1]

This seemingly innocuous introduction to one section of the Handbook suggests that the University has already realized in operational terms the significance of the relationship between merit increments, normal merit increments and promotion.

The criteria for promotion, as specified in the Handbook are again characteristic of the Canadian approach to salary increments and promotion;

> "Three major criteria arise from the stated functions of the University: Teaching, Scholarship and Service."
>
> Teaching is a major University function. Evaluation of teaching performance and effectiveness include all ways the teacher interacts with students: lecturing, discussion, direction, encouragement and advising. The general reputation enjoyed by the teachers among students and informed peers will form part of such evaluation.
>
> Scholarship, research and other creative activity should normally be measured by the quality of the candidate's work, recognizing the appropriate media for different disciplines.

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[1]The University of Calgary, Handbook for Faculty, November, 1970, p. 23.

> The primary concern of the individual and the University will be the importance of high quality work. Evidence of reputation may be obtained from informed peers within and without the University.
>
> Since the University is a community of scholars, responsible for its own government, merit in the area of service should be measured by the faculty member's record of performance through participation in academic government in matters relevant to the progress and welfare of the institution. Contributions to the community and the nation, particularly in his scholarly or professional role (for example, service on a royal commission or on a national body, consultative work which brings distinction to the University as well as the individual) will be taken into account.[1]

Elsewhere in Canada, the same criteria for salary increment and promotion are fairly standard. Often the criteria are four in number: in addition to teaching and research (scholarship), the service criterion is bifurcated into service to the University and service to the community. At the University of Saskatchewan, for example:

> Factors taken into consideration by review committees include success as a teacher, scholarship, administrative and extension duties, and public service.[2]

At the University of Western Ontario:

> The question of criteria for merit increases does not exist on a uniform basis across the University. Many faculties have merit criteria which centre around three areas: excellence in teaching and/or creative work; excellence in research; excellence in administrative duties. Some departments have worked out elaborate scales to determine merit including evaluation by the faculty member's colleagues as well as his students. It is generally accepted that in order to achieve a large merit increase, a member of faculty should excel in at least one of the above-mentioned areas, but of course, there are always exceptions. I believe it would be wishful thinking to expect a uniform policy on merit increases to be formulated in such a diversity of faculties as exist at U.W.O., or at U. of C. I do feel, however,

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[1] Ibid., p. 5.

[2] Faculty Information Handbook, published by the University of Saskatchewan, 1970, p. 10.

> that it would be worthwhile to study the possibility of having a contract with a given faculty member to work a specified number of hours per week, having him 'opt' for a work-load exclusively in teaching, or research, or administration (or a combination of these) and judge his merit purely on the job he does in the area(s) chosen.

A president of an eastern university suggests the optima is to identify the criteria for promotion and to make regular annual salary increments dependent upon normal progress toward promotion. His criteria for promotion would be: to assistant professor, Ph.D. or equivalent and potentiality for good teaching; to associate professor, ongoing scholarship beyond Ph.D. level and proven good teaching; for full professor, ongoing scholarship and proven good teaching. Scholarship in this definition would include performance in the arts, research into university problems, etc.

At the University of Toronto, the criteria for salary increments are not specified but left to the discretion of the heads and deans in the various faculties.

Each of the criteria discussed above involves significant problems of measurement. Effectiveness in teaching has been mentioned at universities for years but only recently has there been a systematic attempt to measure teaching effectiveness, including deliberate efforts to obtain and consider student evaluations. Research and scholarship have been more easily quantified but there are continuing complaints that the quantity of research effort rather than the quality of the effort has taken precedence in the evaluation of scholarship. Still, there is little controversy that teaching and scholarship, or possibly teaching and/or scholarship, should be central to the salary increment process.

Somewhat more controversial, perhaps more among academics than administrators, is the role of service--to the university or the community. The position is sometimes taken that administrative work within a university should be expected but not rewarded per se via salary increments. A variation of this position is that administrative work, particularly if periodic but time-consuming, should be rewarded by special honoraria which cease when the activity ends. The fear seems to be that some academics will choose to opt more and more for administrative work if it is weighted equally with teaching and scholarship, and will therefore make diminishing contributions to the major functions of the university. This hesitation to reward service to the university and community via salary increments does not appear to represent a majority opinion among academics, certainly not among administrators, but is heard more than occasionally in academic circles.

For example, from a professor at The University of Calgary:

> It is stated that the merit increments are based on the following four factors:
>
> (a) Research or Scholarly Work
> (b) Teaching
> (c) Administrative or Committee Work
> (d) Service to the Community
>
> It is not clear what weight is given to each of these. Furthermore, as will be dealt with later, there may be a question of whether there is equal opportunity for all staff members to prove themselves, in item (c) particularly.
>
> As a general principle, and particularly in a rapidly growing institution like The University of Calgary, which is competing with well established, older institutions, it is necessary to attach primary importance to items (a) and (b) and recognize those who excel in research or scholarly activity and in teaching. The former is what adds to the prestige and standing of the University in the international community of

scholars and in the learned societies. The latter is what attracts students, particularly undergraduates and also enables the University to stand on its own among the Universities in general, and Canadian Universities in particular. Research and teaching are like a pair of eyes, which rank equal in importance.

Viewed in this context, there should be a distinction in the recognition for better performance in terms of factors (a) and (b) as compared to items (c) and (d). Additional remuneration for item (c) could be given as a supplement or as a special recognition without 'ts being in terms of an increment.

. . . . . .

Discussing (c), namely administrative or committee work, some caution needs to be exercised. Selection of people to do work on committees are not always such that everyone has an equal chance whereas opportunity to show excellence in scholarly activity and teaching exists for everyone.

It also happens that membership on committees has a snowballing effect. Once a person is in one, the chances of being on another committee are greater.

Unless definite assessment criteria are established, and objectives clearly spelled out, service to community (d) is a nebulous area. It seems appropriate to give sufficient weight to items (c) and (d) only to tip the scale in the case of border line cases, where it is not possible to arrive at a specific recommendation based purely on the basis of (a) and (b). In other words (c) and (d) should not be detrimental nor have undue weightage in assessing a person.

On the other hand, another professor at The University of Calgary has written:

Community Relations - It is not clear anymore whether these are taken into account during consideration of increments. But clearly at the present stage of delicate relationships between the university and the government, these can be of untold importance. Presumably, because of this, the university has recently strengthened its own official public relation staff. There are some people in the university who are doing more - much more - than others to enhance the university's reputation for involvement in public issues.

Points Systems for Evaluating Academic Performance

Several universities in Canada appear to use some kind of point system in evaluating academic performance during the course of the year. It will be discussed in some detail here, to illustrate innovations at The University of Calgary in this respect and to point out some of the difficulties involved.

During the 1970-1971 academic year, the policy and structure committee of the Department of Economics of the University brought forward for departmental consideration proposals relating to criteria for promotion and annual salary increments. The criteria for promotion were slightly modified and accepted by the department as shown below, along with the committee's explanation of some of the promotion issues. The departmental criteria are not used here as a model of what promotion criteria should be but as illustrative of how universities can seek, if they desire, more specific performance standards.

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

TO: Departmental Faculty May 5, 1971

FROM: Policy and Structure Committee

RE: Criteria for Re-appointment, Promotion and Tenure

The attached statement of proposed criteria for personnel decisions is a revised version of the interim proposals circulated February 24. The major change is the deletion of the proposed point system for awarding merit increments. Most of the comments received by the committee were negative with respect to possible implementation of a point system.

The committee has received from within its membership the opinion that an alternative to the point system would be an advisory committee with final departmental responsibility for the appropriate personnel decisions, including merit increments; and the opinion that another alternative to the point system would be to publish the names of those persons who receive more than one merit increment. The Committee has no formal recommendations to make in these matters.

Unless departmental faculty proposes to the contrary at its next meeting, we will assume the uncertainty associate with the existing merit increment system approaches optimality insofar as this departmental faculty assesses it.

With regard to the attached proposal, the committee has assumed that the departmental faculty would prefer decisions about their personal and professional welfare to be made on the basis of reasonable certainty rather than the relative uncertainty that currently exists. Certainty in this context implies specified criteria to which faculty can direct their performance.

Some members of the department in responding to the interim proposal have interpreted it to mean a downgrading of research activities. Such is not the intent, nor do we feel the implications, of the interim report in any absolute sense. For example, promotion to full rank would still require substantial research performance.

The committee, however, has recommended a re-examination of the relative importance of teaching in some tenure, promotion and re-appointment decisions, and has clearly opted for a relative upgrading of teaching. In this regard, we suggest that we are anticipating changes which will derive from University and Faculty policy in any event. For example, the Faculty of Arts and Science

has approved a program for teaching evaluation which will become effective this coming year. Given this kind of information system, we hope it will be possible for the head and the members of the department to more precisely define the concept of good teaching. Given that the concept is nebulous in the existing University setting, the impression we are trying to convey is that teaching performances need to be improved and that the department can perhaps take the lead in attaching greater significance to improved performance in the classroom. Thus, for example, it is at least possible that the department can encourage those members who choose to emphasize and improve teaching; the result should be an average teaching performance in the department which meets the requirements of good teaching. Needless to say, the practice of good teaching remains as elusive a target for committee members as it does for non-members.

Finally, the attached proposals should be looked upon as essentially experimental in nature, subject to revision by the department as its wisdom is enlarged through experience.

I. Assistant Professor

A. Reappointment

1. Satisfactory teaching, as determined by the head of the department according to criteria specified by the department, Faculty and University

2. Potential for scholarly activity

a. For those assistant professors with the Ph.D. degree in hand, one presentation at a major department workshop

b. For those assistant professors appointed without the Ph.D. degree, completion of the degree during the first three-year appointment; those who do not complete their dissertations by the end of their third year should be required to provide convincing evidence that they are working on it, and should be reappointed for one additional year only with subsequent reappointment conditional upon completion of the degree

3. All members of the department are expected to make positive contributions to at least one departmental committee.

B. Tenure (Tenure decision may come before or after the promotion decision)

1. Good teaching

2. Demonstrated scholarly contributions--minimum of two research papers either published or presented at annual meetings of professional associations or their equivalent

3. Participation in departmental functions, as noted above

4. Outstanding Teaching: in lieu of professional publications, evidence of outstanding teaching in conjunction with one major presentation at a departmental workshop, will justify tenure at the assistant rank.

C. Promotion

1. Good teaching

2. Scholarly contributions--a minimum of three papers read at meetings of recognized professional associations; or two papers published in professional journals; or a major published manuscript that is determined to be of a professional quality.

3. Participation in departmental activity as noted above

4. Outstanding teaching, in lieu of publications, as noted in IB4 above.

II. Associate Professor

A. Reappointment--(will represent the rare case, the ordinary decision relating to tenure).

1. Good teaching

2. Demonstrated scholarly contribution--a minimum of one but ordinarily two professional publications since joining the University of Calgary will be required.

3. At this rank, contributions to Faculty and University as well as departmental committees should be expected.

4. Outstanding teaching--as noted in IB4 above.

B. Tenure--same as assistant except that there should be a minimum of five papers, of which a minimum of two must be published in professional journals. There should exist satisfactory evidence that the candidate has demonstrated a level of scholarship which is deemed necessary for the development of the department.

C. Promotion

1. Good teaching

2. Professional publications—it should be expected that a substantial and significant record has been achieved, including continued publications since joining the University of Calgary.

3. Participation in departmental, Faculty, and University activities as noted above.

4. Outstanding teaching will not constitute adequate grounds for promotion to full rank.

5. Associate and full professors should expect to make various and significant contributions to civic activities, particularly as they can bring their experience and expertise to bear on local, provincial, and national problems.

III. Full Professor

A. Reappointment--reappointment should be limited to those instances where special and unusual circumstances have prevented the individual from demonstrating his scholarship. In such cases, reappointment should be for one year only; tenure will usually be the appropriate decision.

B. Tenure--Demonstrated scholarship and good teaching, including evidence of significant current research activity.

Also distributed at a prior department meeting was a proposed system for evaluating professional performance by members of the department annually for salary increment purposes. The original document read as follows:

Increments in Pay

A. Teaching:

zero points for unsatisfactory

10 points for fair

30 points for good

50 points for outstanding

B. Research:

10 points for an unpublished paper read at a meeting of a

professional association

20 points for a paper published in a professional journal

30 points for a scholarly monograph

50 points for a book

Appropriate adjustments for multiples.

C. Service to Department, Faculty, University and Community

5 points for membership in Department Committee

10 points for Chairmanship of Department Committee

10 points for Faculty and University Committees

5-20 points for multiple service of outstanding value, including service to community.

For assistant professors, 40 points should be necessary for one increment; for associate, 50 points; and for full rank, 60 points. Thus, for example, at the associate rank an individual who is a good teacher (30 points) and publishes one paper (20 points) can expect one increment. Similarly, an individual who is a good teacher, (30 points), who produces an unpublished paper (10 points) and who chairs a departmental Committee (10 points) will also receive one increment; unless these criteria conflict with Faculty and University policy.

It should be realized that the above elements represent guidelines only. In some instances, the department head will have to adjust increments according to the availability of funds; but these guidelines for increments should be of significant value in making necessary adjustments.

Similarly, these guidelines for all four decisions are necessarily subordinate to Faculty and University guidelines. If serious conflicts arise, we should look to the possibility of affecting some change in Faculty and/or University guidelines, at least in selected cases.

Departmental response to the suggested salary increment point system was negative, for the most part. The most negative response is reproduced below, and illustrates the difficulties this innovation may face from some part of the academic community.

TO: Policy and Structure Committee 31st March 1971

SUBJECT: Tentative Criteria for Reappointment. Promotion, Tenure and Salary Increments.

I would like it to be known by the members of this committee that it is my intention to make a mockery out of this proposal in the forthcoming departmental meeting. The whole proposal is at least amusing if not ridiculous. It seems to be the work of a person(s) revealing his(their) own personal values with respect to the nature of scholarship which may only be suitable to the personal interests of a few.

Any attempt in the direction of introducing an arbitrary point valuation system in an academic environment would simply reduce the characteristics of this department to an identical level with that of a typical bureaucratic office where each person employs a personal strategy in order to optimize his monetary gains.

It is unfortunate that one feels the need of reminding the author of this proposal that this is an academic institution not a government office. A scholar or a scientist is not a civil servant to the extent that he can be evaluated on the basis of a similar system as utilized in civil service. It should be clear that the value of a scholar cannot be determined by categorising his activities into well-defined regions. He is a scholar in respect to the totality of his intellectual personality. The fact that the degree of scholarship is related to quality and the type of his teaching on the one hand and the quality and the type of his research on the other does not imply that they can be separated, nor can it be treated as such.

On the other hand as far as his contributions into the matters of administration of the academic institution is concerned, these are a part of his normal duties independent of the level of his scholarship and therefore cannot be considered as a part of any evaluation system.

All in all, I think that any attempt at introducing a well-defined point system in an academic environment is totally ridiculous and will eventually work in the direction of down-grading the academic level in any department. To substitute one arbitrary system with that of another arbitrary but ridiculous system seems to me totally unacceptable.

On a more positive tone, another member of the department suggested that a point system deserved support but that the proposed system was too rigid in its construction.

TO Policy and Structure Committee 5 March 1971

I am in full support of the principle of establishing objective criteria for increments, promotions and tenure. However, I feel that the proposed criteria are too inflexible. To rate a publication by class but to allow no variation for quality, discriminates against the researcher who does a limited quantity of very high quality work. To grant the same evaluation for the General Theory as for Hailstones Principles is not an acceptable system. I would propose ranges of valuation for each type of research. For example

1.	Author of book	20 - 100 points
2.	Monograph	10 - 60 points
3.	Journal article	10 - 50 points
4.	Unpublished paper presented at professional meeting	5 - 20 points

In addition I would add three classes

5.	Notes and book reviews	5 - 15 points
6.	Editorship (Edited book or editorship of a journal)	5 - 25 points
7.	Other research activities	0 - 10 points

For increments, points for all types of research would be considered. For tenure and promotion to associate professor, a minimum number of total research points would be required. Of this total a minimum would have to be earned in types 1 - 4. For promotion to full professor, a minimum number of points would be required in types 1 - 3.

Secondly, I would suggest a bi-annual or possibly a tri-annual review. A faculty member may find his research output does not come evenly. Thus an averaging of two or three years production may be fairer than a yearly accounting.

Finally, I would suggest a bonus be given for research which is clearly relevant to Canadians. This bonus could be worth 0 - 5 points dependent on the value of the research. This would serve as an incentive for faculty to do work on Canada.

With regard to teaching, I note there are four rankings.

1. Outstanding

2. Good

3. Fair

4. Unsatisfactory

Good implies above average. Fair can mean average, but frequently it means only barely acceptable. I would suggest the following scale:

Outstanding	50 points
Good	30 points
Fully adequate	10 points
Poor	-10 points
Unacceptable	-30 points

Fully adequate would be adequate for tenure and promotion if accompanied by sufficient publications and service. Poor teaching would be acceptable only if accompanied by outstanding research. Unacceptable teaching would never be sufficient for tenure or promotion regardless of research.

The idea of a point schedule for salary increment evaluation did not receive enough departmental support to justify the formulation of this variable system, although a substantial case can be made for its superiority over the rigid system originally proposed by the policy and structure committee.

Upon further reflection, it is of some interest to note that the salary increment point system was seldom critiqued in terms of its most vulnerable element--the fact that it did not tie in sufficiently with the promotion system to which it is necessarily subordinate. It is clear that salary increments must be based on the same set of criteria applicable to promotion, as the University 1970 Handbook emphasizes. For this reason, it may not be possible to meaningfully quantify a point system for annual salary increments unless it is related to a promotion

system roughly equivalent, on some quantifiable basis, to seven or eight year's worth of annual increments. The failure of the policy and structure committee of the Department of Economics in submitting a point system for annual salary increments was that it left open the question of the relationship between a point system for annual increments and a non-quantified system for promotion. Consistency requires that both systems be quantified in point terms; or that both systems be left unquantified by points but specified by criteria; or that the relationship between annual point accumulations and unquantified promotion criteria be clearly specified. The latter could be accomplished, if a satisfactory point system for annual merit increments could be constructed, by specifying the number of times within a specified time period a normal merit increment must be earned in order to be promoted to the next highest rank. This is related to, but not as specific as, a promotion system based on some minimum number of points to be accumulated over time.

During the course of this study, no support was registered for a promotion system based on point accumulation. Similarly, little mention was made of an annual point system for merit increments, except in those few instances where faculty members were ranked annually on a 1-5 scale on the basis of their total academic performance.

Opting for a Teaching or Research Specialization

The suggestion by a correspondent at The University of Western Ontario that more choice should be available for academics to practice some specialization in function has developed some following at The University of Calgary also. It has been suggested in both administrative and academic circles that it is not necessary for every faculty member

to devote considerable time and develop considerable skills in both teaching and research, although it will be appropriate to do so in a significant number of cases. Rather, why not allow a faculty member option to emphasize that area of specialty in which he thinks his greatest comparative advantage lies? Thus, there could develop divisions of labor in which teaching professorships and research professorships could co-exist with existing professorships, in which some accomplishment in both areas is expected. Pertinent to the question of merit increment systems, a faculty member could opt in one year or over a specified period of years to be primarily engaged in teaching activities and be judged for increment and promotion purposes on his teaching effectiveness; similarly for research specializations, in which increments and promotion would be determined by the nature of his scholarship.

Not everyone would choose to so specialize and in these cases evaluation for salary increments and promotion would continue on the existing system. Those who opted for a teaching specialty would have their teaching loads correspondingly increased and those who opted for research would have their teaching loads correspondingly reduced. The teaching requirements of the University would determine the numbers of faculty to be engaged in their preferred areas of specialization.

Because of the implied difficulties for professional development, little mention of allowing academics to opt for an administrative specialty has been heard, outside of the options already available for headships, deanships, etc. On the other hand, it is implicit in the democratic structure of universities that those who opted for either teaching or research would still be expected, with rare exceptions, to

participate in the affairs of university government. Similarly, if the University is cognizant of the need for academics to become involved in the affairs of city, province and nation, teaching and research options would not preclude community service as a significant element in salary and promotion decisions.

The major benefit of allowing some choice between teaching and research activities lies in the increased efficiency that attaches to specialization. The case assumes somewhat greater significance in view of recent university efforts across Canada to upgrade the teaching of undergraduate courses.

The cost of such specialization would be the teacher-scholar who is now alone supposed to warrant the title of full professor. The fact that many academics would probably choose to continue a combination of teaching and research minimizes this danger, as they would opt to continue at least the image if not the practice of complete university teacher-scholar.

Reduction in Salary for Non-Performance

The entire discussion of salary adjustments to this point has centred around various techniques which can be used to reward academics for meritorious performance and/or to adjust salaries upward for other reasons, e.g., increases in the cost-of-living. Although no mention of salary reductions for non-performance was made by correspondents outside The University of Calgary during this study, the question has arisen within the University about the possibility of pay cuts for faculty members who have not met professional standards of performance over some

specified period of time.

The problem of academic non-performance, if it exists in any significant dimension, is usually [illegible] refusal to promote or to award salary increments or by dismissal. For non-tenured faculty these techniques appear to be adequate, at least according to the implicit reasoning of the overwhelming number of respondents to this study.

If is, then, tenured faculty which conceivably could represent a problem of non-performance for the University. Although the question of and rationale for tenure lies outside the scope of this study, it should be recorded in passing that tenure never was and is not now intended to provide job security in the face of professional incompetence. Tenure arrangements for faculty are justified, for the most part, as a protection against the loss of academic freedom; as a guarantee of the right of a university faculty to speak the truth, even in unpopular causes; to seek the truth without threat of political, social and economic sanctions; and to criticize the institutional forms a society may take--in other words, to insure the University as a haven for free inquiry.

If this concept of tenure is interpreted by an academic as license for non-performance or premature retirement, it should not stand in the way of suitable penalties. If the non-performance has occurred over a significant period of time, and is verified by acceptable criteria, then dismissal would appear to be the appropriate remedy. If non-performance appears to be temporary and/or there are special circumstances which seem to explain or justify it, then salary reductions might be used as a means of compelling renewed performance.

The most important caveat to the use of salary reductions is that the academic community must be apprised of the circumstances in which salary cuts are contemplated; i.e., university faculty must be shown that both efficiency and equity will be served by occasional income reductions for non-performance. Otherwise, if the impression is given that salary reductions are capricious and arbitrary, faculty morale and total university performance will almost certainly suffer.

It should be pointed out that the income reductions discussed in this section are absolute decreases in money income; holding money income constant in the face of non-performance would also involve a loss of real income over time as price levels increased. This remedy, it has been suggested, is not substantial enough if significant evidence of academic incompetence is demonstrated.

Finally, it may be instructive to note that the problem of non-performance is conceivably most likely for the tenured full professor, in the sense that neither the tenure nor the promotion decision is available for creating performance incentives. Moreover, since it is most difficult for a full professor to receive more than a single salary increment beyond some specified salary level, the opportunity cost of non-performance also declines in this instance. Whether this makes a case for salary reductions or more systematic promotion and tenure considerations is a debatable question.

Merit Increments during Sabbatical Leave

The question of awarding merit increments while a faculty member is on sabbatical leave comes back to the problem of the automaticity with which salary increments are awarded. If a university is operating on a merit increment system, then the awarding of a merit increment during sabbatical will be difficult because little if any evidence of meritorious performance will be available, almost as a matter of definition arising from the physical absence of the faculty member. A major exception to this might be scholarly publications during the period of the sabbatical.

Thus, if the position is taken that salary increments should be awarded a faculty member while on sabbatical leave, this implies an automatic award rather than an award based on demonstrated performance, in most instances. This position in turn may rest on the assumption that a faculty member automatically becomes more valuable to a university because of the experience the sabbatical affords; or possibly that a merit increment is justified by the financial hardship a sabbatical imposes on a faculty member and his family.

An alternative to this automatic merit increment would be to postpone the merit decision for one year. Then, if the sabbatical leave results in improved academic performance, two or more increments could be awarded during the year after the leave took place.

One consideration that might be important in policy formulation is to avoid the impression that faculty members will be "punished" for sabbatical leaves by withholding merit increments. Sabbatical leaves serve the university's objectives just as much as they serve the faculty

member's; if they don't, the should probably be abolished. This being the case, the interests of the university are not served by a system of rewards that discriminates against faculty members who take sabbaticals. This is probably what is implied by the statement in the Faculty Handbook that:

> Normally, the faculty member's progress through the salary steps of the various ranks will not be affected by the taking of leave.[1]

Perhaps a restatement of this principle would be in the best interests of the University and its faculty.

The Question of an Absolute Salary Maximum

At a meeting of the Deans' Council of The University of Calgary in the fall of 1970 it was agreed that the awarding of merit salary increments for senior faculty members whose salaries were more than seven steps up from the floor of the full professor rank (approximately $25,000) would have to be presented as "special cases".

This decision reflected a University and community concern that there should be nothing "automatic" about the awarding of increments to full professors in the $25,000 salary range.

Alternative to this policy of careful justification of salary increments for faculty members already in relatively high salary positions is the suggestion that there be imposed an absolute limit on salary levels.

The case for this absolute limit is based on several premises.

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[1]University of Calgary, Faculty Handbook, 1970, p. 15.

In the first instance, it would relieve pressure on department heads and deans who evidently find it difficult to deny a merit increment to high-priced full professors. Secondly, it alleged that salary increases for persons in private industry at high levels of compensation are more difficult to attain than is the case for the University. And thirdly, going back to the original discussion of how the public perceives academics and their appropriate salaries, it would relieve some of the community pressures caused by the existence of professorial incomes in the $30,000 range.

The case against an absolute salary maximum also has many facets. Most importantly, there is no way to determine rationally what the absolute maximum should be without running afoul of undesirable market consequences. If the maximum is placed too high, it is not operationally significant. If it is placed too low, the high-priced academics who are affected will simply leave the University for more attractive alternatives. These may be the people the University can least afford to lose; and they will often be the people with the most affluent and significant alternatives.

The claim that salary levels in private industry for high-priced skills are more stable than in the University is a claim that would have to be defended in terms of empirical study. In the meantime, it may tend to overlook the fact that salaries in private industry for the highest level positions--analagous to full professors, deans, etc.--are much higher than academic salaries; and when salary constraints exist, a change in job title is a convenient way of increasing an already high salary.

The case for an absolute salary maximum, in the final analysis, is most vulnerable in terms of its attempt to defy the market. If a university could ignore the marketplace in formulating its salary system, the case for salary maxima would be improved. But universities in general, and The University of Calgary specifically, have found it impossible to remain aloof from market constraints and considerations. The attempt to impose an absolute salary maximum is subject to the same danger--miscalculations can have a most significant effect on the availability of competent faculty.

With regard to public pressures for limiting university salaries, the Deans' Council decision to carefully examine salary increments for full professors at the $25,000 level may tend toward the optimum. Such careful examinations in no way conflict with market phenomena and few objections will be heard to such a procedure; particularly if the examination is carefully implemented in terms of specified performance criteria and merit increments awarded high-salary professors on a variable basis, i.e.--zero to multiple awards.

III. The Length of the Contract Year

The Nature of University Employment--Full Time or Part Time?

While The University of Calgary has operated on the basis of a 12-month contract year throughout its short history, discussion has arisen from time to time among faculty members and administrators about the desirability of moving to a shorter contract period, say, 10 months. The issues involved may be clarified somewhat by prefacing the discussion with an analysis of the nature of university work and whether it lends itself to optimality through a shorter contract period.

As noted in the discussion of promotion and salary increments, faculty responsibility to a university is ordinarily classified into three or four categories: teaching, research, service--administrative service to the university and service to the community. At The University of Calgary the teaching activity occupies a large part of the period from September through April. Teaching includes not only classroom activities but the various other methods by which professors and students interact; if graduate thesis and research supervision is included in the teaching category, the time frame extends into the summer months as well.

In all probability, most University professors use the period from May through August for more intensive research activities than were possible during the teaching period. This includes the professional reading which is a prerequisite to effective teaching and research as well as the various kinds of research activities the various disciplines undertake. For many staff members, the research

period is shortened by the return to teaching during the summer session, or by various service commitments to the university and/or the community.

The most visible characteristic of university research activities is their diversity. To the chemist, physicist, engineer, etc., the research effort may require a large set of physical instruments for use in a university laboratory; a necessary corollary of this research is the physical presence of the researcher on the university campus. To other disciplines, physical equipment needs are minimal. The historian requires a large library more than anything else perhaps, and this will often mean physical location away from the home university. A researcher in French literature will not be tied to a given university campus by the nature of his activity, but indeed may need to spend his research time in Quebec or France if optimal results are to follow. The social scientist will search out data wherever they exist , within or outside the Province, depending upon the nature of his special discipline.

Thus, the common thread that binds university research efforts together is not the fact that they must be conducted in a common geographic environment but that they, as a professional activity which is part of the total faculty responsibility, require continuous application of effort in common with attendant professional responsibility. The hypothesis to be derived from this interpretation of university employment is that there is no rationale or justification for the position that university work is in any sense part time. As a professional activity, university work necessarily must command the

total attention and commitment of the faculty member. This, however, does not necessarily imply that a 12-month contract is optimal. Neither does it preclude the desirability of activities such as professional consulting as a legitimate activity of university faculty. These are related issues that need to be carefully sorted out in subsequent analysis.

With regard to the desirability of a 12-month contract, the positive case is obvious. If faculty responsibility to the profession and the university is complete and unequivocal--the assumption made here--then a 12-month contract is consistent with what should be a fact of university life. This allows for a holiday period, consistent with national patterns, and the rest of the year is spent in productive activity.

This position is stated candidly by a university president as follows:

> On the matter of 10-month and 12-month contracts, it is my opinion that the latter is better for the people and the institution involved. Although university people should be given a maximum of freedom with respect to their work, it should also be remembered that a university is open on a year round basis. I much prefer paying good salaries on a year round basis so that administrators would not have to ask favors of staff to do work that might occur in the so-called 'down' period of a university.
>
> With salaries high, it would be a serious mistake, and in fact untrue, to imply that such salaries are paid for a 10-month period. University people work hard on a year round basis. The nature of their work often takes them away from their campus, but this does not imply they are on holiday. I could argue this one at further length if necessary.

Another university president opts for a 12-month contract on the grounds that a 10-month contract would imply no obligation on the part of the faculty for two months when such an obligation in fact exists and should be recognized by all responsible parties.

An administrator at The University of Calgary points out, however, that a 12-month contract does not imply physical presence at the University during the 12-month period, unless there are administrative duties which require his presence. Administrative duties in this context might include supervision of graduate theses, although it is not uniformly true that this requires the physical presence of faculty.

At the University of Western Ontario,

> The question of the contract year is not settled at this University. In theory, we have a 12-month year with a one-month holiday entitlement. If, as expected, we have a total integration of all duties throughout the calendar year, the theory will be put into practice--there will be no extra remuneration for teaching Summer School, no Summer Supplements for research, etc. This approach will likely lead to a trimester system and will require a standardization of 'teaching loads', probably additional faculty and allied higher financial commitments. The increase in financial requirements is obvious; the amount of such an increase, will, however, be modified by not having to pay the extra remuneration previously given.

While a 12-month contract may imply a trimester system at the University of Western Ontario, no other university in Canada mentioned the trimester system as a necessary corollary of a 12-month contract.

Canadian Practices with Regard to Contract Periods

On the basis of the correspondence received during this study, the 12-month contract is the common form of contractual arrangement in Canadian universities. Only occasional references to 8, 9 and 10-month contracts have been noted. For example, at the Université de Moncton:

> Our professors are presently hired under a twelve-month contract. We have first experienced a nine-month contract and we had to abandon that system approximately four years ago for the two following reasons.
>
> (a) To obtain a better control of the activities of our professors during the whole year. Even though professors were paid for a twelve-month period, many of them took what could be considered as a three-month holiday. The more conscientious and industrious group would devote part of that time to some scholarly activity, but many would simply 'take-off' for the summer, without any control on the part of any one, and would show up to resume their lectures in September.
>
> Presently, all faculty members are hired on a twelve-month basis. They are entitled to a month's holiday. Except for that period of one month, they are accountable to their Department Head and indirectly to their Dean. At the end of the second semester in early May, they are requested to submit a plan of their activities for the summer and they are expected to report on those activities at the beginning of the first semester in September. Their time can be spent either on teaching a summer course, on research work or in the preparation of their courses for the following year.
>
> The system is far from perfect and we know that some faculty members do not live up to all expectations. However, generally speaking, it is satisfactory. We do have a control over our staff which enables us to know where they are and what they are doing or supposed to be doing. And if there are major abuses on the part of any one, we are in a position to call back the delinquent to order. The mere fact that we have such a control often proves to be 'the beginning of wisdom' for those who could be tempted to take a summer long holiday.

The second reason for a 12-month contract at the Universite de Moncton related to the requirement of making 26 salary payments a

year in order to help the budgeting procedures of the staff, some of whom had experienced difficulties in personal finance when paid over the course of a nine-month period.

Acadia University, much like The University of Calgary, employs a 12-month contract, during which time the individual faculty member is responsible to his department head concerning his whereabouts and his activities, including, of course, the summer period.

Carleton University, Queen's University and the University of Prince Edward Island are all on 12-month contracts with one month's holiday, the latter "to remind faculty of continuing commitment to the University." The University of New Brunswick is also on a 12-month contract, but faculty members enjoy considerable freedom in the choice of their summer activities.

On the other hand, many universities, Sir George Williams and McMaster, for example, offer 12-month contracts, 1-month holidays, and report no problems serious enough to consider alternative systems.

At the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education the contract year is for 12 months but the Institute has recently begun the process of "defining the work year, vacation, and study periods within the twelve months."

At St. Francis Xavier University,

> Our letters of appointment speak of an 'academic year' and spell out that a person is responsible to the University for nine months and may be hired, in addition, to teach summer school or be given a summer stipend for research. It also mentions that everyone is entitled to one month of holidays, free of University obligations. Nonetheless, all of our staff receive their salaries on a twelve-month basis; that is, in twelve monthly instalments, though their actual working responsibility with the University extends from the 1st of September until the end of May.

Thus, in this situation of an academic year contract, there seems to be some confusion about professional obligations between June 1 and September 1, particularly in view of the statement about one month for holidays.

Waterloo Lutheran University has a nine-month contract, closely tied to summer teaching opportunities.

> A recent Ontario survey indicated that W.L.U. appeared to be the only University with a formal contract. Faculty members are contracted by the academic year commencing in September (following Labour Day holiday) to Spring Convocation (end of May). Salaries are paid in twelve (monthly) instalments. The sessional teaching contract served both the Institution and the faculty member during the years of Extension Division development. Faculty members generally leave for conferences and short vacations in June, and return to teach Summer School, on July 1st, for a six weeks' period. The short period following Summer School is used in preparation for the Fall term.

No mention is made of professional obligations of those few faculty members who do not teach during the summer session.

The Nature of Summer Work Under Existing and Potential Contractual Systems

Perhaps the major problem which emerges from the preceding discussion of the professional nature of university employment and contractual systems currently used in Canada focuses with particular force on university commitment during the summer months. The problem may be defined from three vantage points. The first is peripheral to this discussion but warrants brief mention, indeed has been referred to obliquely before. This is the community perception of academic responsibility, and again becomes particularly important to the extent that it influences legislative decisions about university salary characteristics. To put it briefly and candidly, the community at large knows little and can be expected to understand little about how academics perform, particularly during the summer months. The salient problem, which will be discussed in greater detail later in this study and which provides a key to many kinds of performance systems, is the fact that the community at large probably tends to judge academic performance in terms of inputs rather than outputs. Any deviation from community norms of input standards, e.g., office hours from nine till five, will cause some concern among interested citizens. The fact that office hours from nine to five may be entirely irrelevant to academic output is an educational element that will have to be pressed upon the community if it is to understand the operation of universities.

The second perception of the problem of summer activity is that of the university administrator who is concerned with maximizing the efficiency with which the university system operates. In this case, the perception is much different from the community perception--

administrators realize that office hours from nine to five have little if any relevance to professional activities in universities. Administrators who have commented on the subject seem to understand that it is professional output rather than inputs that are the crucial variable in judging academic performance. But they have been influenced by what they seem to believe is a small minority of academic staff which makes no effort during the summer months to develop increasingly effective professional skills. To guard against what they think is an infrequent phenomenon of three-month holidays, administrators in many universities have developed a system in which a schedule of summer inputs are expected from the academic staff. Obviously, by obtaining some assurance that summer months are to be used as inputs toward professional development, administrators hope to accomplish some improvement in professional output.

The third perception of the problem of summer activity is that of the academic community. To the extent that academics accept the definition of professional responsibility as formulated in a previous section, their perception and its implications for efficiency in professional development as measured by high standards of professional output is the same as that of the administrator. Both are concerned with maximizing academic outputs.

And what are academic outputs? They are the same things, of course, as were defined as criteria for promotion and annual salary increments: teaching effectiveness, scholarly research, and service to university and community. Thus, the crucial nature of salary increment and promotion decisions are reflected again in the

problem of contract responsibility--and the ultimate solution to defining this responsibility must lie in the evaluation of professional performance via output measurement, and only peripherally via input measurement.

Adjustments to a Ten-Month Contract

The preceding discussion should not be interpreted to imply that the course of 12-month contracts necessarily runs smoothly or that the output measurements suggested are easily accomplished. Indeed, it has been the inability to design promotion and salary increment systems flexible enough to quantify, for example, variable summer input-output relationships that has led universities to consider seriously the desirability of shorter term, say 10-month, contracts.

In addition, to the extent that these reward systems are not formulated or administered efficiently, there arise very significant problems of equity among those academics who perform in the summer months and those who don't. If the problem of efficient development and administration of promotion and salary increment criteria prove to be operationally insoluble, the case for 10-month contracts will be correspondingly improved, for both equity and efficiency reasons.

A professor at The University of Calgary, for example, comments that 8, 9 or 10-month contracts at the University would be more equitable because it would allow the professor more freedom to develop professionally as he sees fit, e.g., through teaching, research and/or consulting during the summer period. Part of the equity to be

gained by the system relates to the anomaly of paying additional salary for summer teaching at the University, while some kinds of research, graduate thesis supervision, and service contributions are not incrementally rewarded. This problem will be discussed again in the next section.

Another professor at The University of Calgary suggests a 10-month contract for the following reasons:

> Give a nine month contract (ten including one month's vacation) and leave the faculty free to make their decisions. This would provide an opportunity for some (or impetus for others) to seek either contract for research work (which in general is a very healthy procedure, which has been successfully adopted in the United States) or to find other institutions where they could go for collaborative work, leading to new contracts and recognition for the University. This would also be a test for the quality of the faculty.

An administrator at Memorial University of Newfoundland comments:

> I am becoming increasingly convinced that we should work towards a nine month contract year to avoid the inequities that prevail through paying members of the faculty to teach Summer School while they are on full salary, or engaged in other lucrative activities during the Summer Session. We do not have any honoraria to those engaged in research during the summer months.

In this connection, it should be noted that funded research activities conducted at The University of Calgary during the summer months may indeed warrant additional reward. A faculty member at the University may receive a fee for funded research up to two months of his annual salary. In many instances, this amount would be greater than the incremental salary available from teaching one summer session course.

A president of an eastern university has the following reservations about a 12-month contract and seems inclined to favor a shorter contract.

> In our particular case, I moved from what some people thought was an eight month contract to a twelve because I had to convince people that they had some responsibility to do something in the summers. I used to be strongly in favour of twelve month contracts. Now I am wavering. As long as one can control the promotions, perhaps a ten month--or nine-- contract is more realistic, if the salaries are pro-rated.

The question raised with regard to consulting income--and the relationship between it and community service--will be discussed in the last section of this paper.

In substance, the case for a 10-month contract is based upon two considerations: (1) that it would allow more efficient administrative control over the summer activities of academic staff and (2) serious inequities in the existing system would be corrected accordingly. The first point assumes that administration of an efficient and equitable promotion and salary increment system as a check against non-performance during the summer months of a 12-month contract system is either operationally impossible or somehow undesirable.

Several methods of adjusting to a 10-month contract may be briefly identified. The first one may be questionable from the University's point of view because it would probably be financially unfeasible and because it would not provide a mechanism for administrative control over summer activities which appears to be the

basis of a 10-month contract in the first instance. This system would simply change the existing 12-month contract to a 10-month contract without any changes in the salary system or structure.

A second method of adjusting, at least partially, to a 10-month contract would be to allow options to faculty members to choose either a 12-month or a 10-month contract. This system would serve the efficiency designs of the University only to the extent that those people who chose the 10-month contract faced the same promotion and salary increment criteria as those who chose the 12-month contract. Thus, faculty members would most likely choose the 10-month contract under one of two conditions: (1) the summer activity would be at least as productive of professional development as would be the case under a 12-month contract, and would provide an equal amount of summer income; or (2) summer income attainable only through non-university involvement would be enough to offset the inability to meet promotion and salary increment criteria. It is not clear that university efficiency goals would be in any sense advanced if the 10-month option were chosen for the second reason.

A third method of adjusting from a 12 to a 10-month contract would provide for all faculty to shift to a 10-month contract. The funds thus saved would then be available to faculty members on the basis of specified and approved summer development programs. Again the assumption is made, as is the case for all 10-month contract alternatives, that the objective of the potential change is to maximize the efficiency of the University and the professional development of its faculty, not to operate the University on a smaller budget.

Under this system, it would be expected that most if not all faculty members would come forward with substantive plans for professional activity during the summer. Thus the salary savings achieved from moving to 10-month contracts would be absorbed as faculty members identified the nature of summer programs. Under this system, the 10-month contract would include a one-month holiday period; thus, supplemental payments at the regular salary rate would be available for two months for each faculty member. Timing of holidays and the geographic location of summer programs would be matters to be resolved by the faculty members and department heads.

One of the advantages of this 10-month system would be the removal of the existing anomaly of summer teaching. Summer teaching would, of course, call for a supplemental fee but the payment would be incremental to a 10-month rather than a 12-month salary.

Summer teaching would be one of the major activities that faculty members might propose to accomplish during the summer. In fact, it might be necessary under the system to pay some kind of a bonus for summer teaching, lest all faculty opt for other summer alternatives. These alternatives could include programs such as new course preparation or revision of existing courses. The supervision of graduate theses should clearly merit incremental pay under a 10-month contract.

Both funded and non-funded research of a clearly specified nature would justify summer salary supplements, as would the administrative responsibilities of deans and heads. In fact, particularly rigorous and/or time-consuming administrative activities other than those undertaken by deans and heads could merit summer

salaries. Another interesting possibility in this regard would be summer salary for significant service to the community.

Thus, any activity that would justify summer payments--as illustrated above--would be consistent with University efficiency objectives as specified in criteria for promotion and salary increments.

Not all activities would necessarily be worth two months of incremental salary; on the other hand, six weeks of summer teaching might require a full two months salary supplement. Safeguards would have to be provided to insure equity among faculty; for example, that junior ranks would have the same opportunity for summer salary as senior faculty. It might be necessary to guarantee that every faculty member with a legitimate summer program be awarded a one-month supplement before two month supplements were awarded to anyone else; again, with the possible exception of summer teaching.

One interesting characteristic of this 10-month contract, summer supplement system is the fact that it looks very much like the system already in force at the Universite de Moncton, except at the latter institution the requirement of specifying summer programs operates in conjunction with a 12-month, not a 10-month contract.

Two points need to be emphasized with regard to this third method of adjusting to a 10-month contract. The first point is that the University should expect little if any salary savings because it should expect to reward most faculty members with a two-month salary supplement, upon proper evidence of a professional summer program. The only significant savings would be in the summer teaching program,

salaries for which would be supplemental to a 10-month rather than 12-month program. The second point that requires emphasis is that the efficiency objective of the program should be clearly explained to faculty and that the objective was not to lower University costs. Also, the faculty should be assured that summer supplements would be awarded on the basis of professional summer programs, not on some other basis such as rank, familiarity with department heads, etc.

A fourth method of adjusting to a 10-month contract would be to hold salaries of academic staff constant for some period of time, say two years, and to pay the regular 12-month salary for a 10-month contract period. This resembles the first method discussed briefly above. The difference is that the quid pro quo of the same salary for a 10-month as for a 12-month contract would be no increases in academic salaries for merit, cost-of-living or any other reason for some period of time. This method would be more costly to the University, since it would still have to make supplementary payments for specified summer activities such as summer session teaching and graduate student supervision.

A variation of this method would be the adjustment to a 10-month contract in steps. In the first year the contract would be written for 11 months, with a one-year moratorium on any form of salary increase. Similarly, in the second year the contract would be written for 10 months, with another constant ceiling on salaries.

A fifth method of adjusting to a 10-month contract would involve a reduction in faculty salaries of some specified amount--say, 10 per cent-- with this amount of salary savings being available for approved summer projects. In this event, faculty without summer projects

would have no specific commitment to the University during the summer period. This is, in effect, a less drastic version of the third adjustment method discussed previously in some detail.

The Problem of Graduate Student Supervision during Summer Months

One of the problems that is mentioned again and again by academics and administrators when discussing the length of the contract year relates to adequate supervision of graduate student research and thesis programs during the summer. This problem is often mentioned as rationale for changing from a 12-month to a 10-month contract, whereby faculty members who undertook to supervise graduate theses would be paid an incremental stipend and be available for consultation during at least selected periods during the summer.

Without deprecating the importance of having faculty members physically available in Calgary for thesis supervision, and without pressing for a 12-month contract, this problem does furnish an opportunity to ask the question: why isn't it possible, under existing contractual conditions, to arrange for adequate graduate thesis supervision and for the other University activities which require the physical presence of faculty?

The question becomes particularly pertinent, it would appear, in relation to recent administrative changes at The University of Calgary. Specifically, as pointed out earlier, the Faculty Handbook carefully points out:

> All appointments to the full time faculty are on a twelve month basis of which one month shall be the vacation period. Salary will not be paid in lieu of vacation to continuing faculty members.

> Unless special arrangements are made, all full time faculty members are expected to remain on campus during the academic session, that is from September 1 until Spring Convocation. The balance of the year is expected to be used for the advancement of knowledge and for the betterment of the individual. Arrangements to be absent shall be made with the Head of the Department, and in certain cases must be approved by the appropriate Dean and/or Deans' Council as set out earlier.
>
> Faculty members shall notify the Head of the Department of their summer programs and arrange with him the time of their vacations.[1]

Pursuant to this instruction and because of problems and possible abuses of the system, the Faculty of Arts and Science now requires the following form to be filled out by academics who contemplate absence from the campus.

It is submitted here, as a hypothesis for further consideration, that this requirement, if properly administered, is all that is necessary to adequately arrange for the physical presence of faculty members when their physical presence is essential to the adequate discharge of academic responsibility.

The form used by the Faculty of Arts and Science may not be optimal, but no form will help unless department heads and deans properly administer according to the needs of the University. For example, faculty members who are supervising graduate theses should explain to the proper administrative authority how their physical absence from campus will affect this responsibility. If they choose

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[1]University of Calgary, Faculty Handbook, p. 24.

FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCE

APPLICATION FOR APPROVAL OF ABSENCE FROM CAMPUS

Summary of Current Faculty Policy

(1) Leaves during the term (September 1 to April 30) :

(a) Up to 1 week - authorized by Department Head

(b) 1 week to 2 months - must be authorized by Dean on recommendation of Department Head (reported to V.P.(Academic) by Dean

(c) In excess of 2 months - must be authorized by Deans' Council

(2) Leaves during the May 1 to August 31 period :

(a) Vacation entitlement - one month - notify Department Head of dates

(b) Other absences :

(i) Up to one month - must be authorized by Department Head

(ii) In excess of one month - must be authorized by Dean on recommendation of Department Head (reported to V.P.(Academic) by Dean)

Name _____

Period of absence _____ to _____

Purpose and destination :

_____

_____

_____

Details of Arrangements made to cover absence :

_____

_____

_____

_____

APPLICANT :		
DATE :	APPROVED BY DEPT. HEAD	APPROVED BY DEAN
		REPORTED TO V.P.(ACADEMIC)

not to be available for thesis supervision during the summer, this factor should obviously be considered in assigning thesis supervisors. The graduate students themselves can be expected to take a hand in solving this problem by their choice of supervisors. Those faculty members whose legitimate teaching, research and/or service commitments require their physical absence from campus during the summer are in effect opting against graduate thesis supervision in a significant number of cases.

In any event, changing from a 12-month to a 10-month contract will not obviate the requirement that department heads and deans properly administer requests for absence. In some cases, quite obviously, proper administration will require a negative response to a request to be absent from the University. This propensity to deny requests which are void of merit or conflict with other University responsibilities has evidently been lacking in some departments and Faculties in the past.

IV. The Question of Supplementary Income

Related to Summer Work at University

The University of Calgary provides two primary sources of supplementary income for summer activities. The most obvious has been referred to previously--the special payment for teaching summer school. Less obvious is the payment to researchers with funded programs permissive of supplementary income up to two months' salary; also, this income is not as clearly tied to the summer months as is summer teaching.

Payment of extra remuneration for summer teaching is almost universal in Canada. The only exception identified during this study is the University of Guelph, where summer courses are a regular part of teaching loads and thus not associated with supplementary income.

The reasons are clear, and well understood, by academic administrators. For example, at Carleton University:

> Faculty members who teach a regular summer course receive a fee similar to outsiders who do the same. On the other hand, we do not pay any summer stipends for research or for graduate supervision. We do allow the few faculty members who teach 'continuing education' courses to accept fees for them. Rationalization of these practices is not crystal clear but, up to now at least, they have worked quite well. The general idea is that, if a person teaches a summer course, it is somewhat distorting his normal academic year of teaching, study and research, and there is some justification for paying extra. Anyway, unless we did, none of our faculty would teach summer courses. On the other hand, we have held that research work in the summer or sharing in the supervision of graduate thesis work that a department has to carry on in the summer is part of a twelve-month appointment and should not be paid extra. (Underlining supplied.)

At a small eastern university,

> At the present time faculty members may accept teaching commitments during the summer at this or other universities for which they receive a stipend. Furthermore, faculty members who present a course by extension during the regular academic session in the evening hours are given an extra stipend. It is my view that these extra stipends ought not to be paid and that the total teaching load of the Department should be allocated amongst the members of that Department. Such an arrangement, however, cannot be introduced unilaterally by a relatively small University such as ours and we do not anticipate any change in our practice in the future. Our problem is further complicated by the fact that our salary scale, although fairly competitive at the junior ranks, is lagging at the more senior levels. Any such arrangement as I suggested can come only with adequate staffing and a completely adequate salary scale.

The fact that universities throughout Canada pay extra stipends for summer teaching even though they are on 12-month contracts is not at all surprising or difficult to explain. As a question of equity, if extra stipends are paid to visiting professors, then it will be difficult not to make extra stipends available to regular staff. Much more importantly as far as universities are concerned, paying extra stipends for summer courses allows staff recruitment at a fraction of the cost required by hiring additional staff. For example, at The University of Calgary, it was noted in the first section of this study that the average faculty salary is about $16,000. The average teaching load is three full courses during the academic year for all ranks below full professor. Thus, the cost per course is more than $5,000 not counting supplementary costs such as pension payments, etc. Payments to faculty for teaching a full course in the summer is about $2,000. The magnitude of the saving is obvious, and even greater in the case of full professors.

The question of equity remains, and is of concern to academics inclined toward summer research. From a distinguished research professor at the University:

> I would therefore suggest that either the same emolument be given to the research scholar, as is given to the summer lecturer or give no additional emolument for summer teaching which shall be the responsibility of all people in the department on the basis of rotation. Of course some exception will have to be made in the case of very small departments. One could also consider the summer teaching in accounting for a person's load. The net result would be that instead of giving additional money to some one, one might get an extra person in a department.

Given that there exists a question of equity in that only summer teaching and some funded research contracts give rise to supplementary summer income, the principal alternative to the existing system that has been suggested is a shorter contract year. Many universities seem to feel little concern, arguing that the disciplines in which summer teaching opportunities are limited, e.g., engineering, usually find other opportunities such as funded research and consulting income more readily available than do other disciplines. In any event under a 12-month contract, there is some logical reason to support the argument that the practice of paying extra stipends is a necessary part of summer teaching. There is an opportunity cost to participating faculty in terms of research; summer teaching may not be systematically brought into promotion and salary increment systems; summer sessions of universities do generate some extra income for the payment of teaching salaries; it will be impossible to use paid visiting professors unless the regular staff is also compensated; and the cost of increasing the number of staff sufficiently to include summer teaching in regular

teaching loads would probably be prohibitive.

Supplementary Income Related to Continuing Education

As is true for summer session teaching, the almost universal practice in Canadian universities is to pay extra stipends for those faculty members who teach, in effect, overloads for continuing education programs. Very few, if any, Canadian universities choose to hire the additional staff required to treat continuing education as part of the regular teaching load.

A university president explains why, with some candor:

> Honoraria for participating in continuing education is an evil introduced by universities to obtain a cheap form of labor to carry these programs. It uses a monetary reward to induce academic staff to do the wrong thing. The proper course is to hire full-time people to carry such programs. This would, of course, increase the costs.

Once more, at The University of Calgary, it costs about $2,000 per course to staff a course in the continuing education program whereas it would cost more than $5,000 per course to hire enough additional staff to make it part of the regular course load.

The only exception noted to the rule of using existing staff for teaching continuing education courses--usually evening credit during the winter session--is St. Francis Xavier University, where the population is probably not large enough to create large demands for continuing education courses.

> As far as honoraria for continuing education is concerned, we do not provide, as a policy, additional stipends for teaching beyond the University schedule during the academic year. We do have a number of professors giving courses in communities within a fifty-mile radius of Antigonish, and we provide them with a small amount to cover their expenses

> and the difficulty involved, but this does not run into more than $500.00 per year. The actual course, itself, is counted as a part of the individual's teaching burden. We also provide a rather wide series of lectures, covering a two-month period, for adults in the local community, and for this the professors receive no remuneration whatsoever.

The alternative to paying extra stipends for continuing education courses is to hire enough extra staff to teach the courses as part of the regular teaching load. This is probably as financially infeasible as it is for summer teaching and the rest of the arguments for paying extra summer stipends probably apply with equal force to continuing education.

It is at least possible, however, that if the University opts for the teaching-research specialization discussed in an earlier section that the numbers of people who would opt for a teaching instead of a research specialization with appropriate increases in teaching loads might provide a reservoir of teaching skills sufficient to staff the summer and continuing education programs.

Supplementary Income Through Consulting

Much more controversial than the payment of extra stipends for summer and continuing education courses, at least among administrators, is the question of consulting income. Unfortunately, the question is usually phrased in terms of how much income a university should allow a faculty member to earn from consulting activities; or how much time should a faculty member be allowed to spend in consulting activities?

The difficulty with trying to put a ceiling on the amount of

income a faculty member can generate from consulting income is easily demonstrated. Suppose one faculty member can command $500 per day in consulting fees, while a younger and inexperienced colleague charges $100. Does anyone seriously suggest that consulting constraints should be formulated in terms of a total dollar maximum of, say, $10,000 per year so that the more experienced person could consult for only 20 days per year while his younger colleague consults for a period of up to 100 days per year?

The second constraint--a limit on the number of days or weeks allocable to consulting activities--is less vague but only slightly more satisfactory because whatever limit is determined is essentially arbitrary and without specific justification. Is one day a week, ten days a month, or 60 days a year the magic number? Clearly, the difficulty with this kind of restriction is that, again, it concentrates on the wrong variable--inputs instead of outputs. This basic problem will be discussed in more detail later.

Across Canada administrators differ considerably as they consider the problem of consulting activities of university staffs. On the positive side are the following comments from administrators of various universities.

From the University of New Brunswick:

> We have recently had considerable discussion about consulting and the income that may accrue therefrom and it seems to be the general view here that if in the opinion of the department chairman or head and the dean of the faculty the consulting activities of a faculty member do not interfere with the proper and complete discharge of his academic responsibilities, then the University does not feel that it should exercise any control over them. As a matter of fact, it is

felt that within these bounds consulting is generally acceptable, not only to the University but to the academic program which the faculty member is able to offer.

At Acadia University:

The University recognizes the value of faculty members serving as consultants in ways that enhance their professional, scholarly, and/or scientific competence. Full time faculty members may engage in such activities insofar as these are compatible with their university responsibilities and with the general educational goals of the University. Such commitments should not be of a major or continuing nature nor necessitate the commitments of a block of time on a regular basis during the normal timetable for lectures and laboratories. Before a faculty member makes any commitment which is intended to be or probably will become of a continuing nature, he must have the written approval of his Departmental Head and Dean and the latter shall inform the President.

At Sir George Williams University:

Consulting income is considered a personal matter and is not questioned in any way. (The extent to which outside activity interferes with campus duties is of course a concern, but not the related outside earnings per se).

Note in the parenthetical sentence the concern for output rather than input variables.

Although most universities appear to recognize the potential benefits of consulting to the faculty and the university, most seek to apply some controls over the amount of time spent or income earned from consulting.

For example, at the University of Western Ontario:

This area is probably the most worrisome, since it applies only to certain faculty, the services of which are in 'public' demand. We have a policy on outside consulting which limits a faculty member to three half-days per month of outside consulting and then only if it can be justified as being beneficial to the University and does not interfere (in the opinion of the Dean) with his regular duties. The summer period (as it now exists) is pretty well wide

open. The limiting factor is that the consultant must not earn more than $3500.00 or one-third of his salary--whichever is the greater. This policy is, of course, virtually impossible to police. The answer may be to insist on an overhead factor of some 50-100% of the consultant's fees or a percentage of his salary, depending on the length of time. This fee would be payable to the University to compensate for loss or replacement of services, especially during the academic year. If we adopt a bona fide 12-month year in all faculties, the problem will be magnified.

At the Université de Moncton:

The University has adopted the philosophy that a professor may work for an equivalent of up to 20% of his professional time outside of the University in a capacity that will either directly or indirectly enhance his teaching and research activity. This may consist of one complete night course, i.e. extension course, during the regular school year and one course in the summer session, or it may consist of outside work in research or consultantship or a combination of all the above. Approval by the dean of the professor's faculty is mandatory in all instances. The maximum for outside earning has not been set.

At the University of Toronto:

The proper length of the contract year and the question of supplementary income have been receiving sustained attention for nearly two years and we have not yet arrived at a satisfactory policy statement. We are working toward an acceptable document that could include: (a) a definition of the meaning of a University of Toronto academic appointment; (b) a description of the kinds of related activities which generate supplementary income; (c) a code of ethics as a guide to determination of sensitive areas; (d) a policy of disclosure and(e) machinery to assure implementation (on a decentralized basis) of the disclosure requirements and adherence to the code of ethics.

The frustration of university administrators with regard to the question of consulting is perhaps best summed up in this comment from a university president:

We are probably as baffled as most people by the question of outside income from consulting and research contracts. It seems to me that this is something universities collectively must try to move on before long.

Consulting Income--Input or Output Controls?

. The thesis suggested here is that the inability of universities to cope effectively with the problem of consulting income is that they have concentrated on relatively immaterial elements of the problem. Rather than trying to limit outside income or specifying the number of hours that can be delegated to consulting work, universities should look to the impact of consulting on professional outputs. An economist from the West states the matter this way:

> I see no value in trying to make any distinctions between supplementary remunerative employment within the university and outside. Teaching an extra-curricular course for a thousand dollars cannot be said to be of any more academic or social benefit than doing a project for the government for a thousand dollars. Nor is it possible to draw a meaningful line between consulting and other outside endeavors. But, in my opinion, it is useless to get involved in this complex morass of problems. My own view is that we must direct our attention to an individual's output, not his input. I really think this principle is very important, and we must continually insist on it. If two professors do an equal job in teaching and research, but one does it in fewer hours than the other, it should be irrelevant to the university whether he earns money in his spare time, gives away his services, or goes fishing. On the other hand, if an individual's performance is weak, it should be so judged, but it is a secondary matter whether this is because he is devoting too much time to moonlighting or recreation.

A professor at The University of Calgary emphasizes the impact of consulting on professional development:

> A. The University of Calgary has every right to regulate supplementary income from its own payroll, e.g., summer teaching, trust accounts, and so on. However, such income limits should be flexible, determined by the department head, and acknowledging that different faculty members have different skills and capacities towards justifying and rationalizing (more or less) paid supplementary activity within the University.
>
> B. Other secondary income is no concern of the University unless it can be shown that a man is performing poorly intramurally. Punitive procedures already exist and are adequate,

e.g., increment, promotion procedures, etc.

> C. Those faculty whose academic freshness depends on regular skill applications in the community should be encouraged to hold consulting posts and to take the going rate of remuneration. Otherwise the tendency is to undercut legitimate consulting and advisory organizations in the community, or to deprive the community of special technologies and new skills which often stem from academic research activity.

A department head at The University of Calgary assesses consulting as follows:

> As long as the supplemental income is generated by genuinely supplemental work and does not interfere with or replace the 'normal' work, I think it is fine. In nearly all cases it provides additional experience that goes to improve the quality of the normal teaching and supervision work. In some fields consulting is essential to make the teacher up-to-date and useful to his students.

Thus, the crucial element in consulting activity turns out to be the impact of the consulting on professional development. Indeed, The University of Calgary recognized this variable in designing a liberal consulting policy for its Faculty of Medicine. What justification is there for such a policy? The justification is clear and valid--the practice of medicine will be an important determinant of professional development within the Faculty of Medicine. It should be no less clear that the same principle applies to other Faculties as well. Only when consulting is peripheral to a professor's field of specialization will it prove to be of minimal value in the development of his professional skills. And in this instance, an adequate system of output measurement will in the overwhelming number of cases indicate the fact that he is consulting in a field that offers only income and little professional growth.

One of the alleged inequities in consulting ncome is the fact that consulting opportunities do not exist equally in all fields of endeavor. As a question of inequity within the university, this contention is valid only if promotion and salary increments are not attuned to output measures such as teaching effectiveness, research, service, etc. If two men in different disciplines are equal in terms of these output performances while one has consulting income and one hasn't, equity demands that they be judged equal for promotion and salary increment purposes. If consulting income has resulted in the degeneration of university responsibility, then, of course, this must be reflected in promotion and increment decisions. Otherwise, the disciplines without consulting opportunities are merely alleging that the market system itself is inequitable. While this may or may not be true, it is probably beyond even the powers of universities to contravene the principles of the market in this regard.

In the event that a university cannot design a promotion and increment system capable of being administered efficiently, and if it insists upon some control over consulting inputs, then wisdom opts for controlling the time rather than the income element. Not one substantive case has been made by correspondents in this study, administrative or academic, for imposing a money income limit on consulting. The most obvious reason has already been given--consulting fees vary with the discipline and experience, and no optimal schedule of allowable fees is logically possible.

Some limits on the time a faculty member can consult, while almost always an administrative nightmare, at least can be identified

with some hope of reason. Among the elements a policy-making body might want to consider is the fact that the consulting demands of a university faculty will vary directly with the competence of that faculty. That is, a university which finds itself with a faculty void of consulting opportunities might want to look closely at its recruiting policies.

Another variable which might warrant inspection is the relationship between the concern for consulting activities by faculty and university policy which encourages community service. In terms of a university's efficiency goals, is it preferable for faculty to participate in non-paid activities which may be somewhat peripheral to their fields of specialization or to participate in paid consulting assignments which may be more consistent with professional development? Certainly it will be difficult for a university to justify community service while opting against consulting practices.

The answer to the proper relationship between community service and consulting is not clear cut, but ultimately must relate back to professional growth and the promotion and increment systems which recognize it. There is no basic conflict between community service and consulting, and a university will be well advised to encourage both, on the assumption that their impact will be recognized in the basic decisions concerning academic outputs--promotion and salary increments.

Finally, the method used in the Faculty of Medicine might be worthy of consideration for the University at large. In the Faculty of Medicine, there is a fee system for consulting income derived through work with the Ambulatory Care Centre. The fee system is referred to

as a loading charge. Primary loading is 15 per cent of the first $10,000 of consulting income; 25 per cent for the next $10,000, and so on. In addition, there is a secondary loading charge equal to 75 per cent of net consulting income over $15,000. Finally, there is a ceiling loading charge, which effectively puts a limit on the total income a medical doctor in the Faculty can receive.

A University of Calgary professor in the Faculty of Arts and Science has suggested a variation of the Faculty of Medicine system:

> There can be a scale structured such that a person getting consulting income has to give a certain percentage to the University. This could be even given as additional grant back to the faculty member concerned, established as a trust, for his own research work.

The control of consulting income through percentage sharing with the university has also been suggested by a university president in the east, and would appear to make more sense than some arbitrary, absolute dollar constraint on consulting income.

Supplementary Income through Research

The role of research and scholarship in universities throughout the world and Canada is well enough understood to require little if any emphasis here. The University of Calgary recognizes the responsibility of faculty for research and scholarship in a number of ways. First and foremost, it is a recognized and major criterion of promotion and salary increments. The teaching load of the University--varying usually between two and three courses per year, six or nine contact hours per week--is geared to the research aspirations of the

faculty. The University encourages its faculty to seek funded research, and allows them a supplemental income of up to two months' salary from funded programs.

Without exception, Canadian universities contacted during this study recognize the value of university research and scholarship. Most appear to follow the same procedures as The University of Calgary in encouraging scholarly activities. A few make supplementary research stipends available in summer periods to stimulate research programs.

For example, at McMaster University:

> Members of faculty may earn supplemental income from summer and/or other teaching of part-time students; a faculty member is entitled to do outside consulting for up to twenty days each year; faculty who stay on campus to carry out research and supervise graduate students during the summer also receive summer research stipends which vary according to their professional rank.

At the University of New Brunswick:

> Our faculty people may receive supplementary income through participation in the summer school and in the extension program during the winter and as well we have still a summer supplement program which provides something less than $1000 to those who remain on the campus in research activities or other services essential to the continuation of the work at the University. This summer supplement does not begin to represent the equivalent of a professional honorarium but it does recognize their value to the University during the summer months.

And at St. Francis Xavier University:

> As I indicated above, we do provide supplementary income for summer-school teaching, and also for research for those members who apply and whose project is approved by our University Council for Research and the Dean.

Little if any controversy seems to exist about the significance of research and scholarship as primary activities of

universities. On the understanding that research and scholarship is supplementary to effective teaching, and that effective teaching is a continuing responsibility of research scholars, few issues seem to arise within the context of The University of Calgary's salary system.

The only thing the University doesn't do on the same scale as seems to be the case at the universities cited above relates to summer research stipends for research activities not funded by other means. This is a step the University may want to consider as a device for further encouraging research programs and scholarly output. It is essentially a budgetary matter which must be decided on the basis of the opportunity costs of using incremental funds for summer research stipends instead of other programs, and the relative benefits of alternative programs.

Other Forms of Supplementary Income

The question of supplementary income for department heads has been discussed in some detail in a recent special study at The University of Calgary and the question of honoraria for department heads and chairmen need not be further considered here.[1]

The final form of supplementary income that will be discussed here relates to honoraria for special research or administrative activities on the part of university faculty. It is occasionally suggested that when, for example, a faculty member spends an undue

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[1]See, "Report to General Faculty Council of The Committee on Appointment, Authority, and Responsibility of Department Heads," The University of Calgary, May 21, 1970.

amount of time as a committee chairman on an unusually rigorous assignment that some special honoraria should be made available. The essential issue involved is whether this unusual activity should be rewarded through regular promotion and salary increment decisions or whether, because the activity will not be continuing, the reward should take the form of special honoraria.

For example, a professor at The University of Calgary makes the following suggestion:

> There should be a special allotment of money which can be allocated to certain people who have made special contributions during the previous year. Such monies should not be considered as part of ongoing salary. In other words, someone might receive an extra $1,000 at the end of the year 1971 because he had very heavy committee duties. He would not receive anything more than a normal increment in 1972 based on the original salary.

Alternative to this suggestion is the existing practice where, presumably, administrative services to the department, Faculty and University are considered important variables in promotion and salary increment decisions.

APPENDIX A

Salary Systems for Non-Teaching Positions

While this study has been concerned with questions of salary policy for regular members of the University's teaching staff, continuing and vital contributions to the University's teaching and related programs are made by a number of non-teaching personnel. Among these non-teaching positions are those of librarians.

The following submission was made by two members of the library staff, and is included here in its entirety in order to provide some perspective into questions of salary policy not discussed previously in this manuscript.

Seastone Committee on Salary Determination

In reply to Dr. Carrothers' letter inviting comments from faculty concerning the present system of salary determination at The University of Calgary, we would like to submit the following views for your consideration.

The criteria used to measure the performance of teaching faculty are not entirely applicable to non-teaching departments. Librarians cannot, for instance, be evaluated on the basis of their classroom teaching. At the very least, minimum performance criteria should be worked out by each library unit and related to comparative positions within the library organization. A person would then not be judged for increments and promotion on the vagueries of 'personal performance' once basic requirements and responsibilities of his position had been established. Once the duties are defined, promotion, and salary increments should be concomitant. There should, of course, be three avenues of advancement open to any librarian:

a) on the basis of professional accomplishment
b) on the basis of administrative accomplishment
c) on the basis of a combination of (a) and (b)

Salary overlap would then not be necessary because it should be possible to make a decision concerning promotion at the time an individual reaches the top of his current salary scale.

The definitions of 'normal' and 'average' as they apply to merit increments are presently unclear. According to item 8 of the document presented as Appendix A, each librarian is entitled to one normal increment step each year. The Board defined an average increment as 1.2 increment steps for 1971/72 (Appendix A, item 12), while a normal increment was considered to be zero. This distinction is not evident to most faculty members as they tend to understand the terms as being synonymous. While a normal increment was defined as zero during recent salary meetings, some departments in the past have considered the normal increment to be one step. In fact, the present distinction between 'normal' and 'average' raises a nice point in logistics. The majority of faculty must be doing a better than 'normal' job if the 'average' increment is not to be zero. A zero increment for the majority of faculty would average less than one increment step per faculty member.

A difficulty has arisen in the library concerning increment value. Since there are 2 librarian grades for each faculty rank, a situation has developed where fractions of increments have remained in the salary scale. If an individual is granted one increment step and happens to be at that point in the scale where a fraction is left, he would receive only, for example, one hundred dollars rather than the $425 of a usual increment step at this level. The difficulty lies in whether this $100 is to be considered as a full increment step, or as seems fair, about 1/4 of an increment. (See Appendix A, item 14).

The question has been raised also as to whether a person may receive a double merit increment two years in succession. This matter needs to be discussed with possible provision made for this kind of award to be made as an equalization device in special circumstances.

A system of checks and balances is built into the salary promotion system except for one aspect; namely, where the final recommendation on increment/promotion is carried to GPC by the head of the unit or chief budgetary officer. If the department promotion committee, with the head of the unit as chairman, decide and approve certain recommendations for increments, and GPC asks to have the recommendations revised, there is no provision for the unit head to return this directive to the departmental promotions committee for advice on how the changes should be made. While we recognize that at present the departmental promotion committee is an advisory committee, where cuts are to be made a system of appeal should be available to the individuals affected or a more equitable method of dividing the decrease be established.

The length of the contract year raises special problems

for the librarian. Presently the library operates on a twelve-month year. While the heaviest workload for the public service librarians is during session, technical service librarians have a steadier workload throughout the year. Library work is basically service-oriented and well-trained people are needed during both session and intersession. A ten-month contract year would make continuous, effective service more difficult, although there might be advantages for individual librarians in the shorter period. However, if a ten-month work year is adopted, librarians working eleven months should be compensated financially for the extra month. Perhaps similar compensation might be considered for shift work as librarians are the only Board appointees at The University of Calgary who are presently scheduled for this sort of duty.

We hope that these comments on the salary system will be of assistance to you.

APPENDIX A[1]

To all Librarians

PROMOTIONS AND INCREMENTS

1) Under University Regulations, the position and salary level of all librarians are reviewed annually by the Chief Librarian who seeks the advice of the Library Promotions Committee. The resulting assessment shall be in writing. (Handbook 3.9.2)

2) The composition of the Library Promotions Committee is as follows:

Chief Librarian (Chairman)	Dr. T.M. Walter
Deputy Librarian	Miss M.M. McIvor
Two Head of Departments elected by the Heads	Miss P.B. Griffin
	Miss R. Lyons
A representative of the University of Calgary Faculty Association (non-voting)	Dr. H.P. Arai

3) Recommendations from the Library Promotions Committee concerning merit increments and promotion can be modified by the Chief Librarian who will then process the recommendations in the established fashion to the General Promotions Committee. (Handbook 3.9.2.)

4) A recommendation for the awarding of a merit increment to a librarian shall be supported by a written evaluation of the individual's performance. It shall be the responsibility of the individual's Head of Department to supply this documentation to the Chief Librarian with copy to the member of staff concerned. Where this procedure would not be appropriate, the written evaluation will be provided by the Chief Librarian or his designee. (Handbook 3.9.5.)

5) It is the duty of the Head of Department to notify a librarian promptly if normal advancement is not being recommended. The Library Promotions Committee shall pay particular attention to such recommendations and the Chief Librarian shall also notify, in writing, the librarian and the Vice-President (Business) of the recommendation to deny normal advancement. (Handbook 3.9.6.)

6) Each librarian should be informed, in writing, of the nature of the recommendation being carried forward by his Head

of Department or other superior officer to the Library Promotions Committee. Any individual has the right to appeal the recommendation to the Library Promotions Committee. Such appeal should be in writing to the Chief Librarian. Each individual should be informed in writing of the recommendation being carried forward to General Promotions Committee. Any librarian is free to initiate a formal appeal regarding this recommendation; such appeal should be in writing to the Chairman of the General Promotions Committee. (Handbook 3.9.13.)

7) While changes in procedure may result from a meeting of the General Promotions Committee this week, the Vice-President (Business) does not anticipate many changes from last year. Accordingly, the following paragraphs repeat the basic guide-lines used last year.

8) Ordinarily, it shall be assumed that each librarian whose salary is at or below the ceiling of Grade V shall be entitled to one normal increment until he reaches the top of his scale unless due cause be given for granting less than a full increment.

9) Under University regulations, less than one full increment is ordinarily accorded to persons whose appointment dates are on or after October 1

i.e. October 1, 1970 to December 31, 1970 appointment = 0.75 increment
January 1, 1971 to February 28, 1971 appointment = 0.50 increment

10) Special merit may be recognized by additional merit increments and/or promotion to a higher salary grade. Increments may be increased by fraction s or by whole increments, i.e. 1.25, 1.5, 1.75, 2, 3, etc. Where two or more merit increments are recommended, the Chief Librarian shall make available to the General Promotions Committee documentation for its consideration.

11) The Board of Governors has agreed that no fraction of an increment less than 0.2 should be used but this does not mean that a 0 increment cannot be recommended.

12) The guideline that has been set by the Board of Governors for 1971-72 in connection with the number of increments to be given is that there should be no more than an average of 1.2 increments for the complete staff. The Board has expressed concern that the distribution of increments last year heavily favoured senior ranks in the University as a

whole. It was agreed by Dean's Council that the individual Promotions Committees should recognize this concern as being legitimate but that the decision for the actual distribution between ranks of the 1.2 average increment is a matter for determination by the individual Promotion Committees.

13) At the present time there are 30 librarians on staff; accordingly, the total number of increments that may be awarded is 36. If it can be assumed that each librarian shall be entitled to one normal increment (see 8 above), a total of six increments is available for award to persons deserving special recognition, or an average of 0.2 increments per person. It follows that recommendations of 1.5 or greater increments will require more than normal justification. Heads of Departments may wish to consider whether persons who received promotions and/or special increments last year should be considered for special increments this year, or whether preference should be given to giving encouragement to those not so rewarded last year.

14) The salary scales in force for 1970-71 are as follows:

	Scale	Increments	
Senior Administration (Library) only			Full Professor
Librarian V (and above) (senior divisional heads, etc.)	$14,630 to$19,665	7 @$640 1 @$555	Associate Professor
Librarian IV (heads of major units)	$13,010 to$14,575	3 @$500 1 @$ 65	Assistant Professor
Librarian III (seconds in major units, heads of smaller units)	$10,920 to$12,420	3 @$500	
Librarian II (subject specialists, seconds in small depts.)	$ 9,490 to$10,865	3 @$425 1 @$100	Instructor
Librarian I (general librarians, entrance level)	$ 8,215 to$ 9,065	2 @$425	

15) Recommendations from Heads of Departments should reach the Library Administration Office not later than noon on Thursday 17th December, 1970.

16) This memorandum is being sent to all librarians for information. Heads of Departments are being provided additionally with a list of the librarians on their staff, together with gradings and current salary.

December 1970

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