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AUTHOR Starr, Jerold M.; Cutler, Neal E.  
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ABSTRACT

Attitudinal differences between males and females on certain issues have been repeatedly documented through commercial public polls and academic studies. One of these differences is the greater reluctance on the part of females to support the use of institutional violence as an instrument of public policy. This paper empirically explores the components of sex-role identification, parental socialization, and socio-cultural milieu as independent hypotheses using a design which separately measures the effect of these on male-females attitudinal differences toward institutional violence. A systematic analysis of male-female differences in mean attitude scale scores revealed the following: (1) females, as hypothesized, are consistently more opposed to nuclear wars and capital punishment, more pacifistic, and more concerned about world survival; (2) none of the previously hypothesized explanations of sex-role differences alter this pattern. The authors conclude by suggesting alternative conceptual approaches to the investigation of the genesis of male-female differences in attitudes toward institutional violence. (Author/WS)

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SEX ROLE AND ATTITUDES TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL VIOLENCE  
AMONG COLLEGE YOUTH: THE IMPACT OF SEX-ROLE IDENTIFICATION,  
PARENTAL SOCIALIZATION, AND SOCIO-CULTURAL MILIEU

by

Jerold M. Starr

Neal E. Cutler

University of Pennsylvania

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## I. Introduction to the problem and explanation of the research strategy

Widespread and profound changes in the goals and ideals of American youth, particularly college students, have been in evidence for at least a decade. Certainly one of the paramount values in the newly emergent "counter-culture" ethic is the rejection of institutional violence as an instrument of public policy and the affirmation of peaceful cooperation in interpersonal and international relations.

Some idea of the enormity of this change may be gained by making a comparison of the positions on nuclear war of the over 1,100 students sampled from sixteen colleges and universities by Putney and Middleton (1962) in 1961, and the responses on these same scales by our own sample of over 900 incoming freshmen at the University of Pennsylvania in September, 1970<sup>1</sup> (displayed in Tables 1, 2 and 3). While differences in the composition of the two samples could account for some of the differences in response, the tremendous magnitude of these differences strongly suggests the effects of an important change in the climate of student opinion over the intervening nine years.

Investigations of this counterculture phenomenon have postulated a variety of possible causes, ranging from changes in the historically determined consciousness of different generations,<sup>2</sup> to oedipal-like generational confrontation,<sup>3</sup> to reactions to structural strains resulting from rapid social change,<sup>4</sup> to the effects of changes in the socialization of the child.<sup>5</sup>

Taken together, all of these explanations propose that new goals and ideals have come into being as a result of social change and certain important historical events. There is something in the structure of these responses, however, which has remained relatively constant over time and which we consider to be of important theoretical and social consequence: the females in both the 1961 and 1970 surveys are consistently more opposed than the males to the use of institutional violence as an instrument of public policy. Whether we

TABLE 1

Comparison of 1961 and 1970 Student Responses to PACIFISM Scale Items  
(Per cent of Students Agreeing with Item)

<u>Items</u>		<u>Males</u>	<u>Females</u>	<u>Total</u>
*The U.S. must be willing to run any risk of war which may be necessary to prevent the spread of Communism	1961:	78	64	72
	1970:	16	13	15
If current arms limitations talks are not successful, the U.S. should begin a gradual program of unilateral disarmament, that is, begin disarmament whether other countries do or not.	1961:	4	9	6
	1970:	38	53	43
*Nonviolent anti-war demonstrations are harmful to the best interests of the American people.	1961:	50	37	44
	1970:	6	6	6
The U.S. has no moral right to carry its struggle against Communism to the point of risking destruction of the human race.	1961:	30	40	34
	1970:	86	97	90
It is contrary to my moral principles to participate in war and the killing of other people.	1961:	15	20	17
	1970:	56	75	63
*Non-violence and pacifism are simply not practical philosophies in the world today.	1961:	60	45	54
	1970:	28	23	26
The real enemy today is not Communism but rather war itself.	1961:	26	37	31
	1970:	72	79	74

1961 data taken from Putney and Middleton (1962). Items tagged with an asterisk were reversed when the scale was later constructed. For 1961 data, number of males = 694; females = 497. For 1970 data, number of males = 590; females = 318.

TABLE 2

Comparison of 1961 and 1970 Student Responses to NUCWAR Scale Items  
(Percentage who agree Nuclear Weapons Should be Used ...)

<u>Level of Provocation</u>		<u>Males</u>	<u>Females</u>	<u>Total</u>
Under present circumstances, that is, wage a pre-emptive war.	1961:	3	2	3
	1970:	4	3	4
If the Communists attempt to take over any other country, no matter how small.	1961:	11	4	8
	1970:	3	2	2
If the Communists interfere with important rights of the U.S. such as access to Berlin	1961:	29	20	25
	1970:	6	5	6
If the Communists attack an ally of the U.S. with conventional weapons.	1961:	33	16	26
	1970:	5	4	5
If the Communists attack the U.S. with conventional weapons.	1961:	53	32	44
	1970:	25	13	21
If the Communists attack an ally of the U.S. with nuclear weapons.	1961:	90	75	84
	1970:	47	34	42
If the Communists attack the U.S. with nuclear weapons.	1961:	96	95	95
	1970:	72	68	68

1960 data taken from Putney and Middleton (1962). For 1961 data, number of males = 694; females = 497. For 1970 data, number of males = 590, females = 318.

TABLE 3

Comparison of 1961 and 1970 Student Responses to FATALITIES item  
(Percentage giving indicated fatality level)

Highest Level of Tolerated Fatalities		Males	Females	Total
100% - 210 million	1961:	17	8	13
	1970:	6	2	5
75-100% - 158-200 million	1961:	7	2	5
	1970:	1	1	1
50-75% - 105-158 million	1961:	12	6	10
	1970:	4	1	3
25-50% - 53- 105 million	1961:	19	15	18
	1970:	6	1	5
10-25% - 21-53 million	1961:	18	20	19
	1970:	12	7	10
1-10% - 2-21 million	1961:	10	18	13
	1970:	17	13	15
Less than 1% (2 million or less)	1961:	17	31	22
	1970:	53	73	60

1960 data from Putney and Middleton (1962). The 1970 item is only slightly differently worded:

We are interested in the circumstances under which you would approve the use of nuclear weapons given the following situation. War has broken out between the Soviet and the NATO nations. The European allies have already been attacked with nuclear weapons, but the Soviets will not make a first-strike against the U.S. In Washington the decision has been reached to honor the NATO commitment with a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union -- contingent on one consideration which stands in the way of this action: the calculation of how many American fatalities the U.S. would be willing to suffer as a result of the Soviet response. Under these circumstances, what level of American fatalities would you consider tolerable? Please circle the answer which best completes the following statement:

"I WOULD APPROVE A NUCLEAR FIRST-STRIKE AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION EVEN IF THIS WOULD MEAN THAT \_\_\_\_\_ OF THE AMERICAN POPULATION WOULD BE KILLED."

Percentage intervals for responses are identical to earlier version: population figures have been updated. For 1961 data, males = 674; female = 449. For 1970 data, males = 459; females = 230. The drop in 1970 from Tables 1 & 2 represents the substantial number of students who refused to answer this item, several of whom wrote notes, some of them obscene, as to the immorality of the question itself!

are considering the acceptability of war in the modern world (PACIFISM SCALE), the degree of provocation which the subject deems necessary to justify the use of nuclear weapons against an enemy of the United States (NUCWAR), or the number of casualties the subject would be willing to suffer in pursuing a nuclear war (FATALITIES), the females in both surveys are always proportionately more opposed to the use of such institutional violence.

Where the differences are not statistically significant, it is almost always in those instances where the percentage of males supporting such violence is too small to allow for a large enough contrast with their female classmates. Despite this important difference, many social psychological profiles of students (of different ideological persuasion and varying degrees of militance) have failed to consider males and females separately.

Of course, the observation that males and females in the U.S. and elsewhere have differed in their political behavior is not new. Numerous commercial public opinion polls<sup>6</sup> and academic studies<sup>7</sup> have documented differences between men and women in their rates of political participation and amount and area of political knowledge. On matters of issue there are also many differences between men and women, but none more widely reported than the difference in position regarding institutional violence. By wide margins, women are consistently more opposed to such things as capital punishment, universal military training, and conventional or nuclear war.

In September of 1971 this issue was raised in an explicitly political context. Speaking at a meeting of the New Democratic Coalition in Washington, feminist Gloria Steinem said it is the "insecure male" practicing "bureaucratic machismo" that is responsible for the war in Indochina. Representative Bella Abzug called for support for the Women's Political Caucus, which she and Ms. Steinem recently founded, claiming it would field candidates who would "free society from the powerful male clique that produces nothing but

violence."<sup>8</sup>

Despite the obvious theoretical and social implications of this phenomenon, the problem rarely has been systematically investigated. Rather, a variety of factors have been variously proposed by social scientists as explaining, accounting for, and/or predicting to sex differences in sociopolitical attitudes. In the present study we intend to directly test a number of these explanations as formal hypotheses. In pursuing this investigation, we have constructed four scales representing attitudes toward and responses to institutional violence: PACIFISM, NUCWAR (the two scales adapted from the 1961 Putney and Middleton study), CONCERN - a measure of concern for world survival in the face of possible nuclear war, and an additional scale, DEATHPEN - attitudes toward capital punishment, included in order to expand the scope of our measures of institutional violence. Each of these measures represents multiple-item summated scales. The component scale items for the first two attitude scales have already been presented; the items for the other scales are given in Appendix A.

We shall look at the following often-cited but seldom empirically-tested explanations for differences in political attitudes among students, particularly, between males and females: traditional sex role identification; parental socialization patterns; and socio-cultural milieu. As Table 4 illustrates, there are persistent male-female mean differences in attitudes toward institutional violence on all four of our scales, with females consistently displaying mean scale scores demonstrating greater opposition to the use of institutional violence than males. Our research strategy in testing the three hypotheses regarding sex differences will be to undertake a comparative analysis of these mean scale scores in the context of operational indicators of each of the three explanations. If, in fact, sex differences are to be explained by one or more of these factors, then we would expect the



sex differences (found in Table 4) at least to be substantially diminished, if not to disappear altogether, when these factors are systematically applied.

## II. Sex-role identification and attitudes toward institutional violence

One frequently cited explanation of observed sex differences on attitudes toward violence argues that they are due to differences in "aggressive and dominant" behavior appropriate to the respective sex roles. For example, political scientist Fred I. Greenstein (1961) states, "At every age boys are more pugnacious and quarrelsome than girls. Even among the two- to four-and-a-half-year-old nursery school children studied by (LaBerta A.) Hattwick, boys exceeded girls 'in all forms of aggressive behavior with the exception of verbal bossing.' This class of sex differences seems to have an obvious bearing on the adult tendencies...for women to be more pacifist in their issue positions."(p.,366)

If one examines the literature on sex role learning, however, it soon becomes apparent that there are considerable differences in the rate and degree to which a child learns aggression or any of the other norms of proper sex role performance depending upon a variety of factors such as the presence or absence of either parent for purposes of modeling and identification;<sup>9</sup> the nature of the same sex parental model;<sup>10</sup> the birth order position of the child;<sup>11</sup> the sex and proximity in age of the child's siblings;<sup>12</sup> the distribution of power in the home, including which parent assumes primary caretaking responsibilities for the child;<sup>13</sup> the larger social rewards for proper sex role performance;<sup>14</sup> and many other factors, including, of course, demographic variables such as religion and social status. The result of the interaction of many such relevant variables are the more than a few cases of "cooperative and sociable" males and "pugnacious and quarrelsome" females that one encounters in the real world.

It follows, then, that the sex role one learns to identify with can be more fruitfully conceptualized as a complex, continuous rather than a simple, discrete variable. That is, even the culturally stereotypic male and female roles are described by a whole complex of norms and the degree of identification with these many conventional norms must vary according to the particular socialization experiences of the child. Taking this into consideration, one might expect to find some possible relationship between degree of identification with one's sex role, as traditionally defined, and an apparently sex-linked attitude such as relative support for or opposition to the use of institutional violence.

As our first task, we confirmed the important pattern of differences between the male and female mean scores. As can be seen in Table 4, females are more opposed to violence than males on every scale. The magnitude of the difference in means is not as great as would be the case in a nationally representative sample because of the very small proportion of males who were willing to endorse the use of violence under less extreme circumstances. As mentioned, it is this important trend in student opinion which has become such a central theme in the student movement.

Sex role identification was measured by a set of fifteen semantic differential scales constructed around the major bipolar male and female sex role norms.<sup>15</sup> The norms were selected from those cited in previous studies of sex role learning in children.<sup>16</sup> The full set of scales can be found in Table 5. Two indices of sex role identification are used in this study, noted as SEXROLE1 and SEXROLE2. SEXROLE1 is simply the summated score on the basic ten semantic differential scales for each respondent (the remaining five scales being pairs of polar attributes in which the connotative loadings of five of the scales were reversed). In addition, we submitted all fifteen scales, for males and females separately, to a principal components factor analysis employing a varimax orthogonal rotation. This procedure yielded a

TABLE 4

Mean Scores on Attitudes Scales by Sex

	<u>Males</u>	<u>Females</u>
PACIFISM	20.9	22.6
NUCWAR	21.6	23.0
CONCERN	20.0	22.5
DEATHPEN	10.2	11.5

For all scales, the higher the score the greater the attitude, i.e., the greater the pacifism, the greater the opposition to nuclear war, the greater the concern, and the greater the opposition to capital punishment.

"male factor," dominated by strong loadings for five of the semantic differential scales.<sup>17</sup> Given the possibility that attitude differences potentially related to sex role identification might emerge when the index based on the "male factor" is employed rather than the index based on the total set of scales, both indices are included in the analysis.

Contrary to expectations, there were few differences in the mean male and female responses to any of the ten scales. As can be seen in Table 5, the female subsample has a higher masculinity score on only two of the ten scales used in SEXROLE1, but the differences in all cases are so small as to be negligible.<sup>18</sup> This still does not preclude, however, the possibility that the degree of sex role identification might make some difference in attitudes towards institutional violence within each sex category.

Consequently, the two sex role identification indices were dichotomized at the mean, and the mean attitude scale scores were computed for each half of the dichotomies, separately for males and females. These data are displayed in Table 6.

Looking horizontally at the differences in male-female means under conditions of high and low identification with stereotypic male sex role, we may conclude that degree of identification does not alter the basic pattern of gender differences across the attitude scales. Within each of the sex role categories, the female respondents are still consistently more anti-violence than are the males. While, for reasons already discussed, the individual differences are not very large, the total pattern is statistically significant beyond the .05 level using the sign test as a measure of the degree to which two groups systematically differ in the face of several different "treatments," conditions, or experiences (Siegel, 1956).

In fact, the sex role indices do not seem to account for much of the total variation in the mean scores on all four attitude scales for either

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TABLE 5

Mean Scores on Semantic Differential SEXROLE Index Items

	<u>Males</u>	<u>Females</u>
Active-Passive*	3.3	3.3
Friendly-Agressive	2.8	2.8
Independent-Dependent	2.8	3.0
Innovative-Conformist	3.4	3.3
Dominant-Submissive*	3.5	3.6
Exhibitionist-Modest*	4.6	4.8
Work-Oriented - Pleasure-Oriented	4.0	3.7
Controlled-Impulsive	3.6	4.0
Self-Oriented - Other-Oriented	3.8	4.0
Changing-Enduring	3.7	3.8
Dynamic-Static*	3.5	3.4
Flamboyant-Reserved*	4.7	4.6
Busy-Relaxed	3.4	3.2
Cooperative-Competitive	3.7	3.6
Socially Deviant- Socially Respectable	5.2	5.3

All means have been computed in the direction indicated in the pair of polar attributes, i.e., higher mean score indicates position closer to right-hand attribute. The first ten scales are those summed in SEXROLE 1. SEXROLE 2 is a summed index of the five scales indicated with an asterisk, obtained from a factor analysis of all fifteen items.

TABLE 6

SEXROLE Identification by Attitude Scales

	<u>Males</u>		<u>Females</u>	
	Mean	N	Mean	N
<u>NUCWAR</u>				
Sexrole 1				
High	21.4	253	23.0	140
Low	21.8	271	23.0	149
Sexrole 2				
High	21.6	148	22.9	69
Low	21.6	379	23.0	220
<u>PACIFISM</u>				
Sexrole 1				
High	21.1	247	22.9	137
Low	20.8	268	22.4	146
Sexrole 2				
High	20.7	149	22.8	64
Low	21.0	367	22.5	219
<u>CONCERN</u>				
Sexrole 1				
High	20.4	241	22.3	126
Low	19.7	263	22.7	133
Sexrole 2				
High	19.9	145	22.6	59
Low	20.1	362	22.5	200
<u>DEATHPEN</u>				
Sexrole 1				
High	10.1	276	11.6	148
Low	10.3	286	11.5	160
Sexrole 2				
High	10.2	164	11.6	70
Low	10.2	400	11.5	238

High scores on the SEXROLE indices represent scores toward the feminine side of the semantic differential scales, as traditionally defined, and low scores represent responses on the masculine side.

sex. Looking at these data vertically within each of the sex groups, there does not seem to be any correlation between degree of sex role identification and degree of support for or opposition to the use of institutional violence for either males or females. Thus, at our present stage of analysis we may tentatively conclude that degree of identification with traditional sex role is not able to account for the previously observed male-female differences in attitudes toward institutional violence.

### III. Parental socialization and attitudes toward institutional violence

There is a great deal of literature in the field of political socialization,<sup>19</sup> in addition to the many studies of student activists,<sup>20</sup> which also establishes the importance of family socialization in personality development, particularly with respect to the formation of socio-political attitudes in the individual. In large measure such research would suggest that individuals socialized in permissive, humanitarian family environments are more likely to be opposed to both interpersonal aggression and institutional violence. Exceptions to this pattern may be found in children from that minority of politically conservative, middle class families in which the parents are successful in promoting the internalization of such attitudes in their children through the use of permissive (e.g., the use of reason, threats of isolation, appeals to guilt, etc.) rather than punitive techniques of instruction and control.

Individuals raised in authoritarian family environments are more likely to support both interpersonal aggression and institutional violence as effective methods of social control. Psychodynamically speaking, such individuals have a need to project feelings of moral inferiority on to "outsiders" on whom they can displace their repressed feelings of hostility toward their parents.<sup>21</sup> A few exceptions to this pattern may be found in children from authoritarian families who, for various reasons, do not so

totally submit to parental domination that their hostility toward their parents is repressed. Such individuals, according to Sarnoff and Katz (1954), often express their rebellion by adopting attitudes contrary to those of their parents with respect to political issues when such issues are perceived by the children to be salient for the parents.

While we do not have any data on the direction or the salience of parent's attitudes toward institutional violence, the observed association (Adorno, et.al., 1950) between such attitudes and parental socialization practices, in addition to our understanding of the probable effects of certain kinds of socialization practices on the child, would suggest the possibility of finding similar relationships in our data -- relationships which could alter the simpler pattern of male-female attitudinal differences. In our study we have used several different kinds of family socialization measures. One set of variables focuses on the role differentiation between parents (PARSTYLE, PARDECSN, DISCIPLN). Other variables focus on: (2) the degree of participation the child was allowed in family decision making (FAMLDECN, FREEBTCH); his degree of satisfaction with such participation (SATYINF); (4) the amount of affection, support, and guidance provided by parents (SHOWLOVE, PARVALUE, JOBPARN); (5) the degree of understanding and communication between parents and child (KNOWNEED, PARTALK); (6) the frequency of physical punishment administered by parents (FIVEPHYS); and (7) the child's perception of the relative severity of the punishment received (TOOSEVER).

If different patterns of family socialization tend to influence the development of the individual's personality in certain characteristic directions, one might expect to find such differences in the socialization experiences of the males and females in our sample and some relationship between certain kinds of socialization and certain dispositions toward the



use of institutional violence.<sup>22</sup> In general, as Scott (1960) has demonstrated, interpersonal relations are often the bases and model for orientations toward international relations.

Table 7 defines each of the socialization variables in terms of the tags or labels which are used in the subsequent analysis. The data arraying the mean attitude scores by the various socialization variables are presented in Table 8. A pattern similar to that found for the sex role indices is found, although a bit more complicated. Looking at these data horizontally, we see that the predominant male-female differences in the four attitude scales is, in the main, unchanged. For virtually all of the response options within all of the socialization variables, females still possess mean scores which are more on the anti-violence end of the scale. While for reasons already discussed, the magnitude of these differences are small and there are a few scattered reversals of this basic trend, the total pattern is consistent with our previous findings, and, using the gign test, is significant beyond the .05 level.

When we look vertically at the interactive effects of the different socialization variables upon the attitude scale scores, we do not find -- with one exception -- any consistent and meaningful patterns. Neither the role differentiation within the family, the degree of participation allowed in family decision making, the degree of satisfaction with such participation, the amount of parental affection and guidance provided, nor the degree of communication and understanding between parent and child seem to have had any systematic effect on the individual's attitudes toward institutional violence.

The one exception to this pattern is the positive monotonic relationship between the amount of physical punishment to which the child was subjected and his support of all forms of institutional violence. But even

TABLE 7

Definitions of Parental Socialization Items

<u>Tag</u>	<u>Questionnaire Item and Response Options</u>
PARSTYLE	Which parent would you say was the more influential in setting the pace and tone of the family's routine and style? <p style="text-align: center;">Mother                      Father                      Both</p>
PARDECSN	Generally speaking, which parent made most of the important family decisions? <p style="text-align: center;">Mother                      Father                      Both</p>
FAMLDECN	As you were growing up, did you, yourself, have much influence in family decisions in matters affecting you? <p style="text-align: center;">Much                      Some                      None</p>
FREEBTCH	Did you feel free to complain about family matters? <p style="text-align: center;">Felt Free              Felt a little Uneasy              Better not Complain</p>
SATYINF	Are you satisfied with the amount of influence you had in your family? <p style="text-align: center;">Satisfied                      So-So                      Dissatisfied</p>
KNOWNEED	As you were growing up, did your parents generally understand your needs? <p style="text-align: center;">Always      Usually      Sometimes      Usually Not      Never</p>
SHOWLOVE	To what extent are there usually open displays of affection of affection between members of your immediate family? <p style="text-align: center;"><u>Much</u>                      <u>None</u>  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9</p>
DISCIPLN	Which parent assumed the primary responsibility for disciplining you? <p style="text-align: center;">Mother                      Father                      Both                      Other _____</p>
FIVEPHYS	After the age of five, did discipline ever take a physical form? <p style="text-align: center;">Always      Usually      Sometimes      Usually Not      Never</p>
TOOSEVER	Was your parents' discipline ever, in your view, too severe? <p style="text-align: center;">Always      Usually      Sometimes      Usually Not      Never</p>
PARVALUE	To a greater or lesser extent, did your parents give you a solid set of values and direction in life? <p style="text-align: center;"><u>Greater</u>                      <u>Lesser</u>  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9</p>

TABLE 7 (Continued)

<u>Definitions of Parental Socialization Items</u>																									
<u>Tag</u>	<u>Questionnaire Item and Response Options</u>																								
PARTALK	Did you ever feel a problem communicating with either of your parents?  Always      Usually      Sometimes      Usually Not      Never																								
JOBPARIN	To what extent do you feel your parents influenced your choice of career goals?  <table><tr><td><u>Greater</u></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td><u>Lesser</u></td></tr><tr><td>1</td><td>2</td><td>3</td><td>4</td><td>5</td><td>6</td><td>7</td><td>8</td><td>9</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr></table>	<u>Greater</u>											<u>Lesser</u>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9			
<u>Greater</u>											<u>Lesser</u>														
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9																	

-9(c)-

TABLE 8

Mean Scores on Attitude Scales by Parental Socialization Items

Socialization Items	Males		Female	
	Mean	N	Mean	N
A) <u>P A C I F I S M S C A L E</u>				
<u>PARSTYLE</u>				
Mom	21.0	173	22.9	107
Dad	20.8	138	22.5	44
Both	20.9	205	22.4	130
<u>PARDECSN</u>				
Mom	21.2	59	22.9	41
Dad	20.9	298	22.9	96
Both	21.0	160	22.4	145
<u>FAMLDECN</u>				
Much	21.3	122	22.8	107
Some	20.8	343	22.5	154
None	20.9	49	22.8	21
<u>FREEBTCH</u>				
Free	21.1	313	22.9	194
Uneasy	20.5	155	22.2	64
Not	21.1	49	22.1	24
<u>SATYINF</u>				
Sat.	20.5	320	22.5	185
So-So	21.6	148	22.8	72
Not Sat.	22.1	50	23.3	26
<u>KNOWNEED</u>				
Always	20.0	50	21.9	40
Usually	20.9	322	22.8	159
Sometimes	20.7	103	22.5	53
Usu. Not	23.0	37	22.1	28
Never	24.0	5	21.0	3
<u>SHOWLOVE</u>				
Much (1-3)	21.0	161	22.7	133
Medium (4-6)	20.7	212	22.5	75
None (7-9)	21.1	141	22.3	75

PACIFISM (cont.)

	Males		Females	
	Mean	N	Mean	N
<u>DISCIPLN</u>				
Mom	21.0	118	22.7	107
Dad	20.8	173	23.0	34
Both	20.9	220	22.4	134
Other	20.0	3	23.9	7
<u>FIVEPHYS</u>				
Always	19.3	8	23.3	6
Usually	20.0	77	22.1	29
Sometimes	20.7	186	22.8	87
Usu. Not	21.2	172	22.6	105
Never	22.0	74	22.6	56
<u>TOOSEVER</u>				
Always	18.6	5	23.2	5
Usually	21.1	20	20.3	11
Sometimes	21.6	122	23.3	67
Usu. Not	21.1	237	23.0	113
Never	20.1	130	21.9	88
<u>PARVALUE</u>				
Greater (1-3)	20.4	347	22.6	199
Medium (4-6)	21.8	116	22.3	53
Lesser (7-9)	22.0	49	23.7	28
<u>PARTALK</u>				
Always	21.8	25	22.0	30
Usually	21.9	89	23.8	45
Sometimes	20.9	223	22.8	119
Usu. Not	20.3	143	22.4	67
Never	20.9	334	21.0	22
<u>JOBPARIN</u>				
Greater (1-3)	20.5	118	22.4	44
Medium (4-6)	20.8	174	22.3	85
Lesser (7-9)	21.3	207	22.8	139

TABLE 8 (cont.)

## Mean Scores on Attitude Scales by Parental Socialization Items

Socialization Items	Males		Females	
	Mean	N	Mean	N
<b>B) <u>NUCLEAR SCALE</u></b>				
<b><u>PARSTYLE</u></b>				
Mom	21.6	179	22.8	109
Dad	21.5	139	22.6	47
Both	21.8	211	23.4	130
<b><u>PARDECSN</u></b>				
Mom	21.6	61	22.8	43
Dad	21.6	303	23.1	99
Both	21.7	164	23.0	145
<b><u>FAMLDECN</u></b>				
Much	22.0	131	23.1	111
Some	21.3	346	22.9	155
None	22.1	49	23.6	21
<b><u>FREETCH</u></b>				
Free	21.7	315	23.2	200
Uneasy	21.3	160	22.6	62
Not	22.3	54	20.9	25
<b><u>SATYINF</u></b>				
Sat.	21.2	323	22.8	191
So-So	22.3	157	23.2	71
Not Sat.	22.3	50	22.9	25
<b><u>KNOWNEED</u></b>				
Always	20.0	53	22.0	42
Usually	21.7	325	23.2	161
Sometimes	21.7	102	22.7	55
Usu. Not	22.6	40	24.8	25
Never	22.2	6	20.8	5
<b><u>SHOWLOVE</u></b>				
Much (1-3)	21.6	165	23.0	133
Medium (4-6)	21.7	213	22.9	80
None (7-9)	21.5	147	23.2	75

NUCWAR (cont.)

	Males		Females	
	Mean	N	Mean	N
<u>DISCIPLN</u>				
Mom	21.4	124	22.8	106
Dad	21.5	178	23.5	37
Both	21.8	223	23.0	137
Other	23.0	3	25.0	7
<u>FIVEPHYS</u>				
Always	19.5	8	22.6	5
Usually	20.4	81	22.9	31
Sometimes	21.7	194	22.9	85
Usu Not	21.8	175	22.9	107
Never	22.7	72	23.4	60
<u>TOOSEVER</u>				
Always	21.3	4	25.3	4
Usually	22.3	20	21.8	12
Sometimes	21.9	131	23.6	63
Usu. Not	21.7	238	23.4	119
Never	21.1	133	22.2	90
<u>PARVALUE</u>				
Greater (1-3)	21.3	356	22.9	203
Medium (4-6)	22.1	120	22.5	53
Lesser (7-9)	22.8	46	24.8	29
<u>PARTALK</u>				
Always	21.4	27	23.0	30
Usually	22.8	91	24.0	44
Sometimes	21.6	230	23.1	122
Usu. Not	21.2	146	22.5	66
Never	20.9	32	22.1	25
<u>JOBPAR IN</u>				
Greater (1-3)	21.3	118	22.7	46
Medium (4-6)	21.4	173	23.0	86
Lesser (7-9)	22.0	216	23.1	144

TABLE 8 (Continued)

## Mean Scores on Attitude Scales by Parental Socialization Items

Socialization Items	C) <u>CONCERN SCALE</u>			
	Males		Females	
	Mean	N	Mean	N
<u>PARSTYLE</u>				
Mom	19.9	167	22.5	97
Dad	19.9	133	24.5	43
Both	20.3	209	21.8	116
<u>PARDECSN</u>				
Mom	20.4	56	23.4	34
Dad	20.0	299	22.8	92
Both	20.0	154	22.1	131
<u>FAMLDECN</u>				
Much	20.6	124	22.4	102
Some	20.0	335	22.5	136
None	19.2	48	23.3	19
<u>FREEBTCH</u>				
Free	20.3	310	22.2	180
Uneasy	20.0	148	23.0	54
Not	18.7	52	23.7	23
<u>SATYINF</u>				
Sat.	20.3	310	22.4	173
So-so	19.7	151	22.3	61
Not Sat.	19.8	49	23.8	24
<u>KNOWNEED</u>				
Always	18.9	48	22.2	40
Usually	20.4	319	22.1	147
Sometimes	19.9	96	23.3	46
Usu. Not	18.9	37	24.9	22
Never	21.0	6	20.0	3
<u>SHOWLOVE</u>				
Much (1-3)	20.4	161	22.4	121
Medium (4-6)	20.0	206	22.5	67
None (7-9)	19.8	140	22.6	70
<u>DISCIPLN</u>				
Mom	20.2	113	22.5	96
Dad	20.4	172	23.4	33
Both	19.8	219	22.1	121
Other	21.0	3	25.4	7
<u>FIVEPHYS</u>				
Always	20.6	8	26.2	5
Usually	20.6	76	23.1	26
Sometimes	19.9	177	22.9	82
Usu. Not	19.8	174	22.1	93
	20.5	75	22.2	53



-9(h)-

CONCERN (cont.)

	Males		Females	
	Mean	N	Mean	N
<u>TOOSEVER</u>				
Always	20.0	4	27.5	4
Usually	20.2	20	23.4	11
Sometimes	19.9	120	23.0	56
Usu. Not	19.6	238	22.5	106
Never	21.0	126	21.9	82
<u>PARVALUE</u>				
Greater (1-3)	19.6	342	22.3	186
Medium (4-6)	20.6	113	22.6	46
Lesser (7-9)	20.0	48	24.5	24
<u>PARTALK</u>				
Always	19.5	28	23.5	28
Usually	19.2	84	24.8	40
Sometimes	20.5	217	22.0	104
Usu. Not	19.7	147	22.0	62
Never	21.5	30	21.8	24
<u>JOBPARIN</u>				
Greater (1-3)	19.7	116	23.3	40
Medium (4-6)	19.7	168	22.3	80
Lesser (7-9)	20.4	207	22.8	128

TABLE 8 (cont.)

Mean Scores on Attitude Scales by Parental Socialization Items

Socialization Items	Males		Females	
	Mean	N	Mean	N
<u>D) DEATHPEN SCALE</u>				
<u>PARSTYLE</u>				
Mom	10.4	189	11.8	122
Dad	10.0	149	10.7	50
Both	10.2	231	10.7	134
<u>PARDECSN</u>				
Mom	10.6	65	11.0	44
Dad	10.1	330	11.4	105
Both	10.3	174	11.8	157
<u>FAMLDECN</u>				
Much	10.2	140	11.7	116
Some	10.2	374	11.3	169
None	10.0	51	12.3	23
<u>FREBTECH</u>				
Free	10.2	343	11.6	207
Uneasy	10.3	168	11.5	72
Not	10.3	56	11.4	27
<u>SATYINE</u>				
Sat.	10.0	350	11.5	202
So-So	10.4	165	11.3	76
Not Sat.	10.3	55	12.4	29
<u>KNOWNEED</u>				
Always	10.0	59	11.0	42
Usually	10.2	350	11.7	173
Sometimes	10.0	110	11.3	58
Usu. Not	11.7	44	12.2	29
Never	9.8	6	11.7	6
<u>SHOWLOVE</u>				
Much (1-3)	10.3	186	11.5	142
Medium (4-6)	10.1	225	11.5	82
None (7-9)	10.1	156	11.7	83

DEATHPEN (cont.)

	Males		Females	
	Mean	N	Mean	N
<u>DISCIPLN</u>				
Mom	10.5	130	11.4	116
Dad	9.9	191	12.1	38
Both	10.3	243	11.5	146
Other	12.3	3	12.4	7
<u>FIVEPHYS</u>				
Always	8.4	9	11.6	7
Usually	9.8	83	11.7	33
Sometimes	10.0	207	11.5	98
Usu. Not	10.2	186	11.4	107
Never	11.2	85	11.8	63
<u>TOOSEVER</u>				
Always	8.0	5	13.7	6
Usually	10.7	21	11.0	12
Sometimes	10.6	136	11.8	72
Usu. Not	10.3	261	11.3	122
Never	9.8	144	11.6	96
<u>PARVALUE</u>				
Greater (1-3)	9.8	384	11.5	217
Medium (4-6)	10.8	128	10.4	55
Lesser (7-9)	11.1	51	12.7	33
<u>PARTALK</u>				
Always	9.6	27	11.6	32
Usually	10.5	89	12.0	50
Sometimes	10.3	246	11.5	128
Usu. Not	10.0	159	11.4	74
Never	9.8	35	11.2	23
<u>JOBPAR IN</u>				
Greater (1-3)	9.4	129	11.9	145
Medium (4-6)	10.1	186	11.6	91
Lesser (7-9)	10.7	234	11.6	155

this relationship (to be investigated more closely by the authors in ongoing research) applies only to the males and fails to produce any instances where the mean male scores within any of the option categories on this variable exceeds any of the female scores. We may conclude, therefore, that these indicators of parental socialization have also failed to provide a generally applicable explanation for the genesis of the consistent difference between male and female attitudes toward institutional violence.

#### IV. Socio-cultural milieu and attitudes toward institutional violence

Finally, we turned to another major body of research which proposes a relationship between religion and social status and political liberalism, variously measured.<sup>23</sup> Our interest in these variables stems from two separate bodies of research. First, although recent studies suggest that, as the student movement continues to spread, it is increasingly broadening its base of support -- drawing students from all classes and religions; early research on radical student activists at some of the more elite universities revealed a disproportionate representation of students from Jewish and from upper-middle class families.<sup>24</sup> Also, many earlier studies of the general population have established a positive relationship between higher social status and political liberalism. Second, many studies of working and middle class socialization practices and life styles have pointed out sharp differences in normative sex role definitions in these two groups, differences which may help account for the aforementioned differences in political .. attitudes.<sup>25</sup>

Although the results reported in the previous two sections of this paper indicated that the sex pattern in attitudes toward institutional violence is not affected by our measures of sex role identification and family socialization experience, nonetheless it may be hypothesized that there are other elements of the cultural contexts of different religions and social

classes which can explain the observed sex-attitude differences. We have used two separate and somewhat crude indicators of social status in the present analysis: the estimated annual family income of the respondent's family and the highest educational level attained by the respondent's father.

Table 9 presents the male and female attitude scale scores when controlled for religion, family income and father's education. With respect to religion, our data generally confirm the greater opposition to institutional violence among Jewish students. Whether one uses father's religion, mother's religion or student's own religion,<sup>26</sup> Jewish males are consistently more opposed to institutional violence than their Protestant and Catholic classmates. Jewish females show a similar pattern with respect to attitudes toward war, but are very slightly exceeded in their opposition to capital punishment by Catholic females, and in their concern for world survival by Protestant females.

Nevertheless, when we compare the male-female scores horizontally, religious background or identification fails to modify the established pattern. In thirty-eight basic horizontal comparisons (three measures of religion by three religious affiliations, with an additional two for own religion by four attitude scales) there are no cases where the mean male score is greater than the mean female score. And in the total matrix, out of 124 potential comparisons, there is only one case where any male score exceeds a female score.

With respect to social status, the data are more complicated and varied. While there doesn't appear to be any relationship between either family income or father's education and attitudes concerning world survival (CONCERN) or capital punishment (DEATHPEN) for either subsample, there are clear relationships between both of these variables and attitudes

TABLE 9

Mean Scores on Attitude: Scores by Socio-Cultural Milieu

Background Variable	Males		Females	
	Mean	N	Mean	N
<b>A) <u>PACIFISM SCALE</u></b>				
<b><u>FAMINCOME</u></b>				
under \$9999	20.4	96	22.2	46
\$10 - 19999	20.7	161	22.6	74
\$20 - 34999	21.4	112	22.5	57
\$35000+	21.3	117	22.9	68
<b><u>DADSCHOOL</u></b>				
1-8 yrs.	19.8	22	20.8	6
9-11 yrs.	19.9	38	21.2	9
high schl	20.5	100	22.3	45
2 yr coll	20.1	10	22.7	11
4 yr coll inc.	21.2	50	22.4	24
4 yr coll compl.	21.3	138	23.2	73
beyond 4 yr coll	21.2	155	22.7	109
<b><u>OWNRELIGION</u></b>				
Prot.	20.0	123	21.0	56
Cath	19.7	121	21.9	48
Jew	21.4	132	23.1	77
Agnostic	22.2	55	23.2	46
Atheist	22.4	12	25.1	9
<b><u>DADRELIGION</u></b>				
Prot	20.8	149	21.7	85
Cath	20.2	137	22.3	52
Jew	21.5	157	23.5	96
<b><u>MOMRELIGION</u></b>				
Prot	20.9	164	22.0	90
Cath	20.1	151	22.1	61
Jew	21.5	153	23.6	98

TABLE 9 (cont.)

Mean Scores on Attitude: Scores by Socio-Cultural Milieu

Background Variable	Males		Females	
	Mean	N	Mean	N
<u>B) NUCWAR SCALE</u>				
<u>FAMINCOME</u>				
under \$9999	21.1	102	22.3	50
\$10 - 19999	21.4	165	22.6	71
\$20 - 34999	22.4	122	23.4	58
\$35000+	21.8	108	23.5	72
<u>DADSCHOOL</u>				
1-8 yrs	19.8	20	21.7	7
9-11	20.5	40	21.4	10
high schl	21.1	106	21.7	47
2 yr coll	21.5	11	22.5	11
4 yr coll inc.	22.4	47	23.2	21
4 yr coll compl.	22.1	135	23.5	72
beyond 4 yr coll	21.8	167	23.5	111
<u>OWNRELIGION</u>				
Prot.	20.3	130	21.4	60
Cath	20.5	127	22.6	54
Jew	22.0	128	23.1	75
Agnostic	23.8	58	23.5	42
Atheist	24.3	10	25.3	12
<u>DADRELIGION</u>				
Prot	21.6	243	22.5	87
Cath	20.7	144	22.8	55
Jew	22.1	151	23.5	90
<u>MOMRELIGION</u>				
Prot	21.3	173	22.3	93
Cath	21.2	157	22.8	63
Jew	22.2	146	23.6	93

TABLE 9. (cont.)

Mean Scores on Attitude: Scores by Socio-Cultural Milieu

Background Variable	Males		Females	
	Mean	N	Mean	N
<u>C) CONCERN SCALE</u>				
<u>FAMINCOME</u>				
under \$9999	20.1	96	22.5	43
\$10 - 19999	19.8	155	23.2	75
\$20 - 34999	20.5	115	21.3	49
\$35000+	19.7	112	22.7	65
<u>DADSCHOOL</u>				
1-8 yrs	19.2	49	23.1	7
9-11 yrs	20.1	38	20.9	10
high schl	20.3	98	22.5	43
2 yr coll	23.0	11	23.3	8
4 yr coll inc.	19.9	48	21.1	18
4 yr coll compl.	19.8	134	22.8	63
beyond 4 yr coll	20.1	158	22.9	102
<u>OWNRELIGION</u>				
Prot.	19.9	118	22.6	54
Cath	19.9	119	22.8	46
Jew	20.3	125	22.8	69
Agnostic	20.6	58	21.7	40
Atheist	22.6	8	21.4	10
<u>DADRELIGION</u>				
Prot	20.1	148	22.8	76
Cath	19.7	139	22.4	47
Jew	20.3	148	22.5	87
<u>MOMRELIGION</u>				
Prot	19.9	162	22.9	81
Cath	20.0	154	22.3	55
Jew	20.1	146	22.4	89



TABLE 9 (cont.)

Mean Scores on Attitude: Scores by Socio-Cultural Milieu

Background Variable	Males		Females	
	Mean	N	Mean	N
<u>D) DEATHPEN SCALE</u>				
<u>FAMINCOME</u>				
under \$9999	10.2	105	11.1	50
\$10 - 19999	10.3	177	11.7	79
\$20 - 34999	10.5	128	12.1	65
\$35000+	10.0	123	11.3	74
<u>DADSCHOOL</u>				
1-8 yrs	9.8	22	11.8	8
9-11 yrs	10.1	42	10.4	10
high schl	10.2	112	11.4	51
2 yr coll	10.4	11	11.6	11
4 yr coll inc.	9.9	54	11.5	23
4 yr coll compl.	10.4	150	11.6	77
beyond 4 yr. coll	10.2	174	11.7	119
<u>OWNRELIGION</u>				
Prot.	9.3	134	10.4	64
Cath	9.9	132	11.8	52
Jew	10.3	142	11.6	79
Agnostic	11.4	60	11.7	49
Atheist	11.2	12	12.3	11
<u>DADRELIGION</u>				
Prot	10.0	165	11.2	93
Cath	10.1	155	12.1	56
Jew	10.5	167	11.9	100
<u>MOMRELIGION</u>				
Prot	10.0	181	11.3	99
Cath	10.2	171	11.9	65
Jew	10.5	163	11.8	101

toward nuclear war for both males and females. In all cases, increased income or education correlate positively with greater opposition to war. However, since the directional impact of these status variables is identical for both males and females, within-category comparisons again fail to yield any cases where the male mean scores on these two scales exceed that of the females.<sup>27</sup> These data thus do not provide positive evidence that the socio-cultural milieu hypothesis, as operationalized here, accounts for observed male-female differences in attitudes toward institutional violence.

#### V. Conclusion and suggestions for further research

Our attempt to verify those widely accepted hypotheses used to explain the repeatedly observed male-female differences in attitudes toward institutional violence has failed to produce any positive results. Neither degree of sex role identification, family socialization practices, nor socio-cultural milieu as measured by religious affiliation and social status seem to interact with this important sex-linked attitude in such a way as to produce any modification of the basic pattern. Future research on this phenomenon would do well to either employ different configurations of the same and different data or place the problem in a different conceptual perspective.

A factor analysis of the dependent socialization variables revealed that the two physical punishment variables combined with the three family participation variables to form a factor for the females while the physical punishment variables formed a separate factor by themselves for the males; the males combining the communication and understanding variables with the family participation variables for their highest loading factor. This could suggest, among many possible interpretations, that physical punishment might occupy a quite different role in the socialization of males and females (despite the fact that both groups reported about the same

amount of physical punishment received) and, consequently, have a quite different meaning for the two sexes. Given the fact that this variable produced significant differences within the male population on attitudes toward the use of institutional violence, its full implications need to be drawn out in further research.

One new source of possibly relevant insight might be gained by gathering data on the student's perception of his parents' expectations regarding proper sex role performance, including more detailed information than we presently have on parents' attitudes toward the use of institutional violence. Another possible direction would be to devise some means of ascertaining the models that parents presented their children with respect to methods of conflict resolution and goal achievement.

Finally, we are willing to entertain the possibility that differences in the content and quality of socialization experiences, and all that this entails, may not be the primary, let alone exclusive, cause of the sex-linked differences in attitudes toward the use of institutional violence. Rather, the differences may be due more to different rational assessments of their respective self interests (the attitudes in question thus serving predominantly instrumental or utilitarian functions for their holders). This argument would parallel, in certain major respects, the controversy between the "culture of poverty" theorists and those who challenge the notion of distinct value orientations for underclass people by pointing to the differential structure of opportunity and the utility of alternative strategies for goal achievement for the disadvantaged.

Looking at the 1969 Gallup poll (Erskin 1970) on capital punishment, for example, we note that race divides the population more dramatically than any other variable, with only 35 per cent of black men and 31 per cent of black women supporting the use of capital punishment as opposed to fifty

five per cent of white men and forty two per cent of white women. As blacks proportionately tend to be much more often the victims of such a policy, with whites handing out the "justice," the interpretation appears quite obvious.

Similarly, as the quotations from Steinem and Abzug suggest, women may perceive themselves to be most often the victims and least often the beneficiaries of institutional violence. This argument, of course, could not apply to the capital punishment issue, but could well apply to the issue of war. In almost any war there are bound to be civilian casualties and women and children are often as likely to be the victims of such violent aggression and very seldom the offenders. Not only are their lives at stake, but often their families are disrupted -- leaving them with tremendous responsibilities for the survival of its remaining members.

Because of the traditional differentiation of sex roles in the family, women develop a much greater investment in sons who may be called off to war. Women are called upon more to assist in the re-habilitation and re-adjustment of physically and/or psychologically wounded war veterans and women have to bear more of the pain and grief of bearing physically deformed children in the aftermath of the use of nuclear weapons. They are required to make such sacrifices by men, who control the machinery of the state, with none of the customary rewards for heroism and valor which men confer upon one another. It may be a plausible inference, then, that women simply assess themselves as suffering more and gaining less by warfare (or even interpersonal violence for which men are more biologically equipped). This "afterthought" remains in the realm of speculation, however, until means are devised to empirically test such a hypothesis.

In the meantime, these authors are convinced of the necessity of a much fuller exploration of the line of inquiry which formed the body of this paper -- a line of inquiry for which we have additional data resources and in which we continue to maintain an active interest.

FOOTNOTES

1. We surveyed the entire class of some 1800 incoming freshmen and had a response rate of slightly over fifty percent.
2. See, for example, Mannheim (1952); and Goertzel (1972).
3. Feuer (1969).
4. See, for example, Eisenstadt (1971); and Fishman and Solomon (1964).
5. See, for example, Block, Haan and Smith (1969); Bay (1967); Flacks (1967); and Kenniston (1967).
6. See, for example, Gallup (1971, 1970, 1967); Erskin (1970); Meyer and Seplow (1971); Vawter (1968); and "Bay Staters Favor Retaining Death Penalty," Boston Sunday Globe, May 7, 1969, p. 26.
7. See, for example, Granstein (1961); Heiskanen (1971); Lane (1959); Levitt (1967); March (1953-4); Shilvock and Schnepf (1953).
8. McGrory (1971).
9. See, for example, Hartley (1959); Clark (1955); Lynn and Sawyer (1959); Barclay (1967); Eisseg and Morgan (1946); Hoffman (1961); and Biller and Weiss (1970).
10. See, for example, Lefkowitz (1962); and Mussen and Distler (1960).
11. See, for example Kammeyer (1966) and Sears (1950).
12. See, for example, Koch (1954); Brim (1958); and Leventhal (1970).
13. See, for example, Beier and Ratzeberg (1943); Hetherington (1965); Maccoby (1959); and Sears, Whiting, Nowlis and Sears (1953).
14. See, for example, Hartley (1962); and Lynn (1966).
15. We decided not to use more conventional diagnostic instruments for testing sex role orientation, such as the M-F scale developed by Terman and Miles (1936) or the California Psychological Inventory Femininity Scale developed by Harrison Gough (1951) either because of changes in the behavioral norms around which the original items were composed or because of the inappropriateness of the scale for our predominantly middle and upper

class population. It must be further noted that neither scale can be regarded as inclusive for any population. For example, Leventhal (1970) has observed, in assessing his own research, that the CPI Femininity Scale and the MMPI Mf scale which he also used "give different weights to various aspects of masculine and feminine behavior." (p. 136).

A more probing "Projective Test of Masculinity Femininity," designed by Franck and Rosen (1949) to uncover unconscious sex role orientations was rejected because of the greater difficulty in scoring and because we were uncomfortable with the anatomical determinism implied in their definition of sex roles. The semantic differential test seemed appropriate because we simply wanted to measure degree of conformity to explicit sex role expectations, however they might be expressed in any particular situation and regardless of the extent to which conscious conformity was congruent with the individual's unconscious personality structure.

16. See, for example, Kagan, Hosken and Watson (1961); Beller and Turner (1962); and Brim (1958).
17. Those items included in the "Male factor" were: ACTIVE (passive), DYNAMIC (static), FLAMBOYANT (reserved), DOMINANT (submissive) and EXHIBITIONISTIC (modest). The female subsample also had a five item first loading factor (which included three of the same items contained in the male factor), but the loadings were not as strong( three were below .5 and none above .6) and the factor accounted for only 20.8% of the variance in the entire correlation matrix as compared to 25.4% for the male factor.
18. One reason the scores were so similar was because of a well-pronounced central response tendency in our sample. Some twenty-five per cent of both the male and female subsamples chose the middle response on the scale in rating themselves. Even when these subjects are eliminated, however,

the magnitude of the male-female group mean differences on either sex role index does not exceed the standard deviation for either group.

We are uncertain as to the specific reason(s) for this result. In the search for possible explanations we have entertained the possibility that the item choices were too vaguely formulated to permit meaningful discrimination or that each subsample may have responded to the scale using their own sex as a reference group (thus obviating between-sex differences). Of course, the latter is a problem of interpretation which is likely to occur almost anytime a semantic differential test is employed. One implication would be that the item choices may have had different meanings for males and for females, both in terms of perception and behavior.

One other possibility is that this sample of young people drawn predominantly from families headed by relatively affluent, highly-educated parents reflects the accelerated trend toward the "depolarization of sex roles" about which so many have written. Broderick and Fowler (1961) have stated that "while old patterns of hostility and withdrawal are not dead, new behaviors and relationships between the sexes are developing, based on greater understanding and sharing of value orientations." For example, Winick (1968) has noted that "young girls appear to be demonstrating the sexual precocity and aggressiveness once associated with boys." Conversely, McKee and Sherriffs (1958) have demonstrated in their research that "there is no inconsiderable pressure on men to modify their role by incorporating more of the traditionally 'feminine' qualities."

Barry, Bacon and Child (1957) point to the mechanization of the economy and change in family structure from the extended to the nuclear model as the principal causes of the reduction in sex role differences. As they explain:

"Our mechanized economy is perhaps less dependent than any previous economy upon the superior average strength of the male. The nuclear family in our society is often so isolated that husband and wife must each be prepared at times to take over or help in the household tasks normally assigned to the other." (p. 331). For our purposes it is also relevant to point out that, according to Barry, Bacon and Child, the "conditions favoring sex differentiation" are even more characteristic of upper status groups in our society, leading to even smaller sex differences in such groups.

19. See, for example, Easton and Dennis (1969); Dawson and Prewitt (1969); Hyman (1959); and Almond and Verba (1963).
20. See, for example, Eckhardt and Schriener (1969); Braungart (1970); Middleton and Putney (1963); and Spreitzer, Perry and Pugh (1971).
21. See, for example, Adorno et. al. (1950); Sanford (1959); and Gough and Martin (1950).
22. The authors recognize, of course, that when dealing with self report data, much of which is retrospective, it is not valid to deduce causation from mere correlation. Nevertheless, most of the literature in the field would predict some correlation.
23. In addition to much of the literature already cited, such as Flacks (1967) and Kenniston (1967), see Westby and Braungart (1966).
24. In addition to the articles by Dunlap (1970) and Spreitzer, Perry and Pugh (1971), see Mankoff and Flacks (1971).
25. See, for example, Rabban (1950); Lipset (1960); Bronfenbrenner (1958); and Kohn (1959).
26. The logic of using all three measures rests on the distinction between the effects of different values, implicit in parental religious affiliation, on the socialization of the child and the extent to which the individual himself seems to identify with such values in his own orientation toward religion.



The reader will notice that we have included the figures for those students who identify themselves as agnostic or atheist. These categories are not included under father's or mother's religion because the figures were too small to permit meaningful analysis.

27. In fact, the only way to produce superior male margins on any of the scales is to compare the males and females at opposite ends of the scale on father's education. Roughly speaking, only males whose fathers are college graduates or more are more opposed to violence than females whose fathers are high school graduates or less--and then only by a small margin on just two of the four scales.

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APPENDIX

Male and Female Responses to Items Used in the  
CONCERN and DEATHPEN Scales

<u>Item</u>	<u>Response</u>	<u>Male%</u>	<u>Female%</u>
On a nine-point scale, running from "low tension" to "high tension," indicate what you believe best represents the level of world tension .... just about now: (trichotomized for this table)	Low	3	1
	Medium	42	34
	High	53	61
.... world tensions you expect in five years: (trichotomized for this table)	Low	8	4
	Medium	25	15
	High	59	72
What is your estimate of when World War III, if it comes, will arrive?	Never	37	24
	Over 20 yrs.	20	14
	Within 20 yrs.	21	26
	Within 10 yrs.	10	18
	Within 5 yrs.	5	7
	Within 1-2 yrs.	2	2
What is the likelihood of a nuclear World War III?	Very Unlikely	29	19
	Fairly Unlikely	33	27
	Fairly Likely	22	31
	Very Likely	13	18
Do you believe that capital punishment acts as a deterrent against murder?	Yes	11	5
	Sometimes	40	36
	No	49	60
Generally speaking, are you for or against the death penalty for convicted first-degree murderers?	Strongly For	6	5
	For	31	16
	Against	39	50
	Strongly Against	24	29
Are you for or against the death penalty for convicted first-degree murderers who killed as part of their employment in organized crime?	Strongly For	20	7
	For	30	22
	Against	33	46
	Strongly Against	18	26