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**ABSTRACT**

Designed to help bring students to greater understanding of concepts of the introduction to psychology and leadership course (see the final reports which summarize the course development project, EM 010 418, EM 010 419, and EM 010 484), this Structural Communications unit is coordinated with the instructional unit in the core course on discipline (EM 010 441, EM 010 442, EM 010 462, EM 010 470, and EM 010 510). The basic strategy of the unit is to have the student work through the central theme which dominates problems presented in a brief series of modules. Each successive module refers to a matrix of statements which the student examines for relevance to the problem being considered. The unit can be used either individually or in a group setting, and was designed so that the end product would be a student with a more complete grasp of the elements of the theme and their interaction. EM 010 420 through EM 010 447 and EM 010 451 through EM 010 512 are related documents.  
(SH)

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UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY

# INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY AND LEADERSHIP



MAY 1971

ENRICHMENT XB  
DISCIPLINE AND THE INDIVIDUAL

EM 010 4/11



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INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY AND LEADERSHIP

ENRICHMENT X B  
DISCIPLINE AND THE INDIVIDUAL

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Enrichment Modules 22, 23, 24, & 25

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Orientation:

This Structural Communication Unit, DISCIPLINE AND THE INDIVIDUAL, is designed to be used only after Part Ten, "Discipline," of the course, Introduction to Psychology and Leadership, has been completed.

The project involves individual work. The student is presented with certain subject matter to be analyzed and then required to register his response to problems posed by the authors. The response is made by recording the numbers of the items he would deem pertinent to the problem from among those listed in the Response Indicator. The Discussion Comments and Interpretations serve as a diagnostic test of the student's response. By this method, he is presented varying points of view concerning the problems posed, and can gain confidence in his mastery of the concepts previously introduced to him. He can also develop his own ideas and come to understand different points of view.

Organization of the Unit

Each unit is divided into the following sections:

INTENTION. This serves as an introduction. It briefly describes the theme which the authors intend to communicate. It also summarizes the rationale for the approach, method and viewpoint.

PRESENTATION. This presents the scope of the discussion, giving an outline of the main and subsidiary themes.

INVESTIGATION. This section explores the theme in greater depth, and introduces a set of PROBLEMS. By working through the problems, the student will have his attention focused on the more subtle points in the theme, enabling him to develop his understanding of it. Included in this section also are the DISCUSSION COMMENTS and INTERPRETATIONS which provide feedback to guide the student.

RESPONSE INDICATOR. This is a matrix of items, all of them relevant to the theme as a whole. The student uses these items to solve the problems in the Investigation, and they provide a basic vocabulary for the student to interact with the authors and to 'talk back' to the authors of the Unit. Different sets of these items can be used to give adequate expression of different viewpoints on, or interpretation of the problems. A characteristic combination from the matrix, which will give adequate discussion of a problem, is certainly greater than one and usually less than ten.

Procedure:

Instructions about specific activities are given to the student in the body of the text.

The student should commence work on the Unit by reading the Intention and Presentation sections. The student may refer back to the Presentation at any stage of the Investigation. He should next work on the Investigation with its problem situations according to the following procedure:

Investigating the Problem

The student should read the problem and compose his solution to the problem by selecting a number of items from the Response Indicator. When required by instructions in the text, the student categorizes all items on the Response Indicator according to given criteria ranging from highly significant to irrelevant.

The Discussion Section takes the form of an Interpretation or Analysis in which the authors group all the items into various categories and give their rationale. The student evaluates his response by comparing his selections with those of the authors. The Discussion Section acts as a bridge between the student and the authors of the material. It is the device for channeling more information to the students in order to clarify more complex aspects of the problems than the student may have been aware of in his response. It also exposes him to another point of view. The student should consider the bearing of this section on his response, and make a second selection if he wishes.

Each module can be adequately considered with a number of possible combinations of items selected from the Response Indicator. The student can start with a small combination of items and build up a more complete picture by adding to it. Or he can make a broad attempt by including more general selections, review them, and reject some items. If he has no firm ideas on what to select, he can try anything at random, and then see if the Discussion helps him to make more sense of the problem. He should review his selection not just for what each item signifies, but to see what the items taken together signify. He should check that there is no internal contradiction between them, and that as a whole they represent a set of coherent interdependencies.

#### THE DIAGNOSTIC PROCEDURE

THE NOTATION FOR THE TESTS WORKS LIKE THIS:

When a test is written -

$I_2$  (1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10) -

it means: "If you INCLUDED TWO or more ( $I_2$ ) of items 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, then read the comment below."

I refers to Inclusion (of items #....)

O refers to Omission (of items #....)

The numerical subscript refers to the count of items involved:

$I_2$  inclusion of TWO or more

$O_3$  omission of THREE or more, and so on.

The numbers in parentheses are the referenced numbers of items on the Response Indicator included or omitted.



Thus -

I<sub>1</sub> (2, 12, 20) and

O<sub>3</sub> (1, 3, 5, 6, 7)

means -

if you have INCLUDED one or more of response items 2, 12, 20 and OMITTED three or more of items 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, read the following comment.

- (1) Look at the first test to see if it bears on your response. If it does, then read the comment below the test. If it does not, continue looking until you find a test that does bear on your response.

Example:

I<sub>2</sub> (1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10)

"What you say is quite valid, but we would like to make the following points. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor ....."

- (2) When you have read a comment, review your response and the decisions which led you to it comparing your reasoning with that of the authors. Then look for the next appropriate comment.
- (3) Continue this process until you come to the end of the DISCUSSION. You may not have changed your reasoning and may be in disagreement with the authors, but you should make sure that you understand the significance of the authors' remarks.

## INTENTION

Traditional disciplinary structures are under strain and you as a potential naval officer will be subject to this strain. The aim of this Discussion Unit is to enable you to picture the problems of individuals and groups who attempt to alter disciplinary processes or adapt themselves to suit changing social conditions and meet the challenge of conflicting objectives.

The materials contained here cannot be an exhaustive study of such a complex situation, i.e. the erosion and development of forms of discipline. You will undoubtedly find ample grounds for disagreement. The method of study used in this unit simulates the ambiguities and conflicts of real life situations. You will be called upon to make judgements where the evidence is not clear. You will be asked to assume points of view which may seem quite alien to you. Such exercises are a training in analysis; you will profit by these exercises in developing and understanding your own self-imposed discipline.

## PRESENTATION

## THE HAZARD IN DISCIPLINE - conforming to authority

Military organizations are necessarily authoritarian, bureaucratic structures. The key to understanding this structure is recognition of the need for immediacy of command (c.f. the Discussion Unit - "Concept of Leadership"), i.e. orders must be obeyed without delay, as in operational situations. At such times, there is no time for persuasion. Men must comply with orders immediately, even if they have to be threatened or exhorted to do things. Given the mechanism of obedience, authority must be hierarchical, or conflicting orders might be generated which neutralize each other. A policy decision at the top splinters down into separate orders for each man or group of men in the organization.

The historical reasons for a hierarchical system are important. The typical army or navy in the nineteenth century consisted largely of criminals or drop-outs of various kinds. It was easy to assume that only petty officers or sergeants were capable of responsibility. The men were then treated as automatons. The mechanisms used in today's chain of command arose from such conditions, i.e., out of the social attitudes of the time and the kind of man recruited.

The mechanisms of command, including those pertaining to discipline, are subject to the winds of change that leave nothing untouched. Inevitably, what has come about is a mixture of approaches rather than a unified solution. Side by side with the authoritarian bureaucracy, modern management techniques encourage such civilian practices as those concerned with 'human relations'. Though there is participatory leadership in the military, participation and bargaining has not developed to the same extent as it has in civilian life in, for example, such practices as collective bargaining. We should not, however, belittle the influences of contemporary social values on the running of military organizations. The influence is likely to grow, not diminish.

The authoritarian bureaucratic structure is a book of rules, a series of ranks, a set of attitudes, a repository of certain values. Its key feature is that it is monolithic, but if it is to survive it needs the support of insights into effective action. Men in military organizations are no longer criminals and drop-outs, but self-respecting individuals who respect democratic procedures. The average man of today feels humiliated if he is treated as a piece of machinery. He will lack motivation and not try to do his best. There are nearly always some loopholes by which the 'system' can be dodged, and if things become intolerable, ingenuity will find a way to play on the weakness of superiors.

We appear to be describing a 'them and us' attitude; but such a description is apt to an authoritarian, bureaucratic structure. Concern with human relations cuts across this attitude, but does not necessarily resolve it.

In a sense, the authoritarian structure and human relations are antithetical. The contemporary officer might find himself subject to dilemma in considering these two conflicting approaches. The basis of such confusion is that one cannot easily conform to an authority and, at the same time, have complete freedom to act according to one's own ideas. Conforming to authority means acceptance without pre-judgment. Obedience based on reason requires time for hesitation, reflection, judgment and decision - time that may not be available in cases needing immediate action.

*Consider these directives and counsels:*

*. The duty of an officer is to support the actions and policies of his superiors.*

*. An officer increases his probability for promotion when he has conscientiously executed the orders of his superiors.*

*. Discipline in the Navy means a prompt and willing responsiveness to commands.*

These statements express the authoritarian side of discipline in the Navy.

## THE HAZARD IN DISCIPLINE - discipline and self-discipline

For self-discipline to be really effective, it must be related to the needs and goals of the organization. Controls and regulations are needed to communicate the purpose and nature of an organization to the individual.

But even a highly developed system of rigorous controls will not cover all the 'loopholes'. Unless there is a reserve of self-discipline among the members of an organization, the avoidance of duties and responsibilities will eventually rock the boat. If a man is effectively self-disciplined, he is not a machine. A band of mercenaries is always likely to turn tail when the going is rough, or take things into its own hands and become a law unto itself. A highly-drilled soldier, who is nothing else but, is useful for firing a rifle in a line, but he falls to pieces if the pattern of attack is broken. Discipline must be transferred into the man himself and made his responsibility, though it can never be his responsibility alone.

Discipline is a means, not an end. It should shape the individual to enable him to meet the objective demands of the situation. Given human variety, this means a variety of disciplines. But the great extent of the variety *should be internalized.*

The internalization of discipline requires an understanding which can be gained only through personal experiences. This means that there is no set way of training in self discipline; it is something indeterminate.

Where there is good morale, there is a high measure of agreement with the organization's objectives and means of attaining these objectives. If discipline is seen as an integral part of the means, it is well on the way to becoming internalized. Much depends, however, on how well the men understand the relation between means and ends. A unit at one time with high morale may yet disintegrate under a disciplinary regime aimed at producing readiness for combat situations which are outside the men's experience. To hold the situation together, there should be a bond of confidence and trust between the leader and his subordinates.

It is self-discipline which enables an individual to adapt intelligently when under strain and uncertainty. This is not a matter of routine. The responsible individual directs his own discipline in terms of the situation and his understanding of himself. He learns to distinguish between the letter and the spirit of discipline. Part of his self-discipline will always remain invisible to those around him, including his superiors.

Consider these propositions:

- . *Self-discipline is internally motivated.*
- . *Self control demands habitual, but reasoned, obedience to command, an obedience that preserves initiative and functions unfalteringly, even in the absence of a commander.*
- . *Obtaining discipline through each man's fear of punishment is negative discipline. Discipline and punishment should never become synonymous. Negative discipline can be effective to a degree when used correctly, alarmingly destructive when used incorrectly.*
- . *An officer can drive men to obedience, but he cannot drive them to loyalty.*

These statements express the need for individual responsibility in naval discipline.

The problems suggested by the above propositions are taken up in the modules which follow.

Turn to page 13 for Module 22

19 for Module 23

30 for Module 24

36 for Module 25.

MODULE 22

AMERICAN POWS IN KOREA

## MODULE 22 - American P.O.W.s in Korea

## INVESTIGATION

With the entry of the Chinese into North Korea in November 1950, the character of the engagement took a different turn. For the first time outside China, the methods of the Chinese Liberation Army were put into practice against a highly technological but traditional force. Guerilla tactics and the use of the civilian population were only some of the new methods. Perhaps the most striking innovation introduced by the Chinese was in the treatment of American prisoners of war.

After Americans had learned to expect vicious treatment by the North Koreans - including a high probability of being shot - encounters with the Chinese came very much as a shock: their hands were shaken, they were bid welcome and offered cigarettes. Everything was smiles. Captured soldiers were completely disoriented, especially since morale was low. The war had turned out to be far more protracted than foreseen, and the conscripted men were ill-prepared for the rigors of the front line.

Even so, the kinds of incidents that followed could hardly have been expected. Army records are full of rank insubordination to officers immediately after capture. On being ordered to carry their wounded comrades, soldiers flatly refused and sometimes even went so far as to strike a superior.

On arrival in P.O.W. camps, the officers were separated and the Chinese began a conversion program aimed at demoralizing soldiers to the point where they would attach themselves to communist doctrine, or reveal information far beyond the bounds of the Geneva convention. Many soldiers proved unable to cope with the inevitable problems of dealing with sick comrades and making the best of a meager diet. Often against explicit medical advice, many of the prisoners refused to eat soya beans which were then their principal source of vitamins and protein. When a fellow soldier contracted dysentery, he was often left to stink unattended. In a number of cases, sick soldiers were murdered by fellow prisoners who could no longer stand the smell.

Prisoners had to attend lectures on Marx and Lenin, sitting for hours on hard benches. They were encouraged to discuss the validity of the war and the faults of capitalism. Their Chinese captors proved to have formidable knowledge of American life, and more often than not the American prisoner found himself at a loss to refute points made against American policies.



During interrogations, no physical torture was used, only psychological manipulation. The prisoner would be confronted with files purporting to contain certain details on troop movements or even on himself, and he was encouraged to speak, supposedly because it did not matter. The threat of death or even torture was often used; but the most effective weapon was the demoralization felt by the prisoner if he inadvertently made a statement which seemed to be giving any information or involving him in discussion. Many men felt that there was no hope for them, that their spirit was broken.

Almost two out of every five prisoners died, mainly because of 'give-up-itis'. In comparison, not one captured Turk died, and every Turkish group remained resolute in its opposition to the Chinese authorities.

In looking back at the conditions which allowed such terrifying moral decay, people have drawn attention to the recommendations of the Doolittle Board. Based on investigations into disciplinary brutalities a soldier should have the right to appeal over his immediate superiors. This was implemented and taken advantage of. Junior leaders lost their most potent weapon - immediate punishment for misconduct. In fighting conditions which separated military personnel into relatively small units, it was often the case that only junior officers were in charge.

Also at fault was American propaganda policy. Soldiers going to Korea were told they could expect plenty of good food and a fair degree of comfort. They were ill-prepared for the rigors of the front or P.O.W. conditions.

#### PROBLEM

Adopting the hypothesis that discipline in the American army was seriously defective, analyze the defects by means of the Response Indicator. Take each Response Item in turn and see whether you can come up with an interpretation which throws light on the erosion of discipline. Almost every one of the items is in some sense applicable to the Korean P.O.W. situation.

---

In building up your interpretation, you should consider the items on the Response Indicator according to the following criteria, and mark with one of the letters A, B, or C:

- A These items are obviously significant.
- B These items are important, but they need special interpretation.
- C These items definitely do not apply.

You should consider categorizing every item.

---

*INSTRUCTIONS*

Refer to the Response Indicator and make your selection. Then turn to page 17 of this book and compare your selection with the categories in our Analysis of Interpretation I.

---

## ANALYSIS OF INVESTIGATION I

Note that we have set out our explanation of items in category B in sub-groups, given the need for special interpretation, for easier reading.

A: 3, 5, 14, 21

As a result of the recommendations of the Doolittle Board, close superiors lost their punitive powers over subordinates (3). This strengthened the non-military informal structure of groups in combat (14). The overall result was an individualism which in the aggregate made a split between officers and men (5). It was very much a 'Them and Us' situation (21).

B<sub>1</sub>: 1, 4, 7, 16

The division between officers and men was enhanced by a number of factors. First of all, the men did not expect to take responsibility (1). Since the breakdown of order in combat and in the prison camps was so unforeseen, it is highly probable that a great deal of lip-service adherence to discipline was at fault (16). Finally, most of the men had no clear idea about the purpose of the war or the traditions inherent in military organizations (4) and (7).

B<sub>2</sub>: 2, 6, 13, 24

Some general, but vague points can be added. There was no adaptation of disciplinary practices to the situation (implied in 2). The men were not ready for military life (6 and 13), having been rather misled by the promises of good living conditions. They could appreciate the need to be trained in the use of rifles and grenades, but when it came to training themselves, it was another story (24).

B<sub>3</sub>: 10, 11, 19

Pushing young Americans into war in a strange land and subjecting them to both military and environmental pressures may have produced a significant proportion of 'weaklings' (10 and 11). There is, however, little evidence of harsh disciplinary regime. More likely, the 'culture shock' produced a degree of reversion from civilized standards (19) - the same phenomenon is to be seen in Vietnam.

B<sub>4</sub>: 23

Item 23 is interesting as a cultural factor that may have had quite a strong bearing on the erosion of discipline. The 'Protestant ethic' supposes a model of man as a being with a central will. Once that will is broken, he is lost and at the mercy of evil.

B<sub>5</sub>: 20

Discussion of item 20 might prove too controversial.

C: 8, 9, 15, 17, 18, 22

To bring in these items would be misleading: either (a) they refer to standard components of any disciplinary situation in a traditional military organization (9, 15, 22), or (b) they were significantly absent (8, 17, 18).

### Conclusion

You should by now have some appreciation of the meaning of the items in the Response Indicator and be able to use them yourselves with confidence. If there are still some areas of confusion, bear with them and look for clues in the following parts of the Investigation.

A word about ambiguity: if you find that response items are being used with more than one meaning, look for reasons why this should be so.

MODULE 23

AMERICAN POWS IN KOREA

(CAPTOR'S APPROACH TO ERODING POW DISCIPLINE)

The Student who has not worked on any earlier enrichment units should read pages 3 to 12 for procedural instructions. Before starting work on Module 23, read pages 14 to 15 for background information leading into the Investigation below for Module 23.

MODULE 23 - Captor's Approach to Eroding P.O.W. Discipline.  
INVESTIGATION

The Chinese communists had prepared specific techniques for the indoctrination of prisoners of war. These techniques were an extension of the procedures used for 'communizing' local villages or maintaining the discipline of their own armies. In putting this program into operation they were greatly helped by the unpreparedness of the American soldiers for prison conditions and the lax discipline prevalent in the American Army at that time.

Immediately after capture, the Chinese appeared friendly and by various guises obtained as much information about the prisoners' personal lives as possible. When the prisoners responded to the personal interest of the Chinese, the Chinese collected data which contributed substantially to the success of the indoctrination program.

The political instructor had absolute power over the men. He made decisions on welfare, medical care, duties, punishments and rewards. He was effectively an officer in charge of the men. The Chinese undermined the basis on which any informal resistance to prison discipline could stand. The political instructor, both through his relations with individual prisoners, and in his role as director of lectures, discussions and group criticism sessions, severely damaged the cohesive group relationship of the P.O.W.s. This 'education' created a system of informers among the men, a situation in which mutual trust was almost impossible.

Negative feelings aroused during the sessions held by the political instructor were redirected towards fellow prisoners as criticism flowed back and forth between members. During these sessions, the wealth of ideological information memorized was brought into play as the men related it to their individual experiences. The group criticism of a man whose faith in his friends was shattered, was a major part of the process engineered to break down his faith in his own opinions until he gladly accepted Marxist-Leninist principles.

---

**PROBLEM**

Keeping in mind the extensive power of the camp political instructor over the prisoners and the techniques he was able to use in this situation build up a picture, from the Chinese point of view, of the reasons why the Chinese were so effective in gaining control over so many of the American prisoners. Consider the items in the Response Indicator which refer to authority, (regular superior's or captor's), which bear on the Chinese captor's disciplinary hold over the POWs.

---

**INSTRUCTIONS**

Refer to the Response Indicator and interpret the problem by selecting items from the Response Indicator. Then turn to the next page and work through the Discussion Comments.

---

## DISCUSSION COMMENTS

[II - 1] I<sub>1</sub> (16,21)

One would have expected the P.O.W.s to be united by a shared antagonism towards Chinese coercion. This was not in fact what happened. There were two factors at work. First of all, as experience has shown (in the Nazi concentration camps), even the most brutal treatment will lead in the end to a proportion of prisoners identifying themselves with their guards. A point of apathy is reached at which the prisoner feels himself to be without identity. Beyond that point, he will identify himself with the strongest element in his environment. He can become more brutal to his fellow prisoners than the most vicious guard. The second factor involves methods used in political groups. Negative reactions are given full rein in meetings and discussions until they are played out. In the P.O.W. camps, the Chinese involved prisoners in discussion meetings every day. It was a skillful piece of social engineering. There was no way in which anti-authoritarian attitudes could consolidate the resistance.

Attitudes and questions were not ignored but were made the raw material for shaping the thinking of the prisoners. It was made very clear that the Chinese wanted the P.O.W.s to study and learn their doctrines, to 'understand' the 'truth' of the situation.

[II - 2] O<sub>1</sub> (11, 18)

These two items should be considered together. The Chinese discipline was aimed at demoralization. The method used to turn each individual against his fellow prisoners by creating mutual mistrust and suspicion. A proportion were persuaded to become informers, and the rest would never know who was to be trusted.

In any authoritarian organization, it is useful and sometimes necessary to bring into play the informal group structure to support official leadership. The Chinese were, by all accounts, very successful at doing this.



[II - 3] 0<sub>2</sub> (13, 14, 22)

The Chinese maintained a system of rewards and punishments, but attached a much greater emphasis to the morality of the beliefs which underlay the 'discipline' they were applying. The higher forms of values seemed to give greater purpose to discipline than many of the men had been aware of. A critical factor to remember is that the Chinese managed to *destroy the group*. They made every man frightened of his fellow prisoners. One informer could be used to poison the atmosphere among a score of men.

Perhaps you think we are interpreting the term 'camaraderie' in a peculiar way. But item 14 refers to a state of affairs where relationships between the men are largely determined by values outside of, and even in conflict with, those of their military organization.

Many of the P.O.W.s felt that all their previous training and discipline were useless in this situation. Survival needs and belongingness needs were in conflict.

[II - 4] 0<sub>1</sub> (11, 19)

Since the only disciplinary action we are talking about is that which came from the Chinese, these items do have a bearing. Their relevance is to be seen in records of incidents in which P.O.W.s were murdered by fellow prisoners, sick men left to rot, and food grabbed by the strong.

You may feel that such behavior is latent in our society and only military discipline can keep people up to standards under such conditions. The P.O.W.s were adjusting to the civilian standards of China; but, as always in transition between cultures, they ended up with the worst of both.

[II - 5] 0 (9) or I (3)

The removal of the official leadership by the Chinese left an immediate gap in the authority structure. The political instructor filled this gap in many ways, like organizing daily work and holding the power to give and withhold privileges of all kinds.

[II - 6]    0<sub>2</sub>    (5, 6, 10)

The meaninglessness of so much of the Chinese activity was an important weapon. It reinforced the sense of isolation. If a prisoner succumbed to disciplinary pressures - e.g. by giving information - the pressures increased. This made the prisoner increasingly vulnerable to the Chinese authorities.

[II - 7]    I<sub>1</sub>    (2, 4, 8)

The Chinese approach was psychological through and through, and the political officers were supremely important in providing individual attention. The projection of an image of dedication, integrity and self effacement on the part of the political officers was done magnificently. But they were ruthless in the ideological line and in discipline. As far as unity goes there is an amusing story:

"After an indoctrination session, a G.I. was walking between his political instructor, who was expounding his view of some Marxist point, and the instructor's assistant. When the instructor finished, the prisoner said, pointing at the assistant, 'But Comrade here told me different'. For a moment, the two Communists stared at each other in amazement. Then both started running as fast as they could toward headquarters, each presumably to prevent the other's getting there first and denouncing him as a deviationist". ('Why they Collaborated', p. 137)

The Chinese methods show a unique blend of authoritarian and persuasive discipline that must be understood in this age of war for the mind.

[II - 8]    I both    (7, 12)

This may have been true for some of the P.O.W.s but cannot have applied to the majority. The whole purpose of the Chinese approach was to entangle the P.O.W.s in their own web of doctrines, attitudes and values. An image of the Chinese officers as elements of an alien culture would not have served this purpose.

[II - 9] I (13)

Let's see how your interpretation compares with ours. Some of the men were so confused by the unremitting intellectual demands placed on them by the Chinese that they finally believed they had no personal stake in the war and no duty towards the execution of American policies. They had assumed that there was some good reason for the war, but had never really thought about it. The democratic ideals of free expression and the right to individual opinion were manipulated so that a comment on American policy could be made into a criticism of the capitalistic system. Things no longer made sense and some of the men just wanted to drop out and did, by collaboration or plain dying.

[II - 10] I (1) or 0 (23)

The line taken by the Chinese was to encourage men to take initiative by speaking out in group discussions, reading in the library, and giving information. Maybe for some of the men, it had been the first time in their lives when their views were taken seriously by seemingly intelligent people.

[II - 11] 0 (15)

In interrogations, the dominant line was that all the prisoner had to do was talk. He was not expected to reveal military secrets, only to say a few things about his fellow prisoners or his home life. Every man was forced to fill in a questionnaire on himself (ostensibly for Red Cross purposes), but it was made to seem absurd to object.

When it seemed to a prisoner that what he was asked to talk about could cause no harm, he was easily tempted to comply when threatened with torture. But once he had complied, he was lost. A piece of false information would make the Chinese treat him like a villain. An innocuous remark about a fellow prisoner would be thrown back in his face as a denouncement of his character. Contrary to becoming free of pressures, the pressures built up. If a man refused to talk *at all*, these methods could not work. He was eventually left alone.

[II - 12] 0<sub>2</sub> (12, 17, 23)

These items express the ideal behind the Chinese discipline. Namely to make the P.O.W.s conformists to Chinese doctrine by their own free will. Of course, there were specific purposes behind the indoctrination camps: creation of agents who could be used in the U.S.A., gathering information on the U.S. army, and so on. But the indoctrination had to be serious and not make believe to achieve these purposes.

[II - 13] I (20)

This is true but we do not see it as significant.

[II - 14] I (24)

This item is not applicable.

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#### INSTRUCTIONS

Turn to the next page and read the Final Comment.

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## Final Comment

In this situation, there were four main disciplinary components.

1. The Chinese authority structure, legitimate in its own eyes.
2. The U.S.A. authority structure, legitimate in its own eyes.
3. The P.O.W.s as soldiers in the U.S. Army.
4. The P.O.W.s as a group under the control of the Chinese authorities.

The soldiers were already set on the path of looking for the easy way out of situations, avoiding stress, and not making demands on themselves. That path is quite incompatible with the need for concerted passive resistance when made prisoner. We are not talking simply about a lack of toughness, but also about a lack of self-respect. No man should succumb to his captors in such a degrading fashion as happened in Korea.

One of the strongest supports a man can have in times of stress is a sense of duty towards a legitimate authority. This, in practice, can only be an authority of one's own nation.

It is unrealistic to suppose that American soldiers could have been forewarned of what they would be subjected to. But is it unrealistic to suppose that a sense of duty and an understanding of its value could have been inculcated? If not unrealistic, then how could it have been done?

The officials assessing the Korean situation felt a need to review the whole disciplinary framework. One colonel looked back to the Doolittle Board and the powers it had withdrawn from officers and said he felt that officers' confidence in their position had been very much undermined. He recommended that more power be given to those with responsibility. The company grade officer should be permitted summary court martial authority. The noncommissioned officers' power should be reinforced and outside bodies such as the Inspector General's office should not be allowed to interfere with the disciplinary process. The colonel insisted that firm discipline was essential to protect the men from indoctrination.

## DISCUSSION COMMENTS II CONTINUED

Training for prisoner of war conditions now includes fuller information on the living conditions that can be expected. It was felt that the Army had given the impression of easy P.O.W. life. Now trainees are given detailed advice on the ways of coping with medical and nutritional problems. All the training would be to no purpose unless the men had a will to support their buddies. As a contribution to esprit de corps, a replacement policy was instituted. Units, but not individuals, were transferred.

The Army needed to establish a firm set of values on which the soldier could depend. The issue lay in deciding whether these values were to be orders or guidelines. By insisting that men evade giving information beyond name, rank, serial number, and date of birth, and by holding the right to court martial those who had violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Army confirmed their findings that people who give information were put under more pressure than those who did not. The Army rejected suggestions that misleading information should be given on the grounds that the highest moral standards would be necessary in the fight against indoctrination.

The Six-Point Code of Conduct finally established the structure of discipline to which a man must be loyal. But it also specified the individual's loyalty to his country. It provides a basis for reconciling the independent loyalty and group loyalty to discipline.

## CODE OF CONDUCT

*For the U.S. Armed Forces*

Article I

*I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.*

Article II

*I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command I will never surrender my men while they still have the means to resist.*

## DISCUSSION COMMENTS II CONCLUDED

Article III

*If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.*

Article IV

*If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information nor take part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way.*

Article V

*When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am bound to give only name, rank, service number and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.*

Article VI

*I will never forget that I am an American fighting man, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of America.*

Various commentators have pointed out that the problem of discipline in the army began in the schools and homes of America. The state of military discipline is largely a reflection of the state of the society from which military organizations draw their men and which supports their legitimacy.

MODULE 24

THE TENSION ON BOARD A DESTROYER



The student who has not worked on any earlier enrichment units should read pages 3 to 12 for procedural instructions. Before starting work on Module 24, read pages 14, 15, 20, 27-29, for background information leading into the Investigation below for Module 24.

MODULE 24 - CASE STUDY - The Tension on Board a Destroyer  
INVESTIGATION

*In the case presented below, there is an example of the intrusion of social conflicts into a military unit. It may seem an extreme situation, but the point is that the Navy has to work with the material which society provides. Recruitment and selection can go only so far in eliminating undesirable elements.*

As you read the following case material, put yourself in the Commanding Officer's place. You are the one who has to perceive why and how things have gone wrong:

"You are the Commanding Officer of a destroyer that is participating in an Operational Readiness Inspection (O.R.I.) in Hawaiian waters preparatory to deployment to Westpac as part of a task force. The inspection has gone exceptionally well and everyone, officers and crew, appear to be in the best of spirits. Looking forward to a fine cruise, you return to Pearl Harbor and tie up at Ford Island for three days of replenishment and excellent liberty in Honolulu. However, on the first night in port a fracas occurs at the Ford Island E.M. Club between two of your men, both seamen, one black and the other white. One of the men is stabbed in the heart and killed. Only prompt action by the Shore Patrol prevents a riot.

Later that night on board ship preliminary investigation indicates that there had been bad blood between the two men since before departure from the States and that a fight on this particular evening had been more or less agreed upon. The next morning a fist fight takes place in the berthing spaces, again between a black man and a white man. At 1300 during liberty inspection the O.O.D. apprehends several of the men carrying switch-blade knives ashore. At 1400 your Executive Officer reports that questioning of Division Officers and Chief Petty Officers has revealed feelings of race antagonism on board which were apparently touched off by yesterday's killing.

There are twenty black men in your crew including stewards, cooks, firemen and technical rates, many of whom had a direct hand in the excellent showing of the ship during the O.R.I. There are also many white men whose excellent work contributed to your state of readiness".\*

\*Taken from "Principles and Problems of Leadership" Nav Pers 15924

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PROBLEM

Your task is to make a diagnosis of where discipline has gone wrong on the destroyer which you command. You must study the case material carefully.

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INSTRUCTIONS

Each student should attempt to diagnose the problem, using the Response Indicator. When you have made your selections, turn to page 33 and work through the discussion comments for Module 24.

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## DISCUSSION COMMENTS

[III - 1] 0<sub>2</sub> (3, 4, 20)

These items indicate part of the shipboard state which were to some degree both causes and at the same time consequences of the incident. Apparently the officers closest to the men involved in the incident were to some extent caught up in the racial tensions of the men, as the inquiry afterwards implied. At the same time, while they would not have gotten into such a brawl themselves, they could neither by example nor through an exercise of their authority prevent the brawl. It may be that their own intolerance prevented them from seeing what was coming. To a degree the Commanding Officer and his immediate subordinates were at fault here, since there seems to have been some separation or communication breakdown between him and his lower-ranking officers, as there was between them and their subordinates.

[III - 2] I<sub>1</sub> (9, 11, 15, 17, 21)

The case study itself does not seem to reveal the picture which these items do. The incident and its aftermath were not brought about by an excessive use of authority, but through the application of formal authority without informal backup.

[III - 3] I<sub>1</sub> (10, 12)

The inclusion of any of these items puts an undue emphasis on the influence of authoritarian discipline as an agent in the crisis.

[III - 4] 0<sub>1</sub> (5, 13, 14)

Much of the motivation behind the men's acts seems to have arisen from civilian values and attitudes carried into the Navy by the men and allowed to develop in the absence of informal contact between officers and men. Once the hostility started to build between the men, nothing was there to control it. It had been assumed that since these men performed their duties adequately their off duty hours were also under control. The officers in control may have felt that their men's private affairs were unimportant to their ship's combat readiness, but the event shows how mistaken they were.

[III - 5] O<sub>1</sub> (1, 7, 23) or I (22)

The officers were pleased with the results of the readiness inspection and shared with the men a feeling of satisfaction in a job well done. Everybody was feeling that a bit of letting the hair down was justified. For senior officers, however, discipline should not stop at the entrance to a bar. The state of mind of the men on board was different. For them, discipline did not extend beyond the performance of duties: when commands stopped, discipline stopped.

Discipline which extends into free activity depends on self control, judgment and initiative. It is traditional to assume that initiative is the prerogative of officers. If this is so, lack of self discipline among the enlisted men is to be expected. When they leave the ship, they revert to civilian attitudes, sometimes with the spirit of children let out of school. Civilian attitudes in contemporary America are complex and confusing; but we cannot shut our eyes to racial tension. The officers are perhaps to be congratulated on preserving order as long as they did. On the other hand, the evidence points to a peculiar blindness on their part.

The good officer can take pride in his ability to keep himself to certain ethical rules and standards; and that kind of self discipline is integral to the profession, without which it can degenerate into meaningless ritual. For the ordinary enlisted man, this can appear as something quite alien, and he will justify himself by thinking of such discipline as an individual trait which has no bearing on himself.

If you included item 22, just ask yourself whether you think that *the men* saw their day-to-day discipline as being at all relevant to morality.

[III - 6] I (24)

This is right. The men are able to do a job and recognize what it means to do it well. But they are not able to apply the same self-control in social life as they are in task performance. They probably do not even see any relevance of training to discipline as such.

[III - 7]     0<sub>2</sub>     (2, 15, 16, 18)

The officers in command allowed the incident to occur by asking nothing of their men beyond an outward, rule-book show of discipline. The officers may have been dedicated men themselves, but they must have overlooked the fact that good discipline is not measured only in the behavior of the men towards specific commands but in their general behavior on and off duty. They contented themselves with their men as individuals whose personal lives had less bearing upon their martial readiness than their salutes did. The officers' duty was to prepare their men for service and maintain them in that state of preparedness. The officers in this study failed to do that until too late.

[III - 8]     0<sub>1</sub>     (6, 8)

Both of these items refer to the state of affairs which is taking hold of the ship at present. There is still time for effective action, but the longer the delay, the more of a stranglehold these attitudes will have.

MODULE 25

STUDENT UNREST

The student who has not worked on any earlier enrichment units should read pages 3 to 12 for procedural instructions. Before starting work on Module 25, read pages 14, 15, 20, 27-29, 31, for background information leading into the Investigation below for Module 24.

#### MODULE 24 - STUDENT UNREST INVESTIGATION

In this module we look at problems of discipline in a completely non-military sector of American society - the civilian university. The struggle in the universities between forces of 'order' and 'revolution' is sometimes very bitter. Perhaps there is a new mode of educational organization in the process of painful birth, but the present state of affairs is a headache to administrators, teaching staff, parents and students alike.

Student unrest is not confined to the U.S.A. Over the last five years it has become very active in France, Ethiopia, Great Britain, Japan, Poland, Italy and Mexico to name but a few. It has erupted into violence, and in certain extreme cases the state has intervened using armed force.

#### PROBLEM

You have been reading newspaper articles, watching television reports and perhaps talking to people about student unrest. We assume you have a wide variety of data on the topic; but you may not have tried to make sense of what you know. Using the Response Indicator make an analysis of the erosion of discipline in the universities.

The Response Indicator talks of 'superiors' and 'subordinates'. These terms can be translated into 'staff' and 'students'. The term 'men' can be taken to refer to the students. Items 13 and 14 can be ignored.

In constructing your analysis you should consider the items on the Response Indicator according to the four following criteria, and put the appropriate letter A, B, C or D in the box relevant to each response item on the response form.

- A These items are obviously significant.
- B These items are important, but they need special interpretation.
- C These items definitely do not apply.
- D These items are irrelevant.

---

INSTRUCTIONS

Refer to the Response Indicator and group the items according to the above criteria. Then turn to page and determine how your analysis compares with the Interpretation given in the text.

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## AN INTERPRETATION

## A 3, 4, 12, 24

3, 4: There is no effective control of the students and little respect on their part for the administration.

12: 3 and 4 together imply that the picture of conformity alienates the students.

24: Academic studies have drifted right away from life. It is difficult for students to see any sense in disciplinary controls.

## B 6, 7, 8, 11, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23

8: Complementing 12, the arbitrariness of disciplinary action (which varies from one administration to another and from university to university) produces a lot of reaction.

6, 7, 11, 19: The traditional disciplinary structure of the universities no longer makes sense; it is felt that the academic world is too isolated from life and too closely allied to treating students like children.

21: Establishment values are felt to be hypocrisy.

20, 23: It is also traditional that universities are the place for free discussion and exploration of issues. In many instances, this has opened the door to political action which the authorities consider to be intolerable; however, academic discussion is no longer felt to be significant.

22: Disciplinary controls extend to matters of morality and this is resented by an increasingly 'permissive' student population; also, many students are in direct revolt against the values implied in the university organization and its objectives.

C 1, 5, 10, 15, 16, 17, 18

1, 15, 16: This is not the ethos of the university which presupposes some motivation to learn and get somewhere.

5, 10: This is very much a peripheral factor in student unrest; the students are perhaps *too much* involved.

17: The students do not.

18: In nearly every instance, disciplinary action has served to create further reactions and sources of unrest. Some people argue that radical students play on this escalation mechanism to bring more support to themselves when the university uses repressive measures. Their aim is *polarization*, i.e. a splitting into two camps between which dialogue is impossible.

D 2, 9

2: Irrelevant.

9: There are two kinds of authority - that of academic disciplines and that of social control - and both are breaking up; the present mode of discipline is inadequate to the changes in authority relations.

---

*INSTRUCTIONS*

*Turn to page 41 and read the final comment.*

---

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---

*INSTRUCTIONS*

*Turn to page 41 and read the final comment.*

---

## FINAL COMMENT

There is always the temptation to identify the causes of the erosion of discipline with a small proportion of 'trouble-makers'. This kind of explanation is very limited. Trouble-makers can only be effective if (a) the rest of the groups or population is weak-minded, or (b) they are to some degree in sympathy with the 'troublesome' minority. Further, the majority of people tend to be conformist and want things to remain as they have been. Readiness for change is a fairly rare attribute.

The key points of danger are mistrust, lack of communication, and distortion. For example, if the administration of a university prides itself on freedom of speech and then clamps down on political meetings, only very active student-staff communications will prevent 'polarization'. Nearly all organizations are involved in a kind of 'double-think' about important issues; but when people in the organization are also taught to be critical, trouble is in store.

It seems then, that either the beliefs and values of the most active and independent members of the community have to be changed, or the disciplinary structure of the universities must *evolve*.

## SUMMARY

We have looked at some extreme cases in the erosion of discipline, and introduced various viewpoints. The answers to the problems are not easy for anyone to see. It is difficult enough to identify the problems!

Your own specialized organization - the Navy - is not isolated from the rest of American society. Nor is it isolated from the rest of the world. The negative characteristics that undermine discipline existing in the U.S.A. as a whole impinge on the military, and have to be dealt with. It is possible to control certain things by authoritarian mechanisms. But if bald coercion and indoctrination are not permitted, the attitudes of people remain inviolate, subject only to education (*educare* - to lead, to bring out).

The key to effective education is good leadership. The good leader is *ahead*, he is *leading*.



RESPONSE INDICATOR

DISCIPLINE AND THE INDIVIDUAL

|  |   |   |   |
|--|---|---|---|
| Initiative is assumed to be the prerogative of superiors.                        | The subjective reactions of the men are ignored by those in authority.                                  | There is little authoritative weight in the orders of close superiors.                                      | The men have no positive image of the responsibilities and work of those in charge.   |
| 1  | 2   | 3   | 4   |
| Men dwell on their own personal problems and lose sense of an overall direction. | For the men, disciplinary controls exist in a vacuum and seem to serve no purpose.                      | Some of the men feel that their superior's sense of purpose is something personal to him and alien to them. | The men feel that there is little unity in the command above them.  |
| 5  | 6   | 7   | 8   |
| Discipline is used to reinforce structure of authority.                          | Some of the men feel that they cannot cope with disciplinary pressures on top of other kinds of stress. | Some of the men feel demoralized by disciplinary action.  | The men see their superiors as nothing but conformists to the unity of command.   |
| 9  | 10  | 11  | 12  |
| Some of the men are alienated from military action because of value conflicts.   | Extra military criteria are the bases for camaraderie among the men.                                    | It is taken for granted that the men will try to minimize the demands made on them.                         | The approach taken is that as long as the men comply with the disciplinary requirements, their attitudes and opinions are of no interest or significance. |
| 13   | 14  | 15  | 16  |
| The men feel the pressures which are put on their superiors.                     | Disciplinary action is shaped according to its expected effects on the men as a whole.                  | Men feel they are cut off from civilian expectations and obligations.                                       | Value conflicts are shared by both superiors and subordinates.  |
| 17   | 18  | 19  | 20  |
| Disciplinary action brings anti-authoritarian attitudes into focus.              | The disciplinary line is identified with morality.  | Self-discipline is considered to be dependent on a man's own choice and will power.                         | The men feel that discipline and training are two quite separate issues.  |
| 21   | 22  | 23  | 24  |