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ABSTRACT

Designed to help bring students to greater understanding of concepts of the introduction to psychology and leadership course (see the final reports which summarize the course development project, EM 010 418, EM 010 419, and EM 010 484), this Structural Communications unit is coordinated with the instructional unit in the core course on authority and responsibility (EM 010 432, EM 010 433, EM 010 458, and EM 010 506). The basic strategy of the unit is to have the student work through the central theme which dominates problems presented in a brief series of modules. Each successive module refers to a matrix of statements which the student examines for relevance to the problem being considered. The unit can be used either individually or in a group setting, and was designed so that the end product would be a student with a more complete grasp of the elements of the theme and their interaction. EM 010 420 through EM 010 447 and EM 010 451 through EM 010 512 are related documents. (SH)

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UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY

INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY AND LEADERSHIP



MAY 1971

ENRICHMENT VI
PROBLEMS OF LEADERSHIP

EM 010 460



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United States Naval Academy

ED 071323

INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY AND LEADERSHIP

ENRICHMENT VI
PROBLEMS OF LEADERSHIP

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Enrichment Modules 12, 13, 14

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1971

C O N T E N T S

Instructions for use of the materials.....	2
Introduction to the discussion topic.....	5
Module 12	
"The Case of the Missing Ham".....	7
The Problem.....	9
Discussion Comments.....	10
Module 13	
"The Case of the Unmoved Files".....	16
The Problem.....	17
Discussion Comments.....	18
Module 14	
"The Case of the Efficient Ensign".....	23
The Problem.....	24
Discussion Comments.....	25
Optional Task.....	30
Response Indicator.....	33

INSTRUCTIONS

This Structural Communication Unit, "Problems of Leadership," is designed to be used only after Part Six, "Authority and Responsibility," of the course INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY AND LEADERSHIP.

The Unit is divided into three main sections:

INTRODUCTION to the discussion content

MODULES 12, 13, AND 14 - case studies illustrating problems in leadership and providing feedback on answers to problems

RESPONSE INDICATOR containing a matrix of twenty-four items which are used to solve the problems

PROCEDURE

Instructions about specific activities are given to the student in the body of the text.

The student should commence work on the Unit by reading the INTRODUCTION to the discussion content, pages 5 and 6. The student may refer back to this section at any time while he is working through the separate modules.

The student should next read the case study and the problem identified for a particular module. Then, he should make an individual response by selecting items from the Response Indicator which he feels have a bearing on the problem or case.

The Discussion Section takes the form of an Interpretation or Analysis in which the authors group all the items into various categories and give their rationale. The student evaluates his response by comparing his interpretation with that of the authors.

The Discussion Section serves as a further stimulant to the student. It also acts as a bridge between the student and the authors of the material. It is the device for channeling more information to the students in order to clarify more complex aspects of the problems than the student may have been aware of in his individual response. It also exposes them to another point of view. The student should consider the bearing of this section on his response, and make a second selection if desired.

Each module can be adequately discussed with a number of possible combinations of items selected from the Response Indicator. The student can start with a small combination of items and build up a more complete picture by adding to it. Or he can make a broad attempt by including more general selections, review them, and reject some items. If he has no firm ideas on what to select, he can try anything at random, and then see if the Discussion helps him to make some sense of the problem.

He should review his selection not just for what each item signifies, but to see what the items taken together signify. He should check that there is no internal contradiction between them, and that, as a whole, they represent a set of coherent interdependencies.

The DIAGNOSTIC PROCEDURES are straight forward in the Unit and spelled out.

FOR EXAMPLE:

If you have omitted any of items 2, 13, 14, then read this comment

If you have included 3 or more of items 3, 4, 5, then read this comment, etc.

The student should look at the first test to see if it bears on his response. If it does, then he should read the comment below the test. If it does not, he should continue looking until he finds a test that does bear on his response.

When a student has read a comment, he should review his response and the decision which led him to it, comparing his reasoning with that of the authors. Then, he should look for the next appropriate comment.

The student should continue this process until he comes to the end of the DISCUSSION. The student may not have changed his reasoning and may be in disagreement with the authors, but he should make sure that he understands the significance of the author's remarks.

INTRODUCTION

SOLVING LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS

In solving a problem you should avoid making prejudgments. Gather all relevant information. Eliminate hearsay or mere opinion. Next focus on the heart of the problem. Distinguish between facts and principles. Many problems you will have to face arise because rules and maxims of naval life are not adhered to. Such principles as responsibility and authority will be highly significant to you as a leader. In the light of these principles, you will be able to interpret the facts and seek a viable solution in terms of appropriate naval behavior.

Before you tackle the problems set in this unit, you should review the following key notions.

Communication and the Chain of Command

The chain of command provides for the efficient transfer of information. Orders move from a superior to his next immediate subordinate; reports move from a subordinate to his next immediate superior. Adherence to the chain of command insures that those charged with responsibility receive all the authority they need. Personnel in the chain of command are assigned authority commensurate with their responsibility. Thus, the higher one is in the chain of command, the wider is his authority and the more inclusive is his responsibility. The rigid structure of the chain of command therefore provides each person a sure basis on which to exercise authority and discharge responsibility.

Authority

The naval officer's authority springs from his power to command action. Subordinates willingly carry out an officer's orders when the officer has both formal and informal authority. The leader must, therefore, have both kinds of authority if he is to establish and maintain good discipline and high morale among the men.

Formal authority is established by US Navy Regulations. Obedience to one's superior is an integral part of naval discipline, and attaches to position, not to personality.

Informal authority depends upon subordinates' responsiveness to the personality of the leader. Men instinctively follow a superior capable of motivating them and accomplishing objectives.

An officer's authority is strengthened by his attention to the following Key Leadership Factors:

- a. An effective leader knows his job
- b. An effective leader is consistent but not inflexible
- c. An effective leader establishes objectives and plans for their accomplishment
- d. An effective leader makes sure the task is understood, supervised and accomplished
- e. An effective leader takes responsibility for his actions regardless of their outcome.

The quality of professionalism thus exhibited by an officer will greatly enhance his exercise of authority.

RESPONSIBILITY

An officer is responsible for all that his unit does or fails to do. He must be self-disciplined and insure that his subordinates are disciplined. He is also responsible for their training and welfare. His concern for welfare is evidenced both in his behavior and in his attitude. Attitude is important as it is easily communicated to subordinates and affects their responsiveness.

By working through the case studies in this Unit, it is hoped that you, the future officer, will learn to anticipate certain practical problems of leadership. For example, when an officer first assumes responsibility aboard a ship or at a naval station, he will have no personal knowledge of his subordinates, and he will, in certain cases, inherit problems. Rules of conduct and formal leadership practice will of course provide guidelines. But he will have to be alert to the attitudes and relationships of his subordinates, analyze and solve any problems. He must also be able to view his own activities and behavior objectively, and learn from any initial mistakes, if he is to become an experienced and capable leader.

In the case studies, you are asked to define the problems facing the officer in the situations described, analyze his relationships to the personnel involved, and evaluate the officer's behavior and actions in dealing with the problems.

Turn to page 7 for Module 12
 16 for Module 13
 23 for Module 14

PROBLEMS OF LEADERSHIP

Module Twelve - The Case of the Missing Ham

2

THE CASE OF THE MISSING HAM

Location: Wake Island, Central Pacific - Christmas Time

The USS Tanager (MSC 358) was scheduled for search-and-rescue duty at Wake Island. Orders were received advancing the departure date, which necessitated the Tanager's leaving Pearl Harbor, her home port, just prior to Christmas.

Three weeks after arriving on station, Tanager was ordered on a highly specialized operation for three weeks to replace an MSC which had suffered a material casualty. The nature of this operation meant that the crew would not be allowed ashore when in port, and would have to stand port and starboard watches.

The Captain directed his Commissary Officer to serve exceptionally good meals, and to maintain an open galley at night. He realized that this would cause the ration allowance for the 3-week period to be exceeded, but as the ship was scheduled to return to Pearl Harbor 6 weeks before the end of the quarter he estimated that the allowance for the quarter would not be exceeded (when the ship was in Pearl Harbor, the crew usually ate at least one meal ashore).

However, when Tanager was relieved of special duty, she was ordered to return to Wake Island as her replacement was unable to sail. This meant that the Tanager would not return to Pearl Harbor for still another two weeks. The Captain informed the crew that the tour would have to be extended, giving them the reasons. He also asked them to conserve as much food as possible, as it would now be difficult to make up for the overexpenditure on the special operation, before the end of the quarter. The crew cooperated fully, and made several catches of fish which helped considerably.

However, three days before their expected relief, word was received that relief would again be delayed, this time for at least another week. The crew were immediately informed. It was pointed out that the ration situation would, as a result, become even tighter.

That evening, the cook took a frozen ham from the cold box and put it in the galley to thaw. At about 0530 next morning, the Commissary Officer was awakened by the cook, who reported that the ham was missing. The cook also asked what he should prepare for breakfast.

The Commissary Officer replied, "What the hell is the idea of waking me up? I don't give a ----- what you feed the ----- crew." The cook left in haste.

The Executive Officer, whose room the Commissary Officer shared, overheard these remarks. After a few words to the Commissary Officer, the Executive Officer went down to the galley himself, and arranged a menu.

Investigation failed to turn up either thief or ham. The crew were of the opinion that the thief was Seaman Crutty who had been fishing near the galley hatch. About 2200 he had thrown what the quarterdeck watch thought was his fishing gear over on the pier and had signed out with the watch to go to the barracks ship (APL) down the pier. Questioning the personnel on the APL produced no information.

THE PROBLEM

IN THE CASE STUDY THERE ARE SEVERAL GOOD SENIOR-SUBORDINATE RELATIONSHIPS AND A NUMBER OF GOOD LEADERSHIP FEATURES. THE INCIDENT OF THE MISSING HAM IS, NEVERTHELESS, SYMPTOMATIC OF SOME PROBLEM AMONG THE SHIP'S COMPANY.

TO DEFINE WHAT THE PROBLEM IS, AND ANALYZE WHY IT EXISTS, THE WHOLE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS MUST BE CONSIDERED.

INDIVIDUAL SELECTION

YOU SHOULD NOW REFER TO THE RESPONSE INDICATOR ON PAGE 33 . MAKE A SELECTION OF ITEMS WHICH YOU THINK INDICATE THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM. RECORD YOUR SELECTIONS AND THEN TURN TO PAGE 10 AND READ THE DISCUSSION COMMENTS

DISCUSSION COMMENTS

YOU SHOULD READ ANY OF THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS THAT APPLY TO YOUR RESPONSE. NOTE ANY CHANGES YOU DECIDE TO MAKE IN YOUR SELECTION OF ITEMS IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT YOU READ.

-
- [I-1] *If you have omitted any of items 2, 17, 21, 23 then read this comment:*

We can view the behavior of the Commissary Officer in two ways. From one point of view it looks like an isolated outburst of irritation from a man rudely awakened from his sleep. From another, we must recognize the effect of this behavior on associates; that is within the structure of naval organization. This behavior is a symptom of a serious weakness in discipline.

An officer should be in control at all times. To be a good leader he must direct his attitudes and responsibilities towards the upkeep of morale. In this case he is ignoring a request concerning the welfare of his men at a critical time. He should automatically disregard any personal inconvenience in dealing with the situation. He is obviously setting a bad example. The missing ham is the first symptom of deteriorating morale. The officer's undisciplined reaction will only exacerbate the situation. He should in fact aim at isolating the incident.

- [I-2] *If you have included 3 or more of items 5, 6, 7, 10 then read this comment:*

As far as we can tell, discipline and morale on the ship were quite high, even after the announcement of extra duties. There have been many occasions when officers and men have had to return to their duty stations unexpectedly and ships have had

to retrace their paths. Not all of them have had the kind of leadership shown by the Commanding Officer in this case. Thinking about your men is not the whole answer to morale, but it is a good start. The Commanding Officer told the Commissary Officer to serve exceptionally good meals. Food is always important in regimented situations. He also *explained* at a later date why belts had to be tightened to meet the new situation.

The Commanding Officer also showed good leadership in explaining, subsequently, why belts had to be tightened. He is obviously aware that subordinates accept orders more willingly if morale and esprit de corps are reinforced. There is another point to be made here. We mentioned *informal* authority in the Presentation in relation to professionalism and mastery of the job. There is no evidence in the situation described that the CO was lacking in this. Consider how a leader puts out the word in such a situation. Do you tell the men that somebody on the staff 'goofed' and that they have to suffer for it, or perhaps remark on the 'fouled up' condition of the ship that was supposed to relieve them? This may seem an easy way to get men's sympathy. This may have been the reason for the extension of the tour, but as far as we know the CO did not resort to such a practice.

However, the missing ham and the breakfast incident do point to some weakness in discipline. The core of the problem might be traced to a lower level of the chain of command - the relation between the junior officers and the men. It is easy to see that under these conditions relations between junior officers and their subordinates will deteriorate rapidly. When JOs are slack in discipline and are under strain from prolonged duty, and restricted rations, and there is a thief in their midst, esprit de corps will be lacking and the whole ship will suffer. Such a diagnosis is certainly more on the right lines.

[I-3] *If you have omitted 8 or 15 or included 18 then read this comment:*

There are a number of good features in the behavior of the Executive Officer. When the crisis arose, he dealt with the cook's difficulties immediately, supporting the policies of his superiors, without regard to personal inconvenience. He corrected the Commissary Officer in private. (Public reprimand should occur only when necessary, such as to avoid appearing to condone wrong or unfit behavior.)

The Executive Officer is in a difficult position, however, as there is an apparent conflict in fulfillment of duties. He has to intervene to salvage the situation and deal with the immediate practical problem of breakfast for the men - fulfilling his responsibility for upkeep of morale. He also has to deal with the problem of the Commissary Officer's behavior and see that he does not shirk his responsibility - appropriate practice within the chain of command. It is true that as the Commissary Officer's superior he bears responsibility for his actions. But he should have seen that his subordinate discharged his own duties.

One might argue that weak leadership in the chain of command above the Executive Officer was setting a bad example. The fact that good leadership must operate from the top level down does not excuse us from operating with our best leadership at *our* level. In the second place, top level leadership can go just so far down the line. When a man reaches the "top" he has hundreds of things to worry about. He can try to exercise leadership in everything he does, but he cannot substitute for his juniors at their levels.

In the case here, the cook obviously should not awake the Commanding Officer to tell him about a stolen ham and ask what to serve the crew for breakfast. It is equally obvious the the Executive Officer should not have to get out of bed to handle the matter. Both the Commanding Officer and the Executive Officer should be able to depend on the Commissary Officer.

[I-4] *If you have omitted any of 6, 16, 19 read this comment:*

There are often bad elements in a ship's company. But what is particularly serious is that a man with antisocial tendencies was able to act, and that an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion arose. It is part of an officer's responsibility to ensure a disciplined state of mind and behavior among the men. Discipline is not just a matter of responding correctly to occasional demands. It should be an automatic response developed by training and the enforcement of high standards.

The case study provides evidence of a lack of discipline among the junior officers themselves. The behavior of the Commissary Officer towards the cook is an example of this. Such an incident will only undermine the already precarious situation. The Executive Officer and the Commanding Officer themselves have been giving special attention to the preservation of good morale and cooperation aboard since the beginning of the tour. The Commissary Officer, therefore, shows himself to be a weak link in the chain of command.

[I-5] *If you have included any of 6, 17, 24 read this comment:*

Have you considered whether the Executive Officer dealt adequately with the problem of the Commissary Officer's behavior? All we know from the description of the case is that the Executive Officer said a few words to his subordinate officer, before going down to the galley. Reprimand can be either immediate or delayed. In this instance, immediate reprimand was obviously important, but follow-up discipline is needed. A significant feature of this case is that the Executive Officer went down to the galley *himself*. There seems to be some ground for questioning the effectiveness of the Executive Officer's authority over the Commissary Officer. Items 6, 17 and 24 together point to this possibility.

- [I-6] *If you have omitted any two of 4, 11, 14, 16, 19, 24 then read this comment:*

Discipline and the Chain of Command. Why did the Executive Officer not order the Commissary Officer to see to a matter that was his responsibility? Why did the Executive Officer go down to the galley himself? The chain of command has been broken here, and represents a symptom of weakness in dealing with junior officers. On the spot action was needed, but only a reprimand was given.

Perhaps it is significant that the two men share the same cabin. Too much familiarity can weaken the right relationship of authority, and in times of crisis make the senior or junior officer unsure of his position.

- [I-7] *If you have omitted either 1 or 20 read this comment:*

Informal Authority. The events described suggest a weakening of respect for immediate superiors, with a corresponding decay in discipline. The news of a failure in leadership spreads rapidly. How long do you think the cook kept the Commissary Officer's remarks to himself? This snarling reply would not be the only thing that would be talked about. The men would also surmise that the Executive Officer has no control over his subordinate officer, and that junior officers here have no respect for their seniors. Such points underline the seriousness of the situation.

NOW REVIEW YOUR FIRST SELECTION IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE COMMENTS YOU HAVE READ.

THEN TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE, AND READ THE CONCLUSION.

CONCLUSION

Let us leave this case now, even though we have not solved all the problems it raises. The case of the missing ham actually occurred. We have not come up with any formula for dealing with some of the problems caused by changes in operational plans. Nor have we found the thief. But we have called attention to some of the factors that harm or enhance morale in situations of stress.

We have also seen the importance of adherence to the chain of command, even in conditions where it causes inconvenience or strain to the officer involved.

There should be willing cooperation on the part of all hands toward achieving organizational objectives. It is the responsibility of every officer to do all in his power to insure that conditions under his control are tailored toward that end. By keeping his men well informed and trained the effective officer encourages the intelligent, willing cooperation of his subordinates.

PROBLEMS OF LEADERSHIP

Module Thirteen - The Case of the Unmoved Files

THE CASE OF THE UNMOVED FILES

Location: A large Naval Station

The following is a first person account by LT Smith:

"Some sections in the Navy administration building were to be moved to another floor. LT Jones requested a one-man working party to assist in moving his files to his new office. I asked the Journalist third class (JO3) in my office to assist LT Jones in moving. I considered the matter closed, and busied myself with other tasks which took me outside the office.

"On my return I received a telephone call from LT Jones inquiring about a man to assist in the moving. I replied that I had asked the JO3 to assist, and thought he had done so.

"I turned to the JO3 and asked why he had not gone. He told me that I had not made an order out of my request, and that after talking it over with the other six enlisted men in the office, he felt that such tasks were not part of his job.

"Furthermore, he said he felt that the assignment was doing something personal for the officer concerned. It was a personal request and he did not like the officer, so did not feel obliged to assist him. What course of action should I take against the JO3? What action with respect to the six other enlisted men in the office?"

THE PROBLEM

YOU WILL NOW HAVE TWO EXERCISES TO DO ON THE CASE STUDY DESCRIBED:
(a) DIAGNOSING THE PROBLEM; (b) SOLVING PROBLEM.

(a) DIAGNOSIS

IN THE CASE STUDY, THE SITUATION IS DESCRIBED IN THE WORDS OF THE REPORTING OFFICER. YOU, THE STUDENT, ARE ASKED TO MAKE YOUR OWN DIAGNOSIS OF THE PROBLEM. REMEMBER THAT THE REPORTING OFFICER IS NOT JUST AN OBSERVER. HE IS A PART OF THE SITUATION ITSELF.

LOOK AT THE RESPONSE INDICATOR, PAGE 33, AND CONSIDER WHICH ITEMS YOU WOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IN DEALING WITH THE SITUATION, IF YOU WERE THE OFFICER INVOLVED. RECORD YOUR SELECTION AND THEN TURN TO PAGE 18 AND READ THE DISCUSSION COMMENTS.

DISCUSSION COMMENTS

- [II-1] *If you have omitted any two of 1, 3, 7, 10, 14 or included any of 12, 13 and 23 or included any two of 2, 6, 11, 17, 18, 20 then read this comment:*

In many of the situations you are likely to encounter as an officer, it will be very important for you to be able to see the *fundamental* problem that underlies *manifest* problems. Like a doctor, you must not mistake the symptoms for the disease. Here are some of the things you might consider to be central to this case:

- The files needed moving
- The files were not moved
- The J03 was asked to move the files and did not do so
- Six other men supported the J03 in his attitude
- The J03 was given a request, not an order
- The J03 did not like the officer he was asked to help

Does any one of these, or any combination of these, in fact represent the central problem? If these problems were dealt with, would the entire matter be cleared up satisfactorily?

Considering the incident carefully, one begins to realize that the J03 dislikes more than one officer. He probably resents the officer telling the story. It is likely, too, that the other six enlisted men share the J03's feelings towards the officers.

What we have here is primarily a problem in human relations. In this situation there are seven enlisted men working for the reporting officer. A fellow officer asks him for help in getting his files moved. Put yourself in the position of the reporting officer. If your men like and respect you, will they stop to think whether they feel like doing something for the other officer, or whether this is their job? How good are your relations with the J03 and the men?

Reconsider your selection, and decide on any changes you may want to make.

[II-2] *If you have included any of 2, 3, 20 or omitted 24 then read this comment:*

Negative Thinking. The first question asked by the officer who submitted the case was: "What course of action should I take *against* the J03?" But is this kind of action called for immediately? What needs to be done is to get the files moved, otherwise the officer who wants them moved is likely to become involved, and the whole affair could blow up into an unpleasant incident.

[II-3] *If you have omitted either 6 or 19 then read this comment:*

Discipline. Whatever the relationship between the officer and men in this instance, there are clear indications that discipline is slack.

You may consider that the maintenance of strict discipline is not so vital on shore in peacetime as it is at sea or in wartime. The truth is, however, that unquestioning obedience of orders or acquiescence in requests from an officer, is a habit which once acquired is not easily lost. Equally, the habit of questioning orders, once formed, is hard to break.

[II-4] *If you have omitted any two of 5, 9, 10, 15 then read this comment:*

Teamwork. You may not think that these items are fundamental to the problem. However, if you consider how they undermine effective teamwork, you will come closer to one of the most significant issues in this case.

'Esprit de Corps' can exist only if each man feels that what he does *matters*. The officer must make it clear to his men what is expected of them; otherwise they could not take pride in what they do. Most men are wholly willing to serve a cause which they consider important. If their willingness can be tapped, men will be ready to do far more than the rules require, and situations like the present case are unlikely to arise. A general rule is useful here: the more you expect of men, the more they will be willing to do.

(b) SOLUTION

HAVING DIAGNOSED THE PROBLEM, THE NEXT TASK IS TO FIND A SOLUTION. CONSIDER THE ACTIONS IN THE NUMBERED BOXES ON PAGE 21. THEN, DECIDE ON THE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE AND TIMING YOU WOULD GIVE THEM. THE GRID ON THE NEXT PAGE SHOWS YOU HOW TO ARRANGE YOUR LIST. WHEN YOU HAVE MADE YOUR PLANS OF ACTION, RECORD THEM ON A SEPARATE PIECE OF PAPER IN THE FORMAT SHOWN AT THE BOTTOM OF PAGE 21.

THEN TURN TO PAGE 22.

Strengthen the chain of command 1	Discuss the problem with subordinates 2
Raise morale by praising the work of subordinates 3	Resort to disciplinary action (negative discipline) 4
Make your orders simple and definite 5	Spend time counseling individuals who have slipped up 6
Explain and justify orders which have been made 7	Get things moving right away 8
Be positive about the policies and actions of superiors and peers 9	Insist on receiving full reports on operations 10

LIST ITEMS TO SHOW WHAT ACTION YOU WOULD TAKE:

TIME SEQUENCE	Most Important	Supplementary

Compare the following suggestions for a plan of action with your own. Note any changes in your ideas on page 4 of the Response Form.

The following is one way in which the situation could be handled.

Let us assume you told the file owner, when he called, that you thought the files had been moved. However, you would look into the matter immediately. (You would not of course tell him that the J03 had refused to do the job because he did not like his officers. Nor would you tell LT Jones that you are sorry but you cannot force your men to do something they do not want to. It would also be wrong to hedge: "My men have been really tied up all day," or say "Do you think you could get somebody else to come over here and pick up the files?")

You would then call the J03 into your office, and tell him that you want the job done regardless of personal feelings. If necessary, order him to do the job. Make it clear to him that his attitude to the job has been unacceptable, but that you will discuss this later. For the moment the important thing is to get these files moved, because Navy business is being delayed on their account. Later you will give the J03 and the others the opportunity to explain what is bothering them.

In this way you get the immediate problem of moving the files out of the way. At the same time you are starting on the central problem of human relations. You are recognizing that there is a basic issue underlying the overt one, and you are moving towards defining and solving it.

CONCLUSION

We see the fundamental causes of this problem as follows: 1) poor discipline, 2) poor 'esprit de corps', 3) poor relations between officers and men. This case contains a valuable message. If an organization like the US Navy is to be powerful and function well, the same morale and procedures must prevail throughout the organization, at all times. As we said before, obedience is a habit - a habit which must be learned by every member of the Navy. Without this uniformity of behavior, any military organization would cease to function.

PROBLEMS OF LEADERSHIP

Module Fourteen - The Case of the Efficient Ensign

THE CASE OF THE EFFICIENT ENSIGN

"I was Executive Officer of a destroyer that enjoyed a reputation for high morale and esprit de corps.

"A newly commissioned ensign reported aboard. He was an NROTC graduate with an engineering degree. He was assigned as the main propulsion assistant (MPA) and machinery (M) division officer.

"He appeared highly motivated and eager to assume his duties.

"At the end of two months I observed that 'M' Division's UA quotient had risen well above previous levels. The main propulsion team were not performing their drills with their former speed and precision.

"I investigated and found that the MPA had tackled his engineering duties enthusiastically. He had quickly obtained exceptional knowledge both of the engineering plant and of the administrative tasks associated with the plant. However, I found that he had delayed approval of four leave chits and one request for reenlistment brought to him by the Chief Petty Officer. He had also failed to conduct general military training.

"When I talked to him in my office he still appeared enthusiastic, but was puzzled by what was going wrong with the men. He was friendly with some of them, and thought that they had mostly got along fine."

THE PROBLEM

THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER HAS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF PUTTING THE NEW MPA ON THE RIGHT TRACK. FIRST, HE HAS TO DIAGNOSE THE PROBLEM, AND BASED ON HIS ESTIMATE, THEN DECIDE ON A SUITABLE COURSE OF ACTION. HE HAS NO INFORMATION TO JUDGE BY OTHER THAN THAT DESCRIBED IN THE CASE ABOVE.

PUT YOURSELF IN HIS POSITION, AND MAKE YOUR DIAGNOSIS, SELECTING APPROPRIATE ITEMS FROM THE RESPONSE INDICATOR, PAGE 33. RECORD YOUR SELECTION. THEN, TURN TO PAGE 25 AND READ THE DISCUSSION COMMENTS.

DISCUSSION COMMENTS

[III-1] *If you have included 8 then read this comment:*

We do not consider that there is any *conflict* of responsibility in this situation. The officer is launching himself enthusiastically into his job and attending to his duties to the best of his abilities. However, it may be that he is unaware of the *full extent* of his responsibilities. Technical responsibility and efficiency are not enough - there are men to look after and morale to maintain. The officer has to learn to shoulder his military responsibilities as well.

[III-2] *If you have included 2 then read this comment:*

If you are thinking of this item in terms of the Ensign's military performance then we agree. But in terms of his technical performance he has set an example of high standards and efficiency. Decide whether you want to revise your response.

[III-3] *If you have included any of 9, 11, 12, 13, 22 then read this comment:*

You do not seem to have identified the problem correctly. Reconsider your response, and try to focus more clearly on the problem present in the case study.

[III-4] *If you have omitted any of 2, 10, 17 then read this comment:*

A high standard of discipline and strong morale and esprit de corps that go with it are obviously not present in the M Division. The men are going UA, always a sign of poor morale, and the standard of their drill is dropping. Why is this happening?

[III-5] *If you have omitted 16 or included 18 then read this comment:*

The question of bad leadership from the top and of failure to execute policy decisions from below does not arise. However, the Ensign has failed to execute all the duties inherent in his rank. The defects in his handling of the men is undermining the high morale and esprit de corps which has gained this ship a good reputation. He is, therefore, failing in his responsibility to maintain the high standards required by the Navy.

[III-6] *If you have included any of 7, 11, 20 then read this comment:*

There is no direct evidence in the case study that these conditions actually exist. However, the Ensign may well be creating an atmosphere where these conditions will arise, unless he puts a little less emphasis on the technicalities of his job, and more on the handling of men.

[III-7] *If you have omitted either 4 or 5 then read this comment:*

The officer is a newly commissioned Ensign, an (NROTC) graduate. He finds himself assigned as an (MPA) and machinery (M) division officer. This means that he has a Chief Petty Officer Petty Officers and enlisted men under his command. They are an integral part of a destroyer which enjoyed high morale and esprit de corps. The Chief Petty Officer brings him some leave chits and a request for re-enlistment but he takes no action on them. His failure to see to the leave and reenlistment requests is only one of his errors. He has failed to take the Chief Petty Officer into his confidence and to seek out his advice. Chief Petty Officers are there to show young officers the ropes, to convey to them the feeling of the unit and to communicate what kind of leadership is expected from them. The officer must have the humility and common sense to realize that he needs initial guidance.

[III-8] *If you have omitted any of 14, 15 and 23 then read the following comment:*

We are concerned with diagnosing not just where the Ensign went wrong, but the basic cause of his failure. Different men have different styles of assuming command. The style a new officer adopts may be a coverup for an initial uncertainty in the exercise of command. This, we think, may be the crux of the problem.

Some men will put on a false front of confidence which hopefully turns into the real thing. Some overdo the discipline which again gradually relaxes. Others, as the Ensign did, will throw themselves wholeheartedly into that part of their job that they know well, and hope that this enthusiasm will gain the confidence of the men. This on its own cannot work - the men need to respect their officers for more than technical achievement. The officer must be able to use and to serve the men under him in the chain of command. The men must feel that their officer is concerned with their personal needs, and he must earn their support and respect. His first step is to observe, listen and take interest in what his subordinates have to say. No officer should be too proud to consult his Petty Officers and take them into his confidence.

[III-9] IF YOU HAVE INCLUDED 14 AND YOU HAVE OMITTED 21, THEN READ THIS COMMENT:

You seem to have seen what lies at the heart of the present problem, but you have overlooked an important part. The Ensign was not meeting all the responsibilities of his position. Prior high standards were starting to drop after only two months. Yet he did not understand what was wrong. Is he innately incapable of understanding just what his responsibilities are, or will he be able to fulfill them once he becomes more secure in his new position?

[III-10] *If you have omitted 19 or 23 then read this comment:*

At first glance there might not seem to be a direct connection between making demands on subordinates and showing concern for their welfare. However, if the men know that their superior is concerned about their welfare, then he can ask a lot of them. The Ensign is failing on both points.

[III-11] IF YOU HAVE INCLUDED 14 AND YOU HAVE OMITTED 24, READ THIS COMMENT:


In this case, the new Ensign thinks that he has got down to the job and is on the ball. He has in fact avoided leadership issues for two months. The ability to deal with situations on the spot is one of the marks of a good leader. However, if the officer is unsure of his position, how can he be expected to act in a decisive manner?

ON THE FOLLOWING PAGES ARE SOME OPTIONAL EXERCISES BASED ON THIS CASE STUDY. DO THEM ONLY IF YOU HAVE TIME.

OPTIONAL TASK

On the next page we are going to show, in a diagram, how we reached our diagnosis of the problem in this case study.

First, however, we want you to answer some specific questions. On scrap paper, draw a block diagram, like the one below. You can add as many spaces as you need.




- (1) What evidence is there in the case study of a leadership problem?
- (2) What actions or behavior of the Ensign do you think are causing the problem?
- (3) Why do you think the Ensign acted that way?

TO ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS, SELECT RELEVANT ITEMS FROM THE RESPONSE INDICATOR; INSERT THEIR NUMBERS IN THE BOXES APPROPRIATE TO OBSERVABLES OR INFERENCES.


WHEN YOU HAVE DONE THIS TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE.

How do your diagrams compare to ours?
Our diagram shows the basis of the discussion comments.



We have reviewed both your own and our interpretation of the facts. Turn to the next page where you will find another diagram.

Below we represent diagrammatically the relationship of the facts to the problem. Study this diagram individually. Starting with item 14, consider how the Ensign's basic weakness shows itself in terms of naval behavior. Consider how this affects his relationship (a) with his chief subordinates and (b) with the men.



RESPONSE INDICATOR
PROBLEMS OF LEADERSHIP

Subordinates lack respect for their superiors 1	The officer has failed to set a good example 2	Subordinates form groups not related to tasks 3	The superior ignores the duties and responsibilities of his chief subordinates 4
There is a lack of communication with subordinates on matters concerning their welfare 5	Discipline is below standards 6	Antagonism exists between officers and subordinates 7	There is a conflict of responsibilities 8
Responsibility for the assignment is not clearly indicated 9	Esprit de corps is not built and strengthened 10	Subordinates are not given firm and clear orders 11	Requests are not made of subordinates in the right way 12
The assignment should not have been given to the subordinates 13	The officer is unsure of his position 14	The officer does not accept responsibility for the behavior of his subordinates 15	The officer does not support policies of superiors in dealing with subordinates 16
The morale of subordinates is deteriorating 17	Leadership is weak at the top, and does not give specific policy guidance. 18	Subordinates are unaccustomed to being required to meet high performance standards. 19	Subordinates do not willingly obey orders. 20
Officer fails to meet all the responsibilities of his position 21	Reprimand is made publicly 22	The officer lacks concern for the welfare of his men 23	Situations are not dealt with on the spot 24