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ABSTRACT
          Designed to help bring students to greater
understanding of concepts of the introduction to psychology and
leadership course (see the final reports which summarize the course
development project, EM 010 418, EM 010 419, and EM 010 484), this
Structural Communications unit is coordinated with the instructional
unit in the core course on group dynamics (EM 010 424, EM 010 425, EM
010 454, and EM 010 503). The basic strategy of the unit is to have
the student work through the central theme which dominates problems
presented in a brief series of modules. Each successive module refers
to a matrix of statements which the student examines for relevance to
the problem being considered. The unit can be used either
individually or in a group setting, and was designed so that the end
product would be a student with a more complete grasp of the elements
of the theme and their interaction. EM 010 420 through EM 010 447 and
EM 010 451 through EM 010 512 are related documents. (SH)

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UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY

INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY AND LEADERSHIP

MAY 1971

ENRICHMENT III

GROUP DYNAMICS AND THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

EM 010 441

United States Naval Academy

INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY AND LEADERSHIP

ENRICHMENT III

GROUP DYNAMICS AND THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

Enrichment Modules 8, 9, 10, 11

A Structural Communication Unit
prepared for Westinghouse Learning Corporation
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C O N T E N T S

Orientation

This Structural Communication Unit, GROUP DYNAMICS AND
THE CHAIN OF COMMAND, is designed to be used with Part Three,
"Group Dynamics," of the course, INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY
AND LEADERSHIP.

Each module is oriented towards discussion and is designed
to be used for individual instruction. By working through
these modules the student will gain confidence in his mastery
of the concepts previously introduced to him. He will also
be able to develop his own ideas and understand different
points of view.

The feedback from the authors does not confirm the correct
answer, though the authors do indicate the items they use in
their interpretations. Each student is encouraged to develop
his own interpretation of the case studies according to his
knowledge and point of view.

Organization of the Unit

Each module is divided into the following sections:

INTENTION. This serves as an introduction. It briefly
describes the theme which the authors intend to communicate.
It also summarizes the rationale for the approach, method and
viewpoint.

PRESENTATION. This presents the scope of the discussion,
giving an outline of the main and subsidiary themes.

INVESTIGATION. This section explores the theme in greater depth, and introduces a set of PROBLEMS. By working through the problems, the student will have his attention focused on the more subtle points in the theme, enabling him to develop his understanding of it. Included in this section also are the DISCUSSION COMMENTS and INTERPRETATIONS which provide feedback to guide the student through the problem.

RESPONSE INDICATOR. This is a matrix of items, all of them relevant to the theme as a whole. The student uses these items to solve the problems in the Investigation, and they provide a basic vocabulary for the student to interact with the authors and to 'talk back' to the authors of the Unit. Different sets of these items can be used to give adequate expression of different viewpoints on, or interpretation of the problems.

Procedure

Instructions about specific activities are given to the student in the body of the text.

The student should commence work on the Unit by reading the Intention and Presentation sections. The student may refer back to the Presentation at any stage of the Investigation. He should next work on the Investigation with its problem situations according to the following procedure:

INVESTIGATING THE PROBLEM

The student should read the problem and make an individual response.

The student categorizes all items on the Response Indicator
according to given criteria ranging from highly significant to
irrelevant. The Discussion Section takes the form of an Inter-
pretation or Analysis in which the authors group all the items
into various categories and give their rationale. The student
evaluates his response by comparing his interpretation with
that of the authors.

The Discussion Section serves as a further stimulant to
the student. It also acts as a bridge between the student and
the authors of the material. It is the device for channeling
more information to the students in order to clarify more
complex aspects of the problems than the student may have been
aware of in his individual response. It also exposes them to
another point of view. The student should consider the bearing
of this section on his response, and make a second selection if
desired.

Each module can be adequately discussed with a number of
possible combinations of items selected from the Response
Indicator. The student can start with a small combination of
items and build up a more complete picture by adding to it.
Or he can make a broad attempt by including more general
selections, review them, and reject some items. If he has no
firm ideas on what to select, he can try anything at random,
and then see if the Discussion helps him to make some sense
of the problem. He should review his selection not just for
what each item signifies, but to see what the items taken
together signify. He should check that there is no internal

contradiction between them, and that as a whole they represent

a set of coherent interdependencies.

THE DIAGNOSTIC PROCEDURE

THE NOTATION FOR THE TESTS WORKS LIKE THIS:

When a test is written - I_2 (1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10) -

it means: "If you INCLUDED TWO or more (I_2) of items

1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, then read the comment below."

I refers to Inclusion (of items #....)

O refers to Omission (of items #....)

The numerical subscript refers to the count of items involved:

I_2 inclusion of TWO or more

O_3 omission of THREE or more, and so on.

The numbers in parentheses are the references numbers of items

on the Response Indicator included or omitted.

Thus -

I_1 (2, 12, 20) and

O_3 (1, 3, 5, 6, 7)

means -

if you have INCLUDED one or more of response items 2, 12,

20 and OMITTED three or more of items 1, 3, 5, 6, 7 read the

following comment.

(1) Look at the first test to see if it bears on your
response. If it does, then read the comment below
the test. If it does not, continue looking until
you find a test that does bear on your response.

Example:

I_2 (1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10)

"What you say is quite valid, but we would like
to make the following points. When the Japanese
attacked Pearl Harbor ...."

(2)   When you have read a comment, review your response
      and the decisions which led you to it comparing
      your reasoning with that of the authors. Then look
      for the next appropriate comment.

(3)   Continue this process until you come to the end of
      the DISCUSSION. You may not have changed your
      reasoning and may be in disagreement with the
      authors, but you should make sure that you under-
      stand the significance of the authors' remarks.

INTENTION

Any change in assignment of an officer creates new relationships with new men who make up the work groups in that division. The officer may have several difficulties to overcome. First, he may not be familiar technically with the specific means for achieving his objectives. Second, he will have to recognize quickly how effective the chain of command is in that division. Third, he will have to establish a motivating relationship with the various groups, which will regard him initially as an outsider.

Although common sense is the basic guide to handling such situations, an understanding of the psychology of groups can be helpful in diagnosing any difficulties and in avoiding the unexpected disruption often caused by seemingly straightforward decisions and actions. Work groups behave in certain typical ways, not because of unwillingness or any deliberate intent, but because of the inherent dynamics of any group.

In this Unit, we shall examine a case study which requires an understanding of how natural group dynamics can affect a chain of command.

PRESENTATION

The scene is a West Coast Naval Air Squadron to which a new type of gun (the Mark 12) is being introduced. A Division J Officer describes his situation as follows:

"I am an Ordnance Officer of a fighter squadron, deployed to a certain air station for two weeks gunnery. The Mark 12 guns are new to me and my division.

The Ordnance Division has been divided into three crews: one crew for maintenance, one for arming and de-arming, and one for tow banner operations.

A first class aviation ordnance man (AO 1) is in charge of each crew, and a chief aviation ordnance man (AOC) is overall supervisor. The AOC has had twenty-two years of service, most of which has been spent in patrol squadrons on the East Coast. This is his first fighter squadron duty and he apparently has a short-timer attitude.

There is a bureau representative, Mr. Day, who is attached to the squadron to aid us in any difficulties which arise with the new guns. He is a retired chief gunner.

Today, after two days of gunnery operations, it is clear the guns are failing at an abnormal rate. The Squadron Commander has already called me, as Ordnance Officer, to explain. I was not able to give him a satisfactory reason.

I called the AOC and asked him about the gun failures.
His reply suggested that the guns were no good and that he
was having too much trouble getting a tow banner rigged to
worry about the maintenance of guns.

Following this, I called a conference of the AO 1 and
the AOC which brought to light two things. One was that
Mr. Day was telling the men how to do their jobs, and this
seemed to cause considerable friction, and an "I don't care"
attitude. The other was that the Chief was swapping a great
number of men around into other jobs. The men do not
understand why, and are even uncertain that there are any
good reasons for the changes in jobs.

"How can I obtain maximum performance from the guns?"

GROUP DYNAMICS AND THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

Module Eight: Group Dynamics in a Naval Air Squadron

INVESTIGATION - Module 8

     Consider.the specific conflict in this situation
between the work group and the basic group. Which
combination of actions from the Response Indicator
would tend to aggravate the particular basic
assumption dominating this division?

INSTRUCTIONS

     Refer to the Response Indicator and make your
individual selection. Record your final choice of
response items. Turn to page 12 and work through
the Discussion of Phase I.

DISCUSSION - PHASE I

O_1 (1, 11)

To treat the men as if they were inept and untrained would
probably increase the force of the basic assumption driving
them; it would certainly have a marked effect upon their
actions.

I_1 (2, 12, 21)

To consult with the crewmen about their problems, to talk
to the leading Petty Officers, or to institute group discussions
would all have the effect of decreasing the force of the
group's basic assumption. It is the solution of a group
and its lack of communication with other groups and individuals
that gives rise to its basic assumption.

O_2 (5, 15, 23)

As a newcomer to the division, the Chief may feel out of place.
Any actions on your part which stress his subordinate position
or which put the responsibility for reducing the failure rate
onto him will probably make him angry, and result in his venting
his feelings on the crew, increasing the force of their basic
assumption.

O_1 (7, 10)

A sudden change in conditions could deeply affect the crew.
One such change would be the replacement of Mr. Day. Even
telling him to stick to his job and stop interfering would
make an impact if pressure were really put on him. In the
face of sudden change, the men could go either way; they
could reconsolidate the work group and dissolve the basic
groups, or the reverse. A critical factor would be
communication with the crew prior to a sudden change such
as this. Explanations after the decision to change had been
taken would probably not prevent the crew from wanting to
preserve the basic group.

I_2 (8, 9, 13)

Any one of actions 8, 9 and 13 might aggravate the situation,
but it would depend on how you carried them out. You would
aggravate the situation by making the Leading Petty Officers
responsible for the crew's performance, if you implied that
they were to be blamed for the situation. Then they would
take it out on the men. Again, if you got Mr. Day riled up
or treated him abruptly enough to shock the crew, you would
probably increase the strength of their basic assumptions.
Telling the division why they had to practice could aggravate
things if you showed dissatisfaction or anger.

I_1 (3, 22)

To tell the men you were pleased with their performance, or
to tell the Leading Petty Officers that steps were being
taken to rectify the situation would temporarily, at least,
decrease the force of the group's 'basic' assumption.

I_1 (18, 19)

To take either Mr. Day or the Chief into your confidence
and try to make them understand what effect they are having
would undoubtedly make them act to reduce the conflicts in
the situation, which would decrease the strength of the
group's basic assumption.

END OF PHASE I

INSTRUCTIONS

Revise your individual response at this stage according to any
changes in thinking caused by the Discussion. Record your
revised response. Then turn to page 14 and continue with
Phase II.

DISCUSSION - PHASE II

So far we have considered aggravation of the basic assumption from a negative point of view. However, there is a rationale for aggravating the basic assumption in order to improve the situation. One could say that under intense pressure the group would get down to work to straighten things out themselves. Such an approach depends more on the human, group dynamic realities of the situation than on the chain of command. Whether or not you would decide to use a pressure approach will depend both on your assessment of the group and on your assessment of yourself as a leader.

A basic assumption comes to the fore when it seems the easy way to resolve conflict. When that way is shown to be ineffective the work group might re-emerge. Think about this in terms of survival of the groups. If the crew can get away with pretending that the work doesn't matter - and that their superiors are incompetent - everything that goes wrong is their fault - they will do so. If pressure is put on AND the men are able to perceive the nature of the solution, they may turn to.

I_1 (1, 11)

Giving the men further training misses the point of the problem. Even if a training scheme is introduced in order to put the men under more pressure, to test their mettle as a group, the effects may be diametrically opposed to those you intend. The group seems to be reacting to the actions of Mr. Day and the Chief the only way it knows how; training might bring about a greater deterioration of their record with the guns.

I_2 (7, 10, 15) and 0_1 (2, 22)

Group communications exercises, or praising the crew might well provide a channel or focus for the men's efforts. If they knew something of what you required from them, and felt you were behind them, they might be more able and more willing to surmount the added strain of the situation.

I_1 (8, 13) and 0_2 (12, 21)

Doing this is really just shouting in the air. You have the authority to enforce standards among your subordinates, but responsibility must be clearly and firmly established - not as a way of passing the buck. The Petty Officers have to have your confidence and they need confidence in you. The crew who are in the center of the problem need help.

DISCUSSION - CONCLUSION OF PHASE II

In this approach, authoritative action is necessary, but not sufficient. You can push the men but you must also give them a direction. They must understand the situation.

GROUP DYNAMICS AND THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

Module Nine: Recognition of Structure in the Group

INVESTIGATION - Module 9

The situation described is full of ambiguities arising from
different sources, and the tolerance of the group appears to
be breaking down. Which combination of actions would tend to
bring more recognition of structure into the group?

Study the general ideas below before deciding on your response.

Stress and Ambiguity.

        The social climate of a group changes according to the
way it perceives its relationship to its goals, and its
environment. These perceptions also affect the role of the
basic group in relation to the work group. When the perceptions
of a group become dimmed or distracted, the men are less able
to direct their energy constructively. But when a group is
appropriately challenged it will seek to recognize the
structure of its situation and become more aware. Thus,
although stress can break groups.it can also be the making
of them, as acts of group heroism in warfare exemplify.
The behavior of groups in ambiguous situations may be
summarized as follows:

        a)   People who do not perceive challenge or threat
                in their environment tend towards informal
                permission groupings.

        b)   Ambiguity is frustrating because it stands as
                a barrier to successful action.

        c)   Ambiguity generally leads to random behavior
                or loss of hope.

        d)   Groups placed under stress show a greater
                tendency to make an early attempt to recognize
                some structure behind an ambiguous situation.

        e)   Anxiety, threat or reaction can be reduced by
                seeking to increase the situational structure
                of the group.

INSTRUCTIONS

Refer to the Response Indicator and make your selection.
Record your final choice of response items. Then turn
to page 17 and work through the Discussion of Phase I.

DISCUSSION - PHASE I

O_2 (1, 11, 20, 21)

One way that the situation could be structured more
effectively would be to re-orient the men to the practical
necessities of the situation. Training schemes, group
discussions, observation or consultation with the crewmen
about using the guns, are all possible ways of setting up
a task orientation among the crew which has been lost.

O_2 (8, 13, 15)

A couple of ways to reduce ambiguity of the situation
would be to set up specific operational objectives for your
subordinate officers, while at the same time setting before
the division as a whole the purpose of the exercise.

We are not saying that any of these actions are viable
by themselves. Any one of them could cause a great deal of
trouble by aggravating the basic assumption of the crew.
Nevertheless, they do resolve ambiguity.

I_2 (7, 9, 16)

While it is important that the relationship of Mr. Day
and the Chief to the crew is adjusted, how this is attempted
will probably influence the outcome profoundly. Though you
want Mr. Day to concentrate on technical problems (7, 9) you
want him to understand the practical necessities guiding your
action, or what you say may only make things worse. Though it
is important that the Chief stop moving men around aimlessly
(16), you would have to make clear to him what you hope to
achieve and what he should keep in mind when acting, namely a
reduced failure rate.

I_2 (3, 10, 17, 23)

In trying to introduce more effective structuring it is
important to get everyone involved in actually doing things,
in working towards the goal of an improved practice showing.
To ask for a replacement for Mr. Day, to admit that you share
the general ignorance of the Mark 12, to tell the Leading Petty
Officers that steps are being taken to clarify things, or
even to order the Chief to advise you before moving any more
men; none of these actions tend to restructure the situation.
None of them really gets any members of the group into a work
orientation, and some of them would probably make things even
more ambiguous.

-17-

I_2 (5, 7, 10, 23)

The relationship between Mr. Day, the Chief and the crew seems to have been the major source of the abnormal failure rate. In trying to structure the situation, you would want to adjust their roles. Yet, abruptly dealing with either of them in an authoritarian way will not achieve any positive results, because your actions will annoy them and make things worse. There is even a possibility that if you ask for a replacement for Day, you will create more disruption in the overall situation, and will have gotten no closer to reducing the failure rate.

Ambiguity cannot be reduced by decree!

I_2 (12, 18, 19, 21, 25)

Although it is no doubt important to open up lines of communication between yourself and everyone concerned in the situation, through consultations and informal talks, this sort of thing does not really effectively structure the situation. Such an approach may deal with some of the human realities of the situation, but it neither strengthens the chain of command, which is a framework that can be effectively used to get things done, nor does it get people actively involved in doing things to solve the problems at hand.

END OF PHASE I

INSTRUCTIONS

Revise your response at this stage according to any changes in thinking caused by the Discussion. Record your revised response. Then turn to page 19 and proceed with Phase II.

DISCUSSION - PHASE II

As we have seen, to introduce effective structuring into this situation involves both making use of the chain of command in a practical way and getting everyone oriented to reducing the failure rate as a practical problem. If we were to look at this approach in another way, we might say it was replacing informal group orientation with a work group orientation. At the same time, the chain of command, if used effectively, provides one of the best mechanisms for structuring the situation. Phase II is devoted to examining the place of the chain of command in bringing out the structure of such an ambiguous situation.

I   (8)   and   0   (14)

While it is important to make the Leading Petty Officer responsible for the good performance of the guns, care must be taken to remind the Chief that the Leading Petty Officers should not be by-passed. Otherwise instead of increasing structure, greater disorganization would probably result. Your response suggests you have overlooked this.

I   (15)   and 0_1 (2, 24)

It is clearly important to get the Chief working to reduce the failure rate of the guns. This cannot be done in isolation, however, and it is equally important that he see that the Leading Petty Officers have definite responsibilities and duties in helping to achieve the goal. At the same time, it is also important for the Chief to get to know the men better, and to get to understand their position and role. Your response suggests that you have overemphasized the Chief's role to the detriment of the lower ranks.

I_2 (2, 8, 13, 15) <u>and</u> 0 both (1, 11)

In bringing out the structure of the situation, you have rightly stressed the importance of getting the division functioning as a whole, bringing it together through discussions, setting aims before it, and clearly and firmly establishing responsibility throughout the chain of command. You have, however, left the crew out of the picture. If they are to be effectively oriented to the job at hand, some sort of training program is needed.

If the situation is to be structured by getting the division involved as a whole in the task of reducing the failure rate, it is as necessary for the crew to be practically involved as it is for any of the other ranks.

While a training program may be effective in reducing the ambiguities of the situation, it must be remembered that the main problem is not due to a lack of training, and that such a program may stir up more resentment among the men. It is only in the context of clearly communicated objectives that training can lead to useful results. When all levels of command are turned to, nobody can feel themselves to be the scapegoat.

CONCLUSION OF PHASE II

At this point it should be fairly clear to you that any of the actions you could take would not structure the situation so much as bring out or emphasise the structure inherent in the division itself in the chain of command.

GROUP DYNAMICS AND THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

Module Ten: Social Climates For Leadership

INVESTIGATION - Module 10

Leadership of this division obviously implies the exercise
of the authority associated with rank and respect for the chain
of command. However, highly effective groups appear to be
fairly democratically organized. Which combination of actions
would specifically increase the democratic integration of the
division and its performance?

Study the general ideas below before deciding on your response.

Forms of Leadership.

.Effective leadership is never exactly the same for
different situations. The "social climate" which predominates
in a group may make certain styles of leadership awkward or
impossible. On the other hand, the change from one style of
leadership to another may induce marked changes in the social
climate. There are obvious differences between a civilian and
a military social climate, and styles of leadership appropriate
for one may be quite inappropriate in another. For example,
going over your chief's head may be a morally permissible
act to help save an industrial firm from a major mistake,
but in the Navy it would be a serious break of vital chain of
command. We will consider three social climates for leadership:
the authoritarian, the democratic and the laissez-faire.
These have been described as follows:

Authoritarian Climate:

a)   All policy is determined by the leader.

b)   Techniques and activity steps are dictated by
        authority, one at a time, so that the group is
        often uncertain about future steps.

c)   The leader will usually dictate the particular
        work task and work companion of each member.

d)   The leader tends to be "personal" in his praise
        and criticism of the work of each member,
        remaining aloof from active group participation
        except when demonstrating.

Democratic Climate:

a)   All policies are a matter of group discussion
      and decision, encouraged and assisted by the
      leader.

b) . Perspective on activity is gained during discussion
      periods. General steps to the group goal are
      sketched, and when technical advice is needed,
      the leader suggests two or more alternative   .
      procedures from which choice could be made.

c)   The members are free to work with whomever they
      choose, and the division of tasks is left to the
      group.

d)   The leader is "objective" or "fact-minded" in
      his praise and criticism, and tries to be a
      regular group member in spirit without taking
      on too much of the work.

Laissez-Faire Climate:

a)   There is complete freedom for group or individual
      decision with a minimum of leader participation.

b)   Various resources are made available by the leader,
      who makes it clear that he will supply information
      when asked. He takes no other part in the work
      discussion.

c)   Complete non-participation of the leader.

d)   Spontaneous comments on member activities by the
      leader are infrequent, and no attempt is made to
      .   appraise or regulate the course of events.

        Comparing these categories with the viewpoints on good
leadership in the Navy indicates that there is no clear-cut
categorization of the naval leadership view into authoritarian,
democratic or laissez-faire. Some feature of each may be present
in typical situations. For example, major policy must be laid
down by the Naval Chiefs of Staff; division leadership is
often effective when it is democratic; the recreational activities
of personnel are often best left as laissez-faire.

INSTRUCTIONS

Refer to the Response Indicator and make your selection.
Record your final choice of response items.   Then turn
to page 24 and work through the Discussion.

DISCUSSION

0_2 (2, 12, 21)

Any attempt to increase the democratic organization of the division must bring the Leading Petty Officers and crew into the picture. This could be achieved through group discussions, or by your talking with the Petty Officers and crew.

I_1 (1, 10, 11, 15, 23)

Democratic processes depend upon give and take. Throwing the men into a training program, ordering the Chief to produce results or to stop moving men around, or asking for a replacement for Mr. Day are all indicative of an authoritarian leadership style rather than a democratic one.

You have a problem here of whether the end justified the means. Non-democratic procedures may enable a democratic integration to take place in the long run. This is a problem which faces any leader in a society centered on democratic values.

0_2 (4, 6, 9, 18)

The treatment you give to Mr. Day must be similar to that you give any other man. You may get him to cooperate by asking him to recall his Navy days, or by getting him to see the disruption he has caused, but he must be made to see that he should not overstep the boundaries of his position. At the same time you might want to put in a word for him with the men, to see that they treat him fairly in the future.

0_2 (19, 24, 25)

You should get the Chief's views on how performance could be increased. At the same time you should get him to see the importance of the chain of command and the duties he should leave to the Leading Petty Officers. Democracy can work only through mutual understanding.

I_1 (5, 16)

If you are aiming for democratic integration of the division you should not tell the Chief to stop moving men about or to advise you of his reasons for doing so - does he think he moves them without reason? You have to deal with the reasons, not simply the behavior.

O_2 (3, 17, 20)

     You ought to let the men know that you share with
them the dilemma facing the division, and you should
probably take an active interest in their gun practice.
At the same time you ought to let the Leading Petty Officers
know that the situation was being dealt with.

I_1 (13, 22)

     Democratic organization depends upon frankness, trust
and mutual cooperation. Telling the men they have done well,
or even telling them why they are practicing with the guns -
.as if they didn't know already -- will be seen as an indication
that you are not inclined to treat them like equals. .

I (20)   and O_1 (8, 14)

     You have rightly decided to take an active interest in
the gunnery practice of the crew. At the same time you have
to exercise some authority through the chain of command to get
it working effectively during such practice, with the Chief an
and the Leading Petty Officers knowing what their
responsibilities are, and carrying them out.

CONCLUSION

     The introduction of more democratic organization into
the division involves a nice balance between the say each
individual has in deciding things, and the duties and
responsibilities he has because of his particular position
in the chain of command. This is especially true of you
as leader.

GROUP DYNAMICS AND THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

Module Eleven: Engineering A Group Situation

INVESTIGATION - Module 11

Study the criteria of an effective group described below.
These are the ideal for the Division Officer.

Characteristics of a Highly Effective Group.

Getting the best out of a team or crew means turning
them into a highly effective group. Such groups have been
studied by research workers and some of their characteristics
are easily recognized with practice. In taking on a new
group of men, it is important to ensure that they have a
certain stability towards the task to which they are assigned.
For example, men moved about without reason are likely to
react. They resent impersonal treatment which reduces their
personal dignity. They are also curious and want to be
consulted. They need to have time to become reasonably
secure and cohesive. The outsider has to be tactful,
friendly and modest in approaching a group. A few of the most
salient features of a highly effective group are now summarized.

a)   The group has been in existence sufficiently
        long to have developed well-established and
        relaxed working relationships amongst all
        its members.

b)   The members are attracted to it and are loyal
        to fellow members, including the leader.

c)   The members have a high degree of confidence
        and trust in each other.

d)   Where necessary or advisable, other members of
        the group will give a member the help he needs
        to accomplish successfully the goals set for
        him. Mutual help is characteristic of highly
        effective groups.

e)   All the interaction, problem-solving, decision-
        making activities of the group occur in a
        supportive atmosphere. Suggestions, comments,
        ideas, information, criticisms are all offered
        with a helpful orientation. The ideas of others
        are considered and discussed.

f)   The superior of each work group exerts a major
        influence in establishing the tone and atmosphere
        of that work group by his leadership principles
        and practices. The superior sets a good example.

g) Each member accepts willingly and without resentment the goals and expectations that he and his group establish for themselves. These goals are high enough to stimulate each member to do his best, but not so high as to arouse excessive anxiety or fear of failure.

h) There is high motivation in the group to use the communication process so that it best serves the. interest and goals of the group.

The Division Officer has to act. The effectiveness of the group depends very much on the appropriateness of the formal leader's style in the situation. Most people can be effective leaders in only one type of situation, and are unable to cope in others. The Division Officer has to engineer the situation so as to enable the people under his command to operate effectively. He cannot realistically expect people to change their basic patterns of behavior. What he can operate upon is the group situation. This approach is called 'organizational engineering'. It can be very valuable when there are difficulties in the chain of command in a given group. Some of the ways a superior can engineer a group situation involving supervisors or subordinate leaders are:

a) He can change the power of the leader's position. This means giving him more authority or less authority; he can let him have the final decision or have him consult with his subordinates. He can give him subordinates who are two or three steps below him, or subordinates who are equal or nearly equal to him in rank and power.

b) He can change the task structure. One leader may be given detailed operating instructions while another may be given overall problems that require new procedures.

c) He can change the member-leader relations. He can assign 'trouble-makers' to one man and keep them out of groups led by another. He can assign one leader to tasks likely to create dissension, and he can assign another to tasks likely to increase the harmony and cohesiveness of the group. He can increase or decrease the homogeneity of groups.

The principles of group dynamics described above are
a selection made to illustrate how taking over a new assignment
and a new group of men calls for a continual process of
diagnosing problems of group behavior, seeking out possible
solutions and then implementing these solutions through
leadership techniques.

INSTRUCTIONS

From the possible courses of action in the Response Indicator
put together the program of action you would take. Record
the response. Then turn to page 30 and work through the
Discussion.

DISCUSSION - Module 11

0_2 (3, 8, 13, 14)

The assignment of responsibilities very much influence the
performance of groups. In an over-authoritarian climate,
members of a group who normally may have more responsibility
and capability will in fact be inhibited and restricted. This
may create hostility and accentuate basic assumptions in the
group. In the case under discussion, it should become apparent
that the undue interference of the Chief was tending to by-pass
the leading Petty Officers and hence to frustrate them, and,
in effect, reducing their responsibilities. We can engineer
the organization of the division by increasing the leadership
scope of the AO 1 level and changing the position power of the
Chief. But we should beware of using an over-authoritarian
approach ourselves.

I_5 (12, 17, 21, 22, 25)

If you think these are the key items it indicates that
basically you have taken the line that an experienced officer
would towards the initial stage of the problem. Your first
job is to reassure the men and to be in the best position to
find the facts of the case. Before you can engineer the
situation you have to analyze it.

I_1 (3, 8) __and__   0 all (5, 14, 15, 16, 19, 23, 24, 25)

The style of leadership shown by the Chief seems inappropriate
and awkward. His moving the men about over the heads of the
leading Petty Officers is obviously one source of the problem.
However, in reassigning the immediate responsibility for the
crew to the leading Petty Officers you must not create a
similar problem through by-passing the Chief. Your response
suggests you have done this. Be careful to set an appropriate
example in restoring the disrupted chain of command.

0_1 (3, 8, 13)

The actions you should look for are those which are important
for activating the 'work group' and changing the assumption
of the 'basic group'. These actions you have overlooked help
also to reduce the ambiguity in the situation and to increase
its structure. Reassurance must be given that misunderstandings
are being cleared up and that you appreciate how responsibility
should be assigned.   You should check that the overall
objective of the division is clear to the officers and crews.

0_3 (4, 6, 8, 9, 17)

Do not overlook the difficulty of improving the relationship
of Mr. Day. He will be seen as an outsider to the crew, and
this will be accentuated by his being a bureau man. Bureau or
staff see line as narrow and restricted, unable to see the larger
picture. Line regard staff as stuffed shirts, unrealistic
dreamers, people who never go to sea and who do not understand
Lines' particular problems. Even people who have had both
bureau and service experience tend to react this way. Notice
that Mr. Day is ordering the men directly what to do and hence
is also interfering with the chain of command and increasing
ambiguity. Your response suggests that you need to extend
your action in this area.

0_1 (14, 19, 24)

Do not overlook the difficulty of getting the Chief to see his
proper role as a supervisor of three crews. A good supervisor
would make the leading Petty Officers run their units as much
as possible, and avoid unnecessary or unexplained shifts of the
men from job to job. Perhaps the Chief does not have a short-
timer attitude but has been made to feel like an outsider and
is throwing his weight about to assure himself of his own
importance. Withholding information which people want can
give a sense of power. We might diagnose the 'I don't care'
attitude of the men as the basic assumption of flight from the
threat of the Chief's interference.

I_1 (2, 5, 6, 9, 15, 16, 20)

Action 2 would require you to be reasonably skillful in handling
such discussions. Actions 5, 15, and 16 would depend very much
on a closer look at the Chief's personality and on establishing
a confident relationship with him. Actions 6 and 9 would also
depend on personality factors of Mr. Day not sufficiently clear
from the officer's report. Unless trust has been established
with the crew, the Chief and Mr. Day, then action 20 might
be misinterpreted as interference, however, well intentioned
it was.

END OF DISCUSSION

INSTRUCTIONS

You have now established a pattern of action which makes a
sound approach to the problem, although it is certainly not
the only possible one in the circumstances. Finalize your
response. Then turn to page 32.

FINAL TASK

Using your final response to Module 11, outline a
plan of action. This plan should show the sequence in
which you would take the various actions included in your
response. The plan should consist of a number of steps,
each with a brief explanation filling in details and
indicating whether certain actions are to be done
simultaneously.

RESPONSE INDICATOR
GROUP DYNAMICS AND THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

Arrange for a special crash training program for the men **1**	Improve communication in the division by group discussion exercises **2**	Advise the Leading Petty Officers that steps are being taken to clarify misunderstandings **3**	Ask Mr. Day to recall his Navy days and his reactions to being bypassed in a chain of command **4**	Request that the Chief advise you of any changes of task allocation together with reasons **5**
Remind the men that Mr. Day was once a Chief Gunner himself **6**	Tell Mr. Day to stop telling the men how to do their jobs and instead concentrate on technical problems **7**	Tell the Leading Petty Officers that they are immediately responsible for good performance of the crews **8**	Find a way to get Mr. Day to give advice and instruction only when asked by the Petty Officers **9**	Ask the Squadron Commander to arrange for a replacement for Mr. Day from the bureau **10**
Seek out the men who seem to make most mistakes and and give them special training **11**	Have further informal talks with the Leading Petty Officer **12**	Indicate to the division that the point of target practice is to prepare to defend the U. S. **13**	Emphasize to the Chief that he should not bypass the Leading Petty Officers **14**	Set the Chief the objective of reducing failures by one half in two days **15**
Advise the Chief to stop moving men about without reason **16**	Point out that you are aware of the general ignorance about the Mark 12 and that you share this ignorance **17**	Tactfully describe to Mr. Day how his behavior affects the group **18**	Discuss informally with the Chief the importance of a supervisory role towards the three crews **19**	Spend much more time observing and encouraging the work of the crews without interfering **20**
Arrange for consultation with the crew on the difficulties encountered **21**	Tell the crews they have done well in the first two days and that you are pleased **22**	Order the Chief to consult you before moving any men in the crews **23**	Emphasize to the Chief the need for Leading Petty Officers to have responsibility for details of the work **24**	Ask the Chief's views on how performance might be improved, given that other squadrons are using the Mark 12 very successfully **25**