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ABSTRACT

The author explores some germane implications of cognitive consistency theory. An "affective-cognitive consistency" theory, which specifies the relationship between the affective and cognitive components of the attitude structure, was taken as the theoretical basis of this study. The theory suggests that by knowing what a person values, it should be possible to predict the valences of the cognitive and affective components. An instrument designed to deal with these attitudinal dimensions was administered to a sample of 350 college students. The results of the research tended to be mixed in terms of the affective-cognitive model. There was a moderate degree of relationship (approximately .35 for contingency coefficient) between cognition and affect. (Author/WS)

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AN INVESTIGATION OF
ATTITUDE CONSISTENCY

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Milton Rosenberg, a cognitive balance theorist, has posited a theory of attitude formation and change which was taken as the theoretical basis of the present study. His theory, referred to as an "affective-cognitive consistency" theory, suggests his major theoretical thrust, namely, specifying the relationship between the affective and cognitive components of the attitude structure. Furthermore, he maintains that by knowing what a person values--or doesn't--it should be possible to predict the valences of the cognitive and affective components.

An instrument explicitly designed to deal with the above-mentioned attitudinal dimensions was administered to a sample of 350 college students. In general, the results of the research tended to be mixed in terms of Rosenberg's affective-cognitive model. For example, in one instance (refer Table 2) the "negative side" was consistent with the theory, but the "positive side" was not. In another case (refer Table 4), the findings were partial compatible and partially incompatible with the model. Finally (refer Table 6), the positive dimension was in the predicted direction but only half of the negative side was congruent with the theory.

In summary, there was a moderate degree of relationships (approximately .35 for the contingency coefficient) between cognition and affect. When the value dimension was "partialled out" in only one case (refer Table 6) were the partial associations different from those in the marginal tables.

INTRODUCTION

The proposition that consistency tends to exist among attitudinal components has received wide currency among social psychologists. Although scholars (Sumner, Lecky, Wertheimer, Kohler, Koffa and others) have frequently asserted that there is consistency in human thought, feeling, and behavior, it has only been in recent decades that the notion has been put to serious scientific test. Many regard Fritz Heider as the father of modern consistency theory since he was first to publish a monograph devoted to "balance theory" in 1958. In the last few decades, widespread interest in the concept of "consistency" has developed.¹ In this paper the author has attempted to explore some germane implications of cognitive consistency theory.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR THE STUDY OF ATTITUDES

The concept "attitude" has been defined in a number of different ways.² For the present discussion it is defined as regularities in an individual's beliefs (cognitive component), feelings (affective component), and response tendencies (behavioral component) toward some aspect of the environment. With this general conception of attitude in mind, a brief review of the theoretical frameworks from which attitudes have been studied follows.

¹The following names and theories are developments based on the consistency principle and other more general theories of attitude organization: Heider's balance theory; Newcomb's theory of symmetry in interpersonal communication; Osgood & Tannenbaum's congruity theory; Festinger's cognitive dissonance theory; McGuire's two-process theory of consistency; Katz and Stotland's theory of attitude change; Kolman's three-process theory of attitude change, and Cartwright & Harary's formalization and elaboration of Heider's theory in terms of the mathematical theory of linear graphs.

²Attitudes have been defined and conceptualized in a number of different ways. Allport (1935:810) maintained that "an attitude is a mental and neural state of readiness, organized through experience, exerting a directive or dynamic influence upon the individual's response to all objects and situations with which it is related." In contrast, Dobb (1947:138) defined an attitude as "an implicit, drive-producing response considered socially significant in the individual's society." Another way of defining attitudes is in the manner noted in the text. The point is that each conceptualizing emphasizes a somewhat different aspect of attitude (Freedman, Carlsmith & Sears, 1970:246-247).

It has been suggested (Secord and Backman, 1964) that when measurement techniques came to the fore attitudes were studied as if existing in a social vacuum. Since World War II the social psychological arena has witnessed the development of theory appropriate to the study of attitudes. Most of the current theories are Intrapersonal³ in nature, that is, "they pertain to the relations of the three attitude components within an individual and specify various conditions that control those relations and produce changes in them" (Secord and Backman, 1964:109).

There are a variety of conceptual schemes dealing with the formation (and change) of attitudes. Each typology tends to focus on certain aspects of the attitudinal arena. To illustrate, this writer has selected two (of several) schemes for review. Marlowe (1971) suggests four general types of attitude theories: (1) functional, (2) perceptual, (3) learning, and (4) consistency. Each of these will be briefly reviewed.

The functional theory ties up attitude development with such personality dimensions as motives, needs, and drives. To understand how and why a person develops certain attitudes it is paramount that one understand what personality needs he has. The classic exploration of the functional perspective was undertaken in Adorno's The Authoritarian Personality (1950).

The perceptual framework views attitude formation in terms of the basic components for understanding perception and cognition in general. It is related to Helson's "adaptation level" notion in the sense that the individual strives

³Schellenberg (1970:129) writes that there are two general bases for attitude change. One of these is in the person (intrapersonal), and the other is in the social milieu. It seems necessary to consider the social context as well as the personal situation. In brief, attitudes are probably best conceived of as products of persons in situations. Attitude change, too, is best viewed in terms of persons and their situations. Furthermore, attitude development is best thought of as due to a multiplicative (vis-a-vis an additive) effect of personality within a situational context.

to maintain some degree of psychological equilibrium. For example, as one grows older, changes social roles, and/or moves to a new geographical locale he must adapt his contemporary perceptions so that they are compatible with these new alterations in his life space.

The learning perspective views attitudes as habits in which stimulus-response bonds have been established through various reinforcements.

The consistency viewpoint maintains that attitudinal components--cognitive, affective, and behavioral--must be mutually supporting. Consistency theories have frequently concentrated on two of these components. For example, Rosenberg (1960) has examined the relationship between cognition and affect while Festinger (1957) has explored the cognition--behavior nexus.

Another approach from which attitudes (formation and change) have been studied may be subsumed under three rubrics: 1) conditioning or reinforcement, 2) incentives and conflict, and 3) cognitive consistency (Freedman, Carlsmith, Sears, 1970).

The conditioning/reinforcement approach sees attitudes as habits that have been learned via the socialization process. As such, the basic principles of learning⁴ that apply to other learned behaviors are held responsible for the formation of attitudes. This scheme, associated with Carl Hovland, maintains that there are three mechanisms--1) association, 2) reinforcement, and 3) imitation--that account for the learning of attitudes. Like the classical conditioning approach, this conceptual view holds that contiguous stimuli (in time and space) come to be associated. To illustrate, if a parent shows a child a picture of an obviously dirty, broken-down, evil-looking man and says the word "Negro," an association may be formed between the image and the word. Thus, a somewhat

⁴In the learning theory approach to attitude development and change there are two basic psychological principles that frequently operate; namely, stimulus generalization and response reinforcement (Schellenberg, 1970:130).

negative attitude becomes formed.

Learning can also occur through reinforcement as evidenced in the case where a person who tries drugs has a pleasant experience or is told by another that "pot is great." Although the former is a direct behavioral consequence and the latter is a symbolic form of reinforcement, in both instances a positive attitude is likely to develop toward the object, in this case drugs.

Imitation, too, is a powerful mechanism for influencing attitudes. While children are well-known for their imitative behavior it certainly isn't confined to this age category since adolescents and even adults often model themselves after teachers, friends, sports figures, and others.

The Incentive/conflict theory assumes that people adopt those attitudes that are personally advantageous for them. This approach tends to view attitude construction in approach-avoidance terms. In many instances the individual has reasons for both accepting or rejecting a particular position. For example, take the increasing use of drugs on college campuses. One person may believe they are detrimental to health, illegal, and wants to finish college and go on to graduate school. In this case a negative attitude toward drugs may manifest itself. On the other hand, another person may believe drugs are "mind-expanding" and exciting and know that many of his close friends "turn on." In this case, a positive attitude toward the same object, namely drugs, may emerge. This approach to attitude formation is similar to the conditioning approach in that an individual's attitude is determined by a sum of positive or negative elements. The difference, however, lies in the fact that the incentive theory stresses what the individual has to gain or lose by taking a particular position.

Cognitive consistency theory⁵ is the third and regarded by many as the most popular theory today for investigating the attitude arena. (Actually "cognitive consistency theory" includes a number of similar theories within it, e.g., those of Lewin, Heider, Abelson, Festinger, Osgood, and others). Basically, though, the theories all begin with the assumption that there is the tendency among homo sapiens to seek consistency among the attitudinal components (cognitive, affective, and behavioral) and that this consistency-seeking is a major determinant of attitude formation and change.

Balance theory, developed by Fritz Heider, is one approach within the cognitive consistency framework. Basically, his scheme includes three elements: 1) P--a person who is the main interest (his evaluations and cognitions of something else), 2) O--another person, and 3) X--an object in the environment. Heider's major contention is that there is a tendency for a cognitive system to move from a state of imbalance to a state of balance. In particular, the balance model states that a system in a state of imbalance will move toward a state of balance; either of the imbalanced states will move toward one of the balanced states.

Congruity theory is another model within the consistency family. This approach, formulated by Osgood and Tannenbaum, is in some respects simpler than that of Heider since it is entirely concerned with the effect of one person taking a positive or negative position toward another person or object. In short, congruity theory asks this question: When Wib says something good or bad about Bob (an object), what effect does the assertion have on Bill's attitude toward both Wib and Bob. The main application of this approach is in the prediction of communicator's effectiveness in producing attitude change.

⁵According to Scheilenberg (1970:130-131), the conditioning (learning) approach fails to deal with the fact that attitudes are "largely composed of meanings." Principles of cognitive organization, particularly consistency, provide a framework for viewing this neglected aspect.

THE PROBLEM

Milton Rosenberg, a cognitive balance theorist, has posited a theory of attitude formation and change which was taken as the theoretical framework of the present study. His theory, called an "affective-cognitive consistency" theory, suggests a mutually supporting relationship between the affective and cognitive components of the attitude structure. In general, past treatments have recognized these components, but have not been concerned with specifying the exact relationship between the two. Rosenberg attempts to deal with this deficiency and, in addition, expands the cognitive component (of an attitude) to include not only cognitions but also "beliefs about the relations between that object and other important values of the person" (Secord and Backman, 1964:111).

Rosenberg's thesis is that the affective (or feeling) component of an attitude is positively associated with the cognitive (or belief) dimension, . . . In his own words.

Strong and stable positive affect toward a given object should be associated with beliefs that it leads to the attainment of a number of important values, while strong negative affect should be associated with beliefs that the object tends to block the attainment of important values. Similarly, moderate positive or negative affects should be associated with beliefs that relate the attitude object either to less important values or, if to important values, then with less confidence about the relationships between these values and the attitude object (Rosenberg, 1960:18).

Like other cognitive theorists, Rosenberg maintains that when elements of the attitudinal system are out of balance, tension exists for the individual to achieve consistency and by so doing to abate the imbalance.

While Rosenberg has dealt mainly with attitude change, the concern on the present research was with his consistency notion, that is, with measuring the degree of consistency between the affective and cognitive dimensions of attitudes.

Accordingly, those elements deemed relevant to the organization of an attitude are: 1) the person's positive or negative value areas, 2) his cognitions or beliefs regarding the role specific attitude objects play in relation to his value areas, and 3) his personal affective orientations to specific attitude objects, i.e., liking or disliking. Based on these principles Rosenberg suggests one should be able to predict a person's affect toward an attitude object. In short, he argues that if we know what a person values and his beliefs or cognitions regarding a given attitude object, one should be able to predict the nature of his affect toward the object.

According to Rosenberg's scheme, if a person expresses a strong negative value and sees the attitude object in question as facilitating that negative value area, then he should be more likely to register negative affect toward that attitude object than persons not meeting the first two conditions.

The generic hypotheses put to empirical test, stated in the null and alternate form, were:

H_0 : There is no association between cognition and affect when value is "partialed out."

H_1 : There is an association between cognition and affect when value is "partialed out."

H_0 : The affective and cognitive components of attitudes are independent of one another, i.e., not related.

H_1 : The affective and cognitive components of attitudes are related to each other.

For each set of questions a measure of the degree of association--as distinct from the existence of an association--was computed.

METHOD

To gather the necessary data a modification of MacDonald and Schellenberg's (1971) interview schedule was employed and administered to 350 university students. The research instrument consisted of nine Likert format questions

(see Appendix for reproduction of questionnaire). In line with Rosenberg's theory, it was necessary to include a value, cognitive, and affect dimension to adequately test the scheme noted above. The three value areas were:

1) military expenditures, 2) crime, and 3) sexual freedom. For each of these value areas the subjects were requested to respond to question designed to deal with the cognitive and affective components.

To illustrate, take the "military expenditures" case. The first question (see Appendix) was designed to elicit subjects' preference for military over domestic spending (value area). The second question dealt with the cognitive component and asked whether they see Nixon advocating a policy that favors military over domestic spending. The seventh query asked what their personal feelings about Nixon were (whether they felt favorably or unfavorably toward him, i.e., affective component). For each hypothesis there were questions designed to elicit the affective and cognitive components of the attitude structure.

DATA ANALYSIS

The data analysis used the process known as elaboration,⁷ that is, after assessing the relationship between two dichotomous variables (X & Y) a third dichotomous variable (T) was added to see what light it shed on the initial relationship. This third variable--"value" in the present research--is called the "test factor" because we test the strength of the original relationship with the third variable under control.⁸

⁷ This procedure was formulated in sociology by Kendall and Lazarsfeld.

⁸ Mueller, Schuessler, and Costner (1970:199-200) briefly describe the steps involved in elaboration: (1) Analysis is begun by cross-classifying in a 2 x 2 table the dependent (Y) and independent (X) variable. By inspecting this arrangement one can judge the relationship between X & Y; (2) the original relationship is then decomposed into two partial relationships, one for each level of T (test factor); (3) from the partial tables the researcher can

Since the data consisted of frequency counts, a chi square test--a nominal level test of significance--was employed along with the contingency coefficient--a nominal level measure of association--to test the hypothesis. "p" was set at the .01 level.

FINDINGS

Table 1 provides an answer to the query: Is there an association between a particular belief (cognition) in Nixon's spending policy and feelings toward him? The results are statistically significant: $p < .001$ and $C = .36$. It appears that respondents (59%) dislike Nixon when he is believed to advocate a military spending policy and like him when he is believed to advocate a domestic spending policy (81%).

Table 2 supplies the raw data for answering the question: What is the relationship between what persons believe (cognition) to be Nixon's relative emphasis of a military vs. domestic spending policy and their feelings (affect) of like or dislike toward him when they negatively value military spending? The findings are statistically significant: $p < .001$ and $C = 0.31$. Substantively speaking, it appears that those who see Nixon favoring a military spending policy are prone to dislike him (56%). Conversely, those who see him blocking a military spending policy tend to like him (79%).

Table 2 also supplies the data for answering the question: What is the relationship between what students believe (cognition) to be Nixon's relative emphasis of a military vs. domestic spending policy and their feelings (affect) or like or dislike toward him when they positively value military spending?

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evaluate the effect of T on the total (original) relationship. Three configurations of the variables have been found: (1) partial relations nearly identical to the original (in which case we conclude that the test factor has no effect on the X-Y relationship); (2) both partial relationships very nearly equal to zero (in which case the test factor accounts for the relationship between X & Y); and (3) partial associations different from one another (in which case there is an interaction effect, i.e., the X-Y association is a function of the specific level of T.)

The statistical results are statistically significant: $p < .01$ and $C = .45$. The results here are in the opposite direction that consistency theory would predict. One finds Nixon being disliked when he is seen as facilitating military spending (60%) and liked when perceived as blocking such spending (88%).

Since the partial tables (Refer Table 2) do not display a radically different cell configuration than the marginal table, one can conclude that the test factor--value--is not effecting the original relationship between X(Cognition) & Y(affect). Furthermore, the two partial tables are basically the same.

Table 3 answers the question: Is there an association between a particular belief in the Supreme Court's contribution to crime and liking for the Court? Once again, the results are statistically significant: $p < .001$ and $C = 0.35$. In substantive terms, the Court tends to be disliked (86%) when it is believed to contribute to crime and liked (50%) when it is not believed to contribute to crime.

Table 4 supplies the data for answering the question: What is the relationship between what students believe (cognition) to be the Supreme Court's contribution to crime and their feelings (affect) toward the Supreme Court when they negatively value crime? The results are statistically significant: $p < .001$ and $C = 0.34$. Substantively speaking, there appears to be a strong tendency to dislike the Supreme Court (84%) when it is believed to facilitate crime increases; and to dislike it when it is seen as blocking crime increases (51%).

Table 4 also provides an answer to the query: What is the relationship between what students believe (cognition) to be the Supreme Court's contribution to crime and their feelings (affect) toward the Supreme Court when they positively value crime? The findings are statistically significant: $p < .01$ and $C = 0.36$. Substantively, when crime is valued, there exists the tendency to dislike the Court when it is believed to facilitate crime (91%) and to dislike it (52%) when it is perceived as blocking crime increases. Here again, is found a

situation in which the partial tables are similar to one another and to the original table (Refer TABLE 3). Apparently the control variable-value-has no effect on the cognitive-affective connection.

Table 5 answers the question: Is there a relationship between a belief in motion picture producer's contribution to sexual freedom and feelings toward them? Here, too, the results are statistically significant: $p < .001$ and $C=0.26$. The tendency seems to be disliking (51%) the producers when they are believed to exploit sexual themes and liking them (76%) when they are not believed to do the same.


Table 6 contains the data for testing the (null) hypothesis: No significant association exists between the belief (cognition) that motion picture producers contribute to sexual freedom and liking (effect) of motion picture producers when sexual freedom is negatively valued. The results are not statistically significant. Substantively, when motion picture producers are believed to exploit sexual themes (and by extension to increase sexual freedom) there exists a strong tendency to dislike them (77%). Even, when the producers are not believed to exploit sexual themes they tend to be disliked (89%).

Table 6 also contains data for testing the (null) hypothesis: No significant association exists between the belief (cognition) that motion picture producers contribute to sexual freedom and liking (affect) of motion picture producers when sexual freedom is positively valued. The findings are statistically significant: $p < .001$ and $C=0.31$. In this case producer's are liked (57%) when they facilitate sexual freedom and disliked (74%) when they block such expression.


In Tables 5 and 6 one can see an interaction effect when value is partialled out. The cell percentages (Refer: Sexual Freedom: Negative Value) are considerably different, e.g., in cell A, 49% vs. 23%; in cell B, 76% vs. 11%; in cell C, 51% vs. 77%; and in cell D, 24% vs. 89%. A comparison of the partial tables likewise reveals some interesting differences.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In general, the results of this research tend to be moderately supportive of Rosenberg's affective-cognitive principle. For example (refer to Table 2), when students negatively value military spending and when they perceive an attitude object as facilitating this type of expenditure, there was a tendency to dislike the attitude object, or, diagrammatically,



Also (referring to Table 2), when students negatively value military spending and when the attitude object was perceived as blocking this type of expenditure, there was a tendency to like the attitude object, or, diagrammatically,





Examining the "Positive Value" dimension of Table 2 one finds a situation contrary to expectation. It would be expected that Nixon would be liked when he facilitates military spending and disliked when he blocks such expenditures. Instead 40% like him in the former situations and 12% dislike him in the latter circumstance. In brief, the findings are statistically significant in the opposite direction. One finds an "imbalanced" situation:





Perusing the "Negative Value" dimension of Table 4 reveals an expected pattern, though diagram on right is slightly discrepant with model. When the value is facilitated the attitude object is disliked and when the value is blocked there's a "split".



Diagrammatically,



The "Positive Value" aspect to Table 4 is contrary to expectation. One would expect to find positive affect when the value is facilitated and negative affect when blocked. The results conform to half the expectation, that is:





Examining the "Negative Value" dimension of Table 6 one finds the following circumstances:



The diagram on the left is comparable with consistency theory but the one on the right is not.

The "positive value" side of Table 6 can be illustrated as follows:



In both cases is found a pattern of responses consistent with Rosenberg's model.

A thorough examination of Tables 2, 4, and 6 presents a mixed picture with respect to consistency theory. In Table 2 the negative side was consistent with the theory but the positive side was not. In Table 4 both dimensions--positive and negative--were partially compatible with the model in mind. In Table 6 the positive dimension was as expected but only half of the negative side was congruent with the theory. Since the empirical results did not corroborate all the balanced conditions of Rosenberg's model, the researcher suggests two possible explanations to help account for this. First, the questions were phrased in such a way that if a person did not negatively value a particular item, e.g., military spending, crime increase, and exploitation of sexual themes, he was, for analytical purpose, assumed to positively value the area in question. Obviously, from a logic standpoint, it does not hold that a person who does not negatively value something automatically positively values it. In other words, the fact that I do not dislike you does not mean that I like you (I could be indifferent).

Secondly, the validity of the items may be suspect. No other check than that of "face validity" was made. In addition, in retrospect, it appears that "better" value items (or a scale) could have been more appropriate.

TABLE I
 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NIXON'S POLICY
 OF MILITARY VS. DOMESTIC SPENDING AND FEELINGS ABOUT NIXON

	<u>Cognition</u>		<u>Domestic Spending</u>	
	<u>Military Spending</u> (N)	<u>%</u>	(N)	<u>%</u>
<u>Like Nixon</u>	(62)	41	(61)	81
<u>Affect</u>				
<u>Dislike Nixon</u>	(90)	59	(14)	19
	N=152	100%	N=75	100%

Chi square = 33.3; df=1, significant: $p < .001$; C=0.36; Gamma= -0.727*;
 Tau-B=-0.38*; DXY=-0.36*; DYX=-0.41*; Gamma Significance=5.61*

*These statistics are not applicable since they assume ordinality.

TABLE 2
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COGNITION AND AFFECT
CONTROLLING FOR VALUE

	Military Expenditures: Negative Value		Military Expenditures: Positive Value	
	<u>Cognition</u>		<u>Cognition</u>	
	<u>Facilitates</u> (N) %	<u>Blocks</u> (N) %	<u>Facilitates</u> (N) %	<u>Blocks</u> (N) %
<u>Positive</u>	(61) 44	(45) 79	(6) 40	(15) 88
<u>Affect</u>				
<u>Negative</u>	(79) 56 N=140 100%	(12) 21 N=57 100%	(9) 60 N=15 100%	(2) 12 N=17 100%

Chi Square=20.4; df=1, significant: $p < .001$; C=0.31;
Gamma=-0.66*; Tau-B=-0.322*; DXY=-0.66*; DXY=-0.35*;
Gamma Significance=4.35*

Chi Square=8.2; df=1, significant: $p < .01$;
C=0.45; Gamma=-0.84*; Tau-B=-0.51*; DXY=-0.53*;
DXY=-0.48*; Gamma Significant=2.45*

*These statistics are not applicable since they assume ordinality.

TABLE 3
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SUPREME COURT'S CONTRIBUTION
TO CRIME AND FEELINGS ABOUT SUPREME COURT

	<u>Cognition</u>			
	Court Contributes to Crime		Court Does not Contribute To crime	
	(N)	%	(N)	%
<u>Like</u>	(15)	14	(57)	50
<u>Affect</u>				
<u>Dislike</u>	(91)	86	(58)	50
	N=106	100%	N=115	100%

Chi Square= 31.5; df=1, significant: $p < .001$; C=0.35; Gamma=-0.713*; Tau-B=-0.38*; DXY=-0.40*; DYX=-0.35*; Gamma significance=5.456*

*These statistics are not applicable since they assume ordinality.

TABLE 4

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COGNITION AND AFFECT
CONTROLLING FOR VALUE

	Crime: Negative Value		Crime: Positive Value	
	<u>Cognition</u>		<u>Cognition</u>	
	<u>Facilitates</u> (N) %	<u>Blocks</u> (N) %	<u>Facilitates</u> (N) %	<u>Blocks</u> (N) %
<u>Positive</u>	(13) 16	(35) 49	(2) 9	(21) 48
<u>Negative</u>	(71) 84 N=84 100%	(36) 51 N=71 100%	(20) 91 N=22 100%	(23) 52 N=44 100%

Chi square=20.6; df=1, significant: $p < .001$; $C=0.34$;
Gamma=-0.68*; Tau-B=-0.36*; $DYX=-0.39^*$; $DYX=-0.34^*$;
Gamma Significance=4.35*

Chi Square=9.6; df=1, significant: $p < .01$;
C=0.36; Gamma=-0.80*; $DYX=-0.38^*$; $DYX=-0.39^*$;
Gamma Significance=2.81*

*These statistics are not applicable since they assume ordinality.

TABLE 5
 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MOTION PICTURE PRODUCER'S CONTRIBUTION
 TO SEXUAL FREEDOM AND FEELINGS ABOUT MOTION PICTURE PRODUCERS

	<u>Cognition</u>			
	<u>Contribute</u> <u>to sexual freedom</u>		<u>Do not contribute</u> <u>to sexual freedom</u>	
	(N)	%	(N)	%
<u>Like</u>	(65)	49	(71)	76
<u>Affect</u>				
<u>Dislike</u>	(67)	51	(23)	24
	N=132	100%	N=94	100%

Chi square=15.8; df=1, significant: $p < .001$; C=0.26; Gamma=-0.53*; Tau-B=-0.265*; DXY=-0.267*; DYX=-0.236*; Gamma Significance= 3.83*

*These statistics are not applicable since they assume ordinality.

TABLE 6
 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COGNITION AND AFFECT
 CONTROLLING FOR VALUE

	Sexual Freedom: Negative Value		Sexual Freedom: Positive Value	
	<u>Cognition</u>		<u>Cognition</u>	
	<u>Facilitates</u> (N) %	<u>Blocks</u> (N) %	<u>Facilitates</u> (N) %	<u>Blocks</u> (N) %
<u>Positive</u>	(7) 23	(1) 11	(58) 57	(22) 26
<u>Affect</u>				
<u>Negative</u>	(23) 77 N=30 100%	(8) 89 N=9 100%	(43) 43 N=101 100%	(64) 74 N=86 100%

Chi square=.634; df=1, not significant; C=0.13;
 Gamma=.43; Tau-B=.13*; DXY=.12*;
 Gamma Significance=.32*

Chi square=19.2; df=1, significant: p<.001;
 C=0.31; Gamma=0.59*; Tau-B=.32*; DXY=.32*;
 DXY=.32*; Gamma Significance=4.23*

*These statistics are not applicable
 since they assume ordinality.

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