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AUTHOR   Greeley, Andrew J.; McCready, William
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ABSTRACT
              This paper begins with a very simple theoretical
question: Do the cultural heritages of the Old World persist among
children and grandchildren of the immigrants from the various
European countries? Two ethnic groups--the Irish Catholics and the
Italians--about whose country of origin there exists something of an
anthropological and sociological literature are chosen for study.
From this literature are derived a considerable number of hypotheses
about their respective differences in the Anglo-Saxon American norm
and from one another. To the extent that these hypotheses are
sustained by the available evidence, one is able to assert that there
is a persistence of diversity of cultural heritage within the United
States, predictable on the basis of the culture of the countries of
origin. Also, the fact of ethnic cultural diversity in the United
States is thereby established, a fact which many social scientists
are not yet prepared to concede. An ethnic group is defined here as a
large collectivity, based on presumed common origin, which is, at
least on occasion, part of a self-definition of a person, and which
also acts as a bearer of cultural traits. On the basis of the
evidence presented, it can be safely said that it would be very
difficult to understand the present behavior of American immigrant
groups without knowing something of the cultural heritage from which
the groups came. (Author/JM)

THE TRANSMISSION OF CULTURAL HERITAGES:

THE CASE OF THE IRISH AND THE ITALIANS

by

Andrew M. Greeley
and
William Mc Cready

for the

Seminar on Ethnicity at·the
Academy of Arts and Sciences

October 27, 1972

A survey researcher is somewhat flabbergasted when he is asked to do a theoretical paper. He does not know whether to be flattered or to come out fighting, but he vigorously resists the temptation to respond with the battle cry of the trade, "theory-schmeary!"

At least we can be content with the thought that those who have commissioned this paper wish neither grand macro-cosmic speculations nor elaborate systems of definitions and logical deductions, because surely they are aware that survey researchers are incapable of these fascinating; but difficult intellectual exercises. Presumably all they desire from us is that which we can do. We must ask simple questions which can be answered by available data, and then use the answers to these simple questions to ask more refined questions. It is, one very much fears, a relatively low-grade intellectual activity, though it does have the merit of being tied closely (or at least as closely as anything in social science gets) to the outside world.

However it may be that in the present circumstances a low-level theory which proceeds in lock-step with empirical data may be precisely what is required. There is a plethora of theorizing, or at least speculating, about the persistence of ethnicity in American society with a good deal of it highly moralistic (ethnicity is either a "good" thing or "bad" thing, depending on your viewpoint), but a paucity of hard (by which social scientist usually means medium soft) data to prove or disprove such speculations. As in most other controversial matters, people with strong opinions--even social scientists with strong opinions--need scarcely be bothered by evidence.

In our fact-grubbing way we propose in this paper to ask one question and to provide for the question a limited and imperfect answer, as part of

hewing one building block for the construction of, if not a grand theory

of American ethnicity, at least a better understanding of that phenomenon

in our society.

The question is: do the cultural heritages of the Old World

persist among children and grandchildren of the immigrants from the various

European countries. We shall choose two ethnic groups--the Irish Catholics

and the Italians--about whose country of origin there exists something of

an anthropological and sociological literature. From this literature we

will derive a considerable number of hypotheses about their respective

differences in the Anglo-Saxon American norm and from one another. To the

extent that these hypotheses are sustained by the available evidence, we

will be able to assert that there is a persistence of diversity of cultural

heritage within the United States, predictable on the basis of the culture

of the countries of origin. We will also have, incidentally, established the

fact of ethnic cultural diversity in the United States, a fact which many

social scientists are not yet prepared to concede.

It is necessary that before we begin, we provide some kind of a

description of an American ethnic group, though we must note that we make

no claim that this description has any validity beyond the borders of the

United States: An ethnic group is a large collectivity, based on presumed

common origin, which is, at least on occasion, part of a self-definition of

a person, and which also acts as a bearer of cultural traits.

In the present paper we are concerned with the second element

of the definition. A respondent may think of himself as Irish or

Italian only when our survey interviewer asks him what his nationality

background is. . We assume that such a response

indicates the possible presence of predispositions to attitudes, values,

norms and behavior, which are part of the baggage the immigrant groups

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brought from their country of origin and passed on largely through an

implicit socialization process, through their children and then to their

grandchildren. Our main concern in this paper is not with the explicit aware-

ness of ethnic heritage (whether there is a difference between those Irish who

are frequently conscious of being Irish and those Irish who are not), nor with

the decline of ethnic attitudes and behaviors through the generations. We are

merely concerned with the facts of the ethnic diversity and the predictability

of some aspects of this diversity from knowledge of the culture of the land

of origin.[1]

Not all differences among ethnic groups are to be attributed to

cultural heritages from whence they came. The groups arrived in American

society at different times in that nation's development, they settled in

different regions of the country, and they have had different natural

histories since their arrival. Thus, time of arrival, place of settlement

and "natural history" may also account for the differences that are to be

observed among ethnic groups. We limit ourselves in this paper to the differ-

ences that can be predicted from cultural patterns which existed in the country

of origin, simply because these differences are much easier to sort out in

the absence of elaborate social histories of the various immigrant groups.[2]

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[1] In fact, there is some evidence available that would suggest that
consciousness of ethnicity does increase, but only very slightly, the levels
of ethnically-linked behavior, and there is also evidence that these levels
do not decline very rapidly across generations. But in order to keep this paper
within some   sort of reasonable limits of time and space, we will defer
to another occasion an extended treatment of these questions.

[2] Many researchers seem surprised by the phenomonom
of a correlation between ethnic background and attitudes
and behavior in the absence of a strong explicit ethnic consciousness. How-
ever, it should be noted that the cultural patterns of the old country existed
before the ethnic groups came into being.   The ethnic group as a self-
conscious collectivity is the result of the American experience, but Irish
behavior with regard to drink, Italian behavior with the regard to sex, and
the values of both groups about family life existed before immigration to the
United States.

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There are four principal weaknesses in the strategy we are pursuing in this paper:

(1) The anthropological literature upon which we are relying was written after most of the immigrants left Italy and Ireland and came to the United States. There is a sufficient amount of historical information available to persuade us that southern Italy and western Ireland, as they are described in our literature, are similar enough to those regions 50 to 100 years ago, but there obviously have been some changes in Connaught and the Mezzogiorno between the time the immigrants left and the arrival of Arensberg and Kimball in the one, and Edward Banfield in the other.

(2) There may well be deficiencies in the literature on Ireland and Italy of which we as American social scientists are not aware. The literature on Italy is more extensive and as far as we know, has not been subject to critical disagreement. The literature on Ireland is more limited and has been the subject on some good critical disagreement on the part of Irish scholars.

(3) Some of the hypotheses to be derived from reading the literature on Italy and Ireland are of much greater value than other hypotheses because they are based on observations that are at the core of the description of the two societies. Thus, our a hypothesis suggesting that Italian-Americans would be more fatalistic than Anglo-Saxons is indeed substantiated. This validation is of considerably more importance than the failure of other hypotheses because the theme of fatalism in the Mezzogiorno is of capital importance in all the writings on that area. Similarly, given both historical anthropological evidence on drinking be-- havior in Ireland, the difference between the American Irish and others in drinking behavior outweighs many "non-differences" based on less important observations about Irish peasant culture.

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(4) Finally, in our comparison of the Italians with the Irish, we had to make certain decisions on the basis of descriptions that were scarcely written to facilitate such comparisons. For example, we predicted that the Irish would score higher on a measure of Trust than the Italians because there seemed to be somewhat more emphasis on the importance of religion as generating at least ultimate Trust in the Irish literature than the Italian literature. Similarly, we predicted that the Italians would score higher than the Irish on measures of Fatalism, because the theme of Fatalism seemed to us to be more obvious in the Italian literature than the Irish. While these decisions then were not completely arbi-- trary , they cannot be justified as possessing the precision that would be desirable in the best of all possible worlds (the world in which, incidentally, neither the Italians nor the Irish seem to live).

The literature on southern Italy (see for example, Banfield, Cronin, Gower, Ianni,and Parsons) describes a society in which the social _structure_ is close to a state of collapse, while the _culture_ postulates an extended family value system. The extreme poverty of daily life precludes the effective operation of the extended family and indeed dictates that individuals have as little to do with an extended family as possible, less they be caught in the ancient web of obligation, which they are now no longer to honor.[3]

While Banfield's "amoral familism" may have a value connotation that is unfortunate, the reality to which he attaches that label is recorded by all other observers. Little, if any, trust persists beyond the nuclear family. It is difficult enough to honor the obligations to one's spouse and children

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[3] Cronin's study of Italian immigrants in Australia shows that when it becomes economically possible, to sustain the values and norms of the extended family system, the extended family re-emerges.

without running the risk of entanglement in any other sort of relationship.
Hence, the society is permeated by distrust and suspicion. Anxiety
and fear are at a very high level. Men and women are caught in the
grip of a fatalism which tells them that none of their efforts really
matter very much. The principal proof of a man's quality as a father, in
his ability to protect the chastity of the female members of his family.
An unfaithful wife or prosmiscuous daughter become an absolutely intolerable
social disgraces and the virgin symbol of the Italian version of Catholicism
is central to the southern Italian belief system, both becuase it empha-
sizes the importance of biological integrity and because it stresses the
automatic and fatalistic elements of life. Relationships between man and
woman tend to be formal and tense. The behavior of girls is rigidly controlled,
while the behavior of boys is less closely supervised . Young men
learn early the need to prove their maleness by being superior to women,
which means protecting the chastity of one's own family and threatening
the chastity of other families--insofar as one can get away with it and
not get caught.

The peasant society of Ireland (Arensberg, Kimball, Humphrey,
Messenger and Jackson) is not so grim and disorganized as that of Italy.
While both societies have known poverty and oppression, one still compares
the literature on the two countries and concludes that the
social structure of western Ireland was much less traumatized than that of the
Mezzogiorno. Both the demands and the support of the extended family are much more
evident. The nuclear family displays a higher level of trust and indeed a
capacity for political organization, of rather a sophisticated variety (dating
at least Daniel Connell's Catholic Association of the early 19th century).
In the west of Ireland there is a great concern about the transmission of
family property, and indeed marriage contracts concerning the exchange of

property in dowrys are of the highest importance. The
rearing of children and the planning of marriage, the assumption of the
roles of wife and husband, retirement from active direction of one's
family fun, all are decisively affected by the property contract at the
time of marriage. Such concern would seem to indicate a more prosperous
and better organized culture than that described in Sicily and in south-
ern Italy.

On the other hand, there seems to be even more sexual repression
in Ireland than in Italy and hence a very high level of frustration, re-
pression and suppressed anger, which find outlets in prodigious feats of
alcohol consumption. Precisely because the west of Ireland is apparently
less disorganized than the south of Italy, there are external means of
social control in the former that do not exist in the latter, particularly
the highly skilled ridicule of extended family and local community and the
harsh, puritive and omnipresent moralism of Irish Catholicism.[4]

While the Irish country family is, with some exceptions,
almost as patriarchal as that of Italy, studies of country families migrat-
ing to Dublin indicate that matriarchy emerges rather quickly in the large
cities--much more quickly than in southern
Italian cities such as Naples. While mothers "spoil" their sons by waiting
on them themselves and constraining their daughters to wait on them, the
Irish male seems to have less freedom and independence than does the Italian
male, if only because it is for all practical purposes impossible for him to
marry without parental approval. The family structure in Ireland looks some-
what less rigid thanthat of Italy, but it is still rigid enough. While Connaught

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[4]For a brilliant, historical account of development of contemporary
Irish Catholicism see Emmett Larkin's "A Devotional Revolution in Ireland-
1850 to 1875" The American Historical Revune Vol. 77 No. 3 June 1972, P.625-652.

may not be as harsh and repressive a place as the Mezzogiorno, there is

still substantial evidence in the available literature that the life of

the peasants in the west of Ireland is filled with anxiety, insecurity,

repression and powerful conformity-oriented norms. Both Italy and Ireland

then are presented in the literature as peasant societies with all the

narrowness and conservatism characteristic of peasant societies and the

special problems that come with poverty, oppression and a less than

enlightened religious world views.

We now turn to a number of hypotheses about Italian and Irish

Americans derived from this literature. The 7 accompanying tables are

arranged in such a way that in each table a comparison is made between

Irish and the Anglo-Saxon, the Italian and the Anglo-Saxon, and the Irish

and Italians. In the first column the direction of the hypothesis is

indicated, the second and third columns provide the scores of the two

groups. The next column indicates whether the hypothesis is sustained

and in the first four tables the level of statistical significance is indicated in

the final column. (In Table 5 the size of the samples makes even the

smallest differences "significant.")

I.   PERSONALITY SCALES

In Table 1, we compare our three groups on seven personality

variables derived from a survey of a national sample of American males.[5]

The following hypotheses were generated on the basis of the literature

we examined: 1) the rigid family structures, value systems and religious

norms of both Italy and Ireland should make both the Irish and the Italians

less "trusting," more "fatalistic," more "authoritarian," more "anxious,"

more "conformist," more "moralistic," and less concerned about "independence

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[5] In the appendix to this paper, all measurements used in the
tables are described.

for children" than Anglo-Saxon Americans--who represent the statistical "norm" of American society. However harsh and rigid American Protestantism may be in some of its manifestations, it certainly does not seem to compare with the situation as described in either southern Italy or the west of Ireland.

2) The Irish will be higher than the Italians on "trust," but also on "conformity" and "moralism." The Italians will score higher on "fatalism," "authoritarianism" and "anxiety," and the Irish are probably somewhat more likely than the Italians to stress "independence for children."

Our hypotheses have only a limited amount of success as far as the comparisons between the two Catholic immigrant groups and the Anglo-Saxons are concerned. Both the Irish and the Italians are significantly higher than the Anglo-Saxons in "fatalism," thus confirming in the United States one of the principal themes of the literature on the two countries, but significant differences between Italians and Anglo-Saxons exist only on one other scale. As predicted, the Anglo-Saxons are more likely to emphasize independence for children than Italians.

But only the fatalism hypothesis is validated for differences between the American Irish and their Anglo-Saxon fellow citizens. Indeed, in four cases ("trust," "authoritarianism," "anxiety," and "independence" for children), the differences between the Irish and the Anglo-Saxons are in the opposite of the hypothesized direction and in three of these, the

differences are significant. The Irish are, despite our hypothesis, significantly less "anxious." Another difference, slightly less than significant, indicates the Irish are more likely than the Anglo-Saxons to value the "independence" for children.[6]

On the other hand, on all but one of the scales, the differences between the Irish and the Italians are significant in the direction hypothesized. The Italians turn out to be less fatalistic than the Irish, but in every other respect, the predicted differences do, in fact, exist. One way to summarize Table 1 would be to say that with the exception of fatalism, the Italians and the Anglo-Saxons are relatively similar to one another, while the Irish are significantly different from both, with the difference between the Irish and the Italians being in the direction predicted by our hypothesis, and the differences between the Irish and the Anglo-Saxons being in the opposite direction than those predicted by our hypothesis. Knowledge of the culture of land of origin, then, is of some help in understanding the differences between the two ethnic groups, but of rather little help in understanding their differences from the Anglo-Saxons--at least with regard to our personality scales.

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[6] Ought one to be concerned about the possibility that the Irish may be more "cute" (to use their word) in answering questions than other respondents? May it be possible that among the cultural traits that have survived the immigration is the facility at blarney, which has been defined as the capacity never to mean what one says and never to say what one means? Anyone who has attempted to get a straight answer when wandering through the west of Ireland must be at least alive to this possibility.

But two questions remain after an examination of Table 1:

1) Why are the Irish different in the opposite direction than that which we had predicted? Perhaps there are aspects of the Irish personality that are more complex than the field workers in the west of Ireland were able to report.

2) Why are the Irish--a group that came to the U.S. before the Italians-- more likely to be significantly different from Anglo Saxons on personality measures than are the Italian? Perhaps Irish Catholicism provides a much stronger structural and cultural focus around which the Irish could rally, sustain their values and world view than was available to the Italians in their version of Catholicism.

II. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

We now turn to differences among the three ethnic groups on political participation measures developed by our colleagues Norman Nie and Sidney Verba. The following hypotheses were derived:

1)Given the high level of political activity and sophistication reported by historians and contemporary political scientists in Ireland (for example, see the work of Chubb) one would predict that the Irish would be more likely to engage in voting and political campaigning than Anglo Saxons, though less likely to engage in the organization-joining "civic activity"-type of political behavior (which Verba and Nie report to be a "Protestant" mode of participation). Given a lack of a viable political culture in southern Italy and Sicily, one would expect that both the Irish and the Anglo Saxons would score higher on political participation than the Italians. This expectation would be reinforced by the fact that the Irish learned their politics as part of an Anglo-Saxon system and that after 1875 most of the Irish immigrants spoke English as their first language.[7]

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[7]Larkin points out that many of the "famine" Irish probably did not speak English as their first language and some of them may not have spoken it at all, since the principal famine migration was from the west of Ireland which, in the middle of the last century, was a primarily Irish-speaking

Table 2 indicates that in 6 of the 9 cases hypotheses are sustained at a significance level of .01. The Irish indeed are more likely to vote and to campaign than the Anglo Saxons, but despite our prediction and despite the expectations of the work of verba and Nye they are also more likely to engage in civic activities than the Anglo Saxons. Similarly, both the Irish and the Anglo Saxons are significantly more likely to campaign and engage in civic activity than are the Italians. The Irish are also more likely to vote than the Italians, the difference is not significant. The Italians, on the other hand, are somewhat more likely to vote than the Anglo Saxons, but once again the difference is not significant.

Our predictions then, turn out to be much more successful when we are dealing with participation behavior than when we are dealing with personality variables, a phenonomen which has some consolation in it because political participation is, as social science measures go, something much "harder" than responses to social psychological personality scales.

There are a number of important questions, of course, about these differences in political participation. The present authors have addressed themselves to some of these questions elsewhere and we return to them in the conclusion of the present paper.

III. MORAL ISSUES

The next issue to be raised is whether knowledge of the culture of the country of origin can enable us to predict attitudes towards sexuality and drinking behavior in the three groups that we are studying. It can be hypothesized on the basis of the literature that the Irish will be more likely to drink than the Anglo Saxons and would be also more likely to have serious drinking problems. It also could be hypothesized that the Irish would be more restrictive than the Anglo Saxons in their attitudes towards both male and female sexual permissiveness.

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While little is said about drunkenness in southern Italy in the literature, one still might conclude that the very fact that it is not mentioned would indicate that it is a problem that does not plague that otherwise problem-burdened region. Hence, the Italians, we expect, will have lower scores on the alcohol than do the Anglo-Saxons. We would also expect that because of the sexual double standard, the Italians will score lower on restrictiveness toward male sexual behavior, but higher in restrictiveness toward female sexual behavior.

Finally, we hypothesize a greater alcohol problem for the Irish than for the Italians, more sexual restrictiveness for the Italians with regard to female sexuality, but more restrictiveness for the Irish with regard to male sexuality.

Our hypotheses about the differences between the Irish and Anglo-Saxons on alcohol and sexuality are simply not supported in any way, but three of the four hypotheses about the differences between the Irish and the Anglo-Saxons are supported (Table 3.) Our only mistake was to assume that Italian sexual restrictiveness would be limited to female sexual behavior. In fact, the Italians are sexually restrictive for males and females. The Italians are also significantly less likely to have alcohol problems than the Irish and more likely to be sexually restricted than the Irish was significantly so only in the case of male sexual behavior.

Table 3 then presents a picture that is exactly the opposite of Table 1. On the personality scales the Irish were significantly different from the Italians and the Anglo-Saxons who were quite similar to one another (save on fatalism). One would have concluded from Table 1 that the Italians had "assimilated" and the Irish had not. However, in Table 3 the Irish and the Anglo-Saxons are the ones that are similar and both are different, in most cases, significantly so, from Italians. One concludes with what must

surely sound like a truism; the processes of differentiation and an

acculturation among the American ethnic groups are far more complicated

than we might have expected.

IV.   RESPECT FOR THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS

Only one scale is presented in Table 4, a measurement of the respondent's

respects for certain elements in the Democratic process.   Ireland became

a political democracy long after most of the immigrants had left, and while

the Irish were a politically involved people, their involvement was not

such as to incline them to respect for the niceties of democratic process

(one need only look at the present situation in Ulster to see why).   Simi-

larly political democracy was never effectively established in Sicily or

the Mezzogiorno and the processes of the democratic government seemed to

mean relatively little in such an impoverished society.   Furthermore, the

levels of trust that openess · reported in the anthropological literature

on both countries would indicate that there would be less concern for civil

liberties among those affected by such cultures than there would be among

native Americans.   Finally, the allegedly authoratarian proclivities of

Roman Catholicism might also ill-equip Italians and Irish to respect the

democratic processes.   Hence one would predict that the Anglo Saxons would

be higher on the democratic process scale than either the Irish or the

Italians and that the Irish would probably be higher than Italians.   Table

4 indicates two of these expectations are supported.   Both the Irish and

the Anglo Saxons have higher scores on the democratic process scale than

do the Italians.   However the expectation of a higher score for the Anglo

Saxons and the Irish is dramatically disproven.   The Irish are significantly

and indeed overwhelmingly higher on a democratic process scale than are

the Anglo Saxons.   The senior author of this paper has pointed out elsewhere

that the American Irish are more "liberal" than much of the mythology about them would have led one to believe. It may well be that a thousand year revolutionary tradition does generate a respect for political democracy, which survives even bourgeoisement.

V. FAMILY STRUCTURE ATTITUDES AMONG COLLEGE WOMEN STUDENTS

Our final set of hypotheses have to do with attitudes toward family structure measured in the middle 1960's among a representative sample of 1961 college alumnae, it should be noted that there are both advantages and disadvantages in looking at this sub-population. An advantage is that both age and educational level are held constant , disadvantage is that given the fact that the Italians are still less likely to go to college, than is Irish. The Italian respondents may be far less typical of their generation than are the Irish respondents.

The following hypotheses are generated for the differences between the Irish and the Anglo Saxons: The Irish would be more likely than the Anglo Saxons to think that the principal career of a wife was to support her husband's pursuit of his career. The Anglo Saxons would be more likely than the Irish to value independence for their daughters. The Irish would be more likely than the Anglo Saxons to stress security than the Anglo Saxons. Similarly the Irish would be more opposed to working mothers, more likely to maintain contact with parents and in-laws, more likely to report tense relationships with parents and less likely to report good health.

Exactly the same differences would be predicted between the Anglo Saxons and the Italians, and in a comparison between the Irish and Italians, one would expect the Irish to value indepencence for daughters somewhat more than the Italians, to record more overt ension with parents than the Italians and perhaps to assert more frequently that they enjoy good health.

Of the 10 possible comparisons in the first panel of Table 5, the differences in "important" (of 6 percentages points or more) are in the expected direction 6 times. Irish women respondents are indeed more likely to view the woman's role as a helpmate, to place less emphasis on independence of daughters, to think working mothers could have a bad impact on their children, to see a woman's role primarily that as wife and mother and to report tense relationship with their father. On the other hand, the difference between the Irish and Anglo Saxons on valuing frequent contacts with family run in direction opposite of that which we expected. We were less successful in predicting differences between young Anglo Saxon and young Italian women. Italians are, as predicted, more likely to discuss family relationships and less likely to report good, health. They are more in sympathy with independence for children and working mothers and less likely to see their role as a traditionally feminine one. They are also less likely to report tension in their relationship with their father. It is quite clear from the second panel of Table 5 that the young Italian American women in this sample do not fit in any way the stereotype of the southern Italian female.

They also, as we note in the 3rd panel Table 5 are substantially different from their Irish Catholic age peers in the opposite direction from that predicted on attitudes toward the role of women. However, four differences in the expected direction do exist between the Irish and the Italians. The latter are more likely to stress family relationships while the former are both more likely to claim good health and more likely to report tension among themselves and their fathers. The very high level of tension, incidentally, reported between Irish daughters and their fathers is a subject to which we hope to return on another occasion.

Table 5 presents yet a new pattern of diversity among the 3 ethnic groups. The Italian college-educated women are even more likely than Anglo-Saxon women to have broken from traditional view of women's role, while the Irish in this case are substantially less "lrogressive." On the other hand, Irish young women are less likely to value traditional family ties than are Anglo Saxons and the Anglo Saxons, in turn, are less likely to value them than young Italian women. The Italians, then, are more traditional on family ties, the Irish more traditional on the role of women.

On the whole, our efforts to predict differences in attitudes and behaviors among the three American ethnic groups has been moderately successful. Of 75 hypotheses, we have been right at a statistically significant level-- thirty-four times (assuming for our college alumni that a 6 percentage point difference is one worth writing about).

On the other hand, in eighteen cases (mostly dealing with either Irish personality or Italian and Irish family structure) there were statistically significant (or numerically important) differences in the opposite

of the direction predicted. With the exception of "fatalism" the Italians were basically similar to the Anglo-Saxons in personality, but different in the predicted direction from the Irish. The Irish, on the other hand, were different from the Anglo-Saxons, but in the opposite of the predicted direction. We were most successful in predicting political participation, with the Irish being the most active politically and the Italians the least active, though both groups were significantly different from the Anglo-Saxon mean. The Irish were rather like the Anglo-Saxons in their sexual attitudes and their drinking behavior, but the Italians were both less likely to drink and more likely to be sexually restricted than either of the other groups, as the literature on the country of origin would have led us to believe. The Irish, unexpectedly, were more likely to respect the democratic processes than the Anglo-Saxons, while the latter, expectedly, were more likely to respect such processes than the Italians. Finally, the Irish, as predicted, took more conservative views on the role of women than the Anglo-Saxons, but were less "conservative" on family ties, while the Italians were less "conservative" on the role of women and more "conservative" on family ties.

Or to put the matter somewhat differently, on some 52 of the 75 comparisons made among the three ethnic groups in our tables, "significant" differences are to be found. If one knows something of the culture of the country of origin, one can correctly predict the direction of the difference about two-thirds of the time. This is an improvement of predictability that

is at least somewhat superior to flipping a coin (in which case would be correct half of the time). How successful our enterprise has been depends on what the assumptions were with which one started. If one begins by believing that there are no important differences among Native Americans, Irish Americans and Italian Americans, then our enterprise will produce a shocking surprise. If on the other hand, one began with the conviction that ours is a mosaic society in which differences among the 3 groups in question are to be expected on most every variable, then the enterprise has been a disappointment. The truth seems to lie somewhere in between. The 3 groups are in many ways similar and in many ways different.

If one begins the exploration with the assumption that virtually all differences that do in fact exist among the 3 ethnic groups being considered, can be explained in terms of the cultural heritages whence they, or more likely their parents or grandparents came, then our search has been something less than a complete success. The majority of differences are in fact of the sort that could be predicted by a study of the literature of the two countries of origin, but a substantial minority of the differences are exactly opposite of the predictions of such a literature would lead us to make. On the other hand, if one assumes (and many commentators in American life seem to have made this assumption) that European heritages of the American ethnic groups are irrelevant to an understanding of the present attitudes and behaviors of such groups, one can find very little consolation in the tests reported in this paper, The European heritage may not be all important, but it is still important, and indeed, if one may hazard the statement, probably more important than most of us would have thought.

A final question needs to be asked, "Are the differences among American groups dimishing as social class differences diminish and as the number of

years the family has been in the United States increases?" Tables 6 and 7

provide data with which to begin to fashion a response to these two ques-

tions. In Table 6 we present the zero-order correlations between ethnicity

and political participations for each of the 3 comparisons and then the

standardized correlation with region and educational level held constant.

If an increase in education is leading to a decline in the differences

in political behavior; the standardized coefficient shoud be smaller than

the zero-order coefficient. However, the data in Table 6 make it perfectly

clear that even taking into account the regional and educational differences

among the 3 ethnic groups, the differences in political participation remain-

ed unchanged.

In Table 7 we ask whether generation in the country (foreign born

are the first generation, native born with foreign parents are the second

generation, native born with native parents are the third generation) has

any effect on political participation. The assimulationist theory would

lead us to believe that the longer that the immigrant family are in the

country, the more likely it would be to participate in political activity.

The high level of Irish political participation and the low level of Italian

political participation than would be seen as a function of the time the 2

immigrant groups have been in the United States. However, as Table 7 makes

clear, there are only very small correlations between generation and politi-

cal participation for the Italians and the Irish. On the other hand, by

contrast, the relationship between generation and active political partici-

pation is concerned, the assimulationist model may be relevant for Jewish

Americans, but not for either the Irish or the Italians. The differences

between Irish and Italian Americans in political participation, in other

words, has very little to do with generation or with social class, while

the assimulationist model must be tested with many other variables, one

can say with some confidence that as far as the relatively "hard" variable

of political participation is concerned, the differences among the Irish,

the Italians and the Wasps show no sign of going away.

By way of brief conclusion, this paper began with a very simple

theoretical question, "Does a knowledge of the cultural heritage of an

immigrant group help us to understand its present behavior?" On the basis

of the evidence presented, we think it can be safely said that it would be

very difficult to understand the present behavior of American immigrant

groups without knowing something of the cultural heritage from which the

groups came. The heritage may not explain everything, but it is clear that

much cannot be explained without investigating cultural background of the

country of origin. The critical question becomes not one of choosing between

the culture of origin, on the one hand, and the immigration and post-immigration

experiences on the other, but of asking rather how the interaction between the

Old World culture and the New World experience shaped the phenomenum of American

ethnic group cultures. Why in the immigrant experience were some parts of the

Old World culture ignored, others rejected, others perhaps vigorously reinforced

and maintained with little conscious effort and still others vigorously and

tenaciously reinforced. To put the matter more concretely, why do young

women of Italian background who graduated from college in the early 1960's

tend to cling to an Old World view of the importance of maintaining ties with

parents and in-laws, while vigorously asserting the modern view of the role of

women, while the Irish Catholic counterparts endorse exactly the opposite

values. Something strange, fascinating, and as social science concerns go,

quite possibly important has happened in the socialization experiences of those

girls and their parents and their grandparents since their families left behind

the sun-drenched Hills of Sicily, or Calabria and the soggy peat bogs of Clare,

Kerry or, God help us, Mayo.

TABLE 1

PERSONALITY VARIABLES

Variable	Hypothesis	Score		Con-firmed	Signif-icance
A. Irish and Anglo-Saxon					
		Irish	Anglo-Saxon		
Trust	Anglo	2.50	0.24	No	(.01)*
Fatalism	Irish	1.97	-1.34	Yes	.01
Authoritarianism . .	Irish	-1.24	-1.01	No	(.05)*
Anxiety	Irish	-2.10	-0.01	No	(.05)*
Conformity	Irish	1.00	0.01	No	
Moralistic	Irish	2.24	1.45	No	
Independence for children	Anglo	2.03	0.40	No	
B. Italian and Anglo-Saxon					
		Italian	Anglo-Saxon		
Trust	Anglo	0.50	0.24	No	
Fatalism	Italian	0.54	-1.34	Yes	.01
Authoritarianism . .	Italian	1.52	-0.01	No	
Anxiety	Italian	1.10	-0.01	No	
Conformity	Italian	-1.30	0.01	No	
Moralistic	Italian	1.40	1.45	No	
Independence for children	Anglo	-2.30	0.40	Yes	.01
C. Irish and Italian					
		Irish	Italian		
Trust	Irish	2.50	0.50	Yes	.05
Fatalism	Italian	1.97	0.54	No	
Authoritarianism . .	Italian	-1.24	1.52	Yes	.01
Anxiety	Italian	-2.10	1.10	Yes	.01
Conformity	Irish	1.00	-1.30	Yes	.01
Moralistic	Irish	2.24	1.40	Yes	.05
Independence for children	Irish	2.03	-2.30	Yes	.05

*Differences are significant in the opposite direction to the one hypothesized.

TABLE 2

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Variable	Hypothesis	Score		Con-firmed	Signif-icance
A. Irish and Anglo-Saxon					
		Irish	Anglo-Saxon		
Voting	Irish	30.6	06.2	Yes	.01
Campaigning	Irish	42.4	06.8	Yes	.01
Civic activity	Anglo	22.3	13.7	No	
B. Italian and Anglo-Saxon					
		Italian	Anglo-Saxon		
Voting	Anglo	17.6	06.2	No	
Campaigning	Anglo	-15.4	06.8	Yes	.01
Civic activity	Anglo	-32.5	13.7	Yes	.01
C. Irish and Italian					
		Irish	Italian		
Voting	Irish	30.6	17.6	No	
Campaigning	Irish	42.4	-15.4	Yes	.01
Civic activity	Irish	22.3	-32.5	Yes	.01

TABLE 3

MORAL ISSUES

Variable	Hypothesis	Score		Con-firmed	Signif-icance
A. Irish and Anglo-Saxon					
		<u>Irish</u>	<u>Anglo-Saxon</u>		
Drink	Irish	1.63	1.64	No	
Drunk	Irish	4.17	4.05	No	
Male sex*	Anglo	3.53	3.71	No	
Female sex	Anglo	3.87	3.93	No	
B. Italian and Anglo-Saxon					
		<u>Italian</u>	<u>Anglo-Saxon</u>		
Drink	Anglo	0.43	1.64	Yes	.01
Drunk	Anglo	1.69	4.05	Yes	.01
Male sex	Anglo	4.06	3.71	No	(.01)**
Female sex	Italian	4.14	3.93	Yes	.01
C. Irish and Italian					
		<u>Irish</u>	<u>Italian</u>		
Drink	Irish	1.63	1.43	Yes	.01
Drunk	Irish	4.17	1.69	Yes	.01
Male sex	Irish	3.53	4.06	No	.01**
Female sex	Italian	3.87	4.14	No	

*The score measures restrictiveness in attitudes towards male sexual behavior.

**Differences are significant in the opposite direction to the one hypothesized.

TABLE 4

RESPECT FOR DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES

Hypothesis	Score		Confirmed	Signif-icance
A. Irish and Anglo-Saxon				
	Irish	_Anglo-Saxon_		
Anglo	.60	.05	No	(.01)*
B. Italian and Anglo-Saxon				
	Italian	_Anglo-Saxon_		
Anglo	.05	-.16	Yes	.01
C. Irish and Italian				
	Irish	_Italian_		
Irish	.60	-.16	Yes	.01

*Differences are significant in the opposite direction to the one hypothesized.

TABLE 5

ATTITUDES TOWARDS FAMILY STRUCTURE OF COLLEGE ALUMNAE

Variable	Hypoth-esis	Per Cent		Con-firmed	% Dif-ference
A. Irish and Anglo-Saxon					
		Irish	Anglo-Saxon		
Woman primarily help husband	Irish	32%	41%	Yes	9%
Daughter's independence important	Anglo	49	33	Yes	16
Security important	Irish	53	48	No	
Working mother frequently harmful to children	Irish	31	45	Yes	14
Principal role wife/mother only	Irish	42	58	Yes	16
Keep up relationships with parents and in-laws	Irish	45	34	No	(-11)*
Family contacts important . .	Irish	45	33	No	(-12)*
Relationship with mother was tense	Irish	20	21	No	
Relationship with father was tense	Irish	47	61	Yes	14
Health very good	Anglo	27	26	No	
N = ...		(163)	(838)		
B. Italian and Anglo-Saxon					
		Italian	Anglo-Saxon		
Woman primarily help husband	Italian	32%	20%	No	(-12)%*
Daughter's independence important	Anglo	49	63	No	(-14)*
Security important	Italian	53	33	No	(-20)*
Working mother frequently harmful to children	Italian	31	20	No	(-11)*
Principal role wife/mother only	Italian	42	48	No	
Keep up relationships with parents and in-laws	Italian	45	52	Yes	7
Family contacts important . .	Italian	45	54	Yes	9
Relationships with mother was tense	Italian	20	18	No	
Relationship with father was tense	Italian	47	33	No	(14)*
Health very good	Anglo	27	16	Yes	9
N = ...		(54)	(838)		

(Table 5--Continued)

TABLE 5--Continued

Variable	Hypoth-esis	Per Cent		Con-firmed	% Dif-ference
C. Irish and Italian					
		Irish	Italian		
Woman primarily help husband	Italian	41%	26%	No	(-15)%*
Daughter's independence important	Irish	33	63	No	(-30)*
Security important	Italian	48	33	No	(-15)*
Working mother frequently harmful to children . . .	Italian	45	20	No	(-25)*
Principal role wife/mother only	Italian	58	48	No	(-10)*
Keep up relationships with parents and in-laws	Italian	34	54	Yes	20
Family contacts important . .	Italian	33	52	Yes	11
Relationships with mother was tense	Irish	21	18	No	
Relationship with father was tense	Irish	61	33	Yes	28
Health very good	Irish	26	16	Yes	10
N = ...		(163)	(54)		

*Differences are important (more than 6 per cent) in opposite of predicted direction.

TABLE 6

ZERO ORDER AND STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN
ETHNICITY AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Variable	Zero Order	Standardized for Region and Education
A. Irish and Anglo-Saxon		
Campaigning	.10[*]	.11
Civic participation .	.03	.04
B. Italian and Anglo-Saxon		
Campaigning	-.07[**]	-.06
Civic participation .	-.11	-.11
C. Irish and Italian		
Campaigning	.27[*]	.28
Civic participation .	.28	.31

[*]Positive correlation with Irish.

[**]Positive correlation with Anglo-Saxon.

TABLE 7

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN GENERATION AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR[*]

Variable	Irish	Italian	Jewish
Campaigning	.04	.04	.30
Civic participation . .	.04	.08	.34

[*]A positive correlation indicates that the longer a respondent's family has been in the United States, the more likely he is to participate.

APPENDIX

Scales Used in This Paper

I. Personality Scales

The seven personality measures used represented a number of the factors that emerged from a battery of 57 items. We present below the items which had a factor loading of over .200 for each scale.

Conforming

According to your general impression, how often do your ideas and opinions about important matters differ from those of your relatives?

How often do your ideas and opinions differ from those of your friends?

How about from those of other people with your religious background?

How about from those of most people in the country?

How often do you feel that you can't tell what other people are likely to do, at times when it matters?

Anxious

I feel useless at times.

At times I think I am no good at all.

On the whole I think I am quite a happy person.

How often do you feel that there isn't much purpose in being alive?

How often do you find that you can't get rid of some thought or idea that keeps running through your head?

How frequently do you find yourself anxious or worrying about something?

How often do you find yourself counting unimportant things, such as the number of cars passing by?

How often do you find that you are really enjoying yourself?

How often do you feel bored with everything?

" " " " " powerless to get what you want out of life?

" " " " " so restless that you cannot sit still?

" " " " " that the world just isn't very understandable?

" " " " " downcast and dejected?

" " " " " that you are about to go to pieces?

" " " " " guilty for having done something wrong?

" " " " " uneasy about something without knowing why?

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Authoritarian

Young people should not be allowed to read books that confuse them.

In this complicated world the only way to know what to do is to rely on leaders and experts.

People who question the old and accepted ways of doing things usually just end up causing trouble.

There are two kinds of people in the world, the weak and the strong.

Prison is too good for sex criminals; they should be publicly whipped or worse.

The most important thing to teach children is absolute obedience to their parents.

No decent man can respect a woman who has had sex relations before marriage.

Moralism

When you get right down to it, no one cares much what happens to you.

If something works, it doesn't matter whether it's right or wrong.

It's all right to get around the law as long as you don't actually break it.

Once I've made up my mind I seldom change it.

You should obey your superiors whether or not you think they are right.

It's all right to do anything you want if you stay out of trouble.

It generally works out best to keep doing things the way they have been done before.

Do you believe that it's all right to do whatever the law allows, or are there some things that are wrong even if they are legal?

Fatalism

To what extent would you say you are to blame for the problems you have--mostly, partly, hardly at all?

Do you feel that most of the things that happen to you are the results of your own decisions or things over which you have no control?

When things go wrong for you, how often would you say it's your own fault?

How often do you feel that you are really enjoying yourself?

How often do you feel bored with everything?

How often do you feel guilty for having done something wrong?

Trust

It's all right to get around the law so long as you don't actually break it.

Human nature is really cooperative.

You should be able to obey your superiors whether or not you think they are right.

If you don't watch out, people will take advantage of you.

Do you think most people can be trusted?

How often do you feel that you can't tell what other people are likely to do, at times when it matters?

Independence for Children

(Positive loadings)

    Considerate of others

    Interested in how and why things happen

    Responsible

    Self-control

    Good sense and sound judgment

(Negative loadings)

    Good manners

    Neat and clean

    Good student

    Obey his parents

II. Political Participation Variables

The Voting variable was composed of four items--voting in last two presidential elections, last congressional election, frequency of voting in local elections.

The Campaigning scale was composed of four items: attending political meetings, contributing money to a campaign, working for a candidate, trying to persuade others to vote for a candidate.

The Communal (or Civic) scale was composed of items indicating membership in civic organizations and working for community "improvement."

The Particularized Contact scale was composed of two items indicating direct approach to public officials either in person or through mail.

III. Moral Items

The items in the "Drink" scale were--

I neglect my regular meals when I am drinking.

Liquor has less effect on me than it used to.

I awaken next day not being able to remember some of the things I had done while I was drinking.

I don't nurse my drinks; I toss them down pretty fast.

I stay intoxicated for several days at a time.

Once I start drinking it is difficult for me to stop before I become completely intoxicated.

Without realizing what I am doing, I end up drinking more than I had planned to.

The items in the "Drunk" scale were--

Has an employer ever fired you or threatened to fire you if you did not cut down or quit drinking?

Has your spouse ever left you or threatened to leave you if you didn't do something about your drinking?

Has your spouse ever complained that you spend too much money on alcoholic beverages?

Have you ever been picked up or arrested by the police for intoxication or other charges involving alcoholic beverages?

Has your physician ever told you that drinking was injuring your health?

The "Permissiveness for Men" items were--

I believe that kissing is acceptable for the male before marriage when he is engaged to be married.

I believe that kissing is acceptable for the male before marriage when he is in love.

I believe that kissing is acceptable for the male before marriage when he feels strong affection for his partner.

I believe that kissing is acceptable for the male before marriage even if he does not feel particularly affectionate toward his partner.

I believe that petting is acceptable for the male before marriage when he is engaged to be married.

I believe that petting is acceptable for the male before marriage when he is in love.

I believe that petting is acceptable for the male before marriage when he feels strong affection for his partner.

I believe that petting is acceptable for the male before marriage even if he does not feel particularly affectionate toward his partner.

I believe that full sexual relations are acceptable for the male before marriage when he is engaged to be married.

I believe that full sexual relations are acceptable for the male before marriage when he is in love.

I believe that full sexual relations are acceptable for the male before marriage when he feels strong affection for his partner.

I believe that full sexual relations are acceptable for the male before marriage even if he does not feel particularly affectionate toward his partner.

(The women items were the same with "female" substituted for "male.")

IV. Democratic Processes

The items in the <u>Democratic Process Scale</u> were--

1) If the government makes a decision that most people think is a good one, do you think other people should be allowed to criticize it--always, sometimes, or never?

2) Do you think people should be allowed to circulate petitions to ask the government to act on some issue, always, sometimes, or never?

3) Do you think   people   should be allowed to vote even if they are not well informed about the issues--always, sometimes, or never?